Document
Y
4
J87/2
C73/42

GOVERNMENT
Storage

A11600 669231

Congress } COMMITTEE PRINT

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
MANHATTAN

COMMUNIST PENETRATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE FREE PRESS

STUDY

PREPARED FOR THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
APR 22 1963
MANHATTAN, KANSAS

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

89595 WASHINGTON : 1962

62-64492

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

KANSAS STATE
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
MANHATTAN

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, *Vice Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

J. G. SOURWINE, *Counsel*
BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

Document
Y
4
J87/2
C73/42

CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Australia: From "Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage," August 22, 1955, Commonwealth of Australia	2
Bulgaria: "Communist Infiltration of the Bulgarian Press Prior to the Red Takeover of Bulgaria," by Dr. G. M. Dimitrov	11
Burma: Testimony of Aleksandr Yurievich Kasnakheyev	16
China: "Chinese Communist Infiltration of the Mainland Press, 1927–49," by Chu-yuan Cheng	22
Cuba: "The Communist Destruction of the Free Press in Cuba," by Carlos Todd	28
Czechoslovakia: "Communist Seizure of Power and the Press; Czechoslovakia, 1945–48," by Petr Zenkl	40
Estonia: "The Reds and the Press of Estonia Prior to Occupation," by Harold Randsepp	58
Hungary: "Bolshevization of the Hungarian Press," by Msgr. Bela Varga	101
Latvia: "The Communist Infiltration in Latvia," by A. Berzins	64
Lithuania: "Communist Infiltration and Exploitation of the Press in Independent Lithuania," by Henrikas Blazas	69
Poland: "Methods of Communist Infiltration and Subversion in the Polish Press," by Janusz Kowalewski	73
Rumania: "Communist Infiltration and Exploitation of the Rumanian Press Before the Take over," by Dr. Asra Berkowitz	87
Yugoslavia: "Communists and the Press in Yugoslavia," by Dr. Milan Gavrilovic	92

COMMUNIST PENETRATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE FREE PRESS

INTRODUCTION

For almost two centuries this Nation has enjoyed the benefits of a free press.

We have come to take this blessing so much for granted that we have lost proper appreciation of it and proper perspective with regard to it. We tend to forget the true role ot the press in the development and maintenance of a free society.

Without an informed people, democracy cannot function soundly; and a free press is indispensable to an informed people.

This vital role of the free press in our democracy has been attested throughout our history by those who have played leading parts in founding and developing this country.

Thomas Jefferson said "Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press."

Henry Ward Beecher called newspapers "the schoolmasters of the common people." "That endless book," he declared, "the newspaper, is our national glory."

Horace Greeley hailed the press as the "chosen guardian of freedom," as the "sword-arm of justice," as the "bright sunbeam of truth."

An attitude of mind which regards our free press as a God-given, irrevocable natural right inclines toward disregard of the influences at work to corrupt and destroy this priceless possession. We must not fall into this error at any time; and it is especially dangerous to do so when the United States is threatened as never before in its history by the aggressive, worldwide Communist empire.

We have invited outstanding writers who have had firsthand experience with the tactics and devices of the Communists of foreign lands in penetrating, undermining, and destroying various segments of the free press of the free world to describe their experiences, so that we may profit from them. This is a compilation of such descriptions, plus certain case-histories resulting from official investigation or sworn testimony.

In the majority of cases described, the Communists ultimately took over power. In all cases the Communists have been quick to recognize the free press as a powerful bulwark against the forces of Communist subversion and insurrection; and they have been ruthless in their efforts to undermine and destroy it.

History has contributed a warning we cannot ignore. It is documented in these pages. We are indeed grateful to the individuals who by their lucid and knowing reports have contributed to this documentation.

A free press can be lost. Let us know and understand what happened in nations which have suffered this loss. Let us understand how and why it happened. And let us resolve that it shall not happen here.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, *Chairman.*

AUSTRALIA

THE OPERATIONS OF THE M.V.D. IN RELATION TO JOURNALISTS

(From "Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage", Commonwealth of Australia) [1]

690. The interest of the M.V.D. in journalists, and in particular in members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery at Canberra, appears clearly from the material before us. The principal reason for that interest is obvious. Parliamentary journalists are in constant touch with Ministers and with highly placed officials. They frequently receive "off the record" and background information, sometimes of an important nature.

691. It is apparently the world-wide Soviet practice for Tass representatives to be recruited espionage agents. It certainly was so in Australia, where Nosov, Pakhomov, and Antonov—in succession the Tass men here—were all active M.V.D. cadre workers.

692. The "study" of journalists for the M.V.D. was primarily the task of the Tass representative, who could without exciting attention mix freely with journalists and would be naturally accepted by them as one of themselves. He is thus in the way of gaining access to such information as they have and may be able to use them as at least unwitting informants.

693. The M.V.D. interest in journalists is shown by the G Series of documents to have existed prior to 1949, and by the Moscow Letters to have continued thereafter.

694. The Enclosure to Letter No. 2 of 10th November 1949, the origin and nature of which we have described in the preceding Chapter, contains also entries concerning a number of journalists who had attracted the attention of the M.V.D. This Enclosure should not be confused with the Enclosure to the Moscow Letter No. 5 of 27th September 1952 which reflects O'Sullivan's personality reports contained in Exhibit H.

695. The first entry in the Enclosure to the 1949 Letter is in Document G.8. That entry is in these terms:

> "Miller Forbes—born 1912, a native of Australia, deputy editor of the 'Daily Telegraph'. Expressed a desire to inform 'T' systematically concerning material prepared for the press. Both he and his wife are favourably disposed towards us."

---

[1] Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov left the service of the Soviet and sought and was granted political asylum in Australia on Apr. 3, 1954. His wife, Evdokia Alexeyevna Petrov sought and was granted the protection of the Acting Administrator of the Northern Territory of Australia on Apr. 20, 1954. Mr Petrov served in the following capacities in the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Australia, from January 1951 until the date of his defection: Embassy clerk, Third Secretary, and temporary M.V.D. (Ministry of Internal Affairs) Resident. Mrs Petrov's overt post was that of Embassy accountant and secretary to the Ambassador. She was assigned, however, to take over the M.V.D. cipher work.
Mrs. and Mr. Petrov appeared at hearings of the Royal Commission on Espionage of the Commonwealth of Australia from Aug. 16, 1954 until Mar. 31, 1955. The report from which we quote here was issued Aug. 22, 1955. The passage reproduced was ch. 13 of that report.

696. The entry refers to Forbes Keith Miller, a Sydney journalist. In 1943 or 1944 he became chief sub-editor of the "Daily Telegraph" newspaper, and he held that position until 1952. He later became chief sub-editor of the magazine "A.M.".

697. Miller told us that in 1943 he had—with the consent of his employer—made an arrangement with Nosov, whom he believed to be merely a Tass representative, to supply Nosov with news which might be of interest for him to cable to Tass. For these services, Miller said, Nosov, with the knowledge and approval of the proprietor of the "Daily Telegraph", paid him a weekly sum of £2. Miller told us that he had earlier been a member of the Communist Party but had ceased to belong to it in 1942 because he disagreed with its policies. There was, he said, nothing improper in the arrangement made by him with Nosov, and such an arrangement to supply information of interest to correspondents of overseas newspapers is, we were told, a common practice in newspaper offices. "T" stands for "Tekhnik", Nosov's M.V.D. code name, and doubtless Nosov originally supplied the Moscow Centre with the information contained in the entry and it was later sent out to the Resident here.

698. The next entry in Document G.8 is as follows:

> "McInnes—about 40 years of age, journalist. Has wide connections among press workers and in political and business circles. In his convictions he appears to be a man inclined to the left."

699. Despite an inaccuracy as to the age mentioned, this entry relates to Ian Gray MacInnes, who was a member and, for a period, an office-bearer of a branch of the Communist Party. He told us that he allowed his membership to lapse in 1950 or 1951. From 1945 until 1947 he was the editor of "Labour News" and before that had been on the staff of the "Daily Telegraph" and later of the "A.B.C. Weekly". In 1947 he joined the Department of Commerce in a journalistic capacity. He was for a period an office-bearer of the Australian Journalists' Association, and he knew Nosov.

700. The next entry in Document G.8 is as follows:

> "Birtles B.—about 48 years of age, prominent journalist, has contacts among writers and artists. Has travelled in Europe, knows Greece well."

701. This refers to Herbert Victor Birtles, a journalist and writer with—so he told us—"leftish" views, who had travelled in Europe and particularly in Greece, where he had collected material for a book, which he subsequently published, about Greek politics and travel. He knew Nosov.

702. The next entry in Document G.8 is as follows:

> "Maclean—journalist, sympathetically disposed towards us, a very well informed man. In 'T's' opinion, he will give information."

703. This is the same Maclean who became a member of the Department of External Affairs in 1947 and to whom reference is made in Chapter 10. He was at one period a member of the Communist Party, and he knew Nosov.

704. The next entry is in Document G.9 and reads as follows:

> "Olsen O.—promised 'T' assistance in the study of the country and in obtaining information passing through the newspaper."

705. Counsel assisting us informed us that investigations had disclosed two journalists of this name but it seemed probable that neither of them was the person mentioned in the entry.

706. The final entry in Document G.9 relating to journalists is:

"Simpson Colin—favourably disposed towards us."

707. This entry relates to Colin Simpson, a writer who has produced a number of well-known books and who was a journalist. He stated that his views in his earlier days had been radical but had changed with the years, and that now he is in no way pro-Communist in his outlook. A letter from him, written in 1952 to the Secretary of the "Youth Carnival for Peace and Friendship", dissociating himself from that organization because of its Communist inspiration, fully supported this last statement. He knew Nosov as a fellow member of the Journalists' Club.

708. Two other journalists are mentioned in Document G.4, the second part of which consists merely of a list of seven names with a code name against each. The entries are in Petrov's handwriting and were copied by him from a list in Sadovnikov's handwriting. There is nothing in the document itself to indicate the exact nature of the M.V.D. interest in the persons listed or why they were grouped together.

709. The entries relevant for the present purpose are:

"Christisen, S.B.—'Crab' "

"Turnbull, K.—'Teodor' "

710. The entry "Christisen, S.B." refers to Clement Byrne Christisen, who has been for many years the editor of "Meanjin", a literary magazine published in Melbourne. He and his wife knew Nosov, and he told us that he took some interest in the activities of Australia-Soviet House in Melbourne and in its professed aim of fostering peaceful relations with the Soviet, and in the work of Voks. He has never been a member of the Communist Party. His wife was born in Russia, the daughter of a Russian monarchist who left Russia after the 1917 Revolution. She has lived in Australia since 1925. Since 1946 she has been teaching Russian in the University of Melbourne, and she had some social contact with members of the Soviet Embassy. Mrs. Christisen was for a period a member of Australia-Soviet House, mainly, she said, so that she might be able to use its library. Her name also appears in Document G.4, the entry being:

"Christisen, N.M.—'Eva' "

711. There is nothing to suggest that either Christisen or his wife ever participated in any way in espionage. It is possible that Mrs. Christisen was allotted a code name because of her position as a teacher of Russian at the University of Melbourne and because of her consequent social contacts with members of the Soviet Embassy. It seems probable that the interest of the M.V.D. was attracted to her husband because of his wife's position as a teacher of Russian, and his interest in Voks and in good Australia-Soviet relations in respect of cultural matters generally.

712. The entry relating to "Turnbull, K." refers to Stanley Clive Perry Turnbull, a well-known Melbourne journalist. The letter K in the Russian alphabet is the equivalent in our alphabet of the hard C which is the initial letter of the word "Clive".

713. Turnbull met and had some business and social contacts with several members of the Soviet Embassy and with Nosov. During

the war he was associated with Australia-Soviet House, with which his wife was more actively associated. He told us that at some time between August 1949 and October 1950 he had had discussions, on behalf of newspaper organizations, with Krutikov in an endeavour to procure the importation of newsprint from the U.S.S.R. Krutikov was overtly a Commercial Attaché but was also an M.V.D. worker.

714. There is nothing to suggest that Turnbull ever engaged in any activities on behalf of the Soviet. He has never been a member of the Communist Party. In 1936 he visited Russia as a representative of a number of well-known newspapers; and in 1953 he applied for, but the Soviet refused him, a visa to visit the Soviet as a representative of the Melbourne newspaper "Sun-Pictorial".

715. Turnbull's position as a journalist, his war-time association with Australia-Soviet House, and his wife's interest in that organization, probably attracted the interest of Nosov and led to the allocation of a code name to him by the M.V.D.

716. There is nothing to suggest that any of the journalists whose names appear in the G Series of documents were in fact in any way associated with espionage activities.

Concerning Fergan O'Sullivan

717. That the interest of the M.V.D. in journalists continued after 1949 appears first from the evidence relating to Fergan O'Sullivan.

718. We have already mentioned in Chapter 4 that, late in 1951, Pakhomov procured O'Sullivan to write Exhibit H, he being then a journalist employed by the "Sydney Morning Herald" and a member of the Press Gallery, and we have described the general nature of the contents of the document.

719. According to Pakhomov's statement to Petrov, O'Sullivan had been recommended to him as a "progressive" by Chiplin, the Canberra correspondent of the "Tribune". The Moscow Centre was advised of Chiplin's recommendation and it directed that O'Sullivan should be "studied". It allotted him the code name of "Zemliak".

720. Although, as we have previously pointed out, O'Sullivan must have known that the Tass representative was an official of a Soviet Government organ, he said that he had no knowledge that Pakhomov was an M.V.D. worker. He said that he gave Exhibit H to Pakhomov with the purpose solely of assisting the latter to influence journalists to publish Soviet news.

721. We think it is most improbable that Pakhomov would have disclosed to O'Sullivan that he was an M.V.D. worker, or that O'Sullivan would have known it, but O'Sullivan's excuse for giving Pakhomov Exhibit H does not explain what appears to be a design to hide the fact that he was its author. Writing in the third person, he inserted some particulars about himself—including an indefinite statement of his age. Nor does his excuse seem to afford an explanation of the references in it to persons believed by O'Sullivan to be connected with our Security Service.

722. Whatever O'Sullivan's purpose may have been in supplying Exhibit H, it is clear from the Moscow Letters that the document was got by Pakhomov for M.V.D. purposes, and that after its dispatch to Moscow the Centre took a keen interest in O'Sullivan and regarded him as a promising prospective agent who as a result of his secret

meetings with Pakhomov and of his supplying Exhibit H was "on the small hook". That interest became intensified after O'Sullivan became Press Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition in April 1953.

723. In the Moscow Letter No. 4 of 24th July 1952, paragraph 2, which asks for information concerning the members of the Australian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, O'Sullivan is mentioned, along with Madame Ollier and Chiplin, as a person who might be used for the purpose of obtaining the information.

724. Paragraph 4 of the same Letter is even more significant:

"CONCERNING O'SULLIVAN

In reply to your paragraph 3 of Letter No. 3 of 7.7.52.

We regard the study and cultivation of O'Sullivan as very full of promise, and therefore, with the object of enforcing it, we request you to include Antonov in this work as soon as possible. It is essential to verify the data supplied by O'Sullivan about himself and about his father. In so far as this is feasible, try to do this through Chiplin. A verification is being carried out by us in England; we shall inform you of the outcome.

In order not to draw the attention of the counterintelligence to him, we advise that O'Sullivan should not be invited any more to the Embassy and that meetings with him should be transferred to the city, all the more so as he has already secretly met Pakhomov.

We consider that, by continuing to study and verify O'Sullivan, you can already draw him gradually into our work by way of putting before him concrete tasks which he is in a position to fulfil.

It is desirable that, when a suitable opportunity offers, you should ask him to compile for us a survey concerning the economic, political, and military penetration of Australia by America, with the inclusion of unofficial data. Warn O'Sullivan that his survey will not be published in the press and that it is required by you for your personal use. Promise him that the time spent by him on the preparation of this survey will be compensated by you.

Ascertain also whether O'Sullivan has contacts with circles pertaining to the government, the parliament, and business, and also in Liberal Party, Country Party, and Labour Party circles.

We request you to inform us in detail in every letter concerning progress in the study and cultivation of O'Sullivan."

725. O'Sullivan and his father had in fact been engaged in journalistic work in England; and this accounts for the Moscow Centre's reference in the paragraph to inquiries in England.

726. In the Moscow Letter No. 5 of 27th September 1952, paragraph 2, Petrov was directed to—

"Advise Antonov to continue to extend his contacts, in the first instance among the political correspondents and among members of the parliament, ignoring any embarassment through temporary difficulties in the spoken language.

With the object of the successful execution of this task we recommend that Antonov should take measures to establish contact with ———" (*a named journalist*), "with O'Sullivan, ——— and ———" (*two other named journalists*) "whose per-

sonality reports, with the exception of O'Sullivan who is known to you, we send in Enclosure No. 2."

727. The Enclosure No. 2 above referred to is based upon Exhibit H and is set out in the Annexure.

728. Pursuant to this instruction, and probably in October or November 1952, Petrov, who had earlier been introduced to O'Sullivan by Pakhomov, introduced Antonov to him, and this was duly reported to the Moscow Centre. Later, the Centre directed that the contact between Antonov and O'Sullivan should be developed as a matter of urgency. Antonov, however, informed Petrov that it was difficult for him to maintain contact with O'Sullivan, because he was living in Sydney and O'Sullivan in Canberra. When this difficulty was reported to the Centre, Petrov was instructed to undertake the "study" of O'Sullivan himself.

729. In April 1953 O'Sullivan was appointed Press Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition. This was duly reported to the Moscow Centre. Later in 1953 Petrov and O'Sullivan travelled to Sydney together in the same aeroplane and on the following day by prearrangement had lunch together in a Sydney restaurant. According to Petrov, they conversed only on general matters, and O'Sullivan gave Petrov his Canberra telephone number, which Petrov recorded in a notebook which was produced before us.

730. Subsequently Petrov received a Letter from the Moscow Centre complaining of the delay in the "study" of O'Sullivan; stating that he was a very promising person occupying the position of "information secretary" to Dr. Evatt; and pointing out "once more" that he had already given written information to Pakhomov, with whom he had had secret meetings. The Letter directed that the "study" of O'Sullivan should be actively pursued, but Petrov remained inactive in this respect.

731. Kovalenok—after his arrival in Canberra on 3rd April 1954, and before Petrov's defection was known at the Embassy—discussed with Mrs. Petrov M.V.D. affairs in Australia. Amongst other things, he stated that he "wished to discuss certain matters with Mr. Petrov, among them being the matter affecting O'Sullivan". He told her that "O'Sullivan was never so important to the M.V.D. as he is now in view of his position and the coming elections which may result in Dr. Evatt becoming Prime Minister".

732. O'Sullivan did not meet Kovalenok, who left Australia with the other Embassy officials shortly after Petrov's defection.

733. In the Moscow Letter No. 4 of 24th July 1952, paragraph 4, the Centre had suggested that O'Sullivan should be asked to compile a "survey concerning economic, political, and military penetration of Australia by America". In fact O'Sullivan was not procured by either Petrov or Antonov to compile this survey. He was a young man who had not been long in Australia and would have had little knowledge of the subjects. It would seem that Antonov approached Rupert Lockwood to prepare the survey, because part of Exhibit J, which was written by Lockwood, is such a compilation as was asked for in the Letter. Both O'Sullivan and Lockwood knew Antonov; and O'Sullivan, who knew Lockwood, met him at Canberra during the period when Lockwood was writing Exhibit J for Antonov at the Soviet Embassy in May 1953.

734. Exhibit J covers a much wider field than that of American "penetration of Australia". In the course of it Lockwood included much material, some of it of a scurrilous nature, about a number of journalists with whom he had worked over many years. Such information, while irrelevant to the subject-matter of the survey, was no doubt added by the Moscow Centre to the entries on Australian journalists in its "books".

Concerning Rex Chiplin

735. Chiplin's name appears in several paragraphs of the Moscow Letters, of which we have previously mentioned some and later refer to others. Because he is a journalist, we think it convenient to deal with him generally in this Chapter.

736. He is a Communist and is employed by the "Tribune" as a political roundsman.

737. According to Petrov, it was Chiplin who introduced O'Sullivan to Pakhomov; and Chiplin himself said that this was quite possible. Pakhomov also told Petrov that it was Chiplin who recommended O'Sullivan as a "progressive", which led to Pakhomov procuring Exhibit H from O'Sullivan. Chiplin denied this.

738. Petrov also said that Chiplin claimed to have contacts in Government Departments from whom it might be possible to obtain information, and that early in 1954 Chiplin had told him that he had a "few friends in External Affairs"—"two chaps".

739. The "Tribune" is a newspaper which is violently opposed to any Governmental policy designed to strengthen friendship between Australia and the United States of America; and Chiplin was consequently anxious to collect what information he could for the purpose of attacking any such policy. He himself said that, as a journalist, he would approach Government officials in an endeavour to acquire information and, even if he knew that information thus acquired was secret or confidential, would use it. He had the hardihood to claim that all journalists were entitled to do so.

740. On 14th November 1951 Chiplin published an article in the "Tribune", under the heading "Secret treaty sells us to U.S.", which purported to set out an analysis of the contents of what he described as a "top secret" Treaty of Friendship between Australia and the United States of America. There was considerable political stir when the article was published, because it claimed that Chiplin had obtained his information from a "highly-placed government official".

741. Chiplin's article was a piece of dishonest journalism. There was, as he well knew, no such concluded Treaty. The Commonwealth Government had been considering for some years a proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States, and part of the proposed Treaty had been sent to the Department of National Development for its consideration. In that Department a minute had been prepared dealing with the part sent to it. In fact, the Treaty has not yet been concluded and is still under departmental consideration.

742. On 29th August 1952 a search under warrant was made in the "Tribune" office and also in Chiplin's home. In the course of the search there was found a document which appeared to be closely copied from the above-mentioned departmental minute. Chiplin's

article was in substance a distorted reproduction of the minute, with certain alterations which made it falsely appear that the items comprised in the minute were part of a concluded Treaty which, the article said, had been hidden from Parliament and the public.

743. The relevance of these facts to our Inquiry arises from certain passages in the Moscow Letters. Antonov was in the habit of going to the "Tribune" office in order to hand Chiplin certain journalistic material supplied by Tass. On 29th August he had gone there for that purpose, but was told that a search was in progress and left immediately. Petrov reported this to the Moscow Centre and suggested that it would be advisable for Antonov to discontinue going to the "Tribune" office. This brought forth the Moscow Letter No. 5 of 27th September 1952, paragraph 7, in which the Moscow Centre agreed "that Antonov should not go any more to the editorial office of the 'Tribune'" and that a "technical worker" from that office should be asked to visit Antonov to collect any press material which might be required.

744. The incident of the search was mentioned in the Moscow Letter No. 6 of 25th November 1952, paragraph 8, concerning Maclean, in which the Centre referred to "measures taken in the Department of External Affairs after the article which Chiplin published".

745. Similarly, in relation to Body, in paragraph 9 of the Moscow Letter No. 5 of 27th September 1952 the Centre referred to "conditions which have arisen in the Department of External Affairs", which the Petrovs explained as being a reference to additional security measures taken in that Department as a result of the publication of the article and the search in the "Tribune" office.

746. It is apparent that the Moscow Centre had for some time regarded Chiplin as a person who was willing to give information to Soviet officials. He had been allotted his code name "Charlie" at some time before Petrov's Residentship. When the Centre wanted information about the Australian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization in New York, it suggested that the information should be sought from Madame Ollier, O'Sullivan, and Chiplin.

747. There is also the statement in the Moscow Letter No. 6 of 25th November 1952, paragraph 7, that "when receiving information you should ascertain and inform us about the source from whom Chiplin receives information, and not merely its contents, as you did when dealing with the question of exchange of enciphered material between the governments of Australia and America." It is evident from this that it had been earlier reported to the Moscow Centre that Chiplin had been acquiring information from Governmental sources and passing it directly or indirectly to Soviet officials.

748. Finally, when Petrov received the instructions to inquire about Milner (with which we have already dealt in Chapter 10) he suggested Chiplin to the Centre as a means of obtaining the required information, and the Centre approved.

749. Having regard to all these matters, we thought it proper to inquire as to the manner in which Chiplin acquired the document upon which he based his article of 14th November 1951, in an endeavour to discover the nature of Chiplin's sources of information. Chiplin was therefore examined on the matter.

750. He gave a most circumstantial account of having been in the library at Parliament House at Canberra in a room set apart for the

press on a day between 4th and 14th November 1951. He said that a "highly-placed Government official" came to him with a document and told him that he thought it might be of interest to him. He said that he there and then sat down and made a copy of it in pencil, writing on the arm of a leather armchair. This occupied about 20 minutes. When he had finished the copy he handed the original back to the official. He said that he went back to Sydney and made a typewritten copy of his pencilled note, and that the document found in the "Tribune" office during the search in August 1952 was that typed copy. He refused to say who the "highly-placed Government official" was. Certain names were submitted to him, including the name of a Mrs. "A". He denied that any one of them was the person who gave him the document, but still refused to give the name of the person. It was quite obvious from his evidence that he was asserting that it was a male officer who had shown him the document.

751. Mrs. "A" was then called as a witness. Chiplin had known her for many years and had regarded her as a pro-Communist friend and an "under-cover" agent of the Communist Party. To his obvious surprise, it emerged that Mrs. "A" had for many years been an agent for various Australian intelligence organizations. She was in June 1951 temporarily attached to the Department of National Development at the request of its permanent head for the purpose of detecting whether suspected leakages from the Department were in fact occurring, and, if so, in what manner.

752. While she was in that Department Chiplin endeavoured to use her as an "under-cover" agent to get confidential information; and on occasions, on instruction from a Security officer, she passed out to Chiplin innocuous information.

753. After her true role was disclosed in the witness-box, Chiplin shifted his ground and his counsel, under instructions, cross-examined Mrs. "A" to suggest that it was she who had handed Chiplin the document to copy in Parliament House. This she denied. Chipilin returned to the witness-box and affirmed that Mrs. "A" was the "highly-placed Government official" who had handed him the document.

754. Unfortunately for Chiplin, departmental records, a hotel register, and travel records, which we examined, showed beyond question—and quite apart from any evidence from Mrs. "A"—that, as she herself had sworn, she could not have been at Canberra at any relevant time. Faced with this, Chiplin sought to modify his second version of the incident by saying that while his firm impression was that it was at Parliament House in Canberra that he had been shown the document, the incident might have occurred in Sydney.

755. It is certain that Chiplin lied in telling one or other of his inconsistent stories and we have no doubt that he lied in saying that he was shown the departmental minute by Mrs. "A". We believe that he had some other source in departmental circles from which he was able to obtain confidential information.

756. The obtaining by Chiplin of this particular confidential information is not directly connected with Soviet espionage. Its relevance is that it discloses Chiplin as a person willing and able to obtain confidential departmental information, and shows that the Moscow Centre's opinion of him—as disclosed in the Moscow Letters—was well founded.

BULGARIA

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE BULGARIAN PRESS PRIOR TO THE RED TAKEOVER OF BULGARIA

By Dr. G. M. Dimitrov [1]

Since the days of the Tsars Russian imperialism has coveted Bulgaria in its expansionistic plans. Russian policy of the 19th century envisioned Bulgaria as a "Zadunaiskaya Russkaya Gubernia" (Transdanubian Russian Province) to serve as a stepping stone in the Russian drive toward the Dardanelles. This plan was realized briefly following the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 when the Turks were expelled from Bulgaria by Russian armies. Though peace was signed, Russian generals remained to administer Bulgaria, ostensibly until the country was able to govern itself. But when the Russians showed no intent to leave, the Bulgarians rebelled and were successful in asserting their independence. The Russians left, but they were successful in fostering pro-Russian feelings among the Bulgarian people by convincing them that the war of 1877 was fought solely for the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule regardless of the fact that this was purely an imperialistic undertaking to gain a Russian foothold in the Balkans, and control the straits—the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Traditionally Bulgarian Governments have tolerated the pro-Russian sentiments of the Bulgarian people who were grateful for the liberation of their country from the Turks. These sentiments were very shrewdly exploited by the Bolsheviks from the very beginning of their dictatorial regime in 1917. Though the Tsar was gone, Russian plans for domination of Bulgaria remained unchanged. For this reason, the Soviets from the very beginning began to court all Bulgarian regimes following World War I, even the most reactionary ones, in order to bring a restoration of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. They were particularly hopeful that the democratic agrarian government of Alexander Stamboliisky in the early twenties would restore diplomatic relations. But Stamboliisky was aware of the true Soviet motives and refused to establish diplomatic relations which would have brought Bolshevik agents in Bulgaria under the guise of diplomats. Curiously enough, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were restored in 1934 by the totalitarian reactionary government of Kimon Georgiev, who was instrumental in the overthrow of the democratic Stamboliisky regime in 1923.

