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EAST OF THE ELBE

REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

3
Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK

ON A

STUDY MISSION TO WARSAW, MOSCOW,
BELGRADE, AND PRAGUE



JANUARY 23, 1967

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a report on a study mission to four European countries "East of the Elbe"—Poland, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

After leaving the United States on November 12, I spent several days in Paris as a member of the Senate delegation to the 12th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. That Conference is not herein discussed, as a separate report is being submitted to the Senate by the chairman of the Senate delegation to the Conference.

The enclosed report deals with my activities from November 17 until November 30. During this period, I visited Warsaw, Moscow, Belgrade, and Prague, spending several days in each. I was accompanied by James G. Lowenstein of the committee staff whose intelligent assistance was invaluable to me and who continued on to Budapest and Bucharest on behalf of the committee after I left Prague for the Middle East.

The enclosed report consists of my observations and recommendations. I hope that they will be of assistance to the committee in its work during the coming session of the Congress.

I would like to record my gratitude to the government officials and private citizens in the countries I visited who gave so generously of their time. I would also like to thank our Ambassadors and the many officers in our Foreign Service posts abroad, who were so hospitable and helpful to me.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH S. CLARK.

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EAST OF THE ELBE

A report of a study mission to Poland, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia

(By Senator Joseph S. Clark)

I. OBSERVATIONS

1. *Eastern Europe and the war in Vietnam*

To the governments of the Communist countries of Europe, the United States is fighting two wars in Vietnam. One is the fight against a so-called "war of national liberation" in South Vietnam. The other is the war the United States is carrying on in North Vietnam—against a "Socialist ally." In the interest of "socialist solidarity," to which they are committed, and because the assistance that has been provided North Vietnam has been confined to trade and military equipment and has not included fighting men, the communist countries of Europe feel a strong obligation to lend whatever political support they can to the North Vietnamese.

Thus, in almost every conversation in Warsaw, Moscow, Belgrade, and Prague, Vietnam was quickly raised. This was the case in almost every conversation, for the subject was not broached in some talks, specifically those concerned with trade. I gather from Mr. Lowenstein that the exception would have been the rule had I continued on to Rumania.

It is difficult to define precisely to what degree the war in Vietnam impedes the development of friendly relations between the United States and the European Communist countries. It seems clear, however, that there can be no profound and pervasive improvement in our relations with the East as long as the war in Vietnam lasts. Mr. Kosygin's statement in October that it was "a strange and persistent delusion" to think that there could be closer Soviet-American cooperation as long as the war continues is taken literally and seriously by knowledgeable observers (Mr. Kosygin is reported to be personally bitter about the bombing of North Vietnam because it began while he and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, with whom I talked on my trip, were on a visit to Hanoi). Nevertheless, it appears that there could be some improvement in economic relations and, to a lesser degree, in educational and cultural relations. Even in the political field, progress seems to be possible where a specific agreement, like a nonproliferation agreement or an outer space agreement, is considered to be of overriding importance.

The political support now being given North Vietnam is centered on the demand that the United States stop bombing the North, a demand I heard wherever I went. But whenever I asked what result would follow, I was told only that, in the first place, "the atmosphere would be greatly improved" and that, in the second place, while the bombing

continued there was no hope of starting negotiations because the North Vietnamese could not agree to negotiate "with a gun pressed in their backs." I argued in every conversation that the United States had stopped the bombing twice before and that the only result had been increased infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam which had naturally resulted in additional American casualties. I made it clear that I did not think that the United States could be expected to suffer the same disadvantage again and reap no return from a prolonged bombing pause. I inquired in every conversation in which Vietnam was discussed whether it was possible that some signal, and I emphasized that it could be a private signal, could be received indicating that if we stopped bombing, the other side would be willing to start talking. My conversations convinced me that there was no prospect of receiving any such signal through the Eastern Europeans or Soviets.

