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
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
COMMITTEE PRINT

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RELATING TO THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



JULY 1965



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
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PREFACE

This compilation contains material deemed useful in any discussion dealing with the present situation in the Dominican Republic. The material has been collected with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, the Department of State, and the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations.


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
PREFACE

The following is a list of the books in the collection of the University of Toronto Libraries which are available for loan to students of the University of Toronto. The books are listed in alphabetical order of the author's name. The books are listed in the following order: 1. Books in the collection of the University of Toronto Libraries which are available for loan to students of the University of Toronto. 2. Books in the collection of the University of Toronto Libraries which are available for loan to students of the University of Toronto. 3. Books in the collection of the University of Toronto Libraries which are available for loan to students of the University of Toronto.

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A. CHRONOLOGY: 1492 TO JUNE 28, 1965

Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, and the Staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations¹

The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two-thirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which lies between Cuba and Puerto Rico. Haiti occupies the western third of Hispaniola.

Area: 18,711 square miles (about the size of Vermont and New Hampshire).

Capital: Santo Domingo (formerly Ciudad Trujillo).

Population: 3,334,000 (estimate July 1, 1963). Main ethnic groups: 28 percent white, 12 percent Negro, 60 percent mixed (mestizos and mulattoes). The state religion is Roman Catholicism.

The economy is principally based on agriculture which provides about 85 percent of the exports (sugar, coffee, cocoa, bananas, tobacco). Iron ore is the main nonagricultural export.

1492

December 5.—Columbus discovers the island of Hispaniola.

1496

August 4.—Spanish found city of Santo Domingo (whose name was changed to Ciudad Trujillo in 1936), the oldest European settlement in the New World.

1697

September 30.—Spain cedes the western part of Hispaniola to France, which becomes the French colony of St. Domingue (today's Haiti).

1795

June 22.—Spain cedes Santo Domingo (eastern part of Hispaniola) to France.

1804

January 1.—Haiti wins its independence from France.

1809

Dominican Republic is proclaimed after successful revolt (with the aid of British troops) against Haiti and French rule.

1814-21

Dominican Republic is again under Spanish rule.

¹ This chronology has been compiled primarily on the basis of "Deadline Data on World Affairs." Deadline Data, Inc., New York.

1821

December 1.—Dominican Republic proclaims its independence from Spain.

1822

Haiti conquers and annexes the Dominican Republic (which remains under Haitian rule until 1844).

1844-61

Dominican Republic regains its independence.

1861-65

Dominican Republic is again under Spanish rule.

1865

May 1.—Spanish rule is terminated after a successful Dominican revolt.

1870

U.S. Senate refuses Dominican offer to have the Dominican Republic annexed by the United States.

1904

European powers threaten to intervene in the Dominican Republic to collect their debts, after the Dominican Government becomes bankrupt.

1905

United States takes over administration of Dominican customs, to forestall European intervention.

1916-24

United States military occupation of the Dominican Republic, in order to quell constant revolutions and remedy the fiscal chaos. This measure is criticized by other Latin American countries.

1937

October.—Dominican Army drives out illegal Haitian settlers from border areas near Haiti. Haitian Government claims several thousand Haitians were massacred. Dominican Government denies this allegation but agrees (on February 1, 1938) to pay compensation to Haiti.

1941

December 7.—Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

December 8.—Dominican Republic declares war on Japan (and on Germany and Italy on December 11).

1949

December 26.—President Trujillo accuses Cuba, Costa Rica, and Guatemala of planning armed aggression against his Government. All three countries deny accusation.

1950

April 9.—Council of the Organization of American States calls on Cuba and Guatemala to stop aiding anti-Dominican movements and orders the Dominican Republic to cease support of Haitian groups seeking overthrow of the Haitian Government.

1951

February 23.—Dominican Republic signs point four agreement with the United States.

November 26.—Dominican Government extends to United States a long-range proving ground for testing guided missiles.

1952

May 16.—Gen. Hector Bienvenido Trujillo Molina (Minister of War and brother of Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina) is elected President (there were no opposition candidates). Gen. Rafael Trujillo, President from 1930 to 1952, remains commander in chief of the armed forces. "Gen. Rafael Trujillo has been in effect dictator of the Dominican Republic since the 1930's * * *" (New York Times, Feb. 28, 1956).

1955

December 9.—Dominican Republic outlaws the Communist Party and all pro-Communist organizations.

1956

March 12.—Dr. Jesus de Dalindez, a Spanish-Basque lecturer at Columbia University, and an outspoken critic of the Trujillo Government, disappears from New York under mysterious circumstances.

1957

March 30.—Inter-American Press Association's Freedom of the Press Committee (in a report on censorship in Latin American countries) declares: "There is no freedom of the press" in the Dominican Republic.

May 16.—Gen. Hector B. Trujillo Molina is reelected President for a second 5-year term. (See above, 1952, May 16.)

1958

June 17.—Dominican Government announces it has ordered 30 Dominican cadets and officers enrolled in U.S. military establishments to return home immediately. (The action follows failure of Gen. Rafael Trujillo's son to graduate from the U.S. Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.) “* * * the younger Trujillo * * * spent much time in Hollywood, where he gained publicity by giving lavish gifts * * * to film actresses. Military aid to the Dominican Republic amounted to \$600,000 * * * a year, exactly the sum * * * which the general allowed his son for his private expenses.” (Times, London, June 20, 1958.) “* * * General Trujillo has * * * acted to reject American military aid and revoke agreements which allow the United States to operate radar stations in the republic.” (Times, London, June 20, 1958.)

1959

- January 1.*—Batista Government in Cuba is overthrown by rebel forces under Fidel Castro. Batista flees to exile in the Dominican Republic.
- April 21.*—State of emergency is declared in the Dominican Republic because of the situation allegedly created in the Caribbean area “by the activities of elements at the service of the Kremlin.”
- June 12.*—Venezuela breaks off diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic.
- June 23.*—Dominican radio announces that Government troops have crushed a Cuban-supported invasion force.
- June 28.*—Cuba breaks off diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic.
- June 29.*—Cuba's chief U.N. representative declares that Cuba intends to ask the U.N. to support rebels opposing the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic.
- August 12-18.*—Conference of Foreign Ministers of the 21 American Republics is held in Santiago, Chile, to discuss political tensions in the Caribbean area. The conference is marked by violent recriminations between the Foreign Ministers of Cuba (Raul Roa) and the Dominican Republic (Porfirio Herreros).

1960

- January 28.*—Dominican Republic jails 1,000 to 2,000 persons for participation in an alleged plot to overthrow the Government.
- January 31.*—Dominican Republic's six Roman Catholic Bishops issue a joint pastoral letter (read in all Roman Catholic churches in the Dominican Republic) declaring their solidarity with the families of those arrested by the Government. “* * * Trujillo * * * got an ominous warning from the Roman Catholic Church. It came in a pastoral letter like those the church directed against Argentina's Juan Peron, Venezuela's Marcos Perez Jimenez and Colombia's Gustavo Rojas Pinilla just before their downfalls” (Time, Feb. 15, 1960).
- February 5.*—Venezuela requests the Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate (Venezuelan) charges of mass arrests by the Dominican Republic in violation of human rights.

1960—Continued

February 9.—Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo declares that free multi-party municipal elections will be held within a year, and multiparty national elections within 2 years, according to U.S. Senator George A. Smathers' account of his meeting with Gen. Trujillo.

February 15.—OAS Council (in Washington) votes to refer to the Inter-American Peace Commission Venezuela's charge that the Dominican Republic has violated human rights.

February 26.—U.S. State Department announces that military aid to the Dominican Republic and Cuba will cease in June 1960.

April 1.—Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo resigns as head of the Dominican Party (the only effective political party in the country). He declares: "No one wants to form new parties while I remain in the Dominican Party." "Said his purpose was to set the stage for free elections with two or more parties in the running" (New York Times, Apr. 3, 1960).

May 4.—U.S. State Department accuses the Dominican Republic of "restricting freedom of information" by demanding the transfer of the head of the U.S. Information Agency program in Ciudad Trujillo. "The protest was the latest in a long series of moves by which the United States has sought to make evident its dislikes of actions by the Dominican regime" (Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 1960).

June 8.—Inter-American Peace Committee accuses the Trujillo regime of "flagrant and widespread violations of human rights," and denounces "the denial of free assembly and of free speech, arbitrary arrest, cruel and inhuman treatment of political prisoners and the use of intimidation and terror as political weapons" (New York Times, June 9, 1960).

June 20.—Dominican Government formally protests the charges made by the Inter-American Peace Committee.

June 24.—President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela is injured in an assassination attempt in Caracas.

June 25.—Betancourt accuses Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo of having engineered the assassination attempt against him.

July 1.—Venezuelan Foreign Ministry announces it will call for an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States to consider charges that the Dominican Republic was implicated in the attempted assassination of President Betancourt.

July 21.—The United States does not include the Dominican Republic in the allocation of extra sugar quotas to replace the 700,000 tons cut from Cuba's 1960 quota.

August 2.—The United States again allocates new sugar quotas (totaling over 100,000 tons) to various foreign countries, and again refuses to authorize purchases from the Dominican Republic.

August 3.—President Hector Bienvenido Trujillo Molina, brother of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, resigns and is succeeded by Vice President Joaquin Balaguer. "This move does not affect the rule of his brother, General Trujillo, who has been dictator since 1930" (New York Times, Aug. 4, 1960).

1960—Continued

August 4.—General Rafael Trujillo is appointed head of the Dominican delegation to the 1960 General Assembly of the U.N. "President Balaguer removed Trujillo relatives from the command of the armed forces and the secretaryship of the Presidential office. * * * Speculation was that the Trujillos had moved from the center of the stage to quiet criticism abroad and lessen the likelihood of inter-American action on Venezuela's charges * * *" (New York Times, Aug. 5, 1960).

August 16-29.—Conference of OAS Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica, to consider the Dominican and Cuban questions.

August 20.—Dominican delegates walk out of the OAS meeting, as the other 20 American Foreign Ministers vote unanimously a resolution to "condemn emphatically the participation of the Government of the Dominican Republic in the act of aggression and intervention against * * * Venezuela that culminated in the attempt on the life of the President of that country." The resolution also calls for breaking of diplomatic relations of all OAS states with the Dominican Republic and for "partial interruption of economic relations of all member states with the Dominican Republic, beginning with the immediate suspension of trade in arms and implements of war of every kind." "* * * the conference members did not take any practical steps to provide for a peaceful transition to democracy in the Dominican Republic" (New York Times, Aug. 21, 1960). "This is the first time in the history of the inter-American system that collective sanctions have been recommended in line with the treaty of reciprocal assistance of 1947" (Times, London, Aug. 22, 1960).

August 23.—President Eisenhower asks Congress to curtail sugar imports from the Dominican Republic.

September 1.—Congress adjourns without settling the question of the Dominican sugar quota.

August 25.—Radio Caribe in Ciudad Trujillo announces that it will start using the daily report of the Soviet news agency Tass. "The Dominican Republic radio is rivaling Havana stations in broadcasting attacks on the United States. * * * The official Ciudad Trujillo station * * * also went to the defense of Premier Fidel Castro's Cuban regime" (New York Times, Aug. 27, 1960).

August 26.—The United States severs diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. Not since 1918 has the United States refused to have political relations with any country in Latin America.

August 31.—President Joaquin Balaguer urges Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo to assume the Presidency, and offers to resign immediately in Trujillo's favor.

1961

January 4.—OAS Council (in Washington) votes to impose limited economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic. OAS members are to discontinue exports of oil, oil products, trucks and spare parts to the Dominican Republic. The vote is 14 to 1 (Dominican Republic), with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, and Uruguay).

1961—Continued

March 13.—President Kennedy outlines Alliance for Progress excluding “tyrannies” from participation.

May 31.—President Joaquin Balaguer announces that Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina (dictator of the Dominican Republic since 1930) was assassinated on May 30. President Balaguer reportedly declares that “the Dominican Army is in control of the situation.” A Government statement says that the assassination had been planned for 3 months and names Brig. Gen. Juan Diaz, a retired officer, as one of the leading conspirators.

On the same day, U.S. Senator George A. Smathers (Democrat, Florida), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Latin American trade, demands that two brigades of Marines be sent to the Dominican Republic to prevent a “bloody civil war and a Communist takeover of the country by the Castro brothers.” “Many of the Americans who have invested \$250,000,000 in the Dominican Republic and their politically powerful spokesmen in the United States have long argued that the Generalissimo was the best guarantor of United States—that is, their—interests and that open intervention was now needed to protect their property and to prevent a Communist coup” (New York Times, June 4, 1961).

June 1.—Lt. Gen. Rafael Trujillo, Jr., elder son of the dictator, is appointed Chief of Staff of the Dominican Armed Forces. “In effect, General Trujillo succeeded his father as ruler of his country, although the figurehead President, Joaquin Balaguer, is retaining his office (U.S. News & World Report, June 12, 1961). “The whole Trujillo family remained very much in the political picture. Hector and Arismendi, brothers of the Generalissimo, were reported taking leading roles in the family’s determination to continue their dominant position” (New York Times, June 2, 1961).

June 2.—United States asks the Organization of American States to send a special investigating committee to the Dominican Republic to prevent repressive measures by the Government. “Naval task forces, including Marines, have been advised to be ready to evacuate U.S. citizens from the Dominican Republic if this should prove necessary. There are about 2,000 to 5,000 Americans in the Republic. * * * Nearly 40 American ships are patrolling the Caribbean in the vicinity of the Dominican Republic, prepared to take part in any emergency action” (New York Times, June 3, 1961).

July 11.—New opposition group, the National Civic Union, is formed and is headed by Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo.

August 5.—Police raid the headquarters of the National Civic Union (see above, 1961, July 11) and detain about 150 persons, including Viriato A. Fiallo, president of the Union.

“The U.S. Government appears to be split as to what policy should be followed toward the Dominican Republic. The result is a virtual absence of policy. This attitude in Washington has encouraged the Dominican regime to embark on increasingly tougher policies against the National Civic Union, which now includes most of the opposition groups * * * the union has taken the stand that democratization of the country is impossible as long as members of the Trujillo family remain in power” (New York Times, Aug. 17, 1961).

1961—Continued

October 23.—President Balaguer announces that various members of the Trujillo family will leave the country in the next few days; among them will be two brothers of the late dictator: Gen. Hector Bienvenido Trujillo and Lt. Gen. Jose Arismendi Trujillo.

October 27.—Three major opposition groups (National Civic Union, Dominican Revolutionary party, and 14th of June group) issue joint statement calling on the Organization of American States to continue the political and economic sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic. The statement says that the Dominican people could not have obtained the "very scarce and circumscribed liberties" which they now have without the pressure of the sanctions.

October 30.—Gen. Rafael Trujillo, Jr., makes public a letter sent by him on September 23 to the OAS investigating subcommittee in which he announces that he will resign as head of the Dominican armed forces as soon as the OAS sanctions against the Dominican Republic are lifted.

November 14.—United States proposes in the OAS Sanctions Committee (meeting in Washington) that certain economic sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic (see above, 1961, January 4) be lifted in recognition of progress made by the Dominican Government toward democracy.

November 18.—It is announced in Ciudad Trujillo that Gen. Rafael Trujillo, Jr., resigned (on November 14) as head of the armed forces and left the Dominican Republic on Nov. 17. "* * * Rafael Trujillo, Jr. * * * resigned after having converted into cash more than \$200 million of personal property (companies, shares, etc.) which had been bought for him 'by the State' and after transferring to foreign banks all his personal fortune in dollars" (Le Monde, Paris, Nov. 21, 1961).

November 19.—President Balaguer assumes control of the armed forces, and declares a state of emergency. In a demonstration of support for the Balaguer Government, U.S. naval units, including a cruiser and an aircraft carrier, patrol 3 miles off the Dominican coast, and U.S. Navy jet planes fly near the shore line. In a radio broadcast to the nation, President Balaguer says: "The country is at the brink of civil war because of the differences that have arisen between the armed forces. This fact could lead in the course of the next few hours to foreign military intervention." He announces that Gen. Hector Bienvenido Trujillo and Lt. Gen. Jose Arismendi Trujillo have agreed to leave the country. Later on the same day, a plane leaves for Miami with the two Trujillo brothers, other members of the Trujillo family and their associates. "The U.S. Navy's show of force * * * off the Dominican Republic was believed to have been the decisive factor in averting the restoration of a Trujillo dictatorship. Although the Kennedy administration would not confirm it, it was known on the highest authority that U.S. Marines would have been ordered to land in the Dominican Republic if President Joaquin Balaguer had appealed for aid, or if he had been ousted from office by pro-Trujillo forces" (New York Times, Nov. 20, 1961). "* * * the opposition indicated that it supported the President in his efforts to frustrate all attempts at a right-wing coup d'etat" (Times, London, Nov. 20, 1961).

1961—Continued

November 22.—President Balaguer reshuffles his Cabinet, making Gen. Pedro Rafael Rodriguez Echavarria (former Air Force chief) his Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. (According to the Constitution, the holder of this post is the legal successor of the President.) In Ciudad Trujillo, crowds demonstrate for the second successive day calling for the resignation of President Balaguer.

November 23.—Dominican Congress votes to change the name of Ciudad Trujillo back to its original name of Santo Domingo. Rioting mobs sack business establishments and homes of members of the Trujillo family. Armed forces occupy the capital to stop looting, and a curfew is imposed.

President Balaguer announces the dissolution of the Dominican party, the official party of the Trujillo regime.

December 9.—Eleven-day general strike is called off after government and opposition negotiators reportedly reached an agreement in principle on a provisional government to rule until new elections are held.

On the same day, the U.S. Government announces that U.S. naval units have been withdrawn from waters off the Dominican coast. "The resignation of Dr. Balaguer, a symbolic carryover from the dictatorship, is the key question in the public eye. * * * The United States was receiving widespread credit for having pressed the Balaguer regime for a negotiated settlement by withholding the Dominican Republic's prospective share of the former Cuban quota in the United States sugar market for 1962 until a political settlement was reached" (New York Times, Dec. 10, 1961).

December 10.—President Balaguer announces that he will not resign before the legal end of his term in August 1962, and says that in this he is following the wishes of the armed forces. Gen. Pedro Rafael Rodriguez Echavarria, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, declares (at a press conference) that the armed forces will not agree to the resignation of President Balaguer as part of a political settlement with the opposition. On the same day, the National Civic Union, the main opposition group, declares it is withdrawing from further negotiations with the Balaguer Government. Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo, president of NCU, says (in a broadcast from NCU headquarters): "President Balaguer and General Echavarria have betrayed the Dominican people who are threatened with a new military dictatorship."

1961—Continued

December 17.—President Balaguer announces the creation of a 7-man Council of State to govern the country with himself as President of the Council. He declares that he will resign as soon as the Organization of American States lifts the economic and political sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic. Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo, president of the opposition National Civic Union, is not named as a member of the Council, but another NCU member, Dr. Rafael F. Bonnelly, is selected as Vice President to succeed as President when Balaguer resigns. Subsequent to Balaguer's announcement, Gen. Rodriguez Echavarria, chief of the Armed Forces, promises his support for the new regime. "The plan announced by President Balaguer follows almost exactly that proposed by the Opposition leader, Dr. Viriato Fiallo, except that he had demanded Dr. Balaguer's immediate resignation" (Times, London, Dec. 19, 1961).

December 29.—Dominican Congress gives final approval to a constitutional amendment setting up the provisional government consisting of a Council of State which is to govern the country until February 1963.

1962

January 1.—Council of State is sworn in with Balaguer as President and Rafael Bonnelly as Vice President.

January 4.—Council of the Organization of American States removes all diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic.

President Balaguer declares that he will resign before the end of February 1963 in accordance with his promise to do so after the lifting of the OAS sanctions (see above, 1961, December 17).

January 5.—Council of State confiscates all the possessions of the Trujillo family, estimated to be worth up to \$800 million in securities and business interests.

January 6.—United States and the Dominican Republic resume diplomatic relations.

January 16.—President Joaquin Balaguer resigns after serious rioting in Santo Domingo, and a new civil-military junta is sworn in to take over the Government. A spokesman of the largest opposition group, the National Civic Union, calls the change a military coup d'etat.

January 18.—Armed Forces Secretary Maj. Gen. Rafael Rodriguez Echavarria, who staged the military coup of January 16, is imprisoned by a group of Air Force officers in a military counter coup d'etat. The former Council of State (minus Balaguer) regains control of the Government, and Dr. Rafael Bonnelly is unanimously approved by the Council as the new President and head of the Council of State.

January 22.—United States extends a \$25 million emergency credit to the Dominican Republic to help ease the critical balance-of-payments problem. The money is to come from Alliance for Progress funds.

1962—Continued

January 26.—U.S. State and Defense Departments announce that a U.S. military team will arrive in the Dominican Republic on January 28 to study the possibility of resuming a military aid program.

January 29.—United States ends restrictions on exports to the Dominican Republic (see above, 1961, January 4).

February 12.—United States authorizes the purchase of 105,135 additional tons of sugar from the Dominican Republic (see above, 1962, January 6).

December 18.—Juan Bosch, Presidential candidate of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), declares himself back in the race after threatening to quit because of charges by the Roman Catholic hierarchy that he was a "Marxist-Leninist." The charges were withdrawn after a 5-hour television-radio debate between Bosch and a Spanish Jesuit leader.

December 20.—Juan Bosch is elected President by a 2 to 1 majority over Dr. Viriato Fiallo of the right-of-center National Civic Union. Bosch receives about 580,000 votes to Dr. Fiallo's 270,000. "The new President was assured of congressional control under a system which permits voters to cast ballots for candidates of 1 party only" (Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 24, 1962). " * * * is in the political line known throughout Latin America as the democratic left" (New York Times, Dec. 26, 1962). " * * * Juan Bosch, 53, candidate of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) * * * 26 years of exile during the dictatorship of the late Rafael Trujillo * * * Bosch spent his exile in a number of Latin American nations, and is closely identified with the leaders known as the anti-Communist democratic left. This group includes ex-president Joseph (Pepe) Figueres of Costa Rica, President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre of Peru and Gov. Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico * * * 12 years in Cuba. He fled when Batista ordered his arrest for extradition to the Dominican Republic, and returned in 1959, staying until 1960 when he became convinced that Fidel Castro was betraying the Cuban revolution to international communism" (Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 24, 1962).

1963

January 4.—President-elect Juan Bosch confers with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington on U.S. assistance for his projected social reforms.

February 1.—President-elect Bosch confers with French President de Gaulle in Paris. Next day, he states that France is prepared to help in the economic development of his country.

February 8.—Bosch confers with British Prime Minister Macmillan in London.

February 10.—Bosch arrives in Bonn for talks with West German officials.

1963—Continued

February 17.—Bosch returns home following his visits to the United States and Europe. He states that he has received pledges of 3 times as much economic aid from Europe as from the United States. He also states that his Government will revise the contract negotiated by the former Council of State with the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey saying that the contract is harmful to national interests. “* * * unofficial sources said he had obtained European loans totaling \$200 million” (Reuters, Feb. 18, 1963.)

February 26.—Juan Bosch inaugurated as President.

April 1.—Government allows the return to the country of Maximo Lopez Molina, who was deported in 1962 after his formation of the pro-Castro, left-wing Dominican People's party. On his return, he states that his deportation was due to “Yankee imperialists” since he was “prejudicing their efforts to deceive the people.”

April 28.—Dominican Republic announces (at an emergency session of the Council of the Organization of American States in Washington) that it has issued an ultimatum to the Government of Haiti, demanding that it change its “aggressive policies” within 24 hours or face the consequences. On the same day, Dominican troops and ships are reported alerted for action.

April 29.—Dominican Republic and Haiti accept the good offices of the OAS commission, and Haitian troops are withdrawn from the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince. Next day, the commission (including representatives of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador) arrives in Haiti.

May 11.—President Bosch (in an interview) calls on the OAS to discard its traditional adherence to the principle of nonintervention and to establish instead “its responsibility for observance of democracy and human rights which cannot be subordinated to any other principle.”

May 31.—Armistead Selden, Jr. (Democrat, Alabama), chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on Latin American affairs, tells the House of Representatives that Communist subversive penetration in the Dominican Republic “apparently is not being effectively countered by the new Dominican Government.”

September 20.—Thousands of shops throughout the Dominican Republic are closed following a call for a general strike from the right-wing political parties. On the same day, the Government seizes several radio stations on the charge of having incited business men to join the strike. Arrests are also reported by the press.

