


Congress }
Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT



Y4

.F 76/2

F 76/12/

no. 4

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

AFRICA

A STUDY

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

PROGRAM OF AFRICAN STUDIES
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
(Pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., and
S. Res. 31, 86th Cong.)

No. 4




OCTOBER 23, 1959

Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1959

46905

KSU LIBRARIES



11900 917938

AY
F. 10/7
15/10/7
A. 07

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, *Chairman*


THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, ¹ Rhode Island	ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama	BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana	GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon	HOMER E. CAPEHART, Indiana
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana	FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts	
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee	
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio	
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho	

CARL MARCY, *Chief of Staff*
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, *Clerk*

¹ Chairman emeritus.

CONTENTS

	Page
Map.....	IV
Preface.....	V
Letter of transmittal.....	IX
I. Summary of principal findings.....	1
A. The position of the United States.....	1
B. African dynamics and African-American relations.....	2
C. African nationalism and multiracialism.....	4
D. Economic factors.....	7
E. Africa and the East-West struggle.....	9
F. Toward a positive approach.....	12
II. Conclusions and recommendations.....	13
III. Body of the report.....	18
A. Survey of the present situation.....	18
1. Economic factors.....	18
2. Political factors.....	22
3. Social factors.....	30
B. The United States and Africa.....	40
1. U.S. commitments and interests in Africa.....	40
2. The evolution of U.S. policy.....	48
C. Problems of the immediate future affecting United States- African relations.....	52
1. Nationalism and colonial control.....	52
2. Racial tensions.....	58
3. Economic development.....	61
4. Cultural relations.....	65
5. Subsaharan Africa and the posture of neutrality.....	68
D. The United States, the United Nations, and Africa.....	73
E. Some future policy choices for the United States in Africa.....	78
1. Colonialism.....	78
2. Race.....	78
3. The future political units of Africa.....	79
4. Rectification of boundaries.....	80
5. Democracy in Subsaharan Africa.....	81
6. Nonalinement.....	81
7. Aid programs.....	82
Appendix: Committee outline.....	83



PREFACE

By Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations

In January of 1958 the Committee on Foreign Relations decided to undertake a review of conditions and trends in the world and of the policies and programs of the United States with respect thereto. That review grew, in part at least, out of the concern of the committee over the impact which Soviet scientific achievements might have upon our relations with the rest of the world.

From time to time throughout the spring of 1958, the committee held public hearings on U.S. policies respecting the Far East, the Near East, south Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Canada. Those hearings were limited in nature and served primarily to focus attention on the principal policies and problems of the United States in its relations with the rest of the world. For the most part, the hearings were limited to receiving testimony from the principal officers of the Department of State concerned with various geographic parts of the world. The committee also sought the testimony of selected nongovernmental witnesses with special knowledge of the areas under examination.

The hearings during the spring of 1958, the focus given to our relations with Latin America as a result of Vice President Nixon's visit there, and, lastly, the then critical situation in the Middle East, all contributed to the committee's belief that the time had come for an exploration in depth of U.S. foreign policies throughout the world.

As a consequence of these factors, the Committee on Foreign Relations, in an executive session on May 20, 1958, authorized its Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs to undertake a study of United States-Latin American relations. At the same time, the committee established a special subcommittee consisting of Senators Green, Fulbright, Wiley, and Hickenlooper, and directed it to explore the feasibility and desirability of a broad study of U.S. foreign policy throughout the world.

Subsequently, this subcommittee reported to the full Committee on Foreign Relations that it was feasible and desirable that the committee undertake such a study of foreign policy. It was felt a study of this nature might serve to develop fresh ideas and approaches to the foreign policy of the Nation and lead to a better national understanding of international problems and to more efficient and effective administration of our international operations.

On July 15, 1958, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted to report to the Senate a resolution authorizing the study. The Senate adopted this resolution (S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., 2d sess.) on July 31, 1958. The resolution authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to "make a full and complete study of U.S. foreign policy." Without

limiting the scope of the study authorized, the committee was instructed to direct its attention to the following subjects:

1. The concepts which govern the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world, and the policies by which these concepts are pursued;

2. The present state of the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world;

3. The administration and coordination of policies and programs by the Department of State and such other departments and agencies of the executive branch which engage in substantial activities abroad; and

4. The relationship of other policies and activities of the Government and private activity which exert a significant influence on the relations of the United States with the rest of the world.

In the conduct of its study, the committee was authorized to "use the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals * * *" and to "enter into contracts for this purpose." It was directed to complete its study by June 1960, and not to exceed \$300,000 was made available to meet the expenses of the committee. The committee was authorized to continue this study by the terms of Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong., 1st sess.).

Shortly after Senate Resolution 336 was adopted by the Senate, Senator Green, then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, designated me to serve as chairman of an executive committee, consisting of Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken, which was given the responsibility for directing and coordinating the study.

On September 16 and 17, 1958, the executive committee discussed with a group of distinguished private citizens the general problems involved and the most advantageous approaches to them. Taking part in these discussions, besides the members of the executive committee, were Robert Bowie of Harvard University, former Ambassador William G. Bullitt, Robert Calkins of the Brookings Institution, John Cowles of the Minneapolis Star & Tribune, William Diebold of the Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Luce of Time-Life, Inc., Walter Millis of the Fund for the Republic, and Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Following these meetings the executive committee developed its plans and announced on October 15 that it was prepared to invite private research organizations and institutions to submit proposals on a series of 15 studies which the committee expected to have undertaken in connection with its examination of foreign policy. As a result of this announcement, the committee received over 50 proposals from organizations and institutions interested in undertaking one or more of these studies.

On January 5, 1959, the executive committee met again to consider the proposals which had been received and decided which organizations and institutions should be asked to undertake studies for the committee. Set forth below are the titles of the studies being undertaken and the names of the organizations and institutions responsible for these studies.

STUDIES

The Nature of Foreign Policy and the Role of the United States in the World. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y.

The Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.

The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, Mass.

Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research, Inc., 1200 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. (Published as Study No. 1 in August 1959.)

Foreign Policy Implications for the United States of Economic and Social Conditions in Lesser Developed and Uncommitted Countries. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Possible Developments in Military Technology, Their Influence on Strategic Doctrine, and the Impact of Such Developments on U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, the Johns Hopkins University, 1906 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif. (Published as Study No. 2 in September 1959.)

The Role of Multilateral Organizations in the Formulation and Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.

Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.

U.S. Foreign Policy in Western Europe. Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Published as Study No. 3 on October 15, 1959.)

U.S. Foreign Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Near East. Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., 27 East 62d Street, New York, N.Y.

U.S. Foreign Policy in South Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif.

U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa. Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif.

Each of these organizations and institutions will submit a study to the committee.

Broadly speaking, I hope these studies will supply essential background to enable the Committee on Foreign Relations to accomplish the following basic purposes:

1. Provide the Senate and the American people with a simple, understandable, and forthright statement of the basic foreign policy aims of the United States which reflects the motivations and aspirations of the American people.

2. Identify those forces, domestic as well as foreign, which now or in the future may tend to frustrate or to promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.

3. Suggest, and if possible, determine, feasible ways to deal with such forces so that they may promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.

4. Examine the impact of those forces and trends, foreign and domestic, upon the conduct of American foreign policy in the various geographic areas of the world.

5. Examine the foreign policy decisionmaking machinery to determine whether it is of the maximum efficiency consistent with our democratic processes.

At the January 5 meeting the executive committee also decided to send a letter to some 50 retired Foreign Service officers "to endeavor to obtain for the use of the committee the personal views of men of practical experience with respect to the foreign policy of the United States." Each of these retired Foreign Service officers was asked to give the committee his "general commentary on what is right with our policies, what is wrong with our policies, and what action (or inaction) might in your opinion best serve our interest in the future."

On June 15, 1959, the committee made public, in a summarized form and without personal attribution, the substance of the views of former members of the Foreign Service who responded to the letter. The views and attitudes expressed in that committee publication deserve the most careful consideration by officials in the executive branch of the Government, by my colleagues in the Senate, and by all citizens interested in the conduct of our foreign policy.

The study printed in this volume, "United States Foreign Policy in Africa," is the fourth of the 15 principal studies the committee expects to publish. It was designed to help the committee find answers to subjects covered in an outline developed in consultation between representatives of the committee and representatives of the Program of African Studies of Northwestern University. A copy of the outline appears in the appendix (see pp. 83-84).

I take this occasion to emphasize that the studies which are received will supply the committee with background material for consideration in preparing a final report to the Senate. The committee is, of course, free to accept or to reject the findings and recommendations of the organizations and institutions submitting studies. It is the function of the committee to evaluate the studies which are submitted. Prior to the preparation of a final report, the committee will hold public hearings to receive testimony from all interested parties. In that way it will be possible for the committee to test the soundness of the findings and recommendations in these studies before reaching its own conclusions and submitting its final report to the Senate.

In addition, I wish to emphasize that the committee is approaching this assignment in a nonpartisan manner, endeavoring to avoid transitory issues and to concentrate on the fundamental forces at work within and without the United States which must be understood if our foreign policy is to serve the Nation.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
Evanston, Ill., August 28, 1959.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I take pleasure in transmitting herewith our report, "United States Foreign Policy in Africa," study XIII in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 31, 86th Congress, 1st session, and in accordance with our contract of February 18, 1959.

Many persons have helped me in the preparation of this report, many more than I can name here. In Paris, Brussels, and London, Africans, and Europeans experienced in African affairs, freely discussed with me their ideas about the present and future role of the United States in Africa. The members of the two conferences of experts on Africa, the first at Palo Alto, Calif., on May 20 and the second at New York, N.Y., on June 25, gave generously of their time to analyze, on the basis of their special knowledge, the tentative drafts of the section entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations." The excellent political map of Africa, tabulations of votes on African questions in the Assembly of the United Nations, and figures on American-African exchanges of persons, were made available by the Department of State. Materials on missionary activity were provided by Father John Considine, of the Maryknoll Fathers, and Rev. Theodore Tucker, executive secretary, Africa committee, division of foreign missions, National Council of Churches of Christ.


My colleagues on the university committee in charge of the Program of African Studies have read the report in whole or in part, and have commented most helpfully on it, while the university administration has provided quarters and otherwise facilitated its preparation. The members of my seminar on contemporary Africa prepared useful memorandums presenting their ideas as to what American policies for Africa should be. James Wilcox and Robert Cole, research assistants, and Mrs. D. D. Moor, secretary, have been of continuous aid in obtaining and analyzing relevant data. Finally, I may name Frances Herskovits, whose knowledge of African affairs and analytical skill have, as always, been of the greatest assistance.

To all of these I extend deep gratitude but absolve them of any responsibility.

It has been a privilege to have had the opportunity of participating in this project. I shall be glad to make myself available to answer questions that may arise in connection with the review of this report by the committee or its staff.

Respectfully submitted.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS,
Director, Program of African Studies.



UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

I. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

A. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has never had a positive, dynamic policy for Africa. Until very recently, we have looked to the continuing control by friendly European powers as a guarantee of stability and dependable cooperation and have been reluctant to acknowledge the principle of self-government as fully applicable to its peoples. Yet in 1960 we shall be dealing with 9 or 10 fully independent states in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, and a decade later with perhaps more than twice that number.

The fact that since World War II Subsaharan Africa has been effectively stable has reinforced a tendency to show little concern for the discontents of African peoples. The events regarded as critical in their impact on international relations may, indeed, have exerted a negative influence on our thinking about Africa. That is, they diverted attention elsewhere and created a climate of opinion dominated by official and popular attitudes almost entirely irrelevant to the realities of the African scene.

Official statements repeat our historic position with respect to the aspirations of African peoples for self-government. However, these ideologically significant declarations are so qualified, as they hasten to add that self-government is only for those who can demonstrate that they are ready for it, that they lose much of their effect. Thus, Mr. Acheson, in 1949:

The United States supports the nationalist aspirations of those peoples who are progressively advancing toward the charter's goal of self-government or independence. It is the policy of our Government * * * to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it.¹

Mr. McGhee, in 1950:

* * * It has been our traditional policy * * * to assist * * * in the * * * advancement of dependent peoples along the road to eventual self-government or independence. We realize, however, that the evolution of dependent peoples toward political maturity must of necessity be an orderly process of events, if it is to succeed.²

Mr. Dulles, in 1958:

The United States supports political independence for all peoples who desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.³

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXI, No. 535, Oct. 3, 1949, p. 496.

² Ibid, vol. XXII, No. 572, June 19, 1950, p. 1001.

³ From a condensed version of a speech delivered at Cleveland, Ohio, Nov. 18, 1958, quoted by J. C. Satterthwaite in an address before the Southern Assembly at Biloxi, Miss., Jan. 17, 1959, as reported in "Africa Special Report," vol. IV, No. 3, March 1959, p. 9.

Mr. Satterthwaite, in 1959:

We support African political aspirations when they are moderate, nonviolent, and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts.⁴

A position of this kind nettles the Africans because of the qualifying caveats, while the European governing powers react to the presence of our traditional affirmation.

We write many prescriptions for self-government. African leaders must be able to withstand "extremist" pressures, and forsake "short-term" domestic political rewards; they must show moderation; they must be able to "rise above mere chauvinism" in border disputes; they must show preference for democracy as a political form; they must expand the area of their competence as legislators; they must be friendly to the metropolitan powers, recognizing the colonial contributions and showing a willingness to continue or expand existing ties with the metropole; they should demonstrate a preference for free enterprise, at least to the extent of choosing a "mixed" economy; they should be receptive to Western economic cooperation.

As for the African peoples, a continuing theme states our preference for steady evolutionary political progress as opposed to sudden, radical change; we feel that there should be a sufficient number of trained African civil servants; that there be an increasing literacy rate and school enrollment; that there be adequate medical facilities; that minority rights to persons and property be respected; and that there be no discrimination on the part of Africans against non-Africans living in their country.

Admittedly, it is not easy to adjust the machinery of policymaking to the rate of change in contemporary Africa. There is little question that where no conflict exists between the emergent African state and the governing European power, and when adequate notice of change is given, the United States can adapt preexisting policy to meet the new situation. Our recognition of the Sudan and of Ghana was immediate, and we have recently raised the consulate in Yaoundé, French Cameroons, which we established only 2 years ago, to the level of a consulate general in anticipation of the change in status of that country from trust territory to an independent state. But the establishment of Guinea found us without even a consular agent in its capital. Moreover, we required over a month to recognize a government that had come into being in accordance with procedures laid down by our French ally; and we showed extreme caution in granting aid requested of us by this new country.

B. AFRICAN DYNAMICS AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Increasing African control in Africa is being faced by European governing powers and Africans alike. The free grant of self-government to the Sudan, Ghana, and Guinea, and next year to Nigeria, the Cameroons, Togo, and Somalia, is one indication of this. In January 1959, the Belgian Government promulgated a revision of earlier policies for the Congo which, with the Leopoldville riots, made it clear that the Congo would no longer be a bulwark between southern, Euro-

⁴ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. XL, May 29, 1959, p. 748.

pean-dominated "White Africa" and the driving African nationalism of "Black Africa" to the north. In the multiracial states, devices such as the qualitative franchise and the communal roll, or concepts such as partnership and even *apartheid*, when viewed realistically, turn out to be means to stem the urgency of African aspirations. A report in a South African newspaper, wherein a European was quoted as stating that "come what may, after the year 2000, all Africa, including South Africa, would be ruled by nonwhites," and that "freedom was creeping down from north to south of the continent" takes on added significance when we realize that the newspaper is published in Afrikaans, and that the authority quoted, himself an Afrikaner, is a professor in an Afrikaner university.⁵

Acceleration in the rate of change in Africa is clearly shown in the materials that follow in the body of this report. It makes little difference, especially in that part of the continent lying south of the Sahara, which territories are considered. It is apparent in the drift to newly built urban centers, in the incorporation of Africans into mining, large-scale agricultural schemes, and industry. It is reflected in the continuous increase in world trade as shown in imports and exports, in the growth of schools and school populations, and the number of African university graduates and postgraduate students in institutions of higher learning in Africa itself and in the rest of the world. It is evident in the many nationalist movements that have appeared; in the way in which Africans have learned to employ parliamentary procedures to achieve constitutional reform, where they have been allowed to do so; in the greater pressure of Africans for administrative responsibilities.

These unities in the changes taking place in Subsaharan Africa cut across earlier tribal and linguistic groupings. They readily move over present political boundaries, as delimited by treaties among the colonial powers, because of the arbitrary nature of these frontiers, which reflect few of the ethnic, geographic, or economic realities of the continent. And they do this despite the fact that for a half-century or more, the peoples of these territories have been subject to the differing policies of the several governing powers; have become accustomed to different kinds of administrative procedures; have been taught different European languages; have grown up under different educational systems; and have been exposed to different forms of European values, institutions, and customary modes of behavior.

Here, however, a caution must be entered. Change is valued in our society. Because we find the changes that have been taking place in Africa so compelling, we allow them to obscure the force of antecedent tradition that underlies the continuities in the African scene. Though the changes in African ways of life are apparent even to the casual observer, lying beneath the innovations are the preexisting cultures of the continent, which turn out to be no exotic and romantic survivals of an earlier day, doomed to extinction, but functioning realities of the present.

If we will but look, we will see the power of tradition manifested everywhere. In the political field, we can see it in the pull of tribal affiliations as against national allegiances; in the difficulties being faced

⁵ Press Digest (South Africa), Mar. 12 (No. 10), 1959, p. 88, from Die Transvaler, Mar. 11, 1959.

by the newly independent African countries that arise out of a need to determine the position of traditional rulers in a modern state; in the problem of adapting the mechanisms and even more the ideologies of parliamentary democracy by peoples who for centuries have utilized different means of reaching political decisions.

Similar phenomena confront us in the economic sphere: in attempts to transfer agricultural work-patterns to the rhythms of industrial labor; in efforts to accommodate a tradition of sharing wealth, income and responsibilities for social welfare among members of a kin-group to the requirements of an economic system based on individual initiative; in the new forms which African labor unions are taking. We can see this same mechanism functioning in the religious field, as in the case of the many independent African Christian churches which incorporate elements of European and African theology and ritual, and in addition have become centers of political activity. There is also a growing synthesis of European and traditional influences in the arts.

It is thus of the greatest importance for an understanding of contemporary Africa, and hence for the future of African-American relations, that we think in terms not of change, but of adjustment. In doing this, we must fully recognize the values Africans find in African ways of life. We must also recognize that adjustment is not unidirectional. Just as Africans are adjusting their ways to meet new needs, innovations from Europe and America are being given new shape and meaning as they are integrated into African life.

What is at stake here is essentially the direction which the future affiliation of the new African states will take, in terms of the friendships that can accelerate or stand in the way of attaining world peace. The most hardheaded approach to our foreign policy dictates that we phrase our statements and base our action on a recognition of the maturity of African peoples in terms of their own cultures, and of the validity of their own ways for them. The Prime Minister of Ghana, in his opening address at the All-African People's Conference of 1958, put the case quite unequivocally:

Some of us, I think, need reminding that Africa is a continent on its own. It is not an extension of Europe or of any other continent. We want, therefore, to develop our own community and an African personality. Others may feel that they have evolved the very best way of life, but we are not bound, like slavish imitators, to accept it as our mold. If we find the methods used by others are suitable to our social environments, we shall adopt or adapt them; if we find them unsuitable, we shall reject them.⁶

C. AFRICAN NATIONALISM AND MULTIRACIALISM

The growth of African nationalism presages the development of symbols of national individuality and worth. These may take on various forms. The French Society for African Culture provides an outstanding example of this development. Its key concept, *négritude*, is supranational in the same way as the concept of "the African personality." The findings of the first conference of Negro writers and artists expressed the core of the idea, that—

(a) our cultures be first interpreted by ourselves; (b) they express at the same time our very inner life and their universal calling.⁷

⁶ All-African People's Conference News Bulletin, vol. i, No. 1, p. 6.

