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COMMITTEE PRINT

REBELLION IN RUSSIA'S EUROPE:

FACT AND FICTION



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PREPARED FOR THE

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

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RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, That the study, "Rebellion in Russia's Europe: Fact and Fiction," prepared by Hal Lehrman at the request of Senator Thomas J. Dodd, be printed and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman.

THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman.

JOHN L. McCLELLAN.

SAM J. ERVIN, JR.

BIRCH BAYH.

GEO. A. SMATHERS.

ROMAN HRUSKA.

EVERETT M. DIRKSEN.

HUGH L. SCOTT.

Dated October 4, 1965.

MEMORANDUM

JULY 31, 1965.

To: Senator James O. Eastland.

From: Thomas J. Dodd.

Re: Publication by subcommittee of Studies by Hal Lehrman on situation in European Communist countries.

I wish to propose that the attached study by Hal Lehrman be printed for the information of Senators by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, under the caption "Rebellion in Russia's Europe: Fact and Fiction."

Mr. Lehrman's thesis runs counter to prevailing opinion. However, his article is carefully documented and, I believe it deserves the most serious consideration because of Mr. Lehrman's very impressive record as a correspondent and as an expert in the field of "Russia's Europe."

Mr. Lehrman's credentials are outlined in the attached paragraphs.

In asking for the publication of the study, I want to make it emphatically clear that I am not asking the subcommittee to endorse Mr. Lehrman's views. In every situation, it is advantageous to Senators to have access to both points of view, or all points of view, before being called upon to make up their minds. Unfortunately, no intelligent presentation of "the other point of view" has yet been available dealing with the situation in the captive nations of Europe.

From the standpoint of the subcommittee's special sphere of interest, the subject is a matter of some importance because it bears on the question of the participation or nonparticipation of the European satellite governments in the work of Communist subversion in this hemisphere.

I have been advised by Mr. Lehrman that we have his permission to print the study.

MEMORANDUM

July 31, 1965

To: Senator James O. Eastland
From: Thomas J. Dodd

Re: Publication by Subcommittee of Studies by Hal Lohman on
situation in European Communist countries

I wish to propose that the attached study by Hal Lohman be
printed for the information of Senators by the Senate Subcommittee
on Internal Security, under the caption "Rebellion in Russia's European
East and West".

Mr. Lohman's thesis runs counter to prevailing opinion. However,
his article is carefully documented and I believe it deserves the most
serious consideration because of Mr. Lohman's very impressive
record as a correspondent and as an expert in the field of "Russia's
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in this hemisphere.

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to print the study.

RE: HAL LEHRMAN

As a foreign correspondent, Hal Lehrman has covered central Europe, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Spain, Israel, North Africa, the Marshall Plan countries, and the Arab countries. From 1945 to 1963 he was a special correspondent on 11 overseas tours on varied assignments from such publications as the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Fortune, Commentary, Wall Street Journal, and The Reporter magazine. He was the first American correspondent to enter Soviet-occupied Hungary and the first American Jewish correspondent to enter Arab countries after the emergence of Israel.

He is author of "Russia's Europe"; "Israel: The Beginning and Tomorrow"; "Israel—Myth and Reality"; coauthor of "Inside Story" and "As We See Russia."

Awards received by Mr. Lehrman include the George Polk Award for best reporting on foreign affairs, Overseas Press Club citation for best magazine reporting, Council on Foreign Relations fellowship for reporting on Soviet Europe, and two Guggenheim fellowships for writing on Israel.

Lehrman was born in New York City in 1911. He is a graduate of Cornell University, where he later was a member of the faculty of the department of history, and of Ecole des Chartes in Paris.

He has been an Associated Press correspondent in the Paris bureau, assistant foreign editor of Newsweek, cable editor of Havas, night cable editor of the New York Daily News, and Chief of the U.S. Office of War Information in Turkey during World War II. He is a founder and governor of the Overseas Press Club.

THE HALL OF RECORDS

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been admitted to the Hall of Records since the year 1800. The names are arranged in alphabetical order, and the year of admission is given in parentheses after each name.

1. John Adams (1800)

2. Thomas Jefferson (1801)

3. James Madison (1802)

4. Andrew Jackson (1803)

5. Martin Van Buren (1804)

6. William Henry Harrison (1805)

7. John Tyler (1806)

8. James K. Polk (1807)

9. Zachary Taylor (1808)

10. Franklin Pierce (1809)

11. James Buchanan (1810)

12. Abraham Lincoln (1811)

13. Andrew Johnson (1812)

14. Ulysses S. Grant (1813)

15. Rutherford B. Hayes (1814)

16. James A. Garfield (1815)

17. Chester A. Arthur (1816)

18. Grover Cleveland (1817)

19. Benjamin Harrison (1818)

20. William McKinley (1819)

21. Theodore Roosevelt (1820)

22. Woodrow Wilson (1821)

23. Warren G. Harding (1822)

24. Calvin Coolidge (1823)

25. Herbert Hoover (1824)

26. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1825)

27. Harry S. Truman (1826)

28. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1827)

29. John F. Kennedy (1828)

30. Lyndon B. Johnson (1829)

31. Richard M. Nixon (1830)

32. Gerald R. Ford (1831)

33. Jimmy Carter (1832)

34. Ronald Reagan (1833)

35. George H. W. Bush (1834)

36. Bill Clinton (1835)

37. George W. Bush (1836)

38. Barack Obama (1837)

39. Donald Trump (1838)

40. Joe Biden (1839)

REBELLION IN RUSSIA'S EUROPE: FACT AND FICTION

(By Hal Lehrman)

I. LOOPHOLES IN THE INDEPENDENCE THEORY

Five Communist Romanian electrical experts inspected United States power plants for a whole month from coast to coast in the spring of 1964. They traveled as guests of the U.S. Government. They found the welcome lamp burning brightly everywhere because Red Romania has sung loudest in the current chorus of East European satellites proclaiming their desire to "go West" away from Moscow.

The group's genial leader, a Deputy Minister for Mining and Electric Power with the resonant Danubian name of Nicolae Gheorghiu, enchanted his American hosts with especially lively talk about a future "Free Romania."

There was one small mishap, unnoticed by State Department escorts, toward the junket's end. An anti-Communist Romanian exile coming within earshot while the Deputy Minister was relaxing among compatriots detected instantly that Comrade Gheorghiu's spoken Romanian gave off a ripe Russian accent.

By itself this quaint tale hardly proves that U.S. faith in the honesty of Communist East European "independence-from-Russia" postures may be our biggest diplomatic mistake since we shrugged off Mao Tse-tung as an amiable Chinese agrarian reformer.

Nor does the possible muddleheadedness of an American policy involving the fate of 100 million people in captive Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany become irrefutably established even when it can be shown that Soviets in masquerade like Comrade Gheorghiu are legion all over Soviet Europe.

Togged in local names and costumes, ranging in rank from commissar down to snooper, Russian agents visibly infest every puppet regime.

Romania is advertised as "defying" the Kremlin. But the chief of the dread Romanian *Securitatea* (Secret Police), known lately as Gheorghe Pintilie, is really a Russian, born Bondarenko.

Three Soviet citizens joined the top Central Committee of the Romanian Workers (Communist) Party when they reached Bucharest from Moscow with "liberating" Soviet troops in 1944: Emil Bodnaras, Petre Borila, Leonte Rautu. All three are still in the Central Committee. The first two are also in its Politburo and are Deputy Premiers in the Romanian Cabinet. The third is an alternate member of the Politburo and chief of the Agitprop. One of them, Bodnaras, was even a General in the Red Army, and may still be.

The abundant presence of such dubious native "patriots" in East Europe is admittedly hard to square with the theory that the area is in revolt from Moscow.

And if the revolt theory is wrong, the damage to our side can be immense. The error could actually strengthen Russia's grip over

half a continent—that half of Europe which, next to the Bomb, is the single most vital extension of the U.S.S.R.'s power structure, and its largest reservoir for economic exploitation.

But, on the other hand, the revolt theory has too much sponsorship to be lightly dismissed. In fact, the sponsorship is so respectable and widespread as to be positively awesome.

BRIDGES TO THE EAST

Except for a few faint dissenting voices, the influential community of U.S. correspondents, columnists, and assorted Kremlinologists has accepted the theory with the ardor of an article of faith. So has the Department of State.

It has been stated publicly that Communist regimes in East Europe were "seeking increased independence" and that we must seek to build "bridges across the gulf which has divided us" from such regimes.

