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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon,
Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential
Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States.)

STUDY

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

(Pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., and
S. Res. 31, 86th Cong.)

Study No. 10



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
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
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PREFACE

By Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations

In January of 1958 the Committee on Foreign Relations decided to undertake a review of conditions and trends in the world and of the policies and programs of the United States with respect thereto. That review grew, in part at least, out of the concern of the committee over the impact which Soviet scientific achievements might have upon our relations with the rest of the world.

From time to time throughout the spring of 1958, the committee held public hearings on U.S. policies respecting the Far East, the Near East, South Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Canada. Those hearings were limited in nature and served primarily to focus attention on the principal policies and problems of the United States in its relations with the rest of the world. For the most part, the hearings were limited to receiving testimony from the principal officers of the Department of State concerned with various geographic parts of the world. The committee also sought the testimony of selected nongovernmental witnesses with special knowledge of the areas under examination.

The hearings during the spring of 1958, the focus given to our relations with Latin America as a result of Vice President Nixon's visit there, and, lastly, the then critical situation in the Middle East, all contributed to the committee's belief that the time had come for an exploration in depth of U.S. foreign policies throughout the world.

As a consequence of these factors, the Committee on Foreign Relations, in an executive session on May 20, 1958, authorized its Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs to undertake a study of United States-Latin American relations. At the same time, the committee established a special subcommittee, consisting of Senators Green, Fulbright, Wiley, and Hickenlooper, and directed it to explore the feasibility and desirability of a broad study of U.S. foreign policy throughout the world.

Subsequently, this subcommittee reported to the full Committee on Foreign Relations that it was feasible and desirable that the committee undertake such a study of foreign policy. It was felt a study of this nature might serve to develop fresh ideas and approaches to the foreign policy of the Nation and lead to a better national understanding of international problems and to more efficient and effective administration of our international operations.

On July 15, 1958, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted to report to the Senate a resolution authorizing the study. The Senate adopted this resolution (S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., 2d sess.) on July 31, 1958. The resolution authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to "make a full and complete study of U.S. foreign policy."

Without limiting the scope of the study authorized, the committee was instructed to direct its attention to the following subjects:

1. The concepts which govern the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world, and the policies by which these concepts are pursued;

2. The present state of the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world;

3. The administration and coordination of policies and programs by the Department of State and such other departments and agencies of the executive branch which engage in substantial activities abroad; and

4. The relationship of other policies and activities of the Government and private activity which exert a significant influence on the relations of the United States with the rest of the world.

In the conduct of its study, the committee was authorized to "use the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals * * *" and to "enter into contracts for this purpose." It was directed to complete its study by June 1960, and not to exceed \$300,000 was made available to meet the expenses of the committee. The committee was authorized to continue this study by the terms of Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong., 1st sess.).

Shortly after Senate Resolution 336 was adopted by the Senate, Senator Green, then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, designated me to serve as chairman of an executive committee, consisting of Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken, which was given the responsibility for directing and coordinating the study.

On September 16 and 17, 1958, the executive committee discussed with a group of distinguished private citizens the general problems involved and the most advantageous approaches to them. Taking part in these discussions, besides the members of the executive committee, were Robert Bowie of Harvard University, former Ambassador William G. Bullitt, Robert Calkins of the Brookings Institution, John Cowles of the Minneapolis Star & Tribune, William Diebold of the Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Luce of Time-Life, Inc., Walter Millis of the Fund for the Republic, and Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Following these meetings the executive committee developed its plans and announced on October 15 that it was prepared to invite private research organizations and institutions to submit proposals on a series of 15 studies which the committee expected to have undertaken in connection with its examination of foreign policy. As a result of this announcement, the committee received over 50 proposals from organizations and institutions interested in undertaking one or more of these studies.

On January 5, 1959, the executive committee met again to consider the proposals which had been received and decided which organizations and institutions should be asked to undertake studies for the committee. Set forth below are the titles of the studies designated to be undertaken and the names of the organizations and institutions responsible for these studies.

STUDIES

- The Nature of Foreign Policy and the Role of United States in the World. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. (Published as Study No. 7 on November 25, 1959.)
- The Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. (Published as Study No. 6 on November 11, 1959.)
- The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, Mass.
- Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Corporation for Economic & Industrial Research, Inc., 1200 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. (Published as Study No. 1 in August 1959.)
- Foreign Policy Implications for the United States of Economic and Social Conditions in Lesser Developed and Uncommitted Countries. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
- Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy. The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, 1906 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. (Published as Study No. 8 on December 6, 1959.)
- Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif. (Published as Study No. 2 in September 1959.)
- The Role of Multilateral Organizations in the Formulation and Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C. (Published in Study No. 9 on January 13, 1960.)
- Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C. (Published in Study No. 9 on January 13, 1960.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in Western Europe. Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Published as Study No. 3 on October 15, 1959.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- U.S. Foreign Policy in the Near East. Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., 27 East 62d Street, New York, N.Y.
- U.S. Foreign Policy in South Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. (Published in Study No. 5 on November 1, 1959.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa. Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. (Published as Study No. 4 on October 23, 1959.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. (Published in Study No. 5 on November 1, 1959.)

Each of these organizations and institutions will submit a study to the committee.

Broadly speaking, I hope these studies will supply essential background to enable the Committee on Foreign Relations to accomplish the following basic purposes:

1. Provide the Senate and the American people with a simple, understandable, and forthright statement of the basic foreign policy aims of the United States which reflect the motivations and aspirations of the American people.
2. Identify those forces, domestic as well as foreign, which now or in the future may tend to frustrate or to promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.
3. Suggest, and if possible determine, feasible ways to deal with such forces so that they may promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.

4. Examine the impact of those forces and trends, foreign and domestic, upon the conduct of American foreign policy in the various geographic areas of the world.

5. Examine the foreign policy decision-making machinery to determine whether it is of the maximum efficiency consistent with our democratic processes.

At the January 5 meeting the executive committee also decided to send a letter to some 50 retired Foreign Service officers "to endeavor to obtain for the use of the committee the personal views of men of practical experience with respect to the foreign policy of the United States." Each of these retired Foreign Service officers was asked to give the committee his "general commentary on what is right with our policies, what is wrong with our policies, and what action (or inaction) might in your opinion best serve our interest in the future."

On June 15, 1959, the committee made public, in a summarized form and without personal attribution, the substance of the views of former members of the Foreign Service who responded to the letter. The views and attitudes expressed in that committee publication deserve the most careful consideration by officials in the executive branch of the Government, by my colleagues in the Senate, and by all citizens interested in the conduct of our foreign policy.

The study printed in this volume, "Ideology and Foreign Affairs" (The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States), is the 12th of the 15 principal studies the committee expects to publish. It was designed to help the committee find answers to subjects covered in an outline developed in consultation between representatives of the committee and representatives of the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. A copy of the outline appears in the appendix (see pp. 81-82).

I take this occasion to emphasize that the studies which are received will supply the committee with background material for consideration in preparing a final report to the Senate. The committee is, of course, free to accept or to reject the findings and recommendations of the organizations and institutions submitting studies. It is the function of the committee to evaluate the studies which are submitted. Prior to the preparation of a final report, the committee will hold public hearings to receive testimony from all interested parties. In that way it will be possible for the committee to test the soundness of the findings and recommendations in these studies before reaching its own conclusions and submitting its final report to the Senate.

In addition, I wish to emphasize that the committee is approaching this assignment in a nonpartisan manner, endeavoring to avoid transitory issues and to concentrate on the fundamental forces at work within and without the United States which must be understood if our foreign policy is to serve the Nation.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Cambridge, Mass., November 23, 1959.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I take pleasure in transmitting herewith 25 copies of a report on "Ideology and Foreign Affairs" (which as requested discusses "The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States"), which has been prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in fulfillment of the contract between the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and the committee, dated February 10, 1959, pursuant to Senate Resolution 336 (85th Cong., 2d sess.) as amended by Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong., 1st sess.).

In submitting the report, it is appropriate to repeat one caveat stated in the body of the report. Concentrating on any single factor in foreign affairs entails the serious risk of conveying a distorted conception of the relative role of that factor. The reader should bear in mind that this report is one of a series of studies which cover other important aspects of international affairs and is expected to be read in that light.

This study was prepared under my direction with the cooperation of the staff of the Center for International Affairs and members of the faculty of Harvard University. Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski was responsible for coordinating the report and preparing much of the material, especially part 2. The report benefited from the advice and guidance of the following members of the faculty of Harvard University: Profs. William Y. Elliott, Rupert Emerson, Merle Fainsod, Carl J. Friedrich and Benjamin Schwartz; and also of Prof. Raymond D. Gastil. Written memoranda and drafts were contributed by: Prof. Rupert Emerson (nationalism), Prof. Stanley H. Hoffmann (internationalism), Drs. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (India), Dr. John N. Plank (Latin America) and Prof. William Polk, Dr. Walter Z. Laqueur and Mr. Max W. Thornburg (Middle East).

While the report reflects in large part the views and opinions of the various consultants and contributors, they are not responsible for the judgments and conclusions.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT R. BOWIE.

IX

IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. SUMMARY

The task of this report is to analyze the role played by ideology in international affairs and to discuss its implications for U.S. policy.

Spreading literacy and expanding social expectations, both induced by the industrial age, have given the political process a new mass dimension and enhanced the role of political ideas which mobilize popular support for internal and external national undertakings. Ideology has thus become a significant factor in international relations. The character of these political ideas, their purposes and their images tend to affect the relations between states, and the bases for conflict and hostility or understanding and cooperation.

The report focuses its attention on three political ideologies commanding the greatest allegiance in contemporary times: constitutional democracy, nationalism, and communism. Part 1 of the report deals in greater depth with their content and appeal. In differing ways each ideology seeks to provide a framework for social action and political cohesion in a rapidly changing world. Of the three ideologies, communism is the most explicit, dogmatic, and institutionalized; the democratic faith, deriving much more from historic experience, tends to be less doctrinaire; nationalism, especially in the postcolonial phase, is least coherent in content, and expresses primarily a drive for self-rule and economic progress. The intricate and changing relationship between these three forces is the major theme of this report.

The interaction between the three ideologies is examined in parts 2 and 3 which deal with the Soviet bloc and with the economically developing and new nations. In Soviet foreign policy itself, despite its gradual erosion, the residue of Communist ideology still shapes the basic interpretative framework which the Soviet leaders apply to international events. For this reason Communist ideology is of continuing importance in defining both the means and the ends of Soviet policy.

Insofar as the Communist bloc is concerned, the Communist ideology has performed a unifying function in the initial stages of the bloc but gradually this same ideology, now applied to specific national conditions, has been penetrated by the local interests of the several ruling elites. This penetration in turn has prompted sharp ideological conflicts between the ruling Communist parties. Nationalism emerged indirectly, either in the guise of the national communism of Tito, or through the more restrained, cautious policies of Gomulka in Poland, or even through the varying ideological interpretations of the Chinese Communists. For this reason, it would be misleading to analyze the pattern of inter-Communist relations merely in terms of the conflict of nationalism with communism. Rather, it is necessary to make more

subtle distinctions, involving insights into certain ideological formulations employed by the various ruling parties. These often have conflicting national interests as their underlying background but they should not be interpreted as a head-on collision between the forces of communism and nationalism.

The Communist bloc is likely to face continued internal difficulties, and the Soviet leaders will find it increasingly hard to assert their unquestioned leadership. In maintaining unity, ideology is likely to be stressed as an important bond, although accompanied by continued reliance on Soviet power and mounting economic ties between the various units of the bloc. The revolutionary phase of the totalitarian development in China and elsewhere in Asia will probably result in increased aggressiveness on the part of these Communist States. The erosion of Communist ideology seems more likely to occur as a result of conflicts in applying it to differing national conditions among the bloc's various constituent units than through the impact of industrialization and urbanization within the individual states. The report warns, however, that this erosion is at best a long-range prospect and not to be expected in the immediate future.

In the foreseeable future a permanent "settlement" with the Soviet Union seems unlikely and any arrangement will be considered by them to be only a transitional one. The Soviet conviction in their ultimate triumph will mount if the pace of their economic development continues to outstrip ours by a significant margin. Soviet policy might well be accompanied by a mounting reliance on threats of force, if the Soviet leaders become convinced that they enjoy military superiority and that the United States is paralyzed by the fear of war.

Part 3 of the report deals with problems of contemporary nationalism, with particular illustrative emphasis on India, the Arab States and Latin America. In these areas nationalism has become closely linked to a widespread aspiration for rapid economic development. Nationalism, while absorbing many democratic values and initially even creating Western-type democratic institutions, has become necessarily involved in a mounting socioeconomic revolution. For this reason, Communist, and particularly Soviet, policy toward these states is one of patience and collaboration in the hope that ultimately the accelerating socioeconomic revolution will create the preconditions for an assumption of power by local Communists. Lately, however, there have been some indications of a divergence in Soviet and Chinese expectations on this score, and of the return of the Chinese Communists to a more radical approach toward nationalism. Such a change would presumably be related to a Chinese conclusion that a nationalist revolution aided by the Communists is not likely to lead in the direction of a Communist victory but to the consolidation of power by the nationalists.

While both nationalism and communism, as revolutionary forces, challenge the status quo, there is a fundamental incompatibility between them, which is increasingly coming to the surface in many of the new nationalist states. On the other hand, despite inherent links between democracy and nationalism, it is open to grave doubt that many of the new countries will be able to make a success of the democratic institutions which they have almost without exception adopted on attaining independence.

The general trend in the new, economically developing nations and in Latin America is toward some form of socialism as a method for achieving social and economic betterment through rapid and planned development. In some cases, efforts to implement rapidly this objective are likely to result in considerable domestic instability and in a consequent quest for stability either through military regimes or through ideologically oriented movements. Many nationalists, seeing the United States as a capitalist power unduly interested in the status quo, reject the relevance of American democracy to the problems facing them. Despite this, and despite the efforts of the Soviet Union to appear as a dynamic, socialist state, the Communist image has been tarnished lately, particularly in Asia. Communist reversals are due not only to the gradual consolidation of nationalist forces, but also to grievous errors of Communist policy itself (the most notable being the recent Chinese actions and the resulting Indian reaction). In the Arab countries, the limited Communist gains have been largely due to the tactical association of the Communists with the local nationalist leaders and not to the appeal of communism as an ideology. However, the developments within these states should not be appraised with standards derived from our own experience and ideological outlook. There is need for American understanding of the nature of neutralism as a necessary reflection of the current stage of development of these nationalist states, and not as always harmful to American interests.

Internationalism is seen as a further phase in the development of national states, a phase for which both communism and democracy offer alternative approaches. Older national states, particularly the European ones, seem already on the threshold of international solutions to their age-long problems. They arrived at this realization, however, only after a difficult trial and error process, which was hastened by the experiences of many wars. For this reason it might be premature to expect a similar awareness of the need for transnational ties on the part of the new national states, although significant progress in this direction has already been made.

With these considerations in mind, and developed more fully in the three major parts of the report, several broad guidelines are postulated for U.S. policy. These guidelines have as their purpose a clarification of American purposes; the creation of preconditions for the erosion of the militant aspects of the Communist ideology; the furthering of close social and ideological association with the new nationalist states; the development of international ties between non-Communist nations.

Since the report is concerned with broad trends and ideological forces, it does not attempt to offer specific prescriptions for action. The analysis of the three major parts of the report, however, carries certain implications for American foreign policy which are discussed in section III. Consideration of the ideological component underscores the long-range character of the present struggle. Erosion of the militant aspect of Communist ideology by pressures of a nationalism and humanism will be a gradual evolution depending on the passage of time and the creation of suitable conditions. In the less developed areas the various drives and urges now combined under the banner of nationalism will work themselves out only over an extended

period. Whether the outcome is chaos and Communist expansion or viable societies compatible with democratic values will depend on many factors. One fact stands out. The creation of conditions for the mellowing of communism and for constructive progress in the less developed countries will require long-term, consistent, dedicated effort by the democratic states. Neither the mature democracies nor the newer nations are likely to persist in the essential effort and sacrifice unless these can be seen within a framework of shared purpose and common destiny.

II. BODY OF THE REPORT

PART 1. COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

A. GENERAL SCOPE OF STUDY

An effective foreign policy depends first of all on the sound appraisal of international conditions. To understand the existing situation is, of course, essential, but what is even more vital is to anticipate what lies in prospect. Looking ahead, what forces will make for change or for stability? What will be the influence and power of other nations; how will their leaders conceive their interests and pursue their policies? How can one's own nation influence the actions and purposes of voters? Well-grounded answers to such questions are central to wise choice of national objectives and skillful use of available means for achieving them.

This task is full of pitfalls. Even in relatively stable times it is inherently difficult to peer into the future and to foresee even its outlines with accuracy. And our era is far from stable. For over half a century the world has been engulfed by an upheaval without historic parallel in the scale, intensity and rapidity of the changes involved. This transformation still goes on.

In so dynamic an epoch it is not feasible to descry the world environment over an extended period. The best that can be done is to identify and analyze the factors likely to shape it. These are of many kinds. Some may directly affect the relative power of members of the international community. These include, for example, advances in military technology, possible scientific developments in other fields, and growth in population and industrial capacity. Other factors are likely to influence the attitudes and reactions of the nations; their view of their interests and purposes; their approach to the use of their power and influence.

Of these basic forces, one of the most potent and pervasive is the influence of ideologies and movements based on them. Over the last 50 years their impact has been a key factor in transforming the world. Exploding nationalism literally shattered the empires of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, of England and France and other European nations. Before their defeat, nazism and fascism had unleashed forces worldwide in their ultimate consequences. In successive stages, communism has brought the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and mainland China under the domination of fanatic parties dedicated to its ideology. And a sense of common destiny and shared values have played a major part in bringing the democratic nations together in joint endeavors for their security and welfare.

Why have ideologies become so potent in remolding the world in our times? The causes seem to lie mainly in the radical change in the nature of politics in the modern era; it has taken on a new mass dimension. The democracies have long assumed that politics is "everybody's

business"; the totalitarian movements, which suppress the individual, indoctrinate him to exploit this growing political awareness. Contemporary nationalist movements seek to channel popular feelings and discontents to forge new nations from the ruins of the colonial empires.

The new mass character of politics can be traced to the impact of the industrial revolution. Its successes have shown that human activity can improve well-being at a rapid pace and enable man to control his environment. The spread of this conviction by wider literacy and the radio has created the popular basis for modern politics. In many parts of the world poverty-stricken peoples, whose forebears were resigned to destitution, no longer accept their fate as inevitable. The consequence is intense discontent, deep frustration and the weakening of traditional bonds.

These conditions are fertile soil for political movements which depend on large-scale popular support. To mobilize it, leaders must be able to translate vague aspirations into political goals which can infuse in the masses a sense of purpose, a conviction of success and a readiness to sacrifice. In this effort to convert a restless mass into an organized political movement, ideology often serves to crystallize purposes, to bolster morale, and to justify obedience and discipline. And one common element in these ideologies is the faith in social engineering which is shared both by those which can be called democratic, in the sense that they reject violence, believe in individual rights and espouse gradual change, and by the nondemocratic ideologies which embrace absolute ends, justify all means and favor violent change.

At the same time, science and mass politics have drastically transformed the character of foreign affairs. On a shrunken globe, relations among nations have grown far more intimate and continuous. In all countries foreign affairs have steadily become more entwined with domestic politics and have ceased to be an exclusive preserve of small elites possessing wide freedom to adopt and modify policies. Today as never before foreign policy must take account of mass hopes and fears.

What then will be the impact of ideology on the unfolding course of events? How far will it influence the attitude of nations and the conduct of their foreign policy? In what ways should the United States take account of ideology in framing and carrying out its own policies?

This study seeks to examine these issues. It concentrates on those systems of political ideas and beliefs which are likely to have a major influence in international affairs in the coming years. Using this criterion, the analysis focuses primarily on nationalism, communism, and constitutional democracy. In the discussion, the term "ideology" is used to embrace these several political creeds and faiths. Thus, it is treated as a neutral term applying to any system of political concepts without regard to its validity or rationality. Since the study has been limited to systems of thought which are politically important, it does not include philosophies or religions which may have many adherents but are not a major political force.

Any study centering mainly on a single facet of international affairs, like ideology, runs the risk of leaving a misleading impression. Obviously ideology is only one of many factors shaping

events and policies and may be less central or controlling than others in many situations. Concentrating attention on one factor always involves the danger of distorting its relative role. This study is intended to be read in conjunction with those which treat other important aspects of the international situation. The picture can be kept in balance only by considering the ideological factors in the context of others dealt with in other studies in this series.

Moreover, ideologies are themselves affected by some of these other factors. They do not operate in a vacuum as abstract or disembodied ideas.

To be effective in the political arena, an ideology must be embraced by an organized movement or embodied by political institutions. A central feature of communism, for example, is the dominance of the party as the sole instrument for realizing the doctrine. Similarly, the nationalistic struggle for independence has always been carried on by dynamic leaders inspiring mass support and action. Constitutional democracy, as a more gradual growth, is the product of many such movements to advance specific ideas which have ultimately been absorbed into the bloodstream of the democratic faith and the institutions to which it has given rise. In all cases an ideology becomes a political force only as it inspires individuals to organize and make sacrifices to advance the ideological goals.

But organizations and institutions have their own logic and imperatives, which tend in turn to mold the ideology in some degree. The movement and institutions themselves will be shaped by the qualities needed to achieve leadership and to retain that position. The character and experience of the leaders will predispose them to favor some parts of the ideology and to slight or slough off others. With rare exception, leaders of revolutionary movements will take it for granted that their first duty is to assure their continued ability to serve the cause by maintaining control and power.

A second point is related. Any movement and its leaders struggle within a specific social and political environment. They face concrete obstacles and challenges in seeking to make the ideology prevail or to put its program into effect. Inevitably this poses hard choices at various points: some parts of the creed may have to be sacrificed or subordinated in order to advance or salvage others. Hence, again inevitably, the leaders must establish priorities among the various goals of the ideology and the means for attaining them. Their choice may take the form of postponing or projecting into the future the part of the program considered less urgent or less essential. But the effect may be to abandon that part as a practical goal. The history of the Communist movement is full of examples of this process.

Finally, the passage of time and changing conditions may reshape the content and priorities of the ideology. As the later discussion develops, nationalist movements in Asia and Africa have experienced this with dramatic force after independence. In the case of Soviet communism, one question is whether a prosperous and evolving Soviet society will tend to subordinate the expansive thrust of the Communist ideology.

The discussion which follows seeks to examine ideology not merely as abstract theory but as a social and political force. It first describes

briefly the content of the major ideologies chosen for study here. It then discusses their interaction with each other and with other factors in shaping the international community and the purposes of its members. Finally, it seeks to draw together some of the implications of the analysis for American foreign policy.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

Each of the three ideologies under discussion has its roots in Western culture and thought. The history of modern nationalism begins in England and France. Marxism, however perverted it became, was inspired originally by aspirations deriving from Western values.

Constitutional or liberal democracy is, however, the legitimate political heir of that tradition. Its origins go back to both classical humanism and the Judeo-Christian heritage. Its concepts and institutions embody the struggles and insight of many generations. In its gradual, organic growth, it has drawn sustenance from many sources but especially from the experience and thought of England, the United States, and France. By its nature, democracy cannot be a precise creed with prescribed content. Lacking an authoritative interpreter, it embraces variants differing in emphasis or specific detail. Nevertheless, the democratic tradition does rest on a common body of premises and political principles. Important as differing aspects may be, the common ground is even more significant for present purposes. The basic elements of the democratic tradition, as expressed in American and European beliefs and practices, would include the following:

1. The human person and his unique worth stands at the center of the democratic doctrine. From this follows the deep concern for human liberty and dignity. Human welfare is the measure of social and state action; the human being is looked on as an end in himself and not as a means or instrument to be manipulated by the society or state.

2. The idea of self-government is deeply rooted in this tradition. Government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. A people is entitled to govern itself and to choose freely its form of government. The citizen has the right to share in the process of governing and hold the government responsible, through periodic elections of representatives.

3. The constitutional order must assure the rule of law and the safeguarding of certain fundamental rights of the individual. The institutions and methods differ in various democratic countries but they share a common purpose of protecting against arbitrary action.

4. The individual is entitled to the opportunity for a decent economic and social life. Constitutional democracy is compatible with many ways of organizing economic life, and with various mixtures of private and public activity. It has become an article of democratic faith that the conditions of human life can be steadily improved by technology and science and by the application of capital and investment. The growth of large cities and large industry has gradually led to greater reliance on state action for maintaining at least minimum standards of welfare. Public measures to protect working conditions and social security have come to be accepted as normal state functions.