⁷ "Africa, Seen by American Negroes" (Présence Africaine, Paris, 1958), p. 8 of insert at end of volume.

Should new political entities arise which are coterminous with linguistic boundaries, we may see language vested with a symbolic value, like Erse in Ireland or Hebrew in Israel. Work looking toward the recovery of the historic past is being prosecuted, and in societies such as those of Africa, where tradition has been handed down by word of mouth, this invites interpretations congruent with national aspirations.

What all these symbols, actual and potential, have in common is insistence that the values of the African past and in present-day African cultures be recognized. The fact that African modes of life have been depreciated and African achievements denied has brought the predictable reaction that reasserts and stresses the worth of things African and the contribution Africans have made to the store of human civilization. With our knowledge of the potency of symbols as cues to action, it is of great importance in our dealings with African peoples, and in our statements bearing on Africa and its future, that we recognize the sensibilities of the Africans as regards their own ways, and make clear that a search for alternatives under new conditions must, in the final analysis, be the task of the Africans themselves.

There are other important aspects of the African scene with which we must deal. Not all the population of Africa is composed of native Africans. Inevitabilities are by no means actualities, since colonial controls continue in most of the Subsaharan continent. Questions of raising standards of living through aid for economic, technological and educational development press upon us. In the present world scene, the United States is concerned that Africa remain on friendly terms with the democracies. And because the factor of race enters so prominently in contemporary Africa, we must always be alert to the effect of racial tensions in our own country in shaping attitudes toward us in Africa.

In all the eastern and southern parts of the continent, where non-African minorities have permanently settled, the problems of adjustment follow racial lines. This is particularly true in the instance of economic differentials, especially as regards standards of living and opportunities for advancement. It is frequently pointed out that comparable differentials, such as rural and urban slums, are to be found in even the most prosperous societies, and are thus no monopoly of these African countries. This reasoning, however logical, becomes less cogent when the racial factor is taken into account. For the class structure of the multiracial African societies is based on race, with opportunity closely correlated with skin color. This holds whether average income, or comparative salary scales, or expenditures for education, housing, or any other factor be taken as an index of these differentials. In the African societies having three racial groups, this is the more striking. Here the Europeans hold the most favored position, the Asians next, the Africans the least.

On many occasions, the United States, as a member of the United Nations, must take a position on the problems of the multiracial African societies. Tanganyika, a Trust Territory, is such a multiracial entity. The question of South-West Africa turns largely on the position of the African inhabitants under the regime of *apartheid* of the Union of South Africa. In voting, we pass judgment, implicitly or


explicitly, on that policy. We do not know whether the question of the relation between Nyasaland and the Central African Federation will be brought before the United Nations, but if its amalgamation with the Rhodesias is insisted on, and African protest continues, we may be forced to take a stand, as we are having to do on the Algerian issue.

Nor is this the only way in which we are involved in the affairs of these African multiracial societies. It is not likely that we will go as far as Great Britain did when, in aiding the financing of a new university college in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, it made its grant contingent on the adoption and implementation of a policy of inter-racialism in the institution. Yet our position in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has made substantial loans to both the Federation and the Union of South Africa, raises significant questions. We may ask whether in participating in these loans we are not tacitly supporting one party to internal interracial controversy by temporarily stabilizing a situation where racial inequality is a major factor in social and economic life. The question has also been posed whether, in continuing to purchase the gold of the Union of South Africa, we are not implicitly giving our approval to the status quo, and thereby intervening in a situation of potential overt conflict.

The problem of balancing our obligations to those of our NATO associates who are colonial powers against the trend toward African control is still with us, although the rate of political change in Africa makes this problem much less pressing than in earlier years. The United Kingdom, during the past half decade, has implemented its policy of the peaceful transfer of control in West Africa by granting independence to Ghana and bringing Sierra Leone a considerable distance on the road to self-government. Nigeria will be independent next year, and plebescites will determine the fate of the British Cameroons. In former French territories south of the Sahara, Guinea is a separate state; Togo and French Cameroons will become self-governing in 1960. Elsewhere all former territories have become autonomous republics within the French community, with independence a matter of their own choosing. Belgium, as indicated, has declared for self-government for the Congo. Only Portugal, among the NATO powers with African possessions, holds to her traditional policy and the practices of classic, which is to say early, colonialism. As Dr. Salazar declared in a recent address, "Africa is the complement of Europe, indispensable to its defense, a necessary support for its economy." For him, "Literally, Africa is aflame," but the combustion, he holds, is due to external influences, not to the force of African aspirations. The maintenance of overseas controls, at all cost, is essential lest "Europe be defeated in Africa."⁸ According to published reports, the only nationalism that exists is that found among the European population, restless under the restrictions laid on them by the metropole.

In the past, our policy-formulating officers have been faced with a dilemma: whether to act in accordance with the obviously strong sentiment in the United States in favor of self-government for dependent peoples that arises out of our own historical experience, or to

⁸ "Noticias de Portugal," vol. xiii, No. 630, May 30, 1959, p. 4.



give priority to the sensibilities of our associated states in NATO. Of the reality of the former sentiment there can be little doubt, and its force has been recognized in many statements made by officials of the colonial powers. This has gone so far that an editorial in a Lisbon newspaper, commenting on the Congo riots and the Nyasaland uprisings, bracketed the United States and Russia as the principal anti-colonial forces in the world:

Portugal is not a sufficiently important country to be able on the diplomatic level to arrest Russian penetration or to explain to the Americans the error that they commit in accepting the fallacious idea of a struggle against colonialism. Under these conditions, we can only prepare ourselves to resist the difficulties we see ahead and the lack of understanding that faces us.⁹

As concerns the problem posed by our obligations to our European allies, there has been a tendency to allow U.S. policy toward Africa to be formulated in the capitals of Europe. The march of events in Africa itself, and the recent change in the internal organization of the Department of State that has brought Africa to the policymaking level, are causing a reassessment of our position, a procedure that is obviously an essential first step toward effective independent American action.

D. ECONOMIC FACTORS

In shaping our policy toward Africa, economic factors hold a place of primary relevance. The questions involved must be considered both in terms of the contributions of the private sector of our economy, and of aid given either by the U.S. Government, or less directly through the operations of international agencies in which the United States participates.

Though we have had private commercial and industrial relations with Africa for many years, these represent only a very small portion of our overseas economy. They have, moreover, been directed principally toward Liberia, South Africa, and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Thus, whereas 11 U.S. firms were listed in Department of Commerce reports as having "substantial financial interests" in Nigerian companies in 1957, in 1952 there were in the Union alone more than this number in the fields of industrial machinery and equipment (15), and in that of drugs and cosmetics (13).

It is too soon to determine whether American capital will move in significant measure to the newly independent parts of the continent. The evident desire of these African states to encourage foreign investment seems to be having its effect. The number of representatives of American business concerns who have visited Ghana is one indication of this. In the older, established country of Liberia, the impact on the economy of the increase in investment in mining ventures, and in the commercial production of bananas, sisal, and other export crops, together with the growth of rubber plantations, has not gone unnoticed by African leaders elsewhere. There seems to be little fear among them that foreign investment means financial imperialism; against this the African states are protecting themselves by encouraging investment on a multilateral basis, with government participation. Whatever the source of investment funds, consequent expansion of their economies will make for larger internal markets. It is reason-

⁹ O Seculo (Lisbon), Mar. 11, 1959.

able to assume that these possibilities will attract U.S. private capital no less than the investors of other nations.

Economic growth can be accelerated by a planned diversification of production. African colonial economies have been called fragile because of their dependence on the export of a few items of primary agricultural or mineral products, whose prices fluctuate with the vagaries of the world market. The African states are fully alert to this vulnerable aspect of their economies. Aside from prestige factors, one of the reasons for the strength of the drive by Ghana to finance the Volta River scheme to produce aluminum is to diminish its reliance on cocoa as a principal source of income. The recent fall in the world price of nonferrous metals caused serious political repercussions in the Congo and the Federation. Diversifying these economies would give them a more stable base and, on a more subtle psychological plane, permit the countries of Africa to move away from the classical colonial pattern that is increasingly resented by articulate Africans because of the economic handicaps it imposes on them.

The greatest present need of Africa, however, is for grants or loans which will permit the expansion in basic capital requirements and essential services that the economies of these territories cannot provide out of current revenue. This has been recognized since World War II by the colonial powers. The grants given African territories by the British Colonial Welfare and Development Fund and the French Fonds d'Investissement pour le Developpement Économique et Social de la France d'Outre-Mer (FIDES) are examples of this. With these funds, roads and railways have been built, school systems extended, and other facilities have been provided that underdeveloped countries must have if levels of income and standards of living are to be raised.

One problem to be faced with the emergence of an added number of new self-governing states concerns future financing for recurrent expenditures now included in the aid programs of the powers that govern them. Heretofore, U.S. grants and loans were channeled principally into countries which played an active role in world strategy. It seems unlikely that in African states where the European population does not dominate, this factor will enter significantly. The proclaimed neutrality of Africans in the world struggle will not encourage commitment on this level. One of the more striking developments in present-day Africa is the way in which Ghana, as one example, has turned to Israel for technical assistance and for aid in financing major undertakings, such as the establishment of a steamship line. With technical skills to give, ecological problems that parallel those of many parts of Africa, and no political controls entering, the logic of seeking aid from that country is apparent. What the newly independent countries of Africa, and African leaders in territories that are at present non-self-governing, appear to desire when they speak of their material needs, is first of all technical assistance and training programs, and secondly, long-term, low-interest loans. But in obtaining these, they propose to avoid aid that has political strings attached.

In discussing aid with Africans, however, one gains the impression that human relations are as important as material needs in their thinking. The statement made by Sekou Touré when the question of

whether Guinea should remain within the proposed French community was pending, that "We prefer poverty in freedom to prosperity under slavery" reads a lesson that the United States, in ordering its dealings with the new African states, can advantageously remember. Said one Ghanaian:

What we want from the United States is sympathy for our aspirations, and understanding for our mistakes.

Stated a Senegalese leader:

We will, of course, need financial help, but what we need most of all is your moral support.

In his opening address to the All-African People's Conference, Prime Minister Nkrumah put the priorities in this order:

Remember always that you have four stages to make—

1. The attainment of freedom and independence;
2. The consolidation of that freedom and independence;
3. The creation of unity and community between the free African states;
4. The economic and social reconstruction of Africa.

It is clear that in aiding African states to achieve the economic ends they have laid down for the betterment of their peoples, insight into their aspirations will pay rich returns in friendship and respect for the United States. There is good evidence that they will turn to us as a primary source of the aid they need. If we are imaginative in our operations, we have here a major opportunity to retain the good will toward us that undoubtedly exists, and to extend it.

The difficult questions of international relations that arise when aid is extended to the multiracial states have been touched on. However, other considerations enter. Loans to these countries, and grants given them, have been in support of governmental projects, usually of some magnitude. These projects, which in their long-term effects are intended to aid the country as a whole, currently benefit only minimally the African majority in the population and, because they are remote from the immediate concerns of the people, they have little psychological impact on them. There is a certain amount of increased employment, and a possible raising of the African wage level in the jobs available in railroad or dam construction. But this is minor and, in the absence of planning to absorb the workers recruited into the permanent labor force, is terminal.

While the degree to which such projects may raise the general level of living standards of the total population is customarily elaborated, the extent to which aid of this character effectively functions to diminish the disparities in opportunity and reward that set off one racial group in these countries from another is rarely, if ever, considered. Here the human factor again enters, and in long-term, realistic thinking is quite as significant as the economic factors on which decisions are commonly based. A full overview of the problems we face in granting aid to these countries would seem to dictate that such human factors must be taken into account to a far greater extent than national and international lending agencies have hitherto done.

E. AFRICA AND THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE

In the concern of the United States that Africa take a position in the current ideological and power struggle that will be to the advan-

tage of this country, we approach a basic preoccupation of American foreign policy since World War II. It has been projected into Africa with the actual or prospective independence of states which will be free agents in the international scene.

One aspect of this has to do with the numerous alternatives that arise out of the fluid complexities of politics in contemporary Africa. The choices before the African states are far more varied than during the period when India established the principle of neutrality in the cold war, or even those implied in the Bandung Asian-African formula. Among these choices are for each state to go it alone, or for African states to affiliate as members of federations of varying degrees of looseness, or to ally themselves with the North African countries and through them with the Arabic world, or to align themselves with the European-American or with the Russian side of the East-West struggle.

Certain of these can be dismissed out of hand. The Bandung Conference, for example, seems to have had little continuing influence in Subsaharan Africa. The African component at that conference, except for Ethiopia, was composed of North African countries, and in it the points at issue were of the Communist versus anti-Communist variety. The bond that gives such unity as exists among African and Asian peoples is the slogan of anticolonialism. To the extent that the colonial powers are not responsive to the force of contemporary currents of world anticolonial thought, or react overtly in defiance of that thought, this can continue to be a powerful rallying cry. The intransigence of Portugal, the manipulations of political and economic mechanisms for the benefit of the European minority in the Union of South Africa, in the Federation, and to a more attenuated degree in East Africa and the Congo reinforce the power of anti-colonialist slogans. For to the newly self-governing peoples of the world, as for those who remain under tutelage, colonialism is something a white nation does to a darker people.

As to the precise nature of the relation between the Subsaharan and North African states, it is to be noted that both belong to the African Caucusing Group in the United Nations, and that the North African states played a major role at the Cairo Conference and were active in the Accra Conference of the governments of the independent African states in May 1958. On the other hand, though Prime Minister Nkrumah visited Cairo, Ghanaian ties with Israel have continued to be close; nor did the North African states play more than a minor part in the Accra All-African People's Conference.

It is too soon to predict what the effect of the Ghana-Guinea alliance will be. Other African territories may in the future affiliate with these two; Guinea may enter the Federation of Mali, and with Senegal and the Sudanese Republic make up an independent federated state. What is significant is how many African leaders are alert to the consequences of what French-speaking West Africans call the "balkanization"—that is, the political fragmentation—of the continent, and the extent to which they are thinking in terms of large political aggregates. This must be kept in mind in our day-to-day operations in Africa, not only as regards our dealings with African states, but also in terms of their reactions to our position vis-à-vis the colonial powers and the multiracial states of Africa, the Portuguese territories, and the Congo.

At present, however, the principal question raised has to do with the position of present and future African states in the East-West struggle. The answer to this is now quite clear. Africans have demonstrated their preference for a neutrality that, other things being equal, will allow them to have continued dealings with the nations of the West with which they have been closely associated for more than half a century. The ties, however unilaterally developed, that exist between them and the European countries which governed or govern them will not be denied, and cannot easily be cut off. Sympathetic understanding of their views, and assistance when this is asked for, will constitute an effective argument for not rejecting well-established cultural and historical affiliations.

As far as can be determined, there has been minimal Communist penetration in Subsaharan Africa. The degree to which the Communist world is disappointed in the independent thinking of the Africans is apparent in an article by Professor Potekhin, a member of the Russian delegation to the Accra People's Conference, in which he takes the Africans to task for the resolutions passed there, notably the one rejecting violent action against imperialism.¹⁰

In this connection, it is essential for us not to confuse communism and African nationalism. We hear of Communist wooing of African students in London and Paris, yet the consensus of observers is that when these students come home, they show few signs of indoctrination. Assertions as to the presence of Communist influence, indeed, are most often heard in the African countries whose commitment to the West is strongest—South Africa, the Federation, and the Portuguese territories. There are some Communists in the Union, and their support, like the support of any other non-Africans who work against current policies there, is accepted by the Africans who are attempting to free themselves of the inequities enforced by the dominant European group.

This, however, scarcely makes Communists of African nationalists. When we are told that Dr. Hastings Banda, the leader of the Nyasaland African Congress, was influenced by Communists because he met certain Russians at Accra—the Russian representation there totaling 6, as against more than 100 Americans—we may well ask for specific proofs of this influence. The explanation, accepted in England by persons of all shades of political opinion, that the unrest arose out of the circumstances under which the Federation was established and out of an intensified fear of the possibility that it might be accorded dominion status without adequate regard for African wishes, would seem to be more to the point.

There is agreement among those who know Africa and Africans well that the surest way to alienate Africans from the West would be to insist on active participation, on our side, in the East-West conflict. The statement of Mr. Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, made recently in London about the limitations of attempting—

to try to use finance as an instrument of diplomacy—a method of winning or cultivating friends among nations, for the purpose of maintaining or improving international alignments in a time of world tension¹¹—

¹⁰ I. Potekhin, "Africa Shakes off Colonial Slavery," *International Affairs*, No. 2, 1959, p. 87.

¹¹ *New York Times*, May 6, 1959, p. 19.

is particularly applicable to Africa. Friendship cannot be bought; we might remember that this is as true in the case of Russian aid, extended for political and military reasons, as it is in the case of our own aid.

F. TOWARD A POSITIVE APPROACH

For the continuation of good relations between the United States and Africa, we must relinquish the negative, ad hoc approach that has marked many of our policy statements and operations of our various Government departments and agencies concerned with African affairs. We must, above all, move beyond the compulsive preoccupation with Communist penetration that has so strongly motivated our actions. Because an African state exchanges diplomatic representatives with Iron Curtain countries, or sends some students to study there, or accepts technical aid from them, this does not mean that political commitment to communism will necessarily follow. An exchange of diplomatic representation means that the African states, in the fullest sense, are moving into the larger world. African students, we are discovering, are far more eager to attend Western European and American universities than those of the Iron Curtain countries, as is evidenced by the complaints of Iron Curtain educators at the small numbers of Africans who have accepted the generous scholarships they offer. It is common knowledge that Africans have shown a preference for assistance from the countries with which they have had earlier and extended contact, and are turning to Western Europe, Israel, and the United States for technical personnel.

Knowledge, imagination, courage, and sympathy: these are the ingredients of a successful U.S. policy for Africa. We have as much to give on the ideological plane as on that of finance and technology, if we will but utilize wisely the advantages of our historic tradition. In formulating our position, we need not desert our European associates who are colonial powers, nor in every case follow the lead of Africans. If the African states are striving to assert an African Personality, let us remember that we pride ourselves on our own long-established personality, which we call the American way. If we live up to this image of ourselves and through our acts project its reality, we shall have no difficulty in gaining and maintaining the degree of friendly relations we seek in Africa.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions and recommendations, which derive from the findings in the preceding section, and the materials of the pages that follow, are presented in paired form to facilitate reference and analysis of the points made, and suggestions for U.S. action deriving from them.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The dynamic character of the drive of African peoples toward self-government makes it apparent that in the near future we will be dealing in Africa with many governments controlled by Africans.

2. U.S. policy during the past decade has been based on the assumption that Africa, as a continent under the control of our NATO associates, can be given minor consideration.

3. The broadest interests of the United States lie in furthering amicable relations with the peoples and governments of Africa and in promoting mutual understanding as an instrument of world peace.

4. It is important that communism and African nationalism not be confused. The choices that African States will make as regards the world struggle will be influenced by the use of perceptive

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. U.S. policy, in furthering its own best interests and in accord with the action of some of our NATO associates, should be guided by expectation of the primacy of Africans in all Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. The United States must treat Africa as a major policy area, to be approached on a level of equality with other policy areas, particularly Europe, where African-American interests are involved. U.S. policy in Africa must be *flexible*, in view of the variations in the African Continent and the rapidity of the changes occurring there; *imaginative* in view of our traditional sympathy with the aspirations of peoples to direct their own affairs; and *positive* in shaping aid programs with a view to African needs rather than cold war instrumentalities.

3. U.S. policy in Africa must facilitate the implementation of mutual interests with African countries. It should favor their development free from outside interference, with governments that will live at peace with their neighbors and serve the best interests of their peoples, as these are defined in terms of their own values, functioning so as to reduce racial tensions where these are a factor.

