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REPORT OF SPECIAL FACTFINDING
MISSION TO NIGERIA

FEBRUARY 7-20, 1969

BY

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, *Chairman*

HON. J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 143

AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COMMITTEE



MARCH 12, 1969


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81st Congress
1st Session

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HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, Chairman

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., March 12, 1969.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the special factfinding mission to Nigeria/Biafra conducted between February 7 and February 20, 1969.

The findings in this report are those of the mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is filed in the hope that it will prove useful to the Congress in its consideration of legislation.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

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THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We submit the report on our factfinding visit to Nigeria/Biafra, from February 7 to 20, 1969. We appreciate your cooperation in assigning Mr. Melvin O. Benson, staff consultant to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to accompany us on this special mission.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,
Chairman,
J. HERBERT BURKE.

(VII)

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Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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J. HERBERT BURKE.

(vii)

REPORT OF SPECIAL FACTFINDING MISSION TO NIGERIA/BIAFRA

INTRODUCTION

The factfinding mission left Washington on February 7, 1969, having already been extensively briefed on the Nigeria/Biafra situation by C. Robert Moore, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, and other officials from the Department of State.

In London, aside from the American officials, we met and exchanged views with British Foreign Office personnel, the Nigerian High Commissioner, a Biafran representative, and the Ivory Coast Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

In Lagos, Nigeria, the study mission received excellent cooperation from Ambassador Elbert G. Mathews and the country team. We were afforded the opportunity of meeting Red Cross personnel, priests, U.N. officials, and many of the principal Federal Military Government officials, including Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, both before proceeding into Biafra and after our return. Our stay was not confined to Lagos; we were flown around the country in General Gowon's personal jet to inspect Enugu and refugee camps, as well as Red Cross centers in that area, where relief supplies were being distributed. At Calabar we met with the Military Governor and his executive council. While there the study mission viewed bombed out sections of the city and visited more refugee installations. We touched down at Port Harcourt long enough to exchange views with the commanding officer of the 3d Marine Division, Col. Benjamin Adekunle.

For the study mission to visit Biafra it was necessary first to drive for 4 hours to Cotonou, Dahomey, where we conferred with Ambassador Knox and met President Zinsou. From there we accompanied an ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) cargo plane loaded with 10 tons of dried stockfish to land at night at the Uli airstrip. The study mission spent 2 days in Biafra in and around Umuahia where Col. Odumegu Ojukwu welcomed the members, and the various commissioners cooperated in every way in giving information and answering questions. We had time to tour the countryside with Father Doheny and inspected refugee camps and the Mbaise Joint Hospital. We also inspected the bombed marketplace where only about a week earlier 200 persons had reportedly been killed and there had been some 300 casualties. We saw several of the victims in the hospital and talked to Sister Luke who admitted them.

The study mission also visited Kaduna and Kano in the northern area where meetings were held with the State officials, and an audience was granted with Alhaji Ado Bayero, Emir of Kano. The study mission returned to Washington, February 20, 1969.

I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. The study mission believes that the posture of the United States concerning the Federal Military Government of Nigeria is correct in recognizing it as the only legal government of that country.

2. However, we believe that if there is to be any negotiated settlement of the war short of complete subjugation of one side militarily,

there must be concessions and guarantees of security to the Ibos and other tribes by way of some form of federalism. The future is questionable, economic or otherwise, for a completely independent Biafra as it is presently constituted.

3. The Nigerian civil conflict is uniquely an African problem. The Organization of African Unity is attempting to mediate the problem. Under the chairmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, and others, efforts have been made to bring the two competing sides together at the conference table. We believe that any ceasefire arrangement which might be worked out should be under African auspices. Furthermore, the OAU has indicated that it would be opposed to the United Nations taking jurisdiction of the dispute.

4. Since the inception of the fighting in Nigeria, the United States has refused to supply armaments to either side. We commend this action. However, arms have been supplied by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and others. It is our hope that the U.S. Government might conduct informal conversations with these powers looking toward a possible agreement for all countries to suspend arms shipments to the warring factions.

5. The study mission strongly believes that our policy in operating through established international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Joint Church Aid (JCA), is justified and should be continued. We would not want to see the U.S. Government become directly involved either through operating an airlift or having the U.S. Government personnel coordinate the local distribution of food. Our humanitarian concern applies equally to both sides of the battle lines. Channeling aid through ad hoc committees should not be undertaken.

6. We are convinced as a result of our study that it is possible through greatly increased delivery of food supplies to prevent mass starvation in both areas of Nigeria. The food is in the area or available. The problem is to provide the means of delivery and distribution to those in direct need. Not enough information has reached the outside world concerning the relief to civil conflict victims in Nigerian federally controlled territory where literally thousands of people are being competently cared for, rehabilitated, and returned to their homes. The Biafran refusal to permit daylight flights and land corridors is the primary reason that relief and rehabilitation procedures are not today as well developed in the east as they are elsewhere in the country.

7. We see no justification for Biafra's continued refusal to permit daylight operations by the ICRC and JCA mercy missions. We have heard all the arguments and justifications for this posture, but we believe that in the light of the grave necessity such rationalizations are unconvincing. If Biafra does wish to save the lives of those verging on starvation in the area which it controls, then it must recognize the necessity of increased airlifts and the advisability of land corridors. The fear of poisoned food has to be shown as unfounded. If military and political considerations are the basis for the rejection of daylight flights and land corridors then the Biafrans must take responsibility for the consequences.


8. While our immediate objective should be to relieve the suffering, the study mission believes that if the two factions can be brought into agreement for increased food delivery there is a good possibility that these discussions might be a bridge leading toward agreement on a cease-fire followed by negotiations.

9. We can only deplore in the strongest terms the willful bombing of innocent civilian populations by the Federal Military Government forces. As we were witnesses to the tragic results of these bombings, we know that no military objective is achieved. Therefore, if these bombings of civilian centers continue, we must conclude that the motivation is malicious.

10. The study mission saw no intent by the Federal troops to follow a policy of genocide toward the Ibo people, although the Biafrans gave the impression of being genuinely fearful of such a development. The International Observer Team to Nigeria, which is made up of officers from Canada, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the OAU, and a U.N. representative, without exception have made the point that no evidence of genocide, based on detailed investigation, was found. We are not so naive as to believe, however, that the bitterness generated by the war has not resulted in some incidents of retribution nor that it will not be in further evidence during the postwar period.

11. The study mission is pleased to note the appointment of Professor Clarence Ferguson, Jr., former dean of Howard University School of Law and presently a distinguished professor of law at Rutgers University, as the special coordinator on relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian Civil War as we believe that pursuing the various initiatives to find agreement will require full time attention, patience, tact, and perseverance in order to reach agreement on certain humanitarian steps which will allow vastly increased delivery of food to the starving populations on both sides.





IV. PRELUDE TO PRESENT SITUATION

A. BRIEF BACKGROUND

As a British colony, Nigeria was ruled as a unitary state until 1946, when at Nigerian insistence a tri-regional Federal structure was created. Nigeria became independent in 1960 and continued as a Federal state. When the constitution was revised in 1963 a fourth region was added. (The Midwest Region.)

As the largest nation in Africa, Nigeria has a population of approximately 55 million people, according to mid-1968 estimates. There are three main ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani (Moslem) in the north, the Yorubas (Christian and pagan) in the west, and the Ibos (Christian) in the east. However, Nigeria is actually fractured into many groups: it has been estimated that there are more than 250 distinct languages in Nigeria, only 10 of which are spoken by groups of more than 350,000.

The north is the most populated region, with a population estimated at 29.8 million in 1963. At that time the other three regions combined

were estimated to have a population of 25 million. As of the time it proclaimed independence, the former Eastern Region (Biafra) had a population of approximately 13 million.

B. AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN 1960

During more than 5 years of civilian government following independence in 1960, Nigeria showed considerable promise of achieving its potential as a large and rich country with a stable, democratic form of government. However, the latent tribalism of the heterogeneous population, exacerbated by politicians for their own ends and aggravated by corruption among officials, turned even the census attempts in 1962 and 1963 into major political crises. Nigeria was a Federal republic with a parliamentary form of government.

Though the least modernized and economically advanced, the Northern Region, because of its large population, dominated the Federal Assembly. With political parties largely operating upon a regional tribal base, shifting coalitions of parties for the most part failed to prevent northern control of the Federal legislature.

By 1965 discontent was spreading throughout several segments of the country as citizens became more and more alienated from the corrupt political elite. In addition, easterners, as citizens of the most prosperous region, resented the control by northerners. Unrest particularly arose among Ibo (eastern) leadership in the army.

C. FIRST MILITARY COUP, JANUARY 1966

In January 1966 civilian rule was ended by a military coup led predominantly by Ibo officers. The military government under Gen. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi declared that Nigeria would become a unitary rather than Federal state.

The last crisis of the civilian government was the Western Region election on October 11, 1965. The results of this election, believed to be fraudulent, were not accepted by the people of the Western Region. After 3 months of widespread lawlessness and the breakdown of regional government, with the Federal Government unwilling to intervene, the coup took place, on January 15, 1966. The Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, along with the Premiers of the Western (S. L. Akintola) and Northern (Sir Ahmadu Bello) Regions, and most senior military officers were killed. The commanding officer of the army, General Ironsi, survived the attempt. The government of the country was turned over to him by the surviving members of the last civilian cabinet on January 16, 1966.

The Ironsi government attempted to reassert legality and to try to redress the damage that had been done to the national fabric, but the effort was too weak and too late. Ironsi, himself an Ibo, was not strong enough to punish the captured leaders of the coup attempt, who were held in high regard by the people, especially in the east and west. Northern elements inside and outside the military regarded Ironsi's government as an attempt at Ibo dominance and in July 1966 a counter coup deposed Ironsi and his followers.

D. SECOND MILITARY COUP, JULY 1966

This second coup attempt, on July 29, 1966, like the first, in January, did not succeed in its basic aims, but it did destroy the existing government. General Ironsi was killed and so was the military governor, Lt. Col. Francis A. Fajuyi, of the west. Hundreds of easterners in the military were killed in the coup attempt which was, however, mostly confined to Lagos and Ibadan. The capital cities of the north, midwest, and east were not involved. Amid great confusion, Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Yakubu Gowon was selected to succeed Ironsi on August 1, 1966, and he in turn appointed a new military governor in the west. The military governor of the north adhered to this new regime, and eventually so did the midwest military government. Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, however, military governor of the east, refused to recognize Gowon as head of state, citing the attacks against easterners which had marked the coup attempt.

An ad hoc constitutional conference was convened on September 12, 1966, in Lagos at which representatives of all regions were to decide on constitutional measures to reunite the country. However, within a week, large-scale disorders and persecution of easterners resident in the north further divided the country and sent hundreds of thousands of easterners fleeing to their region of origin. Eastern officials have since claimed that as many as 30,000 persons of eastern extraction were slaughtered in the north during this time. The study mission was informed by reliable sources in Kano that the figure of 10,000 might be more accurate. Whatever the figure, many with wounds and with stories of terror and death, alienated the eastern population to a significant degree and gave plausibility to the subsequent rationale for secession.

In January 1967 members of the new ruling group of regional military governors, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), met under the sponsorship of General Ankrah, leader of Ghana's national liberation committee government, at Aburi, Ghana. As a result of these discussions, the SMC concluded that: (1) force would be renounced as a method of arbitrating regional grievances, (2) faith in Nigeria as a national unit should be maintained, and (3) there was a need for increased regional autonomy although the precoup constitution (Federal) was still the best system of government. SMC Decree No. 8 on March 17 implemented the Aburi agreements by giving the regional military governors a veto power in some areas and thus decentralized Federal authority. However, it was too late, for by the end of March, eastern military governor Lt. Col. Odumagu Ojukwu had cut off all Federal revenues accruing in the east. Eastern unrest had been snowballing since May 1966. On May 26, 1967, General Yakubu Gowon declared that Nigeria's federation would be divided into 12 ethnically based states, abrogated Decree No. 8, and declared a state of emergency.

The old Northern Region would be divided into six states and the old Eastern Region would be divided into three. This plan, while claiming to be an attempt to improve the balance of power among the regions, failed to satisfy the eastern Ibos as the six northern states could still be expected to act in unison in the Federal Assembly. In addition the Ibo state would be cut off from the rich oil area and their vital Atlantic outlet, Port Harcourt.

E. BIAFRA SECEDED ON MAY 30, 1967, FROM THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION

April and May 1967 witnessed a series of ploys and counterploys between the Federal authorities and the eastern government. A blockade of the east was established in early April, in reaction to eastern claims to tax revenues collected there on behalf of the National Government. On May 26 the Eastern House of Assembly voted to approve secession if the Ojukwu government should so decree. The Central Government responded the next day by announcing a national emergency, mobilizing the army and navy.

While several other factors must be considered, tribalism ranks among the most important elements in the Nigerian conflict. However, it is not traditional tribalism which has most influenced the present situation, but a new tribal consciousness which is the result of unequal modernization among the various tribal groups. The Ibos, large numbers of whom had migrated to the north because of population pressures in their own region, were certainly the most educated, most prosperous, and most modernized of the three major ethnic groups. Therefore, in proportion to their number in the total population they filled a disproportionate number of the top civil service, administrative, and management posts. This aroused a great deal of jealousy among the northerners who grew to fear Ibo domination. As early as 1953 there were riots in Kaduna and violence against the Ibo population in that northern capital. Thus as a result of their status the Ibos began to assume a rather arrogant attitude toward other groups. The Ibos' greater modernization created among them an attitude of increased tribal consciousness which came to outweigh their earlier national orientation and desire for assimilation. However, the Ibos remained ardent nationalists in the sense that their economic and educational advantages convinced them that they would play a major if not dominant role in Nigeria. Ibos rose to prominence throughout Nigeria because of their greater ability to carry out the tasks of modernizing the country.

The Eastern Government on May 30 declared itself the independent "Republic of Biafra." On July 6 the hostilities began. Advancing from the north, Nigerian troops soon captured the Nsukka and Ogoja areas in the northern portion of the former Eastern Region. An amphibious invasion of Bonny Island, near Port Harcourt, on July 25 sealed off Biafra from normal access to the sea and made the isolation of Biafra a significant factor in the strategy of both sides. The fighting since then has resulted in a steady tightening of the Federal encirclement of the Biafran enclave. A Biafran invasion of the midwest and part of the west in August 1967 had been thrown back by early October. Of the original 30,000 square miles, Biafran forces now hold some 7,000 square miles, accessible only by air.

Since November 1968 there has been a slowdown in offensive operations by both sides. No major towns have been captured, with the Federals and the Biafrans limiting their military operations to small-scale attacks and counterattacks. Federal casualties have decreased considerably during this period. Federal authorities are currently undergoing a manpower buildup and stockpiling ammunition and equipment for an all-out offensive. At the same time press reports contend that French military supplies have been sent to Biafra through Gabon. We had conversations with witnesses who had observed at

first hand one large delivery by air of military supplies from a French source.

V. THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT

As the military side of the war has dragged on longer than anyone originally thought possible, there have been innumerable efforts to mediate the dispute and to find grounds for a compromise settlement. Within the context of the given situation it appears likely that the resolution of the conflict could emanate from three possible forms of settlement: (1) cessation of the conflict as a result of one side's military defeat; (2) mediation by a third force—the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), or the United Nations; or (3) the imposition of a solution by an outside power.

The third possibility, the imposition of a solution by an outside power, perhaps may be dismissed as the least probable and least desirable. As death from starvation in both the remaining Biafran territory and the new federally controlled areas continues the consciences of many Western nations cry out for an immediate end to the war. However, the attempt of any outside power to impose a solution upon Nigeria or Biafra would quickly raise cries of neocolonialism. Western nations also lack the powerful influence they had in the African Continent in the era before and immediately after independence. Even though spurred on by humanitarian impulses, the United States has maintained a policy of nonintervention in the crisis. Great Britain, which has attempted to use its influence upon Nigeria to bring about a negotiated settlement, is also not likely to take forceful unilateral action. Such an effort would be at variance with the policy set for Rhodesia, where Britain has already renounced the idea of the use of force.

Three major attempts to reach a negotiated settlement have failed, and there is an increasing possibility that an end to the civil war will come only through a military solution. Yet, military victory cannot necessarily be said to be the short road to peace. Biafra's original life expectancy was predicted to be only a matter of months. With each ensuing Federal military advance the Biafrans withdrew farther and farther into the Ibo heartland and seemed to be only postponing the inevitable. After 19 months of fighting, however, few now venture to guess how much longer the war will drag on.

Even though Biafran territory has now been reduced from its original 30,000 square miles and 13 million people to approximately 7,000 square miles and 6 million people, Federal military victory is not necessarily imminent. The Biafran forces appear to be fighting at a higher level of effectiveness than before. This is partially a result of the fact that their supply lines are now shorter and also because of the small arms supplies and ammunition which they are reported to have received from France. Furthermore, the back of Ibo resistance continues to remain unbroken as the Biafrans are convinced that they are fighting for their very survival. The fear of genocide is very strong among the Ibos, who claim, as indicated earlier, that 30,000 of their tribesmen were killed in the spring and fall disturbances in 1966. Thus, Ojukwu has contended that Biafran forces will continue their resistance through guerrilla warfare if they suffer conventional military defeat. Meanwhile Federal troops, in spite of their superior military equipment and numbers, have been slowed by problems arising

from lengthening supply lines and the fact that frontline forces are actually very small.

With the military situation for the moment apparently at an impasse, economic factors seem to be a more likely cause of Biafra's possible defeat and capitulation. The Nigerian economy appears to be holding up under the demands of the civil war fairly well as seven-eighths of the Federal territory is said to be "physically untouched" by the civil war. Estimated costs of the war for the Federal Government vary between \$1.8 and \$4.8 million per month. Additional extraordinary costs have also been incurred by the creation of the 12-state structure. Thus, the FMG's greatest need has been revenue and the protection of the balance of payments. Since 1966 the nation's currency reserves have, as a result of foreign arms purchases, dropped from \$210 to \$90.8 million. Nigeria's biggest loss in revenues came when oil production ceased in July 1967. However, an increase in other traditional exports, such as cocoa, and import restrictions have prevented the development of an unfavorable balance of trade. Revenue problems may soon be minimized as the oil refinery at Bonny resumed production in September and Shell-BP operations recommenced early in December.

In view of the tragic circumstances of the starving Biafran people today, it is quite ironic that at the outset of the conflict the Biafran economy, because of its natural resources and sound infrastructure, was regarded as more self-sufficient than that of the Federation. Now the conditions of war and the results of military setbacks have created a situation in which the Biafran economy could be on the brink of collapse.

Federal military actions have had serious economic consequences for Biafra. At the outset of the conflict, the Federal Military Government imposed a naval blockade against the Biafran coast. At first oil tankers were allowed through but soon this loophole was also closed. As a result oil producers, no longer able to export, closed down their operations. Thus, without oil revenues, Biafra's advantage in terms of natural wealth was soon nullified. Advancing Federal troops eventually captured Biafra's main food-producing regions: the Abakaliki area and the coastal rivers territory. Biafra had traditionally relied on beef imported from the Northern Region as a source of protein. Now it was also cut off from its own traditional sources of protein in the form of vegetables grown in the Abakaliki region and fish from the coastal rivers. Massive import of food by ship was impossible because of the naval blockade. Air transport, as relief agencies discovered, was difficult because of (1) interdiction by the Nigerian Air Force which was attempting to prevent arms shipments from reaching Biafra, and (2) the dwindling number of airstrips still under Biafran control. Because of its high population density, the Eastern Region even in normal times was not totally self-sufficient in terms of agricultural resources. Federal military advances now also crowded an increasing flow of refugees into the shrinking Biafran territory; this uprooting of the population only intensified the problems of food supply.

Yet, all of Biafra's food and economic problems have not been imposed by the Nigerians. In the process of mining roads and blowing up bridges to thwart the advance of the Federal forces, the Biafrans contributed to the partial destruction of their own economic infra-

structure. As transport routes were completely disrupted the market economy suffered and one result was seriously inflated food prices. This particularly contributed to dietary deficiencies in urban areas where the inflated price of protein products soon placed them beyond the reach of lower income people. Difficulties with roads and the fact that most of the available trucks reportedly have been commandeered for military uses have additionally hampered food relief efforts. Thus, international relief officials recently reported that Biafra's remaining 6 to 7 million people are all now threatened by starvation. Carbohydrate as well as protein food supplies are almost totally depleted.

Biafra's financial difficulties have been compounded by the need to buy arms on the European market. One source estimates that such purchases had almost completely depleted the Biafran treasury by April of last year. Biafra reportedly then began trying to purchase arms on credit at sometimes six times their market value. Biafra has been able to export only a few goods, primarily rubber, on outward bound supply planes. It would thus appear that Biafra is now highly dependent upon foreign loans and assistance and international relief. How long Biafra can hold out militarily may well be a question of how long it can hold out economically, both in terms of arms and food supplies.

