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EUROPE TODAY

REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

ON A

STUDY MISSION TO BRUSSELS, PARIS, LONDON, BONN,
BERLIN AND THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT
CONFERENCE AT GENEVA

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In your letter of March 31, you recommended that I undertake a trip to Europe for the purpose of ascertaining current opinion there on issues of concern to the United States. You suggested that I interview government leaders, members of opposition parties, scholars, journalists, and other political observers. You indicated your belief that these conversations would furnish the committee with up-to-date information, and that this was a particularly important time to reexamine European problems.

As you anticipated, my trip proved to be most useful and informative. I began, on May 1, in Geneva, where the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference was meeting and, in the course of the following 2 weeks, visited Brussels, Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin. I returned to Washington on May 14. Throughout the trip, I had the able assistance of Mr. James G. Lowenstein of our committee staff.

Each day, from early morning until late in the evening, I questioned as many persons—ranging across the whole spectrum of opinion—as time would permit. Included among the government leaders were President de Gaulle, Premier Pompidou, and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in Paris; Prime Minister Wilson and Defense Minister Healey in London; Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants, Foreign Minister Harmel, and former Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in Brussels; Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder in Bonn; and Mayor Brandt in Berlin. Memorandums of these, and of all my other conversations, are included in a separate confidential 91 page committee print which you have already received. As you know, I assured all those with whom I talked that there would be no public disclosure of these conversations and, accordingly, the confidential print is being given the most carefully limited circulation.

The report that is submitted herewith contains my general conclusions and recommendations. They reflect my conviction that the problems we face elsewhere in the world must not distract us from the imperative need to bring our policy toward Europe into line with the changing realities of the European scene.

I would like to thank publicly the Secretary of State, our Ambassadors to the countries I visited, and the many officers in our missions abroad who were so helpful and cooperative. Their assistance, individually and collectively, was much appreciated.

I should note, in closing, that I was received most cordially wherever I went. I am indebted to the officials of the foreign governments, opposition leaders, and many private citizens in the countries I visited for giving me so generously of their time.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK CHURCH.





TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of transmittal.....	III
I. Conclusions.....	1
II. Recommendations.....	5
Appendix: List of Interviews.....	8



EUROPE TODAY

I. CONCLUSIONS

1. *Europe and the United States*

In the eyes of most Western Europeans, the postwar period has ended. Western Europe has fully regained its vitality. Living standards far exceed prewar levels. The threat of a Soviet armed attack appears to be subsiding, and the prospect of a new war in Europe is regarded as increasingly unlikely. Western Europeans long for a thaw in the "cold war." They sense that the time may now be opportune for a gradual relaxation of tensions between the two halves of Europe, as a necessary precondition for an eventual settlement which could bring an end to the present unnatural partition of the Continent.

Although reasonably satisfied with the present and sanguine about the future, there is still a feeling of uneasiness when our allies in Europe look either to the East or to the West. In the East, Western Europeans see a less militant Soviet Union and her neighbor Communist countries evolving, some more rapidly than others, in the direction of a more independent relationship with Russia. At the same time, Western Europeans see no evidence of any present disposition on the part of the Soviets to release their hold on East Germany to permit a reunification that would end the uneasy, potentially explosive, military confrontation in the heart of the continent. Thus, while a Soviet military thrust into Western Europe is regarded as highly improbable, it is not dismissed as impossible. And there appears to be virtually unanimous recognition among Western Europeans that, should war threaten again, their protection still rests on American nuclear power.

X Looking westward, many Europeans suspect that the United States is unattuned to the changing sentiment in Europe—that we are not moving with the times but remain wedded to concepts which reflect the old status quo. In particular, Europeans would welcome our placing less emphasis upon NATO's role as a fort and more upon its use as a forum for reaching agreement on Western initiatives directed toward the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. X

X As for closer ties with the United States, Europeans are apprehensive about being smothered in our embrace. X They are uneasy about the magnetic attraction of a voracious American economy. As cause for alarm, they point to the "brain drain," the disparity between research and development funds in the United States and Europe, and the widening American technological superiority in such growth industries as electronics, aircraft and space. Against these American advantages, even the Common Market is a meager and insufficient answer. "We shall be reduced," a renowned economist lamented to me, "to the same subordination to the United States as ancient Greece bore toward imperial Rome. Unless the trend can somehow be

reversed, we are destined to become a continent of hotel keepers, store clerks, salesmen, and tourist guides."