On June 1, 1964, a first bridge was flung when the U.S. contracted to give Communist Romania valuable credit and trade facilities. Six weeks after that, on July 14, 1964, Romania was awarded the same most-favored-Communist-nation status on exports as Poland, permitting shipment of thousands of American commodities without individual licenses.

It is officially expected from all this that the spirit of freedom will be quickened not only in Romania but everywhere on the Soviet satellite map.

Just the same, and despite the impressive support for the revolt theory, there is considerable evidence to dim such great expectations.

In view of the matter's high importance, the evidence deserves prayerful study.

POSSIBLE FALLACIES AND PERILS

This reporter made his first acquaintance with Kremlin field techniques and tricks around the time World War II ended. He spent two years watching small Communist parties, backed by Red Army bayonets and mainly imported from Moscow, drop the Iron Curtain on an unwilling Eastern Europe.

This article will try to show the possible fallacies—and perils—of a U.S. policy which holds that Communist leaders who survived all Kremlin purges have now become nationalists eager to dispense with the Soviet bayonets and take their chances with the populations of an Eastern Europe still unwilling to be ruled by them.

The article will also suggest that the allegedly liberal trend among the satellite regimes—featuring relaxations in local tyrannies and a hot search for Western trade, know-how, equipment, and credits—may be exactly the opposite of the anti-Soviet turn it is represented to be. *There are grounds for believing that the trend is not only Moscow-approved but even Moscow-invented.*

Reasons:

The pro-West "revolt" is directed by Red chiefs who are bred-in-the-bone Moscow henchmen and/or incapable of resisting popular domestic overthrow without Moscow muscle to prop them up.

Each of these bosses is vulnerable to instant purge by remote control from Moscow, which could order dominant pro-Kremlin

elements in the local party to get rid of him at the first hint of any real independence.

Each satellite's massive economic subjugation to the U.S.S.R. enables Moscow to snuff out rebellion without firing a shot. (Powerful Red Army garrisons, meanwhile, sit in virtual occupation of Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, with swift access to all other corners of Eastern Europe.)

Every instance of supposed internal liberalization or external approach to the West is either an imitation of a similar move by the U.S.S.R. or is a line endorsed by the U.S.S.R. *in advance*.

The spectacle of heroic little satellites tweaking a docile Bear's nose may be more myth than reality. But the myth can serve Moscow well by:

1. Wangling more Western economic aid for Eastern Europe: This would help to quiet mass unrest among the satellite peoples, raise the domestic prestige of the satellite regimes, relieve pressure on the U.S.S.R. for economic relief to the satellites, and beef up the satellite economies for further contributions to the Soviet economy.

2. Improving the image of the satellites: As "independent" states, they would be handier tools for Soviet infiltration of underdeveloped parts of the world where all big colonialisms, including the Soviet brand, are suspect.

3. Improving the U.S.S.R.'s own image: This would abet Moscow's studied campaign, ever since its Cuban-missile setback, to replace intimidation by penetration, and to appear peaceful and reasonable, at least in the West. By seeming to be presiding genially (or impotently) over the Soviet empire's dissolution in East Europe, the Kremlin would be helping the drives of Communist parties in West Europe for strategic alliances with strong Socialist and Center parties (a new edition of the old "Popular Front"); soothing and lulling the West into complacency about Soviet intentions; and further eroding Western unity and vigilance.

Washington's new policy toward Russia's Europe, if the reasoning behind it is sound, could be magnificently beneficial for East European liberty, for the free world, and for the U.S. national interest. Like the Marshall Plan, which frustrated creeping Communism by reviving war-ravaged West Europe. Or like the Truman Doctrine, which decisively scrambled Soviet designs on Greece and Turkey.

But these great successes came without Communist cooperation, while the new policy can succeed only with it. We have tried to cooperate with Communists before on terrain they controlled, and there is no recorded instance—including Poland and Yugoslavia—where we or the peoples under Communism came out ahead or broke even.

SINO-SOVIET SNARES

Advocates of the revolt theory see Moscow's feud with Peking as a crushing restraint against brisk Soviet crackdown on satellite cockiness.

It is certainly correct to evaluate the Sino-Soviet power struggle as a potential windfall for the West—if properly exploited. But this hardly justifies the pipedream, as some are dreaming it, that the U.S.S.R. is scared enough by a "Yellow Peril" to surrender Eastern

Europe in exchange for a Grand Alliance with the White West in a war of the worlds.

Forty-five years ago, in his "Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy," Lothrop Stoddard wrote darkly of such a conflict with an "awakened Orient." Yet even Stoddard, by 1935, had abandoned all prophecy of a "Homeric duel between an embattled East and West."

If the U.S.S.R. is letting go in Europe in order to win our help against the Chinese, it is legitimate to ask why the U.S.S.R. is fighting us tooth-and-nail across the colored continents from Japan through blackest Africa, and even among the native Indian peoples of Latin America?

And when we allow ourselves to think of present U.S.S.R. leadership as a bulwark of peace against the fire-eating Mao, we are in danger of as lurid an error as when we decided in World War II that Stalin was our friend because he had been attacked by Hitler.

If we are eager to believe Communists when they offer "peaceful coexistence," wouldn't it be prudent for us at least also to take note when they applaud a "decay of bourgeois democracy," or a "crisis of capitalism," and when they describe "peaceful coexistence" as *world communism's* prime political-warfare weapon against Western "oppressors"?

These are the sentiments publicly endorsed by the Communist group supposedly in the van of the satellite flight Westward—the Romanian Workers Party—in a Manifesto of its Central Committee on April 26, 1964.

Again, in the Sino-Soviet hassle, the "independence" school has taken heart from Romania's brave "neutrality." Bucharest even had the nerve to send a mission to mediate between the colossi in Moscow and Peking.

But the record put out by the Romanians themselves (in the same April 1964 Manifesto) discloses that they carefully got prior Soviet approval for the mission, stacked the cards against the Chinese, and slavishly endorsed the main tenets of the Soviet case when they returned. After the propaganda plum from "neutrality" had been squeezed dry, the Soviet party organ *Kommunist* quietly inserted Romania's name into a list of 69 world Communist parties backing Moscow versus Peking.

Admirers of Romanian pluck found fresh encouragement in a new Bucharest-Peking economic agreement announced July 8, 1964. They ignored the fact that Chinese accommodations with *all* the satellites are routine. Earlier last year the Chinese made one deal with Bulgaria and two with Poland, although both regimes noisily take Moscow's side in the Moscow-Peking debate. Last year Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito—on whom Peking pours more coals than it did on Nikita Khrushchev—signed up, too. Red China is a loud champion of all oppressed colored peoples, yet has been trading briskly with the biggest racial dragon of them all, the Union of South Africa.

Romania got great "independence" mileage out of its reputed pummeling of Khrushchev in COMECON, East-Bloc counterpart to the Common Market. Much was made of Romania's rejecting a Soviet gimmick for "supernational" controls which would throttle the Romanians' industrial expansion, notably in steel.

Nearly nobody noticed that Romania's real battle inside COMECON was with Czechoslovakia and East Germany, more advanced industrial satellites who want Romania to produce food, not competition.

As for the U.S.S.R., it has kept out of the quarrel, and has continued cordially to supply Romania's burgeoning steel complex at Galtai with materials and machinery.

The U.S.S.R. also continues to extract from all the satellites an average annual tribute of \$1 billion, in overcharges for Soviet goods and underpayments for satellite goods, as compared with prices paid or charged by Moscow on the Western market prices. By latest official Soviet statistics, "independent" Romania's most recent yearly contribution to this outright plunder was around \$160 million.

WHAT MAKES THE SATELLITES RUN?

Insofar as the satellites do loosen the screws on their peoples and reach out for Western contacts, it is, of course, good for our side. The essential thing is not to waste the advantage by misinterpreting the motives and paying out self-defeating bonuses.

One Communist regime may ease up on police terror, another let children of the extinct middle class go to college. But not because they are needling Moscow (which has anticipated them in such ease-ments). They ease up because popular resentments have been on the rise and some sop has to be given, some bone thrown—but nothing big enough to jeopardize their hold on power.

The satellite economies want to buy from the West (so does the U.S.S.R.). They have begun flirting with "imperialist-reactionary" notions like individual enterprise, the profit motive, and interest on capital (so has the U.S.S.R.). They do so not out of conversion to our outlook, but because they require Western help and because their tired Marxist dogmas have failed to produce efficient pots and pans or feed the people.