In fact, the European Communist countries do not seem to be willing to act as intermediaries in the Vietnam conflict as long as we continue to bomb North Vietnam. The Soviets seem most adamant on this point. Furthermore, the Soviets would probably not be willing to act in this capacity even if the bombing were ended. At issue, obviously, are Soviet relations with Communist China and the whole complex of relationships within the communist world revolving around Sino-Soviet issues. The Eastern Europeans are in a much more flexible position to act and seem willing to do so if the bombing is stopped.

Nevertheless, the Soviets, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, apparently genuinely want to see the war end on almost any conditions. They are fearful that what has been a localized conflict may spread and threaten a new world war. They would like to proceed with the process of normalizing their relations with the West and the war in Vietnam is an obstacle to doing so. Finally, the Soviet leaders would like to devote more of their resources to improving Soviet living standards and less to defense. But they apparently do not feel that they can do so at a time of international tension, and the war in Vietnam is one of the principal causes of this tension.

Throughout my trip I asked why the North Vietnamese seem unwilling to negotiate, despite the fact that they thereby run the risk of seeing their country far more severely damaged by American bombing. The consensus of the replies received was that:

(1) The North Vietnamese are convinced that the United States will eventually tire of the war and simply withdraw;

(2) The effect of bombing is greatly overestimated in the United States; an underdeveloped country like North Vietnam has a certain invulnerability because of its primitiveness.

Despite the strains in relationships between most of the Communist countries of Europe, on the one hand, and Communist China, on the other, the European Communist countries I visited do not seem to regard the war as a measure which will result in blocking Chinese expansion or inhibiting Chinese influence. On the contrary, they believe that by continuing the war the United States is playing into the hands of the Chinese who are delighted to see the United States tied down in Vietnam, rejoice at American losses in men and material and feel that the United States is isolating itself, even from its allies. Furthermore, those to whom I talked apparently believe that the

Communist leaders of Vietnam, in both the North and the South, will probably not become Chinese dominated, although they think that the chances of this result are increased the longer the war continues.

It is my impression, based on very superficial evidence, that while the war in Vietnam is a major preoccupation of officials and the politically aware and active elite in Eastern Europe, the claim often heard there that the people of these countries are all outraged at the war is somewhat specious. Nevertheless, to people who have suffered the horrors of war and invasion, photographs and films of the war, many of American origin, do not enhance the American reputation.

2. *Eastern Europe and Germany*

While Eastern European leaders are concerned about Vietnam, they seem to be virtually preoccupied with the subject of Germany. The losses suffered at the hands of Germany—particularly by the Russians, Poles, and Yugoslavs—have caused a mistrust and fear that 20 years of peace have tempered but not ended. This fear has given some Eastern European governments a powerful hold on their people. It has also apparently affected attitudes toward the United States, for it is felt that we, in the name of anticommunism, have rearmed Germany. As one high Eastern European official said to me: "U.S. policy in Europe appears to be the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and vice versa."

Many in Eastern Europe feel that the West Germans have been the main block to detente in Europe. (It should be noted that most of my travel in Eastern Europe occurred before the new German Government had taken office.) The Poles regard the German refusal to accept the present Polish boundaries and the Czechs the German refusal to denounce the Munich Agreement of 1938 *from its inception* (a position toward which Chancellor Kiesinger moved by announcing on December 13 that the Munich Agreement "is no longer valid") as the principal obstacles to a "normalization" of relations.

Eastern Europeans also claim that it is the West Germans who stand in the way of disarmament. Thus it is West Germany's refusal to renounce interest in a hypothetical multilateral nuclear force that is regarded as having prevented a nonproliferation agreement. And the Eastern Europeans seem to be convinced that it is the West Germans, and not as we apparently contend the French, who are the chief obstacle to the recent Polish-Czech proposal to the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit their reactors to the Agency's inspection if the West Germans will also do so.

Nevertheless, despite abnormal political relations with Germany, trade ties have grown rapidly, and West Germany is now every Eastern European country's most important trading partner outside the Communist world. As this trade serves the interests of both parties, it will undoubtedly continue to grow which, happily, can only serve to hasten the process of reconciliation.

