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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICYTHE FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

STUDY

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(Pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., and
S. Res. 31, 86th Cong.)


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
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PREFACE

**By Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations**

In January of 1958 the Committee on Foreign Relations decided to undertake a review of conditions and trends in the world and of the policies and programs of the United States with respect thereto. That review grew, in part at least, out of the concern of the committee over the impact which Soviet scientific achievements might have upon our relations with the rest of the world.

From time to time throughout the spring of 1958, the committee held public hearings on U.S. policies respecting the Far East, the Near East, south Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Canada. Those hearings were limited in nature and served primarily to focus attention on the principal policies and problems of the United States in its relations with the rest of the world. For the most part, the hearings were limited to receiving testimony from the principal officers of the Department of State concerned with various geographic parts of the world. The committee also sought the testimony of selected non-governmental witnesses with special knowledge of the areas under examination.

The hearings during the spring of 1958, the focus given to our relations with Latin America as a result of Vice President Nixon's visit there, and, lastly the then critical situation in the Middle East, all contributed to the committee's belief that the time had come for an exploration in depth of U.S. foreign policies throughout the world.

As a consequence of these factors, the Committee on Foreign Relations, in an executive session on May 20, 1958, authorized its Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs to undertake a study of United States-Latin American relations. At the same time, the committee established a special subcommittee, consisting of Senators Green, Fulbright, Wiley, and Hickenlooper, and directed it to explore the feasibility and desirability of a broad study of U.S. foreign policy throughout the world.

Subsequently, this subcommittee reported to the full Committee on Foreign Relations that it was feasible and desirable that the committee undertake such a study of foreign policy. It was felt a study of this nature might serve to develop fresh ideas and approaches to the foreign policy of the Nation and lead to a better national understanding of international problems and to more efficient and effective administration of our international operations.

On July 15, 1958, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted to report to the Senate a resolution authorizing the study. The Senate adopted this resolution (S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., 2d sess.) on July 31, 1958. The resolution authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to "make a full and complete study of U.S. foreign policy." Without

limiting the scope of the study authorized, the committee was instructed to direct its attention to the following subjects:

1. The concepts which govern the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world, and the policies by which these concepts are pursued;

2. The present state of the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world;

3. The administration and coordination of policies and programs by the Department of State and such other departments and agencies of the executive branch which engage in substantial activities abroad; and

4. The relationship of other policies and activities of the Government and private activity which exert a significant influence on the relations of the United States with the rest of the world.

In the conduct of its study, the committee was authorized to "use the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals * * *" and to "enter into contracts for this purpose." It was directed to complete its study by June 1960, and not to exceed \$300,000 was made available to meet the expenses of the committee. The committee was authorized to continue this study by the terms of Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong., 1st sess.).

Shortly after Senate Resolution 336 was adopted by the Senate, Senator Green, then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, designated me to serve as chairman of an executive committee, consisting of Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken, which was given the responsibility for directing and coordinating the study.

On September 16 and 17, 1958, the executive committee discussed with a group of distinguished private citizens the general problems involved and the most advantageous approaches to them. Taking part in these discussions, besides the members of the executive committee, were Robert Bowie of Harvard University, former Ambassador William G. Bullitt, Robert Calkins of the Brookings Institution, John Cowles of the Minneapolis Star & Tribune, William Diebold of the Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Luce of Time-Life, Inc., Walter Millis of the Fund for the Republic, and Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Following these meetings the executive committee developed its plans and announced on October 15 that it was prepared to invite private research organizations and institutions to submit proposals on a series of 15 studies which the committee expected to have undertaken in connection with its examination of foreign policy. As a result of this announcement, the committee received over 50 proposals from organizations and institutions interested in undertaking one or more of these studies.

On January 5, 1959, the executive committee met again to consider the proposals which had been received and decided which organizations and institutions should be asked to undertake studies for the committee. Set forth below are the titles of the studies designated to be undertaken and the names of the organizations and institutions responsible for these studies.

STUDIES

- The Nature of Foreign Policy and the Role of United States in the World. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. (Published as Study No. 7 on November 25, 1959.)
- The Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. (Published as Study No. 6 on November 11, 1959.)
- The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, Mass.
- Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Corporation for Economic & Industrial Research, Inc., 1200 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. (Published as Study No. 1 in August 1959.)
- Foreign Policy Implications for the United States of Economic and Social Conditions in Lesser Developed and Uncommitted Countries. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
- Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy. The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, 1906 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. (Published as Study No. 8 on December 6, 1959.)
- Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif. (Published as Study No. 2 in September 1959.)
- The Role of Multilateral Organizations in the Formulation and Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy." The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.
- Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.
- U.S. Foreign Policy in Western Europe. Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Published as Study No. 3 on October 15, 1959.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- U.S. Foreign Policy in the Near East. Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., 27 East 62d Street, New York, N.Y.
- U.S. Foreign Policy in South Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. (Published in Study No. 5 on November 1, 1959.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa. Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. (Published as Study No. 4 on October 23, 1959.)
- U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. (Published in Study No. 5 on November 1, 1959.)

Each of these organizations and institutions will submit a study to the committee.

Broadly speaking, I hope these studies will supply essential background to enable the Committee on Foreign Relations to accomplish the following basic purposes:

1. Provide the Senate and the American people with a simple, understandable, and forthright statement of the basic foreign policy aims of the United States which reflect the motivations and aspirations of the American people.

2. Identify those forces, domestic as well as foreign, which now or in the future may tend to frustrate or to promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.

3. Suggest, and if possible, determine, feasible ways to deal with such forces so that they may promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.

4. Examine the impact of those forces and trends, foreign and domestic, upon the conduct of American foreign policy in the various geographic areas of the world.

5. Examine the foreign policy decisionmaking machinery to determine whether it is of the maximum efficiency consistent with our democratic processes.

At the January 5 meeting the executive committee also decided to send a letter to some 50 retired Foreign Service officers "to endeavor to obtain for the use of the committee the personal views of men of practical experience with respect to the foreign policy of the United States." Each of these retired Foreign Service officers was asked to give the committee his "general commentary on what is right with our policies, what is wrong with our policies, and what action (or inaction) might in your opinion best serve our interest in the future."

On June 15, 1959, the committee made public, in a summarized form and without personal attribution, the substance of the views of former members of the Foreign Service who responded to the letter. The views and attitudes expressed in that committee publication deserve the most careful consideration by officials in the executive branch of the Government, by my colleagues in the Senate, and by all citizens interested in the conduct of our foreign policy.

The study printed in this volume, "The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy," is the 10th of the 15 principal studies enumerated above to be published. In this volume discussion is also devoted to an 11th topic referred to above, "The Role of Multilateral Organizations in the Formulation and Conduct of United States Foreign Policy," which was originally planned for separate treatment. Also in this volume is discussion of "Organization of the U.S. Government for Dealing with Latin American Affairs," originally planned as a separate study for the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs.

This study was designed to help the committee find answers to subjects covered in an outline developed in consultations between representatives of the committee and representatives of the Brookings Institution. A copy of the outline appears in appendix G (see pp. 190-191).

I take this occasion to emphasize that the studies which are received will supply the committee with background material for consideration in preparing a final report to the Senate. The committee is, of course, free to accept or to reject the findings and recommendations of the organizations and institutions submitting studies. It is the function of the committee to evaluate the studies which are submitted. Prior to the preparation of a final report, the committee will hold public hearings to receive testimony from all interested parties. In that way it will be possible for the committee to test the soundness of the findings and recommendations in these studies before reaching its own conclusions and submitting its final report to the Senate.

In addition, I wish to emphasize that the committee is approaching this assignment in a nonpartisan manner, endeavoring to avoid transitory issues and to concentrate on the fundamental forces at work within and without the United States which must be understood if our foreign policy is to serve the Nation.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
Washington, D.C., November 9, 1959.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am pleased to transmit herewith a report on "The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy," which has been prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to Senate Resolution 336, approved July 31, 1958. In accepting the invitation of the committee to undertake this study, it was agreed that the report would focus more on an exploration of broad, long-range problems than on a detailed survey of existing administrative arrangements.

This study is based on an appraisal of the evolving ends and means of U.S. foreign policy in relation to changing world conditions. The appraisal indicates the range of problems that the organizational structure and administrative procedures should be prepared to meet. It provides the perspective for dealing more specifically with the administrative tasks to be performed, the major difficulties that seem to stand in the way, and the improvements that appear to be needed. These are analyzed in the main portion of the study, which covers the organization and procedures in the Congress and the executive branch, with special reference to the principal elements on which attention should be concentrated in the future. Some important aspects of the role of multilateral organizations in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and of the organizational arrangements for U.S. relations with Latin America, which were originally planned by the Senate committee as separate studies, are also analyzed in this report.

Because of the time and budgetary limitations that were imposed on this study, an exhaustive analysis could not be made of all aspects of the subject. These limitations also made it necessary to make maximum use of work that had already been done, and of the experience and knowledge of those both inside and outside the Government who are intimately acquainted with the processes for the formulation and administration of U.S. foreign policy.

Previous studies by The Brookings Institution have provided useful background for the present report. On several occasions since the Second World War, special reports have been prepared for the Congress or the executive branch on particular problems concerning the administration of American foreign affairs. Other studies of the subject have also been of great assistance. Some of these have been prepared by committees and commissions of the Congress, others by various agencies of the executive branch, and still others by private organizations and individuals. It is not possible to list and acknowledge here all the specific sources that have been consulted, but several of them are cited at relevant points in the report.

The Brookings staff members and consultants responsible for the present study have sought, by means of interviews with officials in the Government and on the basis of materials supplied by them, to obtain insights into the current administration of foreign policy. More than 300 persons were interviewed, and they were most helpful in sharing the results of their experience and in suggesting the kinds of changes they thought might be needed in the future. The institution has had the wholehearted cooperation of the Members of Congress and the congressional committee staffs, and the several executive departments, agencies, and officials concerned. It acknowledges with gratitude their great assistance.

The study was directed by H. Field Haviland, Jr., who is primarily responsible for the interpretations, conclusions and recommendations in, and the final drafting of, this report. Other Brookings staff members who contributed to it are: Robert E. Asher, Maynard B. Barnes, and Charles A. H. Thomson. The following, who were retained as consultants or special staff members, also made substantial contributions to the report: Harrison Brown, professor of geochemistry, California Institute of Technology; Holbert N. Carroll, professor of political science, University of Pittsburgh; Robert E. Elder, professor of political science, Colgate University; Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., director of academic development, Brandeis University; John Lindeman, International Economic Consultants of Washington; Charlton Ogburn, Jr., private consultant and author; William Reitzel, professor of political science, Haverford College; and Burton M. Sapin, assistant professor of political science, Vanderbilt University. The study was made under the general supervision of Robert W. Hartley, director of international studies, and George A. Graham, director of governmental studies.

In the preparation of this report, the staff and consultants have had the benefit of consultations with an advisory committee consisting of: Robert R. Bowie, director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Harlan Cleveland, dean, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Caryl P. Haskins, president, Carnegie Institution of Washington; Evron M. Kirkpatrick, executive director, American Political Science Association; Klaus E. Knorr, associate director, Center of International Studies, Princeton University; Max F. Milliken, director, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Paul H. Nitze, president, Foreign Service Educational Foundation; James A. Perkins, vice president, Carnegie Corp. of New York; Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips (U.S. Army retired), military correspondent, St. Louis Post-Dispatch; Charles B. Stauffacher, executive vice president, Continental Can Co., Inc.; Harold Stein, professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; Leroy D. Stinebower, executive assistant to the chairman, Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey); and Donald C. Stone, dean, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. The institution is heavily indebted to this group for their many helpful suggestions.

Finally, it must be noted that in making a report of this kind, the institution presents it as a competent treatment of the subject that is worthy of public consideration. Interpretations, however, are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the other

members of the Brookings staff, or of the administrative officers of the institution, or of the board of trustees. In addition to their responsibility for the general administration of the institution, the function of the trustees, according to the bylaws of the institution, is "to make possible the conduct of scientific research and publication, under the most favorable conditions, and to safeguard the independence of the research staff in the pursuit of their studies and in the publication of the result of such studies. It is not a part of their function to determine, control, or influence the conduct of particular investigations or the conclusions reached."

ROBERT D. CALKINS,
President.

THE FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS OF POLICYMAKING AND ADMINISTRATION

1. The organization and procedures for the formulation and administration of U.S. foreign policy should be adjusted to meet new requirements. These requirements are determined by the objectives of the American people in world affairs, the prospective world environment in which they must live, and their capabilities for attaining their objectives.

2. In the years ahead, attainment of the broad American objective of a peaceful and prosperous world order, in which the United States can be free and safe, promises to be no easier than it has been in the recent past. International communism, with its hard core of Soviet Russian and Communist Chinese power, must be expected to remain a continuing threat. Even if the cold war should ease, there are many other sources of continuing tensions.

3. Forces generated by further scientific and technological advances, particularly in the development of weapons, by the rapid growth and changing distribution of world population, by the constant pressure for improved levels of living in the underdeveloped areas, and by the rise of new nations, will tend to produce a changing and unstable international situation.

4. Within this prospective world environment, there are likely to be shifts in the relative power position of the United States. Still the United States has great capabilities for maintaining a strong position. Full realization of them depends, however, on a more systematic mobilization of human and material resources behind national policy and improved collaboration between the United States and other nations whose peoples have goals similar to or compatible with American objectives in world affairs.

5. To make the most of American capabilities, heavy responsibilities must be borne by the U.S. Government. The contribution of governmental organization and procedures will be to mobilize people, ideas, and resources in ways that will make optimum use of their potential. Organization will not be a neutral factor in, but an active determinant of, the successful conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It cannot, however, be a substitute for competent people and sound policies.

6. Future governmental organization and procedures for administering foreign policy must provide for: increased orientation of

public and private energies toward foreign affairs, greater speed and flexibility in the formulation and execution of policy, more effective long-range thinking to identify and analyze future problems, improved integration of the expanding range of skills and resources involved in foreign policy, and strengthened relations with other countries, especially through multilateral organizations. To meet these requirements, adjustments should be made in both the legislative and the executive branches.

B. THE CONGRESS

1. The Congress should find more adequate ways of dealing with the increasing scope and complexity of foreign policy. This calls for adjustment in both relations with the executive branch and the internal organization of the Congress.

2. A greater effort should be made by the executive branch to consult, on a continuing and consistent basis, with Senators and Representatives, including those who are Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Congress should give increased support to arrangements, such as the existing consultative subcommittees of the foreign policy committees, in order that full advantage may be taken of the opportunities for fruitful contacts between the executive and legislative branches.

3. Public opinion continues to lag behind the need for popular association with foreign policymaking. There is a special need for improved cooperation between the executive branch and the Congress in establishing more effective links between foreign policymaking and the public, particularly the leaders of opinion. To this end, the barriers of secrecy should be reduced to the lowest level consistent with the essential requirements of national security.

4. Improved bipartisan collaboration is needed regarding the most critical foreign policy issues. No inflexible commitments are required between the parties but rather a voluntary understanding that their members will conscientiously strive, through objective consultation and a candid sharing of essential data, to reach agreement on matters of major significance. Because this concept remains nebulous in the minds of many, it would be useful for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to undertake a review of the rationale and requirements of bipartisanship.

5. Relations should be strengthened among the committees of the Congress that are most directly concerned with foreign policy, particularly between the authorizing and appropriations committees. Such collaboration could be reinforced through the establishment of a select committee on national security, either as a joint committee of the two Houses or as a separate committee in each House.

6. Systematic efforts should be made to assist Members of the Congress and their staffs to keep more adequately abreast of rapidly moving developments that are shaping the Nation's strategy. Periodic briefings should be available for those Senators and Representatives who are not members of committees intimately concerned with foreign policy. A modest expansion is needed in the professional staffs of those committees most directly involved in foreign policy.

problems and in relevant sections of the professional staff of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.

7. Foreign policy operations, particularly those concerned with foreign aid, often suffer because of the limitations of the annual authorization and appropriation process. In cases where such programs seem to require greater maneuverability, favorable consideration should be given to flexible authorization and appropriation practices, including the provision of funds for periods longer than a year.

C. EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

1. The President needs more effective assistance in integrating and directing the expanding range of individuals and activities involved in the making and execution of foreign policy. To the extent that organizational arrangements can be useful, the need cannot be met by any simple device but requires a combination of approaches.

The Executive Office

2. The National Security Council provides a useful forum for joint consideration of major national security issues by the heads of the principal agencies concerned, together with the Chief Executive. The nature of such an interdepartmental committee, however, makes it difficult for its members to deal adequately with the most fundamental issues. Within these limitations, the structure and procedures of the Council can and should be improved, particularly to point up the central issues and to mesh substantive with budgetary considerations.

3. The President needs a strong staff in the Executive Office that will have as broad an approach to national security policy as his and that will be constantly available to analyze, advise, and mediate. It would be well to move toward integrating the several Executive Office units now concerned with foreign policy, preferably within the framework of an Office of National Security Affairs under a Director similar in status to the Director of the Budget. This arrangement should include the special assistants for national security affairs, security operations coordination, and foreign economic policy, the staffs of the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board, and possibly part or all of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

A new senior secretary

4. Most essential is the need for a stronger Cabinet position responsible for unified direction of the mainstream of foreign policy and operations. This requires a new senior secretary—to be called the Secretary of Foreign Affairs—who should be the President's chief deputy on matters of foreign policy. He should have general directive authority over the more important international programs—political, economic, and information—within the framework of a new Department of Foreign Affairs. He should also be made vice chairman of the National Security Council in order to provide more effective foreign policy direction for other departments and agencies, particularly the Department of Defense.

5. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs should be allowed considerable freedom to establish whatever staff arrangements he believes would best help to make his role effective. These should include

staffs to provide long-range planning, to undertake necessary intelligence analyses, to assist in controlling communications affecting foreign policy, and to help direct the support functions of personnel and budget management.

D. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INFORMATION AFFAIRS

1. The foreign political, economic, and information activities within the new Department of Foreign Affairs should be organized as three component departments, each headed by a secretary with Cabinet rank: the Department of State, the Department for Foreign Economic Operations, and the Department of Information and Cultural Affairs. This arrangement should ease the task of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in providing general guidance for these operations without involving him in the minutiae of daily activities. At the same time, the granting of full secretarial status to the head of each of these departments should help to attract capable leadership for them.

Department of State

2. The Secretary of State and his staff should continue to be primarily responsible, under the direction of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for the formulation and execution of general "political" policy regulating U.S. relations with other countries. This function has always been the core of the diplomatic role and should be the principal source of day-to-day guidance for all U.S. activities overseas.

3. The present organization of the Department of State, combining both geographic and functional bureaus, is reasonably satisfactory. Instead of continuing to stress the primary "action" responsibility of the geographic, as contrasted with the functional bureaus, however, the Secretary of State should feel free to delegate action authority to whatever units seem most appropriate for the particular tasks involved.

4. The apportionment of countries among the geographic bureaus of the Department of State should remain flexible enough to adjust to changing circumstances. Consideration should currently be given to a reapportionment of Asian and African countries between a Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs and a Bureau of African and Asia Minor Affairs. Because the function of preparing policy positions for international organization activities is largely an integrating activity, heavily influenced by other bureaus, it seems preferable to make the Bureau of International Organization Affairs a staff organization directly subordinate to the Secretary of State.

Department for Foreign Economic Operations

5. The new Department for Foreign Economic Operations should be a separate administrative entity with substantial operating autonomy under the general authority of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The following agencies and functions should be placed within the framework of the new Department: the International Cooperation Administration, the Development Loan Fund, all functions under the Public Law 480 program except the determination of the volume of commodities available for disposal and the arrangement of their

shipment and delivery, and the responsibility for providing guidance to U.S. representatives to international organizations concerned with economic aid matters.

6. The procedure under this new Department should be to deal with a country or region as a whole and to plan, in full cooperation with the people being aided, an integrated, long-range program of development that will make the most efficient use of the capabilities of not only the United States but of other countries as well. Present arrangements are far short of the goal. Programing of all relevant U.S. resources available for economic aid should be a major function of the new Department, even though not all of these resources would be placed directly under the Department's control.

7. The basic decisions about military aid—whether to offer it, how much to offer, for what purposes, and the military nature of the forces to be supported—should be made in coordination with similar decisions regarding economic aid. While determination of the military nature of the forces to be supported should remain largely under the control of the Secretary of Defense, the responsibility for the other decisions should be placed under the general direction of the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with the assistance of his Secretary for Foreign Economic Operations.

Department of Information and Cultural Affairs

8. The new Department of Information and Cultural Affairs should—like the Department for Foreign Economic Operations—be a separate administrative entity, able to act with considerable autonomy under the general direction of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The core of the Department should be the activities of the present U.S. Information Agency and the cultural affairs program of the Department of State.

E. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

1. Regular procedures should be established whereby the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his senior officials can, as a matter of course, bring their views to bear on major defense decisions, including choices regarding weapons systems, force levels, and planning for military contingencies that may confront the United States. Under modern conditions, these are as much the concern of officials responsible for the Nation's foreign policy as political decisions are rightfully the concern of military policymakers.

2. The Military Establishment has done a more effective job of developing military officers with substantial knowledge and skill in political and economic affairs than the foreign policy agencies have done in developing officials with comparable skill in military matters. This imbalance should be corrected.

3. There should be increased exchange of personnel among military and civilian agencies. Foreign Service officers should be assigned for regular tours of duty in the Department of Defense. Military officers and certain career civilians in the Military Establishment should be assigned for tours of duty in the new Department of Foreign Affairs as well as other relevant agencies. There should be increased civilian participation in the several war colleges and strengthened inservice training programs within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

4. Problems of internal organization in the Department of Defense continue to cause difficulties in the relationship with the foreign policy agencies. Future arrangements should: (a) accept the expanded role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (b) encourage direct relations between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military as well as civilian staffs of the Department of Defense where these seem an effective way of conducting common business, and (c) recognize the continuing need of the Secretary of Defense for substantial civilian staff to advise on these questions.

5. This supports a continuing role for the Office of International Security Affairs as the principal unit within the Military Establishment for assisting the Secretary of Defense with regard to international political-military problems.

F. INTELLIGENCE, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION

1. Important components of the foreign policy process that deserve special attention for the future are the acquisition and sifting of factual information, long-range as well as short-range planning that will analyze issues and recommend preferred courses of action, and the direction and evaluation of consequent action programs.

Intelligence

2. The ability of the "intelligence community" to gather, analyze, and distribute intelligence data systematically and expeditiously has improved considerably during the past 10 years. The principal need at present is for better servicing of the planners and decisionmakers by means of more comprehensive long-range analysis.

3. The present balance between the Central Intelligence Agency and the several departmental intelligence units seems essentially correct, but a special collaborative relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs should be accepted and developed. This should be facilitated by adoption of the proposal to make the Secretary of Foreign Affairs the vice chairman of the National Security Council.

4. The principle of ultimate public control is as essential in relation to intelligence activities, including the Central Intelligence Agency, as it is in relation to other executive functions, but it is difficult to apply where security controls must be so stringent. The intelligence community is already subject to two specific forms of control: continuing self-appraisal and periodic surveys by ad hoc Presidential committees. Nevertheless, ways should be explored to strengthen relations between the intelligence program and at least a small group of key congressional leaders.

Planning

5. The accelerating pace of events and the growing leadtime required to mount certain kinds of countervailing action call for improved long-range thinking, including a further development of contingency planning. The Policy Planning Staff under the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should not only be expanded but should draw on the most competent, broadly experienced personnel in the several foreign affairs agencies, as well as talented outsiders. This staff should be the principal link with the military planners. It

should be complemented by expanded planning in the three component departments within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

6. One means of making greater use of nongovernmental advisers would be to experiment with a few special task forces set up in various parts of the country where it would be possible to mobilize large groups of competent specialists for extended periods. They should analyze selected long-range problems, possibly parallel to studies that would be conducted simultaneously within the Government. This should provide a basis for arriving at a judgment concerning the desirability of developing this approach further.

Execution and evaluation

7. Although the Operations Coordinating Board has been criticized for involving too much time and paperwork, it continues to serve a useful purpose in facilitating interdepartmental meshing of action programs. Its procedures should be improved, however, in order to concentrate its attention on the more important issues, while reducing the time expended on less essential routine. The new Secretary of Foreign Affairs should designate the chairman of the board.

8. The present system of self-appraisal of action taken is not adequate. Separate staffs should be created, at both the departmental and executive office levels, with sufficient independent stature and authority to engage in continuing and penetrating evaluation.

G. FIELD MISSIONS

1. Field missions labor under the severe handicaps of inadequate financial and personnel resources, restrictions on initiative and long-range thinking, and proliferation of independent agencies. In overcoming these handicaps it is important to insure that the post of chief of mission is filled by the most highly qualified individual available, whether career or noncareer. Prospective conditions are likely to require more than ever the skills that are most often developed in career officers and are less frequently found in non-career appointees. Steps should be taken to provide adequate financing for all posts so that they may be headed by career officers whenever that seems desirable.

2. Ambassadors would be better supported if the corps of officials available for overseas duty were sufficient to permit training and flexibility of assignment and to provide resources that could be quickly marshaled to deal with crises. Tours of duty should be longer than the 2 years that are normal for the more arduous posts—preferably 4 years broken by ample home leave at the midpoint, with provision for staggered rotation to enhance continuity.

3. To improve the quality of delegations to international conferences, particularly the annual sessions of the General Assembly, it would be advisable to inject a larger degree of professional talent at the top representational level. At the same time, ways should be explored whereby noncareer leaders would continue to be used to good advantage, possibly on a shorter term consultative basis.

4. Another recurring problem is the question of proportionate U.S. financial contributions to the United Nations and the affiliated specialized agencies. Although various factors should be taken into account, the capacity to pay should be the principal consideration

in determining at least the minimum rate of contribution. On this basis, the United States should be expected to contribute at least the present rate of 32.5 percent of the regular administrative budget of the United Nations, and preferably somewhat more. The rate should be substantially higher for those special programs whose financing must be carried primarily by the more developed countries.

H. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. To assist in making optimum use of the many skills required to conduct contemporary foreign relations, there should be a broader career service. To this end, the three component units of the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs should work toward a common system.

2. The future emphasis in developing the Foreign Service should not be on a retreat from the single service concept but rather on providing more flexible career patterns within that service to meet varying needs. There should be a number of different career ladders corresponding to the different skills required, both specialist and generalist. At the same time, officers should be permitted, sometimes encouraged, to cross over from one ladder to another in order to fill the need for various combinations, including general executive talents at the top level.

3. There should be a continuing inventory of future personnel requirements. Foreign Service examinations should be designed so that a limited number of specialists could be selected each year through similar but somewhat differently designed examinations. Specialists should be developed within the Service through in-service training and experience whenever possible. Lateral entry into the Foreign Service should be used as an auxiliary but not the major means of acquiring specialists.

4. The waiting period between the oral examination and actual appointment should be reduced, possibly by offering appointments after a preliminary security check, subject to satisfactory completion of the full investigation.

5. A broad merit scholarship training program—particularly at the graduate level—would probably provide a significant number of applicants for entry into the Foreign Service with equal or better formal training and at less cost than a governmental undergraduate academy.

6. The in-service training program is likely to remain inadequate until Foreign Service officers at all levels recognize the needs of the Service and cease to be reluctant to intersperse tours of duty with educational assignments. No adequate inventory of training needs has yet been completed. Present staffing patterns make it difficult to free the more competent officers for training. Appropriations for training remain low compared to the job that should be done.

7. The time devoted to formal training assignments should be increased. The goal should be approximately 1 year for training out of every 9 as a minimum for the average Foreign Service officer. Officers slated for high policymaking posts should be allowed a year at two separate stages in their careers for independent study and reflection.

8. In addition to general participation in the orientation, midcareer, and senior officer courses, Foreign Service officers should be assigned to language, area, functional, and other training courses on the basis

of the training prerequisites for positions to which they are assigned. This requires explicit designation of the training prerequisites for all positions to be filled by Foreign Service officers. The need for language and area training with respect to less familiar countries is particularly acute.

9. The present career management program, initiated on the recommendation of the Wriston Committee, has made a good start, but further improvement is needed in the procedures for evaluating the performance of individual officers and for assigning them to duty. While the importance of selection-out is recognized, far more important is the need to emphasize good recruitment and career development.

of the training prerequisites for positions to which they are assigned. This requires explicit designation of the training prerequisites for all positions to be filled by Foreign Service officers. The need for language and area training with respect to less familiar countries is particularly acute.

3. The present management program, limited on the recommendation of the Winston Committee, has reached good start, but further improvement is needed in the procedures for evaluating the performance of individual officers and for assigning them to duty. While the importance of action on this score is obvious, it is more important is the need to emphasize good management with respect to development.

II. BODY OF THE REPORT

Chapter I. Future Requirements for Policymaking and Administration

In recent decades, the United States has come to occupy a position of preeminent leadership in world affairs. To support this position, American military, economic, and political power has had to be marshalled on a scale unprecedented in American history. This has required, in turn, far-reaching changes in the organization of the U.S. Government in order to administer effectively the vast array of functions and the huge expenditures now involved. New agencies have been established and old ones reorganized in the continuing effort to adapt the structure and processes of the Government to new American objectives in changing world conditions. But the problems continue to grow in scale and intricacy, while attitudes and institutions lag behind.

It is the purpose of this study to look ahead to see what future changes may be necessary in the structure and process of the U.S. Government to cope with the kinds of international conditions that are likely to prevail in the coming years. This analysis begins with some brief observations on U.S. objectives, certain prospective developments in the world environment, the position and capabilities of the United States, the possibilities and limitations of organizational adjustment, and certain administrative requirements that are implied by the assessment of future conditions. These requirements provide the basic yardsticks for reappraising the current foreign policy organization and suggesting possible improvements where they appear to be both desirable and feasible.

A. AMERICAN OBJECTIVES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Stated in their broadest terms, the most immediate objectives of the United States in world affairs are to maintain the peace and security of the American people and to promote international conditions in which they may continue to improve their well-being. To further these broad objectives, the United States has since the Second World War actively sought the establishment of a world order in which all nations, large and small, could live in peace and security and under which their peoples could enjoy a growing measure of well-being.

Attainment of these objectives, however, promises to be no easier in the years ahead than in the past two decades. International communism, with its hard core of Soviet Russian and Communist Chinese power, with its vested interest in disorder and instability in the non-Communist world, its heady new prestige in the fields of science and technology, and its determination to expand and dominate, will remain the most immediate threat. Whatever illusions some Americans may have held about the instability of the Soviet Russian re-

gime, and therefore the duration of the Communist problem, would seem to be dispelled by the growth of economic and military strength and the maintenance of internal order within the Communist orbit. Thus, if the possible catastrophe of a global nuclear war is to be avoided, it is evident that some basis for at least minimal accommodation must be found.

It is the American view that the development of a peaceful and productive international order can proceed best if all nations act in accordance with certain rules of international conduct which recognize the rights and obligations of nations in relation to each other and their individual citizens. These rules uphold the ideal of a community of nations that live according to the same principles of self-government, mutual respect and self-restraint, adherence to the pledged word, and equality of political status and economic opportunity that are espoused in a national democratic community.

These are difficult goals to achieve, however. The concepts and conditions which are essential to their fulfillment are not shared by some countries. Even those who profess adherence to these standards frequently find it difficult to bring their behavior into accord with these ideals. Furthermore, the entire framework of international relations is being profoundly altered by man's new knowledge of himself and of his natural environment and by the effects of this knowledge on his values and institutions. Many of these tensions would exist even if the cold war should cease; with its continuation, some of them will be aggravated.

B. PROSPECTIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT

Given the general objectives of the United States, the problem is to anticipate the probable international environment in order to take advantage of those conditions that are favorable to U.S. interests and to surmount those conditions that are hostile. At the same time, it is well not to exaggerate the novelty of the future. It will be a different age, but not entirely different. The future will be a further development of the present and past, but it seems likely to evolve at a more rapid rate of change. Thus the future does not call for a complete break with the past but a further building on existing foundations.

Scientific and technological advances

A major factor in this development will continue to be the wonders wrought by science and technology, with both calculated and unforeseen consequences.¹ For some time to come, the greatest single investment of scientific skill, having the greatest effect on international affairs, will doubtless be the further effort to create ever more devastating weapons and at the same time to devise more effective shields to ward off the weapons of the enemy.² The continued development of long-range nuclear missiles will increase the power and accuracy of such weapons while greatly abbreviating the reaction time. Defensive

¹ Such review is contained in the following two studies in the series being undertaken for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, the Johns Hopkins University; and "Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States," by the Stanford Research Institute.

² See National Planning Association, Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control, "1970 Without Arms Control" (1958).

measures may have to be taken with only 30 minutes or less warning. In such circumstances, the risk will always be present that a war could be touched off by the mistaken identification of meteors or other flying objects. There will also be increased opportunities for diplomatic blackmail, based on ultimatums with very short time spans, perhaps as little as an hour or less.

Weapons development in the foreseeable future need not be concentrated as previously in a few major powers, which have had the industrial resources and technical know-how adequate to do the pioneering work. To be sure, there will not be many states that, in competition with each other, can support the research, development, and mass production of the full range of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons systems, early warning systems, and squadrons of jet bombers and supersonic fighters needed for a large-scale war. But there will be many states that can develop nuclear weapons and exploit their possession for their more limited policy purposes. Three major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—now possess such weapons. A recent study indicates that:³

1. Twelve countries are technically able to embark on a successful nuclear weapons program in the near future: Belgium, Canada, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland.

2. Eight other countries are considered to be capable economically and fairly competent technically, although perhaps somewhat more limited in scientific manpower: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

3. Six other countries are probably economically capable, but more limited in industrial resources and scientific manpower: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and the Union of South Africa. It is not likely, however, that any or all of these six countries could achieve a successful nuclear weapons program within the next 5 years.

The international situation that could be created by the widespread possession of nuclear weapons would be inherently unstable. The very instability of such a situation will undoubtedly spur renewed efforts in the near future to obtain agreement on some kind of international system for the control and reduction of national armaments.

Even if some degree of armaments control should be achieved in the next decade, it seems probable that the first stages of it would apply primarily to weapons of mass destruction. If such agreement did not reflect a lessening of tensions flowing from the many sources of disagreement between the Soviet-Communist bloc and the Western Powers, pressure would increase to develop and maintain weapons and military establishments for the more conventional kinds of warfare. The result might be no net reduction in the costs of national defense among the major powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.

Research on missile development has also made it possible for man to explore space.⁴ Apart from the advantages to be gained for na-

³ Howard Simons, "World-Wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons," "Daedalus" (summer 1959), p. 395, which is based on the following report, soon to be published: William C. Davidon, Christoph Hohenemser, and Marvin I. Kalkstein, "The Nth Country Problem: A World-Wide Survey of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities."

⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, staff report of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, "The Next Ten Years in Space: 1959-1969," H. Doc. No. 115, 86th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7-10.

tional security and military operations, the potential benefits to be derived from space flight seem great—improved weather prediction and the possibility of large-scale weather modification; improved long-range telecommunication facilities; and increased understanding of the physical properties of the earth, its atmosphere and the solar system. But some of these benefits will pose real problems of how to regulate the use of space.

Peaceful uses of other advances in science and technology will open additional possibilities. Although coal, iron, and oil heretofore have been deemed the essential bases for the industrial growth of a nation, this may be less true within the foreseeable future. The development of atomic and solar energy seems to hold great promise of offsetting a lack of primary sources of cheap power which now exists in some regions of the world. New methods are greatly improving productivity as well as providing substitutes for old materials and processes, thus altering the pattern of production and consumption both within and among nations. Science and technology will increase the mobility of people, goods, and ideas as the facilities for transportation and communication continue to improve.

Taken all together, scientific and technological progress can cause a marked redistribution of power among nations, although it is difficult to forecast how rapidly this will occur. The balance between offensive and defensive potentials can shift significantly. Evolving techniques of production and distribution will also alter the material welfare of nations.

2. *Population growth and standards of living*

It took tens of thousands of years for the human population of the world to reach 2.5 billion, but it may now take a mere generation to add another 2 billion. The growth in world population during the 20th century alone may be fourfold, as the following estimate shows.⁵

Year:	World population (billions)
1900_____	1.5
1925_____	1.9
1950_____	2.5
1975 (estimate)_____	3.8
2000 (estimate)_____	6.3

This remarkable increase may be attributed to a variety of causes, the most important of which is the decline in death rates due to improved health care.

The relatively greater population increase is likely to occur in regions other than Europe and North America, which have been the chief repositories of world power during the first half of the 20th century. Latin America and Asia are likely to gain a larger proportion of the world's population during the remainder of the century. Projections of population growth by regions indicate the following

⁵ U.N. Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "The Future Growth of World Population," Population Studies, No. 28 (1958), p. v. Unless otherwise noted, all world population data cited will be taken from this report, and are based on the "median assumptions" for future population, which are explained in it.

probable future geographic distribution in percentages of the estimated world population:

Year	North America ¹	Europe ²	Latin America ¹	Asia ²	Other regions ³
1950-----	7	23	7	55	8
1975-----	6	20	8	58	8
2000-----	5	15	9	62	9

¹ North America is the America north of Mexico; Latin America is the America south of the United States.

² Europe includes the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union; Asia excludes it.

³ Principally Africa.

Within these regions, the probable growth of some large nations is significant. By 1975, for example, the United States may have a population of about 220 million, an increase of nearly 13 percent over its present numbers. During the same period, the population of the Soviet Union will increase to approximately 275 million; that of India to almost 565 million; and that of mainland China to about 895 million.

The rising tide of population will continue to press hard against the limits of material resources, often with unrealistic expectations which are an invitation to the irresponsible and a hazard to the responsible. Even with the application of tremendous effort, it has not been possible in the past to achieve a sustained increase of agricultural production of more than about 4 percent annually. It is reported, however, that this rate of increase has been accelerated recently in Communist China by regimenting the agricultural population and by applying improved methods.

By the proper application of modern technology, the agricultural areas of the world can probably be increased from the present 2.4 billion acres to about 3.5 billion acres. Very little of this potential cropland, however, is in Asia where the demand for increased food production will likely be the greatest and where the cultivated land area probably cannot be increased more than 25 percent.

The industrial development of these areas will also take time and tremendous effort, although the time scale could be shorter. The output of a basic industry such as steel, for example, can be doubled every few years, but huge amounts of capital and raw materials are required. If all persons in the world were suddenly to be brought up to the level of living now enjoyed by the people of the United States, it is estimated that world steel, copper, lead, and zinc production would have to be increased 100 times the present annual rate. In order to power this newly industrialized society, energy would have to be produced at a rate roughly 10 times larger than at present.

It is obvious, therefore, that the economic, social, and political pressures for rising levels of living in the underdeveloped areas will continue, for decades to come, to cause their peoples to look to the more developed areas for assistance. Their demands for large-scale help will further complicate the efforts of the developed nations to improve the international network of commercial and financial relations. That network, severely dislocated by two World Wars and a great depression in the first half of the 20th century, will be subjected to further strains by the demands of the populations of the developed areas themselves

for increased economic growth and stability. The pressures of mass aspirations in both the developed and underdeveloped areas will undoubtedly be one of the striking phenomena of the coming decades.

3. Nationalism and internationalism

The history of the 20th century has been marked by the rapid appearance of new states and the disappearance of old ones. The Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian Empires disintegrated in the First World War. The British, Dutch, and French Empires have been suffering a similar fate in the aftermath of the Second World War. On the other hand, new drives for expansion and domination in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and South and Southeast Asia are now cloaked in the trappings of international communism.

On the eve of the First World War, there were about 56 national states; today there are approximately 90 such entities.⁶ More than a score of new, independent nations, comprising about one-fourth of the world's population, have come into being during the past two decades. Nor is the end in sight. The number of nation-states may reach a hundred in the next decade or so, and if the forces of nationalism strongly persist, that number might easily grow larger.

The rise of new national entities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa and the resurgence of nationalism in Latin America seem destined to continue as sources of external and internal strains. The newly freed nations will look for both increased respect and assistance from abroad, but will be reluctant to relinquish any of their new-found independence. At the same time, these states will be confronted at home by severe problems of developing and integrating their domestic societies which will make it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve democracy as it is practiced in more developed countries.

The sense of national insecurity and domestic instability that permeates the new nations has also caused them to seek haven in the new internationalism of the mid-20th century. The United Nations and its related specialized agencies provide instruments for obtaining assistance for the underdeveloped areas, for encouraging self-determination and freedom from colonialism, and for maintaining security against external threats. The new nations also look to regional groupings based on old cultural ties, such as the Arab League, or new common interests in economic development, such as the Colombo Plan. In this respect, they have followed the path of the older nations which led the way in creating the United Nations and have also established special security and other arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States and regional economic agencies.

C. UNITED STATES POSITION AND CAPABILITIES

Within the prospective world environment, the United States will be one of the major forces. The manner in which the American people use their immense power in the future to influence the course

⁶ There are differences of opinion on what constitutes a "sovereign and independent" state. The numbers cited here are taken from the lists in "The Stateman's Yearbook," 1914 and 1958 editions.

of international events will do much to determine the kind of world in which they will live.

Maintenance of U.S. strength for world leadership will require continuing heavy expenditures of human and material resources. About 10 percent of the American gross national product is now devoted to military purposes, which consume about 50 percent of the research and development activities of the United States. Barring the conclusion of an effective international agreement for the control and reduction of all kinds of armaments, it is unlikely that for many years there can be any decrease in the magnitude of the total American effort devoted to national defense.

The United States must be prepared to assist friendly—or potentially friendly—nations in their efforts to provide for their national security and to insure their further economic development. Currently, the annual expenditures for American foreign assistance under both bilateral and multilateral arrangements are around \$6 billion, a little more than 1 percent of the gross national product, with about 40 percent going for military assistance and the remaining 60 percent for economic assistance. It seems unlikely that any decrease in the need for this volume of assistance will occur during the foreseeable future, although the allocation according to purpose and region may need to be adjusted.

Even with these exertions, there are likely to be changes in the relative power position of the United States during the decades ahead. Advances in weapons technology in other countries can decrease the military advantages now enjoyed by the United States. The widespread adoption of scientific and technological improvements in agricultural and industrial production will also affect the American position. Many of the economic advantages which have reinforced the diplomatic posture of the United States may be altered during the next decades.

At the same time, the United States has great capabilities. The population will probably increase from 175 million at present to at least 220 million by 1975 and perhaps 280 million by the end of the century.⁷ Between now and 1965, the size of the labor force will not increase as rapidly as the population as a whole, but thereafter the high postwar birth rates will be reflected by rapid growth in the size of the working age group. By 1975, that group should be 25 percent larger than it is now. Concurrently productivity is expected to rise at an even more rapid rate.

Farm productivity per man-hour may increase threefold during the next 50 years. Assuming the American people may need twice as much food as they now consume, fewer than two-thirds of the present number of farmworkers should be needed to produce it. For the next three or four decades, the United States should be in a position not only to meet most domestic needs but to ship large quantities abroad. Industrial production per man-hour could increase fourfold during the next 50 years, and it is difficult to believe that it will not rise at least twofold.

⁷ Some estimates project population growth to about 350 million by that time, a doubling of the present population. See, Population Reference Bureau, Inc., "Population Bulletin", vol. XV, No. 8 (May 1959).

Full realization of these capabilities cannot occur, however, unless some real difficulties are surmounted. Of fundamental importance is the need for a large proportion of the public to have a lively awareness of the nature of the tasks that lie ahead and to act boldly and imaginatively in preparing to deal with those tasks. While recent studies of popular opinion indicate that the overwhelming majority of the American people are now inclined to accept the general objective of international cooperation, this attitude is not based on solid understanding and is seldom expressed in consistent and vigorous action.⁸ More immediate concerns of economic and social interest command greater day-to-day commitment.

There are hopeful signs for the future, however. The public mood is becoming less mercurial as it is tested by succeeding crises and becomes more knowledgeable and committed. In the future, the proportion of college educated will tend to increase, and the gains at all levels of education will be most marked among lower-income groups who are now least concerned about foreign affairs. Contacts with foreigners will increase through travel and exchange programs. Thus the general tendency, which is most acute at the leadership level, is toward greater information, interest, sophistication, and action.

To be effective, opinion must be supported by resources. This will require more systematic mobilization of human and material wherewithal behind national policy not only inside the United States but in collaboration with other nations. The United States today has less than 10 percent of the world's population but is consuming about 50 percent of the world output of raw materials. Increasing quantities of these materials, such as iron ore, bauxite, copper ore, and petroleum must come from abroad. The next 50 years will be characterized, therefore, by a growing need to adjust to the shifting pattern of resource availability, including considerable dependence on foreign supplies.

It is clear, therefore, that to make the most of American capabilities, heavy responsibilities will have to be borne by the U.S. Government. The detailed changes that will need to be made in the administration of policy that is primarily domestic in its focus are beyond the scope of this study. The principal concerns here are the changes that will be required in the organization and procedures for formulating and administering foreign policy.

D. POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ADJUSTMENT

Every study of governmental administration needs to be seen in the perspective of what it is realistic to assume that organizational adjustments can, and cannot, accomplish.

The first cautionary note is that there are fundamental difficulties inherent in the substance of policy and the environment within which the organization must operate that necessarily restrict its performance regardless of how good its administrative arrangements are. In the foreign policy field, these limiting factors include the conflicting objectives, mores, and power drives of nations, the interdependence of

⁸ For two recent surveys, see Alfred O. Hero, "Americans in World Affairs" (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), and William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, "The United States and the United Nations: The Public View, 1945-1955" (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958).

U.S. policy with the affairs of other states which are not subject to the direct control of this country, the inherent difficulty of grappling with complex policy problems to which there are no perfect answers, and the limited resources available to support the governmental performance.

Within these confines, the peculiar contribution that organization can make is to mobilize people, ideas, and things in ways that will make optimum use of their potential. No ingredient is more important than the quality of the people who staff the organization. How well these people work together, how well they serve the President, the Congress, and the public, depends upon a number of things—natural abilities, professional and basic competence, common understanding of policies and procedures, cooperative skills, shared values, the quality of leadership at key points, and the arrangement of functions, duties, powers, and relationships in which they work. These people are and must be highly organized, and it is important that they be organized effectively. True, "good people" can make a poor organization work. But much more significant is the fact that the organization, the system in which people work, can make it difficult for them, or it can greatly increase the probability that they will work together effectively. Organization is not a neutral factor but is an active determinant of the success of an enterprise as vast and varied as the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.

The basic test of the effectiveness of an organization is a functional one: how well it helps to marshal the available human and material resources to do the job for which it was created. There is no absolute formula that will guarantee perfect results. The approach must be flexible and pragmatic according to the peculiar requirements of the task at hand. Many combinations can be made to work, given the right mix of ingredients.

It should constantly be kept in mind that organization (in American public administration today) is more subtle than it seems. It is not simply a matter of titles, duties, and formal powers recorded in legal and administrative documents. Men have concepts of their jobs and of their proper relationship with their associates, superiors, subordinates, and public. They are practiced in joint endeavors, or they are not. They are familiar with what they have to do and can stabilize their actions, or the situation is new and changing with consequent necessity to improvise. The policy and objective may be clear or confused. Leadership of superiors may be vital and firm, or weak and vacillating. Support may be morally, physically, and financially sure, or it may be highly uncertain. All such factors tend to condition the organizational behavior of people engaged in public enterprise on a large scale. "Good organization" cannot be created merely by writing statutes or orders, but statutes and orders which may say nothing about an organization directly or explicitly may have a drastic organizational impact.

Organizations must adjust continuously as people, conditions, and objectives change. In part, the administrative feedback is in itself a cause of change. Hence, flexibility is at a premium and reorganization is not abnormal. A corollary is the need to leave much of the administrative structure to administrative discretion at many levels. Orderly and responsible adjustment and development are the goals, not rigidity.

It is also well to be on guard against expecting too much of "organization." Structural arrangements cannot create leadership, although they can stimulate and provide opportunity for leaders to be effective. Informational procedures do not force men to know, although they may provide essential relevant data. Provision for records and experienced counselors does not make men wise, although it may bring to them what wisdom the past has to offer. Careful definition of duties cannot make men industrious or faithful, although it may make them more accountable and also provide a basis for satisfaction in achievement. Organization is only one element in successful administration, but for a people which prides itself on the subtle nuances of its open and free culture, which is also highly collective and competitive, organization is obviously important.

Finally, there is the fact that the existing organizational apparatus, in this case the foreign policy mechanism, is the result of considerable experience and evolutionary adjustment and that it is sound in many respects. Because there is waste involved in any reorganization through confusion, friction, and loss of momentum, no change should be made unless a strong case can be made for it.

E. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTERING FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY

Against the background of these general considerations there are certain urgent requirements for the future administration of U.S. foreign policy that grow out of the changing world conditions discussed earlier. These requirements provide guidelines that have special significance for this study.

Increased attention to foreign affairs.—As space and time are rapidly compressed, the interests of the United States will become more closely interwoven with the concerns of other countries. To deal effectively with major problems of military security, political cooperation, and economic and social well-being will require intimate collaboration with sympathetic countries and the closest surveillance of hostile states.

The United States must organize itself in such a way, therefore, that it will be capable of directing increased attention, talent, and resources to coping with international problems. The Nation must learn to think of itself as part of a worldwide web of political, military, economic, and social relations.

Greater speed and flexibility.—Another characteristic of the age is the tremendously accelerated pace of events. The awesome speed of modern weapons is the most dramatic and threatening manifestation of this trend, but acceleration is apparent in many other fields as well. While basic economic development may still proceed at a relatively leisurely pace, negotiations and attitudes affecting economic conditions can move quickly.

In part, this trend requires a commensurate acceleration of the formulation and execution of policy. But not all decisions will have to be made instantaneously; each problem will suggest a different timetable according to its nature. The trick will be to meet the policy need while using every means to maximize the time available to the decisionmaker. This requires great flexibility of administration, unfettered by rigid and detailed restrictions.

Long-range thinking.—One way to gain time is to look further ahead. As the train of events moves more rapidly, the need is to try to anticipate prospective developments as far in advance as possible. The chief enemies of this kind of effort are the pressures of more immediate crises and the difficulty of discerning future events.

It should be possible, nonetheless, to mount a more intensive campaign of advance thinking, in at least broad terms. As part of this effort, it would be well to experiment with a further development of contingency planning, benefiting by the attempts that have already been made along these lines. Here, as elsewhere, much depends on the initiative exercised by the top leadership.

Improved integration of related instrumentalities.—As foreign policy grows in scope, it involves a widening circle of individuals and activities, including many located in departments and agencies that have customarily been oriented more toward domestic than international concerns. This calls for constant adjustment to improve communication among these staffs and to bring them into closer relationship in the formulation and execution of their respective segments of foreign policy.

A related but broader problem is the need to develop improved methods of meshing foreign with domestic policy. This calls for the reconciliation of competing resource requirements as well as substantive policies.

Strengthening multilateral associations.—The growing interdependence of the United States with other countries requires administrative arrangements that will reinforce those relations. To some extent such contacts can remain bilateral as they have traditionally been. But as the boundaries of international negotiations expand, it will seem more fruitful in many cases to operate through multilateral organizations.

In some respects all facets of this report relate to these multilateral groupings, but there are special problems that are peculiar to U.S. contacts with such associations. These include the organization of the missions accredited to international organizations and the capability of the personnel assigned to them.

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If there is a single theme that emerges from this analysis, it is that the new era requires a bold adjustment of institutions as well as policies and, what is more fundamental, personal attitudes and skills so that the United States may be capable of orchestrating the growing range of talents and resources needed to support its international objectives. The outer edges of national societies are merging with one another ever more rapidly. This calls for turning the face of the U.S. Government more toward the outside world and, in support of this effort, to develop improved means of marshaling the many activities involved into a more effective program.

Chapter II. The Congress

The dramatic rise of the United States to a role of world leadership has propelled the Congress to greater prominence in international affairs. The scope and costs of the new leadership responsibilities, the fading of the line between domestic and foreign policy, and the growing impact of international developments upon the domestic scene have been among the factors involving the Congress more intimately with foreign policy. More than half of the 36 standing committees now regularly deal with issues of international significance. This confronts the Congress with the same basic problem that faces the Government as a whole: the task of reconciling the competing concepts and requirements of a growing range of policies and organizational entities concerned with international affairs.

A. RELATIONS WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Before the Second World War, "foreign policy" was essentially what might be described as "political" foreign policy and the means and instruments to execute it. Issues like the tariff and immigration, and even the state and use of military power, were considered essentially "domestic." Under the separation of powers, the division of labor resulted in Presidential preeminence in the shaping and execution of foreign policy, in special activity and concern by the Senate because of its powers regarding treaties and appointments and the prerogatives flowing from them, and an intermittent concern by the Congress centering around periodic legislative issues or in response to crises.

Today most important policies bear on foreign affairs. This has affected the balance between the Congress and the Executive. Because the increasing involvement of the United States in world affairs requires constant and substantial legislative support, the Congress has become a more active participant in the foreign policy process, concerned not only with broad goals but with such vital elements as economic development, farm surpluses, shipping subsidies, and cultural contacts. At the same time, there are major obstacles that tend to frustrate the legislative role, including the growing volume and complexity of international transactions, the speed and flexibility with which many foreign policy matters must be handled, the limiting effect of having to work in harness with other countries, and the secrecy that conceals many of these activities.

The adjustment of the Congress and the Executive to this new state of affairs has been pragmatic. Executive-legislative relations have come to involve hundreds of public and private contacts between the two branches at many levels. Agencies and processes to facilitate the achievement of cooperation, whether involving legislation or not, have multiplied. Consultative subcommittees, briefing sessions, participation by legislators in international meetings, joint executive-

legislative commissions, strengthened staffs to maintain interbranch contact—all are efforts to bridge the gap.

The future promises to pose even more demanding tasks that will affect the division of responsibilities and the organization of relations between the two branches. Because the United States will be compelled to devote increasing attention and resources to foreign affairs, both sides will need to work together in a way that will enable them to deal adequately with the most fundamental issues without becoming bogged down in differences over detail. In order that the Congress as well as the Executive may act with the requisite speed, knowledge, and understanding, it will be desirable for increased time and energy to be devoted to strengthening the channels of information and consultation between the two branches on a basis that will discourage narrowly partisan distortion.

1. Division of responsibilities between the branches

Against this background there is the persistent issue: How should the roles of the Congress and the Executive be defined? It is not easy to draw a clear boundary between the activities of the two branches for the simple reason that they overlap considerably. Nonetheless, it is both feasible and desirable to keep in mind certain general distinctions between their roles based upon differences in their constitutional mandates and the functions and structures that have grown out of those mandates.

The essential role of the Congress is to provide a forum in which the representatives of hundreds of local constituencies may scrutinize and pass judgment on matters of national policy requiring legislative action. The individual Member of Congress is not simply a passive transmitter of the "public will" but a creative leader and interpreter as well. His main concern is to make certain that the interests he feels he represents are adequately protected and promoted. When those interests are not involved or are more or less evenly balanced, the Member is freer to act in accordance with his personal views, which is often the case with foreign policy. The general functions he has a responsibility to perform are to participate in enacting necessary legislative authorizations and appropriations and to inquire into policy problems and governmental actions related to those functions. While the Congress does not have the authority, staff, or time to oversee all of the details of day-to-day formulation and execution of foreign policy, it is, and has a right to be, vitally interested in those details that affect its constituents' particular interests as well as broader policy objectives and programs.