Seen in this light, last year's U.S.-Romanian agreement begins to look deplorable on several counts. Elevation of the diplomatic missions in the two countries from legation to embassy, though intrinsically trivial, was resented by anti-Communists in Eastern Europe as an unnecessary compliment to a Red regime. Our pledges to permit Romanian purchase of "most commodities" without export licenses, to allow shipment of entire industrial plants, possibly even a nuclear reactor, and to finance such substantial purchases by Export-Import Bank credits, gave the Romanian Government a large lift out of its Marxist hole. In turn, this lowered the pressure on Communist planners to westernize their rulebook ideologies—exactly opposite to our intention.

DAMAGE TO OUR FRIENDS

By its mere existence, the agreement supports a basic propaganda line of the regime toward its reluctant population: Don't expect any political help from the West; the West is doing business with us; the West has abandoned you; so make the best of it, stop sabotaging, and come over to our side.

The depressing effect of the agreement on any resistance spirit which Washington presumably wants non-Communist Romanians

to nurse is already visible. This writer has received, via Vienna and Geneva, authentic reports of Romanian distress over the American "folly." As if to underline the point, the agreement failed to exact in favor of the Romanian people a single political quid for all our economic quos to a regime they detest.

One-way economic courtesies to satellite governments may willy-nilly exert a modicum of good influence: reducing dependence on the U.S.S.R., opening our markets to Eastern Europe, multiplying contacts with U.S. businessmen and technicians, demonstrating the superiority of "capitalist" goods and methods, even seeping some marginal benefits down to the have-not population through improved productivity.

But vastly more might be gained, with a little adroitness, in the area of simple liberty—short of aiming to ignite a revolution or asking a hated regime to commit political suicide by an overdose of "liberalism."

The American bargaining position is exceptionally strong now because of the Soviet bloc's precarious economic situation, the U.S.S.R. included. Of course, there are limits to what we can get in exchange for what the bloc wants. But it might be shrewder to play poker with our economic chips rather than shovel them out like Santa Claus.

UNANIMITY AND ITS EMBARRASSMENT

An analysis like this one which contradicts a majority opinion may sound like the lady who was watching her soldier-son parading and proudly cried: "Look, everyone's out of step except Johnny." But current history is tragi-comic in examples of monumental bloopers performed by statesmen and other experts who supported each other with rousing unanimity.

We might muse a bit over the universal approval not long ago for the U.S. policies which helped give Algeria to Mohammed Ben Bella (who later set all Washington teeth on edge and even Algerian teeth and helped deliver the Congo from Moise Tshombe, whom we subsequently welcomed back there like a Messiah).

In East Europe itself, disaster has already descended once before because of a Western policy blessed by practically all beholders.

The catastrophe signalled its approach during four long and obvious years, from 1944 to 1948. In that period we and the British, in addition to treaty rights and moral rights, had the political maneuverability, psychological advantage, and hardnosed military strength to make Joseph Stalin cease and desist in his clear grab for what was not yet irretrievable Iron Curtain territory.

But the two Western powers and their experts refused to believe the Soviets really meant to grab. By the time our side woke up, the Prague Putsch had stormed the West's last democratic outpost in Czechoslovakia, and the Iron Curtain had been buttoned shut all over.

II. "NATIONALISTS" ON KREMLIN STRINGS

On the occasion of Communist Party chief Todor Zhivkov's unanimous "election" as Premier by the "People's Assembly" of Bulgaria, Sofia's Soviet-style Parliament, Comrade Zhivkov delivered an acceptance speech which promised the Western world sickles and hammers along with roses.

In the first place, he said he would "follow the trend to improve and expand relations between Bulgaria and the capitalist states—guided by the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence."

But, in the second place, he said he would strengthen Bulgaria's police and security forces in their struggle against "internal and external enemies of the people's regime and, above all, against imperialism and its agents."

In view of Comrade Zhivkov's brass-knuckle approach to "peaceful coexistence," prudent "capitalist states" might be forgiven for not racing to "improve and expand relations" as he recommends.

Nevertheless, the United States has lately adopted a policy of bidding for such improvement and expansion with Bulgaria and other Moscow satellites in Eastern Europe. As already noted, the plan is to encourage a "Western trend" in these countries, mainly by open-handed U.S. economic help to their Communist regimes. Many Washington Kremlinologists claim they can already discern signs of anti-Soviet "national Communism" across Russia's Europe.

In Zhivkov's Bulgaria, however, this independence movement seems likely to encounter some opposition from Zhivkov himself. He is entirely Moscow's man.

BRAVE BULGARIAN

Though in the Communist underground at age 19, Comrade Z. amounted to little in the Party for a quarter century, including the era of the Stalin terror. Only this lucky obscurity when de-Stalinization removed his superiors, plus service as an informer against them, brought him to Khrushchev's attention in the Fifties and eventually to his present eminence.

Since then he has distinguished himself solely by the fidelity of his Moscow imitations: collectivizing of farms, concentration of power in "People's Soviets," creation or abolition of whole Government departments in Sofia six months after the same thing was done in Moscow. In 1963, when Khrushchev periodically put Soviet culture back into a deep freeze, Zhivkov announced he opposed all freedom in art. He is fond of explaining that "Soviet experience has always been for our Party a valuable source of knowledge and leadership."

Should such a model stooge nevertheless be tempted to lead his country westward without Moscow's consent, various obstacles might stay him.

For one thing, Bulgaria's economy is vulnerable to Soviet assault. One-fourth of all Bulgarian capital investment since World War II is Soviet, and Zhivkov went to Moscow in February 1964, to get an extra \$333 million. The U.S.S.R. absorbs 54 percent of Bulgaria's total foreign trade.

For another, Zhivkov personally is vulnerable—to the point of complete liquidation. Influential Stalinists still survive in the Bulgarian Party. They do not altogether approve of Zhivkov. Nor does an energetic revisionist wing. Rival elements alternately call for more purges. The one item on which all hands agree, as the Central Committee proclaimed for the umpteenth time May 15, is their "boundless devotion to the Soviet Union." A straying Zhivkov would not enjoy his stroll much longer than it takes Moscow to phone Sofia.

BOOMERANG IN POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA

Strictly speaking, our policy of carrots for Communist donkeys is not absolutely new. There is the case of Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka. We had a head start here because, unlike Zhivkov, Gomulka took over in Poland *despite* the U.S.S.R.

A genuinely national uprising in 1956 forced Khrushchev to accept the ouster of his orthodox Communists (along with Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, "Polish" Minister of War) from power in Warsaw and a take-over by Gomulka, previously a dissident Red tenant of the Red regime's jails. The purpose of large U.S. benevolence to Gomulka ever since has been not to wean him from Moscow but to *keep* him weaned. Has it paid off?

This writer's private sources "somewhere in Poland" report that a fund is being collected to raise a statue of Gomulka with his face turned East, his hands turned West, and his back to the Polish people.

It is a grim, ironic fact that, as U.S. props have increasingly fortified his internal position, Gomulka has whittled down the liberties won by Polish courage in 1956. Polish foreign policy is an extension or echo of Soviet foreign policy. Mass resistance spirit against communism has dropped to near nil, partly because the U.S. seems to be on communism's side (so why fight?), partly because full bellies do not make revolutionaries. (In Red China, two good harvests have lately brought a tightening of political controls relaxed during preceding hungry times.)

A 30-year-old anti-Communist veteran of the 1956 revolt has told me that the subtlest menace to his homeland today is the student generation's enthusiasm for the regime: "They are not rebellious, as we were, or cynical, like the classes following us. They *believe*. They see Gomulka getting Western help. They think they see communism working. They have convinced themselves the party is good, the collective way good, the individual unimportant * * *."

Same story in Yugoslavia, where our aid program—hatched 16 years ago after Marshal Tito fell out with Marshal Stalin—is the daddy of all American stratagems to reform Reds by fattening them. Yugoslav youth was patriotic long before we began helping Tito; now it is staunchly Communist as well, thanks to Tito's prestige.

Repression in Yugoslavia is a shade less obvious than in the satellites, but exclusively because the regime has more popular backing and can afford some small risks. The Communists are still the only real political party. Career promotions and personal security depend on one's continuing to be a good Communist. Speech is free provided it praises Tito and the Party. A pathetic remnant of private enterprise survives, but it is being steadily squeezed into sell-out to the State.