5. Constitutional democracy presupposes tolerance of differing views, attitudes, and values. A vital feature of the system is the right of individuals and minorities to espouse unorthodox views and policies as long as they do not threaten the constitutional order itself, and to seek to change the system by procedures which do not involve violence or unconstitutional means. The social order is regarded as pluralist in character; indeed the existence of many centers of social, political, and economic power is considered essential to the health and vitality of such a democratic order.

6. The democratic faith assumes that the system will continue to change and develop in order to realize more adequately its basic values and to adapt to new needs and changing conditions. It is dedicated, however, to evolutionary or gradual change by nonviolent means. It accepts the fact that society includes conflicting interests and purposes and conceives that the constitutional order should make it possible for these to exist and thrive without undue friction. Hence it places a high value on accommodating differing views or interests by compromise and adjustment.

7. Finally, the democratic values of the social order are looked on as universal. In other words, the rule of law and other basic features are considered as rights which should be available to human beings anywhere who desire to enjoy them.

The practice of democratic states falls short, of course, of these ideals and principles. In domestic affairs, for example, minority groups may not in fact enjoy full equality in social or political rights or privileges. Under conditions of crisis, the institutions or procedures may not be fully effective to safeguard against abuse or arbitrary action. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that, where democracy is well established, the tendency of such societies is to keep open means for correction of abuse and improvement of performance.

In foreign relations the democratic states have faced some serious dilemmas in squaring their actions with the democratic creed. The colonial peoples, for example, could invoke the principles of Western democratic theory in claiming independence. The United States has repeatedly been faced with the difficult situation where one of its major allies resisted the demands for colonial independence and insisted that the United States support this position. In some cases one might conclude that the interests of the colonial people themselves would not genuinely be served by premature independence, that is, before they were in a position actually to govern themselves effectively. Yet was the metropolitan nation able to judge this capability objectively? Or even more basically, were these people entitled under democratic theory to make their own mistakes in governing themselves? Where the struggle for independence threatens to jeopardize basic security interests of the United States and a major ally, what becomes of the democratic theory?

A similar issue arises when alliances for security interests are made with dictatorial regimes which suppress the rights of individuals. The benefits of the relation may assist the dictator to retain power.

Under such conditions, compromises which may well be unavoidable still have the effect of blurring the image of the United States and eroding its influence as the protagonist of the principles of democratic, constitutional order.

C. NATIONALISM

In essence, nationalism is the assertion by a people of its claim to a distinctive national identity, entitling it to live its own life in its own fashion. This finds its most characteristic political expression in the demand for a sovereign state whose prime purpose is to protect and promote the identity and interest of the nation in whose name it is brought into being.

The headlong drive for national self-realization has in successive waves embraced almost every people on the face of the earth. Since World War II the nationalist demands of the colonial and quasi-colonial countries have tended to monopolize public attention, but nationalism also still exercises a strong sway over governments and peoples in the advanced countries of the West where it found its first formulation. Only a short span of years separates us from the time when Hitler and Mussolini brandished their perverted nationalisms as the heart of the creeds with which they threatened the peace of Europe and the world. The resistance movements in Europe and elsewhere opened up depths of patriotic devotion which many before the war were inclined to ridicule or to discount, and the quislings who settled for an ignoble peace were figures of universal scorn.

Nationalism has, however, a peculiarly significant role to play in the development of peoples undergoing the kind of physical, social, and psychological transformation which the West has thrust upon the rest of the world. The major immediate contributions of nationalism are a sense of independent worth and self-respect and a new social and political solidarity to replace the traditional bonds which have been shattered. For a dependent society to come to a sense of its own national existence is to make a substantial start along the road of equality with its alien rulers.

In the new countries, the nation constitutes a great potential widening of the social and political horizons of most of the people. Far from forcing men to live within restricted quarters, it opens new doors and windows to them. Where men's lives have traditionally been bounded by tribe or caste, village or petty principality, the emergence of nationalism creates pressures which force them into larger communities. For many individuals and groups, considerable time will surely elapse before their social-political consciousness expands to the national limits, but the forces of the modern world all conspire to make man's age-old parochialism impossible. The nation is itself still far removed from meeting the needs of an age of instantaneous global communications and intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it is at least an advance in social magnitude over what has customarily preceded it.

In many spheres of vital concern to the new countries, however, nationalism either offers no answers or answers so ambiguous as to be useless. Nationalism, indeed, rarely if ever represents a coherent and positive body of doctrine and belief reaching significantly beyond insistence on the establishment of an independent state as the political embodiment of the nation. Freedom from partition or alien intrusion is normally a far better defined matter than are the uses to which freedom would be put, once it is attained. Nehru has written that "nationalism is essentially an antifeeling." Everywhere the national "we" has been to a considerable degree defined by contrast to the alien

and opposing "they." Precisely the "anti" character of nationalist movements in colonial or quasi-colonial countries is likely to lend a deceptive sense of national unity and common purpose where little or no unity exists beyond the desire to get rid of the alien overlord. The fact that a people can launch an anticolonialist movement and for that purpose act as if it constituted a true nation conveys no assurance that it will be able to maintain political coherence once the impartial enemy has withdrawn.

Neither the political nor the economic institutions and systems of the new countries can be said to be determined by nationalism. Nationalism normally demands full sovereign self-government and decisions by instrumentalities derived from the nation itself. But neither the content of the decisions nor the nature and structure of the instrumentalities by which they are to be made are defined by nationalism.

If nationalism represented essentially a return to earlier traditional roots, it might be expected that the search would be for institutions organically related to the national past, but in actuality the nationalist victories of recent times have led to the almost universal adoption of alien forms and institutions, often borrowed from the societies whose imperial sway has just been broken.

Nationalism offers no vantage ground from which to choose between the different types of systems and institutions which the modern West offers in relative profusion, nor is there reason to assign it any particular political coloration. In one or another time or country it has been associated with almost every conceivable regime. Nationalism is, of course, always the champion of self-government in the sense of national as opposed to alien rule; it is only accidentally self-government in the sense of rule by the many as opposed to rule by the few. The assertion of a sense of separate identity can by itself give no clue as to how the community may choose to manage its affairs. There are many ardent and unmistakable nationalisms in which democracy as a working political system is either nonexistent or no more than a façade of conformity with current political fashions.

What is, in some sense, inherently democratic in nationalism is its mass character. The heart of nationalism is insistence upon the centrality of the national community and upon the latter's right to make the state the organ of its identity and will. The social-political community which has come to occupy the center of the stage—taking over the state in its own name and establishing a new criterion of legitimacy—is defined in terms of the people who compose the nation. In the national era the state can no longer be seen as the ruler and his subjects (or an empire and its imperial domain) but becomes in principle the emanation and instrument of the nation, which is the people. Even in the Fascist variants the role which the people played was sharply distinguished from their role in earlier types of dictatorship or monarchy, as witness the efforts of Fuehrer and Duce to carry the masses with them, to give the appearance of popular consultation, and to spread the tentacles of the party down into every cranny of the society. This is not democracy in any acceptable sense, and yet it is a perverse offshoot from democratic roots, a postdemocratic phenomenon.

Despite the inherent links between nationalism and democracy, it is open to grave doubt that many of the new countries will be able to

make a success of the democratic constitutions which they have almost without exception adopted on attaining independence. Already several of them have fallen at least temporarily by the wayside, turning to military rule or to authoritarian one-party rule centering about a single dominant leader. It is too much to expect that illiterate peoples living in poverty and inexperienced both in political life and in defending their own rights should be able to master the most difficult and precariously balanced of political systems. Great gaps divide the different elements of these societies, and both the new elites and the masses are inclined to operate on the age-old assumption that the few should govern and the many follow.

Nationalism itself contains ingredients which can with great ease be turned in undemocratic or antidemocratic directions. Wherever it is the main driving force, the temptation exists to give priority to the claims of national solidarity and strength over those of individual rights and democratic participation. In such circumstances the liberalism which is one of the faces of a democratic nationalism is likely to be forced to yield to the demand for unity put forward in the name of the nation. The overwhelming majority of the people are peasants and workers, but their ignorance and lack of experience of the great world, it is likely to be contended, render them unable to deal with the affairs of state. In their stead the elite or the popular leader takes over as the true distillation of the national will. The nation is sovereign, but the exercise of sovereignty, so the argument runs, should, for the good of the people themselves, be entrusted to those who can use it rightly. By this time the national democracy is well on the way to transformation into nationalist autocracy.

In the economic sphere as in the political, nationalism generally offers no firm ground on the basis of which choices might be made between different alternatives. As a means of achieving equality with the advanced peoples as well as for its more substantive contributions, economic development may be assumed to be embraced in any contemporary nationalist program. To such basic questions, however, as to whether development should be pursued within the framework of communism, socialism, capitalism, or some type of mixed economy, nationalism can by itself give no clear answer. What should be the relation of private and public enterprise? Nationalization has an appealingly nationalistic ring to it, but in particular instances does it actually represent the national interest? How much play should an underdeveloped country give to foreign investors and entrepreneurs? The resounding nationalist formula might be: none whatsoever; but with what assurance can this be said to represent the best interests of an expanding and developing economy?

In almost every instance, to hold up the concept of the national interest as the determinant of decision and action is to produce an empty symbol whose content is in dispute between different factions within the nation. Even in the realm of foreign affairs, where nationalism most evidently comes into play, it is likely to give no conclusive answer to questions concerning entry into this alliance or that, acceptance of a given treaty or of the proffer of foreign aid, or the adoption of a policy of neutralism or commitment. The danger is real that nationalism may even serve as an impediment to advance, as, for example, in curtailing access to alien goods, skill, and capital, and,

more generally, in inhibiting useful international contacts because of fear of alien intrusion.

Despite these and other negative aspects, the fact remains that nationalism has much to contribute to the new countries. The achievement of a sense of national unity, the breaking down of local and other barriers through the widening of social horizons, the dynamism and political activism which have been injected into the society, the sense of revolutionary élan, the new appreciation of the national worth and dignity, the devotion to the common cause—these are all matters of profound importance to the future of any people. In the new countries and in those in process of formation the nation is not something which can be taken for granted but an exciting new achievement, worthy of love and sacrifice. The emotional momentum of the drive for independence may in some part be carried over and utilized in dealing with the difficult years ahead. Nationalism opens the possibility of tapping sources of popular energy and participation which no alien or old-style autocratic ruler could hope to tap. The tasks of building a modern state, of putting through major social and economic reforms, and of requiring present sacrifices for future benefits enlist a new dimension of popular support if the national leaders can establish them as integral parts of the devotion which the nation expects from its members.

D. COMMUNISM

The rulers of the Soviet Union, Communist China and other Communist regimes constantly proclaim the primary role of Marxist-Leninist ideology as the basis for their policies and decisions. They ascribe to it a unique value as an infallible tool of analysis and guide to action in domestic and international affairs. To any student of Sino-Soviet policy, it is apparent that ideology is by no means the sole determinant of their purposes and courses of action. Their conduct also shows the influence, in various circumstances, of the historic drives of the nations they now control and of strategic and other considerations normally affecting the foreign policy of states.

Indeed, some observers would explain Sino-Soviet policy exclusively in traditional terms of "national interest" and deny that ideology plays any real role today in its direction. Strategic and similar factors, while influencing Soviet and Chinese policy, by no means suffice to explain its thrust and direction. In Sino-Soviet thinking, Communist doctrine directly affects conceptions of the scope and nature of their interests. National interest in traditional terms will hardly explain the worldwide scope of Soviet activities or its preoccupation with revolutionary change throughout the world. Those aspects of Soviet policy reflect their peculiar ideological perspective which inherently gives the Communists a global outlook focusing especially on such change. Turning to Eastern Europe, a Soviet quest for security could explain a national interest in the area. But only Communist ideology can explain Soviet dedication to transforming by force the social and economic structure of Eastern Europe, which only creates increased hostility toward the U.S.S.R. Their doctrine makes them distrust any non-Communist regime and drives them to recast it in the Communist mold. Again Soviet policy toward the Chinese revolution in the twenties and after 1945 showed

how their doctrine can influence their approach to problems. Soviet insistence on a proletarian revolution in China reflects ideological categories which in this particular case had little to do with Chinese reality. Indeed, as these examples show, the notion of "national interest" can be ambiguous when applied to Communist regimes. If "national interest" means whatever the Communist rulers say, the question still remains as to how far Communist conceptions distort the analysis of the Communist leaders even in assessing national interest.

Accordingly, this report reflects the conviction that the Communist creed does play a significant role in shaping the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and China. From this starting point, the first question then is: Which of the Communist tenets are currently relevant to foreign affairs (including relations among the Communist States themselves)?

Communist doctrine embraces, of course, a mass of material derived from the Marxian scriptures, the glosses of Lenin, Stalin, and others, and many other sources. The successive rulers have repeatedly reshaped the Marxist canon to reflect practical necessities and experience. A vast amount of the inherited theoretical or programmatic doctrine has little or no relation to practical action and is either buried or left for purely scholastic discussion.

There remain, however, a number of concepts and tenets which seem important in molding the orientation of Communist leaders, especially in the realm of foreign affairs:

1. Communist ideology provides a conceptual framework for viewing the world. It looks on history as a continuous conflict in which "progressive" forces contend with "reactionary" forces and defeat them. In the present stage, communism claims to be a superior, a more advanced, form of society. The Communist dictatorship and state ownership and operation of the means of production, it asserts, remove the sources of class conflict and the barriers to efficient use of the productive facilities inherent in capitalist society. Thus the Sino-Soviet bloc, representing the "progressive" forces, is inevitably destined to succeed the "reactionary" system of "capitalism." In short, the basic Communist faith is that capitalism is doomed, that communism is certain to replace it, and that this process must be vigorously abetted.

This does not mean that Khrushchev expects an imminent collapse of the United States, or that he does not know about many of the realities of American life. Doubtless he is aware of the American standard of living, the state of the American economy, and some of the social and economic changes in American life since the great depression. Some of his remarks indicate that he realizes that there is a considerable gap between American reality and the picture painted, for instance, in *Pravda*. Seen through his eyes, however, these facts do not invalidate his conviction that in the long run, capitalism will inevitably decline.

2. In the Communist view, this conflict between the two systems is inherently irreconcilable. It can be resolved only by the ultimate victory of the Communist order. Communist confidence in their ultimate triumph seems to have grown in recent years on the basis of Marxist-Leninist analysis. They now appear convinced that mili-

tary conflict between communism and capitalism may no longer be necessary for final victory and that the military balance makes capitalism less likely to precipitate such a war as a last resort. Their analysis relies on two processes. First, in the newer nations they count on the struggle for economic growth to lay the basis for Communist takeover. This effort and its effects will disrupt the established social order and eventually force these nations to imitate the experience of the Communist States. Second, the Soviet leaders expect the rapid growth of the Soviet Union and the bloc to tip the balance of industrial might in favor of communism by about 1975. Considering industrial development the key to modern power, the Communist leaders believe that this will be a turning point in modern history.

The Communist strategy seems to justify the assumption that they will strive to avoid a total global conflict with the West. An axiom of Communist strategy has been the injunction against risking a direct clash unless certain of Communist superiority. The tactic to be pursued when faced by a superior force is to engage in gradual envelopment and penetration and to destroy the enemy by a process of attrition. To undermine the morale of the superior force, to foster in the opponent an inclination toward ever-increasing compromise, then stage by stage to translate that compromise into capitulation—that is the way to victory whenever lacking the power to impose one's own solution.

The Communists have, however, frequently asserted that certain types of wars are in themselves progressive. Khrushchev reiterated as much immediately after his American trip. If the Soviet leadership should ever conclude that its military and technological superiority would assure victory in a total war without widespread destruction of the home base, it might well be prepared to engage in a so-called progressive war to effect the ultimate collapse of the capitalist world. Khrushchev's boasts and threats are salutary reminders that war as a tool of policy has not been abandoned by the U.S.S.R. However, it seems unlikely that over the next decade the Soviet leaders would be able to reach such a conclusion with any degree of certainty. In such circumstances, Communist strategy is likely to be based on the frequent advice offered both by Lenin, and, in recent times, by Mao Tse-tung, "to avoid a decisive engagement when victory is uncertain and to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation."

3. The Communist Party is the chosen instrument for achieving this millenium. In conformity with Marxist class concepts, moving to the more advanced stage of communism requires the "dictatorship of the proletariat" for its achievement. But the Communist Party represents the proletariat for this purpose. This is one of the key ideas. The party is sanctified as the agent of history and is elevated into an absolute good in its own right. For this reason, each member must be disciplined to accept the party as the spokesman of history and the only true interpreter of the doctrine; and party unity becomes *prima facie* evidence of the correctness of its own historical course.

Since the party enjoys the exclusive title to this role, any effort to contest the course or control of the party identifies the individual

or group as a class enemy. Thus the doctrine provides the justification for the monopoly of power by the party.

4. Communist ideology makes power central in its analysis of society and history and its own methods and goals. Indeed, the main focus of Communist writings in this century has been on the methods of acquiring and consolidating power. The principal writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung as well as Khrushchev's speeches have been preoccupied with the tactics and strategy of political action. By reason of the nature of the doctrine and the party, those reaching the top of the Communist movement are usually driven by an intense urge for political power and dedicated to the use of any and all means to achieve the goals of the party.

5. The creed itself allows for great tactical flexibility. In their practical decisions, the leaders of the party at any time enjoy a wide range of choice, especially since the ultimate goals are both vague and remote. Thus they are able to take account of the strategic and other factors often subsumed under national interest. And the Soviet Union, as the oldest and strongest Communist state, can easily identify its continued progress and security with the interests of the Communist cause as a whole.

These attitudes, plus the initial conspiratorial character of the movement, relieve the leaders from any qualms of conscience regarding the means used. Against non-Communists who oppose the ultimate Communist triumph, any methods are legitimate to achieve the historically inevitable outcome.

6. The ideology contemplates that Communist strategy will vary with the stage and circumstances. Within the Soviet Union, its main function is to justify the continued monopoly of the party and to certify the historical validity of its decisions and actions at home and abroad. Within the bloc, its role is somewhat more complex as an instrument of Soviet direction and control. In non-Communist areas, the movement recruits small numbers of local members with an ideological commitment to provide the hard-core apparatus in each country or area. In its effort to influence and manipulate mass opinion, however, it casts its appeals not in ideological terms but in those best calculated to cater to local discontents or aspirations. Thus at times the policy may appear to run counter to basic tenets of the creed.

E. INTERPLAY AND CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES

For purposes of analysis, the nations of the world are sometimes divided into three broad categories:

- (a) The developed nations, mainly in Western Europe and North America, which are committed to constitutional democracy;
- (b) The less developed non-Communist nations, especially those in Asia and Africa, which have recently gained independence or soon will, where the dominant political force is nationalism with special attributes;
- (c) The Sino-Soviet orbit, under the domination of the Communist parties and ideology.

Such categories can be useful for indicating predominant characteristics or trends. But for many purposes, they simplify the picture unduly. In reality, all three ideologies—democratic, nationalist, and Communist—are steadily interacting in all three areas. This compe-

tition and conflict among them takes different forms according to the varied settings.

The interplay is most apparent in the advanced democratic nations of the West. In these open societies, Communist parties and propaganda are able, by manipulating popular discontent, illusions and aspirations, to attract mass electoral support in several states and to confuse or divide public opinion in more. Yet not even the Communists seem to expect to extend their control into this area by force or threat in the near future. As has been said, they appear to count on the strategy of "encircling" the Western nations and suffocating them.

In the West, nationalism is still a potent symbol which can be exploited by Communists or non-Communists for their own purposes. Even so, there are signs that, profiting by tragic experience, the Atlantic nations may now be working their way through nationalism to come out on the other side with a certain measure of maturity. There is reason to believe that they have come to enough awareness of the dangers and inadequacies of nationalism to lead them to seek greater regional and international integration and cooperation rather than to reemphasize their national separateness.

The discussion in part 3 examines these gropings to transcend national barriers. Otherwise the ideological struggle within the developed nations has not been treated in order to save the limited space for fuller discussion of the situation in the newer nations and the Communist orbit, which is generally less well understood.

In the newer nations, the contest is more complex. In the struggle for independence, the nationalist torrent is fed from many streams of discontent. With the traditional social order in decay, the destitute, the dispossessed, the uprooted, tend to focus excessive hopes and expectations on the overthrow of colonialism and creation of a sovereign state. Yet the concept of the nation offers no pat formulas for their manifold political, economical, and social problems. Hence the leaders must look elsewhere for more explicit programs to meet the expectations aroused but not answered by the creation of the nation-state.

In general the newer nations have inherited from the colonial past political institutions patterned on Western models, and their leaders and elites, usually trained in the West, oftentimes share much of the democratic creed, while sometimes rejecting the West for past "imperialism." Without essential social underpinnings, however, these Western-style governments are likely to be too weak or ineffective to achieve the social cohesion and discipline necessary to modernize their societies at a rapid rate. And many, viewing the economic systems of the West in terms of exploitation and colonialism, are attracted by the idea of socialism. Communism exploits all these attitudes and dilemmas, holding up the Soviet Union as a model for rapid industrial progress.

There are, however, underlying tensions between communism and nationalism. These are due first of all to the inherent conflict between national independence and efforts to promote the Communist subordination of national purposes to the interests of a particular state, namely the Soviet Union. Second, Communist contempt for human rights runs counter to nationalist efforts to gain human dignity through the quest for independence. The nationalist ideal of freedom

is incompatible with the Communist view that national independence is merely a transitional phase on the way toward an inevitable international Communist society. These issues are explored in part 3.

The conflict among the ideologies also penetrates the Communist bloc. As would be expected, the Communists are continuously concerned with the role of ideology within the bloc. They devote an enormous effort to indoctrinating the subjects of the Communist regimes in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and in justifying their policies and actions in its terms. At the same time, they expend major resources to sealing off the orbit and insulating its inhabitants from concepts and ideas which might create doubts regarding the Communist ideology or conduct. This policy is merely a special application of their concept of the two camps. Their orbit is regarded as a permanent Communist area from which no defection will be permitted and in which no outsider is entitled to interfere. The rest of the world, the other camp, is open country for Communist manipulation and infiltration for the purpose of bringing about the inevitable expansion of Communist control.

Despite this attitude and the efforts in its pursuit, the Communist bloc cannot escape the influence of other ideologies. For the bloc, nationalism may be a major force to challenge the Soviet hold in the satellite areas. Nationalism underlay Tito's breach with Stalin's Russia. The developments in Poland and Hungary made manifest the strong national allegiance still alive in the satellites. And the nationalism of one or both of the partners of the Soviet-Chinese alliance may in time create a barrier to further cooperation.

Within the Soviet Union there are also ferments which may well prove hard to control over an extended period. The development of an advanced urban society, the desire to learn more about the outside world, the urge for better living conditions, the effects of education: these and many other factors may tend to complicate maintenance of doctrinaire internal control. The question therefore arises whether these emerging forces are likely to erode the hold of the ideology or its influence on Soviet foreign policy. The impact of these various forces within the Communist orbit is discussed in part 2.

Finally, section III attempts to draw from the preceding analysis certain implications for American foreign policy.



PART 2. COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Within the Communist bloc, ideology provides a source of common purpose which operates under the protective shield of Soviet military power. Without that power, the Communist regimes (with the exception of the Chinese Communist regime and the deviant Yugoslav regime) would not be able to maintain themselves. But the Soviet leadership within the camp is justified by ideology on grounds that the Soviet Union has already reached a higher stage of Socialist and Communist construction. The local Communist leaders, sharing a basic common outlook usually acquired through common operational and bureaucratic experience in the Comintern network, in Stalin's secret police, and in local underground activity, can be relied upon to initiate a domestic program of socioeconomic transformation based largely on the Soviet model. Such programs ensure the development of basically similar social and economic institutions, and thereby, according to Marxist-Communist thinking, also induce a common outlook.

Furthermore, the application of Soviet experience to foreign territory necessarily results in a measure of resistance, which in turn places the local Communist regimes in a relationship of increased dependence on Soviet power. Popular hostility to the existing regimes which are seen as mainly the outposts of Soviet imperialism constitutes the underlying political reality in the orbit. The differing responses of the ruling elites to this reality are one source of the disunity within the bloc. At the same time, the fear of this explosive force constrains the ruling elites from allowing these differences to go too far. The following discussion takes this popular hostility for granted and explores how the Communist elites have attempted to resolve their dilemma.