The distinct nature of the Executive role flows from its basic responsibility to manage the multitudinous activities of the Federal Government within the limits of the laws and resources provided by the Congress. It follows that the Executive has no choice but to be concerned with all, rather than only some, of the details of daily policy. It must not only develop general directives into practical programs but, in turn, translate those programs into effective action. From these responsibilities flow the requirements for personnel and other resources that are capable of dealing with this vast range of affairs and at the same time are organized in such a way as to be responsible to a single, rather than multiple, source of authority representing the Nation as a whole.

Given this basic division of responsibilities, what specific functions should the Congress be expected to perform to carry out its role?

1. It has a responsibility to identify and inquire into problems that may call for legislative action.

2. It shares with the Executive the function of framing broad national objectives.

3. It can help to estimate the relative merits of alternative approaches to dealing with various problems.

4. It may give attention, on a selective basis, to questions of detail related to broader issues.

5. It has the exclusive responsibility for enacting authorization and appropriation legislation.

6. It can help, as part of its investigatory function, to evaluate the performance of the Executive, again on a selective basis.

The general conclusion that emerges from this discussion is that while both the President and the Congress have some exclusive prerogatives, the major portion of their functions are shared. The President alone is vested with "the executive power" to see "that the laws be faithfully executed." The Congress alone is endowed with "all legislative powers." But these mandates are interdependent and, therefore, call for a large area of interlocking powers which are the basis for legislative participation in the functions of inquiry, the formulation of general goals, the identification of major problems, the selective appraisal of alternative courses of action, and the evaluation of past policies and actions.

2. Cooperation in relation to public opinion

A joint responsibility of the Congress and the Executive that deserves special emphasis is that of maintaining effective relations with the public which ultimately sets the limits of maneuver within which those who shape and execute policy must operate. The climate of opinion that emerges from the public is the product of many interacting factors—the impact of mass media, the activity of hundreds of interest groups, the initiatives of public leaders, the influence of foreign opinion, and the weighing of issues and individuals through the channels of party politics.

The anticipated course of future world developments promises to impose greater burdens than ever on the public in relation to foreign policy. At the same time, the obstacles to public understanding threaten to become even more severe. These include the secrecy that often shrouds official deliberations, the bewildering pace of change, and the intricacy of the issues. While this report cannot accommodate a detailed treatment of the role of public opinion, it is pertinent to consider briefly a few alternative approaches to thinking about the relationship between the Government, particularly the Congress, and the general public with respect to foreign policy.

One point of view would place minimal emphasis on governmental efforts to cultivate contacts with the public through informational activities. This attitude stems largely from the feeling that such efforts run the risk of putting the Government in the position of "selling" programs to the people, of manipulating them. There is also the concern that the general public cannot be expected to be well informed or active in relation to the daily flow of international affairs.

Another view is that the Congress and the executive branch should support a stronger foreign policy information program for the general public. The lives of all Americans are touched by the Nation's international policies; it is their survival which is at stake. The public's attitudes toward crucial foreign policies may be seriously distorted by the tendencies of some media toward sensationalism and superficiality.

A third view holds that a more systematic and energetic effort should be made to bring leaders of public opinion into closer touch with the officials and processes that shape U.S. foreign policy. These leaders are extremely important in informing and mobilizing the public and are most likely to make the best use of such an opportunity.

Many devices could be used to implement this third alternative. More high-level briefings might be conducted by the executive departments for selected groups. Some agencies, such as the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, have devised programs for Reserve officers and private citizens in various cities which could serve as models for the foreign affairs field. More opportunities might be given to leading individuals to take part in the policy process as consultants, temporary staff members, delegates, or visitors abroad. Arrangements to provide information and other services for groups conducting programs in world affairs could be strengthened. The Congress could contribute by reinforcing its relations with special groups and the media that reach those groups. Hearings could be held in various parts of the country, and Members of the Congress might more frequently form bipartisan teams to explain aspects of foreign policy and to sample attitudes. A few Members have already performed valuable services in this regard and have developed effective means of discussing the essence of policy with community audiences.

Of these three broad alternatives, the second and third are the most promising. If the Government is to move in the direction of bringing the public into closer touch with governmental policy, it will be necessary to have more adequate continuing collaboration between the two branches regarding both substantive and procedural aspects of the effort. The Congress should provide broad directives for this purpose and the necessary authority and funds to give life to the directives.

The factor of secrecy is of vital importance here. Some secrecy is necessary, but it can be used as a shield against legitimate criticism. As more governments impose restrictions on the flow of information, the public becomes increasingly dependent upon governmental releases. This can lead to serious distortion of public attitudes. Because there will always be justification for some measure of secrecy, especially in relation to matters close to the heart of national security, the solution must be one of degree. The direction should generally be toward a more permissive balance between concealment and disclosure that will provide the public with the basic information it needs to fulfill its responsibilities with regard to fundamental issues.

The politically responsible leaders of the executive and legislative branches play a primary role in this process of public enlightenment. It is their responsibility to interpret major policies to the people, to elevate their understanding, and to draw strength from them. The American statesman has also acquired—whether he fully realizes it or not—a constituency of hundreds of millions of people in other lands.

He is part of the public image of America which is swiftly conveyed to the most remote parts of the world.

In summary, it would seem desirable that the Congress and the executive branch cooperate to establish more effective relations with the general public in the realm of foreign policy. Increased efforts should be made to maintain close contact with leadership groups and the communications media that serve those groups. To this end, the barrier of secrecy should be reduced to the lowest level consistent with the essential requirements of national security.

3. Partisanship versus bipartisanship

Given this allocation of roles and functions and the joint responsibilities of the two branches, there is the question: What should be the place of bipartisanship in the relations between the executive and legislative branches as well as within the Congress itself? The roots of postwar bipartisanship may be traced to the two-party collaboration on the United Nations Charter during the Second World War, but its development as a continuing concept dates especially from the 80th Congress (1947-48).¹ According to its proponents, bipartisan ship recognizes the necessity in foreign affairs of a high degree of responsibility and continuity in a hazardous world, and it represents an effort to overcome the dangers of disunity and delay to which a system of separation of powers is particularly susceptible. Those who resist bipartisan collaboration, or who would concede it only during periods of severe crisis, argue that bipartisanship clouds the issues, stifles useful criticism, dilutes the quality of policy in the search for agreement, and concedes excessive influence to the minority party and to the Congress. These critics claim that bipartisanship enables those in a majority to take disproportionate credit for successes and is a vehicle to diffuse responsibility in defeats and crises.

In practice, bipartisanship, or "nonpartisanship" as some have preferred to call it, has meant cooperation of many types and degrees between executive branch officials and coalitions of Republicans and Democrats in the Congress. Because of the unique qualities and responsibilities of the Senate and the leading roles of men like Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, bipartisan arrangements involving the Senate have been more significant and more publicized than in the case of the House. The foreign policy committees have been main centers of bipartisanship, but the trend, in the past decade in particular, has been to draw party leaders and other influential members not assigned to the foreign policy committees into the process. Crisis situations have sometimes resulted in a formal display of bipartisan unity in the absence of significant advance consultation, as in the case of the movement to give aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and the Formosa resolution of early 1955. On the other hand, questions concerning the Middle East, the plight of Nationalist China beginning in 1948, and the conduct of the war in Korea have been seared by bitter partisanship.

Bipartisanship is a necessary means, in the U.S. system of government, of mobilizing strong and continuing political support for major policy positions. It does not require binding and unalterable commit-

¹ Two recent studies of bipartisanship are Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "Bipartisan Foreign Policy, Myth or Reality?" (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957), and H. Bradford Westerfield, "Foreign Policy and Party Politics, Pearl Harbor to Korea" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

ments between the parties but an attitude that encourages objective, responsible action regarding issues of greatest significance to the national security. This concept would include a full sharing of the essential facts and honest negotiation on the basis of those facts, undistorted by extreme partisanship.

Because of the leading role of the President, the political party in charge of the executive branch must assume the major responsibility for taking the initiative in building coalitions of bipartisan support in the Congress. The minority party, or the majority party in a situation of divided party control, cannot be expected to abdicate its responsibility to explore policy alternatives and to vote its convictions when it cannot, after conscientious and thorough consultation, vote with the leadership of the other party.

Because the requirements of bipartisanship in terms of goals and procedures still remain somewhat nebulous, it would be helpful if the foreign policy committees of the House and the Senate would initiate a thorough review of bipartisanship. The purpose should be to gain a clearer and more widely shared understanding of the need for, and requirements of, bipartisanship.

This discussion leads to the conclusion that: The increasing importance of foreign policy to the security of the country calls for continuing bipartisan collaboration regarding the most critical issues. This does not require any inflexible commitment between the parties but calls for a voluntary understanding that they will conscientiously strive, through objective consultation and a candid sharing of essential data, to reach agreement on matters of major significance. To this end, it would be useful for the two foreign policy committees to undertake a review of the rationale and requirements of bipartisanship.

4. Other means of strengthening interbranch cooperation

Additional means of reinforcing interbranch collaboration have been suggested by the score. Except for a few proposals that would break too sharply with the Constitution and traditional practice, such as formal executive-legislative councils or proposals to import major segments of the parliamentary system, the Congress and the Executive have been willing to experiment. Without exaggeration, it can be said that the principal feasible means of facilitating responsible cooperation have been tried. The difficulties in exploiting these lie partly in the attitude of Members of Congress and the executive branch regarding the allocation of time, attention, energy, and thought.

The main question to be considered here is: What steps might be taken to strengthen executive-legislative relations with regard to foreign policy?

One important channel for this purpose is the executive apparatus designed to maintain close relations with the Congress. Each department and agency concerned with foreign policy has a legislative staff to manage contacts with the Hill on a full-time basis, but they rely heavily on the substantive leadership for important testimony. The Department of State elevated its top legislative liaison officer to Assistant Secretary rank in 1949 and now has approximately six professional staff members to assist him. Several people in the White House office are also in close touch with the Congress. To keep these links strong, the executive leadership expends tremendous amounts of

time and energy in preparing and delivering testimony, as well as in maintaining less formal relations. They know that they are dependent on congressional understanding and support, and that they must perform well to win the votes of those legislators who follow such matters conscientiously. One former Secretary of State has estimated that, during his years in Washington, he never devoted less than one-sixth of his time to dealing with the Congress, and for months at a time this function consumed most of his effort.² At the same time, executive personnel are wary about these relations because they know that the Congress has both a constitutional and a political incentive to find chinks in the executive armor and that, in irresponsible hands, the legislative power can be used destructively.

Although executive relations with the Congress have been strengthened, they could be further improved. An essential ingredient is an attitude on the part of executive personnel that understands the potential role of the Congress as an ally and appreciates the many able legislators who are prepared to deal fairly with the Executive. Another major need is a more continuous effort to consult with the relevant Members of Congress, not only when a crisis arises but on a regular basis, and the direction of more attention to committees other than the two foreign policy committees. Better means need to be devised to consult with a larger proportion of the membership of the Congress. Finally, it would be well to develop further the effort to achieve more regular contact between the top leadership of both branches. Problems of tradition, time, substance, partisanship, and personal idiosyncrasies have restricted such meetings, but they remain both desirable and feasible within limits.

On the legislative side, it is also important to foster a favorable climate of opinion—one that will encourage full, regular, and constructive consultation with appropriate representatives of the executive branch. In addition, there are organizational problems which are discussed further below. Suffice it to say here that arrangements such as the existing consultative subcommittees of the foreign relations committees should be supported so that full advantage may be taken of the opportunities for improved executive-legislative contact. This calls for staff, adequate in number and competence, to help maintain these relations.

This discussion points to the recommendation that: A major prerequisite for improved executive-legislative relations is a frame of mind on both sides that will encourage full and regular consultation with the object of striving to find mutually satisfactory bases for collaboration. This calls for organizational arrangements that will marshal the requisite time and energy to support these efforts.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS

The Congress is characterized by wide dispersal of power, leadership, and authority which makes it difficult to develop a unified strategy and reconcile conflicting policies. While both branches of government are troubled by the pressures of friction and diffusion, the Congress finds it particularly difficult to create structures and processes that will foster unity because of the inherent partisan conflict, the

² Dean Acheson, "A Citizen Looks at Congress" (1956), pp. 64-70.

division between the two Chambers, and the traditional reluctance to accept centralized leadership.

Each house displays distinctive characteristics that condition its response to foreign policy. The Senate's exclusive power to consent to treaties and to major Presidential appointments, coupled with the tradition that the President should consult it about foreign policy generally, have enhanced the prestige and influence of the Senate.

In the past, the House of Representatives occasionally exerted strong influence in foreign affairs in response to public moods, but its concern was episodic. Now the House is involved almost as deeply as the Senate. The powers it shares with the Senate, and its special custodianship of the Nation's purse, are major sources of support for the conduct of the Nation's business overseas.³

1. Institutions and processes to deal with foreign affairs

The committees are the key to congressional behavior. Their decisions, more often than not, become the decisions of each house. The most important committees on foreign policy are still the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Both are looked to by their respective Chambers for leadership regarding general foreign policy developments. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations enjoys an especially favorable position in this respect, partly because of the special constitutional powers of the Senate and its tradition built up since the early history of the Republic. A particularly close relationship of confidence usually prevails between a few committee members and officials of the executive branch. This relationship provides a means for consultation about delicate foreign policy developments which it is deemed unwise to publicize and aids in building a bridge of understanding and support between the branches.

The consultative subcommittees established by each committee provide a more systematic means for continuing communication with the executive branch about particular geographic areas and other policy matters. A striking example of the value of this device was displayed in the intimate collaboration between the Far Eastern Affairs Subcommittee in the Senate and the Department of State in shaping the Japanese peace settlement in 1951 and 1952.⁴ But a majority of the consultative subcommittees are inactive much of the time; even when they meet, it is difficult for members to devote much time to them. As a consequence of this inactivity and the tendency of the parent committees to concentrate on legislation, significant areas of foreign policy may be neglected until a crisis arises.

Other legislative committees of the House and Senate also deal with policies that bear upon international affairs. The committees on armed services have an especially crucial jurisdiction. While both committees on armed services have been compelled to air interservice disputes, and have probed from time to time into aspects of preparedness, the largest fraction of their time is consumed by legislation and problems concerned with such operational matters as military construction and personnel. Vital questions about broad military policy

³ A recent study of the new importance of the House is Holbert N. Carroll, "The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs" (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958).

⁴ See Bernard C. Cohen, "The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

that bear importantly on the survival of the United States and its position in world affairs receive less attention. This choice in emphasis reflects in part the bewildering complexity of the issues raised by the revolution in military techniques and the reluctance to overrule the decisions of professional military experts.

The House Committee on Science and Astronautics and the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences have also acquired jurisdiction over matters of significant military and international concern. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has jurisdiction over the military applications of nuclear energy. The committees on government operations have an important voice concerning administrative aspects of foreign policy.

Virtually every other legislative committee conducts some business that may be classified as foreign policy. A dozen standing committees, in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations, deal with aspects of foreign economic policy. These units are all deeply rooted in the domestic scene and vary widely in the extent to which they weigh the foreign policy implications of their decisions.

All foreign policy legislation approved by the Congress and the President is again reviewed, if money is involved, by the committees on appropriations. In theory, these committees are not concerned with the substance of policy, only the cost of what has already been authorized. In fact, they regularly make financial choices involving substantive judgments. In some policy areas for which the Congress grants long-term authority for appropriations, as in major areas of military policy, the money committees are the principal instruments of legislative control.

Each appropriations committee is a holding company for powerful subcommittees that dominate the financial decisions regarding their respective fields. Considerable influence is wielded by the chairmen of these subcommittees. The subcommittee decisions about their fractions of the budget are usually ratified without extensive deliberation by the full committees. The congressional judgment about the budget as a whole is the sum of its separate actions as compiled at the end of a legislative session.

The House subcommittees work much of the time in executive session, in virtual isolation from the substantive committees and from one another. The Senate group employs subcommittees for conducting most of its business, but, by contrast, the full committee considers foreign aid appropriations, and a larger proportion of its business is conducted in public. The rules of the Senate which provide for representation from the substantive committees to the appropriations subcommittees, and the fact that all committee members serve on another important committee, provide the basis for a blending of fiscal and substantive judgments by the Senate group.

When the activities of the committees on appropriations are added to the activities of the substantive committees, it is evident that at least half of the standing committees of Congress directly affect foreign policy. Occasionally committees cooperate closely, or special committees are devised to work in overlapping policy areas. An example is the Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, which was active in 1956 and 1957 and which drew its

membership from the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services. But most of the committees and their staffs work quite independently of one another. Each carefully guards its jurisdiction. In some instances, subcommittees have become quite independent entities, pursuing inquiries and engaging in other activities over which the parent committees exercise only nominal control. The directing influence of legislative and executive leadership, personal ties among members and staffs, and the fact that a Member of the Senate serves on two major committees modify these barriers but still leave much to be desired in the way of communication among these units.

The behavior of all committees, and thus of each House, is affected by the practice of awarding committee chairmanships according to seniority. Some members who rise to these posts have exceptional capacity and experience; others do not. While the seniority rule has been modified in practice on rare occasions, it is normally enforced because most Members prefer not to risk the controversy that would be involved in a more selective process.

The top party leaders rarely exert their influence at the level of committee activity. They are careful to respect the prerogatives of the chairmen and the ranking members of the committees. On the floor they usually support the bipartisan coalition in charge of a measure. When either House threatens to engage in what they consider to be a major aberration, or when the achievement of agreement is difficult, they employ their leadership resources more rigorously. Seldom do party meetings discuss foreign policy issues and relate these to party policy or to the broader picture of general legislative policy. The leaders are commonly drawn into executive-legislative consultations regarding foreign affairs and in unpublicized ways work to promote responsible agreement regarding foreign policy issues both within the Congress and between the branches. The President maintains continuing contact with his party leaders.

Except in times of grave crisis, broad foreign policy issues must contend with heavy competition in the allocation of a Member's time, attention, and thought. This generalization is less true for the members of the foreign policy committees, but even they are often so overwhelmed by other burdens that they find it difficult to give extended attention to general international developments. Most Members of the Congress feel that it is necessary to concentrate primarily on domestic issues that preoccupy most of their constituents.

Despite these difficulties, some Members have been sufficiently concerned with the critical importance of international issues to devote a major portion of their energies to foreign policy and, in some cases, they have acquired extraordinary expertise. Despite the generally domestic orientation of the public, there has been a trend toward greater interest in international affairs, especially as the result of two World Wars. In response to these changes, each political party has been gradually reorienting its consideration of foreign affairs toward a concept of national interest that is broader than the particulars of sectional demands.

2. Toward improved coordination

Every Member of the Congress knows that foreign policy in its new dimensions embraces a wide span of related policies. Military, polit-

6 ical, economic, psychological, scientific, and other factors must be blended. Excessive fragmentation of effort impedes a comprehensive and balanced consideration of national policy and produces a sense of frustration. Coordination of policy is largely an executive function, but the Congress also has an obligation to be in a position to make judgments about the broad range of foreign policy based on a unified analysis of the many aspects of that policy.

The problem considered here is: How can the Congress better coordinate its consideration of foreign policy?

3. Special briefing for Members

The Congress should provide adequate means for its Members and staffs to acquire a broad understanding of the new dimensions of foreign policy. Some legislators, especially members of the committees most directly concerned, have already gained exceptional knowledge and experience in this field. The Congress is continually educating itself through hearings, studies, travel, and other means. But as foreign policy ranges more broadly and becomes more intricate, the need for a more adequate system of keeping the Congress informed grows apace. Even those Members who acquire considerable expertise on specific questions often lack a sufficient comprehension of broader, more long-range developments.

This calls for increased systematic efforts to help keep busy legislators and their staffs abreast of fast-moving developments that are shaping the Nation's strategy. Special attention needs to be given to those who are not so intimately connected with foreign policy matters.

The objective should not be to develop highly specialized experts. The purpose should be to provide an opportunity for legislators and aides to acquire wide general knowledge and understanding. Such briefing would not run counter to the primary representational function of a Member of Congress; it would reinforce that function. The Member would be in a better position to respond intelligently to public opinion and to provide stronger leadership. Such a program would seem best suited to the newer Members of Congress who labor under a handicap in acquiring the knowledge which others of long service have been able to absorb over the years.

This background information could be provided in various ways. Governmental institutions, for example, have devised effective means of conveying in short time spans knowledge of the many dimensions of national security policy. The concentrated national strategy conferences devised by the National War College provide a possible model. The Congress could appoint a special staff, possibly under the Library of Congress, to conduct sessions at places and times most convenient for legislators. Special hearings and debates could be organized for this purpose. Because the pressure of other duties is a major obstacle, the success of such a program would depend in large measure on the support given it by the leadership.

4. Role of the foreign policy committees

6 Another way of weaving the many strands of policy together more effectively is to look to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as the primary centers of coordinating influence in their respective Chambers. It must be recognized, however, that their role will continue to be restricted by

certain limitations. Some foreign policy issues, such as commercial and communication problems, are closely associated with domestic spheres of interest and will continue to be considered by committees that are more domestically oriented than the foreign policy groups. There is, in fact, a positive advantage in exploiting the possibilities of specialization among the several committees. It is desirable to have many committees feel involved in, and identified with, international affairs. To centralize all foreign policy matters in just two committees would not only be unfeasible but would place too much power in the hands of too few Members.

The principal foreign policy committees, nonetheless, lie closest to the heart of foreign policy, have the most extensive experience, and are best staffed to provide general guidance in the foreign policy field. Their jurisdictions result in continuing contact between their members and leading officials of the executive branch. They are generally regarded as the principal centers for thinking about international issues in the broadest sense. It would be neither desirable nor feasible to attempt to displace them. Rather, efforts should be made to strengthen their leadership roles. This can best be done by selecting able Members and by strengthening their relations with the leadership and other related committees.

5. The party leadership

The organization and behavior of political parties and their leadership condition the entire process of democratic government and the response of the United States to the rest of the world. The competition for nominations, campaigns, elections, and the quality of party leadership in and out of the Congress have a direct bearing on foreign affairs. Party leaders are logical channels for coordinating party, interparty, legislative, and executive attitudes at all stages of the legislative process and across broad policy areas.

The state of American political parties is being vigorously debated today, and many proposals for reform have been advanced. While the limitations of this report do not permit an extended discussion of the party system as it bears on foreign policy, it is relevant to say that the potential contribution of political parties has been only partly tapped. If strengthened, the political parties could provide more useful means than have yet been developed of marshaling the best resources of the Nation to deal with major foreign policy issues.

The present limitations on party leadership are well known. Yet, even in these circumstances, the leadership has on occasion been able to achieve admirable results, and could, within a sympathetic climate, provide even more effective direction in helping each House to achieve better coordination of its actions, to facilitate cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, and to aid in fostering bipartisan collaboration.

6. Creation of a national security committee

Another possible means of bringing the leadership together with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the principal committees concerned with international questions would be the creation of a select committee to study, review, and inquire in the broad field of national security policy. The experiment could be conducted on a joint basis or separately by each House. The Joint Economic Committee provides a possible model.

The Congress annually considers a significant proportion of national security policy when it deals with the mutual security program and with military appropriations. The two foreign policy committees have also engaged in general reviews beyond what was required for specific legislation. But there is still no comprehensive analysis of the broad range of national security policy through the coordinated efforts of the main committees concerned with international affairs. A select committee, representing the leadership and key committees, conceivably could help the Congress to fill this gap. Such a body would not displace the foreign policy committees but could be a complementary channel through which their leaders, together with others, might coordinate this aspect of congressional policy.

There are, of course, many obstacles. The chief difficulty is the traditional independence of congressional committees which makes them extremely sensitive to any unifying effort. And, if the authority of the committee is to be purely advisory, rather than directly legislative, it may not evoke the best efforts of its members. Nonetheless, it could perform a useful function if the key foreign policy leaders were determined to make it work. Thus it seems worth trying.

An alternative to a select committee would be for the foreign policy committee of each House to develop further its periodic reviews of national security policy and to invite leading members of other committees to participate. An example is the Special Senate Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program which conducted a tricommittee study in 1957.

7. Conclusions

The justification for these various proposals is the assumption that what is needed in the Congress, as in the executive branch, is greater integration of the many strands of foreign policy. The obstacles seem great because of the constant pull of political requirements toward domestic concerns, the stress on partisan tactics, the resistance to centralized party direction, and the inclination to distrust the Executive. Prospective trends challenge the Congress, however, to continue to strengthen those structures and processes that would facilitate broader, more integrated, and more farsighted study and action. The general foreign policy committees remain the strongest centers for unifying legislative policy, but their efforts should be reinforced by improved collaboration with the leadership and other committees, possibly within the framework of a select committee on national security, and by a better mobilization of the resources of the political parties.

8. The appropriation process

Another broad issue before the Congress as it prepares for the future is: How might the appropriation process be improved with respect to foreign affairs? Compelled to seek annual authorizations and appropriations, forced to obligate most of the funds appropriated in a single year, bound by complex limitations placed on the use of funds, many executive officials believe that the Congress should permit more flexibility in the administration of foreign policy. Others feel that the executive branch already has sufficient freedom. Still others argue that the Congress should control and instruct even more in the future than it has in the past.

9. *Authorization legislation*

Continuing annual authorizations are defended on the ground that they enable the Congress—through the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees—to remain firmly in control of foreign affairs programs, with periodic opportunities for adjustment to the world situation. Despite the annual cycle, it is possible to operate on a basis of continuity if the Congress is so disposed.

Another approach would institute permanent authorizations for some, or all, foreign affairs programs. This would provide a more solid base for long-range planning. Permanent authorization would provide a framework for building stronger administrative institutions, including more adequate personnel systems. On the other hand, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees would not automatically have a legislative basis for reviewing the programs each year, although they could always do so if they chose to. Budgetary considerations could weigh even more heavily in congressional decisions if only the appropriations committees dealt with the programs.

A third possibility, authorization for a substantial but limited number of years according to the peculiar requirements of each program, would provide the basis for long-range project planning and sufficient stability to improve personnel and other administrative practices. At the same time, this would involve less relaxation of congressional control. But this approach shares the disadvantages of the second approach. The substantive committees might not only lose influence but might lose interest and skill.

In view of these considerations, the third approach—authorization for a substantial but limited period according to the special requirements of each program—appears most appropriate for both the needs of the Congress and for the foreign affairs programs of the executive agencies. It would give a degree of permanence to foreign affairs programs and free the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees from the automatic annual review procedure which imposes heavy demands on their energies and the energies of large numbers of persons in the executive branch. At the same time, the authorizations could always be altered at the will of Congress, and the substantive committees could review the programs even without altering the legislation.

10. *Appropriation legislation*

A related problem concerns the period of time for which appropriations should be made available. The most traditional pattern is the 1-year cycle by which means the Congress—as well as the Bureau of the Budget and the President—can maintain especially close control over agency programs. If funds were made available for longer periods, they might be spent at a time when the purpose for which they were granted could no longer be realized by their expenditure. The 1-year limit forces agencies to operate rapidly in order to make use of each year's appropriations. The annual review keeps agencies conscious on a year-to-year basis of their accountability to the Congress and the public.

Unlimited availability, on the other hand, would provide maximum flexibility. Furthermore, the Congress could still control the rate of spending by limiting the amount appropriated even though it remained available for an indefinite period. But the opponents of this

approach fear that it would weaken congressional control too severely.

A third procedure would provide longer but still limited availability according to the needs of each program. This would retain considerable congressional control while making possible projects of a more long-term nature. "Pipelines" should not be overextended however, nor projects indefinitely approved because conditions may change. There is considerable support for at least a 2-year period coinciding with a single session of Congress.

Finally, to bypass the appropriation process altogether, a fourth device would authorize direct borrowing from the Treasury, as is presently done with certain lending institutions such as the Export-Import Bank. This would free the President to act when necessary without having to seek funds from the Congress through the laborious and short-term appropriation process. Such funds could be "revolving" and not require additional appropriations from the Congress. This does not seem appropriate, however, except for a legitimate lending function because it has normally been based on the assumption that the funds would rotate.

In view of the need for more effective long-range programing, it seems essential to relax the present 1-year cycle to some extent, permitting somewhat longer periods, though seldom indefinite, according to the special exigencies of each activity. Borrowing authority should generally be reserved for functions of a lending nature. It should also be understood that the Congress could review the program each year and could change the system at any time.

11. Budgetary procedures in Congress

In what ways might the Congress improve its internal procedures for handling the budget? This has been the subject of many studies, and the Congress has experimented with various procedures.⁵ The major innovations, the legislative budget of 1947 and 1948 and the experiment with an omnibus appropriation bill in 1950, were abandoned after brief trial.

The existing procedures still leave much to be desired. The Congress does not examine the budget as a whole and relate its actions on individual appropriation acts to the broad picture. Appropriations for foreign policy purposes are not viewed sufficiently in the perspective of a comprehensive national strategy and often suffer unduly amidst the competing pressures for domestic programs. Because the substantive and appropriations committees work in relative isolation from one another, there is duplication of effort, and the quality of the congressional performance suffers.

One possible means of improving the situation would be to have the committees on appropriations examine the budget as a whole and set broad guidelines for the subcommittees working on various segments of the budget. The deliberations of the subcommittees would be periodically reviewed by their respective parent committees to provide general guidance.

Another proposal is that each parent committee file a report with its respective House setting forth its general observations on the budget and the choices it entails. This report could then be debated in each

⁵ A leading study which deals with the subject at some length is Arthur Smithies, "The Budgetary Process in the United States" (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1955).

Chamber before acting on particular appropriation bills. The form of the executive budget would have to be improved, however, to emphasize the broad policy concepts and programs embodied in the budget as a basis for legislative evaluation.

To reduce the gap between the substantive and appropriations committees it has been proposed that the Congress revert to the practice of combining these two functions within single committees. This flows logically from the premise that policy and budgetary decisions should be inextricably bound together. But there is little likelihood of winning congressional approval for this suggestion. Even if it were adopted, there would still be the problem of coordinating the new committees.

Another approach would be to have the subcommittees of the House Committee on Appropriations include representation from the appropriate substantive committees, as is now done in the Senate.

Finally, the committees on appropriations could work more closely with the substantive committees. In major policy areas, such as military policy and foreign aid, cooperation in reviewing performance would conserve an enormous amount of executive and legislative energy and would be likely to produce better results. The substantive and appropriations committees would be in a better position to make responsible judgments about both the merits of particular policies and the appropriate levels of future support.

In weighing these several proposals concerning the handling of the budget, it would seem desirable to move further in the direction of relating individual appropriation acts to a broader policy perspective. While it has not proved feasible to formulate a "legislative budget," it should be possible to mobilize a clearer concept of general policy and budgetary guidelines that would help to coordinate the various appropriations subcommittees. Conceivably the proposed Joint Committee on National Security Policy could serve this purpose. In any event, it is certainly desirable and feasible that closer cooperation be developed between the various substantive committees and their counterpart appropriations subcommittees. This is not to suggest that one side should try to bind the other, but merely that policy would benefit from a full and continuing confrontation of thinking on both sides. The pressure of time is a major obstacle here, but this need is so great and so fundamental that it would seem to deserve a high priority.

12. Toward more adequate staff

Congressional staffing is necessarily restricted by a number of factors, including the distinction between legislative and executive functions. The Congress cannot expect to match the scale of the executive staff. Nonetheless, to play a responsible role in foreign affairs, the Congress needs able assistance to provide essential information and analysis.

At the present, the staff resources in the foreign policy area seem extremely modest. Under the terms of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs are each authorized to employ four professional staff members and six clerical assistants, including a chief clerk and an assistant chief clerk. Occasionally, however, special resolutions are adopted which permit each of these commit-

tees to augment the regular staff.⁶ In addition, the Legislative Reference Service employs only a total of 16 foreign policy experts directly under the control of Congress. To these might be added the professional staffs of the two Committees on Armed Services which are also limited by the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. This small band must carry much of the burden of analyzing the complex, political, military, and economic programs disposing of some \$45 billion annually.

One way of strengthening these resources would be for the Congress to support at least a modest expansion of the professional staffs of those committees whose jurisdictions most intimately touch the field of foreign affairs. Reinforcement would be most desirable where the workload is so heavy that the staff is greatly handicapped in providing the services that the committee members feel are essential. At the same time, it should be remembered that the effectiveness of the staff depends less on its size and highly specialized expertise than on its ability to meet the peculiar and varied needs of the members. Furthermore, the staff should make maximum use of resources outside the Congress, both private and public.

The Congress might also support a modest expansion in the number of foreign affairs specialists in the Legislative Reference Service. The reinforcement of this staff has not kept pace with the demands made upon it by Members of the Congress and the committees.

The Congress and its committees might also make greater use of non-governmental sources of information and analyses in foreign affairs. A few committees, such as the Joint Economic Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations, have effectively used nongovernmental staff resources. These talents provide a wide variety of skills that can be called upon according to varying needs and that provide fresh perspectives.

The pay scales and working conditions of the professional and clerical staffs should be periodically reviewed to make certain that the Congress is attracting and keeping the necessary caliber of staff. The Congress should also make it possible for the members of the professional staffs to keep abreast of new developments by engaging in appropriate professional activities, including occasional leaves for training and research.

The Congress should also support, as necessary, a modest expansion in the staff resources of individual members to help them carry out their substantive, as distinguished from their service, functions. The problem should be carefully reviewed. Better mechanisms could perhaps be devised to handle routine constituent business on a common basis so that existing staff positions could be used increasingly to help the members perform their substantive functions.

policy role thrust upon it has, on the whole, been constructive and responsible. The complexities and subtleties of the institutions and processes of the Congress, as they are affected by tradition, personality,

⁶ For instance, under the terms of special resolutions adopted in the 1st session of the 86th Cong., the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations employed 15 people, 5 or 6 of whom engage in professional work from time to time.

C. SUMMARY: A BASIC ISSUE

The broad response of the Congress to the more prominent foreign partisanship, prerogative, and the fluctuating balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, often obscure this fundamental fact.

In looking to the problems of the future, a basic issue that each Member of the Congress faces is how he should distribute his time and energy. These individual allocations of resources have a direct and crucial bearing on the effectiveness of the Congress as a whole. The burdens of public service are enormous—far greater than the public realizes. Members of the Congress are generally overworked. As every Member knows, however, detached analysis would reveal that a large fraction of his energies is allocated to relatively peripheral activities which have accumulated from practices and habits of a simpler past when the issues were less crucial and complex.

In looking to the future, the Congress should reassess its role in the light of the vast changes that are taking place. The choice is up to the Congress. Basically, it is a question of reappraising priorities in relation to the interest of the Nation as a whole. Amendment of the Constitution and drastic changes in structure and procedures are not required. Modest adjustments, such as those suggested in this chapter, could mean substantial progress.

Chapter III. Executive Leadership

The President is the central figure in American foreign relations. Responsibility is fixed upon him. He has great authority, and the constitutional system, as well as the constitutional document, has given him the function of leadership. He may play his part well and wisely, or not; but he cannot escape it. This is a fundamental constitutional principle, understood by all, and most of all by the President. His effective leadership is essential.

The President's responsibility and authority, however, are not exclusive; they are shared. The nature of "foreign relations" today, in contrast with times past, has increased the sharing. As "international" relations have become "intranational" relations, and as social, economic, and defense activities of impressive proportions have become important in American foreign policy, they have brought the Congress more and more into the process of authorizing programs, appropriating funds, and appraising operations. The interaction of measures which are intended to have an effect abroad and those which are intended to have a domestic effect has increased, thus adding to the joint task of the President and Congress in rationally adjusting objectives, timing, and methods on a wide front of national policy.

The President and the Congress are also dependent upon others, as well as upon each other—for information, advice, and new ideas as well as for performance. The business of conducting foreign relations has become a big dynamic enterprise with a prodigious demand for alertness, imagination, professional and technical skill, cultural empathy, courage, vitality, and dedication. Busily engaged in this vast enterprise are political executives, Foreign Service officers, career civil servants, men plucked out of their normal pursuits in education, industry, or agriculture, and private citizens as employees of contractors, scattered over the United States and the rest of the world.

A. THE NATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LOAD

The President, the Congress, and the public have a special interest in the basic features of administrative organization at the highest levels. Here administrative organization provides the structure to support the principal responsibilities of democratic government. It establishes political and public responsibility as well as administrative accountability. It symbolizes the status and relationship of responsible officials and of important programs. It is almost the only means by which the citizen can visualize even in an approximate sense what his Government is up to. A well-conceived and well-understood top structure also is not without its symbolic uses to President, Congress, and even the humbler employees who work within it.

Essentially foreign policy as an administrative problem presents three questions and an overriding imperative: What to do? How to do it? When to do it? And to do it and get it done. Administrative

experience must feed back into the revision and perfection of policy. This contribution to the legislative process, broadly conceived, is vital if the process is not to be shut off from its biggest and most productive source of information and ideas.

There have always been questions of ends and of means, of timing and of followthrough. Why do they seem so difficult today? Perhaps it is the vast scale of operations. President Jefferson had to communicate with only a few ministers in foreign capitals, and these by letter infrequently. Perhaps it is the variety of endeavors which employ civil servants at home and abroad, the Military Establishment, and contractors ramifying throughout American life. President Washington worked hard at his job, but he had to direct only three departments, with the assistance of a part-time Attorney General. Perhaps it is the swift tempo or the overwhelming flood of information. Washington and Jefferson dealt with information on a few handwritten sheets of paper from limited sources, in contrast with machine-tabulated, mass-produced data, assembled almost instantaneously by mechanized media from literally multitudinous sources, private as well as public. Perhaps it is the urgency. At only a few brief periods in American history have responsible officials felt that mistakes could be fatal to their country.

Whatever the causes, the administration of national affairs, in general terms, today presents an exacting list of requirements:

1. Vision to determine ultimate goals that will retain their basic value and appeal in a changing world for which the past is by no means a complete guide; and foresight to anticipate difficulties not now readily seen.

2. Alertness and flexibility to pick the limited objectives that will lead to the ultimate goals, and to revise them as needed.

3. Multiple coordination of objectives, programs, operations that otherwise might conflict and neutralize each other, or leave embarrassing lacunae.

4. Timing—to act at the opportune moment, phasing into each other activities that may be sequentially dependent.

5. Conduct of technically advanced and complex operations on a large scale at low cost and with normal efficiency.

6. Contraction and expansion of enterprises which in their nature are not easily adaptable to this accordion movement.

7. Awareness of the aspirations, feelings, and reactions of people steeped in cultures foreign to ours, living amidst conditions it is difficult for us to comprehend, and with traditions that may be beyond our ken.

8. Bringing to this process a personal enthusiasm and dedication which go far beyond the kind of commitment that one would expect in a land where the success of what the Government attempted did not seem very important to very many people not very long ago.

There is almost no variety of administrative problem known to man which does not exist in some form today to be dealt with by the President, Congress, and Federal administrators; and "foreign relations" now are an integral and major part of this total process.

B. ADJUSTMENT TO THE LOAD—CYCLES AND DILEMMAS

Looking back over the period of growth in the national administration it is possible to note a cyclical process of adjustment.

New activities and new programs came into existence; and more often than not in recent years, they came into existence in new executive agencies—independent of the executive departments. In due course some of the programs were moved into executive departments, and others became new executive departments. But despite periodic revision in this way the revisions have tended to be rather modest adjustments. Additional programs lead to new agencies, and the total number of executive agencies continues to be large.

The Presidents, meanwhile, confronted with an ever-increasing volume of business, have sought assistance for the White House. First, they borrowed assistants from the executive departments, the President's "secretaries" were increased to three, military aides were put to work, and after 1939 the precedent of six administrative assistants was followed in the steady increase of assistants to the President, deputy assistants, and special assistants. The assistants had to have assistants, and in due course the several ranks of assistants were more or less organized under certain of their number: the assistant to the President; special assistants to the President, e.g., the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; the staff secretary; and the secretary to the Cabinet.

In 1939 the Executive Office of the President was conceived and established. Within it were brought or created staff agencies—"staff" in the sense that they assisted or acted for the Chief Executive but normally did not administer substantive programs. Not all survived; but some have come to be sturdy members in the machinery of government, e.g., the Bureau of the Budget. To these have been added "councils" with their own groups of employees—the Council of Economic Advisers; the National Security Council (the latter with its subordinate Operations Coordinating Board and Central Intelligence Agency); the National Aeronautics and Space Council; and temporary, advisory committees, e.g., the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

While the number of staff assistants and agencies in the Executive Office was increasing, their functions were also evolving—from handling records, to supplying information, to reviewing and analyzing documents (and situations), to advising, to negotiating, and to following up decisions or actions. A full-blown staff function has developed.

In this natural and not irrational evolutionary adjustment to the administrative load, two dilemmas and dangers are apparent.

The creation of new "independent" agencies immediately responsible to the President, often motivated by the desire to enhance their status and make sure that the Chief Executive will be actively responsible for them, in time makes it certain that they will have very little executive attention from the President. Increasing the Chief Executive's responsibility for direct supervision tends to make it a fiction.

When the adjustment takes the form of increasing the staff of assistants and assisting agencies in the Executive Office, at what point does the staff's attention substitute for the President's, and the President's direction of his own assistants and assisting agencies become only nominal? The Executive Office of the President has grown tremendously in both number of employees and scope of activities since it was established in 1939. Today the total personnel embraced by the Executive Office numbers more than 2,700. If the only escape from purely pro forma direction of too many executive departments and

agencies is to a form of staff supervision, there may be a net gain, but there may also be overly centralized administration with little increase in the participation of the Chief Executive.

This brings the discussion back to the main focus of this analysis, the President's responsibility for foreign policy and for the administration of foreign relations. The President is dependent upon the machinery of government to make good in his responsibilities. The machinery of 1800, or 1900, or even 1940 will not do for the Government of 1960. This is recognized, and new machinery has been added, piece by piece, since the Second World War, specifically to deal with matters of national security and foreign policy. Before reviewing this machinery to suggest further changes to be considered, three points should be noted:

- (1) It is easier to devise machinery for particular purposes than to consider its total impact as an addition to the already existing structure; the motivations for additions have in fact been particularistic.

- (2) To keep the structure adequate and up to date requires continuing attention to the mainline of operating command, as well as to staff offices and aids.


- (3) It is not safe to be content with anything less than the best structural arrangements that can be devised. Foreign relations as an administrative problem have more than enough inherent problems without adding to their difficulty by awkward or ill-designed administrative arrangements.

As the machinery of government has evolved, efforts to cope with new burdens have taken the form of added or new types of executive assistance, now chiefly within the Executive Office of the President, or of reorganization of the operating departments and agencies as new programs have been established or modified. These categories will be used in reviewing the present structure and in suggesting changes to be considered.

C. THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE ASSISTANCE

Closest to the President is the White House Office of some 400 persons. It includes an assistant to the President, a deputy assistant, two secretaries, a special counsel, various special and administrative assistants, a staff secretary, a secretary to the Cabinet, and a household staff. Within this organization are located the President's Special Assistants for National Security Affairs, Security Operations Coordination, and Foreign Economic Policy. The Assistant to the President has come to be recognized as a virtual chief of staff. Another aid has been designated Staff Secretary and is responsible for a variety of secretariat functions including supervision of the preparation and flow of White House paperwork, checking on the implementation of Presidential decisions, marshaling the daily intelligence, and preparing "staff notes" to alert the President to emerging problems and events. Another innovation has been the appointment of a Secretary to the Cabinet who organizes the preparatory and followup work surrounding Cabinet deliberations.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH



Not part of the White House Office (and one degree farther removed from the President) but part of the Executive Office are the Bureau of the Budget (1921), the Council of Economic Advisers (1946), the National Security Council (1947), the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (1953, 1958), the National Aeronautics and Space Council (1958), and the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (1953).

Together these Executive Office agencies represent efforts to equip the Chief Executive to deal with basic managerial decisions, to fix the President's responsibility for leadership in planning, and to involve him personally in formal interdepartmental consultations. These agencies themselves must coordinate their efforts, while attempting officially to aid the President to fulfill his executive role with reference to the executive departments and agencies.

The National Security Council which has a statutory basis in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, is, in fact, an inner Cabinet for national security policy rather than a staff agency. In formal terms, it is the highest committee in the Government for the resolution of national security questions. The statutory members of the Council include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. The President may, and does, also invite any other official who he feels should participate in the discussion of particular matters. Those who attend most frequently on this basis include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serve as statutory advisers on military and intelligence matters.

The next level of officials of Assistant Secretary rank has, since 1953, been called the Planning Board; previously it was known as the Senior Staff. The Planning Board is aided by a lower echelon group of officials called Board assistants who meet regularly and do much of the preliminary work. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs acts as Chairman of the Planning Board, works closely with the small staff attached to the National Security Council and is, as his title implies, a key link between the Council and the President.

A major addition to this structure was the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board in 1953. It was an outgrowth of the Psychological Strategy Board, established in 1951, and consists of Cabinet agency officials of Under Secretary rank together with certain agency heads corresponding to the general composition of the National Security Council. The prescribed function of the Board is to advise with the agencies concerned in their development, in more specific operational detail, of the general policies developed within the National Security Council structure and approved by the President, to facilitate a voluntary acceptance of specific responsibilities by the several departments and agencies, and to report periodically on the progress made. The Board has its own staff, separate from the National Security Council-Planning Board staff and, since 1957, a Presidential Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination. It also has its own group of Board assistants. Its approximately 50

interdepartmental working groups oversee the execution of policy dealing with particular regional and functional problems.

In the Executive Office there are also several interdepartmental committees that operate in the area of foreign economic policy and will be discussed later in this report.¹

Finally, there have been numerous ad hoc study groups, such as the recent Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (the "Draper Committee").

The Executive Office is in part the result of efforts to assist the President to fulfill his Chief Executive functions and in part the product of a determination to impose particular tasks as well as responsibilities upon him. The Presidents successively have sought some additions to and modifications of the Executive Office. Others have been thrust upon them. An example of the latter is the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 which, by congressional choice rather than Presidential request, established a Cabinet-level Space Council, chaired by the President, to deal with policy problems in the field of peaceful and military exploitation of outer space. This Council is distinctive in that it has several private citizens as statutory members.

In the aggregate this is a formidable development of "executive assistance" in 20 years. The evolution may be expected to continue. No administration could function without similar machinery today. There are current criticisms of performance and proposals for improvement. In considering them, however, it must be recognized that the President needs much freedom in organizing the entire Executive Office. Presidents differ in their capacities and methods of work; conditions also change. These needs must be accommodated.

D. POSSIBLE CHANGES IN EXECUTIVE ASSISTANCE

Of the many aspects of this problem, the central issue to be dealt with here is: What instrumentalities at the highest level of government would seem most effective in assisting the President to provide unified direction for the major departments and agencies concerned with foreign policy? The following discussion considers the relative merits of three principal channels: the National Security Council, Executive Office staff, and departmental leadership.

1. Role of the National Security Council

It is relevant to recall that a major motive in creation of the National Security Council was the conviction expressed in some military quarters that the political leadership had been too independent of military considerations. Today the Council is looked to as a key device for harnessing military and political thinking more closely. There has been a persistent effort also to broaden the composition and outlook of the Council, but the Departments of Defense and State continue to be the dominant departmental voices.

Although the Council has certain limitations, it is of assistance to the President in identifying crucial issues, in discussing various approaches to dealing with those issues, determining where the general balance of evidence and judgment lies, and in reviewing actions taken

¹ See below, ch. IV.

to carry out presidentially approved policies. The conclusions flowing from these debates are compromised and general, but they can help to produce better mutual understanding among the principal departments than would otherwise exist and to set certain broad limits within which the departments feel bound to operate.

In the clarification of alternatives in the past few years, it is interesting to note that more than 50 percent of the policy papers presented to the Council and the President have involved "splits," that is, differing viewpoints and recommendations set forth in the papers themselves calling for decision by the President. The difficulty is that these splits frequently do not present a clear confrontation of the basic alternative approaches that are involved in the major policy issues.

Various other efforts have been made to improve the procedures, including the use of outside consultants. Furthermore, it is obvious that the National Security Council machinery can be no better than its constituent parts: the policy analysts, intelligence researchers, and leading officials of the participating agencies. If some major overseas development is not anticipated or if the United States does not seem to be positive and imaginative in its approach, the National Security Council cannot be charged with the full responsibility.

What the Council provides as a minimum is a mechanism to see that major questions in the realms of foreign policy and military policy will be considered at the highest level in terms of the interests and policies of the chief relevant departments. Even if the mechanism is not actually used in some particular crisis, these departments and their major officials will have had considerable experience in working together on related questions. The Council has fostered the habit of systematic interdepartmental consultation and recommendation. Furthermore, the existence of a Presidential Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and a small professional National Security Council staff means that there are people among the President's closest aids who are looking at these problems from the Presidential viewpoint, who can advise the President accordingly if they feel that the departments are avoiding issues or diluting them, and who can force issues to be raised to the Council level even if the member departments oppose doing so.

At the same time, it is clear that an interdepartmental committee, no matter how exalted, operates under severe limitations and can be only a partial aid in coordinating matters of foreign policy. Because some of the criticism of the National Security Council implies unrealistic expectations about what it can do, it should be emphasized that a committee cannot function as a single individual. A committee cannot be a very effective decisionmaking instrument. It can give only relatively superficial attention to the crucial questions before it. The tendency is for each departmental representative to come to the meetings well armed to defend a painstakingly formulated departmental position. The result is often a heavily compromised agreement.

It is easier for a committee to look at the present than the future, to follow a well-worn path rather than to alter it. Committee procedures are cumbersome and seldom adapt themselves to emergency situations. Various planning cycles regarding substantive and budge-

tary questions are ill-coordinated. Key departments prefer to keep highly secret information as restricted as possible, and they like to negotiate directly with those they consider most immediately concerned and influential. Each agency tends to look upon the Council as a device used by other agencies to impose their particular points of view. Thus, many of the most important policy issues in recent years have not been settled within the National Security Council. Other issues have been blurred by vague accommodation rather than pointing up major alternatives to be settled at the highest level.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the Council is, and can be, only one of several instrumentalities to meet the need being discussed here. Limited though its usefulness is, however, it continues to provide a specialized high-level forum to help facilitate coordinated consideration by key department heads of major foreign policy issues. This, of course, is not enough; most of the hard thinking in this field must be done outside rather than inside the Council.


Even within the limits of its role, the Council could well conduct its business more effectively. Although the President and his aids periodically try to reduce the number of participants, for example, there is always strong resistance. It is necessary not only to focus the formal process on those agencies most directly involved and best equipped to deal with the subject, but to take full advantage of the opportunities for informal and subcommittee meetings of the principal participants to supplement the regular meetings of the Council.

There has also been a tendency for the procedures of both the Council and the Planning Board to become overly formalized. Some officials have emphasized the regularity of meetings and the volume of output. It would seem preferable to emphasize the need for imaginative and thorough analysis of the major issues. More determined efforts are also needed to reconcile substantive with budgetary considerations. This requires, among other things, the gearing together of military and nonmilitary planning cycles. The Council's decisions also need to be more precisely delineated. Related observations concerning intelligence, planning, and operational functions are made later in this study.²

2. Executive Office staff

A familiar approach to resolving interdepartmental conflicts is to look to a special assistant to the President to serve as a relatively neutral and anonymous agent of the Chief Executive in helping to reconcile differences among departments and agencies. The present Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has been cast in essentially this role. But his position, as presently defined, is quite restricted. To create a stronger instrumentality along these lines, it has been proposed that the several Executive Office assistants and staffs most directly concerned with foreign policy be combined in an Office of National Security Affairs under the leadership of a single director. An additional proposal is to create a separate staff, to be concerned more with long-range projections and planning and less with direct interdepartmental negotiation in matters of foreign policy. This work could be supplemented by that of nongovernmental research organizations.

² See below, ch. VI.



The rationale behind the role of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is that the President needs someone whose jurisdiction is broader than that of any single department—comparable to that of the President himself—and who is constantly available to serve the President as his personal adviser and troubleshooter. At the same time, in keeping with the “staff” concept, the various persons who have served in this capacity have generally been careful to avoid open conflicts with department heads and have stressed their role as mediators, in the name of the President, rather than as initiators and champions of independent views.

This restricted function has meant that the Special Assistant, despite his intellectual stature, could not openly be a major adversary in challenging the ideas of the operational giants. He could play a minor guiding role, occasionally suggesting fresh perspectives, but he lacked the mandate and resources of the principal departments. While he could draw on departmental expertise, the only personnel directly available to him have been the dozen professionals of the National Security Council staff who provide him with independent analyses of each policy paper. It has been a problem, also, to coordinate his activities with those of other assistants and staffs within the Executive Office.

Taking into account these limitations, many of those who continue to search for more effective integrating arrangements at the Executive Office level have tended to advocate a reinforced, unified Executive staff under strong direction. A major proposal calls for integrating the several elements of the Executive Office that are most directly concerned with national security policy, including the Special Assistants for National Security Affairs, Security Operations Coordination, and Foreign Economic Policy, the staffs of the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board, and possibly part or even all of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. The new organization might be called the Office of National Security Affairs and its head given the title of Director, similar in status to that of the Director of the Budget.

The chief advantage of this arrangement would be to encourage more effective working relations among these now separate assistants and staffs, and to give the new director a stronger position and organization than are now available to any Executive Office official in this field. To the advocates of this plan, the example of the Director of the Budget suggests that the head of such an agency could, with the backing of the President, exert considerable influence.

At best, however, the authority and resources available to this new arrangement would be meager compared to those of one of the major departments. The proposed director and his agency would lack a comparable tradition, and they would have no control of field operations. Thus they would not be equipped to make a contribution that would be equal to that of a principal department.

A different proposal is to create a separate advisory council on national security policy, somewhat comparable to the Council of Economic Advisers, which would concentrate on advice rather than active participation in the decisionmaking process. This could be supplemented by a research institution which is discussed later in this report.³ Given competent staff, this agency could add a longer

³ See below, ch. VI.

perspective and fresh thinking to the consideration of issues. It might also appear to be less competitive with line departments than the proposed Director of an Office of National Security Affairs.

The deficiency of this concept is that it would tend to accentuate rather than alleviate the splintering of security policy personnel within the Executive Office. It would create an advisory group that might lack both influence and realism because of its relative isolation from the conduct of affairs. Its role and resources would be pallid compared to those of the regular departments.

Considering these several approaches to utilizing the Executive Office to help provide integrated direction, it is clear that the President needs a personal staff that will have as broad an approach to national security policy as his—more comprehensive than that of any single departmental claimant—and that will be constantly available for analysis, for advice, and for representing him in the process of facilitating decisions. With Presidential support, an official at this level can play a significant catalytic role. There is no reason why such staff must pretend to exercise no initiative, but it must be careful in fact to act for the President and to avoid competition with the line departments. To strengthen this function, it would be well to move toward integrating rather than dividing the several Executive Office units now concerned with foreign policy, preferably within the framework of an Office of National Security Affairs. The Director of such an Office should be a person of stature who would be prepared to work in close harmony with the principal department heads involved. His staff need not be large but should be composed of persons with exceptional skill and broad experience bridging the barriers that separate the various departments.

It is clear, at the same time, that the role of this organization must remain limited in accordance with its staff function. The President cannot delegate to such a staff his own responsibility for providing the ultimate integrating leadership. Nor can such a staff be given operating mandate and resources. Thus, it cannot speak with the authority and influence of a major department.