As for the famed Yugoslav "neutrality" in global affairs, a micrometer is needed to determine how far, on issues where it counts, Belgrade's foreign policy is more agreeable toward the U.S. than Moscow's policy.

The Washington theory that Romania has suddenly become the most daring of satellites in its independence drive raises a startling but logical question: If Romania gets aid, mightn't it spoil everything? We have aided Poland, but the Polish regime has reverted

to authoritarianism and slid back on 1956's independence promise. We came to Tito's rescue when he was defying the entire Communist world, but today the mellow Marshal and the rulers of the Kremlin seem to be as intimate as fleas. Meanwhile, the Romanian Communists, without a dime or the smallest prodding from us, have reportedly grown ravenous for independence. Shouldn't well enough be left alone?

INDEPENDENCE'S SOVIET ORIGINS

Another reason for going slow on aid to Communist satellite states emerges from official Communist records which suggest that the independence idea was conceived, not by the satellites, but by the U.S.S.R.

A Manifesto issued April 26, 1964, by the Romanian Workers (Communist) Party was hailed by many in the West as practically a Declaration of Independence against the Kremlin.

The sharpest anti-Moscow barb in this document is found in the lines: "There does not and cannot exist a 'parent' party and a 'son' party, parties that are 'superior' and parties that are 'subordinate', but * * * a great family of * * * parties which have equal rights. No party has * * * a privileged place * * *. Each makes its own contribution to the * * * revolutionary struggle for winning power * * *."

Two weeks later, on May 10, 1964, the Soviet Communist Party declared it had voluntarily renounced its "leading role" in the world Communist movement, which should be "a voluntary union" with no party exercising "hegemony." Large segments of the Western press interpreted this as an abject Russian retreat before tiny Romania, a retreat presumably forced on Moscow because of its larger troubles with Peking.

Perhaps the press should have done a bit of homework. Two weeks before the Romanian Manifesto (on April 12, 1964) Khrushchev himself in a speech while touring Hungary had anticipated the "parent-son" theme. "In the community of Socialist nations," Mr. K. intoned, "there is no room for great nations and small ones, for infallible teachers and submissive pupils."

One month earlier, on February 14, 1964, top Soviet Party lieutenant Mikhail Suslov had said in a major analysis of the Chinese dispute, as summarized by TASS: "A necessary condition for development of the Socialist system is to promote the independence of each country * * * on the basis of complete equality * * * with the aim of waging a joint struggle against imperialist aggressors * * * and the complete triumph of Communism."

More than six years earlier, in a Moscow speech toasting the U.S.S.R.'s 40th birthday, on November 7, 1957, Khrushchev had already given the Romanians their thesis. He said then: "All countries of Socialism * * * have fully equal rights. Not one of them pretends to whatever preferences, to whatever privileges." One could go back further still, to Stalin and Lenin, and find more of the same.

Now just because the Soviets say the satellites are equal with them does not mean the satellites are, any more than the Romanians' demand for equality means they expect to get it or really want it.

The point is that such declarations seem thin reeds on which to support the prevailing U.S. view that the satellites are defiant of Moscow and that our helping to make them prosperous will produce more defiance.

If texts are holy writ, then we might also ponder the recurrent Communist text about world conquest—their “joint struggle” for “complete triumph” and “for winning power” all over. Khrushchev made no secret of his labors to attain the day of “total victory” when “our Red banner flies above the earth.” This basic Red motif ought to be enough to persuade Washington that all be-kind-to-Communist programs, actual and pending, be junked forthwith.

The fact that Moscow invented the concept of satellite equality, while Western experts have been seeing it the other way round, is in itself reason for suspecting that the current satellite independence epidemic (in which the experts believe, too) may also be invented—a king-sized hoax contrived in the Kremlin.

Obvious advantages of such a ploy would be to lure the West into false security over “breakup” of the Soviet empire without Soviet resistance, to enhance the image of the satellites and make them more effective spearheads of Soviet penetration into Asia and Africa, and to bag Western economic plums for the Soviet bloc at bargain prices.

That such a hoax requires elaborate staging is no reason to discount it. As Khrushchev said more than once, “only crows fly straight.”

THE CASE OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ

But safer guides to Red intentions than what Communist leaders say is what they do and what they are. The comic subservience to Moscow of a puppet like Zhivkov tells more about prospects for real Bulgarian independence than a shelf of manifestoes. Another case in point is the late Party chief of the puppet state regarded by Washington as farthest along Freedom Road: Romania's Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who at the time of his death in the spring of 1965 held the dual posts of President and First Secretary of the Party.

Among Communist parties in Russia's Europe, the Romanian is generally assessed to be the weakest in size, in trained personnel, and in popular support. So weak that Khrushchev, at Gheorghiu-Dej's direct appeal, refrained from pushing his de-Stalinization program in Bucharest. There would not have been enough top Communists left to insure the regime's survival if the Stalin-tainted elements had been swept out.

Sparseness of administrative skills compelled high Party councils personally chaired by Gheorghiu-Dej—who left school to become an electrical apprentice at age 11 and quit that to become a labor agitator at age 18—to deal with matters which in other satellite bureaucracies are handled at a remotely lower level. (The Party's Central Committee once spent four hours deciding the type of porcelain bathroom fixtures the nation should produce.)

Because of the gap of distrust between itself and the people, the Government still employs much of the ruthlessness—arbitrary arrest, forced labor camps, intellectual repression—notorious in Stalin's day.

It strains credulity that a regime so fearful of its own masses, and so thin in its loyal cadres, should be taking on the whole Soviet Union. Under the circumstances, it is almost irrelevant to add that two-

thirds of Romania's borders touch the U.S.S.R., and 40 percent of Romania's total foreign trade is with the Soviets.

Although Gheorghiu-Dej was at the summit of this feeble apparatus, his tenure always was subject to Moscow's pleasure. And weak as he was, it took two men to succeed him: Chiru Stoica as President, and Nicolae Geausescu as Party First Secretary. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej started out with the handicap of being a homegrown Communist, a product of the Romanian underground and of royal jails, rather than bred in Soviet exile. But long ago he squared himself for this with the Kremlin by maneuvering the ouster of an oldtime comrade, the leader of the national Communist faction, Lucreziu Patrascanu (eventually executed in 1954). In his latter years he had been as fulsome in praise of Khrushchev as he once was tireless in salutes to Stalin's "penetrating genius."

If such a man was truly challenging the colossus, the only "explanation" making any sense is that offered by Dr. Ion Fagarasanu, Romanian surgeon who in 1963 operated on the then 63-year-old Bucharest chief for a prostate polyp. Gheorghiu-Dej, the professor is reported as saying, knew he had not long to live anyway, so he wanted to be remembered in history "as a brave Romanian who fought for his country."

EVERY BOSS A PUPPET

Red bosses elsewhere in "rebellious" Eastern Europe would need equally romantic motivations for any sudden seizure of patriotism.

Hungary's Janos Kadar was installed by the Soviet tanks which gunned down the 1956 Budapest revolutionaries. He holds automatic Soviet citizenship by virtue of his title, recently bestowed, of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Lenin Order and the Medal of the Golden Star. When Khrushchev pinned the medal on him in Budapest in the Spring of 1963, Kadar was so moved that he wept. Over 80,000 Russian troops are stationed in Hungary, with armored units in permanent barracks an hour away from the capital.

Grim, tough, friendless Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia, detested by many Communists and by the population at large, especially in the chronically restless Slovak region, was already a ranking Party ogre in Stalin's day. He is a prime candidate for de-Stalinization at the first wrong move. East Germany's Walter Ulbricht, who returned to Berlin from Moscow in 1945 as a colonel with the Red Army, is another stagnant vestige of Stalinism. He feels so insecure he censors new Soviet films which have any anti-Stalin slant.

Even Gomulka, once a popular hero in Poland for having talked back to Stalin, is a hero no more, because of his reversion to totalitarian type. With a pro-Moscow "Partizen" faction in control of Poland's police and military apparatus, Gomulka is an isolated man today, holding on solely by grace of the Kremlin.

To expect such men to renounce Moscow, someone has said, is like inviting a Moslem to spit on Mecca. These are all (and Gheorghiu-Dej was) first-generation Communists, nourished on the dream of world revolution, with the Soviet Union holier to them than the Grail was to Galahad.