Only strong, indigenous Communist regimes can afford to deviate from the Soviet pattern, and the Soviet Union is unwilling to cultivate such deviation. National communism can develop when a Communist regime becomes able to sustain itself in power without Soviet backing. That was the case with Tito in 1948, and that is potentially the case with China. However, Soviet policy toward China has involved a great deal of tolerance for domestic Chinese autonomy, provided the Chinese externally acknowledged ideological unity.

After Stalin's death, some of the ruling Communist parties were deeply impressed by the new departures in Soviet foreign policy, particularly toward Yugoslavia, the Soviet endorsement of the Bandung Conference, and finally the summit meeting of Geneva in 1955. They interpreted them as signifying that domestic adjustments to national peculiarities would now be tolerated and that even weaker Communist regimes might attempt to experiment with their specific methods of building communism under the benevolent protection of Soviet power.

The consequence was the gradual emergence of doctrines which have since been labeled "revisionist." These stressed that the Stalinist emphasis on rapid industrial development, on an intensifying class struggle, on blind imitation of Soviet practice, and on the subordination of all Communist regimes to the U.S.S.R., no longer reflected the demands of the times.

These trends were sharply reversed after the events of October 1956, although the Soviet gamble on Gomulka created persistent strains within the camp. In this period, China played a major role, helping to consolidate the camp's unity and to restore Soviet supremacy. In restoring unity between the conflicting aspirations of the several Communist elites ruling the various nations in the Communist camp, ideology played a major role. There is little doubt that the Communist elites, though often conflicting in their aspirations, remain bound together not only by a common interest in maintaining their power monopoly, but also by an overriding hostility to the outside enemy, as defined in ideological terms. The threat of "imperialism" and "capitalism" is in itself a form of ideological perspective on reality, capable of creating a tangible bond among the various Communist elites. Thus, the process of reconsolidation, which lasted throughout 1957 and into early 1958, laid greatest stress on the need for closing ranks against the external imperialist threat and the internal danger of capitalist restoration.

During this period, various Communist leaders also emphasized the need for a central interpreter of the ideology in order to avoid crises stemming from conflicting interpretations. To eliminate ideological deviations, there must be a common core of doctrine to which all the parties subscribe. Since the Soviet Union was historically the first society that successfully staged a Communist revolution, and since the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the first to wield power and to experience the complexities of the so-called Socialist construction, and finally since the U.S.S.R. was said to have actually begun the construction of "communism," it followed in the Soviet viewpoint that the Soviet Union had a basic claim to ideological primacy. As a result, a central feature of the reconsolidation was the renewed stress put on the need of the other parties to submit to Soviet ideological interpretations as an essential proof of the unity required in the face of a common enemy.

A. POLAND AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP

In 1957, the postulate that the Soviet Union plays a leading role in the Communist camp was disputed by two ruling Communist Parties. Yugoslavia, attempting to protect its national independence and insisting on a looser interpretation of the Communist camp, rejected the Soviet claim to leadership and maintained that relations between Communist States must be based on the principles of equality and non-interference in the domestic affairs of one Communist Party by another. The Polish Communist Party, led by Gomulka, disputed the Soviet claim to leadership in order to protect the measure of autonomy that it had won in October 1956.

In an interesting illustration of the role of ideological semantics in inter-Communist relations, the Polish party replaced the formula

"the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union" with mere descriptive statements to the effect "the Soviet Union, the oldest and mightiest Socialist State * * *." The Polish party, anxious to maintain its domestic autonomy although wishing to avoid external Communist splits, felt that its new formulation preserved the outward façade of Communist unity, without conceding the right of direction within that camp to the Soviet leadership. That the Polish formulation was not satisfactory was clearly suggested by the continuous pressure on the Polish party to submit to the more universally accepted formulation and to hail the Soviet leadership in the camp. In March, 1959, Gomulka finally revised his position. He conceded that the Soviet Union, precisely because it is the oldest and the mightiest Socialist State, plays a special and unique role in the Communist camp, since it carries the main burden of responsibility for the safety and security of the Communist camp in the face of the external, imperialist threat.

Similarly, following the crisis of 1956, some of the parties, particularly the Yugoslav but also the Polish, seized on the oft-used Communist slogan of coexistence in order to protect themselves against Soviet interference. The formula of coexistence suggested implicitly that relations between Communist States were relations between entities which, though bound by special ties of friendship and indeed by common ideological purposes, were sovereign, independent, and fundamentally separate. These interpretations were sharply rejected by the other parties in favor of the concept of "proletarian internationalism." This concept implicitly suggests that state entities are not the important consideration in inter-Communist relations, but that there is a supranational class bond which binds the various ruling Communist Parties together. Proletarian internationalism was thus a formula designed to penetrate the "legalistic" walls of national frontiers, and to reestablish a common purpose and ties between party organizations. As on the question of Soviet leadership, the Polish Communist Party by late 1957 was forced to abandon its position and to subscribe to the more binding ideological formulation.

In spite of such conflicts, it seems that an important element in the Polish relationship to the Communist bloc is still the continuing role of ideology in the thinking of the Polish Communist leaders. Consider the case of Gomulka. The Communist movement with its doctrine was both his school and his profession. His formal education ended at the age of 14, and ever since then, Marxism-Leninism has provided his only perspective from which to view and eventually to shape reality. This does not mean that in every instance Gomulka acts strictly on the basis of doctrinal precepts. Like Khrushchev, he has repeatedly shown a keen sense of political realism and elasticity. Marxism-Leninism, however, provided all his conceptual tools and his sense of commitment. It gave him a broad doctrinal perspective which dictated the ultimate goal, served as a key to the interpretation of the unfolding course of history, and necessitated as well as justified certain actions as both inevitable and good. An ideology which inspires a sense of self-righteousness tied to historical inevitability can exert an enduring attraction, particularly for the self-educated.

In examining Gomulka's views, one can note several themes which he has reiterated frequently, and which appear to form the core of his

conceptions. Both in the 1940's (before his fall from power) and in the second half of the 1950's (after his return to power), he has asserted that communism can be built only if there is "monolithic unity of the labor class around the Marxist-Leninist movement." He has rejected the notion that the working class can build socialism spontaneously, or that the working class itself can wield power through such institutions as the workers' councils. He has repeatedly asserted that in the building of socialism, power must be firmly held by the Communist Party, a point of view which is crucial to Marxism-Leninism, and which places him squarely among those who subscribe to the belief in the necessity of the dictatorship of the party in the stage of socialist construction. He has similarly asserted that under certain conditions, violence is justifiable to defend the party's monopoly of power and that the secret police organs may perform a positive function in the struggle against "reaction." The only qualification which he introduced in 1956 was to suggest that at a certain stage violence may become destructive if carried too far. Besides, Gomulka has continually subscribed to the doctrine that the world is divided into two antagonistic camps, a peace-loving camp and an imperialist camp, and that it is therefore necessary for the Communist movements to stick together, even if such cohesion invokes a certain measure of sacrifice. In that sense, he has gone on record as condemning the Yugoslav position that under certain circumstances the national independence of a particular Communist party is an end in itself and an absolute right which cannot be compromised.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that Gomulka is a rigid dogmatist subscribing in the main to Stalinist positions. While rigidly upholding some of the points just mentioned, Gomulka has continued to subscribe to certain positions which resulted in his being purged from power in 1948, and which have involved him in an enduring conflict with the Stalinist elements in his own party and in the orbit. He has emphasized that in order to be successful, "the construction of socialism" must be based not only on sheer Stalinist determination but also on disciplined patience. He has warned that "the way to socialism is not short, nor can it be shortened," and that shortcuts are dangerous expedients which undermine the development of "socialist consciousness" among the masses. For this reason, he has repeatedly insisted that the so-called universal tenets of Communist doctrine around which the international Communist movement should be built must recognize the need of adjusting to particular national circumstances.

To Gomulka one such Polish particularity is the danger of rapidly collectivizing the agricultural sector. He has publicly acknowledged that the Polish peasants, because of their historical development, are very conscious of their desire for landownership and are highly individualist in their sociopolitical outlook. Gomulka has warned that the Communist Party would be committing a serious error if it forced them prematurely into a collective pattern of socialist organization. He has suggested instead that the party should build up a solid foundation for eventual socialized agriculture by making socialization attractive to the peasantry through cooperative marketing and cooperative use of machinery. Only then will the peasant "consciousness" change, making it possible for the party to socialize the agricultural sector.

Similarly, Gomulka has repeatedly emphasized that the Russian historical circumstances which shaped the subsequent development of socialism and communism in Russia were radically different from the circumstances that prevailed in Poland when the Communist Party came to power in 1945. This assertion was an important departure from the Stalinist insistence that the construction of socialism and eventually communism must be based on the Soviet model and that unity between Communist States could be maintained only if all the Communist States imitated the Soviet practice. The Soviet leaders, particularly Stalin, were fully aware that in politics imitation was not only the highest form of flattery, but actually the basis for political subordination. However, Gomulka stated as early as 1946 that the Polish Communist Party committed a "basic error" in that it "underestimated the matter of independence," a theme which he again underlined in 1957, warning in *Pravda* that "the underestimation or denial of national traits and peculiarities in the building of socialism is nihilistic dogmatism."

Gomulka, however, did not become a national Communist. He did not elevate a national peculiarity into an absolute right. On the contrary, he has felt all along that only by recognizing such peculiarities can a solid foundation be built for real international Communist unity, that only then would the acute Polish sense of nationalism, an impediment to such unity, gradually fade away. Gomulka's statements suggest that ideology, by providing a common basic outlook and common methods of wielding power, as well as a common sense of aspiration, is important in preserving the unity of the camp.

At the same time, both the Polish and the Yugoslav experience also illustrate the proposition that Communist ideology applied to specific national conditions can be a source of tension within the international Communist movement. There is a danger to Communist unity in the tendency of Communist leaders to adjust their doctrine to the specific requirements of their situation, and to suggest that the range of the particular must be widened at the expense of the universal within the Communist ideology. Even while not tantamount to a direct challenge to the international unity of the camp, such application nonetheless introduces a particular perspective which in the long run is inimical to the unity of the orbit. If Gomulka's views were to become widespread within the camp and if they were accepted by all Communist leaders, much of the unity of the camp would be fractured.

Gomulka's continuing insistence on his domestic autonomy thus reflects underlying tension in the international Communist camp. To this day, even though Gomulka has acknowledged the primacy of the principle of Communist unity, even though he has reluctantly accepted the principle of Soviet leadership, and even though he has condemned Yugoslav insistence on their independence, Poland remains a persistent challenge to the unity of the Communist camp. The fact that Poland enjoys a measure of relative autonomy means that the so-called construction of socialism proceeds in Poland on lines much more palatable to the masses who are tired of Stalinist oppression and desire a greater measure of individual rights and individual freedom. In Poland there is still a measure of free speech, contact with the West has expanded, and fear of the secret police has by and large disappeared. These are considerations which mark the Polish road to

socialism as something rather different from that applied and pursued elsewhere. As long as Poland remains a "certified" Socialist State in the Communist orbit, the Polish pattern of Communist development is likely to produce alternatives and create tensions.

Looking into the future, one should not expect striking assertions of domestic autonomy on the part of Gomulka. There are important restraints in the way. One is geographic; the other ideological. The geographical position of Poland, its political isolation in the orbit, as well as the economic dependence of the new Polish industries on raw materials from the rest of the Communist camp, narrowly restrict the range of independent activity of any Polish Government. Even anti-Communist Poles are inclined to feel that Soviet support for the Oder-Neisse frontier necessitates close Polish-Soviet ties, in the name of Polish national (not Communist) self-interest.

Furthermore, insofar as the existing Polish Government is concerned, ideology is an important restraining element which prevents the translation of Polish insistence on domestic autonomy into actual striving for national independence. Even though the Polish nation may itself expect and hope for national independence, and even though Polish nationalism creates pressures in that direction (counterbalanced, however, by the Oder-Neisse frontier issue), the existing Communist regime is committed to certain propositions making it necessary to maintain close liaison with the rest of the Communist camp. Accepting unity and rejecting Titoism, Gomulka, his quarrels with other Communist regimes notwithstanding, does not desire a dissolution of the Communist camp. He has always insisted on a relationship which would permit the Communist regimes to enjoy a measure of domestic autonomy, but which would at the same time maintain external unity against the dangers which he apparently believes exist: imperialism and capitalism. Gomulka, subscribing to the notion that socialism and eventually communism will spread throughout the world, cannot engage in actions which, in his own judgment, would be beneficial to the interests of the enemies of communism.

Thus the Communist ideology of Gomulka plays a twofold and paradoxical role. In one sense, because of his insistence on domestic autonomy and on the recognition of the national traditions of his country as a prelude to real internationalism, his ideological views tend to create a divisive force within the camp. On the other hand, both because of his commitment to certain basic assumptions of the Communist doctrine and because of his domestic weakness, Gomulka is unwilling to attempt to cross the Rubicon and will not emulate the Yugoslav example.

B. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE COMMUNIST CAMP

An issue of a somewhat different dimension is raised by Yugoslavia. It is sometimes forgotten that in its domestic policies, Yugoslavia originally was more Stalinist than Stalin. In the years 1945-47, the Communist leadership of Yugoslavia was openly contemptuous of the efforts of other Communists in Eastern Europe to construe the "people's democracy" as a new form of state, not yet an open "dictatorship of the proletariat." The other Communist leaders in Eastern Europe were then inclined to feel, and apparently so did Moscow,

that Communist aims would be furthered by a policy of circumspection, of alliance between the various classes and adjustment to the existing situation, rather than by a policy of radical Communist evolution. In fact, it can be argued that the Communist policy in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1947 was a prototype for some of the policies recently adopted by the Communist world with regard to the postcolonial and underdeveloped nations. There was a concerted effort to avoid any identification with class violence, with communization and with collectivization. The emphasis was rather on social and economic reconstruction, and on Communist cooperation with non-Communist political parties. This policy, applied in the initial 2 or 3 years, subsequently gave way to a more violent imitation of Stalinism. It is noteworthy, however, that in this initial period the Yugoslavs rejected this strategy and insisted that Yugoslavia was a proletarian dictatorship, essentially imitating Soviet experience and ruled openly by the dictatorship of the Communist Party. However, what Tito and his associates failed to realize was that subordination was the essence of Stalinism, and that a regime which was more Stalinist than Stalin desired at any given moment was, in effect, a regime rebellious to Stalinism.

National communism in Yugoslavia was a byproduct of the Soviet-engineered expulsion of this nation from the Cominform. It was not an act of open rejection by the Yugoslavs of the Soviet-Stalinist model. The Yugoslav way to socialism subsequently emerged through trial and error and because of disappointment with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was only then that Yugoslavia proceeded to manufacture its own so-called social democracy and began to develop its own perspective for international problems. It was then that Yugoslavia began to reinterpret the Soviet Union as a state not truly engaged in the construction of socialism, but one practicing state capitalism, a system in which the means of production, formally owned by the state, are controlled by a small elite group.

Despite their reinterpretation of the Soviet scene and their new conception of their socialist experiment, the Yugoslavs have remained basically sympathetic to the Soviet bloc in the sense that they remain convinced that the Communist camp is objectively marching in step with history despite temporary Stalinist aberrations. They continue to believe that in the long run it will be the Socialist and Communist mode of socioeconomic organization that will replace the capitalistic mode. For this reason, the Yugoslavs welcomed the de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union, and were inclined to interpret it as a radical break with the past, effected by a group of progressive Soviet leaders representing the wave of the future. Applying their Marxist perspectives to the Soviet scene, they interpreted Soviet internal developments as involving a clash between contradictory forces, those of the new opposed to those of the old, Khrushchev symbolizing the future and Molotov the past. To them, these political personalities were the superstructure to basic underlying conflict in the Soviet Union.

In keeping with this assessment, Belgrade was inclined to feel that it was the duty of Yugoslavia to support the progressive forces, that is, the so-called anti-Stalinists, in the struggle against Stalinism. For this reason, they went a long way to avoid any conflict with the new anti-Stalinist elements, and they were encouraged both by Khrush-

shchev's willingness to subscribe formally to the principle that there are many paths to socialism and by his condemnations of Stalinism.

Consequently, when the Hungarian outbreak occurred, the Yugoslavs, after some hesitation, were willing to endorse the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution as a necessary measure designed to protect socialism. They felt that in doing so they were retaining their close association with the anti-Stalinist forces, and that not to have done so would have left Khrushchev and his so-called anti-Stalinists at the mercy of the Stalinist faction. In spite of the attacks launched against them in 1957, the Yugoslavs remained convinced that their duty was to promote the more moderate forces which they believed to be operating within the Communist camp. Their ideological interpretation made it difficult for them not to feel that the Communist camp had outgrown its Stalinist stage and was now entering into an era of greater diversity, which would allow Yugoslavia to play a major role within the Communist councils.

It was in keeping with these exuberant expectations that, in the late summer of 1957, Tito journeyed to meet Khrushchev in Rumania. There Tito promised to recognize East Germany, committed himself to attending the 40th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1957 in Moscow, and obtained in return Khrushchev's reconfirmation of the Soviet acknowledgment that there are many ways to socialism. What Tito apparently did not perceive was that by 1957 the many ways to Socialist doctrine, as expounded by Soviet leaders, had been subordinated to a set of universal principles, the main one of which was the principle of unity and of the leadership of the Soviet Union. After recognizing East Germany, thereby prompting a break in relations with West Germany and reawakening many of the Western suspicions concerning Yugoslavia, Tito discovered to his annoyance that the Soviet Union and the other Communist parties would insist that the November 1957 conference declare the recognition of both Soviet leadership and the principle of unity in the camp. He did not go to Moscow.

Only then did Tito finally revise his ideological assessment. In reacting against his past optimism, he moved in the direction of open ideological challenge. In March 1958 the Yugoslavs issued a so-called draft program, a summary statement of their doctrinal position, to be approved at the Party Congress in April. The draft program systematized and made explicit many of the previously held Yugoslav positions, reassessing many of the sacred tenets of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Claiming that their statement was derived from the principles of Marxism and Leninism, and strongly implying that their judgments had universal relevance for all Communist movements, the Yugoslavs explicitly abandoned the two-camp theory, which is at the core of the Communist image of the world. In rejecting the notion of two irreconcilable world military blocs, they implied a certain degree of equivalence between them and naturally provoked cries of outrage from the Communist citadels. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs suggested that the process of change throughout the world is an interrelated, organic continuum with the capitalist world undergoing evolutionary changes and gradually pointing in the direction of a greater degree of societal ownerships. At the same time, they suggested that the Communist world, despite Stalinist

aberrations, was also evolving in the direction of greater diversity and freedom. The implication was that in the end the two will meet. They further outraged the dogmatic Communist viewpoint by suggesting the possibility of building communism without the dictatorship of the Communist Party. Indeed, they suggested that the construction of socialism is possible through a democratic, socialist, parliamentary system, and that Communist dictatorship is a dispensable aspect of this process. They also rejected the Leninist principles of proletarian dictatorship and class struggle, sacred tenets in both Stalinist and post-Stalinist Communist thinking. They further declared that proletarian internationalism is a meaningless term utilized by the Soviet party to maintain its hegemony over the other weaker Communist parties. Finally, they went on record as observing that Soviet leadership in the camp can lead to aberrations limiting the independence of the several Communist States.

The Yugoslav statement was thus a clearcut ideological challenge to the position maintained by the other Communist parties, above all by the Soviet and the Chinese. It went far beyond the Polish position, for it crystallized an explicit, systematic program to which Communist movements could refer, and on which they could base their actions. Therefore, it is a major irritant in the Communist camp.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Yugoslav position is limited by the consideration that the espousal by a Communist party of the Yugoslav stand would necessarily involve breaking from the Communist camp altogether. To be able to do so, a Communist regime would need an indigenous basis to maintain itself without Soviet support, and presumably in spite of Soviet subversion. No Communist regime in Eastern Europe, save that of Yugoslavia, has the capacity to do so. As a result, the actual effectiveness of the Yugoslav program in the bloc is now rather limited. Most Communists in Eastern Europe realize that to accept the Yugoslav position, assuming that the Soviet Union would allow them to do so, would involve the risk of falling from power completely. In short, insofar as the pattern of internal change in the Communist camp is concerned, the Yugoslav position represents an extreme alternative which, at this moment, no Communist regime can afford to emulate. At the same time the Yugoslav policy of expediency has disillusioned many of the Communist intellectuals in Eastern Europe who formerly attached great hopes to Yugoslavia's separate path.

C. THE U.S.S.R. AND THE SATELLITES

It is interesting to observe that the position adopted by the Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Albania, toward both Yugoslavia and Poland, has been more dogmatic than that adopted by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has an overall responsibility for the unity of the bloc, stemming from its special position of leadership. One of its primary tasks is the resolution of internal conflicts and antagonisms within the camp. Even with respect to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union has not altogether abandoned hope that this nation will return to the fold, possibly at some time after Tito's death. This is why the Soviet Union has been more careful than the other states to avoid a total rupture. But the Stalinist regimes in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria construe

both the Yugoslavian and Polish patterns to be inherently dangerous to their stability and, for this reason, fear them more than the Soviet leadership does. Their dogmatic attitude testifies to the greater degree of ideological diversity existing within the bloc than was the case during the period of monolithic unity before Stalin died.

Ideology, although important in relations among the Soviet and the Eastern European Communist States, is overshadowed by the political dependence of the satellite regimes on Soviet support. Their inability to stay in power without such support circumscribes their autonomy and their capacity for ideological innovation or deviation. As a result, ideological considerations in Soviet-Satellite relations are counter-balanced by power politics. But history shows that theological issues can awaken intense passions and divisive conflicts even within most cohesive organizations. In spite of their continued dependence on Soviet support, the gradual erosion of the universal Communist perspective may result in a mounting recognition of particular national aspirations. In the long run, this may produce a series of conflicts characteristic of declining empires.

Nationalism remains the source for such conflicts. The Hungarian revolution has shown that rejection of communism as an ideology is closely related to a nationalist rejection of Soviet domination. The local Communist rulers are seen both as the standard bearers of an ideology which is almost unanimously rejected and as the puppets of a foreign power. The temporary popularity of Gomulka was due precisely to the fact that he succeeded in becoming for a time the symbol of national independence, despite his Communist views. The decline of his popularity has been closely related to the growing recognition that he stands both for domestic communism and for external Communist unity. The desire for national independence, most dramatically asserted by the Hungarians, is thus a basic factor of East European politics and forces all the Communist regimes to rely on Soviet support. Indeed, the less consolidated and the more dependent a regime, the more likely it is to be ideologically rigid and orthodox. A domestic relaxation has the effect of threatening not only the internal stability of a Communist regime but also the unity of the Communist States by raising a deviationist threat. Therefore, a fundamental datum which all the East European Communist elites must face is that the nationalism of their captive peoples forces them to seek continued Soviet support and that any independent domestic consolidation poses the long-range danger of nationalism prevailing over communism.

Though it is difficult to speculate about the predominant ideological attitudes of the populations subject to Communist power, a few brief but pertinent observations can be presented. By and large the war-time destruction and the postwar industrialization have created a fairly widespread acceptance of Socialist forms of societal organization. To the extent that it is possible to ascertain public opinion behind the Iron Curtain, one can say that the majority of the people have come to feel that certain major sectors of the national economy ought to be under state ownership. This applies particularly to heavy industry, and also to certain kinds of light industry. It would not apply to consumers' goods industries, to services, nor, above all, to the agricultural sector. The undertaking of medical care by the state through socialized medicine, the widening of educational opportuni-

ties, and increased social security provided by the state also seem to have gained popular endorsement. It is very likely that in some of the presently Communist-ruled countries, some form of socialism with strong Christian Democratic overtones would be most likely to emerge if Communist rule were to disappear. In Poland at least partial evidence for this proposition is supplied by a scattering of public opinion polls undertaken during the post-1956 period of relaxation. These polls seem to suggest that, particularly among the younger people, a form of modified socialism, either on the Swedish or on the English model, seems to have taken root in Poland. At the same time, the only groups outside the Communist Party which display a certain measure of activity and seem to offer a potential alternative to Communist rule are young, Catholic intellectuals who are keenly aware of the need to recognize social and economic problems, and who are actively concerned with the formulation of some sort of social-economic program derived from Christian principles. Should the opportunity ever arise in Poland, a Christian Democratic Party with strong socialist overtones in its economic and social policy, could materialize and would be likely to gain a measure of popular support. This would be in addition to the Socialist and Peasant Parties which would probably reappear everywhere.