The prospects for negotiated settlement through the mediation of a third force cannot be said to be bright, but intense efforts are being made by the Commonwealth, the OAU, and other interested nations. In recent months both sides have repeatedly expressed their willingness to negotiate, but peace talks have either failed to get underway because of procedural matters or, once begun, have bogged down when both sides have been unable to find ground for compromise. So far official delegations have met in London and Kampala under the sponsorship of the Commonwealth and in Niamey and Addis Ababa under the aegis of the OAU Consultative Committee. At the last meeting in Addis Ababa, the Biafrans outlined their peace terms in a seven-point plan:

1. Recognition of Biafra as an independent sovereign state;
2. Provision for maximum economic cooperation between Nigeria and Biafra;
3. Negotiated settlement of the sharing of assets and liabilities;
4. An immediate cease-fire and suspension of the economic blockade against Biafra and the withdrawal of troops behind prewar boundaries;
5. Policing of the cease-fire by an international peace force composed of troops from Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, Congo (K), Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zambia;
6. Agreement on a plebiscite in the disputed areas inside and outside Biafra in order to allow these people self-determination; and
7. Immediate agreement on transportation of relief supplies.

The Federal Government rejected the Biafran proposals as "totally unrealistic" and "totally unacceptable." A key Nigerian demand is that the Biafrans renounce secession. In an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, August 28, 1968, in London, Federal Information Commissioner Chief Anthony Enahoro outlined the concessions which his government was willing to make:

1. The Biafrans do not have to publicly renounce secession; the Nigerians will accept any action which pro forma has this effect;

2. The Nigerian Government will share its authority with the Biafrans in their own state;

3. If a negotiated settlement is reached, the FMG will not send troops into Biafra but will allow the Ibos to police their own area;

4. Ibos would be accepted into government service irrespective of their past loyalties;

5. The details concerning the disarming of Biafrans would be worked out by a team of military officers from both sides; and

6. Immediate amnesty would be granted the general mass of Biafrans involved in the conflict.

A negotiated settlement is most likely to result from the mediation efforts of the OAU Consultative Committee rather than those of the United Nations or another interested party. Furthermore, as newly independent nations still sensitive to the threat of neocolonialism, Africans tend to support the policy of African solutions for African problems. The OAU meeting at Algiers followed this philosophy and rejected the idea of intervention by the United Nations. Nonetheless, there are certain limitations upon the effectiveness of the OAU Consultative Committee as an arbitrator. In a resolution passed at the Algiers summit meeting, the OAU called on Biafra to renounce secession and to "restore the peace and unity of Nigeria," thus qualifying to a degree its role as an impartial arbiter. Many westerners have expressed their disappointment at the fact that the OAU has not taken a more activist stance toward finding a solution to the crisis or at least to make a more effective attempt to force both sides to cooperate more fully with international relief efforts.

The U.N. has not been directly involved in the Nigerian dispute except in the area of food relief. One reason for noninvolvement, as mentioned above, is that the organization for regional cooperation, the OAU, has indicated that it wishes that the U.N. keep out of mediation efforts. Though many Western nations appear anxious for the U.N. to take some action in Nigeria, it is unlikely that a resolution would go through the General Assembly against African wishes. The African nations make up approximately one-third the membership in the General Assembly. Moreover, many fear that if the Nigerian issue were brought to the U.N., it would be woven into the web of the East-West conflict and thus become a cause for propaganda-filled debate rather than a serious search for effective solutions.

Since the outbreak of the civil war, the Commonwealth has attempted to reconcile the conflict. Several fact-finding missions have been dispatched to Nigeria and it was the efforts of Commonwealth Secretary Arnold Smith which resulted in the first meeting of Nigerian and Biafran representatives in London. This meeting was then followed by the first peace talks in Kampala, Uganda, in May of last year. The Commonwealth has thus also proven itself to be an acceptable arbitrator. However, the effectiveness of the Commonwealth as a mediator is limited by its connection with Great Britain, which has supported the Federal Military Government.

It is also improbable that an interested third nation such as the United States will be able to act as the catalyst to bring about suc-

cessful peace talks which lead to a lasting settlement. The United States is not likely to have any particular power of suasion over the Federal Government which it continues to recognize. Yet, it is also doubtful that either Nigeria or Biafra would totally reject efforts from any quarter which showed the potential for satisfactorily ending the war. At various times Biafran leader Colonel Ojukwu has appealed to the OAU, the U.N., the Commonwealth and more recently the United States to find a means for ending the hostilities. General Gowon does not appear to have rejected any of these sources as arbitrators.

When the grounds for negotiations and settlement are found, it seems that the future of Nigeria could take several forms. Some of the alternative patterns of government which now appear to be potential solutions for Nigeria are: (1) Federation under either the proposed 12-state plan or the old four regions, (2) confederation, (3) a unitary state, (4) Biafran independence, or (5) the final disintegration of Nigeria into separate states.

The acceptance of Gowon's 12-state federation is one of the Federal Government's conditions for settlement. The Biafrans have been unwilling to accept this plan because in their eyes it does not provide the necessary means of guaranteeing the Ibos security or assuring the east-central state of a suitable degree of autonomy. The 12-state structure also offers no assurance that a coalition of the six northern states will not once again allow the northern emirates to control the country. In addition the new state boundaries deprive the Ibo states of access to the sea. So far there also has been no solution developed for the allocation of revenue which would create a balance between "derivation" (and thus provide justice for the more prosperous Ibos) and "need" (and thus continue to provide the needed funds for the development of the north). Moreover, some northerners and westerners also have been opposed to the 12-state system. Thus, there has been some agitation in the west to further divide the western state into a Yoruba and a non-Yoruba state. Once such a process of re-drawing the state boundary lines is begun, it is conceivable that a Nigerian federation could end up with at least 14 or 15 states.

Yet, if the whole plan of a multistate federation is thrown out, the question arises as to whether battered Nigeria will be able to withstand the instability created by another complete administrative reorganization of the nation. This factor would perhaps be one disadvantage of returning to the old system of a federation based on four regions. Moreover, the old four-region organization would very likely have to be amended in some way to include substantial guarantees to satisfy eastern desires for greater autonomy and assure the security of the Ibo people. In view of the long struggles in the past to find a balance of power among the four regions, it does not appear likely that these guarantees could be easily found.

A confederal system could be the pattern of government which would have the most potential for maintaining a united Nigeria. Reportedly this was the plan that Ojukwu favored during the Aburi discussions. At various times Biafra has suggested some type of arrangement where Biafra would be essentially autonomous but would have certain economic agreements with the federation for common services. A guarantee assuring northern access to the sea would very likely also have to be a part of such an agreement. So far

the FMG has rejected such plans on the grounds that Biafra must accept the 12-state structure and remain an integral part of Nigeria.

Nigeria as a unitary state could range anywhere from a totalitarian dictatorship to a total democracy. However, it must be remembered that Nigeria under the British was a unitary state and that a more federal-type rule was introduced at Nigerian insistence in 1946. At the time of independence, a federal system was maintained because of the belief that it provided the necessary expression for Nigeria's strong regionalism. Furthermore, the unitary state declared by General Ironsi, leader of the first military coup in January 1966, was not well received and Nigeria returned to a federal system in September 1966. In addition a unitary state would not appear to have any structural means of allaying the threat of northern dominance in the parliament or Ibo dominance within the bureaucracy.

The successful secession of Biafra and its ensuing independence appears likely only if the federation is militarily defeated or an outside force such as the OAU imposes such a solution upon the Federal Military Government. At present, a Biafran military victory seems improbable, though it is impossible to tell what the effect of further arms aid or the resort to guerrilla warfare might bring. Though Biafra is now recognized by four African states it seems possible that it would have difficulty gaining extensive African recognition. Many independent African states have potential secessionist problems of their own and would not be anxious to appear to sanction such a procedure.

The disintegration of Nigeria into separate, independent states with possible economic cooperation does not seem to be a completely remote possibility. This would be regarded by many as a tragedy, but with the continued prolongation of this bitter struggle the possibility cannot be ruled out. Many of the resulting political units would still be more populous than many of the other nations of Africa. The earlier attempt of the midwest to secede would appear to indicate the existence of certain separatist sentiment in that region. The Yorubas also have a strong ethnic identity; they constitute 90 percent of the 14 million people of the former Western Region. In January 1968 the *Morning Post* (Lagos) reported a secret meeting of the banned Action Group (the west's regionally based political party). At that time there was reportedly a desire for Yoruba civilian rule in place of the military occupation of the west.

With respect to the future of Nigeria, the question also arises as to what political role the military might play. Many maintain that the military stepped into power temporarily to stem the tide of corruption which was eroding the efficiency of the Balewa Government. Thus, they expect Nigeria to follow the pattern charted by other West African states which have military governments and plan to return to civilian rule. On the other hand, some observers believe that a continued period of military rule will be necessary following the settlement of the conflict in order to provide the necessary stability and modernization machinery needed to heal the nation's wounds.

The ultimate question in Nigeria is the distribution of political power and whether a satisfactory division of power can be made within a unified state. The question Nigeria must answer is whether she will continue to exist as a nation. Since accomplishing independence, Nigeria, like so many African nations, has been confronted with

the problem of maintaining and developing a basis for internal stability. Thus, the civil war in Nigeria could well be the most important benchmark on the map of Africa in the remainder of this century. If Nigeria fails to find a common ground for nationhood, her disintegration would severely dash the hopes for future Pan-African unity and further balkanize the African economy. The concept of nationhood in Africa is being challenged in Nigeria; if Nigeria cannot surmount this challenge the map of Africa may be on its way to being amended, perhaps accompanied by the strife of territorial reorganization—an event which certainly would have significant implications for the continent's future stability.

The Federal Government gave the study mission the following list of nine concessions they have made toward settlement, but they claim that the rebels, as they call the Biafrans, have not made any concessions at all.

1. *Participation in Federal Government.*—Ibos from the East Central State will participate in the Federal Government on the same basis as people from other states in the executive, administrative, military, police, judicial, and other spheres. Each of the states is represented by one civilian Commissioner on the Federal Executive Council, and the 12th place, now vacant, will be filled by an Ibo from the East Central State.

2. *Military Governor.*—As in all the other states, a military Governor will be appointed in the East Central State. He will be an Ibo and will be a member of the Supreme Military Council with the same status as the other military Governors.

3. *Reinstatement of civil servants.*—In accordance with its offer of a general and specific amnesty, it will be the policy of the Federal Government to reinstate and reemploy former Federal public servants, both in the Government service and in public corporations, who for one reason or another had to leave their posts in the past 2 years.

4. *Rehabilitation of displaced persons.*—The Federal Government attaches the greatest importance to its plans for the rehabilitation of persons displaced from their stable sources of livelihood as a result of the tragic events of the past 2 years. A National Rehabilitation Commission has already been set up and will cooperate with state governments in carrying out the policy.

5. *Administration of East Central State.*—The military Governor will be assisted by a civilian council, drawn from the people of the state. In addition the law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, and civilian administrators will be Ibos of East Central State origin.

6. *Policing.*—Policing of the East Central State will be by the Nigerian Police Force, whose rank and file are normally recruited locally. In the case of the East Central State it will be guaranteed that both officers and other ranks are drawn from natives of that state.

7. *External observer force.*—To give additional confidence to the population, an external observer force will be stationed in areas at present under rebel control.

8. *Armed Forces.*—The Federal Army will not normally perform policing duties and its presence will only be required if there is a threat to peace or breakdown of law and order. It will therefore be stationed only at a number of strategic points in the East Central State and its presence will not be felt by the ordinary person.

9. *Disarming.*—Since there can be only one army in a united Nigeria, it will be necessary to disband the rebel forces, but the intention of the Federal Government is to reabsorb individual Ibos into the Federal Army, as confidence is reestablished, on the same basis as other ethnic groups.

VI. ARMS SUPPLIES

Four days after the outbreak of hostilities in July 1967, the United States announced that it would not sell or otherwise supply arms to either side. The Soviet Union did not follow our example, and in August 1967, it agreed to sell to the Federal Government military equipment, including advanced-type aircraft, an action which the United States strongly criticized in its August 21 statement. The Soviets continue to sell to the FMG substantial quantities of arms.

Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. has been a traditional arms supplier, but the United Kingdom, as the former colonial administrator, has historically trained and equipped Nigerian forces. It has taken the position that to refuse to continue to sell arms to a Commonwealth member facing an armed secession would amount to a prorebel action. The United Kingdom also maintains that such action would reduce Western influence with the Nigerians, and increase that of the Soviets.

Since September 1968, there has been an influx of foreign arms on the Biafran side. The provision of arms from abroad is believed to have stiffened Biafran resistance and to have prolonged the war. France has officially denied giving military aid to Biafra though press reports continue that French military supplies have been sent to Biafra through Gabon. The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Belgium, and the United States have all placed an embargo on arms sales to either side.

VII. THE NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN RELIEF PROBLEM

On February 22 President Nixon, reiterating the deep concern of the Nation for the terrible human suffering in the Nigerian civil war, announced the appointment by the Secretary of State of Prof. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as Special Coordinator on relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. Mr. Ferguson is charged with assuring that the U.S. contributions to the international relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. He will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to the suffering on both sides of the battle lines. He will work closely with the relief agencies engaged in the international relief effort. A sharp distinction will be drawn between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others.

Since May 1968, the United States has been providing active assistance to the international relief effort mounted by the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations. The ICRC derives its role from the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims and has had the support of both the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria and the Biafran authorities. In addition UNICEF, the World Council of Churches,

Caritas International, the Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, and many other organizations are directly concerned with supplying relief to the needy in both the Biafran and the Nigerian controlled areas.

Dimensions of the relief problem

The civil war in Nigeria has brought about serious food shortages in the former Eastern Region, which proclaimed itself the Republic of Biafra in May 1967, and certain areas in the Midwest State. The best estimates available indicate that by May of this year as many as 4.5 or 5 million people on both sides of the battlelines may be in need of relief. The situation is worst in the area still under Biafran control, which during the course of the war has been reduced to an enclave about one-fourth of its original size. There are no reliable figures on the death rate in Biafra. Reports from relief experts on the scene vary, but it is clear that large numbers have died, particularly children afflicted by malnutrition. However with the delivery of protein foods through the international relief effort, the death rate is substantially lower than it was in the summer of 1968.

Food and medicines are being distributed to the suffering in the Nigerian Government-controlled areas with its cooperation. Relief supplies can only enter Biafran-held territory through or over Federal territory and most of these supplies have been brought in by the night airlifts of the ICRC and Joint Church Aid from Fernando Po, Sao Tome, and from Cotonou, Dahomey. Despite the decline in the mortality rate, it is now feared that local carbohydrate foods are being exhausted. This portends an intensification of the disaster, unless the parties can reach agreement on badly needed daytime airlifts and surface relief corridors.

The relief impasse

Because relief entering Biafra is limited at present to supplies airlifted by night, strenuous efforts have been made to open up additional corridors. Despite proposed safeguards, the Biafrans have consistently opposed the overland relief corridors the Federal Military Government has offered, while proposing a water route which has been unacceptable to the FMG for military reasons. Most observers believe that surface corridors are the only means of conveying adequate supplies to the needy in Biafra. For its part, the Federal Government was initially opposed to the air corridors preferred by the Biafrans because of concern that they would be used to bring in military supplies as well. It subsequently indicated its acquiescence in the ICRC night airlift from Fernando Po. In September 1968 the FMG made a temporary agreement with the ICRC for daylight relief flights into the main Biafran airstrip at Uli but the Biafran authorities refused this agreement. In early November the FMG again told the ICRC that it would agree to daytime relief flights to Uli, Biafra's major operational airstrip, specifying only that no arms flights occur at the same time. The Biafrans have recently expressed agreement in principle to daytime relief flights, but thus far have not indicated willingness to grant facilities at Uli. Instead they have proposed that a new relief airport should be created. Replacement of night flights by daylight flights would significantly increase the inflow of relief supplies.

Allegations of genocide

The Biafrans have raised charges of genocide against the Nigerians. In response, the Federal Government invited the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Poland as well as the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity to form international observer groups at the front to satisfy themselves and to help reassure the Biafrans that Federal forces behave with discipline and restraint. Report of the observer team to Nigeria is included as appendix B (see p. 27).

The initial report of the international observer team noted that "there is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people and the use of the term 'genocide' is in no way justified" and that "the Federal troops in the area are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population and to assist them in reestablishing a normal life." Subsequent reports of this team and those of the representatives of the OAU and the U.N. have continued to support these findings.

U.S. policy

U.S. concern for this human tragedy is deep. Humanitarian, political, and military factors are interwoven in this situation, and it has been the policy of the U.S. Government to avoid politico-military involvement by channeling our support for the international relief effort through the nonpolitical International Committee of the Red Cross and through UNICEF and American relief agencies, which have cooperated with it. The Federal Government of Nigeria has taken the position that all international relief efforts should be coordinated through the ICRC.

In consultation with other governments and with the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United States has explored the possibility of U.N. consideration of the Nigerian crisis. The great majority of member states, including almost all of the African states as noted above, have viewed the crisis as an internal political problem of civil war and secession and have been opposed to formal United Nations consideration. In our search for practical measures to alleviate the suffering and to help bring about a satisfactory resolution of this tragic situation, we are, however, keeping the possibility of United Nations action under continuing review.

The U.S. Government has the deepest sympathy for the suffering victims of the war. We believe that the prevention of wholesale famine is of crucial importance. We continue to back efforts by the OAU and the ICRC to bring about agreement on daytime relief flights and on the opening of land corridors to the needy in Biafra. We have appealed to the parties to subordinate the political issues of the war in the interest of reaching agreement on relief. We have fully supported the Commonwealth Secretariat and the OAU efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement and both publicly and privately backed the December 21 appeal to both sides by the Emperor of Ethiopia for a 7-day truce. We are, of course, not able to impose a solution, but we continue to press for an early negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The relief effort

In the areas under the control of the Federal Government, thousands of tons of food, medicine, and other relief supplies are stockpiled.

Supplies are distributed from Lagos, Enugu, Calabar, Agbor, and Port Harcourt by trucks and Land Rovers, cargo aircraft, helicopters, barges, and coastal ships. Most of the relief supplies for Biafra have been stockpiled on the offshore islands of Fernando Po and Sao Tome for delivery by airlift. Here thousands of tons have been accumulated, and large cargo aircraft have been used for transport. The amounts of relief supplies reaching Biafra have recently averaged 3,000 to 4,000 tons per month. The ICRC estimates that it has been feeding 850,000 in Biafra and 850,000 to 1 million in areas under Federal Government control. Additionally, Joint Church Aid, a group of religious organizations including Caritas and Church World Service, has delivered large quantities of food into Biafra from Sao Tome and estimates that it is distributing food to almost a million persons.

A problem which recently developed for the airlift was the banning on January 6 of ICRC night flights from Fernando Po by the Government of Equatorial Guinea (GEG). We and other governments actively assisted in efforts to iron out this problem. While the matter was under active discussion between the ICRC and the GEG, the Government of Dahomey concluded an agreement with the ICRC initiating relief flights to Biafra from Cotonou. On February 12 the GEG agreed to a renewal of night flights from Fernando Po for 30 days. We hope this agreement may be extended.

The United States has thus far made about 60 percent of the global contribution for relief in Nigeria/Biafra. The U.S. Government has donated a total of \$25 million in cash and surplus food commodities. Of this total \$6.2 million in cash has been provided to the International Red Cross which has used a major part for the chartering of aircraft for the airlift to Biafra. On December 27 the U.S. Government announced that it was making available for the airlift at nominal cost eight C-97G cargo aircraft no longer needed by the U.S. Air Force—four to the ICRC and an additional four to the American voluntary agencies participating in Joint Church Aid. Four aircraft have been delivered to the American agencies. The transfer of the remaining four aircraft to the ICRC is underway. These aircraft are to be used solely for transporting relief supplies.

Surplus food commodities (dried milk, bulgur wheat, and high protein blended food products totaling over 23,000 tons) provided to Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, Church World Service, and the World Food Program are valued at \$17.3 million, including freight costs. The U.S. Government also pays overseas transport costs of the relief supplies donated by accredited American voluntary agencies.

The private voluntary organizations of the United States have made substantial donations of food and other supplies totaling more than \$7.3 million on behalf of the relief effort.

<i>Relief summary</i>	
U.S. Government.....	\$24, 991, 700
Public Law 480 food and transport costs	17, 291, 700
ICRC.....	6, 200, 000
General relief items.....	285, 000
Voluntary agency transport costs.....	1, 215, 000
Total.....	24, 991, 700
U.S. voluntary agencies (for which figures are available).....	7, 268, 062
Grand total.....	32, 259, 762

APPENDIX A

NIGERIA/BIAFRA: A CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1968- FEBRUARY 15, 1969, BASED ON NEWSPAPER REPORTS

1968

November 15

In an interview with foreign newsmen, Biafran leader Col. Ojukwu commented on Biafra's relations with the International Red Cross: "That organization does not believe in Biafra's existence. Consequently, it has not been able to get itself out of diplomatic technicalities imposed by Biafra's diplomatic position."

Col. Ojukwu stated that he felt that when Biafra's existence became more formalized there would be less friction with the Red Cross. (The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss organization which is acting as a coordinator of the relief effort, is frequently referred to in press dispatches as the International Red Cross.)

November 19

The commander of Biafra's mercenary forces, Lt. Col. Rolf Steiner, and four of his chief lieutenants were arrested and flown out of Biafra. They were later reported to be in Libreville, Gabon. Biafran overseas representatives claimed the mercenaries had been forced to leave because they had been caught hi-jacking relief supplies intended for Biafran refugees. Other observers attributed the action to the hostility which had grown up between other Biafran commanders and Col. Steiner and his elite unit. Steiner reported directly to Ojukwu and was said to have had great rapport with the Biafran leader. Steiner commanded the Fourth Commando Division which was regarded as Biafra's best unit.