Once diplomatic relations were restored Soviet propaganda previously conducted cladestinely moved into the open. Carrying out well-prepared long-range plans, Soviet agents began planting Bul-

---

[1] President of the Bulgarian National Committee for Liberation with headquarters in Washington, D.C. Dr. Dimitrov has a long journalistic career dating back to 1928 when he founded and edited the agrarian oriented, independent daily "PLADNE" (NOON) which flourished until 1934 when its publication was stopped by the totalitarian regime of King Boris III. During the thirties, Dr. Dimitrov also participated actively in the publication of several other agrarian publications in Bulgaria. At present Dr. Dimitrov is editor of the monthly "Free and Independent Bulgaria," organ of the Bulgarian National Committee, and is also editor of the Bulletin of the International Peasant Union.

garian Communists in all non-Communist publications principally as journalists or printers. These Communist plants were instructed to go slow in their activities until the press was thoroughly infiltrated. They were to become friendly with all the personnel of a publication from the editorial staff down to the printshop workers. They were to study the attitudes of the key members of the staff and to gauge how they can best be used by the Communists.

After a Communist plant was well established in a non-Communist publication, his first task was to create favorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union. He would speak of the supposed "democratization" of the Bolshevik regime and its "great socialist achievements," the great sympathy of the fraternal Russian people for little Bulgaria, and the readiness of the Soviet Union to protect Bulgaria from the imperialistic designs of the Western European Powers. These tactics met with a measure of success and some non-Communist Bulgarian journalists were induced to write articles favorable to the Soviet Union, speaking of the traditional Russo-Bulgarian friendship, Slavic solidarity, etc.

THE SOVIET "DIPLOMATIC" AGENTS

Following the infiltration of the Bulgarian press, the Soviet Embassy in Sofia began to court openly the favor of Bulgarian newspapermen. Journalists of all convictions, even extreme anti-Communists, were invited to lavish vodka-and-caviar parties. As these parties became more frequent, the guests included political leaders as well. Even intimates of the late King Boris became regulars at official Soviet banquets and parties, as well as at private affairs of Soviet diplomats. Ironically enough, the man who established this successful system of currying favor with the Bulgarian press, Soviet Ambassador Raskolnikov, was shortly thereafter liquidated by Bolshevik assassins on the French Riviera.

The next Soviet step was to invite prominent journalists, writers, and political leaders to visit the Soviet Union and write about their impressions. The visitors, of course, saw only what the Soviets wanted them to see on closely supervised guided tours. The Soviet officials did not expect glowing praises of the Communist system in Russia by the Bulgarian press at that time, but they sought to induce the Bulgarian visitors to write about the struggle of Russian workers and peasants to build up their backward economy after centuries of neglect under the Tsars. The Soviets also lost no opportunity to impress on the Bulgarian visitors the fraternal feelings of the great Russian people for their little Slav brother to the south. Another familiar Soviet theme was their great desire for peace in the world. These tactics paid off, and many Bulgarian newsmen and other prominent people, most of them anti-Communists by conviction, actually did write favorably of their impressions while visiting Russia.

Parties and dinners for newsmen continued at the Soviet Embassy in Sofia. More and more editors and publishers softened their anti-Communist sentiments and were willing to accept leftists, and later, even known Communists, on their staffs. At the same time, the infiltration by concealed Red agents of the Bulgarian press and publishing houses continued.

Breaking its wall of isolation in the thirties, the Soviet Union joined the Western democracies in their opposition to nazism and fascism and even sponsored a number of antiaggression resolutions in the old

League of Nations. At the same time, the Soviet Union was spending considerable sums for propaganda in many countries to promote "popular front movements" as bulwarks against fascism. They skillfully concealed the true nature of these movements as Communist fronts, by organizing them along democratic lines and principles, and giving leading roles to prominent liberals and other so-called progressives, to give the fronts respectability. As the Communists and other leftists gained a measure of acceptability in many countries because of their support of anti-fascist movements, many newspaper publishers and editors dropped their opposition to employing Red journalists. In fact some publishers found it highly desirable to have Communists or "pinks" on their staffs as insurance in case the Communists gained power, with Soviet help (as, of course, happened).

At the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939, the fascist-oriented press of Bulgaria was thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists. The prominent pro-Nazi journalist, T. Kojoucharov, for example, wrote in the reactionary daily, Slovo, that "nothing could be more natural than the unity of Nazi socialism and Soviet socialism" and that this unity would last forever. At the same time the Bulgarian Communist theoretician, T. Pavlov, wrote a whole pamphlet in which he presented similar views.

In 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria without any provocation or reason and the Red Army occupied the country without firing a shot because the allies assured the Bulgarian people that the Soviets were coming as "liberators." One of the first acts of the Communists upon gaining control of the country was to suspend all non-Communist publications and to place all newsprint under strict control. Soon the country was flooded with printed Communist propaganda with no opposition press to answer. Little later the Communists permitted the organs of the other parties participating in the then coalition government to resume publication. These were the papers of the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats, the Zveno Union, and somewhat later also the Democratic Party. However, the circulation of these papers and their effectiveness were severely limited by the Communist control of newsprint.

Most non-Communist publishers and journalists were declared Fascist or Nazi and sentenced to long prison terms by "peoples courts." Some were even executed. Among them were publishers and editors who had harbored Communist journalists as insurance against just such an eventuality. On the other hand, many non-Communist journalists and writers who had been reported as pliable by the Communist plants on various publications prior to the Red takeover, were retained to write Communist propaganda at handsome salaries. The list below includes such people who were planted in the past in the non-Communist press and are now prominent Communist writers and newsmen in Bulgaria.

Svetoslav Minkov.—A Communist prior to the Soviet occupation, was employed in the press section of the Agricultural Ministry as a journalist, now in the Communist press and propaganda.

Dimitrii Polyanov.—Well-known Communist writer, formerly wrote for the daily, Zora, one of the most pro-Nazi publications of the past.

Orlin Vassilev.—Also a well-known Communist writer, was on the editorial staff of the literary magazine, Svetlostruy, one of the most serious and influential Bulgarian publications of the prewar period.

Lozan Strelkov.—Also a Communist, worked on the rightist daily, Zarya.

Bogomil Rainov.—Worked on the very popular literary magazine, Zlatorog.

Assen Bossev.—Was reporter on the daily, Zarya, and is now editor of the Communist humorous paper, Sturshel.

Georgi Enev.—Wrote for the rightist daily, Utro, and the government publication, Zemedelski Zadrugi, is now a factor in the Communist propaganda establishment. He was well known as a Communist in the past.

Peter Tassev.—Formerly editor of the conservative daily, Mir, is now active writing Red propaganda.

Angel Karaliichev.—Popular short-story writer in prewar Bulgaria who also wrote for various rightist dailies, has joined the party and is now very active in the Communist Writers Union.

Nikola Fournadjiev.—Formerly with the literary magazine, Zlatorog, also is now active in the Communist Writers Union.

Slavcho Vassev.—Was a "neutral journalist" and wrote for the rightist daily, Zarya, and the agrarian-oriented, Pladne, but now is editor of Literaturen Front, organ of the Communist Writer's Union, and is also member of that union's executive body.

Georgi Kulishev.—Formerly editor of the extreme rightist Macedonian publication, Macedonia, and collaborator for several other extreme rightist publications is now one of the most active writers for the Communist propaganda machine and a member of the Communist "parliament."

Writers like Krum Valkov, Dimiter Goundov, and others are perfect examples of former Communist agents, planted in former rightist publications, who are now actively turning out Communist propaganda.

How well the Communist agents infiltrated the prewar Bulgarian press and influenced some very prominent conservative writers to become Communist tools, is illustrated by the cases of two of the most gifted Bulgarian women writers, Dora Gabe and Elissaveta Bagryana. Dora Gabe, an extreme rightist, who once wrote poetry praising King Boris and his son, now writes laudatory poems devoted to the late Communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, and has become one of the most slavish literary tools of Communist propaganda in Bulgaria. Elissaveta Bagryana, also a former rightist, is now a very obedient tool of the party, active in the Communist Writer's Union.

The activities of the Communist agents planted in the prewar Bulgarian press can be summarized as follows:

1. They reported to their Communist masters everything that went on in their particular publications including editorial tendencies, who was financing the publication, and even matters of "office politics."

2. They collected information on all the important personalities of the press and literary world, and based on this information the Communists could judge who might be corrupted, indoctrinated, or simply intimidated to become their collaborator. It was also decided, on the basis of this information, who would be liquidated after the Communists took power.

3. They used their influence to improve the image of the Soviet Union among editorial writers and columnists in an effort to induce them to write favorable articles on behalf of the Soviets.

4. These Communist agents gained valuable experience and training in journalism which later was very useful to the Communist propaganda operation. While performing their insidious role in undermining the press, these Red agents were making good livings from salaries paid them by their anti-Communist employers.

While a few of these Communist agents sold out the Reds, the majority remained faithful to their masters and did their job well.

After the Soviet occupation of Bulgaria and the Communist takeover of the government, documents were discovered concerning wealthy industrialists, who contributed heavily to the Communist Party in the hope that both their lives and their fortunes would be spared in the event of a Red takeover. But these individuals and many others like them were unceremoniously executed, illustrating the fate of all those who thought that they could deal with the Communists. Such individuals or groups committed a fundamental error in accepting the belief that communism is a political movement or even a party, when in reality communism is an international conspiracy aiming at world domination.

BURMA

Aleksandr Yurievich Kasnakheyev testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on December 14, 1959. He had served in the Soviet diplomatic service in Burma in 1957 and 1958, first as information officer and then as intelligence agent until his defection at the end of 1958. He had specialized in the study of Burmese at the Eastern Department of the International Relations Institute in Moscow. Mr. Kasnakheyev's testimony dealt in part with his activities in the process of perverting the Burmese press while he served in that country:

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us of the Sino-Soviet use of the Burmese press?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. One of my assignments with the Intelligence Service was the work with usage of Burmese press for Communist aims. Soviet Intelligence regularly published in different Burmese publications provocative anti-American and anti-West articles. These articles were fabricated in Moscow, in KGB headquarters, sent to Burma on microfilms, then developed in Soviet Embassy.

One intelligence officer was translating the text from Russian into English. Another officer was planting this material in Burmese press.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say translated into English——

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. From Russian into English. I know this because sometimes——

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the Burmese press printed in English?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No. They translate—when these articles were given to KGB-controlled Burmese press, they translated them from English into Burmese. In the next stage, when this article appeared in Burmese newspaper, it was my duty to check the Burmese text against Russian text, and then my corrections and corrected text were sent back to Moscow through TASS agency. Then it was distributed. Then TASS agency distributed this material now as true story, published in press throughout the world, especially in countries of special interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. This propaganda material was prepared in Moscow?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And microfilmed?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The microfilm was sent to Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was translated not directly into Burmese?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. But first into English?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. First into English.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then translated from the English into Burmese?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. By the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. By the newspapers?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; because newspapers can give some small variations and adopt, make their own style.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now you were competent to have translated directly from Russian into Burmese. You could have done that?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; I was not so competent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was not. In several cases my work was also to translate from Russian into English, where this officer was ill or was absent. So I know that it is microfilmed, that it is photocopied, that it is translated from Russian into English.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you the only person in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon who was thoroughly conversant with the Burmese language?

Mr. Kasnakheyev, this seems at variance with the usual Soviet policy of having competent language officers in their embassies. Why was it different in Burma, because of the difficulty of learning the language?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; because of difficulty of the language. First of all in the field of language, knowledge of language, native languages, there were many people in Soviet Embassy that studied Burmese, but after they finished their term of 2 or 3 years assignment to Burma they were transferred to other countries. So they lost their knowledge. Second, they were not encouraged in studying Burmese, as all Soviet embassies work through English. There is no necessity for studying Burmese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Soviet international organization support or manipulate any of the newspapers in Rangoon?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I know directly that Soviet intelligence manipulated such newspapers as the Mirror, the Vanguard, the New Path, People's Journal, and Dagon Publishing House.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those five publications were manipulated by Soviet intelligence?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they so manipulated today?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; they are not so manipulated today as all these newspapers and publishing houses have been closed by present Burmese Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did the Soviet intelligence subvert these Burmese newspapers? How did they accomplish this subversion?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I think that Soviet intelligence had its agents among the staffs of those newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. They actually infiltrated——

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The staffs?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. This is standard Soviet Communist technique; it is not?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. With the press?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. By the way, all these publications and this publishing house were controlled by Burmese Communists or had very close ties with them. So it is a fact that the agents Soviet intelligence recruited in these newspapers and publishing houses were then transferred to the Communist Party.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did Soviet intelligence spend money on these Burmese newspapers or on newspaper people in Burma?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I heard a fact that one anti-American book was published in this Dagon Publishing House. It consisted of approximately 25 or 30 articles previously published in the People's Journal. The Chief of Soviet Intelligence, discussed with me whether this article should be published as a separate book, and what effect it can have. I told him that these articles were very poor and gave no facts, and were built on sand.
But he told me that these articles cost too much already, it was better than nothing, and so we have to publish this material.
Mr. SOURWINE. Then to summarize what you have said about the subversion of the Burmese press, there were three different methods used, were there not, money, ideological subversion, and actual infiltration of the newspapers.
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can you name any Communists who work on Burmese newspapers?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No, I can't.
Mr. SOURWINE. How do the Soviets utilize their control and influence over Burmese newspapers and other publications?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. They publish articles. This is articles published in Burma. It is part of an international net.
Mr. SOURWINE. I hoped we might get an expansion. It seemed to me from the story you told us there were at least two different objectives. One was the printing in Burma of propaganda directed at the Burmese people, and the other was the planting in Burmese newspapers of stories that could then be picked up by TASS and sent around the world as anti-American propaganda?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. They had both of these objectives?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us about the handling of the forgery that came to be known as the Admiral Frost letter?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV, Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about that.
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. These exactly were articles that I translated from micirofilm into English and then when they

were published in Burmese newspaper Mirror, I checked it against Russian text.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now what was the Admiral Frost letter?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. It stated that it was during international rebellion, and it stated—it was forgery of letter promising support to international rebels and asking them not to surrender.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a forged letter purporting to have been written by a U.S. admiral.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Offering support?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the Indonesian rebels?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And this was prepared in Moscow?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Microfilmed?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sent to Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Translated?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Retranslated?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Published in the Burmese newspapers?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Then it was sent back to Moscow and through TASS, through other Soviet propaganda organizations, and also through official diplomatic channels it was distributed around the world.

Then it was republished in Indonesian press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not as something that originated in Moscow?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. But as something that originated in Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. In Burma this article was published from our Djakarta correspondent and published in Burmese press.

It was sent from our Djakarta correspondent to Moscow and from Moscow to our embassy in Rangoon. In Rangoon we planted it in the Mirror. It was then replayed in Indonesian press and attributed to the Mirror.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other outstanding instances of this?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. The most interesting one was an article about Indian Finance Minister Desai. It stated that the Indian Finance Minister on his visit to the United States in the fall of 1958 got a bribe from the United States amounting to 2 or 3 million American dollars, in order to promote subversion of Indian neutrality and bring down Nehru government.

That article was published—I don't remember exact date—that article was published at the end of 1958 in the newspaper Vanguard. By the way, at the same time Soviet intel-

ligence published the same article in another country. For instance, in India I know they used such newspapers as Blitz and New Delhi Times. For instance, in New Delhi Times Soviet intelligence published an article that accused—that was signed by the Delhi Times nonexistent Rangoon correspondent—and accused three Burmese newspapers, the Nation, the Reporter, and the Guardian, of working for the American Embassy, and accused one newspaper, the Nation, of getting a bribe from American Embassy in Rangoon in amount of 34,000 American dollars for reporting, for making propaganda against Burmese policy of neutrality.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say this charge was fabricated in Moscow?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And handled as you have explained?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; and it was published in New Delhi Times. Then from New Delhi Times it was through TASS transferred to Burma and TASS representative in Burma. Kovtunenko his name was. He republished this article in his official TASS bulletin. Here definitely the channel of distribution was found not very proper, the Burmese newspapers charged this Kovtunenko with defamation of character, and there was a lawsuit. The Burmese court ordered Kovtunenko to appear in court.

He refused and hid in Soviet Embassy. It was at the end of April. Up to now Kovtunenko is hiding in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has been hiding since April?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are the principal propaganda themes of the Soviets in Burma? You mentioned one, and anti-Americanism.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Mainly anti-American. Soviet intelligence, in all these articles as I remember were aimed at spoiling name of United States. For instance, I mentioned already there was a book that was published in Dagon Publishing House called "His Deeds."

It described very vividly how Americans behave in Burma, that they make espionage war, that they use for subversive activities their economic adviser groups, that they have special radio installations in Rangoon. Then it described that they have very bad morals, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. In their propaganda in and from Burma, to what extent do the Communists use misinterpretation or slanting off actual events, and to what extent to they peddle straight lies?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I found that such forgeries as the Frost letters were not very many. During my work in this network, from approximately January 1958 up to February 1958 when these newspapers were closed, there were published about 25 articles that passed through me.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is clear fabrications?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Among these articles clear fabrications were maybe 5 or 6, because even about this Indian Financial Minister what they told were rumors.

Mr. SOURWINE. So misinterpretation and slanting is about 4 to 1?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over clear fabrication?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

CHINESE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE MAINLAND PRESS, 1927–49

By Chu-yuan Cheng [1]

Communist employ the united front and armed struggle as two basic means to seize political power. In the course of forming a united front, propaganda becomes one of the party's most important weapons. Newspapers, magazines, and various other literary forms are considered the major media for propaganda, and have received high attention in Communist total strategy for seizing power. As Lenin had once observed: "The newspaper is not only the collective propagandist and agitator, but also the collective organizer." The Chinese Communists, in their striving for power, did not limit their propaganda activities to press channels; they also extended them to the literary and artistic fields. In May 1942, summarizing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) propaganda task, Mao Tse-tung indicated:

> In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people, there are various fronts, of which, two may be mentioned, the civilians' front and the soldiers' front; i.e. the cultural front and the military front. In order to defeat the enemy, we must rely primarily on an army with guns in its soldiers' hands. But this is not enough, we also need a cultural army which is absolutely indispensable for uniting ourselves and defeating the enemy.[2]

Mao advocated that the Chinese Communists should employ every way and means "to fit art and literature properly into the whole revolutionary machinery as one of its component parts, to make them a powerful weapon for uniting and educating the people and for attacking and annihilating the enemy." [3] With this basic strategy in mind, the Chinese Communists sufficiently utilized the press in the Nationalist government-controlled area to win support from all classes.

Prior to the 1949 victory, generally speaking, the Chinese Communists were prohibited from engaging in political activities. Therefore, they conducted propaganda and agitation chiefly through infiltration of the Kuomintang's (KMT) and neutral newspapers and periodicals. This was effected by assigning capable cadres to assume positions as editors or reporters in these organs, and also by means of drawing the responsible personnel of neutral influential newspapers first into the left-wing front and then into the circle of fellowtravelers of the Communists.

---

[1] Research Professor Seton Hall University. (See biography in Appendix).
[2] Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1956), pp. 63–64.
[3] Ibid.

The infiltration of the non-Communist press by CCP agents produced momentous effects. It is not only enabled the Communists to change their inferior position to a superior one, but also eventually served to defeat the Kuomintang. The process of this infiltration, its basic strategy, and the tactics employed in different situations are still of great signifiance. The story serves as an historical lesson to the still-free countries where Communist infiltration constitutes a real threat to their democratic systems.

In the 22-year period after 1927, the year the KMT began its nationwide purge to drive out Communist elements from the political scene, and preceding the final Communist victory, the basic strategies of Communist infiltration and exploitation of the non-Communist press may be roughly divided into three stages.

The first stage, beginning in 1927 and ending with the 1937 outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, was a period of indirect infiltration. Suffering a series of military setbacks, the Chinese Communists were forced to launch the so-called 25,000 *li* (about 5,000 miles) Long-March, fleeing from Kiangsi to Yenan. All activities in the Nationalist-controlled area had to go underground. Under such extremely adverse circumstances, the Chinese Communists implemented Mao's formula by using the literary movement to cover their political activities. In Shanghai, the nation's cultural and economic center, great numbers of literary organizations sprouted. They first concentrated on translating and introducing Marxist-Leninist doctrine and theories for literature and social sciences, in order to disperse Communist concepts to the Chinese intellectuals. The next step was the formation of a united front. The League of Left-Wing Writers was secretly established on March 2, 1930, in Shanghai. China's leading writer, Lu Hsun, who had wide influence on the young generation and was praised by the Communists as the Chinese Gorky, was elected president of the League. But, in fact, this organization was manipulated by its General-Secretary, Chou Yang, a Chinese Communist underground agent in Shanghai, who is now serving as the deputy director of the CCP Central Committee's Propaganda Department. The "All-China Federation of Left-Wing Cultural Workers" was subsequently set up to enlarge Communist influence. It includes the League of Left-Wing Writers, the League of Social Scientists, and the Leagues of Dramatists, Journalists, etc. The Federation and its subordinate organizations, under the pretense of cultural activities, actually became the party's weapon for conducting subversive plots on every front.

As the Nationalist military action was extremely vigorous at that time and the Communist forces were at the verge of total annihilation, the "cultural army" of Communists in the Kuomintang area was forced to lead the counter-offensive. Party propagandists grasped the high tide of the people's anti-Japanese sentiment following in the wake of the Mukden Accident of September 18, 1931, to publically accuse the Nationalist government of bowing to the Japanese aggressor. Besides winning the intellectuals to the left-wing front, the anti-Japanese appeal created a powerful public opinion demanding that the Nationalist government abandon its military encirclement of the Communists. The Sian Accident of December 1936, was the masterpiece of this Communist drive to force the KMT to suspend its plan for total annihilation of the Communist armed forces.

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, marked a new era of Communist infiltration. With the united front effort of all people to resist Japanese aggression, Communist activities again emerged into the open. In the spring of 1938, the Nationalist government established a Political Department under the supervision of the Military Affairs Committee. This new department, which functioned as the highest organization waging political and cultural struggle against the Japanese aggressor, was headed by General Chen Ch'eng (now Vice President of the Nationalist government), with Chou En-lai as deputy director. Kuo Mo-jo, a veteran left-wing writer now President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was appointed as chief of the Political Department's Third Division in charge of propaganda affairs. This organization served as a center for all left-wing writers, artists, actors who had evacuated from Shanghai, and Communist underground agents in the Nationalist-controlled area, to engage in three important subversive functions.

First, this Communist-led coalition was able to disguise its illegal activities beneath the cloak of legality. Under the pretense of national struggle with Japan, Communist agents infiltrated into various public and private propaganda apparatuses and then commenced to subvert them from within.

Second, by means of cultural activities, Communist agents were increasingly enabled to penetrate schools and universities and assimilate professors and students, thus gradually enlarging the left-wing front.

Third, by infiltration and provocation, they were able to differentiate and finally isolate the right-wing elements.

In order to consolidate the left-wing united front, three new organs were established in Chunking, the war-time capital of China. These included the "Association of Literary and Arts Workers" led by Kuo Mo-jo and Mao Tun (now the Minister of Culture in Peking's State Council); the "Association of Journalists" led by Fan Ch'anh-chiang, an important Communist agent for journalism; and the "Association of Music and Drama Workers" led by Tien Han (now Director of the Administration of Art in the Communist government). The area in which they were active stretched from Chungking to Kunming in the southwest and Lanchow in the northwest. This work was to lay the foundation for the subsequent CCP victory in the final stage of struggle.

The end of the Sino-Japanese War was followed immediately by the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists. Since Communist agents had been widely planted in the Kuomintang area, they no longer worked under the cover of literature and art but instead carried out their subversive infiltration of the neutral press directly. The basic strategies used in this period included: (1) spreading anti-civil-war sentiments among the masses to weaken the prestige of the Nationalist government; (2) publically revealing KMT military secrets to shake the army's morale; (3) agitating students to provoke strikes and demonstrations; and (4) exaggerating stories of hardship in the KMT-controlled area as compared to allegedly bright conditions in the Communist area to induce popular sympathy and support. These measures not only succeeded in undermining the social order in the Nationalist-controlled areas, but also promoted the psychologic effect of defeatism among the Kuomintang's army which paved the way for wholesale surrenders along many fronts.

In the process of press infiltration, the Chinese Communists varied their tactics according to stages and circumstances. The basic method was via the indirect way of mobilizing left-wing writers to contribute articles, comments, and cartoons to the Kuomintang and neutral press. Of more importance was the direct infiltration to some influential press organs which were then used as Communist platforms.

The indirect method was widely employed during the Sino-Japanese War. Chinese Communists had mobilized great numbers of left-wing writers to edit publications and write editorials for many non-Communist organs in Shanghai. For example, more than a dozen veteran Communist writers including Wang Jen-shu (the Communist Ambassador to Indonesia in 1950–54), and Mei I (Director of the Broadcasting Affairs Administration Bureau after 1949), regularly wrote editorials for such non-Communist papers as Ta-ying Wan-pao (the Great Britain Evening Post); Hua-Mei ch'en-pao (the Sino-American Morning Post), and the two most widely circulated newspapers, Shun Pao and Hsin Wen Pao. Wang Jen-shu (or Pa-jen) also edited "Tzu-yu-t'an" (Free Talks), Shun Pao's famous literary section. Mei I and other Communist cadres, regularly wrote editorials for Shên Chou Jih Pao.[4] Naturally, all these articles were Communist-inclined.

The direct infiltration used in the latter stage of civil war included two major tactics: (1) to assign the best well-trained cadres as editors and correspondents in the most influential newspapers and magazines; and (2) to buy off the chief responsible persons of these organs. The most conspicuous achievement of this Communist infiltration in post-war China was in the cases of three influential publications—Ta-kung-Pao (Impartial Daily) with editions in Chungking, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hong Kong, Kuan Ch'a (The Observer) in Shanghai, and the Hsin-min-Pao (the New People's Daily) in Nanking.

Ta-kung-pao, a private newspaper, began publishing in Tientsin in 1902. During the period from 1926 to 1949, it was China's most authoritative newspaper. This paper, which maintained a middle course in political affairs, was widely respected for its excellent editorials, and had great appeal for the educated public. During the latter phase of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Communists skillfully planted many young reporters and editors on the staff of Ta-kung-pao. These cadres, who were well trained and highly skilled, attracted a large following in the Kuomintang area. One of the outstanding field correspondents of Ta-kung-pao was a young reporter named Fan Ch'ang-chiang, who was actually a Communist underground agent. Another famous reporter of Ta-kung-pao was a woman called Peng Tzu-kang, who had been a CCP member since 1933. Several editors of this influential newspaper, including Hsiao Chien and Hsu ying (Peng's husband) were Communist agents. Peng's party membership had been kept secret for almost 20 years.[5] Fan's Communist status was well hidden for many years, but he was finally dismissed by the Ta-kung-pao for his apparent leftist deviation. But, immediately after the 1949 Communist victory, Fan became the Director of the regime's General Administration of the Press. He is now a vice chairman of the State Council's Scientific and Technical Commission, a high position requiring party member-

[4] Yang Chin-ch'en, "Revolutionary Press and Progressive Press in Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese Period," Peking, *Hsin-wen Chan-hsien* (News Front), monthly, No. 6 (June 15, 1958), pp. 53–58.

[5] Peng Tzu-kang, "A New Copy for an Old News," Peking, Hsin-wen yu Chu-pan (Journalism and Publication) (June 10, 1957), p. 2.

ship. According to the Chinese Communists' own record, in 1947, eight editors and reporters of Ta-kung-pao's Chungking office were discovered to be working for the Communists and arrested by the Kuomintang.

In 1948, Communist infiltration of Ta-kung-pao had already reached its leading personnel. While the Nationalist government still controlled Nanking and Shanghai, through its underground agents in Shanghai, the CCP invited Wong Yün-sen, editor in chief of Ta-kung-pao, to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in the Communist-controlled area. Wong secretly left Shanghai in the autumn of 1948, entering the Communist area via Hong Kong. Since that date, this influential newspaper has actually been completely controlled by the Chinese Communists.[6]

Kuan-ch'a (The Observer) a weekly concentrating on political affairs, was operated by a group of intellectuals, most of whom were university professors. It was first published on September 1, 1946, in Shanghai, and soon won a wide audience among the intellectuals. At its peak, this magazine has a circulation of 105,000. Readers included college students, government officers, businessmen, professionals, and army generals. The president of this magazine, Ch'u An-ping, appeared to be an open-minded democrat, although actually he was manipulated by Communist agents in Shanghai. Kuan-cha's outstanding feature was its articles contributed by correspondents in all the major cities and particularly its military analysis by the Nanking correspondents. In the latter stage of the civil war, the Communists mobilized their underground agents to serve as correspondents to Kuan-ch'a. The weekly began to publish articles revealing top KMT military secrets. Since most military developments happened as predicted in corresponding articles, Kuan-ch'a was regarded as a very authoritative organ in 1947–48. According to a survey article written by the responsible personnel of Kuan-ch'a in November 1949, news correspondents were then secretly working in Nanking, Peiping, Tientsin, Sian, Hankow, Chengtu, Kunming, Urumchi, and Lanchow. There were nine such reporters in Nanking alone, four of whom were specializing in collecting and disclosing Nationalist military secrets. Some correspondents were even hidden in the Nationalist Ministry of Defense.[7] Most of the contents of these reports, apart from disclosing military information, were designed to reveal "the darkness and evils under Kuomintang's reactionary rule." [8] Until December 23, 1948, when the Nationalist Ministry of the Interior decided to prohibit its publication, this Communist-infiltrated magazine had fulfilled its assigned mission in disturbing public morale to the benefit of the CCP.

