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UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN  
RELATIONS

6  
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

A STUDY

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS

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OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
CONGRESS, UNITED STATES SENATE

BY 3

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## PREFACE

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In the spring of 1958, the Committee on Foreign Relations took initial steps toward planning a broad and long-range review of U.S. foreign policy. Hearings were held with regard to U.S. policies respecting specific geographic areas, among them Latin America. Coincidentally, public attention throughout the world was abruptly and sharply focused on Latin America as a result of the incidents attending Vice President Nixon's visit there.

Consequently, the Committee on Foreign Relations instructed its Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs to engage in a thoroughgoing, nonpartisan, critical but constructive, inquiry into U.S. relations with the other American republics. In Senate Resolution 330 of the 85th Congress, agreed to July 28, 1958, the Senate authorized expenditures of \$150,000 for the purposes of the study and likewise authorized the committee to "use the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals." This authority was continued in Senate Resolution 31 of the 86th Congress, agreed to February 2, 1959. The study published herewith is the third of a series resulting from contracts with various private groups. The first study published is entitled "Post World War II Political Developments in Latin America," and was prepared by the University of New Mexico. The second, done by International Economic Consultants, Inc., is entitled "Commodity Problems in Latin America." Others are in the process of preparation.

It is our hope that these studies will assist the subcommittee in formulating its own recommendations for the improvement of this Nation's relations with our neighbors to the south. However, it is to be kept firmly in mind that the study presented herewith, as well as subsequent studies which will be published, do not reflect the findings, opinions, or recommendations of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs. They represent the work and possible biases of competent specialists, but will serve the subcommittee only as background material in preparation for the hearings to be held later on, and as outside suggestions to be considered in concert with other extensive information—gathered partly through the personal study missions to Latin America of individual Senators—when the subcommittee formulates its own conclusions and recommendations to the full committee. It will be the subcommittee's duty to evaluate the studies in light of the information and experience gained in the course of its inquiry. It will feel free to accept or to reject, in part or in whole, the substance of any of the reports submitted to it by the contracting organizations and institutions.

WAYNE MORSE,

*Chairman, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs.*

DECEMBER 24, 1959.



## FOREWORD

This study on the Organization of American States was prepared for the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the U.S. Senate. It consists of two parts: First, an analysis is made of the present-day functioning of the Organization as seen in historical perspective; second, a set of proposals deriving from the analysis is presented for consideration in the development of United States-Latin American foreign policy. An endeavor was made to maintain objectivity in constructing the analysis. In the formulation of the concrete action proposals, the viewpoint of U.S. national interests was adopted.

Scholars have made few thorough and critical studies of the Organization of American States (OAS). This places obvious limitations upon the solidity of the conclusions contained in this report, which might otherwise have drawn upon a generation of cumulative academic research. The study is based upon source documents, such as reports of committees, minutes of council meetings, etc., available in the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan American Union. Research in the basic documentation was supplemented importantly by confidential interviews with 50 persons who occupy, or have occupied, important roles within the Pan American Union, within Latin American delegations to the OAS, within the U.S. Government (in the Department of State, Department of Defense, International Cooperation Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and the National Security Council), and within non-Government organizations, such as overseas business firms and newspapers which have activities in Latin America.

The study was prepared in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University, within its program of graduate training and research in international relations, by Profs. George I. Blanksten, Harold Guetzkow, and John N. Plank. The three men constituted an unusual team, in that the members combined considerable substantive knowledge about Latin America with the developing insights of organizational and decisionmaking theory in their analysis of this unique institution, the Organization of American States.


It is often said we neglect the things closest to us. To those who read this report carefully, the unappreciated significance and untapped potential of the OAS as an instrument of American foreign policy and of hemispheric welfare will be clearly evident.

RICHARD C. SNYDER,

*Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, and  
Co-Director of the Program in International Relations.*

EVANSTON, ILL., October 1, 1959.

**ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES**



# THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

## SUMMARY OF STUDY

### A. ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNCTIONING

The Organization of American States is a viable institution with deep tradition capable of solid growth. Its difficulties derive fundamentally from its milieu. The environment of the inter-American system provides strong tendencies toward fragmentation, countered by less strong forces toward cohesion. The very principles from which hemispheric cohesion derives, namely, respect for national sovereignty and adherence to a policy of nonintervention, are themselves inducive of continued fragmentation. The very action in which the hemisphere is most cohesive, namely, cooperation against outside powers to maintain national independence, itself emphasizes the individual autonomies of the nations.

The Organization of American States (OAS) increasingly becomes an instrument for the realization of goals by the 21 governments of the system, even though its visibility as an institution to the peoples of these states is low. It is seen by many in power as a vehicle for achieving economic, social, and cultural growth, securing and supplying economic aid and technical assistance without infringing upon internal sovereignties. Technical cooperation in the OAS has been more successfully organized than has activity dealing with the hemisphere's broader economic and social problems. The OAS is also seen by governments as a way of achieving peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. The Council through its activity as organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty and the Inter-American [I-A] Peace Committee have mollified a long series of intrahemispheric disturbances. The OAS takes as its objective, in large measure, the restoration of peace and the status quo ante, not the resolution of underlying conflict. In giving response to extrahemispheric threats, the "multilateralization" of the Monroe Doctrine has gone far, although hemispheric power is still overwhelmingly that of the United States. The OAS yet has not mobilized machinery for countering extrahemispheric subversion and infiltration, nor has it given much more than lipservice to increasing the effective exercise of civil liberties by citizens in the hemisphere. In the main, the OAS has been a conservative organ, providing little support for significant political changes.

The central decisionmaking organs of the OAS—the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of consultation of the foreign ministers, and the permanent OAS Council—all find admirable service units in their secretariat, the Pan American Union (PAU). Its overburdened operations are considerably more efficient than those of the councils and committees manned by the member governments themselves. PAU's

accomplishments in general equal the accomplishments of secretariats serving other international organizations.

Contradictory pressures toward fragmentation and cohesion in the OAS environment are reflected in a lack of vigorous leadership. The arrangement of one large member (the United States) versus 20 small member nations imposes restraints upon leadership by that large country. The complexities of the Organization, with large representational demands on each country, has diluted the leadership given by the Latin American countries. This dearth of leadership, in turn, has created even further complexities in the Organization by inducing the use of ad hoc supergroups to handle problems which become bogged in the regular organs of the OAS. Yet these very complexities create an elaborate net of checks and restraints on the operation of the OAS, so that it is not much feared as an organ of intervention by its member states.

The OAS is linked to a rich variety of nongovernmental organizations, almost all of which are concerned with its nonpolitical functions. Its relations to the United Nations are many, from competitive, overlapping activities in the economic area to completely integrated operations in the field of health. In the main, the OAS is complementary to the development of the United Nations, tailoring programs to the particular needs of the Americas.

During the first decade of its existence under its 1948 charter, the OAS has achieved a balance between its military-political functions and its economic-social-cultural activities. The extravagant expectations voiced by its member nations—and the pressing realities of a seething heimsphere—far exceed its present capabilities. Compared with the functioning of other international organizations, its modest achievements have been less than those of NATO and the U.N.

#### B. IMPLICATION OF ANALYSIS FOR ACTION AND POLICY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Organization of American States is one of several instruments used to implement U.S. foreign policy. It is an alternative to direct bilateral relations, as well as an alternative to multilateral relations through the United Nations. To be a more effective instrument, it must be considerably strengthened. Its growth should be so timed that it retains the present internal balance between military-political functions and economic-social-cultural activities. Its growth should be so engineered that it remains complementary to, rather than competitive with, the U.N. Its growth should be so directed that the OAS itself has impact upon the milieu in which it operates, by serving to encourage the development of vigorous leadership in inter-American affairs. With such growth, the OAS would be markedly more capable of serving as an alternative instrument for the pursuit of U.S. national interests in the inter-American arena: hemispheric peace and security, based on abundance for all, yielding opportunity for the free and good life.

Because of its overwhelming power, the United States has difficulty in being a working partner in the OAS without at once becoming dominant. It is for this central reason that the Organization of American States must remain only one of a number of alternative instruments

for implementation of our foreign policy. Over the century ahead, as the Latin American countries increase their own capabilities, we will be able to work more easily on more equal terms within the OAS. Then the Organization of American States may develop enough capacity to realize long-cherished dreams of the New World.

### C. COMPILATION OF THE PROPOSALS FOR ACTION AND POLICY

Increase the effectiveness of the OAS for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy with respect to—

#### I. PEACE AND SECURITY

##### A. *By strengthening hemispheric military capability through the Inter-American [I-A] Defense Board*

*Proposal No. 1.*—Consolidate the military advisory functions within the OAS as follows:

(a) Provide that the I-A Defense Board furnish the Advisory Defense Committee for the meeting of consultation of the ministers of foreign affairs.

(b) Utilize the I-A Defense Board staff to provide military attaché services, when such are needed, for the investigatory committees established by the Council when acting as the provisional organ of consultation and for the I-A Peace Committee.

*Proposal No. 2.*—Establish a miniature inter-American auxiliary force, especially trained for guerrilla warfare and antisubversion activities, which might be used by governments with the approval of the OAS Council, to supplement national forces—

whenever the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American state shall be affected (OAS Charter, art. 24).

*Proposal No. 3.*—Establish an inter-American staff college and mission unit to be operated by the I-A Defense Board.

(a) The inter-American staff college should provide a curriculum of study for higher level officers. The content would include training in (1) the relation of military matters to hemispheric and world political problems, (2) procedures for handling subversion and riots without jeopardizing civil and political rights, and (3) organizational techniques for guerrilla combat.

(b) The inter-American staff college mission unit would be an extension field service of the staff college, operating in countries under bilateral agreements with the OAS, as requested.

##### B. *By strengthening political machinery for peace maintenance*

*Proposal No. 4.*—Provide an ample peace maintenance fund in the Secretary General's office to meet the operating costs of the Inter-American Peace Committee and the ad hoc information and investigatory committees established from time to time by OAS Council.

*Proposal No. 5.*—Reestablish the old Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense as a permanent inter-American observation group to assist the ad hoc investigatory committees and the I-A Peace Committee of the OAS Council, as requested by them, and to report independently its observations to the OAS Council at regular intervals.

*Proposal No. 6.*—Establish an inter-American court of international justice, articulated closely with the International Court of Justice of the United Nations, which would be its superior court.

II. ABUNDANCE FOR ALL, BY STRENGTHENING THE ABILITY OF THE OAS TO TAKE ECONOMIC INITIATIVE

*Proposal No. 7.*—Decrease response time on the part of the governmental apparatus of the United States vis-a-vis its participation in the IA-ECOSOC [Inter-American Economic and Social Council] and related activities in the OAS.

*Proposal No. 8.*—Change the regulations of the IA-ECOSOC so that the Council meets but once or twice a year, with representation by deputy ministers of economy or finance; supervise the interim activities of the Council through a small executive committee meeting ad hoc.

*Proposal No. 9.*—Establish an emergency economic defense board within the IA-ECOSOC, with its own revolving emergency fund.

III. THE FREE AND GOOD LIFE, BY ENDEAVORING TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND INCREASE THE ACTIVITY OF LEGISLATORS AND POTENTIAL POLITICAL LEADERS

*Proposal No. 10.*—Encourage interim meetings of the Western Hemisphere contingent of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as well as encourage wider Pan-American participation in world meetings through establishment of American parliamentary fellowships within the OAS fellowship program.

*Proposal No. 11.*—Establish an Inter-American Leadership Foundation, independent of the OAS, which would match funds with foundations and men of wealth within the whole hemisphere on projects designed to encourage the development of lay leaders through democratic participation in inter-American organizations, official and nongovernmental.

*Proposal No. 12.*—Allow citizens in the hemisphere to receive tax deduction benefits of generous proportions, applying to persons in lower income brackets as well as those in higher brackets, for contributions to private but nonprofit organizations concerned with inter-American affairs.

*Proposal No. 13.*—Organize within each member nation an official National Advisory Commission on Inter-American Affairs.

IV. THE DEPTH AND STRENGTH OF THE OAS, BY FIRING THE OAS AS AN INSTITUTION CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING THE TASKS TO BE ASSIGNED IN THE CENTURY AHEAD

*Proposal No. 14.*—Relocate OAS headquarters in an inter-American district.

*Proposal No. 15.*—Establish and generously endow an inter-American free and autonomous university devoted to basic studies in all disciplines with—

(a) A Special Institute for the Objective Study of Inter-American Affairs; and

(b) A set of extension professional chairs of inter-American law and politics in the national university of each member country.

*Proposal No. 16.*—Begin steps toward the multilateralization of the Panama Canal under the aegis of the Organization of American States.

## I. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNCTIONING

The Organization of American States (OAS) focuses political, economic-social, and cultural relations among 21 republics of South and North America. Its charter becomes alive as the Organization keeps the peace, helps its members in their economic development, and facilitates the exchange of persons in cultural activities. The Organization operates in a milieu which at once is divisive and cohesive. Although of modest proportions, its machinery is diffuse and complex. Its accomplishments are dwarfed by its extravagant goals. Given more adequate resources and leadership, its potential for service to the nations of the New World is great.

Over the past century and a half the volume of contacts of Americans with each other through inter-American conferences has increased (fig. 1). In 1826 Simón Bolívar sponsored an attempt to initiate more formal relations among the newly liberated Latin American States at an abortive conference held in Panama. In 1889-90 a "First" Inter-American Conference established the Pan American Union (PAU) in Washington, D.C. Other major conferences followed. In 1948 during their Ninth Conference, the American States culminated their World War II collaboration by restructuring the sprawling "inter-American system" of some 60 official and nongovernmental organizations into an "Organization of American States." The old Pan American Union was reconstituted as the Secretariat for the new Organization. This regional Organization now serves as a center of a growing complex of activities among states and peoples of the Western Hemisphere.


### A. DOCUMENTS AND REALITIES

And so in May 1948 was begun the transition from the old, even more diffuse system to the new Organization of American States, with its conference, meeting of consultation, councils, committees, Secretariat, and specialized organizations. The Charter of the OAS (see app. B) officially became effective in December 1951. Argentina was the 21st country to deposit its instrument of ratification in April 1956, some 6 months after Perón was overthrown. The gradualness of the legal transition from the old to the new is typical of the slow, evolving ways used in the conduct of inter-American affairs. It contrasts with the turbulent internal politics of some Latin American countries. The present-day structure of the OAS is charted in the frontispiece (see p. viii).

The documents that formalize the OAS—the charter itself, the various inter-American treaties, the sets of regulations developed in

its councils, boards, and committees—are juridical bases not only for the relations among the various representations of states but also for their direction of the work of the Organization's 500 employees. These documents are given reality through the daily activity of the people who man this inter-American structure.

FIGURE 1  
OFFICIAL INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES  
1826-1948




*The Inter-American Conferences*

The pace setter is the Inter-American Conference, which serves as the “supreme organ of the Organization of American States.” In recent years the Conference has been convened approximately every 5 years for a month or so in one of the capitals of the Western Hemisphere. The gatherings, consisting of some 500 persons, afford foreign ministers and top-ranking government officials of the 21 nations an opportunity for formal deliberation and informal, face-to-face consultations. Their torrents of resolutions are directives and guides for the units comprising the Organization. A tabular summary of the conferences held since 1889 is presented in table 1.

TABLE 1.—Pan American Conferences, 1889-1959

Name	Date	Location	Countries attending	Major agenda items	Outcomes
1st International Conference of American States.	Oct. 2, 1889, to Apr. 19, 1890.	Washington, D.C., United States.	18; all the American Republics then extant except the Dominican Republic.	Discussion of problems of mutual interest, principally questions of peace, trade, and communication.	Formation of the International Union of American Republics and the "Bureau of American Republics."
2d International Conference of American States.	Oct. 22, 1901, to Jan. 22, 1902.	Mexico City, Mexico.	19; all the American Republics then extant.	Discussion of international legal question, procedures for arbitration of disputes, problems of hemispheric peace.	Protocol of adhesion to "Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes." Treaty of Arbitration for Pecuniary Claims.
3d International Conference of American States.	July 21 to Aug. 26, 1906.	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.	19; all the American Republics except Haiti and Venezuela.	Consideration of problem of forcible collection of debts. Discussion of Drago and Calvo doctrines.	Conference decided to take question of forcible collection of debts to 2d Hague Conference. Convention on International Law.
4th International Conference of American States.	July 12 to Aug. 30, 1910.	Buenos Aires, Argentina.	20; all the American Republics except Bolivia.	Consideration of various economic and cultural matters.	Decision to change name of "International Bureau of American Republics" to "Pan American Union."
5th International Conference of American States.	Mar. 25 to May 3, 1923.	Santiago, Chile.	18; all the American Republics except Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru.	Discussion of reorganization of Pan American Union (PAU) for purpose of reducing U.S. dominance. Discussion of possible modification of Monroe Doctrine.	"Treaty To Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between American States" (Gondra Treaty). Decision to make chairmanship of PAU elective.
6th International Conference of American States.	Jan. 16 to Feb. 20, 1928.	Havana, Cuba.	21; all the American Republics.	Latin American delegates anxious to secure condemnation of American intervention in the Caribbean.	"Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife." (Designed to prevent use of other American countries as bases for launching revolutionary activity.)
International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration.	Dec. 10, 1928, to Jan. 5, 1929.	Washington, D.C., United States.	20; all the American Republics except Argentina.	Problem of arbitration and conciliation of disputes.	General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation. General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration.
7th International Conference of American States.	Dec. 3-26, 1933.	Montevideo, Uruguay.	20; all the American Republics except Costa Rica.	Problem of U.S. dominance and intervention.	"Convention on Rights and Duties of States." Concerned with the principle of nonintervention.
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.	Dec. 1-23, 1936.	Buenos Aires, Argentina.	21; all the American Republics.	Security of hemisphere in event of war in Europe or Far East. Principle of nonintervention.	"Declaration of principles of Inter-American solidarity and cooperation." Additional protocol relative to nonintervention.
8th International Conference of American States.	Dec. 9-27, 1938.	Lima, Peru.	do	Consideration of the relation of American Republics to Europe and possible German and Italian penetration of the hemisphere.	"Declaration of the principles of the solidarity of America." Established the meeting of consultation of foreign ministers.

<p>Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace.</p>	<p>Feb. 21 to Mar. 8, 1945.</p>	<p>Mexico City, Mexico.</p>	<p>20; all the American Republics except Argentina.</p>	<p>Consideration of possible postwar problems. Hemispheric relations of Argentina.</p>	<p>Act of Chapultepec. Dealt with acts or threats of aggression against any American Republic; recommended consideration of a treaty to deal with such acts and measures to take when they occurred.</p>
<p>Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security. 9th International Conference of American States.</p>	<p>Aug. 15 to Sept. 2, 1947. Mar. 30 to May 2, 1948.</p>	<p>Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Bogotá, Colombia.</p>	<p>20; all the American Republics except Nicaragua. 21; all the American Republics.</p>	<p>Consideration of proposals for a treaty of mutual defense of the hemisphere. Discussion of means to strengthen the inter-American system, and to promote inter-American economic cooperation. Consideration of juridical and political matters, including recognition of governments and colonies.</p>	<p>Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Charter of the O.A.S. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá). American declaration of the rights and duties of man. Economic Agreement of Bogotá.</p>
<p>10th International Conference of American States.</p>	<p>Mar. 1-28, 1954.</p>	<p>Caracas, Venezuela.</p>	<p>20; all the American Republics except Costa Rica.</p>	<p>Consideration of hemispheric policy respecting the intervention of communism into the Americas; discussion of possible economic assistance to Latin America.</p>	<p>"Declaration of solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of the Americas against the intervention of international communism."</p>



*Meetings of consultation*

When there are problems of an "urgent nature and of common interest," the member states may convoke a meeting of consultation of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This device is of recent origin, although it, too, antedates the 1948 OAS Charter as written at Bogotá. First used during the pre-World War II crises in 1939, it has met but five times, each time except the last as the organ of consultation with respect to threats from outside the hemisphere. Its meetings and important decisions are summarized in table 2.

TABLE 2.—*Meetings of consultation of foreign ministers, 1939-59*  
 [Each meeting attended by all 21 American Republics]

Number of meeting	Location	Date	Major agenda item	Outcomes
First.....	Panama City, Panama.....	Sept. 23-Oct. 3, 1939; after start of World War II.	Consideration of means for maintenance of the neutrality of the hemisphere.	Declaration of Panama, establishing a hemispheric zone embracing the American Republics within which the belligerent nations were to commit no hostile acts. General declaration of neutrality.
Second.....	Havana, Cuba.....	July 21-30, 1940; after fall of France.....	Discussion of European possessions in the Americas and the danger of their possible transfer to other non-American powers.	Act of Havana and Convention of Havana, concerning the provisional administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas. Resolution XV: Any attempt by a non-American state against sovereignty or independence of an American state to be considered attack on all.
Third.....	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.....	Jan. 15-28, 1942; after Pearl Harbor.....	Determination of attitude to be adopted by American Republics in face of attack by a non-American power upon an American state and subsequent declaration of war by Germany and Italy.	Resolution: "The American Republics * * * recommend the breaking of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy." Establishment of the Inter-American Defense Board. Establishment of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense.
Fourth.....	Washington, D.C., United States.	Mar. 26-Apr. 7, 1951; after Korea.....	Consideration of problems of communism and hemispheric security.	Recommendation that each Republic examine its resources to determine what steps it could take to contribute to collective defense of continent. Recommendation that governments examine their laws with view to adopting changes considered necessary for prevention of subversive activities of Communists.
Fifth.....	Santiago, Chile.....	Aug. 12-18, 1959; after April-June disturbances in Caribbean.	Consideration of problems of unrest in the Caribbean. Discussion of problems of democracy and human rights in Latin America.	Declaration of Santiago, concerning assignment of principles of democracy and respect for human rights. Special temporary power to Inter-American Peace Committee to investigate and conciliate in cases of invasions by foreign-based rebels.



*OAS Council and its three organs*

In session continuously, and responsible for the operation of the entire organization, is the Council of the OAS. Its existence in the form of a government board for the old Pan American Union also antedates Bogotá. The representatives now hold ambassadorial rank and are accredited to the OAS itself. The Council meets once or twice a week, depending upon the volume and urgency of business. In addition to electing and directing a Secretary General and an Assistant Secretary General, the OAS Council formulates the statutes of its three, quasi-autonomous subsidiary organs: The Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC), the Inter-American Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council.

*Voting procedures*

The OAS was established without either a veto or a unanimity rule, partly in response to the objections the small Latin American countries felt about the unfairness of a great power veto in the United Nations. Most OAS proceedings are governed by votes requiring two-thirds majorities. Even the provision for amendment of the charter requires ratification by two-thirds of the signatory states and is free of veto. The councils and committees develop their own regulations, in the course of which there has been some tendency to reduce the required majority to but 11 votes. Perhaps most remarkable, when the OAS is compared with other international organizations, is the extent to which the nations bound themselves in one of their treaties to the employment of diplomatic and economic measures, short of the use of their own military forces, when such are voted by the organ of consultation. Membership for any country in the OAS may be terminated by its unilateral denunciation of the charter.