November 25

Pierre Gaillard, an ICRC director, stated that the International Red Cross needed an additional \$2.2 million by mid-December to pay transport and distribution costs for Biafran relief. The ICRC had stocks of relief supplies or promise of supplies valued at about \$22.8 million; but additional funds were needed to meet distribution costs.

November 26

AID officials estimated that half of the seven million people remaining in Biafra were in danger of starvation. The minimum food supply needed to prevent such massive starvation was estimated at 40,000 tons for the next month alone.

FMG troops fired on tax protesters in Ibadan, the capital of the former Western Region of Nigeria. Protesters were agitating against the recent 5% increase in the taxes levied by the Federal Government. The tax increase is part of the Federal effort to meet the high costs of the civil war.

November 27

Observers at the United Nations in New York believed that by early 1969 all of Biafra's remaining 7 million people would be threatened with starvation. A number of estimates placed the death toll so far at one million, mostly children, and estimate that another one million might die by the end of the year if the relief effort was not stepped up.

Estimates indicate that bare subsistence for the Biafran population would require 2,000 tons of food supplies daily. This minimum figure would require approximately 200 flights daily. The last remaining Biafran airfield at Uli has only a capacity for about 30 flights nightly. According to the *Washington Post* (November 29) ten of these flights usually contain arms shipments from Gabon.

November 29

The Nigerian Federal Government issued a 267-page decree designed to pave the way for greater Nigerian economic nationalism. A key section of the new

decree declares that within a month all branches of foreign businesses must become Nigerian corporations. Observers believe that this provision is the result of Nigerian suspicions that foreign companies are not carrying their full tax load. (*Washington Post*, 29 November 1968.)

November 30

Federal Military Government (FMG) head General Gowon announced that the civil war had set back Nigeria's timetable for a return to civilian rule. The new date for civilian government, according to Gowon, will now have to be established by the Supreme Military Council when the war is over. A Constituent Assembly with Ibo participation will be set up after the war to pave the way for a return to civilian rule. Gowon reiterated that he would return to purely military duties at the end of the war.

December 3

Under Secretary of State Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, in a speech delivered at Brown University, warned that millions of people were threatened with starvation unless the Nigerian civil war is brought to a swift conclusion. Katzenbach berated both sides for being willing to "subordinate the lives of innocents to the political struggle" and to "frustrate relief efforts to make a political point or gain a tactical advantage". He said a solution must provide for Nigerian unity while also giving ample guarantees for Ibo safety.

December 4

The New York Times reported that the Swiss government was conducting an investigation into reports the arms manufactured by the Swiss company Hispano-Suiza, had been sent to France and reexported to Biafra. The Zurich newspaper *Blick* said that the arms were factory rejects which are normally returned and melted down because of their defective performance. (*New York Times*, December 5, 1968.) (The Swiss Government stated later that these reports on Hispano-Suiza were untrue.)

Shell-BP announced that it had resumed oil production in Nigeria. Present output is limited to about 200,000 barrels daily because of damage to pumps and pipelines at the fields and at the Bonny terminal. Observers have projected that if current and potential Shell-BP production is added to the existing production from the offshore production of Gulf in the Mid-West, Nigerian production should soon surpass prewar levels. Gulf fields are presently running at 160,000 barrels per day and this rate is expected to increase to 175,000 b/d in early 1969. (*West Africa*, December 7, 1968, p. 1447.) The Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Mines and Power recently reported that the earnings of the Nigerian government from oil production (rents, royalties, premiums, profits, taxes and other fees) increased by 42% in 1966-67. Over this same period the volume of petroleum exports increased by 51% and there was a 35% increase in the value of sales.

December 5

State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey criticized Biafra for refusing to permit daytime relief flights. At present only 500 tons are reaching Biafra weekly in the face of a need of 4,000 tons daily. Day flights could raise deliveries to at least 1,000 tons weekly.

December 7

It was reported that the Government of Switzerland had opened an inquiry into illegal arms export to Nigeria and five other countries. Two senior executives of one arms firm, Oerlikon-Buhrle, were arrested. The Swiss Attorney-General's office said that this company had sent arms instructors to assist the Nigerian rebels and although this was legal, arms export was not. (*West Africa*, December 7, 1968, p. 1457.)

Dr. Herman Middlekoop, relief expert for the World Council of Churches, (WCC) estimated that by the end of December the Biafran population will need 3,000 tons of relief supplies daily in order to be saved from massive starvation. By the end of January, he said, only a massive relief operation by sea can save the people of Biafra. Other relief spokesmen indicated that the greatest present need is for medicines and funds to charter relief aircraft. A total of 1.2 million Biafrans are being fed at feeding centers, according to the WCC and another 800,000 Biafrans are being aided in refugee camps; 20,000 are receiving hospital care.

The Biafran Rehabilitation Commission announced that it receives a monthly grant of \$2.8 million from the Biafran government for use in treating starvation and malnutrition. (*West Africa*, December 7, 1968, p. 1457.)

West Africa cited a Financial Times report which quoted observers in Gabon who stated that eight planes were involved in the Gabon to Biafra arms flights. The planes are reportedly flown by 18 Rhodesian and South African pilots in addition to a few French crews. There are now three to four flights a night in comparison to the normal operation of 16 a few weeks ago. (*West Africa*, December 7, 1968, p. 1457.) Both Gabon and France have denied the existence of such flights.

December 10

The International Red Cross reported that a Nigerian Air Force plane bombed a Red Cross hospital near Awo-Omama which is near the last remaining Biafran airfield at Uli. Several persons reportedly were killed in this daylight raid.

December 13

The Central Bank's annual report for 1967 indicated that the Nigerian economy had been badly hit by the civil war. Spending on defense and security almost doubled from \$49.56 million in 1966 to \$89.6 million in 1967. Foreign assets at the end of 1967 were \$108.9 million, down \$127.4 million from 1966. The bank's report said that a quadrupled balance of payments deficit was a result of an outflow of capital in the private nonmilitary sector, arms purchases abroad and sterling devaluation which cost the country \$23.2 million. Oil production dropped 23% in 1967 to 116.5 million barrels; however, production had shown an impressive gain in the first seven months of 1967 in comparison with the same period in 1966.

The year 1966-67 was a good one for agriculture. The output of major export commodities was 7.8% higher than in 1965-66; cocoa rose from 175,000 tons to 265,000 tons, groundnuts from 977,000 to 1,026,000 tons and seed cotton from 127,000 to 149,000 tons. Because world groundnut prices declined, receipts from this export were down but cocoa export receipts doubled as cocoa prices rose and Nigeria's total earnings from her biggest export crops increased considerably. (*West Africa*, December 28, 1968, p. 1544.)

December 14

Great Britain was reported to be attempting to set up a Christmas cease-fire in the Nigerian civil war. According to this report, British Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs Lord Shepherd was dispatched to Lagos to try to persuade Gowon to accept a proposal for a cessation in the fighting. It was hoped that Ojukwu would follow in his acceptance of the plan. (*New York Times*, December 15, 1968.)

West Africa reported that Dr. Eke, the Biafran Information Commissioner, stated that Biafra would accept a workable arms embargo on both sides. "We are sure that if there is an effective embargo, we would acquire 50 percent of what the Nigerians have within weeks and would be better armed within months." Eke denied allegations that Biafra had received arms from France or the Ivory Coast. He said that Biafra bought her arms on the black market but had not bought any from Switzerland. (*West Africa*, December 14, 1968, p. 1494.)

December 16

Biafran forces were reported to have launched an offensive against Owerri, which has been under Federal control since mid-September. Foreign journalists reported that the Biafrans had entered the town and that house-to-house combat has ensued.

Britain and the Nigerian Federal Government issued a joint communique in Lagos expressing the FMG's "willingness to accept proposals for an emergency daylight airlift and land routes guaranteed by OAU civilian observers." The communique followed a completion of talks between Lord Shepherd and the Nigerian Government. (Cf. entry for December 14, 1968.)

December 19

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State C. Robert Moore conferred with Auguste R. Lindt, head of ICRC program for Nigeria and Biafra.

December 20

Maj. Gen. Gowon announced that Federal Nigerian forces would observe a special Christmas cease-fire on December 24 and 25. British Labor Party members Lord Brockway and James Griffiths, who were in Lagos on an independent peace mission, stated it was now up to Ojukwu to accept the truce. Brockway commented that the Christmas truce was "* * * the beginning of a break in the

war which may result in a more prolonged cease-fire during which there could be a cooling-off for peace negotiations in a relaxed atmosphere." Reuters also reported that it was rumored in London that Prime Minister Wilson had considered flying to Nigeria to promote cease-fire moves but reconsidered when Biafran rejections of any British mediation efforts and personal attacks on Wilson made it clear such a mission would not succeed. (*Washington Post*, December 21, 1968.)

December 21

Nigerian federal forces observed a 24-hour truce in order to celebrate the Moslem festival of Id-el-Fitr which marks the end of Ramadan. However, Reuters reported from Umuahia that Nigerian planes had bombed the town. It was not known whether Biafra had agreed to go along with the cease-fire. (Most Biafrans are Roman Catholics). Lord Brockway of Britain and Rep. Donald E. Lukens (R-Ohio) both of whom had spoken with Gowon and Ojukwu indicated they felt a cease-fire could be extended.

President Johnson endorsed an appeal made by Emperor Haile Selassie for a week-long Christmas truce in the Nigerian civil war. "We earnestly hope that all nations will join us in urging the parties in this tragic conflict to accept this truce. The Nigerian Government has already issued orders for a two-day cease-fire. It is the fervent desire of all Americans that this action will be reciprocated by the Biafran authorities and that both sides will agree to extend this arrangement to the full period proposed by the Emperor. * * * Only the end of fighting will permit a deeply concerned world to provide the necessary quantities of food and medicine to those in desperate need on both sides of the lines of battle. From this pause we hope that both sides will summon new courage to make peace."

December 23

The International Red Cross announced that Equatorial Guinea had suspended ICRC flights from Fernando Po to Biafra. The last flights to Biafra left the island on December 20 carrying 90 tons of food on nine flights. No reasons for the suspensions were given by the government of Equatorial Guinea. There have been reports that Equatorial Guinea objected to the alleged activities of Biafran refugees on Fernando Po. Red Cross officials also speculated that the ban resulted from a misinterpretation of the FMG announcement that there were to be no flights over its territory during the Christmas cease-fire. (Relief flights resumed after a two-day ban.)

Lt. Col. Ojukwu ordered an eight-day Christmas truce. In addition, Ojukwu promised to provide an airport site for daylight relief flights; any relief organization which did not find present nighttime facilities adequate could then build at this site a landing strip which could be used for daylight flights.

December 24

The FMG announced it would not accept the Biafran proposal for a Christmas-week cease-fire. In a letter addressed to Emperor Haile Selassie, who has proposed a Christmas truce, the FMG declared "Until there is a change of attitude by the secessionist hierarchy, the one-week truce proposed will only create an illusion to the whole world and raise false hopes." (*New York Times*, December 25, 1968.)

December 27

The Christian Science Monitor reported that some 35 people had been killed as a result of disturbances in Western Nigeria within the past month. (Cf. entry for November 26, 1968.) The riots and unrest are believed to stem from opposition to increased tax rates but foreign observers also have said that other causes include political infighting among the Yorubas, discontent with the civil war, and local grievances. (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 27, 1968.) Disturbances occurred in Ibadan, Ishara, Abeokuta, Ede, Oyo, and Ogbia.

The Lagos Daily Times stated later that "it is clear that the people are angry with their government." The Lagos paper suggested one reason for this anger was that the government had failed to carry out promises made during the 1966 coup to punish and remove corrupt officials. All states except Kano have been operating under a heavy deficit since April 1968. In the Benue-Plateau State officials have not been able to collect any head taxes since the state was formed. (*New York Times*, February 9, 1969.)

It was reported that the Canadian Government had officially withdrawn its transport plane from the Biafran relief run. The plane, a Hercules C-130, was ordered to return to Canada because of the stalemate over daylight relief flights. The plane had been grounded November 4. Flights had been made from Fernando Po under the auspices of ICRC by the Canadian plane. (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 27, 1968.)

December 28

The United States announced that it would sell at nominal cost (around \$3,670 each) eight C-97G cargo planes to the international relief organizations operating airlifts into Biafra. The planes will be flown by chartered civilian crews and no U.S. military personnel will be involved in their operation. Four of the planes would be offered to ICRC and four to Joint Church Aid, which includes the Catholic Relief Services, Church World Services, and the American Jewish Committee. State Department press officer Robert McCloskey stated that "The planes are provided with a clear understanding that they are to be used solely for humanitarian purposes in transporting needed food and medical supplies for non-combatants." The planes have a reported capacity of 18-20 tons of cargo.

West Africa cited a Financial Times report that France was reconsidering its Biafran policy. The Financial Times suggested that Paris believed that the possibility of an independent Biafra is now less likely. A similar story published earlier was denied by the French Foreign Ministry. (*West Africa*, December 28, 1968, p. 1530.)

December 30

The Nigerian Federal Government issued a warning to Washington that the U.S. sale of cargo planes to relief agencies serving Biafra could have serious repercussions. Following a meeting between American Ambassador Elbert Mathews and Maj. Gen. Gowon, the FMG statement said that the planes would "encourage the rebels to continue to resist and prolong the war, thinking that the U.S. Government was now prepared to intervene in their favor to balkanize Nigeria." Relief officials have estimated that the eight cargo planes will allow them to increase daily relief supplies by 80-90 tons and thus feed an additional million people. (*Washington Post*, December 31, 1968.)

December 31

In his New Year's eve address, President Charles de Gaulle again voiced France's support for the Biafran cause stating that "valiant Biafra's right of self determination must be recognized." (*Washington Post*, January 1, 1969.)

Federal forces overcame strong Biafran resistance and took the town of Inyi. The Federal Government also announced that it would pull out of the upcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London if any attempt was made to include discussion of the Nigerian civil war in the agenda.

In reply to General Gowon's criticism of U.S. sale of C-97G cargo planes to the international relief agencies serving Biafra, the United States issued a statement which said: "In no way does this relief action reflect, either directly or indirectly, United States Government political support of the rebellion, nor does it portend such support." (*New York Times*, January 1, 1969.)

1969

January 1

In a New Year's eve broadcast, Lt. Col. Ojukwu proposed a limited truce in the civil war in order to allow delivery of massive relief. He also withdrew Biafra's demand that a cease-fire be a pre-condition to peace negotiations. He stated that there was a large area of "great mutual advantage" between Nigeria and Biafra and that talks could include consideration of economic ties and a possible Commonwealth arrangement. (*Washington Post*, January 2, 1969.)

January 3

UNICEF reported that more than 2 million people died from starvation in Biafra in 1968. In Geneva, Red Cross officials said that they were "reaching the limits" of their resources in attempting to deal with the Biafran food crisis. President Samuel Gonard said, "the extent of the drama being enacted (in Nigeria) is such that the necessarily limited resources of the Red Cross are no longer sufficient." (*Washington Post*, January 3, 1969.)

January 4

The FMG declared that it would not object to ICRC daylight flights into Biafra providing that the airstrip receiving them was not used for arms supply during the same period. All planes flying into Biafra at night were taking the risk of being interdicted, according to Federal Information Minister Anthony Enahoro.

January 6

A Biafran bulletin reported that Biafran forces had surrounded Nigerian troops in a section of the town of Owerri and cut the Nigerians' last line of communication with their headquarters 30 miles south of Owerri.

January 9

ICRC distribution of relief supplies to 850,000 Biafrans was halted as a result of a dispute between Equatorial Guinea and the ICRC. Equatorial Guinea refused to allow the Red Cross to fly fuel to the airstrip near Uli, on the grounds that some of the fuel had been used by Biafran military vehicles. The ICRC denied this charge saying that the fuel was used to light the runway and run Red Cross vehicles distributing the supplies. (Cf. entry for December 23, 1968.)

January 10

Biafran military sources reported action on all three main fronts. Federal troops and Biafrans clashed in the Azumini sector south of Umuahia, in the Owerri sector to the west and in the north west near Onitsha.

Federal Commissioner for Finance Chief Awolowo announced in London that the Federal Military Government was planning a four-year development plan which would cost \$420 million for national reconstruction.

January 13

Nigerian Commissioner for Information and Labor Anthony Enahoro stated that Nigeria was not prepared to accept the idea of an unconditional cease-fire. Enahoro said that such a cease-fire would be "stupid" in light of the fact it would "allow the secessionists" to recover from past attacks. He claimed that the Nigerians now have the Biafrans on the run.

January 16

The Government of Equatorial Guinea informed U.N. Secretary-General U Thant that it would allow Santa Isabel airport to be used as a private base for relief supplies to Biafra but it could not be used by the International Red Cross. (Cf. entry for January 9, 1969.)

January 22

Secretary of State William P. Rogers met with the Ambassador of Equatorial Guinea to seek his cooperation in reopening negotiations between ICRC and his government over the use of the island of Fernando Po as a base for Biafran relief flights.

January 24

President Nixon ordered a full-scale review of existing U.S. aid to Nigerian war victims and recommendations on what could be done to "enlarge and expedite it."

January 27

Federal Ministry of Information sources reported that the Nigerian Army had barred all newsmen from the front. No more clearances are to be issued to newsmen for the area around Biafra.

January 30

Three Ibo tribesmen were executed publicly by a Nigerian army firing squad in Enugu for attempting to assassinate Col. Mohammed Shuwa, the commander of the army's first division.

January 31

The first ICRC flight from Cotonou, Dahomey returned from Biafra without unloading its cargo. The plane reportedly was turned back because the pilot had not given the necessary code word to identify himself and the airport lights had not been turned on.

On February 1, Dr. Emile Zinsou, President of Dahomey, made a statement in which he indicated that Dahomey's decision to allow the ICRC to use the Cotonou airport did not imply tacit recognition of Biafra nor was it an indication that Dahomey was taking sides in the Civil War. On February 3, Dr. Auguste Lindt, ICRC Commissioner for West Africa, stated that even if the Red Cross flights from Fernando Po were resumed the flights from Cotonou would continue.

Reuters reported that Nigerian officials had stated that Port Harcourt was once again open to civilian traffic. The port had been closed since its capture in May 1968 by Federal forces.

Meeting at Kinshasa, the 14-nation African-Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) decided to send two-man conciliation teams to Nigeria and Biafra.

February 2

A four-man French parliamentary delegation stated, after completing a visit to Nigeria, that they had found no evidence of genocide by Federal troops against the Ibos.

February 4

Biafra launched a food production campaign in which every family was urged to engage in small-scale farming. All available land is to be used without regard for land ownership. Biafra's most fertile land is now occupied by Federal forces.

Col. Ojukwu announced that the government is setting up a land army of young men, women, and children whose duty will be to assist communities and individuals in massive food production. Speaking before the Biafran Consultative Assembly on February 10, Col. Ojukwu stated that the land army program had been launched because "the war against scarcity of food ranks equal with our war against the enemy." He also described an emergency medical service which organized a series of small clinics in the bush to replace hospitals which have been destroyed or captured by Federal forces. (*New York Times*, February 12, 1969.)

February 7

The crowded market and the maternity clinic of Umuohiagu, a Biafran village, were bombed by a Nigerian jet fighter-bomber. Local officials estimated that 200-300 people were killed while the Biafran Information Ministry stated that the casualties were second only to the bombing of Otuocha last year where it was estimated 500 persons died. Umuohiagu is 15 miles from Owerri and about seven miles from the nearest front. (*New York Times*, February 8, 1969.)

February 10

Addressing the Biafran Consultative Assembly for the first time since September, Col. Ojukwu warned that if "the latest British-sponsored 'final offensive' against our people is on the move all British interests in Biafra both now and in the future automatically become forfeit." The Biafran leader also stressed the determination of Biafra not to capitulate: "We are many times stronger than we were (in September). Our regular forces have been increased, improved and better armed. The initiative has passed into our own hands. The young will fight; children unborn will fight, and their children will fight until they leave us alone Since to give up for us is a fate worse than death, there remain only two alternatives. Either Nigeria and her collaborators call off their mad ambition to deny 14 million people their rights and their lives, or we both prepare for a war of attrition." (*New York Times*, February 12, 1969.)

February 12

Total U.S. relief aid to date to help victims on both sides of the Nigerian/Biafran civil war has been approximately \$31.404 million. Private American contributions have totaled \$6.412 million while the U.S. Government has donated \$24.992 million in relief assistance. Aid officials estimate that about half of the 6 to 7.5 million remaining in Biafra and about 1.5 million in the federally occupied territory are in need of relief.

February 13

Biafran leader Col. Ojukwu stated at a news conference that he would accept the United States as a mediator in the Nigerian civil war. However, he reportedly made one condition, that the Nixon administration act soon before it "becomes identified" with the Johnson administration. (*Washington Post*, February 13, 1969.)

February 15

The U.N. Mission of Equatorial Guinea reported that its government was conducting negotiations with the International Red Cross on the resumption of relief flights to Biafra from Santa Isabel.

Former Nigerian President Nandi Azikiwe proposed a new peace plan to end the Nigerian war. The first step would be for the United States to request that the U.N. Security Council set up a 19-man committee, which would include its permanent members and the supporters of both Nigeria and Biafra. Second, this committee would draw up an armistice plan which would divide Nigeria into three

zones—the area under Biafran control, territory captured from Biafra, and Federal Nigeria. Third, after an arms embargo and a U.N. observed truce, a plebiscite would be held in each of the three zones; if the people voted for Nigeria to remain united then Nigeria and Biafra would sign a Federal agreement; if Biafra voted for independence then it would become a state. (*Washington Star*, February 15, 1969.)