Another conspicuous case of Communist infiltration of the press was the transformation of Hsin-min-pao in Nanking. To turn this pro-Kuomintang's privately owned newspaper into a Communist propaganda agent, the party had assigned a very attractive and capable woman reporter, called Kung P'eng, to that newspaper. Kung establishing her close relationship with Teng Chi-hsing, wife of the publisher, and gradually turned this paper to the left until it too finally became another Communist propaganda arm. After the Communist victory, Kung P'eng was immediately appointed as the

---

[6] Tek-shan, "Analysis of Old Ta-kung-pao," Hsin-wen Chan-hsien, Peking, No. 1 (Jan. 15, 1958), pp. 24–32.

[7] Editorial Board, "An Historical Account of Kuan-ch'a Press Being Oppressed by the Reactionary Government of Kuomintang," Shanghai, Kuan-ch'a (The Observer), IV. No. 1 (Nov. 1949), pp. 32–34.

[8] Editorial Board, "Our Self-Criticism, Task and Editorial Orientation," ibid., pp. 3–6.

Director of the Information Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a reward for her successful infiltration in Hsin-min-pao.

Communist infiltration of the press reaped great benefits to the CCP. According to official Communist data released in 1959, during the first half of 1946, in the four major cities of Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai, and Chungking, more than 100 newspapers and magazines had been infiltrated by party agents and were ordered to close by Kuomintang authorities.[9] This figure reveals the extent of Communist infiltration in the press at the eve of their victory.

The prolonged and widely penetrated infiltration produced at least four important results for the Communist conquest of the mainland.

First, through their exploitation of the non-Communist press, the Chinese Communists could fully utilize the current situation to create favorable public opinion in every stage. In 1931, the CCP grasped the high tide of anti-Japanese sentiments to accuse the KMT of military scheming and obtain a respite from Nationalist attacks. After 1937, it used the national movement to resist the common enemy, Japan, to penetrate into every department of the Kuomintang's propaganda machine. After 1945, it fully employed anti-civil-war feelings to win the sympathy and support of Chinese intellectuals. Without the infiltration of the non-Communist press, the CCP's enormous propaganda scheme could not have been carried out effectively.

Second, by infiltration of the non-Communist press, the Chinese Communists won the wide support of Chinese intellectuals. This successfully isolated the Nationalist government.

Third, through the disclosure of Nationalist military secrets and wholesale revelations of KMT weaknesses, the Communists disrupted the morale of Nationalist troops and reaped an easy triumph without the necessity of bitter contests.

Fourth, by using the non-Communist press, the Chinese Communists fostered a series of illusions throughout the world. They presented themselves as democratic land reformers having no close relationship with Moscow and thus won considerable sympathy in the West.

The fall of the Chinese mainland to the Communists, of course, cannot be attributed to any single factor. But Communist infiltration of the non-Communist press and its transformation in the propaganda machine was one major factor. It was one of the most effective weapons to destroy the enemy from within and to pave the way for a final conquest.

---

[9] Wen Chi, "A Brief Introduction of Chinese Communist Party Organs and Important Newspapers during the Third Revolutionary War Period," Li-shih Chiao-hsueh (Teaching and Study in History), monthly, Tientsin, No. 9 (1959), pp. 24–30.

THE COMMUNIST DESTRUCTION OF THE FREE PRESS IN CUBA

(By Carlos Todd) [1]

When Fidel Castro's crypto-Communist forces seized power in Cuba, on January 1, 1959, a well-planned offensive against the free press, following similar Communist action in other conquered nations, was immediately put into action.

At the time, Havana counted more than a dozen dailies, including the powerful morning papers, El Mundo, Diario de La Marina, Información, Crisol, and Alerta, all with large circulations; and the equally prominent Prensa Libre, Avance and El País in the afternoon. Although several other smaller dailies prospered, the above were the most important.

English-language papers were limited to the morning Havana Post, long established in Cuba, and the fledgling afternoon paper Times of Havana.

The Communist plan called for a gradual offensive against the press, specifically designed not to alarm independent newspapers initially favorable to Castro.

In brief, the plan called for:

1. Military occupation and seizure of those newspapers and radio stations which had belonged to officials, friends, or elements allied to the Batista regime.

2. A studied campaign of discreditation and defamation, originating from these confiscated newspapers, now in the hands of the government, against any independent expression in the independent press. High government officials were to take part in this campaign.

3. Economic strangulation of the independent press by retiring all paid government propaganda and notices from the independent press; and the application of pressure to important commercial advertisers to force them to retire or to decrease their advertisements in that press.

4. The instigation of premeditated acts of violence, such as burnings of newspapers in public, symbolic funerals, physical interference with delivery trucks, agents and newsboys, all designed to produce fear among the subscribers, with the consequent losses in circulation.

5. Control of the Press Association, the unions of Graphic Arts (linotypists, etc.), by ousting former directors and secretaries, substituting

[1] Carlos Todd is a Cuban citizen, born in Havana. He attended secondary school and college in the United States, and served with the Canadian Army overseas during World War II. Mr. Todd was engaged in sugar, insurance, and real estate in Havana; he became a columnist for the Times of Havana in 1956, and became the political writer of that newspaper in January 1959.

Todd was the first Cuban journalist to turn against Fidel Castro, early in 1959. In February of that year, he warned about Communist infiltration in the ranks of the "26th of July Movement." He was forced to flee Cuba in October 1960, and has been the president and editor of the Cuban Information Service in Coral Gables, Fla., ever since.

Carlos Todd followed the Cuban Communist revolution from its very beginnings, and is today considered an expert in that field.

for them Communist, pro-Communist, and opportunistic elements, disposed to act as servile instruments of the regime, in the plan of the destruction of independent expression.

6. Well planned and executed measures of acute provocation within the staffs of the newspapers, which inevitably would lead to internal troubles, designed to undermine the authority of the publishers and editors of the newspapers.

7. Outright illegal confiscation of the property of publishers, following accusations of collaboration with the Batista regime.

8. A final offensive brought about by the creation of serious conflicts between the few independent papers left and part of their personnel, making use of agents provocateurs to precipitate the armed occupation of those newspapers prior to confiscation.

These, basically, were the steps that were carried out to the letter by the Cuban Communists. They succeeded beyond all expectations; yet, ultimately, they made necessary the use of force to silence the press of Cuba.

Step 1. Military occupation

Instantly, on the very day that the Communists took power, and immediately on the entry of Castro's Sierra Maestra "barbudos" in Havana, orders went out to seize the newspapers Alerta, Pueblo and Ataja, radio stations CNC-Reloj de Cuba, Radio Mambí, etc., in Havana, and many more in the interior of the Republic. All these press and radio organizations had ties with the Batista regime.

At the same time, the Communist Party newspaper Hoy resumed publication on a very modest scale, with little more than 5,000 circulation. It is interesting to note here that Hoy had been proscribed by ex-President Carlos Prío Socarrás, due to the fact that it did *not* belong to the Communist Party, but to the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC), the parent union of all labor unions in Cuba. The Castro regime, in permitting Hoy to resume publication, sanctioned the original theft of the paper by the Cuban CP.

At the time, it was felt by many Cubans that it was only just that newspapers which had blatantly favored the Batista regime be seized by the Castro government. However, few noticed the fact that the seizure was done by armed military force; that the newspapers were turned over to Communists or their sympathizers; and that no effort was made by the government to place the papers up for auction, as should have been the procedure under Cuban law.

The confiscated newspapers were immediately staffed by the very dregs of Cuban journalism; the incompetent, the frustrated, the mediocre, men who had never succeeded at their profession, who constituted a fertile breeding ground for Communist subsidization.

The result of this infusion was instantly evident in press and radio editorials, which were plagued by the vulgarity and mediocrity that has persisted in the Cuban Communist press to this day.

The newspaper Alerta became Revolución, the official organ of Castro's 26th of July Movement, in reality a front for the Communist operations within that movement. Carlos Franqui, a Communist of long standing, former proofreader for the CP paper Hoy, was named editor of Revolución.

The initial seizure also brought with it the birth of the newspapers La Calle and Combate, designed to reach the lowest strata of the population; and, as such, filled with outright libel, sensationalism,

and gruesome copy. Together with Revolución, these newspapers continued in the same role that they had played during the Batista regime, this time as the sycophants and mouthpieces of the Castro tryanny.

From the very beginning, Revolución, La Calle, and Combate had access to government sources of information denied to independent newspapers. Government offices, police, military and judicial organizations, government investigative agencies, and the like would permit only reporters and photographers from those three newspapers to secure on-the-spot information. The rest of the independent press was forced, in numerous cases, to copy the slanted, erroneous, and false information that appeared in the government-controlled press.

There is no doubt that these Castro newspapers were operating at an enormous deficit. They did not carry appreciable advertising from the commercial and business sectors of Cuba; their circulation did not grow to expected levels—indeed, it fell off after the first few euphoric weeks—and the government poured funds into the depleted treasuries of the dailies.

Step 2. Defamation and Discreditation

In January of 1959, Fidel Castro himself undertook to neutralize the power of one of the most effective press organs that fought against the Batista regime: the humorous weekly, Zig-Zag. This weekly, probably the most popular newspaper of its kind in Cuba, wielded the weapon of ridicule with deadly results.

That January, it published a cartoon which depicted the professional "politicos" of the Batista era, following a parade led by Castro. The cartoon was in no way detrimental to Castro; quite the contrary. Yet realizing the power that might be loosed against him in the future, he raged publicly at Zig-Zag, threatened a public boycott of the weekly, and succeeded in permanently intimidating its publisher and editors. His action was criticized in only one newspaper, the Times of Havana, where Carlos Todd called the spectacle censorship and intimidation.

Not another voice of protest was heard. The Cuban press did not understand that if such coercion and intimidation could be applied to any one of its members, the others were also open to similar attacks by Castro and the government.

The defamation campaign was aimed directly at all independent newspapers and their publishers and editors. Revolución published a list which alleged that enterprises and individuals in the press had been receiving hush money from the Batista regime. The list appeared on the stationery of the Presidential Palace; but without date or signature. The effrontery of the entire apocryphal document was made more evident by the listing of men who had been dead for several years as among those receiving government bribes. Nevertheless, it was accepted as gospel truth by the delirious and credulous people of Cuba.

Yet the Cuban press which did not at the time protest the coercion and intimidation of the weekly Zig-Zag (although it was evident that if it could be applied to one, it could be applied to any), made no comment on the spurious document which the Communists foisted on an unsuspecting and receptive public. True, the public mood would not have brooked such comment.

The government did not debate a thesis; it insulted. It did not tolerate independent opinions; it viciously attacked the man or the enterprise that voiced them, no matter how discreet or respectful they might be.

When the official anti-American campaign began early in the Castro regime, those who disagreed with this policy were called servants of Yankee imperialism, paid by the State Department. It was impossible to demand proof of the accusations or to appeal to the courts of the land, which had been "purged" of all elements which might be considered not even hostile, but merely independent.

In March 1959, Castro flourished an edition of the large evening daily, Prensa Libre, before a throng gathered at the plaza of the Alameda de Paula, accusing its editor and publisher, Sergio Carbó, of undermining the prestige of the revolution when he condemned the mass dismissal of government workers from different ministries. The maneuver was really dictated by Carbó's constant insistence that general elections be held at the earliest possible moment. Diario de La Marina, which also espoused the cause of free and honest elections, as promised by Castro, was submitted to similar treatment.

As time went on, the campaign of defamation and discreditation reached undreamed-of heights; with insult, calumny, libel, false accusations, fabrications, and every Communist method of vilification being employed. Even the little Times of Havana was not immune. In July 1959, its political editor was sued by the then President Urrutia for libel, when the former revealed the true details of the purchase of a house by the ex-President. It became evident then that it was the Communists, and not Urrutia, who had encouraged the libel suit. The suggestion came from Carlos Olivares Sánchez, then the President's legal counsel, later to show himself to be a faithful party member. The suit was arranged to coincide, and was part of the plot to oust Urrutia from the presidency. Olivares who went on to become the Communists' top man in the ministry of foreign affairs, is now Cuban Ambassador to Soviet Russia.

Agustín Tamargo of Avance, Carlos Robreño, of El Mundo, and other prominent newsmen were publicly castigated by Fidel Castro on television, at a time when such action precluded them from continuing to work as independent journalists.

Young Enrique Llaca, Jr. (now an invasion prisoner in Cuba) was thrown into jail, in June 1959, for daring to write his independent opinion in Diario de La Marina. He was miraculously freed on the presention of a writ of habeas corpus, since the government did not feel that such unwarranted imprisonment would be tolerated without public protest by all dailies at that time. He was ordered rearrested immediately upon his release; and had to take refuge in a foreign embassy.

Step 3. Economic strangulation

The new regime did not waste time in attacking the financial foundations of the independent newspapers; circulation and advertising. All official paid government propaganda and publicity—and there was considerable early in 1959—was denied to independent newspapers. Enormous pressure was brought to bear upon important advertisers to retire their ads from these newspapers, or to reduce the number of advertising lines.

The government maintained that independent newspapers were "counter revolutionary, and enemies of the people"; and therefore they should not be permitted to circulate. In 1959 and in early 1960, there were many abuses tolerated in Cuba by the Communists, who wished to sow disunity and nurture social and racial conflicts in the country. Abuses were also committed in the name of "revolutionary law," which permitted members of the government and the armed forces to loot and steal at will. The slightest protest by the newspapers brought down torrents of accusations. The independent press was "at the service of war criminals of the Batista regime"; or else they were charged with being slaves of the "Yankee monopolies."

As time went on, the greatest sin that could be committed by a newspaper was to attack communism. This became official government policy after a speech made by Juan Marinello, one of the leading Cuban Communists, who stated publicly that it was "treason to attack communism." A shocked press, clergy, and public witnessed the ratification of this statement in March and April of 1960, in the pages of the government's official newspaper Revolución. A few days later, Fidel Castro himself made the same statement on television.

The economic strangulation campaign brought the newspapers Excelsior, El País, and El Crisol to their knees. They were forced to cease publication simply because they ran out of money; and immediately after they published their last edition, the presses were "occupied" by the Communists in their labor unions, who graciously turned the buildings and presses over to the Revolution.

Step 4. Coercion and violence

Both coercion and violence, favorite weapons of a Communist dictatorship, were employed early in the campaign of infiltration, subversion, and destruction of the independent Cuban press by the Communists. Following the time-honored method of plucking the artichoke, leaf by leaf, the methods employed were at first subtle in the extreme; and later erupted in outright force.

Communist agitators throughout the island began a campaign of coercion by burning newspapers as they arrived, off the delivery trucks. Nationally distributed papers, like Prensa Libre, El Mundo, Diario de La Marina, and Avance, had edition after edition burnt by street "mobs" carefully organized for the purpose.

Symbolic burials were also a favorite tactic, with crude coffins bearing the name of the newspaper, being paraded through the streets to the local cemetery. Along with Diario de La Marina, Prensa Libre and Avance, some American publications were also subjected to these mock ceremonies. Inevitably, the "burials" always ended with impassioned speeches by party members, with the local Municipal Commissioner (The title given to city mayors by the revolution) winding up the occasion with condemnatory words.

Drivers of delivery trucks and newsboys were subjected to a studied campaign of terror. The incidents were designed to discourage the delivery of independent newspapers to subscribers. Vigorous protests by the press were completely ignored by government authorities.

In July of 1959, a well-organized and disciplined group of men descended from trucks in front of the offices of the Diario de La Marina, opposite the National Capitol, in the very center of the

city. Bearing red flags, and armed with heavy clubs, they gathered at the entrance to the newspaper. Their arrival was well timed to coincide with the arrival of the newspaper's editor and publisher, José I. Rivero, who always got to his office at the same hour every day. The trained mob hurled insults and threats at Rivero when he entered the building, but did not attempt outright violence. Not a single policeman was present, where normally dozens were stationed. The warning could not have been clearer. Rivero refused to be intimidated, and continued to speak his editorial mind. Shortly afterward, he had to take precautions, and was forced to sleep in a different location every night.

The more open the attacks became, the more people were terrified at the thought of continuing their subscription to the independent newspapers. Avance became another victim, when its circulation figures toppled and the paper had to close its doors in January 1960. Again the Communist controlled press unions "occupied" the building and turned the daily over to "the revolution."

Step 5. Control of press unions

To carry out its offensive against the free press, the government found it convenient to make use of the backing of the labor unions in these enterprises. Understandably enough, the majority of the personnel of the independent newspapers did not submit willingly to government pressure. The official press in Cuba had never prospered; and the prospect of lower salaries as government employees did not appeal to the reporters, graphic workers, and other branches of the trade.

The government employed the same tactics that it had carried out so successfully in other labor unions. Union elections were rigged beforehand; and while the majority voted for the candidates of their choice (all non-Communists), where difficulties were enountered, Communist candidates assumed offices by intimidation, coercion, threats, and outright violence.

Once in control of the labor unions and the press association, this small minority was able to exert fearful pressure on the majority of the employees, who remained loyal to the enterprises.

However, it became a relatively simple matter for the Communists and their followers to apply pressure to their fellow employees. Again there was coercion, intimidation, and threats. Men were warned that they would be dismissed from their jobs by the union, who would then see to it that they did not obtain further employment in the trade. Threats of physical violence, personally and against immediate relatives, served to silence the more timid.

In the case of Prensa Libre, for example, more than 80 percent of its personnel—journalists, employees, and workmen—signed a declaration backing the enterprise, in the very midst of the paper's polemic with the government. The declaration was published by the paper; and, on the following day, the personnel was called to the offices of the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC).

At a 7-hour meeting presided by David Salvador (then head of the CTC), Prensa Libre's" entire staff was forced to retract their declaration, declaring that "what they backed was the decision of the secretary of their union, granting him a vote of total confidence." The secretary, of course, was a Communist working hand in glove with

the government; and the assembly was conveniently ringed by armed rebel army soldiers.

At that same assembly, the personnel of the paper was invited to visit Fidel Castro, at the offices of Revolución, at 1 o'clock in the morning. A minority accepted the invitation, only to hear Castro repeat that "you workers cannot side with management, no matter how well paid you are, because management is your enemy." Castro added ominously that those workers "who strayed from the revolutionary line" would be dismissed; and, in some cases, jailed as "traitors to the people and the revolution." There is very little argument that can be presented by a newspaper employee against these totalitarian methods of persuasion.

Step 6. Other provocative measures

While the campaign of defamation was at its height, newspapers were being burned, symbolic burials carried out, and the unions smashed by coercion and intimidation, someone dreamt up a sure-fire method to exasperate and provoke the management of the independent newspapers.

The now famous "coletillas" (insulting footnotes added to each editorial and/or news story by Communists in the linotype room and others in the press room) appeared to plague editors and publishers.

The two unions that controlled the press—the Press Association (Colegio Nacional de Periodistas) and the Graphic Arts Union (Sindicato de Artes Gráficas)—approved a resolution which sanctioned the insertion of an explanatory note at the end of wire stories, denying the veracity of the information. The measure caught on rapidly, and editorials and articles which appeared in the independent press also carried derogatory statements inserted at the end of those columns.

The purpose of the move was so to enrage publishers and editors at this unheard of tampering with freedom of opinion, that they would refuse to continue publication in the face of such total lack of respect for management and such crass coercion. If management refused to continue publication, then the government could allege a lockout and legally take over the enterprise, according to the new labor "laws" enacted by the Communists.

The explanatory footnotes carried no signature; and were imposed on each newspaper by a small group of Communists, who had already successfully intimidated the remaining personnel of the paper.

The protest was violent and instant. Prensa Libre, Diario de La Marina, Avance, El Crisol, El Mundo, the Times of Havana, all reacted against the imposition of this form of oblique censorship, designed to discredit the American wire services and the management of the independent newspapers, besides interfering intolerably with the editorial function of the press.

The furore reached its height in January 1960, when reduced circulation, plus the unbearable provocation of the "coletillas" brought about the close of the newspaper Avance. Its editor, Jorge Zayas, sought asylum in a foreign embassy. In order to embarrass Zayas, and to dupe people into believing that a "free press" still existed, the government publicly proclaimed that Avance's editor was not wanted for any crime, and that he was entirely free to leave Cuba without hindrance.

This brought about another maneuver against columnist Carlos Todd, of the Times of Havana, when he was threatened with arrest

within 24 hours. The government hoped that he would feel driven to seek asylum; and planned then to declare that the newsman was perfectly free to leave or stay in the country. When Todd did not seek asylum, no action was taken against him.

Prensa Libre, Diario de La Marina, and Información continued to publish daily, despite the "coletillas." The first two stated that they considered the imposition an honor, which brought about a curious public reaction. The "coletilla" business backfired when the public specially began reading those news stories or articles which carried the footnotes. Diario de La Marina cleverly began keeping a box score of "coletillas" as they appeared in each paper that was subjected to the degrading practice.

The Cuban people began to laugh at the measure; but, with Avance, one more paper had succumbed to the government attack.

Step 7. Confiscation of publisher's properties

Eventually the Communists decided that the time had come to destroy El Mundo, owned by wealthy Amadeo Barletta, who had numerous business interests besides the newspaper. The government "intervened" (i.e. confiscated) Barletta's channel 2 television station, his large automobile import business, and other numerous enterprises; his bank funds were frozen; and his safety deposit box sealed. He was accused of the usual "collaboration with Batista." The accusation became ridiculous when it is considered that the Ministry for the Recuperation of Malversated Properties had thoroughly investigated Barletta's assets and had found nothing irregular.

Overnight, Barletta became a public enemy. The government-controlled press published photographs of the publisher at palace receptions being greeted by a cordial Batista. He was vilified and defamed to the extent that he sought refuge in the Italian Embassy (Barletta is an Italian national) when he felt that his personal safety was threatened.

The instant that Barletta sought asylum, the government permanently confiscated El Mundo and all his other properties. It must be understood that El Mundo had not criticized the regime, and had maintained a discreet silence about all the repressive measures taken by the government against the independent press. Its editorials did not carry a single word of condemnation for governmental abuses, nor did it raise its voice in anger against the Communists. The seizure of El Mundo came merely because its time, in the Communist itinerary, had arrived.

Step 8. The final offensive

In May 1960 there were only three Havana newspapers left which openly fought the government: the two large papers, Prensa Libre and Diario de La Marina and the miniscule Times of Havana. The Times, being an English-language newspaper, did not reach the masses; and the government made excellent use of hostile articles which appeared in the small paper to prove to visiting American, British, and Canadian journalists that freedom of the press existed in Cuba.

By this time, the goverment had taken off the gloves and began to pummel Diario de La Marina and Prensa Libre unmercifully. The most infamous insults were personally hurled by Fidel Castro against Diario's publisher, Jose I. Rivero. Raul Castro called the editors of Prensa Libre traitors to the revolution. The entire apparatus of repression of the Communists was concentrated on these two papers.

While readying the final assault on Diario, the government approached the editors of Prensa Libre through a third party, offering an "armistice." The alternative was the destruction of the paper as an independent organ of public opinion. The purpose of the maneuver was clear: to neutralize the editorial comment of Prensa Libre, while the rape of Diario de La Marina was carried out.

The "armistice" was refused, and the government attack renewed its fury against both newspapers. Ther terms "conspirators" and "enemies of the revolution" were constantly used against the management of the dailies; and, under a press behaviour law passed in November 1960, both classifications carried with them severe penal sentences.

The end of Diario de La Marina and of Prensa Libre began on the night of Tuesday, May 10, 1960. The Communists had not succeeded in silencing the two remaining enterprises by the means which they had so successfully employed to destroy other publications. Faced with an impasse, they resorted—as they always will when confronted by firm opposition—to force.

That evening, around 11 p.m., Diario de La Marina was being readied to go to press for the morning edition. This edition was to include a letter, subscribed by practically the totality of the employees of the paper, and due to appear in the rotogravure section of the publication. The letter merely expressed the solidarity of the employees with the management, against the recent attacks made on it by José Pardo Llada, government mouthpiece of the airwaves, and a master of vicious invective and defamation.

News of the intended publication of the letter was leaked to the Communist forces in the government by the small group of Reds in the paper. Before the paper could go to press, a group of armed men appeared, and proceeded to destroy the lead press cylinder which contained the letter. These armed persons were in civilian clothes, and did not form part of the personnel of the paper. A quick call to the police brought no results; and the authorities did not lift a finger to prevent the outrage.

The official explanation was that the employees of Diario had decided to take over the paper. It was one thing for the editor of Diario to criticize and rebut the government's official mouthpiece, Pardo Llada. It was a very different thing to have the near totality of the employees of the Diario do so.

The government could not tolerate a public demonstration of unity between the management and the employees, in the form of an open letter, published prominently in the paper.

The management was forced to leave the offices of Diario, and groups of armed Communists remained in control of the paper, without the slightest interference from the government. When publisher Rivero wrote a letter to the Cuban Press Association, protesting the armed invasion and occupation of his newspaper, the association refused to make the document public. The same letter, addressed to the Union of Graphic Arts, brought the same results.

On the evening of May 11, Prensa Libre published an editorial vogorously protesting the seizure of its colleague, pointing out that there was nothing in Cuban law (revolutionary or otherwise) that could justify or permit such arrogant aggression. The last paragraph of that editorial signed the death warrant of Prensa Libre when it said, "We are for liberty * * * for the Constitution * * * for the

Christian faith * * * for free journalism. *We are against communism*, and any system of procedure which ignores or infringes on the rights of citizens."

The Times of Havana also protested the seizure stating, "We have arrived at the last resort. If a man cannot be silenced by vicious press attacks; if a man cannot be silenced by threats and insults; if a man cannot be silenced because he believes that it is his inalienable right to speak, then the use of force, naked, armed force, must be employed. And if the government cannot and will not protect a man, then the gun has become the law of the land" * * *

Información, a large morning daily which had lain totally dormant since January 1959, finally found the courage to open its mouth and also protested the seizure of Diario.

The end of Prensa Libre came 6 days later, on the 16th of May, 1960. On Thursday, May 12, a symbolic burial of Diario de La Marina was held on the steps of the University of Havana. On that occasion, Prensa Libre protested the hideous travesty which celebrated the end of freedom of the press in Cuba. The government's paper Revolución countered by publishing an editorial entitled, "Prensa Libre takes the road of Diario de La Marina". The death sentence had been passed. Comandante Quevedo, a Communist "student" leader at the university asked, "When do we bury Prensa Libre?"

The entire press of the government trained its guns on the agonizing newspaper. Editorials appeared, "The voice of the traitor, Prensa Libre;" "Now it's the turn of the traitors in Prensa Libre."

On May 16, the same process that took place at Diario de La Marina occurred at the offices and presses of Prensa Libre. The newspaper was invaded by armed militia—not members of the paper's personnel—who told the city editor that it would not permit the appearance of an editorial in that day's edition, because it contained "subversive material." By evening, with the presses still idle (Prensa Libre was an afternoon paper), members of the government repressive arm, the G–2, arrived and surrounded the building. The editors of the paper, Ulises Carbó (now an invasion prisoner in Cuba) and Humberto Medrano, warned of the coming cataclysm, managed to evade police and G–2 vigilance, and took refuge in the Panamanian Embassy.

Prensa Libre was invaded and the end of the free press in Cuba was accomplished. The paper was a valued prize. Since January 1959, Revolución had greedily eyed the modern German presses of Prensa Libre.

Two independent newspapers were left after the fall of Prensa Libre: Información, which returned to its discreet and total silence, after a brief sally in defense of Diario de La Marina; and the very small Times of Havana, which continued to attack the regime unceasingly.

But the Communists were becoming tired of even a small voice in the wilderness; and in October 1960, the political writer of the Times, Carlos Todd, was forced to flee into exile, when faced with arrest by the G–2.

In November 1960, both Información and the now silent Times of Havana succumbed to the inevitable. Repeatedly, the government cut down in the supply of newsprint, until the once multipaged Informaciòn was reduced to penury. The Times simply ran out of money and subscribers. Freedom of the press was dead in Cuba, deliberately suffocated by international communism.

The Communist plan for the infiltration, subversion, and eventual destruction of the press of the hemisphere has not changed. On June 29th 1961, Carlos Olivares Sánchez (then Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, now Cuban Ambassador to Moscow) outlined the master plan in a letter for Guillermo León, at the time Cuban Chargé d'Affaires at their Embassy in Buenos Aires. This document is translated as follows:

HAVANA, *June 29, 1961.*

YEAR OF EDUCATION

Esteemed comrade: In the revolutionary concept, the struggle to destroy definitively the most powerful instrument used by the dominating oligarchies, *the press*, must have its own characteristics and be in agreement with the situation and atmosphere in each country. In this vital task, we need the most powerful and suitable organizations to cooperate with the Cuban revolution, and to open all possibilities to the new plans which, following our victorious experience, have been designed for all Latin America.

That is why, and in accord with the studies carried out by the Institute for the Friendship of Peoples and suggestions offered by several comrades who know the press situation in South America well, we have designed a plan based on the following:

1. Create our own labor section in each newspaper enterprise which should infiltrate in all places of work the mystique of the invincibility of the Cuban revolution, and maintain a heroic aureole around the figure of our maximum leader, Major Dr. Fidel Castro. One must also insist that capitalism is in crisis and that it is necessary to contain the aggressions of Yankee imperialism against underdeveloped and semicolonial peoples by a coordinated and disciplined action, in which each militant should become a zealous vigilante of the interests of the Socialist revolution.