The central groups within the OAS—the Inter-American Conferences, the meetings of consultation of the Foreign Ministers, and the OAS Council—constitute the apparatus for leadership within the OAS complex. In the main, they are competent to act on matters covering the full range of OAS activities, from the technical and cultural through the economic and social to the political and military.

Further understanding of the functioning of the OAS, in terms of its operating realities rather than in terms only of its documents, may be sought by proceeding to two levels of analysis. First, we shall analyze the divisive-cohesive context within which the OAS works, attempting to understand how factors which fragment are countered by factors which produce solidarity among the American nations. Second, we shall examine the way the OAS complex operates within this milieu to see how its decisions are transformed as they are executed or falter in stalemate.

## B. FRAGMENTATION AND SOLIDARITY

The OAS is enmeshed in its environment. The Organization is not a tightly knit structure; its very diffuseness promotes a deep entanglement of its decisionmaking groups with the underlying forces leading simultaneously to fragmentation and solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. What are these forces, and how do they create the jumbled and confused milieu in which the OAS must operate?

*Diversities in background*

The factors leading to fragmentation are many; their expression in intense nationalisms permeates the hemisphere. The important basic differences among the nations provide the ground for their diversity. The states vary in almost all important respects: size, resource endowment, ethnic composition of their populations, social structure, political forms, degree of economic development. In size they range from the continental giants, the United States and Brazil, to El Salvador and the Dominican Republic which, taken together, would fit comfortably inside West Virginia. In resource endowment they range from mineral and hydrocarbon-rich Venezuela to exhausted Haiti. In ethnic composition they range from overwhelmingly white Argentina to overwhelmingly Indian Bolivia. In social structure they range from middle-class Costa Rica to sharply stratified Peru. In political form they range from democratic Chile to oligarchic Nicaragua. The tendency toward strong, unitary central governments, patterned after the vice royalties of Spain even permeates federal patterns adopted by a few of the states. In degree of economic development they range from the highly industrialized United States to the still essentially agricultural Paraguay.

There are still other differences: with minor exceptions the states of Latin America are not natural trading partners but rather are competitors in world markets for the sale of a limited number of primary commodities. The United States, on the other hand, trades with all of them and dominates their economies in many ways. Except in Central America and the River Plate region, geographic barriers impose great obstacles to land communication among the Latin American states; the United States and Canada are separated from their Latin American neighbors by desert and sea. Cultural and linguistic differences serve to divide the region's peoples, going so far in the case of Haiti and the Dominican Republic as to split a single island into hostile halves. Even in religion the Americas are divided: the north is Protestant; south of the Rio Grande, Roman Catholicism predominates. The frontiers correspond roughly to administrative subdivisions of vanished empires. With those frontiers—not always clearly demarcated, as recurrent boundary disputes make manifest—ruling groups assert their states' sovereign independence.

*Nationalisms as drives for autonomy*

In the Western Hemisphere there is tremendous momentum for autonomy within the ruling groups—and within populaces, to an extent. The states of South and North America were built through rebellions from European motherlands during the 50 or so years which straddled the 18th and 19th centuries. Even Canada, the outstanding exception, becomes more and more autonomous. The push toward independence continues in the less-than-self-governing areas, as is exemplified in the commonwealth status recently achieved by Puerto Rico and the West Indies Federation. Today these drives for autonomy continue in the form of strong nationalisms, as though there were deep concern that century-old sovereignties still might be temporary. Is there a sense of threat in losing office among top officials,

constantly rearoused in conditions of political instability, which reflects itself in their incessant voicings of independence?

The impact of the nationalisms on the functioning of the OAS is intensified by the insistent emphasis on the sovereignty of the member states. Inside the system the participants constantly remind each other of their separateness, even when they register their solidarity. For example, in the only meeting held to date of American Presidents and Presidents-elect, gathered in commemoration of the 130th anniversary of the Congress of Panama, 19 chiefs of state declared: "America holds steadfastly to its historic mission: to be a bulwark of human liberty and national independence." As the OAS grows in stature, it provides an even more admirable forum for protestations of sovereignty.

#### *Extrahemispheric pulls*

Besides inherent diversities and widespread ideological attachment to political independence, the states of the hemisphere are divided by their differing relations with countries outside the hemisphere. In the past, perhaps these divisive forces were stronger than they are now, for the influence of historic Latin American ties to Spain and Portugal steadily has become weaker. On the other hand, the United States has become increasingly involved with extrahemispheric concerns, especially since World War II. In fact, the supposed inability of policymakers of the United States to give adequate attention to the needs of Latin America, because of worldwide commitments, has been a persistent grievance of other members of the OAS. And in the case of Canada, the link to the British Commonwealth is an important cause of its unwillingness to accept a long-standing invitation to become a member of the Organization of American States; its participation is limited to one OAS specialized agency, the Inter-American Statistical Institute. As overseas areas, the three Guianas, British Honduras, and the West Indies Federation all maintain closer ties to their home countries than to the nations of the Western Hemisphere. These political units participate only in the operations of the Pan American Health Organization, in part because this specialized OAS agency operates simultaneously as the regional branch of the World Health Organization.

These, then, are strong tendencies toward fragmentation. There are tremendous diversities in nation size, in economic and cultural development, in political background and present forms of government. These diversities, linked to a heritage of rebellion for independence, combine to harden lines of nationalism. Reinforcing the internal pressures toward difference are the pulls of varying relations with extrahemispheric powers. The OAS itself serves as a stage on which the differences may be dramatized and as a forum for the display of strong national sovereignties. Countering these strong forces toward fragmentation, however, are factors inducive of inter-American solidarity. But their strength seems not nearly as great as that of those factors tending toward disunity.

As noted earlier, there is comparatively little economic interchange among the Latin American States, intra-Latin American trade amounting to no more than 15 percent of total Latin American foreign trade in most years. The economic links of Latin America and the United States are increasing and, in Latin America, seem to be increasingly resented. With industrialization and economic specialization within Latin America, viable subregional market areas may be developed. This has not yet occurred, however, except in a very limited degree in Central America and the countries of the Plate River Basin. Thus, economic factors tending toward solidarity are few and weak. The main factors working toward solidarity have been political and ideological. The political factor derives from common opposition to outside powers. The ideological bases derive from an almost mythological and widely held belief that citizens of the New World share a common destiny in the pursuit of freedom.

TABLE 3.—*Pan American Conferences, 1826-88*

Name	Date	Place	Countries attending	Major agenda items	Outcomes
Panama Congress.....	1826	Panama City, Panama.....	4: Central America, Gran Colombia, Mexico, Peru.	Peace and security. Federal union for Latin America. Suppression of slavery.	Several agreements signed; none ratified by all signatories.
Congress of Lima (or "American Congress").	1847-48	Lima, Peru.....	5: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada (Colombia), Peru.	Consideration of defensive measures to be taken to prevent Spanish reconquest of west-coast states of South America.	3 treaties signed; none ratified.
Continental Congress.....	1856	Santiago, Chile.....	3: Chile, Ecuador, Peru.....	Consideration of collective measures to be taken in event of U.S. incursions.	A treaty of mutual assistance signed: if signatories attacked by the United States, all will unite against the United States.
Congress of Lima.....	1864-65	Lima, Peru.....	7: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela.	Consideration of possible responses of presence of Spanish in Santo Domingo and French in Mexico.	Treaty of "Union and Alliance" signed; not ratified.

*Pan-Latin American reactions to nonhemisphere nations*


During much of the 19th century, desires for hemispheric solidarity were fostered by fears of extrahemispheric powers. These fears proved to be realistic already in the 1840's when Spain attempted to retake Ecuador. Later, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the United States with its Civil War, Napoleon III put Maximilian upon a throne in Mexico and Spain repossessed Santo Domingo and the guano-rich Chincha Islands off the coast of Peru. As far as the Latin Americans were concerned, however, fear of the United States was as powerful a force toward Latin American solidarity as was fear of imperialistic European powers. Note in table 3, in which a summary is made of the agenda of the major Pan-American conferences held before the "First" conference of 1889-90, that the Latin American states met in most cases to concert their policies respecting the dangers of European interference and U.S. expansionism.

At the turn of the century the United States took the part of the European powers by assuming responsibility for the redress of European grievances with regard to defaulted financial obligations in the Western Hemisphere. From the Latin American viewpoint, Europe and the United States became a single focus of hostility, thereby generating Latin American solidarity. Until the adoption of a non-intervention policy by the United States in the 1930's, the six inter-American conferences (see table 1 again) held after the founding of the Pan American Union can be said to have been Pan-Latin American bloc actions against the United States.

In the 1930's and early 1940's, extrahemispheric pressure once again became the central force for inter-American solidarity, as the countries of the region reacted against the Axis Powers. The ad hoc machinery of the inter-American complex was expanded to handle responses to these foreign challenges, including such difficult matters as the administration of territories in the Western Hemisphere of European countries occupied by the Axis (through a Committee on the Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas, authorized in October 1939), and such a delicate problem as the countering of Axis-fomented subversion in the Americas (through the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, established in January 1942).

*From a PAU to an OAS*

During the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City in 1945, just before the meetings on the charter of the United Nations in San Francisco, proposals for the redesigning of the inter-American system were considered. It was agreed to construct treaties for collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as significantly to change the structure of the Pan American Union. In a series of conferences during the next 3 years, much of the ad hoc machinery developed during the years of World War II was incorporated into the new Organization of American States. In 1947 the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro (and known as the "Rio Treaty"), formalized collective security arrangements among the 21 American



states. But, as the external pressures lessened after the war, many of the intentions voiced in 1945 faltered. For example, neither in 1948 nor thereafter did more than 9 of the 21 states ratify the "Pact of Bogotá," which concerned pacific settlement measures (including arbitration procedures) for use in the resolution of intrahemispheric conflict.

Just as the factual bases of fragmentation seem to be intensified by constant protestations of sovereign independence, so the solidarity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere appears to be enhanced by ideological pronouncements about regional unity. During World War II, Padilla of Mexico put the matter as follows:

Under the banner of this Pan-American doctrine, defense and collective security will become an impregnable wall. It is then that America will be strong. In its natural resources it will find all the requirements for its needs, and in the souls of its people the noblest inspirations. Each man will have a purpose in living, a hope for which to fight, and a faith for which to die, if need be. Each of our countries will enjoy the supreme pleasure of shaping not only for itself and its own inhabitants, but for all the nations and for the coming generations, a noble, generous destiny.

The tradition-sanctioned belief that special bonds linked men in the Western Hemisphere—and set them apart from men elsewhere in the world—came to be supplemented by a more recent belief, engendered by a decade of successful collaboration, that the inter-American regional system could serve as a model of organization for all nations in mankind's quest for peace. These beliefs became the presuppositions, implicit or explicit, of the decisions of statesmen. In turn, these led toward a self-fulfillment of the solidarity prophecy.

These ideological premises regarding inter-American solidarity became intimately meshed with outside pressures toward cohesion. As Thomas Jefferson had put it as long ago as 1823:

America \* \* \* should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom.

It is important to observe how the tendencies to fragmentation and cohesion interlock. Determination to exercise their national sovereignties unites the nations in their opposition to intervention. The solidarity centers on intolerance of interference with national achievement of their parallel but individual destinies. This commonness in the national goals is interpreted by some as being a manifestation of interdependence. Yet the interdependence among the nations derives largely from the need to cooperate against others to maintain national autonomy. Thus, an underlying ambivalence in the Americas is induced by the states' desire to work collaboratively in the pursuit of noncollaborative goals. The Organization of American States must function within this context. Little wonder, then, that its activities are permeated by political contradictions. At one time its decision-making activities are dominated by the forces of fragmentation. At other times there is cohesion due to fears of extrahemispheric pressures and visions of the solidarity of the New World.

## C. THE OAS AS INSTRUMENTALITY

Most of the resolutions of the sporadically held and sparsely attended Latin American congresses of the 19th century remained unratified. Because the United States, through its developing Monroe Doctrine, and Great Britain, through its seapower, provided relative security against extrahemispheric pressures, there was no urgent need for formal inter-American machinery to solve hemispheric military and political problems. In fact, the founding of a permanent organ for intrahemispheric affairs, the "Commercial Bureau," seemed almost an incidental byproduct of a conference called by the United States during Grover Cleveland's first presidency.

This initial "Commercial Bureau of American Republics" of 1890 became the "International Bureau of American Republics" in 1901, and was rechristened the "Pan American Union" in 1910. The unit gathered information on commercial matters as bases for treaties of trade and commerce. It also developed channels for cooperation among intellectuals. With the United States overwhelmingly the dominant member, little effort was made by the Latin Americans to use the organization except as an instrument to prevent intervention by member states—that is, the United States—in the affairs of others. In this, the growing inter-American system was unsuccessful. It did not stop interference by the United States in the affairs of Mexico and certain Central American states. Nor did it entirely prevent warfare among Latin Americans, which reached important proportions in the Chaco struggles between Paraguay and Bolivia.

Yet experience was gained during these years through work on a multitude of treaties. Examples are the "Convention on International Law" (1906), as it would apply in the Western Hemisphere, and the Gondra "Treaty To Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between the American States" (1923). The experience seemed to provide a useful background for meeting old problems in the new circumstances of the 1930's and 1940's. The Latin Americans used the growing inter-American system as an important agency for applying continuous moral and political pressures on their closest northern neighbor. These pressures culminated in the "Convention on Rights and Duties of States on Non-Intervention" during the Seventh International Conference of American States in 1923 and the "Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention" in a special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936.

But as the United States finally agreed to nonintervention, how were intra-American quarrels to be settled? How could extrahemispheric threats be repulsed?

*Need for a multilateral system for hemispheric defense*

The League of Nations was not serving effectively in the settlement of international disputes. If the United States was not to exercise the Monroe Doctrine unilaterally, how could its power be used in the Americas against extracontinental groups? With the rise of the

Axis Powers and their military missions and political propaganda efforts in South America, a new threat came to replace the sense of hemispheric security that followed upon World War I. As an agency-in-being, one in which the nations had gained experience in working with one another, the inter-American arrangement began to be seen as a potentially more useful instrument for the handling of inter-American needs in the political and military areas. Just before and during World War II, a wide variety of ad hoc activities were undertaken within and around the Pan American Union. Their relatively successful operation throughout the war created a demand for their consolidation in an Organization of American States. The conviction was clear in early 1945 that the OAS would have to be planned not only as an instrument for collective security against external threats but also for the prevention of intra-American conflict.

*Beginnings of broader use of an Inter-American system*

Since the founding of the Pan American Union, the inter-American system had been used over the years in only minimal ways for economic and social interrelations. Occasionally an outstandingly successful arrangement was achieved, as in the operation of a Pan American Sanitary Bureau. In the cultural area enthusiasts for solidarity had an opportunity to develop student exchanges and cultural contacts among the peoples of the Americas. But, as the Latin American countries weathered the world economic depression of the 1930's, most did not think actively of the agencies associated around the Pan American Union as being able to help them achieve economic recovery.

With the success of political collaboration during World War II, the idea took hold of using the renovated inter-American organization as an agent for the economic, social, and cultural development of the American States in the postwar period. Statesmen became venture-some. Elaborate machinery was developed in the new OAS for realization of "just aspirations" and "to provide for the betterment of all." After World War II the inter-American system emerged as an instrumentality, perhaps more useful than was ever thought, for the pursuit of the goals of the Western Hemisphere.

The employment of the regional, inter-American organization as an instrument for commonly held economic and social goals was to prove difficult during the next 10 years. Nonetheless the use of the organization as an instrument for the maintenance of national independence and for collective security against outsiders was to gain momentum during the coming decade. The contemporary operations of the OAS in these two areas now will be analyzed in more detail, in an endeavor to probe reasons for these consequences.

D. THE OAS IN THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL GROWTH OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

As the inter-American system has evolved into an elaborate multi-purpose organization, its operations have come to embrace many activities: political, military, economic, social, and cultural. Some insist, however, that there is a disjunction between the first two of these, the political-military, and the others. They assert that because of the nature of the organization—it being an association of 21 jurid-

ically sovereign and equal states—political decisions, implicit or explicit, must precede decisions of other kinds. What the organization does or does not do in the economic, social, and cultural spheres is to a large extent determined by political considerations, primarily those of national sovereignty and independence.

During the inter-American system's first 50 years, a political "veto" was imposed on most Pan American activities except those of a technical character. In the economic realm, for instance, the Pan American Union and some of its specialized agencies worked on simplifying customs procedures, uniformity of commercial information, consular regulations, port facilities, and the like. At the inter-American conferences there were discussions of such matters as commercial arbitration and commercial law. But consideration of more fundamental economic questions, like those respecting tariff policies, import and export controls, and measures for promoting financial stability, was curbed.

In the 1930's a discernible shift occurred in the attitudes of statesmen toward inter-American organization, a shift brought about by the world depression, the implementation of a good neighbor policy by the United States, and the approach of war in Europe. By 1939 the shift had carried far enough in respect of economic questions to permit the establishment of an ad hoc Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, given authority to investigate problems and propose courses of action across the whole range of hemispheric economic relations. From its creation until its supersession after World War II, the Committee functioned with some effectiveness.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC-SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COUNCILS

##### *IA-ECOSOC established*

Owing in part to the Committee's success and in part to the climate of inter-American relations engendered by successful wartime collaboration, in 1948 the Committee was given permanent status and enlarged responsibilities as one of the major organs of the new Organization of American States. This newly established Inter-American Economic and Social Council, commonly designated as the "IA-ECOSOC," serves as a deliberative body for consideration of hemispheric economic and social problems. Vaguely subordinated to the OAS's general Council, it has "technical autonomy," provided its decisions do not "encroach upon the sphere of action of the Council." Continuously in session, the IA-ECOSOC is charged with ongoing responsibility for programs of its own, working through the OAS Secretariat's Department of Social and Economic Affairs. Further, it is the coordinating agency for all official inter-American economic and social activities. The IA-ECOSOC membership parallels the OAS Council in consisting of representatives from all 21 countries and it, too, almost always sits in Washington. The Director of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs serves as the Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Council.

*I—A Cultural Council established*

At the same time, the cultural activities—concerned with education and science, the arts, and the exchange of persons—were to be promoted by an Inter-American Cultural Council. Because this Council meets but occasionally, its ongoing functions are handled by a permanent Committee for Cultural Action of five members, who are specialists in education or cultural matters. As in the case of the IA-ECOSOC, the Director of the Secretariat's Department of Cultural Affairs serves as Executive Secretary of the Cultural Council. The arrangement in this case is more inconvenient, in that the Committee for Cultural Action regularly and continuously sits in Mexico City, while the Department of Cultural Affairs operates from Washington headquarters.

*Shift in viewpoint regarding OAS*

Before World War II the function of the inter-American system in economic matters was viewed by statesmen in the Americas as being primarily negative, an aid in the removal of hindrances to inter-American trade and cultural exchange. During the war and after, the functions increasingly came to be viewed in positive terms, that is, as being able to give concrete and affirmative assistance to the states of the hemisphere in broad-gaged programs of economic, social, and cultural advancement. As far as the Latin Americas are concerned, the inter-American system is moving away from the philosophy of classical liberalism toward a philosophy that stresses the necessity and desirability of planning and state enterprise in economic and social areas. This latter tendency bore fruit in 1958 in the proposal "Operation Pan America," made by the President of Brazil. This plan represents planning for a 20-year period, from 1960 to 1980. Such long-term perspective is new in the OAS. With the view more prevalent that the OAS is a potential instrument for the pursuit of economic, social, and cultural goals, one expects the recently established councils in these areas to be besieged with more and more requests.

## RISING DEMANDS VERSUS LIMITED CAPABILITIES

- Industrialization and urbanization are inducing changes within Latin America. A population explosion is occurring, due in part to the effectiveness of the Sanitary Bureau's earlier work. There are increasing popular outcries for advances. It is easy for ruling groups to wish that the OAS could be an instrument for meeting these insistent demands for economic, social, and cultural growth. However, in the years since 1948, Latin American expectations regarding the efficacy of the IA-ECOSOC as an agent for development have not been met.

The inability of the IA-ECOSOC to meet the unprecedented demands being placed upon it seems to stem from two basic characteristics. First, political considerations, rooted in the strong drives for autonomy make certain kinds of economic cooperation difficult. Second, until recently, the incongruity of the economic-social-cultural philosophy of the North and South has stalemated growth in the

IA-ECOSOC. Latin Americans tend to rely on governmental structures for activity in economic, social, and cultural areas. North Americans espouse laissez faire and reliance on private structures. Let us consider these factors separately.

*Politicizing of the economic programs*

(1) Most important is the extent to which political considerations tend to override all others in the OAS complex. On the surface there is superficial agreement in political orientation—as evidenced in the way in which the foreign offices of tight dictatorships regularly support high-sounding declarations about the rights of man, along with the foreign offices of those Latin American States which practice considerable internal democracy. Yet in reality the ideological spectrum of the political leaders of the Latin American States is broad, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left. The interests of the government in 21 sovereign states of differing political orientation and in different stages of economic development must be taken into account in formulating hemispheric programs and OAS decisions. Because important economic decisions have pronounced political repercussions, the IA-ECOSOC is able to act only in quite restricted ways on a regional level. The Economic and Social Council does make studies of hemispheric scope, and it does perform services for individual countries. In the field of problem analysis and policy planning, for example, it has considered a wide range of matters connected with such questions as those of double taxation, primary commodity production and marketing, transportation, tourism, migration, and social aspects of economic development. But the implementation of the recommendations from such studies is left to the Council of the OAS in the first instance, and ultimately to the Ministries of Economy or Finance of the 21 home governments. The mounting of concerted hemispheric programs in the economic sphere has been impossible. The American governments have not put resources into economic programs. The diffuse hemispheric demands, however, are no match against imperative domestic demands, closely related to the office-holding of the decisionmakers in the 21 capitals of the Americas.

*Minimal participation of USA in economic development*

(2) The United States tends toward the laissez faire in international economic affairs; Latin America tends toward state enterprise and central planning. The voice of the United States has been the dominant one, especially as it has become clear that the Latin American members are not to supply the resources for IA-ECOSOC's activity. As a Panamanian delegate expressed it:

We can—and should—study all possible solutions to our problems, without restricting ourselves because a government rejects one or another of these solutions; but it is advisable, from a practical point of view, not to lose sight of the fact that if any measure is not accepted by the United States, in certain instances it will become simply an expression of the desire of those other countries that do accept it.