(The Federal Military Government of Nigeria rejected the Azikiwe plan. The FMG claimed that the Azikiwe plan was quite similar to proposals presented by Biafra at Addis Ababa and at earlier meetings; Biafran officials declined comment.)

APPENDIX B

REPORT OF THE OBSERVER TEAM TO NIGERIA

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In September 1968 the Federal Military Government of Nigeria decided to invite the Governments of Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity each to send a representative to Nigeria to observe the Federal Army's operations in the area affected by the civil warfare between the forces of the Federal Government and those seeking to bring about the secession from Nigeria of the area they described as "Biafra". The purpose of the invitation was to permit independent and experienced observers to form and make known their own opinion on the conduct of the war, having regard to reports emanating from the secessionists which suggested that Federal troops sought to massacre the civilian Ibo population and that the Federal Government was intent on the genocide of the Ibo people. The invitation was accepted by all to whom it was addressed and the observers have produced a number of reports on what they have seen. The representatives of the four Governments named have addressed their reports both to the Federal Government of Nigeria and to their own Governments and Her Majesty's Government have decided, in view of the deep concern in the United Kingdom over the suffering in Nigeria occasioned by the war, to publish those reports which are addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom. The reports by the representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the Organisation of African Unity who report separately have been made public by the United Nations and by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

LAGOS, NIGERIA,
25 November, 1968.

OBSERVER TEAM TO NIGERIA

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD 24 SEPTEMBER TO 23 NOVEMBER 1968

Introduction

1. On 6 September, 1968, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) invited a group of Observers to visit Nigeria for a period of two months in the first instance to inspect Federal military operations in the war affected areas of the country.

2. The invitation was issued because of allegations that the Government was conducting a planned programme of systematic and wanton destruction of the Ibo people and their property. Canada, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Secretary-General of the United Nations were each invited to nominate an Observer. By 19 September, 1968, the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. N. G. Gussing Major-General Arthur Raab of Sweden Major-General Henry Alexander of the United Kingdom and Major-General William A. Milroy of Canada were in Lagos. On 23 September, 1968, they met with the Head of State and on 24 September they started their first visit. Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland joined the group on 1 October, 1968. The OAU representatives, Major-General Sliman Hoffman of Algeria and Brigadier-General Negga Teghregu of Ethiopia, joined on 3 and 5 October, 1968, respectively. Major-General Alexander was replaced on 30 October, 1968, by Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson. Each Observer was accompanied by a Deputy or Assistant (see list at Annex A).

3. Because the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the representatives of the OAU report separately, the term "Observer Team" has been applied in practice only to the representatives of the four countries involved.

4. During the period 24 September to 6 November, 1968, the team issued three interim and three special reports. Each of these covered a specific visit. As the Observers' stay in Nigeria has been extended by the FMG until 14 December, 1968, and may be extended further, it is considered appropriate to summarise all the team's activities for the past two months.

Aim

5. The aim of this report is to describe the activities and findings of the Observer Team to Nigeria consisting of the representatives of Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, for the period 24 September to 23 November, 1968.

Method of operating

6. The procedures under which the team has been operating are a combination of the terms of reference given in the FMG letter of invitation and agreements made at the conference with the Head of State and his advisers. These procedures are as follows:

(a) The Observers will visit all war-affected areas and newly-liberated areas on the Federal controlled side to witness the conduct of Federal troops—re charges of genocide, etc.

(b) Such visits may be undertaken at their own instance or at the instance of the FMG.

(c) The FMG will take all necessary precautions to guarantee the personal safety of the Observers.

(d) The team will be based in Lagos. The FMG will provide transport, board and accommodation.

(e) The Observers representing the four countries will address their reports to the FMG and the Governments of the countries concerned. The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the other hand will address his to the Secretary-General, who will in turn release it to the FMG and the public. The representatives of the OAU will report in a like manner.

(The result of this decision was that the Observers became three separate groups in so far as reports and, to some degree, operations were concerned. For this reason the terms "Observers and Observer Team" have been used hereafter to include only the Observers representing Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.)

(f) In so far as the "team" is concerned:

(1) An inspection will not normally be carried out by fewer than two Observers representing different countries though one may be an Assistant Observer.

(2) Each report will normally be signed by the four Observers. An Observer can, if he so desires, append a minority report, or in special cases, he may submit a separate report.

(3) Reports will normally be made available to the Press and public by the team 24 hours after they have been handed to the FMG and to representatives in Lagos of the countries concerned.

(4) Representatives of the Press may accompany the Observers on their visits.

The members of the team agreed that each Observer would act as Chairman of the team for a week in turn.

7. In deciding on a method of operation the team made use of statements made by the FMG concerning its policies towards the treatment of the Ibos and their property; specifically the FMG claimed that:

(a) The treatment of secessionist troops and civilians by Federal troops was in accord with the instructions contained in the directive "Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces", the contents of which were to be read and explained to every member of the Armed Forces.

(b) The Army provides food and medical care for displaced persons until the civilian administration and the volunteer agencies can take over the responsibility.

(c) Abandoned Ibo property in non-Ibo parts of the country is being maintained awaiting their return.

(d) Ibos are returning to the northern part of the country.

(e) Ibos are serving in the Federal Government and Forces.

(f) The war is being waged in a manner to cause a minimum of loss of life and damage in so far as is possible.

8. For its definition of genocide the team used the one given in the United Nations pamphlet "The Crime of Genocide" (sixth revised edition, dated October

1965) which states "genocide is the committing of certain acts with intent to destroy—wholly or in part—a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such".

Area involved

9. The term "war-affected areas" was taken by the team to mean the area of the former "Eastern Region" and any other areas inhabited largely by Ibos, including the eastern half of the Mid-Western State. This area involved about one-tenth of Nigeria. The area actually held by the secessionists in September 1968 when the team started its work measures approximately 70 miles across by 50 miles deep.

10. Notwithstanding the above definition, the team considered itself entitled to visit any other part of Nigeria to check on prisoners of war or on statements involving the treatment of Ibos and their property made by the FMG.

11. For the purpose of arranging visits the area was broken down into nine sectors as follows:

(a) In the area of the First Division:

- (1) Enugu-Awka-Okigwi Sector
- (2) Nsukka Sector
- (3) Abakaliki-Afikpo Sector
- (4) Agoja-Ikom Sector

(b) In the area of the Second Division:

- (1) Asaba-Onitsha Sector
- (2) Benin City-Kwale-Warri Sector

(c) In the area of the Third Marine Commando Division:

- (1) Port Harcourt-Aba-Owerri Sector
- (2) Calabar-Uyo-Itu-Ikot Ekpene Sector

(d) The part of Nigeria outside of the Divisional Areas.

Visits

12. The Observers first visited each of the three Divisional Areas in turn as a group. In each Divisional Area the Observers split into two groups, each visiting a different sector of the area. An investigation of the incident at Okigwi also took place during this phase.

13. When this phase had been completed, the Observers split into small groups, visiting sectors in all Divisional areas and made two visits outside the operational zone. A list of all visits, giving dates and locations visited is at Annex B.

14. During the tours of Divisional areas the team visited Divisional, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters and Company positions, prisoners of war, displaced persons camps, Red Cross medical and food distribution centres, food stores, villages, and markets which had been re-established as inhabitants emerged from the bush.

15. The Observers spoke to officers, NCO's and men of the Federal Forces, to Military Governors and civil administrators, to teachers, priests and missionaries, to Red Cross personnel and to the indigenous inhabitants of all walks of life.

16. During all investigations and visits the team had unrestricted freedom of movement, made up its own programmes and could and did make last minute changes to these plans.

17. On all of its visits the team was accompanied by members of the Press, Nigerian and foreign.

Reports

18. To date the team has issued three interim reports, one on each Divisional area, two reports on special incidents and one report on a visit to prisoners of war in the Lagos area. The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued four reports during the period. The representatives of the OAU issued three reports during the period. A list of all these reports is given in Annex C.

Situation in respect of civilians

19. The Observers found that the "war affected areas" as defined contained several peoples. The Ibos inhabited the area within the rough circle of Nsukka, Abakaliki, Afikpo, Aba, Oguta, Kwale and Agbor. Most of the people in the Rivers State are Ijaws while those in the South-Eastern State are Efiks, Ibibios, Ekois and minority tribes.

20. The pattern appears to be that as the fighting approached an area the inhabitants either retreated with the dissidents, voluntarily or otherwise, or they fled into the bush. Very few stayed in the fighting zone.

21. Discussions with village leaders and other displaced persons emphasize that while all the people were frightened by the fighting, the Ibos in particular were also frightened by the secessionist claims that if they fell into the hands of the Federal troops they would be killed. This fear of being killed by the Federal troops is real and as a result the Ibos in the bush in Federal occupied areas are very slow to come out of hiding. They usually do so only after one of their numbers has made contact with the Federal troops and is able to re-assure the others they will not be harmed. When they do decide to come out they sometimes appear suddenly and in hundreds. Once they are in camps or back in their villages most of them do not display any fear of the Federal troops.

22. The actual situation of the civilian population varies between the areas affected:

(a) In the Rivers and South-Eastern States life is returning to normal except in the areas near the front. Displaced persons who retreated with the secessionists are still returning in considerable numbers. The relationship between these people and the Federal troops appears to be good. On the other hand investigations indicate that the relationship between these people and the Ibos is strained.

(b) In the Ibo-speaking area in the Mid-Western State life appears to have returned to normal except in the areas on the west bank of the Niger River. These areas are on occasion infiltrated by the secessionists and the inhabitants of some villages are kept in camps for security reasons.

(c) In the Ibo provinces of Abakaliki and Nsukka, which have been held by Federal troops for a relatively long time and, where the fighting was not very heavy, the inhabitants appear to have returned in large numbers. The civil administration is taking over. There appears to be plenty of staple food in these areas.

(d) In the areas more recently taken by the Federal troops both north (Awka, Awgu, Okigwi, Afikpo) and south (Owerri, Aba, Itu) of the secessionist-held area most of the inhabitants are still hiding or with the secessionists. The Army, civil administration, the National Committee for Rehabilitation and the volunteer agencies are providing food and medical care on an emergency basis and endeavouring to establish the confidence that will bring people out of hiding.

(e) The cities and large towns are still quite empty although their populations are increasing slowly. It is assumed that their former inhabitants are either with the secessionists or in their home villages.

23. Displaced persons found in camps appear to belong to one or other of the following categories:

(a) Non-Ibo people who were removed compulsorily from their homes when the secessionists were withdrawing under Federal military pressure.

(b) Ibos and non-Ibos who were frightened into hiding by the secessionist claims that they would be killed by the advancing Federal Forces.

(c) Ibos normally living in non-Ibo areas which have been retaken. These prefer to remain in camps while the war is still on.

(d) Ibos living near the present front line who have been detained because of their potential alliance with the secessionists.

(e) Ibos in areas in which infiltration is taking place. These have been placed in camps for security reasons.

24. It should be noted that there are many Ibos now living in war affected areas held by Federal Forces (see paragraph 22). Some of these Ibos state that among their numbers are some who fear reverses to the Federal Force, as they might result in them being harmed by the Federal troops or being treated as collaborators by the secessionists.

25. The team noted that it encountered few well-educated Ibos, the majority of whom are assumed to be in the secessionist-held territory.

26. The team saw many cases of malnutrition, most of them caused by a lack of protein, among the displaced persons in the camps and at the Red Cross clinics. The condition of the refugees seemed to depend on how long they had been in hiding. Those in the worst condition were the elderly people and women and children who had been in the bush for 10 months or more. The most common complaints mentioned by doctors were malnutrition, anaemia, and dysentery. At present the greatest concentration of displaced persons needing help appears to be in the Uyo-Ikot Ekpene area. Here the Red Cross estimates that, in mid-November, up to 350,000 were receiving a weekly ration sufficient to provide a meal every other day.

27. It is the Observers' belief that a large number of people are still hiding in the bush in areas held by the Federal troops. If these people should come out of hiding all at once their numbers will present a tremendous requirement for food and medical care.

Rehabilitation of the civilian population

28. The programme for rehabilitating the civilian population of areas occupied by the Federal Forces is as follows:

- (a) Immediate provision of food, medical care and shelter.
- (b) Return of displaced persons to their villages, where possible, with food and medical care continuing to be provided on an emergency basis.
- (c) As the people get settled into their homes and are able to do something for themselves, the withdrawal of emergency assistance.
- (d) Return of normal peacetime conditions.

29. The Observers found that the provision of shelter is not normally a problem as there are many buildings available in most parts of the country.

30. In many of the areas local foodstuffs are still available, the critical shortages being in protein, vitamins and salt. It should, however, be noted that the problem of malnutrition caused by a shortage of protein existed in the area even in peacetime.

31. The Observers noted that when an area is first occupied the Army provides the displaced persons with food, and, as far as possible, with medical care. This responsibility is then taken over wholly or in part by the National Committee for Rehabilitation and the volunteer agencies, mainly the Red Cross, assisted in many cases by soldiers.

32. When the Observers first arrived this arrangement was not in operation in all areas and where it was operating the civil administration and volunteer agencies suffered from a lack of personnel, medical supplies and transport. Since then a considerable improvement has been noticed. The Nigerian Red Cross has moved into the Port Harcourt Sector. More relief personnel and transport have been provided. The co-operation in the field between the Army and the volunteer agencies seems to be good. However, shortages of medical personnel, drugs and transport still exist and in some areas such as Uyo relief supplies were still inadequate in mid-November because of transportation difficulties.

33. The effectiveness of the emergency care being given impressed the team very much. The death rate drops rapidly once the displaced persons come under the care of those involved in providing emergency aid. The majority of persons suffering from malnutrition are returning to good health.

34. The next stage, in which the civil administration takes over from the Army and the volunteer agencies, is underway in those areas most distant from the front. The Observers consider that if more areas were put under civilian control the return of the population might be expedited. However, where the civil administration is taking over its effectiveness is hampered by lack of qualified officials and of transport.

35. Part of the problem of acquiring adequate staff in the East Central State appears to be an understandable desire to fill positions with Ibos from the State. The lack of educated Ibos in Federal held territory makes this a difficult goal to achieve, at least until the war is ended.

36. A comment on the problems which are likely to arise when the war ends would appear appropriate. It has already been pointed out that a sudden increase in the number of refugees could overwhelm the facilities at present available to handle them. If the war ends as a result of a negotiated peace, it may be possible to handle the situation by utilising the resources of the Armed Forces. If, however, the war ends through military action the Armed Forces will probably be required for purely military tasks and the civil administration and the volunteer agencies may have to handle the problem without their assistance. Whichever situation occurs, quick action will be required to ensure the survival of a maximum number of the people needing help.

Situation with respect to property

37. In any war, civil or otherwise, damage and destruction of property is inevitable and this war is no exception. The damage is the result of deliberate destruction of public facilities and installations, damage from the fighting, the inevitable looting as well as deterioration caused by neglect and weather.

38. Most of the damage to public facilities appears to have been done by the secessionist troops in an effort to delay or inconvenience the advancing Federal troops. In most of the Federal held portions of the war affected areas roads have been cratered and bridges destroyed on both roads and railways. Electric generat-

ing plants and water supply systems have been put out of action. Communication systems have been seriously damaged.

39. In so far as buildings are concerned most of the damage has taken place in the areas affected by the fighting. Villages visited that were not in the areas affected by the fighting were undamaged. While the percentage of buildings totally destroyed is small, a large number in the towns and cities in the area east of the Niger have suffered damage. In addition, in some areas it is evident that materials including corrugated iron sheets have been taken from buildings to construct the small section posts along the roads. This is understandable in view of the condition which prevails during the rainy season.

40. Most of the damage to buildings appears to have been caused by small arms or artillery fire. The team has not found that the Federal Forces are following a policy of wantonly destroying Ibo property.

41. The team has noted that a number of buildings that have been left empty are partially exposed to the elements because of missing doors, broken windows, etc. These include public buildings.

42. Many of the buildings in the area are completely unguarded and as a result there has been considerable looting. From the evidence the Observers consider that this looting has been carried out by civilians and the military of both sides.

43. Another category of Ibo property is that in regions of Nigeria outside the war affected zones which was abandoned by Ibo families moving back to the East Central State. The handling of this property is dealt with in the next section.

Care and restoration of property

44. The repair of damage to property caused by the war or associated factors is considered under three categories:

- (a) Restoration of public services and facilities.
- (b) Care of Ibo property outside the war affected areas.
- (c) Repair of property in the war affected areas.

45. The Army carries out emergency repairs to those public facilities it requires, in particular the roads, where it has constructed temporary bridges, by-passes, etc. The repair of public services, such as light and water, is handled by the civil administration, which is just now coming to grips with the problem. Progress is slow and is hindered by a lack of resources. There is a great deal to be done.

46. The care of Ibo property outside the war affected areas seems to be well in hand. In the Mid-Western State a committee has been set up to take care of all abandoned property. It has compiled a detailed register of all such property indicating its value and the extent of the damage, supported in most cases by a photograph of the property. Caretakers are appointed and rents, less expenditures such as repairs and taxes, are credited to the absentee owners. Similarly, movable property is stored by the police and a register maintained.

47. In the north there is a similar arrangement although the situation differs slightly in that the Ibos carried their movable property away with them. They also transferred their bank balances to banks within the secessionist held area. The team inspected records and property at Kano, Kaduna and Zaria and interviewed a cross-section of owners of abandoned houses who had returned to Kano, claimed their property and received the rents which had been collected on their behalf. Of approximately 5,000 abandoned properties in Kano, 54 had been reclaimed, and a similar situation prevailed in the other northern towns visited.

48. Little appears to have been done as yet to repair damaged buildings in the war affected areas. The State Administrator for the East Central State has a plan for attacking the problem. In the meantime the Observers consider an immediate problem is that of protecting buildings and their contents from looting and the weather. Some efforts have been made to protect movable property: in Enugu, for example, the civil administration has collected some such items for safe keeping.

Conduct of the Federal troops

49. The Observers found that the Federal troops were for the most part aware of the instructions in "The Code of Conduct" and were following these instructions. They neither saw nor heard any evidence that the Federal Forces were committing acts with intent to destroy the Ibo people. The Observers did see considerable evidence that the troops were assisting the civilian population, in particular by feeding them and providing medical assistance until the civil administration and volunteer agencies could take over. In some areas the Army still operates the camps for displaced persons, the actual standard of care varying from very good to fair.

50. The troops seen by the Observers appeared to be under the control of their officers. The Observers noted that most of the officers are young and that the number of NCOs with pre-war experience is small in comparison with the size of the Army.

51. While the majority of soldiers have displayed a correct, tolerant and helpful attitude towards the civilian population the Observers did receive complaints of abuse at the hands of soldiers. These incidents appeared to be most frequent at road blocks in the afternoon and they may be attributable to the seemingly large supplies of beer available to the troops.

52. An initial meeting was held with the Chief of the Air Force to discuss the conduct of air operations. A copy of the Nigerian Air Force Code of Operations, dated 14 January, 1968, was obtained. It states that non-military targets will not be bombed and that any gathering of civilian population will be avoided. Arrangements were made to obtain mission reports as required. Further investigation on Air Force activities will have to await advances by Federal Forces.

53. The Air Force is continuing to drop Safe Conduct Passes. The team encountered some displaced persons who had made use of these passes.

Prisoners of war

54. Few prisoners of war were found in the operational areas, for two reasons. First, any prisoners taken were evacuated with a minimum of delay; and, secondly, because many secessionist soldiers, when capture was imminent, discarded their uniforms and passed themselves off as villagers and were often treated as displaced persons.

55. The Observers visited prisoners of war at several locations. They reported that at Port Harcourt and at Kiri-Kiri and Ikoyi prisons in Lagos there was considerable room for improvement. These improvements should include providing the following conditions laid down in the Geneva Convention:

- (a) Prisoners of war must have freedom of movement within their camp.
- (b) Officers must be separate from other ranks.
- (c) Prisoners of war have the right to communicate by letter with their families, subject always to censorship.
- (d) Red Cross must have constant access.
- (e) Reasonable amenities, such as exercise, games and reading material, must be available.
- (f) Medical attention must be constant.

56. The situation at the prisoners-of-war camp at Makurdi, which a team visited on 17 November, 1968, is similar to those at the other camps that have already been reported upon.

57. The Observers consider that a form of screening tribunal would be of value in reducing the numbers of prisoners of war and therefore the strain on the system and in promoting good will.

58. Some action has been taken by the Federal Army and more is planned. The Observers will be checking on the actions taken. The Red Cross should, of course, have the continuing responsibility for observing and reporting on prisoners-of-war conditions.

Special allegations

59. When the Observer Team was formed it was anticipated that a considerable part of its function would be to investigate international allegations concerning the behaviour of Federal troops. In point of fact, there have been only two that were sufficiently substantiated to merit investigation by the Observers.

60. The first concerned the incident at Okigwi on 30 September, 1968, in which two members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and two members of the World Council of Churches were killed. This was investigated at the request of FMG. The report was critical of the behaviour of some Federal soldiers and of the ICRC procedure in the event of their personnel and buildings becoming involved in the fighting. The Commander on the spot also ordered his own enquiry into the incident. The Observers were informed that its findings will be issued by the FMG.