3. Leadership in the line of command

The heart of the problem of effective leadership and direction of foreign policy (insofar as machinery of Government is a factor) is not in improved work of the National Security Council, although this is desirable; and it is not a matter of a strengthened and unified national security staff in the Executive Office, although this, too, would be helpful. The urgent need is for broader and more effective leadership in the line of command subordinate to the President. What is proposed, therefore, is a senior line secretary who would be the President's chief deputy on matters of foreign policy, who would have general directive authority over the more important foreign policy programs—political, economic, and informational—but who would rely on subordinate secretaries to be responsible for the more detailed supervision of these activities.

What is here proposed is not some unprecedented radical experiment, but a logical step, moderate in character, consistent with American administrative traditions. Although moderate in character, it is important to be clear about what is being proposed, for fine points can be important. Certain aspects deserve special emphasis.

First of all, the idea is to concentrate under a new executive, in the line of command subordinate to the President, responsibility for, and authority over, important foreign affairs functions. Obviously he cannot take them all. There are foreign effects in many parts of numerous Federal programs, but it is not possible or desirable to separate many of these parts from their broader context—whether educational, agricultural, or military. There are no such obstacles affecting the Department of State, the bulk of the economic aid program, and overseas information operations. These should be brought together under one executive responsible to the President. Each of these components is discussed in the following chapter. Other foreign affairs functions could be added later if they have no restricting attachments elsewhere, but these are enough for the present.

Second, a complete consolidation or merger of these functions is not proposed, although some recombination of their constituent parts should be considered in the interest of more effective work, and may in fact be desirable. To make changes of this sort should be within the discretion of the responsible executive. Rather, the combination under a single foreign affairs executive should permit each of the three components substantial operating autonomy. It is just as important for the head of these foreign affairs functions to make sure that he and his aids do not control or concern themselves with matters which they do not need to control, as it is to make sure of their participating in the important decisions, the shaping of governing policies, the timing of new departures, and like matters. The need to make this distinction between matters which benefit from central decision or approval and those which do not should be recognized in setting up the combined organization. Keeping the distinction realistic should be part of the responsibility of the foreign affairs executive.

The third point to be stressed is that the position of the new foreign affairs executive, responsible for ultimate direction of the three components, should be conceived as a new executive echelon closer to the President, sharing his breadth of interest, and acting for him, a secretary in the sense that Washington regarded Jefferson or Hamilton. There is a precedent for this concept in the Secretary of Defense, a new level of command which was created to bring unity into the plans and programs of departments, formerly separate, still highly autonomous. Defense is cited, not as a model or even as a parallel, but as a precedent for a new executive level at the head of a departmental combination, with a function of leadership under the Chief Executive. The move was necessary in military affairs. It is now necessary in foreign affairs.

In due course similar changes may be brought about in other fields as well; for this device is a means through which the Chief Executive can fulfill his role—giving his attention to critical subjects and pivotal programs—without ignoring all other activities in the executive branch. It is also a means of avoiding excessive numbers of independent agencies without compensatory overdevelopment of White House and Executive Office functions. Were there in existence today similar executives and administrative combinations concerned with economic goals and programs, physical resources, and human resources, it might well be easier to dovetail foreign and domestic policies, and to develop a national program that would be effective not

only in the cold war but in economic and cultural cooperation with the vast underdeveloped areas of the world.

Such development of a small number of senior executives to function as a working committee intimately associated with the President is much to be preferred to the scheme of developing Vice Presidents as executive deputies under the President. It is not feasible to make the elected Vice President an executive deputy for a number of reasons. He is not the President's man; the two are not always in agreement; he has other functions; and it would be embarrassing to relieve him.

Having two or even three deputies would endanger the President's role as Chief Executive. If the delegations were real, the Presidency might drift toward its chief-of-state function and the essential vitality of the functioning Chief Executive in fact might be lost, although no one would have intended to sacrifice this cornerstone of our constitutional system. When the administrative pressure reaches the point where some positive step must be taken to make the President's formal authority effective in fact, the practical move is toward a new echelon of executives (and program combinations) comparable to the Secretary of Defense and the proposed new foreign affairs executive. It will be welcome for its effect in helping to integrate foreign and domestic programs in a coherent national policy.

It is not the intention of this proposal, however, to adopt the "first secretary" concept which would leave the existing departmental structure fundamentally as it now is, but would restrict the Secretary of State to operational duties and assign the broad policy role to a first secretary. The hope is that this would give the latter a loftier, and probably broader, role and would afford him more time to consider the most crucial issues and to consult with the President as well as Cabinet colleagues. His office might even be located in the Executive Office headquarters.

A major problem involved in this idea is that it is both difficult and dangerous to try to separate policy from operations. True, there is a functional distinction between broad policy at the top and the details of execution at the lower extremities of the apparatus, but the leadership that is responsible for general policy benefits from having at least ultimate control of operations which keeps him in close touch with the front line of action and enables him to regulate the instruments on which effective policy as well as action finally depend. The same staff that guides operations is the best source of competent policy thinking. As the "first secretary" removes himself from his army of advisers, he will tend to lose touch with the richest resource for policy planning—long range as well as short range. He thereby becomes little more than another staff assistant. This role, therefore, can be thought of as comparable to that of the proposed Director of the Office of National Security Affairs, and would have the same advantages and limitations as those discussed above.

Officials have to have titles. What should the new foreign affairs executive be called? If a new title is needed to emphasize the new concept of the job, he should be called Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the overall Department should be called the Department of Foreign Affairs. These would be the clearest titles with the most meaning and least confusion for the general public. (Today only one-third of the public know what the main job of the Depart-

ment of State is.) It would be a convenience to be able to establish the new Office without disturbing the title, pay, or other formal emoluments of the Secretary of State. This would make clear the continuing importance of the latter position and of the function of the Department of State. The same would be true of the heads of the other two constituent programs. This should make it possible, with strong leadership and support from the President, to recruit topflight individuals to direct each of these activities.

If the antiquity of the Secretary of State's title, its prestige among the informed, and its connotation of a broader mandate are thought to be more important, "State" could be taken for the title of the new secretary and the new Department, and the present Department of State could be called the Department of Foreign Affairs.

All things considered, the simplest and clearest titles are probably best in the long run. The informed may take exception to placing the new title of Secretary of Foreign Affairs over the Secretary of State. But they will adjust, and they will not be confused because they know what is involved. It is also likely that the less informed will have a better idea of the responsibility of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and of the function of the Department of Foreign Affairs than if an attempt were made to convert old titles to new uses.

Someone will surely say, "If the Department of State, the principal economic aid program, and overseas information activities are to operate with substantial autonomy under the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, why do they need to be under his authority in a Department of Foreign Affairs at all?" There are a number of valid reasons why this is necessary.

A "coordinator" acting for the President as an aid could not do the job of coordination. He needs the ultimate authority to direct, which even if not sufficient by itself, does much to insure horizontal cooperation at operating levels. This should enable the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to provide general guidance for the operating programs more effectively and effortlessly than if they were entirely independent. The heads of these programs, as well as the Secretary of State, need a right of access to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The vital contacts of the field personnel of the aid and information agencies are important supplements to those of political officers in identifying problems, clarifying issues, and suggesting potentially useful steps in the development of policy. The political officers' experience and points of view, which dominate the Department of State, although essential, are not alone sufficient for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He needs the feedback from all significant foreign affairs programs, and he can get this feedback most certainly from those which are under his command. Central direction, which is generally accepted in the field, now needs to be developed in Washington.

Military activities present a special problem. They are important for their impact abroad, including their contacts with key elements in the national life of many new states. Because they cannot well be administered by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the problem of integrating them with the total overseas program must be faced directly. Military assistance intended to bolster resistance to Russian or Chinese aggression may produce inflation, defer economic development, and arouse the fears of neighboring states. In dealing with this problem,

the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is in a stronger position to be effective in his intended role of leadership if he can speak for, and reflect the experience of, the other major overseas programs. There is no doubt that the professional military point of view is weighted heavily in national councils on foreign policy, particularly the National Security Council. But it can be as costly to overweight this factor, or to view it too narrowly, as to slight it. Strengthening and broadening the position of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should help to achieve a viable balance. To this end, it would be well to designate the new Secretary vice chairman of the National Security Council. This would be in keeping with his expanded role as the President's chief aid in charting the broad course of U.S. foreign policy.

4. Office of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs

The above proposal carries with it certain implications for the organization of the staff that would help the Secretary of Foreign Affairs fulfill his role not only in relation to the operations under his direct authority but with reference to other departments and agencies and to the President. He should have the essential instrumentalities to inquire, plan, advise, direct, and evaluate without becoming enmeshed in the minutiae of day-to-day activities. In developing this organization, the Secretary should be allowed considerable freedom to establish whatever staff arrangements he believes would be most effective. Thus it is not the intention of this study to attempt to foreshadow in any great detail the precise organizational pattern under the Secretary. It seems relevant, however, to consider briefly some of the kinds of assistance that the Secretary probably would need to carry out his mandate.

One of the first essentials is to provide adequate assistance in anticipating needs and in preparing to meet them. Thus long-range planning should be available with respect to the entire range of responsibilities of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It would not be enough, however, simply to transplant the Policy Planning Staff from the Department of State to the office of the new Secretary. While that staff might provide a major element of the new planning unit, the latter would need to be broader in scope and personnel. More is said about this later in the report.⁴

If the Secretary wishes to make the most of this function and staff he should be able to use them in formulating a more adequate strategy of U.S. foreign policy that would serve to guide the efforts of the political, economic, and information programs under his general direction. This staff should also contain personnel capable of assisting the Secretary to maintain effective relations with related departments and agencies, particularly the Department of Defense. At the same time, this organization should encourage, and keep in close touch with, planning at lower levels within the three component departments.

Another key function is the gathering and analysis of intelligence. At present, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research within the Department of State is responsible for the initial drafting of the political and economic sections of the national intelligence estimates which are produced by the combined intelligence agencies of the Government under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency and pro-

⁴ See below ch. VI.

vide the principal intelligence background for National Security Council papers. In addition, the Bureau publishes a variety of intelligence estimates of its own, varying from terse, spot analyses of the previous 24 hours' occurrences, from which the head of the Bureau briefs the daily staff conference of the Secretary of State, to long-range appraisals and specialized studies. Its members take part in the staff meetings of most of the geographic bureaus and offices. Its analysts are available to political officers seeking information, estimates, or merely an opportunity to exchange views. The Policy Planning Staff is an important consumer of Bureau products.

There are several ways in which the intelligence staff might be organized in the future. One approach would be to move in the direction of decentralizing this activity by distributing part or all of the intelligence personnel among the policymaking offices. If intelligence is too detached from policy, it runs the risk of losing its relevance to the policymaking function. Isolation will tend to weaken the performance on both sides. The occupational disease of the operator is one that leads him to see in the world an illustration of the old saying that the more things change, the more they remain the same. The occupational disease of the intelligence analyst is one that causes him to see the world in terms of drastic upheaval, conspiracy, and revolution. Left too much to itself, the intelligence staff may—depending upon how it is recruited—tend to overemphasize the value of techniques and practices peculiar to itself; it may become overly academic, producing generalizations neither reflecting nor aiding the practical conduct of diplomacy.

There are also dangers in too close a relationship between policy and intelligence. If they are under a common authority at a low level and the relationship is a close one, intelligence analysts may be too responsive to the desires of the policy officers and may be dominated by their preoccupations. Because the policy officers are usually absorbed in current operations, the intelligence staff will probably be required to devote itself primarily to current intelligence, often mere fact gathering. The proper function of intelligence is not merely to answer questions raised by the policy officers but to suggest what questions those officers should ask. When the intelligence function lacks independence and analysts hesitate, even if only unconsciously, to produce estimates at odds with current policy, its value is jeopardized. Indeed, intelligence analysts who fear to make themselves unpopular can do more harm than good. And, if the intelligence organization is staffed largely by personnel from the operating side, intelligence production will depend upon those to whom intelligence is usually of secondary interest and who regard an assignment to the intelligence organization virtually a sentence to limbo. Decentralization, furthermore, would greatly weaken the independent spirit of the intelligence staff.

There is also the possibility that more of the foreign policy intelligence function might be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. This would have the advantage of maximum unification of intelligence activities, but such a move would destroy a valuable link between that Agency and the organization under the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. By maintaining both departmental and interdepartmental intelligence organizations, there may be some overlap, but over-

lap can be beneficial. One set of practitioners can check the other, and the chance of serious errors eluding the double-sifting process is greatly reduced. It is useful that each department is at liberty to issue its own intelligence analyses, in its own field, in which its undiluted findings are made available to its own department.

The preferable course would seem to be to keep the foreign affairs intelligence staff unified, maintain approximately the present division between that staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, and place the staff under the direct control of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Ultimately it might prove desirable to join with this staff the intelligence units of the economic and informational departments. It might also be advisable to consider placing both general intelligence and planning functions under a single staff deputy reporting to the Secretary. This would encourage cooperation between these two closely related staffs and would reduce the number of deputies having access to the Secretary.

Another basic staff function is that of controlling communication both within the Department of Foreign Affairs and between that Department and related agencies. Currently there is an executive secretariat under the Secretary of State that is responsible for overseeing the flow of policymaking within the Department of State. It tries to make certain that all matters going to and from the Secretary and Under Secretaries of State are properly dealt with by the relevant officers within required periods of time. As part of this function, the staff prepares written summaries and oral briefings concerning departmental business. It would be essential that a comparable operation be assigned to the new Secretary and that it be sufficiently strengthened to give him adequate control over all of the activities that would be placed under his jurisdiction.

Finally, the Secretary would need a staff to give him control over the support functions of personnel and budget management. Although considerable latitude in these matters would be left to the major component organizations, it would be necessary for the Secretary to exercise overall direction from the very beginning. Some of the specific problems that must be dealt with to improve these functions are dealt with elsewhere in this report.⁵

⁵ See chs. II and VIII.

Chapter IV. Political, Economic, and Information Affairs


The effectiveness of the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs will depend in large measure on his relationship with the three major activities under his direction: political, economic, and information. The thesis is that his general control over these programs, while allowing them considerable operational autonomy, will place him in a strategic position, with the leadership and support of the President, to guide the main stream of U.S. foreign policy. The following analysis examines the proposal in greater detail by discussing certain organizational aspects of each of the three components in order to determine how they might best be organized to function as a unified team.

A. POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The most central and significant policy area under the direction of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs will continue to be the formulation and execution of general, or "political," policy regulating U.S. relations with other countries in the most comprehensive terms. This function, which calls for the broadest skills and experience, has always been the core of the diplomatic role and should be the principal source of day-to-day guidance for all U.S. activities overseas. The organization that will be primarily responsible for this function will continue to be the Department of State, operating under its own Secretary. As indicated earlier, there are those who prefer to use the title "Secretary of Foreign Affairs" for this position and to give the "Secretary of State" title, which they feel connotes a broader jurisdiction, to the higher position. While this view has much in its favor, it seems simpler and clearer, at least for the purposes of this analysis, to use the reverse nomenclature.

The precise organization of the Department of State has varied considerably over the years and should continue to be adjusted to changing circumstances. Until 1949 the Department was organized primarily along functional lines. That is not to say that there were no geographic units. There were such units, and their geographic jurisdictions were roughly equivalent to those of their present counterparts, but their functions were restricted to political matters rather narrowly defined. There was a time after the war, for example, when the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, the geographic-political unit, was smaller than the Southeast Asian Branch of one of the functional units, the Office of Intelligence and Research. Following the recommendations of the first Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission), the four geographic-political offices headed by office directors were expanded into geographic, or regional, bureaus under Assistant Secretaries of State by incorporating into each of them almost all of the functions represented in the Department as a whole. Each was equipped to deal not only with political affairs, but also with economic affairs, international

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organization affairs, administration, information activities, and policy planning with respect to its area. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs thus became almost a Department of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

At the time of this shift, most of the functional, i.e., nongeographically oriented, components of the Department were greatly depleted as personnel and responsibilities were transferred to the new regional bureaus. Since then, however, the tendency has been to rebuild the functional components; almost all the chiefs of the functional units and most of the units themselves have been given status as high as those on the geographic side.

Despite some conflict and duplication, however, it is necessary to use both the geographic and functional approaches at once. More and more of the problems facing the Government transcend national boundaries—problems of defense against military aggression, defense against Communist subversion, problems of international organization. The United States is likely in the future to require representation on more international bodies dealing with trade, economic development, agriculture, health, atomic energy, joint defense, space activities, as well as international labor, business and professional activities. At the same time, relations with nation states as such—with Great Britain, Argentina, and Laos—will continue to be important for the foreseeable future. Twenty years ago it would have been difficult to believe that the fiscal practices of a mountain kingdom in southeast Asia, the kind of arms to be supplied the Indonesian police, or the paintings to be sent to a Moscow exhibit would be of concern to the highest agencies of the Government.

There seems, therefore, to be no compelling reason why the basic geographic-functional division of labor should be altered. However, on a more modest, pragmatic level, it is worth calling attention to the desirability of flexibility in the apportionment of the countries of the world among the geographic bureaus. The pattern of international relationships changes, and new evaluations of what is significant in human society will result in new linkages or tensions among the countries of the world. As a matter of fact, some changes in the present jurisdictions of the bureaus could bring them into closer correspondence with the geographic, ethnic, cultural, and political divisions of the world. The former Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, for example, represented an awkward catchall, and the situation has been only partially improved by its division into a Bureau of African Affairs and a Bureau of Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs. It is at least worth considering whether a more rational division of territories than the present one, under current conditions, might be as follows:

1. A Bureau of European Affairs: including all Europe, as at present, but with the addition of Greece and Turkey. Canada would remain here, as at present.

2. A Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs: including the present jurisdiction of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs with the addition of the rest of Asia (excluding Soviet Asia), namely, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Iran. The Bureau might well be divided into two subbureaus, each under a Deputy Assistant Secretary (as the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian,

and African Affairs was at one time). One could include Japan, Korea, China, Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania; the other, South and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.

3. A Bureau of African and Asia Minor Affairs: including all of Africa, the Arab countries, and Israel.

4. A Bureau of Inter-American Affairs: the same as at present.

Such a reapportionment would remove the present artificial division of Asia between two bureaus along the Indian-Burmese border, and all truly Asian countries would be brought under one jurisdiction. It would also rectify the present artificial division of the Arab world between two bureaus by bringing it all under one. Finally, Greece would be put back in Europe, where it belongs, and Turkey, which is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more European than otherwise in outlook, and with one foot geographically in Europe, would be included with those with whom it has most in common.

If the proposal, which is presently being considered, to create a Bureau of Communist Bloc Affairs having jurisdiction over both the Soviet Union and Communist China should be adopted, the foregoing scheme could readily be altered to allow for it. It can be argued, however, that the inclusion of the Soviet Union and Communist China in a single jurisdiction would cause some difficulties. It would tend to concede what the Communists maintain as a cardinal tenet of their faith, that there is a Communist monolith and that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are more Communist (or Socialist) than they are Russian and Chinese. Further, it would tend to institutionalize the tendency toward an overpreoccupation with communism which tends to distract attention from much else of crucial importance in the world and fosters a seemingly negative approach to world affairs. In the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the change has already been made, bringing the Soviet Union and Communist China under a single jurisdiction; this has been accompanied by a compensatory transfer of India to the Office of Research for the Far East. Thus India has been separated from Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan, which scarcely seems logical.

1. Role of the geographic bureaus

The matter to be emphasized here, however, is not so much the precise delineation of the organizational boundary lines separating the various geographic bureaus and offices but rather the general role to be played by the geographic staffs in relation to the rest of the foreign policy organization. Should the geographic bureaus continue to be considered the principal "line," or "action," units of the foreign policy organization?

In support of designating the geographic staffs as the chief line agents, there is the fact that they have the broadest interests, skills, and experience. The geographic "desk officers" have traditionally looked at foreign policy from approximately the same point of view as heads of missions and other generalist officers, and they have served as the principal "backstops" for those officers. Furthermore, the delegation of this general coordinating authority to the geographic staffs was one means of relieving pressure on the Secretary of State and his immediate aides.

Countering this point of view is the current trend which is expanding the range of foreign policy even farther beyond the capacities of the regional offices. It is also apparent that other staffs, particularly on the functional side, must exercise action authority, including field operations, regarding matters within their special ken, such as foreign aid operations, trade negotiations, and information activities.

Probably the most feasible compromise would be to authorize the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary of State under him, to delegate action authority to whatever staff units seem most appropriate for the particular tasks and to rely on secretariat staffs to manage the flow of business with the least possible friction. The geographic bureaus would still play a crucial role because of their broad jurisdiction and experience, but they would have no monopoly over the action function. Personnel concerned with economic and information activities would have complementary action responsibilities, and there would be a strengthened staff organization to integrate these several efforts.

2. International organization affairs

A related problem concerns the formulation and execution of policy governing the U.S. role in worldwide international organizations. At present the coordinating center within the Department of State is the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. A major question involved here is whether this function of managing U.S. relations with universal international organizations should be considered a line activity comparable to the other bureaus, as it has in the past, or whether, because it is largely dependent on the policy leadership of the geographic and functional bureaus, it should be considered a staff activity.

The principal consideration favoring the present arrangement is that the international organization function has included participation in the policymaking process, chiefly by contributing expert advice on the special factors peculiar to multilateral diplomacy, and has also included direct action through missions to international organizations to put policies into effect. On the other hand, it is evident that the principal substantive content regarding specific issues usually comes from personnel in other bureaus who normally deal with those subjects.

Because the international organization function is primarily an integrating activity, it seems preferable to place it in a staff rather than a line position. It would still be desirable, however, to leave personnel dealing with regional organizations attached to the geographic bureaus, but the general international organization staff, concerned primarily with the United Nations, the specialized agencies and related activities, should be made directly subordinate to the Secretary of State.

B. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

One of the most fundamental aspects of the postwar revolution in American foreign policy has been the massive use of governmentally administered economic programs, especially foreign aid, to serve the political objectives of the United States. Before the war, the normal assumption was that foreign, as well as domestic, economic relations

belonged in private hands and that governmental intervention in such matters was, and could be, of only peripheral significance. Starting with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration effort, however, the United States began to act according to a new philosophy: that, because the economic ills of other countries could have disastrous effects on the political as well as economic interests of this country, it was both desirable and feasible for the United States to intervene on a scale capable of producing significant improvements. This imperative has seemed increasingly compelling as the plight of the less developed countries has become more serious and as the influence of various extremist elements, particularly the Communists, has become more threatening. The extraordinary scale of the U.S. effort along these lines is indicated by the more than \$60 billion of foreign aid that the United States has dispensed since 1945.

Current and prospective economic trends call for a profound re-examination, not only of U.S. aid policies, but of trade, monetary, and other policies as well. Even if there were no Communist effort to penetrate the less developed areas, there would, for example, be valid reasons for reexamining U.S. commercial policies. Not the least of these reasons are the constantly shifting pattern of trade in the world and the emergence of regional trading arrangements, particularly in Western Europe. These and other developments may well require reconsideration of U.S. attitudes toward regional associations, toward the procedures for protecting domestic interests from injury, toward the "principal supplier" concept in trade agreement negotiations, and toward the "most-favored-nation" principle.

In recent years, aviation issues, shipping policy, and the assignment of radio frequencies have also been major points of contention in foreign economic relations. With the emergence of jet air travel, the impending exploration of outer space, and other extraordinary developments, transportation and communications policy is likely to become increasingly important in international relations. The growing significance of transportation problems is illustrated domestically by current efforts to establish a Department of Transportation headed by a Cabinet level Secretary.

This basic shift toward large-scale economic and social operations as major instruments of foreign policy reemphasizes certain administrative requirements that were referred to at the beginning of this study. Because this vast campaign of raising the levels of well-being in other countries makes demands on the resources of many governmental departments and agencies, there is a need for strong leadership, both in Washington and in the field, to marshal these varied forces into a coherent program. These activities must also be consonant with the broad political objectives of U.S. foreign policy, which are the basic justification of such efforts, although there is always the danger that they can be nullified by being unduly subordinated to shortrun political expediency. The basic assumption must be that in the long run what will be most fruitful for the political interests of both the recipient countries and the United States will be sound improvements in the basic capacity of these countries to meet their essential economic and social needs. These considerations favor a closer linking, not a separation, of political, economic, and information staffs. The new emphasis on operations—altering attitudes,

institutions, and physical equipment in many different fields—also requires a higher order of executive talent than has been typical of traditional diplomacy.

Because these activities place the United States in a position of unprecedented influence in affecting the internal as well as external affairs of other countries, it becomes increasingly important to develop approaches and institutions that will reassure the host states by softening the unilateral aspect of the U.S. role. In part this can be done by placing greater emphasis on truly cooperative planning, giving full consideration to the views of the host states. This calls for encouraging greater administrative flexibility and initiative on the part of U.S. field staffs and less detailed, short-range control from Washington. This objective can also be served by operating as much as possible through international organizations which have the advantage of broadening the range of experience and contributions and filtering the influences of individual countries through a multilateral balancing of varying national interests. One of the most promising aspects of the multilateral approach is its potential for mobilizing the world's human resources on the broadest possible basis which may be the most useful aspect of this new effort to transfer skills from the more developed to the less developed countries.

It is only realistic, however, to remember that it is difficult to harmonize foreign economic policies with other aspects of foreign policy because external economic activities impinge directly on a wide range of specifically identifiable domestic interests. Of course, other actions of the United States in foreign affairs also have domestic effects, but those effects may be cushioned by their broad impact. Taxes in general may be higher, families in general may be faced with military service for their sons, and tensions in general may be heightened by world conditions.

In economic matters the impact is likely to be focused more narrowly and intensively. Economic aid to foreign agriculture may diminish the export markets of identifiable interest groups. Assistance fostering industrial development abroad may threaten the foreign and domestic markets of important American industries. Tariff concessions may result in heightened foreign competition for particular enterprises. The domestic interests concerned often have a special relationship with one or more executive agencies, such as the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, and Labor. These agencies are not directly responsible for the broad direction of foreign policy but are primarily concerned with the effect of foreign policies on the particular groups with which they are closely associated. These constituencies may also carry greater weight in the legislative branch than the interests involved in general international relations. Such interests are legitimate; they must be taken into account in the formulation of national policy, which must be a synthesis of many points of view.

1. Present organizational framework

In considering problems of organization, foreign economic matters can be divided into three broad categories. They are: (1) the complex of activities that constitute foreign aid, (2) commercial policy problems and related issues of monetary and investment policy, and (3) transportation and communications problems. All three fields,

particularly the first and second, are intimately linked and should be administered with full consciousness of their interrelationship.

The aid field is the newest and the one most open to criticism from the point of view of organizational arrangements. There are numerous agencies through which aid can be obtained. The best known is the International Cooperation Administration which administers defense support aid in those countries where agreed military programs are deemed to create a special economic burden, special assistance where loans are not feasible, and the programs of technical cooperation. These activities are designed to help attain certain economic goals in the recipient countries, after taking account of all other prospective sources of funds. The Public Law 480 program, administered principally by the Department of Agriculture, is a surplus disposal program. By subsidizing the original sales of surpluses and by relending the proceeds, it is also used to furnish aid, and in magnitude it overshadows the International Cooperation Administration programs in some recipient countries. The Development Loan Fund makes "project" loans, usually repayable in the currency of the borrowing country. The Export-Import Bank makes loans for specific projects which are repayable in dollars. The Bank has almost always tied its loans to U.S. sources of supply, and the Fund announced in October 1959 that it would begin to follow the same practice.

In addition, the United States has a strong, if not controlling, voice in the allocation of funds by international agencies, notably the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, the United Nations Special Fund, and the newly authorized Inter-American Development Bank and International Development Association. To a lesser extent, the United States can influence decisions of the United Nations expanded program of technical assistance.

The several U.S. agencies mentioned above are relatively autonomous. They have their own legislative mandates and their own philosophies. While there is a considerable measure of cooperation among them, there is also much friction. No coordinating process has yet been developed that adequately meshes their several efforts in relation to the needs of individual countries. The countries being aided frequently feel that they are being smothered in administrative paraphernalia with too little product to show for the effort. Because their own planning apparatus is weak, they need outside help to create integrated country programs, but they are confronted by a bewildering maze of ill-coordinated and often competing public and private, national and international agencies.

In other economic matters the pattern is hardly less dispersed. Agency actions are coordinated by numerous interdepartmental committees, and there are many lines of advisory opinion to the President. He is advised on Tariff Commission cases by the Trade Policy Committee under the chairmanship of the Department of Commerce; on restrictions of imports for national security reasons, by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization; on restriction of agricultural imports for price support reasons, by the Secretary of Agriculture; and on international financial matters, by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, under the leadership of the Department of the Treasury. The func-

tions of the National Advisory Council include the provision of guidance to the U.S. Executive Directors accredited to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Finance Corporation. In the trade and commodity area there is the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, headed by the President's Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy. The Council may voluntarily take cognizance of any problem affecting foreign economic policy and may recommend to the President either approval or modification of any agency's actions. The President's Special Assistant may do the same in his individual capacity. Neither the Council nor the office of the Special Assistant was created by statute.

The picture in aviation, shipping, and telecommunications is no less complicated. In international civil aviation, the Department of State plays a policymaking role, with advice from the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Department of Commerce. In shipping and telecommunications policy, the role of the Department of State is a coordinating one. In at least one field—the resolution of differences of opinion concerning the allocation of a frequency band for military or civilian usage—no one short of the President seems authorized to make the decision.

It is evident that there is need for a thorough reappraisal of the relationships not only among the many aspects of foreign economic policy but between those aspects and the broader sphere of general foreign policy. Because it is impossible to deal with all facets of the problem in this report, it seems preferable to concentrate on the activity that is most novel, most costly, and most complex in its organizational ramifications—the foreign aid program.¹

2. Centralization of the administration of economic aid

The first issue that needs to be considered is: To what extent should the administration of economic aid be centralized within a single agency?

The basic objective behind the effort to seek greater centralization of the program is to be able to utilize all of the resources and instrumentalities available to plan and execute foreign aid activities on as integrated a basis as possible. The ideal is to look at a country or region as a whole and to plan, in full cooperation with the people being aided, an integrated, long-range program of development that will make the most efficient, balanced use of the capabilities of not only the United States but of other countries as well.

At present such a system does not exist. Looking first at the field where the problems arise and where policy must finally meet the test of action, there is great unevenness in the integration of U.S. programs. Specialists drawn from various agencies value their independence, and few chiefs of mission or their deputies are familiar with, or capable of providing general direction of, such operations. Thus there is little unified planning on a countrywide basis. Because of the uncertain future of the program, due to much unfavorable criticism at home and frequent organizational upheavals, as well as certain limitations

¹ For a more detailed study, see "Administrative Aspects of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs," a study prepared at the request of the Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program, U.S. Senate, by the Brookings Institution, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957.

placed on the program, especially the annual appropriation process, little encouragement can be given to the field staff to plan boldly, comprehensively, or in long-range terms. These restrictions also hinder cooperation with international agencies which, in turn, have somewhat similar administrative problems to wrestle with.

The machinery in Washington is bedeviled by all of these difficulties, plus others. A complex programing procedure has been developed, under the general guidance of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the more immediate supervision of the International Cooperation Administration, in an effort to encourage more effective planning along the lines suggested above, but this is greatly frustrated by the proliferation of separate agencies, listed above, with their different purposes, legislative mandates, personnel, and policy approaches.² While the International Cooperation Administration strives through interdepartmental meetings to obtain commitments from the various related agencies regarding their contributions to the development of particular countries, other agencies, such as the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank, find it difficult, for one reason or another, to undertake such commitments until a particular situation reaches such crisis proportions that they are compelled to act in concert. The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs has labored skillfully to provide central direction, but his leadership is retarded by these many impediments.

3. Major components

The total range of talents involved in the aid program is drawn from so many agencies that it would be inconceivable to attempt to cram them all into a single organization. It is feasible, however, to consider unifying a number of units that are wholly focused on overseas activities and that are responsible for the bulk of foreign aid services.

The argument in favor of integrating to the maximum feasible extent the agencies concerned with foreign economic aid is a simple, straightforward one; although their techniques vary, their purposes are similar. They represent a kit of tools which should be used in optimum combination (depending on the circumstances in each case) to do specific jobs in the interest of U.S. foreign policy. It is logical that the use of these tools should be placed within the framework of a single agency although each distinct activity could and should be permitted considerable autonomy. To be effective in a given country, technical assistance should not be divorced from economic assistance and available as another project through a different channel. Economic aid should do more than finance a group of projects approved by different lending agencies; the totality of projects should add up to a coherent program under which the country can move forward on a mutually agreed course at a rate that is economically and politically tolerable.

There are other considerations, however, that militate against this degree of centralization. The Export-Import Bank, for example, has always considered its primary purpose to be the financing of American foreign trade for the benefit of U.S. export and import interests. The fact that these same loans can be regarded and used as a means of aid-

² For a brief description of the present programing process, see app. D.

ing the progress of less developed countries has been emphasized only recently. The management of the Bank denies that any of its loans are designed solely or even primarily to support an economic development program, although they concede that the Bank's lending capacity has been expanded in response to development needs abroad.

There is also the argument that the Bank was designed for business-like operations, favoring hard loans that will not compete with private banking operations, and many Americans would like ultimately to confine U.S. foreign financial assistance to operations of this kind. Evidence of this desire is the fact that the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund are specifically forbidden by legislation to finance on soft terms any project that the Bank is willing to handle. At the same time, the Bank has been responsive to foreign policy considerations, as suggested by the Department of State, has operated efficiently, and has strong support both inside and outside the Government. Thus it scarcely seems feasible to attempt to merge the Bank with the other aid agencies so long as it makes conscientious efforts to cooperate with those agencies. Should that cooperation falter, the status of the Bank should be reconsidered.

The major responsibility for the Public Law 480 program is now in the Department of Agriculture on the ground that this activity is principally for the purpose of disposing of agricultural surpluses in an orderly way. Shipments of surpluses are more often geared to crop cycles than to foreign aid crises. Furthermore, the cost of the Public Law 480 program is not a budget charge against the mutual security program, a circumstance which protects both the surplus disposal budget and the foreign aid budget from limiting each other.

There are several distinguishable functions in connection with the Public Law 480 program. (1) The function of determining which items are available for surplus disposal and their quantities is clearly within the field of responsibility of the Department of Agriculture. (2) So is the function of arranging for the shipment and delivery of the commodities. (3) The devising of programs that will interfere least with normal marketing—of both the United States and other countries—begins to merge with the field of foreign policy. (4) The allocation of commodities among recipient countries and determination of their use (within the limits imposed by the nature of the available commodities and the need for them) are more nearly matters of foreign aid policy. (5) The actual negotiation of agreements regarding the disposal of the local currency proceeds (including grants and loans) and the administration of those funds abroad are intergovernmental matters which are now handled by, or through, the Department of State. It would seem feasible, therefore, to combine with other aid activities all except the first two functions. At the same time, all interested agencies should continue to have a voice in decisions affecting their special interests.

With respect to the Development Loan Fund, it is said that combining the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund would be like trying to mix oil and water. The International Cooperation Administration provides defense support and special assistance as well as technical assistance and is concerned with short-term as well as long-term undertakings. Within a country, the International Cooperation Administration becomes involved

in a wide range of projects, and its assistance—in theory at least—is program oriented, intended to finance that essential part of a country program that cannot be carried on with the resources otherwise available. The Development Loan Fund, on the other hand, is largely project oriented; its principal emphasis is on the project per se and not on the relationship of that project to a total development plan.

Another and quite different argument for keeping the two agencies separate is that the Development Loan Fund, concerned with only long-term loans on soft terms for development purposes, is a device for gaining support for this kind of operation. There is the hope that the Congress may ultimately be willing to finance the Fund by authorizing it to borrow from the Treasury which would liberate it from the annual appropriation process.

It is easy, however, to overemphasize the differences between the two agencies. The International Cooperation Administration is concerned about the soundness of all projects it supports, and the Development Loan Fund wants to be sure that an otherwise estimable project will not founder in an unsound economy. It may be said that the two agencies start at different points in their aid philosophies but approach each other in practice. As for the view that the Development Loan Fund would get less popular support if it were merged with the International Cooperation Administration, there are two bases for rebuttal. The first is that the function of the Development Loan Fund could remain unimpaired and could be financed separately if the Congress so wished. The second is that any merger, which would probably involve more than these two agencies, should result in more efficient operations and consequently should generate more support for the aid program as a whole as well as for its components. It would seem entirely reasonable, therefore, to join the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund within a single aid agency while allowing each to maintain considerable administrative identity and autonomy.

Finally, there is the matter of guidance to U.S. representatives to international agencies having to do with economic aid. At present, guidance to the U.S. representatives to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, and International Monetary Fund is provided through the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. In other multilateral agencies, particularly the specialized agencies associated with the United Nations and the Organization of American States, guidance is channeled through the Department of State. Here also it seems logical that these procedures of U.S. aid should be integrated with the other related mechanisms.

4. Proposed unification of aid functions

Although the arguments against unification, whether based on accidents of the past or hopes for the future, have some validity, they are not as convincing as the proposition that there should be the maximum feasible policy and operational control over the several programs, such control to be exercised with due regard for the special requirements and basic legislative mandates governing each of the programs. Those programs which are brought within a single agency can still retain their individual identities but the chances of operating at cross-purposes and of making less than optimum use of all the programs taken in combination would be reduced.

The maximum feasible degree of unification at the present time would appear to be to bring together the International Cooperation Administration; the Development Loan Fund; all functions under the Public Law 480 program, except the determination of the volume of commodities available for disposal and the arrangement of their shipment and delivery, which are clearly in the field of responsibility of the Department of Agriculture; and the responsibility for providing guidance to U.S. representatives to international organizations concerned with economic aid matters.³

Broader and more important than unified administration is unified programing. Programing of all relevant U.S. resources available for economic aid should be a major function of the new agency, whether or not the administration of all of these resources is placed directly under the agency's control. Although it does not appear feasible that functions of the Export-Import Bank should be turned over to the new agency at the present time, the Bank should remain responsive to general foreign policy requirements, and its lending potential in specific instances should be coordinated as much as possible with the broader aid program.

5. Relationship of the principal aid agency to the Department of Foreign Affairs

Assuming the recommended degree of centralization, the next problem to be considered is: What should be the relationship between such a unified aid agency, on the one hand, and the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the rest of his organization on the other?

The first massive aid program, Lend-Lease, was assigned to an independent agency, but this was during the war when most of the governmental machinery was oriented toward foreign affairs. The immediate postwar programs were placed directly under the supervision of the Department of State. Then the Economic Cooperation Administration was set up as a separate agency and its head was given Cabinet status. The Mutual Security Agency was under a director attached to the Executive Office of the President. The Foreign Operations Administration was a separate entity; although its director had Cabinet status, it received policy guidance from the Department of State. The present International Cooperation Administration is "semiautonomous" within the Department of State, but the other economic aid agencies, such as the Development Loan Fund, are not directly subordinate to the Department.

One approach in the future would be to merge the proposed aid agency even more closely with the Department of State than is the case with the International Cooperation Administration. This could result in some reduction of duplication and a consequent increase in efficiency through the unification of parallel staffs. Such a move would probably result in a closer union of political and aid policies which some observers urge as a means of making each activity more

³ It should be noted that this recommendation is in accord with that of the President's Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (the Draper Committee) in its report of July 13, 1959, entitled "Economic Assistance Programs and Administration," to the effect that responsibility for planning, programing, and conducting economic assistance should be vested in a single agency, operating under the policy direction of the foreign policy agency, currently the Department of State. See "Economic Assistance Programs and Administration," Letter to the President of the United States from the President's Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program and the Committee's Third Interim Report, July 13, 1959, pp. 53-65, especially 63-64.

sensitive to the problems and approaches of the other. Finally, a merger might simplify negotiations between the Department of State and other executive agencies, especially the Department of Defense.

Moving in the opposite direction, a strong case exists for giving the aid agency the independent status once enjoyed by the Economic Cooperation Administration and some of its successor agencies, subject to consultation with the Secretary of State regarding matters affecting foreign policy. Aid operations require skills, attitudes, and administrative practices that are quite different from those that have been customary for traditional diplomatic activities. There is also the need to resist domination by short-range political considerations that can nullify the long-range developmental objectives of economic aid and give it a bad name in the host countries. Furthermore, independent status is said to be necessary to attract first-class talent to assume the leadership of such operations, especially in view of the apparently increasing public resistance to the program. This approach could also spare the Secretary of State considerable involvement in daily operational minutiae, and any duplication that would be eliminated by a merger would be of relatively minor proportions.

An intermediate position between these two poles would place the aid agency under the general authority of the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs but would assign its immediate direction to a special Secretary for Economic Operations and would permit it to remain a separate administrative entity with substantial operating autonomy. While there might ultimately be some merger with this operating agency of other activities now assigned to the Department of State, it would not be desirable for the present to disturb those economic staffs in the Department that are working closely and effectively with the political specialists.

The principal doubts raised by this approach stem from the danger that it might impose excessive burdens on the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that such an arrangement would be considered a "demotion" for the aid program which would discourage top-level talent, that there might not be sufficient policy and administrative freedom for the program to develop as it should, that coordination of political and aid policies should ultimately be managed at the Executive Office level rather than at the departmental level, and that the union would mate programs that are not of equal status and bargaining power.

It must be recognized, however, that foreign aid has become an integral part of foreign policy, in fact the largest source of nonmilitary funds for overseas activities. Furthermore, the program is not so inextricably tied to any domestic interest or agency that it would be inappropriate to make it part of the central foreign policy structure. The principal aid agency has always been closely associated with the Department of State, sometimes part of it, and now has a semiautonomous status within it. There is a risk of having long-range development objectives distorted by short-range political tactics, but there are solutions that are less drastic than making the aid agency independent. The Department of State has already adjusted its thinking considerably to recognize the value of long-range aid, and the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs framework would leave the aid agency considerable leeway within the overall structure. There is the additional consideration that aid must, at times, bend to short-run political requirements.

This solution would also provide a more elevated status for the proposed Secretary for Foreign Economic Operations than that given the Director of the International Cooperation Administration. What support is given these operations in the future, however, depends primarily on the fundamental policies of both the executive and legislative leadership regarding this kind of program. How deeply the Secretary of Foreign Affairs becomes involved in operational details depends more on his own style of work than on his formal relationship to the aid agency. To the extent, however, that this relationship helps to place him in a better position to guide the agency, the new arrangement might well ease rather than increase his burdens.

6. Relationship between economic and military aid

Another troublesome issue is: What official should serve as the central authority, below the President, to help integrate the economic and military aspects of foreign aid?

There is, necessarily, an organic relationship between economic and military aid. In some cases the two are interchangeable. A country may not have the resources to support both the military structure and the economic effort which seem essential. In such cases the United States can offer economic assistance, military assistance, or a combination of the two. The problem is to augment the total resources available to the recipient country, and the choice of means becomes one of mutual convenience. In some cases, it is the increased military burden on a country that produces economic strains which cannot be met by the country's own resources and which call for "defense support."

For these reasons the basic decisions about military aid—whether to offer it, how much to offer, for what purposes, and the military nature of the forces to be supported—clearly should be made in coordination with similar decisions regarding economic aid. The first three of these decisions are the crucial ones; together they set limits to the fourth. The locus of the first two (whether and how much) is now in the Department of State. The third (for what purposes) is a joint effort. The fourth (what kind) is primarily in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

It is logical that the determination of the military nature of the forces to be supported should remain largely under the control of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The responsibility for the other decisions should be centralized elsewhere. At present, an effort is being made in this direction by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The question is: Where should this responsibility be centered in the future? There are two main alternatives: to make these decisions an Executive Office responsibility or to assign this function to the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

It goes without saying that the ultimate responsibility in this, as in all other important matters, rests with the President. It would not seem wise, however, to put the entire burden of numerous and often highly technical questions concerning the balance between military and economic aid in given circumstances on the President and his Executive Office staff. The most appropriate personnel to make such decisions in the first instance would be under the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The decisions are fundamentally political, and they should be made at the highest level of the foreign policy organiza-

tion. Added weight would be given to such decisions if the Secretary of Foreign Affairs were to be made vice chairman of the National Security Council, as proposed above.

Accordingly, it is recommended that this responsibility be placed under the general direction of the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with the assistance of his Secretary for Foreign Economic Operations, to be coordinated closely with the programing of economic aid. The essence of this function would be to obtain the views of the Department of Defense concerning the requirements for military aid and the proper balance between military and economic aid and to reconcile these with the views of the economic aid and political policy personnel of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

7. Related questions considered elsewhere in the report

The basic requirements of the aid program, discussed earlier, involve other matters that are dealt with elsewhere in the study. One such requirement is the need for greater administrative continuity and flexibility which is discussed above.⁴ Another requirement calls for more effective integration of U.S. field activities under the leadership of chiefs of mission and their deputies which is considered below.⁵ Finally, there are the considerations that support the greater use of international agencies to help plan and execute aid programs; this subject is dealt with in an appendix.⁶

C. OVERSEAS INFORMATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

From the time of the American Revolution to the present, the United States has employed propaganda and related information measures as instruments of war—always with vigor and often with imagination and skill. Not until after the Second World War, however, did the country determine that a governmental information service was needed to present the American case abroad during times of relative peace. Cultural exchanges and related programs have no such long history of governmental participation. It was during the 1930's when the cultural activities of the European totalitarian powers provoked the American Governments to counteraction. One result was an inter-American treaty calling for exchanges of intellectuals, musicians, artists, and other cultural figures, together with the artifacts of their specialties, among the various governments in the Western Hemisphere. This resulted in the creation of a small staff in the Department of State to formulate programs and to link governmental and private efforts toward cultural exchange. An interdepartmental committee on cultural and scientific cooperation was also created to measure the range and scope of governmental capabilities to participate in a hemispheric strengthening of cultural relations.

1. Early arrangements

In 1948 the information and cultural programs were brought close together but not wholly merged at the time of the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act. The resistance to total merger came largely from the educational and cultural constituencies who tended to associate information with grossly distorted propaganda. Thus the legislation set up

⁴ See chs. II and III.

⁵ See ch. VII.

⁶ See app. F.

separate advisory commissions for information and cultural relations. Both functions reported to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, but there was a sharp organizational division immediately below him. At the same time, there was recognition by many observers that the broad purposes and goals of the two programs were closely intertwined, and there was need to see that they reinforced each other.

Much attention was also given to the division of responsibility between the governmental and private sectors. It was widely recognized that most of the task of representing the United States abroad, both in such "fast" media as radio and newspapers and such "slow" media as books, could and should be done by private enterprise. But studies of the performance and interests of private media demonstrated that they alone would not provide a "full and fair picture" of the United States, nor could they be counted on to publish abroad sufficient background about the activities of the Government—including the texts of significant speeches and full descriptions of political action—to permit opinion leaders of other countries to form their views on the basis of comprehensive and prompt information.

Similarly, in the cultural field, it was believed by those concerned with the matter both inside and outside the Government that the main job would have to be done by nonofficial persons and institutions. There was recognition, however, that certain coordinating functions had to be performed by government and that the treaty commitments of the United States—to the Organization of American States and to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, for example—called for some governmental organization that would provide staff and policy services that could not be supplied by wholly nongovernmental agencies nor left to the geographic bureaus of the Department of State.

It was widely noticed that the entrance of the Government into the fields of culture and information cost a certain price in the market of world opinion. Those who, for one reason or another, favored the nongovernmental approach in these fields put this price high; yet the price seemed necessary and worthwhile. And, as the United States moved into unmistakable cold war, the information sector of the Government was assigned even heavier responsibilities.

There was also some discussion prior to the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act of the proper location of the information agency within the Government. Should it be in the Department of State, where it was? Should it be in another department? Or should it be an independent agency? One commentator even suggested that it should be in the Federal Communications Commission. There was no parallel discussion of where the cultural program should be; the relation of that activity to treaty commitments suggested clearly that it should stay in the Department of State. The decision at that time was to put the information function in the Department of State because of its close relation to foreign policy. It seemed inappropriate as a component of any other department or agency. It was of insufficient size and stature to warrant establishment as an independent agency, and independent status would have made the function too prominent on the domestic scene—a constant target for public criticism.

Assigning the information function to the Department of State created problems as well. The administrative system of the Depart-

ment had been designed for purposes far different from those of information operations. It was difficult to meet the needs of flexibility, speed, and special handling of personnel and funds occasioned by the new service. In adjusting to the situation, the Department of State encouraged increasing administrative autonomy for the information function. Just prior to the outbreak of the Korean action in 1950, the Department created an International Information Agency that helped to meet these special operational requirements.

Operational autonomy did not, however, mean policy autonomy. Within the information unit, there were regional and overall policy and planning specialists who were to keep in close touch with the operators—broadcasters and writers. The various geographic bureaus of the Department did the same. The operators, true to the custom of their profession, asserted a good deal of freedom in the practice of their trade, and by so doing they created their own version of policy. Nonetheless, close relations were established between some of the operators and relevant desk officers; in other cases, where the information function was less valued or less skillfully manipulated, relations were more abrasive.

As the Government slowly readied itself for crisis and possible war after the Czechoslovakian coup of 1948, it became clear that there was more to the information function than was found in the Department of State. The military departments became interested. Their war-time occupation experience had left them with extensive responsibilities for communication to Americans as well as to the nationals of other countries, and their facilities for such communication exceeded those available to the U.S. Information Service, the overseas arm of the U.S. Information Agency and its predecessors. It was also rediscovered that the mere presence and activities of American troops and the civilians who accompanied them strongly affected relations between the United States and the host countries.

For all of these reasons, efforts were initiated to examine the whole range of governmental actions that might affect the psychological climate abroad and to determine the optimum allocation of control and administration of information resources and people in times of peace, cold war, and war. The outcome was the creation in 1951 of the Psychological Strategy Board—an agency designed to plan governmentwide programs of communication, persuasion and related action, and to see that they were executed in effective and coordinated fashion. The Board floundered, however, due to inexperience, ignorance of the probable impact of U.S. actions on countries abroad, and failure to set priorities and concentrate resources accordingly. It was finally abandoned by the new administration in 1953.

Two actions followed. One was the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board out of the ashes of the Psychological Strategy Board; the other was the issuance of Reorganization Plan No. 8 of July 1, 1953, that removed the U.S. Information Agency from the Department of State and made it a separate unit.

2. Current organization

The main task given to the Operations Coordinating Board was to see that decisions of the National Security Council were developed for execution by the relevant governmental agencies. An inheritance

from the concept of the Psychological Strategy Board was an instruction to the Operations Coordinating Board to see to it that such actions were taken with an eye to the climate of opinion abroad. The resulting "outline plans of operations" were in no sense directives but the outcome of voluntary interagency consultation to be put into effect by individual agency orders. Action did not need to await full interdepartmental agreement whenever individual agencies wished to push ahead.

The chief ostensible reason for moving the U.S. Information Agency out of the Department of State was to free the Department from an "operating" function; part of this motivation appears to have been the desire to disengage from a perennial source of embarrassment. It was made clear in the reorganization plan, however, that the U.S. Information Agency should function within the ambit of foreign policy as enunciated by the Department of State. Neither the Department nor the independent agency escaped subsequent blasts of criticism; but both agencies did succeed in developing ways of dealing with policy guidance that were relatively flexible, efficient, and sophisticated in order to take into account both media requirements and foreign policy imperatives.

The U.S. Information Agency as well as other agencies have experienced a pendulum swing between emphasis on service to the field and operations centered in Washington. Since 1950 the Agency's leaders have emphasized service from Washington to meet field requirements, chiefly as visualized by field officers but modified at headquarters if there were broader policy considerations. Much of the coordination burden has been borne in the field, and field officers have been encouraged to initiate program proposals. The Information Agency has also done what it could to persuade U.S. ambassadors to include public affairs officers on their country teams and to give recognition to the information function in other ways. This procedure has done much to assure coordination of information output with other activities abroad.

The necessary backstop in Washington is a system of guidance and control in the Information Agency, operating on a regional and country basis and geared to the policy prescriptions of the Department of State. At meetings in the Department and in ad hoc interdepartmental groups set up to deal with particular problems, the Information Agency has achieved effective representation. By the frequent presence of its Director in meetings of the National Security Council and in private discussions with the President, the Agency has been able to carry the views and requirements of the information function to the highest levels. The limitations inherent in these relations are those of time, skill, and influence in the policy process; the relationship depends much on personalities.

In the Department of State, under the aegis of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, there has grown up an inclusive and organizationally reasonable solution to the problem of policy guidance for information functions both inside and outside the Department. A Deputy Assistant Secretary and his staff concern themselves with guidance to other agencies. By Presidential directive, spokesmen for all Government agencies, including the military departments, are required to clear in advance with the Department of State any state-

ments that have foreign policy implications. This directive is not always honored; a spokesman may choose not to see foreign policy implications in his statement. In the case of the U.S. Information Agency, the requirement is generally honored; occasional lapses have provoked immediate inquiry by the Department of State. Both U.S. Information Agency and Department of State officials report that mutual respect has developed between them, resulting in considerable operating freedom for the U.S. Information Agency to take prompt action in line with known, or predictable, positions of the Department of State.

On the cultural side, there has been a recent concentration of cultural exchange responsibilities in a new office under the direction of a Foreign Service officer serving as special assistant to the Secretary of State. His deputy is a former U.S. Information Agency official, thoroughly familiar with the cultural interests and responsibilities inherent in the U.S. Information Agency mission.

Noteworthy is the participation of U.S. Information Agency policy personnel in the policy process of the Department of State. Agency regional officials attend the informal Department of State meetings in which there is a weekly governmentwide review of developments and probable U.S. responses. Some Information Agency officials have expressed a hope that their presence at these meetings could be established on the basis of their official position rather than of personal acquaintance or demonstrated contributions to the policy process. Similarly, they consider that the presence of their Director at National Security Council meetings should be mandatory rather than optional.

During recent months there has been an increasing tendency on the part of lower echelon officers assigned to geographic desks in the Department of State to deal directly with operating people in the Information Agency. While this process of direct interagency contact at a variety of levels has some value in fostering better communication, it presents some difficulties as well. One danger is that such contact short-circuits much of the policy machinery within the Information Agency. The Agency operator may be put in the uncomfortable position of having to take action on orders from someone outside his normal range of command, and Agency policy officials may be faced with operational *faits accomplis* that alter policy without adequate consideration of their broader implications. The action requested may be agreed to by the Agency operator simply because it comes from the Department of State, and it may originate with someone who is not fully aware of the information or other consequences of his proposal. This tendency can undermine broad, coordinated policy guidance that should involve the top levels of both agencies.

During the years in which both cultural and information activities have been pursued, now conjointly, now independently, and sometimes in uneasy liaison, the information activities have tended to overshadow the cultural efforts, at least in size of budgets and prominence of operations. In recent years, however, there has developed a steady upswing in emphasis on cultural exchanges and an increasing recognition that the longer term, less controversial, and ultimately more decisive influence may be gained through those channels. The infor-

mation agencies have drawn more heavily on cultural subjects for their output. And there has been a tendency for the information media to deemphasize the shrill and immediate debater's response to Communist arguments in favor of the presentation of aspects of American life that are more congenial to foreign audiences and less patently self-serving. This change involves only in part the selection of subject matter and modification of tone; it is a movement that calls for a closer linking of information and cultural activities.