A Soviet military withdrawal from East Europe would necessarily expose the present Communist regimes to mounting domestic pressure from the forces mentioned above. Possibly in time, even the Communist rulers would be forced to respond to the overwhelming desire of the people to change their present Communist dictatorships and to move in the direction of some form of democratic socialism. However, by and large, most East Europeans realize that any revolutionary activity designed to overthrow their Communist rulers would merely provoke Soviet intervention. Hence, they would be more likely to rely primarily on social pressure to produce the desired objective through evolution. Western inactivity during the Berlin outbreak of June 1953 and during the Hungarian revolution has dissipated much of the faith of East Europeans in the West's intention to free them. Even a Soviet military withdrawal would not be likely to produce an immediate and dramatic reaction.

D. IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

Ideology plays a more important role in Soviet-Chinese relations than in Soviet relations with the East European Communist regimes. In the case of China, the Soviet Union confronts an indigenous regime, proud of the revolutionary victory achieved through its own efforts (and, in some measure, in spite of Soviet expectations), conscious of its actual and particularly of its potential strength, and buoyed by its alleged victory over "American imperialism." Soon after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, the problem of Soviet-Chinese relations was obscured by the fact that the new regime became embroiled in an international conflict in Korea. As a result, Chinese freedom of action was limited both by that conflict and by the continuing crisis over Formosa. Unable to play a major role in the Communist camp, China restricted its relations to the Soviet Union, which performed the role of "an honest broker" for China on the international scene.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist victory in itself produced a need to define the Chinese position in the bloc. Unlike the other Communist States, but much like Yugoslavia, the Chinese Communist Party had pursued the revolutionary tactics which in themselves raised some ideological issues on which the Chinese leadership did not see eye to eye with Moscow. The Maoist conception of revolution, relying on a standing army and a land-hungry peasantry rather than on the urban proletariat, had not won the endorsement of the Soviet theoreticians. The Chinese conception of an alliance with the intellectuals and the peasants was based on the Maoist argument that these two groups could be converted into "conscious proletarians" even though their material class base is not proletarian. It was an adjustment to the specific Chinese situation, but an adjustment which the Soviet theorists never explicitly approved until after the Chinese victory. It is interesting to note that until 1949, the Chinese Communists themselves did not lay great stress on this point; but in recent versions of Chinese Communist history this is now put forth as one of Mao Tse-tung's great contributions to Marxist-Leninist doctrine—namely, that he was able to achieve victory by surrounding the city from the countryside.

Another issue that emerged after 1948 bore upon the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, or, in effect, the dictatorship of the party. Lenin had insisted that one cannot go from capitalism to socialism without a dictatorship of the proletariat which serves to smash the old political system which was the political bastion of the capitalists. Yet, Mao had occasionally hinted that China might go all the way from "new democracy" to "socialism" with a people's democratic dictatorship under the hegemony of the proletariat, a position not unlike that adopted in Eastern Europe prior to the Stalin-Tito break. This meant that the other classes could also play a role not only in the period of socialism but, by a process of teaching and conversion, would be brought into the Communist society itself. The expression of this in terms of political structure was the maintenance of the facade of coalition governments in China. Of course, on the operational level, one could immediately point out that these other parties never made policy. The Communist Party ruled from the very outset. Yet, from the point of view of the ideology, the coalition had some importance. After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, at which Khrushchev postulated the thesis that all Communist States must go through the stage of "the dictatorship of the proletariat," but that the forms of this dictatorship may vary, the Chinese moved in the direction of suggesting that their system was such a varied form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, Khrushchev's more elastic formula made possible a certain ideological quid pro quo.

The emergence of Communist China, a great historical event in its own right, thus raised an implicit problem for the Communist camp. Both sides, however, had a stake in close unity. The Chinese regime, as noted, remained embroiled in a series of international complications, and was highly dependent on Soviet diplomatic support, military supplies, economic advisers, and industrial deliveries. The Soviet leadership, on its part, also displayed more circumspection than it did toward the politically dependent, Communist regimes. It must have realized that it had grossly miscalculated in expelling Yugoslavia in

1948, and it had learned that an indigenous revolutionary movement develops a certain inherent capacity for resistance, even against so hallowed a shrine as Moscow. Accordingly, the patterns operative with respect to the other satellite states could not be applied in the case of China. Even during Stalin's time, the U.S.S.R. had no choice but to tolerate what it had not allowed in the case of Tito: a fundamentally Stalinist regime, which operated autonomously within the framework of international Stalinism.

This adjustment notwithstanding, the gradual consolidation of the Chinese Communist regime, the conclusion of its international conflicts and the dislocations caused by the death of Stalin and the period of de-Stalinization, have resulted in the growing stature of China within the Communist camp. Its very membership thus raised the question: Can a bloc of states bound together by the power of a central state and by common ideological purposes retain its cohesion when one member of that bloc enjoys a considerable scope of political autonomy?

This question is rendered all the more acute by the increased measure of domestic autonomy that the Communist states enjoy because of the death of Stalin, for in spite of the recent reconsolidation of the Communist camp, the several Communist regimes no longer must so faithfully echo the Soviet line. The stringent line taken by the Chinese on certain key issues, such as revisionism and anti-Americanism, suggests a measure of choice which can be exploited by the other Communist states. It is symptomatic that the Stalinist regimes of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria were very prompt in echoing the more violent Chinese attacks against Yugoslavia in early 1958. This implication of the situation is that advance coordination of the Moscow-Peking line is a necessity, if such a choice of alternatives is to be avoided within the camp. The Chinese capacity to adopt more extreme positions could constitute one of the chief sources of Chinese leverage within the camp.

The type of ideological disagreements that can take place when the camp contains fundamentally independent states is illustrated by the well-known Chinese program for the construction of "people's communes." When this program was launched in September of 1958, the Chinese clearly suggested that the formation of the people's communes would bring China close to the stage of transition into communism. Thus, in one brief sentence, the Chinese leadership claimed to be on the threshold of the Communist society—a claim no other Communist state had yet made. Such an assertion could be the basis for Chinese ideological preeminence, because the first state to achieve communism would be said to have advanced most rapidly on the historical way toward the ultimate ideal society. Since the commune was said to replace local government, one could argue that the state was already beginning to wither away on the local scene in China. And thence one could argue that China was well on the way to the achievement of communism, even at a time when the Chinese level of industrial development was still fairly low, and therefore that China was free from the necessity of achieving a very high stage of industrial development before arriving at the portals of communism.

Much of the Soviet claim to leadership in the Communist camp has been based on the fact that the Soviet Union was the first to have allegedly built a socialist society through rapid industrialization.

No wonder, then, that the Soviet response to the Chinese statement contained a certain amount of chagrin that was evident even under the cloak of formal approbation. The Soviet press reaction to the Chinese assertion was remarkably sparse, and in one instance the Chinese boast concerning the imminence of "the realization of communism" was translated erroneously as "the realization of the communes," an error that minimized the Chinese claim. The Soviets realized that the Chinese declaration not only implied a measure of potential ideological primacy but also suggested implicitly that the many-roads-to-socialism doctrine was being revived. It was noteworthy that the Poles, while observing that the people's communes were not applicable to the specific Polish national conditions, were quick to point out that Chinese stress on the people's communes asserted again the necessity to recognize autonomous domestic patterns in the construction of socialism and in the eventual transition to communism.

From subsequent events, however, it is clear that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese had any interest in precipitating an open conflict. The Chinese realized that their economic dependence on Soviet support for Chinese industrialization precluded any open competition. Furthermore, they had a continued interest in bloc unity, which could be fractured by too open a display of Chinese diversity. Indeed, throughout 1957, the Chinese had been actively campaigning for unity. In the unity conference of November 1957 in Moscow, it was the Chinese who took the lead in insisting upon universal recognition of Soviet leadership. Their hostility toward the outside world, particularly the United States, meant that the principle of unity occupied a preeminent place in Chinese thought. As a result, the cool Soviet reaction to the resolution on people's communes presumably helped to restore a certain balance between Chinese domestic impatience and Chinese interest in the external unity of the camp.

In December 1958, in a subsequent statement concerning the construction of people's communes, the Chinese withdrew those portions which might have suggested that the Chinese transition to communism would be more rapid than elsewhere. They followed this by explicitly acknowledging at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union was itself entering the stage of the construction of communism, and by unqualified praise of Khrushchev's contribution to the theories pertaining to such a transition. In return, the Soviets, in the general theoretical discussion of the processes of transition to communism, were careful to suggest that all the Communist States would enter communism together. This reduced the possibility that any one Communist State would again raise the claim that it would be the first to enter into communism. At the same time, Khrushchev's explanation for the predicted simultaneous transition—that the more economically advanced Communist-ruled states would make it possible for the less advanced ones to make such a transition jointly—meant that Soviet economic advances became an ideological guarantee of Soviet supremacy, as well as the essential instruments of the entire orbit's transition to communism. Khrushchev could confidently expect that Soviet economic leadership in the camp was not likely to be challenged in the foreseeable future. Thus the Soviet 21st Congress and the Chinese December Plenum again emphasized ideological unity while preserving Chinese individuality in their domestic policies.

It would probably be idle to expect an open break between the two states at this stage, given their common aspirations, the Soviet willingness to promote industrialization in China, the continued Chinese commitment to such rapid industrialization and, above all else, given their mutual hostility to the external world and their conviction that their form of socioeconomic organization is bound to prevail through a process of continuing conflict with the declining capitalist world. Western hopes to exploit occasional strains in Sino-Soviet relations tend sometimes to overlook the fact that the relations between these two states are not only based on a certain mutuality of economic or political interest, but also on a common ideological commitment. This ideological commitment, shared for many years by their respective leaderships, results in a perspective in which occasional territorial or political strains are minimized when weighed against the need for unity said to be dictated by the imperatives of history as perceived by that ideology.

During Stalin's lifetime, Soviet control over the Soviet bloc rested on Soviet power and on the unquestioned personal authority that Stalin enjoyed among Communists. After his death, and particularly after the Yugoslav and Polish challenges, the Soviet leadership, still relying on Soviet power, attempted to fill the vacuum left by Stalin, with an increasing stress on ideology as a source of unity. If that ideological bond should be dissipated, either through conflicting interpretations of its many disparate elements, or through a process of gradual erosion, or through a gradual subordination to a traditional nationalist outlook, the Communist camp would be faced by the threat of disintegration. China always potentially raises this threat.

E. SOCIAL CHANGE AND IDEOLOGICAL EROSION

Forced to rely on power alone to maintain their empire, the Soviet leadership, and particularly Soviet society, would soon find that the tensions and strains within the camp would be far more acutely felt than is the case today. Today, in many respects and in many areas, the Soviet leadership can rely on the support of ruling parties which are dedicated to the same objectives and which share certain common assumptions. Soviet power serves to prevent domestic rebellions which would result in overthrowing such regimes, but the main burden of the administration and the positive task of building communism are shouldered by the ruling elites. They derive their inspiration and much of their program from the belief in inevitable victory, in the superiority of communism over capitalism, in the continuing imperialist threat and in themselves as agents of history. Without such a common core, the Soviet Union would be forced to engage in large-scale policies of direct occupation and a commitment of energy which might be inimical to its own interests, and which would certainly result in a far more complicated task of directing the Communist camp.


Yet the erosion of this common ideological core is a distinct possibility. There are indications that a trend in that direction is already in motion among the East European Communist Parties, particularly in Poland and Hungary, and, of course, in Yugoslavia. The repugnance felt by many Communists for Stalinist methods, the resentment generated by Soviet exploitation and dominations, the impact of the

events of October and November 1956 have all taken their toll and have weakened the sense of ideological commitment. Empiricism, pragmatism, and even patriotism have reappeared. But there is also a more fundamental cause for the decline in ideological fervor. The East European parties have become increasingly permeated by home-grown personnel. The new party cadres, with the Stalinist-type socioeconomic revolutions as their most deeply felt experience, inescapably approach their political tasks from a local perspective, even though often (like Gomulka) defining them ideologically. Unlike the party cadres immediately post-1945, they are not always Stalinists and are frequently attracted by "revisionist" ideas. In a curious way, the presence and the industrial might of the U.S.S.R. allows them to claim that they need not duplicate the revolutionary zeal of the Soviets of the thirties, because that was the inevitable price of "socialism in one country." They claim that they can afford the luxury of a moderate pace toward communism, enjoying the fruits of power on the way.

In time such views are bound to penetrate the Soviet party. They may take a somewhat different ideological form; they may, for instance, be supported by the argument that with the end of the "capitalist encirclement," through the creation of the other Communist-ruled states, the excessive domestic sacrifice of recent years is no longer justified. Whether the justification is the presence of a leading powerful "socialist" state, or the end of the capitalist encirclement, the social consequences are the same; decline in zeal, and a more relaxed rule by the Communist elite. The word "erosion" of ideology may be premature, but the process does involve its transformation from a revolutionary creed, involving self-sacrifice, into a doctrine of permanent rule. Indeed, Soviet theorists have been asserting recently that even when the state withers away, the party will live on.

Inherent in such views is a major danger to Communist unity. When they become predominant, Communist unity, even if still relying on Soviet power, will cease depending on a common revolutionary purpose. Instead it will become an expression of common self-interest of the several Communist elites. One could argue that such unity will be even stronger than heretofore, but this argument assumes that mutual self-interest can be successfully maintained among the Polish, Hungarian, Russian, or Chinese groups. To maintain it, an even greater diversity in practice and in ideology would have to be tolerated. Such diversity, in turn, could reduce unity to a mere formal assertion, or it could breed conflict. This is the long-range vicious circle which the camp faces, and which suggests that the relationship between communism and nationalism involves subtle distinctions and continuing tensions.

It is essential, however, to bear in mind that this potential trend is likely to be slow and long range. Its gradual unfolding, moreover, is to be distinguished from another process of change which is often predicted for the Soviet Union. According to the latter view, Soviet totalitarianism, the most economically advanced totalitarian society of our age, is now entering upon a new stage of development, the character of which will be determined by the industrialized nature of the Soviet economy. This analysis, partaking somewhat of a materialist determinism, stresses the incompatibilities between totalitarianism and



the requirements of a modern, industrial and hence also bureaucratic order. Noting that totalitarianism in the past has seemed largely irrational, it argues that the rationalistic routines of the indispensable managers of the industrial society will necessarily transmit themselves to the totalitarian leadership and gradually effect a fundamental transformation of the system itself. This process, it is argued, will be facilitated by the fact that the totalitarian movement has become highly bureaucratized and therefore shares in many of the operational patterns associated with running the industrial machine. Furthermore, it is argued, the totalitarian movement itself has become increasingly staffed by managerial-bureaucratic elements to whom party membership means no more than an important club association necessary to satisfy career ambitions. The revolutionary torch and the unending question are accordingly displaced by the swivel chair and the punchclock.

But there is no evidence to suggest that "rational" management in itself is incompatible with totalitarianism, which need not be interpreted in terms of irrational terror almost for the sake of terror. Such a "rationalist" system, arising in the context of one-party domination (not to mention international pressures), could be nothing less than a "rationalist" dictatorship, just as total in control as its less predictable and more violent antecedent of the thirties. The institutionalized revolution which still characterizes the existing totalitarianism will inevitably slow down in the future, but by then it will be involved in an economic commitment which also has its own political logic. The totalitarian economy, as many have observed, has been developed in the U.S.S.R. over the last 30 years in keeping with plans oriented to a final (if not precisely defined) goal. It is thus a goal-oriented economy, the goal being communism. That this goal needs more definite formulation is, for our purposes, irrelevant. The important thing is that those in charge of the Soviet society have assumed that economic and social development in all its aspects can be purposefully steered by man in the direction of an ideal solution. This produces consequences, not only economic but also political, quite different from those induced by other economic systems, equally advanced technologically, where, to a larger extent, economic life is self-directive and where ultimate goals, such as plenty and progress, are purposely vague. These goals have less bearing on current decisions than such factors as past experiences, demand, prices, competition and opportunity. In the latter case, a measure of freedom of interplay is inherent. In the goal-oriented economy, all decisions and plans are made, or are rationalized, in terms of the ultimate goal.

The rationalist tomorrow, if it ever comes, will therefore not be an introduction to a democratic form of government, but rather a stage in further totalitarian evolution, accentuating rationalist features present from the start and minimizing some of the irrational outbursts already noted. Such a society, suffering less from internal tensions bred by arbitrary terror and enjoying a greater measure of consumption, might even be a far more effective tool for the promotion of the international goals of its ruling Communist elite. This elite would continue to find in its ideology the justification for power which any self-conscious elite requires. Democracy begins when a ruling elite begins to doubt the absolute righteousness of its rule.

Communist ideology, even if gradually eroding as a revolutionary creed, has increasingly become the self-justifying doctrine of the ruling class, and the union of the two requires a continuing conflict with "capitalism."

Insofar as the foreseeable future is concerned, it would be risky to base American policy on the assumption that Soviet totalitarianism is about to erode under the twin impact of urbanization and industrialization. Undeniably, there has been a significant change in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death. The fact that Khrushchev is showing greater sensitivity to popular pressures, particularly with respect to consumption, is slowly beginning to alter the former relationship between the ruler and the ruled. At the same time, however, we must not forget that the wider economic options available to him make his society a more formidable challenger than Stalinist Russia. Khrushchev has been much more successful than Stalin in infusing the Russian society with the will to prevail over the Western World and in associating the Russian people with the goals of his party. As long as the party continues to hold its successful grip on the instruments of power, we can expect it to continue stressing, first, the long-range goals of an ultimate utopia, and, second, the consequent sacrifices necessary to achieve it, though at a diminishing rate of effort. The new push under the slogan of the "extended construction of communism" bears this out and augurs a new phase of revolutionary change for the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, though it is always dangerous to insist rigidly that nothing has changed in Russia (thereby often promoting policies calculated to delay any incipient change), it would be at least equally dangerous to ignore the consideration that during the next decade Soviet policy is likely to remain totalitarian, led by a doctrinaire Communist Party, and dedicated to a radical change of the international order.

PART 3. NATIONALISM, NEUTRALISM, AND INTERNATIONALISM

Contemporary nationalism has become socially conscious, and much of the contemporary nationalist appeal is in terms of emphasizing that the creation of a strong nation-state is the *sine qua non* for social and economic development. Thus, modern nationalism has much more social revolutionary ideological content than nationalism in 19th century Europe. In Asia and Africa, nationalism was imported by African and Asian intellectuals who returned from the Western universities imbued with Western ideals and rejecting the subjugation of their people to foreign domination. Realizing that the traditional order of their societies was conducive to the maintenance of foreign rule and was incapable of generating a revolutionary upheaval, they placed their hopes in nationalism. Their new secular nationalism was to be a bond for rallying masses and for generating political action. It thus involved a departure from a passive attitude towards life, which considered it either divinely ordained or essentially spontaneous and timeless. This new nationalism involved a growing preoccupation with the changing pattern of economic and social development and a desire to promote it. It involved the shattering of an integrated compact life and placed a new emphasis on individual, conscious activity. In practice, it meant the telescoping and the transference of several centuries of European development to an alien environment.

In our age, modern nationalists are forced to compete with communism even while borrowing some of its intellectual tools. Lenin's "imperialism" is to some an extremely appealing explanation for past subjugation and a justification for delays in the rapid improvement of conditions after the achievement of national statehood. The word "imperialism" has become a common frame of reference in the speeches of nationalist leaders in many parts of the world. At the same time, Communists have been willing to associate themselves with anticolonial nationalist movements, even though they consider nationalism to be merely a first stop on a longer journey. This association, as well as the Communist willingness to consider nationalism as the means to a further end, gradually forces nationalists, once power has been won, to define their attitude toward communism.

The issue tends to be especially forced after the achievement of national statehood, since communism presents a concrete program of action for resolving some of the socioeconomic ills which the nationalists used to mobilize mass support, but for which they often lack a remedial policy. During this postfulfillment stage of nationalism, the rapid achievement of economic development becomes a substitute, to some extent, for the programmatic vacuum resulting from the creation of the nation-state. The quest for rapid development thus becomes a political force in its own right. To some, economic development can be a source of national power and national prestige; to others, a source of status and privilege, a panacea of economic well-

being which the achievement of the nation-state in itself did not bring about. Economic development, however, requires a more concrete model and more tangible planning than the symbols and myths associated with the nation-state. In time, the blueprints of the future must be translated into specific undertakings.

A. COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM

Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped nationalist states reflects the old Leninist conviction that a transitional merger of nationalism and communism will create a revolutionary wave, inevitably sweeping capitalism and imperialism before it. In shaping their policy for the postcolonial nations, the Communist leaders presumably have taken note of the overwhelming desire in the formerly colonial, underdeveloped countries for rapid industrialization. They also know that industrialization has become associated in the minds of many of the postcolonial leaders with the achievement of national prestige and individual dignity. It is symptomatic that Khrushchev and Bulganin, on their tour to India and Burma in 1955, placed greatest stress on the desirability of rapid industrialization. The Soviet leaders must have observed that all of these areas suffer from overpopulation, which industrialization in itself is not likely to resolve, and which will continue to create political and social tensions within the societies concerned. Indeed, these tensions may even be exacerbated by rapid industrial development with consequent revolutionary upheavals. Thus a test of the political institutions adopted from alien patterns by those new states will be a matter of their ability to operate in response to requirements yet to be put before them. Democracy will survive only if it can both satisfy the aspirations of the people and deal effectively with the consequences of satisfying them.

The Soviet leaders count on democracy not being able to surmount this difficulty. The Soviet leaders hope that once the new states begin to resolve their current problems, an extensive economic and social dislocation will take place. Efforts to industrialize might involve a "squeezing" of the agricultural population and consumers' goods may become scarce. All sorts of temporary adjustments could follow as the situation worsened: barracks for the new factory laborer, a variety of government measures to prevent serious economic crises, obligatory state loans to raise capital, low wages, and high taxation. An atmosphere of conflict may be artificially stimulated to raise morale and to induce mass enthusiasm. However, the Soviet leaders presumably expect that discontent will not be alleviated by these measures as wants and sacrifices increase. They hope that a crisis situation may develop rapidly. In such a situation, the more moderate leaderships in the new states may be faced with a dilemma. Some may suggest slowing down the pace of change; others may insist on pushing the change forward with more radical measures. The Communist parties expect that, under such circumstances, a revolutionary situation may be created in which they will be able to perform their historical role.

The confidence of Communist leaders is buttressed by their belief that the Soviet Union and China are well equipped to influence these new states and, unlike the West, share with them a recent history of underdevelopment and an acute sense of national inferiority. These the Soviet Union has overcome to a great extent by the construction

of its own industrial base. Furthermore, both the Soviet Union and China are in a strategic position to aid and lead the new Asian states. Their geographical proximity makes them logical partners in trade and economic development. They can point to themselves as models for the rapid achievement of the desired objective—intensive industrialization. They also share with these nations a large peasantry that fears the machine and yet wants to harness it, that senses the breakdown of the existing social framework and is at a loss as to what to do about it. Into this situation step the Marxist-Leninist program and the Communist Party.

It would be idle to assume that the Communist parties will limit themselves to gracious encouragement alone. In the Communist conception, political developments all over the world are part of an unfolding process of struggle between diametrically opposed economic and political systems. This being so, the fate of these new states, in the Communist view, will be determined in terms of their future coalescence with one or the other bloc. Noting that in the underdeveloped areas, nationalism is the most vibrant force and foreign imperialism is a widely known and hated phenomenon, the Communist parties feel that they no longer need to attack the local bourgeoisie nor depend on the so-called proletariat alone for the achievement of the ultimate absorption of these states into the Communist world. They feel that it is best to emphasize common hostility to the "imperialist" enemy and the need for rapid industrialization, thus mobilizing the local intelligentsia and the local bourgeoisie, with their nationalist, anti-imperialist feelings. Making its main plank the achievement of rapid industrialization and the defeat of imperialism, the Communist appeal is primarily directed at the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, to whom these points have a great deal of social appeal. Indeed, it is one of the paradoxes of present Communist tactics in the East that the Communists even make their appeal directly to the local capitalists. The Communists realize that emphasis on class struggle would serve to divide "the anti-imperialist forces." Departing from rigid Marxism, the Communist parties suggest to the local capitalists that in the new socialist, or ultimately Communist, society there will be a place for experts, such as the capitalists, to manipulate and to organize the new industrial society. In Latin America, appeal is made to the capitalists also in the name of fighting American interests. The departure from traditional Communist tactics is not so sharp as it may appear. Lenin himself advocated the strategy of taking advantage of the nationalist, anticolonial intellectuals in the underdeveloped sections of the world. Since the party itself is said to be the proletariat, the party can rely on other classes for the promotion of change, even the capitalists, if at a particular historical junction the capitalists have become "objectively" a progressive force effecting change. It may even be argued that this is a technique of adaptation of Marxism to the conditions of underdeveloped, largely rural societies in which a small group of intellectuals or urban capitalists play the leading role. Precedents for it are ample in Soviet and Chinese history. Marxism in its Western manifestation, basing itself on urban, industrialized societies, in which the proletariat plays a leading role, has never succeeded. Marxism-

Leninism, operating on an elitist basis, but drawing on large-scale popular dissatisfaction in retarded, rural areas, has succeeded.