61. The second allegation concerned Press reports in Canada that approximately 500 civilians had been shot by Federal troops when they entered the village of Urua Inyang on 4 October, 1968. After interviewing local elders and other inhabitants and a clergyman who was in the area at the time, and inspecting the market place involved, the team was unanimous in its opinion that no such massacre took place.

Volunteer agencies

62. There is little question that when the Observers arrived there were officers and men of the Federal Army who classed the members of the volunteer agencies working with the secessionists, particularly those belonging to the Red Cross, as mercenaries. This could be attributed partly to the well-publicised activities of these agencies in flying relief supplies to the secessionists while their activities in Federal-held areas seemed less extensive and received less recognition.

63. During the past two months the activities of the volunteer agencies in the Federal-held areas have expanded considerably. The Nigerian Red Cross and the ICRC have moved into Federal-held areas not previously covered. There has been an increase in the number of personnel deployed in the operational areas and in the transport available for moving supplies. The co-operation in the field between the Federal troops, the civil administration and the volunteer agencies is reported as being good. In summary, the situation is improving although shortages still exist. It is to be hoped that this improvement has convinced those who questioned the activities of the volunteer agencies that their work is essential to the survival of Nigerians on both sides of the battle line.

Summary

64. During the period 24 September to 23 November the Observers representing Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom visited all the Federal-held sectors of those parts of Nigeria that can be classed as "war affected areas" as well as some parts of Northern Nigeria. They were able to go where they wanted. They were free to approach and speak to a wide variety of people. Most areas were visited more than once. The Observers were accompanied on most visits by representatives of the Nigerian and foreign press.

65. The Observers found that in the areas visited during the period under report the FMG was following its declared policies for protecting Ibo people and Ibo property in Federal-held areas. Specific findings for the period under report are:

(a) *Genocide*. The United Nations definition of genocide was used. It is the committing of certain acts with intent to destroy—wholly or in part—a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The Observers neither saw nor heard evidence that the Federal Army is following such a policy towards the Ibo people. There is evidence that the Federal Military Government and the Nigerian Army have a programme to assist all persons affected by the war, including Ibos. Based on what the Observers saw and heard they are of the opinion that the use of the term "genocide" is unwarranted.

(b) *Attitude of civilians*. The Ibo inhabitants of the war-affected areas have a real fear that they will be killed if they fall into the hands of the Federal troops. The evidence is that this fear in most cases is dispelled by the treatment they receive when they do encounter Federal troops. The people from the Rivers and South-Eastern States who also live in the areas affected do not seem to suffer from this particular fear.

(c) *Care of displaced persons*. The combined efforts of the Army, the civil administration and the volunteer agencies, which are increasing steadily, appear adequate in most but not all areas to cope with present demands for emergency care of displaced persons. The emergency care being given is saving the lives of a large number of people and all those concerned are to be commended for their work.

(d) *Rehabilitation of population*. The part of the war-affected areas west of the Niger River and those on the periphery of the area east of the Niger have returned, or are returning, to near normal conditions with the civil administration in charge or in the progress of assuming responsibility. The takeover by the civil administration is slow, being hampered by a lack of qualified officials and transport.

(e) *Prisoners of war*. While there are not a great number of prisoners of war, the Observers reported that the conditions under which they lived were not of an adequate standard. It is understood that action is being taken to correct the situation.

(f) *Care and repair of property*. The FMG and civil administration have programmes for caring for and repairing damaged property, both public and private. Progress is being made in implementing these plans, but it is slow and there is much to be done. Help from outside the war-affected areas will be required to ensure a rapid return to normal conditions. Measures have been taken to care for Ibo property outside the war-affected areas.

(g) *Conduct of Federal troops.* The troops of the Nigerian Army are aware of the instructions in "the Code of Conduct" and they appear to be observing them. The troops seen by the team appear to be under control of their officers. They are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population by assisting them in re-establishing a normal life.

66. *Future.* The general situation as reported here is unlikely to change as long as the fronts remain relatively static. A change in the form of the war, and in particular an end to the war, will undoubtedly produce a sudden increase in the numbers of persons requiring food and medical assistance. This increase could overwhelm the facilities available to handle it unless additional assistance is available very quickly. In addition, outside technical assistance may be needed to help restore the public facilities essential for a rapid return to normal life, particularly in the cities.

(Sgd.) Major-General W. A. MILROY,	(Sgd.) Colonel ALFONS OLKIEWICZ, Po-
Canada.	land.
(Sgd.) Major-General A. RAAB, Swe-	(Sgd.) Brigadier Sir BERNARD FERGUS-
den.	son, United Kingdom.

Annex A

LIST OF MEMBERS OF OBSERVER TEAM

Canada

Major-General William A. Milroy (from 17 September, 1968)
Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. M. Pinnington (from 27 September, 1968)

Poland

Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz (from 1 October, 1968)
Mr. Tadeusz Kumanek (from 1 October, 1968)
Lieutenant Michal Byczy (from 1 October, 1968)

Sweden

Major-General Arthur Raab (from 14 September, 1968)
Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Areskoug (from 19 September, 1968)

United Kingdom

Major-General Henry T. Alexander (from 11 September-24 October, 1968)
Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson (from 30 October, 1968)
Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas J. Cairns (from 11 September, 1968)
Major The Honourable W. D. Arbuthnott (from 30 October, 1968)

Organisation of African Unity

Brigadier-General Negga Teghegn	} Ethiopia (from 5 October, 1968)
Captain O. Yilma	
Major-General Sliman Hoffman	} Algeria (from 3 October, 1968)
Mr. Omar Lefgoum	

United Nations

Mr. N.-G. Gussing (from 18 August, 1968)
Mr. Erik Jensen (from 18 August, 1968)
Mr. D. W. Caulfield (from 6 October, 1968)

Annex B

SUMMARY OF VISITS

1. First Nigerian Division, 25-30 September, 1968
Enugu, Awgu, Ishiagu, Udi, Obilagu, Abakaliki, Afikpo
Major-General Milroy, Major-General Raab, Major-General Alexander, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug, Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns.
2. Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division, 5-10 October, 1968
Port Harcourt, Aba, Owerri, Calabar, Uyo, Ikot Ekpene
Major-General Milroy, Major-General Raab, Major-General Alexander, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug, Mr. Kumanek, Lieutenant Byczy.
3. Second Nigerian Division, 15-18 October, 1968
Benin, Asaba, Ogwashi-Uka, Onitsha, Kwale, Warri, Ughelli, Ozorro, Sapele
Major-General Milroy, Major-General Raab, Major-General Alexander, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns, Mr. Kumanek, Lieutenant Byczy.
4. Special Investigation, 3 October, 1968.
Okigwi
Major-General Alexander, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug.

5. First Nigerian Division, 23-27 October, 1968
Enugu, Abakaliki, Afikpo, Okigwi
Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug.
6. Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division, 23-27 October, 1968
Port Harcourt, Opobo, Abak, Azumini, Uyo, Urua Inyang, Aba
Major-General Raab, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns, Mr. Kumanek.
7. Prisoners of war in Lagos, 1 November, 1968
Kirikiri and Ikoyi
Major-General Milroy, Major-General Raab, Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewicz.
8. Kano and North Central States, 4-7 November, 1968
Kano, Zaria, Kaduna
Major-General Raab, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns.
9. First Nigerian Division, 4-7 November, 1968
Nsukka, Awka
Major-General Milroy, Major Arbuthnott, Mr. Kumanek.
10. Second Nigerian Division, 4-7 November, 1968
Benin, Asaba, Kwale, Warri
Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Lieutenant Byczy.
11. First Nigerian Division, 13-19 November, 1968
Makurdi, Agoja, Ikom, Obudu
Major-General Raab, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, Major Arbuthnott, Mr. Kumanek
12. Third Marine Commando Division, 13-17 November, 1968
Port Harcourt, Aba, Owerri, Ahoada
Major-General Milroy, Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug, Lieutenant Byczy.

Note: On some of the visits listed above the team was accompanied by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and/or his assistants and observers representing the Organisation of African Unity. In addition these other observers made separate visits to different sectors.

Annex C

REPORTS

1. The Observer Team have issued six reports. These are:
 - (a) Three interim reports, as follows:
 - (1) First Interim Report. "Visit to First Nigerian Division" dated 2 October, 1968.
 - (2) Second Interim Report. "Visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division" dated 14 October, 1968.
 - (3) Third Interim Report. "Visit to Second Nigerian Division" dated 23 October, 1968.
 - (b) Two reports on allegations involving special incidents, as follows:
 - (1) Report of investigation into the circumstances of deaths at Okigwi, dated 4 October, 1968.
 - (2) Report on investigation into allegations of the massacre of civilians at Urua Inyang, dated 2 November, 1968.
 - (c) A report on the visit to prisoners of war at Kirikiri and Ikoyi, dated 3 November, 1968.

(The activities of the Observers for the period since the Third Interim Report are covered in this report.)
2. The other Observers have produced the following reports:
 - (a) The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations:
 - (1) First Interim Report by the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on his visit to the Northern Front, issued 9 October, 1968.
 - (2) Second Interim Report by the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria: on Humanitarian Activities on visits to the Southern and Western Fronts, issued 30 October, 1968.
 - (3) Third Interim Report of the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities, issued 2 November, 1968.
 - (4) Report of the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on an incident at Okigwi, issued 8 October, 1968.

(b) The Organisation of African Unity:

(1) Report No. 1 on the visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division, issued on 14 October, 1968.

(2) Report No. 2 on the visit to Second Nigerian Division, issued on 22 October, 1968.

(3) Report No. 3 on the visit to First Nigerian Division and to prisoners of war camps in Lagos, issued 15 November, 1968.

(4) A composite report on the activities of the Organisation of African Unity observers during the period of their stay in Nigeria is in course of preparation.

First Interim Report

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO FIRST NIGERIAN DIVISION

1. The Swedish, British and Canadian representatives invited by the Federal Military Government to observe the conduct of the Federal troops in the war-affected areas, visited the First Nigerian Division during the period 25 September to 30 September, 1968. The representative of the United Nations Secretary-General travelled with the group. This report covers this particular visit.

2. On arrival at Enugu the group split into two teams, one visiting the area of 1 sector from Enugu through Awgu to Obinago Chilago and the other visiting the area of 2 sector from Abakaliki south to the front lines. Each team visited front line positions, military units and headquarters, villages, market places, medical and food distributing stations, refugee camps and major cities and towns. The Observers talked to officers, soldiers, local inhabitants, refugees, members of the civil administration, police, Red Cross officials and missionaries. Throughout the period of their visit the Observers received the fullest co-operation from the military and civilian officials. They encountered no restrictions to their movements investigations and none of their requests was refused. Representatives of the Press were free to accompany the Observers and did so on several occasions.

Conduct of Federal troops

3. The Observers found the Federal troops in the areas they visited to be alert, cheerful and well disciplined. They neither saw nor heard any evidence that the troops had committed acts with intent to destroy wholly, or in part, the Ibo people or their property. The Observers did see considerable evidence that the troops in the area were assisting the local population, in particular by feeding them until the civil administration and the Red Cross could take over the responsibility.

Conduct of the civilian population

4. Discussions with village leaders and refugees confirm that the Ibo people feared the Federal troops until they actually met them. This fear is the result of the actual fighting and the propaganda put out by the rebels which leads the Ibos to believe the Federal troops will kill them. Once some of their people make contact with the Federal troops this fear is rapidly allayed. The Observers saw a number of village leaders who had just come out of hiding and noted that the numbers of inhabitants returning to the villages are increasing. The Observers considered it significant that in the villages visited, the inhabitants displayed no fear of Federal soldiers, even when these soldiers arrived in their midst suddenly. However, it was also noted that very few of the more educated Ibos have yet appeared in areas occupied by Federal troops.

Restoration of normal life

5. The major problems in facilitating the return to normal life in the war-affected areas visited, include the provision of food and medical facilities and the restoration of buildings and public services such as water, power, etc. The Observers noted that:

(a) When an area is first occupied, the Army provides the civilians found there with the foodstuffs necessary to supplement the food that is available. This responsibility is taken over as rapidly as possible by the civil administration and the Red Cross and assisted where necessary by soldiers. These arrangements appear to have been adequate to date, but from what was seen, it is apparent that there will not be sufficient to handle the task if the people continue to come out of the bush at the present rate. A contributing problem is the lack of money in the hands of the people.

(b) The major medical problem observed was the malnutrition caused by a poorly balanced diet. The problem exists in normal times in this area, but

it has been accentuated in the case of those people who have spent a long time hiding in the bush. The Army, missionaries and Red Cross are doing a good job but their efforts are hampered by a shortage of drugs, reported to be caused by difficulties in transportation from Lagos. In addition the numbers of medical personnel do not appear to be sufficient to handle a large increase in the numbers requiring attention. For example, the Observers noted in Nenive that there was an increase from 100 on 21 September to about 1,500 mostly women and children, when the medical team returned on 28 September.

(c) In the areas where fighting took place, there is a considerable amount of physical destruction. This is the result of deliberate destruction on public utilities attributable to the rebels when retreating, destruction by shell fire, the use of materials for shelter by soldiers, the inevitable looting by civilians and deterioration caused by the weather. No damage was seen in villages visited that were not in the areas affected by the fighting. Some action has been taken by military and civil officials to preserve property.

Summary

6. In the areas of First Nigerian Division that the Observers visited they found:

(a) *Genocide*. There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.

(b) *Conduct of Federal troops*. The troops in the area are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population and assist them in re-establishing a normal life.

(c) *Conduct of civilian inhabitants*. An increasing number of the inhabitants of the villages, almost all of whom are Ibo, are returning to their homes. The people who have returned to the villages display no fear of the Federal troops.

(d) *Food and medical assistance*. These are being provided to the civilian population through the combined efforts of the Army, the civil administration and the Red Cross. While the supply of food has been adequate, the supplies of drugs and medical assistance in the area seem to be inadequate because of a shortage of transport, particularly air transport. This situation could become serious if an expected large increase in the number of refugees and people requiring such assistance takes place.

(e) *Destruction of property*. The Observers received no evidence of deliberate and unnecessary destruction of property by Federal troops. There has, however, been considerable destruction as a result of the war, and the work required to repair this situation, which is just beginning, will be very expensive.

Future plans

7. The Observers propose to make their next visit to the area of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division.

Second Interim Report

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO THIRD NIGERIAN DIVISION

Outline of work

1. With the arrival of the Polish representative and the representatives of the Organisation of African Unity there were more Observers available to cover the ground of the Third Marine Commando Division. The group split into two teams one visiting the areas Aba, Owerri and Port Harcourt, the other Calabar, Uyo and Ikot Ekpene. The visit lasted from 5 to 10 October. In addition to visiting hospitals, camps for displaced persons, etc., as enumerated in our first interim report we saw and interviewed a number of internees, prisoners of war and some educated Ibos.

2. The group received excellent co-operation from the Military authorities, civilian and volunteer workers. We were free to question detainees, prisoners of war and displaced persons in private. We arranged our own programme and visited forward areas.

3. It has become more apparent that the future efficacy of Observers will depend largely on their continued presence throughout the whole area and their ability to visit without undue delay, the places where incidents are reported as taking place. It will also depend on good communications both in the matter of air and ground transport and wireless. These are lacking at the present time.

The group is not constituted to be able to follow the method of operation suggested above. We therefore recommend that the organisation of the group should be changed to enable it to have certain of its members permanently on the ground in each divisional sector. We consider this matter to be urgent and would be happy to discuss it with the Federal Government at an early date.

State of the civil population

4. We did not see as many Ibos as in the north since a large part of the area is populated by Rivers people and minority tribes. Most of the Ibos who were working in places such as Port Harcourt fled with the dissidents. In addition towns like Aba and Owerri are still close to the fighting line. It is the pattern in such areas that the local inhabitants either flee with the dissidents or take to the bush.

Very few stay in the fighting zone. Over half the people we saw in camps, either Rivers people, Ibos or minority tribes, were in a fair state of health and well cared for, but a large number including small children are in a state of malnutrition.

It is also apparent that the aid on the ground, *e.g.*, Army, Red Cross, missionaries, etc., does not operate on the same scale as it did in the area of the First Division; except in the Calabar area, for example, there is great shortage of doctors. We took note of the fact that the Nigerian Red Cross is beginning to operate in the Port Harcourt area. In the Calabar area the co-operation between the Army, the Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission seemed excellent. If the numbers coming out of the bush increased, as appears to be the case, the Army, the civil administration and voluntary agencies could be overwhelmed. At the moment not many Ibos have come out of the bush, but already relief resources are overtaxed.

The military situation

5. There has been more fighting on this front than on any other, at any rate recently. The Divisional Commander's primary aim is to defeat his enemy, therefore everything else takes second place to this, his main object. This factor has had an effect on the civil population, the noise of fighting, heavy expenditure of ammunition and the aggressive military tactics of the troops appear to have instilled more fear into the Ibo population than is the case on the northern front. The Ibos have therefore been slower to come out of the bush and slower still to return to their villages.

6. The troops are aware of the code of conduct and their military discipline appears good. Their officers are in firm control.

Rehabilitation and resettlement

7. At present there does not appear to be any overall policy for resettlement of inhabitants back in their villages, the matter being handled individually by Sector Commanders. The efficiency of this process varies with the personality and operational task of the individual Commander.

We believe that there should be an overall policy for resettlement laid down by the Divisional Commander in conjunction with the civilian administration. Unless people can get back to the villages and to their land a crop will be missed. This will further accentuate the food problem.

We suggest that the Commander considers declaring areas 10 miles or more behind the fighting line as white or clear of dissidents.

Villagers, after rehabilitation in displaced persons camps should be allowed to return to these areas and restart village life. The forward areas to be declared red and closed to all civilians on security grounds.

When feasible, control of the white areas should be handed over to the civilian administration and in particular to the civil police. This would constitute a visible sign that conditions are returning to normal apart from relieving the military of the responsibility which, due to intensive operational activity, they are finding hard to execute. We understand that such a policy is already under active consideration at divisional level.

Relations military/Ibos/Rivers people/minority tribes

8. Discussions indicate that the relationship between Rivers people, the minority tribes and the Ibos is at present strained. The Rivers people and minority tribes appear to have no love for the Ibo: it is reported that they settled many old scores when Federal troops moved in. In Port Harcourt some Ibo leaders are advising their people to stay in displaced persons camps until after the war is over. Their reason for doing so appears to be that if the war is not finished soon and the Federal Forces suffered any reverses. Ibos outside protection camps might be in danger. The Federal Government allows Ibos to remain in these camps if they wish to do so. In Port Harcourt they live as family units.

9. It is impossible for us to generalize as a result of isolated incidents. However, we did report to the Divisional Commander a case of a Regimental Sergeant Major maltreating an Ibo who had been picked up in the front line dressed in civilian clothes, a practice often followed by dissident soldiers before surrender. This practice is said to be the reason why Federal troops are suspicious of all Ibos of military age, however dressed. Despite this, as many of the Federal officers themselves pointed out, Nigeria has to live as one when the war is over and maltreatment of suspected persons is not going to make this task easier.

10. Ibos in displaced persons camps have a healthy respect for the troops but mutual contact appears to be gradually dispelling the fear that has undoubtedly existed. Due to the intensity of military operations contact between villages and the military is less than in the First Division area. And therefore the process of dispelling fear slower.

11. Prisoners of war and internees appear to be in good health; however there are points which should receive early attention by the military Commanders; for example, the prisoners do not appear to be given any constructive work to do, nor exercise. Accommodation is inadequate. They have little to read and some appear to have been kept in custody unnecessarily: internees and many Ibo displaced persons have no money and are therefore unable to buy anything to supplement the issue rations. We consider that prisoners, internees and displaced persons who are unable at present to earn their living should be given a small weekly allowance in addition to the initial payment most of them receive. It is also important that a record be kept of money and personal possessions taken from prisoners/internees, so that these can be returned to them when they are released from custody; as is customary the Red Cross should be invited to visit prisoners and internees. These points have been drawn to the attention of the Divisional Commanders.

Deliberate destruction of property

12. We saw evidence of destruction of property, particularly in villages along the route of advance Federal Forces. Most of this we assume is the result of the fighting and cannot be ascribed specifically to either side. We did see and hear evidence of looting: from the evidence we have heard we consider that the looting has been carried out by the civilians and the military of both sides.

Deliberate destruction of life

13. We neither saw nor heard any evidence of deliberate wholesale destruction of the Ibo people by the Federal troops. The basis for this statement includes private discussions with a number of educated Ibos who spoke good English. There is evidence that some of the civilians received fairly rough treatment from the troops of both sides and that there is some apprehension among a number of Ibo people now behind the Federal lines. Practically all Ibos testify to the fair treatment they received from officers but some assert that on a number of occasions they have been insulted by other ranks. We therefore consider that selection of Army personnel to look after prisoners, internees and displaced persons should be very carefully done. We did see seven bodies in Owerri Hospital. As these people had been dead for some time and were in an advanced state of decomposition, it is impossible for the Observers to draw any conclusions.

Summary

14. In summary, in the areas of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division which the Observers visited we found—

(a) That we had unrestricted freedom of movement.

(b) *Conduct of Federal troops.* The conduct of Federal troops appears to vary between sectors as does their attitude to the civil population. The degree of positive action taken to obtain the confidence of the local Ibos depends at present on the attitude of the Sector Commander. The troops appear to be under the firm control of their officers.