3. Balance between governmental and private activities

One way of easing the information and cultural burdens of Government would be to transfer more activities into private hands. While it is impossible to explore fully here the implications of such a move, it is necessary to point out that the possible gains are likely to be more apparent than real. Former efforts to persuade private broadcasting companies to assume a larger share of international radio broadcasting soon led to congressional complaints of lack of policy control and demands for a level of policy direction that were unacceptable to the private broadcaster. Policy relations with Radio Free Europe and other nongovernmental broadcasting units have always been delicate and frequently difficult.

Furthermore, it would not be feasible to consider transferring all information activities into private hands. So long as totalitarian countries maintain barriers to free communication with the outside world, there is a national interest in providing a service that will penetrate those barriers in order to correct the distortions and omissions. If private enterprise cannot or will not do it, Government must fill the gap.

As for cultural relations, it has also been noticed that the kinds of exchanges that might take place in the absence of any governmental leadership or assistance would be insufficient to present a full picture of U.S. cultural affairs. Furthermore, because the administration of cultural affairs is under governmental direction in many countries abroad, some government-to-government negotiation seems necessary.

It appears, therefore, that continued governmental participation in information and cultural activities calls for specialized governmental staffs to plan and administer these operations.

4. Relationship of Information Agency to principal foreign policy agency

Despite the improvement in interagency relations in this field, there continues to be concern over the question: What should be the relationship between the U.S. Information Agency and the principal foreign policy department?

The information function was located inside the Department of State for some years and was not made independent until 1953. Nonetheless, there are certain considerations that militate against linking it more closely to the major foreign policy agency, even within the expanded framework of the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs. Perhaps most important is the fact that the skills and experience that are predominant in the Department of State and that would still bulk large under the Secretary of Foreign Affairs have not been as sensitive to, or as sympathetic toward, the information function as they probably should have been. There is the view,

therefore, that this activity should remain entirely independent so that it will not be unduly impeded by countervailing pressures. There is also the possibility that its output would be less suspect if it were not tied too closely to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Some critics of the information program have wanted to remove it from the Department of State in order to shield the latter from the controversy that has sometimes afflicted this activity. There is also the argument that the independent status of the agency has compelled the Department of State to do a better and more integrated job of providing policy guidance instead of allowing individual desk officers to control their information counterparts directly without subjecting that direction to broader perspectives within both the Department of State and the Information Agency.

Other considerations argue strongly that the information program should be placed under the general authority of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Immediate direction of the program would be lodged in a special secretary who would be responsible to the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. This would insure better and more consolidated policy control, underlining the fact that the overseas program is a clear part of foreign relations and governed by a central foreign policy. It would guard against the tendency of the information activities, under the press of particular events or currents of opinion at home and abroad, to generate a separate foreign policy and to express it without reference to broader policy considerations. Such a move would also permit closer relations with the cultural exchange functions. It would thus reduce interagency complications inherent in an already complex set of relationships that involve not only bilateral and multilateral considerations within the Department of State but also the collaboration of such technically oriented agencies as the Office of Education and the Department of Agriculture. At the same time, this arrangement would allow considerable autonomy for the agency and would permit flexibility of administration, including a career service designed to meet the special needs of the information program. This arrangement would have the added advantage of contributing to the general reinforcement of the directing role of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Of the two alternatives this seems the most valid on the basis of the previous analysis.

5. Degree of integration with related staffs

A second question is: To what degree should information personnel be integrated with related staffs?

One way to bring the information function into closer contact with the geographic desks of the Department of State would be to assign the policy and planning staffs of the Information Agency to the regional bureaus of the Department while leaving the operating information echelons relatively independent. This would seem to guarantee the closest possible relationship between political and information policy and might eliminate some duplication of staff and function. Such a move would eliminate the present situation, regarded as anomalous by some but welcomed by many, in which the Director of the Information Agency contributes to policy formation at the level of the Secretary of State and confers with the President directly or in the deliberations of the National Security Council.

The preservation of the information policy function as a separate entity, even within the framework of the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs, complicates coordination and control. There are those who feel that the information policy function is not sufficiently important to warrant such independent status, that it can be adequately managed by those responsible for policy direction of the substantive programs which are the subject of information operations. They argue that a separate information policy function may skew general policy determination excessively toward accommodation of the attitudes and demands of foreign nations, and may not be sufficiently sensitive to the aspirations and interests of the United States.

There are weaknesses, however, in this proposal to make the geographic desks responsible for planning the information program. Foreign policy might be transmitted not from the top political echelons to the chiefs of the information function, but directly from desk officers to information operators. Such a development would strengthen direct contact between political and information specialists, but at the risk of inadequate regional and worldwide coordination of policy. It would also put additional pressure on desk officers who already find themselves overburdened.

Furthermore, it is desirable to have a strong information policy staff in close contact with the information operators in order to provide an effective bridge between the latter and policy specialists in the Department of State as well as other parts of the foreign policy mechanism. To separate the information policy and operating staffs would be likely to weaken the entire information function and reduce its role. The present internal arrangements of the Information Agency work well, and it is likely that the proposed division of its staff would severely damage both the morale and efficiency of the organization.

In the judgment of most of those primarily concerned with cultural relations, close contact with the information function means being tainted with propaganda; they and the clientele outside the government for whom they speak continue to resist it. Thus closer association might not mean any easing of the difficult relations between cultural and information specialists but might provoke increased friction.

This problem is likely to be intractable so long as educators and other spokesmen of cultural interests remain suspicious of governmental information services. Not all cultural specialists do this, however, as participants in the Congress of Cultural Freedom have shown. There are, necessarily, inherent links between cultural and information activities. An information program that ignored the cultural life of the country would omit a vital segment. And cultural exchanges utilize all sorts of communication channels. Therefore, there is continuing need for coordination between the information and cultural programs. But there will also continue to be differences of content, emphasis, and technique between these activities.

It would appear both desirable and feasible, therefore, to link these activities as separate components under a single Secretary for Information and Cultural Affairs who would be responsible, in turn, to the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Chapter V. Relationship With the Military Establishment

The creation of a Department of Foreign Affairs would unify three major foreign policy components but would still leave other important agencies concerned with international affairs outside its boundaries. The most influential of the independent organizations would be the Department of Defense. No development affecting the contemporary organization of foreign policymaking is more significant than the impact of military affairs on the daily relations between the United States and other governments. This is unprecedented in times of relative peace, and the trend is likely to continue in future years. It is obviously infeasible, of course, to consider joining the military and foreign policy organizations within a unified department. At the same time, it is clear that there should be the closest possible collaboration between the Department of Defense and the foreign policy apparatus, but this need is not being adequately met at the present time. Much has been done to improve the situation, but this relationship remains one of the weaker links in the foreign policy process.

The most striking inadequacies lie in the area of those military planning and decisionmaking activities which have critical implications for foreign policy but are often not subjected to adequate consideration by foreign policy officials. Obvious examples are the fundamental choices regarding weapons systems with which the military forces are to be equipped, the size, organization, and distribution of the forces, and military planning for various future international contingencies that may confront the United States. Under modern conditions, these are as much the concern of officials responsible for the Nation's foreign policy as major political decisions are rightfully the concern of military policymakers.¹

In addition to the systematic integration of military and foreign policy and the organizational specifications set forth at the beginning of this study, there are several other criteria of basic relevance in evaluating the participation of the Military Establishment in foreign policymaking. One such criterion is the traditional American concept of civilian supremacy. Unfortunately, as with other venerable concepts, the term has sometimes been used with more emotion than clarity. Essentially, it means that, both theoretically and effectively, the ultimate controlling policy decisions should be made by the politically responsible civilian leadership, executive and legislative. It must be added, however, that there is no set of institutional and organizational arrangements that can insure this condition. Providing the Secretary of Defense with numerous Assistant Secretaries is no guarantee of civilian control. Implied in this concept is the belief that national security policy should not be overweighted in the direction

¹ Such lingering doubts as there may be on this question are in large part answered in Bernard Brodie's recent study of "Strategy in the Missile Age" (Princeton, 1959).

of military concepts and military instruments of policy. There is also the idea that the professional officer corps should be protected from political involvement. Career personnel should eschew the partisan arena; their prestige with the Congress and the public should not be exploited for partisan purposes.

A. MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN RELATION TO FOREIGN POLICY

The significant role of the Military Establishment is reflected in the fact that the Secretary of Defense is a statutory member of the National Security Council, and that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attends Council meetings as an adviser. On the National Security Council Planning Board the Secretary is represented by the "Defense Member" and the Joint Chiefs of Staff by an "adviser." There is also Defense Establishment representation on the Operations Coordinating Board and its working groups.


In reaching his conclusions on major foreign policy and international security questions, the Secretary of Defense has at least two major sources of advice. First, there is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs who has a combined military-civilian professional staff of approximately 140 people working for him. The Office of International Security Affairs is the official, authorized channel for communication between the Military Establishment and the Department of State.

Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the other major source of advice to the Secretary. Their statutory responsibilities as military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense are well known. Under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, their power was increased, giving them operational control over the commanders of unified and specified forces in the field.² However, orders to such commanders are to be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their responsibilities but has no executive authority. To make it possible for them to carry out these increased responsibilities, the authorized strength of the Joint Staff that serves them has been doubled, from 200 to 400 officers.

² Unified commands are those in which units of all the services in particular areas are under the command of one officer, usually representing the service of predominant interest in that area. Examples would be the unified command in the Pacific area (CINCPAC), headed by a Navy Admiral, and one in Europe (CINCEUR), now commanded by an Air Force General.

Specified commands are units of one of the services or special task forces which are deemed important enough to be under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the most significant present example is the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

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The Secretary of Defense also has available to him the advice of the civilian secretaries of the three military departments as well as other Assistant Secretaries within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Comptroller and the General Counsel, but the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the most important advisers on foreign policy questions.


1. Office of International Security Affairs

The Office of International Security Affairs is a relatively recent unit. An official formally designated as Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs was first appointed in December 1950. He was elevated to Assistant Secretary rank in 1953. This office has been given clear responsibility for, and control over, policy and programing for the military assistance program. In performing this function, the office is supported by strategic military guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the overall policy guidance developed by the Office of International Security Affairs, the military services and overseas commands actually conduct the operations of providing material, training and other assistance to foreign countries. At the present time, this program absorbs about one-half of the time and energies of the staff of the Office of International Security Affairs, including its regional desk officers who deal with the Department of State daily on foreign policy problems involving military responsibilities and forces.

The second major function of the Office of International Security Affairs is coordinating and supporting the Department of Defense representation on the National Security Council, its Planning Board, and the Operations Coordinating Board. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have their own staff to advise them in support of the role of their Chairman as statutory adviser to the National Security Council. The officer who heads this group is the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Planning Board. The Joint Chiefs, however, are not separately represented on the Operations Coordinating Board. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs acts as alternate to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the Operations Coordinating Board and is the Defense Department representative on the Planning Board. The Office of International Security Affairs currently supplies roughly one-third of the Military Establishment representatives on Operations Coordinating Board working groups; the rest come from the individual services and the Joint Staff.

The third major function of the International Security Affairs Office, and in a sense the most basic of its responsibilities, is to develop Department of Defense policy positions on a broad range of politico-military problems in United States relations with other nations. Examples would be the varied and complex problems arising from United States membership in regional security organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the arrangements involved in stationing of United States forces in many foreign countries, and the international disarmament negotiations.

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2. *Joint Chiefs of Staff*

In addition to their participation in the National Security Council process and their role as advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet on a fairly regular weekly basis with several high officials of the Department of State, including at least one person at the Deputy Under Secretary level. While the substance of these discussions is privileged, the focus is apparently on what might be termed current operational questions. Examples might include international situations in which military forces are involved or military implications loom large, such as the recent Lebanon, Quemoy, and Berlin crises. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is present at these meetings.

At a lower level, there are weekly meetings of an informal nature between members of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State on the one hand and the director of the Joint Staff and several Office of International Security Affairs officials on the other. In addition, there is some consultation between other Joint Staff officers and the Department of State officials which flows from the new relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commanders.

It should be emphasized, however, that the main portion of Department of Defense contact with the Department of State is conducted by the Office of International Security Affairs. While the Joint Staff exchanges information with the unified commands on foreign policy issues, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and his office retain executive authority in this area through functions delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary.

Mention should also be made of the activities of the three service staffs. It seems to be generally understood, though not formally included in any directive, that there is to be no direct contact between the Department of State and the individual services beyond what is absolutely necessary. In practice, this principle is interpreted liberally. Officials on both sides are naturally inclined to deal directly with whoever seems to be in the best position to help solve a particular problem. Those who operate in this fashion usually feel that they keep the Office of International Security Affairs and other relevant offices sufficiently informed.

B. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND CIVILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AGENCIES

Because there is still disagreement concerning the relationship between the Departments of Defense and State, it is well to consider the issue: How can the relationship between the Military Establishment and the principal foreign policy organization be strengthened?

Before turning to the several aspects of this issue, some basic premises should be stated. There can be no clearcut or fixed boundary between military policies and those of the civilian foreign policy organization. Each agency has its own assigned functions, and these should be as carefully and clearly defined as possible. It is obvious, however, that they must overlap to a considerable extent. Examples can be found in the broad range of factors involved in the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization relationship or in such recent situations as those concerning Lebanon and Berlin.

Major foreign policy guidelines should be set by the primary foreign policy agency within the general strategy approved by the President. Because the general foreign policy organization and the Military Establishment must deal with a considerable number of situations jointly or at least with some recognition of common interest, there must be close and continuing working relations between them at all levels from the National Security Council to the lowest action officer.

Leaving other elements aside, the very differences in the responsibilities and functions of the Military Establishment and the foreign affairs agency make disagreement between them at times inevitable and, under certain circumstances, even desirable. It is not disagreement per se that is undesirable; what is important is the availability of means for prompt and decisive resolution of disagreements.

Those who are concerned that the primacy of civilian leadership be maintained in the foreign policy field should recognize that this cannot be insured by organizational arrangements. It must flow chiefly from the vigorous and creative leadership of the civilian personnel.

These points seem reasonably well accepted. There are others not so well established; these provide the basis for the major issues discussed below.

1. Civilian agency participation in the making of military policy

It is generally acknowledged that military considerations are so closely intertwined with broader foreign policy questions that military perspectives, information and expertise must be brought to bear regularly on a broad range of foreign policy questions. As suggested above, it is by no means clear that the opposite side of the coin, stemming with equal logic from the original premises, is as widely accepted. It is the position of this report that major military decisions—including those affecting force levels, composition and balance of forces, choice of weapons systems—be systematically examined and evaluated in relation to their political implications, with the regular participation of relevant civilian foreign policy personnel.

In an era when the position of the United States in world affairs rests so substantially on the nature and strength of its military posture and when the pace of weapons development is so swift, it is foolhardy for major military decisions to be made without the most searching consideration of their political and economic implications. For example, decisions made today regarding the choice of weapons systems to be developed are likely to have the most important consequences for the foreign policy position of the United States 5 years hence. Thus the broader foreign policy viewpoint must be brought to bear on military problems when fundamental choices are being made and basic planning is being done rather than when it is too late to affect such choices—when the weapons are being put into the hands of the troops.

This concept calls for some well-established relationship between at least the primary foreign policy leaders and the major military decision makers. Such an arrangement is likely to meet considerable resistance in some military quarters; equally reluctant may be those on the other side who assume that closer association may mean less independence.

The military are understandably concerned to protect their freedom of action based on their special role and competence. There are the inevitable time pressures in their work which are not likely to be alleviated by adding still another group to the process. There are inter-service rivalries to be resolved in developing plans and making major policy decisions; presumably this can be done more easily without nonmilitary representatives present. And the military feel a special responsibility to protect the integrity of certain information crucial to the security of the United States.

There is the additional question of where the boundary line should be drawn between those decisions concerning which civilian participation would be appropriate and those regarding which it would be unnecessary or undesirable. It should be noted that this is a question equally relevant to military participation in the making of general foreign policy. There is no simple answer to this problem, but the evidence gathered for this study would suggest that there should be both more extensive and more intensive consultation between the civilian and military staffs.

What is needed are regular procedures whereby the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his senior officials can as a matter of course bring their views to bear on major defense decisions having important political implications, including the determination of important military ends and means. The same doctrine applies to the role of the military leadership in relation to the making of broad foreign policy. Because this recommendation is closely linked to the discussion of long-range planning below, more detailed comments are deferred until then.³

2. Staffs with interagency training and experience

It should be recognized that successful implementation of these recommendations calls for personnel with considerable knowledge and understanding of matters outside their respective areas of professional expertise and responsibility. In the past, the Military Establishment has done a more effective job of developing military officers with substantial knowledge and skill in political and economic affairs than the foreign policy agencies have done in developing officials with expertise in military matters.

There is a need to correct this imbalance by exposing a group of civilian officials to extensive military experience. Some political leaders, civil servants, and scholars have already proved adept at grasping contemporary strategic developments. What is of primary importance is general recognition of the need; opinion is already moving in this direction. What is called for henceforth is the conscious encouragement of this kind of interagency experience on a scale sufficient to meet future requirements.

The several war colleges are designed to develop in the more promising professional officers a capacity to view military problems within a broader political, economic, and social framework. There are also civilian officials, including Department of State officers, attending these schools. Similarly, the Department of State has in the last few years expanded its own in-service training for promising career

³ See below, ch. VI.

officers, and some military officers have been assigned to these courses. A strengthening of these and similar developments is desirable.⁴

A logical extension of these training programs would be the systematic exchange of personnel among military and civilian agencies. Some of this has already been done, but on a very limited basis. In the future, there should be a more adequate supply than now exists of Foreign Service officers who have been assigned for regular tours of duty with defense organizations such as the Joint Staff, the service staffs, the Office of International Security Affairs, and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. Similarly, military officers and certain career civilians in the Military Establishment might be assigned for tours of duty in the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs, possibly with the policy planning staff, one of the country desks, or perhaps the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

At the same time there are obvious limitations that should be kept in mind. Regardless of how much pressure is applied toward broadening a person's interests and skills, it is difficult to push him beyond the boundaries of his primary commitment. Agency and professional interests reinforce these boundaries. Furthermore, with the increasing complexity of both the issues and the decision process, it will probably be necessary to have some people who will be even more highly specialized than at present. This trend will make it increasingly difficult to train people to grapple with the broader dimensions of foreign policy. These considerations do not negate but merely limit what can and should be done to prepare more people to bridge the gap that divides the military and nonmilitary staffs.

In sum, close and well-organized working relations between the Military Establishment and the primary foreign policy agency, the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs, are a fundamental requisite for future U.S. foreign policymaking. One important aspect of these relations must be the participation of key civilian personnel, in accordance with their special roles and expertise, in major military policy decisions, including those affecting force levels, composition and balance of forces, and the choice of weapons systems. Similarly, the Military Establishment should participate, within the limits of its special mission and background, in major foreign policy decisions. This intermixture of military and nonmilitary thinking must be reinforced by both the training and the job assignments of professional career personnel, military and civilian.

C. INTERNAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN RELATION TO FOREIGN POLICY

Because this report is focused primarily on the overall foreign policymaking structure, it is not possible to give attention to all aspects of military organization but only to those most closely related to foreign policy. It should nevertheless be emphasized that such questions as the staffing of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the role and organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the allocation of service functions and missions, and the meshing of substantive and budgetary decisions are relevant to, and bear importantly upon, U.S. foreign policy. Because, however, military organization and doctrine have been the subject of many official studies, much scholarly research, and

⁴ For further discussion of training problems, see below, ch. VIII.

considerable legislative attention during the past 15 years, it would be misleading to suggest that this report could, in a paragraph or two, add much to the continuing debate on these questions.⁵ The major question to be dealt with here is: How should the military establishment be organized internally to deal with other departments concerned with foreign policy, particularly the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs?

1. Possible deemphasis of the Office of International Security Affairs

Many considerations, including the recent expansion of the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, would seem to preclude a recommendation that would channel military participation in foreign policymaking exclusively through the Office of International Security Affairs. It has been suggested, however, that the full logic of the development of the Joint Staff might lead to deemphasis or perhaps even abolition of the Office of International Security Affairs, with a transfer of various functions to the Joint Staff. It is already true, as indicated above, that the Office of International Security Affairs is by no means the only, and perhaps for certain purposes not the most significant, point of contact between the military establishment and the various civilian agencies involved in foreign policy.

The position of the Office of International Security Affairs between the professional corps of the Armed Forces and the Department of State has been a difficult one to create and maintain. It is sometimes pointed out that the substantial attention given by the military services to the political education of their officers in the war colleges and selected universities, plus the broad range of international assignments these officers receive, have already produced a considerable number of military officers who have the broad background to deal directly with the Department of State and other civilian agencies without the aid of any intermediary unit.

There is no reason why the expansion of direct relations between the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs and the Joint Staff and individual service staffs would have to undercut the position of the Secretary of Defense. The latter would still have final control over major military decisions—concerning the budget, force levels, and weapons systems. Aside from other channels of assistance and advice available to the Secretary of Defense, differences among the services can be positively useful in giving him a sense of the different policy alternatives and viewpoints available.

2. Continued reliance on the Office of International Security Affairs

While the above approach has the appeal of administrative neatness, it would leave the Secretary of Defense without a substantial source of specialized nonmilitary advice in the area of foreign affairs.

Although there are a considerable number of professional military officers assigned to the Office of International Security Affairs, the fact that its top officials are all civilian, that the majority of its professional staff is civilian, and, perhaps most important, that it is not

⁵ Among the recent major studies of military establishment organization are: William R. Kintner and associates, "Forging a New Sword" (New York, 1958); John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, "Soldiers and Scholars" (Princeton, 1957); and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State" (Cambridge, 1957).

a part of any of the military services gives the unit a predominantly civilian character and perspective. The Secretary may receive various military views on many of the questions with which he must deal, but this is not the same as having a source of advice on major national security questions independent of the Joint Staff and the three services. The Office of International Security Affairs serves as an instrument of civilian control in the area of international security affairs.

In recent years, one prevalent conception of the role of the Secretary of Defense has been as primarily the manager of a large and complex business enterprise. If he is thought of, instead, as a military statesman, with a grasp of fundamental military problems seen in the context of broader national policies, the argument for providing him with independent civilian staff assistance and expertise in the international field is strengthened. The present situation demands a Secretary of Defense of this character, able to contribute creatively to national security policymaking along with the other major Cabinet figures in this area, particularly the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

In the view of some, the Office of International Security Affairs is still necessary as a bridge between the military services and the principal foreign policy agency, bringing broad and integrated political and economic perspectives to bear on military views and at the same time interpreting and representing military views to the foreign policy organization.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that the Office of International Security Affairs is relatively young and is still in the process of development. By the very nature of its position between two "giants," the Department of State and the military services, it is bound to have difficult sledding for some time to come, no matter how able its personnel or how capable its performance.

3. Recommended arrangements

These considerations point toward an answer that would: (1) recognize the continuing need of the Secretary of Defense for strong staff assistance, separate from the military services and the Joint Chiefs and their staff, concerning international political-military problems; (2) accept the view that this function should continue to be performed by the Office of International Security Affairs with strengthened personnel and closer relations with the military staffs; (3) assign primary responsibility to the Office of International Security Affairs for maintaining contact with the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs on political-military matters; and (4) allow substantial freedom to the Joint Chiefs, their staff, and the military services to engage in direct contacts with the foreign policy agencies on operational military matters while keeping the Office of International Security Affairs informed.

Where control of the military assistance program should be placed depends on a number of factors, some of which have little to do with the fate of the Office of International Security Affairs. In its second interim report, dated June 3, 1959, the President's Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (the "Draper Committee") recommended continued control of the military assistance

program by the Office of International Security Affairs, but with a strengthened Director of Military Assistance—

who would have full responsibility for the operation of the program and would be directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

This recognizes the necessity for strong leadership of this program capable of counterbalancing the special interests of the military services in building their own capabilities, especially because the latter may be done at the expense of the foreign assistance program. This operational activity would not, however, require that the Office of International Security Affairs become equally involved in other operational details that can better be left to the Joint Staff and the individual military services.

It should be noted that these suggestions are not designed to result in the substitution of the judgments of civilian advisers for those of the military. Their purpose is rather to equip the Secretary of Defense to deal effectively with the major political-military problems that confront him. At the same time, increased direct contact between the military and foreign policy staffs should help produce a better integration of military and foreign policy, expedite the handling of common business, and help to broaden the perspectives of both groups along the lines recommended earlier. Perhaps at some future date the political expertise of the military officer and the military expertise of the foreign policy officer will reach the point where a special international security affairs staff in the Office of the Secretary will be less necessary, but that point has not yet been reached.

Chapter VI. Intelligence, Planning, and Execution

The proposals to strengthen the leadership and organization of the major agencies concerned with foreign policy, especially the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs, will require, among other things, a reinforcement of the basic policy functions common to all such agencies. The most crucial of these functions are the acquisition, sifting, and dissemination of essential information; long-range as well as short-range planning that will analyze the key issues and recommend preferred courses of action; and the direction and evaluation of consequent action programs. The following analysis examines certain aspects of each of these functions—intelligence, planning, and execution.

A. INTELLIGENCE

The experience of the Second World War demonstrated the need to draw more closely together the various intelligence efforts, both military and civilian. Thus the National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency as an adjunct of the National Security Council and gave it a coordinating function with respect to existing departmental intelligence organizations. Since then, the concept of an intelligence community has undergone an evolutionary process, the main feature of which has been a tendency toward centralization, a tendency that has been marked by conflict and compromise and that still involves unsettled issues.

At present the intelligence community consists of the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and some elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, the community is informally linked with other information gathering and processing activities in the executive branch. The community, sometimes acting as a whole through the Central Intelligence Agency and sometimes with its components acting separately, services the entire executive branch. Contact with the Congress is more limited, intermittent, and informal.

1. The producer-user relationship

A basic problem that colors all aspects of the intelligence function is the issue: How can the relationship between the producer and user of intelligence be strengthened? The relationship is complicated by the fact that the users' needs are far from uniform. Principal officials, who have the ultimate responsibility for planning and making the major policy decisions, have needs different from those of their supporting staffs. The latter requirements differ again from those of staffs that are responsible for the execution of policy decisions. To meet these varying needs the intelligence producer must develop a close relationship with the user and make every effort to shape his product to the end use. On a foundation of collected raw material,

the intelligence servicing function presently ranges from a large flow of detailed, current intelligence to finished research, estimates, and projections. But there is still a good deal of groping, especially with respect to servicing the policy planners and decisionmakers, as distinct from their supporting staffs and the operators.

The difference is natural enough. Researchers and operators need a large and steady flow of factual detail. In the course of 10 years, the intelligence community's structure and procedures have been steadily improved for this kind of service. The gradual centralization of files, the standardization of processing methods, the establishment of mechanical controls for handling material, the development of routine techniques for communicating products to users—these have demonstrably improved the servicing of the researchers and operators. At the same time, users have learned how to specify their needs more precisely and how to draw more effectively on the available resources. These results have been brought about in considerable part by the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But the picture is different on the policymaking side. Previously, policymaking officials drew the information they needed from departmental reporting and intelligence organizations. Their requirements, as well as their information, were departmentally oriented. Consequently, when the intelligence community was organized, it had no integrated procedures for servicing policymakers as such; nor were the policymakers prepared to give adequate guidance. The intelligence producers could, in these circumstances, only state what, in principle, they believed policymakers ought to want to know.

What seemed to be needed was intelligence analysis that generalized current and emerging situations, anticipated probable future developments, and projected the consequences of possible courses of action. This was to take the form of "estimates" distilled from masses of correlated factual data—the whole strained through the combined professional judgment of "intelligence analysts." This was essentially what the intelligence community, guided and persuaded by the Central Intelligence Agency, proceeded to do.

But the gap between policy and intelligence was not an easy one to close. Policymaking officials were busy, departmentally oriented men. On the one hand, they found it difficult to state their needs sharply, specifically, and in advance. On the other hand, they did not find it easy to accept guidance from intelligence specialists, particularly those outside their own departments.

Although the situation has improved, many of these difficulties remain. The only feasible conclusion is that the top leadership concerned with foreign policy, particularly the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, should take steps to reexamine this relationship to make certain that the planners and policymakers are receiving the full benefit of the resources of the intelligence community. Such an appraisal should cover the attitudes and working habits of the consumers as well as the methods and forms of producing intelligence analyses.

As of the moment, leaving aside the admittedly costly clandestine activities, the collection of raw material, the elementary processing and control of this material, and the servicing of researchers and operators with current intelligence have seemed to be the most pressing

functions and have absorbed the greater proportion of resources. This has led to recurring demands, fixed habits of mind, and set organizational procedures which tend to freeze the pattern. There is clearly an irreducible minimum of effort—and by no means a small one—that must be maintained in this area. But there is the other important need to be met: the better servicing of the planners and decision-makers by means of more comprehensive and sustained long-range analysis and research.

Measuring existing intelligence activities against probable future requirements, a strong case can be made for progressively allocating a greater share of resources to these functions. It is apparent by now that inadequate attention is being devoted, even in the national estimates procedure, to really comprehensive, long-range analysis.

The customary counterargument to these claims is that analysis and interpretation are being carried on within departments by offices not formally called intelligence units, and that any expansion of the intelligence community for these purposes would tend to increase the size and predominance of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization that is already criticized as being beyond the reach of public scrutiny and control.

It seems clear, however, that these are not adequate responses. The greatest need in the future is to think as deeply and farsightedly as possible about the major international problems that confront the United States. Far less effort is being devoted to this fundamental requirement at present than to the massive flow of current intelligence. While the intelligence function cannot entirely satisfy the need for more searching long-range analysis, it can and should make an important contribution to this end.

2. Allocation of responsibility

A related issue is: What should be the basic division of responsibility between departmental intelligence organizations and the Central Intelligence Agency?

This question tends to center around control of the most influential product of the intelligence community, the "national estimates." These documents embody estimates of situations, usually on a country or regional basis, and are the principal documentary contribution of the intelligence community to the National Security Council. Each cooperating department and agency furnishes relevant material, but the Central Intelligence Agency is in charge of preparing the draft. The final formulation is done primarily by the small staff of high-level generalists in the Office of National Estimates within the Central Intelligence Agency. The completed draft is submitted to the participating departments for comment. Differences are worked out in the interdepartmental Intelligence Advisory Committee which is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and contains representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The final product goes to the National Security Council for consideration in relation to key policy decisions.¹

Although the Central Intelligence Agency and its analysts are not supposed to deal with policy, it is apparent that the estimates are

¹ For further discussion of this process, see Harry Howe Ransom, "Central Intelligence and National Security" (1958), ch. VI.

usually considered to contain certain policy implications. There is particular concern, therefore, among the participating departments and agencies about their relative roles in shaping these analyses. They are also determined to maintain considerable independence and staff in preparing less significant documents regarding current intelligence. Initially, substantial freedom of action was left to the individual departments and agencies. More recently a centralizing trend has developed, encouraged by departmental budgetary and personnel problems that have eroded departmental organizations.

It can be argued that the formulation of national policy, requiring as it does the integrated effort of principal policymaking officials, calls for an objective, nondepartmental intelligence service. The Central Intelligence Agency also helps to counteract the uneven quality of intelligence analysis in the various departments.

On the other hand, it can be said that the principal policymakers are traditionally and properly the responsible heads of executive departments and that, in addition to whatever may be provided for their use by a centrally directed organization, they should rely heavily on departmentally oriented intelligence services that are close to the policymaking staffs and have developed some excellent expertise over the years.

The concept of an objective estimate emerging from the free interchange and reconciliation of diverse professional knowledge and judgment is a valid one. The practice leaves something to be desired. The coordinating procedure, as it now operates, does not bring together people of comparable professional experience and intellectual sophistication. The resources, career opportunities, and special influence of the Central Intelligence Agency tend to attract a high level of skill. Some of the policy agencies have greater difficulty in this respect. In addition, the departmental personnel often defend rigid positions so that a process conceived as one of free interchange comes to resemble negotiation among instructed delegates.

In reviewing the considerations favoring and opposing centralization, the present balance seems essentially correct, but ways should be explored to allow greater influence to those agencies, particularly the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs, that are best equipped. This should be facilitated by making the Secretary of Foreign Affairs the Vice Chairman of the National Security Council. It is necessary to have the central activity for the sake of efficiency and a balancing of varying agency views and capabilities. The central product is more acceptable to certain agencies than it would be if it were to emanate from a single policy department. On the other hand, the departments must retain control over their respective areas of policymaking authority and should have their own intelligence staffs to support that function. These staffs can make important contributions to the central product and also give specialized assistance to their departmental policymaking colleagues. Furthermore, a special collaborative relationship should exist between the Central Intelligence Agency and the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs that does not need to be exposed to the constant intervention of less concerned and less adequately staffed departments and agencies.

3. Legislative control and evaluation

The issue of how to establish ultimate legislative control over the intelligence function is a difficult one because of the extreme secrecy

of the enterprise. Some intelligence work—clandestine activities and some collecting techniques—is by its very nature virtually beyond the reach of public examination and control. Other intelligence activity—specifically the servicing of planners and policymakers—tends to fall within the area of privileged executive communication. Nevertheless, there is much of the intelligence effort that could conceivably be brought under legislative scrutiny.

All of these activities, however, are so interlocked that, if the Congress carelessly exerted its power, it might do considerable damage to the intelligence function. This danger is inherent. Clandestine work, field collecting activities through agents, and related techniques are not, never have been, and never can be made subject to continuous and full public control. This is work that, with all its mishaps, mistakes, and imperfections, must be taken largely on trust; or rejected in its entirety. It might be said that democracies should not engage in such activities, but democracies always have engaged in them and will probably continue to do so for their own protection.

This is far from meaning, however, that the intelligence community, and in particular the Central Intelligence Agency, is wholly uncontrolled. As a servicing arm of the executive policy process, it is subject to two devices specifically designed for evaluation and control: formal processes of self-examination and periodic surveys by ad hoc Presidential committees. The former operate continuously and have, as much as any other factor, provided the means for bringing about small but cumulatively significant changes. The Presidential committees, of which there have been several in the course of a decade, have served the purpose of reviewing performance periodically and correcting defects. While the findings and recommendations of these evaluations are not made public, there is evidence that they have acted as limitations on unjustified expansion and controls on ill-conceived activities.

Nevertheless, the Congress has a valid role to play in helping to shape the intelligence community to meet the needs of the future, and this requires at least a minimal power of surveillance. It would be in the interest of the public and of the total national policy process if such a power could be satisfactorily defined.

To this end, it seems both desirable and practicable to draw a line between those activities that cannot be publicly surveyed and those that might profitably be made the concern of at least a small group of key congressional leaders. There can be little doubt that a better, more widespread understanding of the intelligence function would lead to improved support for the function.

Neither the intelligence community nor the Congress is free from fault in the conduct of the argument that surrounds this issue. The community, for its part, tends to overemphasize the need for freedom from control; the Congress is equally inclined to overstate the necessity for surveillance. As far as the future is concerned, it would appear more useful to explore the feasibility of a middle position, on the basis of which the intelligence community could take its broadly stated problems to the legislative leadership for periodic review.

B. THE PLANNING FUNCTION

Another essential link in the foreign policy process is the planning function: looking ahead to identify major problems, to appraise alternative approaches, and to recommend preferred courses of action. In the best of circumstances, this is a difficult task which requires great knowledge and skill, but the rapidly changing world environment makes the function even more taxing.

The strains of recent years have revealed sufficiently serious deficiencies in the foreign policy planning process to warrant a careful review of the problem. At the same time it is important to keep in mind the limitations that will always prevent the ideal from becoming the actual. It is difficult, for example, to see very far ahead with any degree of precision. And the talents that make for good planning are scarce. It is not easy to attract them to governmental service, and it is difficult to develop such skills in conjunction with the usual Foreign Service career. At the same time, the planners must be acquainted with the policy process and develop effective relations with the policymakers. But resources are never sufficient; thus difficult decisions must be made regarding priorities. In addition, every relevant agency wants to influence the output, but few are adequately equipped. Furthermore, there are built-in impediments that tend to discourage the planners from challenging current doctrine. Policies are hard to construct, and cannot—probably should not—be discarded lightly. There are other governments as well as other agencies that must be persuaded, and it is not easy to demonstrate the relative merits of one policy in comparison with another.

1. Present planning machinery

Planning, in whatever time perspective, may be thought of as implying at least the following elements: (1) clarification of objectives, (2) identification of emerging problems, (3) definition and appraisal of various means of overcoming these problems, and (4) recommendation of specific courses of action. The principal departments and agencies that presently dominate the process as it applies to foreign policy are those represented in the National Security Council, particularly the Departments of State and Defense.

In setting forth U.S. policy with regard to a particular region, country, or function, the policy papers of the National Security Council look ahead, attempt to anticipate future developments, and specify objectives and policies with regard to these developments. Ideally, these papers would seem to be an excellent vehicle for long-range thinking and planning. However, as indicated earlier in the report, there are a number of obstacles. The National Security Council is primarily an interdepartmental committee, or series of committees, and its staff is not in a position to undertake extensive, independent investigation and analysis. Thus the quality of the planning manifested in National Security Council papers must rest heavily on the joint efforts of departmental planners, particularly those of the Department of State. This process involves prolonged negotiation via the elaborate interdepartmental apparatus developed for the National

Security Council, the Planning Board, and the Operations Coordinating Board which frequently results in a greatly diluted product.

The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State was originally established in 1947 with long-range planning viewed as one of its primary functions. It was regarded as part of the Secretary of State's staff and was placed in his Office, where it still remains. The group has always been quite small in number; at present there are 11 officers. The staff has three major functions: (1) to act as policy adviser to the Secretary (the Assistant Secretary who is director of the staff is usually an important adviser to the Secretary); (2) to service departmental participation in the National Security Council and the Planning Board (the director of the staff is the Department's representative on the Planning Board); and (3) to engage in the long-range consideration and analysis of policy problems.

While the performance and influence of the staff have varied considerably, certain difficulties have plagued it through most of its existence. As a small group of able officers, its members are frequently drafted for operational duties, such as writing speeches and current policy statements. Such activities can be useful in keeping the staff in touch with current affairs, but they have considerably reduced the time available for thoughtful consideration of longer range problems, as have the burdens involved in servicing the Department of State's participation in the National Security Council.

Thus the Policy Planning Staff devotes only a limited portion of its limited resources to the task of long-term, broadly focused consideration of major foreign policy problems. Yet it continues to be, on the whole, a competent group of officials respected within the Department. Its papers do not usually have wide circulation in the Department, but there are established contacts with the various regional and other bureaus. It has a good working relationship with the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. There are also continuing, informal contacts with the Joint Staff and the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, which are discussed above.²

In the early 1950's, various bureaus in the Department, including some of the regional bureaus, made formal provision for planning at their level by introducing into their organizations individual planning advisers or small planning staffs. The relative lack of support for these efforts is reflected in the fact that at the present time only one of the regional bureaus has a formally designated planning adviser.

Another center of planning related to foreign policy is the Military Establishment. The Armed Forces have substantial planning staffs, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the three military services. The Department of Defense places considerable emphasis on its planning activities and assigns many of its best officers to them. This underlies the view held by some military officials that the Department of State could and should do more of the same kind of planning.

The nature of the military responsibilities and functions makes planning of a rather detailed and specific nature both necessary and relatively feasible. Fundamentally, a military organization must be

² See ch. V.

prepared to meet a variety of possible combat situations, at different times, different places, with different weapons systems, with different logistical and support problems, and with different combinations of enemies and allies. Therefore, the American Military Establishment has to prepare a series of contingency plans to guide its actions for a variety of possible situations. This kind of planning is usually done by military planners working on short-range problems.

In addition, military planning is usually done within two other time frames, middle-range and long-range. Middle-range planning looks 3 to 5 years ahead. Long-range planning is for an 8- to 15-year period. There are distinctive planning groups charged with these two responsibilities. These groups are responsible for analyzing and weighing a complex set of factors, translating these into broad military concepts and strategies, and then into size and composition of forces, weapons systems, disposition of forces in the United States and abroad, training and organization, and fruitful lines for research and development. These are tasks made most difficult by the complexity and rapid pace of development of both contemporary international politics and contemporary weapons systems. The fact that there is likely to be a lead-time of several years between the time a decision is made to adopt a particular weapon and the time when it becomes operational demands considerable advance planning of a detailed nature.

It should be noted parenthetically that the military place considerable emphasis on what they call operational planning. In the case of such situations as the one involving Lebanon, or in an actual combat situation, military operations are so complicated, such a variety of forces and factors are involved, that very careful and precise planning is necessary to assure a reasonable meshing of the many complicated parts.

It should not be inferred from these comments that military planning is a faultless model.³ Sometimes the most ambitious planning operations are in the hands of rather junior officers. Different branches within the same service may have divergent estimates of the future and develop their equipment and weapons accordingly. Occasionally, the quality of the analyses and planning papers is not as impressive as the ambitious time frame in which they are placed. Joint service efforts in the planning field, as elsewhere, leave something to be desired. What can be said is that, given the nature of military responsibilities, planning is a functional necessity. It is a familiar and valued activity to most professional officers.

While there are many intangibles in military planning, there are some fairly concrete elements to work with: size, composition, and disposition of forces, nature and characteristics of weapons systems, military capabilities of potential enemies and allies, layout of possible target or combat areas. On the other hand, many of the most important factors which the Armed Forces must take into account are not primarily military in character: the ideologies and objectives of other nations, trends in world trade and economic development, and political conditions in key countries.

To be most effective, military planning should be done within the clearest and most precisely defined foreign policy framework that is

³ For some rather critical analysis of military planning, see Malcolm W. Hoag, "Some Complexities in Military Planning," *World Politics*, vol. XI, No. 4 (July 1959), pp. 553-576.

possible, including American objectives and policies in relation to significant trends in the world environment. Because military force is an instrument of the Nation's foreign policy and because many of the factors involved in the foreign policy framework do not fall within the traditional area of military expertise, it is assumed that much of the basis for their framework is, or should be, derived from sources outside the Military Establishment. It is often said within the military organization that the National Security Council policy papers provide basic guidance for military planning. It is doubtful, however, that these are sufficient.

2. Future development of long-range planning

Against this background, a central issue that deserves consideration is: What general direction should be pursued in the future development of long-range foreign policy planning?

Clearly, many officials involved in the foreign policy process already engage in considerable long-range thinking. Much of it is unsystematic and unsustained; nevertheless, intelligent policymaking in the present obviously rests on assumptions, whether implicit or explicit, about the future. The question now being asked is whether this kind of analysis can and should be improved in both quality and quantity. Many policymakers, and many outside the policy process, feel that the fairly general projections that they make into the future represent about as much as can usefully be done. They point out that some modest contingency planning has already been done. But they feel that the scope, dynamism, and complexity of the factors that comprise international affairs are so great that it is difficult to look very far ahead with any useful degree of precision.

There are, however, those who are more optimistic. They point to the impressive advances in the social sciences in the past 50 years, the gains in reliable knowledge about human behavior, and they argue that the problems of foreign policy are so crucial that all possible resources of knowledge and understanding should be brought to bear on them. It is felt that the possibilities for more precise, and more imaginative, foreign policy planning and analysis have by no means been exhausted.

One example of this sort of approach is provided by present developments in Africa south of the Sahara. The area is entering a period of rapid and profound change. A few years hence, the United States could well be confronted by a very dangerous situation there. Would it not be advisable, therefore, to develop in as much detail as possible the U.S. objectives for the general area and for the individual countries, to obtain the best possible intelligence projections for the next 3, 5, and 10 years, and, on that basis, to devise specific policies and implementing programs likely to maximize attainment of the objectives?

It is easy to be skeptical about such a proposal, but the experience of the United States in other areas of rapid change—the Middle East, the Far East, and Southeast Asia—is sobering. In any event, the conclusion suggested by this discussion is: Given the crucial importance of the problem, there are available both the accumulated knowledge and sophisticated analytical techniques that can be and should be put to work more fully than they have been up to the present.

3. Improved link with policy

If governmental efforts in the field of foreign policy analysis and planning are to be improved, there are several basic prerequisites that should be underscored. First of all, these efforts cannot succeed without the interest, understanding, and support of the top leadership. If the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs should be skeptical or openly unsympathetic, his planning staff could be several times the size of the present Policy Planning Staff without having very much impact. If the top leaders are willing and interested "consumers" of long-range planning, a significant battle will have been won. Furthermore, the top leadership can, if they wish, encourage the spread of this longer range perspective throughout the foreign policy organization to those not formally designated as "planners."

This last comment suggests a second prerequisite: namely, good working relationships between the planners and the so-called operators, those concerned with current policies and programs. Ideally, this should be a mutually beneficial relationship, with planning staffs keeping in touch with current activities and operating personnel getting more breadth and perspective from the planners. There are sources of tension in this relationship, with planners perhaps fidgeting to get into action and operators skeptical of the worth of planning, but there is no preferable alternative.

Finally, it might be noted that all bureaucracies, and perhaps most particularly governmental bureaucracies, face perennially the challenge of encouraging imagination and originality while maintaining an essential core of continuity and stability. This is a difficult problem, to which there is no easy answer; yet it has a great deal to do with the quality of foreign policy analysis. It may perhaps help to explain the recent tendency to call for greater use of outside agencies in this field, which is discussed below.

4. A strengthened planning staff for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs

If the long-range planning function is to be reinforced, it is clear that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs will need a somewhat stronger planning group than the present Policy Planning Staff and one that will devote more of its efforts to longer term studies. This should be a group that can look critically at the objectives and estimates underlying present policy and identify emerging situations and problems. This calls for a staff of the highest caliber and a wider range of background than is presently available in the Policy Planning Staff. It should not only draw on personnel from the principal governmental agencies concerned, but should be leavened by talented outsiders, both on short-term and long-term assignments.

If steps are taken along the lines recommended above, whereby the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his senior aids will work closely with the Military Establishment on major military decisions, this planning staff should be the principal staff link with the military planners. This means more than occasional, informal, ad hoc contacts; it calls for well-established and continuous exchanges of views, planning documents, and personnel. Taking a leaf from the intelligence field, this cooperation might lead to the development of the concept of a foreign policy "planning community."

The work at this level would be further strengthened if provision were made for complementary planning at lower levels. It might be useful, for example, to have a planning officer attached to each of the regional bureaus of the Department of State and assigned full time to the task of looking ahead to future problems affecting the bureau. These bureau planning officers should obviously have close working relations with the overall planning staff. The major problem would be to keep them from becoming simply one more body to be thrown into the crisis of the moment.

It would not seem fruitful, however, to adopt the suggestion of a council of distinguished senior personnel, particularly retired ambassadors, to supplement the efforts of the planning staff. It can be, and has been, useful for the Secretary of State to call on such people on an ad hoc basis for advice and other special assignments, but to select a particular group as a continuing body might create more problems than it would solve. There would be the difficulty of selecting the right people with the right distribution of interests to deal with a broad range of problems. Because of their elevated and somewhat independent status, it would be embarrassing not to follow their advice. It would be equally embarrassing not to consult them at all. The Secretary of State could exercise relative little control over them, but they could exert considerable pressure on him, especially by threatening to resign.

All of these considerations add up to the conclusion that the Policy Planning Staff to be assigned to the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs should and can be strengthened. It needs, above all, support and encouragement. It needs a somewhat larger staff, composed of people with exceptional competence and a wide range of relevant experience that will be free to concentrate on longer range problems. This organization should be the principal link with planners in other agencies, particularly the Department of Defense. This operation would also benefit by the injection of nongovernmental people on both short-range and long-range assignments.

5. The role of nongovernmental specialists

The use of outside individuals and organizations to serve as consultants to the Government is well established. Recently, however, it has been suggested that a Government-supported institution be established to undertake studies for the national foreign policy mechanism. Some of the enthusiasm for the idea comes from the apparent success of such agencies as the Air Force-supported Rand Corp. An assumption underlying the suggestion is that the kind of analysis that is called for in the foreign policy field is not being done to a sufficient extent within the Government and, in the view of some, cannot be done within the Government. There are intellectual resources that an outside agency can bring to bear on policy problems which are difficult to recruit and maintain within the Government. Many able specialists prefer to remain free of the restraints of governmental service and frequently receive more generous compensation than would be possible within the Government.

There are numerous arrangements through which the talents of outside persons could be put to work in support of the foreign policy planning process. First, the present situation could be continued, with perhaps some increase in the funds available to the proposed Depart-

ment of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council staff for outside help of one kind or another. This would mean bringing in consultants and contracting for specific studies and projects on an essentially ad hoc basis. The argument for expanding the use of non-governmental personnel without developing any one center for the major portion of this activity is basically that of flexibility. It provides the maximum possibility for choice and maneuver without establishing still another institution which might be difficult to dispose of if it should prove unsuccessful. This approach could be less expensive than creating a new organization and would probably be more acceptable to existing institutions.

Those who suggest such a Government-supported organization would argue, however, that precisely what is needed is a well-established base that can attract able scholars and scientists, build up teams adequate to work jointly and imaginatively on the most difficult problems, and have the necessary communication links to the people actually making policy. In addition, this organization could act as a communications channel between governmental and nongovernmental specialists; it could even subcontract to the latter.

Such an agency could be a completely Government-supported but quite autonomous organization like the Rand Corp. It could be semi-autonomous but closely linked to some specific governmental unit like the National Security Council Planning Board, the Policy Planning Staff, or perhaps the combined National Security Council-Operations Coordinating Board staff. Another possibility would be a substantial research and planning operation within one of the above-named units, in turn acting as a contact point with outside research organizations and universities. Or existing outside groups could organize a unit that would serve as an intermediary between the strictly governmental research operations and the nongovernmental operations in various universities and private research agencies. This is roughly the arrangement which now exists between the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group run by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Institute for Defense Analyses, which is an intermediary channel representing a number of universities doing contract work for the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.

The goal is a relationship between the more or less autonomous research personnel on the one hand and the foreign policymakers on the other that will maximize the contribution the former can make to national policies. In this regard, a number of problems arise. Will the outside research community be able to exercise sufficient freedom in selecting its own research targets and problems or at least a major portion of them? This would seem to be desirable for the morale of its staff and its ability to recruit able people. Given such maneuverability, the research group might be able to bring significantly fresh perspectives to bear on the thinking of the policymakers. More basic is the question of the general character of the relationship between the outside specialists and the governmental officials. If there is mutual respect and confidence, the choice of research problems should pose no great difficulty; if not, it may not make too much difference what research problems are chosen.

There is also the problem of gaining access to classified materials. Outside studies are likely to be more useful to those within the policy-

making structure if they are based on rather extensive access to the documents produced within the structure. On the other hand, given the somewhat anomalous position of outsiders working for insiders, there are likely to be security problems involved. This means that the outsiders may not have easy access to everything they need, and they will suffer various restraints in trying to disseminate their findings outside the Government.

There is the question of how best to insure that the work done by the outside scholars receives appropriate attention within the Government. Much will depend on the quality of the personnel recruited and the organization developed. Much will also depend on the kind of relationship developed with governmental personnel. Some argue that this can best be accomplished by linking the outside research facilities directly to some unit at the Presidential level, perhaps to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs or to the proposed Director of National Security Affairs. Presumably this would give the President more of the intellectual resources he needs to carry out his leadership role in the national security field and would strengthen the position of his staff assistant. If the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs is to have the key foreign policy role recommended in this report, there would be a strong argument for connecting the outside specialists to his Office, perhaps through his planning staff.

There are still other problems that deserve at least brief mention. One is the matter of the distribution of the reports prepared by the consultants. Are the reports to go to only that department or subunit requesting them, or is wider distribution to be possible? Assuming that this arrangement is to be essentially a creature of the executive branch, what relation, if any, is it to have to the Congress and its committees and other instrumentalities, such as the Legislative Reference Service? Is there to be some initial capital investment to support a special organization, or is it to be financed yearly either by a line item in the budget of some agency or on a contractual basis? Who is to appoint its directing head? If there is to be a high policymaking body in the nature of a board of trustees, are any governmental officials to be included? Will any ultimate veto power be placed in the hands of a governmental group? Is some kind of legislative oversight desirable?

These are specific questions that must condition any decision to link nongovernmental talents to foreign policy planning. The fundamental choice would seem to lie between establishing a new and substantial organization or expanding the present pattern of a variety of ad hoc arrangements, perhaps increasing the ability of the Policy Planning Staff and the National Security Council staff to contract for studies by outside research groups and to bring in a larger number of outside consultants for longer periods of time. The latter approach has the advantages of flexibility and of utilizing the resources of established organizations. If the personnel capable of doing this sort of work is, as seems probable, rather scarce, introducing a new organization may only increase the strain on the personnel situation without bringing any net benefits. It can be argued that it might be a better investment of limited resources to strengthen the staffing within the Government, to bring more able people into the policy process where they can have a direct impact on what is decided. More able and

knowledgeable people on the governmental planning and research staffs might also be in a better position to make appropriate use of skills outside the Government.

The argument for improved use of nongovernmental resources rests on the assumption that the present quality of governmental analysis and research in the foreign policy field leaves so much to be desired that vigorous, imaginative steps must quickly be taken. A new group is called for because those on the scene have proved inadequate and give little promise of doing much better. Under these circumstances it is felt that only a nongovernmental organization, appropriately supported and staffed, will have the time, detachment, and intellectual keenness needed.

In view of these considerations, a reasonable first step toward a possible larger scale mobilization of nongovernmental talents in the foreign policy field would be to experiment with a few special task forces. These could be created in several different parts of the country where it would be relatively easy to mobilize substantial numbers of leading specialists for extended assignments. They would be given key long-range problems to analyze, possibly identical to studies that would be conducted simultaneously within the Government. This should provide an opportunity to explore both the advantages and disadvantages of such enterprises and to arrive at a judgment concerning the general usefulness of the approach.

C. EXECUTION AND EVALUATION

In the action phase, a central problem that will confront the foreign policy apparatus in future years will be how to orchestrate an ever-expanding range of functions and agents in support of basic objectives and policies. In 1940, the Department of State had approximately 5,000 employees, and it largely dominated the foreign policy field. Today the Department has more than 12,000 employees, and virtually every other major department and agency is engaged in some overseas activity. The new era in American diplomacy is dramatically apparent in the extraordinary proliferation of special programs and staffs under the supervision of most country missions. The Ambassador is only slightly less perplexed by this diffused array of activities than the officials of the host country who require an organizational Baedeker to find their way through the maze. Some amalgamation, such as that suggested above, would be feasible and helpful, but it would be impossible and undesirable to attempt to place all foreign projects under the direct control of a single department. It will continue to be necessary, therefore, to utilize the resources of a number of independent instrumentalities, including multilateral organizations, to play supporting roles in executing basic U.S. strategy.

1. Organizational background

Despite the years of emphasis on coordination through the depression and the Second World War, the National Security Act of 1947 made no provision for any organization to see that actions resulting from the deliberations of the National Security Council would be integrated. The authors of that act did not design the National Security Council as a command mechanism. They created it as a device to

bring before the President and his chief aids major policy issues in the broadening and as yet vaguely perceived national security field.

The informal arrangements of the late forties for coordinating the execution of policy proved inadequate to cope with the sharpening and quickening threats from abroad. The next step was to adapt the Psychological Strategy Board for the purposes of comprehensive identification of national capabilities and harmonization of them into programs of action. That Board already represented the most important agencies in the national security field. It had only to be streamlined and given a sharper focus. Above all, it was necessary to make clear that coordination of agency actions was more important than the earlier efforts to influence opinion abroad.

This finally led to the establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board. As indicated in an earlier chapter, this Board brings together the top operating officials of the major departments concerned with national security. There, in weekly meetings, they consider joint problems of how to put Presidential decisions in the national security field into effect.