September 25.—Predawn bloodless military coup ousts President Juan Bosch and his government. A radio broadcast announces that “Castro communism has been crushed” and that “a chaotic situation,” marked by unemployment and by “incapacity as the order of the day,” must be corrected. United States suspends diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and announces that it has halted economic aid to that country.

1963—Continued

September 26.—Three-man civilian junta is sworn in at a ceremony attended by Maj. Gen. Victor Elby Vinas Roman, the chiefs of staff of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and several other top military and police leaders. The members of the junta are: Emilio de los Santos, former President of the Electoral College (which had elected President Bosch 7 months ago), Manuel Enrique Tavares Espailat, an industrialist, and Ramon Tapia Espinal, a lawyer and member of the former Council of State. “* * * the impression among United States officials and Latin American diplomats was that the junta was primarily a ‘front’ for General Imbert Barrera, who is regarded as the chief power behind the coup * * * in the last two years he has gained almost complete control over the heavily armed, 12,000 man police force” (New York Times, September 27, 1963).

The next day, Foreign Minister J. Donald Reid Cabral announces that former President Juan Bosch will be deported. “Radio Santo Domingo said the opposition party leaders who picked the new three-man junta had agreed to * * *” participate directly in the responsibilities of power and public administration.

Also on the same day (September 26), Costa Rica and Venezuela break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and Bolivia suspends its relations with the Government.

September 29.—Curfew imposed September 25 is lifted. Two days later, the Government released 700 persons arrested in connection with the military coup. A Government spokesman says that 50 known Communists will be sent into exile.

October 1.—Former President Juan Bosch arrives in exile in Puerto Rico. He calls his ouster as Dominican President “a tragic experience for all Latin America.” Puerto Rican Governor Luis Munoz Marin (in greeting Bosch) condemns the military coup and declares: “I think a very hard line of nonrecognition should be taken by the United States and every other democratic country.”

October 4.—United States withdraws all economic and military aid personnel from the Dominican Republic. U.S. Embassy personnel below the rank of Ambassador remain in Santo Domingo. “United States economic aid to the Dominican Republic last year amounted to \$49,600,000 * * * of which three-quarters was in outright grants” (Times, London, Sept. 26, 1963).

November 27.—Government announces that municipal elections will be held on January 15, 1965, elections for the Constituent Assembly on March 15, 1965, for Congress on June 24, 1965, and for President on July 15, 1965.

December 14.—United States extends diplomatic recognition to the Dominican civilian junta.

December 21.—Sixteen pro-Castro rebels, including the leader of the 14th of June Movement, Manuel Taveres Justo, are killed by army patrols in the Cibao region.

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December 22.—Foreign Minister J. Donald Reid Cabral is named head of the governing civilian junta following the resignation of Emilio de los Santos. “* * * Dr. Emilio de los Santos * * * resigned in protest over the apparent massacre of 16 pro-Castro guerrillas * * *. Dr. de los Santos has been concerned for some weeks by the ruthlessness of repressive measures aimed against leftist groups” (Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1963). “The military insisted * * * that a show of force was necessary to prevent the spread of guerrilla activity as well as to justify their overthrow of President Juan D. Bosch * * *” (New York Times, Dec. 25, 1963).

1964

March 21.—U.S. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, Jr., arrives in Santo Domingo to take up his post. On March 30, Bennett delivers a note to the Government which authorizes the release of \$885,000 in U.S. aid for education and public works.

April 8.—Government confirms resignation of Ramon Tapia Espinal from the civilian junta and his replacement by Ramon Caceres Troncoso, a former Finance Minister.

June 10.—Former President Juan D. Bosch (in an interview in New York) predicts a revolution soon against the ruling junta in the Dominican Republic. Bosch declares: “Corruption is so widespread in political and military ranks that it is undermining the politico-military dictatorship led by Donald Reid Cabral, chief of the junta * * *. Everything that could be pocketed has been. Given the limited economic possibilities of the country, the looters are falling out among themselves.”

September 7.—Ruling civilian junta sets September 1, 1965 as the date for Presidential, Congressional and municipal elections.

October 3.—Special commission of the Organization of American States leaves Santo Domingo for Washington after 22 days spent in trying to mediate the Haitian-Dominican border conflict. “The mediators met with executives of both countries and induced them to renew consular and diplomatic relations * * * Haiti broke relations with the Dominican Republic * * * when former President Juan Bosch threatened an invasion of Haiti” (New York Times, October 4, 1964).

December 15.—Dominican Republic and Haiti announce that they will start talks on renewing diplomatic relations on January 2. The talks will be held in Washington under the auspices of the OAS.

1965

April 24.—Military uprising against the ruling junta is staged by supporters of former President Juan D. Bosch.

April 25.—Government of Donald Reid Cabral falls as a result of the military coup. “* * * four air force planes strafed the Presidential Palace [in Santo Domingo] * * * amid an armed forces power struggle for control of the country. * * * The planes strafed the palace to reinforce the demands of the air force and navy for the establishment of a military junta to rule the county * * *. The

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army rebels who sparked the revolt want to reinstall the exiled former President, Juan Bosch, in the presidency. The air force and navy oppose his return" (AP, April 25, 1965). "Mobs roamed the streets of the capital chanting, 'Viva Bosch!' and linking arms with rebel troops. But there was also looting and arson * * * at least five political party headquarters were set afire" (New York Herald Tribune, April 26, 1965).

On the same day, Juan Bosch (who lives in exile in Puerto Rico) declares he has accepted the call of the Dominican rebels to return as constitutional President. He says that he has spoken by telephone with Acting President Jose Rafael Molina Urena who was sworn in earlier in the day to serve until Bosch's return. "The Army announces its approval to bring Bosch back, but the Air Force, the Navy and some Army units refuse" (New York Times, April 26, 1965). "One suspects the real reason for the revolt to be the fact that Donald Reid, the strong man in the overthrown Government, had cut down the military establishment in February and dismissed a number of officers. Moreover, Mr. Reid had instituted several necessary austerity measures, which made him unpopular and hence vulnerable" (New York Times, April 26, 1965).

April 26.—Pro-Bosch rebel regime hands out arms to thousands of civilians. "In Santo Domingo, army troops passed out rifles and machine guns to an estimated 3,000 civilians. In addition, 10,000 to 15,000 persons were reported in possession of gasoline-bottle bombs fueled free by service stations. Armed civilians joined military patrols in the streets" (AP, Apr. 27, 1965). "The pro-Bosch Army officers who overthrew [the] civilian junta * * * claimed to have won the support of the Navy and most of the Air Force. But Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, commanding 1,500 men and 30 tanks at San Isidoro Air Base 20 miles from the capital, still refused to accept Mr. Bosch's return. P-51 fighter planes controlled by the anti-Bosch commander strafe the Presidential Palace, the governmental radio station and a key road block held by pro-Bosch troops" (New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 27, 1965).

April 27.—U.S. Embassy spokesman in Santo Domingo announces that the U.S. Navy is preparing to evacuate U.S. citizens who want to leave the Dominican Republic. (There are about 2,500 U.S. citizens in the Dominican Republic.) Subsequently, about 1,000 Americans are taken aboard U.S. Navy ships at Haina. "The U.S. aircraft carrier Boxer and transports with 1,500 Marines aboard * * * moved in close to the capital [Santo Domingo] last night [April 26]" (Washington Post, Apr. 26, 1965). Later, the pro-Bosch military-civilian revolt appears to collapse after heavy fighting in Santo Domingo in which hundreds are reportedly killed. "The rebels surrender after they had controlled Santo Domingo * * * for three days. Their capitulation came in dramatic negotiations conducted with United States diplomats. The tacit agreement on which the surrender was based calls for the formation of a military junta and the holding of elections, probably in September * * *. The victorious forces, a coalition of the air force, the navy

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and part of the army, proclaim martial law as rearguard fighting continued in Santo Domingo late in the evening with heavy sniper action by armed civilians * * *. In the wake of the rebels' surrender, Jose Rafael Molina Urena, who had served as Acting President since last Sunday [April 25], flees to asylum at the Colombian Embassy * * *. Although all the army units in Santo Domingo, the police and thousands of armed citizens stood behind the Bosch cause, the revolution appears to collapse because of the adamant opposition of Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander of the air force troops * * * [who] used his aircraft along with air force tanks and troops to pound the rebels incessantly for 3 days * * *. The turning point came today [April 27] when the tiny Dominican Navy and an army regiment * * * both of which had remained neutral * * * decided to join Gen. Wessin y Wessin. The navy ships lobbed several shells into the city at noon and air force tanks and infantry finally succeeded late in the day in battling their way into the city * * * (New York Times, Apr. 28, 1965).

April 28.—U.S. President Johnson announces that 400 U.S. Marines have been landed in the Dominican Republic to help evacuate U.S. citizens. "Officials [in Washington] said the marines would stay in the Dominican Republic 'as long as necessary.' They stressed that the marines were not to take sides in the struggle between Dominican political and military factions. Although these sources said that some Communist leaders had been clearly identified as among the rebel forces, they avoided suggesting that the Communists had captured the rebellion. It appeared, they felt, that the superiority of weapons lay with non-Communist forces attempting to crush the rebellion in any case" (New York Times, Apr. 29, 1965). Fighting continues in Santo Domingo between pro- and anti-Bosch factions. Fighter planes under the command of Gen. Wessin y Wessin attack the northern and central parts of Santo Domingo which are held by pro-Bosch rebel elements. "The hard-core Communists and Castroites by yesterday [April 28] had effectively seized control of the movement to bring back the deposed Mr. Bosch * * *" (New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 29, 1965).

On the same day [April 28], anti-Bosch supporters of Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin (who led the coup against President Bosch 10 months ago) name a 3-man military junta (Air Force Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, Army Col. Enrique Casado and Navy Capt. Manuel Santana Carasco) to govern the country. "* * * it could hardly be considered an effective government because of the continued resistance of elements of the rebel regime that had ruled nominally for three days. * * * The members of the junta * * * appeared to be stand-ins for the commanders of the forces opposed to the pro-Bosch group" (New York Times, Apr. 29, 1965).

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April 29.—Cuban Communist newspaper *Hoy* of Havana violently attacks the landing of U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic, and says that "the United States interference has, as always, been cynical, shameless and monstrous." Mexican, Chilean, Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Argentine reactions also unfavorable. Panamanians accept landing.

Soviet official news agency Tass accuses the United States of "direct armed intervention" in the Dominican Republic, and the Communist Chinese news agency Hsinhua declares that "the new intervention of the part of the United States, which came at a moment when United States imperialism was wildly extending its aggression in Vietnam, threw further light on its hideous feature as the international gendarme." U.S. Marines repulse sniper attack on American embassy. * * * "at the first OAS meeting convened since the revolt began * * * President Johnson's order to have Marines land in the Dominican Republic had run into opposition. * * * At a closed meeting of the OAS, Latin Diplomats expressed concern over the fact that the decision was taken without consulting hemispheric leaders. Some Latin spokesmen passionately spoke 'U.S. intervention,' charging the action was reminiscent of U.S. gunboat diplomacy of a bygone era" (New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 30, 1965). "It was the first time American marines have landed in a Latin American country since 1928 * * *" (Chicago Tribune, Apr. 30, 1965).

April 30.—About 1,200 more U.S. Marines are landed in the Dominican Republic, bringing the total of U.S. Marines there to about 1,700. Two battalions of U.S. airborne troops (about 2,500 men) also begin landing at San Isidro Air Base (headquarters of Gen. Wessin y Wessin and the military junta) near Santo Domingo. "The hard-pressed military junta was reported last night [April 29] to have requested * * * direct intervention by the United States to restore law and order to [Santo Domingo]. * * * A high-ranking U.S. Navy officer said earlier that the function of the marines was only to protect the continuing evacuation [of American citizens] but also to see that no Communist government is established in the Dominican Republic. (New York Times, Apr. 26, 1965): "A contingent of [U.S.] marines with tanks cordoned off nine square miles for the 'internationalized zone' * * * The council of the Organization of American States had sanctioned the 'international zone.' It covers all the embassies, many of which contain refugees of various political hues and have been shot at" (Times, London, May 1, 1965).

On the same day (April 30), the Council of the Organization of American States (meeting in Washington) calls for an immediate cease-fire in the fighting in the Dominican Republic, and sends a message to the Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Emanuele Clarizio, to ask for his help in arranging a cease-fire.

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U.S. President Johnson declares: "For two days American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an effort to protect the lives of Americans and the nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence and disorder. With the assistance of these American forces, over 2,400 Americans and other nationals have been evacuated from the Dominican Republic. We took this step when, and only when, we were officially notified by police and military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the safety of Americans and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order * * *. By an outstanding effort of mediation, the Papal Nuncio has achieved an agreement on a cease-fire which I have urged all those concerned to take. But this agreement is not now * * * being fully respected * * * there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control * * *. It is very important that representatives of the OAS be sent to the Dominican Republic just as soon as they can be sent there in order to strengthen the cease-fire; in order to help clear a road to the return of constitutional process and free elections * * *. Late action or delay in such a case could mean a failure to accomplish the agreed objectives of the American States. The eyes of the hemisphere are now on the OAS * * *. The United States will give its full support to the work of the OAS and will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter." "This marked the first public indication by the [Johnson] Administration that Castro-controlled Communists may be playing a role in the revolt" (New York Herald Tribune, May 1, 1965).

Later on April 30, the OAS Council in Washington announces that a formula has been found for a cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. The cease-fire would become effective when two conditions have been met: (1) All lives should be guaranteed, regardless of ideological affiliation. (2) An OAS mediation commission should be sent to act as arbiter in the conflict. "The formula was communicated from Santo Domingo by Mgr. Emmanuel Clarizio, the Papal Nuncio * * * [who] said that he believed the conditions would be acceptable to the leaders of the revolution and counter-revolution." (Times, London, May 1, 1965).

The cease-fire is reportedly signed for the rebels by Fausto Caamano Deno, and subsequently by his brother, the rebel military leader Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. It is signed for the counter-revolutionary forces by the three junta members, headed by Col. Pedro B. Benoit and by Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin.

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May 1.—President Johnson announces that about 2,000 more troops are being sent to the Dominican Republic, bringing the total number of U.S. troops there to about 6,200.

On the same day, the U.S. State Department issues a statement denying that U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic are taking sides in the conflict. "But before that statement could be published in any newspaper, an American admiral was being quoted as saying that U.S. forces were in the Dominican Republic for the dual purposes of saving American lives and 'seeing that Castro and Cuban Communists do not get in' " (Washington Post, May 2, 1965). "U.S. leaders no longer hide their intention of crushing the uprising of the followers of former President Juan Bosch. * * * The massive effectives used in this politico-military operation give eloquent proof that the United States will not permit Juan Bosch to return to power and to complete his term in office which was to have ended in 1967. To justify itself, the United States asserts that commandos trained in Cuba and Czechoslovakia have intervened in the struggle, that anarchy is total, and that the return of Juan Bosch would result in the alinement of the Dominican Republic with the Socialist Republic of Cuba. It is probable that elements of trained Cuba are now playing a role in the violent street combats in Santo Domingo. And no one can say for sure that Bosch would have been able to prevent a slide to the left. But everyone knows, in Washington as in Santo Domingo, that the Partido Socialista Dominicano (which is a Communist party) is insignificant, and that the two other extreme-left groups, the Liberation Movement and the 14th of June Movement (a pale Dominican copy of the Cuban 26th of July Movement), have never succeeded, since the fall of the dictator Trujillo in May 1961, in gaining any significant recognition. The only real popular formation is that of the 'Revolutionary Party', whose leader is Juan Bosch, and which obtained 60 percent of the votes in the presidential election of December 1962" (Le Monde, Paris, May 2-3, 1965).

On the same day, the OAS votes to send a five-man peace committee (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama) to help restore order in the Dominican Republic. "Only those Latin American countries which are least hostile to the U.S. are members of the OAS commission" (Monde, Paris, May 4, 1965). "The OAS created its new fact-finding committee after a long session in which a parade of Latin-American representatives criticized the Johnson administration for its military actions in the Dominican Republic" (New York Herald Tribune, May 2, 1965). "What is * * * unprecedented is the unanimous condemnation of U.S. intervention by the Governments of Latin America, whatever their political complexion, with Mexico and Chile in the lead. Notable among the complainants is Venezuela, whose Foreign Minister summoned the U.S. Ambassador to receive an official protest" (Observer, London, May 2, 1965).

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Former President Juan Bosch declares (in an interview in San Juan, P.R.) that there is "absolutely no justification" for the landing of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic. "The fear of 'another Cuba' has been the main inspiration for the Johnson administration's responses to the rebellion in the Dominican Republic. * * * In the eyes of a growing number of Dominicans, including those who accepted the need for the presence of American marines and paratroopers to help halt the carnage, the United States has become identified with hardline military elements [in the Dominican Republic]. There is no question that Washington is lined up with the three-man military junta which operates from the San Isidro base across the Ozama River from [the] embattled capital but has no control in Santo Domingo. The junta thus is an unreal government, whose military forces have been badly mauled by the rampaging rebels * * * the [Johnson] administration's attitude shows that it * * * views the junta as a means for ultimately achieving Dominican stability" (New York Times, May 2, 1965).

The Soviet Union calls for an "urgent meeting" of the U.N. Security Council to consider U.S. "military intervention" in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic.

May 2.—President Johnson declares that the Dominican uprising which "began as a popular democratic revolution" was seized by "a band of Communist conspirators," and that he has ordered another 4,500 U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic (bringing the total to about 14,000 marines and paratroopers) in order to "prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere." He condemns the Trujillo dictatorship, saying: "For more than three decades the people of that tragic little island suffered under the weight of one of the most brutal and despotic dictatorships in the history of the Americas." He also says that the United States has "maintained communication with President Bosch who has chosen to remain in Puerto Rico." "As late as Saturday [May 1] the United States representative at the Organization of American States, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, was assuring the representatives of the Latin American foreign ministers with a straight face that the United States forces had gone to Santo Domingo solely to rescue civilians and for no other purpose at all. * * * On Sunday night [May 2] Mr. Johnson made explicit what was already obvious, that the administration feared that Communists might get the upper hand and was determined not to allow it. This was government not only freely chosen but devoted to social reform—a government, in short, for which the only conceivable model in the political history of the Dominican Republic is the short-lived administration of President Juan Bosch. One school in the State Department, backed by many people of positive opinions in the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, regards Dr. Bosch not only as an ineffectual do-gooder but also as being dangerously colorblind, that is, lacking in alertness when it comes to picking out Communists and keeping them at arm's length. In his broadcast

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address Mr. Johnson appeared to detach himself from this school. Somebody had evidently persuaded him that it was worthwhile to keep the option of a reforming, or democratic, or at least vaguely popular government open for the future in case it should come in useful. * * * according to American intelligence sources 55 Communist and Castroist plotters, some from outside the country, were active members of the [pro-Bosch] rebel forces, hoping to take over the movement. Estimates of the number of Communist adherents, as distinct from 'agents,' in the Dominican Republic vary between three hundred odd and three thousand. Only ostensibly does the [U.S.] administration remain neutral between the Dominican factions; the real situation is indicated by the convention which labels the forces of General Wessin as 'loyalists' and those of [pro-Bosch] Colonel Caamano as 'rebels * * *.' Something of the outcome may depend on the extent to which the other Latin American governments accept this categorisation" (Economist, London, May 8, 1965).

Former President Juan Bosch (in an interview in Puerto Rico for a U.S. television program) says that the Dominican revolution was won by his supporters until the U.S. intervened. He asserts that the uprising was democratic and in no way under Communist control. "* * * all reports of foreign observers in Santo Domingo, including those of numerous American journalists, are in agreement that the majority of the population wishes the return to power of former President Juan Bosch. It seems to be fact—and Juan Bosch repeated it Sunday evening [May 2]—that his supporters were on the point of winning when the demoralized forces of General Wessin appealed through the U.S. Ambassador and their own representative in Washington, for U.S. military aid" (Le Monde, Paris, May 4, 1965).

May 3.—President Johnson defends once again U.S. military landings in the Dominican Republic. "We don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere." "In the Caribbean, U.S. intervention has undoubtedly resulted in a grave setback to the inter-American system. Decades were spent in creating a policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of hemispheric nations and in a collective system of security based on the Rio Treaty and the Bogotá Charter. These documents stand; but they are fractured, and time will be needed to heal the wounds. * * * What will never end is argument about the United States contention that it is saving the Dominican Republic from a Castro-type revolution" (N.Y. Times, May 4, 1965). "In an attempt to placate the indignation which U.S. intervention has aroused, two experienced diplomatists are making a rapid tour of Latin American capitals. Mr. Averell Harriman has been to Colombia and Peru and will go on to Argentina and Brazil; Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, a Puerto Rican who was the first coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, has gone to Mexico and Venezuela. No one doubts that their task is unusually delicate. Latin American attitudes to the

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affair are sardonic at best" (Times, London, May 4, 1965). President Johnson attempts unsuccessfully to get the backing of former President Betancourt of Venezuela.

Former President Juan Bosch declares (in San Juan, Puerto Rico) that he has been informed by telephone from Santo Domingo that a constitutional congress composed of members of the former Dominican Congress has elected Col. Francisco Caamano Deno as President of the Republic under provisions of the Constitution which were in effect when he (Bosch) was deposed. Bosch declares that the country now has a constitutional government, and he calls on all governments in the Americas to recognize the Caamano Government.

On the same day [May 3], the Soviet Union (in the U.N. Security Council) accuses the United States of having "flagrantly violated" the U.N. Charter by its "criminal intervention" in the Dominican Republic, and calls on the Security Council to "condemn the armed interference of the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic as a violation of international peace."

U.S. delegate Adlai E. Stevenson rejects the Soviet accusations, and says that the Soviet Union is "attempting to exploit the anarchy in the Dominican Republic for its own ends."

U.S. troops establish a corridor cutting through the rebel-held area in Santo Domingo. "The corridor across Santo Domingo [opened] direct communications between the international zone [occupied by U.S. troops] in the west and the San Isidro Air Force Base on the east bank of the Ozama River * * *. The announced purpose of the corridor * * * was to assure a flow of supplies to an international safety zone set up for the protection of foreigners * * *" (New York Times, May 4, 1965). "There were growing indications that the American forces are preparing to seize the rebel-held section of the city * * *. The rebels * * * 800 regular troops and thousands of armed civilians supporting the return of exiled President Juan Bosch * * * now are left with their backs to the Caribbean" (New York Herald Tribune, May 4, 1965).

May 4.—In the U.N. Security Council, Uruguay attacks the "Johnson doctrine" saying that this is a "new corollary" of the Monroe Doctrine, and that both are unilateral declarations by the United States which are not binding on the other American states. Uruguay also urges the Security Council to ask for "an immediate cessation of all unilateral action" in the Dominican Republic. French delegate Roger Seydoux tells the Security Council that U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic "seems to be exercised against those who stand by constitutional legality," and he calls for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops. "Informed sources said Seydoux's speech appeared to have been written personally by General de Gaulle. His surprising break with the United States came minutes after the two Latin American members of the Council [Bolivia and Uruguay] had split over the intervention, and after a lukewarm statement by Britain, which did not support the American

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intervention but endorsed continued action by the Organization of American States * * *. In two days of debate, no member of the 11-nation Council has spoken in support of the anti-Communist aspect of the United States action, and only Britain and France have expressed 'understanding' of the humanitarian aspects of rescuing foreigners" (Washington Post, May 5, 1965).

On the same day [May 4], rebel leader Col. Francisco Caamano Deno is inaugurated (in the rebel-held area of Santo Domingo) as the "constitutional" President of the Dominican Republic. In his inauguration address, he says: "We want United States troops to withdraw from our country as soon as possible, so that the nationalism of the Dominican people may not be converted into anti-North Americanism." He says that U.S. statements that the original revolt had fallen into Communist hands were "lies." "The [U.S.] State Department made it clear that the United States had no intention of extending diplomatic recognition to the government formed by Colonel Caamano" (New York Times, May 6, 1965).

President Johnson expresses the hope that the OAS will "come up with recommendations as to an interim government that will not involve either Communism or dictatorship until we can have free elections and self-determination."

"Top United States officials [in Santo Domingo] privately say that the Dominican crisis fast could become a serious domestic political issue for the Johnson administration if it is shown that the decision to commit so many troops [in the Dominican Republic] was made too swiftly and without fully exploring solutions other than intervention. These officials say they are being hamstrung in trying to present a picture of what is going on in Santo Domingo militarily and diplomatically because of the possible effect of that information contradicting views coming out of Washington. 'This has become a black-and-white issue in the States,' said a highly placed U.S. official, 'and there is pressure to keep it that way.' * * * U.S. officials [in Santo Domingo] responsible for giving information to the huge press corps are admittedly 'not being told anything,' and what they are told is, it appears, often false or misleading. And the kind of reporting of the real Dominican situation that is going to the President and his advisers in Washington is also suspect" (New York Herald Tribune, May 8, 1965).