(c) *Conduct of the civilian inhabitants.* The Rivers people and the minority tribes who are the main inhabitants of the areas visited are returning from the bush in increasing numbers and once out have no fear of Federal troops. Those Ibos who are now behind Federal lines are apprehensive and some prefer to stay in displaced persons camps where they feel safe rather than return to their homes before the war is over.

(d) *Rehabilitation.* We believe that a clear policy for allowing people to return to their villages in the rural areas should be put into effect. The policy of declaring red and white areas could be a solution.

(e) *Genocide*. There is no evidence supporting the allegations of genocide by the Federal Forces against the Ibo people. There are a number of Ibo people alive and well behind the Federal lines. This speaks for itself. However, the majority of the Ibos who lived in the area have not yet returned.

(f) *Food and medical assistance*. The majority of work in this connection is being carried out by the Army assisted in the Calabar area by the Nigerian Red Cross, the International Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission. The civil administration is very short of doctors. The Nigerian Red Cross has just arrived in Port Harcourt. This latter constitutes a move in the right direction. The supply of food is adequate but will not remain so unless a more rapid return to villages can be arranged. The supply of drugs and medical assistance varies from sector to sector but overall is inadequate.

(g) *Destruction of property*. Some property, that is houses and public buildings, has been seriously damaged. Such damage as has occurred took place during the fighting in towns and villages behind the roads. The damage was probably inflicted by the Armed Forces of both sides. There has been considerable looting, some by the dissidents during their retreat, some by the civil population and some by Federal Forces. Most property is completely unguarded and it is surprising that more looting has not taken place. Undoubtedly there will be a large amount of movable property within the Ibo heartland once the fighting is over. It is therefore necessary that strict orders are applied to the troops. There is also a need for civil police to move up behind the forward troops.

(h) *Administration*. The Divisional Commander requires to be relieved of administration responsibility in the rear areas.

Future action

15. (a) It is proposed to make our next visit to the areas of the Second Nigerian Division.

(b) We would like to discuss a certain reorganisation of the Observer group in order to carry out our future task more efficiently.

Third Interim Report

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO SECOND NIGERIAN DIVISION

Outline of work

1. The Observer Team to Nigeria travelling with the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the two representatives of the Organisation of African Unity and their assistants visited the area of the Second Nigerian Division. The visit lasted from 15 to 18 October. The group split into two teams. One team visited the Asaba area and the Bridgehead East of the River Niger around Onitsha. The other team visited the Ibo area West River Niger. The teams made their own programme and had complete freedom of movement.

2. It should be stressed that it is the view of the Observers that the brevity of this visit enables them to reach only tentative conclusions. There are, however, certain matters to which the Observers wish to draw the attention of the Federal Military Government.

Description of area

3. The division is responsible for most of the area of the Mid-Western State, which was recovered from the secessionists during the latter part of 1967. The Eastern part of this State, stretching 50-75 miles from the Niger River, is largely inhabited by Ibos estimated at 300,000-400,000.

4. The division is also responsible for a bridgehead on the east bank of the River Niger around Onitsha and for the front in the Awka area. The latter was not visited by members of the team. Fighting continues in both these areas.

State of the civil population

5. The area west of the River Niger suffered relatively lightly from the fighting. All the area has been firmly under Federal control for a year. Life in most parts has returned to normal. For this reason the conditions encountered by the teams were entirely different from those found in the area of the First and Third Divisions. The foremost differences are:

(a) All of the Ibo people who have returned are living normal lives. Schools are operating and markets are functioning. There is plenty of food and there has been little apparent damage to property in this area.

(b) Camps for detainees are inhabited mainly by people who have been moved out of the areas near to the river, in which some infiltrators are operating. They appear to be well fed and well cared for.

(c) Ibos are serving in the State Governors Council, in the State Civil Service and in the schools.

(d) The Army, civil administration and Red Cross organizations appear to be coping adequately with the task of feeding and administering medicine to the people in the area.

6. *Re* a displaced persons' camp at Kwale. Here some 120 young males are housed in the civil prison. They are in good health. However, they are separated from their families. They are confined within the prison walls and have nothing to do. Some of them have been in the camp for eight months. Most of them are tradesmen of one type or another, some of them from Benin City. It seems more appropriate in order to facilitate their rehabilitation, to hold people in displaced persons' camps within their own home area. A prison is not a proper place in which to hold displaced persons.

7. We were told that there are still people living in the bush along the west bank of the River Niger. If this is so, many of them are undoubtedly suffering from malnutrition.

8. The Onitsha Bridgehead is an operational zone. The city has been badly damaged during the war. The only civilians—some 1,000 persons—are housed in a camp. This camp is run by the Ibos themselves. They appear to be well cared for. Otherwise Onitsha—before the war inhabited by approximately 100,000 people—is an empty city.

Conduct of Federal troops and relations with civil population

9. The Division is comparatively newly formed. Very few of the soldiers have any length of service. There is a programme for instruction of the troops in the code of conduct.

10. In the area west of the River Niger the troops' relations with the civil population are satisfactory except in the area where infiltration occurs. There appears to be no fear of the soldiers except in the latter area. Occasionally infiltrators operate from dissident territory. The method of dealing with this activity is for the Federal Forces to evacuate the villages and take the inhabitants to Asaba. The conduct of Federal troops, as observed during our visit, appears satisfactory.

11. In Benin City, the Military Government's office has compiled detailed inventories of property belonging to the Ibos with a description of each building, supported by a photograph and an estimate of the damage. Some buildings have been rented on behalf of the absent owners and the Observers examined books showing rents collected and held for the property owners.

Summary

12. In summary, in the areas of the Second Nigerian Division which the Observers visited we found—

(a) That we had unrestricted freedom of movement.

(b) *Conduct of Federal troops.* The conduct of Federal troops, as observed during our visit, appears to be satisfactory considering that it is a new Division with limited military training.

(c) *Conduct of the civilian inhabitants.* In the Ibo territory west of the River Niger life has returned more or less to normal. There is plenty of food, including meat. In the Onitsha Bridgehead area where heavy fighting is still going on, there are no civilians apart from those in the camp.

(d) *Food and medical assistance.* In general food is sufficient and medical assistance adequate but in the Onitsha refugee camp there is a shortage of medical supplies.

(e) *Destruction of property.* The destruction has been very slight in the Benin area and insignificant in Ibo territories west of the River Niger. Onitsha has been very seriously damaged and it is obvious that there has been extensive looting.

(f) *Rehabilitation and reconstruction.* We do not consider that a prison is a suitable place for housing displaced persons. On the whole it seems that the Federal Forces have handed over administration to the civil authorities in the right way. However, we consider that the Army remains too actively involved in civilian affairs in the Asaba area and that a hand-over to civilian authorities would be desirable. The roads are beginning to deteriorate very badly. Unless some action is taken very soon it will be a major problem.

(g) *Genocide.* We did not see or hear any evidence of genocide.

Future action

13. The Observers intend to return to the Second Nigerian Division area at a later date in order to satisfy themselves on certain matters which they did not have time to examine fully.

Observer Team to Nigeria

INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEATHS AT OKIGWI

Object of visit

At the request of the Federal Government of Nigeria a team consisting of Major-General H. T. Alexander of the United Kingdom, Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland, Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Areskoug of Sweden accompanied by Mr. Daniel Caulfield of the United Nations carried out an investigation into the circumstances under which two members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mr. and Mrs. Savoury of the World Council of Churches, were killed and three members of the ICRC wounded at Okigwi on Monday, 30 September, 1968.

Programme of investigation

The team carried out the following programme of investigation:

We interviewed:

(A) The Divisional Commander, Colonel Shuwa Mohammed, the Sector Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Wya, the Battalion Commander, Major Isa Mohammed, commanding the 21st Battalion of the Nigerian Army, the Commander of a Company of the 21st Battalion, Lieutenant Joseph Ochai, and an officer of the Headquarters Company of the 21st Battalion, Lieutenant Ogoja.

(B) The following members of the ICRC team in Okigwi: Dr. Mischa Vucinic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Bengt Restrom of Sweden in company with two Yugoslavs, Mr. Pavle Vukcevic and Mr. Branislav Rakij, and another Swedish national, Mr. Kurt Qvarnbo, and Mr. Percy Nilsson of Sweden. The team visited Okigwi on 3 October. During the course of our visit we inspected the site of the incident which was the ICRC hospital at Okigwi.

Co-operation received:

The statement given by the members of the Red Cross coincided in all material respects, although some were interviewed in Enugu and some in Lagos. It is, therefore, our conclusion that their statements are as accurate as is possible under the circumstances. So far as the statements received from the officers of the Federal Army are concerned:

(a) The Divisional Commander has not yet completed his own investigations. This is understandable since operations are still in progress in the outskirts and around Okigwi. It is therefore difficult for him to arrange interviews with the witnesses whom he may require to be cross-examined.

(b) The Sector Commander: It is doubtful whether the Sector Commander knows the complete story either, for the same reasons as are given above in respect of the Divisional Commander.

(c) The Battalion Commander, Major Isa Mohammed: The team believes that his account of his own actions in the matter are true. We were much impressed by this officer who certainly gave all the assistance he could to the surviving Red Cross once he realised their plight. He also took as early action as possible to ensure their safety by sending another officer ahead into the Red Cross buildings as soon as he had identified these.

(d) Lieutenant Ogoja, Headquarters Company: This officer was responsible for bringing the survivors out of the ICRC area. As he arrived at the scene of events after the actual killings, he is not in a position to explain how these occurred.

(e) Lieutenant Ochai, Company Commander: We are not entirely satisfied with the evidence given by this officer, who appears to us to be withholding information. We consider that he probably knows a good deal more about the incident than he is prepared to disclose at present.

Conclusions

From the evidence we have gathered we conclude that the incident occurred in the heat of battle for Okigwi.

Notwithstanding:

- (1) The killings were unprovoked and inexcusable.
- (2) They could have been avoided had an as yet unidentified officer taken action to quell the excited soldiers.
- (3) The killings cannot be excused on the grounds that the unidentified officer and soldiers did not know that these people were Red Cross personnel since the building is clearly marked, even in the compound. Furthermore each member of the ICRC team was wearing the easily identifiable Red Cross badge on his left chest. The Savourys wore a similar insignia. In addition there was a Red Cross flag flying and the ICRC people also had a Red Cross flag which they waved from their shelter.

Comments

As a result of our joint investigation we offer the following comments, with the hope that the risk of further incidents of this nature may be avoided:

(a) We understand that Federal Forces know the location of ICRC buildings in the various towns. If this is the case, it did not save the lives of four people. We, therefore, consider that in all orders for attack on towns the troops should be clearly briefed as to the exact location of the ICRC buildings. They should also be briefed on what to do when encountering ICRC personnel.

(b) When the ICRC buildings are sited beside a main road on the main axis of advance of the Federal Forces, it would seem most imprudent to advise the ICRC personnel to remain in these premises once an attack by the Federal Forces has started. In this particular case not only were the buildings right beside the main road but dug rebel positions were just beside the ICRC area on the same hill, a good defensive position.

The Report was signed by Major-General W. A. Milroy (Canada); Major-General A. Raab (Sweden); Major-General H. T. Alexander (United Kingdom) and Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz (Poland).

LAGOS, NIGERIA,
2 November, 1968.

Observer Team to Nigeria

INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF THE MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS AT URUA INYANG BY FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT FORCES

Reason for investigation

Newspaper stories published in Canada after the capture of Urua Inyang on 4 October 1968, reported that up to 500 civilians had been shot by Federal troops entering the village. This atrocity was alleged to have taken place in the village market place.

Background to investigation

The Observer Team had great difficulty in locating Urua Inyang as it is not found on available maps by that name. It had been described as "14 miles south-west of Ikot Ekpene". A team had visited Ikot Ekpene on 7 October and heard no reports of such an incident in the area. The team interviewed the Reverend Father Eugene Bree at Uyo on 7 October and, although Father Bree had not stated that he lived in Urua Inyang, it had been established that he was from the general area. Father Bree had been enthusiastic in his support of the behaviour of the Federal Forces liberating his area on 4 October and stated that they caused little damage to civilian life or property.

The newspaper report referred to above was received after the interview with Father Bree on 7 October.

Investigation 27 October, 1968

A team composed of Major-General A. Raab of Sweden, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Cairns of the United Kingdom, Mr. T. Kumanek of Poland and Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. M. Pinnington of Canada visited Urua Inyang on 27 October. Mr. Erik Jensen of the United Nations travelled with the team. They were met at Uyo early that morning by Father Bree, Parish Priest of the Urua Inyang area, who accompanied them to the village.

Father Bree is an Irish Priest from St. Patrick's Society, Kiltegan, Ireland. He has served in the Urua Inyang area from 1961 to the present and has a thorough knowledge of the people. His parish numbers 3,000 among 40,000 persons in 63

villages in the surrounding territory. These villages are grouped in communities and the one surrounding Urua Inyang is the Ika Community. During the period that the secessionists controlled the area, Father Bree was co-leader of a refugee camp in the village.

Father Bree was in his Rectory at the time the village was captured by the Federal Forces on 4 October. He took shelter there during the battle from 1000 to 1130 hours at which time he went out to the street. The village was deserted except for Federal troops. By 1200 hours people started to return from the forest and by mid-afternoon life was back to normal. Father Bree saw no signs of injured or dead civilians. He checked all his agencies and heard of no civilian losses. He was taken to a Brigade Headquarters of the Nigerian Army late that day and returned six days later. When he checked his parish upon his return he heard of no mass shootings and was able to account for all of his people. Father Bree was emphatic that such a thing could not have occurred without his knowledge.

The team then interviewed five tribal elders of the area. Their spokesmen were Mr. Augustine Akpou-Enyiekene, Chairman of the Ika Community and Mr. John F. Akpan-Oyoro, Vice-Chairman. The elders described the occupation of the village on 4 October by Federal Forces and their stories agreed substantially with Father Bree's. They were emphatic in their denials of any knowledge of their people being shot by Federal troops.

A detailed inspection of the market place where the incident was supposed to have happened was carried out. The one large cement block building in the centre of the area was examined for bullet marks, as were trees and stalls standing in the area. There were no marks. The team is of the opinion that shooting in the quantity alleged would have left marks that would have been both obvious and unmistakable.

Local inhabitants were interviewed and none was aware of any incident of the type alleged.

Conclusion

The Observer Team has found no evidence of massacre in Urua Inyang by Federal Forces on 4 October, 1968, as alleged. All inhabitants interviewed were pleased to have the Federal troops among them.

(Sgd.) Major-General	(Sgd.) Major-General A. RAAB,
W. A. MILROY,	Sweden.
Canada.	
	(Sgd.) Colonel ALFONS OLKIEWICZ,
(Sgd.) Brigadier	Poland.
Sir BERNARD FERGUSSON,	
United Kingdom.	

LAGOS, NIGERIA,
3 November, 1968.

Observer Team to Nigeria

REPORT ON OBSERVERS' VISIT TO PRISONERS OF WAR AT KIRIKIRI AND IKOYI

1. On 1 November, 1968, the Observers visited the prisoners of war detained in the prisons at Kirikiri and Ikoyi in Lagos. No obstacle was put in our way, and we were allowed to circulate among, and speak freely with all the prisoners that we saw. There were 292 at Kirikiri, and 173 at Ikoyi.

2. We found conditions short of ideal. While fully aware that in the circumstances, prisoners were bound to tell a "hard luck" story, we consider that there is room for improvement in their conditions.

Kirikiri

3. Here there was definitely over-crowding in the cells; and no man had more than one thin blanket. Prisoners had no clothes other than those they were wearing; these were thin and ragged, and in several cases lousy.

4. Although there was a whole-time male nurse and twice a week visits by a medical officer, it was evident that a number of men were in need of medical attention.

5. All prisoners complained of insufficient opportunity for exercise; of the want of reading matter; of their inability to communicate or receive letters with their families; and of the poor food. There were in fact no signs of malnutrition. The Superintendent reported that reading matter was about to be available.

Ikoyi

6. The prisoners here had fewer complaints about food. They could get reading material once a week; they said they had adequate space and opportunity for exercise. But they also complained about inadequate medical attention, and their accommodation was overcrowded and airless. Some claimed that at present they had no bedding whatever.

General

7. It seemed to us that some sort of screening tribunal should be established with the duty of examining each case on its merits. We feel that if this were done, a fair number of prisoners at present being held might be released. This would have the dual result of acquiring good-will and of reducing the strain on the system involved in looking after them. Some prisoners spontaneously expressed their belief in "One Nigeria", and their willingness to enlist in the Federal Forces.

8. The police authorities reported that there had been a Red Cross visit to Kirikiri in August, during which additional bedding had been promised; this has not arrived, and there had been no subsequent visit. We think that such visits should be regular and that the Nigerian Red Cross should co-operate in the provision of better amenities.

9. We fully recognise the degree to which Government resources are stretched at present; but we feel it our duty to point out that prisoners of war remain the responsibility of the Army, and that it is abnormal for them to be handed over to a Prison Service. If this must be done, it is essential to ensure that normal rules for prisoners of war obtain, as laid down in the Geneva Convention. This implies certain conditions including the following:

- (a) Prisoners of war must have freedom of movement within their camp.
- (b) Officers must be separate from other ranks.
- (c) Prisoners of war have the right to communicate by letter with their families, subject always to censorship.
- (d) Red Cross must have constant access.
- (e) Reasonable amenities, such as exercise, games and reading material, must be available.
- (f) Medical attention must be constant.

10. The officials at both prisons were extremely helpful and paid close attention to matters which we pointed out to them.

(Sgd.) Major-General W. M. MILROY,	(Sgd.) Major-General A. RAAB,
Canada.	Sweden.
(Sgd.) Brigadier Sir BERNARD FERGUSON,	(Sgd.) Colonel ALFONS OLKIEWICZ,
United Kingdom.	Poland.

APPENDIX C

NIGERIA—DISASTER EMERGENCY RELIEF REPORT

The general sections of this report supplement but do not replace the January 15, 1969, report. New statistical tables are not attached but changes or additions received by February 15 are included in the "Quick Facts" section on page 48.

Also, this report includes three separate sections on Evacuation and Care of Nigerian/Biafran Children; Nutritional Study—Nigeria; and Medical/Health Situation and Drug Requirements Nigeria/Biafra. These special sections may be requested separately by those who are interested only in these particular phases of the relief operations.

CIVILIAN OPERATIONS ON BOTH SIDES

The U.S. Government has consistently stressed that all of the needy people seriously affected by the Nigeria/Biafra civil war should receive assistance. Information available to the public generally stresses the plight of the people of Biafra. There has been little comment on the human suffering that exists near the fighting zones on the FMG side. The USG and many other governments generally send their aid through the ICRC because it is working on both sides. This is interpreted, however, as aiding only victims on the FMG side. It is the objective of these memos and reports to convey the genuine concern and to record actual help provided for the hungry no matter where located. Worldwide church relief groups are considered to be working entirely in Biafra while, in reality, they are working on both sides. The following was taken from a Joint Church Aid Bulletin issued from Geneva on January 30.

"Hunger is not a phenomenon which faces the Biafrans alone. Nor would it be compatible with their non-political and strictly humanitarian nature for Protestant and Catholic groups to send relief to one side in the Nigeria/Biafra conflict without also assisting war victims on the other. In this respect, JCA has the same criteria of impartiality as the International Committee of the Red Cross."

Joint Church Aid itself does not operate on the Federal side because it was formed for the specific purpose of supplying and operating the mercy airlift from the island of Sao Tome, but its members, such as Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Caritas Internationalis and other voluntary groups, function in Federal Nigeria under the ICRC.

The JCA bulletin pointed out that the situation on the Federal side of the lines was only slightly less dramatic than in Biafra but the difference lay in how relief was brought into each area. Imported food and medicines are needed in both FMG and Biafran areas, but the availability of seaports in the FMG makes expensive air transport necessary only in special circumstances. For Biafra, however, airlift is presently the only means for bringing in relief supplies.

Relief flights into Biafra are conducted under very difficult conditions. The FMG has not given its approval for nighttime flights and the Biafrans have so far not agreed to daylight flights. The FMG reserves its freedom of action to interdict any flights into Biafra on the grounds that Uli airstrip is being used for the delivery of arms as well as relief supplies. On several occasions, relief aircraft have been damaged by bomb fragments and some trouble is being experienced because of this harassment of the relief flights.

As yet no agreement has been reached between the belligerents permitting the use of a land corridor for importing relief supplies into Biafra.