2. To better further their mission, the leaders of each labor section should offer short conferences bringing emphasis on that one theme; and they should spread the slogans of the struggle, and propaganda material.

3. Produce a hypertrophy in the economy of the privileged and exploiting enterprises by means of: (*a*) New (labor) demands; (*b*) affect productivity; (*c*) increase all the expenses of the enterprise by a patient sabotage of materials, machines, and spare parts; (*d*) prepare the conscience of the working classes for the creation of a single labor organization to include graphic workers, photographers, journalists, and newsboys; in turn, this organization will take charge of handling the press at the right moment; (*e*) carry on a campaign of defamation against publishers, editors, and chiefs of departments in all places of work; (*f*) foment rivalries between the enterprises and between the chiefs of departments in each place of work.

At this moment, we are holding a series of conferences to prepare a group of graphic and journalist comrades to enable them to transmit, to their comrades in Latin America, their experiences, which led to the Cuban revolution and to a definite success over a press which considered itself one of the most powerful and best organized.

With revolutionary greetings of "Death or Fatherland," I am,

Fraternally yours,

DR. CARLOS OLIVARES SÁNCHEZ,
Acting Minister of Foreign Relations.

The similarity between these instructions and the general pattern that was followed in Cuba is notable. While the Communists are not in power in a country, military occupation of newspapers is impossible, but the campaign of defamation is faithfully followed; economic strangulation awaits eventual Communist takeover; premeditated acts of violence are carried out whenever possible; several Latin American press associations and press unions are today entirely controlled by the Communists, and the campaign to provoke internal dissension within the newspapers and to sabotage machinery is being carried out whenever possible.

The success of the plan in Cuba encourages its application elsewhere; and false favorable reports from journalists visiting the island have been added, to throw a smokescreen before the eyes of the hemisphere.

The hour is late, and the enemy works ceaselessly for the destruction of the free press in the Americas. He is successfully undermining from within the powerful organs of communication that help to sway the thoughts of millions of people. The brainwashing continues. As his success increases, so does his audacity; for communism is nothing but the product of the apathy of the many and the audacity of the few.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF POWER AND THE PRESS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1945–1948

By Petr Zenkl [1]

The Czechoslovak case is much more complicated than many others. Within a turbulent 10-year period no less than four distinct political phases may be identified: Democratic institutions (to 1938); the Nazi occupation (1939–45); the National Front era (1945–48); and the Communist rape (February 1948). The development naturally conditioned situations in which the Czechoslovak press was to function; these situations ranged from full freedom to complete enslavement.

The ways which the Communists utilized to interfere with the press freedom of non-Communist parties were so many that, given the length limit of this report, only some selected instances may reasonably be given.

(1) ECHOES OF A GOLDEN ERA: THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1918–38

Every state, being the product of human endeavor, is an imperfect work; Czechoslovakia, situated at the very center of European cross-currents, did not escape her share of problems and faults during the interwar period. Yet the state was an island of freedom in a sea of more or less totalitarian regimes, a home of basic human rights, and the most perfect democracy east of Switzerland. The presidency of Thomas G. Masaryk approached the realization of Plato's ideal of a philosopher-ruler, and Edvard Beneš proved to be his worthy successor. Humanitarian government became the hallmark of Czechoslovak political thought and practice.

Adopting the first constitution of 1920, Czechoslovak political leaders were mindful of the nation's own experience as well as of the achievements of Western states, making use of the American Declaration of Independence in particular. This constitution embraced a very modern formulation of fundamental rights of man, resembling that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. Legislation and administrative practice conformed to the letter and spirit of the constitution.

Freedom of the press was guaranteed. Precensorship of the press became a part of constitutional prohibitions. The legal system did allow repressive censorship and administrative seizure of printed matter in specified cases; e.g., offenses against state security. Such censorship can not be effected before the actual distribution of the paper has begun, and judicial safeguards and remedies were always present.

---

[1] Petr Zenkl is the former Lord-Mayor of Prague, member of the two last democratic Cabinets of the Czechoslovak Republic before the Second World War, Czechoslovak Vice Premier during the 2 years which preceded the Communist putsch of February 1948, chairman of the largest anti-Communist party in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party; he has been living in exile in the United States since 1948 and holds the office of president of the Executive Committee of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

The rights of learning, research, conviction, assembly, and press were taken for granted, particularly by the Nazis and Communists who exploited their freedom in order to destroy it. Klement Gottwald, the future President of Communist Czechoslovakia, had this to say to his democratic fellow parliamentarians on December 21, 1929: "You say that we are fighting against the state. Yes. We violate the laws and we are going to violate the laws. You say that we are disrupting the Army. Yes. We are disrupting the Army. You say that we agitate and disrupt the peace. Yes. We agitate and disrupt your peace. Finally, you say that we take orders from Moscow. And we, we are the party of the Czechoslovak proletariat and our highest revolutionary staff really is in Moscow. And we go to Moscow—what do you think? We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to wring your necks. And you know the Russian Bolsheviks are past masters at that! * * *"

The promise was fulfilled in 1948.

(2) THE CLOUDS HAVE GATHERED: PRESS AND THE FACTS OF POLITICAL CLIMATE, 1945

There were two overriding factors present in the Czechoslovak situation at the end of the Second World War: (1) A political and cultural "vacuum" resulting from the facts of Nazi destruction of prewar democratic institutions and their consequent replacement by totalitarian patterns in practically all spheres of public life, followed by the immediate reversal and annihilation of all things Nazi, once the land was liberated; and (2) the circumstance of the country's nearly complete occupation by Soviet forces.

The Nazi heritage involved the necessity of a general economic and social reconstruction, and left a yawning split in the body politic between resistance fighters and Nazi prisoners on one hand, and Nazi collaborators (whether voluntary or not) on the other hand. There was a profound breach between the London and Moscow wartime exile groups. Historical development of the politico-military events of war has placed Czechoslovakia under Soviet domination. For the time being, Moscow did not want to take over power in Czechoslovakia by force (for both internal and external political reasons), but preferred a regime which, though democratic, would insure Czechoslovak Communists such factual overbalance of power as would secure a reasonable certainty of Communist takeover whenever this appeared desirable. Main consequences of this decision came to operate in the Nazi-vacated situation along, for instance, the following lines:

The six permitted political parties had to function within an all-embracing coalition called the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks; all problems were to be resolved *inside* this front to which no formal parliamentary opposition was to be allowed. All but one of the Czech prewar right-of-center parties were banned. Appointive provincial and local governments were replaced by preponderantly Communist "people's committees." Almost all voluntary associations of mass appeal and importance were fused into centralized all-state unions. Whipped-up centralization under the leadership of the national front became a device for Communist infiltration and dominance.

Under Soviet pressure, Czechoslovak Communists were allocated decisive power positions in the new postwar cabinet: the *police* with its military-type units; its investigatory, arrest, and intelligence functions (obtaining, importantly, the Nazi-period police archives); *information and propaganda* including state monopolies of broadcasting, news service, motion pictures, newsprint allocation, etc.; *agricultural matters* involving the confiscation and redistribution of land; *education* with all its obvious implications; *control of armed forces* whereof top command consisted mainly of pro-Communist and fellow-traveling generals; as well as a condominium in the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*.

Wartime Czechoslovak Communists had concentrated on organizational buildup rather than anti-Nazi resistance. The reverse was true of Czechoslovak democrats. Hence, Communist politicians and agitators were ready to move at once into the Nazi-left vacuum. Assisted by Soviet funds and pressure, and by Red Army and NKVD officers, the Communists took a practically exclusive initiative of constructing mass organizations, the people's committees, armed "Revolutionary Guard" units, and factory militias. Communist and fellow-traveling dominance characterized most of the influential mass organizations throughout the 1945–48 period: the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Czechoslovak Youth Union, Union of Czechoslovak Resistance Fighters, Union of Liberated Political Prisoners, and others.

The Soviet dictate was not restricted to the composition and structure of political and social life, but extended to the total reconstruction program of the new "people's democracy." The government program postulated a large-scale nationalization of medium and heavy industry, placed under the direction of a left-wing Social Democrat. The program called for an insoluble bond with the Soviet Union. Further, an official cleansing of all public life through removal and punishment of Nazi collaborators became one of the program's points.

It was under such and similar factors that the postwar democratic press had to function. Its works and difficulties form the subject of subsequent chapters.

(3) THE COMMUNIST PATTERN OF PRESS EXPLOITATION

The 1945-48 Communist objectives in the area of press affairs may perhaps best be judged by reference to the press system which the Communists instituted once they had seized unrestricted power to do so. As will be seen, establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the end of journalism as a free profession.

In formal terms, the Communist 1948 Czechoslovak Constitution guaranteed freedom of the press, stipulating, however, that the exercise of this right as well as the right itself are subject to legislative regulation and limitations. Actually, legislative acts respecting the press amount to rubber stamping of decisions made by the Agitation and Propaganda section of the Communist Party's Central Committee (the *agitprop*).

The function of the press has been defined to center on the indoctrination of the people in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and on implementation of party policies. All journalists must show "militant partisanship and ideological purity" and wage "a systematic struggle

against opinions hostile to the cause of socialism." The Press Act of December 20, 1950, has removed the possibility of any independent papers, stipulating that publication activities are limited to the government, approved political parties, and similar official and semi-official bodies. No newspaper or periodical may be published without a license from the Ministry of Information (lately, the Ministry of Education and Culture as well as the Press Division of the Government Presidium have exercised press control functions); the Ministry has been accorded formal control of the press and state monopoly of the supply of information: the Czechoslovak Press Agency (ČTK) and the Slovak News Agency (ZAS) operate within the framework of the Ministry. The law states further that the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists which, prior to 1958, could not even adopt its own statutes (these were issued by the Ministry of Education and Enlightenment up to 1958), is assigned to see to it that editors fulfill their duties, and the law reasserts as well that only members of this union may be employed as editors. The Ministry of Information was designated to supervise the union's activities. In addition, the entire distribution of the press of political parties of the National Front has been handled by the Ministry of Communications since 1953.

The party's *agitprop*, reaching through the media of state apparatus, the journalists' union, and the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, controls the career, livelihood, and the very safety of each individual press employee. Editors in chief have been made personally responsible for the observance of authoritative guidance. Each paper is supplied with press releases and directives, dictating such matters as format, emphasis, etc., in addition to the content, of the news. These orders, originating in the *agitprop*, are handed down through the transmission levels of the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Press Division of the Government Presidium, and the Czechoslovak and Slovak Press Agencies. The Communist Party manages its own press directly, while all other press became subject to the above control devices.

Editorial offices are staffed with Communists and proven fellow travelers. Scores, indeed hundreds of undesirable democrats had been removed from press employment after the 1948 coup. Many were imprisoned and relegated to hard labor, while hastily trained Communist Party secretaries and hundreds of reliable "village" and "factory" correspondents were recruited to fill the press corps gap. The main force of the "rejuvenated" journalist body in Czechoslovakia came to consist of Moscow's obedient servants and former Nazi collaborators, ardently performing for their new protectors and masters.

The purification of personnel was accompanied by an overall purge and streamlining of papers: the post-putsch period witnessed the discontinuation of some 360 newspapers and periodicals, as Jaroslav Veselý, a Czechoslovak Communist writer, admitted in 1961. According to this Communist source, the share of the Communist Party in both the total circulation (i.e., the number of copies printed) and paper consumption amounted to 88 percent of the corresponding Czechoslovak press total in 1959. The remaining figure of 12 percent of the newsprint allocation, allowed to "nonparty" press, may serve as a yardstick of repression to which the non-Communist majority of the population has been subjected, as well as an indicator of Communist

efforts at indoctrination. Even this small segment of the press, however, is Communist dominated, and Communist Veselý attests to the fact: "Already not only the Communist press but an overwhelming majority of all the press openly recognizes the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Also the press which is formally nonpartisan * * * actually becomes partisan by its contents * * * and serves the cause of the workers' class."

The Communist press system has virtually no need of formal censorship, relying on several safety factors which include: (1) the presence and intransigence of trusted Communists who are a part of all editorial offices, official press agencies, and competent Ministries; (2) immediate responsibility of editors for what they make public; (3) a careful selection process as regards all editorial employees; and (4) a swift and strict punishment of editors' errors of judgment, "sabotage," or "treason."

Freedom of the press has been retained as a solemn principle—an empty shell mocking the higher aspirations of mankind.

(4) DEMOCRATIC PRESS AND COMMUNIST SUBVERSION: THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXPERIENCE, 1945–48

Making full use of its power positions in government, mass organizations, and professional organizations, coupled with overt and covert interventions by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovak affairs, the Communist Party had staked out an initial (1945–47) strategy of obtaining an absolute popular majority by what might, in absence of closer scrutiny, pass for nonviolent, parliamentary means. Absolute power, thus won, might then be described as a "legitimate" validation of the party's claim that it represented the will of the people. Nonviolent ascent to full control, moreover, would cast no untoward shadows into postwar political developments in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy, which were being viewed by Soviet rulers with some degree of hopefulness. In short, the Czechoslovak political system was to be communized by total infiltration and pressure rather than by outright recourse to naked force. Such factors of Communist advantage as those that had been noted in chapter 2, were combined into a tactical pattern of accentuated pressure and intimidation which, the party hoped, would deliver the country into Communist hands. This pressure pattern operated in all significant spheres of public life—each sphere, of course, reacting to changes occurring anywhere in the political system. Press affairs therefore cannot but be considered within this larger frame of reference.

The prewar Czechoslovak press system was, in some ways, different from the American press situation. Except for two or three notable cases, there was no independent, privately owned daily press; as a rule, a man would buy and read the daily paper of his own political party, centrally published in one of the few capital cities of Czechoslovakia. No truly local dailies existed; a regional party paper consisted, in the main, of the bulk of the party's central paper, with some deletions and with the addition of several pages of regional interest. To see to the editorial and administrative needs of its regional papers, a party would customarily run a branch office of its central paper in the various regional centers. Czechoslovak journalists used to enjoy a high degree of prestige, the "editor" title was protected by law, and press work did often supply a base for social prominence and political career.

During the 1945–48 period, press conditions in Slovakia were not altogether comparable to those which prevailed in the two western provinces (Bohemia and Moravia). The Slovak press operated in a situation which permitted a somewhat larger measure of free choice—a circumstance which was partly due to the fact that the Commissioner of Information (the equivalent of the national Minister of Information within the competence of Slovak self-governing institutions) was, since 1946, a member of the anti-Communist Slovak Democratic Party. Because of this difference, and in view of the fact that developments in the Czech provinces proved to be of crucial importance for the whole state, further discussion will chiefly be based on the press pattern of Bohemia and Moravia.

Press objectives of the Communist Party revolved around the subversion of democratic papers and journalists through infiltration, intimidation, corruption, denial of adequate material resources, and elimination. These devices were to serve as means toward the larger end; a totalitarian press organization along the lines described in the preceding chapter.

In Communist terms, the total sum of Communist pressure came to be exerted from at least three major directions of immediate contact: (1) a *downward pressure;* e.g., Communist executive-power holders (Ministers etc.) affecting the informal substrata of democratic political parties, significant associations, and, rather more "downward" yet, the mass of non-Communist citizenry. A similar relationship would obtain between the Communist or pro-Communist leadership of a mass organization and the broad layer of Czechoslovak democrats; (2) an *upward pressure;* e.g., Communist-manipulated and enforced protest wires, letters, delegations, demonstrations, and strikes which were alleged to represent the opinion and will of the total population of an area or enterprise in which the action has been originated, or which would claim a nationwide strength if such were desired. An ultimatum, flung in the face of the President of the Republic or the National Front coalition by the Communist leaders of a mass organization (such as the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement), would properly fall into this category. Another typical example might be a visit of the editorial office of a democratic party paper by a delegation of (Communist and fellow-traveling) workers claiming to voice the "popular will" of a population class or segment, or of the whole population altogether; and (3) a *lateral or horizontal pressure;* e.g., attempts to affect "coordinate" levels, such as an attempt by a political party to infiltrate press organs of another party, or efforts of a political party or a mass organization to penetrate one another's policymaking points and other positions of significance.

As a consequence of extraordinary political conditions in 1945, Czechoslovak Communists were catapulted into decisive executive positions (in terms of press affairs, the Communist-held Ministries of Information and of the Interior were of special importance), and into effective dominance of influential mass organizations (the Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak Unions of Journalists, as well as the centralized trade union movement, represented one of the crucial factors in the press situation). With the connivance of the Social Democratic Party leadership which suffered from a substantial infiltration of fellow-traveling and actually Communist elements up to the Social Democratic Party Congress of November 1947, the Communists were able to

influence or at least paralyze the National Front coalition. The local "people's committees" and the works councils fell largely under Communist domination. A substantial percentage of the population found the 1945 developments perplexing and disgusting, and the widespread reaction of popular malaise which resulted from Nazi oppression played into Communist hands. Thus it happened that the Communist Party was in fact able to manipulate all three types of pressure approaches discussed above.

Communist *downward pressure* applied to the democratic press included the following practices and mechanisms:

(1) The subjection of all press to the authority of a central Ministry of Information controlling certain vital aspects of press affairs. While a communist press bill which, due to opposition of democratic parties, was never enacted in the 1945–48 period, this Ministry reached for extra-legal means to attain its ends: the necessary pretext was supplied by scarcity of newsprint which the Ministry's Publications Bureau started to allocate. Control was exercised over: (*a*) Total newspaper and magazine circulation; (*b*) number and size of pages; (*c*) time and periods of publication; (*d*) total number of periodicals; (*e*) nature and number of dailies and weeklies allowable in border regions; (*f*) proportion of advertisements in the total paper space (20 percent); etc. Altogether, dailies were to be published in only six major Czech cities including Prague; no Monday and evening papers were permitted. Prices of papers, as well as ceilings on sale commissions were fixed uniformly by the Office of Price Control. Regulations concerning advertisements and price control related to Communist efforts to curb financial means of non-Communist publishers. The effects of Communist paper rationing stand out from the data relative to the 1947 circulation levels of Prague dailies, as allowed by the Information Ministry under its licensing system. On the basis of figures supplied by K. F. Zieris, the pro-Communist official of the Journalists' Union, Marxist dailies accounted for 67.29 percent, and the non-Marxist dailies for 32.71 percent, of permitted circulation and newsprint allocation in Prague. Paper allocation to Rudé Právo (the chief Communist Party daily) alone did nearly equate the combined paper allocations to all non-Marxist daily press in Prague (500,000 and 593,000 copies, respectively). Jaroslav Veselý, the Communist analyst, referred to the matter in 1961, as follows: "Between May 1945 and February 1948 the most effective instrument of control of the press in our country was the paper rationing for which was responsible the Minister of Information who was at that time a Communist * * *." Communist control of the existing stockpile of newsprint was a necessary condition for successful press regulation through rationing. Communist efforts toward paper supply monopoly may well be illustrated. On about May 20, 1945, the Red Army, acting on requests of the Communist Party secretariat which had received intelligence from Communist cells in the Melantrich Co. (the publishing house and press plant of the National Socialist Party—the largest Czech anti-Communist party), seized huge stockpiles of newsprint which the Melantrich Co. had secreted in its Stodulky warehouse during the Nazi occupation; Red troops, under the ridiculous pretext that the paper was German property, confiscated the stockpile and put it at the disposal of the Communist Party press enterprises.

The papermills of Krumlov and Česká Kamenice, while nationalized, were placed under Communist control. An ordinance of June 17, 1945, issued by the Information Ministry directed the police and local authorities (the people's committees) to seize all newsprint supplies, impounding them for future Information Ministry dispositions. Finally, the Ministry of Industry, which became infiltrated by Communist and fellow-traveling elements, saw to it that scarcity of paper continued as a Communist pretext for press regulation.

While the Communist Party press obtained all paper desired at official prices, non-Communist parties, wishing to spread their appeal through increased party press circulation, were forced to purchase additional newsprint at black-market prices; some risks and considerable drain on party finances were involved. Thus, for instance, Svobodné Slovo (the chief National Socialist daily) was being printed in 320,000 copies (with a Sunday issue of 540,000 copies) in 1948, whereas its official newsprint allocation remained set at 200,000 copies per day (prescribed size of the paper always identical). The weekly Sobota, which the Melantrich Co. printed for the Central Workers' Educational Institute, appeared in 500,000 copies. Yet not a single pound of newsprint has ever been officially allocated for this magazine. Again, black market remained the only feasible alternative. The whole system amounted to a Communist attempt at economic paralysis of non-Communist press. The Czechoslovak Christian Democratic People's Party had constant difficulties in the matter of paper allocation. According to the preputsch Secretary General of this party, Communist pressures concerning the editorial policies of Christian-democratic Obzory and other party sponsored press were enormous; during Christian Democratic-Communist negotiations over newsprint, for instance, the Communists brought forth an armful of Christian Democratic press showing marked passages which, in Communist view, were grossly impairing interparty coalition agreements. The former Secretary General of the People's Party goes on to relate: "And so I intervened at innumerable occasions in order to obtain paper rations for religious press, for perhaps all press of the publishing houses of individual orders, * * * for allocations for prayer books, for the Bible, * * * for private publishing companies. The results were desperately meager. Already then the Communists were literally killing the entire religious press. Nobody, under any circumstances, was able to obtain paper for this press."

The Communists, acting from their several bases of power and through the instrumentality of the Information Ministry, illegitimately enforced two "press principles," as follows: (*a*) Journalism is not a profit-motivated enterprise but a mission of nationwide importance; hence, no individuals will be permitted to publish newspapers; and (*b*) press affairs are to be centrally planned so as to conserve national resources and human energy. Under a policy of this kind, corporate publishing within a framework of planned press was alleged to require regulation. No privately published papers were allowed, and corporate bodies had to come to terms with the Ministry of Information. A sample of the Communist interpretation of the constitutional safeguard of the freedom of the press was provided by Mr. Zieris who stated that "we mean freedom to express opinions in the press but not the freedom of journalistic enterprise." Authoritative ceilings on what subjects may not be open to critical

public debate, such as Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and socialization, were being neurotically enforced by Communist pressures from all directions.

Further acts and functions of the Information Ministry included the following: (*a*) All papers published during wartime had to change their names; (*b*) several right-leaning papers of wide circulation and repute were suppressed; (*c*) the Ministry's assumed supervision of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists; (*d*) supervision over the official Czechoslovak Press Agency which held a monopoly on information supply and official news releases. The agency's editorial staff was almost exclusively made up of Communists; (*e*) the making of the Soviet Tass and Telepress agencies into the only source of foreign news; (*f*) keeping an index of all newspapermen; (*g*) the Ministry, jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designated press and cultural attachés to Czechoslovak Embassies; and (*h*) the Ministry controlled state monopoly of film production and the broadcasting system.

(2) Communist control of the Ministry of the Interior (as well as of an overwhelming majority of the security departments of the people's committees) meant, as has already been noted, the availability of an armed force, of the police powers of investigation and arrest, and of police archives with their wealth of wartime and other information respecting individuals and groups. These authorities, the most potent single device in the Communist arsenal, were delegated the power to open and close Nazi-collaboration cases—a power which was being used with arbitrary discrimination. Communist pressure was thus brought down on isolated men and women facing, all too often, the dreary alternatives of public disgrace, confiscation of property, imprisonment— or submission to Communist demands of cooperation. Communist protection, was as a rule, available to those who would act the role of "fifth columnists" and spies in non-Communist parties or organizations, who would desist from anti-Communist activities, who would not mind enriching Communist Party coffers, and so forth.

The 1945 retribution decrees set up a separate ad hoc system of people's courts which tried war-guilt cases prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, the mildest sentence being confiscation of property. Even a man who had been innocent of any wrongdoing in this context would have sustained frightful hardships if he had to contend with trumped-up charges, investigations, and police arrest. Intimidation, blackmail, and conditional pardon became a major Communist practice and a lever for infiltration and domination of certain segments of public life. The general feeling of lawlessness was then compounded by aggressive Communist tactics, and by the existence of extra-legal armed bands parading under the disguises of factory militias and revolutionary guards. Hardly any accusation was more damaging than to brand a man as a Fascist or a reactionary. Rudé Právo fanned the flames of terror by requesting of its readers to write down treasonable activities (e.g., anti-Russian remarks) and to file complaints with the police. Police pressure did much to intimidate and confuse the masses, and acted as a contributory factor in Communist infiltration of mass organizations, their press systems, and organs of local government. Needless to stress, persons whose records had been tinted in other ways were being blackmailed in a like manner.

The special case of the Journalists' Union merits a separate treatment. Selected instances of downward pressures exerted on individual newspapermen may now illustrate this aspect of Communist methods: (*a*) A prewar National Socialist who had been a linotypist in this party's press enterprise (the Melantrich Co.) did in fact collaborate with Nazi authorities during the war. He then became a tool of the Communist Party and, in 1945–46, managed to dominate Melantrich's works council. The man was finally unmasked and discharged, only to return during the 1948 putsch and assume executive directorship of the company. He is presently the head of Orbis, the state publishing enterprise. (*b*) A wartime correspondent of České Slovo (the predecessor of the National Socialist postwar Svobodné Slovo) was forced to report on Nazi investigations of the Katyn massacre. Fearing the retribution decree, this postwar theater page editor of Svobodné Slovo was pressured into becoming a Communist intelligence cell and a disruptive element within the National Socialist press enterprise. He too came to be uncovered and discharged. (*c*) An editor of Volné Slovo (the regional National Socialist daily published in Olomouc) was being intimidated and threatened by the Communist district attorney when he shunted pressures to stop exposing Communist bestialities perpetrated in the region. (*d*) Communist fabricated and imaginary incidents were utilized to bring about police investigations of the editorial staff of Nové Slovo (the regional National Socialist daily published in Ostrava) and to incite the mob against the democratic press. One of such fabrications was the assertion that gunshots had been fired at Communist editors who were investigating the "truth." (*e*) An editor of Slovo Národa (the regional National Socialist daily published in Znojmo) was subject to weekly interrogations at police headquarters; state security officers attempted to frighten him into discontinuing his writings and to force him to reveal the identity of his sources. Each weekly "session" has customarily ended with a warning that he stop his anti-Communist activities, or else.

At times, police techniques adopted a rather more dastardly twist of the usual routine. Captured Gestapo men were occasionally forced to sign pre-typed statements incriminating Czech democrats of various Gestapo-informing and related activities. One of the notable examples of such baseness revolved around a "confession" of K. H. Frank, the captured Nazi Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia—a fraudulent statement designed to discredit the good name and character of the secretary general of the National Socialist Party, a man known for his sterling qualities and one of the actual leaders of Czech resistance during the Second World War. It was easy to show this Communist fraud for what it was; the event, nonetheless, may serve as an indicator of the magnitude of Communist pressure. In a related vein, it may be noted that the Communists did not flinch from other criminal methods: on learning that certain material which was deemed damaging to the Communist cause got in the hands of the National Socialist Party, the Communists—believing that the material was kept in the apartment of the editor in chief of the National Socialist Party press—did not mind organizing a burglary in this apartment.

The Ministry of the Interior, and the people's committees which it supervised, were given authority to appoint "people's managers" to those enterprises and properties which had been confiscated from

Sudeten and other German expellees, and from Nazi collaborators This fact had much significance in press affairs since the best and most modern printing plants were handed over to Communist and fellow-traveling press and publishing houses. Thus, for instance, the entire complex of buildings and the press plant of the suppressed Národní Politika daily were officially transferred to the Central Council of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, a Communist front organization. A similar situation obtained in Slovakia where the superior press plant of the suppressed Agrarian Party became a property of the Communist Party through the institution of "people's management," while the Slovak Democratic Party had to buy a press plant of its own, at a considerable loss of time at that.

(3) The "purge process" which sought to remove intransigent democrats, and the utilization of Communist-protected Nazi collaborators, transformed the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists into a pliant tool of the Information Ministry (in a technical, institutional sense) and of the Communist Party *agitprop* (in the ultimate sense of power realities). While the country was still subject to Soviet occupation, the Communists constituted a "Purge Commission" within the union and contrived to expel or exclude such anti-Communist newspapermen as would not do the Communist bidding. The purge commission included such men as K. F. Zieris, a prewar secretary of the union, who—having been tinted by a close cooperation with the pro-Nazi traitor Krychtálek—became a postwar left-winger and Communist servant; and Rudolf Kolář, an editor who had compromised his standing by wartime contacts with the Nazis. Prominence in the Union was being accorded to men like J. Síla, the postwar editor in chief of Práce (main daily of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement's Central Council) who had been in wartime Nazi pay; Jaromír Hořec, the postwar editor in chief of Mladá Fronta (the Czechoslovak Youth Union daily) who had had a Nazi-tinted past; and André Simone, an international crook sought by a prewar warrant of arrest for the burglary of a Berlin theater. Men of this and similar calibers—Communist protegés—were the 1945–48 infiltrators who played, together with other Communists and fellow-travelers, the role of watchdogs over the purity of Czechoslovak journalism.