This strategy of the local Communist parties is buttressed by their claim that the Communists possess a monopoly of understanding of the nature of economic development. Dismissing the Western experience as inapplicable, the Communists can point to themselves as the only group equipped to push through a program like the Soviet Union's. And if internal difficulties mount and some moderates become disillusioned and even veer away from industrialization, the Communist Party will be prepared to emerge in the guise of a leader, willing and determined to push through the original policy. Their task may appear all the more attractive to some of the local elements since Khrushchev's declaration in 1956 that the dictatorship of the proletariat in its violent form is no longer the necessary purpose of Communist activity, and his limited acceptance of alternative ways of achieving socialism.

Thus, in the Communist strategy, mounting internal tensions will be the basis for the eventual assumption of power by the Communist Party. The earlier pattern of Communist strategy as applied in China and Eastern Europe has thus been reversed. In those areas the Communist Party came to power by revolutionary activity or by force of arms. It then proceeded to effect a rapid and accelerated, internal social and economic revolution, designed to change the society in the Communist image, thereby also destroying internal sources of opposition to Communist rule. In the underdeveloped areas, the Communist hope is that rapid social change, intensified by Communist appeal and aided by Soviet encouragement, will create the preconditions for the assumption of power by the Communist Party and for the absorption of these areas into the Communist bloc. It is to be noted, however, that recently the Chinese Communists have been showing signs of impatience with this strategy and it is not unlikely that some Communist leaders may already be inclined to reconsider it. A return to a more revolutionary and aggressive policy is to be expected if the present policy fails to bear fruit in the next few years.

B. AREA ANALYSES

The peculiarity of nationalism is that, unlike communism, in each case it is very much a reflection of its own specific conditions and environment. The ideological conflicts which occur in the regions dominated by a wave of nationalism must, therefore, be analyzed in terms of the nations concerned. We will be primarily concerned with those areas where ideological conflicts have become intense through association with nationalism because of unfulfilled national and/or socioeconomic aspirations. While our comments are designed to have broader significance, they will draw particularly on the experience of India, the Arab countries, and Latin America.

These areas are important to any consideration of contemporary 20th century nationalism, because they are already facing defined ideological alternatives and are seeking an internal program for development. Some of these areas, recently divorced from colonialism and still conscious of their colonial heritage, are prototypes for patterns of development which are likely to come about in the near future in

Africa. Africa today is in the midst of a nationalist revolution, the primary concern of which is the achievement of independence through the elimination of colonial tutelage. Until this takes place and even after, the ideological content of African nationalism will continue to draw heavily on the nationalist experience of other areas. Nationalism will appeal to democracy, to liberty, to individual dignity, and to the sense of African identity, but without clear-cut and tangible institutional definitions. Most Africans still do not have a sense of their own national identity and their horizons are limited to tribal communities. It is only after independence has been achieved that African nationalism will be faced with broader issues of ideological allegiance, which nationalists in the other areas must now resolve. Even the recently established African States, such as Ghana, remain preoccupied with the African struggle for liberation. But once that objective has been achieved in all of Africa, it is possible that African nationalist leaders will look toward the experience of other postcolonial states for guidance and inspiration, rather than to the Western democratic states whose experience and institutions may not appear appropriate.

For this reason, the experience of the Middle East or of South and Southeast Asia will be particularly relevant insofar as they share the anticolonial heritage. Latin America, although not recently subject to colonial domination, in a way offers some similar problems. An underdeveloped and economically retarded area, it regards itself as having been exposed to capitalist and colonial exploitation and feels a certain sense of community with the nationalism of the new states. Its proximity to, and past reliance on, the United States is thus likely to provide a major test of the American capacity to offer leadership to the awakened nationalism of many hitherto dormant nations. The close geographical and historical ties of Latin America to the United States make its emerging consciousness of nationalism and its growing interest in ideological issues of vital importance to American policy.

(1) *Indian nationalism*

These general propositions must now be examined in their more specific national contexts. Indian nationalism, like that of other colonial areas in Asia and Africa, represents both a response to and a reaction against Western cultural and philosophic penetration. Imperialism in Asia, whatever else it may have been, was a bearer of Western culture. Nationalists were faced with the problem of what to do with the imported values and institutions. Of the three possibilities—rejection, adoption, or synthesis—India chose synthesis.

The nature of the synthesis which the nationalist movement and the postnationalist political tradition represent is complex, and its elements live together in an uneasy unity. In the preindependence period, Gandhism, the traditional component of nationalism, marched side by side with Fabian socialism, with a commitment to constitutional democracy and with a weak but noticeable Marxist-Leninist element. All of these tendencies could unite in fundamental anti-colonialism. In examining these elements, it is well to remember that the first three, Gandhism, nationalism, and constitutionalism, rather generally pervade the intellectual climate in which literate Indians

travel, and that many individuals and at least the Congress and Socialist parties are committed to all three simultaneously.

Gandhism bases itself firmly on a reformed and enlightened version of the traditional culture. It emphasizes the ancient virtues of the Hindu, village-oriented society. Stressing duty, self-sacrifice, non-violence and antimaterialism, it hopes to reshape society by the moral reform of individuals. Its antimaterialist and village-oriented outlook make Gandhism suspicious of modern urban industrial and economic organization, whether under Marxist, or liberal free enterprise auspices. In this respect, its critique cuts at modernity, not at any specific philosophy system. Gandhism is utopian, aiming at the metamorphosis of human nature. But it is also apolitical, doubting that any political institution, except possibly the self-sufficient village, can create a better life. This means it is skeptical of the paraphernalia of constitutional government—legislatures, parties, elections, courts and bureaucracies. None of these is really relevant to the crucial issue: how to create moral virtue at the individual level. The Gandhian stress on duty, which emphasizes the individual's obligation to the family, the kinship group, and the village in which he lives, makes this philosophy suspicious of the concept of rights which is central to liberal constitutionalism. In the Gandhian perspective, the emphasis on rights as an extension of individual self-interest smacks of selfishness and lack of moral responsibility.

Although starting from fundamentally different premises and going to different conclusions, Gandhism and Marxism overlap in their skepticism concerning parliamentary institutions. However, Marxism goes beyond Gandhism in finding democratic political institutions not only ineffectual but mere instruments of the ruling class which will disappear once classes are eliminated. Marxism also overlaps with Gandhism in its suspicion of individualism. But while the Gandhian often sees individual rights as an expression of selfishness, the Marxist sees them as a rationalization for exploitation by the propertied classes. Finally, they can agree on the importance of duty and disciplined service, the one supporting them in the name of the self-governing village society, the other in the name of the classless society. While Gandhism and Marxism thus overlap, Gandhism diverges sharply on two issues, the meaning of history and the means for change. Gandhism is resolutely unconvinced that class conflict and revolution are inevitable historical events, and vigorously opposes the conclusion that because they are inevitable, violence is an appropriate instrument for change. The Gandhian commitment to nonviolent moral persuasion as the only legitimate instrument of reform is the element which aligns it with the democratic camp.

The commitment to a kind of Fabian socialism is a more modern component in the nationalist tradition. If the more traditional point of view was borne by Gandhi, Fabian socialism, as well as commitment to constitutional democracy, is identified with Nehru. His Fabian-style, democratic socialism is in many ways reminiscent of the British socialism from which it draws much of its inspiration. It is more pragmatic than ideological, emphasizing political democracy, economic welfare, the elimination of social distinctions, equality of opportunity, and economic growth. In practice, this means that the development of overhead capital and heavy industry falls within the public sector of the economy, but the private sector remains by far

the larger of the two with heavy responsibilities under the second 5-year plan.

This Fabian socialism is fundamentally critical of 19th century individualistic capitalism, an economic system which many Indians tend to ascribe to the United States. That this system in America has been substantially modified in the direction of a concern with welfare and security is not always understood in India, and America is thus flailed from the Fabian perspective for economic practices which were long ago abandoned. In this connection, it is well to remember that the attack on the 19th century capitalism which America is alleged still to pursue, comes from both the Fabian left and the Gandhian, or traditionalist, right.

Interestingly enough, some of the sophisticates within the Fabian camp are heir to the long stream of cultural anti-Americanism which British Fabian intellectuals inherited in their turn from England's aristocratic tradition. Fastidiousness about America's "vulgar materialism" was a characteristic of 19th century English critics of America and is now featured by such leftist British journals as the *New Statesman* and *Nation*. In India this tradition is strengthened by the Gandhian emphasis on simplicity and frugality. While the concern of the Indian "Fabian" socialist with economic development leads him to admire Russia's rapid pace, his constitutional democratic commitments preclude the possibility of using force and exploitation to achieve this end. Indeed, he is suspicious of Marxist-Leninist politics and programs because they fail to use voluntary means based on the consent of the people.

Commitment to constitutional democracy is the official position of every Indian party today, although many Indians subscribe simultaneously to many of the Gandhian theoretical propositions which run counter to it. Still others are ostensibly committed to constitutional democracy but wonder whether a restriction of freedom may not facilitate economic development. Of these, some are influenced by Marxism and some simply by a nonpolitical and essentially technocratic commitment to efficiency. The latter sometimes receive intellectual sustenance from American and European technical and economic advisers, who find democratic politics an inconvenient intrusion into considerations of efficiency.

Genuine commitment to constitutional democracy is doubtful on the extreme right, where the weaker parties advocating a Hindu state would probably restrict the present climate of freedom, particularly with respect to religion, if they had an opportunity to do so. It is very doubtful on the extreme left, where the Communist commitment to constitutionalism is only the latest in a long series of strategic and tactical shifts. Constitutionalism and political democracy may undermine the Indian Communists, rather than vice versa. This is suggested by the party's difficulties in Kerala, where it achieved no magical transformations after almost 3 years in power. By the time of its removal, it not only had lost its charismatic appeal, but also was having difficulty in keeping its ideology intact while operating in a democratic context.

The Marxist-Leninist tradition in India is, of course, carried by the Communist Party, which has made strenuous efforts in the past several years to persuade Indians that their Marxism-Leninism is subordinate to and compatible with Indian patriotism. Since 1952,

the party has attempted to mend the breach which its war record had created. The party supported the British war effort after Germany's attack on Russia, while the nationalist movement refused cooperation unless Britain conceded extensive powers of self-government. The party has to a large extent succeeded in rehabilitating itself, doubling its popular vote—from 5 percent to 10 percent—between the 1952 and 1957 general elections. The most distressing aspect of this growth is the possible trend in the direction of party bipolarity on the Indian scene, with the Congress-Communist rather than Congress-Socialist confrontation supplying the alternatives.

In order to gain electoral support the Communist Party has been at pains to dissociate itself from the commune system in China, which, its spokesmen point out, is "inappropriate for India." On the Tibet issue, however, the party chose to stand alone in support of China, a position which subjected it to attacks on its national loyalty on the floor of Parliament. In the middle of October 1959, the party split publicly on the Sino-Indian frontier issue, with those leaders closest to popular politics and democratic elections taking an Indian nationalist position while the theorists and party bureaucrats tried to play down the issue without saying anything offensive to China. Where it has tried to follow an international rather than a national line as in the case of the frontier conflict with China, the party has lost popular support and opened up fissures in its public front. Thus the retreat from ideology, which the demands of popular politics require, has reduced the party's distinctiveness on the Indian scene.

The main ideological strands that weave together all those already mentioned are anti-imperialism and anticolonialism. The anticolonial sentiment is a product of the intense historic experience which India and other colonial areas have undergone in recent times. This experience is one which the present generation of Indian leaders, who spent much of their adult lives in the prisons of the colonialists, are not apt to forget. (Nehru himself spent 9 years in jail.) Modern intellectual and recent political history has made anticolonialism a most fertile bed for Marxism-Leninism and Russian sympathies.

The Leninist explanation of imperialism has been the single most effective statement of the grievances of colonial peoples. Its favorable reception in former colonial areas has also affected the way in which Western economic systems are viewed. Since the economic system of the imperialist powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries happened to be capitalist, and since the imperialist powers undoubtedly limited the freedom of colonial peoples and in some cases exploited them, capitalism has fallen heir to the epithets "exploitative" and "oppressive" which were initially directed against colonial political power. That imperialism as a force is not associated with any one economic system, that socialism, communism, and capitalism may all be expansionist, that capitalism may flourish without expansion—all are subtle lessons which have an uphill struggle in overcoming the dominant memory of capitalist imperialism.

At the level of political history, India remembers that Russian relations with the West were antagonistic during the post-1917 period, when the Indian nationalist struggle moved into its militant and mass phase, creating common sentiments between India and Russia based on common enmity. The post-World War II Russian entry on the

world scene as an imperialist power has not effectively erased the earlier memories. Russian imperialist activities have been chiefly in geographically and psychologically remote European countries, and though the 1956 events in Hungary and the subsequent execution of Nagy did produce a vigorous public dialog, it was mainly the intellectuals who were deeply concerned.

Communist imperialism in Tibet, however, has become a popular issue. There are cultural, religious, historical, geographical, and economic links between India and Tibet. Tibet has touched the consciousness even of the illiterate peoples. Events in the Middle East have also contributed to modifying Indian conceptions of imperialism. The tension between the new Government of General Kassim in Iraq and the United Arab Republic led President Nasser to denounce the Communist Party as an instrument of a foreign power. His attack served to undermine the idea that only Western Powers are imperialistic.

Finally, the threat posed by China has prompted many Indians to brand the Chinese Communist regime as imperialist. It is quite likely that Chinese and Russian commitments and ambitions will lead to further engagements with similar results. Though the United States cannot create such results, they remain the most effective means to destroy the ideological pretension that communism is never imperialist.

Experience in the rest of non-Communist Asia demonstrates that nationalism is still the fundamental principle of political action in Asia to which all other ideologies must be subordinated. Foreign policy is framed almost entirely in terms of national considerations, and often primarily with regard for the positions of immediate neighbors. In the case of Pakistan, this has resulted in a desire of most major groups to maintain strong economic and military ties with the United States. Yet, their leaders have almost explicitly stated that they would turn their allegiance to any nation that would help them win Kashmir (Russia presently supports India). The feudal, monarchist, Muslim state of Afghanistan maintains comparatively close relations with India and Russia, because the United States seems to aid Pakistan through armaments in its border disputes. Much of the hostility of India toward the United States and the lack of hostility toward Russia, seems to be related to American support of Pakistan.

The further ideological concomitants of nationalism in all of the postcolonial states have been primarily in terms of socialism and the democratic theory of government. In the test of real politics, there has probably been some decrease in the influence of doctrine as such, coordinate with rising demands for governmental efficiency and for success in both its economic and national senses. Yet, in each of these states the ultimate goals of the majority of literate people remain, in addition to economic development, some form of constitutional democracy and the existence of a reasonable degree of equality both within and among nations.

(2) The Arab countries

Nationalism, as the assertion by a people of its claim to a distinctive national identity, entitling it to live its own life in its own fashion, has been expressed in the Arab world in two ways that are related in

basic motivation but different in manifestations and consequences. Both expressions concern us today.

"The Arabs are a natural group in the world," wrote the Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun in 1377. Long before then and ever since, this sense of being Arab has been a factor in the self-definition of more than 80 million people. Precisely what an "Arab" is has puzzled ethnologists but never the Arabs themselves. Being Arab, or in our present context, Arab nationalism, has come down through the ages despite strident discords, dynastic conflicts, long periods of dormancy broken by moments of lofty aspiration under inspired leaders, and still exists as a unifying force—ineffable, diffuse, but pervasive and enduring.

Strongest among its binding elements has been and still is its unquestioning devotion to Islam. Not unquestioning concerning ritual and interpretation in secular affairs—these have produced the bitterest conflicts that have rift the Arab community—but even they arise out of the basic devotion. Moreover, Islam as they have known it has had political as well as spiritual content, urging the Arabs to the conquest of an empire; also it gave order to a vast intellectual outpouring of literature, art, and science. Part, a large part, of the degradation the Arabs now feel grows from the fact that this heritage has been buried under a great overthrust of Western modernity which has not only swept away their social institutions but contemptuously brushed aside the spiritual foundation of their lives. To marshal these reactions against world forces today is not easy, but a resolution to do it persists. We shall return to this expression of Arab nationalism later.

The other expression, which we shall refer to here as (Arab) state nationalism, has the same origin and characteristics as many other newborn state nationalisms (the characteristics change with maturity)—i.e., the driving desire of a people to create their own nation by freeing themselves from subjugation by others. The driving force here is not essentially Arab, but as with other modern nationalisms, an ideological urge for independence; the catharsis of a subjugation complex.

Today in the Middle East it is chiefly this second kind of nationalism that concerns us, although since it breathes the air of the first, common symptoms are becoming increasingly evident. But the goals and the potentials for achieving them are different. Arab nationalism reflects a yearning for the status and attainments that historic memory attaches to the Arabs. Each state nationalism has attributes that grow out of the specific circumstances in which it was born.

State nationalism is relatively recent in the Middle East. We can trace nearly its full growth since the close of the First World War and much of it since the second. After the first war the Allies, partly at least to check the threat of a rising Arab power growing out of their widespread mobilization against the Turks, fragmented the political structure of the Arab world by creating the five mandated states: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine. Egypt already existed, as did the more than 30 British-dominated sheikhdoms that fringe the coast of Arabia. Yemen then as now was an isolated and forbidding principality. Ibn Saud established himself over the vast remainder of the peninsula. We can broaden this picture by adding Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, separated from the Ottoman Empire much earlier; and Libya, released from Italian colonialism by the Second World War.

Most of the foreign-dominated states have by now expelled their foreign overlords, in varied circumstances and with different aftermaths, but in each case with the common purpose of establishing its own independence as a people. The goal in each case was twofold: the right of political self-determination, and the opportunity to live the more abundant life which has become a universal expectation. Later we shall examine the pursuit of these two goals, but first we must look at the basic character of state nationalism itself.

An important factor in the Middle East nationalist rebellions—perhaps, ironically, the one that made them possible—was the very fragmentation designed by the Allies to avert such an event. Successful rebellion against an established overlord requires a combination of nationalistic fervor and unanimous acceptance of leadership, a combination difficult to produce among the scattered Arabs as a whole but very likely to occur within the limited area of a single state where popular resentment can be forced upon specific issues and a single strong leader can assume direct control. But because of this process the new Arab States that emerged remained identified with the particular boundaries within which their rebellion had been confined, dependent upon the resources with which that area had been endowed and associated as fellow citizens with those whom the boundaries happened to enclose. In Iraq, for example, this included a million or more fierce irredentist Kurds who allied (rather than merged) their own nationalism with that of the Arabs to expel the foreign overlord, but only for this purpose. In Syria it combined the roving Bedouin tribes of the desert with the sophisticated merchant city of Damascus. In Lebanon, half Christian, half Muslim, a persisting dichotomy on every other issue can hardly be avoided.

In these circumstances the revolutionary content of nationalism—the reaction to subjugation and the urge for independence—loses both its cohesion and its drive with the achievement of its goal. The foreign overlord, long blamed for afflictions, suppressions, and humiliations, has been driven out. But is this enough? Freedom has not been won for nothing. But for what? Divisive forces appear and internal power groups seize the fruits of victory. Leadership must again fan the spark of nationalism—this time to face the internal challenge of dissension and despotism which is even more clearly seen as the source of popular degradation than was the distant hand of the foreigner. To the masses, even though divergence in views is inevitable within a traditionally stratified society, nationhood appears in two lights: first as a symbol of freedom, second as a provider of the more abundant life. But even when freedom has been won both from the imperialist without and from the despot within, the expectations of the more abundant life prove hollow. Where, the people now ask, has their leadership led them?

In Iraq, to take one illustration, after the Second World War the traditional and familiar social institutions which had provided a sense of security and at least were a thread connecting them with a richer historic past, disappeared almost completely when new institutions were established that benefited only new elites. A mile outside Baghdad and a few other centers 80 percent of the population were no better off than when the Mongols laid waste to their land 600 years ago—worse off, indeed, by reason of knowing now that the new life they

seek could be within their reach and that the causes of their afflictions lie closer than they once supposed.

So much for the people. Now what of their leadership?

A nation born in the circumstances described is not prepared to achieve new goals or even to define them explicitly. The essence of rebellion is to be against everything associated with its cause. But to survive as a nation, positive aspirations toward new goals must be aroused and directed, and capabilities for achieving them generated. This becomes the new function of leadership.

The evidence of the Middle East is that leaders faced with this problem are faced also with somewhat diverging solutions; first with satisfying the direly pressing material wants of the people; second with creating new wants with a high content of national purpose that will give cohesiveness to the society. We see a reflection of this second one in Nasser's reference to the "real revolution" now to be made, which has as its goal the creation of a "cooperative, socialistic and democratic society." These words, as he uses them, are sensitizing concepts that, introduced into the minds of his followers, will give new meanings to the nationalist ideology and stimulate renewed effort toward these goals; or, as Nasser puts it, will form the "national personality."

The first requirement on a leader, nevertheless, is to survive as a leader. When the cohesive force of nationalism no longer binds the people to him and the expected fruits of freedom do not appear, or as they appear are seized by a few and rivals build followings around these dissatisfactions, the leader must use every device available to him—first to survive as leader, and then to prove worthy of leadership. Authority granted him freely in the heat of nationalistic rebellion must now rest upon the instruments of power—army, police, public communications, and finance—and used both to curb the avaricious and to goad the apathetic. But a government that is born of rebellion can die by rebellion and in the end the leader must rely upon popular confidence. At times he will revive the specter of external aggression, as a challenge to which nationalism will respond with a rally to his support. At times he will appeal to the broader but more placid Arab nationalism that lies like a sea around his island of state nationalism, to support him as an Arab in what he is doing as an Arab.

We might call such a government authoritarian but we must not condemn it for being what it must be at this point.

The foregoing generalized model is not a photograph of any particular Arab state. The various states range widely as they traverse the route sketched here, on which some have barely started and others have been turned back repeatedly only to start again. Almost every event in these countries that has made headlines in recent years will drop into its place in this picture, as far as it has yet been sketched. But other factors must also be introduced to make the picture complete.

The first of these is communism, as it has appeared in the Middle East.

Taking this as we find it today, without tracing its infiltration, we find among the Arabs themselves a relatively small number of hard-core Communists who have found its ideology acceptable to—or acceptable as a substitute for—their own ideological urge for freedom. But this relatively few are important. Again the historical accident that

cast these new states in the mold of earlier heterogenous and illy endowed pseudo-nations provides conditions ideal for subversive activities. These Communists do not preach Communist ideology, which is antithetical to the essence of self-determination that gave nationalism its drive. Their operation, supported and directed by Soviet Communists, is tactical, not ideological.

First they associate themselves with the "anti" feelings of the nationalists—against the "imperialists," against all pacts with the West (which they represent as avenues for imperialist reentry), and against the avaricious and corrupt internal groups from which no country is wholly free. Thus nonideological Communist tactics play upon ideological nationalistic feelings. But they do not stop here.

One light in which nationhood appears is itself nonideological—as the provider of needed opportunities. Here other Communist tactics are employed, complementing the first course while breaking even more fertile ground for planting a favorable image of communism. The Soviet Union's own spectacular social and economic achievements are held up as a tried and proven pattern for achieving the very goals to which the Arabs aspire. Invidious comparisons are made with the practices of Western capitalism—unhappily with some basis in fact—not only to plunder weaker nations themselves but to assist favored local groups in exploiting national resources in their own instead of the public interest. This is accompanied by offers of Soviet assistance, technical and economic, to make achievement possible.

Still a third tactic is employed, also nonideological. Communist (or as a result of the tactic just described, pro-Communist) Arabs make themselves a part of the government apparatus (which includes the army) at any or all levels from petty provincial officials and party organizers to cabinet posts. From such positions their influence is magnified.