The Board has been chaired from its inception by the Under Secretary of State. The Vice Chairman is the President's Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination. The membership of the Board includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Directors of Central Intelligence, of the U.S. Information Agency, and of the International Cooperation Administration, and one or more representatives of the President. Standing request members, whose attendance at Board meetings has been approved by the President, include the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, and the Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Originally the Board was staffed largely by personnel loaned by collaborating agencies and financed by agency contributions. The Board now has its own group of assistants plus a small staff of 20 officers, half of whom are detailed from other agencies but all of whom are supported by an independent budget.

Most of the work of the Board is done by working groups of which there are some 50 today. These are composed of agency nominees with representation from each of the interested departments, usually chaired by the Department of State representative. Each working group receives a specific assignment normally based on a National Security Council paper. The central task is to examine the capabilities of each agency to carry out the overall directive and to put specific actions into reasonable relationship with one another. These blueprints constitute so-called operations plans. As approved by the Board, they form a basis on which the agencies can take their own actions. Subsequently periodic reports on action taken are submitted to the Board. In reviewing such action, the Board may recommend a reappraisal of basic policy by the National Security Council and its Planning Board.

The Board has been criticized for the large amounts of time and paperwork involved, for the lack of uniformity in the quality of agency participation, for continuing shortcomings in focusing on major issues, and for deficiencies in its role as a reporting and evaluating mechanism. In deciding what is to be done, when, and where, agency representatives have fought for the freedom to conduct particular opera-

tions according to their own sense of urgency and their relatively limited missions and responsibilities, without full attention to coordinated tactics that might advance the cause of the Government as a whole.

A major argument against special interdepartmental machinery for coordinating the execution of policy strikes at the distinction between policymaking and execution, asserting that the only policies that count in the long run are those that are expressed in action. The thesis runs that only officials who take actions can deal responsibly and effectively with policy.

The effect of this argument, however, is to strike not at the Operations Coordinating Board, but at the National Security Council. If the thesis is accepted, the correct course of action would be to reorient the National Security Council as an operations coordinating agency, and make the Operations Coordinating Board a supporting staff, or abolish it.

But this proposition is not realistic. Granted that policy and operations must be closely intertwined—and in small organizations there is often little organizational separation between them—it is still true that in any organization as large and as complicated as the U.S. Government it is necessary to have greater specialization of function. Some people must concern themselves primarily with the broad objectives and directions of policy. At the same time it is necessary to keep such persons in touch with the realities of day-to-day operations, without involving them in the details of execution. Others must devote themselves more to transforming policy into action. If no such distinction were made, the policy process would be even more cumbersome than it is.

2. Need for central supervision

So strong has the resistance to interdepartmental coordination of the execution of policy been at times that it is relevant to ask: Does there continue to be a need for a central process along the lines of the present Operations Coordinating Board activity?

Those who are most critical of the Board are inclined to abolish the Board and to rely on less systematic communication between operators in the various departments. Such an informal system achieved considerable effectiveness in the years before the creation of the Board and still accounts for much of the day-to-day coordination that presently takes place.

But the volume and complexity of operations are growing every day, and informal consultation may require more effort and produce less satisfactory results than the more formal process. The central mechanism provides a regular channel for communication among those most directly concerned, serviced by an efficient staff. At the same time, less formal contacts may still take place outside the Board procedures. While the appointment of a Secretary of Foreign Affairs would bring some of the agencies under a single roof, there would still be a need to unify the activities of many independent units.

To date, the Board procedures have been most effective at two levels. First is the informal, private consultation among the Board principals, who can do much to educate one another and to mesh their several points of view through joint discussion. Second is the activity of the various working groups, where agency representatives bring

together concrete action proposals and coordinate them into operations plans.

While the criticisms of the Board have some validity, they do not outweigh the basic need for something like its function, though sharpened to do the things it can do well and focused on the most important issues. If it is true that National Security Council papers are too general, one way of dealing with the problem is to use the Board to translate the papers into more precise programs of coordinated action. The Board process provides a forum within which agencies can learn of the full range of Government capabilities and adjust their operations accordingly.

3. Improvement of the coordinating process

If it appears, on balance, that the Operations Coordinating Board serves a useful purpose, the question arises: How can its structure and procedures be improved?

One aspect of this issue has to do with location of leadership responsibility in the Board. There seems to be no viable alternative to location of the Board in the Executive Office of the President, in close association with the National Security Council, so long as the latter continues to play a central role in helping to set the major national guidelines for security policy. There are alternatives, however, regarding who should chair the agency. Foremost among them would be an official directly responsible to the President, within the Executive Office structure, or a deputy of the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

The case for a chairman in the Executive Office rests primarily on the view that such a chairman would be more neutral, more sensitive to all aspects of national concern, closer to the President, and able to devote more time to directing Board affairs than a chairman from the Department of Foreign Affairs. He might also insure closer cooperation with the staff connected with the National Security Council.

It would seem more satisfactory, however, to assign the chairmanship to the Department of Foreign Affairs. This gives the leadership of the Board the closest possible contact with the mainstream of foreign policy and operations. This argument is strengthened by the proposed role to be assigned to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Another way in which the process can be improved is to focus Board energies more effectively on the most important matters affecting action programs. It is difficult to do this, however, because various departments are interested in different problems. Furthermore, one of the main objectives is to look at details within a relatively broad framework. And it is considered necessary to review the papers fairly frequently in order not to fall too far behind the march of events. All of this tends to defeat a more selective and intensive approach. At the same time, the automatic annual report to the National Security Council has been eliminated; the Board now refers matters to the Council only when such action is thought necessary.

On balance, it seems clear that the Operations Coordinating Board could do better if it were to concentrate its attention on the major issues by areas, functions, or combinations of the most critical area-functional difficulties. As now organized, the Board working groups, which may be regionally or functionally oriented, cover such a wide

range of topics on such a restricted time schedule that many observers feel the effort tends to be superficial and inconclusive. Steps should be taken, therefore, to concentrate on a smaller number of key issues and to allow more time for the process, reviewing each program less frequently than at present.

4. A separate evaluation procedure

Closely related to the matter of overseeing the execution of policy is the problem of appraising the effectiveness of the action taken. There is, at present, provision for semiannual reviews within the Board on the execution of operations plans and of other regularized actions taken in furtherance of National Security Council papers approved by the President. These reports have been criticized for lack of sharpness and candor arising, in part, from the fact that agencies are reporting on their own operations. It has been suggested, therefore, that there not only be an independent review but that it go beyond mere reporting of actions taken or not taken to provide a true appraisal of such action. The present system has been defended chiefly on the ground that the reporting process at least forces departments to consider systematically whether they have carried out their responsibilities; and if not, why not.

The case for the present system is that the action agency is in the best position to report its own performance. It has its men on the ground, and the state of affairs in the field is considered obvious enough to keep them honest. Furthermore, regardless of who performs the function, it is difficult to arrive at feasible criteria and to apply them systematically and objectively. Because most governmental operations are technical in nature, and many are subtle as well, who can better evaluate them than those trained to carry them out? This system is at least a minimal response to the need. To do more would require the investment of a considerable amount of skilled manpower.

Despite these difficulties, there seems to be a place for special staffs, at both the departmental and Executive Office levels, with sufficient independent stature and authority to engage in continuing, penetrating evaluation. The success of the International Cooperation Administration with its internal evaluation suggests that personnel of the requisite knowledge and skills can be found for this function and that they can do much to improve field operations by informal suggestion as well as by formal reports.

Such a design would avoid the main difficulty of the present system—lack of independence in relation to the units under review. It would also avoid the difficulties encountered by spot evaluators outside the Government—lack of adequate access to the necessary information and lack of sufficient governmental experience. At the same time, the governmental evaluation staffs could tap the special skills of outside experts and give the occasional external review committee invaluable help.

Chapter VII. Field Missions

The critical link in the foreign policy chain is direct contact with other nations in the field where plans must meet the test of action. Yet U.S. missions are presently operating under extraordinary handicaps, and prospective changes in the international environment are likely to make the situation even worse. Daily, the burdens of field staffs grow in volume and complexity, while financial and personnel resources continue to lag behind, restrictions imposed by Washington continue to restrain initiative and long-range thinking, and the proliferation of independent agencies hampers efforts to integrate the many activities into coherent programs. This situation calls for careful rethinking of the functions and organization of field missions.

The following analysis deals, first, with individual country missions and, second, with missions to multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the three European communities, and the Organization of American States. Much of what is said elsewhere in the report concerning other issues also relates to this discussion, and special appendixes deal more specifically with U.S. relations with multilateral organizations and the inter-American community.

A. ROLE AND SELECTION OF AMBASSADORS

The importance of the Ambassador in the conduct of foreign relations can hardly be exaggerated. He is the eyes, ears, and voice of the United States in the country of his assignment. It is chiefly through him that governmental relations with that country are funneled. He is the primary agency of negotiation with the host government and the image and embodiment of the United States to its officials. For the U.S. Government, he is the central source of information on what its multifarious agencies are doing under his general supervision. He is the primary source of intelligence and advice to which his Government looks in formulating its policies. He sets the bounds for the activities of all other U.S. officials within his jurisdiction and in times of emergency exercises a large measure of authority over other Americans as well. Probably more than any other official below the level of the Secretary of State, an Ambassador can make a shambles of U.S. relations with another country or organization, or can save it from irretrievable blunders.

Some criticism has been voiced regarding the effect on the ambassadorial role of direct negotiations conducted by the Secretary of State in the field. The personal preferences of Secretaries of State vary on this score, but the general tendency in this direction is probably inescapable. It is a consequence primarily of swifter transportation and is akin to the growing centralization of most governmental affairs. With telephonic conversation between all parts of the world and travel

by jet, the trend appears certain to continue and the separation between Washington and the overseas missions certain to diminish.

Carried too far, however, this practice borders on the tendency, apparent in other parts of the organization, for the generals to trespass on the functions of their lieutenants. In this case, the status and authority of the Ambassador will be downgraded, both in the eyes of local officials with whom he may have to conduct critical negotiations when the Secretary is absorbed in more pressing matters elsewhere, and in the eyes of the official American community.

If the importance of the Ambassador has declined from its high watermark in the days when Benjamin Franklin had to wait months for a reply to a request for instructions and a visit to Paris by his superior was beyond the bounds of possibility, there has been and continues to be a countervailing trend. The Ambassador to Loas has a much larger official family than Franklin could have dreamed of needing. The United States currently maintains 2,000 civilian employees in the United Kingdom alone. The exigencies of the cold war which require greater cooperation and consultation among allies, the military, economic, and technical aid programs, the information efforts, the trade negotiations, the growing activity of American business abroad, the burgeoning tourist travel, the visits by Congressmen, the wider interchanges—all have vastly increased the area of activities regarding which the Ambassador must exercise surveillance or at least have an informed understanding.

Because of these heavy responsibilities, the selection of Ambassadors takes on great importance. A major issue affecting this matter is: What should be the balance between career and noncareer appointments?

It is a truism of administration that no ingredient in an organization is more crucial than the quality of the men who compose it. In the case of ambassadorships, the character of the man assumes special importance. He must control a skein of many threads and must be the Ambassador 24 hours a day. His job may best be compared to that of the captain of a ship. In both cases, what is important is not primarily specialized knowledge—pilots can be found to maneuver through the intricacies of the Hoogli River or Indian culture—but a high degree of general competence, including a thorough grounding in basic navigational skills, which means training and experience. Essential are the personal qualities of discipline, steadiness, self-subordination. The talents of a brilliant innovator do not, of themselves, fill the bill on the quarterdeck. Still like the captain of a ship, an Ambassador has unusual opportunities to misuse his power—and so does his wife. The best safeguard is habituation to the traditions and discipline of the craft. Command ability is essential, for a heterogeneous assortment of individuals, many with specialized backgrounds and experience, must be made to function as a team, and in circumstances of cultural isolation likely to accentuate friction.

While those appointed from outside the career service necessarily face many difficulties in serving as Ambassadors, they can also make, and have made, significant contributions. At the present time, 24 out of a total of 75 chiefs of mission are noncareer appointees. These men and women frequently have a better knowledge of American society than do typical career officers, and they invariably have strong

roots of support and influence at home that can be of service in strengthening relations with other governments. They have often demonstrated exceptional ability in one or more fields of endeavor, and may bring highly valuable executive skills to the job. They inject a fresh, nonprofessional view. This is one of the strengths of the American system of relatively high mobility between Government and private life. Finally, there is the fact that private means are considered necessary to supplement the available governmental allowances in some of the larger posts. This is one of the major reasons why only 6 of the 15 major posts in Western Europe are held by career officers.

An Ambassador needs to be thoroughly trained in the intricate and disciplined practice of diplomacy as well as the no less complex process of getting things done in Washington. Noncareer men seldom are in the service long enough to acquire sufficient grounding in these fundamentals. This imposes extraordinary burdens on their subordinates, and has resulted in serious blunders which the United States can ill afford. Because future diplomacy is likely to be even more broadly ramified and complex than at present, the need for solid professional training will be commensurately great. Private and political connections can also be harmful as well as beneficial, particularly when they discriminate for or against certain interests both at home and abroad. Finally, the inadequacy of governmental allowances should never be the determining factor in this matter. Far poorer countries than the United States seem to be able to furnish adequate funds to support their Ambassadors and other representatives.

This analysis leads to the conclusion that future conditions are likely to require more than ever the skills that are most often developed in career officers and are less frequently found in noncareer appointees. Steps should be taken immediately to insure that all posts are adequately financed so that they may be headed by career officers whenever that seems desirable. The important consideration is that the post of chief of mission is of such vital importance in building effective relations with other nations that it should be filled with only the most highly qualified individuals—whether career or noncareer.

B. SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Once a qualified man is appointed to an ambassadorship, it is important for him to be adequately undergirded. He is the United States abroad and must be able to act as such. This kind of authority does not, however, give him the necessary tools to do his job.

Though appointed by and ultimately responsible to the President, the Ambassador normally receives his instructions over the signature of the Secretary of State and communicates whatever he has to say through the Secretary. This would be immaterial if all the officials attached to the embassy were in the Foreign Service and thus under the regular jurisdiction of the Department of State, as the commercial attachés have been for the past 20 years. As it is, those in the employ of the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency are outside the Foreign Service, and the three military attachés, the agricultural attaché and numerous other officials serving abroad represent establishments of the Government that

are not under the direct command of the Department of State. The accompanying table shows the extraordinary range and numbers of overseas civilian personnel other than those directly employed by the Department of State. The multiplicity of separate agencies as well as individuals imposes a heavy burden not only on the chief of mission and his staff but on the host government. This creates a difficult situation in which the kind of support the Ambassador receives both in Washington and in the field means a great deal. The Ambassador must be able to call upon Washington for general direction and to count upon Washington to give him the necessary authority and staff to control his official family.

*Paid civilian employees of selected agencies, military attachés and MAAAG military personnel of the Federal Government in foreign countries, by agency and citizenship, June 30, 1958*¹

Agencies	Europe	Latin America	Far East	Near East and Asia	Africa
State:					
U.S. citizens.....	2,666	1,096	1,149	1,187	361
Noncitizens.....	4,444	786	1,694	2,171	424
Total.....	7,110	1,882	2,843	3,358	785
ICA:					
U.S. citizens.....	136	762	1,119	882	349
Noncitizens.....	141	951	3,983	1,850	285
Total.....	277	1,713	5,102	2,732	634
USIA:					
U.S. citizens.....	361	134	331	287	55
Noncitizens.....	2,376	610	2,074	1,732	305
Total.....	2,737	744	2,405	2,019	360
Department of Defense:					
U.S. citizens.....	10,395	325	8,602	614	990
Noncitizens.....	15,369	2,517	49,967	1,571	1,078
Total.....	25,764	2,842	58,569	2,185	2,068
Military attaché.....	200	85	79	102	16
MAAG military.....	759	7	2,900	488	54
Treasury:					
U.S. citizens.....	87	10	21	4	
Noncitizens.....	12	2	21	2	
Total.....	99	12	42	6	
Commerce:					
U.S. citizens.....	118	103	52	114	47
Noncitizens.....	20	31	2		
Total.....	138	134	54	114	47
HEW:					
U.S. citizens.....	27	47	44	49	24
Noncitizens.....	59	1		5	
Total.....	86	48	44	54	24
Agriculture:					
U.S. citizens.....	47	62	17	24	14
Noncitizens.....	50	227	15	18	6
Total.....	97	289	32	42	20
Total:					
U.S. citizens.....	14,796	2,631	14,314	3,751	1,910
Noncitizens.....	22,471	5,125	57,756	7,349	2,098
Total.....	37,267	7,756	72,070	11,100	4,008

¹ "Improvement in Standards of Language Proficiency and in Recruiting for the Foreign Service" hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 1243, Apr. 16, 1959.

1. Support in Washington

The policy process in Washington has already been discussed, but certain aspects require emphasis here in relation to the role of the Ambassador. While he has been given reasonably adequate authority on paper to exercise ultimate responsibility for all U.S. activities within the country to which he is assigned,¹ his principal superior at headquarters, presently the Secretary of State, has no comparable status in Washington, i.e., ultimate command authority over all agencies engaged in overseas activities. This argues all the more strongly for the proposal to create a stronger backstop in Washington, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.² His direct control over the main foreign policy agencies, including the aid and information units, as well as his designation as Vice Chairman of the National Security Council and his control of the chairmanship of the Operations Coordinating Board, should reinforce his capacity to provide firm and unified backing for the Ambassadors. One of the most useful aspects of the Operations Coordinating Board, despite its limitations, is the production of comprehensive and detailed operations plans which succinctly summarize the total effort that is supposed to be put into effect under the Ambassador's general supervision. This tool, skillfully used, can help the Ambassador to exert considerable leverage in reconciling conflicting agency policies under his jurisdiction.

Another way in which Washington can assist Ambassadors is to liberate them from the demands of unnecessary labors. A vast amount of time, for example, is devoted to extremely detailed reporting, especially in the commercial and economic fields. Staffs in Washington are overworked reading the reports which staffs in the field are overworked producing. On top of this is a welter of administrative paper. It is doubtful that any other government requires so detailed a record of its doings as does ours; few could afford it. No doubt a case can be made for each report. But, in the aggregate, the mass of reporting seems excessive. The best way to demonstrate the superfluity of some of the flow of paper would be to appraise samples of reports over a period of years to see what concrete return they produced. This is a field in which lessons might be learned from other governments.

2. Support in the field

Because the Ambassador must spread himself thin to cover the whole front, he is greatly dependent upon his staff to provide general supervision as well as specialized services. In all but the smallest posts he will have at least a political section, several military attachés, an economic section, a consular section, and an administrative section. Under the jurisdiction of the Embassy but partly independent are whatever economic, military, and information missions are assigned to the country. There may also be separate representatives of various agencies including the Departments of Agriculture and the Treasury. The heads of these several activities are brought together periodically with the Ambassador as the "country team."

Whether the Ambassador is adequately served will depend primarily upon the caliber of the people filling these many posts. The quality of service will also depend upon the length of time the staff officer has

¹ See Executive Order No. 10575, Nov. 6, 1954, 19 F.R. 7249, title II.

² See above, ch. III.

served in the country. Where the assignment is for only 2 years, which has been conventional in the more arduous posts, the Ambassador will usually not be adequately served. The first year is spent in gaining familiarity with the country, and the latter part of the second year, in preparing for departure. The period when a payload is carried is a brief one. The solution lies in a pattern closer to 4-year tours broken by ample home leave at the midpoint, with provision for staggered rotation to enhance continuity.

The Ambassador will be best served if the corps contains a capacity well above current needs to permit training and flexibility of assignment and to provide resources that can be quickly marshaled to deal with crises.³ Only by having an ample reserve will it be possible to permit adequate training of Foreign Service officers and adequate preparation of officers being assigned to new posts. The gains would not stop there, however. Generous staffing would make it more likely that the right man would be sent to the right spot. Misassignments are often the result of having to stretch resources rather than of perversity or stupidity. Another gain would be in safeguarding overseas posts from being chronically undermanned in key positions during personnel shifts. No military organization in time of war has all its strength on the line except in emergencies; neither should the Foreign Service. There should be a reasonable overlap between persons leaving a post and those replacing them so that there may be an orderly transition rather than a disorderly hiatus as so frequently happens now.

At the same time, a serious reappraisal should be conducted regarding the numbers of Americans serving abroad. Overseas establishments have become immense. Even in a less developed country such as India, the United States employs 350 American citizens and an additional 1,000 noncitizens. Numbers alone do not necessarily cause unpleasant relations with the host governments, but it is doubtful that the United States should try to carry such a large portion of the burden directly. Part of the problem can be dealt with by eliminating waste motion, as suggested above. More fundamental, however, is the question of whether the same ends might be served with less expense and better results by transferring certain activities to other personnel, including private organizations, the host governments, other cooperating governments, or international organizations. More is said below about the multilateral approach.⁴

U.S. embassies also labor under handicaps imposed by certain popular American attitudes. There is resentment of the social trappings of diplomatic activity. A Foreign Service officer abroad lives more elegantly, with more servants and more formality, than his counterpart at home. Even a vice consul warrants a five-gun salute. While diplomatic practice has been "democratized" to some extent, the change is slow, and much formality will continue to prevail because of the official significance of the process.

The American public should be willing to give the diplomats the tools and latitude their work requires. The diplomats in turn owe it to those they represent to bear in mind that there is nothing personal in the flattering attentions they receive; this treatment would be given

³ See below, ch. VIII, for further discussion of personnel problems.

⁴ See app. F.

to anyone representing the Nation. They do not need to obtain the most pretentious quarters for themselves and staff or to engage in other unnecessary and unbecoming ostentation.

While a certain amount of entertaining within the official American community is necessary if long tours of duty in alien environments are to be made tolerable, excessive entertaining in this circle is unproductive or worse. It gives an impression of American exclusiveness. The productive relationships are for the most part with the inhabitants of the country. But the tendency to consort with those inhabitants who are most congenial—meaning usually a privileged, internationally minded upper set—has to be controlled. A broader dispersal of power in the world's societies is characteristic of the age; the heirs of the future will often be found in unfashionable circles. In some countries such elements may constitute a political "opposition" with which contacts by members of foreign embassies may be proscribed by the party in power. In such cases, indirect channels of communication through nonofficial Americans may offer the best means of contact.

C. RELATIONS WITH MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

An important adjunct to the more traditional bilateral diplomacy has developed markedly in recent decades, especially since the Second World War, in the form of relations with multilateral organizations, both universal and regional. This has come about largely because of the accelerating development of the complex web of relations among nations which have become increasingly interdependent—economically, strategically, and politically. Partly as a consequence and partly a cause, there has also been a change in attitude which has recognized inadequacies in the strictly national approach and advantages in various forms of international association. This trend has already given rise to certain organizational adjustments within the U.S. Government and raises questions regarding possible future changes.

With regard to some aspects of this evolution, there need be little discussion here because they are discussed elsewhere in the report. These include the difficulty of finding enough skilled specialists in this field, as in others, and the lack of adequate allowances, especially for those assigned to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations which is not considered a regular diplomatic post. It was also recommended earlier that the bureau concerned with the United Nations and the specialized agencies be given a staff role directly subordinate to the Secretary of State. An appendix discusses certain general considerations affecting U.S. relations with international organizations.

The issues to be given special attention here have to do with the unification of policies related to U.S. activities in international organizations, the selection of delegates to international organizations, and the proportionate financial support which the United States gives such organizations.

1. Unification of policy

One of the principal problems involved in conducting relations with multilateral organizations is how to integrate the policies and actions of the many U.S. departments and agencies that are concerned. Policy concerning United Nations consideration of commodity agree-

ments, for example, must be cleared with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and the Treasury as well as the Bureau of the Budget. Dozens of intricate consultative procedures, topped by more than a dozen major interdepartmental committees, have been developed over the years to manage collaboration in the preparation of policy positions to guide U.S. participation in multilateral deliberations. The chief difficulty is that, while the Department of State is at present primarily responsible for tying all of these strands together, its authority in relation to independent agencies is weak, and the latter are determined to defend their special interests.

This problem is a particular aspect of the general problem, discussed above, of integrating various elements of national policy affecting United States relations with other countries.⁵ The most appropriate corrective measures are special applications of the adjustments recommended earlier. The appointment of a Secretary of Foreign Affairs with direct authority over the aid and information agencies as well as the general foreign policy mechanism would provide stronger leadership in unifying the activities of these units as they relate to multilateral organizations. Making the Secretary the vice chairman of the National Security Council and giving him control of the chairmanship of the Operations Coordinating Board would reinforce this leadership in relation to independent departments and agencies involved in multilateral activities. It would also be well to reexamine all other interdepartmental consultative arrangements concerned with international organizations to make certain that they respond to the central unifying role of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

2. Selection of principal representatives to international organizations

Representing the United States in an international organization can be an extraordinarily complex and taxing responsibility, particularly in the larger and more significant agencies such as the United Nations. Dealing simultaneously with a number of different governments—82 in the United Nations—creates perplexing problems of communication and coordination. And a larger proportion of the work is done in an atmosphere of klieg-light publicity than is the case in more traditional diplomatic negotiations. It is essential, therefore, that U.S. representatives to such organizations be persons of exceptional skill and experience.

This discussion focuses primarily on the practice at United Nations Headquarters where there has been the greatest experience in this regard. The use of noncareer personnel for the permanent delegates to various organs of the United Nations is very similar to the normal use of noncareer Ambassadors. Because this matter has already been discussed, the argumentation need not be repeated here. The choice of delegations to occasional conferences, particularly the annual sessions of the General Assembly, is somewhat different and deserves special attention.

The debates of the General Assembly attract extraordinary attention around the world because of the dramatic nature of the institution, the emotional aura that surrounds it, and its broadly representative membership. The normal U.S. practice has been for all of the

⁵ See above, chs. III, IV, and V.

delegates to be noncareer people; few other countries use noncareer delegates to this extent. The pattern of selection has been designed to give representation to both Houses of the Congress as well as various sectors of public life. The nongovernmental members have been chosen with an eye to various occupational fields, including business, labor, and the professions, different religious affiliations, and women as well as men. Experience with this procedure gives rise to the question of whether the practice should be revised.

Many of the arguments in favor of the existing procedure are similar to those mentioned above concerning the choice of ambassadors. In addition, it can be said that the quasi-legislative nature of the General Assembly permits, even encourages, the use of noncareer delegates. Because the term of office is relatively brief, because the consequences of the debate are relatively limited, and because the supervision by the Department of State is relatively pervasive, such a practice may be considered harmless. Furthermore, the admirable qualities of many of the delegates can make a significant contribution in developing friendly relations with other peoples.

Unfortunately, the experience of the past has not been very satisfactory. While the delegates have not served for long periods, they have also not had sufficient preparation regarding general diplomatic practice or the substantive issues involved. They have found it difficult to adjust to the procedures and have, at times, been restive under the restraining effect of their instructions. Their lack of language facility has made it difficult for many of them to break through the cultural barrier. While it seems desirable to retain some of the advantages of the noncareer approach, it appears that the present procedure has serious deficiencies. It would seem advisable, therefore, to inject a larger degree of professional talent at the top representational level while exploring ways in which noncareer leaders could continue to be used to good advantage, possibly on a shorter term consultative basis.

3. Proportionate U.S. financial contributions

The availability of adequate funds is a concern close to the heart of any organization, and the question of the rate of U.S. financial contributions has an important influence on the availability of funds to most international organizations. The issue is: What should be the rate of U.S. contributions to the major associations? While this discussion is generally relevant to all such organizations, special emphasis is given to its implications for the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

This issue becomes acute with the rising activity of international organizations involving a far greater expenditure than was usual before the Second World War, and with continued pressure in the Congress to reduce the general rate of U.S. contributions to at least 33.3 percent, if not less. The total U.S. contributions to the United Nations and affiliated programs have varied from \$17 million in 1946 to a peak of \$135 million in 1950, to an estimated \$107 million in 1959. The rate of U.S. contributions to the United Nations has been reduced, by dint of persistent negotiation, from 39.8 percent in 1946 to 32.5 percent in 1959, and the General Assembly has accepted a goal of 30 percent as the maximum contribution to be made by any country.

The rate of U.S. contributions for the largest continuing United Nations activity, the expanded program of technical assistance, financed by voluntary contributions as distinguished from binding assessments, has been reduced from 59.9 percent in 1951 to 40 percent in 1959. In the latter year, the payments governed by assessments accounted for slightly less than half of the total U.S. contributions to international organizations; voluntary contributions accounted for the balance. While the general tendency of the United States is to reduce the rate of contributions in both categories, the level has been allowed to be greater for voluntary contributions on the theory that these are special operations to assist certain categories of countries to which it is unreasonable to expect all members to contribute.

One point of view favors moving in the direction of increasing the proportionate U.S. share of the assessed support of the United Nations. This position is based largely on the assumption that contributions should be governed primarily by the capacity to pay, and that the relative capacity of the United States is greater than its present rate of contribution, 32.5 percent. The usual measure of this capacity is a country's national income which for the United States is now approximately 40 percent of the total national income of the world. There is also the contention that the wealthiest states should pay even a higher percentage than is indicated by their relative income on the theory that the more developed countries can afford a proportionately greater sacrifice. Finally, it is remarked that the constant pressure of the United States to reduce its assessment, particularly during the years when the rest of the world was especially hard pressed, has generated considerable animosity.

The opposite tendency favors the present restrictive policy that continues pressing for a relatively low rate of payment, aimed at something around 30 percent. In part, this is based on a conservative estimate of the relative U.S. capacity to pay, including the observation that other states, particularly the Soviet Union, have not been accurate in reporting their own capacities. This view also stems from other considerations, including the feeling that no single country should contribute more than one-third, and respect for the opinion of the late Senator Arthur Vandenburg who first expressed the doctrine that one-third was a fair assessment for the United States. Many emphasize that it is necessary to save as much as possible in order to support worthy enterprises at home. It is also pointed out that the United States does pay a higher percentage in supporting special programs through voluntary contributions.

Those who favor a relatively generous approach regarding the special activities supported by voluntary payments maintain that it is particularly important to be openhanded here because the burden must be carried mainly by the more developed countries. The largest of these programs include the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East (with a total budget of \$37 million in 1959), the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (\$33 million in 1959), and the United Nations Children's Fund (\$26 million in 1959). These three programs total more than the regular administrative budget of the United Nations (\$60 million in 1959) and operate primarily to assist certain less well-endowed populations. To help support these enterprises, the

United States contributed, in 1959, 67 percent of the cost of the Palestine refugee program, 40 percent of the technical assistance program, and 50 percent of the Children's Fund. The main pressure in this area is to increase the proportionate share of the technical assistance effort.

Those who tend to be more conservative on this question argue that these activities will lose their international character and become mere appendages of the United States if the American contribution is relatively high. On a strict capacity-to-pay basis it should be no more than 40 percent at the most, according to the relative national income of the country.

In weighing these several alternatives, it is important to remember how extraordinary the postwar development of international organizations has been. The United States has not only taken the lead in this development but has contributed generously of its own resources to nourish these efforts. As for the proper rate of contribution, it still seems reasonable to assume that the capacity to pay should be the principal consideration in determining at least the minimum rate of contribution. On this basis, the United States should be expected to contribute at least the present 32.5 percent of the regular administrative budget of the United Nations, and preferably somewhat more. The rate should be substantially higher for those special operations whose financing must be carried primarily by the more developed countries.

Chapter VIII. Personnel Management

The skills needed to conduct contemporary U.S. foreign policy have long overflowed the narrow requirements of traditional political and economic relations to include the many talents necessary to support a host of overseas operations that cover the globe. These activities range from broad negotiations on such matters as Berlin and armaments regulation to helping less developed countries advance their production, health, and education. This extraordinary shift in personnel needs, which is likely to continue into the foreseeable future, has imposed severe strains on existing personnel practices and institutions which have already been considerably strengthened and are likely to require additional adjustment in the coming years.

In considering the problems of future organization to meet these requirements it is assumed that there are certain general qualities that are necessary as a foundation for more specialized skills.¹ As always, basic intelligence will be at a premium. Ethical integrity will be essential to withstand the tests of personal values that will arise. Persevering motivation to serve the public cause will be necessary to surmount disheartening trials. A sense of how to get large numbers of people to work together effectively will be important in achieving maximum gain with minimum expenditure of resources. And a broad understanding of, and sensitivity to, different political, economic, and social environments, including one's own, will be essential as a basis for building enduring relations with other nations.

Today's demands for personnel in the major agencies associated with foreign affairs call not only for generalists who have a comprehensive understanding of foreign affairs and are capable of directing and coordinating programs of broad scope but also for experts who can deal with detailed complexities and meet high professional standards in relatively specialized fields. It should be understood, of course, that while the so-called generalists are needed to deal with broad areas of policy and operations, they should also have—and usually do have—some specialized skills.

A. BACKGROUND

Although personnel in defense and intelligence activities play important roles in foreign affairs, attention is centered here on selected problems that are likely to affect the personnel who would serve under the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, including those in the aid and information agencies. At present the Department of State, including the International Cooperation Administration, and the U.S. Information Agency employ a total of over 23,000 American civilians, slightly more than half of whom are stationed overseas at any given

¹ Another study in this series explores these qualities in greater detail. See "The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy," Study No. 6, Nov. 11, 1959.

time. In addition, the three agencies employ about 23,000 foreign civilians at overseas posts. Approximately 13,000 of the American civilians are members of the agencies' three separate "foreign services," either as officers, reserves, or staff corps. Over 6,000 of these are serving in the Foreign Service of the United States.²

A unified and professionally staffed Foreign Service was officially established by the Rogers Act of 1924. Although governed by a Board of Foreign Service Personnel in the Department of State, the Foreign Service was set up as an organization distinct from the De-

² See accompanying table on "Foreign Service Americans by Category and Class Overseas and United States" (February 1959).

Department of State — Foreign Service Americans by category and class overseas and United States (February 1959)

Class	Total	Continental United States	Outside United States
Chiefs of mission:			
Career ambassador.....	1		1
Career minister.....	42		42
FSO-1.....	8		8
Noncareer.....	24		24
Total.....	75		75
FSO's not chiefs of mission:			
Career ambassador.....	^b 1	1	0
Career minister.....	^b 26	16	^b 10
FSO-1.....	^b 165	77	^b 88
FSO-2.....	373	161	212
FSO-3.....	529	236	293
FSO-4.....	563	233	330
FSO-5.....	581	212	369
FSO-6.....	611	160	451
FSO-7.....	126	25	101
FSO-8.....	481	250	231
Total.....	3,456	1,371	2,085
FSR-1.....	30	5	25
FSR-2.....	47	9	38
FSR-3.....	135	37	98
FSR-4.....	149	26	123
FSR-5.....	195	28	167
FSR-6.....	176	31	145
FSR-7.....	87	7	80
FSR-8.....	22	21	1
Total.....	841	164	677
FSS-1.....	26	7	19
FSS-2.....	23	9	14
FSS-3.....	33	11	22
FSS-4.....	36	13	23
FSS-5.....	45	13	32
FSS-6.....	67	21	46
FSS-7.....	70	21	49
FSS-8.....	160	23	137
FSS-9.....	315	36	279
FSS-10.....	536	42	494
FSS-11.....	951	61	890
FSS-12.....	958	71	887
FSS-13.....	422	89	333
	1	0	1
Total staff.....	3,643	417	3,226
American consular agents.....	18		18
Unclassified.....	1		1
Grand total, Foreign Service Americans.....	8,034	1,952	^{c d} 6,082

^a Includes part-time employees.

^b Does not include FSO chiefs of mission counted above.

^c Includes 3 employees assigned to USPOLAD in Honolulu.

^d Does not include 14 contract employees.

partment itself. Under the pressure for additional specialized information, during the late 1920's and 1930's, separate services were established by the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, and the Treasury. The idea of a unified Foreign Service was reinitiated in 1939, but the war created numerous independent staffs concerned with foreign affairs.

After the war, the Foreign Service Act of 1946 was enacted as the framework for a unified Foreign Service meeting all basic civilian needs of overseas representation, but the Department of the Treasury continued to maintain its own service. With the aid of a friendly congressional committee, the Department of Agriculture reestablished a separate service in 1954. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 did provide, however, for lateral entry into the Foreign Service to make possible the recruitment of mature specialists as well as individuals with more general aptitudes. It also created a Foreign Service Institute which was to provide training—including some specialization—at various stages in a Foreign Service officer's career. Neither of these steps was, or could have been, sufficient to meet the overwhelming needs of that time. The concept of a unified Foreign Service had to give way under the impact of cold war programs of a military, economic, information, and intelligence nature. Increasing numbers of specialists—including many noncareer personnel—were recruited under separate personnel systems.

The "foreign service" of the U.S. Information Agency was established by Executive Order 10477 in August 1953 after the information service was separated from the Department of State by Reorganization Plan 8. The "foreign service" of the International Cooperation Administration was initiated by Policy Directive No. 7 of May 9, 1957, signed by the Director of the Administration. Both systems are based upon provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, but neither system has been granted permanent or explicit legislative authority. Although the three "foreign services" face many of the same problems, they are currently at different stages of development and are organized to meet different needs.

B. A SINGLE FOREIGN SERVICE

The proposal to establish a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who would have direct authority over the foreign aid and information agencies as well as the general foreign policy staff, raises the question: Should there be established a unified career foreign affairs service, including personnel from the three component organizations?

With the expansion of American activities overseas after the Second World War, several proposals for the establishment of a unified career foreign affairs service were advanced. Under one such proposal, the "foreign service" systems for activities now performed by the Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration, and the U.S. Information Agency would have become the nucleus of such a foreign affairs service, along with the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense stationed at diplomatic missions abroad. Without prejudicing the case for or against inclusion of any civilian

personnel from the Department of Defense in a career foreign affairs service, this element is excluded in consideration of the present issue.

The proposal to create a unified career foreign affairs service is supported by the concept of a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, by the facts that economic and information programs are integral parts of foreign policy, and that staffs linked together in a common personnel system—in which transferability of staff is maximized—should be able to work together more effectively. The International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency have already copied many aspects of the Foreign Service system in setting up their own services so that all three could easily be integrated. Unification would help to break down barriers that impede cooperation and to create a common sense of teamwork both in Washington and overseas. This would be one of the most effective ways of harmonizing the broad range of policies affecting foreign affairs. Unification would eliminate some duplication in administrative machinery and reduce costs. Still an integrated service could accommodate different personnel requirements for different kinds of programs.

Opposed to the single service proposal is the fact that the Foreign Service is still in the process of adjusting to "Wristonization" and requires additional time to become stabilized. It has also been said that uniting the three "foreign services" would be akin to mixing peaches, oranges, and apples. Each agency has its peculiar needs; thus administrative costs might not be greatly reduced. The present recruiting methods for the career Foreign Service, as well as its methods of career management, are not well suited to certain aspects of operations like those of the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency. The former must, for example, search intensively through all of the available professional channels in order to find the necessary specialists. This need suggests considerable decentralization in personnel management. The Foreign Service would be unable to undertake such specialized "program" staffing without substantial modification of its present organization and practices. Furthermore, a complete integration of personnel systems would probably damage the morale of the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency personnel who have a pride in their respective organizations and who do not want to be subordinated to the Foreign Service as it is now organized.

If there are excellent arguments for establishing a unified career foreign affairs service, with sufficient flexibility to meet different staffing needs, the practical problems involved in the execution of such a plan are prodigious. It should be kept in mind that the aid and information agencies are trying to build their own services along Foreign Service lines, but they are still experimenting with adaptations which appear necessary in view of the special types of programs they are administering. The U.S. information Agency is working closely with the Department of State and is willing to accept either unification, under conditions that would meet its special needs, or the present situation. Neither the International Cooperation Administration nor the Department of State, however, is interested in a further pooling of their "foreign services" in the immediate future.

Although the ultimate goal should be a single service under the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the most feasible approach for the time being is to have the aid and information agencies work toward a common system on a relatively independent basis. The International Cooperation Administration should develop devices for cooperation with the Department of State similar to those adopted by the U.S. Information Agency. The three agencies should jointly explore alternative plans by which the "foreign services" of the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency could achieve closer coordination with the Foreign Service, which could pave the way for unification.

This recommendation does not prevent future consideration of steps beyond a "unified" service of this limited nature to a more broadly based foreign affairs service or even to an overall Government service career system of sufficient flexibility to include both domestic and foreign affairs personnel. In any adjustment, provision should be made to allow increasing mobility across departmental lines, both at home and abroad, according to the needs of the various agencies and the capabilities of their personnel without affecting career status adversely.

C. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY FOR OPERATING AGENCY CAREER SERVICES

As a step toward the improvement of the "foreign services" of the aid and information programs, and not precluding ultimate adoption of the goal of a unified service, there is the issue: Should the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency now seek explicit legislative authority for the establishment of career services similar to the Foreign Service?

Because the International Cooperation Administration and the United States Information Agency are both considered to be "specialist" agencies, the issues involved are often treated as a single problem. Both have established makeshift services which are improvements over their earlier personnel systems, but neither has obtained specific legislative authority for the establishment of a career system comparable to the Foreign Service. The U.S. Information Agency has sought such legislation since mid-1954. The International Cooperation Administration, with a broader grant of operating authority, has not sought such legislation.

Placing both the aid and information agencies under the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs would make it seem essential to seek this authority. It would provide a firmer basis for attracting good recruits. The Foreign Service Reserve category under which both agencies now operate implies temporary appointment which does not draw mature personnel in mid-career. Foreign Service Staff Corps assignments for officer-level positions have become virtually untenable since the Department of State removed professionals from its Foreign Service Staff Corps and used this category primarily for administrative assistants and clerical personnel. It has been said that the Foreign Service Reserve employees are too easy to terminate and have little

job security, while Foreign Service Staff Corps employees in officer positions are too difficult to remove and have too much job security.

The lack of a "foreign service" in the International Cooperation Administration until 1957, which was in part responsible for the absence of any real system of rotation between headquarters and the field, left some employees overseas for many years with the result that many of them had little knowledge of the rest of the agency. While it is admitted that the appointment of such specialists to a permanent career service would entail retraining at several points during their careers, this would be both desirable and feasible. Retraining would probably reduce the costs of recruiting and orienting new personnel. It would help keep experienced people in the field, cutting down on costly mistakes by newcomers. Those who have served abroad and adapted to overseas conditions can communicate their skills more efficiently to the people of foreign countries than can inexperienced personnel.

The U.S. Information Agency points with pride to its successful administration of a separate "foreign service" and believes its personnel level will rise still further with full recognition of its quality. The belief is that young officers in this service have more opportunities for rapid development and assumption of responsibility than do those in the regular Foreign Service. Legislative authorization would place the Agency in a favorable recruiting position. The Agency staffs posts in various types of countries and climates and could establish a workable rotation system overseas without undue periods of service in hardship posts.

On the other hand, there is the view that a formal career service would not produce men with the zeal, risk-taking attitude, or the innovating instinct required to administer action programs. It is said that career services build a group consciousness and feeling of superiority alien to the needs of agencies whose personnel operate largely outside of diplomatic circles. In addition, critics say, career services become protective of their members even if they are inadequate, resist changes in policy and working methods, and tend to evaluate their own performance by criteria peculiar to themselves.

So far as the U.S. Information Agency is concerned, only about 200 of its 1,400 member "foreign service" are stationed in Washington at any given time. For the International Cooperation Administration the figures are about 200 out of 3,650. This fact makes any system of rotation between headquarters and the field extremely difficult. In the case of the International Cooperation Administration, there are nearly 900 agricultural specialists in the field and only 20 or 30 positions for such technicians in Washington. The problem is made more intractable by the fact that most of the Administration's posts are "in the most unhappy and unhealthful places that ever existed." This makes continued rotation between posts overseas impractical. Yet, to bring career personnel of the Administration or the Information Agency back to the United States for reorientation, retraining, and reasons of health would involve special training programs or carefully worked out placement for temporary periods in educational institutions or industries.

Some say the International Cooperation Administration has little need for young people who would enter a career system at the Foreign Service grade 8 level. They claim the Administration needs only mature personnel, in their forties and near the peak of their careers. The view is that younger people have less skill or knowledge to communicate, are likely to be less tolerant of cultural differences, are less able to adapt American practices to simpler techniques in underdeveloped countries, and are less acceptable to foreign governments. Supporters of this position argue for "program" rather than "career" staffing.

If the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency had strong support in both branches of the Government, their personnel programs could be strengthened, even without personnel legislation. Until they achieve such recognition, however, it is obvious that both organizations will continue to labor under many difficulties. It is equally apparent that legislatively authorized career foreign services would be costly; but this argument is in part offset by the fact that "program" staffing of International Cooperation Administration or U.S. Information Agency operations is also expensive.

In view of the present and prospective personnel requirements of these agencies and possible acceptance of the goal of a unified service, legislative authorization should be obtained for establishing separate career services for the International Cooperation Administration and the U.S. Information Agency parallel to the Foreign Service. Consideration should also be given to providing a supplementary system of "program" staffing for elements of both agency programs. The immediate development of separate services should pave the way for a broader career service under the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs.

D. BALANCE BETWEEN GENERALISTS AND SPECIALISTS

If the Foreign Service is to meet its own present needs and possibly provide the basis for a broader future service under the proposed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, one issue of major importance is: How should the requirements for generalist and specialist skills be reconciled?

Early in the period following the Second World War, as the Foreign Service struggled to adapt to new responsibilities, the Hoover Commission in 1949 and the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Personnel in 1950 recommended the establishment of an integrated Foreign Service, to be comprised of both Department of State personnel above a certain level and those already in the Foreign Service. Little was done about these recommendations until after the report of Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel—the so-called Wriston Committee—was issued in June 1954.³ By August 1956, "Wristonization" had been completed. The crash nature and wholesale applica-

³ See "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service," Report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, Department of State Publication 5458, Washington, D.C., June 1954. Also see Zara S. Steiner, "The State Department and the Foreign Service: The Wriston Report—Four Years Later," Memorandum Number Sixteen, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Mar. 26, 1958.

tion of the integration program was a shock to both the Department and the Foreign Service. Previous lateral entry programs had been modest in scope.⁴ Now the concept of the Foreign Service as the special preserve of the political generalists was abandoned, and the new service included functional specialists with training in many fields not traditionally handled by diplomats.

Although it was apparent that specialized expertise was likely to be increasingly necessary within the Foreign Service during the next decades, the first impact of Wristonization was to dilute existing expertise. Newly integrated departmental specialists in intelligence, economic policy, international organization affairs, and public affairs were sent to posts overseas where their special skills were often not required. Their former departmental positions were filled largely by Foreign Service generalists. Many of the specialists were unable to adjust to representation requirements abroad, and many Foreign Service officers needed long periods of orientation before they could begin to meet more specialized job requirements. But, as one Foreign Service officer aptly put it, "The omelet is nearly cooked. It can be seasoned in different ways, but there is no going back to boiled eggs, whether hard or soft." Nevertheless, the question of how to improve integration in operation remains a real issue. A number of possible courses of action might be considered.

During the autumn of 1955, while integration was still in full swing, 205 positions which had been classified as "dual-service posts"⁵—mostly in intelligence, security, and public affairs—were returned to civil service status. In the first 3 years since the completion of integration, the inclination of many has been to call for a further increase in the number of posts "excepted" from the Foreign Service. The pressure has been greatest in the economics and intelligence areas, but

⁴ See accompanying table on "Mode of Entry Into the Foreign Service" (June 30, 1958).

Mode of entry into the Foreign Service (June 30, 1958)

Class	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Career ambassadors			2									2
Career ministers	40		12	5		3	5					65
FSO-1	101		1	8	2	10	29	5	30	1		187
FSO-2	108			5	4	20	59	9	160	5		370
FSO-3	158			1	4	34	28	4	300	7		536
FSO-4	235				2	40	5	4	280	3		569
FSO-5	208	1			1	9	2	4	357	4	1	587
FSO-6	288			1		5			323	1	1	619
FSO-7	126								1			127
FSO-8	380											380
Total	1,644	1	15	20	13	121	128	26	1,451	21	2	3,442

1. Entrance examination, class 8 appointment (or former equivalent level).
2. Entrance examination, class 7 appointment.
3. Rogers Act, 1924.
4. Reorganization Act, 1939.
5. Lateral entry, sec. 5 of Rogers Act as amended by sec. 7 of Moses Linthicum Act, 1931.
6. Sec. 517, Foreign Service Act (other than individuals appointed under programs as indicated below).
7. Manpower Act, 1946 (limited to 250).
8. 1951 personnel improvement program.
9. Wriston program, 1954-57.
10. Direct lateral entry, 40 and 175 quota authorization.
11. Continuing lateral entry program, beginning 1958.

⁵ Positions designated as "dual-service" were to be filled in the future by Foreign Service officers.

it also exists in the administrative, public affairs, and international organization fields. The percentage of dual-service positions in all of these categories remains relatively high.

The principal considerations favoring an increase in the number of "excepted" positions are the need for continuity and expertise. Economists, for example, must be able to match skill and experience with representatives of other governmental departments and of foreign governments in such technical fields as those concerning commodities, finance, and trade. It is extremely difficult to convert a Foreign Service generalist into an expert in these fields without years of training and experience—plus an interest in the subject matter. Foreign Service officers assigned to such posts—whether economics, intelligence, or some other field—may stumble down "old blind alleys" because they are ignorant of lessons learned in the past. Continuity of relationships with personnel in other organizations is also important; absence of such contacts increases the time and effort that must be devoted to negotiation.

At the same time, the expertise of integrated specialists is diluted when they are assigned to positions demanding less specialization at field posts. An analyst specializing in certain subjects in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research not only would lose touch with his specialty but might also make a very poor general officer in the field. And such men are hard to replace in the Department, for they are often in demand elsewhere in the Government and in private endeavors. Yet the economic analyst, the administrative expert, the public affairs officer, or the narcotics specialist must normally become more of a generalist if he is to gain promotion under the present concepts and procedures of the Foreign Service.

Those opposed to a further increase in "excepted" positions argue that there is still great merit, substantively and administratively, in exposing most Foreign Service officers to varied experiences so that they will be capable of understanding and administering a wide range of activities. They feel that the Foreign Service can encompass a sufficient variety of talents to handle most specializations required. There also is an advantage in injecting fresh insights to review old problems, particularly from a practical and comprehensive point of view. Furthermore, as the problems of foreign affairs become more complex, there will be an increasing need for Foreign Service officers to be conversant with various specialized techniques. It is hoped that mixing generalists and specialists together will improve the coordination of their efforts and increase their respect for one another.

Between these two poles, there are several intermediate positions that aim at meeting the need for specialization without a major retreat from a unified service. One compromise would look to lateral entry into the Foreign Service as one means of achieving a more satisfactory balance between "generalists" and "specialists." To attract mature specialists from secure positions, it is said that they must be given the status of Foreign Service officers. Because needs cannot always be foreseen early enough, the appointment of older, experienced persons is sometimes necessary; the Foreign Service has absorbed successive waves of lateral entries. Advanced personnel management throughout the Government encourages lateral entry within reasonable

limits. Opponents of this approach assert that mature specialists cannot be sure whether they want to join the Foreign Service until they have served in it, that lateral entry delays the promotion of men who entered the Service at the bottom, and that too much lateral entry of specialists will change the nature of the Foreign Service and make rotation between headquarters and field more difficult to maintain.

Supporters of a second course, temporary appointment in the Foreign Service Reserve, argue that most specialists do not want to cut their ties with outside positions until they are certain they will like the Foreign Service. There may also be competent specialists outside the Government who are interested in short or intermittent tours of duty in the Foreign Service but do not want to resign their regular positions. The Reserve allows the Foreign Service to adapt quickly to fluctuating needs and does not restrict the promotion of regular career officers. On the other hand, few Reserves have been appointed to the Foreign Service until recently, and it has been difficult to keep the Reserve staffed because few specialists have been attracted to temporary appointments.

A third approach would increase the size of the Foreign Service and establish staffing patterns, including longer periods of assignment, that would encourage and enable the generalists to learn specialties. This would require a continuing inventory of personnel requirements. Intelligence research is cited as an example of a specialty that has not suffered unduly through the use of young Foreign Service generalists, although more men are required to do the same amount of work. A civil servant too long on the job may become too remote from the realities of contemporary affairs. Civil servants often contend, however, that it may take a year to teach a Foreign Service officer the job and that before he gets to the point of making a contribution he is more interested in what his next post will be. The normal assignment for Foreign Service officers in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is only 2 years. Furthermore, officers resist some special tasks. Specialization may require more sophisticated training than can be fitted into a man's career pattern. This course would retard the rotation system. Training takes time and money, and may not be flexible enough to adjust to changing needs.

Another approach would give specialists in the Foreign Service career opportunities equal to those of generalists. Use of specialists from the administrative field as deputy chiefs of mission is cited as one example of the many possibilities to equalize opportunities. In addition, if there are specialists who have highly valued and rare technical skills, there should be ways of providing them with satisfying lifetime careers, including remuneration appropriate to the Foreign Service, without moving them into positions involving generalist responsibilities. At present, the emphasis on the generalist career pattern is seriously affecting the supply of the specialties which are essential to contemporary international relations. An opposing view is that specialists cannot blend their efforts with the Foreign Service team unless they have had a variety of experiences, including duty abroad. The number of posts at the top now available to specialists is limited. Furthermore, most generalist leaders are men who started out as specialists.

Still another view proposes that, because specialized talents are not given sufficient recognition by the present Foreign Service examination, the examination should be revised to give greater emphasis to this aspect of recruitment. Opponents feel that to move in this direction would tend to discriminate against those who would be capable of performing as generalists—who must provide the backbone of the Service. Changing the nature of the examination might reduce the numbers taking it because students traditionally interested in the Foreign Service have had a relatively broad liberal arts background—largely in the fields of political science, history, economics, and international relations—rather than a high degree of specialization.

A review of these various courses of action suggests that no single approach provides the whole answer. The most feasible course is to combine elements of several of the proposals in order to achieve a career pattern that will meet the necessary specialist as well as generalist requirements. To this end, certain general recommendations can be suggested.

Because of the need for a unifying overall framework the emphasis should not be on retreating from the single-service concept but rather on providing more flexible career patterns within that service to meet varying needs. There should be a number of different ladders corresponding to the different skills required, both specialist and generalist. At the same time, officers should be permitted, sometimes encouraged, to cross over from one ladder to another in order to fill the need for various combinations, including general executive talents at the top level.

In support of this concept, the following steps might be taken: (1) There should be continuing review of present and future requirements, and of methods to meet those needs. (2) Foreign Service examinations should be designed so that potential generalists will not be penalized, but with an opportunity for a limited number of specialists to be selected each year through similar but somewhat differently organized examinations. If the Foreign Service is to staff a wide range of operational and specialized program posts in the future, it cannot hope to select talented young blood to fill these positions by a single examination. (3) Specialists should be developed within the Foreign Service wherever possible, and inservice training should be provided to retool and maintain expertise during a specialist's career. (4) Personnel assigned to specialist positions should be given longer tours of duty where this seems necessary and feasible. (5) Opportunities for service at the rank of Career Minister should be available in many special fields with no prejudice against promotion of specialists to this rank. (6) Lateral entry into the Foreign Service or appointments in the Foreign Service Reserve should be made as necessary, but should not be regarded as the major means of acquiring specialists. Requirements for such lateral entry should be flexible and realistic, free of unnecessary limitations.⁶

⁶ For example, the ability of a specialist or generalist procured at midcareer to pass a language examination or to pass the entry examination given to beginners may not be relevant to the job which only he may be able to do.