4. The United States should recognize that for African states a policy of nonalignment is in the best interests of the West and of Africa. On the assumption that most of Sub-Saharan Africa will

CONCLUSIONS

insights into African needs cast in African terms, and by understanding African aspirations in the light of patterns based on pre-existing traditional values and modes of behavior.

5. Africans have shown concern about the problem of "balkanization" of the continent, and of strong states preying on weak ones. They are insistent that future independent African States be free to assert their own personalities while benefiting from wider affiliations within the continent.

6. The experience of the United Kingdom in West Africa and of France in the French related territories, like that of the United States in the Philippines, has demonstrated that elimination of uncertainty as to the future of non-self-governing peoples by the establishment of specific timetables or specific measures for the legal attainment of independence is particularly effective in lessening tensions and assuring future good relations.

7. Examined in historical perspective, the present differences in opportunity and reward between African, Asian, and European groups in the multiracial societies of Africa are found to be the end result of the circumstances of early contact. Resistance to change in the existing system of stratification is based on long-established attitudes which are reinforced by tensions of the kind found wherever entrenched social, economic, and political positions are challenged.

8. The problems in international relations presented to the United States by the multiracial countries of eastern and southern Africa arise from the handicaps that racial inequalities in these countries and the tensions result-

RECOMMENDATIONS

soon be released from colonial controls, the United States must take the position that our strategic requirements there will be subsidiary to political considerations, and military aid secondary to technical assistance.

5. The United States should view with sympathy efforts to create wider associations of African States which will promote political and economic stability, and facilitate the extension of aid in the economic and technical fields.

6. The United States should extend to all African dependent territories the policy applied to Tanganyika, favoring the issuance of specific statements by the responsible authorities about when and how self-government is to be attained, since the more peaceful the transition to self-rule, the greater the likelihood that present orientations toward the West will be maintained by newly independent states.

7. The United States should exert its influence to assure peaceful resolution of conflict in the multiracial states of Africa. It should urge recognition of the interests of all concerned and the implementation of their rights, without regard to ethnic affiliation.

8. The United States must demonstrate that in Africa it applies its domestic policies aimed at achieving interracial good will and equality. Examples of this would be the extension to all government operations there of exist-

CONCLUSIONS

ing from them impose in furthering the cause of the democracies in world opinion.

9. The fact that we have never had, and never have aspired to have African dependencies, plus the attitudes generated over the years by the work of missionaries, scientists, and others, have made our contacts with Africa essentially of the person-to-person variety. Private organizations, however, can no longer provide the amounts needed to carry on the educational and research activities that are requested of us. Hence, substantial governmental contributions are essential if the historic continuity of our earlier contacts with Africa, and the resulting benefits from them, are to continue.

10. The rapid shift of power and responsibility to independent African States, with the resultant withdrawal of overseas administrators, has created a shortage of trained and experienced management and advisory manpower that is likely to persist for some time. Africans fully recognize the needs created by this situation, and look to the United States, the United Nations, the former metropolises, and other countries and agencies for aid in providing essential personnel.

11. The proportion of U.S. loans, grants, and technical assistance to African territories has in past years comprised but a minute part of its total world commitments. Metropolitan countries have provided important assist-

RECOMMENDATIONS

ing legislation forbidding dealings by government agencies with firms that practice racial discrimination; having U.S. missions apply nondiscriminatory rules in personnel policies as regards local staff; and requiring U.S. firms operating in Africa to show that they have used all legal means to comply with this principle in order to receive tax concessions.

9. The United States should greatly increase appropriations for African exchanges and educational programs of all kinds. Support should be given to projects that link American scholars and their counterparts in Africa, thereby making available to African countries our best educational resources. The number of fellowships for Africans to study in American institutions of higher learning and technology should be materially increased. Existing programs to train specialists sent to Africa as technical experts or members of the Foreign Service, in the human aspects of their work, should be extended.

10. The United States, in order to play its role in providing technical aid for newly independent and emerging African countries, should facilitate steps to establish career services for technical assistance personnel on the international level in cooperation with other countries, through the United Nations and through its own governmental operations.

11. The United States should immediately reappraise its aid programs for Subsaharan Africa in order to determine their adequacy in the light of the needs of the area and of American interests. To compound the effective-

CONCLUSIONS

ance to their overseas dependent territories, but new provisions must be worked out as these territories become independent.

12. As in most nonindustrialized areas, a basic problem of Sub-Saharan Africa is the low level of average income with resulting deficiencies in health, education, and standard of living. Though the countries of Africa have shown a determination to rectify these deficiencies, they are handicapped by the fact that their essential capital resources, like those of trained personnel, are inadequate.

13. Despite its subsoil resources, and the industrialization that is possible in view of the hydroelectric potential in Sub-Saharan Africa, farming will continue to constitute a major sector of African economies. The needs of farmers, however, are not customarily taken into account when loans and grants are projected, because of the difficulties in organizing and administering programs of aid on this level.

14. There are still great gaps in American knowledge about the ways in which African economic problems can be overcome. In order that technical assistance and loans and grants may best be used to develop stable and prospering states in Africa, a great deal more

RECOMMENDATIONS

ness of future contributions, efforts should be made to develop regional arrangements, roughly analogous to the Colombo plan, that will provide a framework for cooperation among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the European Economic Community, the British Commonwealth, the United States, and other nations willing to participate in measures to promote economic growth in the area.

12. U.S. grants, loans, and technical assistance, whether given directly or through international agencies, should be channeled toward aiding countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in building up an infrastructure of facilities in such fields as transportation, communications, health, and education, where local resources of capital and personnel are inadequate to permit these countries to implement these basic aspects of their developmental plans.

13. U.S. fund-granting agencies and international bodies on which the United States is represented should extend the range of their operations to provide for research into problems of soil management and the development of effective methods for growing, processing, and marketing crops. These matters should be included in the agenda of discussions and negotiations for loans or grants to the governments of African countries.

14. U.S. Government agencies, including the International Cooperation Administration, should be authorized and encouraged to initiate studies of how technical assistance and loan or grant funds can best stimulate long-term economic growth and stability. In

CONCLUSIONS

needs to be learned about the character of these societies.

15. There is little evidence that moves looking toward expropriation or unduly heavy taxation of foreign holdings by newly independent African States are to be anticipated. Thus far, U.S. private investment has been relatively restricted in Africa, both as to number of firms involved, total amount invested, and geographical spread. Enough data are in hand, however, to indicate that greater opportunities for profitable operations exist than has been realized.

RECOMMENDATIONS

fulfillment of this objective, U.S. Government agencies should make maximum use of the growing body of knowledge about African societies gathered by nongovernmental institutions.

15. To encourage American capital investment in that continent, the Department of Commerce should extend the series of economic studies of African countries treating of their commercial and industrial potentials. The United States should also extend the use of methods developed for guaranteeing private investments in newly independent African States, such as the International Cooperation Administration's investment guarantee program, which at the same time will promote the interests of these countries.

III. BODY OF THE REPORT

A. SURVEY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

1. *Economic factors*

(a) *The resource base.*—Africa has been slow to disclose the nature and magnitude of her resources, so that the continent is variously described as possessing great riches and as an area of great poverty. The truth lies between these extremes, depending on the territory being considered, the criteria applied and the basis of comparison.

Subsaharan Africa, with more than 160 million inhabitants, is but lightly peopled, so that the question of the pressure of population against the land enters only in a few regions. Its density south of the Sahara of 18 per square mile may be projected against a world figure of 52 and compared to 54 for the United States, 166 for China, 199 for France, and 306 for India. With the introduction of scientific medicine, destruction of parasites, and other health measures, however, the African population is showing a steady increase. Its annual rate is about 1.8 percent, which suggests that its numbers will double within from 35 to 40 years.

The agricultural base of most African societies can be expected to continue to be of major importance for African economies. The resources determining Africa's present and its predictable future place in the world economic order, however, derive from the range and quantity of the subsoil wealth of the continent, and its hydro-electric potential. The continuing upward revision of estimates of African resources is exemplified in the case of oil. Not too long ago, it was held that oil could not be present in Africa because of the nature of African geological formations. Yet in the last 4 years the known oil reserves of the continent have increased twentyfold, from 200 million to 4,100 million barrels.¹² The Nigerian oilfields are sufficiently promising so that one oil company, as of May 1959, is reported to have spent £48 million in its prospecting operations, with announced production expected to reach 500,000 tons of crude oil in 1960, double the tonnage of the preceding year.¹³

One reason for the reported revisions of African resources is that the potentialities of the continent are closely linked with the technological advances of the past decades. An instance of this is the changed role of the rapids and falls in the rivers that descend from the escarpments of the African uplands to the sea. It was these which, a century ago, rendered access to the heart of the continent so difficult that they were a determining factor in restricting significant contact between Africa and Europe. With technological development, however, these same rapids and falls, as sources of hydro-electric power, are the key to major changes in the economies of the

¹² "Africa Special Report," vol. III, No. 6, June 1959, p. 10.

¹³ "News From Nigeria," May 27, 1959, No. 40/59, p. 16.

continent, and its accelerating importance in the world industrial and commercial order.

(b) *Utilization of resources.*—When we take into account the entire gamut of African potential, we find that the agricultural and, to the extent it is developed, the manufacturing sectors of the economies make their chief contribution to the internal economic systems, while mining is carried on primarily, but not exclusively, for export.

Though it is inexact to state that in Subsaharan Africa no one starves, the system of internal distribution normally meets subsistence needs. Seasonal food deficiencies that coincide with periods of intensive preparation of the soil for planting, when the greatest expenditure of energy is necessary, have been reported for the indigenous agricultural systems of various parts of the subcontinent. Periodic famines, endemic to all technologically less-developed societies, are also present. The critical question is not so much feeding the present population, but how to provide for the increased numbers that the present rate of growth will produce. Because of the nature of the African soils and the threat of exhaustion and erosion if the land is overworked or farmed by mechanized agriculture, the technical aspects of the problem bulk large.

We must bear in mind that Subsaharan Africa presents a series of environmental factors which, taken together, combine to make more difficult the problems of economic development. In addition to those named above, there are also debilitating diseases, a shortage of water, lack of natural transportation facilities and an unsatisfactory distribution of rainfall. The obstacles presented by none of these are insurmountable, but in its totality this complex poses special questions for programs of technical assistance.

The human factor must also be taken into account, since the conflict between traditional systems of communal landholding and the expanding requirements of a growing population poses many serious social and political problems. Various schemes of land reallocation, aimed at converting control over land by kinship groups into a system of individual holdings, have been put into execution, especially in the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Ruanda, and Kenya. Where these schemes have involved the relocation of a community of farmers, this has been a powerful spur to discontents which feed nationalist movements. Schemes of this kind, based as they are on measures that contravene some of the most deep-seated values in aboriginal tradition, have aroused resistances that have effectively masked and thereby minimized the economic benefits to be derived from them. It should be noted that such resistances, encountered in eastern and southern Africa, stand in contrast to the way in which, in many parts of West Africa, transition to what in effect is individual ownership of land has come about as a response of the people themselves to the requirements of a changing economy.

The contribution of agriculture to the overseas trade of Subsaharan Africa derives from beverage crops, cereals, fibers, oilseeds, fruits, sugar, rubber, tobacco, pastoral products such as hides and skins, and timber, these joining the minerals of various kinds that make up the bulk of African exports. Despite this variety for the continent as a whole, most African territories, however, tend to have monoexport systems, and are thus economically "fragile" in the sense that they are

vulnerable to the fluctuations of the world market. How far-reaching the implications of this may be is to be seen in the fact that according to the Parliamentary Commission that investigated the 1959 Leopoldville riots, a major cause was African unemployment that, resulting from the fall in the prices of commodities on the world market, increased between May 1958 and January 1959 from 13,173 to 23,157.¹⁴

Economic fragility is equally present, whether it arises out of dependence on a single crop or a single mineral. From this point of view, the economies of Ghana, where cocoa is a major export, and of Rhodesia, where copper dominates the export market, face the same problems. There is by no means agreement as to how the difficulty is to be resolved. Various marketing board schemes, such as those for cocoa in Ghana, palm kernels in Nigeria, and cotton in Uganda have been established to cushion a serious fall in world prices. Some economists hold for diversification; others maintain that the economy should be strengthened by encouraging light industries that produce goods for internal consumption. These solutions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Certainly the question merits continuous study, since it is evident that none of the measures can, of itself, provide a solution.

(c) *Planning schemes.*—Following World War II, plans for economic and social development were put into effect for all African dependencies. According to a statement of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) made in 1951, the aims of these programs were identical. Specifically, they were to get to know more about the resources of each territory; to protect known resources and insure their most efficient use; to improve and enlarge basic equipment; to improve health, education, and living conditions of the population; to improve agriculture, stockbreeding, and existing industries; and to develop the most profitable new sources of production and new forms of wealth. All were aimed at strengthening the economies of the territories and making them less sensitive to fluctuations in the world economy.¹⁵

In the colonial territories, plans were initiated and financed by the metropolitan countries, either in the form of grants or of loans. The British provided £113,568,000 in colonial development and welfare (CWD) aid, mainly grants, during the 10 years ending March 31, 1958, and £54 million in investments of the Colonial Development Corp., currently engaged in 47 projects. Of CWD funds, 20 percent went into communications, 18.3 percent for education, 18.6 percent to agriculture, 11.4 percent for housing and water supplies, and 9 percent into health services. The French contribution to their Subsaharan territories, mainly through grants and loans from the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social de la France d'Outre-Mer, totaled about the equivalent of \$2,140 million. The Government of Portugal has been lending about \$20 million a year for development. The elaborate Belgian 10-year plan for the Congo initiated in 1949, with a second one projected, has been financed through loans and Congo revenues, and Belgium is lending Ruanda-Urundi the

¹⁴ Chambre des Représentants (Belgium), session 1958–59, 27 Mars, 1959, Rapport (on events in Leopoldville in January 1959), p. 13.

¹⁵ OEEC, Investment in Overseas Territories in Africa, South of the Sahara, 1959, p. 17.

equivalent of \$80 million for the period 1952-61, without interest. Liberia, after the war, launched a 5-year program, largely with U.S. aid.¹⁶ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has made loans totaling over \$470 million, for electric power, highways, industries, ports and waterways, railroads, and general development.¹⁷

(d) *Actual and potential contributions of Africa to world economy.*—The contribution of Subsaharan Africa to the demands of world industry is shown in the proportion of world production that comes from there. In 1954, it contributed 98.6 percent of all the diamonds produced, 80.9 percent of the cobalt, 58.7 percent of the gold, 41.7 percent of the antimony, 40.3 percent of the chrome, 36 percent of manganese, 32.1 percent of the phosphate rock, and 27.3 percent of the copper. Other minerals enter world trade, but in more modest proportions: asbestos, 17.5 percent; tin concentrates, 13.9 percent; lead, 11.9 percent; zinc, 8 percent; iron, 5.1 percent; silver, 4.7 percent; bauxite, 4.2 percent; coal, 3 percent; and nickel, 1 percent.¹⁸

The significance of this list is compounded by the fact that many of the items given, as well as others not named here, are of the rarer varieties, essential in making alloys. In addition, there are the so-called strategic materials, for which production figures are not available. Uranium is the outstanding example in this category; before the last war Africa was by far the largest supplier of it and has continued to produce large amounts.

The contribution of African agricultural products to world market requirements is also appreciable. Maize and millet are consumed locally, but a substantial proportion of the oilseeds produced are for export. Thus 25 percent of world production of groundnuts (peanuts) in 1954-55 came from Africa, while Africa contributed 80 percent of the total supply of palm oil. Of the fibers, cotton, wool, and sisal are to be noted. Africa's share of world production of the first two is small, but the continent produces 58 percent of all sisal. The proportion of cocoa beans, primarily from Ghana and Nigeria, comes to 60 percent; 17 percent of all coffee beans in the same years were from Africa, while tea growing, though not carried on extensively, shows a steady increase. Hides and timber are also exported in substantial quantities.

Among the minerals, the African production of coal is small. Worked deposits are chiefly in the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, with some in the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika and Eastern Nigeria. Coal, however, has been basic to the industrial development of what are now the leading economic nations, being needed not only for power, but also for steel, chemical, and other industries. This is why the great hydroelectric potential of Africa is so significant, since here we find the source of power for future industrialization. This is foreshadowed by the developments resulting from completion of the Le Marinal Dam, which provides power for the Katanga minefields, or the dam at Jinja, built at Owens Falls, the source of the Nile. Shortly we shall witness the effect of the Kariba Zam-

¹⁶ D. Belloch, "Organizations for the Promotion of Development in Africa," *Venture*, April 1959, pp. 8-9.

¹⁷ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Loans at Work," p. 2.

¹⁸ United Nations, "Economic Development of Africa, 1954-55," table 10, p. 19.

bezi power project, which should facilitate mining and manufacturing operations in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and materially ease the demands on the Wainiki coalfields. Other projects include the great Inga Dam to utilize the tremendous flow of the Congo River to produce what will be the cheapest electricity in the world, dams at Sanaga in the French Cameroons, Konkouré in Guinea, and on the Volta River in Ghana, to name only the most important. What effect the advances in the use of nuclear power will have on development of African hydroelectric potential cannot now be foretold. However, the resources of Africa in fissionable minerals should cushion any competitive inroads on the use of her waterpower resources.

These developments should strengthen the economies of African countries by giving them the power essential to utilize more fully their subsoil wealth. Far-reaching results may be anticipated as populations increase and the readjustment of labor objectives and motivations make for the establishment of a permanent industrial labor force. Changes in modes of land ownership and the improvement of agricultural techniques can be expected to bring about greater productivity in this sector, and a concomitant growth of the capital base should give rise to a solidly founded industrial plant. Though internal conflict arising out of political and social changes, or external influences that emerge from the play of international rivalries and the vagaries of the world economy, may alter the course of its development, present probabilities point to a continuing upward curve. And as the general economic level rises, Africa's role as a market for goods should result in increased trade with other countries and greater participation in the world economy as consumer. It is apparent that the colonial economic pattern is changing. Primary materials will increasingly be processed in Africa itself, thus altering the position of African countries by making possible the expansion of their internal trade and changing the character of their export potential.

2. Political factors

(a) *The nature of African nationalism.*—The concept of nationalism in Africa differs strikingly from its accepted European definition, where it means a fixed focus on national interest. In Africa, the term "nationalism" distinguishes those movements that have arisen in reaction to foreign control, and thus designates attempts to attain self-government by the conversion of colonial dependencies into independent political entities.

The rise of these African nationalist movements, and the successes that have increasingly marked their efforts have done much to turn world attention to the continent. African nationalisms have drawn inspiration from many sources: from the history of native African states, such as Ghana and Mali and the Kingdom of Kongo; from convictions as to the worth of African cultures and the need to have a political base for the expression of their values; from an increasingly numerous elite, educated in Europe and America, who came to know the history and practice of democratic institutions; from experiences of Africans in the fighting forces in World War II, especially in the Far East; from the independence of India, Indonesia, and other nations of Asia; from new economic and social develop-

ments, such as the organization of trade unions and the establishment of urban centers; and from reactions to Islam and Christianity that gave rise to religious separatist movements which often had political overtones.

The democratic ideologies and libertarian philosophies of most of the European powers that ruled in Africa, particularly France and England, and of the United States, provided a rallying cry for political freedom. Equally important, and not so frequently recognized, was the fact that opinion in the metropolitan countries came increasingly to favor the principle of self-government for colonial peoples, and was less hospitable to earlier concepts of the white man's burden and the *mission civilisatrice*. This changed attitude has also, in the past year or two, come to be more and more prevalent in Belgium, where in response to political stirrings in the Congo, it has been incorporated into official policy.

World reaction against colonialism, which was given a focus by President Wilson's 14 points and was further stimulated by the doctrine of the four freedoms and the Charter of the United Nations, has set the stage for the relaxation of foreign controls in overseas territories. Subsaharan Africa came late into this struggle and has profited from the experience of India and Indochina. Nowhere in tropical Africa has independence come as a result of armed rebellion. There are danger spots, especially where African nationalist movements face white counter-nationalisms. But for the Subsaharan continent as a whole, independence has thus far come through the instrumentality of constitutional change.