Thus, on the one hand, there is much evidence in Western Europe today of a satisfaction derived from recovery, of a pride associated with the present prosperity, of a desire for the reassertion of European prerogatives, of a wish for reconciliation with the East and, above all, of a general belief that the danger of war in Europe is diminishing. But, on the other hand, a feeling of vulnerability remains. Europeans have yet devised no substitute for the American nuclear shield—and they do not see any in the offering. As a consequence, they regard the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Europe as vital to the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent. Opinions vary, however, as to the number of troops we need to keep in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In attempting to cope with these somewhat ambivalent sentiments, the interests of American policy would seem to call for less dogmatism, less insistence on American solutions which meet with strong European resistance, and a certain relaxation of pressure—an approach which could be best described by that idiom of the American West, "riding a little looser in the saddle."

2. Our relations with France

If we are regarded as the sentinel of the status quo in Europe, then President de Gaulle of France is looked upon as its challenger. To the degree that he has plumbed the European desire to reach eastward—and to the extent that he has appealed to the dignity, pride, and independent spirit of Europeans—he is not isolated either in France or in Europe. His defiance of what is sometimes described as the American hegemony over Western Europe has engendered admiration, as well as apprehension. In this sense, it seems likely that much of what is called Gaullism will outlive De Gaulle. Moreover, his goal of rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, together with his hopes for overcoming the present partition of Europe, represent objectives to which all of Western Europe and the United States can and do subscribe.

But while there is widespread support for these stated objectives, there is anguish over the separatist course De Gaulle has chosen for pursuing them. Outside France, and to some extent even within it, De Gaulle's preemptory treatment of the alliance in general, and of the United States in particular, is deeply resented. There is misgiving that, even though he has declared his intention to remain in the Western alliance, De Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated command will stiffen, rather than lessen, Soviet intransigence. There is also considerable skepticism that France, lacking the needed size and strength in the great power equation, can possibly act as a catalyst in engaging the Soviet Union in meaningful negotiations on European security questions. Nevertheless, there seems to be a certain grudging awe of De Gaulle among many, although certainly not all, Europeans—an inkling that he may be in tune with the trend of the times and that we are not. As one perceptive political observer remarked to me: "France has the objective but not the means, while the United States has the means but not the objective."

One final observation about our relations with France. I left Paris with the impression that a diplomatic glacier now separates France

and the United States. Communication between the two governments appears to have dangerously broken down. If a useful dialog is to commence again, humility must somehow prevail over pride. Overtures will have to come, so it would seem, from the highest levels.

3. The United States and the alliance

I found abundant sentiment in Western Europe that reform of NATO is overdue. In the first place, there is pronounced support for "Europeanizing" the alliance—for giving a larger role to the European countries. Secondly, I encountered a strong desire to see the North Atlantic Council utilized for the forging of agreed-upon Western initiatives directed toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Central to both of these considerations is the question of how the members of the alliance should share in NATO's nuclear defense system. There appears to be little enthusiasm for a "hardware solution" to this problem, outside of a certain circle of officials in Bonn, and, I gather, in Washington. Indeed, I was told repeatedly that the United States had been ill advised in pushing the MLF proposal so aggressively. Far from demanding nuclear weapons for themselves, the German people were said to be either disinterested or opposed. Moreover, the conflict is apparent between striving for greater German access to nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and seeking the reunification of Germany on the other. Finally, candor requires the admission that an antipathy toward Germany still pervades Europe. More than once, from among the most highly placed, I was told: "If West Germany ever acquires nuclear weapons, there will never be a solution to the German problem."

At the same time, I found little resistance expressed against giving West Germany a direct voice in nuclear defense planning and strategy. For these reasons, among all the countries concerned, a consultative solution to the nuclear sharing problem, along the lines of the McNamara committee, appears to have by far the widest measure of popular and official support.

4. The German problem

Germany lies in the middle of Europe—not only geographically but economically and politically as well. Germany is also the frontier in Europe today, for the line which divides it at the same time separates Communist from non-Communist Europe. Thus, so long as Europe lies broken between two hostile camps, Germany, it would seem, will also stay divided.

Western Europeans seem to have reached a consensus that the solution to the German problem will come only after an "improvement in the general climate of confidence" is realized; that a process of reconciliation between Western and Eastern Europe is a necessary precondition to any possible reunification of Germany; in sum, that reunification will follow detente and not vice versa. Even the West Germans themselves appear not to dispute this sequence.

Additionally, it seems to be accepted that a final resolution of the German problem will have to result from negotiations in which the United States and the Soviet Union will be the principal parties. A new all-European security arrangement, guaranteed by the two great nuclear powers, will be required. Given present rigidities on both sides, any speculation as to the specific form of such an arrange-

ment, or what Germany's status within it might be, is obviously premature.