3. *Eastern Europe and France*

While relations between West Germany and the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, are thus far from normal, and many years will pass before they are, French relations with these countries seem to be showing a marked and rapid improvement. The

Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union seem to have been only too eager to grasp the opportunity that President de Gaulle has offered. President de Gaulle is certainly not the only Western leader, or even the first, to state an intention to improve relations with the East. But because of the way that he has gone about putting this policy into effect, he is the one who has earned the credit for what is now being done in the West to relax the tensions of the cold war. As one experienced Western diplomat, not French, said to me: "Everything that is 'detentish' in Eastern Europe is now described as 'Gaullist'."

While there has been a notable increase in French cultural influence (there are many more French artists, singers, writers, musicians, and theater groups touring Eastern Europe than in the past) and some increase in French trade (although France is still behind West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy in trade with the East), the main result of De Gaulle's reach eastward has been a certain psychological advantage: in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the French are apparently regarded as the best disposed among the Western powers to improve relations with the East. It seems likely that this predisposition will be translated into further commercial, cultural and—eventually—political advantages.

It was interesting to note that President de Gaulle seems to be popular not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Soviet Union. It was suggested by some experienced foreign observers that one reason for this popularity is the fact that he has refrained from yielding to the temptation to make any obvious effort to split the Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union. Thus, his first trip to the East was not to Poland, Rumania, or Yugoslavia—countries in which French cultural interest is traditionally strong—but rather to the Soviet Union. Perhaps this has made it possible for the Eastern European countries to be more comfortable in developing their relations with France, knowing that such a policy will not conflict with maintaining good relations with the Soviets.

In sum, for reasons difficult to define precisely, President de Gaulle has been able to capture the initiative in East-West relations. Some of those to whom I talked ascribed his success to the fact that De Gaulle gives the impression of being primarily interested in Europe and willing to "engage himself" in bringing the Continent back together again. Others are impressed by the fact that President de Gaulle seems to have a clearer idea of what he wants and how to achieve it than other Western leaders. As one high-ranking Eastern European official remarked to me: "At least Gaullist policy is a policy."

4. Eastern Europe and disarmament

Discussing disarmament questions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is somewhat like being lost in a maze. A path of discussion appears to lead to concurrence but the way is blocked before the end is reached. I have often had the same impression in discussions on this subject in Washington where paths to agreement appear open in discussions with representatives of one government agency but where obstacles appear as soon as other agencies are involved.

Suffice it to say, that on such a key issue as inspection, the Eastern European attitude appears to be that inspection is a symptom and not a cause—that is, that if the United States were serious about

concluding disarmament agreements, inspection would not be an obstacle. I do not agree with the argument that inspection should follow disarmament but not accompany it, except perhaps with regard to a comprehensive test ban agreement. In that case, we now seem to be isolated, even from many of our Western allies. It seems to be the general consensus among foreign scientists, and even many American scientists, that the only underground explosions not now susceptible to seismic detection, as distinct from on-site inspection, are so insignificant as to be unimportant. This is the Soviet view. But if this position is scientifically demonstrable, why do Soviet scientists refuse to meet with our experts to discuss the issue?

The Polish-Czech offer to the IAEA to put their reactors under IAEA inspection provided that West Germany will do the same has already been mentioned. The proposal, which was made to the IAEA General Conference in September, seems to be a laudable one. The objections to it appear to be in the West, and not in the East; they are apparently based on an insistence on exclusive regional Euratom safeguard procedures. This seems a rather narrow ground for objection when measured against the possibility of extending international on-site inspection to two Eastern countries which have never accepted it before. In fact, with the exception of Yugoslavia, none of the Communist countries of Europe has heretofore been willing to accept on-site inspection.

This opportunity is one the West should grasp. It breaks the barrier of on-site inspection, a barrier that has blocked East-West disarmament agreements for decades. And by doing so it raises the possibility that, at some point in the future, even the Soviets themselves may accept on-site inspection.

A nonproliferation agreement has also been mentioned previously in this report. There is no question in my mind that such an agreement is within reach. A senior Western diplomat remarked to me that the Soviets always decide when the right psychological moment has come to act. They appear to have decided that the moment has now arrived to conclude a nonproliferation agreement. Others in Eastern Europe are certainly ready to follow the Soviet lead.