May 5.—Formal cease-fire (negotiated by the OAS 5-man peace commission) is signed by the military junta headed by Col. Pedro B. Benoit at the San Isidro air force base and by a representative of the Caamano government in the rebel-held area of Santo Domingo. The agreement ratifies the cease-fire signed on April 30 and calls for a cease-fire based on a demarcation of zones held by the two sides in Santo Domingo; on guarantees for foreign embassies and persons in asylum in them; and on general measures of safety within the city. "Despite the accord fighting went on in much of the city * * *. The hope was that the accord would mark the end of hostilities in Santo Domingo where street fighting

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has caused a death toll possibly as high as 2,000 since the April 24 uprising * * *. Total United States casualties at the time the truce was signed were reported at 8 dead and 49 wounded" (New York Times, May 6, 1965). In Washington, U.S. Government sources make available privately to newsmen a list of 54 "Communist and Castroist" leaders whom President Johnson accused of seizing control. "The sources told of Communist-led forces maneuvering to gain control of strategic areas of Santo Domingo, win the populace to its side and instigate widespread terrorism. Provided also were graphic accounts of police officers and Communist opponents being summarily executed and of mobs being incited to loot the homes and offices of anti-Communist elements * * *. Playing a key role in the tactical direction of the rebel forces is Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, an experienced Spanish Communist Party activist who has been working with the Dominican Communist Party for the past two years. There are three Communist political organizations involved. They are the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), which follows Moscow's direction; the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), a small but aggressive Marxist-Leninist party which follows the Chinese Communist line; and the 14th of June Movement (APCJ), the largest of the three, which is known to have connections with the Soviet, Cuban and Communist Chinese regimes" (Washington Post, May 6, 1965). In San Juan, P.R., Jaime Benitez, chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico and a friend of Juan Bosch, declares that [even the intervention] "would not have been fatal had it not been compounded by someone who apparently ordered the marines to collaborate with rightist forces * * * Bosch declares * * * I am not well prepared to deal with the thousands and thousands of young Communists that American actions are creating" (New York Times, May 6, 1965).

May 6.—OAS (at a meeting of consultation of OAS foreign ministers in Washington) approves by a 14-to-5 vote, with one abstention (Venezuela), the U.S.-sponsored resolution to create an inter-American military force to help restore peace and constitutional government to the Dominican Republic. Voting in favor are: the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay. Voting against: Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay. "Out of the narrow victory [a two-thirds majority was required for adoption] * * * came what many American and Latin-American diplomats believed was an important precedent in establishing peace-keeping machinery in the Western Hemisphere and in enlarging the mandate of the organization to include collective responsibility for the political welfare of the individual members" (New York Times, May 7, 1965). "The vote marked an historic break in the OAS tradition of nonintervention in the Western Hemisphere * * *" (New York Herald Tribune, May 7, 1965). "* * * the United States managed to muster 14 of the 20 OAS votes in favour of a joint force. But this 14 included a representative of the Dominican military junta, who

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was seated at Washington's pressing insistence. There seems a contradiction here. The United States argues that it had to intervene because the Dominican Republic had no government worthy of the name, anarchy reigned and the communists were coming out on top: how, then, can there be government's representatives wielding normal diplomatic authority?" (Economist, London, May 15, 1965). "The United States obtained a bare two-thirds majority only on the limited agreement that the unilateral U.S. 'presence' in the Dominican Republic be replaced by an inter-American force under unified command. The Latin American countries insisted on this in order to reestablish the principle (agreed to by the U.S. Government in the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Bogota Charter of 1948 and now flouted by it) that any intervention in an American country must be collective" (Observer, London, May 9, 1965).

The French Government is considering recognizing the recent formed government of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. "President de Gaulle broke new and dangerous ground with his * * * calculated criticism * * * of American intervention in the Dominican Republic. No major French interest is involved. * * * It will be regarded as an attempt to make political capital out of anti-American resentment, wherever it may be" (Times, London, May 7, 1965). Rebels charge truce breach by U.S. forces.

May 7.—Anti-Bosch forces set up a five-man civilian-military junta to replace the three-man military junta headed by Col. Pedro Benoit. The new junta is headed by Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras; other junta members are Col. Pedro Benoit and three civilians. " * * * Gen. Antonio Imbert [is] one of two survivors of the band that plotted the assassination of dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 1961. General Imbert said he joined the 'Government of National Reconstruction' [the new junta] to save the Dominican people from Communist dictatorship * * * [U.S.] government sources said Gen. Wessin y Wessin was believed to be behind the move. The sources speculated that the military group decided on the measure to gain popular support since General Imbert is widely known throughout the country as a result of his role in the Trujillo assassination" (New York Herald Tribune, May 8, 1965). "When it became clear that the military junta's first leader, Gen. Wessin y Wessin, was adamantly opposed in the Dominican Republic and throughout Latin America, Washington came up with another—but equally unpopular and right-wing—protege. American correspondents on the spot agree that General Imbert, now head of the junta, was chosen, groomed and put in by the Americans and is being kept in power by the Americans" (New York Times, May 12, 1965). Senator Robert Kennedy declares that the United States should have consulted the OAS before intervening in the Dominican Republic.

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May 8.—New junta headed by General Imbert meets with provincial governors, and issues statement asserting that the junta controls all 26 Dominican provinces and 90 percent of the capital Santo Domingo. "The appointment of Antonio Imbert Barreras as junta president * * * is understood to be viewed by the rebel forces as a sign that the United States is now committed to the destruction of the rebel movement" (New York Times, May 9, 1965).

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (in written answers to questions on U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic, submitted by the Associated Press) declares that "time factors were crucial" in the U.S. decision to send troops to the Dominican Republic without first seeking OAS approval. Rusk says: "The first action taken by the United States was indeed a rescue operation, and there is voluminous evidence that the Marines arrived just in time to avoid a major calamity * * * after the initial emergency, U.S. forces were necessary to preserve the situation in the Dominican Republic until the OAS could take charge. Meanwhile the evidence was mounting that the Communists had captured the revolution according to plan and the danger of a Communist takeover was established beyond question * * * the pace of events in this case does indicate that the OAS should consider standby forces and political arrangements that would enable the organization to make decisions and to take action in any future emergency with a speed required by the events." Members of Bosch's Democratic Revolutionary Party declare that at no time have Communists controlled the movement.

"Alfredo Conde Pausa, listed as the new Attorney General, was described as 'a known sympathizer with PSPD (the Communist Dominican Popular Socialist Party).' A Supreme Court justice for 26 years, Conde Pausa said, weeping, that in the last presidential election he had voted for the conservative Civic Union Party * * * Luis Homero Lajara Burges (also listed) * * * is regarded by conservative Dominicans as an anti-Communist * * *" (Washington Post, May 9, 1965).

May 9.—"U.S. Information Agency advisers show that Latin American newspaper comments have been nearly 10 to 1 adverse to the United States * * * In all but one [country] the governments will gain strength against their leftist opponents by being critical at a time when they need the support of their own people in efforts to solve domestic problems * * *" (Philip Taylor in the Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1965). Junta removes eight high ranking officers in an attempt to broaden its appeal (not including Brig. Gen. Wessin y Wessin). The rebels continue to demand his removal.

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May 10.—OAS meeting of consultation of foreign ministers votes to extend the mandate of the five-nation OAS peace committee, and to give it the responsibility for restoring governmental machinery in the Dominican Republic and to prepare the way for election of a new government. The vote is 14 to 3 (Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay), with 3 abstentions (Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela). Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin has resigned as commander of the (junta) forces.

At a news conference Colonel Caamano declares "I am completely sure that a dictatorship of the left is infinitely worse than one of the right." He compared the situation to the Mexican Revolution (New York Times, May 11, 1965).

May 11.—John Bartlow Martin, President Johnson's personal envoy to Santo Domingo and former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, confers with Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. "The meeting was the first between a U.S. official and Col. Francisco Caamano Deno since he was installed as the Provisional President of the so-called Constitutional Forces. (New York Herald Tribune, May 12, 1965). "The conference at rebel headquarters came as the mediators in the 17-day-old conflict stepped up their efforts to bring together in negotiation the Caamano regime, which calls itself constitutionalist, and the junta led by Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras. (New York Times, May 12, 1965). The United States now calls for a coalition government. Wessin y Wessin denies resignation reports.

May 12.—Honduras (in a letter to the OAS) makes the first formal offer of troops for the inter-American military force which the OAS voted to set up to restore order in the Dominican Republic. "The first Latin American country * * * to have come to America's aid in the Dominican Republic by actually offering troops for an inter-American force is Honduras, Central America's banana republic par excellence. This gives a hint of the quality of support that the United States is getting from its fellow members of the Organization of American States * * * The [Johnson] administration's attempt to get a measure of Latin American approval is important, but only marginally so. It would make whatever the Americans are determined to do look a little better; clearly it would have no influence in stopping them" (Economist, London, May 15, 1965).

May 13.—Five planes of the Imbert junta forces attack the Caamano regime's radio station with rockets and machine-gun fire.

"The attacks on the radio station and a sharp increase in the sniper incidents indicated the uneasy ceasefire agreement was disintegrating" (New York Herald Tribune, May 15, 1965). "Emboldened by U.S. military support, the Dominican junta has shattered the cease-fire in that unhappy country. Its rashness has aggravated a tide of anti-American sentiment in Santo Domingo, weakened the hemispheric machinery for collective responsibility and thus provided a more fertile soil for Communist subversion in Latin America" (New York Times, May 15, 1965).

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May 14.—U.N. Security Council (responding to an appeal sent May 13 by Jottin Cury, Foreign Minister of the Dominican “constitutional government” of Col. Caamano Deno) approves a resolution asking U.N. Secretary General U Thant to send a representative to report on the situation in the Dominican Republic. The resolution also calls for a “strict cease-fire” and asks “all concerned in the Dominican Republic” to cooperate with the Secretary General’s representative. The United States joins in the unanimous vote, despite its insistence that the task of restoring order in the Dominican Republic should be left to the OAS. Later the same day, U Thant sends an advance party headed by his military adviser, Maj. Gen. Indarjit Rikhye of the Indian Army, who helped organize the U.N. peace-keeping forces for the Congo and Cyprus. “U.N. intervention in a domain reserved up till now to the OAS constitutes a severe defeat for the United States” (*Le Monde*, Paris, May 16-17, 1965). “While the letter of the resolution limits the work of the representative to investigation and reporting, the spirit of the decision clearly establishes a link between the efforts of the Organization of American States and the U.N. The demand for such a link had been made to the council first by Uruguay [and later by Jordan and Britain] * * *. They were motivated by fears that unilateral peace-keeping actions, such as the one taken by the OAS in setting up the Inter-American Peace Force, would set a dangerous precedent for other regional organizations and also would diminish the authority of the U.N. * * *. The switch in the U.S. position might have been necessitated by the following considerations:

If the United States refused to permit the dispatch of a U.N. representative it would be construed by the council to mean the situation in the Dominican Republic is somewhat different than what has been reported by U.S. officials * * *.

Were the United States to reject [the resolution], the council might try to adopt a firmer resolution” (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 15, 1965).

May 15.—Truce in Santo Domingo is broken by all-day fighting between forces of the Imbert junta and of the rebels led by Col. Caamano Deno.

On the same day, President Johnson issues statement saying: “I continue to hope that the OAS mission presently in the Dominican Republic will rapidly find a solution that will at the same time assure for the Dominican people the principles of a democratic constitution and a government of national unity able to maintain economic and political stability. If the good offices of the OAS succeed in achieving this solution, the United States Government will render all available assistance toward rapid economic development.” “* * * Johnson apparently was acting to bolster the OAS following the United Nations intervention in the crisis” (*New York Times*, May 16, 1965).

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Also on May 15, U.N. Secretary General U Thant announces that he has chosen a Venezuelan official of the U.N. Secretariat, Jose Antonio Mayobre, as his representative in the Dominican Republic. (Mayobre is executive secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, and a former Ambassador of Venezuela in Washington, and representative to the OAS.)

May 16.—Special 4-man fact-finding mission for President Johnson (including McGeorge Bundy, Presidential assistant for national-security affairs; Cyrus R. Vance, Under Secretary of Defense; Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs [and in charge of the Dominican affair at the State Department since the outbreak of the rebellion on April 24]; and Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) arrives in Santo Domingo to study the situation.

Heavy fighting continues between junta and rebel forces in the northern sector of Santo Domingo. "The attacks by the United States-backed junta against the northern sector of the rebel zone in Santo Domingo add a new dimension to the tragic conflict. The junta has deliberately violated the truce, as a matter of policy, since Thursday [May 13], when it disabled the rebel radio station from the air * * *. The United States now has 30,000 men in Santo Domingo or offshore. It is preposterous to suggest that a force of that size—operating as part of the hemisphere peace unit being recruited by the Organization of American States—lacks the power to halt systematic breaches of the cease-fire negotiated by the OAS with American help * * *. The partisanship Washington already has shown toward the Imbert junta has imperiled chances for establishment of a coalition government of the type President Johnson recommended this weekend" (New York Times, May 17, 1965).

May 17.—United States and the Dominican rebel movement of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno are reported, "on the highest authority" (according to a Santo Domingo dispatch of the New York Times, May 18, 1965), to have reached a secret agreement in principle to settle the civil war. According to the reported agreement, Antonio Guzman, who served as Agriculture Minister in the government of Juan Bosch, would take over as President of the Dominican Republic until December 1966, when a successor would be elected. "The decision to back Mr. Guzman signified a major victory for Colonel Caamano's movement * * *. The civilian-military junta of Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras, which the United States helped to create nine days ago to oppose the rebels, is opposing the proposal for a Guzman regime. General Imbert refused last night to resign in favor of a Guzman coalition when this solution was suggested to him by McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's special assistant for national security * * *. Tanks and troops of the Imbert junta continued their offensive against the rebels in the northern part of the city in the heaviest fighting of the three-week-old war" (New York Times, May 18, 1965).

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United States offer to turn over its more than 22,000 troops in the Dominican Republic to the inter-American military force is made public. "Thus far, only three nations—Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica—have committed specific numbers of troops and their contributions come to less than 500 men" (New York Times, May 18, 1965).

Also on May 17, Pope Paul VI makes an "urgent appeal" for the restoration of "unity, concord and internal collaboration" in the Dominican Republic.

May 18.—U.N. special representative Jose Antonio Mayobre (at a news conference in Santo Domingo) calls on the U.N. Security Council to bring about a cease-fire, but that junta leader General Imbert spoke "of his military operations and indicated he thought he was winning and therefore could not talk of a cease-fire." "The junta's disregard of truce appeals from many sides suggested that it was hoping for a quick military victory to give it a strong bargaining position in the proposed compromise government. The rebels charged that the United States was willing to allow at least a near-victory by the junta to bring pressure on the Caamano movement to accept the American nominations for the Cabinet" (New York Times, May 19, 1965). "While high-level envoys of the White House * * * are seeking to clarify the situation in Santo Domingo, the military and political imbroglio there has reached a state of positively anarchical confusion. The truce is constantly broken by clashes between tanks of the military junta and the rebels, by sniper attacks on the American Marines, by exchange of fire between rebel artillery and American paratroopers * * * and by bombing attacks by junta planes against the rebel-held sector of the city. The political situation is a parallelogram made up of five—although very unequal—forces. These are: (1) The American diplomatic and military presence; (2) the revolutionary movement under Col. Francisco Caamano; (3) the counterrevolutionary military junta under Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras, whose strong man Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, is the commander of the San Isidro Air Force base; (4) the Organization of American States; (5) the United Nations" (Welt, Hamburg, May 19, 1965).

U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, tells an OAS Council meeting in Washington that the United States is seeking a solution of the Dominican crisis based on a civilian-controlled government "vigorously excluding the extreme right and the extreme left." Bunker says that to achieve this "certain military leaders on each side" will have to step aside. "This was regarded as an oblique reference to the U.S. position * * * that an effective coalition should exclude the rebel leader, Col. Francisco Caamano Deno; the junta leader Col. Antonio Imbert Barreras, and the key leader of the rightist military forces, Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin" (Washington Post, May 19, 1965).

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May 19.—The Imbert military-civilian junta and the Caamano rebel movement agree to a 12-hour humanitarian truce (subsequently extended to 24 hours), effective May 21, to permit removal of the wounded and dead from the streets of the northern part of Santo Domingo. "The announcement of the truce was made by the United Nations representative [Mayobre] following a day of fighting in which the forces of the junta * * * achieved a smashing victory against the rebel regime in an offensive visibly aided by United States troops" (New York Times, May 20, 1965). "United States Marines and paratroopers gave both direct and indirect help to Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras's junta forces yesterday [May 19] as Imbert troops nearly completed a cleanup of 'Constitutionalist' rebels in northern Santo Domingo" (New York Herald Tribune, May 20, 1965).

In Washington at a ministerial meeting of the OAS, the 5-nation OAS peace committee attacks U.N. intervention in the Dominican crisis, and says that it has "greatly obstructed" efforts to restore peace. "By indirection, the committee also criticized the unilateral action taken by the United States in sending a Presidential mission to Santo Domingo last week [see above date for 1965 May 16] to seek a political solution. As a result of the actions of the United Nations and the United States, the committee reported, it faces 'really insoluble' difficulties in carrying out its mandate to achieve a cease-fire and restore normal conditions in the Dominican Republic" (New York Times, May 20, 1965).

May 20.—Rebel Col. Rafael Fernandez Dominguez, a personal friend of Bosch and minister of the Interior under Caamano is killed in fighting involving United States troops. U.S. ambassador to the OAS Ellsworth Bunker, denies the rebel charge that he was shot from behind and declares that U.S. troops have orders to fire only if fired upon. "U.S. support of the Dominican junta has played a key role in the junta's apparent victory over rebel forces in northern Santo Domingo" (Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 1965). In Santo Domingo U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance denies that U.S. troops are aiding the junta and declares that if isolated incidents have occurred, they have been in violation of orders * * *. "The United States policy was reported on high authority to be one of allowing the Imbert forces to complete the cleanup of the northern area, but to halt them at the security corridor" (New York Times, May 21, 1965). Leaders of the two factions sign a 24-hour cease fire negotiated by the Red Cross and the U.N. to allow removal of bodies and rescue of the wounded. Gen. Imbert Barreras declares that it is "too late" to make the cease fire permanent and that loyalist forces will attack rebel strongholds regardless of the U.S. position. "We have not gotten the support of the United States because it has not recognized us" (Washington Post, May 21, 1965). The Brazilian Senate approves dispatch of 1,300 troops for the OAS forces in the Dominican Republic. The OAS votes 16-0 with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Panama) to designate Secretary General Jose Mora as mediator in the crisis with authority to seek a strong cease fire agreement and to coordinate his activities with U.N. Secretary General U Thant.

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May 21.—U.N. representative Mayobre and OAS Secretary General Mora asked General Imbert for an extension of the cease fire. United States announces withdrawal of 1,700 U.S. troops to be replaced by Brazilians. Twenty-four hour truce goes into effect. U.S. officials announce that the United States will not allow junta leaders to “mop up” the last rebel stronghold. “A few of the Administration agents who were most active in encouraging the general have now begun to express fears that he plans a right-wing dictatorship” (New York Times, May 22, 1965). At a mass rally rebel president Caamano removes a pro-Cuban speaker from the platform and announces at a news conference that the United States is now effectively neutral. He offers to step down and to negotiate with the United States but not with Imbert. “Dan Kurzman of the Washington Post reported that talks between U.S. envoys and the so-called rebel group were bogged down * * * Barnard L. Collier of the New York Herald Tribune quoted ‘highly reliable sources’ in Santo Domingo as saying that agreement was reached ‘on the highest levels’ for the formation of a constitutional government headed by Jose Antonio Guzman” (Washington Post, May 22, 1965). “Some reports suggested that other than the Communist-non-Communist split fissures were appearing among the rebels” (New York Times, May 21, 1965).

May 22.—The junta of Brig. Gen. Imbert Barreras refuses to extend the cease-fire but promises not to initiate any new war actions unless provoked. In the midafternoon paratroops of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division engage in a heavy exchange with the rebels off the U.S. manned security quarter. Presidential advisor McGeorge Bundy announces plans for Guzman’s coalition government to serve until February 1967, when former president Juan Bosch’s term would have expired. Bundy also announces that Wessin y Wessin would be given diplomatic employment abroad and that negotiations with the rebels had produced an agreement that the coalition would declare itself opposed to leftist and rightist extremism. The Archbishop of Santo Domingo and four Dominican bishops issue a pastoral letter supporting a coalition government to replace the junta.

May 23.—The United States and the rebel command of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno with the consultation of the OAS and the U.N. reach an agreement on the composition of a new government. Five of eight proposed coalition members are of former president Bosch’s party. Imbert forces continue to express distaste for the arrangement. The OAS announces that both the rebel and junta factions have agreed to a cease-fire. OAS Secretary General Mora and representatives of the United States, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua sign an agreement putting the OAS peacekeeping force into operation under the command of Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvin. No serious fighting reported.

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May 24.—The Washington Daily News reports the disclosure by a New York accounting firm (Ernst and Ernst) of irregularities in the audit of the Dominican Agricultural Bank, headed by proposed coalition president Antonio Guzman. U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett and OAS Secretary General Jose Mora begin negotiations with General Imbert. Thirty-six Dominican air force planes are being kept grounded by the United States. Imbert's deputy, Francisco Jose Cardona declares that if the United States supports a Guzman coalition "our forces could give them more trouble" (Washington Post, May 25, 1965.) The cease-fire continues for the fourth day as essential industrial and commercial activities move rapidly toward normalcy. President Johnson announces that a team of FBI agents will be sent to the Dominican Republic to investigate the nature and extent of Communist influence.

May 25.—The allegations against Guzman are denied by the Santo Domingo manager of the New York accounting firm, Ernst and Ernst. The manager calls the disclosure of discrepancy a "routine bookkeeping device, not an overstatement of capital" (Washington Post, May 26, 1965). United States intensifies talks with the Imbert junta as Imbert accuses the OAS, the U.N. and the United States of "open intervention" (New York Times, February 26, 1965). United States-rebel negotiations are deadlocked as a result of a snag over proposed deportation of 50 Communists. Presidential representative McGeorge Bundy returns to Washington. A fierce but brief exchange of fire breaks the truce temporarily.

May 26.—At a news conference Secretary of State Dean Rusk concludes that the Communist threat in the Dominican Republic is "very substantially reduced" (Washington Post, May 27, 1965). He announces the withdrawal of 600 marines and predicts a more substantial withdrawal in the future. The recalcitrance of the junta in the Dominican Republic was reported today to have become the central obstacle to the formation of a provisional government * * *. There was growing resentment against the general's (Imbert) pretensions to total power and the junta's vigorous maneuvering and lobbying in Santo Domingo as well as in Washington" (Washington Post, May 27, 1965). Administration officials say they are now quite certain that supporters of Mr. Reid rather than U.S. officials spread stories to discredit Mr. Guzman" (New York Times, May 27, 1965). According to Don Kurzman of the Washington Post the rebels are now split between those willing to cooperate with the United States and those who are outspokenly anti-American. OAS protests junta detention of OAS liaison officer Horacio Hernandez. OAS Secretary General Mora and rebel leader Caamano reach agreement on allowing OAS patrols to enter rebel territory. OAS patrols enter junta territory without incident. The transfer of Radio Santo Domingo to OAS control is delayed until Saturday at General Imbert's request. OAS asks the inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic.

1965—Continued

May 27.—The United States is now said to favor 'some form' of OAS trusteeship in the Dominican Republic. OAS Secretary General Mora announces that he received \$6 million from United States to pay the salaries of Dominican civil servants (previously channeled through the junta). With the deadlock in negotiations the United States is strengthening the mandate of Mora as chief negotiator. Outside junta headquarters a crowd of several thousand shouts for the OAS to "clean up" the rebels. Most of the demonstrators are said to be members of the National Civic Union (the conservative opposition to Trujillo in 1961). "In the continuing impasse Dominican as well as U.S. officials are arguing about some of the new men and issues * * * General Imbert is said to be campaigning amongst his people, using Washington lobbyists to promote his cause and generally presenting himself as the best guarantee against communism. The rebels, in turn, have begun to accuse General Imbert and the others of helping Communists in the past * * *" (Max Frankel in the New York Times, May 28, 1965). Rebel "ambassador" to the United States Antonio Rosario declares that in 1961 Imbert had supplied money to the Castroite 14th of June movement. He also warns against the junta candidate for a coalition government, Jose Antonio Jimenez who he calls an extreme rightist and an ex-partner of Trujillo. 440 U.S. marines leave the Dominican Republic.