Thus, the IA-ECOSOC has failed to get a vigorous start because none of the members of the OAS has been willing to implement its recommendations with resources of the magnitude which its problems demanded.

## VITIATING RESPONSES TO INADEQUACY

Disappointment with the IA-ECOSOC is hardly justified, if the usual standards of organizational success applied to international bodies are used in making judgment. But this Council is constantly being compared with two other governmental instrumentalities concerned with economic and social problems in the Western Hemisphere. The Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations (ECLA), located in Santiago, Chile, has had professional leadership of more stature within its secretariat than the IA-ECOSOC. In addition, ECLA has not been harassed by a governing board in permanent assembly, constantly concerned with political aspects of the economic matters being studied. And even more impressive than ECLA's work is the bilateral activity of the United States through its International Cooperation Administration, whose substantial funds make cooperation by the countries involved immediately rewarding.

The IA-ECOSOC is handicapped further by the quality of its personnel. The Council has tended to be represented by political appointees, some of whom lack the professional qualifications to handle adequately matters as technical as those before the Council.

This results in an emphasis on the politics and legalities of the social and economic items considered. The rapid turnover of representatives hinders acquisition of the requisite skills while serving on the Council itself. As of June 1958, seven delegates had served for less than 1 year, while only seven had served on the Council for 5 or more years. Further, the burden of having representation on a number of agencies in Washington requires that some republics simultaneously assign other duties to their IA-ECOSOC delegates.

Off to an unimpressive start and simultaneously competing with two other organizations, the IA-ECOSOC has failed to meet expectations. This tends to cripple still further its ability to perform satisfactorily. With 21 representatives goading a secretariat little larger than the Council itself in many directions at once, the resources available to IA-ECOSOC have been spread thin, making impressive accomplishments few. In striving to please all, the Council has pleased few. With low prestige and disappointing accomplishment, the IA-ECOSOC fails to attract the more qualified delegate and the outstanding international civil servant, who understandably feels that his talent and training can be employed better elsewhere.

It seems such vicious cycles have nowhere been so complete and of such magnitude in the OAS as in the IA-ECOSOC. Less than satisfactory performance induces poorer representation which, in turn, results in mediocre Council performance. Mediocre performance induces a greater sensitivity to new demands, which spreads the resources of the organization, and in turn results in yet poorer performance. Then, because others lack confidence in its competence, the IA-ECOSOC is deprived further of opportunities to perform in the very areas in which it is formally designated as legitimate.

*Ad hoc groups supersede IA-ECOSOC*


In 1956 the IA-ECOSOC was bypassed by the Commemorative Meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics when they assigned responsibility for recommendations to an ad hoc Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives. The recommendations were to be "aimed at strengthening the OAS's ability to serve the member states" in economic and social areas. Not entrusted with this responsibility, the prestige of the IA-ECOSOC was reduced further. And then in 1958, another ad hoc "Committee of 21" was established to implement hemispheric economic planning. To top off all this, because the delegates in the IA-ECOSOC are of middle level rank in their home governments and often have contact only with their foreign offices, this Council is convened on occasion as an "Extraordinary Meeting" in which IA-ECOSOC representation is made by the Ministers of Finance or Economy. These actions in bypassing the IA-ECOSOC at once proclaim its weaknesses in the OAS complex and simultaneously vitiate sincere efforts made to improve its day-by-day functioning.

## THE POLITICAL VERSUS THE TECHNICAL

*The growth of technical cooperation and specialized agencies*

When political considerations dominate, the OAS has difficulty in operating. On the other hand, one predicts that when there is emphasis on the technical, the OAS can function more satisfactorily. Such seems to be the case. The bulk of the resources of the OAS are devoted to the apolitical, just as was the case before World War II. As the graph of figure 2 indicates, they are increasing at an accelerating rate. Even within the IA-ECOSOC the program of technical assistance has so flourished that its farflung operations now have been placed under a special Technical Cooperation Board, with a special fund amounting to about one-third of the regular OAS budget. The Cultural Council's support of rural and fundamental education is relatively nonpolitical, too, and receives support despite its competition with the Latin American literacy program of UNESCO. With some 15 million children without even primary schools, there is room for all agencies. The OAS complex abounds with specialized and technical groups, many of which are nongovernmental in composition. There are agricultural and geographic institutes; there are institutes concerned with the child and the Indian. Crowning the success of the OAS in the organization of technical efforts in the hemisphere is the Pan American Health Organization. It retains all the vigor of former times, shown immediately after its establishment in 1902 by the Second Conference of American States as the Pan American Sanitary Bureau.

FIGURE 2  
PAN AMERICAN UNION BUDGET\*  
1949-1960



\*Does not include expenditures for the Program of Technical Cooperation

### *Peoples versus governments*

Perhaps some of the success of these technical activities derives from the fact that they are fundamentally activities of peoples rather than of governments. Individuals act as professionals in coming to their joint decisions about malaria control, teacher training, and agricultural practices. In the rapidly expanding fellowship programs, students and professors go to each other's countries as scholars, only secondarily as representatives of their states. In these ways there is deemphasis on the political in inter-American activities, permitting their escape from the vitiating context of the sovereign state.

#### A NONPOLITICAL EMPHASIS IN CULTURAL ACTIVITY

##### *The I-A Cultural Council as test case*

A sharp test of the aptness of our conclusion that the IA-ECOSOC is overpoliticized is found in the relative success of the modest effort of the OAS in cultural development. The function of the Inter-American Cultural Council is to promote—

friendly relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples, in order to strengthen the peaceful sentiments that have characterized the evolution of America, through the promotion of educational, scientific, and cultural exchange.

In keeping with this conception, the OAS supports activities designed both to encourage creative work in the fields of philosophy and letters, music, visual arts, and science, and to help secure a hemispheric audience for creative artists of the Americas. Translation and publication of representative Latin American literary and philosophical works is a major project, as is its correlative of translating U.S. works into Spanish and other hemispheric languages. Music and musicianship are fostered through the sponsoring of inter-American music festivals and of concert series at the PAU. Drawings, photographs, and oils by Latin American artists are presented in circulating exhibitions. The OAS is active in promoting hemispheric cooperation and advance in both the social sciences and the natural sciences, primarily through collaboration with governmental and non-governmental organizations already working in these fields. The Cultural Council has met but twice since its establishment over 10 years ago; the physical distance of its small Committee for Cultural Action in Mexico City is far removed from its secretariat's base in Washington. The Department of Cultural Affairs at headquarters is manned by experts. For all these reasons, there is less tendency to endow the cultural activities with political overtones, even though its literary and educational programs in the long run may yield the most potent of political consequences for the ruling groups within each nation.

In summary, the OAS tends to succeed in implementing its goals in economic, social, and cultural activities when the content of its activities is more technical and less directly political and when the execution of its decisions depends more on persons, acting as professionals and as individuals, and less on governments acting as sovereign states.

#### E. THE OAS IN THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Many believe that the achievements of the OAS in the political arena have been considerable in contrast with more modest accomplishments in the economic, social, and cultural areas. Political activity with respect to intrahemispheric matters has centered on the development of viable machinery for the settlement of disputes and the continued growth of legal norms directed toward the prevention of inter-American strife. Efforts concerned with American security vis-a-vis extrahemispheric powers have been considerably less energetic, although certainly not absent. Yet closer examination of the situation indicates this widely held conclusion perhaps is superficial.

#### MOLLIFICATION OF INTER-AMERICAN DISTURBANCES

##### *The Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty*

The Rio Treaty was drafted broadly to encompass conflict among the Latin American States, as well as to provide collective security from outside forces. Eight days after the treaty came into effect, Costa Rica and Nicaragua brought a situation to the attention of the Council of the OAS, which then acted as the provisional "Organ of Consultation," in place of a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Since then the OAS Council has worked as the organ of consultation on 11 occasions, with the consequences exhibited in table 4.

TABLE 4 GENERAL PEACE-MAKING ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES THROUGH INTER-AMERICAN PEACE COMMITTEE AND RIO TREATY (August, 1948 to September, 1959)							Countries Involved in the Situation															
Name of Situation	Auspices of	Date Request for Action Received	Date Action Terminated	Charges by Country Initiating Action or Reasons for Requesting Action	Outcome	Mexico	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Panama	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Haiti	Venezuela	Colombia	Ecuador	Peru	Bolivia	Chile	
Dominican Republic-Cuba Situation	IA Peace Committee	Aug. 13, 1948	Sept. 9, 1948	Dominican Republic alleged organization of revolutionary forces in Cuba directed against Dominican Republic.	Both sides agreed to continue negotiations.								X	X								
Nicaraguan-Costa Rican Situation	Rio Treaty	Dec. 11, 1948	Feb. 21, 1949	Costa Rica claimed it has been invaded by forces coming from Nicaragua.	Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed Pact of Amity on Feb. 21, 1949.					X	X											
Haiti-Dominican Republic Situation	Rio Treaty	Feb. 16, 1949	(Not applicable)	Haiti cited certain acts it claimed could create situation between Dominican Republic and Haiti endangering the peace.	OAS Council heard statements that both gov'ts ready to use peaceful means of settlement.										X	X						
Same Situation	IA Peace Committee	March 21, 1949	June 9, 1949	Haiti requested Committee's good offices in a dispute with the Dominican Republic. (See previous entry)	Two gov'ts signed a joint declaration on friendly relations on June 9, 1949.										X	X						
Cuba-Peru Situation	IA Peace Committee	Aug. 3, 1949	(Not applicable)	Cuban embassy in Lima gave asylum to two Peruvian citizens; on Aug. 14, asylum left embassy and incident was closed.	Cuba withdrew its request that the Committee meet.								X								X	
General Caribbean Situation	IA Peace Committee	(Not applicable)	Sept. 14, 1949	U.S. requested the Committee study the general situation in the Caribbean.	Committee declined to take action; said jurisdiction limited to specific matters of controversy.																	
Cuba-Dominican Republic Situation	IA Peace Committee	Dec. 6, 1949	(Not applicable)	Cuba invited the Committee to investigate charges by Dominican Republic that Cuba permitting movement to exist in its borders directed at Dominican Republic.	Committee declined the invitation; no situation calling for specific measures.										X	X						
Haiti-Dominican Republic Situation	Rio Treaty	Jan. 3, 1950	April 8, 1950	Haiti accused Dominican Republic of flagrant acts of aggression. Dominican Republic accused Haiti of conspiring against the Dominican Republic government.	OAS Council asked both sides to refrain from subversive activities against the other.											X	X					
Cuba-Dominican Republic Situation	IA Peace Committee	Nov. 26, 1951	Dec. 25, 1951	Cuba alleged that 5 Cuban sailors on a Guatemalan vessel were seized and imprisoned by the Dominican Republic.	Dominican Republic and Cuba signed a joint declaration of peacefulness and non-intervention.										X	X						
Colombia-Peru Situation	IA Peace Committee	Nov. 18, 1953	Jan. 21, 1954	Colombia called attention to the dispute over presence of Raul Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian, in Colombian embassy in Lima.	Committee recommended the resumption of bilateral negotiations.																X	X
Guatemalan Situation	IA Peace Committee	June 19, 1954	June 30, 1954	Guatemala requested Committee meet to consider acts violating her sovereignty. Withdrew request, renewed it on June 26.	Committee sent subcommittee to make study; however, before it reached scene, new government in Guatemala.			X	X	X												
Guatemalan Situation	Rio Treaty	June 26, 1954	July 2, 1954	10 states signed note requesting Organ of Consultation be convoked to study situation in Guatemala; convoked and to meet July 7.	Council of OAS postponed meeting; new government in Guatemala.			X	X	X												
Costa Rica-Nicaragua Situation	Rio Treaty	Jan. 8, 1955	Sept. 8, 1955	Costa Rica accused Nicaragua of harboring groups plotting invasion of Costa Rica.	Two countries in Jan. 1956 agreed to take steps to prevent subversive activities against the other.					X	X											
Ecuador-Peru Situation	Rio Treaty	Sept. 8, 1955	(Not applicable)	Ecuador alleged an attack by Peru was imminent.	Ecuador withdrew the request; dispute handled under terms of Ecuador-Peru Treaty of 1942.																X	X
Cuba-Dominican Republic Situation	IA Peace Committee	Feb. 27, 1956	April 20, 1956	Cuba requested Committee meet to study certain difficulties existing between it and the Dominican Republic	Committee expressed its hope that parties arrive at solution through regular diplomatic channels.										X	X						
Honduras-Nicaragua Situation	Rio Treaty	May 1, 1957	June 27, 1958	Honduras alleged Nicaraguan military forces crossed the boundary line established by an arbitral award in 1906.	Two parties agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice.			X	X													
Panama Situation	Rio Treaty	April 27, 1959	June 18, 1959	Panama claimed it had been invaded by foreign elements sailing from Cuba.	OAS Council recommended all governments sign Havana Convention of 1928 and its Protocol of 1957.									X	X							
Nicaragua Situation	Rio Treaty	June 2, 1959	July 26, 1959	Nicaragua claimed it had been invaded by a group entering from Costa Rica.	Information Committee gathered facts in Central America; Council recommended observance of non-intervention.					X	X											
Dominican Republic Request	Rio Treaty	July 2, 1959	(Not applicable)	Dominican Republic requested Organ of Consultation be convoked to study its charges that Cuba and Venezuela were plotting an invasion of Dominican Republic.	Dominican Republic withdrew its request on July 10. Yet Foreign Ministers convened at Santiago to study general Caribbean situation in August, 1959.										X	X			X			
Haiti Request	IA Peace Committee	Aug. 17, 1959	(Unfinished)	Haiti asked the Foreign Ministers of the OAS to study invasion of Haiti by group coming from Cuba	(Matter now being studied by IA Peace Committee operating under ad hoc power granted at Santiago.)										X	X						

The operations of the OAS Council under the Rio Treaty have been characterized by three features which seem critical to its successes in terminating, at least temporarily, conflict among the nations of Central America and the Caribbean. (1) The Council acts quickly, before the conflict enlarges itself in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. In over half of the times in which action has been requested under the Rio Treaty, the Council of the OAS has met on the very same day or on the day immediately following receipt of the request. (2) The Council gathers its own facts, usually through an investigatory committee composed of its own members. The committee travels to the countries involved, for the purpose of gaining direct, face-to-face contact with the antagonists, from country president to invading rebel leader or venturer. This work supplies the Council with a factfinding group upon whose observations it can confidently base its deliberations. (3) The Council's activity as provisional organ of consultation allows "cooling off" time, during which the more conservative forces of self-restraint within each of the nations can work internally for cessation of provocation.

#### *Inter-American Peace Committee*

The unratified Pact of Bogotá, submitted to the member nations by the Ninth I-A Conference, is a consolidation of much previous inter-American juridical activity with respect to conciliation and arbitration agreements. Thus, many of its provisions actually are operative because of earlier treaties and conventions. Typical of the way methods have grown within the OAS complex is the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), which was established at the second meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1940, but not activated by the OAS Council until 1948. The Committee's five members are selected by the OAS Council from the latter's membership, the IAPC being a standing committee, ready for immediate operation upon request of member states. Since 1948, working as a mediatory body with the consent of the parties involved, it has been almost as active as the Council itself (under the Rio Treaty) in the settlement of disputes, working without fanfare but with some success. Table 4 includes a summary of its activities. The OAS Council, operating either through its Investigatory Committee under the mandatory provisions of the Rio Treaty or through its ad hoc and more permissive Inter-American Peace Committee, found it unnecessary until 1959 actually to utilize the prestige and power of its meeting of Foreign Ministers to maintain peace among the mid-American nations.

#### *OAS peace actions stabilize status quo*

It is noteworthy that the work of these groups has had the effect of reestablishing the status quo. In almost all cases, the activities of the OAS have been terminated after cessation of violence. There has been almost no effort to change the underlying conditions which initially fomented the strife. Since such basic causes reside within the nations themselves and since the OAS in its political activities tries scrupulously to avoid intervention in the domestic affairs of its member states, it does not attempt at present to deal with more than those surface manifestations of tensions that result in inter-American disturbances.

## IMPLEMENTATION OF A MULTILATERALIZED MONROE DOCTRINE

*The Inter-American Defense Board*

In the early 1940's the exigencies of world conflict galvanized the American states into more active cooperation. An Inter-American Defense Board was established when it appeared the hemisphere might have to be defended against outside attack. And once again, the system evolved its mechanism in this area slowly and step by step. At the second Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the occasion of the fall of France in 1940, the mutual defense system was tightened up informally. During the third meeting immediately after Pearl Harbor, the IADB was established formally. At Bogotá in 1948 a proposal to make the Board an integral part of the emerging OAS met resistance on the ground that to do so would be to create a too powerful instrument which one day might be used for intrahemispheric purposes. Its relationship to the OAS therefore remains ambiguous. Its only formal tie to the regional organization has been the OAS Council's jurisdiction over the I-A Defense Board's budget. The scope of its defense planning activities was increased by the hemisphere's Foreign Ministers meeting in 1951 called to consider the hemispheric implications of the Korean conflict.

Although its plans are very general, the Board brings together some 75 delegates and their advisers from the armed forces of 20 states. (Costa Rica no longer sends delegates, partly because it has no standing army, partly because it is a staunch advocate of Latin American disarmament.) This background of personal contacts among military leaders of stature within the Americas may make collaboration in joint defense efforts easier, should emergencies arise. It appears also that the Defense Board is helpful in encouraging Latin American military personnel, most of whom are involved intimately in the politics of their home countries, to adopt more professional attitudes toward their careers.

*Slowly increasing Latin American participation in extrahemispheric military actions*

There is some evidence to indicate that over the years the nations of the Americas are becoming increasingly responsive to extrahemispheric conflict, even though the system supposedly operates only within the hemisphere. This presages vigorous response, given limited capability, should external groups attack countries within the boundaries set by the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

In World War I, 9 of the 21 American Republics declared war against Germany and her allies, and of these only 3, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, became active belligerents. While five others severed relations with Germany, seven states remained neutral throughout the conflict. In World War II, by way of contrast, all 21 American Republics eventually declared war on the Axis. Brazil, Mexico, and the United States were active belligerents; Brazil sent an expeditionary force to Italy; Mexico committed some air and naval units. During the United Nations action in Korea, 18 American states volunteered aid of some sort. Only Colombia's infantry bat-

talion and frigate were actually used by the U.N. command in the Korean struggle. In 1956, the call by the U.N. Secretary General for troops to serve in the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt was responded to by five Latin American countries.

#### SECURITY AGAINST SUBVERSION

When the situation is recognized as one of military aggression, the Latin Americans respond positively, provided no standing force is created which possibly could be used for purposes of interference in the internal affairs of American states. But what is to be their response if the aggression takes the form of subversion, if political rather than military means are used for gaining control of a Latin American state? As early as 1901 at their second international conference the American states developed a "Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for Protection Against Anarchism." Even then they considered the problem of the illegitimate use of such tactics for partisan purposes. The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense established in 1941 worked in a most flexible manner during World War II to coordinate measures designed to combat Axis political warfare and sabotage. Its effectiveness was increased by the fact that its members were in frequent face-to-face consultation with national officials in the various American states. This Committee, however, was formally discharged in 1948. At the 10th Inter-American Conference in 1954, despite considerable dissension, the states defined "domination or control of \* \* \* any American state by the international Communist movement" as a threat to the hemisphere which would justify the calling of "a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties." This was a minimal reaction to the growing power of the Communists in the Government and affairs of Guatemala between 1950 and 1954. A few months after the Conference adjourned, strongly anti-Communist rebel forces initially based in Nicaragua and Honduras succeeded in taking over control of Guatemala. At present there is no special machinery for handling subversion in the Western Hemisphere.

Certain political features of inter-American life inhibit the development of devices within the OAS for countering subversion. (1) Because many Latin-American societies lack a tradition of orderly and peaceful political change, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish subversive activity of extrahemispheric origin from quasi-legitimate "revolutions." (2) Even when the distinction can be made successfully, the tradition of noninterference in internal affairs prohibits a prior agreement to procedures for collective intervention by the OAS.

#### THE CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL NORMS TO REGULATE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

With the passage of time, many norms have evolved that condition relations among the states of the hemisphere. Of these norms, a num-

ber have been codified and set down in treaties and conventions drafted by various juristic bodies operating within the context of the OAS. The contribution of such bodies to the growth of international law in the Americas has been significant. Before 1948 the most important juridical agency was the International Commission of American Jurists. Since 1948 the Inter-American Council of Jurists has served as an advisory body on legal matters to the OAS Council, the Foreign Ministers, and the inter-American conferences. Although the Council of Jurists itself convenes only occasionally, once every 3 to 5 years, the subordinate Inter-American Juridical Committee is in continuous session at Rio de Janeiro. The Department of Legal Affairs of the OAS Secretariat at Washington provides technical services.

Besides aiding in the development of private international law, the groups involved in juridical activity have concerned themselves with such matters as draft conventions on territorial waters, the status of stateless persons, those who have found or are seeking asylum, exiles, and refugees, and problems in the recognition of de facto governments. Although its work seldom receives headlines, its successes are fundamental to the adoption of orderly procedures in the conduct of relations among the states of the Americas. Conformance to orderly procedures makes recourse to the special inter-American political peace machinery unnecessary.

Because the Jurists' Council only codifies the law for embodiment in treaties and conventions by the inter-American conference, there often is need for further interpretation of the laws and their enforcement—a function performed in most political systems by courts. The abortive Central American Court of Justice (1907–18) was preceded and followed by many proposals for an Inter-American Court of Justice. Again, matters of national sovereignty coupled with fears of intervention block its establishment. Further, many believe the International Court of Justice of the U. N. provides ample opportunity for judicial reviews and another duplication of international machinery is quite unnecessary.

#### THE CONTINUED PRESSURE FOR FREEDOM AND RIGHTS

##### *Ever-continuing anticolonialism*

Note the persistent eagerness for political independence and individual freedom over the decades. After World War II, the Ninth Inter-American Conference was moved to establish an "American Committee on Dependent Territories" within the OAS to serve as an instrument in efforts to rid the Americas of vestiges of colonialism, especially as found in the overseas areas of the British, Dutch, and French. Although the Committee floundered in its one meeting in 1949 at Havana, delegates to the Tenth Inter-American Conference in 1954 voted to keep it in existence, at least in shadow form. This time, however, its terms of reference were narrowed to preclude "liberation" of colonial territories "against the will of the peoples," an amendment undertaken in response to protests by representatives of the West Indies Conference and Puerto Rico, who feared the Committee's interference in their affairs.