Mutual troop withdrawals, atom free zones in Central Europe, nuclear freezes, and the like are all of great interest to Eastern Europeans. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki and Polish Party Leader Gomulka have, of course, made specific proposals on these subjects. While I am opposed to unilateral American troop reductions in West Germany, it does seem that it may well be possible for the United States, in consultation with our allies, and the Soviet Union to agree on mutual reductions of forces when the time is propitious. The time is unfortunately not now propitious because there can be no Soviet participation in such an agreement while the war in Vietnam continues. The Soviets would not want to be put in a position of being accused of entering into an agreement with the United States which would allow the United States to transfer troops from Europe to Vietnam.

Perhaps most important and certainly most imminent of all East-West disarmament problems is the question of antiballistic missile systems or ABM's. In his state of the Union message, the President stated that in the past year the Soviet Union "has begun to place

near Moscow a limited antimissile defense." He went on to remark that any additional arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States "would impose on our peoples and on all mankind an additional waste of resources with no gain in security to either side." He then announced that he would "seek the advice of Congress about the possibilities of international agreements affecting this problem."

The President's sober and sensible decision to see whether we can avoid an ABM race should be commended. Developing and deploying an effective ABM system involves not only serious financial burdens but other, and wider, considerations as well. It implies such fundamental changes in our society as concentrating industry and population in certain areas which an ABM system would be deployed to protect. It would mean trying to turn part of the United States, but only a part, into an American fortress leaving not only the rest of our country but also the other countries of the world vulnerable, a state of affairs which would be bound to have serious political consequences in our relationships with our European allies, for example. These arguments against turning up the arms race another notch seem equally valid for the Soviet Union. Where mutual interests coincide so closely, mutual agreement must surely be possible.

5. East-West trade

America's trade with the countries of the East is relatively minute, less than 1 percent of our total trade. In part, but only in part, this trifling trade is a result of the obstacles we have erected. These obstacles include the denial of most-favored-nation privileges to the European Communist countries (except Poland and Yugoslavia), a ban on a wide variety of exports, lack of credit facilities and private boycotts. While removing these obstacles would, of course, serve to increase trade, the increase would be moderate at best. The basic problem is that the market in the United States for Eastern European exports is small, and without earning hard currency through exports the Eastern Europeans and Soviets would be hard pressed to increase their imports. A related problem is the question of long-term credits (that is, those beyond 5 years) available to the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans in Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—for example—but not in the United States. While the prospects for increased trade are thus theoretically minimal, certain individual American firms would, of course, profit greatly. In Eastern European countries there is also a great interest in increasing hard currency earnings from whatever source and however modest these earnings may be.

The point that should be emphasized, however, is that it is illogical to talk about normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries while one aspect of relations, and it is a crucial aspect, remains frozen. Trade is, after all, an important medium of communication between countries. It brings in its wake an exchange not only of information but of people as well. It forces countries to inject an element of realism into their economies. An absence of normal trade relations distorts the relationship between two countries and constitutes a barrier to communication and to the interchange of both technology and technicians.

The objections encountered in the United States to increasing our trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seem to be based on two grounds:

(1) These countries trade with our enemies, specifically Cuba and North Vietnam. Thus, to paraphrase the old Arab adage, the friend of our enemy is our enemy.

(2) Trade with the United States helps to strengthen the regimes in Eastern Europe, regimes which we want to see weakened and not strengthened.

As for the first argument, it is of course not only Eastern European countries which trade with North Vietnam and Cuba but many other countries of the world, including some of our staunchest allies. Thus, according to Commerce Department figures, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—in Europe—and Japan, Mexico and the United Arab Republic in other areas of the world, were among the countries which traded with both North Vietnam and Cuba in 1966. Other countries which traded last year with Cuba, but not to any significant degree with North Vietnam, again according to the Commerce Department, included Canada, Denmark, Finland, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, and New Zealand. Hence, were we to make the absence of trade relations with Cuba or North Vietnam a condition of good political relations with the United States, it is difficult to see how we could live with the result.