(b) *The constitutional problems.*—A salient aspect of recent African history is the use of constitutional methods to achieve revolutionary change. African nationalists have impressed politically seasoned observers by the skill with which they have consolidated their gains. This is to be related to the rapidity with which they have become competent in parliamentary maneuvering and debate, not only in their own legislatures and *assemblées* in western Africa, but also in the deliberative bodies of the multiracial territories of East and Central Africa, where they have only recently been allowed to participate. To students of African institutions, this clearly has its roots in the important place of orderly procedure in regulating the affairs of a given group. It is, indeed, possible to refer to the force of this tradition the resolution of the recent All-African People's Conference favoring nonviolent action, which because of its contravention of Marxist revolutionary principles, so irritated the Russians who attended.

Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that constitutional questions assume an important place in the freedom movements of Africa. One of the points raised in England when the Guinea-Ghana agreement was concluded was whether this did not open the way for Guinea to enter the Commonwealth "by the back door," as it was phrased. French reaction to this development concerned the implications, for the Community, of possible similar agreements with African states outside the Community by some of the autonomous Republics. The formation of the Federation of Mali raised constitutional questions with respect to the position of Senegal and the former French Sudan in their relations with the other components of the Community. The

recent political history of the territories of British West Africa is dotted with constitutional crises and constitutional conferences.

African withdrawal from the Kenya Legislative Council was a tactic to force constitutional reform in the direction of greater African participation in government. Issues involving constitutional change are being pressed in Tanganyika and Uganda. The Nyasaland uprising had its genesis in the fear of the Africans that in an independent Federation, they would find their constitutional safeguards whittled away as in the Union of South Africa. In South Africa, the development of the concept of Bantustans, where Africans, in the indeterminate future, will manage their own affairs, is a move to place the implementation of the doctrine of *apartheid* within a constitutional framework. The Leopoldville riots stimulated more incisive moves to bring into being the new constitutional provisions in the Congo; one basic question at issue is the future relations between Belgium and a self-governing Congo. Portugal has had recourse to a constitutional device to avert the necessity of reporting to the United Nations on the non-self-governing territories under her control.

(c) *Colonial control, autonomy, and independence.*—The terms “independence” and “autonomy” are not synonymous in their African usage. Independence means complete freedom of a country to determine its own internal and external policies and relations. An independent African country has its own foreign service and defense force, its form of government is of its own choosing, its international financial status is a matter of negotiation; it is in every sense a sovereign state. Autonomy, a word of varied connotation, means essentially that in principle a territory can determine its own internal affairs. Thus, in the former French overseas territories finance, defense, foreign affairs, and certain health measures are the function of the Community—which is to say, of France. But France sends the autonomous Republics no governors; and at meetings of the Community sits on equal terms with the other members. The flexibility of the concept “autonomy” is underscored in its application by the South African Government to the projected Bantustans, since here, in contrast to the forms of autonomy of the Republics in the French Community, controls are to be held by the government of the Union.

The progression control-autonomy-independence characterized, and continues to characterize, the movement of African territories to full self-government. In the parts of West Africa under British rule at the end of World War II, this can be traced to Ghana, brought to independence in 1957; in Nigeria, which is to become independent in 1960; in Sierra Leone and the Gambia, where increasing responsibility and power are being placed in the hands of the elected representatives of their peoples. French West and Equatorial Africa, and to a degree the French Trust Territories, moved along a parallel route. For the former, at least, this led from the Brazzaville declaration of 1944, inspired by Felix Eboué, through the Constitution of 1946 which established the French Union and granted the franchise to progressively larger numbers of Africans, and the *loi cadre* of 1956 that gave elected territorial assemblies substantial internal powers, to the French Community of 1958, under which the constituent Republics can by vote choose complete independence. The first step from colo-

nial control to autonomy has been taken in the Congo. Similar moves are to be seen in Tanganyika and Uganda.

For the rest of Africa, a different complex of factors enters by virtue of the existence of sizable permanent non-African communities. Here independence, to the African, means domination by a white minority, more or less after the South African policy. Consequently, to the African, colonial control, especially in the Federation, means protection against further discriminatory measures which, under a manipulated qualitative franchise and other devices, they see as a threat. To a lesser degree, the same holds for Kenya, though here Africans are steadily pressing their claims for greater participation in government, with the declared goal of achieving common roll voting on the principle of one man, one vote, and majority representation in the legislative assembly.

A special case is presented by the High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. When the Union of South Africa was established, these territories were retained under the control of Great Britain. Their racial composition differs; Europeans are very few in Basutoland, where they own no land, but numerous in Swaziland, which is closest to the South African pattern. All three in effect are enclaves in Union territory; Basutoland has no other outlet. These territories have for years provided a political rallying cry in the Union as successive South African governments have insisted that they be ceded to it, Britain refusing on the grounds of African dissent. Within the year, constitutional reforms looking toward greater participation of Africans in the Government of Basutoland have been made.

It is apparent that for most of Africa, the first term in our progression, colonial control, is rapidly disappearing on the political level. Only in Portuguese territories, and in the small holdings of Spain, do decisions continue to be made in the metropole without consultation of the indigenous peoples, and earlier modes of control remain as a functioning reality.

(d) *Tribalism and parliamentary democracy.*—Not so long ago, those who were concerned with African affairs took it for granted that the independent states of the future would be parliamentary democracies, after the model of the metropolitan powers that ruled them. As the regions moved along the continuum from colonial control to self-government, the forms which deliberative bodies were taught to follow were those of Europe. Rules of procedure, reports of proceedings, even the physical settings of the legislative councils in British territories resembled those of the House of Commons; and the *assemblées* of the French possessions were cast in the mold of the Chamber of Deputies and its successors.

It is too early to discuss Congolese political development, since experience and expression in this area are for the future, while in Portuguese possessions, democratic political institutions, whether for Europeans or Africans, do not exist. In British Africa, decentralization of authority and the principle of indirect rule stood in sharp contrast to the centralized structure under which French Africa was governed. As the political systems of the African territories evolved, these antecedent policies brought it about that French African politicians were incorporated into the French metropolitan system, while

those in British possessions functioned within the governmental framework of their own territories. To put it somewhat differently, French African politicians sat in the deliberative bodies of France and the French Union, were members of French political parties, and ministers in French cabinets; British African politicians debated in their own legislative councils, not in Parliament, were ministers in the cabinets of their own territories, and not that of Britain.

With independence, the picture changed, and the prognosis became somewhat less assured. What had been overlooked was the factor of pre-European political orientations that, of necessity, had lain dormant under colonial control. These presented two aspects: first, the loyalties to and identity of interests with indigenous "tribal" groupings, and, second, the power of antecedent political patterns. The resulting phenomenon is familiar to social scientists; it is one of cultural adjustment that all independent African states, present and future, will have to face.

The conflict of affiliation has deep historic roots. European diplomats who drew the boundaries of present African states had no concern for ethnic realities. Often the lines of demarcation divided a given group in two, as in the case of the Akan peoples, some of whom are in Ghana, some in the Ivory Coast; or in three or more, as with the Bakongo, who inhabit parts of the former French Equatorial Africa, the western Belgian Congo, and Portuguese Cabinda and northern Angola. The history of the Trust Territories of Togo and, latterly, of the Cameroons, foreshadows the kind of readjustment of boundaries that the diplomats of self-governing African states will be called upon to solve. But the political entities that Europe created not only split ethnic units; they also brought together tribal groups whose earlier relations had been anything but cordial. This is a major and recurrent question Nigeria is facing, for the "regions" of that country essentially represent different dominant ethnic groups and subgroups. Yet the experience of the decades that have passed since the political entity called Nigeria was created by British fiat will not be denied, and this is as true of Tanganyika or the Congo as it is of Nigeria.

The same process is apparent in the adjustments that are being made in developing governmental forms. The matter is most often phrased in terms of the resolution of conflict between democracy and rule by the chiefs. In Guinea and in Ghana this has prompted measures which are intended to assure that the control of power will remain in the hands of the present elected government. The degree to which chiefly systems will continue to exercise their traditional roles is not clear, but it is certain that the institutions of an earlier day will undergo significant change. But by the same token, the democratic procedures of Europe and America will take on new expression. The legislative bodies will in all likelihood continue in their present form, but procedures and values will undoubtedly incorporate a measure of earlier patterns.

The walkouts staged in African deliberative bodies, whereby an opposition group leaves when the majority will not accede to their demands, a reaction that has puzzled European observers, provide a case in point. Traditionally, decisions were made only after debate had brought unanimity, so that the recourse of a dissenting minority in the event of an impasse was to withdraw until further informal dis-

cussion brought acceptable compromise. The difficulty of establishing the concept of "the loyal opposition" can also be referred to the same tradition.

The new Africa, it is being said, will be governed by benevolent dictators. It would be closer to the facts to say that thus far the indications are that we will see states with one-party systems, based on wide popular support, having strong executives and weak legislative bodies, and political maneuvering within the party rather than between constituted majority and minority groupings.

(e) *Movements for a united Africa*.—It is not chance that the phrase "the balkanization of Africa" was first used by Africans in French territory. The same centralization of authority which marked French colonial control, and which has tended to reduce the force of tribalism in her former territories, accustomed the African peoples there to think in terms of larger independent political units. Among English-speaking Africans the impulse for a "United Africa" came from various sources, including the United States, where certain leading African nationalists studied. Thinking along these lines has also responded to a doctrine of some economists that a small state is less viable than a large one, examples to the contrary, ranging from Costa Rica to Denmark and Switzerland, notwithstanding.

The first legal action to implement African unity was the Ghana-Guinea agreement of November 28, 1958. Initially termed a "union," it has thus far taken the shape of an alliance. Its status was further clarified in May 1959, when the leaders of the two countries met and discussed common problems. It was, first of all, to be the nucleus of a larger grouping, to which all other African states would be invited to adhere, with each member state or federation preserving its own personality and its own internal structure. Each would have its own diplomatic representation, and individuals would have double citizenship. Each adhering country would have its own army, but there would be a common defense policy; the Union's flag would be red, yellow, and green, with a black star for each member state. Said M. Sekou Touré:

* * * we have chosen independence, not for the profit of Guinea but for that of Africa.¹⁹

Said Mr. Nkrumah:

We thought at first of a United States of West Africa, but events have gone so fast that we are now thinking about the unity of all Africa.²⁰

At the July meeting of the Presidents of Liberia and Guinea and the Prime Minister of Ghana, the question of African unity was faced in a somewhat different manner. Here President Tubman was able to bring his colleagues to his position that while some form of association between African states is desirable, it should for the time being remain looser than the concept of "Union" implies. These three leaders, deferring action because of the impending independence of other African territories, called for the creation of a Community of Independent African States. This is to be discussed at a special conference to be held in 1960 of independent African states and "nonindependent states that have fixed dates on which they will achieve independence."²¹

¹⁹ London Times, May 4, 1959, p. 7.

²⁰ Le Monde (Paris), May 4-5, 1959, p. 4.

²¹ New York Times, July 26, 1959, p. 4.

In April 1958, the first Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra. This conference reaffirmed an all-African anti-colonialist stand and, including as it did the North African states and Liberia, laid the foundation for a formally constituted African Caucusing Group in the United Nations. In December the All-African People's Conference met; it was much more broadly based and essentially Subsaharan in its attendance and orientation. Early in 1959, it was reported that Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey would constitute a federation within the French Community, but in its final form, under the name of Mali, it included only the first two. The other two joined the remaining autonomous republics, excepting Mauretania, in forming a customs union, led by the Ivory Coast, with which Mali became associated at a meeting held in June. In former French Equatorial Africa there are both separatist and unifying tendencies; a customs union has been formed of the four autonomous republics, but no closer association seems likely at the present time. An East African Federation is improbable as long as the role of the European settler community in Kenya remains unresolved. The future of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland is uncertain.

(f) *Northern and Subsaharan Africa*.—Pan-africanism, as it has developed since the doctrine was enunciated at the end of the First World War, essentially concerned Subsaharan Africa. North Africa entered lightly, if at all; in its earlier forms, it might even be said that it was a West African concept and movement, inspired by American Negroes, and had much stronger roots in British than in French territories. The first Pan-African Congress was convened in Paris in 1918-19, another in Lisbon in 1923, and a third in New York City in 1927. More fully African in representation and more sophisticated in tactical competence was the Pan-African Nationalist Congress held in Manchester in 1945, whose membership included Kwame Nkrumah, his late political adviser, George Padmore, and Jomo Kenyatta.

North Africa has come into this picture only recently. The distinction between North and Subsaharan Africa rests on certain evidence of scholarship of an historical, cultural, religious, ethnic, and linguistic nature. There has, however, been centuries-long trade across the desert, with the societies of the Berber and Arab north and the Negro south effecting the cultural and biological interchanges of all peoples in contact. Islam spread well below the Sahara; something more than 22 percent of the Subsaharan population are Moslems, with the same proportion professing Christianity and about 55 percent holding to their aboriginal religions.

President Nasser's book, "Egypt's Liberation," is one of the few available expressions of North African thinking about relations with the countries to the south. The brevity with which Subsaharan Africa is treated, and the attitude toward its peoples and cultures reflected in it, are revealing. In the two-page section dealing with it, headed "The Interior of the Dark Continent," President Nasser tells us:

I will continue to dream of the day when I will find in Cairo a great African institute dedicated to unveiling to our view the dark reaches of the continent. He notes how—

the peoples of Africa will continue to look to us, who guard their northern gate, and who constitute their link with the outside world.

In words reminiscent of the formulas of the civilizing mission and the white man's burden, he declares that it is

our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle—

a statement that takes on added significance in view of the explanation, in the preface, that the writer's thoughts were set down—

to discover * * * what our role is to be in the succeeding stages of Egypt's history.²²

The bond which at the present time unites the states of the African continent is clearly one of anticolonialist sentiment. All the members of the African Caucusing Group in the United Nations, except Liberia and Ethiopia, have but recently emerged from tutelage; and Ethiopia, it will be recalled, had this status under Italian domination, from which she was released only at the end of World War II. A common adversary is a powerful unifying force. As one writer on the Conference of African States put it;

what emerged clearly * * * was that some Arab States had more in common with some of the African States than they had with some of their fellow Arab States.²³

On the other hand, in the light of the attitudes reflected in President Nasser's comments, the fact that the end of 1960 will see the North African states a minority in the United Nations African Caucusing Group and the Conference of African States may be important, especially since it appears that both Ghana and the United Arab Republic aspire to leadership. Moreover, nonalignment in the East-West struggle, if applied as a general principle, may also mean non-alignment in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

(g) *Communist influence and penetration.*—The pressures of the East-West struggle have made us look at Communist activities in Africa through a magnifying glass. The Russians, we may be surprised to learn, have regarded U.S. activities and objectives in much the same manner.

Evidence of effective penetration by Russia or her satellites is slight and spotty. We read in a dispatch from Accra that the leader of a Soviet trade mission, replying to a speech by the Ghanaian Minister of Transport, stated that Russia is prepared to send civil and mechanical engineers to help Ghana carry out its second 5-year development plan. The Minister, noting that a substantial amount of equipment used by the departments under his Ministry came from Britain, told the Russians that British equipment would continue to be used "whenever it is supplied on advantageous terms."²⁴ In the same month we read of a Russian Ambassador being sent to Accra,²⁵ and that Russia purchased 8,000 tons of Nigerian cocoa.²⁶

In earlier years the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, in French West Africa, had a Communist orientation. From its inception, this party has been under the leadership of M. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Minister in a number of French governments and now Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast. Today it is no longer Communist, but is

²² Nasser, Gamal Abdul, "Egypt's Liberation," Washington, 1955, p. 110, p. 11.

²³ C. Legum, "Bandung, Cairo, and Accra," London, 1958, p. 26.

²⁴ London Times, Apr. 4, 1959.

²⁵ Le Monde, May 25, 1959, p. 7.

²⁶ London Times, May 24, 1959, p. 11.

the chief proponent of the continued association of the Autonomous Republics with France. There was undoubtedly Communist influence in the Parti de Union Camerounaise, which in 1957 staged an armed uprising in the French Cameroons. Its leader was a refugee, first in Cairo and later in Conakry. He has insisted that the government which by United Nations decision will lead the new nation as it becomes independent is a creature of the French. Though the African Caucusing Group, supporting him, urged that an election be held before independence is granted, they were unable to carry their Asian colleagues with them when the question came to a vote.

We hear much of Communist influence in South Africa and the Federation; of intercepted mailings of Communist literature to Africans; of Russian broadcasts beamed there. There is little "hard" documentation, however. We are rather presented with statements such as that of the Prime Minister of the Federation to the effect that Russian influence in Africa is today "much more subtle than it has been in the past."²⁷ There are Communist Party members in the Union of South Africa, small in numbers but active in pressing the cause of African rights. But the Government of the Union does not aid us in analyzing the significance of their activities when, under the South African Suppression of Communism Act it restricts the middle-of-the-road Christian Zulu chief, Albert Luthuli, to his home in rural Natal because he is President of the African National Congress which, though a nationalist organization, is in no sense Communist.

The Russian picture of American activities in Africa is cast in terms of the desire of the United States to infiltrate the continent for the benefit of what is called "capitalist imperialism." In this, our affiliation with the colonial powers is heavily underscored. U.S. scientific research activities are declared to be directed toward furthering these ends. "Anglo-American Ethnography in the Service of Imperialism" was the title of one article of a general nature that appeared in 1951. Moving specifically to Africa, another pictured Liberia as a country in which "American monopolists have taken over all the branches of the economy," and continued to affirm that "U.S. reactionary circles are striving for the rapid militarization of the continent," using extensive ideological weapons for the purpose of "transforming Africans into faithful slaves of American imperialism."²⁸ The report already cited in the Soviet journal *International Affairs*²⁹ showed the same uneasiness over the activities of Americans at the All-African People's Conference as some of the Americans manifested over what the Russians were doing there.

3. Social factors

(a) *Indigenous patterns of stratification.*—Colonial controls, which everywhere strike at indigenous political institutions, also obscure and deflect earlier patterns of social relationships. This process is accentuated by the fact that differences in skin color mark off the rulers from the indigenous peoples, so that administrators, traders, and missionaries come to constitute a physically identifiable class apart, superimposed upon the preexisting social structures. Because in Africa the ensuing disparities in power and privilege were so great, the un-

²⁷ New York Times, June 16, 1959, p. 17.

²⁸ Sovetskaya Etnografia, 1954, No. 3, pp. 143-153.

²⁹ International Affairs, February 1959, p. 86.

derlying population, with the exception of certain traditional or appointed chiefs, came to be thought of by Europeans as an undifferentiated mass, with a resulting distortion of the perspective that guided planning and policy.

Relations between rulers and ruled, in the classical African colonial picture and during its later development, have been well summarized by Representative Frances P. Bolton:

The mentality of this alien ruling class is very evident in daily practices: (1) The superiority or caste structure with little social intermingling; (2) the payment of low wages which deprives the Africans that have skill and technical efficiency of the wages to which they are entitled and of equal justice; (3) evidences of economic progress among the indigenous peoples are not encouraged to the fullest extent because of the fear of competition * * *; (4) the attitude that indigenous peoples should be considered as wards; (5) the very slow acceptance of a rising educated African element as equal to the white ruling class.³⁰

All this has had important implications as Africa emerges to self-government. For one thing, since the viability of indigenous social forms has all too readily been discounted, their role in influencing the new institutions that are the product of the most recent historic contacts of Africans with cultures of the outside world has been underestimated. In most of the continent, foreign rule converted chiefs into instruments for implementing policies they had no hand in shaping. But neither they nor their subjects have forgotten the realities of their earlier power, and not even the new democratic political orientations have effaced their nonsecular and symbolic role.