*National freedoms versus individual freedoms*

The American cultural heritage—be it Spanish, Portuguese, French, or English—emphasizes the importance of the individual. Yet the “freedom” discussed by the revolutionaries throughout the American Continents usually meant the freedom of a collectivity from political domination by extra-hemispheric powers. Such desires for national freedom perhaps have gained momentum in part as compensatory reactions to the oppressiveness of local regimes. One possible alternative to violent rebellion against a government which deprives its citizens of civil liberties and human rights is the bringing to bear of political pressure upon the regime through the OAS. But the inter-American system is now fundamentally an arrangement among governments, not among the peoples of the American States and their governments.

*Broadening as well as rising expectations*

Toward the end of World War II, initiatives for provision of “a favorable environment for the development of [man’s] personality” culminated in an American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The “Revolution of Rising Expectations” that is affecting ever-broader segments of the Latin American population has much more than an economic content. While the demand for a higher material standard of living is insistent and is accelerated a bit by the economic, social and technical programs of the OAS, it is paralleled by a demand for “human rights” of a different, if related, character: rights to family, to residence, to unrestricted movement, to education, to work, even to leisure time. If the OAS is seen as successful in the technical areas of concern for the material and social standards of living, some wonder why the OAS should not be used as a vehicle to aid in the development of the political standards to which the individual is subjected. In fact, a proposal now is being readied for the coming Eleventh Inter-American Conference which, if accepted, might lead to the establishment of a court before which citizens could bring proceedings against governments which deny basic human rights.

In summary, the political-military activities of the OAS are even more plagued by the problems of national sovereignty than are its politico-economic activities. The one area of small success is in the development of legal norms directed toward the prevention of inter-American strife. The several governments cannot bring themselves even to ratify the Bogotá Treaty of conciliation and arbitration. Their intrahemispheric peacemaking activities are largely of a suppressive rather than a remedial nature. The machinery of the Rio Treaty has not confronted quarrels among the larger nations; to date it has been challenged only by small invasion forces and poorly organized ventures. The OAS defense effort is a paper effort, and it allows one of the member states to assume the arms burden for all. There has been an almost complete unwillingness to face the problem of extrahemispheric subversion. There has been no attempt to operate machinery to implement the platitudes of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Perhaps the widespread regard for the success of the OAS as a maintainer of peace has been gained only because the record of other international agencies over the past centuries has been so abysmal.

## F. ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE THROUGH THE OAS SECRETARIAT

At the time of the establishment of the OAS the designation "Pan American Union" was reserved for the Secretariat proper. The name itself has a history that goes back well into the past. Indeed, before 1948 what "system" there was in the "Inter-American System" was owed to the Pan American Union with its Governing Board. In fact, the Director of this pre-1948 secretariat, Leo S. Rowe, had held office for some 25 years and was known in the hemisphere as "Mr. Pan American." The Secretariat no longer plays such a predominant role in the expanding inter-American complex.


*Secretariat services*

The present-day PAU backstops the operation of the Organization of American States. Its preparatory materials serve to undergird the agenda of inter-American meetings. The Secretariat develops the documentation for the decisions of the OAS organs and serves councils and committees as the depository of inter-American treaties and conventions. In addition to its all-important and numerous housekeeping functions, it operates programs—including those of technical cooperation—and prepares background studies on such diverse subjects as public administration statistics and "Travel in the Americas." The internal organization of the Secretariat conforms to the division of labor established in the central organs of the OAS, as is exhibited in figure 3.

FIGURE 3

PAN AMERICAN UNION

Permanent and Central Organ and General Secretariat of the OAS



OCTOBER, 1958

During the development of the Pan American Union before World War II, the professional qualifications of many employees of the Secretariat were ordinary. This was due in part to the fact that wage and salary scales were relatively low; it was due also to the fact that the achievements of the inter-American system were modest. The Union was not able to attract men of stature. Since World War II there has been an important quickening which has accompanied many internal reforms in the management of the Secretariat. The OAS Council recently secured the services of a world-famed management consulting firm, whose tempered recommendations have been put into effect through the initiative of the Secretary General. Salary schedules and benefits are now more commensurate with those of other international organizations, but do not match those of the United Nations. For example, chiefs of divisions in the PAU start at \$12,672 per year, while the roughly comparable principal officers of the U.N. Secre-

tariat start at \$13,300. Pan American Union staff members get home leave once each 3 years, against home leave every other year in the U.N. arrangement.

In the past there had been a decided tendency to keep assignments within the Secretariat, seldom utilizing the resources of outside groups. A change in this respect is now occurring. More and more specialized studies are being "contracted out" to groups with more expertise than the Secretariat possesses. The Union now uses "OAS Advisory Committees" more frequently, as a way of tapping the brainpower of the hemisphere. A recent example is found in the OAS Ad Hoc Advisory Meeting on Science Development, stimulated by the decision to form an Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission. Finally, as the PAU becomes larger, it can afford to employ more specialized talent in the operation of the Organization.

Perhaps the most important function of the Secretariat is achieving continuity in the operation of the various organs of the OAS. As governments change in the Americas, as some representatives are replaced by others, it is imperative that a group with continuity aid the plenipotentiaries to avoid the repetition of resolutions, and duplication of effort which often is authorized by the councils and committees. For example, 2 or 3 years before each Inter-American Conference, intensive preparation and studies are made for its meetings by the Pan American Union. Likewise, the multitude of tasks assigned to various agencies of the OAS by the Inter-American Conferences are processed by the Secretary General and his staff in the years after the Conference has adjourned.

The foreign officers in the Latin American countries operate with limited personnel. The coordination between their different representatives in the OAS often is not accomplished through the home offices of the member countries, but must be done in Washington with the aid of the OAS Secretariat itself. It is not impossible to find delegates from the same country arguing diverse points of view in different organs of the OAS. The PAU strives to integrate the actions of the many quasi-autonomous groups within the OAS complex.

#### *Secretariat overloaded*

Although meshing of the operations of the Secretariat and the councils and committees is well conceived, two characteristics of the OAS create considerable challenge in its implementation. Because of the juridical equality of 21 sovereign states represented in the OAS, there is a strong tendency for the councils and committees within the Organization, in an effort to avoid affronting any member, to entertain all suggestions which are offered at a meeting. Further, because the groups seldom develop priorities among the many projects suggested by these nations of supposedly equal status, the workload developed for the Secretariat within a given department is tremendous, entirely beyond the resources of the Secretariat's capacities. Hence, important decisions must be made concerning the feasibility

and scope of particular projects by the Secretariat itself. Recently there has been an endeavor to attach price tags to projects as they are being worked over by councils and committees, the objective being to increase the realism with which authorizations of activity by the PAU are made. Perhaps this will help reduce the utopian flavor of the deliberations of the councils and committees, which outpace the ability of the Secretariat to perform by a ratio of 10 to 1.

*Difficulties in decentralization*

To bring the Organization closer to its member states—and less susceptible to the influence of the United States—there is a tendency toward decentralization in the OAS complex. But new problems then develop for the PAU. Of the four groups in continuous session—the OAS Council, the IA-ECOSOC, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, and the Committee for Cultural Action—half are away from the Washington headquarters. The location of the Juridical Committee in Rio and the Cultural Committee in Mexico City involves the duplication of Secretariat services. It is imperative to have legal and cultural departments at headquarters, in order to service the specialized conferences, as well as to carry through the tasks assigned by the Inter-American Conferences, the Foreign Ministers, and the OAS Council itself.

As the operations of the OAS become increasingly decentralized, the task of liaison between the Secretariat headquarters and the field gains much in complexity and difficulty, while losing nothing in urgency. Within recent years Secretariat employees have been sent to the field during periods when the juridical and cultural committees are particularly active in order to achieve on-the-spot coordination. Communication problems are great, in any event, within the inter-American system. Such problems, for example, would seem basic to the inability of the Council to match the United States contributions in the area of technical assistance. One consequence of the recent reorganization of the technical cooperation program, whereby its Director was made Chairman of the Technical Cooperation Board itself, may be to increase personal contact between him and his opposite numbers in the foreign offices of the Latin American States. To this point there has not been sufficient communication through the OAS delegations to the home offices to enable the governments to recognize the benefits they could receive by fully meeting their quotas.

In making an analysis of the functioning of the PAU, it is important to avoid applying standards appropriate to industrial bureaucracies of government executive operations. When the Secretariat was kept relatively removed from inter-American political activities in the pre-World War II days, such criteria might have been relevant. In the postwar period, its redundancies and limited accomplishments are largely due to the inability of its 21 sovereign nations to supply clear directions and adequate funds. It seems evident that the efficiency of the Secretariat, while not high in absolute standards, is quite superior to the efficiency of operation of the OAS Councils and Committees manned by the governments themselves.

Thus, the accomplishments of the OAS are modest but real. They are dwarfed almost to insignificance when judged by goals embroid-

ered in flamboyant language. They are probably less than those realized by NATO but more than those achieved by SEATO. Experienced inter-American hands argue that the political activities of the OAS have outstripped the economic-social. The authors of this report beg to differ—both seem equally small, with perhaps less achievement in the political sphere than in the economic-social-cultural sphere.

#### G. PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN THE OAS

These modest achievements since World War II continue to reinforce the tendency of many statesmen to think of the OAS as a useful instrument for the achievement of a wide variety of goals. Because the Organization has been friendly and cooperative—working with ECLA and UNESCO as well as a bevy of specialized and nongovernmental organizations—its public image is blurred. The information programs carried out by the PAU employ a variety of media—film, radio and television, publications, press releases, and speakers—in direct approaches to the public. However, public interest on the part of the United States population in Latin America is slight, a fact reflected by most indexes of measurement: newspaper coverage, college and university course offerings, Hollywood production schedules, and so on. Public interest in the OAS consequently is small. While in Latin America public interest in the operations of the OAS appears to be greater than in the United States, it must be recognized that the Latin American public which can be reached by the media employed by the OAS is relatively reduced. Although confirmation by survey data is lacking, it seems likely that the overwhelming majority of those living in the Americas are unaware even of the existence of the OAS, to say nothing of its modest accomplishments. Hence, it seems its value as an instrumentality is recognized in the main only by the governing groups within its member nations.

#### H. INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE OAS

Basic to the OAS in all its complexity and diffuseness is leadership. In South and Central America the Spanish legacy in the leadership of the aristocracy is isolation and conservation of the status quo. Until after World War II “revolutionary leadership” in Latin America often meant little more than the capture of the privileges of office by one military junta from another. Neither of these “schools” for leadership prepared Latin Americans for political leadership in the developing inter-American system. Nor did North America provide democratic leadership in the hemisphere. Canada’s orientation toward Britain and her Commonwealth prevented exploitation of a splendid heritage for leadership in the hemisphere. The awkwardness of the United States at the turn of the century in dictating solutions through unilateral interventions seriously damaged her potential usefulness as an inter-American leader.

With the trend toward demilitarization of political life in Latin America, with the development of a more influential middle class as the South and Central American countries industrialize and urbanize, and with the continued growth of multilateral leadership skills by Government officials and statesmen in the United States, and elsewhere, there well may be an influx of more adequate leadership into the OAS in the years ahead.

#### RESTRAINTS UPON LEADERSHIP BY COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES

To date the offices of responsibility in the OAS complex have been by and large filled by diplomats, schooled in the heritage of European international law and practiced in surviving within the bureaucracies of unstable governments. Because OAS posts are felt by the Latin Americans to be less desirable than ambassadorial appointments to either the larger capitals of the world or to the United Nations, the top of the small pool of talent already has been exhausted by the time OAS appointments are made. Further many OAS representatives feel restrained in exercising personal leadership on the inter-American scene. Should one strive to make an individual reputation for himself, he might become suspect to his own government.

Once the representatives arrive on the Washington scene, there are further factors which work against the effective development of leadership within the OAS itself. At present over a third of them are over-burdened because they represent their countries both at the White House and in the OAS Council. Some fear this means a nation's position in Council one day is influenced directly by the ambassador's need the next day to maintain smooth working relations in his representations at the Department of State. Many are unable to find time to do their substantive homework and their discussions become legalistic quibbles. The OAS is a very small organization in Washington, a city of many very large and active institutions. The informal relations among the members of the OAS Council and Committees are diluted in an atmosphere full of distractions. Contrasting with the United Nations buildings with their bars, lounges, and delegates' dining rooms, the Victorian grandeur of the Pan American Union Building encourages formality and hauteur, such as befits a plenipotentiary. It does not encourage an easy give-and-take among cooperating nations.

It is difficult to find leadership in an international organization when ambassadors still are learning the skills of multilateral diplomacy. Almost half of the 21 countries have changed their representatives in the Council five or more times during the first decade of the Organization's existence. The average delegate serves a little more than 2 years in the Council. The relative stability in the representation at the Councils in permanent session contrasts with the more complete changeover in representation at the inter-American conferences, the foreign ministers' meetings, and the other groups

that meet occasionally, such as the Inter-American Council of Jurists, the Inter-American Cultural Council and the ad hoc specialized conferences. Because the offices of chairman and vice chairman tend to be regularly rotated in most OAS organs, in keeping with the formal equality among the states and without significant regard to considerations of leadership abilities among the delegates, channels for the exercise of initiative by the more gifted are few.

#### LEADERSHIP PATTERN OF UNITED STATES

##### *Influence of dominant member*

The dominant position of the United States has been reflected in its leadership role in the inter-American system. When the PAU was founded a decade before the turn of the century, the Secretary of State of the United States was designated permanent Chairman of the Board of Governors. All eight Directors General of the Pan American Union who served before the end of World War II were citizens of the United States. Moreover, the employees of the early PAU were largely U.S. citizens, although over the years a gradual and continuing influx of Latin Americans has occurred. The undergirding of the Organization by the United States is reflected even in 1957-58 in the fact that the United States is a member of all 5 permanent committees and 11 special committees of the OAS Council. Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia come next in frequency, with 15, 14, and 10 places respectively—the other 17 countries have less than 9 places. In the I-A Defense Board there is the greatest formal dominance by the United States; its three main positions, including the chairmanship, are permanently occupied by the United States, no matter who is assigned from the United States to the Board by the Department of Defense. The physical location of OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., within a few blocks of the U.S. Department of State, gives apparent substance to the international Communist charge that the Organization is but an annex of the Department.

##### *Ambiguity in self-restraint of dominant power*

Since World War II, the representatives of the United States have been exemplary in the modesty and flexibility of their conduct within the meetings of the OAS. Yet, when the United States does not take initiative in respective matters before the OAS, Latin American members often are reluctant to push forward. In the background, the colossal power of the United States looms as the fundamental reality. Delegates and employees alike are aware that the United States pays two-thirds of the annual budget. In political crises, especially those involved in the struggle against communism, there is fear that in the end the United States will insist on having its way. In the constructive work of the OAS in economic, social, and cultural affairs, the initiative of the Latin Americans is dampened because of their seeming inability to shoulder the financial responsibilities involved in the enterprises they would see implemented. It is for this reason that the establishment of an Inter-American Development Bank had to await a change in U.S. policy with respect to its economic commitments in Latin America, a change that first occurred in 1958-59.

Despite the fact that in the end the Latin American countries agreed to subscribe some 55 percent of the Bank's funds, they were unwilling to go ahead earlier on a reduced scale without U.S. participation. Latent fears of displeasing the United States make it difficult for potential Latin American leaders in the OAS to assert themselves or to seize leadership opportunities now available to them because of the restrained policies of the United States.

#### RESTRAINTS DERIVING FROM ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY

Perhaps even more important in depriving the OAS of leadership is the ever-present fear on the part of member nations that the OAS may acquire supranational powers which could conceivably be used in collective intervention. This fear underlies negative reactions in Latin America to recent proposals for an inter-American police force. This fear goes far to explain also the profusion of councils, committees, and specialized organizations within the OAS. If there is ambiguity in terms of reference, if there is overlap in function, if there is restriction of scope of operations—in compensation there is safety from that power which would accrue from greater effectiveness.

The basic diffuseness of the OAS reflects itself again in the absence of singularity in its leadership. The OAS does not recruit many individuals capable of supplying personal leadership. And once the delegates arrive, there are many handicaps which prevent their development as persons of initiative. The last 10 years of self-restraint by the United States in inter-American affairs carries with it an ambiguity which induces caution in the representatives from other nations. Permeating all efforts to assume responsibility within the OAS complex is the ever-present fear of collective interventions by the OAS in the affairs of its members, should its initiative be forthright.

#### LEADERSHIP STYLES OF THE DIRECTORS GENERAL

##### *Role of Secretary General*

During the post-World War II period of greatest American solidarity, when feelings of hemispheric community were strong and growing stronger, a Colombian of stature, Alberto Lleras Camargo, was chosen to be the Director General of the old Pan American Union. Some hoped he was to be a major force in effecting the transition from the amorphous inter-American system to a strong and coherent new organization. But the new OAS Charter of 1948 frustrated these expectations by providing for a nonpolitical Secretary General who would enjoy substantially less initiative than the Secretary General of the United Nations. Latin Americans have had long and frequently unpleasant experience with strong executives. Lleras' informal attempts to provide perspective and vision within the OAS complex went unappreciated and indeed were criticized openly by some of the governments. When he resigned upon completion of but little more than half of his 10-year term, the OAS Council selected a Chilean, Carlos Dávila, who devoted himself to increasing the public visibility of the OAS in the American states by much travel and

through many public appearances. Upon his death, the Office of Secretary General passed to the Uruguayan diplomat, José A. Mora, the incumbent, who gives much of his energy to improving the internal operation of the Secretariat. In 1957, during a meeting with the presidential representatives, Dr. Mora stated his conception of the PAU's functions, including his role of the Secretary General:

The Pan American Union "has complex functions which are articulated under the authority of the Council. \* \* \* Through its reports, its documents, its publications, its investigations, and its direct services of technical cooperation, the Pan American Union reflects a complex and objective synthesis of the aspirations, objectives, and accomplishments in the various fields of the Organization of American States. The Secretary General, by presenting with full objectivity to the organs of the Institution, to the Governments and to public opinion, the thinking and the action of the Organization, divorces itself from all national or political interests, and it bases itself exclusively in the conclusions that have been approved through the competent organs of the Organization.

*Leadership from within the secretariat*

The development of a more adequate executive group within the OAS Secretariat is now under way. There is realization that the Secretary General needs staff aids in order to carry out effectively his planning and budget activities; no longer will he need to rely exclusively upon his overburdened department directors. The secretaries of the councils and committees are all PAU officials. The yearly shifts in delegate-chairmanships of the councils are disruptive. Perhaps the recent use of a department head as the chairman of the Technical Cooperation Board presages an increase in group effectiveness. Because of the important political purposes served by relative disorganization, it seems likely that a really thoroughgoing reorganization of the Secretariat will meet subtle and indirect opposition from member states. Some argue the Secretariat already is too powerful because of its efficiency vis-a-vis the delegates. In the long run, the tendency toward more effectiveness in the Secretariat may lead to further geographic decentralization of the OAS, its diverse activities being fragmented into highly specialized units distributed throughout the whole of the Western Hemisphere.

PROVISION OF LEADERSHIP THROUGH TEMPORARY GROUPINGS

*Technical work in OAS requires technical representation*

As the diplomats who control policymaking organs in the OAS are able more readily to distinguish technical activities from political ones, the early tendency of the PAU to operate nonpolitically may be revived. The OAS Secretariat seems to emphasize this characteristic of its activities in order to allay fears of member governments. Yet, as OAS operations become more technical, its organs, being manned by foreign relations experts who lack technical backgrounds, will have increased difficulty in guiding these nonpolitical activities. Even now, to remedy these shortcomings, "extraordinary" conferences are held by finance ministers, by education ministers and by health ministers. This structure of extraordinary sessions of the regular councils and committees, in which substantive specialists who are responsible for technical programs in their home countries sit in place of the diplomats, serves further to increase the disorderliness of OAS activities. The procedure does increase the impact of the OAS upon the home

offices directly involved in economic affairs, educational systems, and health problems, for the dilution of influence through the transmission and liaison activities of diplomatic officers is eliminated. As the specialized technical work of the OAS becomes more effective, the governments of the member states become increasingly desirous to have direct participation in OAS activities by their operating ministries.

#### *Growth of supergroups for OAS decisionmaking*

Given the handicaps placed upon personal leadership, efforts have been made to vitalize inter-American activities through the creation of special ad hoc "supergroups" when the diffuse machinery of the OAS proves inadequate. The outstanding example of this to date is the establishment of the Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives, which met on a number of occasions in 1956 and early 1957. Its sponsorship by the presidents of the American states enabled it to break through a number of intra-OAS barriers in economic and social affairs, even though half of the representatives were the very ambassadors who might have come to identical agreements working together in the Council of the OAS. The "Committee of 21," specialists appointed by the OAS's Economic Conference (an ad hoc, specialized conference), was established to supersede, in a temporary way, the ineffective IA-ECOSOC. More recently, this tendency toward the development of superstructure groups to provide more adequate collective leadership was exhibited when the foreign ministers at their fifth meeting of consultation at Santiago gave the Inter-American Peace Committee new, but again only temporary, power to investigate the underlying causes of the tensions in inter-American political affairs. This authorization removed the restriction that the committee might operate only upon the request of particular countries and then was required further to limit its deliberations to a search for procedures by which conflict might be resolved, abstaining meticulously from substantive inquiry into the fundamental matters at issue in the quarrel.

The lack of emphatic personal leadership, either from the permanent representatives or members of the Secretariat, combines with the dispersion of authority among many councils and committees in the OAS to yield leadership "vacuums." These omissions at times are filled by the use of ad hoc superstructures, ranging from "extraordinary meetings" to sporadic "plenipotentiary conferences" in more specialized fields of endeavor when more technical, rather than political, decisions are needed. Until the total supply of leaders in the American states is greater it is difficult to see how more initiative and responsibility can be expected in the short run in the OAS, given the powerful restraining factors which exist in the present situation.

#### *Legalism versus realism*

To those with a more pragmatic outlook in keeping with North American tradition, the activities of the OAS at times seem tedious and slow, given to verbalism. To those with a more legalistic and philosophical outlook in keeping with Latin American traditions, the development of an elegantly phrased declaration is as much a valued end-product as is the subsequent implementation of the expressed sentiment in pragmatic action. Thus for many within the inter-American system, there is no imperative requirement that initiative

and responsibility be encouraged within the delegations and the Secretariat. Further, for both the pragmatist and the idealist, implementation of such developments as common markets, human rights, and arms traffic controls, involve many crosscurrents of interest. Such controversies lead practicing statesmen into difficulties with fellow countrymen, even when an overall advantage to the country can be seen to derive from hemispheric actions.