E. RECRUITMENT

Another continuing issue is: How can the recruitment program at the beginning level (grade 8) be improved? The Wriston Committee's report of May 1954 recommended four steps for strengthening the recruitment of young officers at the bottom of the career ladder. It called for increased recruitment over a broader geographical area, with State quotas set in accordance with population; a shorter entrance examination offered at centers throughout the country; a reinforced liaison program with colleges and universities; and a Foreign Service scholarship training program similar to the Navy's contract system for its Reserve Officer Corps.

Although the Department of State has not pressed for the establishment of a quota system to increase the representative nature of the Foreign Service, the geographic distribution of entering Foreign Service officers has improved. In part, this has been the result of strengthened relations with colleges and universities and the shorter, simplified entrance examination offered at centers throughout the country.

Fluctuations in the annual intake of junior officers, however, remains a problem. Plans should be made so that the rate of recruitment can be kept relatively stable. The annual examination should not be eliminated, as was the case in 1958, or managed so that it becomes exceptionally difficult to pass.

The new examination process has also been the source of difficulties. The objective type of examination can be and is organized in different ways to favor those with certain subject matter backgrounds. This may help meet the changing needs of the Foreign Service, but it makes it difficult for students to plan an educational program in preparation for a Foreign Service career. Many young men interested in the traditional diplomatic and reporting activities of the Foreign Service now hesitate to enter upon a Foreign Service career because of the large percentage of young careerists who are assigned to minor administrative posts, such as disbursing. The increase in administrative assignments stems, in part, from the responsibility of the Department of State to provide administrative services in support of other Government agencies operating overseas. This is one of the reasons, for example, why the U.S. Information Agency believes it offers young people greater opportunities than the Foreign Service. Whenever there is a need for Foreign Service recruits with area, language, or functional specialization, provision should be made for separate and specially structured examinations to select them.

The 1-day multiple choice test instituted in 1955 deemphasized the need for formal training in international relations and eliminated any direct test of the candidate's ability to write. There is a need, therefore, to give Foreign Service officers selected by such an examination some formal training in international relations by means of the inservice training program. Furthermore, an objective test may not provide sufficient indication of a candidate's ability in written expression; deficiency in this area may also call for inservice training.

Oral examinations are now offered in many cities by examination panels of varied composition and abilities. Ratings are scarcely standardized; yet the order of appointment is determined entirely

by the numerical score on the oral examination, with no account taken of the results of the written examination. While efforts are being made to improve the oral examination procedure, this practice would appear to be both unfair and unrealistic. It is particularly unfortunate in view of the backlog of candidates—presently over 100—who have in recent years had to wait long periods for appointments. The lack of assurance that those taking the Foreign Service examination will be promptly informed whether they have passed or failed and at what time they can be given a definite appointment remains an obstacle. In addition to the 2 to 4 months required for oral examinations, 2 more months are required for full field security investigations. Efforts should be made to reduce this period further, possibly by offering appointments after a preliminary security check, subject to satisfactory completion of the full investigation.

The Wriston Committee's suggestion of a scholarship training program as a means of stimulating preparation for the Foreign Service has not been implemented. The reasons given are the cost of such a program and the large supply of candidates under present procedures. Whether those currently being recruited are as good as the candidates brought in by the pre-1955 examinations remains to be seen. There is some feeling in the Department of State and the Foreign Service that the new examination has resulted in a lowering of entry standards.

This raises a related question: Should the Government create its own undergraduate Foreign Service Academy, the graduates of which would be eligible for appointment to the Foreign Service without examination? Several such measures are now before the Congress. The major assumption underlying such a proposal is that there is a need for special training which is not presently available and which could best be furnished in a governmental academy. It is argued that individuals trained in such an institution would be "committed" to a Foreign Service career, thus assisting the Department of State to compete more successfully with other employers for top caliber young men. It is pointed out that liberal arts institutions are not likely to equal such an academy in the attention or resources they would be willing to devote to foreign policy training.

Opponents of the Foreign Service Academy contend that the cost would be high, that persons trained in this manner would become a distinct clique, and that there is no shortage of applicants for entry into the Foreign Service. There is also the possibility that appointment would be by political selection more than merit, within the limits of geographic quotas by population; this might result in students of quite different levels of ability. Furthermore, the Foreign Service requires persons with diverse educational backgrounds. Such diversity can best be provided by drawing on the widely varied resources of the regular colleges and universities. The Foreign Service has been criticized sufficiently for being "a closed club" and a "protective association" without encouraging "separatism" by establishing a special Foreign Service Academy.

It is difficult enough to sift out candidates in their twenties. The choice would be even more difficult if it had to be made while applicants were still in their teens. The Foreign Service often finds candidates at the present minimum age level possessing real ability

but lacking sufficient maturity, and it must recommend further educational or employment experience before actual induction. Automatic acceptance of Academy graduates might compel absorption of individuals who would not be ready for such service.

Many of the points advanced in support of an undergraduate Foreign Service Academy can be met by steps which do not have the disadvantages of the academy concept. For example, a broad merit scholarship training program—particularly at the graduate level—would, if rigorously administered in accordance with high standards, probably provide a significant number of applicants for entry into the Foreign Service with equal or better formal training and at less cost than an undergraduate academy. A scholarship program of this nature could enable the Foreign Service to reinstitute some of the requirements of the pre-1955 examination, and could raise the standards of knowledge without any undue sacrifice in personality characteristics. Under these circumstances, it would be neither necessary nor advisable to create a governmental undergraduate Foreign Service Academy. While a substantial job of inservice training would still remain to be done after induction of new officers into the Foreign Service, such a program is both feasible and desirable.

F. INSERVICE TRAINING

With regard to inservice training, the main questions are: How much time should be devoted to such formal training during an officer's career, at what stages should it be offered, and to what categories of personnel?

Officers entering the Foreign Service on a career basis have traditionally been drawn from among the graduates of eastern liberal arts colleges, although recent recruitment figures indicate a widening geographic base. Even with a college level of education at entry, further inservice training has proved to be a necessity. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 provided for the creation of a Foreign Service Institute, but the Institute's program was at low ebb in 1954 when the Wriston Committee issued its recommendations, including several for strengthening inservice training. Located in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration since March 8, 1955, the Foreign Service Institute has taken substantial strides forward, but much remains to be done.

Emphasis is now placed upon an introductory orientation course, language training, a midcareer course, and a senior officer course. In addition, a limited number of Foreign Service officers are assigned for training outside the Institute, attending university graduate schools or governmental institutions like the service-sponsored war colleges, the National War College, and the British Imperial Defense College. The training skeleton is there, but meat needs to be put on the bones if the future requirements of the Foreign Service are to be met.

The Institute's program still falls short of those offered by any of the armed services. This will not be remedied until Foreign Service officers at all levels recognize the new needs of the Service and cease to be reluctant to intersperse tours of duty with educational assignments. Present staffing patterns—based on a false sense of economy—make it difficult to free officers for training. Appropriations for

training remain low compared to the job that should be done. At the same time no adequate inventory of training needs has yet been completed. Much of the teaching is done as a gesture of good will by governmental employees taking time off from their regular duties, by single appearances of experts from outside the Government, by non-professional educators drawn from the Foreign Service, or by ill-paid tutors with little job security. This is not to say that some excellent teaching is not done in the Institute; it is only to suggest that the program should be better.

One inservice training question is: How much time should be devoted during a career to formal training assignments? Most courses at the Foreign Service Institute cover broad areas in 2 or 3 weeks. Few Foreign Service officers are assigned to training programs for as long as 9 months at a single time; currently there are only about 90 to 100 per year, out of almost 3,500, so assigned. Few officers have spent as much as 2 years in formal full-time training assignments during prolonged periods of service.

The Army estimates that the average military officer with a career of 28 years will spend 3.2 years, or 11 percent of his time, in training. Temporarily, as a result of implementation of the language training program on a crash basis, about 9 percent of the total Foreign Service man-years are going into training. This is expected to fall to 6 percent when the language program tapers off. The current program is running at the rate of 2.7 years of training per officer in a 30-year career, and it is scheduled subsequently to drop back to 1.8 years of training per officer.

In view of the various needs for training discussed above, it would seem desirable at least to hold the line at the present average of 9 percent of a 30-year career for training and, if possible, to move closer to the Army level of 11 percent—1 out of every 9 years. Officers slated for high policymaking positions might be allowed a year at two separate stages in their careers for independent study and reflection.

At what stages in the careers of Foreign Service officers should inservice training be provided? Among the alternative levels at which full-time inservice training might be given are the following, roughly in steppingstone order through a career:

1. Basic orientation course following induction.
2. Rotational on-the-job experience in Washington as a first working assignment.
3. Specialized area and language training before assignment to a foreign country for the first time, if needed.
4. Training in the performance of a specific functional task before assignment to duty. This might occur at several stages.
5. Rotational on-the-job experiences within an Embassy on first assignment overseas.
6. Rotational on-the-job experience in one or more other agencies early in career. This might also occur at later stages.
7. Additional formal training, possibly at a university, after a probationary period of no more than 5 years.
8. "Midcareer" training involving Foreign Service officers and representatives of other agencies.
9. Training in the Foreign Service Institute senior officer course or its equivalent.

10. Training at the National War College or some other advanced interdepartmental training school.

Most of these levels of training are in existence at the present time. For example, candidates who have passed the Foreign Service examination—written and oral—are often encouraged to pursue graduate study but at their own, rather than at governmental, expense. There is little provision for on-the-job experience in other agencies. Although no one officer under present staffing patterns can be spared for participation in all such training programs, short as most of them now are, the average Foreign Service officer who is ultimately to serve in positions of leadership would benefit from such a range of experience.

Who should participate in the in-service training program? Clearly all incoming officers should take part in some kind of orientation course. A major current question is: Who should be assigned to the midcareer and senior officer courses? At present, the goal is to run the top 35 percent of the officers in each class through the 12-week midcareer course. Actually, only about 22 percent of the officers in classes 4, 5, and 6 are currently receiving such training. Other officers receive language and area training or specialized advanced training in economics or other subjects instead of the midcareer course, but no more than 35 percent of the officers in any one class receive one of these various courses at midcareer.

By 1962, it is planned that 6 percent of the officers in classes 2 and 3 will take the senior officer course. Between two and three times as many will attend one of the senior war colleges. This indicates that no more than 25 percent of the officers in these classes will have had a senior level training course by 1962.

There are several possible bases for determining who should receive midcareer and senior training: (1) only outstanding officers at each level might be selected for training; (2) all officers might be trained at midcareer and a high percentage might receive senior training; or (3) officers might be selected for training on the basis of need for improvement, with average or below average officers being given preference.

The Department of State has finally been able to achieve the first goal after a number of years during which assignment for training was used both as a means of rewarding the best officers and as a repository for weaker ones. With an effective promotion-up, selection-out system, there would be little advantage to be gained by adopting the third course based on need for improvement. In practice, few have been "selected out" of the Foreign Service. Thus a good case can be made for giving training to all officers at midcareer because few are likely to be selected out before a number of years of additional service. Senior officers are serving and will serve in such important posts that the benefits they may derive from training will have considerable impact upon the conduct of foreign policy. Those with more than 5 years ahead before retirement should probably be assigned senior level training. To meet future needs, therefore, the second approach appears most attractive: to give all officers midcareer training and a high percentage senior training.

In addition to general participation in the orientation, midcareer, and senior officer courses, Foreign Service officers should be assigned

to language, area, functional, and other training courses on the basis of the training prerequisites for positions to which they are assigned. This would require explicit designation of the training prerequisites for all positions. If such a study is made on a realistic basis, it will undoubtedly indicate the need for a reinforced program of in-service training.

The need for language and area training is particularly acute. The objective of the Department of State is to bring every Foreign Service officer up to the useful-to-the-Service level in at least one of the widely spoken world languages by July 1962. At present only about 60 percent of the officers meet that standard. A more difficult goal to achieve is the objective to create a reservoir of approximately a thousand Foreign Service officers with the same level of proficiency in one of the less familiar nonworld or hard languages. While about 60 percent of this number now meet this requirement, the distribution of languages they speak does not coincide evenly with the pattern of needs. There are, for example, 98, or 164 percent, more officers who speak Russian than are currently required to meet staffing needs, while there is need for 156, or 208 percent, more who speak Arabic. And these skills normally require more intensive training than the world languages. The Department of State, encouraged by the foreign policy committees of the Congress, has greatly accelerated its language and area programs in recent years, but funds and staff still lag seriously behind the requirements. It is now clear that the quality and volume of inservice training need to be substantially increased, and that the Foreign Service Institute should be encouraged to meet these fundamental needs.

G. IMPROVEMENT OF CAREER MANAGEMENT

A related issue is: Is there a need for revising the program of career management in the Foreign Service for evaluation of performance, assignment, and promotion up or selection out?

The career management function in the Foreign Service was substantially strengthened after the Wriston Committee made its recommendations. The most promising aspect of this program was the establishment of a career development and counseling staff as part of the Office of Personnel within the Department of State. The staff is off to a good start, but it does not have responsibility for all aspects of career management.

It is alleged that officers newly integrated into the Foreign Service have suffered when rated by regular Foreign Service supervisors. Many long-time Foreign Service officers feel that they have also been held back at some point in their careers by unfair ratings. The Department is only beginning to study the rating history of supervising officers on a tentative basis; such a study should be an important step toward improving the evaluation system.

There is a criticism that pressure can be brought to bear to alter assignments that are not to an officer's liking. It is charged that some Foreign Service officers spend an undue amount of time cultivating those who they believe can obtain favorable assignments for them. The only possible conclusion is that steps should be taken to insure that assignments are made on an objective basis. Assignment panels

should be composed of persons who possess a reputation for objectivity, including some who have had professional training and experience in modern personnel management. These panels should consult with the policy bureaus before assignment decisions are made, but, once made, their decisions should be final and not subject to personal pressures. It should be recognized that the proper performance of the assignment function will become less difficult if staffing patterns become less stringent.

The selection-out process has not been strictly administered. Officers have been kept in the Foreign Service who were scheduled for selection out because early retirement benefits were not considered adequate. If there is too much deadwood in the Foreign Service or if there are too many officers in the higher ranks, the principles of promotion-up, selection-out should be applied with vigor. After an interim period, however, the question of whether or not to place continued reliance upon this system should be reconsidered. Selection out during a person's later years may be less necessary if methods of initial selection are further refined and if some pruning is done during a probationary period of about 5 years.

With the increasing training needs of the Foreign Service and with additional funds required for the education of each individual officer, application of the promotion-up, selection-out process in the later stages of a career may become too wasteful to continue. Older officers may perform many lower level jobs more ably and be more satisfied doing them than younger men on their way up the promotion ladder. If promotion were not a requirement for remaining in the Foreign Service, officers might display a bit more independence of thought and be less afraid to present original ideas. In a mature personnel system, the "flue" remains open for rapid promotion of outstanding young men without application of the selection-out principle. Separation for cause would still be possible and could be administered in such a way as to eliminate personnel unfit for further service. While the importance of selection-out is recognized, far more important is emphasis on good recruitment and career development.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

THE PROSPECTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR POLICYMAKING AND ADMINISTRATION¹

In this paper an attempt is made to forecast the scientific-technological-demographic-economic condition of the world during the next few decades. At the outset it should be stressed that any such attempt must in essence be an assessment of relative probabilities. And we must make this assessment recognizing fully that there are a great many things we do not know concerning human society and its environment. The best we can do is to bring together the available information concerning the status of the world today, and by applying our knowledge of the patterns of change in the past and of the limitations which are placed upon the system by physical and biological laws, forecast the probabilities of various developments in the future.

The future course of events naturally depends upon the actions and inactions of individual persons and because of this the "most probable" future can often change quite suddenly. A relatively small number of persons can determine, for example, whether or not there will be peace or war. Situations which are brought about by whim or by the desires and views of a few powerful individuals obviously cannot be forecast.

Let us examine some of the pitfalls which confront the forecaster.

Human populations have increased rapidly during the last century. A forecaster would be tempted to say that in all likelihood the population of human beings will continue to increase rapidly during the next century. Yet, all of us can imagine factors which might result in an actual decrease of population rather than an increase. One of these factors might be nuclear war. Another factor might be a suddenly acquired desire on the part of men and women to have few or no children. Another might be an agricultural disaster such as that which took place in Ireland a little more than a century ago.

One is tempted to forecast, for example, that it is unlikely that food production in an underdeveloped country can be increased at a rate which is greater, on the average, than about 4 percent per year. This would certainly be a valid forecast were it based solely upon past accomplishment. Yet it appears today that Red China has approximately doubled its food production during the last few years—in part through the use of techniques which would not be considered tolerable by most Western-oriented persons.

The element of human unpredictability can result in poor forecasts in many areas simultaneously. We live in a world of cause and effect—a world in which feedback operates. For example, the state of military technology 20 years from now will depend in part upon the vigor with which the cold war is pursued. The condition of our domestic economy would be dramatically affected on the one hand by disarmament agreements and on the other by vigorous efforts to improve the standards of living in the underdeveloped areas of the world. The rate of industrialization of India will be determined in part by the condition of the U.S. economy. Expenditures of public funds for research and development and education will be determined in part by our concern over the international situation. The level of public spending in these areas will in turn have impact both on the condition of the U.S. economy and the relationships between nations. In other words, all of the factors with which we are dealing are related. All interact upon each other.

The techniques involved in this study have been primitive. Past trends have been examined. These trends have been projected into the future. The pro-

¹ By Harrison Brown, California Institute of Technology.

jections have been modified by considerations involving plausible ultimate limits of growth and of growth rate. Existing and potential competitions have been evaluated. The end results have been examined for plausibility.

Throughout the study several basic assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that there will be no major nuclear war. Second, it is assumed that the U.S. economy will continue to grow and that there will be no major depression. Both of these assumptions are major ones. Either of these eventualities would render the forecasts, which are presented in the following sections, untenable.

A. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

1. GROWTH AND DECAY

Our present society in the United States is characterized primarily by rapid rates of change in practically all areas of existence. These changes have resulted largely from the emergence of a multiplicity of scientific and technological innovations and developments. Our rate of population growth, our urbanization, our increasing productivity, and our changing patterns of life are all reflections of these developments. We are in truth in the midst of an enormous revolution, and even the most cursory analysis indicates that we are closer to the beginning of that revolution than we are to its end.

Many technological innovations can be forecast, many cannot. Breakthroughs which result from the emergence of new insights into the physical and biological world in which we live obviously cannot be predicted. Yet, we can learn much about the world of the future simply by analyzing the trends of growth and decay of the institutions and gadgetry about us.

We must also look, however, at factors other than the trends of growth and decay—and in particular we must look at the limits which are imposed by physical and biological laws. For example, if we were to place two rabbits of opposite sex in a large fenced-in field with alfalfa we could predict quite reliably that the rabbit population would increase rather rapidly. Were we to examine the rate of increase we would probably find it to be quite constant. We might then use these observations of reproduction rate to forecast the population of rabbits in the field during the years ahead. But certainly were we not to take other factors into consideration our forecast would eventually be greatly in error. It would tell us, for example, that not many years would pass before the rabbits would weigh more than the earth itself.

Our forecast of rabbit population, based solely upon observed growth rate, might indeed be quite accurate for some time. But clearly, as the population grows to the point where it is limited by some factor, whether it be space or the abundance of alfalfa, our forecast would eventually diverge widely from reality. Were we in a position to assess, however, factors which truly limit the population of rabbits in a field, then obviously we would be in a position to make forecasts which would be valid for a much longer period of time.

Then, there is the unpredictable element. Were someone to throw fertilizer over the fence into the field, thus increasing the rate of alfalfa growth, the rabbit population would increase more rapidly than expected. Were foxes to be placed in the field, the population would grow more slowly. Were deer placed in the field, the competition for alfalfa would depress the rabbit population.

Our modern technological world has brought forth many parallels to this imaginative world of rabbits. Witness, for example, the sixfold decrease in the population of horses and mules in the last 50 years as a result of the competition of the tractor, the truck, and the automobile. Or witness the decrease in the population of railroad passenger cars as a result of competition of the airplane and the automobile.

Generally the growth curves for most technological innovations in our society are of the same nature as those in the biological world. As in the biological world there are fluctuations resulting from changing environmental conditions. But in the initial stages the growth is usually exponential—that is, it proceeds at a fairly constant rate, analogous to the laws of compound interest.

As the population of the innovation approaches the limit imposed by the environmental factors, the rate of increase lessens. Eventually the population reaches the limit which is imposed upon it and increases only as rapidly as the limit increases. Frequently the appearance of competition results in the decrease and even the disappearance of the population which originally had grown so rapidly.

The population of motion picture theaters, for example, initially grew very rapidly. Gradually the rate of increase lessened, as the population approached the limit imposed by the amount of time made available by the general public to watch motion pictures. Had competition not arisen, the population of theaters would have reached the point where it would have grown only as rapidly as the population of human beings. But competition did set in, in the form of television, which closely approached in growth rate that of rabbits in an alfalfa field. As a result, motion picture attendance fell precipitously.

In its early years, the population of television sets expanded with enormous rapidity. Then it approached a limit imposed in part by the areas of homes, family sizes, and the amount of time available for viewing. In the not-far-distant future and in the absence of new competition we can expect that the population of television sets will increase only as rapidly as the population of human beings increases.

When we examine our society we find that certain features of it are increasing at rates which are far in excess of our rate of population growth. It is obvious that these are the primary components of the revolution in which we are living. It is equally obvious that this situation cannot last forever. There are limiting factors which we must attempt to uncover. And competitions will almost certainly emerge which we must attempt to foresee.

2. DEMOGRAPHIC

Total population

It is reasonable to assume that the population density in the continental United States will rise eventually to a level corresponding to that which prevails in the greater part of Western Europe today—about 300 persons per square mile. This would mean an eventual population of about 910 million persons, excluding Alaska which can probably support some 30 million persons.

The primary uncertainty in our domestic demographic picture is the rate at which these population levels will be approached. We can visualize circumstances which might result in a continuation of our present rapid growth. Similarly we can imagine factors which might result in a slackening of growth rate. An analysis of the prospects indicates, however, that the population in the continental United States will probably lie between the extremes shown below.

Projected population of continental United States

	1959 (estimate)	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	Eventual
Likely maximum-----	175	180	220	270	310	370	440	910
Likely minimum-----		180	200	230	250	280	320	

During the next 50 years it is likely that the population of the continental United States will more than double.

Urban versus rural

Since 1910 the population of farmworkers in the United States has declined to about one-half the level which then prevailed. This decline has stemmed from the tremendous upsurge in productivity per worker resulting from the intensive application of mechanization and scientific methods to agriculture. We are still in the middle of this new agricultural revolution and can expect continued marked increases in agricultural productivity per man-hour. As a result, the farm population will probably continue to fall for the next two or three decades.

It seems likely that farm productivity per man-hour will increase at least another threefold during the next 50 years. When we take into account the fact that we will need only twice as much food as we now consume, we will need fewer than two-thirds the present number of farmworkers to produce this food. In 1880 farmworkers represented 50 percent of our total labor force. By 1910 they had dropped to 31 percent. By 1960 they will probably have dropped to 8.4 percent. By the year 2010 farmworkers may well represent less than 3 percent of the total labor force.

Thus the new additions to the U.S. population will be primarily city and town oriented. Population in existing metropolitan areas will increase, more

rapidly around the central cities than in them, and more rapidly in rural areas between central cities. A plausible projection of the urban population of the United States, as it is at present defined, is given below (assuming a fairly rapid growth rate for the total population).

Projected urban population of the United States

	[Millions]	<i>Projected population</i>
Year:		
1960	-----	110
1970	-----	140
1980	-----	170
1990	-----	210
2000	-----	260
2010	-----	320

During the next 50 years, while the total population will come close to doubling, the urban population may come close to tripling.

Geographical distribution

The populations of all regions of the United States will increase during the decades ahead, but the most rapid increases will probably occur in the Pacific States which at present have population densities considerably lower than those of most major areas, and which possess high supporting capacities. A plausible projection of the population of the Pacific States over the next half century is given below.

Projected population of Pacific States

	[Millions]	<i>Projected population</i>
Year:		
1959	-----	19.3
1960	-----	20
1970	-----	28
1980	-----	38
1990	-----	53
2000	-----	71
2010	-----	87

We can expect that a strip of land adjacent to the Pacific Ocean will become in effect a continuous city stretching from San Diego to somewhat north of San Francisco, much as a corresponding continuous city is emerging on the east coast stretching from Boston to Norfolk.

Although the eastern seaboard north of Norfolk is already crowded, we can nevertheless expect substantial increases in population in the next 50 years ranging from about 50 percent in the Middle Atlantic States to more than a doubling in the South Atlantic States. Increases in New England, particularly in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, where population densities are already quite high, will probably be modest.

The Mountain States will probably be second only to the Pacific coast in rate of increase—during the next 50 years a fourfold enlargement of population can be expected. Generally we can expect the populations in the central areas of the Nation to expand at a rate below the national average, although there are indications that the region which embraces Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin might be appreciably above average in growth. In any event, it appears likely that in another 50 years about 42 percent of the population will reside west of the Mississippi, compared with 33 percent today.

The fact that most newcomers to our society will be destined to lead an urban existence means that cities will spread over vast areas. Population densities at present range from five or six thousand persons per square mile in our smaller cities to 25,000 persons per square mile in New York (88,000 on Manhattan Island). If we assume for the new urban developments an average population density of 10,000 persons per square mile, an additional area the size of the State of West Virginia will be urbanized 50 years from now (about 20,000 square miles). On the Pacific coast alone new city expansion may take place totaling 15 times the present area of the city of Los Angeles.

These changes in population patterns will obviously have profound effect upon our economy, our way of life, and our military position.

Age and sex

One of the more interesting features of the current demographic transition is the increasing proportion of older persons in our society. In 1900, persons of 65 years of age and older accounted for only 4 percent of our population. By 1957 this had increased to 8.6 percent. By 1975 they will account for 9 to 10 percent. Thereafter the proportion will gradually increase, leveling off at about 15 percent.

This changing age structure is resulting largely from the control of infectious diseases—a development which has taken place largely in this century, and which has greatly lowered mortality, particularly in the lower age groups. In 1900 about 20 percent of the newly born died before reaching school age. By 1955 this had been reduced to 3 percent. Today fewer than 1 percent of the children entering school will die before entering the labor force. Over two-thirds of those entering the labor force will reach age 65. About 60 percent of those persons retiring will live 10 years longer. By 1975, the chances of survival will be even greater.

With infectious diseases under control, the chronic diseases, such as cancer and the cardiovascular-renal conditions have emerged, together with accidents, as the major causes of death. Although progress is being made, it is slow. There might, of course, be a series of breakthroughs. But it would appear that the demographic effect of increased understanding and control of the chronic diseases during the next 50 years will be small when compared with the effect of our control over infectious diseases. Estimates for the year 2000 yield an expectation of life at birth for males of 69–74 years and for females of 75½–79 years, compared with 67.3 and 73.6 years respectively in 1955.

Between 1955 and 1965 the size of our labor force will not increase as rapidly as the size of the population as a whole. Numbers of persons over 65 years of age will increase by about 23 percent, and numbers of persons under 20 will increase, depending on the birth rate, 17–28 percent. But the middle (or working) age group 20–65 will increase a scant 8.5 percent. This will largely be a reflection of the low birth rates during the depression. But from 1965 onward the high postwar birth rates will be reflected by very rapid increases in the size of the working age group. By 1975 there will be close to 116 million persons between the ages of 20 and 65, compared with 91 million in 1955.

Another important feature of the current demographic transition is the changing sex ratio. Until recently there have been more men than women in our society, but women now have appreciably higher life expectancies than men. As a result, women now outnumber men, and particularly in the upper age groups the gap is widening. In 1958 there were only 84 males for every 100 females over 65 years of age. By 1975 there will be only 72. Between 1958 and 1975 the numbers of widows over 65 years of age will double. These changes in age structure and sex-ratio patterns will undoubtedly have a profound effect upon our economy.

3. SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Modern industrial society

Our modern industrial society consists of a vast network of factories, mines, farms, distribution outlets, and consumers all linked together by complex transportation and communication systems. Large quantities of materials are extracted from the earth each year, transported to plants and factories and converted into end products which are transported in turn to the users. For every person in the United States, nearly 8,000 ton-miles of freight are now moved annually excluding transportation across the seas. Persons also are moved from city to city in large numbers. In 1955 the average person traveled 4,000 miles between cities, in addition to his travel within cities.

In order to produce the goods which are needed or wanted, large quantities of metals and other substances are in use on a per capita basis. For example, about 9 tons of steel are in use per person, in the form of machines, automobiles, girders, locomotives, rails, and nails. There are, in addition, large quantities of other metals in use, such as aluminum, copper, tin, and lead.

Communication is an essential operational feature of such a complex society. The average person now talks on the telephone 370 times each year and receives nearly 340 items of mail.

In order to keep the entire system functioning great quantities of energy are needed—coal, petroleum, and natural gas. Energy equivalent to that con-

tained in nearly 10 tons of coal is required to support an individual for 1 year in our society at the present time.

Basic changes

Certain aspects of our society are changing either more rapidly or more slowly than the rate of increase of our population. These are the basic changes which are determining the broad nature of our society in the years ahead.

As the process of urbanization continues and as our society becomes increasingly complex, the requirements for transportation and communication facilities will probably increase rapidly. We have seen that the population of the United States will probably double during the next 50 years. If present trends continue, it seems likely that during the same time interval the total ton-mileage of freight which must be shipped to support the population will more than triple. Intercity passenger traffic may increase tenfold while the numbers of telephone conversations and pieces of mail may increase sevenfold.

The processes of mechanization and automation are resulting in rapidly increasing rates of both agricultural and industrial production per man-hour worked. Present trends indicate that we might expect during the next 50 years a threefold to tenfold increase in agricultural productivity and perhaps a two-fold to fourfold increase in industrial productivity per man-hour.

As in the past these greater levels of productivity will be achieved in part by our consuming vastly greater quantities of raw materials and by our feeding greatly increased quantities of energy into the industrial network. During the next 50 years it is not unreasonable to suppose that the production of basic materials such as steel will increase about fivefold and that electrical power production will increase another tenfold. Our total energy demands will probably increase at least fourfold, corresponding to a doubling of energy consumption per person.

Transportation

We have seen that as our demands for manufactured goods and raw materials increase, it will be necessary to transport larger quantities of materials over greater distances. Between 1939 and 1955 our per capita freight shipments increased from 4,400 ton-miles per person to 7,800 ton-miles per person. During the next few decades we can expect even greater increases in our per capita freight shipments and in addition we can expect major changes in the modes of transport.

The greater part of our freight has traditionally been carried by rail. During the last two decades, however, increasing quantities of materials have been carried by truck and by pipeline with the result that although our tonnage of freight is increasing rapidly, the quantities moved by the railroads are actually decreasing.

We now know that pipelines can be used to transport a variety of raw materials and end products in addition to petroleum products, and their versatility is such that by 1970 more ton-miles of materials may be shipped by pipeline than by rail. Truck shipments will almost certainly increase further although, perhaps, not as rapidly as pipeline shipments. In any event, it would appear that rail shipments are destined either to level off or to decrease slowly during the next two decades.

The quantity of freight carried by air is increasing rapidly but is insignificant compared with quantities carried by rail, pipeline, and truck. Air transport will assume increasing importance in the decades ahead. Even in the absence of a major breakthrough in cost per ton-mile, we can expect at least a tenfold increase in the quantity of air freight carried during the next 50 years. A major breakthrough in cost would result in even greater increases.

The conveyor belt has appeared on the scene and there are indications that it might assume importance comparable to the pipeline, particularly for the shipment of solid materials which are not suited for pipeline transport.

It is unlikely that we shall see during the next 50 years any appreciable increase in the numbers of miles of railroad track. We can look forward, however, to a greatly elaborated pipeline system and possibly to the growth of conveyor-belt systems in certain areas. In addition, our network of highways, which will be used in part for trucking, will become increasingly complex.

Prior to about 1920 the railroad was the main medium for passenger travel between cities. The rapid growth of automobile travel resulted, however, in a precipitous decrease in railroad passenger traffic following World War I. The decrease in automobile transportation during World War II resulted in a marked

increase in railroad passenger traffic which was, however, destined to last only until the end of the war. Following the war, the rapid increase of automobile traffic, coupled with the explosive growth of the airlines, has resulted in a marked decrease in the use of railroads for intercity travel. During the next 10 years the number of air passenger-miles may well increase another threefold. When we take into account the inevitable further increases in intercity automobile travel and the likely further decreases in intercity railroad travel, it would appear that the railroads will cease to become an important medium for the transport of passengers between cities.

The bulk of present air travel is for fairly long distances per trip and increasing numbers of people are traveling for long distances by air rather than by auto or by train. It is a plausible supposition that we will eventually reach the point where the average person travels domestically for long distances by air an average of somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 miles per year. In 1956 intercity travel by air amounted to 26 billion passenger-miles. It may well be that in 1970 over 150 billion passenger-miles will be traveled by air and in 1980 between 500 and 600 billion passenger-miles. By that time rail passenger traffic will represent but a small part of the total and intercity automobile traffic will make up approximately 75 percent of the total intercity traffic.

A fair proportion of intercity travel involves trips of relatively short distance (i.e., less than 100 miles). With the increasing availability of automobiles on a temporary (rental) basis, and decreasing costs of air travel over these short distances, it may well develop that intercity travel by air will increase even more rapidly than suggested in the discussion above. In any event, there is little to lead us to suppose that intercity travel by train, or some such equivalent as the monorail, might increase appreciably during the course of the next 50 years.

The automobile is tending to dominate transportation within cities. The number of passengers carried by public transportation systems reached a peak at the end of World War II. Since that time, the numbers of passengers carried by all forms of public transport—bus, electric, subway, and elevated—have decreased precipitously, almost entirely as the result of the increased use of automobiles for local transportation. Although this decrease is more pronounced in some areas of the country than in others, it is nevertheless a nationwide phenomenon.

In 1920 automobiles were a luxury—few persons could afford them. By 1930, however, the automobile had become a necessity for millions of persons. The new mode of transportation made possible new ways of life. And new patterns of life quickly evolved around the automobile.

We have now reached the point, it would seem, where every person qualified by age to drive a private vehicle would like to have one at his disposal. It may well be that major improvements in public transportation may come into existence during the course of the next few years. But even were this to happen, it seems inevitable that we will eventually reach the point where there is one self-propelled personal vehicle in existence for every person of driving age.

If we assume a limit of one car per eligible driver and if we couple this with the average growth rate of automobile population which has prevailed during the last 30 years, it would appear plausible that in another 50 years there will be more than 200 million private vehicles in the United States. In all likelihood these will not resemble either in size or shape those which exist today.

A plausible projection for the population of motor vehicles in the United States during the next 50 years is given below together with estimates of the average production rates which would be required to support that population, assuming that the vehicles have a mean lifespan of 10 years. It may well develop that the average vehicle will last longer than 10 years, in which case the production projections will be lower than those shown.

Projected population and production of motor vehicles in the United States

[Millions]

Year	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Private vehicles.....	60	85	120	150	185	210
Private vehicle production and imports....	7	11	16	19	21	24

A large part of the future pattern of private vehicular transportation in the United States (including leased and rented vehicles) appears to have been set. The details of the growth would appear to depend in large measure upon public attitudes toward urban and rural highway development and toward the development of rapid public transportation. Thus far, the rates of increase of highway mileage, both urban and rural, have been small compared with the rate of increase of private vehicles—in spite of the precipitous decline in the use of public transportation.

In the light of the vast urbanization which confronts us and in view of the convenience which is associated with the private motor vehicle, it seems likely that in the decades ahead we will spend large sums of money both on urban highway development and on metropolitan rapid transit. Although at present the two modes of transport appear to be competing—with each other with public transit losing—it seems likely that in the end they will complement each other. Efficient metropolitan transit will result in fewer passenger-miles traveled by private vehicle but it is doubtful that it will appreciably decrease the numbers of private vehicles in existence. The convenience and emotional aspect of personal transportation would appear to be too powerful a force to permit any mode of public transport to make major inroads in the numbers of private vehicles.

Communications

As our society becomes increasingly complex, communications assume greater importance. Today the telephone and postal service are about equally important in terms of the amount of information which is communicated. Both the amount of mail which is handled and the number of daily telephone conversations are increasing far more rapidly than is the population.

It seems likely that the number of personal communication instruments—typified by the present-day telephone but in the years ahead to include visual attachments—will increase to the point where there are between one and two (probably about 1.5) such units in existence per adult person.

If we assume an ultimate limit of 1.5 communication instruments per adult we arrive at the following plausible projection for the population of such units.

Projected population of private communication instruments in the United States

[Millions]		Units
Year:		
1960	-----	70
1970	-----	120
1980	-----	180
1990	-----	230
2000	-----	280
2010	-----	320

It seems likely that the number of pieces of mail which will be handled during the next two decades may increase as rapidly as the number of daily telephone conversations. It is probable, however, that in the not too far distant future technological developments in electronic communication and in information storage will result in an actual decrease in the number of pieces of mail handled per capita. Already we find that some businesses prefer the long-distance telephone to the transcription of letters. It is likely that we will eventually reach the point where the combination of telephone and electronic recording is the norm.

This will be particularly true if the communications satellites, which are now being planned, operate as efficiently as expected. Three such satellites placed in proper orbit could permit messages sent by high frequency radio waves to travel from any one part of the earth to any other part. The orbiting of such satellites containing proper relay equipment could result in an increase in our capability for transmitting information worldwide by a factor of 10,000. It could result in a tremendous reduction in cost in the transmittal of information from one city to another and from one country to another. It would make possible the holding of conferences on a nationwide and on an international basis at costs far less than those required to bring the individuals together in person.

It is amply clear that once such satellites are launched, and as we become increasingly dependent upon them for our nationwide and international communications, their very presence will have an enormous impact upon the relationships between nations.

It seems likely that the United States will quickly become dependent upon such satellites, as will all other nations. Yet once we become dependent upon them

we will have reached the point where any nation could at will seriously disrupt communication systems on a worldwide basis.

Agriculture

For the past 20 years food production in the United States has easily kept pace with population. It is clear that even with our current luxury diet, food production can keep abreast of population for a very long time in the future. This can be done primarily by applying the basic knowledge which we now have and secondarily by increasing the acreage of arable land.

Thus far in our history we in the United States have not been particularly concerned about achieving high agricultural yields per acre. Our population density has been low and our land has been relatively inexpensive. Our main agricultural problem has been associated with the fact that the total output of our industrial network and the income of the industrial worker has increased at an accelerated rate. Geared as it is to the number of people to be fed, the output of the farm network has risen much more slowly. As a consequence, agriculture has become an ever smaller part of the total economy. The income of the farmer in relation to that of the industrial worker would therefore have dropped rapidly had there not been extremely rapid increases in the productivity of the average agricultural worker. As we have seen, although the number of industrial workers is rising rapidly, the number of farmworkers is actually decreasing. This trend will probably continue for some time.

We in the United States extract more primary calories from the ground per capita than does any other major region of the world—10,800 calories per day per person compared with 6,750 calories in Western Europe and 2,220 calories in Japan. In the United States the bulk of our produce is not eaten directly by human beings but is instead fed to animals, the products of which are in turn eaten by humans. We have one of the highest per capita intakes of animal products in the world.

In order to produce this large number of calories per person without using excessive agricultural manpower, we have resorted to the use of large acreages rather than to intensive farming. Thus, while 13,200 calories are produced per cultivated acre per day in Japan, and about 7,500 calories are produced per cultivated acre in Western Europe, we are producing only 4,500 calories per acre per day.

Simply by applying what we already know, we can achieve substantial increases in our crop yields in the United States in the years ahead. Were we to achieve the yields characteristic of Western Europe and at the same time were we to reduce our intake of animal products to a level characteristic of Western Europe, we could support a population in the United States approximately 2.7 times that which exists at the present time. In view of the fact that still higher yields are possible—as evidenced by both laboratory studies and the experiences in practice of the Japanese—it is doubtful that it will be necessary to place any appreciable amount of additional land under cultivation during the next 50 years.

Although food will not be a major problem in the United States for a long time to come, it will undoubtedly continue to be a persistent problem in the greater part of the world.

Today we have food surpluses but the surplus is small compared with our total food consumption. And the food surplus is certainly small when compared with that which could be produced were we inclined to do so. For the next three or four decades we will be in a position to produce very large quantities of food for shipment abroad. It is quite possible that the production of food for export could be an important aspect of our foreign policy during the course of the next few decades. We could, for example, develop a new technology aimed at the production of inexpensive protein from such high-yield plants as alfalfa or sugar beet. This protein could be fabricated into palatable foodstuffs, using suitable technology, and shipped abroad for the purpose of easing the food situation in critical areas and of accelerating the economic development. Such measures, however, would be only temporary expedients. In the long run it will be necessary for all major regions of the world to feed their own populations.

Industrial productivity

In the United States, since World War I, the output per man-hour worked in nonagricultural industries has increased on the average about 30 percent per decade. The high output per man-hour has resulted in part from the efforts of industry to reduce labor costs by the use of such techniques as the assembly line,

careful organization of work operations, simplification of design, and electronic control over many aspects of company operations. Other factors which have contributed to the increasing output per man-hour have involved improvement in working conditions and the reduction of hours of work.

It is impossible to place any limit on the output per man-hour which can eventually be achieved. In principle, it should be possible to produce all of the goods and materials needed for the perpetuation of our society with practically no human effort being involved. Although we are still a long distance from the situation where our goods are produced without benefit of appreciable human attendance, our industrial output per man-hour is already high and is increasing rapidly.

In view of the fact that there is no plausible limit to the eventual industrial output per man-hour, there is little reason to suppose that our performance during the course of the next half-century will not be fully as dramatic as that during the last half-century. Indeed it is quite possible that industrial production per man-hour may increase fourfold during the next 50 years. It is difficult to visualize combinations of circumstances which will prevent it from rising at least twofold.

An important aspect of the increase in productivity in the future will be the spread in the use of automatic control. The use of such controls in industry has expanded in recent years only in part because of rising labor costs. The primary impetus has arisen from the need for processing under conditions of speed, temperature, and pressure which make human control impossible, and from the need for turning out products of unprecedented uniformity and quality. When we examine the potentialities of the full range of control possibilities, even as they exist in their present crude form, the ultimate gain in production efficiency that might be realized appears to be enormous.

It seems likely that, in the future, the human control supervisors of large factories will be replaced by automatic computing machines, which can be instructed, which can react in emergencies much more rapidly than can human operators, which can "learn," and which can seek out better ways of accomplishing tasks once they have been given proper sets of criteria. It seems likely that we will have factories in the future under the regulation of central computing machines which govern the activities of all plant components. The computers would receive information from the various controls, process the information, compute the most satisfactory corrective measures and issue instructions to the controls they regulate.

The spread of such techniques will, of course, greatly decrease the need for human labor.

Basic industry and raw materials

The United States today has less than 10 percent of the world's population, but is using up about 50 percent of the entire world output of raw materials. Even on a per capita basis our raw material demands are destined to increase considerably in the decades ahead. When we couple this with the expected population growth, it is clear that our raw material demands 50 years from now will dwarf those of today.

Enormous quantities of materials are required to support an individual in the United States. We now produce each year, for each person, about 1,300 pounds of steel, 23 pounds of copper, and 16 pounds of lead, in addition to considerable quantities of other metals. Our demands for nonmetals are even more impressive. These quantities will almost certainly increase considerably in the decades ahead.

During these last half-century, the quantities of materials in existence in order to support an individual have increased steadily. For every person in the United States there are probably in existence, together with other metals, about 9 tons of steel, over 300 pounds of copper, about 100 pounds of lead, and about 200 pounds of zinc. It seems clear that these per capita quantities of materials in use will continue to rise. In the first place, the quantities of things which people are willing to buy have as yet not reached the saturation level. Second, we must work ever harder in order to obtain the raw materials we need. It requires a great deal more technology, more equipment, more steel, and greater energy expenditure to produce a pound of metal today than was required in 1900. Whereas today we have about 9 tons of steel in use per person in the United States, it would not be at all surprising if by the turn of the century this were increased to about 15 tons.

It seems plausible that by 1970 steel production in the United States will exceed 200 million tons annually. By the year 2000 it should reach 400 million tons.

Pig iron production will probably increase more slowly, reaching about 100 million tons annually by the year 2000. These increasing demands for metals will bring about increasing demands for metallic ores. As demands increase and as the grades of domestic ores decrease, it will become more difficult for us to find supplies of raw materials to keep our industrial network functioning. Increasing quantities of these materials such as iron ore, bauxite, copper ore, and petroleum must come from abroad. By 1980, the United States may well be one of the poorest nations in the world with respect to high grade raw materials.

It seems clear that the next 50 years will be characterized by growing dependence of the United States upon the natural resources of other major areas of the world. Of course as industrialization spreads to other areas, competition for the earth's resources will increase dramatically.

Eventually, of course, high grade resources are destined to disappear from the earth. Decreasing grades of ores will be compensated for by increasing energy consumption. When that time arrives, industrial civilization will feed upon the leanest of raw materials—sea water, air, ordinary rock, sedimentary deposits such as limestones and phosphate rock, and sunlight.

As grades of ore diminish industries will become more complex and highly integrated. It seems likely that we will eventually reach the point where we will have vast assemblages of plants, particularly in coastal regions, where rock is quarried, uranium and other metals are isolated, nitric acid is manufactured, atomic power is generated, hydrogen is produced, iron ores are reduced to pig iron, aluminum and magnesium metals are prepared, and vast quantities of liquid fuels and organic chemicals are manufactured. The single-purpose plant is likely to diminish in importance and eventually to disappear. When this time is reached, most of the major industrial areas of the world will find it easier to gain their sustenance by applying science and technology to the task of processing domestic, low-grade substances than to look abroad. But before that time is reached, we will pass through a period of increasing dependence upon imports.

Clearly as our industrial network becomes more complex and as we become more and more dependent upon other areas of the world for our supplies of raw materials, we will become increasingly vulnerable from a military point of view. And the dramatic changes which are taking place in our resource picture are likewise destined to change drastically our economic relationships with other regions of the world. These changes will undoubtedly have profound effect upon our foreign policy.

Military technology

Developments in military technology during the last 20 years have been dramatic. Developments during the next 20 years promise to be equally so.

It is possible for us to look into the future of military technology with some confidence, for a period of between 10 and 15 years, for the reason that this is the timelag between the conception of an idea for a weapons system and the achievement of operational capability. It is difficult to look much beyond 10 to 15 years for the reason that breakthroughs in the military area cannot be predicted. We can, however, examine the current trends in weapons systems and project those trends into the future. We will assume in this discussion that no agreements are reached in the near future aimed at general disarmament or at the limitation of testing of nuclear weapons or missiles.

The reduction of radioactive fallout is essential if nuclear weapons are to be used in large numbers in certain types of military operations. It seems likely that considerable effort will be made to develop so-called clean bombs, in which radioactivity is greatly reduced. It should be stressed, however, that in no event can radioactivity be completely eliminated.

It also seems likely that nuclear warheads will be endowed in the future with greatly increased ability to withstand high temperatures, shock, radiation, and other extreme conditions. In addition, military requirements will lead to the development of a variety of nuclear weapons in the kiloton range which will be suited for tactical purposes.

A major goal in current weapons development is further reduction in size and weight. Nuclear warheads as small as 5 inches in diameter were operational in 1958 and we can expect even smaller ones to appear in the years ahead. Megaton weapons are probably already in existence which are sufficiently small for use in fighter aircraft. But there is a military demand for still smaller and lighter warheads for use in air-to-ground missiles, in ground-to-ground missiles, and in submarines.

Small nuclear devices which can be used for sabotaging bridges, factories, and other installations are now in production. Eventually we can expect there will be nuclear bombs which can be smuggled into key areas by individual enemy agents. In addition we expect that a variety of nuclear land and sea mines will be developed.

Within about 10 years major attack planes will probably fly at minimum speeds of Mach 3 or faster. Such a plane is the B-70, now under development as a replacement for the B-52. By the mid-1960's manned hypersonic planes will probably be developed which will travel at speeds 13,000 to 14,000 miles per hour. Useful nuclear-powered aircraft will probably come into existence within another decade.

The development of an underwater-launched ballistic missile will give the nuclear-powered submarine tremendous value. Such submarines will probably constitute one of the greatest military threats of the decade 1960-70. The detection of such submarines will be extremely difficult. Indeed it seems quite possible that we are on the threshold of an era of underwater warfare.

Perhaps the most spectacular development, however, will be in the area of missiles. It is likely that long-range missile systems will be fully operational in the United States and in the U.S.S.R. early in the next decade. It appears likely that for some time thereafter manned aircraft bombers will also be in active service. However, as the accuracy of long-range missiles is progressively improved and as better fuels are devised which will provide more thrust and permit advance loading without fear of decay or spoilage, the aircraft bomber is likely to become obsolete. Eventually the long-range missile will become a weapon of certain and instantaneous operation which is available in sufficient quantities to obliterate large target areas in any possible enemy country. The goal of pushbutton operation is destined to be closely approached.

ICBM launching sites will become prime targets of surprise attack. For this reason, efforts will be made to endow them with "hardness" by placing them deep within the earth at concealed locations. Another approach to this problem will be to maintain mobile bases such as nuclear-powered submarines.

The problem of creating an effective defense against missiles is formidable. Early detection is essential—yet detection itself is difficult. Only a few seconds are available for computing the trajectory of an ICBM and for launching a nuclear counterweapon which will bring it down at a safe distance from the target area. Meteors, clouds, ionized gases, and decoys complicate the problem of identification. The actual destruction of a warhead, once identified, presents further problems. Indeed, many competent engineers believe that the antimissile missile is a myth—that by the time adequate means have been perfected to destroy the first effective ballistic missiles, a new effective generation will have emerged. The situation is further complicated by the fact that effective defense requires the use of radio-waves for detection, identification and detonation. However, it now appears possible for an enemy launching a surprise attack to jam radio communications over specified areas.

Very few observers are optimistic about the possibility of defense keeping pace with offense in the decades ahead.

Satellites will probably become important aspects of weapons systems. Reconnaissance satellites equipped to photograph and televise large parts of the world are already under development. Satellites, properly equipped, could be used for jamming enemy radar and radio transmission during critical periods of attack.

Power and energy.

Energy is the key to the perpetuation of an industrialized society such as that which exists in the United States. We have seen that no matter where we look in our society we find steadily increasing demands for materials, even on a per capita basis. As quantities of materials in use increase, consumption of energy must increase also. Throughout our industrial history our per capita consumption of energy from fossil fuels and from waterpower has steadily increased.

We have seen that we now have in use in the United States approximately 9 tons of steel per person. In order to keep our machinery functioning we consume energy equivalent to about 8 tons of coal per person each year. Thus we must consume energy at a rate equivalent to about 1 ton of coal each year in order to keep a ton of steel in operation. Very roughly, by the time we have 15 tons of steel in operation per person, energy consumption will reach the equivalent of about 15 tons of coal per person per year. At the present time our rate of energy expenditure is approximately doubling every 25 years. A plausible projection for our energy needs in the future is given below.

Projected energy needs in the United States (in 10¹⁵ B.t.u.)

1957-----	42.1
1960-----	47
1970-----	64
1980-----	85
1990-----	115
2000-----	150
2010-----	200

At the turn of the century we obtained 90 percent of our energy from coal. With the upsurge of petroleum and natural gas, coal consumption ceased to increase after 1920. Use of petroleum and natural gas has increased extremely rapidly with the result that by 1957 nearly 70 percent of our energy was obtained from those sources. It is likely that the percentages of our requirements which will be met by these fuels will continue to increase for some years to come.

Until recently our needs for petroleum were met by a rapidly expanding domestic petroleum industry. But domestic production is becoming more difficult and more expensive. New domestic fields are becoming more difficult to find. It is necessary to drill deeper. The number of barrels obtained per foot drilled is decreasing. For these reasons oil companies have searched abroad and we now find ourselves importing far more petroleum than we export.

In 1957 over 12 percent of our crude petroleum was of foreign origin. It seems likely that sometime between 1970 and 1980, 50 percent of our oil needs will be met from abroad.

During the past few years there has been an enormous growth in known world-wide underground reserves. As a result of great discoveries particularly in the Middle Eastern countries, the ratio of reserves to production has more than doubled during the past 6 years. Today the world has a far greater supply of known oil reserves in relation to demand than at any time in the past 30 years. And the development of important new reserves in North Africa and in other countries which have oil potentialities is just beginning. For at least the next decade we shall be living in an economy of oil abundance rather than of oil scarcity.

There is a severe geographic imbalance between the areas of petroleum supply and the areas of demand. The major new discoveries of the last 30 years have been largely in the nonindustrialized nations where demands are relatively low. A small group of Middle Eastern nations now has about 72 percent of the oil reserves and accounts for less than 5 percent of petroleum consumption. The Eastern Hemisphere as a whole has about 75 percent of the world reserves and only 25 percent of the demand.

The geographic separation of supply and consuming areas has created a situation in which international problems of major magnitude are arising. There will be continuing problems of access to oil for the consuming nations and access to markets for the producing nations. It seems inevitable that oil will continue to be the most important single item in world commerce.

The quantity of crude petroleum remaining to be tapped is of course finite. The longevity of the reserves will depend upon the rate of increase of world demand. It seems quite possible that we shall pass through a peak of world petroleum production in about 1990. From that time on the nations of the world must rely upon coal and nuclear power as their major sources of fuel.

The United States is richly endowed with coal and our seams can be mined without great technical difficulty. On a per capita basis we have the largest coal reserves in the world, with the result that our country as a whole is not likely to encounter a fuel shortage for many decades. Our coal seams, however, are not uniformly distributed through the Nation, and fuel costs increase as one moves away from the available supply. A number of areas which are far removed from coalfields—for example, southern California—are at present able to generate power at reasonable prices from petroleum or natural gas. There are other areas, however, where both coal and petroleum are expensive and where power costs are as a result considerably higher than the national average. It is in these areas that nuclear power might be expected to play its major role in the United States, aside from the purely military one.

If, as seems possible, we pass through a peak of domestic petroleum production by about 1970, nuclear power may well become important in those areas, such as the Far West, which lack coal but which at present have ready access to adequate supplies of petroleum or natural gas. After 1970 or 1975 the domestic importance of nuclear power may well increase rather rapidly. As we approach the peak

in world petroleum production demand for coal will increase sharply and nuclear energy will probably be able to compete economically on a fairly broad front. But the production costs of coal in the United States are so low that it seems likely that it will remain our major fuel for a very long time.

The United States could, if necessary, satisfy its own liquid fuel demands by placing increased emphasis upon the production of liquid fuels from shales, tar sands, and coal hydrogenation. The extent to which we do this will depend upon the dangers we foresee in our steadily increasing dependence upon importation. It is clear that, if cost is not the overwhelming factor, the United States can function at a high rate of industrial production for an extremely long time on our domestic reserves of fuel.

4. POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC

The demographic and technological changes discussed in the previous sections will affect our lives in many ways and will create numerous political, social, and economic problems. As population increases, as new cities emerge and old ones merge, there will be increased crowding and a multiplication of the problems which have long been characteristic of highly urbanized areas. The basic domestic problems in the United States will be those of a densely populated industrial nation in which the metropolitan area is the basic unit. Regional differences in population patterns will disappear. The geographic shift in population will change the pattern of political power. The farm vote will dwindle to negligible proportions.

Properly planned and financed, the new urban areas could be pleasant places in which to live. Unplanned and in the absence of adequate public funds for public facilities and services, a vast nationwide slum could emerge in a relatively short time. Indeed our political-social-economic situation 20 years from now will depend in large part upon our attitudes toward the expenditure of public funds, toward long-range planning and toward the powers of the various levels of local, State, and Federal Government. A few examples can be cited.

During the next two decades water will come into increasingly short supply and undoubtedly there will be bitter fights between regions and States over the remaining quantities. We are rapidly approaching the time when coastal areas will reclaim seawater. But the expense will be such that problems of water allocation and water conservation will be major political issues for many decades, cutting across all local and State jurisdictions, and probably soluble, in the long run, only at the Federal level.

The new urbanization and migration of the population will create enormous demands for housing. We are faced today by great problems of slum clearance, of local transportation, of providing housing as rapidly as people need it. In another two decades these problems will be even greater—in part, because the slums we are building today will by then have to be cleared.

As demands for transportation increase we are going to be faced with the necessity of reexamining our public policy toward regulation of railroads and airlines and toward highway construction. There will undoubtedly be pressures to create a unified Federal transportation policy.

Our needs for power will probably grow more rapidly than the supply. To what extent should the Federal and local governments augment their existing generating facilities? This promises to be an endless political fight.

The pressures on the schools will grow in intensity, in part because of surging population, in part because of the higher levels of education required by the labor force and in part because of the increasing shortage of teachers. Overcoming the growing deficit will require the expenditure of substantial public funds and long-range planning. Teachers cannot be trained overnight and in a few years another explosion in school population will confront us.

Our expanding population and the changing age structure will place tremendous demands upon our medical facilities. Increasing numbers of elderly persons will present enormous problems in the care of the aged and in medical care of persons with degenerative diseases such as cancer. Already we have insufficient doctors and too few hospital beds and the shortage of both seems destined to increase. The extent to which public funds might be used to relieve the shortages will involve increasingly vigorous political argument.

The increasing technological and sociological complexity of our society will result in the need for higher levels of education. At the turn of the century, more than one out of every three workers were unskilled. By 1950 only one in five workers remained unskilled. By contrast our need for professional workers

has increased fivefold in the last half-century. Even more important, our need for professional workers is still increasing rapidly and seems destined to increase at least another fivefold in the next 50 years. Scientists and engineers alone have increased tenfold in number in the last half century.

The proportion of American youth graduating from college has been increasing steadily. In 1920 somewhat less than 3 percent of all 22-year-olds were college graduates. By 1950 the proportion had reached 11 percent and by 1970 the proportion may reach 17 percent.

The process of automation will result in considerable dislocation of labor in certain industries and in certain localities. The higher productivity which will result, reaching perhaps four times that of the present in 50 years, will give rise to several major problems. Will this give rise to higher total production or to more leisure? If the end result is higher production, to whom will the goods be sold? Can they be absorbed domestically or will they be sold abroad? If the end result is more leisure, how will the hours of work and the wages be divided? And how will people spend their leisure time? The answers to these questions will depend in part upon decisions which are made in the next decade concerning many aspects of foreign as well as domestic policy.

The arms race is an important part of our economy and if it continues it is bound to have profound effect upon our national values, our ethics, and our institutions. About 10 percent of our gross national product is now devoted to military purposes. The race consumes 50 percent of the research and development effort in the United States. And the rapid changes in military technology are pushing the expenditures of money and research effort continually higher.

In the absence of some agreement on arms limitation there would appear to be little prospect that these prodigious expenditures can be lessened. Indeed the great difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of adequate military defense is making necessary a major program of shelter development and in the near future may make it essential to establish a broad program of industrial decentralization.

It is distasteful to inquire into the future of our economy were the arms race suddenly to end. Ten percent of our gross national product represents a tremendous amount of production. Fifty percent of our research and development effort represents a great deal of research and development.

When we couple this with our rapidly increasing productivity, it is not difficult to visualize that disarmament agreements could be linked closely in the future with economic crisis.

As a counterbalance, however, we are faced with the fact that it is economical for us to import high grade resources, such as petroleum, bauxite, and iron ore. We are faced also by the fact that with respect to basic industry and manufactured goods there is a vacuum to be filled in the greater part of the world.

Our present production aimed at military applications is nonproductive in the sense that we are not creating capital of long-range value. Looked at from the economic point of view, we are in effect digging a large hole, manufacturing a variety of products and dumping them into the hole. Were we successful in consummating disarmament agreements, it is quite possible that our surplus productivity could be utilized successfully to accelerate the economic development of other parts of the world. Such a mechanism could contribute substantially to the stabilization of our domestic economy. It is obvious that it could also aid materially in the elimination of deprivation and in the emergence of a stable and peaceful world.

The arms race, if it continues, is bound to have profound social effects. It is difficult to forecast the effects upon a democratic society of a military situation where an individual human error could bring about the destruction of a nation. Both fear and resignation to the inevitable can give rise to strange actions and inactions on the part of both individuals and nations. Indeed, one wonders whether democracy can exist for long in an atmosphere in which "massive retaliation" and "strategic counteroffensive" are looked upon as the only real deterrents to full-scale nuclear war.

On the political side it is clear that new technological developments are making it increasingly necessary for us to engage in long-range planning and to accelerate the entire process of decisionmaking. We can no longer live from year to year or from election to election. Indeed it is quite likely that attempts to plan our domestic affairs on a 20- to 50-year time scale may well be desirable.

Clearly the process of arriving at sound national decisions must be speeded up. In a world where things happen so quickly, where situations are changing at an ever-accelerating tempo, our traditional decisionmaking processes are anachro-

nistic. It remains to be seen whether the processes can be accelerated within the framework of democratic institutions.

B. WORLD ENVIRONMENT

1. DEMOGRAPHIC

The population of the world is increasing rapidly. Even more important, however, is the fact that the rate of population growth is increasing rapidly as well. The number of human beings inhabiting the earth has now reached a level of 2.7 billion persons.

Between 1850 and 1900 world population grew at a rate of about 0.7 percent per year. During the following half century the average annual rate of increase was 0.9 percent per year. Between 1950 and 1956 the annual rate of increase averaged 1.6 percent annually.

This remarkable increase in the rate of population growth has resulted primarily from rapidly lowered death rates. For example, in the single 4-year period 1950-54, the crude death rates in 18 underdeveloped countries decreased on the average by 20 percent. Birth rates in these countries have remained high (close to the biological maximum), with the result that there has been a phenomenal upsurge in the rate of natural increase in population.

We do not have to look far to find the reasons for the rapid decline in mortality in the underdeveloped areas. It is now possible to treat many of the diseases which are widespread in these areas on a mass basis, and it has been found that control can be achieved at low cost. Insecticides such as DDT, vaccines such as BCG, and antibiotics such as penicillin are some of the developments which have made control possible on a mass basis. For example, widespread spraying of the island of Ceylon with DDT resulted in a decrease of mortality by 34 percent in 1 year alone. By the use of penicillin, endemic syphilis has been eliminated as a public health problem in large areas. As a result of the spread of these techniques, the population of Costa Rica is growing at a rate of 3.7 percent per year. The rates in many other areas are nearly as large: Mexico, 2.9 percent; Ceylon, 2.8 percent; Puerto Rico, 2.8 percent—all compared with a world average of about 1.6 percent.

The population of Central America is increasing at the rate of 2.7 percent per year and that of South America at the rate of 2.4 percent. The population of Red China is increasing at somewhat slower pace—perhaps 2.0 percent annually. India, which has not been as successful as China in spreading the use of modern techniques, is increasing at the rate of about 1.3 percent annually.

In any event it is clear that the rate of world population growth can climb to values which are considerably higher than that which now prevails.

A plausible projection of world population, assuming that it continues to climb at the rate of about 16 percent per decade, is given below.

Plausible projection of world population

[Billions of persons]	
Year:	Population
1956	2.7
1960	2.9
1970	3.4
1980	3.9
1990	4.6
2000	5.3
2010	6.1

By the year 1970 it seems likely that the population of the U.S.S.R. will have increased from the 1956 level of 200 million persons to perhaps 254 million persons; that of India may increase from 387 million to perhaps 504 million; that of mainland China may increase from the estimated 1958 level of 643 million to perhaps 840 million.

A plausible projection of the population of Red China is given below.

Plausible projection of population of China

Year :	[Millions]	Population
1958_____		643
1960_____		670
1970_____		840
1980_____		1,000
1990_____		1,300
2000_____		1,600
2010_____		2,000

As industrialization spreads to other areas of the world and as techniques of birth control are adopted by various cultures it is possible that birth rates will fall. If we assume, for example, that the rate of population growth in the West will fall to very low levels by 1975 (which may be true in Western Europe but which almost certainly will not be true in North America), that rates of growth in Japan, Eastern Europe, and Oceania will fall to low levels by the turn of the next century, that Africa, south-central Asia, most of Latin America and China will pass through the industrial transition in 75 years, and that a full century will be required for most of the Near East, then we arrive at a world population of close to 7 billion before stabilization is approached. No matter how optimistic we are, it is difficult to visualize a set of circumstances not involving widespread catastrophe, which can result in the leveling off of world population at much less than this figure. The earth may eventually be called upon to provide for a substantially higher population than this minimum estimate.

2. SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC

The demographic changes which are taking place in the world, particularly in those regions which are predominantly agrarian, are resulting primarily from the application of techniques which are relatively inexpensive, require little capital, and which can be spread without educating large numbers of persons. The task of controlling epidemic and endemic diseases is a relatively easy one, compared with the task of increasing food production, improving housing, or enlarging the overall per capita availability of consumer goods. The latter necessitates a level of industrialization far above that which currently exists in these areas.

During the last 150 years the scientific-technological-industrial revolution has spread in turn from Western Europe, to North America, to Japan, and to the Soviet Union. In recent years we have seen the beginnings of its spread to India and China, as well as to other regions of the world which at present possess primarily agrarian economies. Barring catastrophe it seems likely that these countries will eventually achieve their goals. It is unlikely that the people of the underdeveloped areas can for long withstand the temptations offered by industrial societies any more than the groups of food gatherers, who reigned supreme several thousand years ago, could withstand the temptations offered by agricultural societies.

In three-quarters of the world, persons are now living at extremely low levels of consumption. We can easily appreciate the magnitude of the task that is involved in the industrial development of these areas when we examine the huge quantities of materials which would be required. If all persons in the world were suddenly brought up to the level of living now enjoyed by the people of the United States, we would have to extract from the earth about 18 billion tons of iron, 300 million tons of copper, an equal amount of lead and over 200 million tons of zinc. These totals are well over 100 times the world's present annual rate of production. In order to power this newly industrialized society, energy would have to be produced at a rate equivalent to the burning of about 16 billion tons of coal per year—a rate roughly 10 times larger than the present one.

Such a transformation obviously will take time. It is important, then, that we inquire into the rates at which industrial growth might take place in the future. It is convenient to use, as a measure, the growth of the iron and steel industry, which is the backbone of modern industrial civilization. Per capita annual steel production, which ranges from 9 pounds per person in India to about 1,300 pounds per person in the United States, provides one of the best indicators of the industrial development of a country.

In the past such growth has characteristically followed the law of compound interest, and we can thus speak in terms of a doubling time—the time required to double production capacity. Prior to World War I steel production in the United States doubled about every 8 years. There was a drop in production during the depression but since 1935 the doubling time for steel production has been about 14 years.

Japanese industrialization was greatly accelerated following 1913, aided by the past knowledge that had been accumulated and by the rapid strides in foreign trade and shipping which took place during World War I. Between 1913 and 1936 steel output rose thirtyfold, despite the fact that essentially all the basic raw materials had to be imported. During this interval the doubling time averaged 5 years.

Between 1936 and the outbreak of World War II the rate of increase of steel production lessened. The industry almost perished following Japan's defeat in World War II, but in the years that followed the collapse, capacity for steel production was rebuilt and by 1956 it actually exceeded that which had existed at the start of the war.

Russian steel production increased about as rapidly as did production in the United States in the 34-year interval from 1880 to the outbreak of World War I. During this period the doubling time was about 7 years. Following the disruption brought about by the revolution and the inauguration of the first 5-year plan, the Soviets achieved a 5-year doubling time for the expansion of their steel industry. Following the heavy losses suffered in World War II and the subsequent recovery of lost capacity, Soviet steel capacity has expanded with an 8-year doubling time. During the early postwar years a 4-year doubling time was achieved.

We see that the early stages of expansion of the steel industry in the United States, in Japan and in the Soviet Union took place with doubling times varying from 5 to 8 years. The more rapid rate appears to be characteristic of what is now possible with proper application of modern technology. Indeed it appears that since 1953 China has expanded her steel industry with a doubling time of somewhat less than 3 years.

Of course, if steel production doubles every 5 years, the doubling times for the production of a variety of raw materials and manufactured goods must keep pace. For every ton of steel which is produced or imported, it is necessary to produce or import about 40 pounds of copper, 37 pounds of lead, 27 pounds of zinc and 4 pounds of tin.

Agriculture

Food production can be increased in two ways: by increasing the amount of food produced per acre and by increasing the numbers of acres cultivated. Additional increases in the amounts of food available to human beings can be obtained by decreasing the quantities of plant materials fed to domestic animals.

The amount of food produced on a given area of land depends, of course, upon the soil and upon climatic conditions. In addition, it depends upon the extent to which technology is applied to the problem of producing more food. When we look about the world we see that there are large variations in the amounts of food produced per cultivated acre. Food with an energy content of about 13,000 calories is produced on an average acre in Japan each day. The corresponding yield in Western Europe is 7,500 calories. The yield in India is about 2,500 calories. These differences do not result primarily from differences of soil fertility or of climatic conditions. Rather, they are reflections of the extent to which modern agricultural knowledge is applied specifically to the attainment of high yields.

In Japan there is an acute need for high yields per acre, and this is coupled with the knowledge of the most advanced agricultural techniques ranging from fertilizers to plant breeding and selection to the application of pesticides. In Western Europe the knowledge of modern agricultural technology is also available and the need for intensive cultivation is intermediate between the extreme

need of Japan on the one hand and that of the United States on the other. In India, by contrast, the need for intensive cultivation is fully as great as in Japan but the means of applying modern agricultural technology on a large scale are absent. Indians cultivate their own land intensively but without the benefits of fertilizers, plant breeding and selection, or pesticides.

By the proper application of technology, the agricultural areas of the world can probably be increased from the present 2,400 million acres to about 3,500 million acres. However, very little of this potential cropland is in Asia. Cultivated land area in Asia can probably not be increased by more than 25 percent.

By far the greatest potential for increased food production is in those areas where reclaimed sea water can eventually be used. Today, reclaimed sea water is too expensive to be practicable but at the pressures upon the land increase and as our technology improves, we will reach the time when fresh water from the sea will be used to irrigate large areas of the world.

We have seen that the time scale for industrial development is quite short—basic industry such as steel, for example, can be expanded at a rate such that production is doubled every few years. One of the reasons for this short time scale is that the construction of factories does not necessitate the concerted action of entire populations. A steel plant or a fertilizer factory can be built by relatively few persons.

By contrast, the time scale for changes which involve large segments of a population has in the past been relatively long. The spread of modern agricultural techniques has been slow, in part because so many persons must be educated. Even with the application of tremendous effort it has not in the past been possible to achieve a sustained increase of agricultural production of more than about 4 percent per year.

There is, however, evidence that Red China has circumvented the needs for education and by use of regimentation has succeeded in increasing food production by between 50 and 100 percent in the last 3 years. It is said that this has been done by the application of large quantities of imported fertilizers, by heavy use of chemical insecticides, by the use of selected seeds and by substitution of deep plowing for the old earth-scraping technique.

Military technology

Industrialization and the ability to wage war go hand in hand. In order to wage war today a nation must either possess a vast technology, or must in some way be provided with the products of such a technology. As time goes by, and as the process of industrialization continues, more and more nations will possess a capacity to wage war—to manufacture for themselves mechanized equipment, guns, planes and nuclear weapons and to provide the necessary trained manpower. Japan and the Soviet Union are the two most recent nations to join the group of industrial powers, and we have seen the dangerous situations that have been created by them as they have gained the power to wage large-scale modern war. What will happen as other countries, such as India and China, achieve this power?

At the present time three nations possess facilities for manufacturing nuclear weapons and now possess nuclear stockpiles—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. France will be manufacturing nuclear weapons of its own very shortly. The rate at which we can expect nuclear capability to spread to additional nations will depend upon each nation's present technology, their present industrial capacities, their levels of education and the rates at which these factors are changing. It would take India a considerably longer period of time than Japan to develop the capability of waging nuclear war because she has just started along the path of industrialization. Nevertheless it is not unlikely that India's capacity to wage war might one day exceed Japan's.

In the absence of controls of some sort we can expect that a number of nations which are at present industrialized will commence the manufacture of their own nuclear weapons. Nations which possess this capability include Canada, Sweden, Belgium, eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Japan. At a somewhat later time, perhaps 15 years from now, we can expect that China and India will have achieved independent nuclear capabilities.

The conditions which will govern the spread of long-range missile technology are similar. It seems likely that nations which are able to produce their own nuclear weapons and which are able to produce their own airplanes, will be able to produce long-range guided missiles as well.

Let us now examine the future prospects of three major nations which are likely to have profound influence upon world affairs during the next 50 years—the U.S.S.R., China, and India.

U.S.S.R.

The industrial growth of the Soviet Union has been the most rapid thus far achieved in human history. In but four decades, in spite of a devastating war and internal political upheavals, she is now second only to the United States in coal production, in the production of iron ore, pig iron, steel, and electrical energy. Her steel and coal production is doubling about every 8 years. Comparing the rate of industrial growth of the Soviet Union with that of the United States it would appear that Russian steel production will exceed ours sometime between 1970 and 1975.

The Soviet Union must, of course, produce a tremendous amount of steel if it is to have a per capita steel inventory comparable to that which exists in the United States at the present time. It is possible that she can accomplish this by about 1980 barring major catastrophe or upheaval. From about 1980 on it would appear that the average citizen of the Soviet Union will be as well off from the point of view of material possessions and food as is the average resident of the United States today.

Red China

China's industrial growth during the first 5-year plan (1953–57) appears to have been phenomenal. Gross industrial output came close to doubling. The output of capital goods more than doubled and the output of consumer goods increased by approximately 50 percent. Between 1952 and 1957 electric power production increased twofold to threefold, coal production doubled, crude petroleum and pig iron production increased threefold, and steel production quadrupled. If increases continued as expected following 1957, steel production should now approach that of Japan and coal production should have reached over 200 million tons annually, somewhat less than that of the United Kingdom. From 1952–57 the doubling time for steel production appears to have been somewhat less than 3 years.

It seems likely that the rates of increase of both agricultural and industrial production which have been achieved in China cannot be maintained for a prolonged period of time. Nevertheless it seems clear that through the use of strict totalitarian regimentation and control she is achieving an unprecedented rate of industrialization.

It is probable that China's steel production will equal that of the United States by the year 2000. It is conceivable that she will achieve this goal by 1975. So rapid is China's development that forecasting is extremely difficult. It is reasonable for us to assume, however, that by 1970 Red China may possess military might of the order of that possessed by the Soviet Union during the period 1950–55.

The impact of China's rapid development upon the other countries of Asia will undoubtedly be profound.

India

Steel production was started in India shortly after the turn of the century, and it has grown, although slowly. Twenty-six years were required for pig iron production to double after 1924. At present steel is being produced at the rate of about 1.6 million tons annually. For many years India ranked second to Japan in steel production in Asia. In 1953, China took over second place and now seems destined quickly to take over first place.

In India's first and second 5-year development plan, heavy emphasis has been placed upon the rapid expansion of the steel industry. If all plans are carried to completion, production of finished steel should reach 4.5 million tons by 1960–61. This will be less than one-half of that possessed by China at that time.

There is little doubt that India has ample iron ore to permit her to make the industrial transition. Indeed, she will have ore to spare. She is short of coal of metallurgical grade, but we know that there are technological means for circumventing this difficulty. It seems reasonable to suppose that, given a situation favorable from the social, political and economic points of view, India should be able to achieve and maintain a rate of increase of her steel industry corresponding to a doubling of production every 10 years or so. Even at this rate, however, the per capita amount of steel in use in India in the year 2000 would

correspond roughly to that which existed in Japan immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II.

India is developing slowly and surely—but is it developing sufficiently rapidly?

It is clear that China, within the framework of a strict totalitarian regime, is developing much more rapidly than is India, operating as a democracy. In 1951 the amount of electricity generated in China was less than that generated in India. Today nearly twice as much electricity is generated in China as in India. Production of chemical fertilizers is rising much more rapidly in China than in India. We have seen that steel production in China is doubling every 3 years. Although China's production of steel in 1951 was less than that in India, today it is considerably higher and by 1960 even if the Indian plants now under construction are all in operation, China's steel production will be more than double that of India.

It is clear, of course, that the differences in the rates of development in India and China have not been solely the results of differences in systems. Red China has consumed between 1950 and 1957 some \$2.4 billion in Soviet credits. It is estimated that the Soviet Union has sent 15,000 technicians and military, economic and administrative advisers to China.

Largely as the result of Soviet support, the Chinese have the largest and most modern air force in Asia, some 1,800 jet fighters and bombers. On the ground, the Chinese army has been reequipped and modernized with Russian tanks, artillery and transport. There have been hints that the Chinese might in the near future be supplied with atomic weapons.

In any event, it seems clear that the intensity and depth of the support which China has received from the Soviet Union exceeds by a considerable margin that which India has received from the free world.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The most important possibility which emerges from our examination of present trends and future prospects is that the relative position of the United States as a world power may be destined to decrease fairly rapidly during the next two or three decades. This diminished power and influence will probably not arise as the result of any deterioration of our own economic or military capabilities. It is likely to arise, instead, as the result of the rapid upsurge in the capabilities of other countries and particularly the U.S.S.R. and China.

This shift in power and influence, which seems likely, could be extremely dangerous—but it need not be so. A great deal will depend upon how we conduct our affairs in the remaining years during which we possess economic and technological superiority and at least something close to military equality.

The first requirement for effective policy formulation and administration would appear to be to define our long-range objectives. And here we should look beyond the present deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union. The problems which confront us are too broad, too complicated and too deep-seated to permit us to oversimplify and to justify practically everything we do or don't do on the basis of what the Soviet Union does or does not do. The dangers which are inherent in the present deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union are, of course, enormous. But we should not permit our concern with the Soviet Union to cause us to ignore the other grave threats which we face.

The most serious criticism of our foreign policy today is that our long-range goals are not sufficiently well defined. This criticism can also be made of our domestic policy. At the moment we are the richest nation on earth and we want to preserve our wealth. Beyond that we want to preserve a vaguely defined freedom and an equally vaguely defined way of life. Yet beyond the implied goal of preserving a nebulous status quo there lies only interminable emptiness. We have no real objectives. We have not the slightest idea what kind of world we really want to see. We think primarily of the present, seldom think about the future—and are uncomfortable when we do so.

The forecasts given in the preceding sections make it appear clear that we are moving toward the following serious military situation:

1. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are building up strategic nuclear striking power, sufficient to destroy the military and economic power of any nation which might strike.
2. The strategic attack systems in both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are being made sufficiently automatic that should one nation launch a strategic

attack upon the other, the attacking country as well as the country attacked will almost certainly be seriously damaged.

The extent of the damage which would be inflicted in the event of a strategic attack will depend in part upon the status of the technology of missile defense. We have seen that the prospects in that connection are not very hopeful—in other words that destruction would in all likelihood be severe.

If the situation were perfectly symmetrical—that is, if neither nation were to believe it could destroy the other without being seriously damaged herself—then the situation would, in principle, be stable and the armaments would neutralize each other. But unfortunately the situation is much more complex. Human error could trigger the system. The technological complexity of intercontinental ballistics missile systems renders mechanical error a real possibility. The system could be triggered by the willful efforts of a third nation.

It seems that if either the U.S.S.R. or the United States wished to precipitate a war, that war could not be avoided. We are faced, however, with the additional and very real possibility that our two nations may become involved in a war which neither wants. Are there ways and means by which such a war—whether it be accidental or started by a third party—might be avoided?

Clearly, were the entire system eliminated, the dangers would be decreased. But the problems of disarmament, of eliminating bombs and missiles, are severe both from the technological and political points of view. It is likely, however, that these problems are soluble, at least technologically, provided that efforts aimed at arms control are initiated soon. With each passing year the control problem will become more complex, and eventually will become virtually hopeless.

At this point it should be stressed that it appears possible from the technological point of view to monitor the explosions of nuclear devices and the launchings of ballistic missiles. This should make possible the monitoring of worldwide agreements on the testing of both nuclear devices and missiles. Such agreements could hinder the spread of nuclear weapons technology and thus lessen, for a while, the likelihood of war precipitated by a strategic attack launched by a third nation.

A second approach to the problem of avoiding a war which neither the U.S.S.R. nor the United States wants would be to make the strategic missile systems as foolproof as possible. This might involve the establishment of inspection and monitoring systems to provide early warning of surprise attack coupled with agreements designed to seriously hinder the spread of nuclear and missile technology. It would appear, however, that although such an approach might be useful for a decade or two, in the long run it would not be satisfactory for the reason that these technologies are bound to spread eventually. Further, the possibility of accident can never be completely eliminated.

Clearly, during the next few years every effort should be made to determine whether or not bombs and missiles can be eliminated—and if not, to determine whether or not we can learn to live with them.

One aspect of foreign policy formulation involves the worldwide aspects of arms control considerations. One cannot devise techniques of weapons control, of monitoring, of warning against surprise attack, unless all nations are involved in the agreements. This means that Red China, for example—which will emerge one day as a major power—should be party to the basic discussions and to the agreements when they are formulated.

It is clear that we should pay a great deal of attention to our vulnerability to attack. We will probably be faced with the possibility of attack, for decades—at least until such time as world anarchy is eliminated. And we should realize that there is much that can be done to improve our chances of survival and recovery in the event of large-scale nuclear attack. These steps are intimately linked with such considerations as urban growth, the distribution of our industries, our transportation and communications systems and our situation with respect to raw materials which were discussed earlier.

Another problem which confronts us involves the spread of totalitarianism. As industrialization spreads we will be faced with the prospect of watching more and more nations shift to totalitarian forms of government in the interest of shortening their periods of transition and in the interest of their own military survival. And here we must keep in mind the fact that the tools of persuasion and coercion now in the hands of rulers of nations are extremely powerful. As time goes by, it will become increasingly difficult for totalitarian power to be overthrown.

As our population grows, as the pressures from outside become even more intense, as our industrial network becomes increasingly complex, as the problems of military defense become even more involved, we as a democratic society will be confronted internally by extraordinarily difficult problems. We have only seen the beginnings of rules and regulations designed to bind men's actions. As time goes by, the people of the United States will be steadily driven toward increased organization, increased conformity and increased control over the thoughts and actions of the individual.

China has embraced communism and millions of Asians are impressed by her economic progress. We should not be surprised were India to attempt to emulate China. The pressures of eking out an existence may soon force Japan to return to the totalitarian fold.

It would appear to be very much in the interest of the United States that countries such as India be enabled to pass through the industrial transition as painlessly and as rapidly as possible, within the framework of democratic institutions. With adequate economic aid, this could be done. In the absence of such aid, it is doubtful that the transition can be made without recourse to totalitarian methods.

American attempts thus far to aid the underdeveloped nations of the world have been, in the main, a failure. In the first place, we have spent too little. In the second place, much of that which we have spent has not been spent wisely. It is quite possible that we have injured some countries more than we have helped them.

One of the major problems we face in the United States is the stabilization of both the agricultural and industrial sectors of our economy. It is quite possible that we can provide much of the necessary capital which is necessary for India to travel a good distance along the road of industrialization and at the same time provide it in such a way that it acts as a strong stabilizing force upon our production. As our productivity increases and as arms expenditures decrease, it should be possible for us to maintain full employment by producing goods for shipment abroad. As partial payment we could receive from some nations supplies of raw materials which will be necessary to keep our industrial network functioning.

Science and technology can contribute enormously to problems of world development in a variety of ways. New techniques can be developed which can decrease capital investments per unit of output. There are numerous technical problems which are peculiar to underdeveloped countries and which could be solved by the concerted application of techniques of Western technology—problems which range from the processing of low-grade ores to the development of new methods of birth control, to the industrial application of atomic energy.

Clearly, our science and our technology, if properly applied, could enable man to create a world in which all individuals have the opportunity of leading free and abundant lives. We know this to be a fact. It is not the lack of technical knowledge or of the earth's resources which are the major barriers to the evolution of such a work. The primary hindrance is man's apparent inability to devise those social and political institutions which can enable us to apply our technical knowledge at the rapid pace which the situation demands.

APPENDIX B

THE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MECHANISM¹

As background for the main body of this study, the present account sets forth in relatively brief compass the organization and procedures of the National Security Council and the subordinate units attached to it.

A. STATUTORY BASIS

The statutory basis of the Council is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and as supplemented by various Executive orders and memorandums. The function of the Council, as stated in the act, is: "To advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." There is also a paragraph dealing with the Council's responsibility "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith * * *."²

The membership provided for in the statute includes: The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. It is also provided in the act that the following are to attend as advisers to the Council: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency is made directly responsible to the Council.

Before proceeding to a more detailed description of the Council machinery, it should be emphasized that, in the 12 years of its existence, the Council has undergone considerable change and adjustment in its purposes and functions, in its organizational structure, and in its procedures. Furthermore, growth and development still continue. Primary attention in this paper will be given to the present pattern although major trends will be noted.

B. PRESENT ORGANIZATION BRIEFLY DESCRIBED

The National Security Council is a part of the Presidential staff organization known as the Executive Office of the President. The Council has always had a small professional staff attached to it, headed by an executive secretary, performing the following functions—analyzing policy questions independently and in cooperation with relevant agencies, arranging the agenda for meetings, providing and distributing the supporting papers including records of the actions taken at Council meetings, and facilitating negotiations among the participants. While the essential function of the staff is to service the Council, it also provides for the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs an "objective analysis of every policy paper that goes through the Planning Board to the Council." While it "does not itself make policy recommendations, it does scrutinize departmental proposals and suggest policy alternatives or additions that merit consideration."³

¹ By Burton M. Sapin, Vanderbilt University.

² National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Public Law 253, 80th Cong., July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495), secs. 101 (a) and (b).

³ Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formulation of National Policy," p. 13, unpublished paper presented at the September 1959 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C.

Other useful items on this topic are: Donald S. Bussey, "The National Security Council," Dec. 15, 1958, an unpublished staff paper prepared for the President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (the "Draper Committee"); Colonel Bussey's paper has an excellent bibliography on the subject; two articles by a former Special Assistant,

Mr. Cutler refers to the staff as having 11 "think people" who are "scrupulously nonpolitical and nonpolicymaking. They form the backbone of continuity, the reservoir of past knowledge and the staff assistance required by the special assistant in discharging his responsibilities to the President."⁴

According to Colonel Bussey, the total permanent staff in March 1953 numbered 23, including 6 "think people." At Mr. Cutler's recommendation, 5 additional "think people" were added at that time and a total staff of 28 has continued to the present time.⁵

Since 1950 the Council has had a second-level group connected with it which has done much of the work involved in preparing for its consideration policy papers which, if favorably received by the Council and approved by the President, become official policy. This group was known as the Senior Staff under President Truman and became the Planning Board under President Eisenhower. Each member of the National Security Council is represented on the Planning Board, usually by an official of Assistant Secretary rank. In recent years, these officials have relied on a group of their subordinates, the Planning Board assistants, to do much of the detailed drafting.

In late 1953, in part as an outgrowth of a concern to maximize the psychological impact of U.S. policy, still another unit, the Operations Coordinating Board, was made a part of the national security organization, but it was not formally added to the National Security Council structure until July 1957. In brief, its function is to advise with the agencies concerned to ensure that the interagency execution of policies and programs in various functional and geographical areas is integrated to achieve maximum advantage. The Board is chaired by the Under Secretary of State; other designated members are the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and the International Cooperation Administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not directly represented.

The Operations Coordinating Board has its own professional staff, headed by an Executive Officer and somewhat separate from the staff of the National Security Council-Planning Board structure. Since 1957, there has also been a Presidential Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination, who is designated Vice Chairman of the Board. This official also attends the meetings of the National Security Council and serves as an adviser to the Planning Board. The Coordinating Board members also have their Board assistants to do preliminary labors for them. Detailed scrutiny of policy execution in various geographical and functional areas is actually carried out by approximately 50 Operations Coordinating Board working groups, interdepartmental committees of working-level officials with 1 professional staff person from the Board's staff also sitting in as a member.

One of President Eisenhower's important innovations in the National Security Council system was to establish in 1953 as part of his own immediate staff the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This official plays a key role in the meetings of the Council, sits as Chairman of the Planning Board (a role previously played by the Executive Secretary of the Council staff), and is a member of the Operations Coordinating Board.

C. MEMBERSHIP AND MEETING PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL

In addition to the statutory members, the Secretary of the Treasury, under both President Truman and President Eisenhower, has had virtually regular membership status. At present, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission also attend the Council meetings on a regular basis. A considerable number of other officials normally are present. Some are staff aids and sit in the outer circle. Mr. Gordon Gray, the present Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, recently provided the following list of these other officials:

"The Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign

Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 34 (April 1956), pp. 441-458, and "Defense Organization at the Policy Level," *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, vol. 2 (January-March 1959), pp. 8-15; William R. Kintner, "Organizing for Conflict: A Proposal," *Orbis*, vol. 2 (summer 1958), pp. 155-174; Paul H. Nitze, "National Policymaking Techniques," *SAIS Review*, vol. 3 (spring 1959), pp. 3-8; and relevant chapters in Edward H. Hobbs, "Behind the President" (Washington, 1954), and Timothy W. Stanley, "American Defense and National Security" (Washington, 1956).

⁴ Cutler, *Foreign Affairs*, op. cit., p. 455.

⁵ Bussey, op. cit., p. 45.

Economic Policy and Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination; the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council. For agenda items which are the subject of official interest to them, the Attorney General and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, are invited. Of course, for any agenda items that the President may determine, ad hoc members participate."⁶

For example, when matters relating to the Military Establishment are under discussion, the Chiefs of Staff and civilian Secretaries of the three services are Economic Policy and Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; likely to be present. The total of those now regularly in attendance at Council meetings is 20.

"The Council regularly meets each Thursday at 9 a.m. Meetings normally do not exceed 2 hours. Special Council meetings are called by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs at the request of the President. The agenda for a Council meeting is determined by the President, acting through the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

"One feature of every Council meeting is a regular briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence. He gives a summary of important developments that are occurring throughout the world, and he gives particular attention to those areas which are on the Council agenda that day."⁷

Under President Truman, the Council, particularly in its early years, did not meet quite so regularly or frequently, although during the Korean war it began to meet on a regular weekly basis. As Mr. Cutler has pointed out, President Truman attended the meetings less regularly than President Eisenhower, who has rarely missed a meeting since he has been in office, aside from his periods of illness.

The Council may have one item on its agenda or as many as four or five. There are no formal votes; the usual procedure is to take "the sense of the meeting." The nature of the Council's procedures in dealing with the papers that come before it is discussed below.

D. RELATIONSHIP OF THE COUNCIL TO OTHER UNITS

Since there are other advisory councils and committees at the presidential level and other units in the Executive Office of the President, the question of the Council's relations with them and the division of labor on national security problems is an important one.

The Cabinet is supposed to concern itself with all domestic matters not bearing "directly and primarily" on national security. This is not always an obvious or simple distinction, and there are certainly possibilities for jurisdictional dispute. Mr. Robert Cutler indicates how the question has been dealt with under the Eisenhower administration:

"The complexity of modern times often makes it difficult to draw a clear line between the two categories; but in practice a rational accommodation has invariably been worked out between the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs."⁸

In other words, the fact that the President now has on his immediate staff both a Special Assistant for the Council and a secretary to the Cabinet provides the opportunity for close cooperation and apparently, under present circumstances, satisfactory working relations.

The question of division of labor also arises regarding those national security matters that might be termed current operational questions and those with important longer term policy aspects and implications, the latter presumably being the special province of the National Security Council. Here again, the present system seems to operate satisfactorily because of good working relationships between the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and officials like the President's Staff Secretary, who is largely responsible for White House liaison with the Military Establishment on current operational matters.

As to other high-level advisory councils and committees in the foreign policy-national security field, no significant difficulties of integration and coordination seem to have arisen. The National Aeronautics and Space Council, formally chaired by the President, has not been in existence long enough for any im-

⁶ Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸ Cutler, *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

portant patterns to develop. Both the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems and the Council on Foreign Economic Policy seem to have fairly well-defined areas of responsibility which either have not interfered with any important National Security Council responsibilities or have been brought into the Security Council when this seemed desirable.

In any event, according to the accounts of Mr. Gray and Mr. Cutler, the present President is inclined to give major national security policymaking responsibilities to the Council machinery and to regard exceptions to that rule as temporary.

E. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL UNITS

It has already been pointed out that one of President Eisenhower's major innovations in the machinery of the Council was the introduction of the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This official now plays a central role in the operation of the whole structure, excepting only the work of the Operations Coordinating Board. Mr. Gray himself has provided what is probably the most complete and yet succinct summary of the present duties and responsibilities of the Special Assistant:

"Responsibility for agenda, and presentation of material for discussion at Council meetings; as necessary, briefing the President before Council meetings on agenda items; determining, in collaboration with the NSC Executive Secretary, the agenda and scheduling of work for Planning Board meetings; presiding at, and participating in, Planning Board meetings; supervising the work of the NSC staff through the Executive Secretary; attending and participating in meetings of the Operations Coordinating Board, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and other relevant groups; attending as an observer at meetings of the Cabinet; and such other assignments related to national security affairs as the President may direct."⁹

The general role and organization of the Planning Board have already been noted. Its membership is composed of representatives and observers from the departments and agencies represented on the Council, whether statutory or not. For example, at present a special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and an Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget sit on the Board. Also present is an officer representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is clear that under present arrangements the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs plays a key role in the work of the group. Under both Mr. Truman and Mr. Eisenhower, there seems to have been the hope that the Senior Staff-Planning Board could be developed into a working team of high-level departmental officials who would devote a substantial portion of their time and efforts to its activities. In both cases, this hope has been disappointed. For those who represent their agencies on the Planning Board, this is but one among a number of very important and time-consuming responsibilities and, usually, just one among a number of very important meetings that must be regularly attended each week. Indeed, a standard complaint is that not infrequently these officials must miss Board meetings and are themselves represented by subordinates. Under Mr. Eisenhower, it has even been necessary to organize a body subsidiary to the Board to do some of its work for it—the Planning Board assistants. The meetings of the Board assistants are not regularly scheduled, but they average about five sessions a month.

Under Mr. Cutler, the Planning Board was meeting regularly on a three-times-a-week basis. Mr. Gray informs us that the Board now meets regularly twice a week, on Tuesday and Friday afternoons "from 2 o'clock till 5—or such further time as I may keep them in session."¹⁰ Apparently the latter comment is not a mere idle remark because Planning Board sessions have a reputation among those who attend them of lasting often far longer than the scheduled 3 hours.

The Operations Coordinating Board follows a somewhat different pattern. It convenes "at an informal luncheon meeting each Wednesday in the Department of State. The luncheon is attended by the designated members and the Executive Officer [i.e., of the Board staff]; other officials are invited as required for discussion of specific subjects. Thereafter the Board convenes in formal session for the transaction of business indicated in the advance agenda.

⁹ Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰ Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

"* * * A typical meeting includes the following principal items:

"(a) Reports indicating general effectiveness of assigned national security policies and future problems and difficulties in its implementation, for transmittal to the NSC.

"(b) Operations plans for specific countries or regions, as developed by OCB working groups or committees to facilitate effective interdepartmental coordination.

"(c) Special reports for either the Board or the Council by OCB working groups or committees, on their own initiative or by request, analyzing a specific problem and proposing action.

"(d) Oral reports to clarify issues or stimulate discussion."¹¹

In addition to the two Presidential special assistants and the other designated members noted earlier, the Under Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission regularly attend the weekly meetings. The Board assistants, who do the "final staff work on subjects to be considered by the Board," meet regularly every Friday. The 50-odd working groups of the Board meet as frequently as is required by their work. They may meet as little as once a month; on the other hand, when they are in process of developing or reviewing an operations plan, they may be meeting on an almost daily basis and devoting a great deal of their time to the work of the interdepartmental working group.

F. THE USE OF OUTSIDE CONSULTANTS BY THE COUNCIL

There has been much discussion regarding the desirability of using nongovernmental consultants and advisers in the work of the National Security Council and even some vagueness regarding the actual patterns in this matter. Mr. Gray reports that "from time to time the President appoints one or more consultants as informal advisers to the Council * * * as a general rule, such consultants appear at a Council meeting only to present and discuss their report." He goes on to say:

Examples of the use of such consultants are:

(1) to consider and report to the Council on some proposal, either specific or general, after which the consultant's report is reviewed by the departments and agencies concerned.

(2) to review for the Council integrated recommendations proposed by the NSC Planning Board.

"In the course of the review of a recent fundamental policy paper, 23 consultants were used. They first met with the Planning Board in groups of four or five at a time and gave their views on the existing paper up for review. Then the Planning Board devoted all or part of 27 meetings over many weeks to producing a revised paper, taking into account the comments of the consultants and the recommendations of the responsible agencies. Subsequently, a large number of the consultants came in again, met in a body with the Planning Board, and made further comments on the Planning Board's revised draft. In this way several of the ideas of the consultants formed the basis for policy guidance which was ultimately incorporated into the final approved paper."

Mr. Gray also notes that the reconstitution of the President's Science Advisory Committee and its elevation in December 1957 to a position directly advisory to the President (and, presumably, the simultaneous appointment of a scientific adviser to the President) has diminished the need for outside consultants to the Council and for certain kinds of formalized reports from them.¹²

In his published writing, Mr. Robert Cutler has pointed out a number of the difficulties involved in the use of nongovernmental advisers in the work of the Council. Nevertheless, he reports that during the 3¾ years he was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, "we drew from resources outside of Government, in many instances from private industry, as many as 15 different consultant groups to assist the NSC mechanism in formulating and reviewing policies. Some of these groups worked over long periods of time and their services became known to the public, such as the Technological Capabilities Panel headed by Dr. Killian in 1954-55, and the Security Resources Panel, the "Gaither Committee," in 1957-58. And there were other groups, happily not

¹¹ Operations Coordinating Board, "Functions and Organization of the Operations Coordinating Board," February 1958, points 6, 8, 9, and 10. This is a descriptive handbook prepared by the Executive Officer of the Board.

¹² Gray, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

so well publicized, who gave the benefit of their time and judgment in a stimulating and most helpful way."¹³

G. RELATED DEPARTMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS

Each agency participating in the National Security Council structure has developed some specialized staff arrangements and designated personnel to deal with the flow of documents and substantive problems emerging from its activities. The Vice President also has on his staff an aid responsible for National Security Council matters.

1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Within the Department of State, the Policy Planning Staff is the unit designated to handle National Security Council and Planning Board matters. The Assistant Secretary who is director of the staff is also the Department's representative on the Planning Board. Within the staff, there are two officers who work full time on Council and Planning Board matters; one acts as alternate to the Assistant Secretary for the Planning Board and the other represents the Department on the Planning Board assistants group. Much of the actual drafting of policy papers for the Planning Board is done in the appropriate geographical or functional units of the Department, working closely with members of the Policy Planning Staff. Since members of the Council staff have reasonably good working relations with these units, as well as with the Department's intelligence bureau, the procedures involved in developing a draft document are presumably well developed and well established and should raise no special difficulties.

The Under Secretary of State has on his immediate staff an officer designated as special assistant for Operations Coordinating Board matters. He is the Department's representative on the Operations Coordinating Board assistants group and works with the Department's representatives on the various Board working groups, which are in fact usually chaired by the Department of State's representative.

2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Although the Deputy Secretary of Defense is the formally designated representative of the Department of Defense on the Operations Coordinating Board, there was a recent period when the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in actual fact represented the Department of Defense on both the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. He still acts as the Deputy Secretary's alternate on the Coordinating Board, and at times attends meetings of the Security Council itself with the Secretary of Defense. One of his three Deputy Assistant Secretaries is specifically designated as responsible for National Security Council affairs.

The participation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Council is supported by a small staff within the Joint Staff, usually headed by a general or flag officer of two-star rank. This officer is the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the Planning Board. He also attends all the meetings of the Joint Chiefs so that he is presumably in a position to reflect their thinking in Planning Board discussions. The Joint Chiefs have no representation per se on the Operations Coordinating Board.

Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary charged with National Security Council affairs, there are specific offices, with quite small combined civilian-military staffs of several persons, dealing with National Security Council affairs and Operations Coordinating Board affairs. The Deputy Assistant Secretary is the Assistant Secretary's alternate for Planning Board meetings. The Director of the Office of National Security Council Affairs is the Department of Defense representative at the Planning Board Assistants meetings, while the Director of the Coordinating Board office sits as Defense Department member of that Board Assistants group.

The three services themselves have specifically designated units or officers responsible for National Security Council and Operations Coordinating Board matters. In the Army staff, under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and, more specifically, the Director for Plans, there is a Special Assistant for National Security Council Affairs—at present a full colonel—who is at the same time chief of the International and Policy Planning Division of the staff. Operations Coordinating Board matters are handled separately by a Special

¹³ Cutler, *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, op. cit., p. 15.

Assistant for Operations Coordinating Board Affairs in the Office of the Director for Operations. The International and Policy Planning Division is in effect the international security affairs staff for the Army Chief of Staff and has approximately 20 action officers, any of whom may work on Planning Board drafts depending upon the subject matter.

The Air Force has an International Affairs Division set up very much like the Army's under the Director of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs. However, at present, the Air Force does have an officer specifically designated as Assistant for National Security Affairs who plays a coordinating role. Most of the work on drafts is done by action officers within the International Affairs Division.

The Navy is organized and operates somewhat differently in this field. All National Security Council and Operations Coordinating Board matters are handled by the Politico-Military Policy Division (Op-61), headed by a rear admiral, under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans and Policy. Within this unit, there are different officers responsible for the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. Since the Navy does not use the action officer technique in this field, drafts are circulated to the relevant units within the overall Navy staff for comments, which are then pulled together by the responsible officers within Op-61.

3. OTHER AGENCIES

While the Departments of State and Defense are the most important participating agencies in the structure and have the most substantial arrangements for supporting this participation, the general pattern is similar in other agencies. For example, the Under Secretary of the Treasury represents the Treasury Department on the Operations Coordinating Board and a special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury sits on the Planning Board. Similar arrangements are found within the Bureau of the Budget.

H. DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PAPER

The usual end product of the work and deliberations of the Planning Board and the Council is a National Security Council policy paper dealing with the particular problem, geographical area or functional question. Each paper, when finally approved by the President, has some specific numerical designation and is classified as top secret with only a relative handful of numbered copies in circulation. The routine format of these papers was described several years ago by Mr. Robert Cutler in the following terms: "the covering letter, the general considerations, the objectives, the courses of action to carry out the objectives, the financial appendixes, the supporting staff study; for they invariably appeared in this sequence in the final document."¹⁴ It is often the case that a national intelligence estimate on the particular situation or problem will be requested from the Central Intelligence Agency and thus become a part of the documentation.

Gordon Gray distinguishes three types of National Security Council papers: "fundamental policy; geographical policy, on a single foreign country or on a region; and functional papers not related to a specific geographical area."¹⁵ As an example of the continuing experimentation and the developing character of the Council structure, a rather recent innovation has been the "special discussion paper" which Mr. Gray describes in the following terms:

"Additionally, on many occasions the Planning Board will present to the Council, without recommendations, a special discussion paper consisting of a series of seemingly feasible alternatives, with the pros and cons of each carefully set forth. The Council will discuss the alternatives and thereby provide guidance to the Planning Board as a basis for developing a draft policy statement."¹⁶

The original impetus which leads to a new policy paper or the review and revision of a paper already in existence may come from a number of sources. The President himself, or some other member of the Council, may ask the Planning Board to look into a question and come up with a draft paper if this proves desirable. In the course of its periodic assessments of U.S. policies and pro-

¹⁴ Cutler, *Foreign Affairs*, op. cit., p. 446.

¹⁵ Gray, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

grams, the Operations Coordinating Board may conclude that a review of existing policy in some particular area is in order and may so recommend to the Council. The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs may himself initiate consideration of some matter. The development may start within one of the participating departments, perhaps even rather far down in the organizational hierarchy. Most obviously, the process may be triggered by some compelling event on the international scene.

However the process is initiated, the request or suggestion is usually turned over to the Planning Board which in turn will ask one of the participating departments to prepare a first draft. Since most of the papers fall into the broad category of foreign policy, the Department of State normally prepares the original draft document. The Council does consider major military policy questions and in those cases, of course, the first draft is likely to be produced by the Military Establishment.

Within the State Department, as indicated above, the draft paper will probably be a joint product of members of the interested bureaus and offices and of the Policy Planning Staff. At times, there may be informal consultation even at this stage with opposite numbers in other departments, such as Defense and Treasury. When the draft has been completed, it will be circulated to the representatives of the other agencies, and then the matter will be placed on the agenda of the Planning Board, presumably allowing enough time for the other participating agencies to develop their views on the paper. However, a frequent complaint is that often there is not enough time available between receipt of the drafts and discussion in the Planning Board to prepare adequate papers on the particular problems.

Since the Military Establishment probably has the most elaborate machinery for developing views on Planning Board papers, it may be useful to trace the progress of one of these papers through the Pentagon. They travel through two separate channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense. The responsible Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the official under him who deals specifically with National Security Council and Planning Board matters meet weekly with the representatives of the three service staffs referred to earlier to brief them on upcoming Planning Board agenda items and the latest Board actions. These service representatives receive from the International Security Affairs officials the draft Planning Board documents, on which they are asked to comment. After they have developed their positions, their comments are sent to both the Deputy Assistant Secretary and to the two-star officer who is the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the Planning Board. While these two officials do consult on Planning Board matters and generally arrive at a common position, it does occasionally happen that there will be disagreement between them at the Planning Board level, the Council level, or both.

The draft policy paper will then be the subject of considerable discussion in the Planning Board. The Special Assistant, acting as chairman and with no departmental viewpoint to defend, is in a position to sharpen the discussion, clarifying areas of agreement and disagreement. The paper may be sent back to the originating department for redrafting, or other departments may contribute drafts of their own. After some discussion in the Board, it may be turned over to the Board assistants for further study and redrafting. Mr. Gray comments: "After the Planning Board has discussed a paper, it is usually turned over to the Board assistants to be redrafted. Normally the Board assistants meet 4 to 8 hours on a paper before sending a redraft back to the Planning Board." Gray describes the procedures of the Planning Board in the following terms:

"Normally, consideration of a geographical policy starts off with a study of the latest national intelligence estimate on the country and a briefing by the CIA adviser on the most recent developments in the area. The Planning Board normally does not send a paper forward without meeting three or four times on it. However, in crisis situations the Planning Board may have to complete a paper in one meeting; and on occasion the NSC has had to take action without referring the matter to the Planning Board at all.¹⁷

"* * * no departmental representative is reticent in marshaling the arguments in support of any position he sees fit to take. Moreover, it is the established

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

practice for Planning Board members to bring experts from their own staffs. For example, when a paper on a foreign country is being discussed, the State Department will bring the area people concerned and the Defense Department may bring the people who deal with the military assistance programs."¹⁸

Mr. Cutler comments: "The number of times a particular subject comes before a Planning Board meeting depends upon its importance and complexity. A dozen meetings or more may be necessary before the final version of a particular statement is acceptable to the Board."¹⁹

The draft policy paper prepared by the Planning Board is usually circulated to the members of the Council 10 days in advance of the time it will be discussed at the Council meeting. Among other things, this 10-day period gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff time to meet and discuss the paper and prepare written comments on it, which are then also circulated in advance to Council members. Usually, members of the Council are briefed on the various agenda items by their own agency representatives on the Planning Board sometime before the meeting.

Under present circumstances, according to Mr. Gray, the "President looks to the Special Assistant at Council meetings to present the items upon the agenda, to brief the Council on their background, to explain any 'splits' and to initiate discussion."²⁰ With regard to "split papers," Mr. Gray states:

"It is true that despite the best efforts of the Chairman of the Planning Board, policy papers go to the Council from time to time with split recommendations on minor issues. It is not true that major splits are not generally reflected in such papers. In fact, more than half the policy statements which are sent to the Council from the Planning Board contain split views largely on important issues on which one or more of the NSC agencies have indicated a strong divergence of opinion. A recent paper dealing with a fundamental policy contained 19 splits when it was sent to the Council from the Planning Board and required 5 successive Council meetings before final approval."²¹

According to Messrs. Dillon Anderson, Cutler, and Gray—the three men who have served as Special Assistants for National Security Affairs under President Eisenhower—there is often vigorous discussion and exchange of views at the Council table, very much encouraged by the Chairman, the President. Some observers feel that the past two Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, combining great personal ability and intellectual force with extremely close relations with their Chief Executives, tended to dominate Council discussions.

Mr. Gray also reports: "It is seldom that arguments are made in the Council—except by the President or Vice President—which have not been previously discussed in the Planning Board; although I will say that Council members do not always fully espouse the position taken by their Planning Board representatives and are sometimes persuaded by their own wisdom or by the persuasiveness of others to a different view."²²

While items may occasionally stay on the Council agenda for several meetings, a decision is usually reached on a particular paper at the same meeting at which it has been presented and discussed. Presumably, after hearing the views of his departmental chiefs and top advisers, the President will reach his own decision, and in the process resolve such differences or splits as may have been present in the original paper. It seems reasonable to assume that the split papers are likely to be among those demanding more than one meeting and discussion. However, Mr. Cutler reports:

"The statement of our basic national security policy, to which all our other security policies are subsidiary, is reviewed annually in the Council. Frequently this searching review will extend, as it did in the 1958 calendar year, over a period of several months. It may require a dozen Planning Board meetings and appear on the agenda of several meetings of the National Security Council."²³

No formal votes are taken at the Council meetings. After each meeting, a written record of action is prepared for each Presidential decision made and is then circulated in draft to "those who were present at the meeting for comment before" it is submitted "to the President for his consideration, change if necessary, and final approval."²⁴

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁹ Cutler, *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, op. cit., p. 10.

²⁰ Gray, op. cit., p. 8.

²¹ Ibid., p. 11.

²² Ibid., p. 9.

²³ Cutler, *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁴ Ibid.

If the approved policy paper involves foreign operations, the usual procedure is for it to be turned over to the Operations Coordinating Board. The Board has no command authority; its work rests on the voluntary cooperation of the participating agencies. If the approved policy deals with a functional or geographical area not previously dealt with in the Operations Coordinating Board machinery, a new interdepartmental working group may be established to coordinate policy and program implementation. Otherwise, an established working group will be given responsibility for the paper. In either case, the working group will probably prepare an operations plan. "In general, this is a comprehensive and fairly detailed outline of operating guidance for implementing a given policy and a listing of what is being done or programed to translate the policy into effective action. When conditions obtaining at the moment are confused or rapidly changing, however, only the operational guidance section of the plan may be prepared."²⁵

The descriptive handbook goes on to describe the drafting of an operations plan in the following terms:

"As the committee commences the drafting of a plan, it calls upon the experience and advice of the agencies chiefly responsible for its subsequent execution. And before the final draft is presented to the Board, interested diplomatic missions abroad are also asked to contribute or comment. Preparation of an operations plan helps to identify, clarify, and resolve differences of policy interpretation, operating responsibility, or required actions. It also exposes operating difficulties and recommends practical solutions for the more effective implementation of the policy."²⁶

In the past 6 months, the Board has redesigned its operations plans so that they now consist entirely of general and detailed guidance. An annex to each plan describes each operating agency's programs.

After the interdepartmental working group has completed its draft of the plan, it must go to the Board assistants for further review and is then submitted to the Board itself for approval. Once approved, it represents the authoritative statement of what the particular National Security Council policy paper means in terms of more detailed and specific policy implications and implementing U.S. programs. The operations plans may be reviewed and modified at any time, but, until fairly recently, there was a requirement for formal review and revision every 6 months, and in addition, the Board was required to report to the National Security Council every 6 months indicating both progress and difficulties in the implementation of the various national security policies. The Board was also supposed to bring to the attention of the Council those policies which, in its view, required serious review and possibly modification.

This procedure has now been changed. The working groups must still evaluate both the operations plans and the policies underlying them every 6 months and then indicate to the Board whether new developments have arisen which require changes either in the plans or in the guiding policies. If either a review of or a change in the underlying policy is recommended to it, the Board must then decide whether the matter should be put before the Security Council. In other words, there has been an increase in the discretionary authority granted to the Board. In place of a requirement for periodic progress reports from the Board to the Council, the Board is now responsible for alerting the President and the National Security Council to those particular developments and situations that seem to call for the review of existing policy.

Thus, following the process which has brought a policy paper from the Planning Board stage to the National Security Council and then into the hands of the Operations Coordinating Board, the whole cycle may start again with an analysis by the Planning Board and the departmental units that support its activities, a request for a new national intelligence estimate on the subject, and eventually renewed discussion and consideration in the Council.

²⁵ Operations Coordinating Board, *op. cit.*, point 20.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, point 21.

APPENDIX C

THE FLOW OF POLICYMAKING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE¹

The Department of State is an organism that is constantly responding to a vast assortment of stimuli. A new Soviet threat to Berlin, a forthcoming conference of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, a request from Poland for credit, a solicitation for support of a candidacy for the Presidency of the United Nations General Assembly, a plea from an ambassador that the head of the government to which he is accredited be invited to visit the United States officially, a refusal by another government to permit the duty-free importation of some official supplies for a U.S. consulate, a request from the White House for comment on the foreign affairs section of a major presidential address, an earthquake in the Aegean creating hardships which it appears the U.S. Navy might be able to alleviate, a request for a speaker from a foreign policy association in California, a transmittal slip from a Member of Congress asking for information with which to reply to a letter from a constituent protesting discriminatory actions against his business by a foreign government, letters from citizens both supporting and deploring the policy of nonrecognition of Communist China, a continuing inquiry by a press correspondent who has got wind of a top secret telegram from Embassy Bonn on the subject of German rearmament and is determined to find out what is in it, a demand by a Protestant church group that the Department take steps to prevent harassment of their coreligionists in a foreign country, a request by a delegation of a federation of women's clubs for a briefing on southeast Asia and suggestions as to how its members might be useful in their planned tour of the area, a request from Consulate General Brazzaville for a revision of cost-of-living allowances, a visit by a commission of inquiry into the operations of U.S. foreign aid programs, a notification from the staff of the National Security Council that a revision of the National Security Council paper on dependent areas is due, a telegram from a U.S. embassy in the Near East declaring that last night's flareups make a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, now in mid-Atlantic, inopportune at the moment, a warning by a European Foreign Minister of the consequences should the United States fail to support his nation's position in the Security Council, and a counterwarning by an African representative at the United Nations of the consequences should the United States do so—this is a sample of the requirements made of the Department of State in a typical day. Of course it does not include the oceans of informational reports that come into the Department by telegram and air pouch or the countless periodicals from all parts of the world that arrive by sea.

What is required to begin with is that the flow be routed into the right channels. This does not apply to press correspondents and foreign embassy officials; they usually know where to go without being directed. For the rest, almost every piece of business—every requirement or opportunity for action—comes within the Department's ken first as a piece of paper. These pieces of paper—telegrams, dispatches (or "despatches," as the Department prefers to call them), letters—must be gotten as speedily as possible into the hands of the officers who will have to do something about them or whose jobs require that they know about them.

The telegram and mail branches of the Division of Communication Services, a part of the Bureau of Administration, receive the incoming material and, after decoding and reproducing the telegrams, indicate on each communication the distribution it should receive among the bureaus or equivalent components of the Department. If, in the case of a letter or a dispatch, there are not enough copies to go around, the recipients are listed one after another and receive it consecutively, the original going first to the bureau responsible for taking whatever action the document requires. With telegrams, the deliveries are simulta-

¹ By Charlton Ogburn, Jr.

neous. Several score copies of a telegram may be run off. A yellow copy, called the action copy, like the original of a dispatch or letter, goes to the bureau responsible for taking any necessary action; white copies go to all others interested.

A telegram (No. 1029, let us say) from a major U.S. embassy in Western Europe reports the warning of the Foreign Minister of X country that a grave strain would be imposed on relations between X and the United States should the latter fail to vote with X on a sensitive colonial issue in the United Nations General Assembly. Such a telegram would have a wide distribution. The action copy would go to the Bureau of European Affairs. The action copy of a telegram to the same purpose from the U.S. delegation to the United Nations in New York, quoting the X delegation, would go to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. This is a matter of convention.

Information copies of a telegram of such importance would go to all officers in the higher echelons—the Secretary of State (via the executive secretariat), the Under Secretaries, the Deputy Under Secretaries, the counselor. They would also go to the Policy Planning Staff, to the Bureau of African Affairs because of the involvement of certain territories within its jurisdiction, to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs because the telegram concerns the incendiary question of European peoples' ruling non-European peoples, and of course to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Other copies would go to the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The executive secretariat would doubtless make certain that the Secretary would see the telegram. In addition, its staff would include a condensation in the secret daily summary, a slim compendium distributed in the Department on a need-to-know basis. If classified top secret, it would be included in the top secret daily staff summary, or black book, which goes only to Assistant Secretary-level officials and higher.

In the bureaus, incoming material is received by the message centers. There a further and more refined distribution would be made of telegram 1029. Copies would go to the Office of the Assistant Secretary (the so-called front office), to the United Nations adviser, to the public affairs adviser (since the United States is going to be in for trouble with public opinion in either one part of the world or the other), and to whatever geographic office or offices may seem to have the major interest. In the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, this would be the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Another copy, however, might go to the Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

In the Bureau of European Affairs, the yellow action copy of the telegram goes to the Office of Western European Affairs and thence to the X country desk, where it is the first thing to greet the desk officer's eye in the morning. As it happens, the desk officer was out the evening before at an official function where he discussed at length with the first secretary of the X embassy the desirability of avoiding any extremes of action in the United Nations over the territory in question. In the front office of the Bureau, the staff assistant has entered in his records the salient details of the problem the Bureau is charged with and has passed the telegram on to the Assistant Secretary.

The following scenes are now enacted:

The X country desk officer crosses the hall to the office of his superior, the officer-in-charge, and the two together repair to the office of the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs. The three officers put in a call to the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and tell his secretary that they would like as early an appointment as possible.

The Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (UNP) telephones the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (WE). He says he assumes WE will be drafting an instruction to the U.S. embassy in X to try to dissuade the Foreign Office from its course, and that UNP would like to be in on it. He adds that they had thought of getting the U.S. delegation to the United Nations (US Del) to present this view to the X mission in New York but that there seemed to be no point in doing so since the latter would already be advising its government to take account of world opinion.

After the Secretary's morning staff conference, where the matter is discussed briefly, a conference is held in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs to decide on a line to take with the X government. The X desk officer is designated to prepare the first draft of a telegram embodying it. The draft is reviewed and modified by his officer-in-charge and the Office Director for Western European Affairs.

The telegram instructs the U.S. embassy in X to make clear to the X government our fear that its projected course of action "will only play into hands extremists and dishearten and undermine position elements friendly to West" and suggests that the X government emphasize its policy to take account of the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous population of the territory in order to improve the atmosphere for consideration of the problem by the General Assembly. The Assistant Secretary, after scrutinizing and approving the telegram, finds it necessary only to add the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to the clearances. Those already listed for clearance are the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and the Bureau of African Affairs. He says it can be left to the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs to sign the telegram; he does not see that the telegram need go higher.

It remains for the drafting officer to circulate the telegram for approval by those marked for clearance. In the Bureau of African Affairs the telegram is termed extremely gentle to the X government but is initialed as it stands. The Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (UNP) wishes to remind X that the United States, setting an example of its adherence to the principle of affording the widest latitude to the General Assembly, had even accepted on occasion the inscription of an item on the agenda accusing the United States of aggression. The X desk officer states, however, that WE would not favor such an addition, which might only further antagonize the X government. Thereupon, UNP, yielding on this point, requests deletion of a phrase in the telegram seeming to place the United States behind the X contention that the question is not appropriate for discussion in the United Nations. The drafter of the telegram telephones the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs who authorizes the deletion, having decided that he can do so on his own without referring the question to his superior, the Assistant Secretary.

With that, the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs initials the telegram for his Bureau, and the X desk officer "hand carries" the telegram (in the departmental phrase), with telegram 1029 attached, to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and leaves it with his secretary. At 6 o'clock he is informed by telephone that the Deputy Under Secretary has signed the telegram (that is, signed the Secretary's name with his own initials beneath) without comment. The desk officer goes to the fifth floor, retrieves it, and takes it to the correspondence review staff of the executive secretariat, where the telegram is examined for intelligibility, completion of clearances, conformity with departmental practices, etc., before being sped to the Telegram Branch for enciphering and transmission.

The next morning, all offices of the Department participating in the framing of the telegram receive copies of it hectographed on pink outgoing telegram forms. The telegram, bearing the transmission time of 8:16 p.m., has entered history as the Department's No. 736 to the embassy in X. The X desk officer writes "telegram sent," with the date, in the space indicated by a rubber stamp on the yellow copy of the original telegram 1029, and the staff assistant in the front office makes an equivalent notation in his records. The yellow copy is then sent on to the central files, whence in time it will probably be consigned to the National Archives. Only the white copies may be kept in the Bureau's files.

In this case, however, no one is under any illusion that the matter has been disposed of. Scarcely 24 hours later comes a new telegram 1035 from the embassy in X reporting that, while the X government may possibly make some concessions, it will certainly wage an all-out fight against inscription of the item and will expect the United States to exert itself to marshal all the negative votes possible. The question is, what position will the United States in fact take and how much effort will it make to win adherents for its position? No one supposes for a moment that this explosive question can be decided on the bureau level. Only the Secretary can do so—as the Secretary himself unhappily realizes.

At the end of a staff meeting on Berlin, the Secretary turns to the Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning and asks him to give some thought within the next few days to the alternatives open on the question. The official addressed sets the wheels in motion at once. A meeting is called for the next morning. Attending are: the Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning himself and several members of his staff (including the European and African specialists), the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, the Western European officer-in-charge, the X desk officer, a member of the policy

guidance and coordination staff of the Bureau of Public Affairs, and two intelligence specialists, namely, the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe and the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

The discussion explores all ramifications of the issues involved and is generally detached and dispassionate. The object of the meeting is to help clarify the issues so that the Policy Planning Staff may be sure all relevant considerations are taken into account in the staff paper it will prepare for the Secretary.

The Secretary is in a difficult position. The President's views on what course of action to take are somewhat different from his. The Congress is also of divided view, with some Members impressed by the irresistible force of nationalism among dependent peoples, others by the essential role of X in NATO and European defense. The ambassadors of some countries pull him one way, others another. One of the Nation's leading newspapers editorially counsels "restraint, understanding and vision." At the staff meeting he calls to arrive at a decision, the Secretary perceives that his subordinates are as deeply divided as he feared. He takes counsel with each—the Assistant Secretaries for Policy Planning, European Affairs, African Affairs, and Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. At the end he sums up and announces his decision. Thereupon the following things happen:

The Assistant Secretaries take the news back to their bureaus.

An urgent telegram is sent to the U.S. Embassy in X reporting the decision.

Telegrams are sent to embassies in important capitals around the world instructing the ambassador to go to the Foreign Office and present the U.S. case in persuasive terms.

A similar telegram is sent to the U.S. delegation in New York for its use in talks with the delegations of other United Nations members.

Conferences attended by representatives of the geographic bureaus concerned, of the Bureau of Public Affairs, and of the U.S. Information Agency, are held. Afterward, the representatives of the U.S. Information Agency return to their headquarters to draft guidances to the U.S. Information Service establishments all over the world. Such guidances tell how news of the U.S. decision is to be played when it breaks.

The more important the problem, the more the upper levels of the Department become involved. In a crisis—one brought about, say, by the overthrow of A, a Western-oriented government in the Middle East—the Secretary himself will take over. However, the bulk of the Department's business is carried on, of necessity, by the lower ranking officers. Even when a crisis receives the Secretary's personal, day-to-day direction, the desk officer and the officer-in-charge are always at hand to provide the detailed information only specialists possess, while in the intelligence bureau, country analysts and branch chiefs will be putting in 10-hour days and 6- or 7-day weeks. Generally, moreover, the crisis will have been preceded by a good deal of work on the part of lower level officials.

In the case suggested, it was apparent for sometime that all was not well in A. The U.S. Embassy in A was aware of growing discontent with the regime through its indirect contacts with opposition political elements, from information from Cairo, from evidences of tension, from clandestine publications. Additional straws in the wind were supplied by the public affairs officer in A both to the embassy and to the U.S. Information Agency because of his special contacts among professional groups. On the strength of these reports and of dispatches from American foreign correspondents in the area, and equipped with analyses from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, all pointing in the same direction, the desk officer at a staff meeting of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs imparts his disquiet. He is directed to prepare a memorandum which, if convincing in its presentation, the Office Director undertakes to put before the Assistant Secretary.

What the desk officer has in mind will require national action, so what he drafts takes the form of a memorandum to the Secretary. It embodies a statement of the problem, the actions recommended, a review of the facts bearing upon the problem, and a conclusion. At the end are listed the symbols of the offices of the Department from which concurrences must be sought. Backing up the memorandum will be supporting documents, especially telegrams from the embassy, each identified by a tab. The mass fills a third of an in-box.

The problem is defined as that of strengthening the present pro-Western regime of A. By way of recommendation, the desk officer is especially sensitive

to the problems and needs of the country for which he is responsible. He calls for more detachment of the United States from A's rival, B, expediting U.S. arms deliveries to A and the supply of certain recoilless rifles and jet fighter planes the A government has been requesting, support for A's membership in various United Nations agencies, a Presidential invitation to the Prime Minister of A to visit the United States. Much of what the memorandum recommends has to be fought out in the Bureau and even in the Office since it conflicts with the claims of countries (and the desk officers responsible for them) in the same jurisdiction. While neither the Office Director nor the Assistant Secretary doubts that support of B is a handicap in the region, they consider that a proposal for a radical departure would simply doom the memorandum by preventing anyone from taking it seriously.

As it finally leaves the Bureau with the Assistant Secretary's signature, the memorandum is considerably revised, and further change awaits it. The Department of Defense cannot provide the desired recoilless rifles and jet fighters. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs cannot offer any undertakings at this stage with respect to the question of membership in United Nations agencies. The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs rules out a request of the President to invite the A Prime Minister for an official visit because the number of those invited is already too large.

Among recommendations in memorandums to the Secretary, as among salmon battling their way upstream to the spawning grounds, mortality is heavy. Almost everywhere in the world, things are far from satisfactory, but the United States cannot be doing everything everywhere at the same time. And A, far from seeming to cry out for attention, looks like the one Middle Eastern country about which it is not necessary to worry.

Then the uprising occurs in A. Early in the morning, the officer-in-charge of A and one other country is awakened by the ringing of the telephone. In a flash, before his feet have touched the floor, he has visualized every conceivable disaster that could have befallen his area and has picked the overthrow of the monarchy in C as the most likely. Or did the security people find a top secret document under his desk?

On the telephone, the watch officer at the Department tells him that a "Niact" (a night action telegram, which means "Get this one read immediately even if you have to rout someone out of bed") is coming off the machine and it looks serious—he had better come down. En route, the officer-in-charge turns on his car radio and picks up a news broadcast, but nothing is said about A. Uncle Sam has beaten the press agencies.

At the Department, he finds the telegram wholly decoded and reads the hectograph master. There is revolution in A. The top leadership has been either murdered or banished. The officer in charge could legitimately awaken the Assistant Secretary, but for the moment it seems there is nothing that can be done, so he decides to hold off until 6 a.m. and then call the Office Director and put it up to him. He does, however, call the A desk officer and tell him to get on his way. To share his vigil beside the watch officer's window there is a representative of the executive secretariat, who will have the telegram ready for the Secretary to read immediately on his arrival. In the Bureau of Intelligence and Research—it being now after 4 o'clock—the morning briefers have arrived to go over the night's take and write up items of importance, with analyses, for the Director's use in briefing the Secretary's morning staff conference. The briefer for the Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East, South Asia and Africa—a GS-11 specialist on India—takes one look at the Niact on A and gets on the telephone to the A analyst.

By the time the Secretary has stepped from his black limousine and headed for the private elevator a good deal has happened. In the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, everyone concerned with A from the Assistant Secretary down, and including the officer-in-charge of Baghdad Pact and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization affairs and the special assistant who serves as a policy and planning adviser, has been in conference for an hour laying out the tasks requiring immediate attention. Two more Niacts have come in from A, one reporting that so far no Americans are known to have been injured but offering little assurance with respect to the future. The Assistant Secretary has already put in a call to the Director of Intelligence Research to ask that all possible information on the new leader of A and his connections be marshaled and that the Central Intelligence Agency be informed of the need. For the rest, the following represent the Assistant Secretary's conception of what should be done first:

1. The Department of Defense must be apprised of the Department of State's anxiety and be requested to have transport planes in readiness at nearby fields for the evacuation of Americans if necessary in accordance with prearranged plans. There must be consultation on what instruments are available if American lives have to be protected by force.

2. The U.S. embassy in C, a friendly neighbor of A's to which the Niacts have been repeated, will be heard from at any moment, and the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination in the Office of the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and, also, the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense will have to be alerted to the possibility of emergency military assistance for C.

3. Anything in the pipeline for A should be held up. The Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination must be advised of this.

4. The possibility of a demonstration by the U.S. 6th Fleet in support of C's independence and integrity will have to be discussed with the Department of Defense.

5. A crash national intelligence estimate will be requested of the Central Intelligence Agency, provided the Agency does not consider the situation too fluid for a formal estimate to be useful.

6. The public affairs adviser will get in touch with the Bureau of Public Affairs, the departmental spokesman and the U.S. Information Agency to agree on the kind of face the United States will put on the affair.

7. The B Ambassador will probably have to be called in and apprised of the critical need for his government's acquiescence in overflights of B for the purpose of getting supplies to C. The B and C desk officers had better get busy immediately on a draft telegram to embassy B (repeat to C) setting forth the case the ambassador should make urgently to the B Foreign Office.

At 9:12, anticipating that he will be called to accompany the Secretary to the White House, the Assistant Secretary instructs his secretary to cancel all his appointments for the day, including one with the dentist but excepting his appointment with the C ambassador. ("Mr. Ambassador, you may assure His Majesty that my Government remains fully determined to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his nation.")

At 9:14, 1 minute before the scheduled commencement of the staff meeting, the Assistant Secretary joins his colleagues in the Secretary's anteroom, prepared to hear the estimate of the Director of Intelligence and Research and to give his own appraisal and submit his plan of action.

APPENDIX D

THE PROGRAM PROCEDURE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID¹

The following description of the programing process for foreign economic aid programs is a condensation of material furnished by executive branch agencies. The programing cycle begins approximately 18 months prior to the beginning of the budget year and ends sometime after the beginning of the budget year (depending on the timing of congressional authorization and appropriation) with operating instructions to the field. Thus, in addition to current operations, there are always two program cycles in being, though in different phases.

The programing process involves the coordinator of the mutual security program and the International Cooperation Administration, both in the Department of State.

A. THE COORDINATOR OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

The principal stages at which the coordinator actively participates in the programing process are as follows:

1. The issuance of policy and program guidance to the International Cooperation Administration and the Department of Defense for the development of the next fiscal year program.

2. Review of program proposals and estimates made by the International Cooperation Administration and the Department of Defense on the basis of screened field recommendations.

3. Submission of mutual security program estimates to the Bureau of the Budget.

4. Coordination of the presentation of the program to the Congress.

5. Review and approval of operational country programs after congressional action.

The coordinator looks to the chiefs of the diplomatic missions abroad for local coordination to insure that each country program, in all of its parts, promotes the security and foreign policy of the United States. During the field planning phase, the chiefs of missions are asked to review their programs to insure that: (1) There is a proper balance among the various elements, especially between military and economic assistance; (2) the cooperating country can effectively use the assistance recommended, and is prepared to take whatever actions are necessary for its effective use; (3) the recommended program will make an adequate and effective contribution to the implementation of U.S. policy; and (4) plans submitted to Washington clearly meet the question of whether the recommended program involves the minimum expenditure of U.S. resources required to achieve essential U.S. objectives.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM

The first few months of the programing cycle are spent in seeking to improve the programing procedure in light of experience, and to alter it to fit any new or anticipated legislative requirements. Active exchange between Washington and the field on programing matters begins in the early summer, some 9 months before the presentation of a total program to the Congress, and usually 13 or more months before the program becomes operational. This phase of the operation consists of five stages:

1. PREPARATION AND ISSUANCE OF ANNUAL GUIDELINES (JUNE-JULY)

The coordinator issues general policy guidelines to the chiefs of the diplomatic missions which include assumptions as to world conditions, U.S. policy objectives (in general and for individual areas and countries), the availability

¹ By John Lindeman, International Economic Consultants of Washington.

of mutual security program resources, and the availability of other U.S. and multilateral assistance resources. These guidelines provide the background against which a recommended country program is developed in the field under the supervision of the chief of the diplomatic mission.

The Director of the International Cooperation Administration issues operational guidelines to the directors of the U.S. operations missions. These include procedural instructions on the timing and content of field submissions to Washington; technical guidance and criteria applicable to specialized fields of activity (e.g., agriculture, public health, the prospects for recruiting technicians, etc.); specific guidance where necessary in special situations; and guidance from the International Cooperation Administration and the Department of State which help to coordinate programing on a regional basis.

2. INITIAL FIELD PREPARATION OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAM BOOK (JULY-AUGUST)

The country program book provides the basic rationale for the economic part of the mutual security program in each country. It shows plans for implementation of the program in considerable detail. Although the major responsibility for preparation of the country program book rests with the U.S. operations missions, it is expected that the final product will be the result of the combined efforts of all U.S. elements in the country (the "country team") and will reflect their balanced judgment as coordinated and approved by the chief of the diplomatic mission.

The country program book is divided into two parts. Part I provides the background against which the desirability and need of U.S. programs can be evaluated. It includes a statement of U.S. interests and objectives to which specific program recommendations can be related; a detailed description of the current situation in the country, covering all aspects (political, economic, social, and military) which are relevant to U.S. interests and objectives; an economic forecast; and an analysis of the role of external assistance in the country.

Part II is concerned with the International Cooperation Administration administered program. It culminates in a recommendation for a specific dollar level of economic assistance and shows in detail how it is proposed that this aid be used. Almost invariably the details of part II have to be revised as the recommended aid level is scaled down (*a*) by an executive branch review of all recommended programs in light of budgetary considerations, and (*b*) by the need to fit all programs into the amount ultimately appropriated by the Congress. For these reasons the first submission of the country program book sometimes does not contain full operational details.

A slightly different procedure is used in countries receiving only technical cooperation assistance, where budgetary considerations are less important.

In all cases the content and level of the recommended program must be specifically related to one of the stated U.S. objectives in the country.

3. WASHINGTON REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF FIELD SUBMISSIONS (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER)

Field submissions are reviewed in Washington in two stages: an aid level review and a program composition review. Again, the procedure is slightly different in the case of programs where budgetary considerations are minor.

An aid level review is initially conducted by the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, who holds interagency meetings at which the proposed level of the aid program as recommended by the field is thoroughly analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the relevance of all parts of the proposed program to U.S. objectives, to the assumptions made as to the availability of various U.S. resources in addition to the funds of the International Cooperation Administration (Public Law 480, Development Loan Fund, and the Export-Import Bank) and to conclusions regarding the country's own ability to finance its needs. After these meetings the Director of the International Cooperation Administration makes his program recommendations to the coordinator, who conducts a final review. At the end of this process the coordinator sends revised aid level figures to the field, and notifies the Director of the Budget of his conclusions.

Using the revised figures, the field completes the details of the county program book. Washington then undertakes an intensive staff level review for program content. This review identifies any problems, respecting program competition and feasibility in particular, which might require higher level decisions. At the end of this review, the field is notified of the approved program and is requested

to submit such supplementary or revised data as may be required for Washington preparation of the annual presentation to the Congress.

4. PREPARATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION (JANUARY-MARCH)

The congressional presentation material comes largely from the individual country program books. The actual preparation of documents is widely diffused throughout the agency, and the coordinator has responsibility for the final amalgamation of all information and for guiding the presentation. The program is reviewed by four congressional committees, and the International Cooperation Administration presentation must necessarily be prepared in such a way as to meet the individual requirements of each of them.

5. EXECUTION OF PROGRAMS AFTER CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL (TIMING VARIES DEPENDING ON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION)

Just prior to the final appropriation of funds by the Congress, Washington instructs the field to transmit formal operation program approval requests. These come in the form of a concise and primarily tabular recapitulation of the country program, with an explanation of any departures from the latest version of the country program book or the presentation to the Congress.

Operation program approval requests will normally be received in Washington during the final weeks of congressional action. If it appears likely that the appropriation will be less than the amount requested by the executive branch, Washington may request the field to indicate the program adjustments they would make if the country aid level were reduced by a certain percentage or absolute amount, and to evaluate the effects of such adjustments. After congressional action and a review of the operation program approval requests, final aid levels are established by the coordinator, and funds are released to the field. In the case of technical assistance programs, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration usually makes the aid level decision unless major departures from the congressional presentation are involved.

Execution of the programs in the field begins in August or September, some 13 to 14 months after active programing commenced, and at a time when the next year's program is already in the second stage of the program cycle.

APPENDIX E

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ORGANIZATION FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS¹

Demonstrations during the visit of the Vice President to Latin America in the spring of 1958, as well as more recent expressions of anti-Americanism, have caused renewed concern over U.S. relations with Latin American countries. Although the countries to the South have long been of strategic, economic, and political importance to the people of the United States, events leading up to the Second World War and postwar global commitments have shifted the emphasis in American foreign policy to other critical areas for more than two decades. Undoubtedly, many Latin Americans feel that the United States has not given adequate attention to these problems.

Specific Latin American grievances are publicly expressed as charges of American economic neglect and provision of American military assistance in a manner which helps dictatorial regimes remain in power against the wishes of the people. The Latin American nations are in the midst of an epic social revolution, with the vast majority of their people demanding visible improvements in living standards and a greater voice in their governments. Dependent as many of the Latin American countries are upon one or, at most, a few commodities, the effect of American trade policy has sometimes had grave economic repercussions. As in many other parts of the globe, apparent American support of a regime which is becoming less popular with its own people has been an additional source of irritation.

A major portion of the responsibility for the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy toward Latin America is centered in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in the Department of State. It should be acknowledged that the Bureau's impact upon economic, military, and even political aspects of policy has been limited by the interests of other bureaus in the Department of State and by such other agencies of the Government as the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and the Treasury. If many factors influence the relative success or failure of American foreign policy toward Latin America, the Bureau's organization and methods of operation are still of considerable importance. They are a supplemental if not a critical factor in determining the nature of American relations with Latin America. Reviewed here are some of the problems which confront the Bureau in: (1) the allocation of decisionmaking, (2) the acquisition and use of intelligence, (3) policy planning, (4) policy execution, (5) direct contact with foreign countries in Washington and abroad, (6) personnel management, and (7) budgeting.

A. ALLOCATION OF DECISIONMAKING

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs is staffed by 80 officers and 56 clerical employees. About 75 of the officers are members of the Foreign Service. Only some five civil service officer-level employees remain in the Bureau since Wristonization. Heading the Bureau are an Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, both Foreign Service officers. Under them are four directors of geographic offices and two directors of regional offices—regional political affairs and regional economic affairs. Two of the geographic office directors are responsible for five countries; one, for six; another, for four. Officers in charge for each of the 20 Latin American Republics report to the appropriate geographic office director. Specialists in aspects of economic, political, or international organization affairs report to the directors of the regional offices. A number of officers performing special duties report directly to the Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

¹ By Robert E. Elder, Colgate University.

Decisionmakers near the top of the policymaking pyramid in the Department of State carry a crushing burden. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs is no exception. He is in his office for long hours 7 days a week, with many if not most evenings filled with official social engagements. Like the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary may be so busy "putting out fires" that he has little time for looking ahead. His office directors sometimes even find it difficult to work their way into his busy schedule for consultation on spot questions concerning daily operations.

There are three ways in which the Assistant Secretary might lighten his workload. He could delegate authority for certain types of decisions to appropriate office directors. He could reduce the number of official and unofficial visitors from Latin America with whom he meets personally, and, while this is always difficult, try to reduce the number of official social engagements he attends. These steps might help free him for consideration of broader, longer range issues.

Part of the workload stems from the cluster of officers—not attached to geographic or regional offices—who report directly to the Assistant Secretary. The regional offices—political and economic—are not relied upon for leadership in making decisions concerning many relatively routine regionwide problems. It would appear that they could be. An upgrading of office directors including an increase in their range of authority and discretion would be helpful, although results will depend to a considerable extent on the working styles of the officials involved. Finally, it seems to be an unavoidable fact of diplomatic life that official social engagements make heavy demands on men who have already worked a 10- to 12-hour day.

A recent reorganization of the Bureau has placed many of the duties formerly performed by officers in charge on the shoulders of office directors. This tends to consume an office director's time in relatively routine matters. If personnel now assigned as officers in charge of individual countries were elevated in status and given the prerogatives normally pertaining to their title, the office directors would be in a position to assume more of the workload of the Assistant Secretary.

The work of an officer in charge of a country desk is usually heavy enough in quiet times. The burden sometimes gets entirely out of hand when special problems arise. A staffing pattern which would allow floaters, with broad understanding of Latin American problems, to move from desk to desk as crises occur might make the Bureau's response to unusual situations more effective and require less detailed intervention by the office director or the Assistant Secretary and his Deputy.

B. INTELLIGENCE

A Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary is responsible for liaison with the Washington intelligence community and with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. The same officer bears major responsibility for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs' relationships with the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board. The Special Assistant attempts to obtain adequate intelligence support for Bureau operations and reviews drafts of intelligence materials dealing with Latin America. Since Communist activities in Latin America are part of an international movement and regional in scope, he keeps an eye on this overall problem in behalf of the Assistant Secretary.

As part of the intelligence network, the Assistant Secretary hears each morning the intelligence briefing given by the Director of Intelligence and Research at the Secretary of State's staff meeting. A representative of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is present at the Assistant Secretary's own daily staff meeting and at the staff meetings of the Bureau's office directors. Finally, a host of spot requests are filled by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the country desk officers, while officers at all levels in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs receive a variety of regular or special intelligence reports.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, like other operating bureaus in the Department of State, still finds the Bureau of Intelligence and Research too busy with basic intelligence materials and unable to give quite as many spot answers for daily operations as officers at lower levels in the Bureau might desire. Yet there is recognition of the value of more serious studies in providing a common background of fact on the basis of which the views of the various agencies interested in foreign affairs can be harmonized. There is general sat-

isfaction with the nature of the intelligence material provided, with no drop in quality noted because of the shift from civil service employees to Foreign Service officers. The changeover would be less noticeable to users of spot information, of course, than to those more dependent upon the more basic intelligence studies. Some officers believe that political and economic reporting direct from the posts meets most of their informational needs. However, many officers in the Bureau read a variety of Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Central Intelligence Agency reports with interest, not so much for operational use as to build general background. They point out that such information indicates where explosions are likely to occur but that it cannot easily predict the exact form or timing of such explosions. Unfortunately, neither the Bureau of Intelligence and Research nor the Central Intelligence Agency has ways of determining which of their reports are most useful in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs or other parts of the Department. Undoubtedly, some unnecessary paper crosses Bureau desks as a result.

C. PLANNING

As is the case in other bureaus of the Department, personnel in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs find little time for long-range policy planning or for taking a good hard look into the future. The emphasis is upon daily operations. At the Bureau level, one officer has said, "It is not the planning function to pose basic alternatives to policy already decided upon." Rather, the planning function is concerned with "tactics, timing, and priorities."

Responsibility for Bureau relations with the National Security Council mechanism rests with the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary. When a revision of policy concerning Latin America is filtering up through the National Security Council structure, he sees to it that appropriate people work out a Bureau position; he may then attend sessions of the Planning Board with the Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau and sit in on meetings of the Planning Board assistants.

Outside the National Security Council structure, there is some advance thinking in the Office of Regional Economic Affairs and the Office of Regional Political Affairs. The latter office conducted a conference on Latin American problems with leading experts from outside the Government in February 1959. The regional office directors often take part in academic conferences on Latin America and generally find the discussions stimulating. Office directors and desk officers of the geographic offices sometimes review broad problems informally at lunch with their counterparts from other agencies or departments.

A member of the Department's Policy Planning Staff often attends the Assistant Secretary's daily staff meeting, which is mainly concerned with day-to-day operations. Bureau representatives are usually present in Policy Planning Staff discussions of Latin American problems. The top officers of the Bureau—the Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and the office directors—do not meet as a group for consideration of basic long-range problems.

If time could be found once a week for such discussions, they might prove fruitful in helping these keymen relate daily operating decisions to the needs of the future. It is perhaps unfortunate that at the Bureau level the planning function is limited to consideration of "tactics, timing, and priorities" and includes no continuing review of "basic alternatives to policy already decided upon." Will American foreign policy be responsive to changing conditions if those who initiate and revise policy papers only implement "policy already decided upon" and neglect plausible "basic alternatives"?

D. EXECUTION OF POLICY

Responsibility for Bureau relations with the Operations Coordinating Board rests with the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary. The Special Assistant serves as chairman of the Board interagency working group on Latin America. The general opinion of the Board mechanism in the Bureau is that, while it requires a great deal of time and effort, "it probably contributes more than it costs." Primarily, the Board is valued as a device for "harmonizing interagency views" so that "State can do some coordination" and "give information so that others will be informed of State's view." As one Foreign Service officer in the Bureau observed, "Board papers are not taken off the shelves every hour to refer to. Operators must work more flexibly out of their heads; they cannot depend on an encyclopedia in making an analysis for current action."

The Bureau's concept of the function of planning seems much better adapted to execution of policy, which does involve agreement on "tactics, timing, and priorities," than to long-range policy planning. Essentially, the operating regional bureau—as presently organized—is an executor of policy and cannot be viewed as a major source of long-range planning.

Outside the Operations Coordinating Board structure, action policy is often "harmonized" informally as desk officers talk on the telephone with their opposite numbers in other agencies. More formally, the shuffling of paper between agencies in the clearance process accomplishes the same purpose. It is obvious that interagency cooperation within Operations Coordinating Board working groups has increased the respect of personnel in the Department of State for the views of representatives of other agencies, that working together in such groups stimulates additional exchanges of view in the course of daily operations.

Even if the Board "hasn't quite found itself," "may go into too much detail," and "may be more useful on a new topic than an old continuing one," participation in these interdepartmental discussions has reduced the parochialism of Bureau personnel and made them more tolerant of divergent views. Its existence has, therefore, been a "net advantage."

E. CONTACT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS

Direct contact between the Bureau and the countries of Latin America begins in Washington. Visits or telephone calls by embassy representatives to the Bureau are numerous. Evening social engagements abound. The Assistant Secretary must be kept abreast of detailed developments in each of the 20 Latin American countries so that he can meet and deal with embassy representatives on a daily basis. Much of the time of the office directors is also consumed in the regular routine of embassy relationships. The official social aspect has proved a costly process for Foreign Service officers who receive no representation allowances while on assignment in Washington, feel some duty to repay social obligations, and believe that small gatherings in their own homes are useful for discussing problems with Latin American representatives.

In Latin America, the country team concept—which calls for representatives of all U.S. agencies in a country to work harmoniously under ambassadorial leadership—has been less difficult to achieve than in other areas where military or economic assistance has been more sizable. Nonetheless, in at least one country where major American defense installations are located, the presence of high-ranking military officers has made the country team objective difficult to realize.

Two specific problems concerning direct contact with countries abroad are emphasized by Bureau personnel. A Wristonized officer serving his first tour abroad was appalled to discover that the American Embassy had no organized system for getting to know key officials in all departments of the host government or to insure acquaintance with important nongovernmental leaders. As he observed, "What seemed an obvious necessity to a Washington bureaucrat never occurred to Foreign Service officers at this post nor to the two ambassadors under whom I served."

Another officer pointed out the need for experienced division chiefs under the ambassadors. He recalled that in a 2-year period several embassies in Latin America had lost all of their experienced division chiefs through rotation to new assignments. This left the ambassadors dependent upon relatively inexperienced personnel.

Bureau officers who have served in Latin America do not consider the embassies there to be overstaffed, although they do believe that experienced officers are sometimes assigned duties which could be carried out by officers of considerably lower rank.

F. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Responsibility for problems of personnel management and budgeting within the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs is centered in the Executive Director. The Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries are kept informed of personnel and budget developments and appear before congressional committees at appropriate times, but otherwise they are seldom drawn into either area unless major problems arise. Foreign Service officers assigned to the geographic and regional offices in the Bureau—whether officers in charge, specialists, or office directors—apparently concentrate on substantive problems and give the Executive Director wide freedom in both the personnel and budget fields. The latitude allowed the

Executive Director may be indicative of a lack of understanding among Foreign Service officers of the importance of the support functions to the effective formulation and conduct of foreign policy. In part, it is the result of a heavy workload and an increasing bureaucratization as the Department grows in size.

The Bureau of Administration is the central unit in the Department of State responsible for overall coordination of personnel and budget policies. There is some feeling in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs that the Bureau of Administration has "whittled away at the authority of the operating bureaus" over the past decade. As a result, the operating bureaus and the Bureau of Administration are now engaged in a gentlemanly tug-of-war which tends to maintain the present balance in the division of authority. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs would like a veto on personnel assignments, but it must be satisfied with an opportunity for review, followed by reconsideration and discussion when it objects to a particular assignment.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs is said to have the highest percentage in the Department of personnel who have served most of their careers in a single bureau. This pattern is justified by the Bureau on the basis of the variety of appointments possible in the 20 countries with which it deals. It may be, as the Foreign Service grows in size and increases in specialization, that more bureaus will follow this practice—that a majority of all Foreign Service officers will spend most of their careers in one bureau and in one continent with only short periods of broadening experience elsewhere.

There is considerable worry about the effects of Wristonization, particularly the lack of continuity in Bureau positions, among higher ranking officers in the Bureau. This lack is felt in specialized positions of an economic or administrative nature, in those involving participation in multilateral negotiations in the Organization of American States, and at the desk officer level. Most general criticism of integration has been directed at the lack of continuity in specialist positions. That the lack of continuity has also had an impact at the desk level, where the Foreign Service generalist might be expected to give his best performance, is a serious and disquieting charge. However, as more Foreign Service officers gain experience in the Bureau, it seems likely that the loss of the former country-expert type of desk officer will be less keenly felt. As the Foreign Service increases in specialization, it is possible that rotation will be less of a problem in specialist positions as well.

Many Foreign Service officers in the Bureau have apparently had little inservice training. There still remains some feeling that the best way to learn the Foreign Service job is to "shuffle the papers." A number of officers do look forward to increasing inservice training opportunities with real anticipation. Those few who have attended the National War College (none have yet returned to the Bureau from the new senior officer course at the Foreign Service Institute) show a breadth of view not found among most Bureau personnel. There is the impression, and it is no more than that, of some disparity in the quality of personnel serving at the same level within the Bureau. If such an assessment were substantiated, it might be indicative of many personnel problems, but further inservice training might be a partial remedy. If there should be further delegation of responsibility in the Bureau, a more careful selection of personnel and additional inservice training would be a necessity.

G. BUDGETING

Budgeting seems to require little time in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. It is estimated that no more than 5 man-years are devoted to it annually, including clerical assistance. The time spent in testifying before the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, and in preparing such testimony, involves the time of only four people for 1 month. Most substantive officers in the Bureau are hardly aware that the budget process exists.

Nonetheless, there is recognition by a few officers of the problems resulting from the length of time between preparation of a budget and the actual availability of funds under it. This is said to make it difficult to adjust policies to new situations even if the implications of the new situations are recognized, or if foresighted recommendations are made by individuals or groups reviewing Latin American problems. Furthermore, the budget goes to the Assistant Secretary "in terms of functional budgets rather than in terms of areas or worldwide programs." This makes it "very difficult to back away and take a look at the package as a whole." Such problems the Bureau shares with the rest of the Department and the other foreign affairs agencies.

The process by which other agencies reimburse the Department of State for services rendered in the field—with its lack of knowledge until well into the first quarter of a fiscal year of what funds will be available, followed by fluctuations resulting from the changing needs of the agencies being serviced and consequent renegotiation during the year—also creates problems which the Bureau shares with other operating bureaus in the Department.

There is some feeling against any further centralization of budget control by the Bureau of Administration, but it is obvious that the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs reaps many benefits from the many opportunities for exchange of views between its Executive Director and representatives of the Bureau of Administration. No one would suggest further decentralization of the budget process in the Department, although an increasing awareness of the budget process and its relationship to substantive policy might be helpful within the Bureau.

H. CONCLUSIONS

It does not appear that organizational problems of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs are a factor of any real significance in causing the current level of difficulties in American relations with Latin America. The Bureau's leaders are considered by their subordinates to be hard working and able. Morale is high. Most Bureau personnel appear adequate for the jobs they are now performing. However, as elsewhere in the Department and throughout the Government, improvements can be made.

1. There should be a greater and more precise delegation of responsibility for decisionmaking to the geographic and regional offices of the Bureau.

2. Some formal method should be established for evaluating the usefulness of intelligence materials, both for the benefit of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and to reduce paperflow in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

3. Time should be set aside for regular exchanges of views pertaining to long-range planning among the Assistant Secretary, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, the office directors, special advisers, and other appropriate officers.

4. The role of the office directors should be upgraded, for example, by permitting a broader range of discretionary action. This might help ease some of the burdens of the Assistant Secretary.

5. With Bureau guidance, American embassies in Latin American countries should establish working relationships with local government officials and business and cultural leaders on a more intensive and planned basis.

6. Additional inservice training assignments for Foreign Service officers who are to spend most of their careers dealing with Latin American affairs should be actively encouraged by the Bureau. This will be particularly necessary if any further delegation of responsibility for decisionmaking is planned in the Bureau or the field.

7. Major budget problems confronting the Bureau cannot be resolved unless the Governmentwide budget process is altered to shorten the process and to make possible a better assessment of the balance in country programs.

APPENDIX F

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS WITH MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS¹

A fundamental characteristic of contemporary international relations is the development of various types of multilateral organizations as a means of establishing more effective continuing contacts among nations. There is scarcely an area of human activity that is not touched by this trend, as suggested briefly at the beginning of the main report, and these associations are likely to become an even more significant aspect of U.S. foreign policy in future years. Because of the importance of this development, the main body of the report discusses various facets of the organization of the U.S. Government to deal with multilateral associations. The following paragraphs complement that discussion by considering briefly certain general structural and functional characteristics of different types of international organizations that affect the ability of such agencies in relation to U.S. interests.

International organizations have sprung up during the past half century not because of abstract idealism but because they seemed to offer certain advantages as a way of doing business in support of the national interests of the principal states of the world. Similarly, in the future, the continuing development of these organizations will depend primarily on their relative assets and liabilities as instruments for achieving the substantive objectives of various national governments. Thus the utility of individual organizations must be discussed primarily in relation to the requirements of individual substantive programs.

Some kinds of problems will continue to call for a worldwide approach, such as that embodied in the United Nations. Certain political issues, for example, affecting a broad range of countries, may benefit from inquiry, debate, and mediation under the auspices of a worldwide association. Some economic and social problems may be dealt with most effectively in an organization that embraces the bulk of both the more and less developed countries. Many of the prospective advances in science and technology, such as the exploration and use of space, will emphasize the universal approach. Weapons development is likely to lead to increasing demands for an effective international system for the control and reduction of armaments. The universal applicability of many advances for improving agricultural and industrial production, health and welfare, will raise questions of means to insure their use on an international scale, instead of a national one.

There are also likely to be continuing experiments with closer political and economic cooperation among nations on a regional basis. Much has already been achieved, particularly in Europe during the past decade, with new political and economic institutions—the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. As in Europe, so in the rest of the world, the growing recognition of the interdependence of nation-states will require a more organized system of international relations. How rapidly such a system will be developed is unpredictable, as are its institutional forms. The ideal of world government may remain the ultimate goal for many, but less radical and more feasible steps will have to be taken before that ideal can possibly be realized.

A. GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is beyond the boundaries of this study, however, to probe any more deeply into the special requirements of particular substantive endeavors. Most relevant here are certain general organizational strengths and weaknesses that must be taken into account within the U.S. Government in determining the

¹ By H. Field Haviland, Jr.

usefulness of various multilateral associations. These considerations have to do with the ease of facilitating effective contact with appropriate governments, the adequacy of control that can be exercised by the United States to protect its interests, and the efficacy of international administrative arrangements.

One of the most obvious structural advantages of multilateral organizations is that the commitments their members have accepted, the regular communications and meetings, and the central staffs, all facilitate relations among the entire membership. Contrary to some criticisms of conference diplomacy, these contacts can be quite flexible; negotiations may take place in formal meetings, in informal gatherings, or by letter, wire, and telephone. It can be irksome at times, however, to have rigid schedules of periodic meetings, such as the annual cycle of General Assembly sessions, compel public debate of certain questions that might better be left to quieter deliberations.

By helping to bring different societies into contact with each other, these organizations, at the very least, educate their members concerning each other's interests and problems, and, at the most, facilitate a resolution of conflicting policies. The range of interests is the broadest and the problem of building consensus is the greatest in the general purpose organizations having the most heterogeneous memberships, particularly the United Nations. These may, nonetheless, be among the most useful links for regular communication between quite hostile states that have only the most tenuous relations with each other.

On the other hand, there is always the question of whether it is worth the effort regarding a particular issue to proceed via the multilateral channel thereby engaging the full membership of the organization. The question may concern only a few states, and it may be a very sensitive issue involving highly classified information. The multilateral process is not only laborious and time consuming, but it may bring into the negotiation governments that have little interest in the matter and that may use the issue to extract concessions on some other question. More restricted and specialized associations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have memberships that are more homogeneous and cooperative but are less useful for maintaining close relations with the large number of states outside the organizations.

Because the multilateral organization is not the servant of any one state or any one set of national objectives but balances one interest against another—though admittedly giving greater weight to some than to others—the organization is likely to be regarded by the weaker states as a protective shield against the special interests of the more powerful nations. When the less influential countries are members of an organization and are able to use it as a forum to protect and further their interests, they are inclined to be more accepting of intervention in their own affairs by that organization than by an individual country, no matter how well intentioned the latter may be. This is particularly true of foreign aid activities, but it also applies to other enterprises. Given competent staff, under enlightened and firm political and professional leadership, the organization can still apply rigorous standards with a minimum of concession to political considerations. On the other hand, it is clear that there are always pressures to gain favors on political grounds. Some governments assume that they deserve benefits, such as aid projects, simply because they are members of an organization, but this tendency can be kept within reasonable bounds.

In addition to the merging of interests, there is a sharing of costs. This may involve a pooling of financial resources; every dollar currently contributed by the United States to the United Nations and the specialized agencies is matched by approximately an equal amount given by the other members. This joining of resources also involves human skills. International organizations have greater freedom than national organizations in recruiting personnel without regard to national origin. This not only expands the reservoir of talents available but may result in a net reduction of costs.

Despite the reluctance of governments to surrender their freedom of action, measures undertaken through international organizations can exert considerable influence. This is not primarily because of the organizations' formal command authority; there is very little of that. The United States can seldom be bound against its will by the decisions of such organizations; normally the authority is simply recommendatory. Some observers severely criticize such organizations precisely because of this lack of legal authority.

The real source of an organization's influence lies in the power and determination of the most influential member states. If they give strong support to a

particular policy, it is likely to carry great weight. If they fail to do so, the policy will languish, even though it may win a large number of votes from the lesser states. The fact that there is usually formal equality of voting power is misleading. In fact, votes are weighted in the minds of the delegates according to the relative strength and influence of the various countries. Occasionally, this is given formal recognition as, for example, in the special position of the major powers in the United Nations Security Council, but more often it is not.

An organizational problem that afflicts international agencies is a tendency toward the splintering of programs and institutions largely because of the special interests of various functional and geographic groupings. This is particularly evident in the United Nations economic development efforts. The several specialized agencies and the United Nations with its functional and geographic commissions, all tend to ride off in different directions with only the loosest links among them. This situation, added to the proliferation of national agencies, argues strongly for a more unified framework to help integrate both international and national developmental efforts.²

B. CONCLUSIONS

In arriving at a judgment on this matter, it is important to keep in mind the fundamental assumptions that underline the accelerating development of multilateral associations. The principal motivating consideration is that a growing proportion of international problems cannot be adequately dealt with except through continuing organized collaboration with other states. Such collaboration is facilitated by developing permanent institutions that help to build a sense of community across national boundaries so that states will increasingly think and act as part of a larger society. This is a long-range objective that is broader than the interests at stake in any particular issue and that must be kept in mind as the relative merits of using multilateral channels are weighed. It thus behooves the United States to make increasing use of appropriate multilateral channels to deal with international problems except where the special circumstances of a particular case may militate against such recourse.

In relation to the present powers and functions of international organizations, most of the multilateral decisions have been consistent with U.S. interests. They have not only not injured those interests but have been of positive benefit to them. If, however, increasing use is to be made of these channels with regard to important issues, it will be necessary to explore ways of giving the United States a voice in the decisionmaking process commensurate with its position in the world, including the contribution it is willing to make to the international programs. At the same time, the United States must recognize that, if participation in such joint enterprises carries certain advantages, it also carries obligations, including that of recognizing the right of other states to participate in the decision process roughly according to their relative contributions to the effort.

² See study in this series on "The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy," Study No. 6, Nov. 11, 1959.

APPENDIX G

STUDY: FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.

Submission date: October 19, 1959

Purpose.—This study will be concerned primarily with an analysis of the existing structure and process of the Federal Government for the formulation of foreign policy and the making of day-to-day decisions. It will examine such subjects as the role of American interest groups and public opinion in the formulation of our policy and its conduct in a democracy, the operation of the National Security Council and its effectiveness especially in the coordination of military and foreign policy, the operations of the Policy Planning Staff, and the actual as distinct from the constitutional division of responsibility between the executive and legislative branches of the Government for the formulation of foreign policy. This study will also examine the organization of the U.S. Government for dealing with Latin American affairs, and the role of multilateral organizations in the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

OUTLINE OF STUDY

- I. Summary: Scope, conclusions, recommendations.
- II. Introduction.
 - A. Controlling assumptions.
 1. The major segments of Government to be examined will be:
 - (a) Executive Office of the White House.
 - (b) National Security Organization.
 - (c) Department of State, ICA, USIA.
 - (d) Department of Defense.
 - (e) Department of the Treasury, Commerce, and other departments and agencies.
 - (f) The Congress.
 2. The period for which conclusions and recommendations will be projected will be long range, covering several decades.
 3. The approach will be that of a general appraisal of the existing system in relation to the probable requirements of the long-term future.]
 - B. Design of the study.
 1. Examination of the prospective environment that is likely to condition policy formulation and administration.
 2. Identification and discussion of the major problems, giving special attention to U.S. relations with Latin America.
 3. Conclusions, with broadly stated recommendations, in a form that will focus attention on emerging requirements, possible lines of action, and problems of adjustment.
- III. The prospective environment for policymaking and administration.
 - A. World environment. Analysis of the following major trends, presented in such a way as to bring out the problems posed regarding the processes by which the U.S. Government determines national goals, formulates policies, and conducts operations.
 1. Demographic: future trends of population growth and distribution.
 2. Scientific-technological: communications, transport, industry, agriculture, energy, weapons systems.
 3. Politicosocial: general political and social conditions within and among states which affect their international roles.
 - B. Internal environment within the United States.
 1. Demographic.
 2. Scientific-technological.
 3. Politicosocial.
 - C. Implications for the future.
 1. Major challenges likely to confront the United States, including its relative position in the world.
 2. Requirements for effective policy formulation and administration.

IV. Analysis of the major problems.

- A. The Government and the people. The discussion will be concerned with the general role of the U.S. public, including consideration of the implications of foreign opinion, in the process of formulating and executing foreign policy.
1. Major interests and groupings concerned with foreign policy.
 2. Major functions performed by the public.
 3. Principal channels and devices used, including partisan and non-partisan approaches.
 4. General assessment of public impact.
- B. The definition of congressional and executive roles. The discussion will be concerned with the definition of the respective roles of the two branches, the possible distribution of decisionmaking responsibility between them, the level at which consensus should be developed and maintained, means of strengthening interbranch cooperation, and the adjustment of concepts—both working and constitutional—that would be involved.
- C. Organization of the Congress to deal with foreign policy. The analysis will concentrate on major administrative questions involved in legislative action on foreign policy matters.
1. Allocation of functions within the Congress.
 2. The institutions and processes used to deal with foreign policy issues.
- D. The location of decisionmaking responsibility in the executive branch. The discussion will be concerned with—
1. The kinds of decisionmaking responsibility involved, including the function of coordination.
 2. The most effective distribution of the various kinds of decisionmaking.
- E. The establishment of administrative controls in the executive branch. Given a definition of roles and a distribution of decisionmaking responsibility, this discussion will be concerned with the overall problem of directing in a coherent operation the responsibilities that have been distributed. Special aspects of the problem have to do with—
1. The functions of collecting, processing, and communicating intelligence.
 2. The function of long-range and short-range policy formulation.
 3. The function of implementation to insure adherence to agreed basic goals and policy lines; or, to uncover the need to reconsider such goals and lines.
 4. The function of personnel planning and management.
- F. Diplomatic representation and negotiation. This section will give special attention to the institutions and processes used to keep in daily touch with other states.
1. Bilateral channels.
 2. Multilateral instrumentalities.

- V. Conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions will concentrate on summarizing the world environment, the requirements for acting effectively to maintain U.S. interests and influence, the main directions in which organizational change should move, and the problems that would face a consistent and continuous effort to adjust the present system to estimated future requirements. The recommendations will state in broad general terms the types of change that are called for, and will suggest possible ways of effecting them by concurrent action in various segments of the existing system and in progressive stages.