Moreover, of these "national leaders," including Gheorghiu-Dej's successors, lack all the prime requisites for revolt. For the guts to

choose independence, one must have shown some taste for it, or be secure among his people, or possess a reliable party apparatus in support of a breakaway. No satellite Red boss can claim such a unified party or amiable population or personal record.

One or two high Communists—like Patrascanu in Romania, and Imre Nagy in Hungary after the 1956 revolt—dared briefly to think first of their country. For this they were legally murdered.

III. ROMANIA: A STUDY IN HUMBUG

Practiced observers of Communist guile are recommending that the United States draft the Mad Hatter out of Wonderland, assisted by James Bond, Nero Wolfe, and other analysts, to help sift fact from fantasy in East European Red claims of "revolt" against the Kremlin.

The traditional Balkan clouds of intrigue, now heavily spiked with plain Communist swindle, hang especially thick over Romania.

A juicy case in point concerns release of political prisoners. This Romanian dodge may go down in the records as the Great Amnesty Hoax.

After denying for years the existence of more than a handful of "hardened criminals" jailed for political opposition, the Bucharest regime leaked out word on May 12, 1964—the day a Romanian economic mission left for Washington—that up to 2,000 political prisoners were quietly being sprung from jail.

The leak was designed to show Red moderation and improve the climate for the impending U.S. talks.

These talks, it will be recalled, resulted on June 1, 1964, in credits and other fat concessions to Communist Romania, with intimations of more if "westernization" continued.

Accordingly, on June 14, 1964, Bucharest announced with flourishes that no less than 7,674 political prisoners had been freed since 1961, that a general pardon would be proclaimed the following August, and that "practically all" would be out of jail by the end of 1964.

Several loose ends were immediately obvious:

The regime was blandly admitting that such prisoners totalled many thousands, a charge previously pooh-poohed as "ridiculous."

Brutal concentration-camp treatment—officially termed "re-education"—had broken the health and spirit of many prisoners; those seen on Bucharest streets walked like zombies; but nothing was said about jobs or medical care for them.

No release was indicated for hundreds of jailed clergymen (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and others), and for more than 20,000 forced labor camp inmates like those who work in water up to the waist harvesting reeds in the Danube delta north of Cernavoda or dig for gold and uranium in Transylvanian mines.

THE QUALITY OF COMMUNIST MERCY

Would the freed prisoners stay free any longer than it suited Communist publicity needs? At the time of the Geneva Summit Conference in July 1955, a number of minor political offenders had been liberated in Romania to stimulate the West's "Geneva Spirit." When this good mood faded at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference that same October, the prisoners were drag-netted back into jail.

More fantastically, are all the prisoners now described as free actually released? One is entitled to doubt it, judging from a mammoth example of previous trickery in a similar situation.

Late in 1945 the U.S. and Britain were delaying recognition of the new Communist-imposed regime in postwar Romania on grounds it violated Yalta pledges by the Soviets to help secure democratic government there. Kentucky editor Mark F. Ethridge was sent down to investigate as President Truman's personal representative.

Just before he arrived in December, Romanian Reds emptied their two biggest concentration camps, at Caracal and Pitesti. Over 6,000 anti-Communist internees were packed into cattle cars. Several trains long, these were hauled to remote points in the provinces and left standing on railroad sidings for two months.

Mr. Ethridge, to this writer's knowledge, did not waste his time looking for the vanished camps, nor was his report to Washington enthusiastic about the regime's liberalism.

Nevertheless, U.S. and British recognition was granted the following February. A London note of February 5, 1946, to Bucharest, stating the conditions of recognition, listed regime assurances to the British "that all concentration camps had been closed and that political prisoners still under arrest did not exceed ten in number." While all this was going on, however, the cattle cars were shuttled back and the camps refilled.

OTHER RED RUSES

To hoodwink outsiders, Romanian Communists have been known not only to make unpleasant scenes disappear but also to produce pleasant vistas on demand.

When a 1956 delegation of American rabbis visiting Romania asked to go to Arad, they were unaware the Jewish community center in that provincial city had long ago been converted into military offices, and the rabbinical seminary and two synagogues closed.

Bucharest flashed orders to local authorities to reopen everything. Six hundred workers were mobilized to refurbish and repair. Forty students were speedily recruited for the rabbinical school. Arad's Chief Rabbi was assigned a close "bodyguard" to keep him from spilling the beans.

The delegates were delighted. Later they told the American press the "crowning feature" of their Romanian inspection-trip had been "discovery of the existence of a seminary at Arad; there we found about 40 youths studying Talmud."

The day after the delegation departed, the Jewish institutions were reconfiscated and the Arad Jewish community got a bill for all repairs.

Red Romania continues to improvise on the Jewish theme in its current drive for Western approval.

The Romanian Ambassador to Washington, Petre Balaceanu, is of Jewish origin. So are the two top members of last year's economic mission to the U.S., Deputy Premier Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and Petroleum Minister Mihai Florescu.

It would be easier to take such representation as normal, and not deliberately contrived to win favor here, if Romania for the past several years—and right now—had not been systematically despoiling scores of thousands of Jews required to yield everything they own,

from homes and savings down to wedding rings, in exchange for a passport to Israel.

In this connection one well-publicized "proof" of Bucharest's alleged anti-Moscow stance—the rise of "national consciousness" or "Socialist patriotism"—seems on scrutiny to be less new-style liberalism than old-style racism hashed up fresh by Communist patriots.

Inside Romania the Party's transmission belts spread the good word that the regime is scoring a "national" triumph by plundering the Jews. For it is "the people"—through State seizure of economic sectors where Jewish activity and holdings were large, such as foreign trade and the consumer industries—who now own what has been retrieved from "Jewish exploiters."

To expand its indifferent support among the masses by emphasizing its purely Romanian quality, the regime has put back to work a bevy of purely Fascist craftsmen.

Until recently the poet Nichifor Cranic, wartime dictator Ion Antonescu's Propaganda Minister and literary star of the Nazi-minded Iron Guard, was in jail; now he is free and starring for *Glasul Patriei* ("The Voice of the Fatherland"), a rabid anti-Semitic newspaper. Among other writers busy awakening Romania's "national consciousness" with regime aid are Father Dumitrescu Borsa, Iron Guard priest and proved killer, and ace journalist Alexander Hodos of the pre-war "Christian League for National Defense," whose proud emblem was the swastika.

LATIN REBIRTH

Another gimmick which does double duty for the Communists by puffing national pride while inflating the "independence-from-Moscow" image abroad is Romania's resurrection of its "Latinity."

This ploy had a smashing debut in the United Nations in November, 1963, when Romania voted for a Latin American denuclearization resolution although the U.S.S.R. abstained. The move was praised widely as another audacious sign of independence. Also, Romania has been angling for entry into various non-governmental Latin organizations and paying special court to that sister "Latin nation," France.

Romania was undeniably colonized by Roman legionnaires. But it is a fact, too, that Moscow and Bucharest until lately were trying strenuously to persuade Romanians they are Slavs or kissing-cousins of the Russians.

Could it be the Communist stage-managers have discovered there are no Slav countries outside the Iron Curtain, but vast quantities of sovereign Latins in Western Europe and across the western seas? Is this why Romania, with its convenient Latin potential, has been cast to be the most "independent" satellite?

Anyhow, a crash program is underway to train teachers in Romance languages. Chief Romanian historian Mihail Roller's written-to-order "History of the Romanians," a text of dubious scholarship with a Slavic slant, has been withdrawn from circulation; the Professor has lost his chair at Bucharest University and dropped from sight. Even spelling has been recruited: the name of the country, subtly changed to "România" during the Slavic season by official fiat, is now being restored to the traditional "România," redolent of Latin glory and imperial Caesars.

DE-RUSSIFICATION AND PAY "RAISES"

Bucharest also gets Western kudos for allegedly relaxing the rigors of the life in a Communist society by "de-Russification," a variant of the Latin revival.

The sum and substance of this has been the removal of Russian names previously tacked onto certain streets and places, the closing of the Maxim Gorky Institute and a Soviet bookshop in the capital, and the downgrading of Russian from a compulsory to an elective language in schools. (Many of the Russian teachers, finding themselves without pupils, have become gym instructors.)

But Romania meanwhile remains the most policed state in Russia's Europe after East Germany. Political terror and cultural repression have enjoyed no "relaxation." The regime is too loathed to risk more than "de-Russification," a cheap sop to popular resentment and a threat to nothing.

Besides, the gesture merely copied an invention of the Soviets, who introduced the same "de-Russification" in their captive Estonian province in 1959.