Again, colonial administrators needed clerical assistants and interpreters and these men soon found themselves in preferred positions. Since they were near the seat of power, and were increasingly given greater responsibilities, they came to constitute a new element in the class structure. They, and those others who had had access to European education, learned to function in terms of new procedures, and to observe modes of administration foreign to pre-European Africa. Critical in this context is our key concept of adjustment under change as a primary mechanism in shaping African development. For in these terms, we can see why, in the new self-governing states, there has been and will continue to be a play between the older stratification and the new; between a class structure based on inherited wealth and status and political control, and the enhanced mobility of those who mastered the ways of colonial governing classes.

We must also bear in mind that with but minor exceptions, all the societies in Subsaharan Africa knew and practiced social differentiation. This lodged on various levels; on inherited power, on age, on wealth, on achievement. Stratification was more in evidence in some societies than others, and ranged from those having ruling castes and clans as in the Sudanese kingdoms of Hausa and Bornu, or the Guinea Coast countries of Ashanti, Dahomey, and Benin, or the realms of Lunda and Ruanda and Buganda in the heart of the continent, to the nomadic groupings such as the Masai and Pakot of East Africa, and the village-based peoples of the west like the Ibo of the Niger Delta or the Gola of Liberia, where differentials were based on age or wealth.

³⁰ Bolton, Frances P., "Report of the Special Study Mission to Africa," * * * Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, p. 137.

All the avenues to the attainment of power and high position in indigenous societies have functioned, either positively or negatively, in shaping later adjustments. The factor of age provides a good example. The primacy of the elders was everywhere validated by the sanctions of an ancestral cult that is one of the most powerful stabilizing forces in African society. In the changing scene, however, the knowledge and skills of the educated younger generation became of importance. This made itself felt, initially at least, in various nationalist movements; while much of the control of power and access to wealth has also been passing into hands of younger men.

What makes it especially difficult to assess the changing social and political order is the nature of the democratic orientations in African social life. This is immediately apparent in the less differentiated societies, but even in those having the greatest degree of stratification, power and wealth were not used irresponsibly. Behavior of a subject in the presence of a chief that, to the outsider, seems to be abasement, actually betokens formal respect. In some societies, the young men could unseat a ruler; this has been a very real factor in the social and political adjustments of the Ghanaian people since independence. It would have been a rash African king or chief who would have reached an important decision without consulting his councillors, who in turn would have sounded out opinion in the groups they headed. It is therefore fundamental in considering the new societies of Africa to strike beneath the outer forms to deeper meanings; to recognize that power always has entailed responsibility; and to understand that the emergent political forms which may perplex those outside Africa are manifestations of older sanctions.

(b) *Multiracial societies and interracial relations.*—The differences in physical type between rulers and ruled have given the factor of race a disproportionate place in the recent history of Africa. African population statistics are in the main approximations, but the total of 160 million for Subsaharan Africa we have given is probably not far off the mark. Of these, about 5 million, or slightly more than 3 percent, are non-Africans. This number, however, is by no means confined to Europeans, whose aggregate is about 3.5 million. There are about 750,000 Asians, and slightly more than 100,000 Arabs, while the mixed bloods, mainly the so-called Coloureds of South Africa and the Rhodesians, are over a million. In addition, there is a sprinkling of Lebanese, Syrians, Goans, Greeks and other groups.

The fact that in African multiracial societies power and preferment are in the hands of a European-derived minority, causes the problem of minority rights to be quite different than where the minorities are underprivileged. From this comes the rule of thumb that the degree of tension in a given territory can be directly related to the number of its permanent non-African settlers, as in the instance of the Union of South Africa and Algeria, the two countries that have the largest percentages of permanent nonindigenous residents. It is this same factor that makes of Kenya and the Federation important areas of tension. In contrast, we see the relative absence of racial feeling in West Africa, where the non-African population numbers less than 1 percent of the total. Here discriminatory practices that existed during the full flush of colonial rule were easily given over with the approach of self-government.

The racial equation intervenes on all levels. The fact that the European rulers have been Caucasoid and the Africans Negroid, taken together with a parallel situation of racial differences that existed in Asia and the Middle East, provides a rationale for many current alignments in international affairs. On the continental level, this is the reason why Ghana, on the one hand, and the Union of South Africa, on the other, have come to symbolize for other African countries the political polarities they represent. On the national level, the racial factors explain why the question of communal representation or the qualitative franchise bulk so large in British East and Central Africa. Race also functions on the most immediate level of personal relations. It is significant that the parliamentary commission inquiring into the causes of the Leopoldville riots stressed as one of the most important steps to be taken, "the amelioration of human relations,"³¹ mentioning specifically the scorn customarily shown by Europeans for Africans in the Congo.

The ramifications of the racial factor extend even to terminology, an infallible barometer of basic reactions. The question here is who is to be called African. There are today persons of European and Indian descent who represent the third generation and more of those born in Africa. In English and French, they speak of themselves as Africans; this is also the meaning of the word "Afrikaner" used in South Africa for those who speak Afrikaans. Reciprocally, we find the emotional loading given the word "native." This is a name resented and rejected by Africans all over the continent because of its use in South Africa, where it took the place of the pejorative "Kaffir" and has been officially replaced by the equally inappropriate linguistic term "Bantu," which has already acquired a similar connotation of distaste.

Because in the multiracial societies color is so closely associated with status, we find a descending scale of privilege that goes from European to Asian to African. The position of the Indian is everywhere difficult; he is rejected both by his political superiors and his economic inferiors. He recognizes that his future lies with the African majority, but because in eastern and southern Africa so much of the retail trade is in his hands, he is the object of lively resentment by Africans, whose claim of being exploited by him is continuously heard. Legally, he is at the moment protected by laws made by the Europeans, but even though he may have accumulated a respectable fortune, he is not accepted by them as an equal.

The implications of the Ghana-Union of South Africa polarity are coming increasingly into focus. Each country, as we have seen, has become a symbol, either positive or negative, depending on identification with race and place of residence. This was why the attainment of independence by Ghana had a degree of importance out of all proportion to its area, or size of population, or resources, or potential power. It acted as a catalyst in the growth of African nationalist movements everywhere, and has brought about the acceptance, both by European powers and non-Africans in Africa north of the Zambezi, of the proposition that Africans can be expected to attain major political control in the relatively near future. South of this line, on the

³¹ *Op. cit.*, Rapport, p. 9.

other hand, in the Union and in Portuguese territories, it resulted in a concomitant determination to hold the line, and made more explicit a sense of common interest in assuring white domination. There can be little question that these polarities are factors of which all concerned with Africa, in any way, must remain fully cognizant.

(c) *Education and the language question.*—The drive of Africans for literacy has been facilitated by the fact that it has had to compete with nothing in earlier tradition, and was reinforced by the value Africans place on knowledge. Its advantages were soon grasped by Africans as constituting a leverage for achieving economic and political ends. The need of colonial administrators and traders for clerks and interpreters was complemented by the evangelical ethic of European and American cultures that made of the missions an instrument for bringing literacy to those who must be taught to read Scripture.

A few figures will indicate the strength of this development. In French West Africa, the number of boys in primary and secondary schools more than tripled between 1948 and 1952. Despite antecedent patterns that made it more logical for Africans to send boys rather than girls to school, and the added force of Moslem tradition in this area, the number of girls in school there doubled during this period. In Liberia, there were approximately 55,000 pupils out of a potential of 200,000 in primary schools in 1958, a direct result of United States and UNESCO aid. The number of primary schools in Ghana rose from 1,083 in 1951 to 3,402 in 1958; in Nigeria, between 1926 and 1953 pupils in primary, secondary, and teacher training schools increased from 144,577 to 1,111,289; in Uganda there were 148,338 children in school in 1947, 420,528 in 1956; in Northern Rhodesia the gain was from 137,900 to 226,116. Comparable growth is found in the Belgian Congo, and substantial increases are reported for the multiracial states as well.³²

As impressive are the gains in higher education. Since World War II the University of Dakar, the University Colleges of Ghana and Ibadan, the University of Lovanium at Leopoldville and the Official University of Elizabethville, and the University College of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland at Salisbury have been founded. Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone and the University of Liberia have been strengthened; Makerere in Uganda has been raised to university college level; Gordon College in the Sudan has become the University of Khartoum. In addition, higher technical colleges have been established, medical education has been expanded, and research institutes in the social and natural sciences have been established. Literally thousands of Africans have studied in the universities of England, France, and the United States; some have gone to India and Germany and Israel for higher education, a few to the institutions of Eastern Europe.

For many years it was an unquestioned tenet that for African children "education" meant following the curriculum of the metropole, using books prepared for pupils in the schools there, written in its language and drawing examples from its culture. This, however, is

³² United Nations, "Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summaries and Analyses of Information, 1950," pp. 86, 360; *ibid.*, 1957, pp. 218, 231; "Ghana Today," 1958, No. 2; British Information Service, "British Colonial Policy and Achievement in Africa, 1959," p. 9.

changing. Schools everywhere in Subsaharan Africa, from the primary level to university standing, are adapting the subject matter of instruction to include the background and prior experience of the student.

The language in which pupils are to be taught has been much debated. In essence, the problem as posed by educational psychologists is whether the child new to the school situation will be handicapped if he must use a foreign tongue while working into the new setting posed by classroom discipline. When it is pointed out that there are over 800 separate languages in Subsaharan Africa, it can be seen, if only in terms of printing costs alone, how impossible a task it would be to provide textbooks in all of them. African opinion on this point varies. In the Congo, where primary instruction before 1956 had leaned heavily on the native tongues, Africans flooded the lay schools where teaching was in French. In the Union of South Africa, where the doctrine of *apartheid* has been extended to the educational field, with instruction restricted to the use of African languages or of Afrikaans, this is bitterly resented by Africans. In the countries of the French Community and Guinea, instruction begins in French, while in English-speaking West Africa, native languages are used initially, the pupil moving to instruction in a European tongue after 3 or 4 years of schooling.

One point calls for emphasis. No linguistic nationalism is to be anticipated in the near future. For this, the Africans are indebted to the multiplicity of languages in the continent, and the fact that in no territory thus far is a single language group dominant. Moreover, African leadership is fully cognizant of the need to be able to communicate in a world language. It can be anticipated that recognition of this need, for facilitating communication both internally and internationally, will be a major factor in shaping educational policy in this regard.

(d) *Urbanization and industrialization.*—Africa, like other continents, manifests the post-World War II phenomenon of urban development. By 1957 its Subsaharan portion alone numbered 35 cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. In western Africa, notably that part included in the belt lying directly south of the Sahara, cities have long been known, and the urban tradition in attenuated form extended southeastward into the Congo. In eastern and southern Africa, however, the city is an entirely new thing.

These figures are impressive when we recall that most African cities did not exist a half century ago. The newer centers have broad avenues and multistoried public and business buildings, built in modern architectural style. The more picturesque older centers, such as Kano or Lagos, show strong trends toward modernization. Growth has been rapid: Dakar from 30,000 in 1926 to 230,000 in 1955; Conakry from 13,000 in 1936 to 50,000 in 1951; Abidjan from 17,000 in 1936 to 127,000 in 1955; Kumasi from 18,853 in 1911 to 75,000 in 1955; Ibadan from 387,173 in 1931 to 459,196 in 1952; Leopoldville from 39,531 in 1930 to 299,806 in 1955; Nairobi from 13,145 in 1927 to 75,227 in

1948; Salisbury from 25,594 in 1931 to 167,630 in 1956; and Johannesburg from 282,971 in 1921 to 1,030,200 in 1957.³³

Nowhere has the racial factor had greater impact than in the urban setting, where differentials in standards of living are given their most emphatic expression. Africans and Europeans in the Union, the Federation, the Congo, and East Africa have by law been restricted to different part of the cities, and as effectively by custom and economic status in Angola and Mozambique. The pattern of racial segregation in West Africa is rapidly changing, the differentials coming increasingly to reflect economic status or official position without reference to race.

In the multiracial societies, the strong police controls exerted over the African urban populations are a continuous source of friction. They are at the base of the pass laws of the Union, the Federation, Kenya, the Portuguese territories and, until recently, the Congo. In a number of these countries, Africans cannot own urban plots, and only in special circumstances may they build their own houses. The African quarters are so administered that essential controls rest in non-African hands, and Africans have limited opportunity for the exercise of initiative or enterprise. In the Union, African tenure is at the pleasure of the location superintendent. Sociologists are agreed that this planned uncertainty exacerbates the tensions and hostilities of African city dwellers in multiracial societies, and leads to aggressions both against fellow Africans and the group in power. Everywhere in these regions of Subsaharan Africa the African is in the city, but not of it.

It is important that the nature of the social pathology of African urban centers be understood for what it is. That is, it is urban as well as African, since in many aspects the problems of these African cities are no different from those of modern cities in the older industrialized countries. We must also recognize the variation in the forms of urban pathology found over the continent, and the special situations out of which the differences arise. Lagos has its juvenile delinquents as well as Johannesburg; both are phenomena of urbanization. Yet their incidence and nature differ sharply, and this may be referred to differences in the position of Africans in Nigerian and South African cities. For example, it has been estimated that in South Africa, one out of every four Africans is arrested yearly, mainly because of lack of proper identification or other papers.

Industrialization in Africa does not accompany urbanization to the extent found in Europe and the United States. In Africa, because of the nature of the colonial economic system under which the extractive industries have a primary position, cities tend to be centers of trade and administration, with the largest industrial developments centering about mines or hydroelectric projects. The logic of the city is making itself felt, however, and centers such as Abidjan or Leopoldville or Bulawayo have become important for their manufacturing

³³ Kuczynski, R. R., "Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire," vol. I, 1948, p. 858; United Nations, "Demographic Yearbook, 1957," p. 150; Busia, K., in "Proceedings," 2d Annual Conference, West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1953, p. 32; Gold Coast, "Census," 1950, p. 23; Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Ghana," 1957, p. 7; "Congo," vol. ii, No. 1, pp. 129-130, 1932; "Encyclopedia Britannica," 1936 ed., vol. 16, p. 62; Southern Rhodesia, "Official Year Book," No. 1, 1924; Union of South Africa, "Official Year Book," No. 5, 1922, p. 54.

enterprises. Where mineral resources can be exploited near the cities, as with Johannesburg, literally built on top of the gold mines, or Elizabethville, in the heart of the Katanga, the association makes for continuous interaction and mutual stimulation.

The principal problems of industrialization in Subsaharan Africa are those of any other technologically underdeveloped area. Insofar as they have to do with the extraction of raw materials, the question of transport overseas is critical; this is why the railroads of Africa run almost entirely from coastal ports inland. The availability of power also enters. Financing, which for the most part has come from outside, will have to continue to do so as long as the internal reserves of capital cannot supply the means to support ventures of major magnitude. This economic triad—communication, power, capital—brings the problem of development back to the ever-present political level.

Further matters of importance, however, involve the human factor. The first of these has to do with the size of the internal market, and is closely tied to adjustments in consumption patterns as Africans' wants move from handicraft to mass production commodities. A second has to do with the labor pool, especially the development of workers who are accustomed to the rhythm of the industrial effort and are prepared to accept its discipline. The rise of an African working class has posed many questions that are reminiscent of the industrial revolution elsewhere. These problems in Africa were originally phrased in terms of detribalization, but this has been found unacceptable in the light of later analysis.

(e) *Labor*.—The changes in the life of the urban African worker are far-reaching. The fact that the African does not ordinarily, and in South Africa may not, bring his family to the city produces an urban labor pool largely of migratory workers. The phenomenon of the target worker, who takes a job to pay his tax levies, or earn what he needs to buy a particular commodity or commodities for himself or his family, or to meet a specific social obligation, is one manifestation of this. The essential identification of the African worker is not with his job in the city, but with his relationship group in the country. Moreover, where his habits have been altered so as to conform to the requirements of industrial labor, old age comes on without any means for his continuing support. In such cases, which will inevitably increase in number, the assumption that he can return to his village and be supported by his kin group have been found patently invalid. The growth of cities and the increasing trend toward urbanization thus further bring into focus the human problems, which must take their place at the side of the technical and economic factors as of equal importance in fundamental and long-range planning.

Trade unions are recent in Subsaharan Africa; how recent can be seen in the discussion of the topic in the 1938 edition of Lord Hailey's encyclopedic work, "An African Survey." There is but one short passage, which reads as follows:

It may be questioned whether African workers are in general sufficiently advanced in capacity for organization to form effective trade unions, or whether, in territories where the state has assumed full responsibility for their working conditions, such unions can serve a useful purpose.²⁴

²⁴ Hailey, Lord Malcolm, "An African Survey," London, 1938, p. 698.

Nineteen years later, in the revised edition of 1957, the subject received 15 pages,³⁵ and the year-to-year developments in the short time that has elapsed would need much more extensive treatment.

Until a few years ago, effective labor unions for Africans existed only in British and French territories. Legal provision for organizations of workers was made in the Belgian Congo in 1946, but these could only exist with the sanction of the Government, and functioned under close supervision. In 1957 African unions were given the same legal standing there as those composed of non-Africans. In Portuguese territories, African workers may not organize. While unions of Africans do exist in South Africa, they may not negotiate directly with their employers, nor are strikes permitted. In 1956 the extension of the doctrine of *apartheid* to the labor field made for suppression of the few mixed—that is, interracial—unions.

There are many difficulties in organizing wage workers in Africa. Some of these are common to other underdeveloped territories, such as the fact that workers, unlike in highly industrialized countries, do not think of themselves as members of a working class, while much of the labor force is in government employment, or in agriculture. Special problems, that revert to the ever-present factor of race differences, present themselves in the multiracial parts of Africa. Thus Northern Rhodesia in 1956 had 9 European unions, 2 Asian ones, and 14 African, the latter with about 26,000 members.³⁶ However, the application of trade union principles, on the copper belt at least, has acted so as to reinforce the industrial color bar. There has been insistence on equal pay for a given job, irrespective of race, but this has made it difficult to persuade employers to put Africans into the more skilled categories of workers, with the result of effective debarment of Africans from advancement.

The proportion of African wage workers who belong to labor unions is everywhere small. Hodgkin, who collected data as late as 1955, states that wage earners represented only about 5 percent of the total population.³⁷ The numbers of trade unionists range from almost none in the High Commission territories to 150,000 in Nigeria, out of an estimated half million wage workers. Here, by 1957 the Nigerian trade unionists had become almost 200,000 strong.³⁸ Similar growth is found in the French associated territories. In those of West Africa, union membership between 1953 and 1956 more than doubled, from some 70,000 to 181,388; in former French Equatorial Africa, though numbers were small, they multiplied four times, from about 10,000 to 41,000.

The role of metropolitan French and British labor organizations in the formation of African unions has followed the overall pattern of relations between the home country and its overseas dependencies. In French territories, the African unions were either part of the labor organizations of France, or were very closely affiliated with them. In the regions under British control, trade unions were autonomous, and the Trades Union Congress of the United Kingdom figured in an advisory capacity, sending representatives to teach Africans how to organize and operate their own unions. Because of the strong politi-

³⁵ Ibid., "An African Survey Revised," London, 1957, pp. 1439-1453.

³⁶ International Labor Office, "African Labour Survey," Geneva, 1958, p. 234.

³⁷ Hodgkin, Thomas, "Nationalism in Colonial Africa," London, 1956, pp. 118-119.

³⁸ International Labor Office, op. cit., p. 232.

cal bent of the French workers' organizations, African unions are much more active politically in the Community than in British possessions. The African unions affiliated with the French Communist-oriented Confederation Général du Travail, are in the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions. This contrasts to the much larger number of organized workers in the rest of Africa, and in the non-Communist French unions, who belong to the International Confederation of Free Trades Unions.