In light of these considerations, many West Germans now seem to be thinking more about what practical action can be taken to improve the lot of their East German brothers. There seems to be growing sentiment for doing everything possible to broaden contact and communication across the wall so that East and West Germans will continue to think of themselves as one people. Support for such small steps, however, appears to be stronger within the opposition in West Germany than within the governing coalition. Bonn is skeptical as to what these small steps can accomplish and remains adamantly opposed to recognizing the Oder-Neisse line or modifying the Hallstein doctrine, preferring to retain such concessions for future bargaining in connection with a final settlement.

5. Britain and Europe

The British appear to have decided tentatively to enter the Common Market when the time is right, but this decision betrays definite elements of equivocation. Certainly, there is no evident disposition to move until it is certain that there will not be another French veto. The debate continues on collateral questions: the need first to strengthen sterling by overcoming Britain's adverse balance of payments, the resistance to the supranational character of the Common Market, the uneasiness about the Common Market's agricultural policies, the concern that Britain's close ties with the United States might be attenuated, and the feeling that Common Market membership will inhibit Britain's role in the world at large. Still, there is an underlying realization, both in Britain and on the Continent, that admission of the United Kingdom (which would also entail the entry, either as members or associates, of most of the other EFTA countries) would have highly desirable consequences: it would furnish a healthy counterbalance to West Germany's economic weight, the Common Market itself would be strengthened and enlarged and the cause of European unity would be advanced.

Looking into the future, it is likely, then, that Britain and some, if not all, of her Free Trade Area partners, will enter the Common Market within the next 5 years. However, the chances for immediate entry, specifically within the next year or so, appear slim.

6. The Geneva Conference

At Geneva, there are grave misgivings that if the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference produces no tangible results by this fall, after 3 years' running, further negotiations there may be broken off, with the United Nations assigning disarmament problems to a much less satisfactory forum. Most of the countries represented at Geneva seem to feel that such a setback would imperil whatever chance there may be for agreement on two treaties of far-reaching importance: a nonproliferation agreement and a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The impasse blocking agreement on a nonproliferation treaty results from Soviet unwillingness to accept the so-called European clause in the American draft which would allow for the creation, sometime in the future, of a European nuclear force, to which West Germany could belong. I found little evidence that Europeans either want such a force or think it now feasible to create one. This has given rise to some suspicion in Geneva that we are not really serious about

consummating a nonproliferation agreement at this time; otherwise, some contend, we would not be mortgaging present prospects for the sake of a highly problematical development which, at best, lies way off in an uncertain future.

The practical effect of a nonproliferation treaty is open to legitimate question. It is possible that the key nonnuclear states, wishing to retain the option of developing nuclear weapons, will refuse to sign. As of now, France and China are not likely to adhere. Moreover, it can be argued that none of the nuclear states intends to help non-nuclear states develop these lethal weapons anyhow. But Europeans see the importance of a nonproliferation agreement as less military than political. They believe that such a treaty could contribute significantly toward improving the climate of confidence in which detente can grow. For all who perceived the positive psychological effect in the United States of the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the question of political consequences is a very important one; no other single event has done more to ease Soviet-American tensions than this first-step agreement.

As for a comprehensive test ban treaty, it seemed obvious to me that Europeans are not sufficiently aware of the political problems that would arise in the United States if the Senate were asked to ratify a comprehensive test ban treaty which did not include the right to on-site inspection. Consequently, our reluctance to drop our insistence on inspection—that is, our refusal, as they see it, to accept a small risk for large political gains—is considered, in some quarters, to be an indication of the dominance of military influence over U.S. policy. This is all the more regrettable because, to many at Geneva, a comprehensive test ban agreement is considered to be the most effective nonproliferation measure, for nations are apparently unable, at present, to develop nuclear weapons without testing them.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In the conduct of our relations with France, our manner should be firm but correct. We must avoid over-reacting to French initiatives, even though we may regard them as undesirable. In no case should we disparage the greatness of France, our oldest ally, or engage in any sort of political guerrilla war against the French Government; such tactics should be reserved for our enemies. Above all, we should resist the temptation of interjecting our voice into the internal politics of France. Any American appeal, directed over, under, or around the French President, would surely backfire.

2. It is crucial that effective communication be restored between the French and American Governments. If a summit meeting between the two Presidents is not now feasible, then consideration should be given to the appointment of a special American emissary, who would endeavor to act between President Johnson and General de Gaulle as Harry Hopkins acted between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. His purpose would be to reopen and develop a dialog to the point where a summit meeting between the two Presidents would seem likely to bear fruit.