A similar meaningless, but meaner, device for winning Western friends and influences was a June 24, 1964, announcement of a general 10 to 19 percent "raise" to be spread over the next 17 months for all Romanian wage and salary earners. That this one would be done almost entirely with mirrors was foreseeable if the last such increase—20 percent from 1960 to 1962—was taken as a clue.

In that period, significant prices went *up* as follows: bread and poultry 25 percent, meat 26 percent, men's suits 31 percent, shoes 36 percent, fresh vegetables 58 percent, butter 66 percent. Yes, there were some price reductions: on motorcycles, sewing machines, office supplies, and notably on unsalable products piled up in warehouses.

As of today, except for high Party and Government officials, salaried Romanians have to spend up to 70 percent or more of their income on food.

The hollowness of all devices by the Romanian Reds to look good at home and abroad contrasts revealingly with the major reforms in Yugoslavia and Poland when those Communist states were genuinely standing up to the Kremlin.

The Tito and Gomulka regimes could count on strong local Communist parties and wide popular sympathy. Nevertheless both prudently broadened their internal support in the tussle with Moscow by taking two identical gambles: return of collectivized land to the peasantry, and representation on worker-manager factory councils for the proletariat.

In Romania the Communist structure is rickety. The Party's name is mud with the general public. The main props of stability are a police-state government and the U.S.S.R.'s long arm. Yet the regime does nothing to shore up its home defenses except spurious wage increases, "Latinity," spoliation of Jews, and other transparent stratagems. One may be forgiven for doubting that Bucharest is really shaping up for a main bout with Moscow.

THE WEST AS APPRENTICE SORCERER

Meanwhile, in conjuring up the myth of "westernization" and "independence" the regime even uses locally based Western diplomats as apprentice sorcerers.

Foreign missions in Romania live isolated from private native opinion freely expressed. A chief source of their "information" is Western engineers and businessmen visiting the country. These are usually "sold" on doing business with Romania.

Another source is local officialdom hand-picked by the regime to talk "freely."

Romanians may not be personally invited to diplomatic social functions. If an Ambassador desires to have, say, three Romanians at an official party, he must apply to the Romanian Foreign Ministry, which then assigns three Romanians of its own choice. Any new piece of legend which the government wants planted gets dished out, a hint at a time, by such convivial "guests" at various missions. When the American, British, French, or other Westerners compare notes, their "information" jells—and another item demonstrating "independence" is cabled home.

The myth is helped by its own momentum. If Washington, for example, wants to believe the Soviets have grown reasonable and peace is closer, at least in Europe, then every fresh scrap of confirming "evidence" is good news.

The process is also aided by the absence of resident foreign correspondents in Romania. An itinerant reporter, in for a quick tour, comes pre-equipped with the myth. It is hard to contact private Romanians—and easy to drop in at one's own Embassy. There one gets a briefing on the latest newsworthy developments confirming the march toward independence.

Once everybody is committed to the myth, and a piece of news turns up which does not fit the pattern, a pernicious but natural tendency sets in to play it down or sweep it under the rug. A flagrant case was Romania's brief defiant "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

HOW TO BE NEUTRAL WITHOUT RISK

Much was made of Bucharest's (also Warsaw's and Budapest's) reported resistance to a Soviet call for a world Communist conference on the Peking struggle. A Romanian "mediation" mission to Red China in late February last year was a seven-day front-page wonder story about satellite courage. (No note was taken of the Soviet citizenship of two members in the "neutral" three-man mission, Vice Premiers Emil Bodnaras and Petre Borila.)

But when the mission published a lengthy report at the end of April 1964, on its failure to reconcile the disputants, Western commentaries blinked away the document's built-in denunciation of the Chinese case and support of the Soviet position.

When Romania (also Poland and Hungary) abruptly disclosed their approval of the Kremlin-proposed conference, the presumed reversals were worth only routine paragraphs; nobody referred to the previous interpretation by which Polish-Romanian-Hungarian "resistance" to the conference was a clear sign Russia's Europe was breaking up.

The same one-way approach marked the reporting of Soviet reaction to the U.S.-Romanian economic agreement of June 1, 1964.

It was predicted that Moscow would be furious. Press dispatches datelined Bucharest reported a series of three articles in *Izvestia* castigating Romania.

From Moscow, however, came the disconcerting word that no such articles had appeared. Instead, the Soviet press had commented benevolently on the Romanian economic scene.

It was also learned that a high-level Romanian mission had enjoyed cordial economic talks in Moscow just about the time the other mission was getting agreeable results in Washington.

Nothing daunted, the press here interpreted all this as proof the Kremlin was afraid to challenge Romanian audacity because of the Chinese dispute and other embarrassments.

One Communist-calculated result of such mythology is the zest with which the West now seeks to do business, private and governmental, with "bold little Romania."

An intimate view has reached this writer indirectly from a certain high Romanian trade official on a visit to his non-Communist relatives living in exile somewhere in Western Europe. "We don't have to stir out of Bucharest any more," this worthy chucklingly confided. "We are besieged by capitalist business groups. Each one is outbidding the next. They are offering us fabulous terms. It is quite amusing."

IV. THE MIRAGE OF SATELLITE "LIBERALIZATION"

There is more true revelation than wit in the Hungarian joke about the fellow on a long queue outside a Budapest butcher shop. "Where are you going?" he calls to a friend hurrying past. "I'm off to Szeged (on the Yugoslav frontier)." "Why, is there meat in Szeged?" "No; that's the end of this line."

Food and consumer-goods shortages are rampant behind the Iron Curtain, in an area once the bread-basket of Europe. The scarcities are due to nearly two decades of Soviet plunder, and to an economic system based on Marxist dogma instead of individual incentive and efficient production. Low income, high prices, and a lack of things to buy, have built deep resentments among the captive populations of Russia's Europe.

Economic doldrums and mass hostility—not sudden Communist excitement over "capitalist" ideas—are prodding the puppet regimes to go westward for equipment, know-how, and trade.

The same pressures—and not the onset of a magical conversion to the democratic way—are behind cautious satellite relaxations of political and cultural controls. The changes fall far short of any real freedoms which might eventually loosen the tight Communist grip.

Washington and other hopeful Allied capitals read in these relaxations and "pro-Western" economic trends the beginnings of a satellite breakaway from Soviet dominion.

Such a happy judgment sounds more like Pollyanna than like Talleyrand when the hard facts are marshalled to test it. If anything, the conclusion is compelling that Moscow roundly approves of the puppet experiments in "westernization" and that the Kremlin itself may well have cooked up the whole stew of satellite "revolt."

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In every instance of "relaxation," the record shows *the U.S.S.R.* has done it first.

It was the Soviets, not the satellites, who first invited capitalism to trade with Communism. As long ago as January, 1959, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan came to Washington to propose—in the words of the late John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State—that we "eliminate all political controls over our trade with the Soviet Union so they could acquire strategic goods * * *, give most-favored-nation treatment to their goods * * *, open very large credits so they could buy what they wanted here on a credit basis."

Dulles rejected these terms. But (fortunately, with some watering down) they were at the bottom of the U.S. agreement by June 1964, to extend large credits and export-license facilities for heavy industrial equipment purchases here by Romania, widely touted as the spearhead of the anti-Kremlin revolt.

Could Romania have imitated the Soviets without their consent? Leaving aside all the other devices—economic, political, and military—with which Moscow can bludgeon an unruly satellite, let it just be noted that Romania has little to sell in the U.S. as payment for its American purchases. We don't need Romania's petroleum, nor are we eager for her plywood, glassware, and walnuts. The only adequate coin she has to pay with is gold—and her gold mines, operated by slave labor, are under Soviet control.

The U.S.S.R. is itself in a food and consumer-goods crisis. It cannot soothe the satellite population resentments which threaten Communist stability and which, by individual sabotage and non-cooperation, lower East Europe's capacity as a favorite watering trough for the Soviet economy. To the extent that Western help bucks up the satellite economies, the U.S.S.R. is a prime beneficiary.

With the exception of Poland (specially favored by Washington) the U.S.S.R. has done a higher percentage of its foreign trade with the non-Communist world than has any of the satellites. The Soviet rate of growth in this percentage has kept pace with that of all the puppets, including Romania, despite the latter's reportedly sensational turn westward.