One striking development in the field of labor has to do with the changed position of unions in Ghana where the model of the Israeli Histadruth has been followed. The Ghanaian law governing trade unions, passed in December 1958, aims at creating a structure of strongly centralized labor organizations. Economic development being an overriding consideration, work stoppages are to be minimized. The kind of disputes subject to resolution by strikes is limited, and a certificate from the Ministry of Labor is required before a strike is legal. Unions of civil servants, employees of local governments and teachers may not legally conduct strikes. The old Ghana Trades Union Congress has been dissolved, and its assets transferred to the new organizations, which benefit also from the checkoff system of collecting dues. Each industry has one industrial union, the law stipulating that there are to be 24 of these.

Obviously, this places the unions under strong government control, and has been criticized both in Ghana and elsewhere for this reason. It is pointed out, however, that an underdeveloped country requires controls of this kind if its human resources are best to be utilized, and that the government proposes to support workers in all legitimate claims. With comparable developments in Guinea, and the controls over workers' organizations already existing in Liberia, the question poses itself as to whether all this foreshadows the nature of labor legislation to be expected in other African countries as they gain their independence. Nigeria, as the most strongly unionized country in Africa, will be particularly worth watching for developments in this field.

B. THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA

1. *U.S. commitments and interests in Africa*

(a) *Strategic*.—Announced U.S. strategic commitments in Sub-Saharan Africa have been minimal. Arrangements were made in 1951 for the sale of military equipment to the Union of South Africa under the mutual security program, and there is an American military advisory group detachment in Ethiopia. We have no mutual defense agreements covering any territory south of the Sahara.* The NATO treaty specifically excludes all the Sub-Saharan colonial possessions of the European signatories by setting its boundary at the Tropic of Cancer.

U.S. strategic interest in Sub-Saharan, as against North Africa, has been directed toward its value as a source of raw materials. In 1956, the director of the mutual security program stated:

The United States desires that the peoples of Africa progress and share in the social, economic, and political freedoms and advantages of the West. Beyond this the continent's human and natural resources contribute very significantly to the strength of the Western World. Our interest includes continued access to Africa's important and, in some cases, vital supplies of essential materials. * * * ³⁹

Overall strategic planning has rested on the assumption that in Sub-Saharan Africa military activities are to be left in the hands of our NATO associates and the Union of South Africa, with Liberia to be relied on as a friendly area in the event of conflict. The naval base at Simonstown, which recently has been given over by the British to the Union of South Africa, is one example of this. The Kamina air and military base in the Congo is another. Kenya is being developed as a British military center, with more than £345,000 recently authorized for the improvement of three military camps in the Gilgil area, in addition to an estimated £7 million to be used for building a cantonment at Kahawa, near Nairobi.⁴⁰

With the movement of African territories to self-government, prior assumptions based on the control of Africa by our NATO associates must be reexamined and revised. As the matter has been put by an expert on foreign affairs:

* * * The test of a nation's greatness is whether it can adjust from a position where it once disposed to a position where it must deal with problems * * *. At one time the West disposed with respect to Africa. Today it is necessary to deal with Africa. The basic challenge is whether the West can do this imaginatively and constructively.⁴¹

* On Sept. 10, 1959, after this study was completed, the Department of State released the text of an agreement of cooperation entered into with the Government of Liberia on July 8 which provides, among other things, for consultation between our two Governments in the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia (Department of State Press Releases Nos. 642 and 643 of Sept. 10, 1959).

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. xxxiv, No. 883, May 28, 1956, p. 877.

⁴⁰ "Kenya Calling," May 30, 1959, p. 2.

⁴¹ Nitze, Paul H., in "Africa Today" (C. Grove Haines, editor), Baltimore, 1955, p. 65.

Another level of assumption must also be reexamined. Stability gained through the repression of a majority by a minority has been demonstrated again and again in recent years to be specious, and the value of foreign bases anything but assured in countries where this situation obtains. Moreover, there is the factor of our relations with African leaders, both of independent and of dependent territories, who are making it an article of popular faith that Africa must remain free of involvement in the world struggle. We would be ill advised to dismiss as unimportant such reactions of Africans as those expressed in demonstrations in Accra last July against the proposal by France to use the Sahara as a testing ground for nuclear weapons.

(b) *Economic*.—American direct investment in Africa south of the Sahara has always been a minor part of U.S. overseas financial activity. It has been estimated that, for the whole of Africa, this amounted in 1929 to \$92.4 million (out of a total of all world areas of \$7,527.7 million); in 1936 to \$83.4 million (out of \$6,690.5 million); in 1943, \$104.2 million (the total being \$7,861.6 million); and in 1950, \$298.6 million (out of the global sum of \$11,788 million). In 1954 U.S. investment in Africa rose to \$568 million, and in 1955 to \$657 million, more than a sixfold increase in less than a decade.⁴² During the earlier period, the African share of U.S. investment abroad remained at a little over 1 percent, then almost doubled to 2.5 percent from 1943 to 1950. To double a small share, however, does not produce a large one, so that both in absolute and relative terms U.S. investments in Africa have remained small.

The capital invested is distributed unevenly, both as regards activity and area. The processing and sale of petroleum products and manufacturing accounted for over one-half of the American world total; two-thirds of all foreign direct investment in Africa has gone into petroleum, and mining and smelting. Three-fourths of all American investment in Africa has been made in the Union of South Africa and Liberia. In the Union, U.S. direct investment in 1943 was \$50 million (of a total for Africa of \$104.2 million); in 1950 \$140.1 million (out of an overall amount in Africa of \$289.6 million). According to Union Government statistics, American portfolio investment amounted to a further \$22.8 million, with other types of property owned by Americans bringing the total of American investment in South Africa to \$86.6 million. As for Liberia, where before World War II the Firestone interests had the only significant U.S. holdings, increased sale and use of petroleum products, the discovery of rich iron ore deposits and the opening of Liberian registration to foreign shipping caused a sharp rise in American investments there; \$380 million in 1957 as against \$82 million in 1950 and \$17.5 million in 1943. Liberia has thus passed the Union, where in 1957 American investment totaled \$305 million.⁴³

The proportion of U.S. investments in these two independent countries stands in contrast to holdings in the dependent territories. In 1950, for example, American direct investment in the then British possessions of West Africa amounted to \$10.5 million, which is to be

⁴² Howard, Lawrence C., "The United States and Africa, Trade and Investment," in "Africa, Seen by American Negroes," p. 296.

⁴³ U.S. Department of Commerce, "Survey of Current Business," September 1958, p. 18.

compared to the £42 million (\$117.6 million) of direct and portfolio United Kingdom investment for the same year. This also holds for British East and Central Africa, and in lesser proportion for the Union of South Africa, where British investment, following the general patterns whereby economic ties established between a dependency and its metropole are continued after self-government, is larger than that of the United States. Reports of annual South African company meetings are published in London as well as in South African newspapers.

U.S. investments in the dependencies of other overseas powers are minimal, both in terms of our total commitments in Subsaharan Africa and in comparison to sums invested by the metropolitan countries. Thus, by 1954, U.S. private investment in all French Equatorial Africa amounted to only \$1,297,142, though mining operations in the Gabon Republic by a consortium in which U.S. companies are participating will materially increase this sum. The success of a recent loan floated by the Belgian Congo in the American securities market may also presage larger portfolio holdings by U.S. investors.

In seeking to account for the small proportion of U.S. funds invested abroad going to Africa, we may first consider the proposition generally advanced that investors, when placing their money in foreign ventures, look for high return and political stability. Both these conditions were met in Africa, certainly at the beginning of this decade and earlier. In 1950, for example, the rate of return on all American overseas investment before foreign income taxes was about 26 percent. For Africa as a whole, investment brought a calculated return of about 30 percent before foreign income taxes. As regards stability, political controls were firmly in the hands of the metropolitan governments.

This suggests that yet another, a third factor, enters. Specifically, this involves the relationship of foreign investment to freedom of political and economic decision. Until recent years, investment in colonial territories from countries outside the metropole was not encouraged. Only when it became self-evident that the economic needs for development were beyond the capacity of the metropolitan governments to finance, was there hospitality to investment from other sources.

A growing interest in investment possibilities in Africa has been shown by Canada, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, and West Germany. In all cases, of course, the preconditions of adequate return and political stability must be satisfied. For development projects of the magnitude of the Volta scheme or the Inga Dam, investors await political developments. But with stability and return reasonably assured, it may be anticipated that nations having capital for export, of which the United States is the most prominent, will increasingly respond to the opportunities presented by investment in African enterprises, and figure more and more in financing enterprises in African states.

These considerations of colonial as against independent status hold for trade, though they affect imports more than exports. In 1957 the African share of our total exports was 3.4 percent, while our imports

from the continent, mainly primary materials, made up only 4.4 percent of what we purchased overseas.⁴⁴ This, of course, reflects the size of the American financial commitment in the continent, for more American business activity would be correlated with greater U.S. investment. As economic development raises African standards of living, however, African market potentials become greater, and this in turn makes for more commercial activity, in which U.S. products compete with those of other industrialized countries, with the metropole, past or present, holding the dominant position.

Nigeria exemplifies this. In 1958, imports from the United Kingdom totaled £72.7 million, an increase of over £6 million above 1957 figures. Imports from Japan came to £19.4 million, from Western Germany £12.2 million, from the United States £9.7 million, from the Netherlands £8.8 million, and from Norway and India some £6 million each. Exports to Commonwealth countries and to France dropped in value, but Western Germany increased its purchases by almost 100 percent, and the Netherlands by 50 percent. The United States also took more Nigerian products, while Japan moved from purchases that were only nominal to a total of more than £1 million.⁴⁵

U.S. grants and loans must be included in any analysis of American economic commitments in Africa. Again, because of the nature of the colonial situation, these have been minimal, totaling just under \$800 million to the end of fiscal year 1957. Aid in these categories has been given principally through the International Cooperation Administration and its predecessors, through the Export-Import Bank, and the newer Development Loan Fund. A certain amount of American support for European countries with overseas possessions has been channeled to Africa, as in the case of the French counterpart funds. The colonial powers, however, have showed preference for financing their African needs themselves, so that outside participation on the governmental level has not been sought. It has been calculated that of total U.S. grants from 1945 to 1956, Africa received 0.15 percent; of loans, African countries received only 2.12 percent, of which over two-thirds went to the Union and the Federation.⁴⁶ It is reasonable to assume that with the increase in the number of independent African countries, U.S. governmental aid commitments will materially increase.

(c) *Missionary*.—More American citizens resident in Africa are missionaries than fall into any other category. Their stations are widely distributed; they represent a broad range of Protestant denominations and Catholic orders; their personnel is drawn from American groups of diverse ethnic and national origin; many of their centers show a respectable age. Since missions are traditionally identified in the minds of Africans with the country from which they come, it is not unusual to hear elderly Africans declare that they are "Americans," when they explain their affiliation with an American mission.

Missionary statistics give a sense of the scope of these operations. In June 1959, there were in Africa 470 American Catholic priests and Brothers, 240 Sisters, and 75 lay missionaries, men and women, for

⁴⁴ Ibid., World Trade Information Service, January–December 1957, pt. 3, No. 58–21, table 3.

⁴⁵ News From Nigeria, Apr. 8, 1959.

⁴⁶ Emerson, R., "The Character of American Interests in Africa," in "The United States and Africa," report of 13th American Assembly, New York, 1958, p. 17.

a total of 785. In 1956, 29 American Protestant denominations had 2,652 workers in Subsaharan Africa, and during that year alone sent 209 new missionaries. Total Catholic expenditures for 1958-59 were \$6,465,500; American Protestant groups spent over \$25 million, \$23,944,184 in Africa south of the Sahara, with a present annual increase in budget of about \$1 million. The continent receives 17 to 40 percent of all missionary appropriations made by the major Protestant denominational groups; the four largest of these have from 23 to 47.5 percent of their field force stationed there. In proportion to relative strength, American participation would seem to be greater on the part of Protestants than of Catholics. In 1953, of 27,372 missionary priests, Brothers and Sisters, 379, or 1.4 percent, were from the United States. The 1956 Protestant contingent from America was 18 percent of the total Protestant missionary force of 14,626.

The contribution of American Catholic missionaries is not readily separable from other Catholic effort by virtue of the more centralized authority of the Church, and the less-publicized identities and differences in policy among the Orders. Within recent years, Africans have been trained for the priesthood in progressively greater numbers. Today there are several African bishops.

The role of the American Protestants can be more readily discerned. One of the unwittingly important repercussions of their activity has been the rise of the numerous separatist churches in Subsaharan Africa. These are best known in the Union, where over a thousand are registered with the authorities. Much of the inspiration for them came from American Negro denominations, and later the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church headed by John Alexander Dowie, of Zion, Ill. This influence is to be seen in the 1916 protest movement in Nyasaland, led by John Chilembwe, who, though a product of a Church of Scotland mission school, studied in the United States; and in the Watchtower group, which as the Kitawala movement and its offshoots agitated in the Congo for freedom from white control.

American missionary activity in Africa has supplemented the evangelical aspect of its effort with work in the fields of education, health and hygiene, and agriculture. Teachers, doctors, and agronomists sent as members of these missions have aided the adjustment of Africans to the material changes that have come as a result of contact with Europe. Though agreements have been reached with the colonial governments that permit the missions to function without undue restraint, in some instances mission work has had to be carried on under sufferance of the governments of the territories in which they found themselves. The new self-governing states have shown no tendency to restrict mission activities.

The nature of missionary commitment in general, and hence of American missionary commitment in Africa, has been steadily changing. From the earliest times it was recognized that the foreign missionary could not himself reach more than a fraction of the African people. What is fast developing into the Africanization of missions began at about the same time as the training given by colonial administrators to Africans to help them discharge their governing mission.

The pace of Africanization has been accelerated by the missions to keep step with the overall changes in African life. Thus the Prot-

estant American missions in 1956 had 23,420 African staff members, as against the 2,652 Americans we have already noted. We have remarked about the presence of Africans in the Catholic hierarchy. Today African priests and pastors lead the worship of African congregations in well-built churches, quite a different picture from earlier days when foreign missionaries preached in mud huts or under trees. Christian worship increasingly centers about churches, not mission stations, and as Africanization moves to the higher administrative levels, the autonomy of African Christianity can be expected to parallel the political freedom of the African people in general.

The evangelical picture will of necessity change. With autonomous African Christian churches, it can be anticipated that, as in the instance of political and social institutions, adjustments will veer toward the incorporation of some of the traditional values and practices that were banned by the early missionaries. Equally to be anticipated is the fact that the present educational and medical activities of the missions are destined to come increasingly under the control of the secular arm. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the American missionary commitment in Africa, to the degree to which it adapts itself to these changes, will take on new forms and changed functions.

(d) *Educational*.—American participation in the field of African education moves over the entire range of educational levels. Missions, with their schools everywhere accompanying the churches, have in Africa been the principal providers of primary education. In some territories, mission facilities have been extended to the secondary level. The American contribution to the higher education of Africans, in this case in the United States, has been increasing steadily. Research activities in African ways of life, African ecology, agriculture, medicine, and other fields are being steadily pursued.

Special language problems have entered into the educational work of U.S. missionaries in certain non-English-speaking territories. With the issue of the beginning language of instruction raised anew in the Belgian Congo, American missionaries who had given years to mastering the native languages were faced with pressure from Africans to change to instruction in French. This presented a serious dilemma. In Portuguese Africa, where instruction in the native language is forbidden except for the catechism, American missionaries who are to teach in Angola or Mozambique must spend some time in Portugal learning Portuguese before proceeding to the field.

Reactions to American teaching in colonial territories have been varied. The Africans themselves welcomed the schools. In general terms, it can be said that in British territories there have been no barriers of any consequence. In the Union of South Africa, schools for Africans supported by American missions have been treated as have missionary schools affiliated with mission bodies from other countries. The recent government ban on such schools is a part of the movement to implement the educational aspects of the *apartheid* policy, which is to isolate the African from too close contact with the Western world, and to lead him back to his ancestral way of life. The most notable case in this context has been the taking over of Adams College, an institution which, under American mission auspices, had trained many African leaders.

The number of Africans pursuing higher education in the United States has steadily increased. In 1955, they numbered 851; in 1957, 994; in 1959, 1,190 out of a total foreign student population of 47,245 were from Subsaharan Africa.⁴⁷ Before World War II the few African students in the United States, except where they were sent by a mission body to a denominational college of its own, were as a rule in desperate financial straits. Some of the outstanding African leaders of the present time are men who studied and received their degrees under these conditions.

Of the 1,109 African students in American universities in 1958, 577 came from Ghana, Liberia, and British West Africa. In recent years there has also been an increasing flow from British East African territories. As the numbers of African students began to pose special problems for university admissions officers, and questions of providing for those in need became more pressing, a Committee on African Students in North America was formed, with branches in West Africa to screen applicants. Because the problems of African students in the United States were found to be not much different from those of foreign students in general, the task was taken over by the Institute of International Education, with information officers at U.S. consulates and embassies directing applications from the field, and counselors appointed by the British West African Governments advising students once they arrived in this country. In this way, and through aid given by private organizations such as the African-American Institute, the situation of African students in the United States has been materially bettered, though many problems remain—of adequate financing, and of making available information as to the institutions at which a given subject may most profitably be studied.

Attitudes in Africa concerning the value of degrees from American universities have made difficulties for returning students, at times even for those with degrees from our foremost colleges and universities. These attitudes crystallized about the performance of some of the earlier students who returned with degrees from colleges where standards were low, and were reinforced by biases, some based on misinformation, of both colonial educational officers and Africans who had received their degrees in institutions of the metropole. The demonstrated ability of those who came later to the United States and had been directed to American institutions of high caliber, their insistence on a more realistic evaluation of American higher education, and the findings of the West African educational counselors who came to know the American academic scene, have done much to restore perspective.

The United States is being called on to enter the field of African higher education in still another way. A proposal has been made to establish the equivalent of an American land-grant university in the eastern region of Nigeria with the aid of U.S. Government funds. A new pattern of tripartite consultation, with African, British, and American representatives on a planning commission for this project, may establish a procedure for future educational projects. It is to be expected, however, that American participation in higher education for Africans, particularly in the United States and perhaps in Africa as well, will continue to be greater in English-speaking terri-

⁴⁷ Institute of International Education, "Annual Reports," 1955-59.

tories, if only because of the language equation, though Africans are showing themselves ready to master a new language in order to obtain professional training, as witness the African students in Germany, Israel, and Eastern Europe.

American research in Africa in the field of public health has been carried on for a long time. The American research effort, however, was sporadic until after World War II. The extension of the Fulbright program to overseas territories of European colonial powers, fellowship awards of the major private foundations, of research councils and latterly of the National Science Foundation, university exchange arrangements, and grants from the International Educational Exchange Service have permitted scores of advanced students and established scholars in this country to profit from first-hand research experience in Africa. As a result, the level of expert knowledge about Africa in the United States has risen significantly; this country now possesses a body of informed personnel in the African field that compares favorably with that for any other world area.

(e) *Diplomatic*.—In 1930, we had three diplomatic posts south of the Sahara—in Ethiopia, in Liberia, and in the Union of South Africa; one consulate general—in Cape Town; and seven consulates—Dakar, Lagos, Nairobi, Lourenço Marques, Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth. By 1957 there were 20 posts, but in that year, in all the African Continent, there were fewer Foreign Service officers than in the single European country of West Germany.⁴⁸ African affairs were still being handled by an Assistant Secretary, who was also responsible for the Near East and south Asia, two of the most troubled areas in the world, and he was obliged to function under the additional handicap imposed by the European orientation of those with whom ultimate decisions rested.