The pressure which the Union exerted on Czechoslovak pressmen was subsequently strengthened by the act of May 28, 1947, which was pushed through the Constituent Assembly and which regulated the status of both individual editors and of the Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak Journalists' Unions. The edge of police blackmail was sharpened by a legal sanction: No one could hold an editorial position who, (*a*) was struck off electoral lists, (*b*) was sentenced under the retribution decrees, (*c*) was sentenced for offenses of base and dishonest motives, and (*d*) was sentenced to loss of civic rights. Newspapers and authorities dealing with press affairs were forbidden to employ any editor who had not been admitted to membership in the Journalists' Union. Union membership, moreover, was made obligatory for all editors by profession. In other words, the communized unions received a legal mandate to keep the press corps at bay. The Czech and Slovak Unions represented the basic mode of organization and filter; the Czechoslovak Union took care that no errors were made; and the whole structural pyramid was in turn placed under the general control of the Information Ministry. Discarding any pre-

tense of voluntary association, the act constituted the Journalists' Unions as "autonomous public corporations." In the last analysis, *agitprop apparatchiks* were deciding the fate of a good number of Czechoslovak journalists.

A disproportionately large part of this discussion has been devoted to techniques and examples of the downward pressure strategy. An explanation and justification of such treatment may rest in the fact that it was this strategy which operated as the dominant factor underlying the final Communist rape of February 1948.

Upward and lateral pressures were being applied as interacting complements of the downward push. At the horizontal level, the scheme relied on a direct placement of Communist plants in democratic political parties, organizations, and their press organs, and, secondly, on the penetration of these bodies by dependable members of those mass organization which had already been communized.

Some cases of downward-lateral pressure collusions had previously been described. Another example, furnished by the 1945–48 executive president of the Melantrich Co., points to the intensity of Communist Party efforts: "The Communists have been ceaselessly trying to smuggle their spies into the employee ranks of Melantrich or of the National Socialist Party. Whenever we sought to hire additional help for Melantrich or the party, there invariably were some applications which, directly or indirectly, led to the Communist Party Secretariat." This infiltration pattern was equally valid for the rest of the anti-Communist press. In the context, a position of special significance attached to the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH) and its Central Council (ÚRO). Its leadership, having issued from a fusion of Communist and Nazi-collaborationist labor elements, was under full Communist domination; so was a great majority of its enterprise locals. Because of ROH's exclusive monopoly of labor organization (both white- and blue-collar), this Communist front of immense power controlled the technical and office employees of the press, printing shops, papermills, and transportation. There was no single press enterprise in the country wherein some Communist penetration *via* this mass organization would not have occurred. Functions of such Communist cells included intelligence gathering, sabotage, demoralization and confusion of democratic coworkers, and eventual seizures of democratic press plants which were to take place in the decisive moment. Now and then, ROH pressures amounted to factual censorship; thus, for instance, workers in a papermill refused to deliver paper to democratic papers in Prague, and setters refused to set up the newspapers—all because of an article which was critical of the Soviet Union or of the Communist Party policies. Another case of similar censorship transpired when the ÚRO decided that typesetters would work on no matter which was unfavorable to, or critical of, the ÚRO. Generally, typesetters' locals (even in democratic printing shops) were led by Communists. The 1945–48 history of their widening activities has been characterized as follows: Initially, the setters were used to report on what a democratic paper would carry the next day; later, the setters' leaders started to criticize articles and struck up discussions with editors so as to persuade the latter to modify their orientation; in the final phase, the setters would refuse to set certain articles and, during the putsch, would decline to put out the paper—effectively stopping the demo-

cratic, anti-Communist press. A somewhat similar sequence concerning the National Socialist Nové Slovo, an Ostrava daily, worked out in this manner: At first, the Ostrava police headquarters, resorting to an ancient press law of Austro-Hungarian vintage, effected precensorship—suppressing certain anti-Communist articles under the pretext of endangered state security; later, reprints of censored issues did not reach readers because Communist transport workers discontinued all delivery of the newspaper; finally, in the critical phase of the putsch proceedings, no further issues of Nové Slovo came out, as the Information Ministry (acting through workers' organizations) stopped newsprint supply.

Other ÚRO decisions aiming at the elimination of anti-Communist papers in the decisive putsch period (February 21–25, 1948) involved orders to papermills and transportation workers not to produce and deliver newsprint to Svobodné Slovo, Lidová Demokracie (main daily of the People's Party), Čas (main daily of the Slovak Democratic Party), and other democratic newspapers; and not to take part in any transport and distribution of finished copies. The elimination of newspaper-distribution outlets in 1948 was reminiscent of Communist practices of the electoral campaign of 1946 when, in the regional center of Znojmo for instance, the newspaper stands, newspaper boys, and other sellers were prohibited, on the eve of the elections day, to sell and distribute non-Communist papers by the organs of the Communist Party. They were forced by Communist threats to interrupt all contacts with the administrative offices of non-Communist papers. These conditions were then reported from almost all branch offices of non-Communist papers.

Where it appeared that a democratic paper would come out despite all Communist putsch-period pressure, armed factory militias and police intervened and, on the eve of Communist seizure of power, illegally occupied democratic papers and press plants. During the final phase of the putsch, Communist cells within the several anti-Communist papers constituted novel, governing "action committees" which had been carefully preplanned and which then took charge of the once democratic press. The Interior Ministry, a day or two before the actual consummation of the coup yet, appointed Communist or communistic "people's managers" who usurped power in selected democratic press enterprises, acting in concert with the action committees. Some 200 democratic editors were in turn dismissed, expelled from their Journalists' Unions, and relegated to starvation, imprisonment, hard labor, or exile. Communist commissars were delegated to supervise the overhauled papers.

Upward pressures; i.e., the mobilization and misuse of regimented popular "masses," their Communist-appointed "delegations" and "representative bodies," and other "nonpartisan" action groups and subversive teams, were to apply raw pressure and threats against democratic forces. Actions were either openly organized or "spontaneous." Thus, a flood of wires and letters might be directed to the President's attention, or sent to democratic parties' headquarters or editorial offices, urging a specific policy. When a caricature of a Communist minister was printed, the "culpable" paper was sure to receive an avalanche of threatening letters from works councils, mass organizations' locals, and individual Communists. An article, critical of a given Works Council in a nationalized enterprise, would invite

the visitation of the editorial office by a delegation of labor representatives, often some hundred men strong, who would extend threats and try to cow the paper. The guilty party might then be branded as "an enemy of the people," "an agent of Western imperialism," or "a traitor of the people." In this fashion, the National Socialist editorial office of Nové Slovo in Ostrava reported a visit by a delegation of miners who let the editors know that they would return with axes, should the paper persevere in its anti-Communist orientation. Innumerable cases of this sort were occurring, time and again, in press offices of the National Socialist, Christian-Democratic, and Slovak Democratic Parties. The apartisan, democratic Svobodné Noviny daily became the object of similar harassment, and so were other democratic magazines and papers.

Belonging here would be a number of cases of individualized terror, such as anonymous phone calls to a politician's wife advising her to prevent her husband from participating in a given meeting, for she might not see him again otherwise. A particularly repugnant case involved a Communist Parliament member from the district of Olomouc who had been proved to have arranged, in the summer of 1947, for the mailing of concealed trigger bombs to Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister, and to two National Socialist Cabinet members, P. Drtina and P. Zenkl.

The Communist use of mob politics provided a constant reminder of the ever-present possibility of a violent coup.

The Soviet Ambassador and other officials of the Embassy, as well as the Communist Prime Minister and Cabinet members intervened with the President of the Republic and with leaders of other parties, requesting that certain authors and articles be banned from the press.

The extended pressures may be illustrated by two documented cases: the Christian-Democratic weekly, Obzory, and Nové Prúdy, the biweekly published under the auspices of the Slovak Democratic Party.

Obzory was a political weekly sponsored and financed by the Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak Christian Democratic People's Party. Since its first issue in the fall of 1945, this anti-Communist, widely read weekly has been subjected to unceasing, lateral attacks launched by the Communist-oriented press and Rudé Právo in particular. According to a statement by the Obzory's erstwhile editor, the weekly was thus being vituperated for such varied reasons as its comments on the pro-Soviet slavish behavior of certain Czechoslovak Army officers; its defense of the Vatican; its article concerning a London auction of Hitler's bust; its stress on the need of a U.S. loan; its opinion that the Czechoslovak Army represented an insignificant force in the global framework; its criticism of several Soviet plays as "boring, monotonous, and artless;" and its general anti-Soviet tone.

Gradually, downward pressures came to be applied; the Communist Minister of Information, for instance, referred to the weekly in a speech reported by Rudé Právo on February 9, 1946: "Obzory abounds in manifestations of hatred against the Soviet Union. It offends the Red Army constantly. And it undermines the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship." On February 22, 1947, Mr. Valerian Zorin, the Soviet Ambassador, delivered a protest to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister

against Obzory and asked for its suspension as its writing has proved harmful to the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance. Rudé Právo then proceeded to feature the Soviet intervention prominently in several of its subsequent issues, all the while denouncing the Christian-Democratic weekly and describing "workers' indignation." This set the stage for Communist manipulation of upward pressures so that, on March 1, the Communist press was able to print a page 1 heading, "Workers Protest Against Obzory," with the column depicting the adoptions of anti-Obzory resolutions by workers' meetings in three of the largest Czech industrial plants. The Czechoslovak Government did not suspend the weekly despite Communist pressures; suspension did come on the day of the Communist putsch, the weekly's offices were taken over, and its funds confiscated.

Nové Prúdy, a monthly which was later made into a biweekly, was financed by the Slovak Democratic Party. Because of its strong anti-Communist orientation, the magazine enjoyed a wide readership not only in Slovakia, but in the Czech lands as well. It too became a target of Slovak, and allstate, Communist attacks, particularly on account of its expositions of Communist excesses in economic, military, and police administration as well as for its pictorial supplement which featured Western, while excluding Russian, motifs.

Downward pressures were brought to bear on Nové Prúdy, and its editorial staff and policy were subjected to Communist onslaughts on the floor and in the Cultural Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament. The Soviet Consulate in Bratislava registered several protests against the magazine's orientation. Following the Soviet Ambassador's interventions, Nové Prúdy was put on the agenda of the Czechoslovak Cabinet which acted to transfer the matter into the informal policy machinery of the National Front coalition. By way of preparing ground for the final disposition, the Minister of Information (through the instrumentality of the nationalized film industry) and the Minister of Defense (through the instrumentality of Obrana Lidu—the Army daily) filed a total of seven suits against the responsible editor of Nové Prúdy, asking that his parliamentary immunity be lifted and that he be subject to criminal prosectuion.

Within about a 2-month span which preceded the 1948 putsch, a number of Nové Prúdy issues were confiscated by Communist-dominated authorities because of the magazine's criticisms of excesses which the Communist-led Slovak Commissariat of the Interior perpetrated on leading members of the Slovak Democratic Party. During the critical 5-day putsch period, but ahead of the final Communist coup of February 25, Communist police entered the premises of Nové Prúdy, conducted a search, and sought to arrest Mr. J. Fuchs, the magazine's leading editor who was in fact apprehended at a subsequent occasion.

The cases of Obzory and Nové Prúdy may also serve to underscore another interesting aspect of Communist pressure: the use of court suits as a device for public, legal, and financial harassment of democratic papers. A related practice to which the Communists frequently resorted was the submission and request of long-winded, space-consuming press corrections which were sometimes running to a length of 1,000 words or thereabouts.

The Communist Party followed a consistent policy of weakening and restricting democratic papers' financial means. Even though

some aspects of this practice have already been mentioned, a brief listing of some of the major Communist efforts in this direction may perhaps be of use: (1) Forcing the democratic press to black-market purchases of newsprint at inflated prices; (2) forcing certain democratic publishing houses to costly purchases of printing plants and equipment, while Communist papers obtained the same under the "people's management" system; (3) fixing uniform prices, sales commissions, and classified space for all dailies regardless of production-cost differentials and advertising appeal; (4) endeavoring, through the device of paper rationing, to enforce dictated ceilings on newspaper circulation, disregarding the popularity and growth potential of individual papers; (5) utilization of court suits and press corrections; (6) the fact that the Soviet printing house which filled the wartime order of the London Czechoslovak government-in-exile for provisional currency (scripts) turned out one-third more money than ordered, and secretly retained this extra amount. This sum eventually wound up in the hands of Soviet Army and diplomatic officers, and in the coffers of the Czechoslovak and Slovak Communist Parties; and (7) the immediate postliberation occupation and seizure of abandoned Nazi and collaborator properties, including homes and enterprises which the Communists, assisted by Red Army and NKVD agents, had successfully performed. Negotiable and movable financial assets, such as cash, jewelry, furs, and other valuables, often went undeclared and are said to have landed in Communist pockets and treasuries of the Communist Party and of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement's Central Council. All these factors are indicative of Communist practices, and they all were of direct benefit to Communist press as well as harmful to democratic forces and their press media.

The simultaneous operation, in their interaction, of the three pressure approaches amounted to a preplanned scheme and hopeful expectation on the part of the Communists that, given the conditioning factors which were present in the 1945–48 period, the democratic press (and indeed all democratic elements in general) would enter on a gradual but certain process of decay and submission—yielding to the Communist forces a majoritarian control of Czechoslovak affairs by what might be called legitimate, parliamentarian methods of transfer.

The Communist hope had been in vain.

(5) COMMUNIST FAILURE AND THE COUP

Ever since the general elections of May 1946, which had given Czechoslovak Communists 38 percent of the total vote, the popular appeal of the Communist Party has ebbed. The change was barely perceptible at first; the democratic resurgence, however, was gaining momentum at a steady pace. Serious observers of the Czechoslovak scene appear to place Communist realization of the failure of the "parliamentary takeover" method at some time-point between July and November 1947; i.e., between the unanimous decision of the Czechoslovak Cabinet to participate in the Marshall plan (rescinded on immediate orders of Moscow) and the outcome of the Social Democratic Party Congress which rid this party of some, but not all, of its fellow-traveling ballast. Various factors have prompted Stalin and Czechoslovak Communists to bring matters to a head; at any rate, the decision for violent seizure was tantamount to admission

that peaceful means of infiltration and disruption had failed. The truth of this fact was but underlined by a finding of the Public Opinion Research Institute (connected with the Information Ministry) which estimated that Communist electoral strength would show a decrease of about 10 percent in the coming 1948 elections. The impending seizure of power came to be foreshadowed on December 3, 1947, in a speech that was delivered by the Minister of Information at a meeting of Communist university students: "As long as we have Rudé Právo, the main Communist daily, we do not actually need any universities * * *. He who works against the Communists is guilty of high treason—you learn this from Rudé Právo and you will learn it at the university. You laugh at this now, but you will soon discover it has come to be true * * *."

The mutilated press freedom of 1945–48 did not facilitate Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia. The Communists therefore resorted to force to carry out the putsch. The political and legal system of those years—with its political parties, elections, meetings, and newspapers—obstructed Communist aims and ways, as a boulder which could only be removed by a violent coup.

The Communist apparatus and the Communist Minister of Information were able to harass the non-Communist and anti-Communist press, but they could not exclude its influence. A coup d'etat which would monopolize the entire press was a necessary prerequisite for the extinguishing of the freedom of the press. The only starting point for an assessment of the Czechoslovak case is provided by Communist press practices which followed the actual seizure of power. Earlier Communist practice cannot be precisely characterized as accomplished infiltration, but rather as a partial and preparatory seizure which cannot be repeated at any other place where those conditions which made the Czechoslovak putsch possible are not present. The existing press monopoly of a Communist "people's democratic" regime is all embracing and allows for no exceptions. All press is government press. It was only in rare instances, during the 14-year existence of this press, that anyone dared to criticize the Government in a newspaper, book, or pamphlet, regardless of what the occasion might have been.

No doubts prevail but that the Communists had planned to communize Czechoslovakia. To attain this end, they were in need of an efficient helper—a communized press which would have no competition. Had they been able to implement their plan in the immediate wake of Nazi defeat, they would have enthroned an exclusively Communist press without delay. They did not put their plan into effect for various reasons, both internal and external (substantial resistance of the nation; fears of Western reaction; etc.). They did not discard this plan, however; it was just postponed. They decided to prepare ground for its consummation through disruption, terror, and infiltration. They lost no time in employing these means at full speed. Their hopes were nonetheless in vain. They encountered insuperable resistance; they saw that infiltration was not working out as they had expected; democratic resistance was increasing and thus obstructing Communist infiltration plans; they therefore resorted to violence and the final coup. They have not gained additional helpers in the press, but a contrary process has set in, their opponents were growing stronger.

The 3 postwar years of representative government, however limited and perilous, will have left substantial effects on the long-run development and preservation of the spirit of democracy and freedom in the minds and hearts of the Czechoslovak people. Here, a large measure of merit rests with democratic newspapermen who had been kindling the flames of freedom against crushing odds and at great personal risks, and who had successfully resisted Communist infiltration and extortion.[2]

[2] See bibliography, appendix p. 99.

ESTONIA

THE REDS AND THE PRESS OF ESTONIA PRIOR TO OCCUPATION

By Harold Randsepp

In free Estonia I started working in the newspaper field in 1922. A few years before the Soviet occupation I was elected to the managing board of the only active newspapermen's trade organization, Association of Estonian Journalists, and as a result I personally knew all the people working in the field in Estonia. I was removed from my job by the Soviet forces a week after the beginning of the Soviet occupation on June 28, 1940. During the occupation it was made impossible for me to work as a journalist or in any related occupation. Therefore I became employed by the Central Union of Estonian Consumers Cooperatives as worker. I was employed there during the German occupation of Estonia. I was arrested by German forces in 1944, as a member of underground movement against the Nazis. I once again found my way back to journalism as a refugee in Germany in 1947. At the present time I am on the editorial staff of the Free Estonian Word, a weekly publication appearing in New York, and I am also the president of the Association of free Estonian journalists in U.S.A.

Among the people who worked for the press at the time of the Estonian Republic none has ever been discovered to have been a Communist either openly or under cover. Even later, an intense observation of the workings of the press under Soviet occupation, has revealed no individual, from whose works it could be gathered that he had been, during the Estonian Republic, an undercover Communist with the task of secretly infiltrating the press with Communist propaganda.

The seizure of the free Estonian press by Soviet forces on the 21st of June, 1940, took place through the sheer forces of terrorism. At the time a large number of newspapermen were forced to resign from their jobs. Along with the loss of the jobs came the loss of their right to ever again work in this field. Some of them were arrested on the spot. A few of the journalists were kept on at their posts, but these only out of pure necessity, since the Soviet forces did not have enough people with whom to replace them. But these who remained were kept under constant terror and control and they, too were only to stay for a short while to be replaced by Soviet citizens of Estonian background recruited by the Communist forces. The terrorism was so great that every journalist who was still employed as such knew that even the slightest error would lead him to prison or to a slave labor camp or even to death. It was this terrorism that made it possible for the Communists to still have the newspapers published during its occupation.

Of the Estonian newspapermen, only a few, running in the lower tens have escaped to the free world. At the present time in occupied Estonia there is only one newspaperman working for the press, who, in the Estonian Republic, was not a Communist, but who has become one now, out of necessity. The others have died either as a result of deportation to Soviet slave labor camps or of old age. Aside from the presently employed newspapermen a very small number of people have had the opportunity to express any of their writings in the press, and these few have been able to do so only according to rules set up by the Soviet power.

HUNGARY

BOLSHEVIZATION OF THE HUNGARIAN PRESS

By Msgr. Bela Varga [1]

In Hungary, as in all other satellite nations, the formal Communist takeover of the press came about from one day to the next, when the Red Army occupied Hungary. On this very day all newspapers were discontinued and the next day the Communist newspapers appeared. Thus, we cannot speak of slow infiltration prior to the Communist takeover.

Naturally, Communist journalists and undercover Communist party agitators were engaged in underground activities prior to the Soviet occupation, however, at that time they were collaborating with the anti-Nazi resistance movement. Progressive and anti-German forces at that time rallied around the "March Front," a political organization to which belonged also the underground Communists. The progressive bourgeois parties gave space in their newspapers to Communist sympathizing journalists who, upon Moscow's instructions, refrained from Communist propaganda and dealt only with the social problems in a nationalistic vein, or urged liberal and social reforms. After March 19, 1944, when the Nazis completely occupied Hungary, this activity came to an end, since all liberal or progressive papers were banned.

The first Communist newspapers were published early during the Red Army's operational activities in every city they occupied, in Budapest in January 1945. The Communist journalists who formerly worked for the bourgeois press, took off their masks then and it became evident how many of them had been old Communist Party members. As a matter of fact, if we check on the newspaper staffs after 1945, we find that each of them had been previously working for some paper, some even for decidedly rightist papers.

According to the wish of the Russian occupation troops, the new regime obeyed the Soviet political headquarters and completely reformed not only the Hungarian press, but the entire printing industry and publishing trade as well.

The two major printing houses that had been publishing the larger half of Hungarian publications, were immediately nationalized and all paper stocks seized. This measure was followed by decrees by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs which also listed in two heavy volumes, all publications that were put on the "index." These decrees provided simultaneously for the ban, confiscation, and surrender of all papers, periodicals, novels, and other literary products within a short period of time and contained strict punitive sanctions for the violators.

By this measure, upon Russian orders, an entirely new situation arose regarding publication of Hungarian spiritual products, erasing

[1] See biographical sketch, app. II, p. 101.

every vestige of the past. Enterprises of long decades' standing were dissolved only to be replaced, using their financial assets, by those that were conforming to the new political and ideological situation in every respect.

Nevertheless, the national elections of November 1945 did prove the opposition to the Communist-planned political pattern, since the smallholders and bourgeois political parties received a parliamentary majority.

In addition to the Communist Party, every parliamentary party was granted permission to publish its own press organ, though only if conforming to strict and applied censorship and restricted by Soviet policy. Upon demand of the Communist Party, Communist correspondents were assigned to each editorial office to see that these measures were observed.

During this period of the coalition government, we already can speak of infiltration to some extent within the bourgeois and social-democratic press. The Communists had to tolerate the press of the coalition parties and later even that of the opposition, or else they would have disavowed their much publicized principles. However, in order to keep a tight control and check on the comparatively free press, their "undercover" agents reported everything that happened, giving information on everybody in every editorial office. Naturally, they also smuggled in their own subversive or propaganda material. Even the most resolute resistance of these papers could not eliminate the control and interference of the Communists, and the situation deteriorated rapidly.

The Communist Party soon found ways to force the Communist press upon the public, at the expense of the bourgeois press. A so-called house supervisor was appointed for every apartment house, a reliable agent of the party. This supervisor had to check on the everyday habits of the tenants and to take notes on: (1) with whom they associate, (2) what newspapers they read, and (3) whether they get mail or newspapers from abroad. The apartment house supervisor in turn had to report to the Communist Party block supervisor who collected these reports. In this way "cadre files" were kept of every person over 16 years of age, on which it was also noted which newspaper the subject subscribed to, or customarily read. It was public knowledge that you earned a bad mark for reading or subscribing to a bourgeois paper and not the Communist Party organ "Szabad Nép." It was made compulsory to read Szabad Nép, official party organ, at every office, factory, and workshop. The officers, employees, and workers had to come to work earlier than the official working hours, and they were made to report what they read of the Szabad Nép of that day. Some had to review the editorials and other articles of Szabad Nép. Political agents could even interrupt anybody during his or her work and ask about his or her views in connection with the articles carried by Szabad Nép. After working hours "Political Seminaries" were held, the attendance of which was made compulsory so as to check more thoroughly whether people really read Szabad Nép. At these seminaries the paper was thoroughly analyzed and its articles discussed. Even in elementary and other schools the teachers had to check on the newspaper reading habits of the parents. On the cadre file of each pupil it had to be noted what newspapers the parents read.

This explains why publication figures of Szabad Nép surpassed several times those of the other newspapers. Whenever a newspaper failed to conform to the party concept it was easy to enforce repressive measures. For instance, after one of the strongest parliamentary groups on March 15, 1947, received a permit to publish a paper called Holnap, exactly 11 days later it was banned for not sufficiently following the regime's orders. The ban of this paper was carried out under such extraordinary circumstances that it might be of interest to report here the historical facts.

When the first issue of Holnap was published, a delegation of the printers came to the editorial office and one of them gave a speech commenting enthusiastically on the importance of the day. The workers even had champagne at the luncheon they held on this occasion. Eleven days later, the very same delegation came to announce their refusal to print the paper for its antiworker attitude. When asked to point out a line or article they disapproved of, the reply was deep silence only. A member of the editorial staff asked them if they could give any reason for this sudden change of heart, unless all had gone suddenly crazy. The spokesman for the workers replied that it would be no wonder if this were the cause, and that they could not say anything more. It was evident that the workers acted under strong trade union and Communist Party pressure.

It was not difficult for the Communist regime to bolshevize the Hungarian press since it had unlimited power. Bolshevization was carried out through both negative and positive methods. The bourgeois, or non-Communist press products, were eliminated by use of negative measures, while positive measures strengthened the Communist political line. By the end of 1947 no press opposing the Communist policy existed any more in Hungary.

The same thing happened to literature. In Hungary, as well as in every other Communist dominated country, the interpretation of the Communist law is merely dogmatic. A government manifesto of August 18, 1949, stressed freedom of speech, press, and meeting for every citizen, and ruled that in the interest thereof all paper stocks, buildings, and printing machines be confiscated! On September 15, 1952, "Társadalmi Szemle" carried a statement by József Revai, Minister of Culture at that time, which said in part:

> The writers attempt to defend their own viewpoint, their right to freely select their subjects. However, in our society they have no such right and we do not accept this idea at all. We do not accept the esthetic right of the writers either to be free to select the way of representation of their ideas in their own taste. The judgement of the writer and his taste cannot conflict with the interest of the people, the state, and the party. Not the people and the party will conform to the taste and judgement of the writers, but rather the writer must assimilate to the interests of socialist construction.

The generally accepted rights of human freedom are codified by the legal code of every Communist state, but only so they can be cited in particular cases, and shown off to the Western World. In practice the implementation of these rights is without exception suspended.

And the rights of the press, in particular, have fared no better. As early as 1950 or 1951 our "Report on Hungary" reported as follows:

> The Hungarian press is gradually coming to resemble the Soviet press, not only in the line it takes, but also in its contents. Articles often are either written by Russians especially for the Hungarian press or take word for word from the Russian papers; feuilletons are frequently translations of Russian originals. A good illustration of how blindly the press follows the Russian example, was the fact that the canvassing speeches preceding the Russian elections in 1950 were printed on the front pages of the Hungarian papers. In addition to the translations of Russian articles, the major part of the daily papers is filled with articles, studies, reviews, and pictures dealing with the U.S.S.R., as well as with advertisements of Russian books and films.

At the same time a New York emigre publication, "News from Behind the Iron Curtain" described the Hungarian press in the following way:

> By declaring that the press is the party's best weapon for communicating its ideology to the masses, the Communists themselves freely admit the rationale underlining absolute control. Only with ownership and direction of its mechanism and the obedience of its journalists has the party been able to transform the press into the docile propaganda organ it requires, and which it terms "a new type of press."

In a February 1st editorial, the Budapest daily Szabad Nép clearly distinguished between the former, bourgeois press and the new Communist press:

> In the old days newspapers * * * fanned the flames of base and sinister passions by reporting murders, crimes, and human tragedies. Today, newspapers chronicle the magnificent transformation of a happy land * * * Today's journalists educate the people to hate their enemies and ardently love their fatherland. What a wonderful historic task this is.

Szabad Nép then explained what the people and the party expect of this new press:

> Our people expect the press to give more, to give something better, to be a faithful delineator of the great days of our country, to show * * * the great constructions of our 5-year plan, to reveal more forcefully the perspectives and future of the people's work * * * Our press must watch the country's everyday work more vigilantly; it must notify the country's defaults, of laziness and loafing, or deviations from party resolutions, offenses against state or party discipline, the suppression of criticism and every harm done to our working people * * * Press workers must be aware of their great responsibility for the education of the people.

LATVIA

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE PRESS IN LATVIA

By A. Bērzinš [1]

The Communist Party was outlawed in Latvia. This happened as a result of the fact that Communists had been actively fighting against Latvia during the war for her liberation and also because after the conclusion of the peace treaty with the Soviet Union, in 1920, they continued their subversive activities against Latvia's independence, with the purpose to achieve the annexation of Latvia by the Soviet Union.

The numbers of the active Communists who were tied up with the party work in the underground were relatively small. According to data collected by the Latvian security institutions, there were between 300 to 350 such underground Communists during the era of the independent Latvia. Yet the influence exercised by this tiny group was infinitely more impressive than its numbers. This could be explained by the well-trained leadership of the underground, and also by the discipline and the activity of the party members.

It is known that special schools for training of the most active Communists for their work in the Baltic countries were located in Leningrad and Pleskau. Persons designated for especially responsible tasks who were thoroughly trusted by the Kremlin, were trained for 1 additional year or even longer in Moscow, in a special party school for higher education. After this careful training the party functionaries, supplied with forged documents, were sent in illegally to their assigned districts. Often they did not have any official posts in the party underground, but practically they decided everything pertaining to the tactics, kinds of activities, distribution of funds, or selection of leading persons. The residences, the assumed names, and the tasks of these Moscow emissaries were known only to a few of the most active Communists, through whom were transmitted orders received from Moscow to be carried out by the local party apparatus.