## I. THE OAS COMPLEX AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

### RELATIONS TO NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The formal and close relations within the OAS of the Council and Secretariat to the half dozen inter-American specialized organizations, like the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, contrasts with the loose, minimal relations of the OAS with the many nongovernmental organizations operating in the inter-American scene. In 31 cases the OAS has concluded quasi-formal arrangements for general cooperation with nongovernmental organizations. Represented among them were such diverse groups as the Inter-American Federation of Automobile Clubs, the Inter-American Boy Scouts Advisory Committee, the Pan American Association of Ophthalmology, the American Coffee Grower's Federation, the Hispano-American Press, Motion Picture and Television Association, and the Inter-American Bar Association. Cooperation with these groups usually involves little more than exchanges of information respecting programs in progress and in prospect. Occasionally a program may be undertaken with the joint sponsorship of a nongovernmental organization and an agency of the OAS. In addition, the OAS maintains informal, ad hoc relations with a great many nongovernmental organizations, such as the National Education Association of the United States and the American Society of Travel Agents.

Mention has already been made of the many ways in which the OAS has direct and immediate contact with citizens of its member states, as in technical assistance, through the expanding fellowship program, via its cultural activities, and more recently through its official Pan American Union offices now existing in more than two-thirds of the capitals of the hemisphere. The many nongovernmental organizations also provide direct relations of peoples in the hemisphere to the inter-American system, reducing its remoteness and serving as concrete symbols of hemispheric cooperation.

### RELATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The Latin American nations have considerable pride in their inter-American system, despite its deficiencies. When the U.N. draft charter was being reworked at San Francisco in 1945, the delegates from the hemisphere were united in demanding explicit provision for the regional arrangement, especially as an instrument for collective secu-

ity. Provision for such was made in articles 51 and 53 of the U.N. Charter. Reciprocal and more explicit provisions were placed in the OAS Charter which enjoins the Council of the OAS—

to promote and facilitate collaboration between the Organization of the American States and the United Nations, as well as between inter-American Specialized Organizations and similar international agencies.

For example, the OAS Charter instructs that—

all international disputes that may arise between American states shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Except in the case of Guatemala in 1954 when the pro-Communist Arbenz government appealed to the Security Council while it still had its request before the I-A Peace Committee, there have been no violations of this provision—nor has the inter-American peace machinery failed to the extent that involvement of the U.N. Security Council was needed as a further step. In two instances since 1948 Latin American countries have utilized the International Court of Justice for the rendering of opinion—in an asylum case involving Haya de la Torre, and in the 1957 boundary dispute of Honduras and Nicaragua. There is no relation between the I-A Defense Board and any group within the United Nations.

*Competition and cooperation among OAS and U.N. specialized agencies*

The relations between agencies within the OAS and technical, economic, and cultural units within the U.N. complex are much greater than those in the political-military area. Even formal cooperative agreements have been reached for division of labor between IA-ECOSOC and ECLA, between the Agricultural Sciences Institute and FAO, between the Committee for Cultural Action and UNESCO, and between the Pan American Health Organization and WHO. The degree of cooperation varies considerably from pair to pair. Despite formal working agreements, the rivalry between ECLA and the IA-ECOSOC has been keen, with ECLA clearly overshadowing the OAS organ in the Latin American view. In fact, the more radical approaches taken by ECLA have been used to provide leverage within the more conservative OAS for securing concessions from the United States with respect to Latin American economic development. The arrangements between both FAO and UNESCO and their OAS counterparts have been moderately satisfactory. The U.N. organs are said often to accrue public credit, actually developed by the OAS agencies, because of the overall greater prestige and resources of the world agencies. The most successful articulation of OAS and U.N. is found in the arrangement whereby the old Pan American Sanitary Bureau actually operates as the regional arm of WHO. With but one organization in the Americas, there can be neither competition nor problem in coordination of related efforts. The Pan American Health Organization, as the Sanitary Bureau then was renamed, operates with two budgets, one from OAS and one from WHO. Its program fulfills world requirements and at the same time there are resources for tailoring programs to hemispheric need.

Thus, although there have been few actual relations between the OAS and the U.N. in political areas, the programs in the technical, cultural, and economic areas have varied from severe rivalry with duplication of effort to almost complete cooperation by the incorporation of an OAS agency into a U.N. specialized organization.

*Lack of relations among regional organizations*

The relations between the OAS and other regional groups—NATO, SEATO, the Arab League, etc.—are practically nil. When the Secretaries General of OAS and NATO had a pleasant exchange of notes in 1958 relaying their willingness to share information on “questions of common interest,” the Latin American drive for autonomy once again evidenced itself in Secretary Mora’s reply which took pains to point out that “the OAS and NATO have *separate* and distinct natures.” [Italics ours.]

THE REGIONAL VERSUS THE UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATION

It is quite possible—but not necessary—that a more successful OAS would weaken the ties of the countries of the Western Hemisphere to the United Nations. The regional organization could withdraw from the world scene, constituting an American hemispheric island, isolated unto itself. On the other hand, if the arrangements between the OAS and the U.N. are formed so as to make competition less common than is now generally the case, the regional unit might function as a decentralized agent of the universal organization. This is the case at present in the field of the health organizations.

The OAS cannot isolate itself from the problems handled by the U.N. because of the potential and actual interdependence of its members upon other countries in the world. South American countries trade extensively with Europe, and the Latin American nations compete in coffee and cocoa with the African States. Trade arrangements and problems of commodity prices cannot be settled within the hemisphere. As Japan and other countries in the Far East open larger markets on the west coasts of both South and North America, the linkages with the East and West will be increased. With respect to economic development the Latin Americans already have demonstrated solidarity with the Afro-Asian bloc in their voting in the U.N. Assembly. As worldwide cultural exchanges increase, there is little reason to expect that ties between North and South America will be stronger than ties to other parts of the world. In political matters, the claims of Chile and Argentina on the Antarctic Continent may make the U.N. an important instrument for these two countries in future negotiations with other claimants. Problems of fallout from nuclear testings are of concern to both North and South Americans. Because of the dependence of the Latin American countries upon the armed shield of the United States—and to an extent on Canada, too—the success of the United Nations in its contributions to world order is of immense concern to members of the OAS. In the overall picture, it would seem that there are many occasions in which the U.N. provides an important arena for the achievement of Western hemispheric interests, complementary to the activities of the OAS.

The OAS-U.N. relationship provides a way of simplifying the complexities of operations in the world organization. By settling disputes within the hemisphere, occasions for exacerbation of great power quarrels are reduced. By developing tailored social and economic assistance programs to the region, the maladaptations of universal programs are remedied. By using the OAS as a decentralized arm of the U.N., instead of structuring the relations as potentially competitive, activities in the OAS would serve to increase the ties of the countries of the Western Hemisphere to the U.N., rather than weakening them. In the long run the members of the OAS could arrange the organizational activities at the regional and universal levels so as to obtain a division of powers that restrains both the OAS and the U.N., but simultaneously allows each to undertake those activities appropriate to its scope of operations and the skills of its personnel. But to repeat: it is as possible to develop an OAS which is competitive and a threat to the functioning of the U.N. as it is to build a regional organization which integrates into the overall world picture. The die has not been cast.

### J. VIABILITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OAS

#### *Insufficiency of external pressure alone*

In assessing the inter-American system, one must adopt a long perspective. The system's growth has been slow and gradual through its history of some 130 years. Occasionally periods of crisis have provided opportunity for rapid and important moves forward. The Pan American Union first began to flourish after the Spanish-American War, and the mushrooming complex was retailored after World War II into the OAS. But other hemispheric crises produced no particular acceleration. After the Latin American colonies successfully revolted from Spain during the early part of the 19th century, efforts to organize a continental system failed. During the time of the Civil War in the United States, when the European powers attempted to gain territories in the hemisphere, efforts to organize a tighter linkage were unsuccessful. After World War I, there was no significant impetus toward closer hemispheric collaboration. This evidence indicates that more than pressure by nonhemisphere forces is necessary to ensure adequate impetus for long-term growth, even though the recent invigoration of the system during 1945-48 was stimulated by World War II. Perhaps an internal ripeness for growth must also be present.

#### *Growth by adding new members*

Membership in the OAS is open to all political entities within the Americas. Despite the estrangement of Argentina from her sister countries at the end of World War II by her pro-Axis leanings, solidarity within the hemisphere prevailed by including her in the OAS, even though her ratification came only after the deposition of Perón. Canada has long had a standing invitation to join, sometimes dramatized by the inclusion of an empty chair at the ceremonial meetings of the OAS Council. The relations of Greenland and the Antarctic regions (portions of the latter being claimed by American countries) to the system are vague, although they were included in (and Hawaii out) of the boundaries drawn in 1947 at the time of the Rio

treaty to define the system's defense perimeters. Should the non-self-governing areas change their relations with their mother countries, it would be entirely feasible for them to obtain membership in the organization. Should there be a reunion of some of the smaller countries in Central America, the new entity would be able to secure membership by reratification of the charter, although the amalgamation would be entitled to but one vote.

*Change in rate of growth*

At present, member states for the most part regard the OAS as an auxiliary device to be used as one of a number of tools available to a sovereign nation-state in the pursuit of its interests. The further growth of the OAS will depend upon what and how much its governments will allow it to do and upon how well it is able to do what is allowed. Should there be an increase in the nationalism of its members, its scope will be reduced. Should it fail to perform its functions, it will tend to be weakened by neglect. Should there be less fear of intervention, there will be more growth in the OAS. The OAS now competes with bilateral arrangements and the universal organizations. Should this regional organization develop even more adequate non-political and culturally tailored ways of meeting the needs of its member states—especially if it meets the needs of their peoples as well as of their governments—its rate of growth will increase.

Perhaps a comparison of the growth of the OAS with that of NATO is useful. Although the inter-American system has had a formal existence seven times longer than that of NATO, many would agree that, inversely, the present effectiveness of NATO is at least seven times that of the OAS. This seems to be the case for two central reasons: (1) The pressure from the Soviets upon NATO is tremendously great, with one incident after the next to arouse and rearouse European vigilance, and (2) the internal capabilities of the NATO member nations for cooperation are much greater than those of the Latin American countries. It is possible for the arms contributions of highly industrialized countries to be of considerable magnitude. The governments of Europe are more stable than those of Latin America so that their commitments tend to be more firm. Their economic capabilities enable them to support a common infrastructure program providing such things as pipelines and common training facilities, an action which is impossible for impoverished people. Then too, their relative skill in democratic practice makes possible the evolution of the "NATO method" of decision-making, with its avoidance of formal voting. Both the magnitude of the external threat and the relative adequacy of internal capability of the member countries worked to make NATO's growth spectacular during the first decade of its existence, as contrasted with the halting progress exhibited during the same decade in the OAS.

The explicit goals of the OAS are extravagant. Against such standards its accomplishments necessarily look modest. At present, its elaborate and extensive organizational structure is not supported by financial and personnel resources adequate to accomplish its goals. The OAS attempts to satisfy the diverse demands of all its members. This has given its activities a scope which endangers its continued growth through failure to discharge satisfactorily its multiple re-

sponsibilities. An adjustment is inevitable: either there will be an increase in manpower and financial support or there will be a re-scaling of goals to less pretentious levels. The latter probably will not take place. If the OAS continues to be capable only of modest accomplishment, its members will look elsewhere for ways of achieving their national purposes.

Consider the broader potential of the OAS in the ideological struggles of men in the Americas. To an extent it already has been an ideological battleground: the American countries have been successful in their use of the Organization as a device for the implementation of the principle of nonintervention, both as a multilateral doctrine directed against non-American forces, and as a juridical principle applying to relations among the units of the American system. Over the past century Pan Americanism has coped successfully with tendencies toward Pan Latin Americanism. However, this notion that Latin Americans could do better if they went alone is far from dormant. It serves as successfully today as material for anti-U.S. propaganda by Latin American Communists as it did in the 1930's and 1940's when employed by the Axis Powers. The OAS would constitute an excellent base from which to initiate programs of neutrality, because a policy of hemispheric withdrawal from the broader world holds substantial appeal for many Americans, both North and South. The Conferences and Councils of the OAS might easily be turned into a forum in which groups of liberal-democratic orientation could lock ideological horns with spokesmen for more conservative, or even totalitarian, political philosophies.

#### *Positive potential for OAS accomplishments*

To date the central political accomplishments of the OAS have been of a negative nature: the preventing of interference by one state in the affairs of the other. Those active in political life know that it is easier to secure agreement on what not to do than on what might be done in a more constructive way. There are many signs that the Organization may be viable enough to do much that is positive, despite its century of slow growth. But it is unlikely to do so, unless its member states give tenfold more abundantly of their leadership and resources to the pursuit of such goals.

The Organization of American States can wither, should it continue to fail in meeting the great expectations of its members. The nations then will tend to seek instruments for their progress in other ideological movements, in stronger forms of nationalism, or in stronger ties outside the hemisphere. Alternatively, the OAS is capable of much growth, should its member nations decide to support it with adequate talent and resources. Its membership could be increased to include all the peoples of the hemisphere. If the Organization is given more money and manpower, its representatives will improve in quality, which in turn will enable the Secretariat to perform its work more adequately. As OAS activities grow in scope, the development of its member nations will be accelerated, giving them a greater capacity to cooperate with the other American nations in the OAS complex. A more effective OAS then will have a base of strength from which it can bargain with the agencies of the U.N. for more adequate coordination of regional functions within the universal organizations.

## II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS FOR ACTION AND POLICY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

What are the implications of this analysis of the Organization of American States for the development of the foreign policy of the United States? Different individuals and different groups have different goals—and because of this, they will tend to view the inter-American system in somewhat different ways. The following section describes U.S. goals, first in a more general way and then in some particulars. Next, consideration is given to the problem of the extent to which the OAS, as a regional arrangement, should be utilized in achieving our general goals, versus the alternative uses of bilateral channels and the United Nations. Finally, concrete proposals are made for the implementation of our conclusions, derived by placing our particular U.S. goals in relation to the capabilities of the OAS.

### A. GENERAL GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE AMERICAS

Basic in much thinking in the United States is our desire to “live and let live.” But because of its overwhelming power, this country has much difficulty in being friendly in the Western Hemisphere without at once being dominant. We seek peace and security; we are concerned with health and material standards of life; and we increasingly yearn to behold things of the spirit, as freedom and beauty. How can these interests of the people of the United States be realized in the Americas?

### B. THE OAS AS AN ALTERNATIVE

This is the underlying question for action: To what extent should the United States conduct its relations in the Western Hemisphere through the OAS? If isolation were viable, one would drop membership in the Organization. But isolation allows totalitarian inroads, as the earlier analysis has indicated. If the United Nations were adequate, duplication of multilateral channels in the machinery of the OAS would be wasteful. But the U.N.'s functions are hamstrung by conflict between the East and West. Our general goal of increasing friendship in the Americas then must be achieved in the main through our bilateral and our regional multilateral arrangements.

What balance should obtain between our direct relations with the countries of Latin America, individually, versus our group relations with these countries in concert through the inter-American system? At present the balance of bilateral to multilateral activity is of the order of 100 to 1, at the very least; perhaps the proportion is closer to 1,000 to 1. Does such a state of affairs serve our interests? It would seem not.

Yet, there are advantages for the United States in bilateral relations, at least in the short run. They are the traditional way of conducting diplomatic relations, replete with helpful procedures tested over the centuries. A tremendous number of matters, commercial and otherwise, simply must be handled by a nation's consular services as citizens conduct business and travel across boundaries. Working bilaterally, our International Cooperation Administration can tailor its technical arrangement into the servicio of another government without too many complications. Third party considerations press for fewer compromises when action is limited to the two parties directly involved. Our Government loan agencies, including the long-useful Export-Import Bank, can work with private banking groups to help governments in Latin America without interference from the "European bankers," as some in Latin America phrase the barriers they encounter in working with the International Bank. The military assistance programs of our Department of Defense can be more easily arranged to fit our interests in antisubmarine warfare and can be coordinated with our unilateral efforts to control Caribbean arms traffic. Bilateral arrangements for local broadcasts can be made by the U.S. Information Agency without having to insure that all other 19 Latin American countries get equal time. Each party in the two-nation relation seems to have a free hand, committing itself to action which it alone controls. Many in the executive branch believe that unless the United States exercises considerable control over its foreign programs, it cannot reduce corruption and misuse of moneys and personnel. "Incidents" make it increasingly difficult to obtain funds for foreign aid from the Congress.

These considerations tend to emphasize the short run, but it is in the short run that program administrators, desk officers, and Assistant Secretaries of State must survive. In the long run emphasis on the bilateral adds to fragmentation of the hemisphere. In fact, our bilateral moves are said to cause bitter friction at times among the Latin American nations as each competes with the other for our favors. Because the state which gives also deprives, at times dissatisfaction is directed toward ourselves. Bilateral relations with the United States are small power versus large power relations—such is the fact of life. To circumvent these difficulties, one is led to the conclusion that serious effort should be made to decrease the disproportionately large volume of activities carried through bilateral as contrasted with multilateral channels in the relations of the United States to its Latin American neighbors.

Our earlier analysis reveals another important reason for desiring a relative increase in the utilization of the Organization of the American States. By standing 20 to 1, the odds against an overwhelmingly successful neighbor seem less forbidding. When there is more self-confidence, there is more tendency to act with initiative and responsibility in hemispheric affairs. The feeling of self-assurance in the collective strength of organized American states reduces the impulse toward nationalistic self-assertion.

In summary, then, there are two fundamental reasons why the ratio of bilateral to multilateral activities on the part of the United States vis-a-vis our Latin American neighbors should be reduced: (1) in bilateral relations we inadvertently continue pressures toward hemi-

spheric fragmentation because we are so powerful; (2) by using multilateral relations, our power seems less threatening, thereby arousing fewer tendencies for nationalistic self-assertion against us as an outsider. As indicated in our earlier analysis, both of these conditions precede the development of more solidarity on the part of the Latin American states with the United States.

There are two ways by which such a change in proportion can be effected. One might reduce the number of functions carried bilaterally through our Government agencies which conduct overseas programs. Alternatively, one might increase the number of activities carried by the multilateral organization. This study focuses on the Organization of American States per se and makes no analysis in detail of U.S. bilateral relations. Our report will examine only how the basic imbalance can be remedied by increasing OAS activity. But sometime the underlying question must be answered: Should these increases be obtained by transferring bilateral activity into multilateral channels, or should increases in OAS activity be obtained by raising the total level of our Latin American efforts?

Two limiting conditions must be applied to our conclusion that the activity of the OAS should be increased. (1) If the OAS is charged with tasks beyond its capability, it will fail. The United States must avoid stimulating too rapid surges in its undertakings. The rate of increase indicated in the last few years represented in figure 2 would seem maximal. (2) If increases in U.S. participation in the OAS should become so great as to preclude the very advantages of partnership obtained by working through a regional organization, it would seem better to sustain the disadvantages of bilateral activity. Should the capacity of other nations to contribute to the OAS not increase proportionally to the increased emphasis we place on the Organization, it would be possible to upset the balance of ourselves vis-a-vis the others.

### C. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OAS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

If we are to use the OAS as a relatively more important way of conducting U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, how may its capability be increased? The analysis made in the first part of this report revealed that an important part of the limitations of the Organization derive from its environment. Hence, some of the proposals which follow are directed toward long-term efforts at changing its environment. Our analysis also revealed that some of its limitations are due to problems in the OAS's internal adequacy. Hence, some of the proposals are more immediate, aimed toward internal operations which will implement more directly the interests of U.S. citizens.

#### PEACE AND SECURITY

The security of the hemisphere, with peace and order, is a fundamental interest of the United States. Our endeavor to seek this peace and security through the inter-American system becomes urgent because of our underlying commitment to nonintervention.

In its earlier form, protection from meddling by outside powers was the salient problem, and we expressed our concern in the Monroe

Doctrine. Given our military capacity, we of the United States still provide the bulk of the defense potential of the hemisphere. In our friendliness with our neighbors, we are pleased that our might protects them as well as ourselves. We are grateful for their willingness to make naval bases available to us for operations in peace and war, as well as for their more recent agreements to permit us island stations for use in our missile programs. We know we need to use our power in collective ways, thereby avoiding some of the political disadvantages of its gigantic proportions. In the long run, we will not always want to carry the burden of arms for the hemisphere. Should world conditions continue to make necessary protection from outside aggression, we will want to share the load with the Latin Americans as they realize their growth in the next half century.

Over the years, our security goal has become broadened to include defense from indirect interferences through infiltration and subversion. We fear disorders within the American states because they provide opportunity for penetration by foreign powers and ideologies; communism thrives on chaos. Further, infighting among neighbor nations destroys the political stability which serves as a base for our citizens in their many relations with peoples in Latin America. Many of us hold it is as important to have intrahemispheric peace among the nations as it is to secure hemispheric insulation from interference by outside powers.

The earlier analysis indicated the OAS defense effort is largely a planning effort; how could its military capability be improved to meet our national interests? The analysis indicated there was little readiness for handling subversion; what standby machinery could be readied? The analysis revealed that, although legal norms had been established, there were less than adequate ways for implementing their observance; how could steps be taken to increase the likelihood of the embodiment of the platitudes in practice?

As the OAS evolves, it seems to have the makings of a viable solution for the classic dilemma of democracies as it applies in the Americas: How can the freedom of the state be so allowed that its sovereignty does not endanger the peace and security of the hemispheric community? What suggestions are implicit in our earlier analysis which might lead to increasing the capacity of the OAS to help in providing hemispheric peace and security?

I. Consider the advisability of strengthening hemispheric military capability within the OAS through the I-A Defense Board by these measures:

*Proposal No. 1.*—Consolidate the military advisory functions within the OAS as follows:

(a) Provide that the I-A Defense Board furnish the Advisory Defense Committee for the meeting of consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Explanation: The Advisory Defense Committee, provided in article 44 of the charter, is not activated as yet. When need arises, instead of proceeding on an ad hoc basis with a special group in usual OAS style, it would be well to have a committee in shadow existence within the Defense Board.

(b) Utilize the I-A Defense Board staff to provide military attaché services, when such are needed, for the investigatory committees

established by the Council when acting as the provisional organ of consultation and for the I-A Peace Committee.

*Explanation:* By being on standby duty with respect to the peace-making functions of the OAS, the military will not be quite so prone to think of their activities in isolation from the underlying OAS tasks of war prevention. These consolidations of the military advisory functions within the OAS complex may have the longrun effect of constructing military force within the hemisphere which is truly subservient to the civilians. It is difficult to believe that the present isolation of the I-A Defense Board from OAS activities can have salutary effects in this direction, even though it may quiet fears of the moment by putting military matters out of mind because they are out of sight.

*Proposal No. 2.*—Establish a miniature inter-American auxiliary force, especially trained for guerilla warfare and antisubversion activities, which might be used by governments with the approval of the OAS Council, to supplement national forces—

whenever the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State shall be affected (OAS Charter, art. 24).