As for the argument that our trade helps to strengthen the regimes of Eastern Europe, not only is our trade with them an insignificant percentage of *our* total trade, but their trade with us is also a very small percentage of *their* total trade—less than 1 percent except for Yugoslavia and Poland. Furthermore, these Eastern countries are trading, and will continue to trade, with other Western countries so that it is not a question of cutting off a sole source of supply. Finally, these regimes do not seem to be so frail that the absence of trade with the United States will make that much difference to them—a point on which there is further comment in the section that follows on the internal situation.

There is one other aspect to the conduct of our trade with the East which was emphasized in my talks. Because we link trade to political developments, it follows that the ground rules under which we conduct trade often change. Eastern Europeans therefore regard the United States as an unreliable and capricious trading partner. Examples abound. They include the Firestone Company's action in 1965 in changing its mind at the last minute about selling Rumania a catalytic cracking plant, an action taken by Firestone because of pressure tactics used by one of its competitors. They also include a threatened withdrawal of most-favored-nation privileges from Yugoslavia and Poland in 1962.

While not strictly a trade matter, the new food-for-peace legislation is another example. It contains an amendment, inserted by the House of Representatives, disqualifying any nation which sells, furnishes, or transports "equipment, materials, or commodities" to North Vietnam or Cuba (except that if medical supplies, agricultural raw materials, or agricultural commodities are sent to Cuba, the President is given discretion to make an agreement for food for peace). The Yugoslavs do furnish "commodities" to North Vietnam. These commodities are blood, bandages, and medical supplies. They do

not trade with North Vietnam as did the countries listed earlier in this section, a list which includes 7 of our 14 NATO allies. And even the United States has, in a few cases, authorized the use of U.S. funds for the purchase of Canadian medical supplies to be sent to North Vietnam to alleviate civilian suffering (these medical supplies were then sent to North Vietnam by the Canadian Friends Service Committee on behalf of a group of American Quakers).

As for Yugoslavia's trade with Cuba, Yugoslavia exported some \$4 million worth of goods to Cuba in the period January-July 1966. This was less than the amount exported during the same period by Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, to take only the NATO countries. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's relations with Cuba are not as good now as they have been in the past. Yet the United States has picked this moment when Yugoslavia needs outside assistance as it liberalizes its economy (a step being taken in close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund) and when Yugoslav-Cuban relations are deteriorating to impose a punitive measure. Such an action seems not only inconsistent but shortsighted as well.

6. The internal situation

It is obviously impossible in a brief visit of only a few days to delve deeply into the complicated internal developments in any country. One general conclusion I reached in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, however, was that in the countries I visited, and I gather from Mr. Lowenstein in Hungary and Rumania as well, the regimes are stable in the sense that there is virtually no prospect that in any of these countries a Communist government will be replaced by a non-Communist government. It is about time that we concluded that these regimes are here to stay and that any policy aimed at weakening them is not going to achieve that result. Conversely, while a policy of building bridges may influence these regimes to move in a more liberal direction, not only in foreign policy but also in internal policy, it seems doubtful that bridge building strengthens these regimes domestically.

Volumes have been written about internal developments in each of the countries of Eastern Europe and about the wide variations among them. I will confine my brief comments to one recent development: the economic reforms being developed almost throughout Eastern Europe (Rumania being a notable exception). One of the current jokes in Eastern Europe is to the effect that while anyone can explain these economic reforms, no one can understand them. In essence, they involve changing the character of central plans from directives to guidelines, considering profit to be an index of efficiency, recognizing the importance of incentives, permitting at least some prices to be determined by supply and demand and allowing a natural relationship to develop between the prices used in foreign trade and those that apply domestically. The total effect of these reforms will be to make the economies more flexible and free them from the rigid planning requirements of previous days. Since economics and politics are so closely connected, it seems inevitable that a certain political relaxation is bound to follow from this economic loosening up.

The speed at which these economic reforms are implemented varies, of course, from country to country. There is often no correlation between movement in what we would call a progressive—and indeed

a quasi-capitalistic—direction internally and movement away from orthodoxy in foreign policy. Thus, for example, while the Czechs are now moving rapidly in the field of economic reform, they follow an orthodox foreign policy line. The Rumanians, on the other hand, are developing a highly unorthodox foreign policy but have not even begun to institute economic reforms similar to those being instituted in almost all other Eastern European countries.