KHRUSHCHEV, THE WESTERNER

To cite a few other instances of the U.S.S.R. blazing the trail for satellites toward what has been called "independence," it was the Soviets who first lauded American agricultural techniques as superior, and advised Russian (and Hungarian) farmers to copy them; who put out feelers to the West European Common Market well ahead of Romania; who not only equipped but actually *planned*—and still make deliveries to—the Galati steel complex bruited to be at the root of Bucharest's alleged anti-Moscow position inside COMECON, the Soviet bloc's economic union.

And it was none other than Nikita Khrushchev, howling down Red China's drumbeating for revolution, who first counselled the satellite world that "goulash, books, and good housing" were as vital as barricades.

In Hungary, as a desperate antidote to public apathy and to the economic stagnation induced by Party control over everything, the regime has opened up higher education, jobs, and promotions on the basis of ability instead of Communist credentials. The totalitarian slogan, "Whoever is not with us is against us," now stands tolerantly on its head and officially reads: "Whoever is not against us is with us." This shocking heresy, introduced by Premier Janos Kadar against the ominous grumbles of the Party's formidable orthodox elements, was made possible only with Khrushchev's encouragement and blessing.

The first cultural thaw in the Soviet bloc was announced from Moscow. War on "the cult of the individual"—that legacy from Joseph Stalin which left Eastern Europe under Red bosses inflated to the size of gods—had Khrushchev as its first and chief trumpeter. "De-Stalinization" began in the Kremlin and swept out across satellite Europe. Its purge of the more conspicuous puppet despots, and its stress on rule by agreement rather than by annihilation, let the first small breath of liberal air into the Soviet Empire.

Paradoxically, the only sign of anything like rebelliousness in Romania was a revolt in reverse: the regime felt too weak to relax its iron political hand at Moscow's bidding, and it resisted a thorough purge which would have left few Party stalwarts qualified to run the country. But even here the Kremlin, seeing the fraternal point, gave its prior blessing.

BEHIND THE "REFORMS"

In all this it is paramount to know what has motivated the few mincing steps toward tolerance taken by Soviets and satellites.

It clearly isn't gratitude for Western credits and export-license waivers. The desire to coax such advantages from us may generate a liberal gesture or two to "improve the climate" for negotiations. But the rewards, once delivered, produce no freedom bonus. As earlier noted in Poland, they tend to the opposite effect: the more the outside aid, the cockier the Communist regime—and the tighter the screws.

Where gifts from outside fail, the pressures of mass hostility inside succeed. The classic (though extreme) instance of this was the 1956 Hungarian-Polish uprising. In the next year, the excessive prices extorted from the satellites for Soviet goods dropped to their lowest mark. Later, when the storm was past, Moscow jacked its prices up again. On a smaller scale, every concession by a satellite regime to its people is a response to the rumbling from below.

In economics, a secondary prod toward reform is the mess which Marxism and its practitioners have made of production. Popular demand for a less miserable standard of living provides the main impulse; but the evident contrast between Western efficiency and Marxist muddle is another.

Planning is a Communist fetish. Dedication to The Plan, regardless of its irrelevance to the actual market, causes such ludicrous jams as a doubling in the number of freight cars with no increased cargo for them to carry, or the multiplication of washing machines when people need shirts.

Thanks to the uncommon Communist hunger for bureaucratic controls, a recent count in Czechoslovakia shows 29 technical "experts" and 9.1 administrators for every 100 workers. The regime has declared its intention to dislodge up to 40,000 of these Party hacks from the apparatus.

Other symptoms and their causes are too numerous to list. But the sum result is plain: slump in labor productivity, failure in production targets, shrinkage in rate of growth, inability to compete abroad, inability to supply needs at home.

Poland is the only satellite state without a major food problem—because Poland alone has de-collectivized agriculture, allowing peasants to regain their land and the zest to work it.

There is small likelihood of any more voluntary reforms on this scale. Polish agrarian liberalism followed Wladyslaw Gomulka's leap to power during the 1956 euphoria. He could take the gamble of free enterprise—anathema to Communist dogma and survival—because he was enormously popular then as a symbol of Poland's defiance of Moscow.

BRAKE ON BASIC CHANGES

Neither Gomulka nor any of his colleagues elsewhere in Soviet Europe has enough popularity today to count on the proverbial job of dogcatcher in a free election. Therefore the "westernization" they permit is petty against the "easternization" which endures. The absolute limit on change is set by an absolute purpose: to stay in power.

So Gomulka permits peasants enough freedom to produce an export surplus in ham—but his security chief, General Mieczyslaw Moczar, tells the Party's Central Committee that Western cultural influence is a bigger threat to Polish Communism than Western espionage.

Czech President Antonin Novotny concedes that criticism of economic boners is needed "as much as the body needs salt * * *. But no one may touch our Communist Party, our Socialist system. This must remain holy."

Deputy Premier Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, chief of last year's Romanian economic mission here, confides in a moment of cynical candor: "Capitalism is man's exploitation by man; with us, it's the other way around."

Enough time has elapsed for this writer to have received from non-Communists in Russia's Europe some native views on Washington's intention to stimulate Romania's "independence" by economic aid to Communists in charge there.

To a syllable, the responses are bitter. Sample outcries: "By helping the Reds you abandon the people." "Why should we resist Communism if you are determined to save it?" "If you send wheat because the Communists can't produce it, we'll choke on the bread."

Maybe the clincher is the slyness with which the Romanian propaganda mill uses American commentaries to demoralize anti-regime sentiment.

Official speeches and the press cite only our praises for Romania's alleged economic progress, say nothing about our belief in Romania's growing independence from the U.S.S.R. This independence theme,

boosting the regime's bogus nationalism, comes in loud and clear via our official shortwave broadcasts.

There must be some significance in the fact that Moscow no longer jams the "Voice of America" in Eastern Europe.

V. PROPOSAL FOR A POLICY

Life in the Soviet Union, despite Nikita Khrushchev's bounce and boast, kept getting leaner and hungrier toward the end of his regime, and has not improved materially since. The Marxist-management machine is running down faster than Moscow's progress toward the moon. Symptoms selected at random:

Deliveries to State storage bins in Russian poultry country are so reluctant that farmworkers must hand over a hen's egg along with their ticket for admission to village theatricals.

Due to the shortage of bread, many Moscow restaurants are selling it by the slice.

Sixty percent of Soviet-made television sets break down during the first "guaranteed" six months.

From an official survey of 367 *kolkhozes* (cooperative farms) near Moscow: "Only a few have properly organized the payment of wages. In the rest there is chaos. Wages have not been paid for one or even two years."

From an official 1964 survey of the Soviet automotive industry: "Truck repairs in the past five years swallowed as much money as (the cost of all new trucks). Despite these outlays, 40 percent of vehicles are idle awaiting repairs."

From a report by a Hungarian woman on a conducted tour of Moscow: "When they wanted to buy the shabby pullover I had bought in Budapest and was wearing in Red Square, I felt like Captain Cook among the cannibals."

The only praise which Soviet citizens privately rendered to Khrushchev during his last year of power was for his Miracle of the Wheat. "He sowed it in Kazakhstan," they said, "and he reaped it in Minnesota."

MOSCOW CAN'T HELP EAST EUROPE

Knee-deep in military, lunar, and other space-flight programs, stepping up aid to Africa to meet Chinese "competition," plagued by chronic production inefficiencies and shortages in heavy as well as in consumer goods, the U.S.S.R. cannot effectively alleviate satellite East Europe's own sharp economic distress.

Only the "capitalist" West has the serum of factories, plant equipment, technical knowhow, patents, and supplies for the shot-in-the-arm needed by Communist regimes in captive Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany.

Only the West, in fact, can banish, or even substantially relieve, the splitting economic headache of the Soviet Union itself.

United States policy envisages the provision of quantities of such assistance both to Russia and to Russia's Europe.

After looking down its nose at Canada for selling wheat to the U.S.S.R., the Kennedy Administration endorsed—and the Johnson Administration ratified—shipment of American wheat to the same address. Our explanation: It's "good business."

After trying to restrain the appetite of our allies for trade with Communist East Europe, we turned around and made available to Red Romania large credits and licenses with which to buy whole factories, and we have indicated readiness to build more such "bridges across the gulf" to other Soviet puppets.

Our explanation: The governments of Romania (and other satellites) have shown signs of "seeking increased independence" from the Soviets. If we trade with them, and nourish their economies, they will be encouraged and enabled to widen the gap.