*Explanation:* The force would be small, say of 100 men of differing American nationalities, operated by the I-A Defense Board at the command of the OAS Council. The Council, supplied with its own facts through an investigatory committee or its own I-A Peace Committee, then would be ready to apply force at any time. Such readiness for immediate action might prove an effective deterrent to indigenous adventurers and to infiltrations of foreign force by submarine landings on the shores or islands of the hemisphere. The use of the force only at the request of the sovereign state would avoid the central difficulty of an autonomous inter-American police force operated by the OAS. Its ultimate control by the OAS Council should serve to prevent its use for the suppression of genuinely internal attempts at revolution. It may serve as a way of aiding the Latin American countries in gradually reducing double-purpose military forces—forces maintained ostensibly for external purposes, which are designed so as to provide a bulwark against internal revolution. It will be difficult but not impossible for the OAS to decide, when receiving a request for military aid by the auxiliary force, whether national forces are being used for illegitimate purposes in perpetuating dictatorial regimes.

*Proposal No. 3.*—Establish an inter-American staff college and mission unit to be operated by the I-A Defense Board.

(a) The inter-American staff college should provide a curriculum of study for higher level officers, whose content would include training in (1) the relation of military matters to hemispheric and world political problems; (2) procedures for handling subversion and riots without jeopardizing civil and political rights; and (3) organizational techniques for guerrilla combat.

(b) The inter-American staff college mission unit would be an extension field service of the staff college, operating in countries under bilateral agreements with the OAS, as requested.

*Explanation:* Further professionalization of the military is needed in Latin American nations to hasten the day when the military will

play only background roles in assuring the stability of legitimate civilian governments rather than foreground roles by assuming dictatorial powers. But opportunities are few for political-military education comparable in scope and orientation to that recently developed in our U.S. service colleges for middle and high level military officers. The I-A Defense Board already does much educational work by bringing in outside military and diplomatic experts; this suggestion increases the intensity of such activity.

The provision of on-the-spot training services from an OAS staff college mission unit would complement and perhaps eliminate the need for the 18 U.S. military missions now operating within Latin America. Our U.S. missions operate under severe handicap because of our need to restrict their activities to military activities associated with hemispheric defense, in keeping with our nonintervention policies. Yet, a most important service from the armed services in Latin America is aid in preserving the stability of duly constituted governments from subversive activity inspired outside the hemisphere and from guerrilla attacks. There is one country in Latin America in which the legitimate armed services fear enclaves led by Communists schooled in guerrilla tactics. In another country, ever-continuing street riots in its capital go unmanaged by the armed forces, to the detriment of the provinces and those less skilled in the arts of disorderly demonstration. The armed services in Latin America need training in these skills certainly as much as they need training by the United States for hemispheric defense tasks.

II. Consider the advisability of strengthening political machinery for peace maintenance by these measures:

*Proposal No. 4.*—Provide an ample peace maintenance fund in the Secretary General's office to meet the operating costs of the Inter-American Peace Committee and the ad hoc information and investigatory committees established from time to time by OAS Council.

Explanation: Because the committees are dependent upon the hospitality of the countries they are investigating, there is considerable awkwardness in the relation of the committee to each of its host countries. Further, because the OAS does not have its own air and sea transportation facility, the mobility of its committees is limited by ad hoc provisional arrangements. There is no OAS pouch service, so the committee in reporting to the OAS Council must send its dispatches by expensive commercial cable. The OAS is not well supplied with funds—and each time moneys must be used for the unexpected and unscheduled peace maintenance purposes, some other program within the OAS is deprived of funds supposedly already allocated.

*Proposal No. 5.*—Reestablish the old emergency advisory committee for political defense as a permanent inter-American observation group to assist the ad hoc investigatory committees and the Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS Council, as requested by them, and to report independently its observations to the OAS Council at regular intervals.

Explanation: This group would observe regularly and consult with special liaison persons in member states in their respective territories (as well as at OAS headquarters) with respect to problems of peace and security, so that information would be gathered before and dur-

ing a disturbance rather than having to be reconstructed after disorder had occurred. The observation group would be available instantly on request for special observation of seas, coastal areas, frontiers, and air landing sites. Its existence would tend to balance off premature use of an inter-American auxiliary force. One of the important areas in which the observation group might work in its consultations with member states is toward the development of practical measures for the control of black market and unauthorized traffic in arms.

III. Consider the advisability of strengthening the legal machinery for the maintenance of peace by this measure:

*Proposal No. 6.*—Establish an Inter-American Court of International Justice, integrated with the International Court of Justice of the United Nations, which would be its superior court.

Explanation: Treaties and agreements are capable of varying interpretation. In order to reduce the reliance of the inter-American system upon political means for resolution of these conflicts through its central organs and in the end through its cumbersome Inter-American Conference, the OAS complex needs a court of its own. By associating an I-A court with the U.N. Court, a complementary relation between the OAS and U.N., as analyzed earlier, can be furthered. A court closely adapted to the inter-American system will be useful because of the special international law which has developed among Latin American countries, with respect to such hemispheric problems as political asylum. Further, the court will allow the Americas to continue their development of an international law which is workable, as a demonstration to the world of our all-American ability to pioneer steps toward universal peace.

There would be another advantage in supporting an international court in the inter-American system. In 1916 the United States was unwilling to recognize the decision of the Central American Court of Justice against Nicaragua with respect to a treaty giving us control over the only other practicable canal route across the isthmus. This act was important in the Court's demise. By allowing ourselves to be subjected to a court of international justice, without reservations, we will provide once again leadership of the most basic kind, in this hemisphere. Further, such action will demonstrate to the world our desire to establish a world rule of law. This action should make our deeds in the regional system conducive to the growth of a more adequate universal system.

#### *Summary and comment*

These proposals derive from the analysis presented in the initial part of this report. They attempt to make the OAS defense effort more than a paper effort, preparing for the eventual assumption of more collective responsibility of hemispheric defense in fact as well as in plan. The proposals attempt to move the OAS complex toward more realistic handling of the problem of subversion by acquiring skills and machinery which can move rapidly when there is infiltration from abroad or sabotage from within.

As the analysis indicated, considerable resistance to a number of these proposals may be anticipated. Yet, it would seem the citizens of the hemisphere cannot wait yet another 10 years in taking action

to secure a firmer ground for their collective responsibility in the maintenance of peace within the hemisphere. Note how the first three proposals, aimed at strengthening the Defense Board, are counter-weighted by the last three proposals which increase civilian controls. This arrangement may reduce some of the resistance. Because the small Auxiliary Force would be used only at the request of the member state itself to help already existing national forces under already existing provisions of the OAS Charter, its threatening character would seem less. The OAS Council has veto power over use of the Force when its employment is sought for perpetuation of regimes maintained in office without widespread popular support.

Some of the fears of the OAS as gaining supranational powers are fed by the military groups within the member countries. These groups validate their nationalism when they are assured that their own military powers will be subjected to no external restraints. This attitude recently expressed itself with vigor when national disarmament was proposed as an integral part of the Inter-American Police Force package, as well as in the earlier negative reaction within the OAS itself to the Costa Rican proposal before Council for the disarmament of all except the United States. In making the proposed OAS Force an Auxiliary Force, used only at the nation's request, these sources of resistance may be less consequential. By developing increased stature for the Defense Board, there may be further impetus toward professionalization of the national military groups with increased regional perspective.

An inter-American court would serve to bolster the effectiveness of the political side of the system in the one area where it has been really quite successful in a preventative way. The reestablishment of a permanent observation-consultation group would tend to accelerate appreciably the responsiveness of the system to dangers. The fact that the Council would have a constant supply of information through a non-Defense Board agent, the Permanent Inter-American Observation Group, should insure further civilian control. With the existence of both the ad hoc investigatory committees and the Inter-American Peace Committee, there would seem to be ample opportunity for the use of civilian political machinery alongside the regional military apparatus to insure control over an enlarged and integrated Defense Board activity.

But to this point, the proposals still lack peacemaking capability other than of the suppressive variety. It will be noted that no proposal has been made with respect to conciliation except to oil the existing machinery with independent funds in the Secretary General's office. This has been deliberate, inasmuch as further work on a revision of the Pact of Bogotá should be initiated by the Latin Americans, not us. It perhaps would be well to avoid an attempt at revision, as the problem today is not the development of paper documents but the giving of impetus to the machinery which already exists, as was demonstrated so often in the analysis in the first part of this study. Work on revision of documents will dissipate energies desperately needed for action. Perhaps when the OAS peacemaking machinery is strengthened, as proposed herewith, its accelerated development will even render it capable of handling quarrels between larger American states in a quarter century or so from now.

One might characterize the proposals made to this point by indicating that they largely are directed at consolidating present machinery within the OAS complex, with considerable strengthening of OAS military activities in a context to insure civilian control. They are shortrun proposals whose effectiveness could be evaluated immediately. They will, however, also have intermediate to longrun consequences by creating an OAS with a limited capability to handle political problems with force.

#### ABUNDANCE FOR ALL

Because of their relatively high material standards of living, citizens of the United States tend not to be concerned with the commercial importance of our trade, investment, and overseas industrial operations, to other American countries except in regard to Canada. There is perhaps just as little realization of the economic importance of Latin America in our own domestic economy. Yet our citizens do like coffee and bananas, and in more thoughtful moments some recognize the importance of South American oil, zinc, tin, nickel, aluminum, and other raw materials which might become vitally essential, should our imports from other parts of the world be cut off.

Our big stake in Latin America, however, is in its capacity for continued and rapid self-development so that its nations may provide abundance for all its citizens. Then, only, can the Americas assume responsibilities commensurate with their present idealism. Can the mixed system of government and private enterprise of the Latin American scene provide an economic structure viable enough to outpace population increases so that more totalitarian economic systems lose their appeal?

As important, many citizens of the United States believe there is something deeply wrong when one-half of the hemisphere lives in plenty and the other half starves in poverty. Our basic desire in wanting to live and let live holds only when those who are allowed to live can live. The humanitarian impulses within the citizenry of the United States are strong. Many of us are restless so long as there is not abundance for men on both continents.

To what extent is the Organization of American States a useful channel for the implementation of economic and technical assistance activities? Again we face the problem of alternatives: to what extent should bilateral channels be used by the United States versus multilateral channels, in aiding the more rapid development of our Latin American neighbors? This problem has been discussed above in general terms. The detailed study of the efficacy of bilateral aid versus OAS versus United Nations aid in the economic areas is outside the terms of reference of this report.

The facts of our present participation in the economic and technical programs of the OAS are clear. The United States sits in the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. The United States supplies one-half of the funds for the Technical Cooperation Board, a budget which is separate and distinct from the moneys used for underwriting the activities of the Pan American Union itself. And, finally, we recently have agreed to subscribe 45 percent of the funds for the newly established Inter-American Development Bank.

Many U.S. citizens believe overseas trade and investments should be handled by private interests, with Government providing only the framework for the orderly development and transaction of these commercial ventures. The OAS has given a heavy emphasis to educational facilities as a way of undergirding self-development: schools and training institutes, applied research stations, and pilot and demonstration projects. There is little reason why our Government representatives and our private citizen groups could not help intensify aspects of the OAS program which provide training for entrepreneurship.

The analysis of the functioning of the OAS indicated its relative success in rendering technical assistance, with weakness in handling economic problems involving political consideration. What proposals, if any, can be made relevant to this state of affairs? Further, the earlier analysis indicated how one part of the organization serves to balance other parts. The analysis also recognized the fact that the Russo-Sino offensive in the long run may be as actively conducted through economic means as through political and military subversion. Can proposals be developed in such a way as to avoid overbalance, but yet meet a Communist economic offensive?

It would be foolhardy to destroy the balance which already seems to have been obtained within the OAS between its military-political features and its economic-social activities. The one stimulates and balances the development of the other, giving more stability to the whole inter-American system. Should the first five proposals of this report be accepted, one would desire compensating enlargements of the economic-technical sides of the OAS to retain the balance now in existence. How could such an enlargement be encouraged by the United States without our assuming a dominant role?

Perhaps just as important as inducing balance within the OAS in order to civilize and mellow its increasing political-military strength, there is need to develop its economic activities in such quality and scope that special machinery could be adopted for countering Communist economic offenses which take the form of uneconomic loans and the dumping of products and goods. What kind of machinery might be set up within the OAS to provide the Western Hemisphere with a weapon for economic security analogous to the way in which we have worked our political defenses?

IV. Consider the advisability of strengthening the ability of the OAS to take economic initiative in the inter-American system by these measures:

*Proposal No. 7.*—Decrease response time on the part of the governmental apparatus of the United States vis-a-vis its participation in the IA-ECOSOC and related activities in the OAS.

Explanation: It seems the United States has tended to hold back support for economic suggestions of others until finally pressured into participation by spectacular events, such as the Nixon visit in Latin American countries. The effectiveness of our participation then is diluted because we agree too late and begrudgingly. Although it may not be wise, considering present demands on our economic resources, to provide leadership in economic-social developments as a government, we must give more adequate moral support to such efforts, sometimes making immediate contributions and commitments at least partially commensurate with our position of economic power.

There would be two other values in making our response more rapid within the economic-technical areas of the OAS. (1) By doing so, we are encouraging the initiative which others take: our ideology argues that Latin American countries must be self-developing in the longrun. Our recent reversal of policy on the development of the Inter-American Bank is an important demonstration of how essential is our willingness to participate in getting projects off the ground, because of the confidence created by the support of the one great power within the Organization. (2) The rate of growth of the OAS in its totality will increase over the years ahead. Therefore, a rapid response in the economic area is important to keep a balance between the political and the economic spheres of activity. Lagging on our part might create potentially dangerous disbalances within the inter-American system as a whole.

*Proposal No. 8.*—Change the regulations of the IA-ECOSOC so that the Council meets but twice or three times a year, with representation by deputy ministers of economy or finance; supervise the interim activities of the Council through a small executive committee meeting ad hoc.

*Explanation:* The expense of maintaining full-time, continuous, special representations by 21 nations in the IA-ECOSOC is hardly warranted, given the difficulties experienced in securing adequate representation, as our earlier analysis indicated. The budgetary contributions of the 10 smaller states to the OAS will vary between \$22,000 and \$27,000 for the fiscal year of 1959-60. Continuous representation in the IA-ECOSOC probably makes these countries' total "overhead" costs in Washington greater than their financial contributions to the OAS itself. The difficulties of securing coordinated relations between the OAS and the financial ministries of the countries of the region also may be remedied to some extent by the proposed representation.

*Proposal No. 9.*—Establish an Emergency Economic Defense Board within the IA-ECOSOC, with its own revolving emergency fund.

*Explanation:* The OAS needs to be able to take immediate, short-term action to relieve economic distress due to Sino-Russian economic offenses, should such again materialize. The Board might be chaired by the Director of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and consist of the three member representatives of the proposed IA-ECOSOC Executive Committee. The Vice Chairman of the OAS Council might participate as an ex officio member to provide liaison with the central decision-making group within the OAS. Although its fund would be disbursable immediately on the Board's own authority, general policies would be subject to the usual reviewing procedures of the OAS. In addition to its emergency activities, the Board would work with countries involved in such emergency action in order that longer term actions could be sustained by regular machinery already established for such purposes, like the Inter-American Bank and the international basic commodity agreement groups. This would increase the chances that the emergency fund could be replenished as a revolving resource.

#### *Summary and comments*

The three proposals presented above are of minor proportions. The capability of the OAS—through its bank, its Technical Cooperation

Board and a re-vamped IA-ECOSOC—is sufficient to facilitate self-development in the Americas. The magnitude of the resources poured through these channels would be determined by economic analysis outside the scope of this report. A considerable increase in economic activities in Latin America would be possible through the OAS before its economic features would disbalance its political-military aspects.

If the United States becomes too active within the OAS, however, the chances of freshening fears of intervention by the great power of the north increase. In the economic area, because of the large resources which must be applied, it perhaps will be impossible to avoid the predominance of the United States, whether we work multilaterally through the U.N. and the OAS or bilaterally through private and public agencies. This contrasts with the situation in the political domain, especially with respect to intrahemispheric problems. In the political-military domain the OAS can muster adequate resources to handle intrahemispheric applications of the charter and the Rio Treaty. In the economic area, too great a funnelling of U.S. resources through the OAS might destroy the chances of our success in achieving the long-term underlying objective of greater equality among neighbors in the inter-American system, which our analysis indicates is important to the stimulation of greater capability in the Latin American nations in the years ahead. It seems our opportunities for developing a partnership are better in the OAS than in the UN, where our cold war problems often necessitate the full exertion of our power potentials.

The proposals are disappointing in that they do not provide for increasing the articulation of the economic and technical activities of the OAS with those of the U.N. For example, the competition between the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America, operating under the aegis of the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations, and that of the IA-ECOSOC is not remedied. Perhaps a special study can be conducted sometime to determine whether an integrated setup analogous to that existing between the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization could be achieved in both the economic secretariats and in the technical assistance programs. Those OAS social activities not easily annealed into an IA-UN-ECOSOC arrangement could be transferred to the I-A Cultural Council, thereby giving the latter more stature. The limitations of the proposals are especially distressing, because regional economic problems cannot be solved except in terms of their world context.

#### THE FREE AND GOOD LIFE

It is customary to define the goals of a nation in terms of its more concrete self-interests, such as its security and its material well-being. If such should be the case, our task is done. But citizens of the United States show increasing signs of selflessness in their construction of a role in international affairs as the decades pass. Many of us share with citizens of the other States of the Americas the century-old dream for the New World: a hemisphere of individual freedom and political democracy. In the tradition of outstanding forefathers, many of us feel ourselves not fully religious or free, as long as fellow-men in the hemisphere are deprived of freedom of worship or other civil liberties.

Peace and security, material abundance, and individual freedom are only means for some to more final ends: the development of self in terms of godliness and beauty. Increasing numbers of citizens in the United States define their goals in less material ways. They want to enjoy cultural enrichment through wide contacts in the hemisphere. They want to hear the music and see the art of their American neighbors. Because the inner things—the really good and important things of life—cannot be imposed or given by others, these developments require the encouragement of indigenous sources of talent within all the countries of the inter-American system.

Given our convictions about the nature of democracy, many of us in the United States believe the freedoms underlying the good life must be won and then developed with growing maturity by the citizens of each country for themselves. Can the Organization of American States be utilized to aid this growth? How can the OAS complex be modified so that it no longer is only an organ of the status quo, but can accelerate the development of freedom and the good in hemispheric life?

The analysis which constitutes the first part of this report indicated the smallness of the effort within the OAS with respect to cultural affairs and the inability of the OAS to work effectively toward increasing the individual freedoms of citizens within the hemisphere. It also was noted in the earlier analysis that the Organization was an arrangement among governments and that it provided relatively little direct participation of the citizens of the Americas in the development of inter-American policy. The eight proposals made to this point have avoided the central problem of development of an OAS which is much more than an organ of the status quo. The proposals submitted below may help to increase the ability of the OAS to accelerate the development of freedom and democracy in its member states by increasing the quality and quantity of American political leadership.

V. Consider the advisability of endeavoring to improve the quality and to increase the activity of legislators and potential political leaders in the inter-American system by these measures:

*Proposal No. 10.*—Encourage interim meetings of the Western Hemisphere contingent of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as well as encourage wider Pan American participation in world meetings, through establishment of American Parliamentary Fellowships within the OAS Fellowship Program.

*Proposal No. 11.*—Establish an Inter-American Leadership Foundation, independent of the OAS, which would match funds with foundations and men of wealth within the whole hemisphere on projects designed to encourage the development of lay leaders through democratic participation in inter-American organizations, official and nongovernmental.

*Proposal No. 12.*—Allow citizens in the hemisphere to receive tax deduction benefits of generous proportions, applying to persons in lower income brackets as well as those in higher brackets, for contributions to private but nonprofit organizations concerned with inter-American affairs.

Explanation: The earlier analysis of the inter-American system indicated that a key to the viability of the OAS would be found by increasing the initiative and responsibility of its leadership. The pool

of leadership skill existing within the American nations must be enlarged to be commensurate with the demands being placed upon it.

American legislators know each other slightly. There could be a profitable exchange of legislative know-how, those with more satisfactory experiences in democratic procedures sharing with those who have felt frustrated in attempts to operate their home institutions in less authoritarian ways.

One of the projects which might be undertaken by the Inter-American Leadership Foundation would be an itinerant school for first-term legislators. The Foundation might also conduct training institutes as well as demonstrations of the efficacy of volunteer groups in handling local social and cultural problems. It would seem men of wealth interested in less pervasive reliance upon government could be encouraged to contribute generously from their fortunes to such nongovernmental activities.

Many of the already existing nongovernmental organizations in the inter-American field are unusually restricted in their activities because of inadequate funds. It would seem appropriate that the Foundation and private persons help supply financial resources over the years ahead by means of which the leaders being trained could operate more expansively in already existing inter-American organizations. The tax deduction proposal, with its emphasis on small givers, encourages democracy in the giving itself. As things stand now, men of higher class alone are able to call the tune because of the utter dependence of some nongovernmental organizations upon their largess.

If the United States can work through its people to the peoples of Latin America with more vigor, the problem of governmental intervention is circumvented. This device has the additional democratic value of developing an informed "foreign affairs" constituency within the United States, knowledgeable about Pan American matters, which can support the constructive efforts of the United States Congress in its relations to the governments of Latin America. The tax deduction proposal would materially reinforce citizens in their idealistic motivations.

The Members of the Congress of the United States themselves can do much in accentuating the leadership they already have given in inter-American affairs. They can make more frequent and more informal visits to countries and areas in and outside the OAS, including the areas in the hemisphere closely associated with our allies in Europe. They can be more active in sponsoring activities within nongovernmental inter-American organizations, as the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production, or the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers. If it is desirable to create a milieu in the hemisphere in which the nation-state is less pervasive, then political and nonpolitical leaders alike must participate actively to increase the nongovernmental capabilities in Pan American affairs.

*Proposal No. 13.*—Organize within each member nation an official National Advisory Commission on Inter-American Affairs.

Explanation: This proposal already was made by the Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives in 1957 in the context of a series of nonpolitical recommendations. In the perspective of our analysis the commissions would be even more important for they now would serve as sounding boards for the policies and actions

of each government. The ministries of foreign affairs, of economy, of education—and perhaps other governmental officials having inter-American work—would find in their national commission a home reference group in which to test their representations in the OAS complex.

These national commissions would encompass the whole of inter-American relations, and thus differ from the UNESCO commissions, which are concerned only with the cultural segment of U.N. affairs. Because the I-A commissions would look at the whole picture, they would be of considerable challenge and probably could induce important leaders to participate. Their annual meetings might be arranged to serve as a focus for national activities on Pan American day. They would provide yet another opportunity for the local development of leadership for inter-American affairs.

#### *Summary and comments*

Our earlier analysis pointed to the dearth of leadership in the Americas; our proposals suggested three ways to increase gradually the talents available for the hemisphere's search for freedom and the good life. The national commissions would aid by providing a home public forum to which the citizen representatives and OAS delegations might report on inter-American affairs.