QUICK FACTS

	Tons supplies shipped		Value supplies, shipping costs, cash donations
	Biafra	Lagos	
U.S. Government:			
The U.S. Government continues to increase its food grant approvals to meet food projections for the coming months. Shipments are being made by volags as quickly as they can be handled. In the last report, a total of 70,469 metric tons had been approved. Since Jan. 15 report, 12,268 more tons were approved for a total of 82,737 tons, valued at			\$17,130,700
Shipping costs reported to date by volags for Public Law 480 shipments			1,080,367
Of this 82,737 tons, volags report having shipped	6,508	26,216	
Previous cash allotments to ICRC, USAID, and volags for relief operations totaled \$7,000,000. Since Jan. 15, the U.S. Government made new grants of \$300,000 to ICRC for purchase of stockfish; a \$300,000 allotment to USAID for the measles program in Biafra, and \$400,000 in support of JCA/USA air bridge to Biafra, for a total of			8,000,000
Subtotal, U.S. Government			26,211,067
U.S. voluntary agencies, own resources			
Total from previous report	1,821	1,355	6,412,341
New contributions			855,721
Subtotal, U.S. voluntary agencies			7,268,062
Total U.S. commitment	8,329	27,571	33,479,129
Other nations			
Total from previous report	5,260	6,388	15,627,510
New contributions			1,306,520
Subtotal, other nations			16,934,030
International organizations			
Total from previous report	11,905		3,134,620
New contributions			79,000
Subtotal, international organizations			3,213,620
U.N. agencies:			
UNICEF, from previous report	226	3,196	1,820,394
UNICEF, new contributions			18,765
Subtotal, UNICEF			1,839,159
World food program, no change			1,164,000
Total commitment, other than U.S. sources	17,391	9,584	23,150,809
Grand total, all sources	25,720	37,155	56,629,938
	Biafra		FMG
Number of people being reached:			
JCA	1,150,000		
ICRC	850,000		
Subtotal, Biafra	2,000,000		
ICRC/NRC/Volags			900,000
Total		2,900,000	

It is expected that 3.0 million persons will be accessible in Biafra for aid by March 1, 1969. Access to villages off main road is attained gradually. There are still many areas which have not yet been visited by ICRC. In southern areas where the front is more clearcut, it is easier to ascertain population in need.

REPORTS ON FOOD NEEDS IN BIAFRA

There appear to be many contradictions in reports about imported food needs in Biafra.

On January 4, a Joint Church Aid bulletin reported a World Council of Churches representative stating that 3,000 tons of supplies would need to be flown into Biafra *nightly* to avert starvation early in 1969, as compared to the then maximum of 200 tons being flown in by JCA and ICRC daily.

The following is taken from a JCA Report dated February 5: The Vice-Chairman of the Board of Canairelief and Overseas Secretary of the Presbyterian Church

in Biafra was recently in Biafra and praised Biafran efforts to organize their own relief in the struggle against starvation. He described the progress made to produce carbohydrates and other basic foods, and said that immense areas of bush and forest in the Biafran territory had recently given way to cultivated land. He said that every available acre would shortly be cultivated. He quoted Colonel Ojukwu as having expressed the hope that, by May, his territory would be more self-supporting in the essentials to avoid starvation. Maize—which matures in three months—is the first seed to be planted in the new Biafran plots. After the maize, rice will be planted in April/May, then cassava, then yams. Though low in yield and devoid of proteins, cassava has the advantage of being planted with stickes—unlike seed yams, some types of which can be eaten. Notwithstanding these Biafran efforts to avert starvation by intensive cultivation of carbohydrates, and JCA plants to utilize a further \$4.5 million airlifting proteins and medicines over the next 3 months to reduce the spread of malnutrition, he said that a peaceful solution to the conflict was the only sure way of saving Biafra. This was also the consensus of the delegates of the JCA meeting in Copenhagen.

One observer who admits to pro-Biafran bias recently reported that experts had calculated that foodstuffs grown locally in Biafra must be supplemented by at least 500 tons per day from outside to avoid mass starvation.

The ICRC, in a recent report, estimates that 9,000 tons of imported food and 9,000 tons of local food are required each month for one million population to insure 2,000 calories daily ration. This estimate is based on a daily diet composed of 1,500 calories a day from imported food, and 500 calories a day from local commodities as follows:

Commodity	Grams	Calories	Grams/protein
Local carbohydrate (yams/cassava)	250	450	1.5
Palm oil	50	450	
Cereals	125	450	12.5
CSM/beans	125	450	25.0
Stockfish	25	100	15.0
Powdered milk	25	100	9.0
Total	600	2,000	63.0

REQUIREMENTS FOR 1,000,000 PEOPLE

Commodity	Tons per month	
	Imported	Local
Local carbohydrate (yams/cassava)		7,500
Palm oil		1,500
Cereals	3,750	
CSM/beans	3,750	
Stockfish	750	
Powdered milk	750	
Total	9,000	9,000

For each million persons in receipt of relief, 54 tons of salt and 36 tons of sugar are also required.

Colonel Ojukwu in a speech of January 18 called for establishment of a "National Emergency Food Production Program." The plan envisages a crusade by everybody in Biafra to plant yams, raise chickens, maintain small vegetable gardens. It was announced that the Biafran government was setting up a land army of children and youths sufficiently regimented to assist communities to cultivate untilled land. Colonel Ojukwu warned that outside relief was like a drop in the ocean that could not be depended upon. He said that each community should be able to produce enough food for its people.

FOOD SITUATION—FEDERAL NIGERIA

Some redistribution of locally produced foodstuffs is necessary within the federally held areas. Although the amount of starchy staple foods required in the two major deficit areas (Southeastern and East Central states) is double the estimated amount surplus in the northern areas, efforts are being made to move some of the food south.

The Southeastern State has requested assistance for opening one of the routes. The Southeastern State Rehabilitation Commission proposes to accomplish the necessary work through a procurement type contract. USAID plans to assist by financing approximately \$200,000 of the contract between the Southeastern State and the contractor from the \$2.8 million dollars support assistance grant previously authorized.

Since the war has resulted in substitution of cassava for yams, or a two percent protein food for six percent protein food, a higher percentage of the total protein intake will have to be provided from other sources.

Seeds are required for yams in all areas except the East Central State; maize seeds are urgently needed in all areas; rice seeds, both swamp and upland varieties will be required. Machetes and hoes will be required in all areas and rice mill rehabilitation is needed as well as cassava grating machines.

The FMG Rehabilitation Commission in cooperation with the State Commissions and USAID is providing agricultural tools and seeds.

Stockpiling

UNICEF, WFP/Rome, CRS, International Union of Child Welfare, WCC, USAID and ICRC representatives met in Geneva on food requirements. They expressed the need for a coordinating mechanism for over-all assessment of food requirements. There was agreement to centralize information and to exchange plans and facts. The group agreed on the need for a stockpile within Nigeria and in neighboring areas of about 40,000 tons, which it should be possible to attain by April unless there is a dramatic rise in distribution in coming months.

ICRC OPERATIONS

The new ICRC budget estimate is 14 million Swiss Francs monthly. Estimated costs of Lagos operation alone are currently 6.5 million Swiss Francs monthly. (Exchange rate 4.346 to \$1 US).

Distribution of supplies in FMG

ICRC reports that it is distributing about 4,000 tons of food per month, which constitutes full or supplementary rations for about one million people. In order to provide additional food distribution, there will need to be an increase in the number of vehicles, improved maintenance of the trucks on hand and additional personnel. Military action in the war areas also makes it difficult to reach more than a small portion of the displaced persons.

Road transport

There are only a few land routes open to the east and they are of limited capacity. The shortest land route from Lagos to East involves using Lakojo Ferry across the Niger River, which takes a maximum of 3 trips per day and can carry 14 cars or six lorries. It is currently jammed with military vehicles and supplies. Alternate route involves driving further north, crossing the bridge at Jebba, then back across the Benue River at Makurdi. Roads are in such poor condition that it often takes a week for a truck to go from Lagos to Enugu.

It is extremely difficult to rent civilian lorries for movement of foodstuffs to areas adjacent to former eastern region because of high risk of military commandeering vehicles. Also, lack of petrol and maintenance facilities discourage local commercial transport.

Currently ICRC has 244 vehicles in Nigeria—127 are lorries of 5 to 7 tons capacity and 117 are landrovers. About 30% are in need of repairs.

A recent review of ICRC transportation requirements engaged in all phases of relief operations, including stockpiling, distribution centers, field teams, has resulted in a request for the following equipment for ICRC:

5 to 7 ton flat bed, stake body trucks with bows and tarp covers with sufficient spare parts, accessories, including tires for one year operation...	100
Wreckers—10 tons, 4x4 drive	5
Portable air compressors, 300 lbs. capacity storage tank	5
Small units, jeep type, 4x4, with trailer hitch and FRO mounted winch	50
Water tank trailers with 250-300 gal. capacity	25
Hydraulic jacks, heavy duty, wheel type	8
Repair shop type creepers	24
Large capacity lister bags	100
Tires and tubes, heavy duty, various sizes	1,000

The above items are minimal for the next 6 months. Such increased vehicle fleet will contribute substantially in alleviating bottlenecks and assuring an even flow of relief supplies to all phases of operation. (A sudden shift in accessibility of contested areas with resultant increase of relief feeding would, of course, increase this requirement for vehicles and related equipment.)

Land corridors

Land routes north from Port Harcourt or Calabar and south from Enugu have been rejected for various reasons by the belligerents while hostilities last. Following a cessation of the fighting, however, either or both routes offer the best option for delivery of large quantities of supplies to the afflicted zones.

Ports

Although Lagos port remains badly congested, the backup of relief supplies which occurred in late December no longer exists and cargoes are forwarded to depots shortly after their arrival. ICRC operations are improving since ICRC has been assigned exclusive use of Pier 14 at the end of Apapa dock.

Current maximum logistic capacity for ICRC to move supplies to distribution depots (without direct access to Port Harcourt, Calabar and other ports) is 17,500 tons monthly.

Calabar remains as a possible alternative to Lagos for relief shipments, as it is regularly used by ocean going vessels up to 3,000 DWT, provided 17 foot draft is not exceeded. It is near the area where many people are in need of food. Should Calabar port become a principal relief center of operations, it would provide many jobs, thereby helping the local economy.

Airlift to Biafra by ICRC

Following suspension of ICRC flights from Santa Isabel by the Government of Equatorial Guinea on January 6, negotiations were undertaken by ICRC for both an alternative airlift from Dahomey and for obtaining approval from the GOEG for resumption of flights from Santa Isabel. On January 28, ICRC announced that the Government of Dahomey had authorized ICRC to airlift relief goods from Cotonou to Biafra. ICRC was allotted space for three planes at Cotonou. At present ICRC planes at Cotonou are: one Transal and two DC-6s. Two relief flights were completed on February 3, carrying in 19 tons. On the night of February 5-6, six flights were completed, two by each plane. From February 3 through February 6, ICRC airlifted 151½ tons. Total previous ICRC airlifts from April 8 to January 6 from Santa Isabel were 764 flights with 7,108 tons.

ICRC plans to transfer 500 tons of supplies presently in Lagos to Cotonou and to reroute to Cotonou expected arrivals of 1,000 tons of stockfish and 440 tons of milk, cheese, other supplies as well as 1,270 metric tons of USG CSM being provided through UNICEF.

On February 12, ICRC received a letter from the Government of Equatorial Guinea agreeing to a period of 30 days for airlift of accumulated supplies still in Santa Isabel for as many flights as deemed necessary to withdraw the food, medicines and other supplies. As of January 15, ICRC had 4,690 tons of supplies (rather than 3,690 tons previously reported) at Santa Isabel. ICRC has 3 DC6B planes at Santa Isabel. Flights from Santa Isabel are now operating and planes are to continue to make nightly deliveries to Biafra. The DC-7 freighter from Sweden chartered by the Swedish Red Cross will soon leave Stockholm to join the ICRC airlift at Cotonou.

ICRC expects soon to make use of the four C-97G's purchased from the USG.

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OPERATIONS

Joint Church Aid—Sao Tome airlift to Biafra

Apart from supplies sent to Sao Tome by ship, a chartered Boeing 707 is flown from northern Europe to Sao Tome each week with about 20 tons of foods and medicines needed in Biafra. The January flights from Europe were sponsored respectively each week by: Das Diakonische, Catholic Relief Services, Caritas Suisse, and Caritas Austria.

The Canadian Superconstellation began its operations from Sao Tome on January 25 with two flights of 15 tons each; followed on January 26 with four flights of 15 tons each. This plane is part of the JCA fleet and is operated with an all Canadian crew of eight. Its maximum load is 21 tons. The Nigeria/Biafra Relief Fund of Canada, the Canadian Red Cross, UNICEF, OXFAM of Canada and the Presbyterian Church of Canada helped raise money to purchase the plane

which will cost the combined Canairelief group an estimated \$480,000 to operate for the first three months. The plane has a spare engine and enough spare parts for 3 to 4 months without major overhaul.

Four C-97G's purchased from the USG by JCA/USA are currently in operation at Sao Tome, with about a 15-18 ton capacity. The highest total of 19 flights in one night by JCA was reached on January 31 after the addition of the Canadian Superconstellation and for the four C-97G's. There were a total of 309 flights in January carrying 2,821 tons of supplies. The 19 flights on January 31 carried 192.4 tons and JCA expressed the hope of being able to airlift an average of 200 tons of supplies per night by the middle of February.

JCA has been experiencing problems at the Uli airstrip. Unloading is being delayed because strong workers have been largely replaced by young, weak and undernourished ones (which may be attributable to military mobilization of the stronger). JCA is pressing Biafrans to assure availability of workers capable of unloading the planes. Also the strip has been bombed on several occasions and there has been some damage to JCA aircraft.

Supplies flown from Sao Tome to the Uli airstrip are divided up for distribution by Catholic and Protestant groups. These two groups have agreed that one night the supplies will be picked up and distributed by the Protestant groups and the next night by the Catholic groups. The Catholic group reported that it had 20 trucks in operation. They load up the material at the airfield and deliver it to Ihioma, about 20 miles from Uli. From there, smaller vehicles go out to four centers—sub-centers—and from these sub-centers into the feeding centers. There is practically no reserve of relief supplies. As fast as the materials come in, they are sent to the centers and are distributed. Each pound of relief supplies costs something over 12 cents for transport into Biafra, including the cost of getting them to Sao Tome. Maintenance, stock installations and repairs then bring the total costs of operation up to about 30 percent of the value of the supplies themselves.

A representative of Diakonisches Werk Stuttgart (German Protestant group), who serves as coordinator of food planning for JCA/Sao Tome stated that 17,650 tons of assorted foodstuffs were required for the two months of February and March for the Sao Tome operation, of which 7,650 tons had been pledged by various groups.

JCA flights from February 1 to 5 totaled 54 with 564.6 tons. Eight of these were C-97G flights. Six other C-97G flights had been made prior to February 1.

Caritas International

CI reports that Caritas Austria has sent to Sao Tome for delivery to Biafra a complete prefabricated children's hospital with equipment at a cost of \$52,000. Caritas Austria has also sent 21 tons of canned meat and 1.3 tons of specially fortified baby food valued at \$27,000 for a total of \$79,000.

U.S. voluntary agencies

The following are new contributions since January 15 report, and reflect information received from the volags prior to February 15:

American Red Cross.—Approximately 1 ton of emergency kits containing rations, tablets for purifying drinking water, valued at \$1,511.

International Rescue Committee, Inc.—Contributed drugs and medical supplies for the Nov. 6ths chartered flight to Biafra coordinated by the Biafra Relief Services Foundation and B'nai Brith, valued at \$179,000.

Seventh-Day Adventist Welfare Service.—Provided an X-Ray Unit, \$3,000.

Medical assistance program.—Value reported Jan. 15 report for 6 tons of medical supplies was only the handling charge. Report has since been received indicating the total was 7 tons with a value of \$594,126.

World Ministries Commission—Church of the Brethren, Illinois.—Seven volunteer workers have been assigned to an ICRC-Lutheran Church team in Biafra. WMC has joined in sending supplies, including medicines, high protein food, metracal and beans, through Church World Service. It hopes to move additional workers from the Northern region to the war area.

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, Michigan.—Sent food and medicine for distribution through the Nigerian Christian Council to needy persons on both sides, valued at \$6,000.

Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Inc., Mass.—Has school, hospital and clinic at Awo Omamma which was disrupted by the war. The hospital is used by military personnel and the school is being used as a kwashiorkor center. They have sent emergency funds totaling \$3,500.

Mennonite Central Committee/American Friends Service Committee.—With common concerns to give relief to victims of the Nigerian war, these two agencies recently established a jointly sponsored program for Biafra. To be known as Quaker-Mennonite Service, the program will be carried out only in Biafran territory. Both agencies also work elsewhere in Nigeria, although not in conjunction with each other. The program will be initially medical and emergency relief services will be added as may be necessary and possible. Both agencies will contribute personnel, funds and supplies.

Comments from American Friends Service Committee report on team in FMG.—“Our team (a doctor, two nurses and two generalists) is a medical one responsible for medical aid up to the borders of the Southeastern and East Central states.

“The team has developed local contacts and reopened a local hospital to which we can now refer very severe cases. The bulk of the medical work takes the form of once or twice weekly bush clinics held every day except Sunday. Quite often two are held simultaneously with the doctor alternating between the clinics. Once the people hear that the clinic will be in a certain place and at a certain time, they come from far and wide.

“Local assistants and interpreters enable two expatriates and a Nigerian nurse to cope with at least 150 people and often more daily. Thus, our capacity as a team is 300 to 350 patients per day. The doctor sees everyone assembled but only gives care to those whose need is urgent. Then they follow the production line ‘en famille’;

“1. Diagnosis

“2. Dressing and injections

“3. Dispensing of tablet and pills

“4. A drink of complan for all the children, nursing mothers and sick adults.

“Our problem now lies with how to follow the advancing army and bring relief immediately. We have a good site for a ‘residential children’s feeding center’ to cope with those refugee children in an emaciated condition or with moderate kwashiorkor cases (i.e. without complications of burst skin and sores).”

The American Friends reported that Nigerian personnel trained in the medical and para-medical field are hard to find. They are in short supply and great demand even in normal times. They did find, however, a potential source of seasonal volunteer help among the university students.

Church World Service.—Recently sent 2 tons of medicines and 64 tons of beans for Biafra. The medicines were sent by air and the beans by surface. Total value of these new contributions plus CWS share of shipping costs was \$68,584.

Total new US volag contributions since January 15, \$855,721.

OTHER NATIONS

Cash donations to ICRC not previously reported:

Japan	\$83, 000
Netherlands	558, 000
Switzerland	73, 400
United Kingdom	60, 700

Supplies donated through UNICEF:

New Zealand: 7 tons from CORSO for Biafra	4, 920
Switzerland: 35 tons for Lagos	46, 500

Funds for Sao Tome airlift:

Canada: Canairelief raised funds for 3 months operation of a Superconstellation for the JCA airlift	480, 000
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Total 1, 306, 520

French relief aid to Biafra:

France has to date sent 1,200 tons food and medicines to Biafra via Gabon, of which 860 tons already delivered by night flights. France has also sent 2 medical teams totaling 12 persons to Biafra and set up a field hospital with 66 personnel in Libreville for Biafran children. French Government financial ability to support relief operations is limited and most of the support comes from private contributions.

STEPHEN R. TRIPP,
Disaster Relief Coordinator.

SECTION I. EVACUATION AND CARE OF NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN CHILDREN

There is a great deal of interest in the plight of Biafran children. For this reason as much information as is presently available has been drawn together on the evacuation and care of children.

Within African traditional family relationships, there are no "orphans," because the extended family system involves all relatives in bringing up the children. Nigerian children without their parents or relatives are referred to as "unclaimed" and not as "orphans."

In Biafra, the regime has consistently maintained that the children are not to go out of the country under anyone else's juridical control. Even though some children have been evacuated, the leaders have never been enthusiastic and have stated they are only temporarily outside of Biafra. There is also a strong reluctance to allow children to be admitted into private homes. It has been emphasized by Biafran authorities that they want the programs for the care of children to be operated within Biafra.

Policy statements on concern for children of Nigeria/Biafra were issued in October and November 1968 by Church World Service and Caritas International. These emphasize the importance of respect for the wishes of the families; return of evacuated children to their own families and environment; programs for nutrition, medical care and rehabilitation treatment in Biafra; and lastly the consideration of individual problems of homeless children that could be effectively met by temporary institutional care in neighboring countries when it is in the child's best interest medically, psychologically and socially, and when his right to return is assured.

Generally, child welfare specialists recommend that children not be removed from the environment in which they will have to live and grow up. There had been little or no evacuation of children from Biafra until the circumstances of relief and arms planes made transportation available. First came reports from pilots and crews who told of people thrusting babies and small children into the planes. Some were flown out. This resulted in children arriving outside Biafra and neither their names nor village of origin were known. After this, the Biafran regime allowed a small number of children to be transported to nearby countries—those which had recognized Biafra such as Gabon and Ivory Coast—for temporary care until the end of the hostilities.

Gabon

As of the end of January 1969, about 2,250 Biafran children had been placed outside of Biafra. Libreville, Gabon, is the principal place where Biafran children are being received. A Committee for the Care of Biafran Children in Gabon with President Bongo as its ex-officio head, was created and is in charge of Biafran children in Gabon.

Upon arrival, the Biafran children are taken immediately to a French Army field hospital which was specifically flown to Libreville for this purpose. It is set up on a sandy beach near the airfield. In January it was under command of a pediatrician assisted by 14 other doctors and 50 nurses from the French military and 6 Biafran nurses. At the hospital, arrangements have been made to accept supplies other than from the French Government, such as the French Red Cross. By stretching every capability, the hospital has been extended to take care of 300 children.

Because of acute difficulties during the hot rainy season, French military hospital directors are anxious to move the children out of tents and off sand floors into more adequate, comfortable and sanitary accommodations. Plans are being made to construct more permanent buildings and to convert the hospital to civilian administration, as it is expected to be needed for some time. Construction is slated for two barrack buildings near the field hospital site. Charitable organizations have recently donated a new almost completed building for pharmacy and laboratory.