It would serve no useful purpose in this report to dwell at any length on the authoritarian character of the regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say that they are not yet free societies in our terms (socially, economically, politically, or even culturally); that they are still controlled by their respective Communist parties; that repression is still present (more in some countries than in others); and that their citizens do not enjoy the various freedoms which we regard as our most priceless possessions. But the points that should be borne in mind, with regard to these unhappy features of Communist societies, are that, looking at the European Communist world as a whole, the situation is improving in that the European Communist world is generally becoming more liberal internally and more interested in relaxing tensions; that increasing involvement with other countries with different social systems can only have a beneficial effect from our point of view; and that we in America do not help matters by holding back and not taking advantage of every opportunity to increase contacts between these societies and those of the West.

7. Cultural and educational exchanges

The most direct medium of contact between societies is, of course people—the raw material of cultural and educational exchanges. The educational exchange program began in Eastern Europe in 1957. In that year five Polish students came to the United States under official auspices. In fiscal year 1966, in contrast, 333 students, researchers, professors, and the like from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union came to the United States under the program and 245 Americans went to the Eastern countries. While the program has thus involved a steadily increasing number (although it has leveled off in the past year), it is still far too small. In part, the war in Vietnam is to blame. While it continues, the governments of European Communist countries are unwilling to agree to enlarge the educational exchange program, although they are willing to let the program continue at its present rate.

There are other factors, however, which would inhibit a rapid growth of educational exchanges even if there were no war in Vietnam. While there is increasing interest among the youth of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in studying in the United States, the Soviet Government apparently believes that a rather conservative limit should be placed on the number of students exposed to the United States and an even more conservative limit on the number of Americans permitted to study in Soviet universities. In other countries of Eastern Europe such factors as the lack of funds available under the program and language problems would prevent a rapid expansion of exchanges.

The fate of the informational media guarantee program is closely related to educational and cultural exchange matters. The program has reimbursed American publishers who sell educational materials,

including magazines and books, for local currencies in certain countries where hard currencies are not available. In Eastern Europe, the program has operated in Poland and Yugoslavia. Just before the 89th Congress adjourned, the Senate Appropriations Committee ended the program by ordering that the salaries and expenses of the employees working on the program no longer be paid.

The decision seems particularly badly timed. The program has enabled thousands of Yugoslavs and Poles who would not otherwise have had the chance to read American books and magazines. They will now no longer be able to do so. And their source of information is being cut off at a time when American policy is under particularly strong, and hardly dispassionate, criticism in their countries.

8. Eastern European attitudes toward the United States

Attitudes toward the United States have already been discussed in a general way in all of the above sections. A few other specific impressions follow.

I was received with friendliness wherever I went and with particular cordiality in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, however, our embassy officials stationed in most European Communist countries are not so well received. It is one thing to be a visitor passing through Prague, or Moscow or Bucharest. It is quite another thing to live in one of these countries as an American official. In the latter case, normal social contacts are either highly restricted by the host government or inhibited by the latent danger of attracting the unfavorable attention of the authorities. In Moscow, this treatment is apparently traditional; in other capitals, it seems to be a postwar innovation. In any case, it is deplorable and it is bound to influence the attitudes of those affected and thus, indirectly, the official American attitude. Exacerbating the situation are the travel restrictions (happily not applicable in Yugoslavia) which prohibit our diplomats from traveling in certain areas and in some cases also require them to give advance notice for any travel. We are largely responsible for this unhappy situation in countries other than the Soviet Union as we were the ones who took the first step by imposing travel restrictions on Eastern European diplomats in 1963. The Soviets, on the other hand, imposed travel restrictions on us in 1941 and we did not reciprocate until 1953.