3. If the NATO structure is to be salvaged without France, the old architects must come up with new plans or new architects must be engaged. Clearly, SHAPE should be moved to a new site in the

Benelux countries and streamlined, its bulk trimmed back in adjustment to the diminished danger. The European role in SHAPE should be sharply upgraded. Since the headquarters exists for the defense of Europe, I would recommend, among the specific steps that should be taken to Europeanize NATO, the following:

(a) Appointing a European general to serve as SACEUR, under a command arrangement which would leave control of our nuclear weapons in the hands of the President of the United States.

(b) Moving the Military Committee of NATO out of the Pentagon and relocating it in Europe in close proximity to SHAPE and the North Atlantic Council.

(c) Establishing a hot line communications system, linking together the heads of the NATO governments, to enable immediate consultation in case of emergency.

4. Another objective in the revision of NATO should be to make the alliance outward looking, an instrument concerned not only with the negative aspects of military defense but also with the positive aspects of the quest for peace. Here, it is De Gaulle who has seized the initiative. Yet, it remains the United States, not France, which possesses the size and power to engage in meaningful negotiations in the field of East-West relations. President Johnson has spoken of the need for "building bridges" to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. De Gaulle's initiative makes it more urgent that we assume our natural position of leadership in this vital endeavor.

5. With regard to European integration, the Common Market appears to be weathering its way to success. This is, by all odds, the most significant achievement in the direction of European unity since the war. The economic cement binding the six members of the Common Market together is the best guarantee against any reversion in Western Europe to the rampant nationalism of the prewar period. Accordingly, in lining up 14 to 1 against France in the current dispute over the command structure of NATO, we should strive to avoid any rupture between France and her European neighbors so bitter as to propel the French toward neutralism or vengeance. As between vindicating our position in favor of an uncompromised NATO command, and jeopardizing either the underlying Western alliance or the prospects for strengthening and enlarging the Common Market, the course of prudence should be clear.

6. As for Geneva, I recommend that immediate attention be given to pumping life back into these moribund negotiations. A decision should be delayed no longer on the issue of nuclear sharing within NATO. We must make up our minds whether to give priority to binding West Germany more tightly into the remnants of the NATO organizational structure, or whether to seek further agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear arms control. If a consultative arrangement, along the lines contemplated by the McNamara committee, is settled upon with West Germany, then the way may yet be open to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a nonproliferation treaty. I strongly recommend this course as best suited to our highest national interests. But time is fast running out at Geneva.

7. Respecting a comprehensive test ban, I urge that immediate attention be given to the "threshold" approach. It would limit the ban on underground tests to explosions above an agreed size which could be detected by seismic devices without need for on-site inspections. It is possible this may prove a feasible area for enlargement of the present treaty to correspond with the advances that have been made in detection techniques.

APPENDIX

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Geneva:

Jacques Freymond, Director, Institute of High International Studies.
General Burns, Canadian Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.
Count Wachtmeister, Acting Swedish Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.
Mr. Blusztajn, Polish Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.
Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.
Ambassador Roshchin, Soviet Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

Brussels:

Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants.
Acting President Robert Marjolin, and Commissioners Jean Rey and Guido Colonna di Paliano, European Economic Commission.
Foreign Minister Harmel and Paul-Henri Spaak.

Paris:

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville.
French political leaders:
Jean Lecanuet, leader of the Democratic Center.
Maurice Faure, president of the Radical Party.
Guy Mollet, secretary of the Socialist Party.
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the French Independent Republican Party.
President de Gaulle.
Alain Peyrefitte, Minister Delegate for Scientific Research, Space and Atomic Questions.
Defense Minister Messmer.
General Beaufre, Director, Institute of Strategic Studies.
Prof. Raymond Aron.
Prime Minister Pompidou.

London:

Hedley Bull, Consultant to the Foreign Office and J. E. D. Street, Head of Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, Foreign Office.
Uwe Kitzinger.
Prof. Max Beloff.
Mr. Michael Palliser, private secretary to the Prime Minister.
Prof. Patrick Blackett.
Mr. George Thomson.
Defense Minister Healey.
Kenneth Younger, Director, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home.
John Barnes, Head of Western Development, Foreign Office.
Lord Carrington.
Prime Minister Wilson.

Berlin:

Prof. Richard Loewenthal.
Egon Bahr, press chief of the West Berlin Senate.
Mayor Brandt.

Bonn:

Foreign Minister Schroeder.
Chancellor Erhard.
Franz-Josef Strauss.
Dr. Karl Mommer.
Erich Mende, Minister for All German Affairs.