Africa today has Bureau status in the Department of State, with an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; and parallel changes are being made in other arms of government dealing with the continent. As of March 1959, we had in Subsaharan Africa 6 embassies, 9 consulates general, and 11 consulates. Subsaharan posts were manned by 170 Foreign Service officers, 244 ICA personnel, 39 members of the U.S. Information Agency, 10 foreign agricultural officers, and 17 Army, Navy, and Air attachés, these last being stationed in the embassies at Addis Ababa, Monrovia, Khartoum, and Pretoria. However, adequate provision has still to be made for handling African affairs that is consonant with the size and importance of the continent. Subsaharan Africa has less than 10 percent of all Foreign Service posts, 26 out of a total of 283, and 4½ percent of field personnel, 480 out of 10,598.⁴⁹

Mention should also be made of the various agencies of the United Nations, such as UNESCO, the International Labor Office, and the like, in which the United States participates, as well as representation on the parent body and its various commissions. In addition, we play a major role in other bodies that function in Africa, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In this, as in the increase of our own aid programs, and of our diplo-

⁴⁸ McKay, Vernon, "The African Operations of U.S. Government Agencies," in "The United States and Africa," p. 195.

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Service List, April 1959."

matic and consular representation in Africa, we are continuing to react to the accelerating tempo of African movement into the world political and economic picture. This will continue as more territories gain independence, as new relationships between them are established, and as measures to increase their economic, technical, and educational resources call for a greater degree of African-American cooperation.

2. *The evolution of U.S. policy*

(a) *Liberia*.—The creation of Liberia was a direct outgrowth of the antislavery movement in this country, when the American Colonization Society in 1821 purchased land on the West Coast to repatriate African slaves and their descendants. As the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs phrased it recently:

The oldest Republic in Africa is Liberia. In view of our long and cordial association, the United States is particularly alert to important policy decisions on the part of its government.⁵⁰

In 1847, when Liberia declared itself a sovereign state, the British Government was notified that it was an object of "peculiar interest to the United States;" that the State Department was prepared to "interpose its good offices" in Liberian relations with other countries, and was—

very unwilling to see it despoiled of its territory* * * or improperly restrained in the exercise of its necessary rights and powers as an independent settlement.⁵¹

The United States has repeatedly been termed by the Department of State "the first friend of Liberia," and by diplomatic measures has interceded to check encroachment on Liberian territory. In a number of instances, American warships have been sent to assist the Liberian Government in putting down native revolts.

During the 1920's, the American Departments of State and Commerce supported a plan of the Firestone interests to obtain a concession for a million acre rubber plantation. Overcoming Liberian reluctance, an agreement was signed, which included a \$5 million loan, financed by New York banking firms. Difficulties brought on by the world financial crisis of 1929 made for strained relations, and for 4 years the United States had no diplomatic representation in that country. Diplomatic relations were resumed in 1934. Liberian recovery has continued steadily since then, having been stimulated by the circumstances of her strategic position in World War II, and by substantial postwar aid.

This is apparent in the Liberian budget figures. From 1938 to 1950, Government revenues increased from \$885,000 to approximately \$4 million; in 1953, the budget figure was \$8½ million, and 6 years later the amount rose to \$20 million. Much of this was due to revenues from Firestone operations, but the installations of the American-owned Liberian Mining Co. at Bomi Hills and the extension of Liberian-flag registration to foreign shipping, as well as other ventures by American and European companies in mining and agricultural enterprises, contributed heavily. In 1950 a Point 4 agreement for technical aid was signed and, in 1955, the Export-Import Bank granted

⁵⁰ Ibid., Bulletin, vol. XL, May 25, 1959, p. 746.

⁵¹ Cited in Buell, Raymond Leslie, "The Native Problem in Africa," New York, 1928, vol. II, p. 707.

Liberia a \$50 million loan for road construction. With the help of these and other measures, the Liberian Government, under President Tubman, has expanded its educational activities and established an economic base for the extension of political and economic rights to the indigenous peoples of the interior, under the current program of "unification."

(b) *Colonial control and African independence movements.*—The historical position of the United States in Subsaharan Africa has until recently been one of detachment. There have been official moves, as when in 1833 an agreement was concluded with the Sultan of Zanzibar which, among other things, permitted American consuls to reside in his ports and judge disputes involving U.S. citizens;⁵² or the recognition of the Congo Free State in 1884. On the whole, however, the United States has left Africa to the European powers who took over the responsibility of governing her peoples.

This position was dominant until, with World War II, our Government was officially brought into the African scene. African strategic importance for the North African theater of operations and the Near and Middle East, and its mineral resources that were vital to the war effort, were the key factors in bringing about this change. U.S. troops became known in West Africa and the Congo, and their presence was not without influence on the internal political situation of those areas, as for example, in the contact of the Congolese with American Negro units. In the total war effort the direct role of Subsaharan Africa was not large, however, and it continued to be subsidiary in U.S. postwar thinking and planning.

Since the end of the war, changes in American approaches to Africa can best be considered in the setting of U.S. policy in general:

(1) In 1946–48, the rest of the free and uncommitted world was regarded as constituting three fairly homogeneous blocs—Europe, Latin America, and Afroasia—the latter two, as far as international relations were concerned, tending to be considered extensions of the United States and Europe, respectively. Where questions about Africa arose, negotiations dictated by wartime strategic concerns gave way to established diplomatic procedures with the colonial powers, or with the independent states of Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Union of South Africa.

(2) In 1949–52, President Truman's point 4 program provided a new dynamic for our conduct of foreign affairs. This moved from a fresh ideological base, though from the outset there were signs of the erosion of its original intent by military considerations that later dominated its implementation. In these terms, the fact that Subsaharan Africa had no immediate strategic significance, and that in any event ultimate decisions concerning so much of the continent were in the hands of our NATO associates, meant that African matters could have only a limited place in our thinking.

(3) During the years 1953–56, the policy of "containment" caused expression of the American point of view to be more abstract, and to be cast in global, moralistic terms of an East-West struggle. Since Subsaharan Africa has no land border with either the Soviet Union or any of its satellites, U.S. interest in African happenings declined to a new low.

⁵² Ibid., vol. I, p. 261.

(4) Since 1956 there has been more active U.S. concern with African affairs than ever before. We have reacted to the increasing dynamic of the continent, manifested in the year 1958 alone by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Cairo, the Conference of Independent African States in Accra, the Pan-African Students' Conference at Makerere College in Kampala, the initiation of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa in Tanganyika, the All-African People's Conference in Accra, and, on a broader level of official governmental operations, the setting up of the African Caucusing Group in the United Nations and of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa.

We may review how this concern is being given expression. We find it in our mass communications media at home—in radio and television programs, and on lecture platforms for general audiences. It is evident in the growing inclusion of African studies in universities and colleges all over the country. It is taking shape in official moves like the elevation of Africa to Bureau status in the Department of State and the establishment of new consular and diplomatic missions, and in the training programs that have been instituted to provide African specialists for the Foreign Service and the International Cooperation Administration. It is to be seen in the impressive increase in the number of visitors from Africa brought to this country under various educational and exchange programs.

We are in effect witnessing developments that reflect a more realistic and sophisticated attack on questions of African-American relations. We have still to work out approaches in a continent as large and as varied as Africa, to implement our fundamental aim of achieving a continuing state of good relations with the peoples and governments of the continent.

(c) *The autonomous and newly independent states.*—As U.S. approaches to African affairs become less oriented toward the European colonial governments, the factors which determine policy become more complex. Differences in traditional background, in the adaptation of traditional patterns to changing economic, social, and political requirements, in resource base, and in relations with the former governing powers, come to the surface. Evaluation of these factors, and decisions as to the measures we must take in each individual case, demand a flexibility that was not called for when the relations between the United States and Africa moved through the foreign offices and the colonial departments of the metropolitan powers.

From this point of view, U.S. policy for Africa involves principally planning for the future. Certain problems, however, already have had to be faced. One of these is the position of the United States in relation to the territories approaching self-government. The visits by officials of territories not yet independent, who come for consultations about economic, educational, and other forms of aid, pose new questions. The status of the Autonomous Republics of the French Community on the international scene poses others. At the July meeting of their representatives in Madagascar, it was indicated that they could send their officials as part of the French delegation to the United Nations, or be represented in other bodies as associate members. The Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has a resident Minister in Washington, even though two of its three component ter-

ritories are still partially under the control of the British Colonial Office.

With the newly independent states we move into the channels of customary diplomatic relations. Steps have to be taken to establish Foreign Service posts, extending aid through loans and grants, and the like. Adjustment must be made to the announced policy of non-alignment. We must agree on a position with regard to the forms their governments are assuming; here our understanding of their modifications of European political forms and values becomes critical.

(d) *The Asian-African formula.*—The repercussions of the Bandung Conference of 1956 were fully as great in the West as in the East, and can be said to have made a more lasting impression on thinking in the United States than in Subsaharan Africa. It has, for us, become a formula with which to approach questions arising out of the drive for self-government in Africa and Asia, or to evaluate the positions taken by the newly formed government in these continents on controversial issues.

It is the part of wisdom to subject to continuous scrutiny any formula that can lead to action. In this case the principle is of special applicability in the light of the rapidity of change in both the continents involved. The variations to be encountered in each of them in almost any phase of life are matched by the differences between the two when they are compared as wholes. What both have in common is the fact that their peoples are striving for independence, or have recently achieved it. This, as has often been pointed out, provides a basis for negative reactions; it holds no assurance that positive action will have the same unity of approach.

The United States, in its dealings with the peoples and governments of Africa, as in the case of Asia, must be as sensible of differences as of similarities, on no matter what level. To assume any degree of identity or unity on the basis of a formula that has been dramatized by a single event is to impose a handicap on our operations through the simplification of what, in actuality, is a series of political, economic, and social complexities.

C. PROBLEMS OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AFFECTING UNITED STATES-AFRICAN RELATIONS

1. *Nationalism and colonial control*

(a) *African nationalism and white counternationalisms.*—In U.S. dealings with Africa during its transition from a continent under colonial control to a series of self-governing states, the problems of African nationalisms and non-African counternationalisms rank high. The range of African nationalist movements, as these have been defined in these pages—"those movements that have arisen in reaction to foreign control," whose aim is to "attain self-government by the conversion of colonial dependencies into independent political entities"—is wide. In the territories moving toward self-government, they take the form of political parties; in multiracial states, they produce African congresses based on racial affiliation. They vary from well-organized, well-financed groups in Senegal and Nigeria to the burgeoning mass movements of the Belgian Congo. They may be monolithic, as is the Convention People's Party that attained its goal as a nationalist organization when it brought the Gold Coast to independence as Ghana, or may be loose and fragmented by tribal affiliation, as in Uganda.

African nationalisms, for all their complexities, whether as to origins, factors that have contributed to their growth, or the means used to attain their ends, show certain unities. The most important of these is the mass support they have called forth. Other unities are demands for educational opportunity and training in technical skills, the rejection of the role of tutelage, and of the doctrine of gradualism. Of relevance here is the fact that, except in the fast diminishing procolonial literature, the nationalist upsurge is no longer seen as merely an expression of the discontent of an elite striving for recognition. Today we know that the distinction between the tribal dweller in his village, long believed to be indifferent to political affairs, and the urban, westernized African has been greatly overstressed.

The question of the attitude toward African nationalism to be taken by the United States leads directly to the heart of the controversy between those who stress our obligation to our NATO associates and those who urge full and active support for African aspirations. The problem has been posed in its most uncompromising form by Sekou Touré:

We judge our relations with other countries on the basis of their attitude and political concepts toward Africa as a whole, toward colonialism, the right to self-determination and [economic] development. There can be no middle way, no compromise between colonial interest and African interest, which are contradictory by nature and by definition. The United States cannot rightly hope that Africa will be erected on a foundation brought about by [zones of] influence and colonial interests.⁵³

⁵³ New York Times, July 9, 1959, p. 4.

The matter is not so simple. American popular sympathy for the aspirations of non-self-governing peoples, as has been repeatedly pointed out, is one of our oldest traditions. But our relations with the principal European colonial powers are deeply embedded in common democratic ideals and common values, and thus go far beyond the one aspect of those relations that turn on their African commitments. In our dilemma, time is fortunately on our side. Every move by one of these powers to modify or relinquish colonial controls anywhere gives us more room for diplomatic maneuvering between the alternatives that face us. Nevertheless, there are situations where we must register choice, and in those it is the part of both wisdom and realism to initiate policies which point toward the future.

A far more difficult problem for the United States is posed by the counternationalisms of eastern, central, and southern Africa. These movements are, in essence, reactions to African nationalisms. Their ideology has long been implicit in the thinking of Europeans, but organizations and explicit programs did not appear until Africans began seriously to challenge the position of the Europeans.

These counternationalisms also show substantial variation. Though they are all directed toward the preservation of the status quo as regards the preferred position of Europeans in these societies, they differ in the positive programs they espouse, and in their methods. Statements of ends and means, for example, are far more rare from the Kivu settler community of the eastern Congo than in Kenya and the Rhodesias. In the Federation, the Dominion Party stands for European supremacy and racial separation. Though this is but the extreme expression of European opinion, and the party is not in the majority, it makes difficult the position of those who urge less intransigent action, or, like the Capricorn group, would fully implement the doctrine of qualified partnership in multiracial societies.

Rhodesian counternationalism has a positive component not found further to the north. This is the drive of the Europeans to attain full independent Commonwealth status. Powers reserved to the United Kingdom Government, in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, limit the ability of Europeans to act in the area of African affairs. This they view as an affront to their competence to govern. They argue that since Ghana and the Sudan have been granted independence, despite the fact that the peoples of these countries are Africans who have had but a brief experience with the problems of governing a modern state, there can be no reason why the Federation, governed by Europeans who know the parliamentary tradition, should not also be given full freedom.

The currents of nationalism and counternationalism in the Union of South Africa are particularly complex. Here the classical European definition of the word "nationalism" seems of greater applicability than anywhere else in Africa, for to most white South Africans, the Union's destiny is to maintain a citadel of white civilization on the African Continent. Political power rests in the hands of the Nationalist Party, which is dominated by the Afrikaners, who use it as an instrument to establish the primacy of the Afrikaans-speaking group over those of British origin and English speech. Historically the conflict of interests of these two groups erupted into the Anglo-Boer War which, it is essential to recognize in analyzing the South

African situation, is one of the great realities of the present in shaping thought and action.

Unlike elsewhere in Africa, organizations of Africans and Asians, termed in South African parlance "non-Europeans," have little leverage for exerting political pressures. Their only recourse, therefore, has been to organize sporadic economic action, through the medium of strikes and boycotts, though in this they have been deterred by government restrictions, and by the bans laid against their leaders. The organization of Africans takes on two forms: a moderate congress, and the Africanists, whose motto is "Africa for the Africans." The Asians also have a well-organized congress. The third non-European community, the Coloureds, or mixed bloods, in the past have steadfastly identified themselves with the Europeans. The extension of *apartheid* measures to them is, however, bringing them closer to the African group.

(b) *Belgian colonialism in transition*.—The history of Belgium in Africa since it took over the Congo Free State a half century ago, and after World War I assumed responsibility for Ruanda-Urundi, has been characterized by hardheaded, enlightened self-interest. Its mission, as conceived by successive Belgian Governments, was phrased by King Baudouin in his broadcast of January 13, 1959, that accompanied the announcement of a revised Congo policy:

The purpose of our presence on the African Continent was defined by Leopold II: to open up these backward countries to European civilization; summon their populations to emancipation, to freedom, and to progress after having freed them from slavery, disease, and misery.

Among students of African affairs, the official Belgian policy in the Congo has consistently been described as one of paternalism.

Belgian rule has been held under the tight control of the metropole. The underlying philosophy has been one of gradualism, with the training of Africans calculated to build solidly on lower levels before attempting further advance. Stress was laid on primary education; secondary schools were few. Very few Congolese who were not studying for the priesthood received higher education. Where technical training was given, emphasis was laid on developing manual skills. Official recognition of influences from other parts of Africa came slowly. In 1952, the first institution of higher learning, Lovanium, was projected; in 1957, the first local elections in pilot cities were held.

For a time, it seemed as though Belgium, with policies lying between those of the French and British in West Africa on the one hand, and of Portugal and the Union of South Africa on the other, might have found a solution to the basic problems of developed African dependencies for self-government. Evenhanded political arrangements had always prevailed; if the Africans did not have the vote, neither did the Belgians resident in the Congo. Forms of racial discrimination were gradually being lifted. For Africans, the rewards of a higher education for those with demonstrated ability had appeared above the horizon.

In 1958, a Research Group for the Study of Political Problems in the Belgian Congo (*Groupe de travail pour l'étude des problèmes politiques au Congo Belge*) was appointed. Its recommendations were due to be made public January 13, 1959, and were actually announced on that day. Four days earlier, however, the Leopoldville

riots occurred, revealing an urgency in the African desire for self-government that had hitherto not been suspected. The riots profoundly shook the Belgian nation. The timetable for the preliminary moves given in the report, however, is being followed. Municipal and territorial councils are being named at elections scheduled for November or December 1959; provincial councils will be constituted by March 1960. Out of these a general council will be formed, as a step toward establishing a chamber of representatives.

At the completion of this development—
stated the declaration of the Government—

it is desirable, in the interests of both countries, to maintain partnership between the Congo and Belgium, who will decide freely on this, when the times comes.⁵⁴

It is probable that the kind of constitutional progression observed elsewhere in Africa will occur in the Congo, with an accelerating devolution of power to the Africans until complete "decolonization" has been achieved. One of the signs of this has been the formation of political parties. In the 1957 elections for the office of burgomaster in selected cities, the Bakongo tribal group, organized as the Abako Party, prevailed. This party was outlawed later, when it was charged with responsibility for the Leopoldville riots. The burgomasters it had elected were dismissed and jailed, but were later released and sent to Belgium. After their return to the Congo they were reinstated, and the Abako Party was once more given legal status. In April 1959, a congress was held at Luluabourg to merge some of the existing groups and form a large political party for the entire Congo. Because it was under the ban, the Abako representatives were absent; no consolidation of the other groups resulted.

The uncertainty of the Belgians as to their future is shown in various ways: return to Belgium, reluctance to invest in Congo enterprises, liquidation of small businesses. One development of long-term significance is the decrease in the number of Belgians preparing themselves for a future in Africa. The number registered in the *Institut universitaire de territoires d'outre-mer* dropped from 102 in 1953-54 to 50 in 1958-59; in the *Cours coloniaux* at Brussels from 48 in 1950-51 to 3 in 1958-59; at the colonial science course at Louvain from 68 in 1952-53 to 8 in 1958-59.⁵⁵

Because of the contribution the mineral resources of the Congo make to the industrial and military requirements of the United States, it is essential that our future relations with it be such that the continuation of these supplies be assured. The implications for world politics of the possibility that the Congo will be fully independent in 5 years or less, as many unofficial Belgians are predicting, are far-reaching. The ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of the Congo, as now constituted, raises the important question as to the extent pre-existing affiliations will make themselves felt, and concomitantly whether present boundaries will be indefinitely continued.

(c) *The Portuguese territories.*—Portuguese possessions in Africa are rarely included in discussions of African affairs, since of all Africa

⁵⁴ Inforcongo (Brussels), "Political Future of the Belgian Congo," 1959, pp. 15, 17.

⁵⁵ "Crise des vocations pour le Congo," reprinted from *Revue Nouvelle*, January 1959, in *Bulletin of the Centre d'Etude des Problèmes Sociaux Indigènes (CEPSI)*, No. 44, March 1959, pp. 156-157.

their recent history has been least affected by the movements for self-government. They are four in number—Angola and Mozambique in the southern part of the continent, the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe in the Bight of Biafra off the coast of Nigeria and the Cameroons, and Portuguese Guinea in West Africa.

The two large southerly territories overshadow the others in importance. Angola has appreciable mineral wealth, while Mozambique makes substantial contributions of cotton and other agricultural products to the Portuguese economy. Mozambique is also a primary source of labor for South Africa, providing over 100,000 workers annually for the Transvaal mines, as well as many more tens of thousands who individually, and often illegally, leave to find work in the Union, and in Southern Rhodesia as well. These two Portuguese territories also provide outlets for Union and Southern Rhodesian exports, since the railway lines that link both the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia to the sea run largely through them.