Travel restrictions generally seem to be of dubious value from a security point of view not only because of the nature of our free society but also because of the gaps that remain open in the system of restrictions. Thus, for example, while officers of the Soviet Embassy in Washington cannot visit closed areas in the United States, Soviet exchange visitors, Soviet tourists visiting relatives or even Soviet United Nations Secretariat employees can enter these closed zones. The same situation is true in reverse. Americans attached to our Embassy in Warsaw, to take a particular case, cannot enter closed zones but American tourists or even officers attached to American Embassies in other countries can.

One final observation on Eastern European attitudes toward us. It is most unfortunate that the Eastern European and Soviet governments do not always realize the importance of showing regard for American sensibilities. Such recent cases as that involving Mr. Kazan, a naturalized American citizen of Czech origin who was

arrested in Prague after being abducted from a Soviet airliner which made an unscheduled stop in the Czech capital, and Mr. Wortham, who was given an unduly severe prison sentence for stealing a statue and changing a small amount of currency through irregular channels in violation of Soviet law, are bound to outrage American public opinion and thus harm relations with the United States.

There is a tendency in European Communist countries to dismiss public statements favoring better East-West relations, notably the President's October 7 speech, as only words and not deeds. At the same time, there is an apparent unwillingness to realize that cases such as the two just mentioned make it all the more difficult to transform words into actions. And while on the subject of the charge that we do not suit our actions to our words, it would be a welcome change to hear more conciliatory language not only in public statements issued in the West but also in those issued in the East. It takes two parties to end a war—even a cold war, even a cold war of words.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Policies toward Germany and the East*

If we are to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, the most important fundamental foreign policy decision we can take is to decide that our relations with West Germany will not have priority over our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This does not mean that our relations with the East need have priority over our relations with West Germany. The two policies should be pursued hand in hand. We should strongly urge the Germans to normalize their relations with Eastern Europe and be alert to any possibilities to help them to do so. The fact that there is now a new German Government, the new interest within NATO in detente and the evolving relationships between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe are all hopeful signs for the future. We should encourage this trend and, even more importantly, participate in it.

2. *Disarmament measures*

(a) The United States should move with the utmost possible speed to sign a nonproliferation agreement with the Soviet Union, for if we do not grasp this opportunity now such an agreement may soon be worthless. Such an agreement should be signed, providing it permits consultative arrangements within NATO on nuclear planning, even if the West German Government is unwilling to accept it.

(b) The United States should propose to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference that it organize a special official public conference on seismic detection which would publish a document on the subject setting forth the arguments for and against the need for on-site inspection of underground explosions. There have been a number of private conferences held on this question which have concluded that on-site inspection is not necessary. This conclusion should be officially confirmed or refuted. The Soviet Union and many other countries claim that seismic detection has advanced to the point where on-site inspection is no longer necessary. We dispute this claim and have invited Soviet scientists to discuss it. They have refused and the United States and Soviet seismologists have therefore not

met to discuss this question since 1960. Surely, the time has come for both sides to present their arguments publicly.

(c) The President should revitalize our own disarmament activities by appointing the Vice President American disarmament coordinator to resolve the interagency disputes that so constantly inhibit our disarmament policy, disputes that the Committee of Principals, by its very nature, has been unable to resolve. Assigning this function to the Vice President would demonstrate the importance with which we regard disarmament matters. The Vice President's appearance in this new capacity at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva would dramatize our intention to work for disarmament, particularly if he could present new proposals on a comprehensive test ban agreement or an arms freeze in central Europe or the Middle East, for example.

(d) Finally, the United States should, with utmost urgency, enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government at the highest possible level with the aim of reaching agreement on a moratorium on the deployment of ABM systems. For the moment, no formal treaty seems necessary. The immediate need is for a meeting of minds.

3. Eastern European participation in the IBRD and IMF

If the two parts of Europe are to move closer to one another, it seems to follow that they should be involved with one another in all possible ways. Trade, tourism, arms control, and cultural and educational exchanges are all parts of this process. So is membership in international organizations. The United States should want to see as many of the countries of the East as possible join the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund (in addition to Yugoslavia which is already a member). The question of joining these two organizations is apparently under consideration in some Eastern countries (although not at present in the Soviet Union or, I am told, in Rumania). We should lend every support to any Eastern European country that does express an interest in joining these two organizations.