May 28.—Mora announces OAS takeover of the Dominican Central Bank. The action follows a threat by the Imbert junta to remove the bank's funds. Rebel leader Hector Aristy declares that the rebels refuse to be controlled by the OAS. Imbert also denounces the OAS. President Johnson calls for strengthening the OAS machinery against indirect aggression.

May 29.—As the OAS continues to be criticized by both sides the Imbert junta cancels the agreement to allow the OAS to take over the major radio station. Rebel leaders criticize the OAS for not securing the release of rebel-OAS liaison officer Hernandez Almanzar, imprisoned by the junta. U.N. fact-finding team reports that a substantial majority of the Dominican people are "overwhelmingly opposed" to the junta (New York Times, May 30, 1965). The United States proposed that the OAS send a three-man team with wide powers to the Dominican Republic.

May 30.—Rusk proposes that a plebiscite be held to determine whether the 1963 Bosch constitution or the 1962 constitution be reestablished * * *. Mora recommends security zone be expanded to include the national palace. Rebel demonstrations flare up after the shooting of a 14-year-old girl.

May 31.—U.S. proposal on three-man team is called "purposely vague" because of opposition it already faces (by Chile, Venezuela, and Costa Rica) (New York Times, June 1, 1965). Clash between the two factions occurs in San Francisco de Macores with two dead and five wounded. 4,200 U.S. marines will leave by the end of the week. U.N. representative Mayobre flies to Puerto Rico to talk with Juan Bosch.

1965—Continued

June 1.—Imbert proposes elections but declares that no rebel nominees should be allowed on the slate. "According to Bernard Collier of the New York Herald Tribune Imbert has lost almost all effective control over the civilian-military junta * * * to old guard regular army officers * * *." Junta defense minister Rivera Caminero has told Imbert that the armed forces wouldn't automatically obey his orders (New York Times, June 1, 1965). Agreement between the OAS and Imbert concerning neutralization of the national palace is apparently achieved.

June 2.—U.S. officials are now calling for elections in the Dominican Republic within two or three months. It is suggested that former president Balaguer might emerge from the contest. Junta accepts plans for elections and also proposes a civilian council to govern provisionally. Rebels continue to reject plan so long as 1963 constitution is not accepted. National palace is occupied and neutralized by OAS. Three-member OAS mediation committee appointed—Bunker of United States, Penna Marinho of Brazil, and Clairmont Duenes of El Salvador. Rumors of a neutral government of professional and business leaders to be set up in Santiago continue.

June 3.—Former president Betancourt of Venezuela criticizes United States for unilateral intervention. Rebels express doubts on likelihood of free elections. High U.S. officials report that the "third force" in the Dominican Republic is strong.

June 4.—The last 2,100 marines board ships, leaving 14,000 paratroops behind. OAS human rights group under chairmanship of Manuel Bianchi of Chile to visit northern cities in response to rebel complaints. OAS mediation team meets with papal nuncio, U.N. military observer Gen. Indarjit Rinyke, and finally with Caamano. Caamano gives qualified support to Antonio Guzman for provisional president.

June 5.—OAS mediation team meets with General Imbert. Rebel rally draws 10,000. Rebels complain that shelling from the international zone killed a woman and child. According to John Goshko "There have been persistent reports that U.S. Ambassador Tapley Bennett played a big part in the formation of the plan put forward * * * by Imbert * * *." (Washington Post, June 6, 1965).

June 6.—Dominicans gather in public squares of northern cities to describe instances of beatings and illegal entries by junta police. According to Goshko of the Washington Post "Local officials have been expressing skepticism about Bianchi's visit but in a few cases they have released a number of political prisoners to coincide with his arrival" (Washington Post, June 7, 1965). Conditions of both sides clarified: Rebels want 1963 constitution, Guzman as provisional president and elections in 1966. Junta wants elections in 60 days after entire country brought under the control of the country and the 1962 (Balaguer) constitution. "Interviews with scores of persons in this capital and in towns in the interior disclose a desire that the United States use its power and influence to 'get the military off the country's back' as one businessman put it" (New York Times, June 7, 1965).

1965—Continued

June 7.—At the U.N. France, Jordan, and Uruguay propose to extend and enlarge the task and staff of the U.N. in the Dominican Republic. OAS investigation reveals that fragments from shelling of rebel area are not up to date U.S. ammunition. "The Dominican armed factions gave some signs today of growing readiness to negotiate a political settlement" (New York Times, June 8, 1965). Rebels appoint 6-man negotiating team which includes Antonio Guzman and declare they are prepared to negotiate on all points save the restoration of the Bosch constitution of 1963. The junta begins to release political prisoners.

June 8.—Antonio Guzman contends that the third force idea has "no popular support" and represents only "wealth and status quo" (New York Times, June 9, 1965). Junta representatives continue to insist that the surrender of the rebel zone is a precondition for elections. Caamano promises to release three U.S. paratroops captured by the rebels. In Puerto Rico Juan Bosch contends that ex-Ambassador Martin urged him to justify U.S. intervention in exchange for U.S. acceptance of then provisional president Molina Urena.

June 9.—Junta and rebels sign agreement pledging cooperation with the OAS human rights group now active in the Dominican Republic. The OAS and the U.N. begin investigation of allegation that 33 persons were killed in a mass execution on the outskirts of Santo Domingo between May 22 and June 5. Chairman of the OAS human rights group Bianchi calls on General Imbert to investigate and explain the reports made by residents of the area. OAS mediation committee meets with Imbert. Three U.S. paratroopers released by the rebels.

June 10.—OAS investigation of execution continues. "Although the first body has yet to be uncovered, it now is known that the reports of mass murder came from sources so reliable that there is almost no doubt in official circles as to their truth" (Washington Post, June 11, 1965). Junta officials deny the charges. OAS troops are dispatched to guard the area pending investigation. OAS sends for a technical team of criminologists to come immediately to the Dominican Republic headed by Daniel Schweitzer of Chile.

June 11.—United States weighs political effects of helping the junta meet its June payroll. Rebels have rejected OAS paychecks to rebels on the payroll before April 24, so that, in effect, continued payments would aid the junta. Rebels ask U.N. observation mission to expand its powers to include investigation of violations of human rights. Secretary General U Thant stresses that the Security Council itself must decide this. In San Juan Former President Bosch declares the United States must choose between supporting the rebels and establishing a U.S. occupation government. "A U.S. military government would respect human rights more than any so-called political government imposed by the United States * * * by establishing a military government the United States would at least be accepting responsibility for its

1965—Continued

own actions * * *” (Washington Post, June 12, 1965). General Imbert makes countercharges that prisoners are mistreated at rebel prison. But “OAS and the U.N. officials announce separately that they had been unable to find any evidence that the Ozama prisoners were being mistreated * * *” (Washington Post, June 12, 1965).

June 12.—Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings on the U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic. OAS mediators report six new cease-fire violations. It is revealed that former president Joaquin Balaquer had begun to campaign for the presidency a year before the rebellion began.

June 13.—Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs declares that “after ten days of talks between the OAS mission’s members and the rival factions. * * * We apparently aren’t much closer to a coalition agreement than we were when we arrived. * * *. It is going to be even more difficult to force it upon the Dominican people” (New York Times, June 14, 1965). Junta demonstrators demand that Mora wipe out the rebels. The Washington Star, apparently with official authority, releases an expanded list of Communists participating in the Dominican crisis (77) (Washington Post, June 14, 1965).

June 14.—At 14th of June rally, Caamano states that the rebels will not abandon their demand for the restoration of the 1963 constitution. According to John Goshko of the Washington Post the mood of the crowd was not as virulent as that of the speakers, “due in part to the realization that the U.S. troops here are the only barrier to a slaughter by the stronger junta forces * * *” (Washington Post, June 15, 1965).

June 15.—Twenty-one die in heaviest clash in six weeks. U.S. (OAS) troops advance three blocks into rebel zone. Sources in Washington blame the rebels for the outbreak. A rebel spokesman says that after some preliminary firing broke out and died down “the Americans opened up and started shooting like crazy—like they were attacking Russia” (Washington Post, June 16, 1965). “At least two big fires were started including one at the rebel-held Customs House in the docks area. Civilians in the area fled their homes * * *” (Washington Post, June 16, 1965).

June 16.—U.S. military spokesman declares “the only firing yesterday was by either Inter-American forces or Caamano people. The junta forces took no part * * *” (New York Times, June 17, 1965). Rebels resume negotiations with OAS 3-man team. U.S. Ambassador Bunker announces that proposals to both sides are soon to be made by the team. Later in the day sporadic fighting resumes near the Ozama River. It is announced at the OAS that the new territory taken from the rebels would be held until assurance is received from the rebels that no new attacks will occur. At the United Nations the U.S.S.R. proposes that the Security Council itself visit the Dominican Republic.

1965—Continued

June 17.—At his press conference President Johnson accuses the rebel side of “flagrant violation” of the cease-fire in order to obstruct a possible political settlement (New York Times, June 18, 1965). Johnson’s statement was purportedly made in order to quell persistent rumors that the United States provoked the attack in order to supply evidence of Communist domination of the rebels. “Two independent sources of substantial reliability * * * said they were inclined to credit top U.S. officials with the intention to move against the rebels if no settlement was reached” (New York Times, June 18, 1965). Cease-fire is observed today. OAS proposal is to be presented to both factions tomorrow.

June 18.—OAS proposal is revealed. It includes no mention of particular individuals. The main provisions are:

- (1) General elections in 6 to 9 months under OAS supervision.
- (2) Opportunity for candidates from all democratic parties to return and participate in the campaign under OAS safeguards.
- (3) An immediate end to the fighting with provisions for the junta troops to return to their barracks and the rebel irregulars to return to their homes.
- (4) Surrender to the OAS of all arms in the hands of civilians.
- (5) Reopening of all business and industry.
- (6) Formation of a provisional government to carry out essential administrative functions and to pave the way for elections
- (7) Preparation of an Institutional Act to guide the provisional government.
- (8) Convening of a Constituent Assembly 6 months after the elections to decide whether the 1962, 1963, or a new constitution shall be adopted.

June 19.—Dominican rivals receive an appeal from the Pope for a peaceful settlement. Rebel leader Caamano says that the OAS proposal is “not a solution * * * but an initiative which could lead to a solution” * * *. Imbert calls the proposal a “useful contribution” but “privately junta leaders were displeased” (New York Times, June 20, 1965). The OAS distributes 70,000 copies of an appeal to the populace to support its proposal (Washington Post, June 20, 1965).

June 20.—Dominican labor leaders call for 72-hour general strike against “yankee invaders.” Social Christian labor leaders, spearheading the drive, declare that they are neither for nor against negotiations but that they support the constitution of 1963 (New York Times, June 22, 1965). Rebel leader Caamano in promising negotiations criticizes the leftist extremists in his ranks by assailing “those intent on creating confusion and sowing discord by announcing that a solution is being imposed on us. * * * Nothing is further from the truth” (New York Times, June 22, 1965). Junta Leader Imbert “is said to be bitter about the [OAS] proposal” (New York Times, June 21, 1965).

June 21.—General strike fails to materialize. The strike was apparently called by the labor confederation CASC (Autonomous Social Christian Confederation) which claims to represent 100,000 Dominican workers and is an affiliate of CLASC (Latin American

1965—Continued

Social Christian Confederation). The strike call was criticized by the AFL-CIO sponsored ORIT (Inter-American Regional Labor Organization) (Washington Post, June 22, 1965).

"Informed rebel sources said that [Colonel Caamano's] * * * reply would substantially accept the OAS proposal" (New York Times, June 22, 1965). The junta leaders are not expected to reply until the rebel position is revealed. Secretary General U Thant reports rebel demand that the OAS pull back to its position as of June 15. He declares that according to the last word the cease-fire is now effective.

June 22.—Rebel leaders indicate they substantially favor the OAS proposals although they have reservations about the question of civilians giving up their arms. They also want rebel commanders to be reinstated in the army. Team of OAS criminologists unearths seven bodies of rebels executed by junta firing squads. The team reports that the hands of the victims had been tied behind their backs and that the locations of 11 other bodies are known (Washington Post, June 23, 1965).

June 23.—New plan drawn up by the three-man committee of the OAS proposes to place the Dominican Republic under an OAS trusteeship until elections are held. It goes beyond the original proposal by providing for: (1) Fourteen member civilian cabinet made up of nonpolitical technicians. (2) Eighty-five technicians from other Latin American countries to aid the fourteen ministers. (3) Rebel military officers to be excluded from reentry into the armed forces but to be protected by the OAS. (4) The army would be required to purge itself of "undesirable elements" (New York Times, June 24, 1965). (According to the Washington Post these "undesirables" would probably include Wessin y Wessin and Imbert). Counter-proposals of junta and rebels to original OAS proposal received. Imbert insists that the existing junta be made the key to any provisional government, that the Inter-American force leave immediately upon agreement of the two factions and that arms in the possession of civilians be turned over to the OAS for only 15 days before being returned to the military forces. Rebels propose that all civilian arms be turned over permanently to the provisional government, that the Inter-American force remain one month after its formation, and that rebel officers be reincorporated into the armed forces. Rebels now insist on only the human rights provisions of the 1963 Constitution.

June 24.—Three-man OAS team reports progress towards a negotiated peace after studying counterproposals of junta and rebels. Both sides have accepted the creation of a provisional government and the holding of free elections. The rebels have announced that they are willing to give up their arms once the provisional government is created. The OAS team flatly denies reports that it had given consideration to a [OAS] trusteeship plan. A State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey said "there is no basis for that story * * * there is no plan for a trusteeship to be imposed in the Dominican Republic" (New York Times, June 25, 1965). Isolated and brief rebel sniping is reported. It becomes clear that the junta will not receive the \$8 million from the United States neces-

1965—Continued

sary to meet its civilian and military payroll by June 25. "No one in authority would concede that the money was being held up to apply pressure. * * * It is known, however, that the day before General Imbert made his counterproposal to the OAS committee's peace formula, it seemed the payment would be made" (New York Times, June 25, 1965).

June 25.—Sixteen persons are killed in San Francisco de Macoris when armed civilians attack police station. Another battle in the same city occurs near the army fortress occupied by junta troops. By the afternoon the city is quiet. The OAS sends Sr. Soto Ortiz to investigate. Sniper fire continues in Santo Domingo but is described by the 82d Airborne Division as "insignificant" (New York Times, June 26, 1965). OAS troops do not return the fire. "The OAS believes the rebel counterproposal indicates a desire for a peace settlement" (New York Times, June 26, 1965).

June 26.—Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, a member of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, is refused permission by junta authorities to visit prisoners captured the day before in San Francisco de Macoris. Calm is restored in San Francisco de Macoris.

June 27.—Dr. Carlos Dunshee de Abranches of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission issues a formal protest against the junta for not allowing him to visit prisoners taken in the recent San Francisco outbreak. "Observers said the uprising in San Francisco has served to cause greater friction between the peace-keeping team of the OAS and the Imbert forces" (Washington Post, June 28, 1965). "Meanwhile, reliable reports reaching the capital indicated that junta forces were hunting down persons in the hills outside of San Francisco de Macoris" (New York Times, June 28, 1965). There were also reports that armed civilians were gathering near Pimentel, 20 miles southeast of San Francisco. Five more bodies are uncovered by OAS team of criminologists working near Santo Domingo. This brings the total number uncovered to 14.

June 28.—Former President Joaquin Balaguer returns to the Dominican Republic after a 3-year absence to be with his dying mother. He announces his candidacy for the presidency and calls the OAS peace plan "excellent" (New York Times, June 29, 1965). He calls on General Imbert to step down and declares that the provisional government should be comprised solely of civilians. Balaguer reportedly "has strength among both the junta and rebel groups" which might "speed peace talks" (New York Times, June 29, 1965). Junta forces in San Francisco de Macoris give the Inter-American Human Rights Commission permission to visit political prisoners. Richard Reston of the Los Angeles Times reports that agreement is "near" on a provisional government. The negotiations are reportedly focused on two men: Jose Julian Perez, a Santo Domingo lawyer, and Hector Garcia Godoy, a diplomat from Santiago (Dominican Republic) (Washington Post, June 29, 1965).

B. PERTINENT EXCERPTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND INTER-AMERICAN TREATIES

1. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS JUNE 26, 1945 (Excerpts)

* * * * *

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

* * * * *

ARTICLE 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Chapter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

ARTICLE 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

ARTICLE 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international

peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VII

ARTICLE 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

ARTICLE 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments con-

cerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, SEPTEMBER 2, 1947 (Excerpts)

* * * * *

ARTICLE 3

1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.

4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

* * * * *

ARTICLE 5

The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

ARTICLE 7

In the case of a conflict between two or more American States, without prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High Contracting Parties, meeting in consultation shall call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the *status quo ante bellum*, and shall take in addition all other necessary measure to reestablish or maintain inter-American peace and security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and in the application of the measures which the consultative meetings may agree upon.

ARTICLE 8

For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic and radiotelephonic or radio telegraphic communications; and use of armed force.

3. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SIGNED AT THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, BOGOTÁ, MARCH 30 TO MAY 2, 1948 (Excerpts)

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(CHAPTER III)

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES

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ARTICLE 15

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat

against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.

* * * * *

ARTICLE 17

The territory of a State is inviolable: it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

* * * * *

ARTICLE 19

Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.

* * * * *

(CHAPTER IV)

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 20

All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

DECLARATION RELATIVE TO THE DOMINION OF THE PACIFIC

and cultural elements of the Pacific region, and the

...

ARTICLE 11

The purpose of this Declaration is to establish a basis for the peaceful settlement of disputes between the States of the Pacific region, and to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific region.

...

ARTICLE 12

Disputes between the States of the Pacific region shall be settled by peaceful means, and no State shall resort to the use of force against another State.

...

ARTICLE 13

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 14

Any dispute between the States of the Pacific region which is not settled by peaceful means shall be referred to the Pacific Commission for settlement.

C. OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

1. RESOLUTION OF EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Punta del Este, January 31, 1962¹

COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN AMERICA

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consultation, declare that the continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger.

The Ministers have been able to verify that the subversive offensive of communist governments, their agents and the organizations which they control, has increased in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified offensive are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing bodies of the international communist movement, that one of its principal objectives is the establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries and in Latin America; and the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers.

2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their true intentions, the communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-favored sectors of the population and the just national aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are violated and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party. Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" they try to establish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism which subordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and aggressive interests of extracontinental powers. By maliciously utilizing the very principles of the inter-American system, they attempt to undermine democratic institutions and to strengthen and protect political penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of communist governments and their agents constitute one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive offensive of communist governments, their agents, and the organizations that they control and to the tactics and methods that they employ and also warn them of the dangers this situation represents to representative democracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-determination of peoples.

The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system.

¹ Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, final act, 1962, pp. 5-7.

4. Convinced that the integrity of the democratic revolution of the American states can and must be preserved in the face of the subversive offensive of communism, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs proclaim the following basic political principles:

a. The faith of the American peoples in human rights, liberty, and national independence as a fundamental reason for their existence, as conceived by the founding fathers who destroyed colonialism and brought the American republics into being;

b. The principle of nonintervention and the right of peoples to organize their way of life freely in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, expressing their will through free elections, without foreign interference. The fallacies of communist propaganda cannot and should not obscure or hide the difference in philosophy which these principles represent when they are expressed by a democratic American country, and when communist governments and their agents attempt to utilize them for their own benefit;

c. The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of isolating or combatting communism, may facilitate the appearance or strengthening of reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of social progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and cultural and political movements with communist subversion;

d. The affirmation that communism is not the way to achieve economic development and the elimination of social injustice in America. On the contrary, a democratic regime can encompass all the efforts for economic advancement and all of the measures for improvement and social progress without sacrificing the fundamental values of the human being. The mission of the peoples and governments of the hemisphere during the present generation is to achieve an accelerated development of their economies and to put an end to poverty, injustice, illness, and ignorance as was agreed in the Charter of Punta del Este; and

e. The most essential contribution of each American state in the collective effort to protect the inter-American system against communism is a steadily greater respect for human rights, improvement in democratic institutions and practices, and the adoption of measures that truly express the impulse for a revolutionary change in the economic and social structures of the American republics.

2. RESOLUTION AGAINST CUBA; NINTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Washington, July 26, 1964

APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA ¹

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 10, 1964, pp. 181-182.

HAVING SEEN the report of the Investigating Committee designated on December 3, 1963, by the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, and

CONSIDERING:

That the said report establishes among its conclusions that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and gurreilla warfare," and

That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of intervention and aggression, conflict with the principles and aims of the inter-American system,

RESOLVES:

1. To declare that the acts verified by the Investigating Committee constitute an aggression and an intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of the member states.

2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and the political independence of Venezuela.

3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures:

a. That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba;

b. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and

c. That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States, by an affirmative vote of two thirds of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted in the present resolution at such time as the Government of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.

6. To urge those states not members of the Organization of American States that are animated by the same ideals as the inter-American system to examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution.

7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the United Nations Security Council the

text of the present resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the United Nations Charter.

* * * * *

STATEMENTS

STATEMENT OF CHILE

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of Resolution 1, because of its doubts regarding the legality of the use of the term "aggression" in describing the acts. It voted negatively on paragraph 3, because it is firmly convinced that the measures agreed to are not appropriate to the particular case that has brought about the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. It also voted against paragraph 5, because it believes that there are discrepancies between the provisions of that paragraph and those of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and of Article 3 of the Rio Treaty. With reference to its abstention on paragraph 6, its attitude is consistent with the attitude taken with respect to the measures called for in paragraph 3.

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on the Declaration to the People of Cuba since, although agreeing with its basic content, it maintains relations with the Republic of Cuba and since it believes precisely in the principle of nonintervention, it has deemed it preferable not to give positive support to this resolution.

STATEMENT OF MEXICO

The Delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter of record in the Final Act, that the Government of Mexico:

1. Is convinced that the measures provided for in the third paragraph of the operative part of Resolution I (which the Delegation of Mexico voted against) lack foundation inasmuch as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance does not envisage, in any part, the application of such measures in situations of the kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of Consultation.

2. Makes a specific reservation to the fifth paragraph of the operative part of the same resolution since it endeavors to extend, in such a way as to be incompatible with the provisions of Articles 3 and 10 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the right to individual or collective self-defense.

3. Reiterates without reservations its "will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace," to which "is essentially related" the "obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics," in accordance with the provisions of paragraph five of the Preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs sign the present Final Act.

DONE in the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., United States of America, in the four official languages of the Organization, on July twenty-six, nineteen hundred sixty-four. The Secretary General shall deposit the original of the Final Act in the archives of the Pan American Union, which will transmit the authenticated copies thereof to the governments of the American republics.

3. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, APRIL 28, 1965¹

I just concluded a meeting with the leaders of the Congress. I reported to them on the serious situation in the Dominican Republic. I reported the decisions this Government considers necessary in this situation in order to protect American lives.

The members of the leadership expressed their support in these decisions. The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger. These authorities are no longer able to guarantee their safety, and they have reported that the assistance of military personnel is now needed for that purpose.

I have ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be available to the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already asked for our help.

Pursuant to my instructions, 400 Marines have already landed. General [Earle G.] Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has just reported to me that there have been no incidents.

We have appealed repeatedly in recent days for a cease-fire between the contending forces of the Dominican Republic in the interests of all Dominicans and foreigners alike.

I repeat this urgent appeal again tonight. The Council of the OAS has been advised of the situation by the Dominican Ambassador [José Antonio Bonilla Atilas], and the Council will be kept fully informed.

4. OAS RESOLUTION CONVOKING MEETING OF CONSULTATION, APRIL 30, 1965²**WHEREAS:**

The Ambassador Representative of Chile, on April 29, 1965, addressed a note to the Chairman of the Council in which his Government requested "that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be convoked for the first day of May 1965";

As the agenda for the aforesaid Meeting, which would be held pursuant to the terms of Article 39 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Ambassador Representative of Chile has proposed the following:

"Serious situation created by armed strife in the Dominican Republic"; and

The urgency of the convocation makes it necessary to call attention to the provisions of Article 42 of the Charter of the OAS, adopting as regulations those approved by the Council at the meeting held on March 1, 1951, and designating the Pan American Union, in Washington, D.C. as the site of the Meeting;

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES**RESOLVES:**

1. To convoke, pursuant to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, a Meeting of Consultation of

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, pp. 738-739.

² Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 739.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics for May 1, 1965.

2. To approve as the agenda of this meeting the following: "Serious situation created by the armed strife in the Dominican Republic."

3. To approve as the Regulations of the Conference those approved by the Council of the Organization of American States at the meeting held on March 1, 1951.

4. To designate the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., as the site of the Meeting.

5. To request the Secretary General to inform the governments of the member states of the OAS of this decision, in the most rapid way possible, calling attention to the provisions of Article 42 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

6. To appoint a committee to begin today to study the preparations for this Meeting, in the more urgent aspects not covered in this resolution.

5. OAS RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CEASE-FIRE, APRIL 30, 1965 ¹

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
RESOLVES:

1. To reiterate the call of April 29, 1965 upon all the authorities, the political groupings, and the opposing forces to pursue immediately all possible means by which a cease-fire may be established and all hostilities and military operations suspended in order to prevent any further tragic loss of life or injury as well as material damages in the sister Dominican Republic.

2. To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safe haven.

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution pursuant to Article 54 of the United Nations Charter.

6. STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 30, 1965 ²

The United States forces in Santo Domingo are completing the establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge covering a limited area in the western section of the city. This neutral zone was established in response to a resolution passed by the Council of the Organization of American States earlier this morning.

This OAS resolution appealed to all authorities, political groupings, and forces on all sides of the conflict to permit such a zone to be established. The zone of refuge encompasses the area where many foreign embassies are located and is designed to provide a safe haven for nationals of all countries pending the restoration of law and order.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 741.

² Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 742.

The operative paragraph of the OAS resolution is:

2. To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safe haven.

7. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, APRIL 30, 1965¹

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen: For 2 days American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an effort to protect the lives of Americans and the nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence and disorder. With the assistance of these American forces, over 2,400 Americans and other nationals have been evacuated from the Dominican Republic. We took this step when, and only when, we were officially notified by police and military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order.

In the last 24 hours violence and disorder have increased. There is great danger to the life of foreign nationals and of thousands of Dominican citizens, our fellow citizens of this hemisphere. By an outstanding effort of mediation the Papal Nuncio has achieved an agreement on a cease-fire which I have urged all those concerned to take. But this agreement is not now, as I speak, being fully respected. The maintenance of the cease-fire is essential to the hopes of all for peace and freedom in the Dominican Republic.

Meanwhile there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. Thus the legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people and most of their leaders for progress, democracy, and social justice are threatened and so are the principles of the inter-American system.

The inter-American system, and its principal organ, the Organization of American States, have a grave and immediate responsibility. It is important that prompt action be taken. I am informed that a representative of the OAS is leaving Washington very shortly for the Dominican Republic. It is very important that representatives of the OAS be sent to the Dominican Republic, just as soon as they can be sent there, in order to strengthen the cease-fire and in order to help clear a road to the return of constitutional processes and free elections. Loss of time may mean that it is too late to preserve freedom, which alone can lead to the establishment of true democracy. This, I am sure, is what the people of the Dominican Republic want. Late action, or delay, in such a case could mean a failure to accomplish the agreed objectives of the American states.

The eyes of the hemisphere are now on the OAS, both in its meeting today and on the meeting of its foreign ministers contemplated tomorrow. The wisdom, the statesmanship, and the ability to act decisively of the OAS are critical to the hopes of peoples in every land of this continent.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 742.

8. RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING OAS COMMITTEE, MAY 1, 1965¹

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS—

1. Decides to establish a committee composed of representatives of the following five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama;

2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain, the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following two functions:

a. To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:

i. a cease-fire; and

ii. the orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and

b. To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting;

3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting on the progress of its work, including the conclusions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate, in the shortest time possible;

4. Requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee; and

5. Instructs the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the Security Council of the United Nations the text of this resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

9. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 1, 1965²

United States forces in the Dominican Republic have the necessary mission of establishing a neutral zone of refuge in the western zone of Santo Domingo in the terms called for by yesterday's resolution of the OAS Council.

This is a means of carrying out the goal of protecting the life, and insuring the safe evacuation, of all foreign nationals.

However, the forces in this area are thinly spread and subject to continuing attack and sniper fire. Their current responsibility extends over 9 square miles of a largely urban area. They also have the responsibility for keeping the port area of Haina free from attack from any side. Under current circumstances their capability is not adequate to this mission. For this reason we are lending additional forces. Those forces consist of two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division comprising approximately 1,500 men and additional detachments of Marines.

These forces are engaged in protecting human life. It is our earnest hope that it will not be necessary for them to defend themselves from attack from any quarter.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 741.

² Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 743.

10. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 1, 1965¹

The Organization of American States has demonstrated why, as Franklin Roosevelt said, it is the oldest and most successful association of sovereign governments in the history of the world.

Today, faced with a threat to the principles of the inter-American system and the peace of the hemisphere, the OAS acted decisively.

A committee made up of five member states will soon be on its way to the Dominican Republic. Its mission is to reestablish peace and normal conditions in that strifeweary island.

The good offices of this commission, representing the entire hemisphere, will be available to every group and party in the Dominican Republic. It will work for a cease-fire. It will try to insure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. And it will investigate every aspect of the current volatile situation in that island.

We look forward, as do all the American states, to the success of the mission and to any recommendations and suggestions the commission might make.

For our part, the United States is ready to support—with every resource at its command—the inter-American system. We will help carry out the solemn judgments of the assembled American Republics.

And we once again join in the common appeal to put an end to violence. For only when shooting and bloodshed stop will it be possible to work toward the aspirations and hopes of the Dominican people. Progress and justice do not flourish at the point of a gun.

The daily work of the inter-American system is filled with hope for the progress of the American peoples. But it is in moments of crisis such as this we truly test the vitality of our association. We prove that independent and proud nations can work together in the common cause of peace and human liberty.

Our goal in the Dominican Republic is the goal which has been expressed again and again in the treaties and agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is that the people of that country must be permitted to freely choose the path of political democracy, social justice, and economic progress. Neither the United States, nor any nation, can want or permit a return to that brutal and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and punishment of this hemisphere and of all civilized humanity. We intend to carry on the struggle against tyranny no matter in what ideology it cloaks itself. This is our mutual responsibility under the agreements we have signed and the common values which bind us together.

11. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 2, 1965²

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen: I have just come from a meeting with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, which was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. I briefed them on the facts of the situation in the Dominican Republic. I want to make those same facts known to all the American people and to all the world.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 743.

² Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 744.

There are times in the affairs of nations when great principles are tested in an ordeal of conflict and danger. This is such a time for the American nations.

At stake are the lives of thousands, the liberty of a nation, and the principles and the values of all the American Republics.

That is why the hopes and the concern of this entire hemisphere are on this Sabbath Sunday focused on the Dominican Republic.

In the dark mist of conflict and violence, revolution and confusion, it is not easy to find clear and unclouded truths.

But certain things are clear. And they require equally clear action. To understand, I think it is necessary to begin with the events of 8 or 9 days ago.

Last week our observers warned of an approaching political storm in the Dominican Republic. I immediately asked our Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.] to return to Washington at once so that we might discuss the situation and might plan a course of conduct, but events soon outran our hopes for peace.

Saturday, April 24—8 days ago—while Ambassador Bennett was conferring with the highest officials of your Government, revolution erupted in the Dominican Republic. Elements of the military forces of that country overthrew their government. However, the rebels themselves were divided. Some wanted to restore former President Juan Bosch. Others opposed his restoration. President Bosch, elected after the fall of Trujillo and his assassination, had been driven from office by an earlier revolution in the Dominican Republic.

Those who opposed Mr. Bosch's return formed a military committee in an effort to control that country. The others took to the street, and they began to lead a revolt on behalf of President Bosch. Control and effective government dissolved in conflict and confusion.

Meanwhile the United States was making a constant effort to restore peace. From Saturday afternoon onward, our Embassy urged a cease-fire, and I and all the officials of the American Government worked with every weapon at our command to achieve it.

On Tuesday the situation of turmoil was presented to the Peace Committee of the Organization of American States.

On Wednesday the entire Council of the Organization of American States received a full report from the Dominican Ambassador.

Meanwhile, all this time, from Saturday to Wednesday, the danger was mounting. Even though we were deeply saddened by bloodshed and violence in a close and friendly neighbor, we had no desire to interfere in the affairs of a sister Republic.

On Wednesday afternoon there was no longer any choice for the man who is your President. I was sitting in my little office reviewing the world situation with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after 3 o'clock I received a cable from our Ambassador, and he said that things were in danger; he had been informed the chief of police and governmental authorities could no longer protect us. We immediately started the necessary conference calls to be prepared.

At 5:14, almost 2 hours later, we received a cable that was labeled "critic," a word that is reserved for only the most urgent and immediate matters of national security.

The cable reported that Dominican law enforcement and military officials had informed our Embassy that the situation was completely

out of control and that the police and the government could no longer give any guarantee concerning the safety of Americans or any foreign nationals.

Ambassador Bennett, who is one of our most experienced Foreign Service officers, went on in that cable to say that only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other citizens of some 30 other countries. Ambassador Bennett urged your President to order an immediate landing.

In this situation hesitation and vacillation could mean death for many of our people, as well as many of the citizens of other lands.

I thought that we could not and we did not hesitate. Our forces, American forces, were ordered immediately to protect American lives. They have done that. They have attacked no one, and although some of our servicemen gave their lives, not a single American civilian or the civilian of any other nation, as a result of this protection, lost their lives.

There may be those in our own country who say that such action was good but we should have waited, or we should have delayed, or we should have consulted further, or we should have called a meeting. But from the very beginning, the United States, at my instructions, had worked for a cease-fire beginning the Saturday the revolution took place. The matter was before the OAS Peace Committee on Tuesday, at our suggestion. It was before the full Council on Wednesday, and when I made my announcement to the American people that evening, I announced then I was notifying the Council.

When that cable arrived, when our entire country team in the Dominican Republic, made up of nine men—one from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, our Ambassador, our AID man, and others—said to your President unanimously: Mr. President, if you do not send forces immediately, men and women—Americans and those of other lands—will die in the streets—well, I knew there was no time to talk, to consult, or to delay. For in this situation delay itself would be decision—the decision to risk and to lose the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands.

I want you to know that it is not a light or an easy matter to send our American boys to another country, but I do not think that the American people expect their President to hesitate or to vacillate in the face of danger, just because the decision is hard when life is in peril.

The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.

Many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies because they had been superseded by other evil forces, and the Secretary General of the rebel government, Martínez Francisco, appealed for a cease-fire. But he was ignored. The revolution was now in other and dangerous hands.

When these new and ominous developments emerged, the OAS met again, and it met at the request of the United States. I am glad to say they responded wisely and decisively. A five-nation OAS team is now in the Dominican Republic, acting to achieve a cease-fire to insure the safety of innocent people, to restore normal conditions, and to open a path to democratic progress.

That is the situation now.

I plead, therefore, with every person and every country in this hemisphere that would choose to do so, to contact their ambassador in the Dominican Republic directly and to get firsthand evidence of the horrors and the hardship, the violence and the terror, and the international conspiracy from which United States servicemen have rescued the people of more than 30 nations from that war-torn land.

Earlier today I ordered two additional battalions—2,000 extra men—to proceed immediately to the Dominican Republic. In the meeting I have just concluded with the congressional leaders—following that meeting—I directed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue instructions to land an additional 4,500 men at the earliest possible moment. The distribution of food to people who have not eaten for days, the need of medical supplies and attention for the sick and wounded, the health requirements to avoid an epidemic because there are hundreds that have been dead for days that are now in the streets, and other protection and security of each individual that is caught on that island require the attention of the additional forces which I have ordered to proceed to the Dominican Republic.

In addition, our servicemen have already, since they landed on Wednesday night, evacuated 3,000 persons from 30 countries in the world from this little island. But more than 5,000 people, 1,500 of whom are Americans—the others are foreign nationals—are tonight awaiting evacuation as I speak. We just must get on with that job immediately.

The evidence that we have on the revolutionary movement indicates that it took a very tragic turn. Many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder and to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. What began as a popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. Many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies and they are there tonight.

The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of all the American nations when, in January 1962, they declared, and I quote: "The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system."

This is what our beloved President John F. Kennedy meant when, less than a week before his death, he told us: "We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere. * * *"

This is and this will be the common action and the common purpose of the democratic forces of the hemisphere. For the danger is also a common danger, and the principles are common principles.

So we have acted to summon the resources of this entire hemisphere to this task. We have sent, on my instructions the night before last, special emissaries such as Ambassador [Teodoro] Moscoso of Puerto Rico, our very able Ambassador Averell Harriman, and others to Latin America to explain the situation, to tell them the truth, and to warn them that joint action is necessary. We are in contact with such distinguished Latin American statesmen as Romulo Betancourt [former President of Venezuela] and José Figueres [former President of Costa Rica]. We are seeking their wisdom and their counsel and their advice. We have also maintained communication with President Bosch, who has chosen to remain in Puerto Rico.

We have been consulting with the Organization of American States, and our distinguished Ambassador—than whom there is no better—Ambassador Bunker, has been reporting to them at great length all the actions of this Government, and we have been acting in conformity with their decisions.

We know that many who are now in revolt do not seek a Communist tyranny. We think it is tragic indeed that their high motives have been misused by a small band of conspirators who receive their directions from abroad.

To those who fight only for liberty and justice and progress I want to join with the Organization of American States in saying—in appealing to you tonight to lay down your arms and to assure you there is nothing to fear. The road is open for you to share in building a Dominican democracy, and we in America are ready and anxious and willing to help you. Your courage and your dedication are qualities which your country and all the hemisphere need for the future. You are needed to help shape that future. And neither we nor any other nation in this hemisphere can or should take it upon itself to ever interfere with the affairs of your country or any other country.

We believe that change comes, and we are glad it does, and it should come through peaceful process. But revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only—repeat, only—when the object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship.

Let me also make clear tonight that we support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic. Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.

The form and the nature of the free Dominican government, I assure you, is solely a matter for the Dominican people, but we do know what kind of government we hope to see in the Dominican Republic. For that is carefully spelled out in the treaties and the agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is expressed, time and time again, in the words of our statesmen and the values and hopes which bind us all together.

We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people.

We hope to see a government dedicated to social justice for every citizen.

We hope to see a government working, every hour of every day, to feeding the hungry, to educating the ignorant, to healing the sick—a government whose only concern is the progress and the elevation and the welfare of all the people.

For more than three decades the people of that tragic little island suffered under the weight of one of the most brutal and despotic dictatorships of the Americas. We enthusiastically supported condemnation of that government by the Organization of American States. We joined in applying sanctions, and, when Trujillo was assassinated by his fellow citizens, we immediately acted to protect freedom and to prevent a new tyranny, and since that time we have taken the resources from all of our people at some sacrifice to many, and we have helped them with food and with other resources, with the Peace Corps volunteers, with the AID technicians; we have helped them in the effort to build a new order of progress.

How sad it is tonight that a people so long oppressed should once again be the targets of the forces of tyranny. Their long misery must weigh heavily on the heart of every citizen of this hemisphere. So I think it is our mutual responsibility to help the people of the Dominican Republic toward the day when they can freely choose the path of liberty and justice and progress. This is required of us by the agreements that we are party to and that we have signed. This is required of us by the values which bind us together.

Simón Bolívar once wrote from exile: "The veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into the darkness."

Well, after decades of night the Dominican people have seen a more hopeful light, and I know that the nations of this hemisphere will not let them be thrust back into the darkness.

And before I leave you, my fellow Americans, I want to say this personal word: I know that no American serviceman wants to kill anyone. I know that no American President wants to give an order which brings shooting and casualties and death. I want you to know, and I want the world to know, that as long as I am President of this country, we are going to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against attackers. We will honor our treaties. We will keep our commitments. We will defend our nation against all those who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere. We do not want to bury anyone, as I have said so many times before. But we do not intend to be buried.

Thank you. God bless you. Good night.

12. SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES U.N. REPRESENTATIVE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, MAY 3, 1965 ¹

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

The Security Council,
Deeply concerned at the grave events in the Dominican Republic,
1. *Calls for a strict cease-fire;*

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, p. 885.

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the present situation;

3. *Calls upon* all concerned in the Dominican Republic to cooperate with the representative of the Secretary-General in the carrying out of his task.

13. PRESIDENT JOHNSON: REMARKS TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AT WHITE HOUSE, MAY 4, 1965¹

SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Now, the expenditure is not great in the Dominican Republic, but we do have many thousand men there. We do have 5,000 people yet to evacuate.

We were sitting quietly in my little office last Thursday afternoon, I believe—Wednesday afternoon maybe—discussing the logistics involved in the Viet-Nam situation with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and a cable came from our Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.], who is an experienced man in the Foreign Service for 20 years, an expert on the Dominican Republic, and because he had been there before and had tours of duty there we sent him back. He said that he had been notified by the governmental authorities and by the police authorities, including the chief of police, that American lives were in danger, that they could not give them any more protection, that we were on our own and we should immediately take measures to protect them.

The Ambassador said this concerns me but I am not prepared at this moment to recommend that you take this action, but I do want to alert you and see that you have a contingency plan ready.

We had anticipated difficulty there. The intelligence reports each morning indicate difficulties in dozens of spots throughout the world. We were due at least one revolution in another country yesterday. It didn't come through, but the intelligence reports had indicated it might. Because we had that information and because we knew the difficulty and we knew the unsettled political condition, we asked Ambassador Bennett to come back to the United States, and he was here when the government was overthrown. We immediately rushed him back. This was his cable informing us that he had had official notification that they could no longer guarantee the safety of our people.

We immediately alerted the forces who had had previous plans and some of them had been working on building them up and carrying them out, and continued our discussions when another wire came in at 5:16, almost 2 hours later, and said there is firing in the streets, there is great danger to all personnel in this area, land the troops immediately to protect our people. It was a rather strong and compelling and almost distressed message. Thanks to the expert management of Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and the forces under his command, we passed out an order immediately to land our troops.

I had to attend a balance-of-payments meeting with some bankers who were in town, but I asked while I was attending they call the

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 24, 1965, pp. 820-822.

leadership of the Congress and they did, and they came to the White House around 7 o'clock. While we were talking to them I had a report that our troops had already landed, showing the speed and efficiency of that group.

Since that time we have evacuated approximately 3,000 persons. It has been necessary for a few Marines to go out and take an old lady and her little belongings and with a crippled hip, carry her down through the streets where the firing is taking place, but we carried 3,000 that way without the loss of a single civilian up to now.

There remain 5,000 others—1,500 Americans and some 3,500 other nationals. Six or eight of the embassies have been torn up. There has been almost constant firing on our American Embassy. As we talked to Ambassador Bennett, he said to apparently one of the girls who brought him a cable, he said, please get away from the window, that glass is going to cut your head, because the glass had been shattered, and we heard the bullets coming through the office where he was sitting while talking to us.

We have sufficient manpower to continue that evacuation, and some 200 are coming out today that we have gathered. We will continue until all who will come will be evacuated.

In our first meeting that night from 3 o'clock, when we got our cable, until 7 o'clock, when we met with the congressional leaders, our intelligence indicated that two of the prime leaders in the rebel forces were men with a long history of Communist association and insurrections. One had fought in the Spanish Civil War, and both had been given detailed lengthy training in operations of this type.

As reports came in, as they do every few minutes, it developed there were eight of those who were in the movement that had been trained by Communist forces. Alerts were set up, and our men continued to ferret out and study the organization. Up to yesterday they had the names and addresses and experience and numbers and backgrounds of some 58. As those 58 came forward and cream began to rise on that crock of milk, they came to the surface and took increased leadership in the movement and the leaders and friends of ex-President Bosch were more or less shoved in the background and stepped aside. Our military people outlined a plan, and that plan has been consummated.

It is our hope that the OAS [Organization of American States] will, after a visit on the grounds, come up with recommendations as to an interim government that will not involve either communism or dictatorship, until we can have free elections and self-determination.

On Saturday, when the revolution took place, we asked for a cease-fire. On the following Tuesday our Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs, Mr. [Jack Hood] Vaughn, met with the Peace Committee of the OAS and explained the gravity of that situation. On Wednesday morning, before our intervention Wednesday afternoon, the OAS met and discussed the matter thoroughly and in some detail but then adjourned without taking any action. Wednesday afternoon, after getting the 3 o'clock wire and 5 o'clock wire, I had no choice but to take action or to sacrifice American lives.

I took the action and simultaneously notified the OAS again and asked them to act. They met. They discussed the matter, and then they adjourned over an extra day. When I found that out the next morning, I asked Secretary Rusk and our very able diplomat, Mr. [Ellsworth] Bunker, to give them an urgent appeal not to stay out

of session today but to come back and immediately send some delegation there to view the situation. They had agreed to send Secretary General [José A.] Mora, and he went that night and they met the next day and debated it that day and sent the delegation down there, and it is there now.

We want very much to work and cooperate with them, and as soon as they have outlined a program for a stable and peaceful interim government we would hope that we could embrace their suggestions and contribute what we need to contribute along with other nations.

We have sent able emissaries to explain all that I have said to you to other countries because a man's judgment is no better than his information and there hasn't been full information on this subject. We have indications that some of the Latin American countries might perhaps, maybe, be willing to supply some of their forces to engage in the protection during this period. We would certainly hope that is true.

Now that is where we stand. The primary reason for asking you to come here this morning is to let you know that the situations that confront us had not been planned when we submitted our budget to you, that our Armed Forces now are in need of \$700 million. We are prepared to testify on it this afternoon or any time that may meet your pleasure. We would hope that you could thoroughly and carefully consider it and with a minimum of difficulty and discord say to the rest of the world that we are going to spend every dollar, we are going to take every action, we are going to walk the last mile in order to see that peace is restored, that the people of not only the Dominican Republic but South Viet-Nam have the right of self-determination and that they cannot be gobbled up in the 20th century and swallowed just because they happen to be smaller than some of those whose boundaries adjoin them.

I think it is well to remember that there are a hundred other little nations sitting here this moment watching what happens and what the outcome is in South Viet-Nam, and if South Viet-Nam can be gobbled up the same thing may happen to them.

Secretary Rusk is here to give you any details on the political developments. Secretary McNamara is here to give you any of the details on the posture of our troops, the missions they are performing.

I think there is one point I'd like to make before I close. We are not the aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came in there and overthrew that government and became aligned with evil persons who had been trained in overthrowing governments and in seizing governments and establishing Communist control, and we have resisted that control and we have sought to protect our citizens against what would have taken place.

Our Ambassador reported that they were marching a former policeman down the streets and had threatened to line a hundred up to a wall and turn a machinegun loose on them. With reports of that kind, no President can stand by. So we resisted their aggression to the extent that (a) we protected our own people and (b) we hope that we have exposed what leadership attempted to seize that little land. We have a good many people there. We are trying to feed all the people. I notice this morning they demanded none of the labels have American food on them, but some of the people haven't eaten in 4 days.

We have from 1,000 to 1,500 bodies that are dead in the street and possibilities of a serious epidemic breaking out. We are trying to avoid that. We have our mobile hospital units that are trying to give treatment to the wounded and the casualties who have not yet died.

We are doing what we can to preserve order, yet the sniping is still taking place. There are men still standing on rooftops that are shooting at not only our own Embassy but other people, and just fortunately none of our civilians yet have been killed. But we do have 5,000 yet there that must be moved individually, one by one, to our ships.

While we are doing that, we optimistically hope and pray that the OAS and this inter-American group can make some satisfactory suggestions.

If it is agreeable, the press will excuse themselves now. I would like for Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to go into details with some of you.

14. ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO, MAY 5, 1965¹

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Ambassador Colombo to Ambassador Bennett

SANTO DOMINGO, May 5, 1965

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you, Sir, under instructions of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, a certified copy of the Act of Santo Domingo signed today by the parties who entitle themselves, respectively, "Military Junta of Government" and "Constitutional Government."

As item 4 of the Resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation "requests the American governments to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee," this Committee hopes that your government will cooperate with it in observing the stipulations of the Act of Santo Domingo.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

RICARDO M. COLOMBO,
*Representative of Argentina,
Chairman of the Committee.*

The Honorable W. TAPLEY BENNETT,
*Ambassador of the United States of America to the Dominican Republic,
Santo Domingo de Guzmán, Dominican Republic*

Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Colombo,

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1965

EXCELLENCY: I have been advised by the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic of Your Excellency's communication to him of May 5, transmitting a certified copy of the "Act of Santo Domingo" and expressing the hope that the United States Govern-

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, pp. 867-869.

ment will cooperate in its observance. Since the Commission has now returned to Washington, I am taking the liberty of replying directly to you.