After the children receive initial treatment at the French military field hospital and when they are able, they are moved to child centers in Gabon and Ivory Coast.

In Libreville, Terre des Hommes operates two centers that are filled to capacity with 450 children.

The facilities at the Schweitzer Hospital at Lambarene have been opened to a small number of Biafran children, estimated 20 to 30. This medical facility has received private and public financial help from the United States.

In and nearby Libreville, there are small numbers of Biafran children at various Catholic Missions. There are also children at Catholic Missions Franceville (30), Oyem (45), Bitam (50), and Lambarene (34).

The Order of Malta is taking care of about 30 Biafran children at Mouila.

The German Catholic and Protestant relief agencies, Deutscher Caritas Verband and Das Diakonische Werk, as part of Joint Church Aid, started in November 1968 to provide facilities for Biafran children in Libreville. They are now taking care of approximately 200 children. The Gabonese Red Cross plays a support role but does not operate any center. The French Red Cross role is to sponsor and supplement the French military hospital, to advise on the children's airlift and to provide medical and relief personnel in Biafra itself.

Various other voluntary agencies are assisting with the care of the children, providing facilities, and in assisting on plans to expand to meet expected increases in the number of Biafran children. None expect that there will be a large increase, but indications are that facilities for about 2000 to 3000 more are in the planning or construction stages.

Terres des Hommes, acting on behalf of itself with \$40,975, "Movement Mondial des Meres" with a like amount, and the Gabonese Red Cross with \$20,487, plan to construct a new center south of Libreville on land donated by the Government of Gabon. If this total of about \$101,000 is assured, the new center could be built to hold 500 children. It is not yet known when work will begin.

At the German Caritas-German Protestant center, six buildings are already complete. Capacity is expanding at an approximate rate of 50 beds per week and construction will continue until 1,000 can be accommodated and further expansion is envisaged to at least 2,000. Staff housing on site is also to be constructed. Cost of the center for 1,000 children is estimated at \$1.3 million. The Center now manned by two German doctors with the assistance of Biafran nurses and teachers. More nurses and teachers are being sent from Biafra by Caritas International representatives as the center expands. Plans call for 10 doctors, some Biafran.

Biafran authorities appear satisfied with children's relief effort in Gabon, but believe that the best solution to problem lies in focusing on the development of the main child care program within Biafra itself.

It is reported that the voluntary agencies in Gabon refuse to assume any legal responsibility for any of the Biafran children. They are willing to give material assistance but don't feel they can be held legally responsible.

Sao Tome

Even though the agencies representing Joint Church Aid are in principle against the evacuation of children from Biafra, they are providing airlift to Sao Tome and back and help with facilities there. The Governor of Sao Tome has agreed to the entry of 150 children. It is reported that there are adequate facilities to take up to 250 children. All children are received at a hospital. When they are able, they are transferred to rest centers—several are in operation. As the children reach a good degree of health, many of them are taken back to their families and villages in Biafra and additional children are brought to Sao Tome for medical and rehabilitative care and return. Some of the rest centers are being supported by the Joint Church Aid, Catholic and NORDCHURCHAID groups. Reports indicate that these organizations are making a contribution equivalent to \$2.50 to \$3.50 a day for the children.

Ivory Coast

Most of the Biafran children now in the Ivory Coast have been transferred there from Gabon. Order of Malta flights have taken about 300 children from Libreville to Ivory Coast. These flights were halted in late January, and are supposed to resume as soon as additional centers are ready. As of January 21, the only center capable of receiving children in Ivory Coast was at Bouake where a 390-bed center is functioning. Recently a child center at Cocody was completed with accommodations for 300 additional children, but as of February 15 it had not been opened for use. Future plans call for facilities for 1300 to 1500 children in Ivory Coast.

When the children are transferred to the Ivory Coast, they are accepted by the Ivorian Red Cross.

Recently an ad hoc group of doctors and nurses from the United States has agreed to serve at the children's center at Bouake. The recruitment of medical teams for work in Ivory Coast clinics helping Biafran children has been undertaken by the Medical Support Program for Biafra/Nigeria begun by Michael Reese of Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston and Edward Barton, who directs student activities at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University.

Mr. Barton and several doctors have been in Abidjan to work out arrangements for a series of doctors and nurses to circulate from the U.S. to Ivory Coast so as

to provide professional health-rehabilitation for the children. This group also plans to provide medical equipment, supplies and drugs to support the work of the doctors.

The New York Times of February 9 reported the formation of a group named "ABC—Aid for Biafran Children," under the direction of Norman Cousins, Editor of the Saturday Review, assisted by Dr. Pope. Its purpose is to concentrate on mobile teams in Biafra. Reportedly this action was taken because Biafran authorities have cooled to the mass evacuation of children, which is confirmed in other statements in this report.

If the average cost for the recuperative care of the children is \$3.00 a day each, the international voluntary agencies are now providing for 2,250 children at a monthly cost of over \$200,000, or \$2,400,000 a year. There are no cost figures available on the construction costs for the centers and hospitals or the maintenance costs.

Individuals and ad hoc representatives of voluntary agencies have recently visited other African nations to encourage them to receive and provide recuperative care for Biafran children. Talks have reportedly been conducted in Dahomey, Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia. Indications are that these talks have little chance of developing into plans and facilities for the children. Any one of these actions would require doctors and paramedical personnel, administrators, facilities and large amounts of money.

Despite indications that conditions for children have improved in Biafra, observers continue to report large numbers remain in sick and famished condition. Although evacuation may be indicated in certain cases and could be considered in adjunct to other measures, it appears obvious that the main thrust of aid for children must be to provide food and medical care for them in Biafra.

SECTION II. NUTRITIONAL STUDY—NIGERIA

This report on the nutritional study is especially important. The description of the plan has been received from the U.S. Public Health Service/National Communicable Disease Center team on detail to ICRC and is summarized below. The results are significant and may serve as an important factor in life saving, serving the nutritionally needy, and determining the quantity and types of food required.

Pilot project

In the Federal areas affected by the war, it has been obvious for some time that a better system is needed to identify people suffering from malnutrition and in need of supplemental food and those who require medical evaluation and treatment.

In December, the U.S. Public Health Service, National Communicable Disease Center team, on detail to ICRC, directed a nutritional survey of areas around Ikot Ibritam in the Southeastern State. Within a radius of 3 to 5 miles of Ikot Ibritam are 21 villages with an estimated population of 15,000, 20% being displaced persons caused by the civil war. In this area, the doctors set up the pilot project, the objectives of which were to—

1. Develop screening procedures capable of identifying persons who—
 - (a) Require food supplements,
 - (b) Require medical evaluation, and
 - (c) Those who do not require food supplements or medical evaluation;
2. Set up a food distribution program for the group requiring food supplements; and
3. Establish an in-patient Nutritional Treatment Center for patients requiring nutritional care.

At the start of the survey, the team made standard statistical measures based on cluster samples taken in each village. Within these clusters the screening process was conducted. Six Nigerian helpers were trained to record, weigh and measure, vaccinate with smallpox vaccine, and issue cards. Each team can screen 2,000 people a day. The doctors prepared a "Height/Weight Screening Chart for Malnutrition." The chart had the following columns: "Patient requires individual medical evaluation;" "Stamped card holder entitled to weekly food supplements;" and "No card for food supplements." The chart also contained instructions that "All patients get card for milk for mother or food for baby," and "All obviously pregnant women get weekly food supplement."

The survey demonstrated that from a therapeutic and preventive viewpoint food supplements are required for all children in the 0 to 4 age group, and that

50% of these children required medical evaluation. In addition, all children under 40 inches in height required weekly food supplements.

At each food distribution point a short talk was given on use of the imported foods such as the CSM (corn, soy, milk formula), the dry powdered milk, food preparation, and the importance of food being shared with the children.

At the Nutritional Treatment Centers each patient was given a milk, sugar and oil mixture, in addition to prepared meals.

This pilot nutritional study indicated that the screening technique is rapid and can be conducted by non-medical personnel. It is sufficiently accurate to use as a basis for planning and deciding on geographic priorities. The screening process assures that virtually all of the nutritional needy will be detected. Most importantly, the individual screening techniques are essential for more precise and useful food distribution. This could save vast quantities of food and at the same time give systematic assurance that the food is getting to those who need it for survival and return to normal health. In addition, the survey emphasizes the necessity to take action to establish Nutritional Treatment Centers for advanced malnutrition cases. Without complicated facilities proper nutritional therapy can be given on a mass approach basis making use of locally available personnel and facilities.

ICRC has accepted this plan and with a team of nutritionists from the U.S. Public Health Service, National Communicable Disease Center, under the ICRC medical field coordinator, implementation in the Federal areas is underway.

Concurrently, the ICRC medical/relief teams and those engaged in the nutritional study have initiated a surveillance system to report on the condition of the people and the number of deaths. A future professional study is under Red Cross consideration to analyze the traumatic affect of hunger, health deterioration, and civil war.

SECTION III. MEDICAL/HEALTH SITUATION AND DRUG REQUIREMENTS— NIGERIA/BIAFRA

This section deals with some phases of the health situation in Biafra, the number of hospitals, doctors and drugs. There is included a list of basic drugs which is intended to serve as a guide for voluntary agencies and pharmaceutical companies planning the donation or procurement of drugs for Nigeria/Biafra.

Health situation inside Biafra

Recent reports from Ihiala, the areas around Uli airstrip, and in relief centers, indicate that there has been an observable decrease in kwashiorkor among children. Many children reportedly have recovered after receiving the needed protein. This is a real accomplishment, but it could be quickly reversed unless the children continue to receive protein in their diets. One other recent report indicated kwashiorkor among adults. To stabilize and maintain the health of the people, their diets must include high protein foods and carbohydrates totalling a minimum of 1500 calories a day. This calorie figure is used as an estimate for planning purposes because of differences between adults and children requirements, lack of accurate population figures, and other factors.

The following is quoted from the Saturday, February 15, 1969, issue of the Washington Post: "Radio Biafra, meanwhile, reported that international relief efforts have cut the death rate inside the secessionist territory from 10,000 deaths daily to 1,000."

Medical facilities in Biafra

There are no cumulative reports on the number of hospitals, clinics and health centers operating in Biafra. One report states that schools and public buildings are being used for medical purposes which until recently has stopped schooling for the children.

Indications are that 11 hospitals are functioning in Biafra: Aboh Joint Hospital, Aboh Mbaise; Awo Omama Community Hospital; Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Umuahia; Ihiala Catholic Mission Hospital; Amaigbo Joint Hospital; Itigiti Hospital; Arochukwu General Hospital; North Ngwa County Hospital; and hospitals at Okpala, Ihioma, and Abiriba.

The American Friends Service Committee have joined with the Mennonite Central Committee to administer the Abiriba Joint Hospital in Abiriba serving 3/4 to 1 million Biafrans, in an out-patient and feeding program.

Caritas International from Austria recently announced the dispatch from Vienna to Sao Tome for Biafra of a complete prefabricated children's hospital

with equipment. The hospital, which is valued at \$52,000, left Vienna on January 16, and was scheduled to arrive at Sao Tome on January 24, and is believed to be in Biafra at this time.

Doctors and paramedical personnel in Biafra

Many Ibo medical and paramedical personnel from all over Nigeria returned to Biafra during the time of the secession movement. Some of the voluntary agency doctors and nurses also remained in order to continue their work at hospitals and relief centers. These doctors and paramedical personnel are serving the people. Need for doctors has not emerged as a major request by Biafran authorities. There has been no report of a worldwide appeal for doctors and nurses for Biafra.

Drugs for Biafra

There is a continuing need for drugs in Biafra. One problem is that there are no known means for manufacturing biologicals in Biafra.

International voluntary agencies and other countries report the delivery to Biafra in the last 7-8 months of 61 tons of medicine and related supplies at an estimated value of \$1.5 million. Medicines, biologicals and medical supplies from American drug firms donated through or purchased by U.S. voluntary agencies during the same time period are reported at 43 tons with a value of approximately \$1.2 million.

These drugs were delivered to Biafra by the ICRC airlift from Santa Isabel, Fernando Po and the Joint Church Aid airlift from Sao Tome.

Value of drugs from U.S. voluntary agencies not previously reported: from International Rescue Committee, Inc., for Biafra drugs valued at \$179,000.

When the threat of measles/smallpox was reported in November, AID worked through ICRC to provide \$300,000 for vaccines, and UNICEF donated 100,000 doses of vaccine valued at \$50,000. ICRC arranged for a doctor to work on the immunization program. In addition to the vaccine, ped-o-jet inoculators and other essential supplies were obtained and delivered. The immunization program is underway and is continuing successfully. On February 14, AID authorized an additional donation of \$300,000 to ICRC to continue the delivery of measles and smallpox vaccine.

Health situation in Nigeria

Reports from the ICRC medical/relief teams and the U.S. health advisers state that the severe malnutrition cases have been reduced. The populations receiving high protein and other foods through the ICRC food distribution system which is nearing an average of 1,000 tons a week to 900,000 people, has definitely made the difference. Application of the nutritional screening process and the functioning of sufficient treatment centers are expected to contain and eventually control further health deterioration. The most important thing is the ability to distribute food to the displaced and destitute population. This can change from day to day due to war conditions, and therefore requires constant vigilance and long-range plans with adequate stockpiles of essential foods and drugs.

The following list of drugs is based upon reports from the ICRC medical/relief teams and U.S. Public Health Service advisers in Nigeria, and upon observations from inside Biafra. Officials of the American National Red Cross, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, and the U.S. Public Health Service in Washington participated in the review of the original listing and in the preparation of this revised list. For estimating purposes, a population of one million people in the war-affected areas was chosen. Screening and other surveys indicate that 50 to 60 percent of the people would require medication. The quantities recorded are planned to treat 552,000 patients in relief camps, treatment centers and clinics. It is assumed that these drugs would supply 23 health teams over a period of 3 months. The value of these drugs is estimated at \$300,000.

Registered voluntary agencies and the American National Red Cross may be contacted directly on the donation and shipping of drugs. Transportation is a critical item that also involves customs clearances and proper care of the drugs. All shipments must be cleared in advance and scheduled for arrival by the International Committee of the Red Cross or Joint Church Aid. Nothing should be sent to Sao Tome for Biafra without prior clearance with JCA/USA which can be reached in care of CRS, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10001, phone area code 212 594-9300. Those assuming independent action must take on full responsibility from origin to user.

List of drugs for relief camps, treatment centers, and clinics in Nigeria/Biafra

[Quantities estimated for 552,000 people for 3 months]

		Quantity
1. Aspirin, 5 grams 1000 tablets per bottle	bottles	600
2. Iron-ferrous sulphate, 1000 tablets per bottle	do	600
Imferan (inj.) 2 cc., 10 ampules per box	boxes	60
3. Multivitamin preparations:		
a. 250 tablet per bottle	bottles	240
b. Suspension—pediatric	gallons	10
c. Injectable	ampules	10, 000
d. Vitamin C	tablets	5, 000
e. Chewables—pediatrics		500, 000
4. Anti-malarial preparations:		
a. Tablets, 250 mgm., 100 per bottle	bottles	600
b. Ampules, injectable	ampules	10, 000
c. Suspension—pediatric, pints or gallons	gallons	16
5. Triple sulfa preparations:		
a. Tablets, 7L grains, 1000 tablets per bottle	bottles	400
b. Suspension—pediatrics, pints	pints	100
c. Gantricin tablets, 100 per bottle	bottles	100
6. Anti-helmenthics preparation Povon:		
a. Tablets, 50 mgms., 1,000 tablets per bottle	bottles	200
b. Liquid—pediatrics, 2-4 ounces per bottle	do	20, 000
7. Tetracycline products:		
a. Capsules, 250 mgm., 100 per bottle	do	24, 000
b. Injectable, vials, 1 vial per dose	vials	160, 000
c. Suspension—pediatrics, pints or gallons	gallons	500
8. Penicillin preparations:		
a. Ampecillin, 250 mgm. capsules	capsules	100, 000
b. Suspension, 125 mgm., 1 bottle	bottles	16, 000
c. Procaine penicillin, 300,000 units	tubes	1, 000
Procaine penicillin, 600,000 units	do	25, 000
Procaine penicillin, 2,400,000 units	do	15, 000
d. U.K. tablets, 250 mgm., tablets	tablets	32, 000
9. Ophthalmic/topical preparation:		
a. Chloromyceton ophthalmic gtts	bottles	20, 000
b. Neosporin ophthalmic ointment	tubes	44, 000
c. Neosporin topical cream	do	12, 000
d. Kwell cream (topical)	do	25, 000
e. Sulfur ointment, 10 percent	do	10, 000
f. Sulfur ointment, 5 percent	do	5, 000
10. Disinfectants:		
a. Phisohex liquid, 6-ounce bottle	gallons	96
b. Bar soap—phisohex, cake	cakes	10, 000
11. Anti-diarrheals preparations:		
a. Kaopectate, 16 ounces per bottle	bottles	20, 000
b. Lomatol, 2.5 mgm. tablet	tablets	10, 000
c. Paregoric, 2-ounce bottles	ounces	4, 000
12. Analgesics:		
Aspirin—codeine, 30 mgm. tablet	tablets	25, 000
Codeine, 30 mgm. tablets	do	10, 000
13. Anti-acid:		
a. Tablets	do	200, 000
b. Liquid, 8 ounces	bottles	10, 000
c. Liquid, 12 ounces	do	20, 000
14. Bandages, adhesive, etc.:		
a. Bandaids, box of 100	boxes	20, 000
b. Bandage, 4-inch roller, 12 dozen per package	packages	600
c. Bandage, 3-inch roller, 12 dozen per package	do	600
d. Surgical adhesive tape, assorted widths, roll	rolls	100
e. Elastic bandage, 2 x 6 yards, 12's to package	packages	12
15. Need drugs envelopes for dispensing		500, 000
Bottles, assorted sizes for dispensing		200, 000
Syringe/needle glaspak, disp. 10 to box	boxes	200
Needles, No. 22/24 per dozen	dozen	144

List of items for relief camps, treatment centers, and clinics in Vietnam, Burma

Quantities estimated for 552,000 people for 8 months

Quantity		
400	bottles	Aspirin, 5 grains, 1000 tablets per bottle
400	do	do
80	boxes	Infant tablets, 2 cc, 10 ampoules per box
		Antibiotic preparations:
210	bottles	a. 250 tablet per bottle
10	gallons	b. Suspension—pediatric
10,000	ampoules	c. Injectable
5,000	tablets	d. Vitamin C
500,000		e. Chloramphenicol—pediatric
		Antibacterial preparations:
800	bottles	a. Tablets, 250 mgm., 100 per bottle
10,000	ampoules	b. Ampoules, injectable
10	gallons	c. Suspension—pediatric, pint or gallons
		Antitubercular preparations:
400	bottles	a. Tablets, 75 grains, 1000 tablets per bottle
100	pints	b. Suspension—pediatric, pints
100	bottles	c. Gentamicin tablets, 100 per bottle
		Antitubercular preparation: Papan
200	bottles	a. Tablets, 50 mgms., 1,000 tablets per bottle
20,000	do	b. Liquid—pediatric, 2-4 ounces per bottle
		Tetracycline products:
24,000	do	a. Capsules, 250 mgm., 100 per bottle
100,000	vials	b. Injectable, vials, 1 vial per dose
500	gallons	c. Suspension—pediatric, pint or gallons
		Penicillin preparations:
100,000	capsules	a. Ampicillin, 250 mgm. capsules
10,000	bottles	b. Suspension, 125 mgm., 1 bottle
1,000	boxes	c. Procaine penicillin, 300,000 units
25,000	do	Procaine penicillin, 600,000 units
15,000	do	Procaine penicillin, 2,400,000 units
32,000	tablets	d. U.K. Tablets, 250 mgm. tablets
		Ophthalmic/ocular preparation:
20,000	bottles	a. Chloramphenicol ophthalmic gts.
44,000	tubes	b. Neosporin ophthalmic ointment
15,000	do	c. Neosporin topical cream
25,000	do	d. Kwell cream (topical)
10,000	do	e. Salicyl ointment, 10 percent
5,000	do	f. Salicyl ointment, 5 percent
		Disinfectants:
98	gallons	a. Phisohex liquid, 6-ounce bottle
10,000	cases	b. Bar soap—phisohex, case
		Antidysentery preparations:
20,000	bottles	a. Kapectate, 16 ounces per bottle
10,000	tablets	b. Lomotil, 2.5 mgm. tablet
4,000	ounces	c. Paragard, 2-ounce bottles
		Analgesics:
25,000	tablets	Aspirin—codeine, 30 mgm. tablet
10,000	do	Codone, 30 mgm. tablets
		Antacid:
200,000	do	a. Tablets
10,000	bottles	b. Liquid, 8 ounces
20,000	do	c. Liquid, 12 ounces
		Bandages, adhesive, etc.:
20,000	boxes	a. Bandaid, box of 100
500	packages	b. Bandage, 4-inch roller, 12 dozen per package
500	do	c. Bandage, 3-inch roller, 12 dozen per package
100	rolls	d. Surgical adhesive tape, assorted widths, roll
12	packages	e. Elastic bandage, 2 x 6 yards, 12 to package
200,000		Needle and syringe envelopes for dispensing
200,000		Needle and syringe envelopes for dispensing
300	boxes	Extreme needle syringe, disp. 10 to box
114	boxes	Needles, No. 22-24 per dozen