Our sale of the wheat which Moscow hungers for, of an entire synthetic rubber factory, strategic petrochemical equipment and thousands of other production items to industry-starved Bucharest, was made without political strings.

No demands on the Communist Romanian rulers for loosening of totalitarian controls over their non-Communist population.

No demands on the Kremlin for modification of Soviet hostility somewhere, anywhere, in the Cold War—a war which still rages, as every second speech by Messrs. Kosygin and Brezhnev confirms.

Up to here this article has suggested that:

1. There is no genuine evidence of satellite breakaway from the U.S.S.R.
2. No possibility of such breakaway exists as long as Communists hold power in the satellite capitals.
3. A U.S. policy of rewards for phony defiance of Moscow can only inflate Red puppet prestige, nail down the Communist lid on non-Communist populations, demoralize any lingering spirit of popular resistance, and replenish the region's capacity for continued economic and political exploitation by the Soviets.

It seems time to suggest that the U.S. ought to help the subjugated peoples behind the Iron Curtain, rather than the system which subjugates them.

SWAP AID FOR FREEDOM

No further relief should be delivered to East European economies except in exchange for specific and commensurate relaxations of Communist tyrannies.

These concessions in freedom can be wrung from the satellites because they grievously need the economic muscle we can supply.

Freedoms for East Europe—and, for that matter, even a lessening of tensions on issues like the Berlin Wall, Vietnam, or Arms Control—can be obtained direct from the Kremlin by the same kind of barter. Contrary to the "independence" myth, the ultimate power of decision in satellite Europe resides in Moscow.

Space is lacking here to detail the U.S.S.R.'s grave and numerous economic deficiencies, its need for long-term credits, its vulnerability to organized Western assault on Soviet markets for oil and gold. But the crisis in food alone is sufficient to make Comrades Kosygin and company amenable to our persuasions.

After ten years, Khrushchev's "virgin land" panacea of growing more grain, by adding 13 million fresh hectares to the area sown, is a confirmed fiasco. Despite great expenditure, oratory, and blood-letting, today's Russia produces less cereals per capita than the Czar's Russia. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia was a top world exporter of wheat; today Russia and Red China are the world's two

largest *importers* of wheat. Since 1958, the rate of food production in the U.S.S.R. has been falling behind the rate of population growth.

Khrushchev's last-offered panacea, a crash program in chemical fertilizer, was tacit admission of virgin-land failure. Even if successful, the grandiose fertilizer project can't make a dent before 1970. But, according to most expert opinion, it is already as chimerical as the dream of turning bleak Siberia to wheat.

Harsh climate limits Russia's food-expansion potential. Droughts and stunted harvests are as Russian as *borscht*. Most of all, the Marxist gospel of collectivism lays a permanent blight on Russia's fields by paralyzing the peasant's will to work them; they belong to "the people," therefore to nobody. As of 1962, barely 3 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s tilled ground was cultivated around peasants' homes as private "gardens," each to feed a single farm family. Yet this "private sector" produced in 1962 for general sale 7 percent of the Soviet Union's vegetables, 14 percent of its cattle and poultry, 26 percent of its potatoes.

GRAIN A TRUMP CARD

Russians are a carbohydrate people. They must have bread. And whoever rules the Kremlin had better give it to them. He can import the wheat. Or he can free the U.S.S.R.'s agricultural system, inspiring the peasants to grow enough domestic wheat.

But distribution of *kolkhoz* land would be a first stupendous inroad into the Kremlin's structure of political controls. This could sweep Communism out of the Kremlin. Therefore, the U.S.S.R. will import the wheat instead.

Imports have to be paid for. If we choose, we need not accept payment in the caviar, lumber, and other non-priority Russian commodities which our markets can absorb. Nor do we have to be satisfied with the bogus coin of "peaceful coexistence" promises. If we choose, we can exact payment, at least in some measure, in the true coin of freedoms, authorized by Moscow, for the captive peoples of Europe.

We certainly have the economic power to accomplish this. Add some intestinal fortitude and a dash of imagination, and we may be able to get the cooperation of our allies, whose avid commercial approach to the Soviet bloc has only been stimulated by our recent deals with Moscow and Belgrade.

There are pressures one can apply even to friends, when the cause is sufficiently large and right. The British people still remember that as late as 1939 their respectable merchants were selling armaments on a business-as-usual basis to Nazi Germany. That was the year of World War II, the eve of Dunquerque, and the Battle of Britain. Just the memory of that folly provides the moral justification this time to intervene.

PRECEDENTS FOR PRESSURE

This reporter knows that the State Department has convinced itself Moscow will reject all proposals to trade political for economic advantage. But the Department, as is obvious from a glance at the map of past and present disaster to which it has led us, is not the final repository of wisdom.

Even without a push from outside, Communists will take political risks for an imperative economic compulsion.

The Berlin Wall is eloquent proof that Communists dread most the "contamination" of their prisoner peoples by contact with free peoples outside, to say nothing of actual escape. For years the outer borders of all of Russia's Europe were virtually impenetrable in either direction.

But today the whole place is agog with tourism. Romania and Bulgaria are pouring fortunes into resort hotels, advertising them loudly in the Western press. Czechoslovakia offers Western motorists the cheapest cut-rate gasoline in Europe. Hungary has bleached all the red out of its bureaucratic tape for visitors. As a necessary reciprocal gesture, the satellites are even letting their own peoples become tourists—despite a significant ratio of defections.

This open-door turnabout is not due to satellite self-confidence or enlightenment. It is due to the hard currency which foreign tourists spend—and which the regimes must have if they are to import the production machinery and other materials their economies urgently require.

Nor is the State Department's view shared by informed quarters in Congress. After testimony from a galaxy of area specialists about acute economic distress in Soviet Europe, a House Subcommittee on Europe recommended to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and to Congress: "The U.S. should not take any steps which might help the Soviet bloc in its present difficulties unless, in return, external concessions or internal reforms resulting in an enlargement of freedoms * * * implemented."

This report was issued on June 1, 1964—the very day the State Department announced its package of unconditional economic favors for independence-loving Romania.

Our chief negotiator of that deal was Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman, who on March 10th previous had told the same Congressional subcommittee: "There is no indication that the Soviet Union has changed its objectives. We have to believe Mr. Khrushchev when he says there is no such thing as coexistence in ideology. That conflict goes on. I would hope people fully realize that."

One political commodity the Kremlin or its puppets will never knowingly trade for bread, hard currency, credits, or factories: their political survival. So we can't expect them to agree to honest elections, a normal democratic diversity of political parties, and such seminal freedoms as speech and assembly. All these carry a virus which could lay the Communist body politic flat in brief order.

Short of these "prohibitive" human rights there are humanitarian rights which, with firmness and a salesman's kit of tempting prizes, we can redeem.

LIBERTIES THROUGH BARTER

We should insist on dispersal of all forced labor and "corrective" labor camps, on abolition of forced residence, on genuine release (under International Red Cross inspection) of persons imprisoned for defending their human rights, on restoration of their just claims to confiscated pensions, homes, and employment, on compensation for lost years and on medical care for lost health.

Police and judicial reforms are also for barter: safeguards against arbitrary arrest and indefinite detention, establishment of independent

courts, open trials, and a defendant's right to choose his own counsel. Freedom of worship, too, is a Communist trading commodity, by withdrawal of all repressive measures against churches, synagogues, and clergy.

Directly on the economic front, we could secure benefits for the peoples by pressing sound doctrine on the regimes—including some shift from obsessive concentration on production of machines to production of goods for human consumption. We have made bolder demands when giving aid to friendly or neutral regimes; why stammer and blush before enemy ones?

RIGHT AND MORAL DUTY

All these conditions, and more, are our legal right and our moral duty to obtain by the peace treaties guaranteeing them to which we and our allies, including the Soviets, pledged our honor.

There are other relaxations to be sought on the global front. Meanwhile, in paying for even such limited concessions inside Russia's Europe by aiding the Soviet bloc economies, we risk shoring up the regimes there. But the regimes risk something, too.

By the present U.S. policy of straight giveaway, the regimes risk nothing. But in paying us with small freedoms, they elevate our prestige among the subject peoples, not Communist prestige. In extracting such payment, we quicken and revive pro-Western morale behind the Iron Curtain instead of stifling it.

And, in securing a floor for minimal freedoms, we build a platform from which the 100 millions in captive Europe some day may yet spring into full emancipation. It is a long-range program—but it is more prudent, practical, and decent than instant surrender.

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