I have the honor to express my government's gratitude for and support of the work of the Commission in Santo Domingo. The United States will cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo. I do not have before me the map attached to the Act of Santo Domingo, but I assume that the boundaries of the International Safety Zone coincide with those that now exist and that the line of communication crossing the Duarte Bridge as it now exists is shown on the map.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK.

His Excellency DR. RICARDO M. COLOMBO,
Representative of Argentina on The Council of the Organization of American States.

TEXT OF ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned, respectively, the "Constitutional Government" and the Military Junta of Government hereby place on record that they have reached the following agreement as a result of the discussions held with the two Parties by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, whose members also sign the present Act as a guaranty of its compliance and execution, functions that both Parties agree the Committee may carry out.

1. The Parties who sign the present Act ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30 last.

2. The Parties accept the establishment of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo, demarcated within the boundaries indicated on the map attached to this document and signed by the same Parties who sign the present Act.

3. The Parties bind themselves especially to respect this safety zone, within which there is guaranteed, in the manner that the Organization of American States may deem appropriate, adequate protection and safety for all persons found within that zone of refuge.

4. The Parties undertake to give all necessary facilities to the International Red Cross or to the international agency that the Organization of American States may designate to carry out in any part of the city of Santo Domingo or of the Dominican Republic the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment that are being sent as a result of the appeal made by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They also undertake to provide all facilities required by the Organization of American States so that medical and sanitary personnel sent by the governments can be transported to any point in the city of Santo Domingo or Dominican territory, to perform their services.

5. The Parties undertake to provide all necessary safety measures for the evacuation of asylees in foreign embassies or diplomatic missions who so request of them.

6. The Parties undertake to respect the diplomatic missions and to offer all cooperation necessary to guarantee the safety of all personnel of those missions and of asylees or refugees therein.

7. The Parties declare that they accept and recognize the full competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for purposes of the faithful observance of what is agreed to in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the present document, which shall be known as the Act of Santo Domingo, is signed in four original copies, of which one shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, one shall be for each of the Parties, and one shall be for the files of the Committee.

The Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall transmit certified copies to each of the member states.

May fifth, one thousand nine hundred sixty-five.

For the Military Junta:

Colonel PEDRO BARTOLOMÉ BENOIT

Dominican Armed Forces

Colonel ENRIQUE A. CASADO SALADÍN

National Army

Captain OLGO SANTANA CARRASCO

Navy

For the Constitutional Government:

Colonel FRANCISCO CAAMAÑO DEÑO

Constitutional President

Lieutenant Colonel Doctor AUGUSTO JIMÉNEZ HERRERA

Lieutenant RAMÓN MANUEL MONTES

Major HÉCTOR L. ACHAPPELL

Doctor HÉCTOR ARISTE

Minister of the Presidency

For the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States:

Ambassador RICARDO COLOMBO

Representative of Argentina, Chairman of the Committee

Ambassador ILMAR PENNA MARINHO

Representative of Brazil

Ambassador ALFREDO VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA

Representative of Colombia

Ambassador CARLOS GARCÍA BAUER

Representative of Guatemala

Ambassador FRANK MORRICE, Jr.

Representative of Panama

15. OAS RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING INTER-AMERICAN FORCE, MAY 6, 1965¹

WHEREAS:

This Meeting at its session of May 1, established a Committee to proceed to the Dominican Republic to seek the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions in the territory of that republic;

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, pp. 862-863.

The said resolution requests the American governments and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation to facilitate the work of the Committee;

The formation of an inter-American force will signify *ipso facto* the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into another force that will not be that of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organization of American States, which Organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members;

The American states being under the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance to each other, the Organization is under greater obligation to safeguard the principles of the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of peace and normal democratic conditions;

The Organization of American States being competent to assist the member states in the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, it is also competent to provide the means that reality and circumstances require and that prudence counsels as adequate for the accomplishment of such purposes; and

The Committee of the Organization of American States that proceeded to the Dominican Republic, in its second report to this Meeting, advises the formation of an inter-American force to achieve the objectives determined by the Meeting of Consultation,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To request governments of member states that are willing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States, within their capabilities and to the extent they can do so, to form an inter-American force that will operate under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

2. That this Force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.

3. To request the commanders of the contingents of forces that make up this Force to work out directly among themselves and with a Committee of this Meeting the technical measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of the Organization of American States for the coordinated and effective action of the Inter-American Armed Force. In the composition of this Force, an effort will be made to see that the national contingents shall be progressively equalized.

4. That at such time as the OAS Unified Command shall have determined that the Inter-American Armed Force is adequate for the purposes contemplated by the resolution adopted by this Meeting on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of meeting these purposes shall be assumed by that Force.

5. That the withdrawal of the Inter-American Force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this Meeting.

6. To continue in session in order to keep the situation under review, to receive the report and recommendations of the Committee, and in the light thereof to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic order in the Dominican Republic.

7. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution.

16. RESOLUTION CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE OAS, MAY 10, 1965¹

WHEREAS:

On May 1 the Tenth Meeting of Consultation adopted a resolution by which a committee was established, composed of representatives of five member states, to go to the city of Santo Domingo for the purpose of doing everything possible to obtain the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions; and

At the session held on May 6, the Meeting adopted a resolution, by which it requested the member states to contribute contingents to form an Inter-American Armed Force that would operate under the authority of this Meeting and provision was made for the establishment of a Unified Command of the OAS for its coordinated and effective action,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To express the thanks of this Meeting to the Special Committee established by the resolution of May 1 for the outstanding work it has done so far.

2. To continue the existence of that Committee so that it may carry out the tasks that were assigned to it in that resolution.

3. To request that Committee to assume the functions of the committee referred to in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution adopted by this Meeting on May 6.

[17. U.S. NOTE OF MAY 15, 1965²

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on May 6, 1965, and to the communication of May 13 from His Excellency, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. By paragraph 1 of the resolution of May 6, governments of member states willing and capable of doing so were requested to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States to form an Inter-American Force that would operate under the authority of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. In accordance with earlier statements by President Johnson and by

¹ Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, p. 866.

² Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 911.

myself, I have the honor to advise you formally that the United States hereby offers to make available to the OAS to become part of the Inter-American Force its military, naval and air forces presently in the Dominican Republic for the execution of the mission and purposes contemplated in the relevant resolutions of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

Arrangements are presently being made for appropriate notification of the composition of the United States forces included in this offer.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

ELLSWORTH BUNKER

Ambassador, Representative of the United States of America on the Council of the Organization of American States

The Honorable WILLIAM SANDERS

Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States

18. OAS RESOLUTION URGING A CEASE-FIRE, MAY 19, 1965¹

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

To again urge the parties in conflict to cease fire and thereby to create conditions favorable to peace and normality in the Dominican Republic.

19. OAS RESOLUTION ON PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE, MAY 21, 1965²

WHEREAS:

At the session of May 19, 1965, this Meeting unanimously decided once again to urge the parties in conflict to cease fire;

These parties have agreed upon a 24-hour truce for humanitarian purposes; and

The Secretary General of the Organization is in Santo Domingo and this Meeting, by resolution of May 20, entrusted him, among other activities set forth in the resolution, with the negotiation of a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To urge the parties to convert the truce into a permanent cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo and the resolution of this Meeting of May 19.

2. To entrust the Secretary General of the Organization, as Representative of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with communicating the text of this resolution to the parties and with doing everything possible to accomplish its objectives.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 912.

² Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 913.

20. U.S. NOTE OF MAY 22, 1965¹

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my Note No. 115 of May 15, 1965, conveying the offer of the United States to make available its military, naval and air forces presently in the Dominican Republic to become part of the Inter-American Force for the execution of the missions and purposes contemplated in the relevant resolutions of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The composition of the United States forces presently in the Dominican Republic, and which are therefore included in this offer, is as follows: Army units totaling 14,400; a Marine Brigade totaling 6,100 and Air Force support units totaling 1,000.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

ELLSWORTH BUNKER

*Ambassador, Representative of the United States of America on
the Council of the Organization of American States*

The Honorable WILLIAM SANDERS

Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States

**21. RESOLUTION ON INTER-AMERICAN FORCE COMMAND,
MAY 22, 1965²**

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. That the Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall assume the functions referred to in paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted by this Meeting of Consultation on May 6, 1965.

2. That this Meeting shall indicate the mission and objectives of the Inter-American Force in accordance with the sole purpose set forth in paragraph 2 of the resolution of May 6.

3. To request the Government of Brazil to designate the Commander of the Inter-American Force and the Government of the United States to designate the Deputy Commander of that Force.

4. To appoint a committee composed of those members designated by the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation to study the functioning and maintenance of the Inter-American Force, and to present a report to the present Meeting of Consultation.

**22. PRINCIPLES OF U.N.-OAS RELATIONSHIP IN DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC: STATEMENT BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ADLAI
E. STEVENSON, MAY 22, 1965³**

The news which we have received from the Secretary-General about the suspension of hostilities is not as ominous as some feared this morning. In view of the predisposition of the forces of the two factions, north and south of the line of communication, the action

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 912.

² Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 913.

³ State Department Bulletin, June 14, 1965, pp. 975-977.

which United States forces are taking to prevent any attacks across the line of communication or through the safety zone or by air or by sea is, of course, the most effective possible assurance against further fighting on any large scale.

All of us here, I am sure, are determined that the hostilities must cease. The cessation of hostilities is, of course, ultimately a question of fact, not a question of agreement. The truth of the matter is that the truce, or the suspension-of-hostilities agreement, was immediately checked yesterday afternoon and found to be in effect. It is the fact of hostilities that concerns us. An agreement as an indication of intent is greatly to be desired, but it is no guarantee of an absence of fighting. That is a question of fact.

We now have the statement of General Imbert that he does not intend to resume hostilities unless he is fired upon. I gather, but am not sure, that Colonel Caamaño takes the same position. If we have further information available as to that, it would be very welcome.

There are now no hostilities, to the best of our knowledge. I hope there will be none. Furthermore, we now have the complete information on the factual situation, as conveyed, as I said, by the Secretary General of the OAS. I should like to quote again the last paragraph of the statement that he [General Imbert] transmitted to our Secretary-General through Mr. Mayobre [José Antonio Mayobre, personal representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic] from Dr. [José A.] Mora:

For these reasons, the Government of National Reconstruction will abstain from resuming fire unless provoked, while conversations continue with the Secretary General of the OAS to arrive at a definite solution of the conflict.

In the circumstances the urgency has diminished, but other implications of the texts before us presented first by the United Kingdom and then by France become more important. We were prepared to vote for the resolution presented by the representative of the United Kingdom, which welcomes the recent decisions of the OAS and calls for a complete cessation of hostilities. We consider that such a reference to the OAS decisions is the minimum necessary to reciprocate the express desire of the OAS to work in cooperation with this Council.

We were surprised that immediately after the presentation of the United Kingdom's text, the representative of France submitted another text, whose main divergence was to eliminate any reference to the OAS.

We would of course prefer that the United Kingdom resolution would have retained its priority, because we believe it more accurately reflected both the normal courtesies between agencies of the United Nations and the true feelings of the majority of the members of the Council, who are anxious to get along with the conclusion of this work, not to mention the true feelings of the majority of the members of the OAS.

The appropriate relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations such as this one, the OAS, can be summarized in terms I think of six principles.

One, the members of the United Nations pursuant to articles 33 and 52 of the charter should seek to deal with threats to the peace within a geographical region through regional arrangements before

coming to the United Nations. This is precisely what the members of the OAS have done in the Dominican case.

Second, regional organizations should not of course take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council. But in the Dominican Republic the Organization of American States did not take the kind of action that would require Security Council approval.

Third, action taken by regional organizations must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This is obviously the case with the actions of the OAS in the Dominican Republic case.

Fourth, the Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of actions undertaken by regional organizations. The OAS is keeping the Security Council fully informed; witness the report you have just had from Dr. Mora through Mr. Mayobre this afternoon. And the Council has also arranged to keep itself informed through a representative of the Secretary-General.

Fifth, the Security Council has the competence to deal with any situation which might threaten international peace and security. This competence is not at issue here.

But sixth, the Security Council should not seek to duplicate or interfere with action through regional arrangements so long as those actions remain effective and are consistent with our charter. The purposes of the United Nations Charter will hardly be served if two international organizations are seeking to do things in the same place with the same people at the same time.

As a matter of sound practice and the wise use of discretion, the Security Council under present conditions should keep itself fully informed but not undertake any activity, either diplomatic or on the ground, which would hinder the efforts and the responsibilities of the competent organization. It will serve the purposes of the United Nations Charter best if the OAS achieves what it has set out to accomplish, and that is to restore peace and achieve reconciliation so that the Dominican people can develop their own democratic institutions.

In the circumstances we have considered introducing an amendment to the French text to restore appropriate references to the work now underway by the OAS which the delegate of France has eliminated. We have not done so only because the Soviet Union's negative vote against the Uruguayan text this morning made it clear that the U.S.S.R. would veto any reference whatsoever to the Organization of American States for its purposes. We do concur, however, that the more formal extension of the temporized cessation of hostilities into a permanent cease-fire is desirable in spite of the fact that the fighting has stopped.

As I have already said, the Secretary General of the OAS is actively at work, as are representatives of the United States and others, to achieve this purpose. And our decision to interpose our forces is the most practical possible way to achieve this objective.

As the resolution does not encourage the regional activity which article 52, paragraph 3, of the charter enjoins the Council to do, we cannot vote for it. However, because the resolution does not impede the OAS in the exercise of its functions, because of the desirability of further steps to extend the truce in a formal fashion, and because all

concerned in restoring peace to the Dominican Republic are perforce in fact working in consultation, the United States will not seek to prevent the adoption of this resolution, and we will abstain.

23. STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVENSON, MAY 24, 1965¹

Mr. President, I had assumed that the afternoon's session would be preceded by the reading of the reports by the Secretary-General, Documents S/6378 and 6380, which we have recently received.

However, let me proceed by reminding the Council that the Organization of American States adopted a resolution on the 6th of May which authorized the establishment of an Inter-American Force which would operate under the authority of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This resolution was furnished to the Security Council in Document S/6333 dated May 7 of this year.

The text makes very clear that this Inter-American Force has but one purpose. That purpose is to cooperate—

* * * in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.

Now, sir, as we are all aware, several Latin American members of the Organization of American States now have their initial contingents on the ground in Santo Domingo. These countries currently represented are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Brazil, and the United States. In addition, the Republic of Panama is being represented by a group of civilian doctors.

On Saturday last, May 22, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution which requested the Government of Brazil that it designate the Commander of the Inter-American Force and the Government of the United States to designate the Deputy Commander. The Government of Brazil has designated as Commander in Chief of the Inter-American Force General Hugo Panasco Alvim of the Brazilian Army.

The meeting on Saturday last of the Consultation of Foreign Ministers in that same resolution reaffirmed that the sole purpose of the Inter-American Force was that set forth in the May 6th resolution, which I have just quoted in part.

I am pleased to report that the act establishing the Inter-American Force was signed at 7:45 p.m., EDT, on Sunday, May 23. With the official establishment of the Inter-American Force yesterday evening, all United States forces in the Dominican Republic are now assigned to the Inter-American Force and have donned the yellow and blue armbands of that organization.

Following the signing of the act establishing the Force, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Mora, said,

* * * the purpose of the Inter-American Force is clearly not one of intervention but rather one of rendering assistance to the people of a sister nation.

The creation of the Force demonstrates once more the capacity of the Organization of American States to adjust to new conditions and to deal with new problems, problems having characteristics perhaps not even envisaged at the time

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1965, pp. 977-980.

the charter and the Rio Treaty were ratified. It is clear, however, that the objectives for which the Inter-American Force was created fall within those broad provisions of the charter which are concerned with matters affecting the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. Peace, prosperity, and justice are indivisible and interdependent. Where these are lacking in one nation it must be a matter of concern to all.

The Organization of American States' activities in the Dominican Republic are directed toward the fostering of peace and tranquillity under conditions which will permit the Dominican people to establish a democratic civil government of their own choosing, to heal the wounds and the bitterness of civil strife, and to begin the path of relief and reconstruction.

Still another significant development has taken place since we last met, through the consultations among the members of the Organization of American States. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has proposed that American states be represented commencing on May 27, that is, Thursday of this week, in the Meeting of Consultation by the foreign ministers themselves. The United States supports this Brazilian initiative, and a considerable number of foreign ministers will attend the meeting on Thursday. It is a further demonstration of the determination of the OAS to take every possible step to insure that its efforts are effective.

Turning for a moment to another aspect of the current situation, I invite the Council's attention to the report of the Secretary-General in Document S/6378 of this date, distributed, I believe, this morning. It informs the Council about certain allegations made by Colonel Caamaño with regard to hostilities against his troops. It fails, however, to inform the Council about the ensuing investigation.

The results of this investigation have now been reported to the Security Council in Document S/6380, and the Council will note that the investigation failed to sustain the allegations made by Colonel Caamaño.

The investigation reveals, if I may invite the members' attention to these two reports of the Secretary-General, that on the afternoon of May 22, that is, Saturday, 34 violations of the cease-fire were committed by the Caamaño forces on United States troops. One of these instances of violation occurred when the Caamaño forces fired on United States soldiers along the southern edge of the line of communication with light and heavy machinegun fire. Two United States soldiers were wounded. United States forces returned the fire and took action to silence this heavy volume of fire against these troops. After carrying out this maneuver, United States forces returned to their original positions and did not establish any new positions.

Later in the afternoon of May 22, the Caamaño forces again fired without provocation against troops located on the southern edge of the line of communication in the vicinity of Avenue the 30th of March. Under this fire, four United States soldiers were wounded, one losing an eye. The United States troops returned the fire but did not move from their original positions. Later in the evening complaints were made by the United Nations team that the Caamaño forces had alleged that the United States troops were using mortars against them. This charge was also flatly contradicted. United States forces have not fired a single round of mortar fire in the Dominican Republic.

Later, at 10 o'clock on that same night, Saturday, it was charged that United States troops were pushing forward from the United

States corridor and establishing a new post in the vicinity of the 30th of March Avenue. This allegation was denied as equally false. The area and action described was that mentioned as the area in which four soldiers were wounded by fire initiated by the forces of Colonel Caamaño.

With regard to the allegation that the corridor has been extended three times during the last week, as reported in the Secretary-General's report, S/6378, attributing to our forces the statement that the corridor will be extended as and when United States forces deem it necessary, I can inform the Security Council that the following statement was issued in Washington today to remove any doubt on that score:

General Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.] states that the assertion that the corridor has been extended three times during the past week is incorrect. The only departures from the established line have been temporary and limited maneuvers in self-defense while under fire. There will be no extension of the corridor except upon request of the OAS and with prior notification by the OAS to both sides.

I think it also relevant to note that at the time the United States representatives met with the United Nations team to discuss these allegations, the United States authorities expressed their deep concern with regard to the continuance of the cease-fire situation for humanitarian reasons and in a wider sense pointed out that the political situation in the Dominican Republic was only made more difficult in an atmosphere of accusation and counteraccusation.

Let me add that there is one enlargement of the security zone which the OAS is attempting to negotiate with both factions. That would be an extension of the security zone to include the Presidential Palace, which at present constitutes an enclave held by General Imbert's forces within the Caamaño-held territory and is one of the points at which the cease-fire is most frequently violated and has been since the beginning of the trouble. If the OAS can obtain the agreement of the two factions to this particular enlargement of the zone, it would make an important contribution to the maintenance of a strict cease-fire.

So much for the current situation. Let me now address myself to the draft resolution which was tabled by the United States delegation on the morning of May 21. Since then several events have occurred.

First, the Council was informed in Document S/6372 that the OAS had adopted a resolution which *inter alia* entrusted its Secretary General with negotiating a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo, with providing his good offices to the parties with a view to establishing a climate of peace and reconciliation that would permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic, and with coordinating where appropriate with the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in action leading to the attainment of these objectives.

Second, we were informed in Document 6374 of a further resolution of the Organization of American States which *inter alia* called upon the parties to transform the suspension of hostilities into a permanent cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo and to request the Secretary General, who is in the Dominican Republic, to do everything possible to achieve this objective.

Third, the Security Council itself on the 22d of May, last Saturday, adopted a resolution which requested that the suspension of hostilities in the Dominican Republic be transformed into a cease-fire.

In light of these actions taken by the Security Council and by the OAS, the United States resolution previously presented to the Council, which dealt with these same points, is no longer timely and pertinent. Therefore I no longer see any need of requesting the Council to act upon the U.S. resolution and accordingly withdraw it from the Council's further consideration.

24. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 26, 1965¹

As you know, since May 1 there has been meeting a Consultation Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States. Up to this point each foreign minister has designated a representative, but tomorrow a number of foreign ministers will attend personally in order to take stock of the situation in the Dominican Republic and decide what further steps are necessary.

I think a stocktaking is of some value at this point, because a number of things have been accomplished and there is certain unfinished business still in front of us.

At the very beginning the principal preoccupation was the elementary question of the safety of American and foreign nationals. We have evacuated more than 4,000 people from the Dominican Republic, about 1,800 Americans and about 2,300 foreign nationals of some 46 countries. I think that we, given the facts as we knew them at that time, agree with what seems to be the consensus of the diplomatic corps stationed in Santo Domingo, that the prompt arrival of American forces averted a major disaster. Now, that part of the mission was successfully accomplished.

Then you will recall that the Organization of American States called for the establishment of an international safety zone and later the associated lines of communications required for that zone. That was established, and I have no doubt whatever that that safety zone and its accompanying facilities has had a great deal to do with the reduction of bloodshed in that island and a provision of an area of stability and peace which would be available to all elements, foreign and domestic, in that situation. And so that mission was successfully carried out.

Then we had to give very serious thought to the needs, the daily needs, of some 3½ million Dominicans. It was very important that the essential structure of the country not disintegrate despite the anarchy and chaos that existed in and around Santo Domingo itself, and so very large quantities of foodstuffs and of course smaller quantities of medicine had to be made available, regardless of political problems, regardless of political sides or orientation, in order to keep the essential structure of the country going during this period.

A number of countries have contributed. We ourselves have made very large supplies available. A number of the Latin American countries have sent in food and medicine that has had to be distributed to both sides, and that has been accomplished.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1965, pp. 938-947.

Then it became apparent that there was a possibility that extremist elements would attempt—were attempting—to capitalize on the anarchy and the disorder to seize control of the mobs and to try to assert a position of power that would destroy the democracy of the Dominican Republic. I think that threat has been very substantially reduced, although not completely eliminated.

And then our forces, and more lately the inter-American forces, have had responsibility for assisting in the maintenance of a cease-fire. We hope that that can continue to be successful. That does not mean that the cease-fire has been completely observed on all sides, but we are pleased to see that in general the bloodshed has been largely stopped, although there continue to be snipers and there continue to be problems. I think in the last 10 days there have been over 500 breaches of the cease-fire of which we have had to take account. Just yesterday, for example, there were some 20 violations of the cease-fire, and on 8 of those occasions our own forces were required to return fire. But, broadly speaking, that cease-fire called for by the OAS and later by the U.N. has been pretty well established.

Therefore we can take considerable satisfaction in what has been accomplished thus far. The principal piece of unfinished business is that of constituting among the Dominicans and by the Dominicans a broadly based provisional government which can accept responsibility for the affairs of that country pending elections and pending full return to the democratic and constitutional process.

Now, that is a difficult matter. We recognize the difficulty against the background of decades of violence. As one of the Dominican leaders put it the other day, the primary problem of any Dominican leader is to stay alive in that situation. But nevertheless not only we but others throughout the hemisphere and most responsible Dominicans hope very much that there can come into being a broadly based government which will be able to provide for the Dominicans the kind of democratic and constitutional society which is, we believe, their basic wish and their basic purpose.

There have been many consultations on that subject in recent days. We were pleased when last Friday [May 21] the Organization of American States gave its distinguished Secretary General, Dr. [José A.] Mora, an important responsibility in this regard. The earlier fact-finding commission of the OAS apparently did not feel that it had such a mandate from the Organization of American States. Dr. Mora has been working on that matter very diligently with great competence. Our own people down there have worked closely with him and have been in touch with various elements of the Dominican Republic.

We cannot report that there has been broad success yet in that enterprise, though we are encouraged to believe that most elements in the Dominican Republic believe that the answer must be found through the processes of discussion and agreement on a broadly based government rather than on the processes of violence or further military action.

Looking ahead into the future a bit, I think that the Organization of American States can take some satisfaction from the fact that they have constituted an Inter-American Force to deal with this hemispheric problem. There are, I think, five contingents there now.