During the last years of the independent Latvia, Jānis Kalnbērzinš, alias ZaKis, was one of those trained in the higher school in Moscow. When the Soviet Union occupied Latvia in June 1940, he was appointed First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, in which capacity he remained for 15 years. Now Kalnbērzinš is Chairman of the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

More than 30 years ago the leaders of international communism in Moscow came to the conclusion that to achieve the Communist

[1] Alfreds Bērzinš was born in Latvia, on Oct. 21, 1899. Was member of Parliament on the Farmer Union list. From 1934 until the occupation of Latvia in 1940, was Cabinet Member. After the occupation of Latvia by the Soviet Union he escaped to the West. Was arrested by the Gestapo and held for 34 months in solitary confinement in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. At present he is member of the Committee for a Free Latvia and editor of the Baltic Review.

aims in all their totality in any country there should be used all available legal means provided by the constitution of the respective country, as well as by the social and national structure of the population. Nothing has changed in essence in this important sector of subversive activities, as is evident from N. Khrushchev's speech in Moscow, on January 6, 1961. With reference to legal activities in countries with established parliamentary traditions (i.e., democratic countries), Khrushchev said in his speech:

> Transition to socialism in countries with developed parliamentary traditions can also be carried out by making use of parliament and in other countries of institutions in keeping with their national traditions.

As said before, the Communist Party was outlawed in Latvia. Therefore it participated in the parliamentary elections under an assumed name. During the 1931 elections the list of Communist Party candidates was registered under the name of "The Left Wing Workers and Peasants Party." The world economic crisis had affected also Latvia at that time and therefore the candidates of this list had had success. The party obtained 6 parliamentary seats out of 100 in the result of these elections.

The representatives selected by the Communist Party did not by far belong to the best peoples of the party. The leadership of the party was taking into account the eventuality that the candidates of this list might be persecuted or even arrested. Therefore by nominating insignificant persons the party was protecting itself from the loss of its better workers in case of an eventual arrest.

According to the rules of procedure of Saeima (Latvian Parliament) the stenograms of the speeches delivered by its members in Saeima were published in a special edition by the Presidium of the Saeima. The members of Saeima were permitted to propagate these speeches in unlimited numbers by printing them as special publications, or in form of stenograms multiplied by the Saeima itself. The Communist representatives who would not otherwise have any means of spreading their hostile-to-the-state speeches were using Saeima's rostrum to the fullest extent to deliver long speeches directed against the state organs and independence, and to propagate them without any interference all around the country.

When in November 1933, the parliament, using the rights reserved by the constitution, deprived the Saeima members of the said party of their immunity and brought them to trial, one of the legal channels for spreading Communist propaganda was closed.

Taking advantage of the freedom of the press, the Communist front organizations printed various publications. These publications often clashed with the law, and in consequence to this they were confiscated by the order of the public prosecutor, and sometimes also closed. Foreseeing such cases the Communists were prudent enough to provide themselves with another publishing license that would permit the publication to be continued, though perhaps with a slight change of name. So, for instance, Mūsu Cīņa (Our Struggle) instead of Cīņa (The Struggle). During the last years of the independent Latvia Government supervision of the press was increased, and thus the communists lost the chance to use these legal ways of propaganda.

The Latvian Communist underground, in its illegal propaganda work, was supplied by the Moscow Communist group with literature pub-

lished for this purpose by the party publishing house Prometējs in Moscow. This literature was smuggled into Latvia and later by means of contacts delivered to distribution centers. Small hand printing presses were at the disposal of the Communist underground to print illegal literature, mostly proclamations. To have the people reminded about Communist underground activities, from time to time, but particularly on the Soviet Union's anniversary in November, red flags with Communist slogans were hung out in some places during the night.

In view of the fact that there had been in existence in Latvia similar societies for rapprochement, with the purpose of developing cultural relations with the other Baltic countries and several Western countries there was no reason to forbid the establishment of such an organization for cultural rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Formation of the Society for Cultural Rapprochement with the Nations of the Soviet Union gave the Soviet Union's legation the possibility to establish close contacts with members of this society. Being cautious enough not to compromise either the organization or its own legation, the Soviet Union did not use this society for any direct propaganda work, (unless presenting books for the society's library should be considered such). But this society gave the possibility for the members of the Soviet Legation to watch the society's members, to hear their opinions, and to learn about their weaknesses that eventually could be used. It was quite natural that the membership of this society should be recruited from among persons having some kind of sympathy toward the aims of the society. Therefore the membership of the Society for Cultural Rapprochement with the Nations of the Soviet Union was composed of the left-wing liberal intelligentsia, some university professors, and writers, journalists, and artists. With those most suitable for the Soviet Union's purposes the representatives of the latter tried to establish direct and personal contacts by inviting them as guests to the Legation or visiting them at their homes with the purpose of widening of the friendly relations by personal contacts to an extent guaranteeing that the respective person might be used for the aims of the Soviet Union.

The Communists are masters of infiltration. Through long experience in underground work Communist leaders had perfected the infiltration technique. Their infiltration of the anti-Communist press was based on the establishment of personal contacts with the influential press workers, engaging in the newspaper work of writers or journalists sympathizing with Communists, the same referring to gaining of support by the "progressively" minded intellectuals in other branches, as well. The task of these infiltrated or friendly press workers was not so much to praise the Soviet Union as to criticize their country's government and to create dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

Among the more "accessible" (to Communist infiltration) newspapers should be counted the so-called liberal papers where representatives of many opinions, including free thinkers and Marxists, are contributing. In Latvia to this category belonged the daily Jaunākās Ziņas. Being by its nature a middle-class national and loyal paper it gave the possibility to express various opinions. The circulation of this paper running into 220 thousands of copies which was a large number for Latvian conditions (population 2 million)

necessitated employment of many contributors. Many of the contributors to the paper, such as Prof. A. Kirchenšteins and Prof. A. Kalniņš, became members of the Rapprochement Society with the Nations of the Soviet Union. A. Kirchenšteins was elected president of this society.

P. Blaus, the responsible editor of the Jaunākās Ziņas, was invited to visit Moscow during the big purge trials, thus giving him the opportunity to participate as a journalist at the trial staged by Vishinsky and the NKVD. Also working in the same paper was the writer V. Lācis, about whom it was known that he had been an active Communist underground worker in his youth, which fact Lācis did not deny. When he began to work with a loyal paper he explained that his short-time enthusiasm about communism had been nothing else but a fancy of his youth. This proved to be untrue during the later years. V. Lācis was designated by A. Vishinsky as Minister of Interior in the cabinet subservient to Moscow, which post was the most important one for the purpose of takeover. Also among the contributors to the Jaunākās Ziņas was the Communist-minded writer and historian of literature, A. Upītis.

After visiting in the Soviet Union the journalists and artists considered it to be their duty not to criticize "the kind hosts" in Moscow. On the contrary, they felt something agreeable and kind about the impressions gathered in the Soviet Union might be appropriate instead. This was one of the ways in which the makers of the Soviet Union's propanganda were able to achieve features friendly to them even in publications which were known to their readers as hostile to the Communist regime in Russia. Knowing too well the progressive minded writers' and journalists' irresistible tendency to be "objective," i.e. to counter-balance everything bad by good when reporting about a visit to the Soviet Union, one could be sure that the results would be, if not perfect, then at least blurred enough when describing the conditions prevailing in the country dominated by the Communist dictatorship.

The diplomats of the Western democracies very seldom asked the prominent representatives of Latvian art or science to be guests in their legations. This usually took place when some artists or scientists of the respective countries were visiting in Ríga, the capital of Latvia. The Soviet Union's Legation, on the contrary, arranged each year several of such big receptions for writers, journalists, and artists. Besides these big receptions with more than 100 guests, there took place also smaller and more intimate receptions, and visits by the members of the Legation at private residences to persons who seemed to be suitable for the realization of the Communist aims.

The Soviet Legation's efforts to establish friendly relations with the progressive press workers became understandable after Latvia's occupation by the Soviets in June 1940. On the second day after Vishinsky's arrival in Rīga with a special task (as he himself pointed it out) to establish a government in Latvia that could deserve the Soviet Union's trust, Vishinsky designated A. Kirchenšteins, President of the Society for Cultural Rapprochement with the Nations of the Soviet Union, and contributor to the Jaunākās Ziņas, as the Prime Minister. The following were appointed members of his cabinet: P. Blaus, the responsible editor of the Jaunākās Ziņas, and contributors to the same paper; V. Lācis, J. Lācis, and the jurist J. Pabērzs.

From the nine members of the government selected by A. Vishinsky, five, including the Prime Minister, came from a liberal newspaper, which fact undoubtedly indicated that the infiltration of a positively middle-class paper, such as the Jaunākās Ziņas had been, could be a success.

As it turned out, the activities of the Communist underground were of little significance in Latvia. During the last years of the independence of Latvia the numbers of the Communist underground were so tiny that they had not been able to endanger the Latvian state structure and regime, nor even threaten the takeover of any governmental institutions. A great assistance, therefore, was rendered to the Moscow occupants by the "liberal" sympathizers who had been so friendly with the members of the Soviet Union's Legation. The former, being not themselves inveterate Communists, naively believed the Moscow's lies that Latvia would not be incorporated into the Soviet Union, and thus helped to create the impression so desirable to Moscow that the arrival of the Red Army in Latvia did not signify the occupation of the country, but only a change of the regime. They also believed that Latvia would remain an independent state, though more closely bound up economically and politically with the Soviet Union. The same left wing liberals helped Vishinsky to organize the sham elections, and when there was no way back, they "pleaded for admission of Latvia into the brotherly family of the Soviet nations."

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE PRESS IN INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA

By Henrikas Blazas [1]

Independent Lithuania was a country situated between Germany and the Soviet Union and therefore a steppingstone for both—for the Germans to begin their "Drang nach Osten" and for the Soviet Union to proceed with her expansion toward Western Europe. The Soviet Union was, on the one hand, interested in curtailing German influence in Lithuania and, on the other hand, careful not to arouse the suspicion of Lithuanian authorities and public opinion concerning the designs and the real intentions of the U.S.S.R.

After Hitler came to power in Germany, his foreign policy toward Lithuania was very helpful to the Soviets. Hitler's claims to the ethnographically Lithuanian area of Klaipeda (Memel), which was claimed by Lithuania in 1923, and also the economic pressure he tried to apply by barring all Lithuanian agricultural exports to Germany, steadily diminished German influence in Lithuania.

Before 1940, the Lithuanian Communist Party was outlawed and its membership never exceeded 1,000 card-carrying members. The Communist Party never exercised any significant influence on Lithuanian public opinion and its activities were kept under careful surveillance by the Lithuanian security forces.

The organizations which really carried out the task of expanding Soviet influence in Lithuania were the Polpredstvo (full-fledged Legation-Soviet Embassy) and the Torgpredstvo (Soviet Trade Legation).

The Polpredstvo and the Torgpredstvo had huge staffs whose numbers could not be justified either by the requirements for maintaining diplomatic relations or by the need to conduct the very limited volume of trade between the Soviet Union and Lithuania. Both of these Soviet Legations were involved in Communist activities, and they maintained public relations with more or less influential Lithuanian intellectuals and leading personalities of the press, literature, and the performing arts. Their activities in Lithuania were conducted along two major lines of endeavor:

Firstly, they tried to prevent the publication of hostile information about the Soviet Union or communism in the Lithuanian press and to arrest the circulation of such information through other channels such as radio, lectures, public discussions, etc.

Secondly, they attempted to get the Lithuanian press to print favorable evaluations of the state of Soviet domestic affairs and the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. It was their job to foster public recognition of Soviet successes in the construction of gigantic new projects, in

[1] Managing Editor of the International Peasant Union Bulletin, New York, former publisher and Chief Editor of the daily, Laikas (The Times) and other periodicals in Lithuania prior to the Soviet occupation of that country on June 15, 1940.

industrialization, in collective farming, and in cultural achievements. They spread the belief that the Soviet Union is a rapidly progressing country and a true friend of the Lithuanian people and their independent republic.

The Polpredstvo was always busy keeping in touch with Lithuanians who had any influence upon public opinion. Every month, sometimes even every 2 weeks, the Polpredstvo invited them to small informal receptions under the pretext of various cultural activities. These receptions took place in the Soviet Legation, where the Ambassador, Mr. Pozdniakov, was the host and the First Secretary of the Legation, Mr. Molochkov, and other staff members assisted him. Usually a strictly male affair, these receptions generally lasted all night, from 9 p.m. until 6 a.m. No matters of any special importance were discussed, and most of the time was spent in eating, excessive drinking, and singing, so that a friendly atmosphere was created. When it became necessary, Mr. Molochkov or the representative of the Soviet Information Agency Tass could pick up the phone and ask the "friends" they had met at these receptions for small favors such as the publication of favorable information about the Soviet Union or the suppression of Western dispatches on certain subjects which went contrary to Soviet interests.

It was an open secret in Lithuania, that if a newspaper wanted to get a big advertisement from the Torgpredstvo, the only thing it had to do was to publish something favorable about the Soviet 5-year plan, about some Soviet industrial development or other achievement.

By such methods, Soviet Legations acquired a degree of psychological and material influence upon people who were active in shaping Lithuanian public opinion.

Communist infiltration into the free press of Lithuania was never direct and rarely occurred with the knowledge of the publisher or editor concerned.

The top men in the journalistic profession in Lithuania were well known, and to employ them involved no difficulty at all. But the hiring of personnel for secondary jobs—translators, proofreaders, circulation clerks—was a problem because it was not so easy to check the background of persons who are not well known.

Thus, for example, in April 1938 the daily Laikas (the Times) needed a translator from French into Lithuanian. Among the applications it received there was one from a former army colonel of the Imperial Russian Army, an elderly man who had gone into exile after the Communist revolution of October 1917. Naturally, it was assumed that he was an anti-Communist.

This colonel was with Laikas for 5 months, when he decided to move to Paris, France. Before leaving, he recommended as his successor a Lithuanian university student, Aleksandras Guzevicius, aged 30, who had been living in Paris for some time. Guzevicius was a bachelor, made the impression of being very shy, modest, and not too healthy. He performed his duties well and efficiently and was friendly with the members of the editorial staff and the workers in the printing plant, but somehow he managed to keep to himself and made no real friends. He never directly suggested anything new or different or took the initiative in anything. Occasionally he remarked about this or that matter and showed an interest in everything that was submitted for publication.

When, in June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania, Mr. A. Guzevicius came to the publisher of Laikas the day after the occupation and presented a list of demands in the name of the Communist Party:

(*a*) Two staff members of the editorial office must be fired because of their anti-Communist views.

(*b*) The paper must accept Communist management and Communists on the editorial staff.

(*c*) The daily will no longer be the property of the publisher.

All of these demands were rejected by the publisher and after 2 weeks, on June 30, 1940, Laikas was closed by order of the Communist Party.

It turned out that Mr. A. Guzevicius had been a secretary of the underground Lithuanian Communist Party and when the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania he was immediately made First Vice Minister and shortly thereafter Minister of Interior Affairs of Lithuania. There is no reason to doubt that also the colonel of the Imperial Russian Army who had recommended him was, in some way, used by the Communist Party to carry out Soviet orders long before Lithuania was occupied.

Independent Lithuania had signed a number of agreements with the Soviet Union involving mutual assistance, nonaggression and noninterference in internal affairs. These agreements were, however, used by the Soviet Union as a basis for meddling into Lithuanian press affairs.

During the Finnish-Soviet war, in the winter of 1939–40, the newspaper Laikas openly declared its sympathy with the Finns and refused to publish the dispatches of the official Soviet news agency Tass, which were one-sided and not objective. Laikas kept its readers informed about the Finnish-Soviet war by publishing news from French, British, and Scandinavian sources of information. Naturally, the Soviet Union regarded such information as harmful to its interests.

The representative of Tass in Kaunas called on the publisher and chief editor of Laikas and asked him to give preference to the dispatches of Tass, because Western information about the Finnish-Soviet war was "capitalist slander against the Soviet Union."

When Laikas refused to comply with the demands made by Tass, the Soviet Ambassador made three diplomatic representations on this subject to the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, on the ground that information about the Finnish-Soviet war as published by Laikas was in violation of existing Soviet-Lithuanian agreements of mutual assistance, friendship, nonaggression, and noninterference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry informed the publisher of Laikas of the essence of the Soviet demands, without insisting upon any change in the stand already taken by the daily. The result was that the Soviet Embassy ceased to invite the editors of Laikas even to official receptions at the Soviet Embassy.

Today, when the Soviet Union insists upon a policy of coexistence with the West, when Soviet leaders are proposing nonaggression pacts between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact countries, when the disarmament conference in Geneva, at the insistence of the Soviet Union, almost reached an agreement to curtail so-called war propaganda, one is reminded of the Soviet methods used in the countries

of eastern and central Europe prior to the imposition of Soviet domination. These methods remain essentially unchanged: First get an agreement on mutual assistance, friendship, nonagression, and noninterference; after the agreement is signed, use it to halt the dissemination of the truth about the Soviet Union and the Communist conspiracy for world conquest under the pretext that this violates signed agreements, keeps alive the so-called cold war, and endangers the peace!

POLAND

METHODS OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION IN THE POLISH PRESS*

By Janusz Kowalewski

In my description of the methods of Communist subversion and infiltration in the press, I shall use my personal experiences and knowledge which I gained from my activities in this field in the years 1932 through 1939 in Poland, in the capacity of an organizer of a certain type of Communist press. I shall also use my observations which I made after the above period up to the present time as a newspaperman and journalist fighting communism and interested in the activities of the Communist propaganda apparatus with the purpose of exposing it.

To give the reader an idea of my experiences, I think that I should briefly describe my life from this aspect.

It was in 1931 that I became interested in Communist ideology. At that time I was a student of the University of Warsaw. Poland experienced an economic crisis. General dissatisfaction was growing, due to proverty and unemployment. People were looking for a remedy to the crisis. Nationalist groups found a remedy for this crisis in fighting against national minorities, mainly Jews, and taking over from them their commercial and industrial enterprises. Polish leftists tried to find a solution in a basic transformation of the "capitalist" system. The Communists were the most radical, as they proclaimed the principle of the destruction of "capitalism" by way of a revolution and building of socialism on its debris. This path appeared to be fast, logical, and sound because it rejected all partial solutions and substitutes.

At that time, I was a member of the student's organization of Democratic Pilsudski followers, the Association of Polish Democratic Youth (Z.P.M.D.). At the meetings, I started to express ideas of a Communist type and spread them in a paper I was editing, the Academic Life (Zycie Akademickie, "Z.A."). I was still a member of the Z.P.M.D. and the paper Academic Life was its official organ. There were discussions which started spontaneously. In the beginning I was in no contact with the Communists, nobody directed my actions, I built my ideology myself, learning from the classic Marxist literature and from articles in the legal leftist press, articles which, as I found out later, were written and inspired by camouflaged Communists. I mention this in order to show, in my own instance, the effectiveness of the influence of Communist literature on "unattached" people, not bound to the Communist organization, but inwardly aroused. The propaganda of the Soviet 5-year plan played a great part.

---

*Translated by George Starosolsky, Library of Congress, September 17, 1962.

Yet, the "spontaneous" period did not last long. Soon the Communist students became interested in me. At that time, a student's organization called Life (Zycie) was in operation, connected with the Communist Association of Polish Youth, not as an integral part but as a subsidiary. Only after a certain apprenticeship could an activist of Life be "integrated," i.e., receive the status of a member in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. In turn, Life created further subsidiaries under its supervision but even more loosely connected with the Communist Association. Such were, e.g., the Academic Society of Free-Thinkers, the student chapters of the League to Combat Fascism, and many more sporadic task units as subsidiaries of Life, which were established within all student's organizations, political, social, or scientific. A special agency of the Communist Association directed all these groups, an agency which was called, as I learned later, Department of Enemy Organizations.

Within the Association of Polish Democratic Youth there also existed a Communist group in my time. Its leader was Edward Damiecki, later a secretary of the Embassy of the Polish Regime in London, who used a false name of Albert Morski. The faction compelled me to join. After a few months the leadership of the Association of Polish Democratic Youth removed me from this organization and, consequently, took away from me the editorship of Academic Life. Then, together with Damiecki, we formed a substitute organization, Association of Polish Democratic Youth—Secession, which was active outside of the Association of Polish Democratic Youth and, in fact, was a branch of Life (not to be confused with Academic Life). After winning over as many people as possible from among the members of the Association of Polish Democratic Youth, it was dissolved at the order of Communist authorities as no longer necessary.

I was assigned to the *Propagit*, the department of propaganda and agitation within the Communist Association of Polish Youth, with the order to make propaganda, at first among students. The topics of the propaganda talks, the way of delivering them, and the form of activity were decided upon by the executive committee at its meetings, or, rather, by the liaison with the analogous committee of the Polish Communist Party (a delegate of the Communist Party to the Communist Association of Polish Youth). Voting was a mere formality, as the liaison in fact made all the decisions. The main topic was the economic crisis and the Soviet Union. The forms of activity were such as students' strikes against college fees, and deepening of all causes of discontent.

After my graduation from the university, I was transferred to the party and sent to Poznan in order to create there a legal periodical publication as an organ of the illegal party. I did this and "edited" the paper for 1 year, which means I just printed the material sent to me secretly. Upon my return to Warsaw, I set up another publication of the same type, but of a literary content, under the title "The Face of the Day." This was already a new era in Communist tactics, the era of "popular fronts," so the methods changed accordingly (see below for details). I was told to seek contacts with the non-Communist press and to infiltrate it either by sending them my own material, or by having other writers, expecially journalists, write articles in a spirit to suit us. In this way, I infiltrated the weekly magazine Labor Front (Front Robotniczy) an organ of the Associated Trade Unions. I

convinced its editor Jerzy Szurig to publish a supplement "The Front of the Young" (Front Mlodych), and by the end of 1930, also to publish, at the expense of the Communist Party, the daily paper Common Voice (Glos Powszechny), which went all the way along the lines of the popular Front. After the closing of the Common Voice due to the protests of the majority of the members of the executive committee of the Associated Trade Unions, I joined, as a professional newspaperman, the publishing company House of the Press (Dom Prasy), a group of daily and weekly papers of the popular pro-government press with some possibilities of infiltration (the party ordered me to concentrate mainly on propaganda regarding the successes of Soviet industry and Polish-Soviet cooperation).

I worked at the House of the Press till the war. Later, I went to Lublin with a group of editors in order to continue publishing at the local printing shop of Lublin Express, which was already impossible in Warsaw. After this printing shop was destroyed by bombing, I went from Lublin to Lwow, already deeply disappointed in Russia because of the August pact of Stalin with Hitler, disgusted with the effects of this pact, tragically frustrated. At Lwow I was still persuaded to participate in the editorship of the official Soviet daily The Red Banner (Czerwony Sztandart). The last remains of my illusions that the Bolsheviks would help Poland in her war against the Germans were gone when I learned the views of high Soviet officials such as Korniejchuk, not to mention the "politruks" who directed the editing of the paper. The relationship of the Soviet authorities to the Polish population, especially to the workers, finally did it. I rebelled openly, left the editorial staff, was arrested and, after a long investigation, tried and sent to a prison camp.

After my release, I joined the Polish Army in Russia and, with all my heart, devoted myself to the fight against communism. After the war I transferred to the commanding staff of the 2d Corps, to the unit which investigated communism. Since the demobilization I have been fighting communism with my pen, by participation in liberation organizations and by doing my best to disseminate my experience, to expose Communist lies, and to teach about its methods of activity.

Communist propaganda, especially the press and literature and, in general every word written or spoken, serve exclusively the purpose of Soviet politics. It has nothing to do with the truth, with reflecting public opinion, with investigation, or research. It is enslaved, depending upon the Moscow center as the last link through a longer or shorter chain of intermediate links. It does not even reflect the discussions or expressions of doubt within the various Communist movements or groups; it expresses exclusively the interests of the group in power in the Kremlin at any particular time. If the press happens to publish something that is contrary to this interest, it is appropriately punished.

The methods and tactics of propaganda are identical with those of the policy and tactics of communism. So, the press may lie, terrorize, camouflage according to the needs. It may spread discontent whenever it works in foreign countries, where it attacks the enemies of the Soviet system, disregarding the principles of morality. It is invariably the same, regardless of the person of the editor and regardless of how this editor might feel deep in his heart. It is like communism itself.

I started my activities as a Communist propaganda agent first in the student paper Academic Life (Zycie Akademickie), a publication of an anti-Communist and patriotic organization. Instructed by a special liaison of the party *Propagit*, through a chain of intermediate links, I disseminated, as long as I could, news concerning the misery and economic conditions in Poland, characterized the crisis as the "crisis of the capitalist system," gathered and exaggerated news of strikes and demonstrations of those unemployed. On the other hand, I brought news of the successes of the Soviet 5-year plan. Naturally, not in a single instance, did I use the word "communism" and never did I directly recommend communism, because my instructions forbade it. I changed the composition of the editorial staff, by forcing the "reactionary" colleagues to resign and introducing concealed Communists, as myself, as "progressives."

Then, after the leadership of the Association of Polish Democratic Youth removed me from the organization, I became the author of several illegal pamphlets printed by Communist "technicians," which presented the political and local students' events along Communist lines. These leaflets were signed either by the Association of Polish Democratic Youth-Secession, or by a Committee of Underprivileged Students. The politically more significant leaflets were signed by the Organization of Socialist Youth Life, and, from time to time, the most important were signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Association of Polish Youth-Section of the Third International. Communism was very unpopular in Poland (the membership of the party and Communist youth consisted in nearly 90 percent of national minorities), and therefore, such tactics enabled a more effective dissemination of Communist views by apparently non-Communist organizations. On the other hand, it helped to promote the authority of the Communist leadership which demonstrated its control of several organizations by voicing the same propaganda line in each.

The aim of this propaganda activity has always been to submit the organs of propaganda under the strict control of the party. If this could not be accomplished, if, during the transformation of a group into a leftist one, they objected to the name KPP (Polish Communist Party) or KZMP (Communist Association of Polish Youth), then the given group or paper was assailed as "renegade," "provocative," "traitors," even if such group or paper were very close to communism.

This was the era in which the theory of "social fascism," created by Stalin, ruled. It proclaimed that organizations which used the "Communist slogans" but were not or did not intend to be subject to the party were indeed "farthest advanced outposts of the bourgeois, or a social fascism." Consequently, in those times, the primary goal of the infiltration process was not merely to spread the ideas of communism, but, rather, to get people and organizations under the control of the Communist organization. This was to be done in a short time. The theory of "social fascism" was based on the belief that the crisis would cause a world revolution of the proletariat in the very near future and that, in that revolution, the Communist parties must take the leading role to such an extent that all countries embraced by a revolution, would become dependent upon Russia. It was basically for this purpose, that Stalin started the 5-year plan. In contrast to capitalism in crisis, the industrialization of Russia, by creating a model system for the popular masses, was to stir up sentiment and to help to start the revolution in the West, in the Communist spirit.

The effects of this kind of propaganda were quite significant. In Poland, the country which was overridden by the Red Army just 10 odd years before, the pro-Soviet sentiments grew steadily, especially among intellectuals and in general among educated people who engaged in reading. As a typical instance, we can point to Wladyslaw Broniewski, an officer of the (Polish) Legion, a friend of many leading personalities of the ruling circles, a soldier of the war of 1920 (war with the Bolsheviks), who, already at the beginning of the crisis, became a leading Communist poet. Many others, non-Communists, as e.g. Tadeusz Hollender, wrote poems sympathetic with Russia, such as Hollender's poem which was awarded a prize by a non-Communist literary magazine Literary News (Wiadomosci Literackie), under the title "And in the East the Tractors Snarl."

At that time, the party's press was chiefly engaged in illegal activity. There were such publications as Nowy Przeglad (New Review), Czerwony Sztandar (Red Banner), Czerwony Zwiazkowiec (Red Trade-Unionist), Moprowiec (MOPR-member) (MOPR—International Organization for the Support of the Revolutionists), Zolnierz Rewolucji (Soldier of the Revolution), a publication of the military department of the party, directly subject to the IV Department of the Staff of the Red Army, and others, along with various local publications, leaflets, and occasional publications. There were also legal publications under innocent titles, such as Ze Swiata (From the World), Miesiecznik Literacki (Literary Monthly), Orka (Tillage) (the editor of the latter was Zenon Kliszko, presently a high official of the Polish regime). For some time, I was his liaison officer. There was a farmer's magazine at Torun, Przekroj Tygodnia (Review of the Week) (containing only reprints from legal "bourgeois" press, but selected with a special purpose). Oblicze Dnia (Face of the Day), and many legal pamphlets which discussed more important political events (such as Japan's attack on China—"Japan is not isolated"), satires, pseudo-literary short stories, and even novels written at the request of the party and published by legal bookstores and publishing houses of the party, such as, "Tom" (Volume), "Ksiazka" (Book) and others. From among the books, we should mention Kruczkowski's "Kordian i Cham" (Kordian and the Churl) and "Pawie Piora" (Peacock's Feathers), Wasilewska's "Ojczyzna" (Home Land) and "Oblicze Dnia" (Face of the Day) (the magazine which appeared later took its title from the title of this book), Drzewiecki's "Kwasniacy," and many others. Those legal periodicals, pamphlets, and books did not advocate communism, never mentioned the Communist Party, avoided drastic expressions, such as "revolution," *but they spread Communist propaganda.*

During the period of "sectarian leftism" as Stalin called it later, although he was its creator, the party did not permit an arrangement under which the editing staff of those legal party publications contained anybody that was not entirely subject to party authority. Such publications could keep silent about certain matters, but were not allowed to shed light on any matter which would differ, even in the slightest degree from the general party line then in effect. I organized and "edited" a few such publications and therefore I will tell how it was done, in order to give an idea of the methods of camouflaging and of the techniques, as well as of the ways of using the

political and legal conditions in a country in which the Communist Party was illegal.