From the viewpoint of national leadership all these tactics seem supporting, at least in the beginning. National cohesion is intensified by the challenge of recurrent subjection. New goals perfumed with the promise of prompt achievement arouse efforts toward satisfaction and growth. Reinforcement of central authority reduces risks to the leader's survival and increases his effectiveness of direction. But raising all these pressures also raises the difficulties of containing them. Anti-Westernism interferes with seizing opportunities for Western aid and also with the adoption of Western institutions and certain—but not all—Western standards and practices that have long been targets for Arab aspirations. Concentration of central authority is attractive only when concentrated in the leader's hands. Leadership is thus faced with a dilemma, not between conflicting ideologies but between alternative and conflicting courses of action.

The other horn of this dilemma grows partly from the Arabs' desire to emulate the West in many but not all ways, and partly from the West's own anxious concern lest the Arab world be drawn into the Communist orbit, with the loss to the West of both ideological and material objectives.

Between the Arabs and the West there is no ideological conflict as to the values attached to freedom from subjection and the right to political self-determination. Western nations were built upon these prin-

ciples, at least as applied to themselves. True, historical evidence is abundant and freshly in mind that in the pursuit of this aim Western Powers have exploited others, but on a pragmatic—not an ideological—principle.

In the United States we believe in the principle and practice of private enterprise, as an offshoot of our ideological dedication to the concept of individual freedom and the right of self-determination. But our judgment that private enterprise is inherently more effective than state enterprise is entirely pragmatic, not ideological, and indeed on the basis of statistical evidence can be challenged even as a prevailing judgment. In any case there is nothing ideological about it beyond our dedication to the right of doing as we please about it; nor do we deny the same right to those outside our country. As a matter of fact, our readiness to assist Arab national governments in financing and executing industrial undertakings of many kinds is evidence enough that our judgment is pragmatic and not ideological. As a matter of principle we regard state and private capitalism as complementary and depending upon circumstances favor one or the other. Tactically, the Communists are forced to take the same position with the Arab nations, to conform with the Arab concept of the right of self-determination and the growing exercise of this right in fostering private enterprise where it serves a national purpose by bringing the more abundant life nearer. Unfortunately the Communists have been more successful in concealing the fact that private enterprise is in fundamental conflict with their doctrine and ultimate intentions, than we have in exposing the fact that choice between the two is not a matter of ideological principle but of wholly pragmatic judgment in each case.

On balance, we can sum this up as follows:

1. Arab nationalism has a long way to go before achieving political objectives of its own, if indeed any exist at this time. The emergence of Arab national states has relieved the long pent-up urge for self-definition, self-determination, and opportunity for the more abundant life. While obstacles to these still exist, they are not of a kind that Arab nationalism is likely to solve if state nationalism cannot. Nevertheless, Arab nationalism is still a powerful and a growing force in the reshaping of the Middle East. First, because state nationalism has made the political breakthrough that the more diffuse Arab nationalism could not, thus clearing the way for unification among Arab States that could not be produced among discordant Arab peoples. Second, because Arab leaders cannot in the long run escape increasing pressure toward the common aim of placing the Arabs on an even footing among world powers, even though they may resist forms of collaboration that in the short run oppose vested interests or ambitions. And finally, because Arab nationalism is ideologically compatible with Western principles concerning not only the right of national self-determination but of joining in larger communities within which this right becomes even more secure.

2. State nationalism within the Arab world, within states that have achieved substantial freedom from former servitudes, appears to have little active ideological content today, except in response to direct challenge. Once free nationhood has been achieved, popular effort is directed toward reaping the expected fruits of that achievement. This is not ideological in its motivation but may be responsive to

ideological appeals. Among long-deprived people, it is results that count. What kind of results depends upon what is wanted at various social and economic levels, but as a generality it is what lies just beyond their grasp—not what people in the United States might want. Leadership is even more practical minded, since its survival is more imminently at risk. High concentration of authority is essential both for survival and for creating opportunities for the more abundant life, but for practical—not ideological—reasons.

The hard-core, dedicated Communists who have worked their way into the mechanism through which national authority is exercised may be motivated by their ideology, but if their tactics begin to disclose this it serves as a challenge to the nationalist ideology upon which the new nation rests and also to the authority of nationalist leaders. Such challenges were raised in Egypt after Nasser had invited Soviet military and economic aid, but the present evidence is that they were successfully met by both nationalist ideology and national leadership. They were raised again in Syria, where Communist ideology was thrown back by nationalist, and the problem of leadership solved by uniting with Egypt. They are now raised again in Iraq, with the outcome not yet clear. But if the Communists succeed it will be a victory of tactics—not of ideologies—not until compulsive indoctrination has worked its will on the victims of its tactics. And in all cases, for we can expect more, Communist tactics of subversion and seduction, as distinguished from ideological conversion, will be far less likely to succeed if national leadership has meanwhile endowed the peoples' vision of the more abundant life with a high content of "national personality."

3. Communism's most obvious instrument in the Arab world today is not its ideology, for reasons already made clear; but, first, the nationalists' own ideology—which can always be turned against the foreign "imperialist"; second, the plausible proposition that Soviet methods of achieving material goals are especially suitable for the Arabs' situation; and third, participation in the mechanics of government—effective by magnifying influence and dangerous if vital posts are reached. All three, while tactical on the surface, are ideological in depth, and require equally skilled and sophisticated tactics to check them.

4. The ideology most prominently asserted by the United States, and by the West as a whole, is our concept of democracy, the political expression of which is neither understood nor presently sought by the Arabs. Here is a conflict that we can avoid by the simple course of not going out of our way to produce it. Almost certainly the time will come in the Arab States, as it has in all countries where freedom is valued, when popular concern in government affairs will be expressed through orderly procedures and the source of authority will be transferred progressively from the ruler to the ruled. For reasons that scarcely need to be reviewed here, the time has not yet come when our kind of political democracy will work in the Arab States nor when our effort to bring it about will serve either their interests or our own. Arab leaders, as stated earlier, need and presently seek centralized authority, and with aspiring rivals and other opportunists striving in their own interests to divide such unity as may exist within the populace, a head of government fighting to retain his power may be excused

for scorning our visions of a democratic state. This conflict, ideological with us but not with the Arabs, is exploited by the Communists, who support the leader in his struggle for concentrated authority for reasons of their own—a plus for the Communists and a minus for us, in the Arab leader's estimation.

There is another and more distinctively American ideology which fits like a glove on the Arab hand. It is set out in the opening words of our Declaration of Independence, with which all Arab leaders and many other Arabs are familiar. It states the case for the right of national self-determination. It is the essence of all nationalisms in the Arab world, both Arab nationalism and all state nationalisms. It is also the essence of our own. In all cases it is unqualifiedly ideological—without reservation or margin for bargain as to how fast or how slow economic improvements might take place. As to this ideological concept there is agreement between us and the Arabs. But it is the kiss of death for the Communists in any issue that turns on it. This is why they avoid it.

This is also why we should exploit it. It is the essential ideological ingredient of Arab state nationalism and a strong component in Arab nationalism (which has also an obscure cultural side to it). It is the one basis for ideological conflict between the Arabs and the Communists. But, if we put our preference for democratic political procedure in its proper place, no basis at all exists for ideological conflict between the Arabs and ourselves. As for sophisticated tactical measures we can, if we will, take steps as effective as any the Communists can take, both to support nationalist leadership and to make possible a more abundant life for the people. Moreover, we can do this within an ideology that is common to both the Arabs and ourselves and carry it through to a finish without betraying the Arabs, at a critical juncture, as the Communists must when one ideology or the other must prevail.

From the policymaking point of view we can summarize the implications of what has been said by stating that the overt conflicts in the Arab countries with which we have to deal today, involving internal rivalries, dictatorships, military and economic deals with the Soviet Communists, social and economic reforms—and even many aspects of the Arab-Israel conflict itself—are as much the outcome of concrete and pragmatic factors in decisionmaking as of ideological motivations or collisions.

But we must follow this at once with the caveat that this is only part of the story. Even when we can discount ideology as a direct operational factor, we cannot disregard the fact that concepts of value—social, religious, cultural—have equal importance as discrete factors in the calculus of pragmatic decisions as when they are woven together in a particular ideological pattern. Hence while they are not the prime subject of this present inquiry, which centers upon ideological conflicts, they are the stuff of which ideologies are made and have important claim upon our attention.

(3) *Latin America*

Latin America is another important area experiencing the impact of emerging nationalist awareness, which is expressed through a search both for national dignity and for concrete solutions to internal political and socioeconomic difficulties. Thus, nationalism again

serves as a general framework within which ideological alternatives are maturing and competing. What is occurring in Latin America today is a competition among spokesmen for various ideological positions, the outcome of which will go far toward determining not only the internal affairs of the Latin American nations but also the nature of Latin America's future relations with the wider world.

Latin American nationalism as a broad popular phenomenon and as an idea that engages the attention and allegiance of the masses dates in Mexico from 1910, and in most other states of the region from the 1920's and 1930's. Despite the fact that all but 2 of the 20 Latin American States have been juridically independent for well over a century, it is only now that the transition from prenational to national societies is taking place. Even today, in a number of Latin American Republics, many people are only dimly aware of their national affiliation. Moreover, in many states of the region the "national idea" is far from determined. Or, again in President Nasser's terms, the "national personality" has not been formed. Indeed, the absence of consensus respecting fundamental values and orientations is one of the most striking features of many Latin American societies. This means that the ideological future is open to a far greater extent than is the case in the older national societies of Europe and North America. Hence South America is an area of ideological conflict comparable to Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

In determining how to cast their popular appeals, spokesmen for the competing ideologies in South America must take into consideration the varying roles played by the peasants, the urban proletariat, the middle classes, the upper classes, and the students. Today, well over half of all Latin Americans are directly dependent upon the land for their livelihood, and in most Latin American States two-thirds or more of the population is officially classified as rural. With comparatively few exceptions the peasants of Latin America are either small landowners, scratching out a precarious living from overworked plots, or are peons attached to large estates. In neither case does the return to the peasants from their labor suffice to meet more than their bare subsistence requirements. Until recently, these agrarian masses played a very minor political role, and were not an effective part of the national community to which they formally belonged. In some of the predominantly Indian States this is still the case, but elsewhere the incorporation of the peasants is proceeding rapidly. With improvements in transportation and communications, with rising levels of health, literacy and education, and with the adoption by some of the region's political leaders of the peasants' cause as their own, the peasants are beginning to expand their hitherto extremely restricted horizons and to feel that their depressed situation is a consequence not so much of immutable law or inscrutable providence as of an unjust social and economic order that can be changed.

One consequence of recent efforts to ameliorate peasant conditions has been migration to the cities. As a result, Latin American cities are growing at a phenomenal rate. Most workers who come to the urban centers from rural areas are unskilled and form part of the floating labor force. These people barely subsist in miserable slums and are highly susceptible to demagogic appeals. To be distinguished from them are the skilled industrial and service employees, most of

whom are now members of unions, although the strength and autonomy of the trade union movement varies widely. Some unions and some union federations are powerful independent factors in national government, others are adjuncts of national administrations, and still others ostensibly eschew politics altogether. Most autonomous and politically involved unions in Latin America are strongly oriented to the left.

A few years ago, a middle class along the patterns of those in Western Europe and North America could hardly be said to have existed. Those engaged in middle class occupations—professional people, intellectuals, journalists, teachers, middle-level bureaucrats, and technicians of various kinds—were few in absolute numbers and received poor incomes. Like much else in Latin America, this situation is now changing. Although the middle class is still extremely weak in a number of Central American, Caribbean, and Andean countries, it is elsewhere becoming a group of substantial size and considerable importance. Economic dissatisfaction is rife in this class, especially among its salaried members, who suffer most from the chronic inflation common to most states of the region.

This middle class is increasingly rebellious against the upper class, traditionally a tightly knit oligarchy of large landowners, big merchants, capitalists, and high-ranking officers of the ecclesiastical and military hierarchies. Such an oligarchy has long dominated political and economic life in most of Latin America. The dominance of this group is now seriously threatened, and it has had to give ground before new social forces even in such tradition-based societies as those of Ecuador and Peru. Within this ruling class there is now a search for ideological underpinnings to bolster the group's position, a search that half a century ago would have been regarded as quite unnecessary.

Latin American university students, although they make up only a minute if growing fraction of the population, also deserve special mention. Drawn largely from the middle class (upper class children are frequently educated in Europe or the United States), they are politically more articulate and socially more concerned than are their counterparts in North America. Furthermore, as young men and women coming to maturity in societies in which traditional norms and values have been discredited and discarded, they are particularly susceptible to ideological appeals. Since from this group will come most of the intellectual and many of the political leaders of the Latin America of tomorrow, the ideological positions that they adopt are of great importance.

It is to these diverse groups that conflicting ideological appeals are being directed. Traditionally, ideology played a very minor part in Latin American political life. "Conservatives" distinguished themselves from "liberals" in respect of such matters as the proper role of the church and the extent of the formal powers of the central government. But the division was essentially spurious, since politics was regarded as exclusively the concern of a small ruling oligarchy, to which both "conservatives" and "liberals" belonged, and neither "party" was interested in initiating radical social or economic change. In the last three decades, however, with the incorporation of the urban and increasingly the rural masses, and particularly with the rise in

political importance of the middle groups, ideological issues have become increasingly significant.

The principal ideological movements of recent years can be classified under five general headings: communism, democratic socialism, welfare liberalism, Catholic action and neofascism. All these share two features. First, they are all attuned to the rising tide of Latin American nationalism. Second, they all adhere to the principle of large-scale and continuing state intervention in social and economic matters.

The Communist Party is outlawed in many countries in Latin America, a fact that complicates gathering reliable statistics concerning it, but its membership is not believed to be larger than 250,000. Figures, however, reflect inaccurately the true Communist strength in the area. In the first place, the Communists are concentrated very heavily, to the extent of three-fourths of their total regional membership, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela, which are among the most important and most highly developed countries in Latin America. Secondly, the proportion of Communists among the politically active population is very much higher in view of the fact that most Latin Americans, particularly those in rural areas, are still politically inert. Thirdly, the groups within which the Communists are most active and influential—the urban proletariat, the lower middle classes and the students—are acquiring a steadily increasing political significance in their societies. Finally, the Communists almost by definition are more tightly organized and disciplined than are the adherents to other ideological positions. Therefore, despite their apparently insignificant numbers and the fact that their positive influence appears to be declining, the Communists are a force to be reckoned with.

To some extent the Communists compensate for the erratic course of their day-to-day party line, dictated from Moscow and bearing no necessary relationship to developments within Latin America itself, both by the plausibility of their fundamental philosophy of history as an instrument to account for the depressed and frustrated condition of those to whom they make their major appeal, and also by the virulence of their campaign against the United States. Since class lines are indeed much sharper in Latin America than they are in the economically more developed societies of Europe and North America, and in that respect more similar to the areas already discussed, it is not at all farfetched in view of Latin American history to assert that the state had been traditionally little more than an instrument of class oppression. Furthermore, many students find in Marxism-Leninism a complete philosophy to replace the Thomistic philosophy they feel they must now reject.

With respect to the Communist attacks upon the United States, it is well for us in this country to be aware that many among the general public in Latin America are predisposed to dislike us. It is widely believed that we regard the states of the region as our economic "colonies," and that a principal cause of Latin America's economic backwardness is collusion between business interests in the United States on the one hand and members of the discredited oligarchy on the other. Therefore, when the Communists raise the cry of "Yankee imperialism," their words find a receptive audience, even among many who consider themselves to be strongly anti-Communist.

The positive program of the Communists exerts comparatively little appeal, not only because Latin Americans do not take readily to totalitarianism and because Latin Americans have witnessed the bloody oppressions in Hungary and elsewhere, but also because there are alternative ideologies and programs that appear to direct themselves more specifically to Latin American realities and needs.

In some respects, the most important of these ideologies is democratic socialism as derived from the Mexican Revolution. The Mexican Revolution, which began in 1910, and is regarded by spokesmen for the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party as still going on, was the first true social and economic revolution in Latin American history. At the outset, ideological content was conspicuously absent from that revolution. Its initial slogan was "effective suffrage, no reelection," and even today it lacks the support of a coherent political theory. Nationalism, however, has characterized it from the beginning. The objective throughout has been to build a Mexican nation in which all who live in Mexico would effectively participate.

In the Mexican context, this has meant mass literacy programs, the raising of living standards, and a deliberate effort to incorporate the Indians through agrarian reform. It has also meant emphasis upon the establishment of political democracy, the achievement of industrialization, the end of economic domination from abroad, and the encouragement of the rights of organized labor. These goals have not been fully achieved, but they continue to serve as operative ideals in Mexico. To the extent that an experiment as pragmatic as the Mexican Revolution can be labeled, it must be called democratic socialist in content.

Although the Mexicans themselves insist that their revolution is *sui generis* and is not for export, it has provided inspiration and to some extent a model for a number of other movements in Latin America. These are the "Aprista" parties, so called after the Peruvian APRA (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) which became an important force in Peruvian politics in the early thirties and is today Peru's strongest political party. Usually included among the "Aprista" parties are Venezuela's *Acción Democrática*, Costa Rica's *Liberación Nacional*, Cuba's old *Partido Revolucionario Cubano* (the *Auténticos*), and Paraguay's *Febreristas*. Also included is Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party.

Parties in the "Aprista" group differ from the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary party in being much more ideological, the ideological content being stressed deliberately by "Aprista" party leaders in order to break away from the prevailing Latin American pattern of personalism in politics. The ideologies themselves owe much to Karl Marx, although "Apristas" have not hesitated to reinterpret Marx to fit what they take to be the special features and requirements of Latin America. Today they are all strongly anti-Communist, and where they have been permitted to operate freely they have deprived the Communist Party of much potential popular support.

The "Aprista" parties have been proved able to attract the allegiance of majorities in all sectors of their societies up through the middle reaches of the middle class. They encounter the strong opposition of the large landowners, the traditional capitalists, and the members of the higher ranks of the ecclesiastical and military hier-

archies. As a consequence, most of them have been outlawed during much of the time since their founding.

Little needs to be said of the third highly ideological democratic socialist movement in Latin America today, the National Revolutionary movement in Bolivia, except that the alternatives to it under present conditions are probably either communism or anarchy. The *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* in effect has preempted the Communist program for the country by its redistribution of land and its nationalization of the mines. What it has not done, that the Communists certainly would have attempted to do, is make Bolivia a vassal of the U.S.S.R.

The line between democratic socialism and welfare liberalism cannot be drawn with any precision, least of all in the Latin American context. What is involved in the distinction appears to be more a subtle question of political orientation than one of specific programmatic content. Welfare liberalism in Latin America lacks the elaborate ideological foundation that is characteristic of democratic socialist movements, and it also lacks the urgent sense of mission. Its goals in office, however, are very similar to those of the democratic socialists: the achievement of social welfare on an industrial base through state intervention and the establishment of mixed economy.

Welfare liberalism has been the dominant political philosophy in Uruguay for 40 years, in Chile since the midthirties. The left wing of the well-established Colombian Liberal Party is in this tradition as are the Intransigent Radicals—now in power in Argentina. Welfare liberal parties, it will be observed, are active in what are generally considered to be the more advanced and stable Latin American countries with fairly long traditions of orderly political change and economic development; whereas most of the "Arista" parties have arisen in more volatile political environments. Both kinds of parties, however, make their appeals to the same groups within their populations, and both encounter opposition from much the same sources.

In economic matters, both the welfare liberals and the democratic socialists are strongly nationalistic and "anti-imperialist." This means that they are committed to the building of "balanced" economies—which in Latin America means industrialization—and are concerned that ultimate control over domestic resources remain in national hands and that a "just" return from the exploitation of such resources be received by the state in which the resources are located.

Catholic Action groups, deriving ideological support from the Encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno* of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, are now working in all Latin American countries, particularly among the urban proletariat. In a few states, notably Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, there are Catholic Action parties, the first three of which are rather like the Christian Socialist parties of Western Europe. These groups, however, have comparatively slight influence despite the fact that well over 90 percent of the people in Latin America are nominally Catholics. Unfortunately from the viewpoint of the church, the Catholic hierarchy is too closely identified in the public mind with the traditional era that is now passing and, except in a handful of countries like Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, the church as an agency in secular affairs is widely distrusted and discredited.

A word should be said about Christian corporativism, an ideological position that has almost no mass support but that enjoys considerable vogue among members of the traditional oligarchy, the old landowning families and the high clergy. Spokesmen for this position would like to halt the transition in Latin America from established status societies to modern contract societies. The latter they profess to see as being too individualistic and materialistic. They would assign to the church a much more important role in secular affairs than it enjoys today and would restore to it many of its lost privileges and responsibilities. Regarding Spain as the spiritual mother of Hispanic America, they would reestablish close ties with that country. They would try to block further "cultural" imperialism from the United States and to prevent further "corruption" of Latin American youth by North American customs, attitudes and modes of thought. The society they envisage would be organic, fundamentally static and paternalistically authoritarian.

During the thirties and forties, fascism was a movement with a considerable following in much of Latin America. Fascist groups like the *Integralistas* in Brazil, the *Sinarquistas* in Mexico, and the *Nacistas* in Chile were to be taken seriously. Peron's administration in Argentina, which was not terminated until 1955, had many fascist characteristics, as did that of the ill-fated Villarroel in Bolivia. At this time, however, no overtly Fascist or neo-Fascist regime is established anywhere in the region, and groups espousing Fascist doctrine are declining in power and importance.

Fascism has affinities with the Christian corporativist position sketched above, but it differs from that position in three critical respects. First, it asserts the supremacy of the state over the church, the state itself being endowed with quasi-divine attributes. Second, it is dynamic, geared to change and inducive of change. Third, it makes its appeal to the masses as corporativism cannot do, promising them a new life, better conditions and the opportunity to participate in an avowedly exalted mission of national aggrandizement. In the Latin American context, with the regions' notorious addiction to *personalismo* in politics, the notion of the Fascist leader, *el jefe supremo*, is not necessarily repellent. Indeed, that has been the appellation of most successful *caudillos* in the area.

Fascism has foundered in Latin America, however, because of three factors: the fierce pride in self and the sense of individual dignity that are to be found in even the humblest of Latin America's citizens; the apparent inability of Fascist leaders to structure compelling myths for the societies they would dominate; and the lack of adequate instruments of administration and control. Latin Americans are not receptive to the idea of *Gleichschaltung*; and Latin American societies are too poorly coordinated to permit the kind of extensive and intensive government supervision that fascism requires. It is conceivable that at some later period these conditions will have changed. But they pose insurmountable obstacles to doctrinaire fascists today.

The Peronist experience is revealing. Its synthetic philosophy, *Justicialismo*, a peculiar amalgam of Thomistic, syndicalist, and liberal democratic thought, was never taken seriously even inside Argentina; and efforts to spread that philosophy outside Argentina were utter failures. (It is noteworthy that other dictators who took

many pages from Peron's book—Odria of Peru, Rojas Pinilla of Colombia and Perez Jimenez of Venezuela—did not try to borrow Peron's spurious philosophy.) The social and economic program advanced by Peron did, of course, gain widespread popular approval, for that program called for a redistribution of Argentine wealth, a realignment of Argentine classes, the development of Argentine industry and the acquiring for Argentina of a place in the international scene. But the program's appeal was successful not because of its totalitarian overtones nor because of the ideology which was later constructed to support it, but rather because Argentina's traditional parties had failed in their programs to take account of Argentina's changing social and economic requirements.

To sum up, there is little doubt that the democratic left, in either its welfare liberal or its democratic socialist form, exerts the greatest ideological appeal among the incorporated citizens of Latin America today. This ought not to be taken to mean that the forces of the democratic left will automatically emerge triumphant everywhere in the region. The Guatemalan episode reveals that such forces may be subverted by the Communists; and elsewhere in the region elements representative of the traditional oligarchy are still in a position to block the exercise of power by the democratic left.

In a sparse handful of countries, dictators not far removed from the traditional *caudillo* type still exercise essentially untrammelled authority and govern their states as feudal fiefs. Their position, however, is becoming increasingly precarious, and the traditional military *caudillo* is losing his importance on the Latin American scene. From this fact, however, it does not follow that parts of the region will not in the future be governed by dictators of a different nature. Latin America shares many of the characteristics of the newly emerging nation states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The kinds of considerations that promote the seizure of power by dictators in those areas are operative in our own hemisphere. Fidel Castro of Cuba, for instance, may legitimately be called a dictator. As a dictator he has much more in common with President Nasser of Egypt than he has with his immediate Cuban predecessor, Fulgencio Batista. There is much evidence to support the view that he has the uncritical support, even adulation, of the great majority of the Cuban people and that he thinks of himself as the leader—and to some extent the vessel—of a profound social and economic revolution.