There will be certain others coming shortly. This will make it possible for us to reduce our own forces. We have announced certain reductions already.

We will be in consultation with the Commander of the Inter-American Force, the distinguished Brazilian General [Hugo Panasco Alvim], about what he considers to be his requirements in the immediate future, and it may well be that further and prompt reductions in our forces can be accomplished.

But, looking ahead, the hemisphere needs to take up again the question of constituting some standby forces on a continuing basis, on prompt call, and the organization of a political machinery for taking hemispheric decisions promptly in the face of fast-moving events. Now, I have no doubt that that will be discussed in some detail as various foreign ministers gather tomorrow to see where we go from here.

That is a very brief and perhaps too short a summary, but I just wanted to make those opening remarks before we began.

Mr. Hensley.

Q. Mr. Secretary, much of the criticism about the American operation in the Dominican Republic would appear to boil down to the assertion that the United States overreacted, particularly with respect to the Communist threat, when the President said on May 2 that the Communists had seized control of the rebellion and that this is making the political way back a bit difficult. Could you address yourself to that assertion?

A. I don't know how one draws the line between overreaction and underreaction and exactly what is right under the circumstances. There is no question at all in our minds that there was a very serious threat for a period that elements of the extreme left had in a very professional and highly organized way seized control of mobs who had been armed, and some of these elements were not under the discipline of any of the recognized political leadership of the Dominican Republic on either side, and that there was a very substantial threat.

And I am not impressed by the remark that there were several dozen known Communist leaders and that therefore this was not a very serious matter. There was a time when Hitler sat in a beer hall in Munich with seven people. And I just don't believe that one underestimates what can be done in chaos, in a situation of violence and chaos, by a few highly organized, highly trained people who know what they are about and know what they want to bring about.

We have had very reliable information from the responsible elements of all groups on both sides about what some of these people were doing, and although it would not be wise for me to go into detail on personalities or individuals, I think that you should assume that at least, whether you agree with us or not, we feel that we were acting on the basis of solid information, and that there were many others working with us down there on both sides in the Dominican Republic, as well as in the foreign diplomatic corps, who thoroughly agreed with our concern about this problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up two points which depend partly on the correct understanding of the chronology that the administration has presented, and I hope it is right. In the early days, before the total chaos, before the American troops landed, a period that the President has described that the rebellion had noble purposes, it has now been said that at various points Colonel Caamaño [Francisco Caamaño Deño], Mr.

Guzmán [Antonio Guzmán Sylvestre], and others had presented themselves at the U.S. Embassy and were given rather short shrift in their pleas for help to arrange a cease-fire and other forms of political assistance. Could you tell us whether this is true?

A. I don't recall personally that Mr. Guzmán came to the Embassy in that period. I think that there were talks with Mr. Caamaño. But when you go back to the Saturday morning in which the violence first erupted, there were strenuous efforts made on all sides, by our own Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.], by the very distinguished and courageous dean of the diplomatic corps, the Papal Nuncio, and others to try to get the elements on both sides together to halt the fighting and to work out a pattern for a peaceful settlement of the internal situation.

Our own role at that time was precautionary in terms of the possible need to evacuate our own people. As you know, most governments have contingency evacuation plans for their own nationals and in regard to most situations, and our contingency evacuation plans involved moving of certain vessels into the area in the event they were needed for the evacuation of American citizens.

It was not until Wednesday, the 28th, in the late afternoon that we had before us the problem that there was violence which such authority as existed in the island could not control, that American and foreign nationals were in desperate danger. They were actually under fire at the time, and it was necessary to move promptly at that time if their safety was to be assured.

Q. The second point, sir, was that at that point, when there seemed to be a threat of the Communists taking over, the army forces of the Dominican Republic had been virtually defeated and it was not until our troops had arrived and specifically until former Ambassador [John Bartlow] Martin was on the ground that, with our encouragement, the junta of General Imbert [Antonio Imbert Barrera] was reconstituted. That would be the second.

A. Yes. It seems to me there was never any likelihood that either side would be wholly successful from a military point of view. As far as the civilian military group under General Imbert's leadership is concerned, we did encourage them to form a group which could try to assure the normal processes of the countryside which was not involved in downtown Santo Domingo. There were over 3 million people in the countryside, and it was necessary that they have the essential elements of civic order and civic life if the needs of these 3 million people were to be taken care of. And so we did encourage these gentlemen to associate themselves and to try to help deal with the problems of those areas of the country that were not directly involved in the violence in Santo Domingo itself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, M. Peyrefitte [Alian Peyrefitte, French Minister of Information] this morning called the American presence in Santo Domingo foreign intervention and predicted that this will lead to some kind of escalation. This being an official French Government statement, I wondered if you would care to comment.

A. Well, I think that in Paris they might give more attention to the fact that the countries of this hemisphere as a group are dealing with this problem and that this is not a matter on which the French Government carries a very active responsibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why did the administration not consult with the OAS before moving in the troops or at least concurrently inform the OAS about this action?

A. I think the answer to that is a very simple one indeed.

On Tuesday, the 27th, we did call together the Peace Committee of the OAS for a discussion of the situation in the Dominican Republic. It was the general view of the Peace Committee that it did not have a charter or a mandate itself to take up this situation because it was constituted to deal with disputes among governments and at the request of the several governments or the two governments that might be involved in the dispute.

We then, on the morning of the 28th, asked for a meeting of the Council of the OAS for a further discussion of the Dominican situation. That was before any decision was made to put in any troops. That was discussed, and I would have to say that we did not ourselves ask that specific action be taken with respect to troops or anything else, either in the Peace Committee or in the Council of the Organization on the morning of the 28th, because we ourselves did not believe that the situation called for it.

As late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that Wednesday, we had in front of us reports from our Ambassador in which he himself was not recommending that we use our own forces with respect to that situation. But then, as you now know from other sources, the President and Secretary of Defense and I were in a meeting on another matter and about 5:15 we were handed a telegram from our Ambassador, saying that the situation had completely deteriorated, disintegrated, that the police and the military authorities there had indicated that they could no longer undertake responsibility for the security of American and foreign nationals, and that if these people were to be safe, U.S. forces would have to be employed.

Now, it was that telegram which was emergent, which was what we call a "critic telegram," that is, it's the fastest and most emergent kind that we have. That is, that telegram indicated that there was a most immediate problem on the scene. Hundreds were gathered in the Embajador Hotel, and there were people running around the hotel, shooting it up with tommyguns, and so forth. There were large numbers of people gathered on the Polo Grounds who were then apparently under fire.

When the Marines got there at 7 o'clock, or thereabouts, they in fact found that these people were under fire. So that at the time the decision was made, the decision was also made by the President to inform the troops, inform the OAS, and inform the Congress.

We had a meeting of the congressional leadership around 7 or 7:15, or thereabouts, and we immediately began calling Latin American ambassadors here to inform them. We met early the next morning to go into this situation.

Now, in retrospect, I suppose that one could say that it might have been somewhat better for us to have insisted upon a meeting that same evening. It might have looked better. But, in fact, when they met the next morning, they felt that under the Charter of the OAS the Council standing alone was not empowered to act, that it was necessary to convene the Organ of Consultation in order to be able to take action.

And the general decision at that first morning's meeting was to give themselves 48 hours in order to get instructions from their governments and convene such a meeting. We were able to get a further meeting within 24 hours, that is, the next day, to take certain preliminary steps that were of assistance in the Dominican Republic.

But here's one of those situations where events themselves made it necessary that some action be taken before the formal machinery could be convoked and could act upon it on a multilateral basis. That has occurred before in a number of situations.

But what we would hope is that the Organization of American States would look at the experience in this particular problem to see whether the OAS itself needs to take additional steps to gear its own machinery to the requirements of a fast-moving situation. And that involves, of course, the possibility of standby inter-American forces that might be available in such a circumstance.

Mr. Gulick?

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that there is an indefinite period ahead without an interim government—at least for the time being—in the Dominican Republic, could you outline what aid steps the United States might be contemplating?

A. Well, I think that, first the Secretary General of the OAS has a very large responsibility there at the present time with respect to several resolutions passed by the OAS, and that includes offering his good offices to the several elements on the island to see if they cannot reach a peaceful settlement of the problem on the island.

We feel that it is very important that the 3½ million people on that island not themselves suffer from these events if that can be avoided. We have moved in large quantities of foodstuffs and medicine. We have taken strenuous efforts working with local Dominican individuals and agencies and authorities to try to keep the economy of the country going, to keep production up, try to get pay to the workers, both in government, in private, in the private sector, so that the country doesn't just collapse, pending a final settlement of the governmental problem.

Now, we have put substantial resources in there already, but we are prepared to do what's necessary to try to sustain that country and the daily life of the people pending the final settlement and the general agreement on the government with which we can deal more efficiently. We are making a major effort in that connection.

Q. Mr. Secretary, neither in your opening statement nor subsequently in reply to questions have you used the word "Communist" in referring to this possible takeover in the Dominican Republic. You prefer to call it "leftist" or "leftist extremists." I wonder if there is anything significant in that?

A. None at all. I will be glad to call them Communists.

Q. And, also, could you tell us how the threat has been reduced? In other words, presumably these 55 Communist leaders are still in the rebel zone. Is that correct?

A. Well, we suspect that some of them have, shall we say, returned underground, but that others are active and are known to be there.

As you know, in that unfortunate incident near the National Palace the other day one of them was killed along with one of Mr. Juan Bosch's close associates—a rather curious episode that we still don't fully understand.

But they have been active in there from the beginning. They are still active, some of them.

I think, however, that when I talk about a reduced threat, I think what I am basically saying is that it is now clear to everyone that a solution here is not going to be found by violence and military means; that the solution must be found by the political processes of discussion and agreement, and the processes of a constitutional democratic society.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some idea of how long our troops will have to be in the Dominican Republic, do you think?

A. Well, we would hope that the situation would soon reach a point where there could be substantial reductions. But I think the question of the duration of the presence there of an Inter-American Force, of which our troops would be a component part, would be something that the Organization of American States would take up in connection with its estimate of the total situation. I wouldn't want to predict precisely. I should think some of them may be there for a while, but we would hope there could be a substantial reduction before too long.

Q. Sir, you have been involved in negotiations with India and Pakistan in resorting peace on the borders. I was wondering, sir, what the status is and what has been the outcome of the efforts.

A. We, of course, fully support the efforts made by the British Government. It is in touch with both sides to try to arrange a cease-fire and a resumption of political discussions of differences that divide these two great countries of the subcontinent. We are in touch with both Governments frequently on this matter, and we would hope very much that these discussions could come to a good conclusion.

I think as far as details are concerned that I wouldn't want to elaborate at this point, because I think the processes of peace here are too important to get into prematurely and I wouldn't want to make things more difficult for those who are trying to work out a peaceful settlement in both countries and between both countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you appraise the role of Guzmán in the Dominican Republic in relation to the charges that have been brought against him in the last day or two?

A. Well, I am not advised as to what the source of those charges might have been. The auditors' report itself does not implicate Mr. Guzmán, does not itself point any finger at him. We have no information ourselves indicating irregularities on Mr. Guzmán's part. When the matter first reached the press a day or so ago, we felt that since we ourselves were not informed in detail on the Agricultural Bank and its operations, that it would be better for Mr. Guzmán to comment himself. And I gather that the auditors have also commented on that matter.

I think that's about all I can say on it. But we do not have any indication that Mr. Guzmán has been involved in irregularities.

You see, when he was Minister of Agriculture under the Bosch government, for example, he was ex officio member of the board of that Bank but did not, we understand, take a very active part in its actual operations.

Now, it is true, as far as the Bank is concerned, our own people have been in touch with them over the past 2 years about the way

in which our aid (to the extent that it involves the Bank)—our aid is administered. We have had assurances and satisfaction on the relationship between the Bank and our own aid activities in the island. But I think there is nothing more I can add to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we regard Mr. Guzmán as a likely person to head the government down there?

A. Well, I think that the question of personalities is still one for discussion. As you know, we have been talking frequently with Mr. Guzmán about the possibilities of a coalition government. But it is in the nature of a coalition government that it have broad representation and be based upon a broad agreement among different political elements.

I think, therefore, it would not be for me to answer your question precisely. This is a matter for the Dominicans to work out through these processes of mediation and discussion that have been going on for the last 10 days or 2 weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, many observers in Santo Domingo say that if a free election were to be held tomorrow Colonel Caamaño just might win. Would the United States contemplate a place for him in any provisional government?

A. Well, I think the matter of agreeing on a provisional government for the purpose of administering the country until an election can be held is the first requirement here. Now, what the Dominican people would do in their own choices in such an election, and who the candidates might be, would be very much for the future.

I just don't know what the results would be. I have not heard the particular point that you have just made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States have any specific proposals to make to the OAS in connection with this standby force, or the new machinery?

A. Well, we will be discussing that matter. As you know, we had hoped to convene a general meeting of the inter-American system in Rio in May—this month. But that was postponed for a period, a short period, because of the Dominican problem, and the preoccupation of most of the foreign ministers with that problem, and the interruption which it injected into the preparations for the conference. I think we undoubtedly will be discussing informally with the foreign ministers while they are here this matter. But whether final action or formal action would be taken prior to an inter-American meeting, I think it would be too soon to say. We want to know what the others think about it.

Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in yesterday's briefing there was a rather agonizing discussion about ethics and about writers who write and demands that you hold a press conference so you could be asked about it. And Mr. McCloskey [Robert J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News] said he was entering that in the record, and I wondered if he is holding out on you, too. (Laughter.)

A. Well, why don't you ask your question? Here I am.

Q. Well, I wonder if you could discuss the ethical question of Mr. Martin's writing about the Dominican situation?

A. Yes. There is no problem on that, unless you gentlemen have a problem about not having written it first. (Laughter.)

Mr. Martin was not down there on an official appointment. He was not down there as a salaried employee of the Government. He was a former Ambassador, and particularly was Ambassador during the Presidency of Mr. Juan Bosch. He was asked to go down to establish contact with many of the people that he had known during that period, a good number of whom were in the downtown area of Santo Domingo.

You see, an ambassador normally knows best those people who are in the government while he is accredited to that particular capital. We felt that Mr. Martin might be able to be of considerable assistance to Mr. Bennett by being in touch with people that Mr. Martin had known when he was serving there as an ambassador during the Juan Bosch government.

He has been on our consultant list in the Department of State. Since he has returned, we have asked him to take on certain things for us. But his status down there was that of a private citizen who had been asked to go down by us here in Washington to be of assistance in this situation. This is not an unusual circumstance at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that the provisional government was a matter for the Dominicans themselves. There have been some current reports from Santo Domingo that objections by at least some United States officials to some of the proposed candidates for the coalition have also contributed to the deadlock. Can you say whether we as well as the Dominicans are haggling over names?

A. Well, I think that all the governments of the hemisphere would be interested in the character of the government that emerges in the Dominican Republic. But I can assure you that differences which we might have had with one or another person pale to insignificance compared to the differences among the Dominicans themselves.

* * * * *

Q. Sir, one more question, if I may ask. What has bothered the people abroad greatly is your commitment to the charter, not only to the OAS Charter but to the U.N. Charter. I was wondering whether you can reconcile your intrusion into the Dominican Republic with the two charters, legally speaking?

A. Both the Organization of American States and the Security Council have had a full opportunity to pass judgment on that matter, and neither one of them has considered what we have done in violation of the charters—of either charter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the Martin question was raised, I don't think you answered the question, which was concerning the ethics. You made a good case as to why he was valuable to Mr. Bennett at the time. But what I would like to ask is, one, whether (I don't know whether this is ethics)—but, one, whether his article was cleared for publication by the White House and the Department. Because this raises the question as to whether, private citizen or not, he was putting on the public record information which had not yet been disclosed officially, if he were doing so.

A. Yes, he was giving an account of his personal experiences in this situation. He himself is a former newspaper man, as you know.

I will be glad to sit down with you gentlemen at some length in a private session to talk about ethics, if you like. (Laughter.)

The Press: Thank you very much.

25. SECRETARY RUSK'S TELEVISION DISCUSSION, DOMINICAN SITUATION, MAY 28, 1965

*Transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by John Chancellor, which was part of an NBC television program of May 28 entitled "Santo Domingo: War Among Friends."*¹

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. Secretary, I think most people would like to know how long must American troops remain in Santo Domingo? I realize you can't give us a precise answer, but is it likely to be a long time?

Secretary RUSK. That would depend on further decisions of the Organization of American States. As you know, a very distinguished Brazilian general is commanding that force; we would be prepared to remove our force just as rapidly as he feels it is militarily prudent and safe to do so. The President this week has announced certain reductions as a first step, but we feel we should not give—all of us in the hemisphere—should not give the commander of the Force important missions and then take away the resources that he would need to carry out the mission. I would think that they would be there for some weeks. It is possible that they could be there—some of them could be there longer, but that will depend on the evolution of the situation.

Q. Well, may I ask you then a political question based on that? Do you see any easy or quick solution to the Dominican political problem?

A. Well, this is a problem which was at the heart of the beginning of this affair, and it, of course, is the key question about winding it up. We are convinced that the solution must be a Dominican solution, that Dominican leaders themselves must find the answer to a government which can govern the country pending elections. Now, it's not just the United States that takes the view that extremes on both sides should not take part in any such arrangements. You will recall that the Organization of American States applied sanctions against Trujillo. You also recall that at the Punta del Este conference in January 1962, and again last summer when we were considering the Venezuelan case, this hemisphere made it very clear that Communist regimes are incompatible with the institutions of this hemisphere. So we should forget those two extremes and try to find among Dominicans a moderate group—a center group—a coalition group—that can take responsibility for the country until the people themselves can decide how they want to be governed.

Q. Would you say, sir, that, given this formula, Colonel Caamaño or General Imbert could figure in to lead or dominate a coalition government?

A. Well, this is a matter that is difficult to talk about. Personalities are hard to get into at this point, but I would think that the feelings that have run so high during this past month are such that those who have taken the most active part would probably not be the basis for a government. Now that does not mean that one or another of them might not have some role to play in the Dominican Republic, but the very controversy itself, I think, makes it a difficult matter to bring these people together.

Q. What about the OAS role? While the Dominicans are sorting out their political problems, which, as you say, may take a very long time, is there the possibility of an OAS trusteeship? What would be your view on that?

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1965, pp. 947-949.

A. I think we should reject the idea of a trusteeship. The Dominican people, I think, would resent it. I think the Organization of American States would be very reluctant to attempt to impose a trusteeship on one of the countries of the hemisphere. On the other hand, the OAS will have to provide a lot of assistance to the Dominican Republic during this period: the Inter-American Force, the provision of food and medicine, the help that is needed to get the economy of the country into full operation, perhaps some technical assistance in many fields, but also assistance in helping the Dominicans themselves get together on a government. In other words, there is room here and a need for very important OAS assistance, but I would stay away from the concept of trusteeship.

Q. Sir, the United States has been criticized for overreacting to a Communist scare in the Dominican Republic. Were we justified in sending in all those extra troops because we felt the rebellion was menaced by communism?

A. Well, I wouldn't call these troops extra. It's very hard to draw an exact point at which you have just enough, not too few and not too many. In your opening remark you pointed out some very large missions that these forces have had. The evacuation of 6,000 people, the provision of food and medicines throughout the island and to both sides, the establishment of a safety zone that runs about 16 miles in length which has to be patrolled regularly on a 24-hour basis by neutral soldiers. These were very large responsibilities. Now, it was also important that those who might be seeking an answer by violence on the island—whether the two opposing sides in the more formal sense or some of these irresponsible elements that had seized arms in the downtown area and were under no control—it's very important that all of those elements realize that there is no military solution available to them. Otherwise, there could be no cease-fire, and we would be faced with a prospect of a bloodbath that could take literally tens of thousands of lives. And so the presence of substantial forces there, I think, had a very important part to play in bringing about a cease-fire and keeping the peace.

Q. The President said on May 2d that the rebellion had been taken over by Communists. Now what has happened, sir, in the meantime to change our views?

A. Well, I think that in the first place it became apparent to some of these extreme elements downtown, who were supported by irresponsible bands of armed civilians who had been given arms in the first day or two of the so-called rebellion, that they themselves could not succeed by such means. I think some of them have undoubtedly gone back underground, but there are some of them still active there in the downtown area. We have seen some of them, and on one occasion we have exchanged fire with one of these bands under such leadership. I would suppose that the reduction of the threat consists primarily not in the departure of the individuals but in recognition by them that there is no future along the path in which they were embarked.

Q. Given our response in the Dominican Republic, sir, can't the Communists thwart any genuine democratic uprising against a dictatorship by sending in some identifiable Communists?

A. Well, that generalizes a problem in the Dominican Republic, I think, a little too much. I think that the people here in the hemisphere

and other countries would be sophisticated enough to draw the line between a real threat and a pretended or sham threat that might be used for other purposes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, where do we draw the line? If we will intervene to stop a potential Communist takeover in the Caribbean, would we do so in Africa or other parts of the world?

A. Well, we do not have a general policy of intervention. We have 42 allies all over the world. We are very active in South Viet-Nam at the present time because that country is under direct attack by Communist infiltrators from North Viet-Nam, but we have assisted Greece when they were under guerrilla operations. We have had large aid programs all over the world to support and assist democratic countries and constitutional regimes to support themselves and to develop viable institutions. No, I wouldn't say that one should generalize on a worldwide basis on the experience of the Dominican Republic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what about the press coverage? We've heard a lot about it in these past few weeks. Has it hurt you, helped you, what is your reaction?

A. Of course, a situation like the Dominican Republic attracts enormous attention by the press. There were many reporters in the Dominican Republic. It was a very confused situation with violence in the key areas of the city. Deadlines made it difficult sometimes for reporters to check out both sides of a particular piece of information. There was a lot of good reporting. There was some reporting that was not so good, but I think, broadly speaking, the American people got a pretty good picture of what was going on down there during this period. Now, there were some points where we had information which we could not ourselves disclose because it would lead to direct danger to some of the individuals who were the sources of that information, and that made it difficult for us to prove exactly everything that we had to say.

Q. I want to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule, Mr. Secretary, for joining us tonight. Thank you very much.

26. THE SEARCH FOR A DURABLE PEACE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT BAYLOR UNIVERSITY, MAY 28, 1965¹

Mr. President, members of the Board of Trustees, faculty, student body, my fellow Americans:

This is a moment I deeply wish my parents could have lived to share. In the first place, my father would have enjoyed what you have so generously said of me—and my mother would have believed it.

More than that, the honor you pay me is, in a real sense, honor that is due my mother. All of her life she spoke often of Baylor—a trait I have found not uncommon among all of your alumni. Her pride in Baylor—and in being the granddaughter of a president of Baylor—passed on to me early and influenced the course of my own life more constructively than I could ever describe.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, pp. 989-992.

So I am most grateful to you for this moment—and for its meaning to me.

Woodrow Wilson once told the men of Princeton that: "It is not learning—but the spirit of service—that will give a college place in the public annals of the nation."

For 120 years Baylor University has touched the lives of many generations with an unusual spirit of selfless service. That spirit—expressed in the works of ministers and missionaries, public servants and public school teachers, of devout parents and dedicated citizens—has not only won for Baylor a place of esteem in this State and this nation. It has served the betterment of the condition of man to the remote ends of this earth.

On this occasion we meet here today at an historic hour in the life of the American nations.

In Washington leaders of this hemisphere are meeting to work together to open a road to durable peace in the Dominican Republic.

Their efforts will have our full support. For at stake is the future not only of one of our sister Republics but the principles and the values of all the American Republics.

We are members of an inter-American system in which large and small nations are partners in the defense of freedom and in the progress of economic welfare and social justice.

That partnership must be constantly strengthened. Our common aim and our combined ability must increase—in crisis as well as in calm. The tragedy of the past 4 weeks in the Dominican Republic renews our common resolution to accept common responsibility in dealing with common dangers.

In that unfortunate nation, 4 weeks ago, the legacy of dictatorship exploded in fury and anarchy. Hundreds of Dominicans died, leaving thousands of widows and orphans of war. Nineteen of our own American boys lost their lives. The capital city, birthplace of the Western Hemisphere, was split asunder. Blood and hate drowned ideals. And for days freedom itself stood on the edge of disaster.

In those early terrible hours, we did what we had to do. Remembering Simón Bolívar's admonition that "to hesitate is destruction," as your President, I did what I had to do.

Since then, working with the Organization of American States and its distinguished Secretary General, José Mora, the forces of democracy have acted. The results are clear.

More than 6,500 men and women and children from 46 different countries have been evacuated. Not a single life was lost.

A cease-fire was achieved, bringing an end to the threat of wholesale bloodshed.