In 1932, the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact was signed. Immediately, the party decided to publish legally a magazine Ze Swiata (From the World), to inform about the neighbor in the east, with whom a pact was concluded against the growing danger of "Hitler-fascism." The married couple, the Brahms of Bydgoszcz, were to be its editors, as they had not yet been exposed as Communist activists and were not known, at least in this respect, to the police. Bydgoszcz was chosen, because it was situated in the territory of former Prussian occupation, in which the press regulations were much more liberal than in other parts of Poland (a carryover from the time of Prussian rule). The magazine presented the dangers of Hitlerism and Soviet successes. It attacked Socialism in Poland and elsewhere, especially the German "social-fascism" because, in its struggle against Hitler, it did not submit to the orders of the German Communist Party, which was called the vanguard of the labor movement. After the first house search by the police, the "editors" got scared and terminated the publication.

"Propagit" recommended me for a trip over the formerly Prussian territory of occupation, to see about the possibilities for publication of a new magazine. After an initial failure in the Pomeranian town of Wabrzezno in which the Chief of Administration (Starosta) happened to know me from activities in the Association of Polish Democratic Youth of which he was a senior, I succeeded in the publication of the first issue in Poznan. Before that, I set up an "editorial committee" which meant that I came to an agreement with a few sympathizers with the Communist movement, not exposed as such, to the effect that, should the police ask me about the contributors to my magazine, I would give their names. In this "shield-committee" there were, among others, W. Bienkowski, later a Minister of Education in the Communist government; Jan Kott, the present "rebel" against this government, and Jerzy (last name unknown), the present prisoner of this government. Another person promised me to testify that he loaned me the money for the first issue.

Naturally, I received all material from the Central Editorial Board, a department of the party Propagit, by way of a liaison (because, once the decision was made that I would edit a legal publication, I stopped attending the Propagit meetings). It was Josef (Gruenberg) and later, in matters of greater importance, I met the secretary of the "internal" Propagit (there was also an "external" one with its seat in Moscow) Hilary Minc, called professor.

After the first issue in Poznan of the magazine (as mentioned before, we chose an innocent name "Illustrated Biweekly"), I was summoned to the Security Department. Police officer Malinski questioned me. I described the "editorial committee" and the "loan." I know that later it was checked and everything was found all right. I told about my views, naturally not admitting that I was a Communist. I stated that, in my opinion, Poland, because of the danger on the part of Hitler, should have its rear secured and a neutral Russia. Thus, I acted in accordance with the Polish national interest and in line with Minister Beck's policy. Apparently, they believed me, the more so, since I backed my story with my past membership in the Association of Polish Democratic Youth. And I continued to publish the maga-

zine for over 1 year, with only a few instances of confiscation. Once a month I went to Warsaw, always carefully eluding the detective who was stationed in front of my house every time I came to Warsaw. I was also followed in Poznan. I am now wondering about the inefficiency of the police at that time: all they could do was to follow my steps and to make home searches (about which, by the way, an officer, Kowalski, who hated Malinski, used to warn me beforehand, perhaps to play safe in case things should change). After all, the police could have seized my manuscripts in the print shop and could have easily found out that they were not written by the members of the "editorial committee" which I mentioned. It is true, however, that, during my trips to Warsaw, I used to meet these apparent "editors" thus supporting the impression that they were my contributors. With Bienkowski I would appear publicly on purpose, and after all we were friends when attending the same department (Polish Studies) at the University. I proceeded similarly with Zolkiewski who was officially a member of the Legion of the Youth.

The reason why I write about all this in such detail is to show how carefully and precisely Communist camouflage is prepared and how well concealed, and, since nothing has changed up to now, in order to make people draw proper practical consequences and, first of all, to make them distrust all kind of "nonpartisans" and "progressives."

The Bimonthly attacked the Socialists and Hitler, praised the 5-year plan, wrote much about strikes and misery in Poland. Several times, I published Stalin's speeches and other articles from the Soviet press, mostly on economic problems, under fictitious names.

When, in December 1934, I was told to publish on the first page an article on Kirov with his picture in a coffin, although I protested against it, knowing that it would expose me, the police started confiscating my paper maliciously, i. e., ordering a repeated confiscation of the same issue. I was compelled to discontinue the publication. I returned to Warsaw. From then on I worked at the Propagit. I organized another literary weekly Oblicze Dnia (Face of the Day), with such "editors" as Mieczyslaw Bilnrowski (?), a lawyer's assistant (Duracza), Andrzej Wolica, a Communist poet, Wanda Wasilewska—all Communists, but, along with them: Waclaw Rogowicz, Maria Dabrowska, and Zofia Nalkowska—not Communists, but progressives, and such Communist sympathizers as Zegadlowicz, H. Roguszewska, Kornacki.

This was already another era, that of the "Popular Front." I was instructed to employ in the "extended editorial committee" as many "Progressive intellectuals" as possible. Their names, along with such "foreign contributors" as Romain Rolland, Henri Barbusse, and others, were mentioned on the first page of each issue. Naturally, they wrote very little, nearly nothing, and the whole issue was filled with the material from the "Central Editorial Board." When some non-Communist member of the "extended editorial committee" was asked to contribute an article, the topic was discussed with him at length and certain theses were "talked into him."

The era of the Popular Front started before the VII Congress of the Comintern, which is supposed to have decided upon it in August 1935. It originated in 1934, as the tactics of a "uniform front," a common action of the Communist parties with the Socialist ones, which were not called social Fascists anymore. Hitler's victory in Germany

showed how harmful it was to use the theory of "social fascism" which broke up the anti-Hitler forces. Actually, it was Stalin with his theory of "social fascism" and the practice of the Communist war against the whole anti-Fascists camp, that helped Hitler to gain power.

The tactics of the "Popular Front" offered much better possibilities of infiltration, maneuvering, and diversion. It did not mean that communism gave up its claim of exclusiveness and of the monopoly of leadership, or that they allowed a true cooperation of groups and people of non-Communist views with Communists, on the basis of a democratic equality. It merely meant that they agreed to postpone for some time the subjection of others and imposition of its exclusive leadership and rule. This position results from the modern Communist view that the revolution of "popular masses" will not remove the capitalist system in the long run, and that this removal will not come about in the near future. When it comes, it will be accomplished by some kind of coup d'etat by an elite force, scientific or military, supported by Soviet rockets. Within this modern conception, the significance of the method of diversion, infiltration, and planting of subversives in a long-run planning becomes increasingly important. While under the traditional Communist plan every unit had the task of taking over a given organization as soon as possible and if this was not possible in a short time, it was to create disunity or secession, under the new policy, the Communist unit may and should exist for years, as long as possible and patiently destroy and paralyze the given "bourgeois" organization.

The same applies to the press. While formerly the party would set up its own—legal and illegal—publications, applying infiltration only in exceptional cases, and rather forbidding the publication of "true" ideas in the "bourgeois" press (thus precluding the possibility that this "truth" might be credited to this "class enemy"), nowadays this method is being applied to the broadest possible extent. Before the time of the "popular front," a Communist was not permitted, even in order to save his life, to deny his Communist views (although he was allowed to deny his membership in the party), or to say that he is an enemy of communism. My instructions were to avoid the matter of ideology: Under no circumstances was I to say that my paper—the Biweekly—had the task of fighting communism. At the present time, even this camouflage is permitted to be used by a "perversionist" who is assigned for a longer period of time to an organization or the editorial board of a paper.

Perhaps the best instance of this tactic in prewar Poland was the case of the "Polish Teacher's Association" and its children's publications. Several agents were sent to this association with the purpose of staying there as long as possible and teaching children to sympathize with communism. The publications of the association "Plomyk" and "Plomyczek" (Flame, Little Flame) spread sympathies for communism, and Wanda Wasilewska was one of the editors. Officially, she was a member of PPS (Polish Socialist Party) but within PPS she formed a Communist faction. I was in contact with her, as a Communist, in connection with the publication of "Oblicze Dnia" (Face of the Day). The activity of these (children's) magazines caught the attention of the authorities, but no charges against the association "could be proven," since it appeared as "progressive" and "pacifist." By the way, the trick of the "Defense of peace" is an old tactical

device which goes back to Stalin. In 1932, by order of the party, I organized a mass meeting "in the defense of peace" together with Senator Bogushewski who was a member of the Senatorial Club of BBWR (Nonpartisan Block of Cooperation with the Government), but turned Communist in 1932.

After the termination of Oblicze Dnia (which was published in Warsaw), I was ordered—now in line with the tactics of the "Popular Front"—to cooperate with the paper Front Robotniczy (Worker's Front), using the fact that I was acquainted with its editor Jerzy Szurig. I wrote articles along the line of a common front, according to the materials and instructions which I received from the Central Board of Editors. I managed to win over the secretary of the editorial staff, Roman Biernacki. On behalf of the paper, he went to organize a strike at Lida, where he was arrested.

Another typical example of a subversive paper with a very mixed editorial staff, was the daily paper Glos Powszechny. Its editor was Jerzy Szurig, a radical but not a Communist. I was the secretary of the staff, and the two other members of the editorial staff were young, camouflaged Communists, Irza and Ejzenberg, engaged by me; a close contributor was Jan Karol Wende (Czerniakow), presently a high personality in the "regime's" government, a Communist, delegated to the Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (Democratic Party). Four others were workers of the ZZZ (Federation of Labor Unions(?)), rather anti-Communist, but sympathetic with the idea of a popular front—Euzebiusz Ziolek, P. Gawlikowski, Prof. Zakrzewski, and a satirical poet, then pro-Communist, and later its foe—T. Hollender. The paper called for the unity of all forces of peace and progress, supported the organizations which leaned toward communism, advocated a policy of friendship with Russia, spread hatred toward Hitler's Germany, emphatically defended the Madrid government against General Franco. In the supplement, I published a novel by H. Boguszewska and J. Kornacki dealing with Communist ideology. After half a year the publication of the paper was discontinued due to stormy protests of the members of ZZZ (Federation of Labor Unions).

Then I joined Dom Prasy (House of the Press), publishers of a series of pro-government papers, first as a proofreader, and then, owing to the support of Stefan Swierzewski, a thoroughly camouflaged Communist sympathizer, I was employed as a member of the editorial staff of the afternoon daily paper Kurier Czerwony i Dobry Wieczor (Red Courier and Good Evening). Its editor was Stanislaw Kapuscinski, an anti-Communist, yet indulgent with my "youthful idealism" as they called my kind of communism, already known in Warsaw. Politically, I could not do much in this position, because the paper was well guarded, but I supported writers of Communist learnings, giving them good reviews in the cultural section of the paper. I published little "gossip items" which presented the Soviet Government in a favorable light. Often, I corrected manuscripts and telegrams by striking out sharp statements directed against Russia and communism. In spite of that, I enjoyed increasing recognition and, perhaps, I would have later become an editor of one of the papers. Yet, I suppose that the evolution of my ideology might have (already then) taken the turn it took (later). Before the war, the Moscow trials, the accounts of friends who visited Russia and were frank in their views, and finally the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party by

the Comintern on the charge that it was "a party of Trotskyists and Pilsudski's provocateurs," had weakened my faith. The influence of the environment, decidedly anti-Communist, and anti-Soviet, did its share, too. Editor H. Rudkiewicz who employed me in the editorial board and even regarded me with favor, said, as I was later told, when he was cautioned about my views: "He is young, and today's youth have red rather than green in their heads; he will grow out of it."

Dziennik Popularny (People's Daily) was the most daring and typical subversive enterprise in the "People's Front" style. I did not take an immediate part in its organization, since I was busy with Glos Powszechni (Popular Voice) at that time. Its organizer was Wiktor Grosz, a member of the party (later general in the regime's army). Grosz made up an editorial committee of two members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), Stanislaw Dubois and Norbert Barlicki. The two were not Communists but belonged to the left wing of the PPS. Both wrote many articles—and in this the paper differed from those of the previous era, when such "editors" were merely figureheads and only members of the Party's Central Editorial Board were allowed to write articles.

Grosz directed (the editorial committee) from a hiding place and wrote principal articles of decidedly Communist contents, however without using Communist phraseology. The non-Communist part of the editorial committee contributed articles in the spirit of the "popular front" and was instructed by way of discussions with the Communist part of the committee.

Semiofficially, the Daily was supported by the Polish Teachers Association and, for this, it wrote much about the teachers' problems and "fought" for the improvement of their material security.

The lawyer Muszkatenblitt was the official publisher. He testified that he gave the money for the foundation of the publication (while, in fact, the money was received from the party and Grosz was in charge of them). Among the popular-front papers, only Glos Powszechny, which I founded, had received the money not from the party, but from the anti-Communist Association of Labor Unions, and, therefore, the party had a relatively small voice in this paper, and only through me.

The literary department in the Dziennik Popularny was in charge of Mrs. Wasilewska in cooperation with Emil Zegalowicz, a non-Communist, but with Communist sympathies which he developed as he had a feeling of resentment in regard to the government for not giving him government awards. He was a maniac in matters of honorary distinctions. Zegadlowicz's novel "Motory" (Motors) was published in the supplement.

At that time several other "Democratic" papers of the "popular front" type were published, e.g., a high level monthly Droga (Way).

The dissolution of the Polish Communist Party by the Comintern, considerably restricted further subversive activities through the press and greatly disappointed (Polish) Communists; the August pact with Hitler deepened this disappointment.

After the invasion of the Red Army in Lwow, I got in touch with my friends with whom I was active in Warsaw. In spite of all my doubts, in spite of the pact with Hitler, I hoped, and was supported in my hope by other Communists, that this alliance was just a

maneuver, that, sooner or later, the Red Army would attack the Fascists but was presently gathering strength and the Soviet Government was gaining time.

Together with a group of known Communists, such as Leon Pasternak, Emil Szurer, and some local ones, I joined the editorial staff of Czerwony Sztandart (Red Banner), a paper which was actually edited by a group of Politruks of the Red Army—Mankowski, Braun, Markowski. Formally, the local poet Dan was the editor in chief, but he had nothing to say in important matters; in fact he, as well as all of us, so far obeyed the Politruks in everything.

Then, controversies started on a seemingly insignificant item, such as the language. The Politruks distrusted us so much that sometimes they corrected our language; e.g., they told us to substitute the term "Jew" (Zyd), which is a derogatory form in Russian for "Hebrew" (Jevrej), which is accepted in Russia, but is derogatory in Poland. This went on for several weeks, and they even wrote to Moscow in this matter. Now I found myself in opposition; I started making remarks as to the wisdom of the pact with Hitler, of the behavior of the military authorities, imprisonments, robberies, or famine. At one of the meetings a quarrel started during which Politruk Mankowski pulled out his nagan (gun). I declared my exit from the editorial staff, and said that this was not behavior worthy of communism, that this was an arbitrary action of the military authorities, and that I would file a charge with the prosecutor. In this quarrel, the poet Broniewski, whom I met daily, supported me, although he did not work in the editorial staff.

A few days later, on January 23, 1940, I was arrested.

It seems to me that now I am able to recognize every printed matter, a paper, a pamphlet, book, or a separate article which is instigated. Such a publication may even deny communism and even criticize it. Yet, instigation always leaves a trail which I can recognize because of my long-lasting work in this field. First of all, it always expresses an element of general Soviet politics: "Defense of peace," "anti-German sentiments," a fierce personal attack on somebody who particularly effectively fights bolshevism, a special way of expressing the thought. All this cannot be hidden. There is one thing in common with all publications instigated by Communist subversion: the absence of any attack on Russia and her politics. There may be attacks on communism, on some particular agencies or even on satellite governments, but Russia is sacrosanct, i.e., Russia of the group just in power, or the actual politics of Moscow.

The tactics of the popular front are, in fact, the tactics of gathering and using people who agree with Soviet politics, with Moscow's supremacy, with being her hired hand, regardless whether they are most ardent Fascists like, e.g., Bosleslaw Piasecki in Poland, or regular gangsters or most loyal Communists. True belief and ideology do not count. A man can be a faithful Catholic, but if he says: "Russia should be the leader of Europe" or something else to this effect, he will be accepted, used, and paid. Today, communism is just one of several tools of Moscow's imperialism, very important, but not the only one. Therefore, in the fight against propaganda and subversion in printed and spoken word, it is necessary first to look for Soviet traces and only afterwards, for Communist ones. One must remember that all satellite spying and subversive activities are centrally directed

by Soviet Intelligence and that its requirements are decisive. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Soviet Party, gives orders to all others. An agent of the Warsaw "regime" is, first of all, a Soviet agent; therefore, he can, for purposes of confusion, even criticize the Warsaw regime, but this should not mislead anybody, as long as Russia is not attacked.

The Communist Parties have their Departments of Enemy Organizations. Their purpose is to penetrate into foreign organizations, groups, papers, broadcasting stations, and conduct subversive activities within them. All these departments are in one way or another subject to Soviet Intelligence, but have their autonomous rights and privileges, just as Soviet spies have, with the exception of the anti-Soviet shield. This is allowed in very exceptional cases. However, in the field of propaganda and in publications this exception is hardly admissible. At any rate I have never noticed it although I have been watching these matters carefully and for a long time.

As far as the Polish emigree groups are concerned, the methods of the "regime" government in regard to press matters changed repeatedly. At the beginning, the consulates published their own papers, such as Tygodnik Polski (Polish Weekly) in London and several papers in France. Now they have changed, nearly completely to the method of "popular fronts"—to subversive papers supposedly published by emigrees, seemingly non-Communists, but secretly connected with the consulates, such as Oblicze Tygodnia (Face of the Week) in London. Horyzonty (Horizons) in Paris, or Nasz Znak (Our Emblem) in Sweden. Such papers, though slightly different in topics and approach, have common principal objectives: Praising of the Soviet politics, exciting disgust toward the west, a mad anti-German flavor, libeling of the independence camp of the emigree groups and their individual leaders, instigation, stressing the "achievements" of Polish industry and culture, exciting of sentiments among the Polish emigrees against any political activity but, instead promoting the interest in a purely moneymaking existence, supporting of all kinds of "nonpolitical", "regime" organizations such as Oder Neisse, Committee for the (Polish) Millenium, Polish Paedagogical Center, and of all groups and factions opposing the principal trend for independence.

It was a typical move, when, in 1954, after the dispute of the group around President Zaleski with "Zjednoczenie" (Association) had started, the "regime" government, in order to support the Zaleski group, assigned all its agents to it—Hanke, Mackiewicz, Matlachowski, Kotowicz. Matlachowski and Kotowicz published periodicals under Zaleski's name but along the line of the "regime" government politics (both later returned to Poland).

In addition to the papers completely in line with the "regime" policy, many agents and instigators work on several editorial staffs. Such a typical agent works for the daily Narodowiec (Man of the People): he is Adam Gas who was removed from the Polish Popular Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe) for his proregime activity. In his correspondence from England, Gas fights "Zjednoczenie" and "amateur-politicians" in general, advertises the "regime's" organizations in England, attacks "Sanacja" (political faction) of General Anders. He uses the pathological phobia of the editor of this paper, Kwiatkowski, whose hatred for "Sanacja" surpasses that of communism.

Also the Catholic paper Gazeta Niedzielna (Sunday Paper) is instigated, which fact can be seen, e.g., in the standpoint of its editor in chief T. Borowicz, concerning the persecution of the church in Poland: "Let's not write about the persecutions of the church in Poland, because this would harm the church." Borowicz is also connected with the group of Horyzonty, a paper decidedly pro-Russian, although with a delicate anti-Communist touch.

The papers also play an important part in the organization of political and social subversion, as they send out their "correspondents" into the country. For example, M. Lang, member of the editorial staff of Oblicze Tygodnia (Face of the Week), is such a typical subversive similarly like Gas, the correspondent of Narodowiec, who constantly travels across England.

Lang was "in the country" (i.e., in Poland) for 2 months, for retraining, made speeches full of loyalty and antiemigree, then returned to England where he is acting quite openly, disregarding even public warnings on the part of the emigrees. Disregard for the danger and for the effects of propaganda is characteristic of people deeply believing in their cause and honesty. Yet they misjudge the perversity and the power of lie of the "regime" propaganda. The effects of the subversive press and of that infiltrated by the particular instigators, are great indeed. In England there are whole groups which are under the influence of the ideologies of Oblicze Tygodnia, Nasz Znak, or Horyzonty. The first one affects the groups of Socialists and the working "intelligentisia," the second one—the popular masses, the third one the Catholics and nationalists.

In addition to the subversive emigree papers, the "regime" government publishes in Poland papers *for* the emigrees, which constitute a kind of source for subversive activities and instigation in the press. They are centrally directed by "Polonia"—a Society for the Liaison with the Poles Abroad, with its seat in Warsaw. The "Krajowa Agencja Informacyjna" (National Information Agency) now edited by former emigree K. Hrabyk who, before his departure to Poland, conducted a subversive press activity in America, similar to that of Kotowicz and Matlachowski in England. "Polonia" also publishes in the English language a magazine for Polish children in England and America, under the name: "Polish News and Views," telling the children of Polish emigrees about strikes in prewar Poland, about the "Rapacki Plan," about the "Association of Polish Socialist Youth in Poland," and—with racial hatred—about German atrocities.

Also several anonymous leaflets and pamphlets are published, with libelous attacks on Polish independence workers among the emigrees, such as the mimeographed pamphlet "Codalej, panowie" (What now, gentlemen).

It is time to watch closely Communist subversive activity in the press and declare a decisive war on it.

Summing up:

1. The subversive press, infiltrated by Communist agents, is always depending upon Moscow, serves the purposes of its politics and has never anything in common with objective information, freedom of opinion, or clash of views.
2. It is camouflaged in various ways, including the "fight against communism."
3. It never attacks the politics of the group ruling in the Kremlin at the particular time.

4. It uses people regardless of their ideologies or morality and demands only one thing; obedience to Russia.

5. In its activities, it uses the general Communist method—lies, terror, the principle of attacking the main foe of Russia at the given time, and joining even in temporary alliances with lesser foes.

6. In addition to the propaganda by printed materials, the press and its workers also perform the role of organizers of the subversion "in the field," by using the same methods; the same is going on in broadcasting.

7. The damaging effects and effectiveness of such press activities is usually greater than believed by the foes of communism.

8. It is necessary to fight it recklessly, with all means; it has nothing to do with the "Oppression of free thought."

RUMANIA

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE RUMANIAN PRESS BEFORE THE TAKEOVER

Dr. Asra Berkowitz [1]

A thorough examination of Communist infiltration in the Rumanian press and into Rumanian public opinion naturally takes us into a succinct analysis of Rumania's position toward bolshevism from its inception. For the Russian Revolution of 1917 took place also on Rumanian territory where the Russian troops under the command of the Russian General Cerbachev happened to be. Fighting side by side with the Rumanian Army on the front at the River Siret in Moldavia, the Russian regiments, believing in the counsel of the Communist agents, fell apart, deserting the front and pouring back over the towns and taking with them into Iasi, the capital of Moldavia, the Communist agitator Dr. Rakowski, later to be the first Soviet Ambassador to Paris and then to London, who tried to overthrow the social order in Rumania also. The Rumanian people strongly resisted this direct Bolshevik campaign, not only in Moldavia, Bucovina and Bessarabia, but also in Transylvania where the Hungarian communism of Bela Kun was trying to gain ground. The Rumanians, from the villages as well as the towns, in spite of all the privations inherent to the war and the German invasion, to hunger, epidemics and to the defeats suffered until then, did not allow themselves to become contaminated by the germ of communism, but opposed the revolutionary propaganda with a profound contempt and a limitless resistance.

---

[1] Biography.
Name: Asra Berkowitz.
Born: November 6, 1886, Rumania.
Status: Married.
Arrived in United States: October 12, 1961.
Languages: Perfect French, German, Rumanian, fair English.
Education: Completed high school in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, University in Heidelberg, Berne and specialised studies Sorbonne, Paris. 1910, graduated doctor in philosophy.
Experience:
1956–61: Literary writing and translations, Bucharest, Rumania.
1949–56: In jail as political prisoner, without trial and conviction. During this period he wrote in jail the history of the Rumanian Liberal Party.
1944–48: Director and editor of the political newspaper "Liberalul." Political activity as counselor of C. Bratianu, chief of the Liberal Party in Rumania. Permanent contact with the Allied (Western) Embassies in Bucharest, mainly with the press office of the U.S. Embassy. Various official and unofficial participation in the fight against Communist propaganda and Soviet domination in Rumania.
1941–44: Underground political activity during the Second World War and a year (1941–42) in Nazi concentration camp, Tg. Jiu.
1918–41: Director and editor of the political newspaper "L'Independence Roumaine," published in French. Correspondent of the French newspaper "Le Temps," Paris. Collaboration with the London "Times." Manager of the news agency "Danubian Press." Twice Senator (1933–35 and 1937–38) in the Rumanian Parliament and several times candidate as representative of the Rumanian Liberal Party. Special press envoy to each session of the League of Nations, Geneva. Collaborator of Nicolae Titulescu, chief of the Rumanian Foreign Affairs and twice President of the League of Nations. Permanent adviser of the head of the Rumanian Liberal Party and of the liberal prime ministers.
1913–18: Political activity in preparing the participation of Rumania in World War I, against Germany Member of the editorial staff of the newspaper "La Roumanie".
Decorations: Chevalier of the "Legion D'Honneur" of France. Numerous distinctions and decorations from the states forming the "Petite Entente" treaty: Rumanian, Jugoslavia, Tchecoslovakia. Decorations from Poland and Spain. Guest of honor of the French government and of the British Council in 1938.

The Peace of Versailles, from which Russia was excluded, did not bring back to normal the relations between Rumania and the Soviet nation. The boundary formed by the Dneister River, which flows between the Rumanian and the Russian territory, remained closed legally, but actually, Bolshevik agents could cross over, night after night, bringing their partisans and local agents orders from the Comintern to incite the Rumanian people and to prepare the terrain for a revolt in Rumania. Their efforts were in vain, thanks to the deep nationalistic sentiments of the Rumanian peasantry as well as due to the severe measures and the constant vigilance of the governments which succeeded one another at the helm of the nation between the two World Wars.

The method of Communist infiltration was not that of directly and openly advocating the overthrow of the social order and the installation of a dictatorial regime of the proletariat, which at that time was relatively small in the country. Nor was it possible to clandestinely place agents in the editorial offices of the Rumanian daily newspapers and magazines, all of which were being subjected to a severe censorship. The method of undermining the established order was based upon a persistent activity of disparagement of prominent political men and political parties, of belittling their importance in the minds of the people, of exaggerating the shortcomings inherent to the governments during the most difficult period of reconstruction after the First World War, of aggravating political passions, exaggerating social discrepancies, intensifying the strife between the different political groups and among the divers social categories; in a word, a slow but continuous destruction of the national heritage and feelings, in order to raise upon the ruins of a collapsed society their own Communist establishment.

The means used in order to attain this purpose were of an internal as well as of a foreign nature. In this respect, there is a striking similarity between that which happened in the Danubian regions after the First World War and what is happening today in the free world, in this period following the Second World War. Then, there appeared just like mushrooms after a rain all sorts of international organizations carrying the banners of associations for peace, for struggle against oppression, for the defense of the rights of man, for Red relief. All these organizations—numbering among their leaders persons of renown in scientific, literary, cultural, and religious fields, fallen victims to their own vanities, naive by nature, dreamers and idealists, complete strangers to realities, allowing themselves knowingly or unknowingly to be misled by attractive appearances—all these created, preferably in the West, in large centers such as Paris and London, tried and often succeeded in establishing branches in Rumania, distributing ideas of propaganda designed to wear away the foundations of religious beliefs, of ethical behaviour, and even threatening the social order itself.

In the domestic field, Communist propaganda cleverly took advantage of the internal political battles, the mutual attacks launched by the political parties, the calumnies circulated against the political leaders and pictures the entire class as one lacking in conscience, one that was amoral, egoistic, selfish, grasping, and seeking to exploit the lower classes—the peasantry and the laboring class—for its own advancement.

This labor of social disintegration unfortunately found knowing or unknowing servants among the tabloid-type newspapers with large circulations, which craved scandal, sensationalism, and stories of passion, which would captivate readers and increase circulation. The Communists also found indirect ways of carrying it on among those political groups and leaders who did not hesitate to throw baseless accusations at one another in hopes of demolishing the other.