If anything has been well established by the research endeavors in political science over the last half century, it is the generalization that one cannot legislate democratic governments by legal fiat. This has been demonstrated vividly in the paper constitutions proclaimed by well intentioned law-givers in Latin America. Citizens must have opportunities to learn the skills of democratic leadership. Our proposals are intended to provide such skills and such opportunities, so that democratic procedures can be incorporated more rapidly into governmental processes throughout the hemisphere.

As compared with our first 10 proposals, this last set emphasizes the use of indirect rather than direct ways of inducing action within the hemisphere. If the capability of the OAS complex is to be increased to secure the goals of peace and security and of abundance for all, its member nations and their citizens must be more capable of providing a milieu and a leadership in which democratic processes may thrive.

✓ To realize all these U.S. interests, we want an OAS with intellectual depth, symbolic strength, and physical rootage.

✓ While developing the analysis and the proposals presented to this point in the report, three additional proposals emerged which tended not to fit well within any one of the three categories used above in detailing our national interests. Rather they were measures for undergirding the OAS by providing it with depth which comes from an ideological and physical base—and with strength which could derive from its symbolization of inter-American unity.

VI. Consider the advisability of firming the OAS as an institution fully capable of undertaking the tasks to be assigned to it in the century ahead, by these measures:

*Proposal No. 14.*—Relocate OAS headquarters in an inter-American district.

Explanation: With both the delegations and the Secretariat physically located in our Nation's Capital, OAS personnel cannot help but be unduly influenced by Washington. Inadvertently, the Latin Americans tend often unconsciously to be dominated by the Washington culture. As was pointed out in the earlier analysis, the present physical headquarters of the OAS in the District of Columbia continues to symbolize domination by the United States, with overtones of the old, somewhat imperialistic role played by our country in Spanish-American affairs. Its present headquarters are inadequate, being spread around in a number of buildings, some rented. The atmosphere of Washington undoubtedly interferes with efficiency of the work done by OAS representatives and employees.

The OAS cannot symbolize the inter-American system with as much visibility as would seem to be desirable by being submerged in any nation's capital. Its main headquarters should be relocated in territory of its own someplace in mid-America. The territory purchased for the "Distrito Inter-Americano" should be on a coast where two countries join. Direct access to the high seas and the international airways, as well as independence from the jurisdiction of any national sovereignty, are important to symbolize the OAS's freedom from domination by any country. It should be located in a wholly desirable climate on generous acreage.

"Pan America," as the Pan American capital could be called, might become an important inter-American center. It will need to have ample space for permanent housing and schooling of the families of delegations and the Secretariat. It should have residential arrangements for transients, although certainly by no means should all of the conferences, councils, and committees meet in the inter-American district, for the OAS must grow closer to the citizens of its member nations. The two fine buildings in the United States could be used as field offices for OAS operations. The OAS might gain visibility partially comparable to that obtained by the U.N. through magnificent headquarters' buildings. As Americans travel more, the city of Pan America easily could become a tourist mecca. The inter-American traders might operate a permanent exhibition of the Americas there.

*Proposal No. 15.*—Establish and generously endow a Free and Autonomous Inter-American University devoted to basic studies in all disciplines with a—

(a) Special Institute for the Objective Study of Inter-American Affairs; and

(b) Extension professorial chairs of inter-American law and politics in the national university of each member country.

Explanation: As was indicated in the analysis, it is important to give solidarity and depth to the applied economics, education, politics, and science work being done by the OAS. Its expertise must be constantly renewed and invigorated. Perhaps an inter-American university, proximate to OAS central headquarters, could allow both delegates and members of the staffs and Secretariat to increase their depth, compensating for the cultural loss to be suffered in the early years by removal of the main headquarters from Washington, D.C.

The provision for a Special Institute for Inter-American Affairs is made to prevent the more basic researches and teaching from being perverted toward immediate and practical emergencies by requests from the Pan American Union. The presence of 5,000 students on the

university's campus in Pan America should provide many natural opportunities for the inter-American leaders of tomorrow to know intimately the inter-American system of today. Then, as they become the delegates and officials of the Organization of American States during the next generation, they will know how the OAS can be used to implement further the ideals of the New World, as they carry forward in our inter-American heritage.

The provision of a professorship within the national law schools of each of the member nations takes advantage of the great extent to which the leaders of both North and South America come into politics with law school training. Little is taught today about the OAS in the universities of the hemisphere. So that the professors who hold these chairs may avoid provinciality, it would be wise that the endowments for each chair be generous enough to cover a semester every 5 years in residence for research and teaching at the Free and Autonomous Inter-American University in Pan America, D. I-A.

*Proposal No. 16.*—Begin steps toward the multilateralization of the Panama Canal under the aegis of the Organization of American States.

Explanation: Were the United States to begin multilateralization of the Panama Canal now, it could pace a gradual relinquishment of rights and obligations with gain both to itself and the OAS. Perhaps a first step might be to encourage the OAS Council to establish an advisory Canal Commission. Such a group might supervise studies on Isthmian Canal traffic, including the long-range problem of arranging for a second canal across Nicaragua. This latter issue is fraught with political difficulties from which it would be useful to spare the United States. If the early moves were successful, further steps then could be initiated over the years ahead, as including some representations from the OAS on the board of directors of the Panama Canal Company. Perhaps Company stock, now held entirely by the United States, could be transferred in small blocs from time to time to the OAS, so there would be a sense of vested interest. The small profits from ownership could be utilized by the Office of the Secretary General for such purposes as the Peace Maintenance Fund, proposed above. The OAS Auxiliary Force might be stationed in the zone. The ports at Colon and Balboa might serve as bases for an inter-American sea patrol, should such ever come into being as a part of the Auxiliary force.

Again the policymaker confronts the issue whether it is wiser to multilateralize through the universal or regional organization. Because of the tendency of the United Nations to invest controversial issues with the politics of the cold war, it would seem advisable to use OAS machinery. If the statesmen of the hemisphere wish to continue their multilateralized Monroe Doctrine—and there is much reason to believe they do—as sensitive a matter as the Panama Canal should be placed under the aegis of the OAS. Note how the Security Council of the United Nations muddled the Guatemalan situation in 1954, without unanimously respecting the provision of the OAS charter that the regional organization would be used first.

By regionalizing the canal in this way, we avoid the political dilemma of internationalizing it through a divided U.N. or having it eventually nationalized despite ourselves by the Panamanians. A promise

to multilateralize the Canal Zone will be another striking symbol of the nonimperialistic nature of our foreign policy. The move would be as forceful a demonstration of our integrity as was the honoring of our early-made promise of freedom to the Philippines. Further, the act would give us a firm posture for maneuver with respect to future problems regarding the Suez Canal. However, its most important and fundamental impact would be within the Americas. It would be another demonstration—and a most impressive one—of our long-term willingness to work as partners with the other nations in the hemisphere.

#### *Summary and comment*

Our analysis revealed the hemisphericwide invisibility of the OAS. The proposals of this section would make concrete the operations of the OAS in a physical and intellectual plant of dimensions commensurate with the potential importance of the Organization. The proposals would give the OAS material stature, so that its nonmaterial functions could be more successfully carried out. In a materialistic world, the OAS would accrue a sense of importance through its possession of a headquarters District of its own. But more important, perhaps, would be the effect of the proposal to provide an intellectual base for its operations through a great university, which over the century ahead would provide the sinews for achievements for the welfare of all.

In 1815 Bolivar wished: "How beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama could become for us what that of Corinth was for the Greeks." Yet, it seems not wise to relocate the OAS headquarters in Panama, because of the close connections between the Republic of Panama and the United States. Denial of domination by the United States would be difficult in such a situation.

The headquarters territory should be ample and allow for expansion. In addition to locating the Inter-American University in the new city of Pan America, it would seem wise to place the proposed I-A Defense Board Staff College in the district, too, to gain the advantage of closer association of the military with Pan American-minded civilians. Then, once an inter-American court is organized, it too would probably find the inter-American capital desirable for its site, as the district would provide a haven of neutral territory for the settlement of international conflicts.

We want all this, but at a modest cost and with reasonable efficiency.

Although the proposals are conservative in attempting in each instance to use existing machinery where such is possible, they do constitute a significant enlargement of the OAS. Given the fact that the United States pays almost 67 percent of the bill, this again increases our international commitments. However, given the degree of politicization of the OAS—and political it must be, otherwise it cannot work with the nation-states in solution of international problems—the Organization is reasonably efficient. The international civil service which operates the PAU seems to be free of corruption and spoils. It might be useful to assemble the top level leaders, both political and administrative, of the various regional organizations in which we participate—especially NATO, SEATO, and OAS—for an exchange of know-how to help further the efficiency with which our regional

organizations operate. Our analysis revealed that under the present Secretary General, the OAS has worked vigorously to improve the internal efficiency of the PAU. The operations now are under continuous review by the Secretary General's executive staff. Perhaps it would be as well to have analogous consultation provided for the improvement of the operations of the councils and committees, including training in ways toward improvement of meetings.

#### D. TAKING ACTION ON THE PROPOSALS

Caution must be taken in using the proposals in the development of the foreign policy of the United States. First, it must be remembered that the analysis and its implications are restricted to the Organization of American States. The assumption that the OAS is an underused complement of our more direct bilateral relations and of our multilateral relations through the United Nations certainly is in need of further scrutiny after the studies prepared for the Senate's Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs are assembled. Second, caution must be exercised in using bits and pieces of the proposals, for although the linkage among them is not tight, it is easy to see how some could fail because they were not used in concert with others. An attempt was made throughout the text of this report to note some of these interdependencies among the proposals, as with respect to the balancing of military-political functions by economic-social-cultural activities, and the problem of headquarters location in conjunction with U.S. possession of the Panama Canal.

Our proposals are conservative in the sense that they call for no revision of the OAS Charter. In many ways they are simply extensions of ideas that have been proposed in various forms over the years by persons interested in Pan Americanism. In the past, critical developments within the OAS have come through gradual changes by the work of special ad hoc committees. There is no need for endless legal discussion at this time, for the charter provisions are flexible, as our earlier analysis has shown. Where a new framework is actually necessary, it can be achieved by resolution or through a new complementary treaty, a traditional practice within the inter-American system.

It would be unwise to ask our overworked Ambassador to the OAS to attempt to implement these proposals—even in their certain-to-be-modified form. Nor should the Congress of the United States attempt unilateral efforts. Instead, consider the following means:

*Proposal No. 17.*—In collaboration with one or two Central American countries and one or two South American countries, develop a presidential Operation OAS, for modification and then adoption at an extraordinary OAS Council meeting, in which representation is by the foreign ministers of the 21 nations, assisted by their OAS ambassadors.

Explanation: Again, to reduce the dangers of U.S. initiatives being considered as attempts to dominate within the inter-American system, it would be well to work through a set of proposals jointly with two or four other countries, using anew the device of a committee of special presidential representatives, this time reduced to three or five in size. The countries might be selected by a resolution at the 11th

Inter-American Conference in February or March, 1960. All countries within the Organization might be asked to submit new proposals for increasing the capability of the OAS. After these have been winnowed, a single meeting of the special representatives could be held with their three or five presidents for guidance, so that the Committee's aspirations become commensurate with the realities of inter-American politics. Then the Committee would work to prepare an Operation OAS, somewhat analogous to President Juscelino Kubitschek's proposal in the economic field, Operation Pan-America. The final plan then could be worked over by an extraordinary set of meetings of the OAS Council by the foreign ministers and their OAS ambassadors.

This proposal involves participation by some Presidents of American Republics, giving the Operation OAS stature. Yet its proposals would be gradualistic, so that no special inter-American conference is needed. Any particularly formidable legal blocks could be postponed until the 12th Inter-American Conference in 1965. Yet by doing its work in 1961 and 1962, after the momentum from the 11th Conference is gone, the Committee would serve as a stimulant for an accelerated development of the OAS to meet urgent hemispheric needs.

During a phase of its work, the Presidents' Committee of Special Representatives might profitably employ a consulting service, so that two special substudies suggested earlier might be conducted: (1) One of the efficiency of the councils and committees in the OAS, which the earlier management study of the PAU wisely avoided, and (2) one of the potential ways in which the OAS (including secretariat functions in the PAU) might be linked more closely into the operations of the United Nations and its many agencies.

#### E. THE LONG PULL WITH THE OAS

The inter-American system has served the United States well as an arena in which pioneering efforts in the development of regional arrangements could be tried. Its charter served as the model for the charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations. These proposals, in emphasizing new ways by which peoples can be related more directly to peoples and to their regional organizations, will need to be tried, modified, and changed over the next decade. Then perhaps another recodification of the inter-American system will need to be made, comparable in magnitude to that made at the end of World War II in drawing the Rio Treaty and the charter of the OAS.

As the OAS grows in capability, there are real dangers that its effectiveness could lead to its gradual transformation into supranational quasigovernment. It is for this reason, among the others mentioned above, that the proposals presented for consideration include the development of extragovernmental devices. These may help develop an articulate and more democratic pan-American opinion and leadership, so that any tendency for the OAS to become too autonomous would be checked by restraining opinions and counterbalancing universal organizations. For this reason also, among the others mentioned above, it is imperative that the growth of the OAS be well coordinated with the development of the United Nations, so

that the OAS at once can constructively supplement the shortcomings of the national state and complement rather than disrupt the United Nations in actions which should be handled by a universal organization. As Alberto Lleras Camargo, now President of Colombia, said when he was Secretary General of the OAS:

The inter-American system is difficult to comprehend, not only for the Russians, but for Europeans and Asiatics in general. \* \* \* It has been built on the incredible premise that mighty nations and small ones have the same right to live together in peace—free from intervention in their domestic affairs, or from external pressure—that individuals enjoy in a democratic society.

We should not enlarge the OAS simply as a defensive response against the Communist offensives, but because an increase in its capability will be of value to us all as partners in the pursuit of our hemispheric goals. Yet, the report has not ignored the realities of the international Communist movement and its operation in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps two proposals (Nos. 5 and 9) provide the kind of emergency machinery, standing by and ready to be triggered into immediate action, which will significantly reduce occasions for Communist offensives. Will an enlarged OAS be powerful enough to help counter the activities of international communism, rather than to continue crippled by its inadequacies so that it can serve only as an organ for the maintenance of the status quo?

The proposals presented in this report do not presume to “mastermind” the future development of the Organization of American States. They are directed fundamentally at providing means by which the inter-American complex may become a more effective seed-bed for the development of ideas and activities which will enable the nations of the Western Hemisphere—including our own—to play ever more constructive roles in the world community of nations.

As action is taken on the proposals, the fundamental objective of an enlarged OAS must be kept ever in mind: The OAS should so grow that it develops means for orderly and peaceful change within the hemisphere. The inter-American system must be so nurtured that it continues to grow as an “open system.” The challenge, of course, is that in the process of remaking the OAS as an organ for change, the very forces set in action may transform ourselves. But is not this the core of our democratic faith? Must we not allow ourselves to be so free as to be able always to grow in new ways and be always open to new ideas?

# APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX I

### OUTLINE FOR STUDY—THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

- I. Main findings.
- II. Conclusions and recommendations.
- III. Body of report.
  - Part I. Background.
    - A. Historical origins.
    - B. Objectives and purposes—similarities and differences compared to U.N. and NATO.
  - Part II. Description of organization and activities, including specialized agencies. Include also the Secretariat.
  - Part III. The record: Major OAS accomplishments and failures.
  - Part IV. OAS as a medium of consultation.

Degree to which OAS has been used as a device to concert hemispheric policies. Could or should it be so used to a greater degree? If so, how?
  - Part V. Changes, if any, which should be made in OAS Charter.

This section will include analysis of proposals, if any, which have been made in the United States or in Latin America.
  - Part VI. Relations of OAS to U.N.
  - Part VII. Recommendations for future of OAS.

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## APPENDIX II

### CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá,  
March 30–May 2, 1948

IN THE NAME OF THEIR PEOPLES, THE STATES REPRESENTED AT  
THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES,

Convinced that the historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations;

Conscious that that mission has already inspired numerous agreements, whose essential value lies in the desire of the American peoples to live together in peace, and, through their mutual understanding and respect for the sovereignty of each one, to provide for the betterment of all, in independence, in equality and under law;

Confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man;

Persuaded that their welfare and their contribution to the progress and the civilization of the world will increasingly require intensive continental cooperation;

Resolved to persevere in the noble undertaking that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles and purposes they solemnly reaffirm;

Convinced that juridical organization is a necessary condition for security and peace founded on moral order and on justice; and

In accordance with Resolution IX of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Mexico City,

HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING

## CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

## PART ONE

## CHAPTER I

## NATURE AND PURPOSES

## Article 1

The American States establish by this Charter the international organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence. Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency.

## Article 2

All American States that ratify the present Charter are Members of the Organization.

## Article 3

Any new political entity that arises from the union of several Member States and that, as such, ratifies the present Charter, shall become a Member of the Organization. The entry of the new political entity into the Organization shall result in the loss of membership of each one of the States which constitute it.

## Article 4

The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes:

- a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
- b) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States;
- c) To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression;
- d) To seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; and
- e) To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development.

## CHAPTER II

## PRINCIPLES

## Article 5

The American States reaffirm the following principles:

- a) International law is the standard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations;
- b) International order consists of respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law;
- c) Good faith shall govern the relations between States;
- d) The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy;
- e) The American States condemn war of aggression: victory does not give rights;
- f) An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States;
- g) Controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States shall be settled by peaceful procedures;
- h) Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace;

- i) Economic cooperation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the continent;
- j) The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex;
- k) The spiritual unity of the continent is based on respect for the cultural values of the American countries and requires their close cooperation for the high purposes of civilization;
- l) The education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom and peace.

## CHAPTER III

## FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES

## Article 6

States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise these rights, and have equal duties. The rights of each State depend not upon its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international law.

## Article 7

Every American State has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by every other State in accordance with international law.

## Article 8

The fundamental rights of States may not be impaired in any manner whatsoever.

## Article 9

The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States. Even before being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of the rights of other States in accordance with international law.

## Article 10

Recognition implies that the State granting it accepts the personality of the new State, with all the rights and duties that international law prescribes for the two States.

## Article 11

The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State.

## Article 12

The jurisdiction of States within the limits of their national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens.

## Article 13

Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.

## Article 14

Respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitute standards for the development of peaceful relations among States. International treaties and agreements should be public.

## Article 15

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.

The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

#### Article 16

No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

#### Article 17

The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

#### Article 18

The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.

#### Article 19

Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.

### CHAPTER IV

#### PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

#### Article 20

All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

#### Article 21

The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time.

#### Article 22

In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American States which, in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels, the Parties shall agree on some other peaceful procedure that will enable them to reach a solution.

#### Article 23

A special treaty will establish adequate procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes and will determine the appropriate means for their application, so that no dispute between American States shall fail of definitive settlement within a reasonable period.

### CHAPTER V

#### COLLECTIVE SECURITY

#### Article 24

Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States.

## Article 25

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.

## CHAPTER VI

## ECONOMIC STANDARDS

## Article 26

The Member States agree to cooperate with one another, as far as their resources may permit and their laws may provide, in the broadest spirit of good neighborliness, in order to strengthen their economic structure, develop their agriculture and mining, promote their industry and increase their trade.

## Article 27

If the economy of an American State is affected by serious conditions that cannot be satisfactorily remedied by its own unaided effort, such State may place its economic problems before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to seek through consultation the most appropriate solution for such problems.

## CHAPTER VII

## SOCIAL STANDARDS

## Article 28

The Member States agree to cooperate with one another to achieve just and decent living conditions for their entire populations.

## Article 29

The Member States agree upon the desirability of developing their social legislation on the following bases:

- a) All human beings, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, creed or social condition, have the right to attain material well-being and spiritual growth under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security;
- b) Work is a right and a social duty; it shall not be considered as an article of commerce; it demands respect for freedom of association and for the dignity of the worker; and it is to be performed under conditions that ensure life, health and a decent standard of living, both during the working years and during old age, or when any circumstance deprives the individual of the possibility of working.

## CHAPTER VIII

## CULTURAL STANDARDS

## Article 30

The Member States agree to promote, in accordance with their constitutional provisions and their material resources, the exercise of the right to education, on the following bases:

- a) Elementary education shall be compulsory and, when provided by the State, shall be without cost;
- b) Higher education shall be available to all, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, language, creed or social condition.

## Article 31

With due consideration for the national character of each State, the Member States undertake to facilitate free cultural interchange by every medium of expression.

*P A R T T W O*

## CHAPTER IX

## THE ORGANS

## Article 32

The Organization of American States accomplishes its purposes by means of:

- a) The Inter-American Conference;
- b) The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
- c) The Council;
- d) The Pan American Union;
- e) The Specialized Conferences; and
- f) The Specialized Organizations.

## CHAPTER X

## THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

## Article 33

The Inter-American Conference is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States. It decides the general action and policy of the Organization and determines the structure and functions of its Organs, and has the authority to consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States. These functions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Charter and of other inter-American treaties.

## Article 34

All Member States have the right to be represented at the Inter-American Conference. Each State has the right to one vote.

## Article 35

The Conference shall convene every five years at the time fixed by the Council of the Organization, after consultation with the government of the country where the Conference is to be held.

## Article 36

In special circumstances and with the approval of two-thirds of the American Governments, a special Inter-American Conference may be held, or the date of the next regular Conference may be changed.

## Article 37

Each Inter-American Conference shall designate the place of meeting of the next Conference. If for any unforeseen reason the Conference cannot be held at the place designated, the Council of the Organization shall designate a new place.

## Article 38

The program and regulations of the Inter-American Conference shall be prepared by the Council of the Organization and submitted to the Member States for consideration.

## CHAPTER XI

## THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## Article 39

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation.

## Article 40

Any Member State may request that a Meeting of Consultation be called. The request shall be addressed to the Council of the Organization, which shall decide by an absolute majority whether a meeting should be held.

## Article 41

The program and regulations of the Meeting of Consultation shall be prepared by the Council of the Organization and submitted to the Member States for consideration.

## Article 42

If, for exceptional reasons, a Minister of Foreign Affairs is unable to attend the meeting, he shall be represented by a special delegate.

## Article 43

In case of an armed attack within the territory of an American State or within the region of security delimited by treaties in force, a Meeting of Consultation shall be held without delay. Such Meeting shall be called immediately by the Chairman of the Council of the Organization, who shall at the same time call a meeting of the Council itself.

## Article 44

An Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.

## Article 45

The Advisory Defense Committee shall be composed of the highest military authorities of the American States participating in the Meeting of Consultation. Under exceptional circumstances the Governments may appoint substitutes. Each State shall be entitled to one vote.

## Article 46

The Advisory Defense Committee shall be convoked under the same conditions as the Organ of Consultation, when the latter deals with matters relating to defense against aggression.