What we shall probably see in a number of states is a political situation rather like that of Mexico and Bolivia: a very big and very powerful government party directing its ideological and programmatic appeals to the newly politically active masses and deriving its electoral support from them, and an array of strongly ideological parties occupying points on the political spectrum from the extreme right to the extreme left, parties which cannot realistically anticipate acquiring control of the state apparatus through legitimate means. Peru, Venezuela, and Costa Rica are other countries in which this pattern is being approached; elsewhere it will be approached as conditions become propitious. In Mexico, this pattern has brought relative political stability for more than a quarter century, and it may well do the same in Bolivia under conditions which are much more difficult. It is a pattern, therefore, not to be condemned out of hand simply

because it fails to conform to patterns common in North America and Western Europe. If not "democratic" in the North American sense, one-party government of this kind is considerably more democratic than the type of government with which the masses in most Latin American countries have been acquainted in the past.

There are, of course, some countries in which political practice corresponds quite closely to that in Europe and the United States. A multiparty system functions in Chile, and presumably will continue to do so. It is not unrealistic to suppose that a viable two-party system will arise in Argentina and Colombia, if those two societies can peacefully surmount their present social and economic crises. Even in these cases, however, it will almost certainly be found that the political consensus will lie considerably to the left of the corresponding consensus in the United States.

The foregoing discussion of India, the Arab States, and Latin America points to the general conclusion that in the underdeveloped areas experiencing intense ideological conflicts, an ideological acceptance of some measure of socialism is taking place, and that socialism as an ideal is widely accepted even when considerably watered down in practice. This shift is not necessarily equivalent to an acceptance of communism. In fact, in some respects communism has been losing ground, particularly in Asia. It is, however, evident that by and large the so-called free-enterprise, liberal, capitalist society associated in many parts of the globe with America does not have many adherents. The prevailing outlook also involves an overwhelming desire for rapid economic development, as well as an extremely sensitive nationalist consciousness. Related to this essentially domestic perspective is a less definable, but nonetheless widespread, feeling that in the final analysis the present conflict in the world is not between freedom on the one hand and Communist oppression on the other, but between two rather sharply different systems of socioeconomic organization. In such a conception of the present conflict, America tends to be placed on the right, as the defender of the status quo, and the U.S.S.R. on the extreme left, as a revolutionary power striving to undermine that status quo.

However, at the same time, there is a mounting strain in the relationship between communism and nationalism. This strain is an old one. It is rooted in the effort of communism to employ nationalism as a tool for the destruction of the old order and for the construction of a new, supranational Communist system. It is this international aspiration of communism which brings it into an inevitable collision with nationalism. This clash is further intensified by the fact that communism as an international doctrine has become linked with the interests of a particular nation-state. Communists are thus finding that the nationalistic sentiments are increasingly turned against them. In time, it becomes evident that the congruence between communism and nationalism was merely tactical.

The collision between nationalism and communism also occurs because of the very nature of these two movements. Much of the intellectual content of nationalism is derived from democratic 19th-century European thought, even though this tradition is often abused in practice. Nationalism as a movement and as a doctrine is much more pluralistic and "open-ended" than communism. Much more is

left unsaid, much more is left to the interplay between men, their times and their context, and not all issues are resolved on the basis of alleged doctrinal truths. In part romantic, in part humanistic, nationalism relies heavily on the heart, on the vague love for one's country, on the abstract idea of freedom. Even though sometimes degenerating into a doctrine of hate, nationalism remains essentially an instrument for the initial self-awakening of hitherto identity-less peoples.

C. THE NATURE OF NEUTRALISM

Since the nationalist movements, irrespective of their ideology, on the whole desire a radical improvement in material conditions, they inevitably reject the status quo, even though, imbued with Western democratic notions, they often abhor Communist totalitarian methods. Indeed, they readily concede that America, or the West in general, is governed through democratic institutions which guarantee individual freedom, and that the U.S.S.R. and China are not. Nonetheless, they conclude that, given the vested interest the Western societies are alleged to have in stability and given the fact that nationalist aspirations can be fulfilled most rapidly if social-economic change is consciously stimulated, an excessive identification with the West would be inimical to their objectives.

It is a much remarked and very important fact that most of the neutral nations of post-World War II international politics are new and weak nations. The mutually reinforcing experiences of colonial rule and the nationalists' struggle for independence continue to shape their outlook and actions. In the postindependence period, these experiences have been given expression by a search for dignity and identity. The new nations are not quite sure of who or what they are. In the pursuit of national consciousness and character, they are particularly sensitive to attitudes and policies which affect their independent status. As a result, the new nations tend to place the burden of proof concerning motives and objectives on their former colonial masters, who are associated with their lack of freedom in the recent past.

The "nonalignment" position in international politics, however, is more than a response to certain psychological dispositions based on past experience. It also has the very practical effect of maximizing the power of neutralist nations in world diplomacy and is thus a response to their weakness. Possessing neither military nor economic strength, the neutralists have developed the tactics of negotiation into an effective instrument of policy. The growth of world public opinion has had the effect of democratizing diplomacy. Neutralist nations have both contributed to and exploited this development. By playing such roles as arbiter, conciliator, and negotiator in a context of world opinion which is moving from a norm of partisan bipolarity toward a more fluid tripolarity, they have succeeded in maximizing the source of influence available to them in world politics. It is no mere coincident that India places great stress on the United Nations as the arena for the conduct of world politics, for it is in the United Nations that world public opinion is given formal recognition and some authority. The discrepancy between equality of voting strength within the United Nations General Assembly and the actual

power position of various nations no doubt creates serious problems by throwing the relationship between authority, power, and responsibility out of joint. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that such a situation maximizes the influence of the ex-colonial nations.

At the same time, given the growing Soviet and American preoccupation with the postcolonial, neutral nations, their position of neutrality can be materially advantageous. Neutrality in the cold war, together with relatively smaller military expenditures, is seen as promoting the economic development of these new nations, and frees them from the burdens of "alien conflicts." In that sense, there is some similarity to the predominant American isolationist attitude in the 19th century. Nonetheless, it is also true that in addition to certain motives derived from their own purposes and experience, many nationalists viewing the United States-U.S.S.R. conflict as pregnant with a potential worldwide tragedy see themselves as capable of performing an international service—namely, that of preserving the peace by active or positive noninvolvement.

The Indian attitude is a case in point. The Indians strenuously object to the term "neutralism" as a characterization of their foreign policy. This difference is not merely a semantic one; it involves very real disagreement concerning assumptions, perceptions and substantive issues. Unlike the 19th-century and early 20th-century American notion of neutrality, which was founded on a desire to avoid "foreign entanglement" and eventual war, India's neutrality stems from her assumptions that her policy helps to prevent war. India rejects the view that neutral isolationism is a viable means for dealing with international politics in the contemporary era. This difference concerning neutrality often confuses discussion of the issue.

Nonalignment, however, is not only an expression of the new nations' efforts to form an ideologically viable and effective foreign policy in the present complex of world politics to maximize their interests. Nor is it only a reflection of the desire to promote the maintenance of peace. It is also an expression of internal economic and political forces and circumstances. For instance, India's great dilemma is how to overcome the problem of economic backwardness while preserving democratic authority and processes. The Communist alternative remains clearly before her. It is an alternative which promises rapid economic growth and constitutes a living model of the conversion of a backward economy to one of the world's two great powers. India's economic development must be pursued with extremely limited resources. She faces severe shortages of trained personnel and overhead and investment capital. A foreign policy which requires a large allocation of scarce resources to military preparedness would seriously conflict with the requirements of economic development. India thus believes that her policy of nonalignment is a means by which she can participate effectively in international affairs, while not diverting scarce resources from what she views as the primary task of economic development.

A second internal factor that finds its expression in a nonalignment policy is the degree of urgency with which foreign policy issues affect political leadership and public opinion. There are few, if any, international developments which do not have important consequences for the United States. The nonallied countries, including so large a

nation as India, are in a quite different position. For India, relations with Pakistan, including the Kashmir issue, the problem of Goa, and relations with China, especially those concerning Tibet, overshadow all others in the public mind. To the Indonesians, it is the question of New Guinea; to Egypt, that of Israel; and so forth. It is issues such as these that are close to home, rather than the more global issues of the cold war, that are crucial to nationalist public opinion.

The nonalignment policy is also intimately related to the problem of maximizing internal political support and the more general problem of political stability. The nonalignment policy has been a force for unity in Indian politics. It has served to weaken the appeal of the Communist Party internally, and it has sustained the ruling Congress Party's shaky reputation for being a party of the left, a substantial asset in many parts of the globe. No party seriously challenged the Congress Party's foreign policy during the 1957 election campaign. It is unlikely that any policy departing from nonalignment could marshal similar internal support. Nonalignment thus increases the ruling party's strength in the country. Given the current strategy of Soviet international policy, nonalignment has weakened the Communist Party's capacity to oppose the Congress party on either foreign or domestic issues. The Soviet attempt to mobilize an anti-imperialist peace bloc has led it to define the Nehru government as "progressive" in domestic issues, and to view it as a potential supporter on specific international issues. The effect has been to force the Communist party in India into a "me, too" policy on foreign and domestic issues. Any shift in Indian policy toward a partisan commitment or alliance with the United States would break the foreign policy unanimity. Under the circumstances, the Communist Party presumably would not only take the offensive more vigorously, but would fall heir to the fairly numerous and crucially important body of urban and semieducated opinion which supports the Congress Party, but which is highly sensitive to the imperialism issue. Further, it would undermine the Congress claim to being a party of the left. Under present circumstances, not even the Communist Party in India disputes this, even while denouncing the vested interests in Congress. For this reason, a shift from the Congress Party's present policy of nonalignment toward a closer relationship with the West would jeopardize its capacity to continue to provide stable and effective government, which is clearly in America's interest.


There is also a philosophical dimension in India's policy of neutralism, which ought to be understood. It is quite clear that the present Indian Government assumes that conflict and violence are distinct possibilities in the present world scene, and it acts accordingly by maintaining substantial armed forces. It has used force to protect vital national interests, as in Kashmir and Hyderabad. But non-violence also plays an important role in Indian foreign policy by rationalizing and legitimizing a nonalignment policy. Nonviolence rationalizes it by supporting the belief that violent conflict may exacerbate rather than solve problems, and that negotiations and compromise, which are aimed at establishing mutual confidence, can produce a more enduring solution. It legitimizes the nonalignment policy by invoking the authority of Gandhi and, through him, aspects of India's religious and philosophical tradition. As recently as May

15, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru, answering a press conference query concerning India's reasons for not joining the military alliance in the face of the recent trouble in Tibet, mentioned that "if I agreed to that, it would mean the negation of all that I have made during my 40 years of association with Mahatma Gandhi." All of this is not to deny that contemporary India has been profoundly affected by Western values and thought, but it is to argue that the eclecticism and the synthesizing and accommodating turn of mind remains the dominant approach to philosophical and religious ideas, including the ideologies of modern politics.

As in the case of India, so in some of the other postcolonial states, excessive support of the Western position would be likely in the long run to benefit the Communists. For instance, in the present "anti-imperialist" and anti-Western climate in the Arab world, which is unlikely to change in the near future, open support by America and of America would have the opposite effect from the one desired. It may well be the "kiss of death," fatally compromising the side scheduled to benefit from this assistance. Although in the Middle East the Pan-Arabists undoubtedly want considerable, though discreet economic support, they need even more the freedom to attack the West in their propaganda. A considerable measure of tension in their relations with the West is highly desirable in order for them to appear as the staunchest champions of national interest in the competition with the Communists. In such a situation, full of contradictions, it is difficult to see what useful purpose would be served by closer American involvement. This in no way justifies the often cynical use by the postcolonial states of the sanctimonious label of nonalignment to blackmail the democratic states, but it does suggest that the underlying causes and purposes of neutralism are more complex than a mere desire to derive the maximum advantages from the cold war.

To sum up, basically the postcolonial nationalistic states see in neutralism: (1) the reflection of their desire to concentrate on domestic economic development, free of military burdens associated with the cold war; (2) a political necessity dictated by domestic public opinion; (3) an opportunity to maximize their international role and compensate for their actual economic and military weakness, thereby gaining the prestige they so lack and so much desire; (4) a reflection of their rejection of "imperialism" and of their unwillingness to embrace communism; (5) an opportunity to promote peace.

For these reasons, it is futile to hold up to India, Indonesia or Egypt the examples of Pakistan, Iran or Turkey. Turkey rejects neutralism, not just because it is devoted to the cause of freedom and abhors totalitarian communism, but also because its own particular circumstances are such that communism as represented by the Soviet Union constitutes a very direct threat. The Soviet Union has long entertained territorial claims against both Iran and Turkey, and Russia has been a traditional enemy of both these nations. Their close association with the United States and the Western camp is thus explainable both in terms of their history and their own immediate national interest. Without minimizing the political and the religious hostility of Pakistan to communism and to Soviet dictatorship, it must also be noted that Pakistan derives from its alliance with the United States



much-needed military and moral support in its continuing conflict with India. The unqualified support given by the Soviet Government to India on the Kashmir issue is a very relevant consideration in shaping Pakistan's attitude in world affairs. (It should be added, in this connection, that the heavy-handed Chinese Communist policy toward India might go far in altering the Indian conception of the present world conflict.) Popular nationalist issues are hence involved in the rejection of neutralism by some of these states.

We should, furthermore, differentiate between the post-colonial national states and the Latin American nations. Latin America's history, geography and political development make that region the natural, if occasionally uncomfortable, ally of the United States; and the fact that Latin America is not neutral in the cold war is of inestimable importance. But we will do well to bear in mind that many responsible Latin Americans are becoming increasingly aware of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and are conscious of Latin America's many affinities with those regions. This awareness has led occasionally in the past, and will lead more frequently in the future, to the adoption by Latin American Governments of positions that are at variance with those of the United States and its Western European allies. This fact ought not to be interpreted as an indication of neutralism in the cold war. This it is not. Unanimity is not and should not be the proof of having opted for freedom in the present conflict.

Insofar as those movements which are currently struggling for national independence are concerned, Americans might do well to remind themselves that to such movements the American position also appears to be one of neutrality. To a nationalist in Algeria or Africa, the most vital consideration is the attitude that the various states adopt toward his aspirations. American policy, in view of American ties with France and the United Kingdom, by necessity involves caution, even if there is widespread popular sympathy for the nationalist cause. This sympathy, however, cannot compensate for what appears to be tangible support for the colonial powers, and the most charitable interpretation of American policy that a nationalist leader might make is to call it neutralism. In view of this, however, and particularly considering the Soviet willingness to support such nationalist movements, their continued rejection of communism and their maintenance of neutralist positions is the most that America can expect.

D. THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONALISM

Internationalism is not a powerful ideology comparable to communism or nationalism. Indeed, it has never really been an ideology all by itself. It was part and parcel of most of the major ideologies of the nineteenth century, and took on as many facets as those ideologies themselves. Liberalism, putting its faith in the development of democracy and of industrialism, looked forward to a world of nation-states cooperating under law and brought together by the force of public opinion and world trade. Socialism stressed the solidarity of the workers as an international reality transcending national borders which would collapse along with the power of the bourgeoisie. Even nationalism, in its liberal varieties, had an internationalist component;

once every nation enjoyed the right to self-determination, there would be no more obstacle to the harmonious cooperation of states.

The liberal dream of a world of nation-states willing to pool their power against any aggressor instead of resorting to traditional balancing policies, ready to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to work together within a league of sovereign nations—this dream which inspired Wilson survives only as a hope for the future rather than as a faith in the present. Nevertheless, internationalism remains an important feature of contemporary world politics. It appears today in varied guises. First, it is a component of the global outlook of both the West and the Soviets. Second, Asia, Africa, and Western Europe have seen the development of creeds and interests which are not exactly internationalist, if one equates internationalism and universalism, but which are certainly transnational. Third, the growth of universal and regional organizations represents the most impressive aspect of internationalism in the postwar world. These organizations have been created more for realistic than for ideological reasons. On the one hand, the dour consequences of traditional politics played by sovereign states have led statesmen, after each world war, to build institutions which would try to curb some of the freedom of action of the states and to submit the behavior of their members to certain common rules, so as to make resort to violence less frequent and less tempting. On the other hand, states have realized that in order to achieve even the most selfish of their objectives—the preservation of security against outside aggression, an increase in domestic welfare, the destruction of imperialistic controls—they needed the support of other states; in this respect, both the technological revolution and the political revolution, which have made the cold war and the nationalist upheaval the key problems of our time, have contributed to a growing awareness of transnational solidarity. To sum up, internationalism today is a corrective, not a substitute, for nation-states; it is essentially a remedy against the dangers to which the world order is exposed when the states are left to their own devices, as well as a cure for the deficiencies which states experience when they remain isolated.

The importance of transnational ideas and institutions is not due only to the reasons for their emergence, which have just been mentioned. These forces are important also because of their present and potential contributions to the cause of the West and to the cause of world order.

On the one hand, the two major developments of the postwar world, bipolarity and the end of colonialism, tend to make the consolidation and extension of international procedures and services essential from the point of view of the West. The nationalist revolution has created units whose viability is questionable. International bodies capable of curbing the excesses of nationalism and of giving assistance to the new nations are therefore highly useful. Communist tactics have concentrated in recent years on exploiting precisely the grievances and the domestic tensions of the new states as well as those of the Western allies of the United States; consequently the need to prevent these nations from remaining in a state of isolation which the Soviets could exploit has contributed to the importance of transnational bonds.

On the other hand, the international and regional forces of today perform essential services from the point of view of world order as well. In the first place, they try to restore some measure of predictability in those sectors of international life in which a sense of community already exists. They try to provide for procedures mitigating the dangers of present power conflicts and for services in various technical areas which would otherwise become stakes in these conflicts. In the second place, even though the number of independent states has increased and will probably continue to do so, international ideas and organizations have contributed to the transformation of the content of state sovereignty. State sovereignty today does not mean what it meant a century ago. Then it meant a promise of security against external attack; today the technological revolution has made every state permeable to aggression. Furthermore, and paradoxically, with the extension of the functions of government in almost every country and in particular the taking over of responsibility for economic development and welfare by the government, the dependence of each state on outside assistance has increased along with the dependence of each citizen on his government. Hence a gradual erosion of sovereignty, a gradual "devaluation of borders" is taking place just as new bonds of loyalty have been forged both by mounting socialization and by ideological nationalism. The nation-state remains for most people the highest object of loyalty but it has ceased to be the exclusive source of protection and services. It is more and more subordinated to common standards and caught in international procedures. This analysis applies to the major powers as much as to the small ones.

In order to assess with more accuracy the extent to which this relative transformation of the nation-state has already taken place, we should examine briefly three kinds of transnational forces: the United Nations system, the various regional organizations, and unorganized or private transnational forces.

The limitations of the United Nations need hardly be stressed. The three main objectives of the United Nations can be said to be the preservation of peace, the promotion of peaceful change, and international cooperation for the development of the nations' economies and social systems. As for peace, all the members of the United Nations have tacitly agreed to divest the organization of primary responsibility for international security. The cold war has made it almost impossible, with the exception of the Korean war, for the United Nations to affect the Communist bloc in any of the East-West issues brought before the organization. The nationalist revolution has produced a number of disputes which involve not merely, as in the past, minor border problems, but the life and death of nations. Consequently change, when the United Nations has promoted or legitimized it, has rarely been peaceful. Often the United Nations has not been able to do more than ratify a situation created without its consent or against its will, or, as in the Middle East, preserve a status quo which is likely to prove explosive. Finally, the funds made available to the United Nations for technical assistance and economic development have been too small to allow for spectacular successes, and in many of the technical fields the opposition between more and less advanced states has prevented the abolition of protectionist practices or agreements on international commodity arrangements.

But there are impressive entries on the credit side. The United Nations has shown a remarkable capacity to survive in and adjust to a world radically different from the one its founders had in mind. The assumptions behind the charter were, first, the continuing cooperation of the major powers; second, the idea that most of the future disputes could be accommodated by classical diplomatic techniques and would, as in the past, not affect the domestic jurisdiction of states; third, a return to normalcy in the international economy after a brief transition period, so that multilateral trade and financial development through private capital would again be the norm. All these assumptions have proved wrong. Nevertheless, the United Nations has functioned in the world as it is: the transfer of authority from the Security Council to the Assembly has shown a determination to operate despite clashes among the big powers and to tackle revolutionary situations. The evolution of the World Bank's loan policies and the launching of a United Nations technical assistance program have shown a determination to shift from the restoration of "normalcy" to the new problems of development. In its various activities, the United Nations has been able to play three important roles.

In the first place, all states can be said to have one identical aim: the avoidance of total war. This common fear has allowed the United Nations to maintain a frail but lasting link between East and West and to intervene to limit conflicts started by lesser powers which might otherwise degenerate into a nuclear holocaust: hence the development of various techniques of truce-making and truce-keeping.

In the second place, United Nations activities in the realm of decolonization in general and trusteeship in particular have not been just sound and fury. At times it has been possible to accommodate both the rising nationalisms and the colonial powers. The latter have learned that it is unprofitable to ignore the United Nations, and the former have become aware of the fact that resort to violence does not always serve their interests. But it is in the functional sphere that the convergence of state interests on the United Nations has been most interesting. Certainly the hopes of those who thought that functional agencies would gradually fill all the areas previously occupied by power politics have been dashed; indeed, the extension of government activities to many functional areas previously left unregulated has even caused such agencies to become highly important stakes in the game of politics. But politization here has not at all had the same crippling effects as in security matters or in the settlement of disputes. The underdeveloped countries have turned to the United Nations agencies in the expectation of substantial benefits, and the major industrial powers have not been able to do more than soften the pressure or delay the process. Furthermore, each of the major competitors in the cold war has been afraid to leave the field wide open to his rival by staying too much aloof. The Soviets, originally hostile to United Nations technical assistance and international development plans, reversed their stand when they saw how popular such plans were, and they joined numerous specialized agencies they had snubbed before. Far from subverting these bodies, the Soviets have been obliged to tone down their propaganda efforts, to settle down to serious business and thus to contribute to the creation of a world order of more viable and cooperating states—a prospect which can hardly satisfy the Commu-

nists. (Indeed, the flaws of some of their contributions to these programs have been exposed to all.) Thus, whenever there has been a reciprocity of interests rather than total opposition (such as it exists in most cold war issues or in the field of human rights), United Nations successes have been possible.

In the third place, the United Nations, through its debates and the varied arsenal of diplomatic practices which has developed, has contributed to the psychological unification of the world. For the first time, all states, simply because they participate in the United Nations, have had to take a stand on issues not all of which immediately affected their interests; in such cases, alignments are likely to be based on transnational solidarities rather than on narrow calculations of self-interest. Thus a leveling of concern and a sort of political mobilization of the statesmen have taken place. Consequently, it has become possible in various areas (mostly nonpolitical, to be sure) to elaborate certain international standards of behavior, and it has become difficult for most states to define their national interest without taking into account international objectives and principles. In this connection, the role of the Secretariat has been crucial: the Secretary-General has behaved increasingly as an independent diplomatic agent acting on behalf of a community which is more than the sum of its members' interests. The Secretariat's services in the United Nations and in the specialized agencies have laid the groundwork for cooperation and development in many economic and technical areas.

When we turn to regional organizations, we find a bewildering variety of bodies. Some are the outgrowth of historical solidarities: for instance the Commonwealth of Nations and the new French Community are attempts at preventing the total disintegration of past empires. Some are the expression of regional solidarities in what has been called the international civil war: either organizations created by a major power in order to get its interests shared by a number of allies (OAS, NATO, SEATO), or, on the contrary, organizations founded by smaller powers in order to forge a common shield against the cold war or a common sword against colonial powers (Arab League). Some are functional arrangements comparable to those of the United Nations system, such as the array of Western European economic organizations.

These agencies have tended to reinforce the interdependence of their members in three ways. First, through the peaceful adjustment of disputes among them. In this respect the OAS has played a useful role; but when the organization has been both too heterogeneous and without a powerful and disinterested state capable of playing the role of a balancer in its midst, there have been failures as conspicuous as the United Nations: the Arab League has had more than its share. Second, such organizations have promoted the cooperation of their members in areas of converging expectations. Sometimes, they have cooperated for the accomplishment of political objectives: for instance the definition of a NATO policy on the German problem or Berlin, or Arab policy against Israel; but whenever the members' interests have diverged too sharply, political cooperation has failed, as the fiasco of the European Defense Community has shown. Economic cooperation has been more successful, both among West-

ern Powers (OEEC) and between industrial and underdeveloped nations (Colombo Plan). Third, nonuniversal organizations have been able, in contrast with the United Nations, to go beyond the mere cooperation of nation-states, and to achieve actual "integration," i.e., the pooling of resources under a joint control—something which runs against the traditional practice and theory of sovereignty. Thus the integrated command of NATO, its agreements on bases and on the stationing of forces on foreign soil, detract from traditionally exclusive territorial sovereignty. The European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market, with their supranational administrative commissions, similarly entangle the sovereignty of their six members in a net of commitments and procedures which should prove hard to break.