Another method of social disintegration consisted of the illegal and clandestine introduction of Communist literature into the country, material written in Rumanian but printed outside the borders of Rumania. Using harmless titles, whether scientific, commercial, or literary, these Communist publications in the form of fliers were distributed by the tens and hundreds of thousands. Appeals to embrace communism, tendentious and slanderous information, posters, newspapers, magazines, brochures—all bore a common place title, whether it was a description of how to plant, how to work the soil, or how to perform other agricultural and domestic chores. For the more enlightened peasantry and city workers the brochures, publications, magazines, and books had covers bearing all sorts of inscriptions alien to Communist interests and propaganda, but their contents were exclusively devoted to Communist propaganda and to the exaltation of the Soviet regime in Russia and of its leaders. In this way, the vigilance of the authorities was evaded and, through the mails and by means of agents scattered throughout the country, Communist propaganda infiltrated the length and breadth of the Rumanian land. The Bolsheviks are exceptionally masterly in their use of camouflage and of deception. On the front, during the battles, their military units were the ones best camouflaged against the Germans, who had one of the best detection and information services. In the political battles for the promotion of their ideas, Communists use the same methods of masking their real goals and the frightening reality of their activity.

As a matter of fact, the infiltration into the public opinion forms an indivisible whole, the press being but an insignificant part in proportion to the total means of activity at their disposal. Disregarding the democratic principles of the rule of the majority and not attributing too great an importance to the adherence of the massive numbers, but militating for the establishment of active, aggressive minorities, of shock battalions carefully selected, well grouped and conducted without scruples, international communism is active especially in countries which are underdeveloped agriculturally, without a large or organized proletariat (as was Rumania), through clandestine methods not exposed to the light of day, and through the great publicity methods of the daily press.

But, if the peasantry, forming over 70 percent of the population of Rumania, closely tied to its ancestral land, remained an unshaken rock against all the attempts of the Communists at penetration, the intellectual strata often showed itself to be changeable, unstable, ready for compromises and yielding, opportunistic, orienting itself according to the force of the wind blowing from the East or from the West. There were university professors, among them one who dared proclaim in a full Senate session that "the light comes from the East" ("ex oriente lux"); there was also a group of political intellectuals, under the deceptive banner of the Labor Party, which actually promoted

and propagated revolutionary ideas. The so-called democratic press of wide distribution raised one or another of them to the skies, praising their progressive and novel ideas. Did the press undergo a Communist infiltration? Or did it allow itself to be seduced because of the naivete of its conductors? Whichever the case might have been, from studies published later by the Communists themselves (such as Lucretiu Patrascanu, former Minister of Justice in the Groza government and later executed by the Communists), it appears that the Communist Party in Rumania numbered no more than 1,000 members. The Communist infiltration, no matter how great the effort made by Moscow, consequently did not have too great a success, considering that the population of Rumania in 1944 was more than 16 million.

Certainly, in retrospect we can ascertain that there were journalists and newspapermen who militated in the ranks of the democratic newspapers and publications of the extreme left and who, today, can be found among the Communist leaders. Mr. Macovescu, recent representative of the Rumanian Communist Government in Washington, was formerly a writer and journalist for the democratic and bourgeois press in Rumania. M. Dalea, former R.P.R. Minister to Moscow and at present a member in the Communist Government in Bucharest, was also a collaborator for the democratic publications. Alexander Sahie, deceased, who has been decreed by C. P. as a martyr for bolshevism and whose name—in accordance with the usual ritual—has been given to many streets, factories, institutions, and enterprises, wrote pro-Communist articles in the magazine Cuvantul Liber (Free Speech) published by two widely distributed democratic newspapers, Dimineata and Adevarul. To these publications as to many others in Bucharest, Iasi and Cluj also contributed a great number of leading intellectuals and journalists who had nothing in common with communism and who later militated in the first ranks of the anti-Communist democratic movements.

Certainly, the current of extreme rightist ideas and the Fascist movement, propagated and subsidized by the Hitler government and by Italian fascism, produced a counter-reaction in favor of the extreme left. The excesses and crimes of the National Socialist Government in Germany had as a direct result not the promotion of Communist ideas, but rather of creating a sympathy toward Communist Russia, considered to be the only great power desirous of fighting against the Third Reich. But disillusionment was not slow in setting in when the Molotov-Ribbentrop accord was signed.

In any case, Communist infiltration in the Rumanian press could not manifest itself in the years just preceding the onset of the Second World War, inasmuch as the regime in power in Rumania was one of the extreme right, followed by the government of Marshall Antonescu, who entered the war on the side of Hitlerist Germany.

From a historical point of view, the events we lived through in the recent and perhaps the most distressing epoch for mankind, one cannot speak objectively of the influence of communism upon the Rumanian people, today fallen into the Soviet orbit. The only power which could subject this people to Communist leadership was the Russian soldier, who installed in Rumania the regime of the proletarian dictatorship and continues to maintain it in power, if not from within the country, from beyond its borders.

As for the struggle against communism being carried on with determination and firmness by the Western powers and, especially the United States, the Rumanian people began this unequal battle back in 1917, resisting for decades all the Soviet attempts and aggressions, falling finally an innocent victim of overwhelming international events, without despairing or completely losing hope in the triumph of justice, right, and liberty.

Although between the First and Second World Wars it was not possible to identify the direct infiltration of Communist agents in the staffs of the large daily newspapers in Rumania because of the severe censorship, Communist initiative was apparent in the creation of many small weeklies, bimonthly, and monthly magazines, varied in content: political, literary, economic, sports—all with obvious tendencies toward the extreme left. The initiative for these publications was always taken by some Communist sympathizing intellectual who succeeded in attracting promising young intellectuals desirous of having their work publicized and of seeing their writings in print. The source of the funds for these publications long remained a mystery, but today it is easy to trace their Communist source.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the dissemination of these periodicals had an insignificant effect on public opinion. We mention them only to point out one more of the methods used by Communists to propagate their ideas.

As for the period just preceding the Communist Party takeover of the government, it must be considered in two phases. There was, in fact, a transitory phase beginning with the armstice of August 23, 1944, when there were successively two bourgeois governments, the first—that of General Sanatescu—made up of the Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party of Bratianu and Maniu, respectively, along with the Communist Party. The second—the cabinet of General Radescu—was likewise supported by the bourgeois, the Socialist and the Communist parties.

In this phase, which continued until March 6, 1944, when the government of Petru Groza, a capitalist turncoat, was installed, the Communist Party manipulated the press through methods worthy of mention. First of all, the Communist Party, by threatening the independent newspapers with a boycott on the part of the printing shops, forced them to accept a political manager delegated by the party. Some of the newspapers concurred, while others suspended publication. The newspapers of the bourgeois parties were forced to appear in a greatly reduced format inasmuch as the control over the available newsprint was placed exclusively in the hands of the Communist Party. Then, besides the government censorship, there was also a censorship on the part of the Russian high command. In the printing shops, party faithfuls had been slipped in to prevent the shops from typesetting any articles unfavorable to communism by threatening the workers with exclusion from the unions—which meant being fired from their jobs.

When the Communists saw that some of the newspapers, in spite of the difficulties placed in their paths and the threats to which they had been subjected, continued to carry out their duties, publishing the bourgeois papers, mutilated as they were by censorship and lack of paper, the Communists proceeded to close down the newspapers and followed that with the arrest of the newspapermen.

YUGOSLAVIA

COMMUNISTS AND THE PRESS IN YUGOSLAVIA

Dr. Milan Gavrilovic [1]

The Communists ask for freedom of action for themselves in the name of our democratic principles, but refuse to grant the same freedom to their opponents in the name of their principles.

True to their democratic principles, the democratic governments of Yugoslavia, after the revolution in Russia in 1917, did not hinder open Communist propaganda. The Communists were taking advantage of their individual liberties like everyone else.

It soon became obvious that their main course of action was secret, and that the freedom which they enjoyed served only as a useful cover for their underground, directly subversive activities. This freedom was also used for ideological propaganda which made the secret work spiritually stronger, more resolute, more daring. It was manifest to the public after one of the Communists threw a bomb at the car in which King Alexander was driving with the Prime Minister N. Pasic. Both escaped unhurt. Soon after, another Communist shot and killed the Minister of the Interior while he was sitting, resting on a bench in the public park of a mountain spa. This was done in the belief that once these two rulers were removed, the realization of the revolution would be easier.

But the overwhelming majority of a really freely elected parliament, in which the Communists previously had 56 members, was aroused, and voted the Communist Party illegal. The revolt of the democrats was so great that the Serbian Peasant Party from the opposition benches voted with the Government for this bill.

This law had some effect, but did not solve the problem. The Communist Party, by their own admission after the war, dropped in membership from 12,000 to 3,000. But the law did not kill the movement for two main reasons. The first was Communist ideology

---

[1] Biographical notes.

Dr. Milan Gavrilovic graduated from the faculty of law, Belgrade University in 1906.

Graduated from the faculty of law, Paris University, as doctor of law in 1911. For his thesis he did research work both in Paris and Bonn, Germany.

From 1911 to 1923 served in the Serbian, then Yugoslav Foreign Office, in Belgrade, Corfu, London, Athens, Berlin and Rome.

Resigned at his own request in 1923.

From 1923 to 1929 was editor in chief of the Belgrade daily Politika.

During the dictatorship of King Alexander was interned for 3 months.

Was vice president of the Serbian-Yugoslav Peasant Party from its foundation 1920, and subsequently its president.

Appointed first Yugoslav Envoy to Moscow in 1940, where he remained from July 1940 to November 1941. On March 25, when the Yugoslav Government (Cvetkovic-Macek) signed the Tripartite Pact with Hitler, he resigned. Two days later when that Government was overthrown by a coup d'etat in Belgrade, he became a member without portfolio of the new pro-Western Government. In November 1941 was recalled by the exiled government to London for consultation. In January 1942 submitted a report on the Soviets ending with: "The system I saw in operation there on the spot, I cannot recommend to my people." This was reported to the Soviet Embassy in London and the same month he was declared, by the Soviets, persona non grata and was refused the visa to return to his post in Moscow. He, therefore, remained in London as Minister of Justice, Cults, and Agriculture in the Government in exile.

In 1946 he was sentenced to forced labour by Tito's courts.

In 1950 he came to the United States.

In 1960 he was elected by the All Serbian Congress to be the president of its executive committee, Serbian National Committee.

propagated by all means of communication, mostly secret, and directed from Moscow; secrecy adding to the appeal to youth. The Communist clubs at the universities became the strongest. The second was the success of Stalin's foreign policy, which was not adequately met by the foreign policy of the West. So ideology and Soviet success became the two main sources which made the infiltration of Communists everywhere possible.

It is my conviction that these two sources should be seriously examined and taken into consideration. Communist infiltration of the press, as Communist infiltration in general, is always preceded with Communist infiltration of minds, and those two sources are the cause of it. Once human minds are infiltrated, the other infiltration follows naturally.

Take my country, Yugoslavia. After the First World War there was full political freedom with all individual rights, freedom of speech, press, secret ballot, etc. Using that freedom the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was formed by a split of the Socialist Party, at that party's congress in 1920, where an overwhelming majority of Socialists voted for communism. This was natural, as the Socialist party was made up mostly by workers and some intellectuals, as Marxist communism had gained in popularity and appeal, especially after the successful revolution in Russia and the proclamation of a "workers state," "workers and peasants state." The Socialist Party was very small, and so was the newly formed Communist Party. But what was not natural was the fact that communism spread past the limits of the party and spread mostly among the young people, students and young intellectuals. The reason was a lack of understanding of marxism in its most disastrous consequences. Marxism was preached openly as the remedy for all social evils, something new, better,more progressive in all fields of human activities, in politics, in economics, in literature. In politics there was the new Communist Party. But around it there were many societies, associations with special, apparently nonpolitical aims. Among others there were some literary societies under names such as "realists," "surrealists," etc. All of them, in fact, played into Communist hands, although Communists were not conspicuous. All were under the direct, though not open, directive of the Communist Party. From these different societies were recruited young journalists, as one of the great aims of the Communist Party was to penetrate the newspapers' staffs.

The Communists could not expect to see Yugoslav newspapers preaching and demanding a foreign policy in accordance with the Soviet foreign policy. During the First World War and especially after it, Yugoslav foreign policy was definitely based on the West, not as before on Russia, being a Slav country. Newspapers followed the foreign policy of the Government. It corresponded to the feelings of the people. So, except for Communist organs, the press was not pro-Soviet, but pro-Western powers. The direct attack on newspapers, the direct takeover, was morally impossible. The only thing left to them was infiltration. Their aim was to get a member of the existing staff, or to place one of them on the staff of any and all newspapers.

One example. The the most influential paper, because it was the most popular, the most read, was the independent daily Politika. It was the property of brothers Ribnikar. Two of them were killed in

the First World War. The third took over the paper. The son of one of the dead brothers studied in Paris, but was unable to graduate. The young man was on the staff of Politika. During the last illness of Dr. S. Ribnikar, I agreed to replace him as editor in chief, and on his death I took over his job. One of the above-mentioned literary circles (the "surrealists"), attracted the young Ribnikar. At that time I knew nothing about it. I suppose it was not very difficult for them to get the boy. On one side there was a frustrated unfinished student with all unpleasant experiences after he returned from Paris without a diploma. On the other side, something "new," "progressive." On the third side, total misunderstanding of the real meaning of the revolution in Russia. All concurred to influence the young man. The only thing he was known for was as a son of one of the proprietors of the newspaper enterprise, a spoiled, rich boy.

One day he said to me that he had decided to start a real journalistic career, since, until that time, he was only in charge of crossword puzzles. He had decided, he said, to go to Moscow and to report what was happening there. I answered that he can go if he managed to get the visa. Surprisingly he got the visa from somewhere abroad, because we had no diplomatic relations with the Soviets. I was later informed that it was from Berlin. I advised him to write only what he has seen and verified. He came back. The first article was about ordinary things without any tendencies. The second and especially the third showed his hand. I suspended all other articles, brought the young man before me and asked directly: "Who wrote them?" He broke down. He admitted immediately: "I had to accept them." He told me his story. He fell in love with a girl in Moscow, without doubt, an agent. He married her there, in Moscow, though he was engaged to a girl in Belgrade and the marriage was already arranged. If he marries here in Belgrade, it would be a bigamy. Thus, the Communists got the man firmly in hand. Among the numerous staff on Politika I had gradually discovered a former disappointed party member, Bogdan N. who was liquidated by the Communists during the last war. Also on the staff were two Communist idealists, V. Dragovic and B. Prodanovic. I sent the latter, who was also liquidated by the Communists during the last war, to Berlin to the Soviet Embassy to tell them that I am going to publish the whole story if they did not give the boy a divorce. They did it, formally. He married. But there was no doubt they could raise the question of bigamy any time it suited them. He kept up with his friends the "surrealists," but I put him back to the crosswords job.

Then came January 6, 1929. King Alexander proclaimed the dictatorship believing to force unity between the Serbs and Croats, both peoples speaking the same language, but belonging to two Christian denominations. The Serbs are Eastern Orthodox, the Croats are Catholics. Naturally, I was soon removed from the Politika, and interned. The young Ribnikar, until then only a formal director, without any influence on the national and democratic line of the paper, became also editor in chief. He could not change the line of foreign policy, King Alexander was entirely pro-West. He could not make Politika a Communist paper, because of introduced censorship. But he started with little things in the daily reportage, like: "Arrogant richman drives his car over a beggar," etc. The end: He joined Tito during the war. Died after the war and was buried with all Communist honors. And he was not alone.

Another example. Both the son and daughter of a former foreign minister Dr. M. Ninchich, a very rich man, became Communists. The son is now in the United Nations.

This proves that before the Communists infiltrated newspapers they infiltrated minds. How could you prevent it? And how could you legislate?

Communist propaganda was not met adequately by democratic forces, who did not know how to fight and how to win in an ideological field. The second source which makes infiltration possible, the foreign policy, did not exist; Yugoslavia did not recognize the Soviets and was pro-West. But the first source, the appeal of Marxist ideology was there, unhindered, free to excite feelings of young men and young intellectuals.

Appendix I

Biography of Cheng Chu-yuan

(1) Name: Cheng Chu-yuan (alias: Cheng Tek-cheung).
(2) Date of birth: 8th April, 1926.
(3) Place of birth: Kwangtung Province, China.
(4) Status: Permanent resident.
(5) Education: B.A. (Eco.) National Chengchi University, Nanking, China, 1947.
M.A. (Eco.) Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1962.
(6) Present occupation:
(*a*) Research professor, Seton Hall University, South Orange, N.J.
(*b*) Chief Investigator, Research Project on Communist China's Scientific and Engineering Manpower, for National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.
(7) Previous occupation:
(*a*) Research Fellow, Central Co-operative Bank of China and concurrently Lecturer of Canton Co-operative Economics Institute, Canton, China (October 1947 to May 1949).
(*b*) Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of Chinese Problems, Hong-kong (October 1949 to July 1951).
(*c*) Associate Professor, New Asia College, Hong Kong (September 1951 to February, 1952).
(*d*) Editor, *The Democratic Review* (Fortnightly), Hong Kong (March 1952 to January 1953).
(*e*) Editor-in-chief, *The Democratic Review* (Fortnightly), Hong Kong (February, 1953 to 1959) and concurrently, Director, Research Department, Union Research Institue, Hong Kong.
(*f*) Special Contributor, *Japan Times* (Daily), Tokyo, Japan (1957 to 1959).
(8) Publications:
A. Books:
(*a*) *The People's Communes*, Union Press, Hong Kong, 1959, 137 pp. in English.
(*b*) *Communist China: Its Situation and Prospect*, Chinese Edition: Freedom Press, Hong Kong, 1959, 237 pp. Japanese Edition: Japan Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1959, 266 pp. Tokyo, Japan.
(c) *Income and Standard of Living in Communist China*, Union Press, Hong Kong, 1958, 362 pp., in English.
(d) *The Chinese Market Under Communist Control*, Union Press, Hong Kong, 1956, 96 pp., translated into English.
(e) *An Analysis of the First Five Year Plan in Communist China*, Freedom Press, Hong Kong, 1955, 366 pp., in Chinese.
(f) *The Anshan Iron and Steel Industry in Communist China*, Union Press, Hong Kong, 1955, 88 pp., translated into English.
(g) *Financial and Economical Developments in Communist China, During 1949–1954*, New Cultural Institute, Hong Kong, 1954, 48 pp., in Chinese.
(h) *Monetary Affairs of Communist China*, Union Press, Hong Kong. Chinese Edition: Union Press, Hong Kong, 1954, 167 pp. English Edition: Union Press, Hong Kong, 1954, 160 pp. Japanese Edition: Japan Ministry of Finance, 1956, Tokyo.
(i) *New Trends in Financial and Economic Policies in Communist China*, in two volumes, Freedom Press, Hong Kong, 1953, 299 pp., in Chinese.
(j) *An Analysis of Financial and Economic Policies in Communist China*. Freedom Press, Hong Kong, 1952, 172 pp., in Chinese.
(k) *The Forced Labor System of Communist China*, Freedom Press, Hong Kong, 1952, 120 pp., in Chinese.
B. Articles published in Chinese, Japanese, and English in Hong Kong and Tokyo: Articles on political, economic and educational developments in

Communist China, amounting three million words were published in *Tokyo Shimbum, Yomiure Shimbum,* and *Sanyo Keizei Shimbum* (all translated into Japanese) and in *Japan Times* (in English) in Tokyo, Japan; and in *The Democratic Review, The World Today, China Weekly,* and *Freedom Front* (all in Chinese published in Hong Kong).

C. Articles published in United States:

(*a*) A Decade of Communist Rule on the Mainlaind of China, in *Free World Forum,* June, 1960, Washington D.C.

(*b*) The Sino-Soviet Rift, in *New Leader,* August 7, 1961, New York.

(*c*) The Changing Pattern of Rural Communes in Communist China, in *Asian Survey,* November 1961, California.

(*d*) Red China, in *Atlantic Monthly,* February, 1962, Boston.

(*e*) Chinese Commune System in Retreat, for U.S. Information Agency worldwide broadcasting and news release, June, 1962.

(9) Academic activities:

(*a*) Visited Japan in June, 1958 for a lecture tour under the auspices of the Japanese Asian Cultural Association; stayed there for nearly one month; gave over 20 lectures on current problems of Communist China, two of the lectures were given at the Japanese Diet. Audience including high-ranking government officials, Diet members, leading industrialists and businessmen, bankers, economists, college professors, newspaper editors, students and others. The lectures were given in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka and were published in a book form by the Japan Institute of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

(*b*) Given lectures in Sino-American Amity, New York City June 1959, the extracts were printed in the *U.S. Congressional Record,* dated July 21, 1959 (p. A 6284) and August 6, 1959, (p. A 6779–80) by Hon. John W. McCormack of Massachusetts.

(*c*) Participated the Twelfth Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies as discussant in the Panel of Communist Chinese Economy, on April 11, 1960, in New York City.

(*d*) Invited by the Jubilee Congress of University of Hong Kong to contribute a paper on "The Structural Changes of Economy in Communist China" and act as a chief discussant in its Symposium in Social and Economic Problems of Far East, September 11, 1961.

(*e*) Presented a paper on the "Changing Pattern of Commune System in Communist China" to the 14th Annual meeting of Association for Asian Studies, on April 4, 1962, in Boston. The abstract of the paper has been published in *Christian Science Monitor,* May 2, 1962.

Appendix II—Bibliographic Notes to Petr Zenkl Article

Sources of this study comprise Czechoslovak official documents; Czechoslovak, English, and French articles and publications dealing with the 1945–48 period of Czechoslovak history; and, of course, the author's own experience. A further important source material has been provided by written and oral statements given the author by many personalities of Czechoslovak public life.

The documents, books, and articles included especially:

Act Relating to the Status of Editors and the Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak Journalists' Unions, Prague, 1947.

Bušek, Vratislav, and Spulber, Nicolas, *Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1957.

Chálupa, V., *Communism in a Free Society: Czechoslovakia 1945–1948*, Chicago, 1958.

Council of Free Czechoslovakia, *Czechoslovakia Under Hammer and Sickle*, Washington, 1951.

Ducháček, Ivo, *The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: the Case of Czechoslovakia*, New Haven, 1949.

Herben, Ivan, "L'Asservissement de la Presse en Tchécoslovaquie," in *La Presse derrière le rideau de fer*, Paris, 1948.

Josten, Josef, *Oh, My Country*, London, 1949.

Kopecký, Václav, *30 let KSČ* (Thirty Years of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), Prague, 1951.

Krajina, Vladimír, "*Komunismus v praksi: varování z československého případu*" (Communism in Practice: Warning of the Czechoslovak Case), manuscript, no date.

Laušman, Bohumil, *Kdo byl vinen? Jak umírala československá svoboda* (Who Was Guilty? The Way Czechoslovak Freedom Died), Vienna, no date.

Penal Code of May 23, 1873 (Imperial Body of Laws), Vienna, 1873.

Penal Act of 1924 (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1924.

Press Act of 1862 (Imperial Body of Laws), Vienna, 1863.

Press Act of 1933 (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1933.

Press Distribution Act of 1933 (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1933.

Ripka, Hubert, *Le Coup de Prague*, Paris, 1949.

Sbírka zákonů republiky Československé (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague.

Press Act of 1950 (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1950.

Schmidt, Dana Adams, *Anatomy of a Satellite*, Boston, 1952.

State Security Acts of 1923 and 1934 (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1923 and 1934.

Šturm, Rudolf, "Propaganda," in Bušek and Spulber, *Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1957.

Táborský, E., *Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960*, Princeton, 1961.

Úřední list republiky Československé (The Official Register of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague.

Ústava republiky Československé (The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1920.

Ústava devátého května (The Ninth-of-May Constitution), Prague, 1948.

Veselý, J., "The Development of the Czechoslovak Press," in *Novinářský sborník 2, 1961*, (Collected Works on Journalism 2, 1961), transcribed in *Czechoslovak Press Survey* (*Special*), No. 995 (20), Radio Free Europe Research Department, 1962.

Zieris, K. F., *The New Organization of the Czechoslovak Press*, Prague, 1947.

Korbel, Josef, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, Princeton, 1959.

Written and oral statements, mentioned above, included communications by:

Vratislav Bušek, the former Professor of Law, the Charles University of Prague, and Rector, the Comenius University of Bratislava;

Ivo Ducháček, formerly a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament and Chairman of its Foreign Affairs Committee;

Julius Firt, formerly a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament;

Matěj Josko, a former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament and member of the Slovak Board of Commissioners;

Adolf Klimek, formerly a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament and Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Christian Democratic People's Party;

Pavel Korbel, formerly Chief of Bureau, Presidium of the Czechoslovak Government;

Josef Pejskar, a Czechoslovak journalist;

Alois Rozehnal, a former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament;

Joaroslav Stránský, a former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament, Czechoslovak Vice Premier and Cabinet member;

Rudolf Šturm, formerly Section Chief, Bureau for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Czechoslovak Ministry of Information;

Lubor Zink, a Czechoslovak journalist; and others.

Appendix III

Msgr. Béla Varga

Msgr. Béla Varga, Canon of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Vezprém, Hungary, with the rank of Archdean, is the Chairman of the Hungarian Committee. He was appointed Canon and Archdean by Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty during the Cardinal's Episcopacy in Veszprém. He was appointed Papal Prelate by Pope Pius XII. President of the Hungarian Parliament in the years of 1946–1947.

Msgr. Béla Varga, the son of Hungarian farmers, was born on February 18th, 1903, in Börcs, County Györ, Hungary. He became a priest and rose to the rank of Archdean and Canon of Veszprém. It was in this capacity that he had close relationship with Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty.

Msgr. Béla Varga started his political career in the early thirties when the Smallholders' Party was under the direction of the late Gaston Gaál, famous Hungarian political personality and his close friend. The Smallholders' Party advocated social reforms, land reform, improvement of democratic institutions. Msgr. Béla Varga was elected Member of Parliament during the 1939 elections.

He helped to save the lives of thousands of Polish and French political refugees, prisoners of war who escaped from Germany and countless of persecuted Jews during World War II. His rectory in Balatonboglár became the real headquarters of the resistance movement in Hungary. He maintained a high school for Polish refugee children and did everything in his power to help those who had lost their country and home. As a recognition of his wartime services rendered to the Polish underground an honorary Polish citizenship was conferred to him.

During the occupation of Hungary by the Nazis in March 1944, he was sought by the Gestapo and was forced to hide in the countryside; for a time he was hidden by Cardinal Mindszenty. After World War II he was arrested by the Soviet Secret Police and sentenced to death by an NKVD major acting as judge and managed to escape only by sheer luck. Later, he became one of the central figures in Hungarian politics. During the first postwar elections held on November 4, 1945, he was elected Member of Parliament, and in 1946, elected President of the Hungarian Parliament—a post he never resigned of, even after he was forced to leave the country in 1947 by the Soviet occupation forces in Hungary. As the last freely elected President of the Hungarian Parliament he became the Chairman of the Hungarian Committee, an exile organization consisting of the representatives of the leaders of democratic political parties and the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 representing the oppressed and silenced Hungarian people.

KANSAS STATE
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
MANHATTAN

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

	Page
A	
Australia (re: free press)	2–10
B	
Berkowitz, Asra	87–91
Bērziņš, A., article by	64–68
Blazas, Henrikas, article by	69–72
"Bolshevization of the Hungarian Press"	60–63
Bulgaria (re: free press)	11–15
Burma (re: free press)	16–21
C	
Cheng Chu-yuan:	
Article by	22–27
Biography of	97–98
China (re: free press)	22–27
"Chinese Communist Infiltration of the Mainland Press, 1927–49"	22–27
"Communist Destruction of the Free Press in Cuba, The"	28–39
"Communist Infiltration of the Bulgarian Press Prior to the Red Takeover of Bulgaria"	11–15
"Communist Infiltration and Exploitation of the Press in Independent Lithuania"	69–72
"Communist Infiltration and Exploitation of the Rumanian Press Before the Takeover"	87–91
"Communist Infiltration of the Press in Latvia"	64–68
"Communist Seizure of Power and the Press: Czechoslovakia, 1945–48"	40–57
Cuba (re: free press)	28–39
Czechoslovakia (re: free press)	40–57
D	
Dimitrov, Dr. G. M., article by	11–15
E	
Estonia (re: free press)	58–59
G	
Gavrilovic, Dr. Milan, article by	92–95
H	
Hungary (re: free press)	60–63
K	
Kasnakheyev, Aleksandr Yurievich, excerpt from testimony of	16–21
Kowaleski, Janusz, article by	73–86
L	
Latvia (re: free press)	64–68
Lithuania (re: free press)	69–72
M	
"Methods of Communist Infiltration and Subversion in the Polish Press"	73–86

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MANHATTAN

O

Page
"Operations of the M.V.D. in Relation to Journalists, The" ---------- 2–10

P

Poland (re: free press) ---------- 73–86
Randsepp, Harold, article by ---------- 58–59
"Reds and the Press of Estonia Prior to Occupation, The" ---------- 58–59
Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage (Australia), excerpt from -- 2–10
Rumania (re: free press) ---------- 87–91

T

Todd, Carlos, article by ---------- 28–39

V

Varga, Msgr. Bela:
Article by ---------- 60–63
Biography of ---------- 101

Y

Yugoslavia (re: free press) ---------- 92–95

Z

Zenkl, Petr:
Article by ---------- 40–57
Bibliographic notes ---------- 99, 100