## Article 47

The Committee shall also meet when the Conference or the Meeting of Consultation or the Governments, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, assign to it technical studies or reports on specific subjects.

## CHAPTER XII

## THE COUNCIL

## Article 48

The Council of the Organization of American States is composed of one Representative of each Member State of the Organization, especially appointed by the respective Government, with the rank of Ambassador. The appointment may be given to the diplomatic representative accredited to the Government of the country in which the Council has its seat. During the absence of the titular Representative, the Government may appoint an interim Representative.

## Article 49

The Council shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, who shall serve for one year and shall not be eligible for election to either of those positions for the term immediately following.

## Article 50

The Council takes cognizance, within the limits of the present Charter and of inter-American treaties and agreements, of any matter referred to it by the

Inter-American Conference or the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

#### Article 51

The Council shall be responsible for the proper discharge by the Pan American Union of the duties assigned to it.

#### Article 52

The Council shall serve provisionally as the Organ of Consultation when the circumstances contemplated in Article 43 of this Charter arise.

#### Article 53

It is also the duty of the Council :

- a) To draft and submit to the Governments and to the Inter-American Conference proposals for the creation of new Specialized Organizations or for the combination, adaptation or elimination of existing ones, including matters relating to the financing and support thereof ;
- b) To draft recommendations to the Governments, the Inter-American Conference, the Specialized Conferences or the Specialized Organizations, for the coordination of the activities and programs of such organizations, after consultation with them ;
- c) To conclude agreements with the Inter-American Specialized Organizations to determine the relations that shall exist between the respective agency and the Organization ;
- d) To conclude agreements or special arrangements for cooperation with other American organizations of recognized international standing ;
- e) To promote and facilitate collaboration between the Organization of American States and the United Nations, as well as between Inter-American Specialized Organizations and similar international agencies ;
- f) To adopt resolutions that will enable the Secretary General to perform the duties envisaged in Article 84 ;
- g) To perform the other duties assigned to it by the present Charter.

#### Article 54

The Council shall establish the bases for fixing the quota that each Government is to contribute to the maintenance of the Pan American Union, taking into account the ability to pay of the respective countries and their determination to contribute in an equitable manner. The budget, after approval by the Council, shall be transmitted to the Governments at least six months before the first day of the fiscal year, with a statement of the annual quota of each country. Decisions on budgetary matters require the approval of two-thirds of the members of the Council.

#### Article 55

The Council shall formulate its own regulations.

#### Article 56

The Council shall function at the seat of the Pan American Union.

#### Article 57

The following are organs of the Council of the Organization of American States :

- a) The Inter-American Economic and Social Council ;
- b) The Inter-American Council of Jurists ; and
- c) The Inter-American Cultural Council.

#### Article 58

The organs referred to in the preceding article shall have technical autonomy within the limits of this Charter ; but their decisions shall not encroach upon the sphere of action of the Council of the Organization.

## Article 59

The organs of the Council of the Organization are composed of representatives of all the Member States of the Organization.

## Article 60

The organs of the Council of the Organization shall, as far as possible, render to the Government such technical services as the latter may request; and they shall advise the Council of the Organization on matters within their jurisdiction.

## Article 61

The organs of the Council of the Organization shall, in agreement with the Council, establish cooperative relations with the corresponding organs of the United Nations and with the national or international agencies that function within their respective spheres of action.

## Article 62

The Council of the Organization, with the advice of the appropriate bodies and after consultation with the Governments, shall formulate the statutes of its organs in accordance with and in the execution of the provisions of this Charter. The organs shall formulate their own regulations.

A) *The Inter-American Economic and Social Council*

## Article 63

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council has for its principal purpose the promotion of the economic and social welfare of the American nations through effective cooperation for the better utilization of their natural resources, the development of their agriculture and industry and the raising of the standards of living of their peoples.

## Article 64

To accomplish this purpose the Council shall:

- a) Propose the means by which the American nations may give each other technical assistance in making studies and formulating and executing plans to carry out the purposes referred to in Article 26 and to develop and improve their social services;
- b) Act as coordinating agency for all official inter-American activities of an economic and social nature;
- c) Undertake studies on its own initiative or at the request of any Member State;
- d) Assemble and prepare reports on economic and social matters for the use of the Member States;
- e) Suggest to the Council of the Organization the advisability of holding specialized conferences on economic and social matters;
- f) Carry on such other activities as may be assigned to it by the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or the Council of the Organization.

## Article 65

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, composed of technical delegates appointed by each Member State, shall meet on its own initiative or on that of the Council of the Organization.

## Article 66

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council shall function at the seat of the Pan American Union, but it may hold meetings in any American city by a majority decision of the Member States.

B) *The Inter-American Council of Jurists*

## Article 67

The purpose of the Inter-American Council of Jurists is to serve as an advisory body on juridical matters; to promote the development and codification of public and private international law; and to study the possibility of attaining uniformity in the legislation of the various American countries, insofar as it may appear desirable.

## Article 68

The Inter-American Juridical Committee of Rio de Janeiro shall be the permanent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists.

## Article 69

The Juridical Committee shall be composed of jurists of the nine countries selected by the Inter-American Conference. The selection of the jurists shall be made by the Inter-American Council of Jurists from a panel submitted by each country chosen by the Conference. The Members of the Juridical Committee represent all Member States of the Organization. The Council of the Organization is empowered to fill any vacancies that occur during the intervals between Inter-American Conferences and between meetings of the Inter-American Council of Jurists.

## Article 70

The Juridical Committee shall undertake such studies and preparatory work as are assigned to it by the Inter-American Council of Jurists, the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or the Council of the Organization. It may also undertake those studies and projects which, on its own initiative, it considers advisable.

## Article 71

The Inter-American Council of Jurists and the Juridical Committee should seek the cooperation of national committees for the codification of international law, of institutes of international and comparative law, and of other specialized agencies.

## Article 72

The Inter-American Council of Jurists shall meet when convened by the Council of the Organization, at the place determined by the Council of Jurists at its previous meeting.

C) *The Inter-American Cultural Council*

## Article 73

The purpose of the Inter-American Cultural Council is to promote friendly relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples, in order to strengthen the peaceful sentiments that have characterized the evolution of America, through the promotion of educational, scientific and cultural exchange.

## Article 74

To this end the principal functions of the Council shall be:

- a) To sponsor inter-American cultural activities;
- b) To collect and supply information on cultural activities carried on in and among the American States by private and official agencies both national and international in character.
- c) To promote the adoption of basic educational programs adapted to the needs of all population groups in the American countries;
- d) To promote, in addition, the adoption of special programs of training, education and culture for the indigenous groups of the American countries;
- e) To cooperate in the protection, preservation and increase of the cultural heritage of the continent;

- f) To promote cooperation among the American nations in the fields of education, science and culture, by means of the exchange of materials for research and study, as well as the exchange of teachers, students, specialists and, in general, such other persons and materials as are useful for the realization of these ends;
- g) To encourage the education of the peoples for harmonious international relations;
- h) To carry on such other activities as may be assigned to it by the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or the Council of the Organization.

#### Article 75

The Inter-American Cultural Council shall determine the place of its next meeting and shall be convened by the Council of the Organization on the date chosen by the latter in agreement with the Government of the country selected as the seat of the meeting.

#### Article 76

There shall be a Committee for Cultural Action of which five States, chosen at each Inter-American Conference, shall be members. The individuals composing the Committee for Cultural Action shall be selected by the Inter-American Cultural Council from a panel submitted by each country chosen by the Conference, and they shall be specialists in education or cultural matters. When the Inter-American Cultural Council and the Inter-American Conference are not in session, the Council of the Organization may fill vacancies that arise and replace those countries that find it necessary to discontinue their cooperation.

#### Article 77

The Committee for Cultural Action shall function as the permanent committee of the Inter-American Cultural Council, for the purpose of preparing any studies that the latter may assign to it. With respect to these studies the Council shall have the final decision.

### CHAPTER XIII

#### THE PAN AMERICAN UNION

#### Article 78

The Pan American Union is the central and permanent organ of the Organization of American States and the General Secretariat of the Organization. It shall perform the duties assigned to it in this Charter and such other duties as may be assigned to it in other inter-American treaties and agreements.

#### Article 79

There shall be a Secretary General of the Organization, who shall be elected by the Council for a ten-year term and who may not be reelected or be succeeded by a person of the same nationality. In the event of a vacancy in the office of Secretary General, the Council shall, within the next ninety days, elect a successor to fill the office for the remainder of the term, who may be reelected if the vacancy occurs during the second half of the term.

#### Article 80

The Secretary General shall direct the Pan American Union and be the legal representative thereof.

#### Article 81

The Secretary General shall participate with voice, but without vote, in the deliberations of the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Specialized Conferences, and the Council and its organs.

## Article 82

The Pan American Union, through its technical and information offices, shall, under the direction of the Council, promote economic, social, juridical and cultural relations among all the Member States of the Organization.

## Article 83

The Pan American Union shall also perform the following functions:

- a) Transmit *ex officio* to Member States the convocation to the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Specialized Conferences;
- b) Advise the Council and its organs in the preparation of programs and regulations of the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Specialized Conferences;
- c) Place, to the extent of its ability, at the disposal of the Government of the country where a conference is to be held, the technical aid and personnel which such Government may request;
- d) Serve as custodian of the documents and archives of the Inter-American Conference of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and, insofar as possible, of the Specialized Conferences;
- e) Serve as depository of the instruments of ratification of inter-American agreements;
- f) Perform the functions entrusted to it by the Inter-American Conference, and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
- g) Submit to the Council an annual report on the activities of the Organization;
- h) Submit to the Inter-American Conference a report on the work accomplished by the Organs of the Organization since the previous Conference.

## Article 84

It is the duty of the Secretary General:

- a) To establish, with the approval of the Council, such technical and administrative offices of the Pan American Union as are necessary to accomplish its purposes;
- b) To determine the number of department heads, officers and employees of the Pan American Union; to appoint them, regulate their powers and duties, and fix their compensation, in accordance with general standards established by the Council.

## Article 85

There shall be an Assistant Secretary General, elected by the Council for a term of ten years and eligible for reelection. In the event of a vacancy in the office of Assistant Secretary General, the Council shall, within the next ninety days, elect a successor to fill such office for the remainder of the term.

## Article 86

The Assistant Secretary General shall be the Secretary of the Council. He shall perform the duties of the Secretary General during the temporary absence or disability of the latter, or during the ninety-day vacancy referred to in Article 79. He shall also serve as advisory officer to the Secretary General, with the power to act as his delegate in all matters that the Secretary General may entrust to him.

## Article 87

The Council, by a two-thirds vote of its members, may remove the Secretary General or the Assistant Secretary General whenever the proper functioning of the Organization so demands.

## Article 88

The heads of the respective departments of the Pan American Union, appointed by the Secretary General, shall be the Executive Secretaries of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Council of Jurists and the Cultural Council.

## Article 89

In the performance of their duties the personnel shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority outside the Pan American Union. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect upon their position as international officials responsible only to the Union.

## Article 90

Every Member of the Organization of American States pledges itself to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary General and the personnel, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

## Article 91

In selecting its personnel the Pan American Union shall give first consideration to efficiency, competence and integrity; but at the same time importance shall be given to the necessity of recruiting personnel on as broad a geographical basis as possible.

## Article 92

The seat of the Pan American Union is the city of Washington.

## CHAPTER XIV

## THE SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE

## Article 93

The Specialized Conferences shall meet to deal with special technical matters or to develop specific aspects of inter-American cooperation, when it is so decided by the Inter-American Conference or the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; when inter-American agreements so provide; or when the Council of the Organization considers it necessary, either on its own initiative or at the request of one of its organs or of one of the Specialized Organizations.

## Article 94

The program and regulations of the Specialized Conferences shall be prepared by the organs of the Council of the Organization or by the Specialized Organizations concerned; they shall be submitted to the Member Governments for consideration and transmitted to the Council for its information.

## CHAPTER XV

## THE SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS

## Article 95

For the purposes of the present Charter, Inter-American Specialized Organizations are the intergovernmental organizations established by multilateral agreements and having specific functions with respect to technical matters of common interest to the American States.

## Article 96

The Council shall, for the purposes stated in Article 53, maintain a register of the Organizations that fulfill the conditions set forth in the foregoing Article.

## Article 97

The Specialized Organizations shall enjoy the fullest technical autonomy and shall take into account the recommendations of the Council, in conformity with the provisions of the present Charter.

## Article 98

The Specialized Organizations shall submit to the Council periodic reports on the progress of their work and on their annual budgets and expenses.

## Article 99

Agreements between the Council and the Specialized Organizations contemplated in paragraph (c) of Article 53 may provide that such Organizations transmit their budgets to the Council for approval. Arrangements may also be made for the Pan American Union to receive the quotas of the contributing countries and distribute them in accordance with the said agreements.

## Article 100

The Specialized Organizations shall establish cooperative relations with world agencies of the same character in order to coordinate their activities. In concluding agreements with international agencies of a world-wide character, the Inter-American Specialized Organizations shall preserve their identity and their status as integral parts of the Organization of American States, even when they perform regional functions of international agencies.

## Article 101

In determining the geographic location of the Specialized Organizations the interests of all the American States shall be taken into account.

*P A R T T H R E E*

## CHAPTER XVI

## THE UNITED NATIONS

## Article 102

None of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations.

## CHAPTER XVII

## MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

## Article 103

The Organization of American States shall enjoy in the territory of each Member such legal capacity, privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions and the accomplishment of its purposes.

## Article 104

The Representative of the Governments on the Council of the Organization, the representatives on the organs of the Council, the personnel of their delegations, as well as the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary for the independent performance of their duties.

## Article 105

The juridical status of the Inter-American Specialized Organizations and the privileges and immunities that should be granted to them and to their personnel, as well as to the officials of the Pan American Union, shall be determined in each case through agreements between the respective organizations and the Governments concerned.

## Article 106

Correspondence of the Organization of American States, including printed matter and parcels, bearing the frank thereof, shall be carried free of charge in the mails of the Member States.

## Article 107

The Organization of American States does not recognize any restriction on the eligibility of men and women to participate in the activities of the various Organs and to hold positions therein.

## CHAPTER XVIII

## RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

## Article 108

The present Charter shall remain open for signature by the American States and shall be ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The original instrument, the Spanish, English, Portuguese and French texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments for purposes of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall notify the signatory States of such deposit.

## Article 109

The present Charter shall enter into force among the ratifying States when two-thirds of the signatory States have deposited their ratifications. It shall enter into force with respect to the remaining States in the order in which they deposit their ratifications.

## Article 110

The present Charter shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Pan American Union.

## Article 111

Amendments to the present Charter may be adopted only at an Inter-American Conference convened for that purpose. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the terms and the procedure set forth in Article 109.

## Article 112

The present Charter shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced by any Member State upon written notification to the Pan American Union, which shall communicate to all the others each notice of denunciation received. After two years from the date on which the Pan American Union receives a notice of denunciation, the present Charter shall cease to be in force with respect to the denouncing State, which shall cease to belong to the Organization after it has fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose full powers have been presented and found to be in good and due form, sign the present Charter at the city of Bogotá, Colombia, on the dates that appear opposite their respective signatures.

For Honduras:

M. A. Batres  
Ramón E. Cruz  
Virgilio R. Gálvez  
April 30, 1948

For Guatemala:

L. Cardoza y Aragón  
J. L. Mendoza  
Virgilio Rodríguez Beteta  
M. Noriega M.  
José M. Saravia  
April 30, 1948

For Chile:

J. Hernández  
E. Barros Jarpa  
W. Muller  
Julio Barrenechea  
D. Bassi  
J. Ramón Gutiérrez  
Rodrigo González  
Gaspar Mora Sotomayor  
April 30, 1948

For Uruguay:

Dardo Regules  
Pedro Chouhy Terra  
Juan F. Guichón  
Héctor A. Grauert  
Gen. Pedro Sicco  
R. Píriz Coelho  
Nilo Berchesi  
Ariosto D. González  
Blanca Mieres de Botto  
Carlos Manini Ríos  
April 30, 1948

For Cuba:

O. Gans y M.  
Ernesto Dihigo  
Carlos Tabernilla  
Ricardo Sarabasa  
Guy Pérez Cisneros  
E. Pando  
April 30, 1957



- For the United States of America :  
 Norman Armour  
 Willard L. Beaulac  
 William D. Pawley  
 Walter J. Donnelly  
 Paul C. Daniels  
 April 30, 1948
- For the Dominican Republic :  
 Arturo Despradel  
 Minerva Bernardino  
 Temístocles Messina  
 Joaquín Balaguer  
 E. Rodríguez Demorizi  
 Héctor Incháustegui  
 April 30, 1948
- For Bolivia :  
 J. Paz Campero  
 E. Montes y M.  
 Humberto Linares  
 H. Palza  
 A. Alexander  
 April 30, 1948
- For Perú :  
 A. Revoredo I.  
 V. A. Belaúnde  
 Luis Fernán Cisneros  
 Juan Bautista de Lavallo  
 G. N. de Arámburu  
 Luis Echeopar García  
 E. Rebagliati  
 April 30, 1948
- For Nicaragua :  
 Luis Manuel DeBayle  
 Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa  
 Modesto Valle  
 Jesús Sánchez  
 Diego M. Chamorro  
 April 30, 1948
- For Mexico :  
 J. Torres Bodet  
 R. Córdova  
 Luis Quintanilla  
 José M. Ortíz Tirado  
 P. Campos Ortíz  
 J. Gorostiza  
 E. Villaseñor  
 G. Ramos Millán  
 J. López B.  
 M. Sánchez Cuén  
 E. Enríquez  
 Mario de la Cueva  
 F. A. Ursúa  
 April 30, 1948
- For Panama :  
 Mario de Diego  
 Roberto Jiménez  
 R. J. Alfaro  
 Eduardo A. Chiari  
 April 30, 1948
- For El Salvador :  
 Héctor David Castro  
 H. Escobar Serrano  
 Joaquín Guillén Rivas  
 Roberto E. Canessa  
 April 30, 1948
- For Paraguay :  
 César A. Vasconcellos  
 Augusto Saldívar  
 April 30, 1948
- For Costa Rica :  
 Emilio Valverde  
 Rolando Blanco  
 José Miranda  
 April 30, 1948
- For Ecuador :  
 A. Parra V.  
 Homero Viteri L.  
 P. Jaramillo A.  
 Gen. L. Larrea A.  
 Alberto Puig Arosemena  
 H. García Ortíz  
 B. Peralta P.  
 April 30, 1948
- For Brazil :  
 João Neves da Fontoura  
 Arthur Ferreira Dos Santos  
 Gabriel de Rezende Passos  
 Elmano Gomes Cardim  
 João Henrique Sampaio Vieira da Silva  
 A. Camillo de Oliveira  
 Jorge Felipe Kafuri  
 Ernesto de Araújo  
 April 30, 1948
- For Haiti :  
 Gustave Laraque  
 J. L. Dejean  
 April 30, 1948
- For Venezuela :  
 Rómulo Betancourt  
 Luis Lander  
 José Rafael Pocaterra  
 Mariano Picón Salas  
 April 30, 1948
- For the Argentine Republic :  
 Enrique Corominas  
 Pascual La Rosa  
 Pedro Juan Vignale  
 Saverio S. Valenti  
 R. A. Ares  
 April 30, 1948
- For Colombia :  
 Eduardo Zuleta Angel  
 Carlos Lozano y Lonzo  
 Domingo Esguerra  
 Silvio Villegas  
 Luis López de Mesa  
 Jorge Soto del Corral  
 Carlos Arango Vélez  
 Miguel Jiménez López  
 Augusto Ramírez Moreno  
 Cipriano Restrepo Jaramillo  
 Antonio Rocha  
 April 30, 1948

## RESERVATIONS MADE AT THE TIME OF RATIFYING

*Guatemala*

None of the stipulations of the present Charter of the Organization of American States may be considered as an impediment to Guatemala's assertion of its rights over the territory of Belize by such means as at any time it may deem advisable.<sup>1</sup>

*Peru*

With the reservation that the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation and essentially those set forth in the preamble and declarations of the Act of Chapultepec constitute standards for the mutual relations between the American States and juridical bases of the inter-American system.

*United States*

That the Senate gives its advice and consent to ratification of the Charter with the reservation that none of its provisions shall be considered as enlarging the powers of the Federal Government of the United States or limiting the powers of the several states of the Federal Union with respect to any matters recognized under the Constitution as being within the reserved powers of the several states.

## STATUS OF THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

*Signed at Bogotá, April 30, 1948, at the Ninth International Conference of American States*

Signatory Countries	Date of Instrument of Ratification	Date of deposit of the Instrument of Ratification
Argentina.....	January 19, 1956.....	April 10, 1956
Bolivia.....	September 25, 1950.....	October 18, 1950
Brazil.....	February 11, 1950.....	March 13, 1950
Colombia.....	December 7, 1951.....	December 13, 1951
Costa Rica.....	October 30, 1948.....	November 16, 1948
Cuba.....	July 8, 1952.....	July 16, 1952
Chile.....	May 5, 1953.....	June 5, 1953
Dominican Republic.....	April 11, 1949.....	April 22, 1949
Ecuador.....	December 21, 1950.....	December 28, 1950
El Salvador.....	August 15, 1950.....	September 11, 1950
Guatemala.....	March 18, 1955*.....	April 6, 1955*
Haiti.....	August 21, 1950.....	March 28, 1951
Honduras.....	January 13, 1950.....	February 7, 1950
Mexico.....	November 23, 1948.....	November 23, 1948
Nicaragua.....	June 21, 1950.....	July 26, 1950
Panama.....	March 16, 1951.....	March 22, 1951
Paraguay.....	March 30, 1950.....	May 3, 1950
Peru.....	May 15, 1952*.....	February 12, 1954*
United States.....	June 15, 1951*.....	June 19, 1951*
Uruguay.....	August 17, 1955.....	September 1, 1955
Venezuela.....	December 21, 1951.....	December 29, 1951

\*With a reservation.

The Charter entered into effect December 13, 1951, when the 14th ratification was deposited by Colombia. It was registered with the General Secretariat of the United Nations on January 16, 1952.

<sup>1</sup> With respect to this reservation, the Pan American Union consulted the signatory governments, in accordance with the procedure established by paragraph 2 of Resolution XXIX of the Eighth International Conference of American States, to ascertain whether they found it acceptable or not. At the request of the Government of Guatemala, this consultation was accompanied by a formal declaration of that Government to the effect that its reservation did not imply any alteration in the Charter of the Organization of American States, and that Guatemala is ready to act at all times within the bounds of international agreements to which it is a party. In view of this declaration, the States that previously did not find the reservation acceptable expressed their acceptance.