4. Parliamentary exchanges

Another point of contact is parliamentary exchanges. The time is past for being inhibited by the fact that the parliaments of Eastern Europe are not equivalent in many ways to ours. The fact remains that many important people sit in these parliaments; that these bodies, generally speaking, represent geographical areas and economic interests in the country; and that this is another channel for exchanging views and discussing differences. Many Western countries, including a number of our NATO allies have found these parliamentary contacts fruitful. The Eastern Europeans and Soviets seem well disposed to have such contacts with us. As an initial step, we in the Senate should consider appointing a small group to visit these parliaments, on an informal basis. There is a movement within the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to explore the subject of contacts with the parliaments of Eastern Europe but there is some opposition within the organization to doing so and some question about financing such a project. The Inter-Parliamentary Union has performed a valuable service in bringing together parliamentarians from all countries, including those from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But its

conferences are too large and too formalized to achieve the results that bilateral meetings could produce.

5. *East-West trade*

(a) There is considerable resistance to the East-West trade bill both in the Congress and among the American public. In order to meet what appears to be primarily a problem of public education, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Finance Committee should schedule a full series of open joint hearings on East-West trade. These hearings could bring up to date the excellent hearings held by the Foreign Relations Committee in 1964-65.

(b) The Congress should also rescind the ban on shipping food for peace to countries trading with North Vietnam or Cuba. The intent of the law may be admirable. On close analysis, however, it seems clear that Cuba and North Vietnam would hardly notice the difference in trade even if potential food-for-peace recipients were to cut off all their trade with these two countries. The few countries trading with North Vietnam and Cuba which are affected by the ban will, of course, suffer by not receiving food for peace. But so will our relations with the countries against whom we have imposed this punitive measure. Thus, in terms of our long-range national interests, the ban appears to do us more harm than good.

6. *Bilateral questions*

(a) We should make a special effort to negotiate a new claims agreement with Czechoslovakia.

(b) The consular convention with the Soviet Union is so clearly in our interest that it should be promptly ratified by the Senate.

(c) The Congress should also restore the authority which will permit USIA to reinstitute the informational media guarantee program in Poland and Yugoslavia.

7. *Travel restrictions*

The travel restrictions imposed by us on the members of Eastern European missions in the United States should be lifted. Since the restrictions on our representatives abroad were imposed as a reciprocal action, I would assume that these countries would be willing to abolish such restrictions on a reciprocal basis. Perhaps the Soviets would then follow suit by abolishing the restrictions they have imposed.

8. *Visa procedures*

The administration should give serious consideration to proposing amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which would liberalize the provisions regarding the granting of tourist visas to citizens of Communist countries. As the act now reads, a member of a foreign Communist Party or front organization may not be granted a tourist visa unless a waiver is obtained from the Attorney General. While waivers are almost always granted in such cases, deleting this requirement from the act would remove a time-consuming encumbrance, which seems to be of little value from a security point of view, and would be a contribution to improving the atmosphere surrounding our relations with the European Communist countries.

The administration should also consider the possibility of abolishing tourist visas completely. The Yugoslav Government has taken this step on a trial basis for the year 1967. Their example merits the close attention of the executive branch.

9. *Travel to Eastern Europe*

Finally, I recommend that more Members of Congress, more American officials, and more private American citizens visit Europe "East of the Elbe" to increase their understanding of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. More of us should know the facts of life, both pleasant and unpleasant, in the European Communist countries. For when one looks at the places in the world today where there is either violence in being or violence in prospect—Berlin, the Middle East, and Vietnam—the conclusion seems clear that the most important and effective step that could be taken in each situation would be an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, joined by their respective allies. In Germany, the eventual result could be virtually complete disarmament in the heart of Europe; in the Middle East, an end to the arms race; and in Vietnam, an internationally guaranteed neutralization.

We may not approve of what we see in the European Communist world. We may wish that this world were different. We may not want to emulate it in any respect. But we must realize that we are going to have to be able to reach understandings with Europe "East of the Elbe" in order to live in peace—or, in this nuclear age, even to live at all.