An international zone of refuge was opened as a haven for all men of peace, and a safe corridor 17 miles long was established by American men.

More than 8 million pounds of food have been distributed to the Dominican people.

A well-trained, disciplined band of Communists was prevented from destroying the hopes of Dominican democracy.

Political avenues were opened to help the Dominican people find a Dominican solution to their problems.

Today those achievements are guaranteed—guaranteed by the troops of five nations representing this hemisphere. They are under

the command of the able Brazilian general, General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim.

For the first time in history the Organization of American States has created and sent to the soil of an American nation an international peacekeeping military force.

That may be the greatest achievement of all.

The United States made its forces a part of that Inter-American Force. And, as the contributions of the Latin American nations have been incorporated into the OAS force, in the past 2 days the United States has removed 1,600 troops from the island.

I am issuing orders this morning to remove an additional 1,700 men on Saturday. I have also instructed our commander, General Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.], to discuss possible further withdrawals with General Alvim. Such action will be taken when the military commanders believe it is safe and warranted by the arrival of further Latin American forces and by the continued stabilization of the military situation.

Now we ask ourselves this morning: What is next?

The answer to that question rests partly with the people of the Dominican Republic and partly with their neighbors throughout this hemisphere.

Already, under the distinguished leadership of Secretary General Mora, the broad outlines of a reasonable settlement are beginning to emerge—outlines which meet the needs and respond to the desires first of the Dominican people themselves and then of all the people of this hemisphere.

First, the Dominican people—and the people of their sister Republics—do not want government by extremists of either the left or right. That is clear. They want to be ruled neither by an old conspiracy of reaction and tyranny nor by a new conspiracy of Communist violence.

Second, they want—as we do—an end to slaughter in the streets and to brutality in the *barrios*.

Third, they want—as we do—food and work and quiet in the night.

Fourth, they want—as we do—a constitutional government that will represent them all—and work for all their hopes.

Fifth, the Dominican people know they need the help of sympathetic neighbors in healing their wounds and in negotiating their divisions—but what they want ultimately is the chance to shape their own course.

Those are the hopes of the Dominican people. But they are our hopes, too. And they are shared by responsible people in every nation of this hemisphere.

Out of the Dominican crucible the 20 American nations must now forge a stronger shield against disaster.

The opportunity is here now for a new thrust forward—to show the world the way to true international cooperation in the cause of peace and in the struggle to win a better life for all of us.

We believe the New World may most wisely approach this task guided by new realities.

The first reality is that old concepts and old labels are largely obsolete. In today's world, with the enemies of freedom talking about "wars of national liberation," the old distinction between "civil war" and "international war" has already lost much of its meaning.

Second is the reality that when forces of freedom move slowly—whether on political, economic, or military fronts—the forces of slavery and subversion move rapidly, and they move decisively.

Third, we know that when a Communist group seeks to exploit misery, the entire free American system is put in deadly danger. We also know that these dangers can be found today in many of our lands. There is no trouble anywhere these evil forces will not try to turn to their advantage. We can expect more efforts at triumph by terror and conquest through chaos.

Fourth, we have learned in the Dominican Republic that we can act decisively and together.

Fifth, it is clear that we need new international machinery geared to meet the fastmoving events. When hours can decide the fate of generations, the moment of decision must become the moment of action.

Just as these lessons of the past 4 weeks are clear, so are the basic principles which have guided the purpose of the United States of America.

We seek no territory. We do not seek to impose our will on anyone. We intend to work for the self-determination of the peoples of the Americas within the framework of freedom.

In times past large nations have used their power to impose their will on smaller nations. Today we have placed our forces at the disposition of the nations of this hemisphere to assure the peoples of those nations the right to exercise their own will in freedom.

In accordance with the resolution of the eighth meeting of the ministers at Punta del Este, we will join with the other OAS nations in opposing a Communist takeover in this hemisphere.

And in accordance with the Charter of Punta del Este, we will join with other OAS nations in pressing for change among those who would maintain a feudal system—a feudal system that denies social justice and economic progress to the ordinary peoples of this hemisphere.

We want for the peoples of this hemisphere only what they want for themselves—liberty, justice, dignity, a better life for all.

More than “a few agitators” was necessary to bring on the tragic and the cruel bloodshed in the Dominican Republic. They needed additional help and a deeper cause. And they had both.

For the roots of the trouble are found wherever the landless and the despised, the poor and the oppressed, stand before the gates of opportunity seeking entry into a brighter land.

They can get there only if we narrow the gap between the rich nations and the poor—and between the rich and the poor within each nation. And this is the heart of the purpose of the United States.

Here on the campus of Baylor University we will reaffirm that purpose on June 26 when almost 50 Peace Corps volunteers will begin training for service in the Dominican Republic. These young men and women will go to the *barrios* of Santo Domingo and Santiago to work with and to work for the people of the Dominican Republic in attaining a new life and new hope.

At home, with the strong cooperation of our Congress, we are waging war on poverty; we are opening new paths of learning for all our children; we are creating new jobs for our workers; we are providing health care for our older citizens; we are eliminating injustice and inequality; we are bringing new economic life to whole regions.

These objectives we will continue to pursue with all of our strength and all of our determination.

As peace returns to the Dominican people and as a broad base is laid for a new Dominican government responsive to the people's will, the United States will be prepared to join in full measure in the massive task of reconstruction and in the hopeful work of lasting economic progress.

For in bold ink our signature is on the charter of the alliance. That charter commands a peaceful, democratic, social revolution across the hemisphere. It asks that unjust privilege be ended and that unfair power be curbed. It asks that we help throw open the gates of opportunity to these millions who stand there now knocking.

Just as we have joined in the Dominican Republic to bring peace to a troubled land, we have joined with these forces across the hemisphere who seek to advance their own independence and their own democratic progress.

We work with and for those men and women not because we have to. We work because morality commands it, justice requires it, and our own dignity as men depends on it. We work not because we fear the unjust wrath of our enemy but because we fear the just wrath of God.

In Santo Domingo the last month has been grim. The storm there is not yet over. But a new sense of hope is beginning. Across the angry arguments of the opposing forces, the voice of good sense is now beginning to be heard.

As the Organization of American States recommits itself to the hard efforts of peacemaking, the Government and the people of the United States proudly pledge full support to the peacemakers.

The path ahead is long, the way ahead is hard. So we must, in the words of the prophet, "mount up with wings as eagles . . . run, and not be weary."

Thank you.

27. PRESIDENT COMMENTS ON SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, JUNE 1, 1965¹

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL

The situation in the Dominican Republic continues to be serious. That is why we welcome the additional efforts which are being made in the OAS today to enlarge and strengthen the effort to find a peaceful settlement. We continue to give our full support to Secretary General [José A.] Mora in his outstanding service under existing OAS resolutions, but we share his judgment that a strong and sustained effort will be needed.

Meanwhile, I have been advised today by General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim, the Commander of the Inter-American Force, and Lieutenant General [Bruce] Palmer, the Deputy Commander of the Inter-American Force, that conditions in the Dominican Republic now permit further withdrawal of the United States military personnel from the Inter-American Force. This recommendation has the con-

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, pp. 992-993.

currence of Secretary General Mora and Ambassador [W. Tapley] Bennett.

I am accordingly ordering the immediate withdrawal of one battalion landing team of United States Marines plus headquarters and support personnel, totaling approximately 2,000 personnel.

**28. EMERGENCY RELIEF WORK, WHITE HOUSE
PRESS RELEASE, JUNE 1, 1965¹**

I want to call your attention to the very effective and selfless emergency relief work done by representatives of our Government in cooperation with the OAS.

From the very earliest days we have been distributing food and medical supplies to ward off starvation and epidemic. This work has been under the very able direction of Mr. Anthony Solomon, who is being sworn in this afternoon as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Under his direction we have now distributed more than 9 million pounds of food, and distribution continues at a rate of half a million pounds a day. We have given out rice, cornmeal, powdered milk, beans, and flour.

In the same way, we have provided medical supplies from U.S. Army sources in repeated shipments. They have included antibiotics and other medicines, oxygen tanks, serums for immunization, power generators for the hospitals, and surgical supplies.

Both food and medical supplies have been distributed all over the country by nine food teams of Spanish-speaking Americans working to relieve need on a straight humanitarian basis. These teams have cooperated fully with private charitable agencies like Catholic Relief, CARE, and the Church World Service. They have been subjected to harassment in about equal measure by suspicious members of both contending groups.

We have also reopened lines of fuel supply for the civilian economy while at the same time we have resisted pressure to provide fuel for either of the contending military forces.

It is entirely natural that while the shooting continued, public attention focused heavily on the fighting. But it is time now for us all to pay tribute to the work of these peaceful representatives of our country. They have saved uncounted lives, and they have taken the lead in the first steps toward the peaceful reconstruction of the Dominican Republic.

29. CABLE DATED JUNE 18, 1965, FROM THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO AMBASSADOR SEVILLA SACASA, PRESIDENT OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C.²

DECLARATION TO THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE

The representatives of the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic, speaking on behalf of the regional community

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, p. 993.

² OAS Document 180, June 18, 1965.

address the following declaration and appeal to the Dominican people:

"The American Republics comprise a family of nations. They are bound together by close spiritual and material ties. What affects one member of the family necessarily affects all the other members.

"The American community has been deeply disturbed by the fratricidal strife in the Dominican Republic. We are here because of this concern. We have not come to take sides in the struggle. The reestablishment of peace is what we seek. Our mission is not intervention, but rather conciliation.

"The Organization of American States is no stranger to the Dominican people: it has shared in the struggle for freedom which you have sustained for so many years. In cities and hamlets throughout the land the Organization of American States stands for impartiality, respect for human rights, assistance to the needy and defense of the democratic process. We come in the same spirit to help the Dominican people in this moment of crisis.

"In an effort to understand the current situation we have spoken to Dominicans from all walks of life and of all persuasions. We recognize the patriotism and valor that have gone into the struggle. We understand the causes and objectives which have brought Dominicans to take up arms. We know the price that has been paid in human lives. We appreciate the fact that those who live do not want to break faith with those who have died. We realize that convictions are passionately held and that divisions run deep.

"But we also sense the longings of countless numbers of Dominicans not actively engaged in the struggle. They do not want a solution imposed by force of arms. Their desire is for a peaceful solution emanating from the will of the people. At this moment they ask for peace to resume their normal lives, assurances of respect for individual rights, and guarantees for democratic institutions to function again. We interpret these to be the aspirations of the great majority of the Dominican people. We are confident that these aspirations have the support of the peoples of the hemisphere.

"We have examined many different possibilities in an effort to find a basis for understanding between the contending sides. We have also held extensive conversations with the leaders of the two groups in an effort to determine the possibility of reaching a formula satisfactory to both. We regret to say that we have not found agreement on the fundamental issues.

"We are confident, however, that there is a solution that all democratic men and women of good will can support. This is to let the Dominican people decide the crucial issues for themselves through early general elections. The Organization of American States stands ready and willing to play a major role in this undertaking, as it did in 1962.

"We, therefore, propose to the Dominican people the following:

"1. The holding of general elections with Organization of American States supervision in a period of six to nine months, the minimum time required to make the necessary arrangements.

"2. The opportunity for all leaders of democratic political parties abroad to return to the Dominican Republic under safeguards of the Organization of American States in order that

they may participate in the political life of the nation, including the elections.

"3. The immediate termination of the armed struggle, with the return of all members of the regular armed forces to their barracks and irregular forces to their homes under the supervision of the Organization of American States.

"4. The surrender to the Organization of American States of all arms in the hands of the civil population. For this purpose there will be established arms collection stations of the Organization of American States.

"5. The reopening of all commercial and industrial establishments throughout the country and the return of all employees to their customary places of work.

"6. The formation of a provisional government which will carry the country to elections and the preparation of an institutional act which will serve as a provisional charter until the people decide the constitutional issue through a constitutional assembly which will meet following elections.

"The Organization of American States for its part assures the Dominican people that it stands ready to carry out the program described below in establishing a climate propitious for the holding of free elections and thereby helping the country to return to political normalcy and to initiate economic recovery:

"1. The creation of a new OAS Electoral Commission to work closely with the Central Electoral Board in organizing and supervising the electoral process.

"2. The continuation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Republic to assure respect for political rights throughout the electoral period.

"3. The immediate establishment of an expanded program of economic and technical assistance to promote the recovery of the nation and to help it solve its most urgent economic and social problems.

"In making the foregoing proposals we do not ask the Dominican people to cease in their struggle to win political freedom. What we ask is that the solution not be imposed by force of arms—by hatred, by imprisonment, by persecution or by death. We want no one to surrender his ideals under the threat of force. We desire, instead, that the political struggle continue, but that it be decided by ballots, not bullets. Let the will of the people freely expressed determine the destiny of the nation. In this way the decision of the majority will prevail and the rights of the minority will be respected. Violence will give way to reason!

"In making this proposal we appeal to all Dominicans to help save their country from further suffering and bloodshed:

"We ask those who fight to lay down their arms and return to their barracks or to their homes.

"We ask public employees to return to their posts to reestablish all public services.

"We ask labor and management to restore the economic life of the nation.

"We ask political leaders to rally their followers to the cause of peace through free elections.

"We ask teachers to instill in their students Dominican brotherhood.

"We ask the clergy to heal the spiritual wounds caused by civil strife.

"In conclusion, we address a sincere, urgent appeal to all patriotic Dominicans of democratic conviction and good will to take this path to national reconciliation.

"The Dominican people long for peace and freedom.

"This is the hour of decision!"

SANTO DOMINGO, *June 18, 1965.*

AD HOC COMMITTEE.

ILMAR PENNA MARINHO

Ambassador, Representative of Brazil

RAMON DE CLAIRMONT DUEÑAS

Ambassador, Representative of El Salvador

ELLSWORTH BUNKER

Ambassador, Representative of the United States of America

JOSE A. MORA

Secretary General of the Organization of American States

30. CABLE DATED JUNE 18, 1965, FROM THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO AMBASSADOR GUILLERMO SEVILLA SACASA, PRESIDENT OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C.¹

PROPOSAL OF AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR SOLUTION OF DOMINICAN CRISIS

In carrying out the mandate entrusted to it, the Ad Hoc Committee composed of Representatives of the 10th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, has, since its arrival in the Dominican Republic on June 3, undertaken extensive exploratory conversations with both contending sides, and with a large number of groups and individuals from various sectors of the population and various sections of the country. Despite existing divergences, the Committee has been able to observe a general revulsion against possible resumption of fighting and a widespread yearning for the restoration of a climate of peace and conciliation and for a return of the country to normal democratic institutional life so that the Dominican people may freely express their will and shape their own destiny. The Organization of American States is sincerely devoted to helping the Dominican people achieve this vital objective.

As a result of its conversations and study of the present situation the Committee is convinced that the best way of achieving this objective is through free, Democratic elections. For this purpose, the committee herewith presents for the consideration of the parties and of the Dominican people as a whole the following plan of action:

"1. ELECTIONS.—General elections for the President and Vice President of the Republic, Members of the National Congress, and for municipal authorities shall be held throughout the country. In order to allow sufficient time for the restoration of a climate of peace and

¹ OAS Document 179, June 18, 1965.

tranquility necessary for carrying out the electoral process, the date set for these elections will be no earlier than six months, but no later than nine months, from the present date, so the period referred to will be as short as possible with an assured termination date.

"In these elections all political parties and their candidates who register with the Electoral Board will be able to participate and all will enjoy full freedom of speech and assembly.

"2. PREPARATION FOR THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND OAS ASSISTANCE.—In order that such elections might be free and reflect the will of the Dominican people, the Organization of American States, through its competent organs, will cooperate fully in the preparation and holding of the elections and will provide the assistance which may be indicated.

"An OAS Technical Advisory Election Commission will be established immediately, composed of jurists and experts from the member States of the Organization. In its work, the Committee may draw upon the experience of the OAS Electoral Commission which assisted in the preparation and holding of the elections of December 1962. The Committee will cooperate in all aspects of the technical preparations that may be necessary. The Committee will observe the entire electoral process, including the elections themselves, as well as the verification of the results of the voting.

"The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, provided with an adequate staff, will maintain a headquarters in Santo Domingo throughout the preelectoral period and will be available to all Dominicans to receive and investigate any complaints of violations of the basic civil and political rights of the people. The appropriate provisions of the American declaration on the rights and duties of man, which both parties have already pledged themselves to observe, will be accepted by all civilian and military authorities and all political parties and candidates who participate in the election.

"During the electoral process, the Inter-American Peace Force, reduced to the number strictly necessary to carry out its mission, will supplement the efforts of the Dominican authorities in the maintenance of peace.

"3. GENERAL AMNESTY and RESTORATION OF PEACE.—In a spirit of reconciliation, full amnesty will be granted to all who have participated in the civil strife: *Provided*, That they will lay down their arms and acknowledge a willingness to live at peace and in harmony with their fellow citizens. The Organization of American States will give assistance to any who wish to leave the country and will take the necessary action to obtain safe conducts for them.

"The Dominican armed forces will return to their quarters and will remain subject to the authority of the provisional government which will be established. They will refrain from any political activity.

"The Organization of American States and all responsible authorities will call upon the irregular forces on both sides to lay down their arms and return to their homes and peaceful pursuits. The Organization of American States will receive custody of all arms surrendered and will establish arms collection stations.

"4. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.—In order to carry the country to the elections, there must necessarily be a provisional government

which will exercise authority throughout the entire Dominican territory until the elected government assumes office, and which will—

“A. Assume immediate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, and insure respect for human rights;

“B. Restore the normal functioning of public administration;

“C. Institute urgent and necessary programs for the rehabilitation and development of the economic and social life of the country; and

“D. Represent the Dominican Nation in the international community.

“In order for the provisional government to carry out its caretaker functions and insure an impartial atmosphere during the electoral process, it should represent all sectors of the country. The Commission will hold conversations with political groups and community leaders in order to contribute to the formation of the provisional government.

“5. OAS ASSISTANCE FOR THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.—Once the provisional government is established, the Ad Hoc Committee will recommend to the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers that the governments of the member States of the Organization of American States grant it immediately diplomatic recognition. The provisional government will then be in a position to receive, through the organization, major technical and economic assistance, in order to institute immediately programs of national rehabilitation.

“6. INSTITUTIONAL ACT.—Without prejudice to the constitutional instrument under which the Dominican people will wish to be governed following elections, the provisional government can best be provided with the basis for exercising its political and administrative authority through putting into effect temporarily of an institutional act, drawn from the relevant provisions of the 1963 constitution, which are essentially those of the 1962 constitution in these respects.

“A group of distinguished Dominican jurists could be entrusted with the immediate preparation of the draft of the institutional act.

“7. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY.—It is the conviction of the Committee that it is up to the Dominican people to decide the constitutional issue. In accordance with this principle a Constitutional Assembly will be convoked within six months following assumption of office by the elected government. The Congress, once elected, shall determine the method by which the Constitutional Assembly shall be composed.

“8. The Committee hopes that, in a spirit of democracy and patriotism, this plan will receive the support of the leaders of the contending forces and of all the Dominican people.”

SANTO DOMINGO, *June 18, 1965.*

AD HOC COMMITTEE.

ILMAR PENNA MARINHO

Special Delegate of Brazil

RAMON CLAIRMONT DUEÑAS

Special Delegate of El Salvador

ELLSWORTH BUNKER

Special Delegate of the United States of America

31. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS OF 1962 AND 1963 OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ¹

General

The basic difference between the Constitutions of 1962 and 1963 is the greater emphasis given under the 1963 Constitution to the State as a positive social force in society. Recurrent use of concepts such as public versus private interest, social good, property must serve the progress and welfare of society, the primary duty of the State is to concern itself with the training of the workers and the improvement of their skills highlight this tendency. The 1962 Constitution places somewhat greater stress on individual rights and therefore conforms more closely to the traditional liberal constitutional models. It does not ignore, however, the social role of the State; it merely reduces the stress placed upon it.

Property Ownership

The 1962 Constitution contains one provision (Article 8 [9]) relating to the right to own property, which is among the enumerated guaranteed human rights. The 1963 Constitution likewise guarantees the right to private property. Both constitutions specify that the State may take over private property only for public benefit and with fair compensation. The 1963 Constitution (Article 22) speaks of compensation in terms of an equitable balance between the public and private interests. The 1963 Constitution limits ownership of excessively large or small amounts of land, and prohibits ownership of land by aliens except as Congress may legislate. The 1963 Constitution also contains a number of provisions relating to the right of every family to have a comfortable and sanitary home and protecting the home from seizure by creditors.

Religion

The 1962 Constitution provides for a Concordat with the Holy See. There is no similar provision in the 1963 Constitution.

Family

The 1962 Constitution provides that families shall receive the broadest protection from the State, and provides for property agreements between husband and wife. The 1962 Constitution does not provide for divorce. The 1963 Constitution includes articles providing special protection provisions for maternity, children (including illegitimate children) and common-law marriages. The 1963 Constitution also allows dissolution of marriages by mutual consent or on demand by either party for cause as provided by law.

Education

The 1962 Constitution guarantees compulsory elementary education. The 1963 Constitution also provides for compulsory primary education.

Labor

The 1962 Constitution guarantees freedom of work and states that legislation will establish the maximum working day and minimum wages, and will provide for social security. The 1963 Constitution recognizes the right of all persons to work and states that private

¹ State Department Analysis.

enterprise is to be free but to operate without inhibiting security, liberty or human dignity. The 1963 Constitution states that the law will determine the measures necessary to assure complete compatibility between private economic activity and the interests of society. The 1963 Constitution also provides for trade union organization, profit sharing and the right to strike.

Individual Rights

The 1962 Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and worship; freedom of association; and freedom of expression without censorship, with the latter right subject to penalties for persons who threaten the honor of individuals, social order or the public peace. The 1962 Constitution also guarantees against arbitrary imprisonment, double jeopardy and self-incrimination. The 1963 Constitution has a long list of individual rights including freedom of belief and conscience, association, speech, movement within and without the republic and access to courts. The 1963 Constitution also forbids arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, double jeopardy, self-incrimination and deportation.

Sovereignty

Both the 1962 and 1963 Constitutions expressly affirm the principle of non-intervention. The 1963 Constitution states that sovereignty resides inherently in the people.

Executive

The 1962 Constitution provides for a President and a Vice President elected every four years by direct vote and who cannot be immediately reelected. The Chief Justice is next in succession. The President is Commander of the Armed Forces. The enumerated powers of the President include, *inter alia*, appointing and removing cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, promulgating laws and regulations, ensuring collection of revenues, declaring a state of siege and also declaring a state of national emergency in case of grave danger when Congress is not in session, making contracts, controlling the armed forces, defending the country, prohibiting entry of and expelling undesirable aliens, and granting pardons. The President and Vice President may not resign except before the National Congress.

The powers of the Executive under the 1963 Constitution do not differ substantially from those of the 1962 Constitution except that under the earlier Constitution the functioning of the ministries was regulated by law whereas under the later one, this power was given to the Executive.

Legislative

The 1962 Constitution provides for a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies elected by direct vote every four years, each Senator and Deputy to have an alternate. Exclusive powers of the Senate include electing judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts and trying impeachments. The Chamber of Deputies has the exclusive power to impeach public officials. The Chamber and the Senate together constitute the National Assembly, to meet regularly each February 27 and August 16 for 90 days, extendable for another 60 days. Important powers of the Congress include levying taxes, approval or rejection of the budget, creating or abolishing political divisions,

declaring a state of siege or national emergency, creating or abolishing courts, approving or rejecting requests for extraordinary expenditure, granting loans, approving or rejecting treaties, legislating concerning the public debt, interpolating ministers on authorization of the President, approving or rejecting contracts submitted by the President and legislating on all matters not within the competence of another branch of the government or contrary to the Constitution. The 1962 Constitution provides that laws contrary to it are null and void and forbids retroactive effect of laws unless favorable.

The 1963 Constitution differs importantly only in that the Congress is specifically empowered to refuse to authorize loans, may interpolate ministers on its own authority, and is empowered to authorize or refuse to authorize municipal governments to alienate real property. There are no provisions voiding laws contrary to the 1963 Constitution or relating to the retroactive effect of laws.

Judiciary

The 1962 Constitution establishes a Supreme Court of at least seven justices, the Chief Justice to be determined by the Senate. Its exclusive jurisdictions include actions involving the President and Vice President, members of Congress, ministers, judges and diplomats; hearing appeals of cassation; and acting as ultimate court of appeal.

The 1963 Constitution provides for nine Supreme Court Justices. Other provisions regarding the Supreme Court are virtually unchanged from those of the 1962 Constitution.