All these organizations appear like new actors on the scene of world politics. They affect existing trends and create new ones. Because of their impact as well as their multiplicity they sometimes increase tensions: there are conflicts between them and rival appeals to key states to join opposing groups. The present clash between the "Little Six" and the "Seven" in Europe is a case in point. Such tensions can be beneficial when they produce a competition for the development of trade, or when, as in the case of NATO, the controversial organization is one which fills a power vacuum which communism might otherwise have occupied. These tensions are much more dangerous when neither domestic strength nor local military resources are present to underpin alliances such as SEATO and especially the formerly so-called Baghdad Pact, which heightened conflicts among Middle Eastern states without any appreciable benefit for the West. Often, however, such organizations have contributed to the elimination of age-old tensions, such as the Franco-German antagonism, or tended to prevent new ones from becoming explosive (for instance, conflicts between members of the Commonwealth and threatening ones between France and its colonies in Africa). Also they have often put restraints on the freedom of action of major powers (Germany in the case of European agencies, the United States in NATO), thus stressing interdependence again.

But the general impact of these organizations on world affairs and on the autonomy of their members has been held down by two circumstances. First, the scope of many of these agencies is narrow; they either have a single function or else they deal with a limited sector of policy. Such "slicing" of problems is necessarily somewhat artificial and slows down efforts at cooperation or integration. Second, a state participating simultaneously in numerous organizations, in order to reconcile its various commitments, tries to preserve within each as much freedom of action as possible. There is no organization without its built-in brakes.

As for transnational political forces such as ideologies (liberalism, socialism, anticolonial solidarities, exemplified by many conferences since 1955), or the hundreds of nongovernmental interest groups, many of which have access to the United Nations, their impact on world affairs is highly ambiguous. In one way, they do contribute to psychological unification and political mobilization as much as the United Nations. In this respect they both transcend national borders and point toward the actual political unification of certain areas.

The "European idea" has been quite successful in creating appropriate institutions to that effect—something which present pan-African movements and meetings at Bandung, Cairo, or Accra have so far failed to do.

However, such forces often tend to play a disruptive role in world affairs. Contemporary socialism and liberalism have lost much of their internationalist flavor: national preoccupations and differences have taken precedence over transnational aspirations and links. Solidarities such as anticolonialism are more negative than constructive and almost exclusively devoted to the short-term goal of getting the colonialists out; the failure of regional organization in Asia and the vagueness of present attempts in Africa make one fear that once the "outsider" has been expelled such a purely "fighting" solidarity might have run its course. Furthermore, such forces risk being manipulated by certain specific powers—including of course the Soviet Union—in the interest of such powers alone. Too often they appear as the transnational weapon of a certain state or as the non-governmental extension of a government's policy.

If we try to summarize these partial conclusions in a general balance sheet, we must ask to what extent traditional state sovereignty has been undermined by all these efforts. Again the answer is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because the forces which work for interdependence are both promising and fragile. In a world in which the clash of the two superpowers and the nationalist revolution affect every nation, and in which all nations participate in various kinds of international bodies, international affairs tend to dominate the politics of nations and to push the purely domestic issues into the background; therefore "one world" begins, in a way, to emerge. But nations continue to react to international affairs in terms of their past domestic experience, of their frustrations which diverse traditions and different geographical locations perpetuate. Thus the world appears to be unified in its concerns, but not in its responses.

Ambiguity appears again if one tries to foresee the direction in which international forces will lead such a world. It is difficult to predict whether it is the unifying process which will win out, or whether the divisive reactions will prove to be stronger, because international channels and procedures are, in and of themselves, quite neutral. They can be made to serve the interests of all people, but they can also be made to increase the power of such and such a state at the expense of another. These procedures are available to states; whether the machinery will be used for purely selfish purposes or for purposes which reconcile the legitimate self-interests of states and those of mankind in general depends entirely on the spirit with which the machinery is infused. It can be made to prepare the days in which international or super-national agencies will be more significant than nationalism, just as it can be used to foster the spread of nationalism at its most destructive. It is most important for the West to understand that progress toward further integration or an acceleration of the process of erosion of state sovereignty requires deliberate policy efforts.

On the basis of our postwar experience, such progress seems to be least difficult to achieve when the nations involved are what one could call mature nations: i.e., countries which have existed as nations for quite a while, both in the sense of having been independent long

enough to appreciate the blessings and the pitfalls of independence, and in the sense of having gone through the domestic social processes which tend to make of all the groups in society active participants in the national community. In this light, the development of Western European unity is both encouraging and discouraging. It is encouraging since it shows that nationalism can be curbed and harnessed for common transnational purposes. It is discouraging since it has grown on the ruins accumulated by a long history of wars between sovereign neighbors. It is also discouraging because it suffers setbacks, as often as severe internal crises within some of the participants put such a strain on the domestic community that the transnational links are endangered by new bursts of a nationalism born of these internal frustrations and developed in order to transcend or gloss over severe internal division. The maximum growth of transnational bonds seems to presuppose "settled" nations—nations which are both unfrightened and slightly disillusioned. If the preceding analysis is correct, then it becomes very important that new nations should achieve their independence without excessive violence, and be able to proceed to the "social mobilization" of their inhabitants without too much delay and too many crises.

Even when optimum conditions exist, progress in the establishment of transnational bonds finds its limits in the two following phenomena: In the first place, behind the politically mobilized statesmen there is only a small amount of domestic enthusiasm for actual international or regional organization. The public at large and the elites are usually indifferent, and their support is shallow. The example of the "Little Six" in Europe shows that only where leading groups are both alerted and divided can integration movements exploit such fragmentation in the interest of unity: division here is more fruitful than unanimous but lukewarm sympathy, but the latter remains the rule. Second, the core of sovereignty today is in the sense of identity which the citizens enjoy in the nation. Whenever this core seems threatened by an external organization, one can expect a short-circuit in the international powerline. This can happen not only when the very existence, or the regime, of a nation seems imperiled, but also when certain values which are fundamental to the image which the citizens have of their nation appear challenged. India's reactions over Kashmir, France's emotions over EDC or Algeria, Israel's distrust of many United Nations activities, are only a few examples.

Within these limits, there are many possibilities open to the forces at work for interdependence, as the preceding analysis has attempted to suggest. As to how the gradual consolidation of these forces would affect the main ideologies analyzed in this report, it is almost impossible to give a clearcut forecast. But it would be surprising if at least a limited amount of ideological erosion did not result from the channeling of ideologies through international mechanisms, provided that the latter were devoted to substantial diplomatic or functional activities, rather than serving as mere shoptalks. Indeed, such harnessing of ideological power for concrete transnational tasks may well be one of the best hopes for the gradual predominance of pragmatic considerations over purely ideological ones.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The primary purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the international situation by clarifying its ideological aspect. The preceding discussion has shown that in crucial areas ideology is an important and pervasive force, which significantly affects the purposes of many states and, in some cases, their power as well.

In seeking to assess the implications of this analysis for U.S. foreign policy, it is essential to keep several points in mind.

As was stressed in part 1, the present struggle cannot be properly understood in terms of a single factor such as ideology. Obviously, any appraisal of the situation for the purpose of choosing national objectives and selecting suitable means for pursuing them must take full account of other major elements as well. Moreover, in focusing on ideology, one must be on guard against putting too much weight on "political warfare" or verbal means in the conduct of foreign relations. It would be a grave error to conclude, as some do, that because ideology is important in foreign affairs, words can be a substitute for action based on power and resources in influencing events. The proper conclusion is quite different. It is that the ideological aspects of the situation should be taken fully into account in shaping the objectives, actions, and the manner of carrying them out in order to assure that they will in fact produce the desired results.

From this viewpoint, it is apparent that the ideological element is relevant to the entire range of our foreign policy. Consequently, any effort to treat the full implications of this factor would carry us far beyond the scope feasible or appropriate for this study. All that can be done is to suggest how the ideological component bears on the approach or emphasis on certain key issues.

A. THE DYNAMICS OF "COEXISTENCE"

One fact about the decades ahead is certain: the international order will be profoundly altered by the forces of change.

In the less-developed nations, the quest for a better life is bound to transform radically their political, economic, and social structures, amid turmoil and disruption. These countries will doubtless try to pursue both strands of their nationalism: independence and progress. For these purposes the new nations will require effective governments capable of maintaining order and carrying out radical programs of reform. Few of them now have governments adequate to fulfill these tasks. Most of them lack the prerequisites for stable democracy: literacy, a sense of tolerance, minimum political consensus, as well as political and economic stability. It should not be surprising, therefore, that in many of these states democratic governments have faltered and given place to more authoritarian regimes, often under mili-

tary control. But any regime will have to telescope drastically the time period for economic growth while carrying out social tasks which would severely strain institutions far more strongly based than theirs can possibly be. Prolonged chaos or frustration could create strains ultimately leading to Communist domination and loss of independence.

At the same time, the Communist bloc seems likely to undergo severe internal pressures of its own. Over an extended period, the essence of Communist society might be profoundly modified by the fading of the dogmatic revolutionary ideology, even though some of its forms are retained. Given time and evolution, doctrinally rooted hostility might decline, if it became clearer to the Soviets that our system was not giving way to theirs but that both are subject to continuous change. This recognition might come earlier in some Communist societies than in others, and, together with the already existing stresses between the constituent units of the bloc, would subject the camp to mounting internal frictions and cause the gradual sapping of its unity. Continuing tension between the unfulfilled national aspirations of the several Communist-ruled states and the requisites of the Communist doctrine is a major source of weakness in the Communist world. East Central Europe, and particularly Poland and Hungary, has not become resigned to continued Soviet domination.

In both these arenas, the forces of change will take an extended time to work themselves out. The result is unpredictable. The two movements will interact on each other. And the outcome will depend not only on their inner dynamism but to a great extent on the actions of the advanced democratic states and especially the United States, as well as the Soviet Union.

The Communists also see our epoch as one of change but in different terms. For them the non-Communist world is the area of change and conflict, whereas the Communist orbit is not subject to change in the same sense. They have conceived that what happens in the less-developed nations may well be decisive, and they appear confident that the situation can be caused to evolve in their favor.

Apparently they recognize, however, that the outcome may well turn on the actions of the non-Communist world, especially in relation to the newer nations. Much of their present effort is directed to lull the non-Communist world into failing to take the necessary actions. That is a crucial aspect of the campaign for "coexistence." For them this is merely a transitional stage on the road to their conception of a Communist world. They are satisfied that the past actions of the advanced countries for their security and for assisting the less-developed nations were largely prompted by a sense of fear and exposure to Soviet expansion. They expect the non-Communist world to accept "coexistence" as reflecting essentially a Soviet desire for stabilizing the status quo and accordingly to be led to relax their efforts and cooperation. The Soviet leaders themselves, however, have repeatedly described this as a period during which the inevitable spread of communism goes forward without violence, if the non-Communist states do not resist. To this end, they are committed to a vigorous offensive, using economic, political, and propaganda means.

This situation poses a new and basic challenge to the free nations. Unless they grasp the real meaning of coexistence many of these nations and their peoples, by acting on the basis of illusion, will un-

wittingly further the Communist hopes. To avoid this danger, it will be essential to understand—

(a) That the basic conflict is between human freedom and welfare on the one hand, and totalitarianism on the other. The Communists seek to depict the situation as competition between socialism (typified by the U.S.S.R.) and exploitative capitalism not much changed since the 19th century (typified by the United States). This view, derived in part from their ideology, aims to alienate the newer nations from the West, and especially the United States. It is designed to divert attention from their disregard of respect for man, rule of law, individual and group freedom and welfare.

(b) That also at issue are two rival conceptions of world order—one based on pluralism and diversity and the other based on dogmatic totalitarianism. International pluralism envisages a world in which a variety of societies based on consent live together in peace and mutual toleration. Dogmatic totalitarianism envisages a world in which all societies are basically alike, and uniformity replaces diversity.

(c) That in the minds of many, the United States appears as satisfied, comfortable, interested primarily in the status quo. Other advanced states are remembered as colonial and imperialist. The result is often to identify the West with entrenched domestic interests opposing necessary social change which impinges on traditional or oligarchic privileges. Correcting this view involves actions in many diverse fields, both domestic and foreign, to show support for constructive change.

But the necessary response can no longer be generated by negative attitudes of fear alone, if the Communists adhere to the main lines of their present policy. To assure a favorable outcome the free nations will have to engage in programs extending over many years and requiring sacrifices and dedication.

The advanced nations will have to continue to cooperate intimately among themselves and to develop new bases for assisting and working with the less-developed nations. The requisite range of actions will be broad: maintaining dynamic societies in the advanced countries, assuring the flow of adequate capital to the less-developed states, keeping pace in the scientific and technical fields, keeping adequate military strength.

B. NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT

The consolidation of the new nations and the success or failure of their continued efforts to maintain their independence may well be decisive in determining the outcome of the current struggle. The strength of their nationalism and of the urge for better living conditions makes relations with these nations difficult to handle. Among the thorny issues arising from, or involving, ideological aspects are the attitude toward nonalignment, the nature of their political institutions and their economic policy.

(a) U.S. policy should start from the fact that its primary interest toward the underdeveloped countries is in their continued independence. Our aim should be to cooperate with each nation for this purpose on as wide a front as is acceptable to it. In the past too much weight has sometimes been given to having such nations formally commit themselves to the West as allies or in other ways. Experience

with countries such as Iraq and elsewhere indicates that this is not necessarily the wisest course. Such commitments may impose on such governments greater strains than they are capable of carrying in view of popular attitudes. In addition, for many of these nations military alliances run the risk of diverting too much of their limited resources away from the economic development which may well be more important in the long range than accretion in their military power. This does not mean, of course, that existing military pacts should be scrapped or that none should be made in the future. In some cases there may be sufficient strategic gains to justify the political and economic risks but the benefits and costs should be carefully weighed. It should not be taken for granted that an alliance is necessarily a real addition to strength; a nation should not ordinarily be urged to enter one against the better judgment of its leaders.

The corollary of the foregoing is, however, that our policy should not discriminate against states which choose to remain uncommitted. With them we should actively cooperate on economic and political planes in ways bolstering their independence. Those who choose to become allies should benefit mainly in terms of greater confidence in their military security.

(b) In our relations with these nations it is important to approach their problems with a sense of history. It is well to remember that many advanced nations had a long period for developing democratic institutions and habits in step with social and economic change. In time one may hope that literacy, technology, and rising conditions of life will improve prospects for democratic systems. In the meantime it will be essential to display patience and tolerance for developments which do not follow the Western democratic model. In some of the nations the military is the only trained and disciplined organization capable of effective administration. Its officers, having fought for independence, may have esprit de corps and a sense of obligation valuable for a transition period until foundations can be laid for more democratic regimes. Such military regimes should be distinguished from traditional oligarchic dictatorships which rested on military support to prevent change and maintain a privileged position. Our standard should be—is the regime dedicated to improving the economic and political conditions of the country? Is it acting constructively to cope with problems of the society? Where the answers to these questions are affirmative, the United States should actively cooperate in assisting such a regime in fulfilling its tasks. Doing so does not mean abandoning democratic principles; it merely means recognizing that the road to pluralistic democracy is long and tortuous, especially for societies less favored than those of the West. In helping them strengthen their institutions, we should make a concerted effort to cooperate with the younger intellectuals and rising leaders and to bring substantial numbers of these men as well as labor leaders, bureaucrats and leading army officers for training in the United States.

(c) The United States should not judge the new nations by standards derived from its own experience. In all of them, there prevails a widespread acceptance of the notion that only a socialist form of society can resolve the urgent problems of the immediate future. The likely consequence of this is widespread implementation of state

planning and a considerable measure of state control in those aspects of social life which Americans prefer to consider as free from state interference. This tendency, originally ideological, is increasingly modified by pragmatic considerations. This gives grounds for optimism that, in the future, the ideological factor will continue to give way, and that social developments in these new states will reflect their own particular needs and not ideological prescriptions. It is to be expected, however, that even if democratic government consolidates itself in the new nations many of its socioeconomic forms will differ profoundly from those of the Western World. But that should be accepted as part of the international pluralistic world order which we wish to promote.

(d) In meeting the needs of some of the new nations, an international approach has special advantages. For economic and social progress, many of these nations will require assistance in training personnel, in creating an administrative structure, and other institutions. Bilateral assistance for these purposes can easily offend the nationalist sensitivities or be misconstrued as interference in domestic affairs. International programs do not entail these obstacles. Similarly, such agencies can play a valuable role in resolving disputes, such as border issues. In some cases it should be feasible to find regional solutions to common problems of these newer nations. Finally, international agencies and programs should be able to play an increasing role in providing the investment capital so essential to economic and political progress.

C. IDEOLOGY AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Eventual erosion of Communist ideology will depend mainly on the working out of forces within the Communist societies and orbit. The actions which can be taken from outside specifically to foster such erosion are limited, but worth pressing:

(a) In one area—the Communist bloc—the policy of “coexistence” is designed to preserve the status quo. The Communists systematically inculcate the idea that their domination of the satellites is a “reality” which must be accepted as final and irreversible. These notions should be rejected and combatted by insisting that the Communist world is an area of concern to the outside world and is itself undergoing a process of change giving rise to contradictions.

In particular, the non-Communist states should keep in the foreground issues pertaining to Soviet domination of the captive nations and relations within the orbit, and should not be deterred by Soviet claims that such actions keep alive or revive the cold war.

At the same time, but without endorsing existing Communist regimes, attempts to deal with them as if they were independent could be useful in creating tensions whenever rejection of Western overtures would make it manifest that such states were not truly sovereign.

For this purpose, efforts might be made to draw the satellite states into the European community, particularly in terms of economic and cultural cooperation. Even if the regimes at first denounce such efforts, the attractiveness of Western recovery, as well as traditional cultural links of Eastern Europe to Western Europe, would gradually begin to assert themselves and to exert a centrifugal pull. A dual pol-

icy of this sort need not involve sanctioning such regimes. The United States ought to continue to assert that it stands for self-determination within the Communist bloc.

(b) To encourage evolution within the Soviet system and the Communist bloc, we should promote the most extensive contacts possible with the Communist world. Our policy ought to be to stimulate real exchange as contrasted to formal exchange. The Communist leadership, on the other hand, is fearful that excessive contact with the West might undermine the ideological commitment of its adherents. Thus, the Soviet Union now emphasizes exchanges of dancing groups, sports teams, orchestras, and so forth, which are not likely to result in an exchange of ideas and viewpoints nor cause political risks. The United States should strive to develop extensive contacts with intellectuals in the Communist orbit and eventually with politicians in the upper and medium levels in the hope of gradually affecting their ideological commitment.

One of the more effective ways of influencing Soviet domestic evolution may be through the Communist-ruled European states. Traditionally Western oriented, they show much greater receptivity to the Western way of life and have already served as transmission belts of Western values, styles, and interests to the Soviet Union. These trends ought to be encouraged through continued U.S. interest in East Europe.

It would be misleading to expect too much from such exchanges. The cumulative effect is not likely to be felt for a number of years, and even then it is likely to express itself only through a very gradual and prevailing skepticism of some Communist ideological assumptions.

Moreover, even extensive intellectual and political contacts will not alter the Communist belief in the inevitable collapse of our social and economic order, unless accompanied by an active, general policy blocking further Communist expansion. Similarly, continued economic growth in the United States, belying the Communist assertion that their system is more productive and therefore historically superior, will be an important factor in inducing an eventual erosion of the militant aspects of the Communist ideology.

D. THE NEED FOR POSITIVE PURPOSES

The challenges facing the free world over the coming years are much more grave than those surmounted since World War II. While the Communist threat was mainly military, the necessary response of the free world was provoked by the threat itself. In that period fear provided a sufficient spur for joint action.

The shift to "coexistence" has changed this situation. The threat has not been removed but has become more difficult to meet. To meet it will continue to require heavy sacrifice, especially by the advanced nations, for an extended period. Many of the requisite actions will not be dramatic nor show results in any short period of time. Cooperation will be more necessary, not less, and must embrace a much wider group of both the advanced and the less developed nations.

The negative motives based on imminent military threat will probably not be available and would not be adequate to stimulate the kind of measures required. If the necessary actions and cooperation are

to be undertaken and carried through, they will have to rest on a broadly shared conception of positive purposes. Both the mature democracies and the new nations will have to arrive at a wide consensus within which the various separate actions can take on meaning. The sense of consistent purpose will also facilitate persistence in the task, despite reversals and failures which will inevitably occur. To achieve this kind of affirmative commitment will call for strong and creative leadership, both in the United States and in many other free countries. It will have to overcome the lethargy and letdown developing in many countries and replace these attitudes with long-term commitments to affirmative goals.

Our political heritage provides a source for such goals: a world in which order is insured, not through imperialism, but through the cooperation of nations enjoying the maximum freedom, solving their disputes peacefully, and insuring the respect of human rights. The Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, Wilson's Fourteen Points or the Atlantic Charter, classic formulations of our political creed, have become part of this democratic heritage. Their historic significance was due to the fact that these declarations reflected the genuine aspirations of a large part of mankind and were also closely related to actions which underlined the American dedication to their fulfillment. A statement of principles which guide American policy in our age, issued at a timely moment by the highest authority, could play a similar role in clarifying the nature of the present challenge and the response it demands.

Democracy will not survive merely by reacting to the threats of tyranny. Our foreign policy, therefore, must have wider perspectives than those stimulated by the continuous clash with the U.S.S.R. The rapidly changing world is seeking a sense of direction. In the age of ideology, successful political action must be related to ideas. Dogmatic systems of ideas can be undermined only by positive actions which consistently refute their accuracy, and by affirmative principles which truly reflect the aspirations of mankind.

APPENDIX

STUDY: THE PRINCIPAL IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS, VARIATIONS THEREON, THEIR MANIFESTATIONS, AND THEIR PRESENT AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

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Purpose.—This study will analyze the principal political and ideological forces of the 20th century which have attracted substantial support from peoples. It will assess the strengths and weaknesses of these forces, their future development or construction, and will recommend such courses of action as would seem to serve the interests of the United States.

OUTLINE OF STUDY

- I. Summary of main findings.
- II. Conclusion and recommendations.
- III. Body of report.
 - A. The nature of ideologies and their relation to U.S. foreign policy.
 1. A brief description of the origins and nature of ideology; its relationship to ethical, religious, philosophical, or political concepts; its development as a political and social phenomenon, and the major conflicts between worldwide ideologies as these affect the interests of the United States.
 - B. U.S. policy and communism.
 1. An examination of the role of Communist ideology in the Soviet Union, China, and the East European satellites, including the following aspects:
 - (a) Distinctions between ideology and other factors of national interest affecting the exercise of Communist foreign policy.
 - (b) Major ideological concepts pertaining to foreign policy.
 - (c) Evolution since the death of Stalin and probable trends over next decade.
 2. An examination of Communist bloc relations including—
 - (a) Elements of ideological cohesion and conflict (including nationalism).
 - (b) Emergence of the concept of "national" communism since the death of Stalin.
 - (c) Probable future ideological changes affecting bloc relations.

III. Body of report—Continued

C. An evaluation of the implications of alternative U. S. policies.

1. Identification of those objectives of Communist ideology affecting vital interests of the United States.
2. Probable effects upon Communist ideology of alternative U.S. policies relating to deployment, use, and control of military power; economic relations; political relations; travel and cultural relations.

D. U.S. policy and nationalism.

1. An examination of the characteristics and sources of appeal of nationalism in countries at different stages of economic and political development.
2. An analysis of the affinities or aversions of nationalism toward Western political concepts, communism, other authoritarianism or neutralism in different parts of the globe.
3. The merits or limitations of alternative U.S. policies over the next decade.

E. U.S. policy and neutralism.

1. An examination of the nature of "neutralism" or "non-alignment" and the extent to which it is beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the United States.
2. Merits or limitations of alternative U.S. policies for affecting any change over the next decade.

F. Other ideologies, issues, movements, forces, etc.

1. An examination of the characteristics and the implications of other forms of ideological movements, such as fascism, racism, etc.
2. Their implications for U.S. policy.