Portuguese Africa has seen little political activity of any kind in recent years. The vast majority of Africans living there not only have no opportunities to function politically, but any attempt by them, or by Europeans, to organize for political ends is promptly suppressed. Officially, there is no race prejudice, and Africans who can fulfill the necessary requirements may become *assimilados*, which gives them full Portuguese citizenship. The opportunities to meet the educational and other requirements set for this are, however, limited, and only a minute fraction of the African population has attained this status. In the 1950 census, Angola reported 30,089 *assimilados* out of a total African population of 4 million; in Mozambique, there were 4,353 out of 5,733,000.⁵⁶

Despite the absence of segregated schools, the disparities in educational opportunities are apparent when it is indicated that though the proportion of Portuguese to Africans in Mozambique is about 1 to 100, in 1954 there were 4,412 white children in the regular primary schools, and 5,177 African; in the secondary school in Lourenço Marques, there were 800 European pupils and 5 Africans.⁵⁷ There is little encouragement for the development of an African educated elite. As one student has put it:

Although color may play no part in the suppression of the African's educational opportunities, cultural and economic distinctions may have the same prejudicial effect.⁵⁸

In 1951, all Portuguese territories were designated "overseas provinces," and were accorded juridical status as integral parts of the Portuguese state. From all indications, this in no way altered relations with, or within, the former colonies. The move, however, had important repercussions on the international scene. Once Portugal was admitted to the United Nations, she used this constitutional device to justify her refusal to submit reports on her overseas territories, as do the other colonial countries. The self-image of Portugal, richly documented in the speeches of her statesmen, as a single people linked by bonds of loyalty to a metropole of which they form an integral part, is closely associated with her conception of her civilizing mission, and

⁵⁶ Duffy, James, "Portuguese Africa," Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 295.

⁵⁷ Harris, M., "Portugal's African 'Wards' ", New York, 1958, p. 16.

⁵⁸ Duffy, James, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

her centuries-old experience as a colonial power. In effect, it is a 19th century colonial policy.

In the immediate future, it does not appear likely that Portuguese Africa will see decisive political change. It is equally unlikely that it can indefinitely be isolated from the currents affecting its neighbors; that is, whether the recent events in Nyasaland and the Belgian Congo will not be reflected in Mozambique and Angola, and those of French Africa in Portuguese Guinea. There is also the question whether the tribal nationalism of the Bakongo will not reach over the present boundary of the Belgian Congo and induce African movements for economic and political rights in Northern Angola and the enclave of Cabinda. It is evident that Portugal will soon be under added pressure from the African Caucusing Group in the United Nations to report on her overseas territories.

(d) *Relations between North and Subsaharan Africa.*—The degree to which the new states of Subsaharan Africa will continue to concern themselves with events in North Africa, and to which the North African states will continue to identify themselves with Subsaharan Africa, as well as with the Arab world, has important implications for both African and world affairs. For the moment, as we have said, the common bond of anticolonialism, which finds its most concentrated focus in the Algerian situation, holds these countries together. Future relations rest on the extent to which they will develop a durable continental solidarity by establishing positive identifications, outside the colonial issue, that will counterbalance the historical differences and psychological attitudes that have previously set off northern from Subsaharan peoples.

There is every indication at the present time of a continuing concern of Liberia, Ghana, and Guinea with events to the north. They are active in the African group in the United Nations that has been a prime mover in keeping the question of Algeria before that body. Ghana, in July 1959, recognized the nationalist "Algerian Provisional Government," and Guinea in August. Cairo's hospitality to the refugee members of the UPC (*Union des Populations du Cameroun*) and the continuous stream of anticolonial broadcasts beamed to Subsaharan Africa indicate reciprocal interest. On the other hand, protests made by African governments to France against her proposed nuclear tests in the Sahara have been rejected by the French Government, without the voiced dissent of the African members of the Community. In the area of economics, the disquiet shown at the Cairo Afro-Asian Conference over the implications of the interest of the Common Market in Africa was sufficiently pronounced to elicit official notice from the President of its Executive Council, who issued a statement explaining the proposed nature of its relation to economically underdeveloped African territories.⁵⁹

The role of Islam has special meaning for the northern tier of Subsaharan Africa, where the population is predominantly Moslem. The key question here is the degree to which the Moslem Subsaharan Africans think of Islam as a political as well as a religious force. Currently, there is little indication of Islamic political overtones south of the Sahara. French-speaking Moslem Africans have repeatedly

⁵⁹ "Communauté Européenne," vol. III, January 1959, p. 8.

made this point. The role envisaged by Mauretania of being the mediator between north and south is not cast in terms of pan-Arabism. Ghana and Nigeria, who are friendly with both the North Africans and Israel, may well serve the cause of world peace by acting as mediators of the Arab-Israel conflict.

The approaching independence of Nigeria introduces another element into the equation of contemporary Africa. With more than 34 million inhabitants, it will be the most populous of African states. Its northern region, with more than half its people, is mainly Moslem, and Islam has also penetrated effectively into the western region. Separatist tendencies, arising out of the diversity of Nigerian ethnic groups, have come to the surface, and preindependence adjustments within and between its three regions will doubtlessly continue. We can anticipate that Nigeria will have a leading position in the Conference of African States, in the United Nations African Caucusing Group, and in other all-African groupings by virtue of her size, her population, her economic potential, and the political experience of her leaders.

2. *Racial tensions*

(a) *Eastern and Central Africa.*—In the eastern and central parts of Africa, as in the south, the factor of race shadows all aspects of life. With increasing contacts between Africans from all parts of the continent, with increasing opportunities for schooling, there has developed determination on the part of the African majority to gain economic, social, and political rights. The Europeans, who in relative though not absolute terms are numerous in this part of Africa, and who are permanently settled there, take the position that they are the civilizing agents who, in developing Africa, are bringing benefits that are gradually raising the level of African life. They live under a constant fear of being "swamped" by Africans, as it is most commonly phrased, should the African nationalist goals of majority rule be reached.

Unlike incidents such as the Accra riots of 1948, which were anti-government, rather than against the whites as such, the Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya, the Leopoldville riots, and the Nyasaland rebellion were anti-European. On the other hand, in Nyasaland, while the demand for self-government was increasingly expressed, it was also apparent that the reaction was against removing Colonial Office controls, regarded as a protection against local excesses. This has also been the reason for the disquiet of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia. The Leopoldville riots involved no issue of settler control. The Minister of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, who while on later official visits was welcomed by the Congolese because the official government statement had promised self-government, was received with hostility by the Belgian small traders and the Kivu planters.

The degree of racial tension varies from one territory to another. Uganda Africans, with a much larger Asian population than European, direct their hostilities toward the Indian community. The two eastern African territories for which the United States, as a member of the Trusteeship Council has some measure of responsibility, are comparatively temperate in the climate of their racial relations. In Ruanda-Urundi, where the proportion of Europeans to Africans is of the order of 1 to 1,000, there has been some discontent because of un-

popular social and agricultural reforms attempted by the Belgian administration, and because of efforts to modify the feudal relationship between the indigenous rulers, the Watutsi, and their Bahutu serfs. Tanganyika, a Trust Territory, has had a less politically entrenched settled group to deal with, with resulting relative calm in race relations. The complex franchise arrangement whereby persons of all three racial groups—African, Asian, or European—vote for candidates from all three, and a sense that self-government is to be achieved in the near future, have done much to diminish aggressive tendencies.

Modification of practices involving discrimination against the African majority has taken place generally in this area, though to a lesser degree in British Central Africa than in East Africa or the Congo. The problem is essentially one of timing. Under pressure, the minority gives way. Thus discriminatory practices in Kenya were eased after Mau-Mau and Africans were given wider participation in government. The Federation, after the Nyasaland uprising, moved to implement the principles of partnership by eliminating certain discriminatory practices. In all these cases, the degree to which the aspirations of the Africans are met fall short of their demands. Piece-meal action predicated on the assumption that there is time to make gradual change has proved ineffective. In consequence, an African leader denounced as an extremist at a given time comes later to be accepted as a moderate when new, less conciliatory leaders come on the scene.

For the United States, the fact that these racial tensions in Africa highlight the vulnerability of our world position, in terms of unresolved race problems we face at home, gives them added significance. This is why no posture of detachment can resolve the difficulty for us, for we are under constant pressure from both sides to declare ourselves. Some Europeans who live in these countries see the future clearly and are prepared to face it, but they are vastly outnumbered by those who cannot adjust to the swiftness of change in African thought and action. Unless African hostility is fed by repressive measures, there is little reason to suppose that once the African sees himself on the way to a full place in his society, he will be anti-European. For the time being, however, the decisions are not in his hands, but in those of the Europeans. What those decisions will be are of consequence not only to their own countries, but to the African continent, and the rest of the world.

(b) *The Union of South Africa*.—The problems presented by the racial tensions of eastern and central Africa are compounded by those in the southern part of the continent. Its non-African population is the largest in the continent, with a resulting increase in the severity of the conflict of interests. The fact that the Union is an independent state brings it within the focus of international controversy. Its internal racial strife receives added prominence because of its refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the United Nations over South-West Africa, which it has in effect incorporated as a part of the Union. The disabilities under which its 450,000 Asians live have further brought its racial policies to world attention through official protests lodged by India and Pakistan against their treatment.

South African racial tensions take on special importance because they are the determining factor in shaping the symbolisms of the

Ghana-South African polarities. Just as Ghana symbolizes self-determination for African peoples, the Union of South Africa crystallizes counternationalist sentiment. It is not too much to say that it is impossible to understand Africa south of the Equator without a knowledge of South African policies and procedures. Here we find the position of counternationalism stated in its most unequivocal form, and implemented according to plan. Thus the Prime Minister, in a speech delivered in May 1959, speaking of plans to make of the Union a republic, is reported as having said that it must be a white republic, where only the white men have a say in the government.⁶⁰

In the Union, the factor of race differences is never absent. The people of all races have had to learn to live under unceasing tension. No matter to what group the individual belongs, such adjustment is essential to survival. The way of South Africa is a lonely one, out of step with the rest of the world in its ideology, so that the country finds itself continuously on the defensive in the forums of the world. Yet the countercurrents there continue to run strongly. Everywhere else in the continent, tribal loyalties are considered a threat to national unity and the development of a modern state, and every effort is being made to reduce them. But in the Union, tribalism is encouraged to the point of imposing it on urban dwellers. Elsewhere, Africans are taught to know a world language. In the Union, African schooling must be in the tribal languages, while Afrikaner children also follow a curriculum in which the world language most accessible to them, English, is learned as a foreign tongue.

In approaching the South African situation, it is incorrect to attribute to the Afrikaners sole responsibility for the policy of racial separatism, which in Afrikaans is called *apartheid*. There is little disagreement in principle about it among the majority of Europeans; the differences between the English-speaking group and the Afrikaners revolve about the manner of its implementation, and how far racial separation should be taken toward its logical conclusion. It is incorrect, again, to think of South Africa as an authoritarian state. For those who are neither African, Asian, nor Coloured, there is considerable freedom of discussion. Nor is it correct to think of either of the two European groups as unified; there are Afrikaners, even within the Nationalist Party, who strongly disagree with many of the measures it has enacted, and there are many English-speaking white South Africans who readily accept them. Neither can the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church, which gives religious sanction to *apartheid*, be overlooked in seeking to understand underlying drives, nor the role of the non-Afrikaner churches in supporting an opposite position.

It is not possible here even to indicate the principal measures that have been taken to put the doctrine of *apartheid* into effect. The African, Coloured, and Asian segments of the population watch the shrinkage of the narrow area of their legal rights with a despair that many observers feel must find release in action. Most South Africans accept this as an eventuality which must be continuously apprehended and guarded against. On the economic level, many industrialists

⁶⁰ Press Digest (South Africa), No. 21, May 28, 1959, p. 195, from Die Volksblad, May 25, 1959.

and economists feel that separation of the races is economically unsound, and that attempts to enforce it will fall of their own weight.

In contradistinction to what is found in most other parts of Africa, no workable solution to the South African racial dilemma has as yet appeared. Meanwhile, as a member of the free world group of nations, the Union of South Africa is the example offered the Africans by non-Western nations, to demonstrate a willingness on the part of the United States to embrace inconsistencies between principle and practice. At the same time it has become the countersymbol against which the growing force of the new African nations will be directed.

3. *Economic development*

(a) *Dependent territories*.—The assistance rendered by the governing powers, particularly in the past two decades, has done much to stimulate and sustain economic development in their African territories. In the case of England and France, this aid has taken the form of direct grants, as well as long-term loans at low rates of interest, or interest-free. Belgium has made funds available to Ruanda-Urundi on a similar basis. In territories having budget surpluses, these have been tapped to meet capital needs of general social value, such as communication grids, schools, clinics, and the like, essential to form an economic infrastructure and an institutional framework for further economic growth. In British territories, the various marketing board schemes, functioning during periods when the world prices of the commodities they control have generally been high, have also made substantial contributions toward these same ends out of accumulated surpluses.

The eagerness of African dependencies in recent times to promote foreign investment has given rise to a new political argument, particularly in the multiracial territories. This is the argument for gradualism, urged on the grounds that unrest will frighten away investment from abroad. It is not germane here to discuss the merits of this formula. What is important to recognize is that African opinion stresses immediate, tangible moves to widen substantively African participation in government, and African opportunities for economic advancement.

(b) *Independent states*.—The economic problems of the African territories after independence do not differ significantly from those they faced before they became self-governing. The differences arise out of the sources of aid available to them, responsibility for their own decisions, and the internal and external political implications of what they do.

It can be taken for granted that the stability of the newly emergent states will be strongly influenced, if not determined, by the dynamics of economic growth. Toward this end, the adoption of policies to aid in raising the standard of living of their peoples, and thus lessen the discrepancy between their average per capita income and that of the more industrialized parts of the world, is to be anticipated. The internal capital resources of these states are meager; more important, where these resources do exist, there is need in most African societies to build a tradition for investment. Consequently, outside financing for developmental projects will be needed for the foreseeable future. There is reason to believe, however, that with educational campaigns directed toward the support of Government issues, more

internal possibilities will develop and, in time, lessen dependence on outside grants and loans. Thus, a series of development loans totaling £2 million of the Nigerian Federal Government, after 9 days of offering, were oversubscribed in the aggregate of more than £700,000.⁶¹

A significant potential source of capital lies in the expansion of internal trade. With the increase of Africans in business, a modest capital structure should develop which, to the extent it exists, will contribute to establishing African national economies on a sounder base. Nor should we underestimate African pecuniary motivations, which have a strong traditional base in West Africa, and are fast developing elsewhere. We can look to the emergence of what one economist has termed the future development of "interest and initiative" on the part of the Africans, "the missing link in the chain of industrialization."⁶² The encouragement of existing tendencies to produce new commodities for the export market should also strengthen these economies.

Nevertheless, even under the most favorable circumstances of development, internal capital for expansion will continue to be only auxiliary to foreign aid. In all Africa south of the Sahara, only the Union, and perhaps Southern Rhodesia, have the necessary preconditions for self-sustaining economic growth: adequate trading and commercial activity, an organized money market, a labor pool composed of workers having the requisite skills and psychologically oriented to regard the industrial plant as their primary source of income, essential transportation and communication facilities. Increasing population, the growth of urban centers and the development of industry, together with a concomitant increase in the effective exploitation of agricultural potentialities, mean that the fulfillment of these conditions elsewhere in Subsaharan Africa is a matter of time and of the outside aid they can be given.

The form and scope of U.S. economic operations in independent African states present distinctive problems of procedure as yet not defined. For one thing, under the colonial system, financial aid was channeled through the metropole. The problems of the near future may involve negotiations with something of the order of 20 Subsaharan African countries.

It has been suggested that the complexity of this situation will be reduced if groupings can be formed on a regional basis. There is little question that such arrangements would be to the best economic interest of the countries of Africa. Experience teaches, however, that economic best interest is by no means always a controlling factor in ordering human behavior. We have learned, at times to our cost, that new nations have lively feelings of national pride, and are particularly sensitive to influences brought to bear from outside. The United States will thus do well to give serious thought to the consequences of any direct or indirect pressures on its part in this direction. For however much goodwill and careful planning there may be in attempts to achieve efficiency, it would be ill advised to impose conditions requiring the formation of such groupings when negotiating loans, grants, or other forms of aid.

⁶¹ Federal Nigeria, vol. II, No. 5, May 1959, p. 1.

⁶² Lewis, W. A., "Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast." Accra, 1953, p. 15.

Another point should be kept in mind when economic factors affecting future United States-African relations are considered. We must have a care that we do not overestimate the purely economic aspects of our operations. This report bears testimony to the place of the human factors in the African scene. There is no question that economic development is a leading goal of the peoples of Africa, but they may count the cost in terms of social and religious values that can be far removed from the area of economic advantage. In some instances, their preferences can lead directly to a rejection of economic benefits, as in the case of cattle in eastern Africa where, being a prestige good, the people are most reluctant to make of them a routine marketable commodity. Here once again we find that our concept of adjustment must be called on to explain why what may seem of paramount and immediate economic importance to us, will not necessarily carry the same conviction to the Africans.

(c) *Sources of external aid.*—One of the problems to be faced by the newly independent African states is the change in their economic relations with the countries under whose tutelage they lived. Thus, for example, the fact that their loans will no longer be guaranteed by a metropolitan power may make it more difficult for them to raise the funds they require. In view of the stimulus given to African economic development by these loans and other developmental grants, measures which may make them no longer available to territories that have gained self-government have serious implications. For economic change, like any other historical process, is not reversible; once begun, it cannot be halted.

The lesson of Guinea, where France withdrew all support, all technicians, all administrators within 2 months after independence was voted, makes the point. For if France and the NATO powers were unwilling to provide the new state with the economic and technical aid it needed, the countries of the Communist bloc were very willing indeed to help. Yet even in this case, the strength of preexisting ties with France were such as to cause Guinea to ask, and France to arrange for her, to remain in the franc zone. There is also another aspect of this situation that should not be overlooked. There is reason to believe that membership in the Community is regarded by some of the African leaders as a temporary measure, to be continued until the economic position of these constituent African states allows them to come to some mutually satisfactory financial arrangement with France.

The question is thus where the aid given over the years during colonial control can be obtained. It is not clear what measures France is contemplating for the franc zone in Africa. England, at the 1958 Commonwealth Economic Conference held in Montreal, announced a plan to make Commonwealth assistance loans from Exchequer funds to governments of independent Commonwealth countries, which would carry interest at current United Kingdom borrowing rates plus a charge of $\frac{1}{4}$ percent. The position Belgium will take with regard to extending economic aid to a future independent Congo is thus far not known. The size of the Belgian commitment there, however, the contribution made by the return from Congo investment to the Belgian economy, and its reciprocal importance for the economy of the Congo, make it doubtful if many of the existing economic ties will be

cut. As for British East and Central Africa, the political situation is such that until it is clarified, predictions as to their future economic relations with England in terms of aid programs would be hazardous.

It seems certain that the United States will be increasingly looked to as a source of financial support. The opportunities that the changed situation will afford for foreign private investment should stimulate more interest in this country than has been the case in past years. To this end, agreements should be negotiated to bring African countries, as they gain their independence, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed with the nations of Western Europe, while the ICA investment guarantee program as it gathers strength should make available more of the American capital they seek.

Where grants and loans from U.S. sources, public or private, are involved, the factor of competition is minimal. This does not hold, however, for commercial activities, as the comparative figures given above for Nigerian imports show. According to an April 1959 statement of the Department of Commerce, the African market has been given little attention by U.S. exporters. Market surveys of requirements and demands for consumer goods have been inadequate. Evidently unknown is the fact that, as the British Board of Trade put it:

where articles which he (the native consumer) understands are concerned, he is a more exacting purchaser than the European.

As the statement points out:

the tendency has been to rely on the "Made in U.S.A." label rather than on trade factors such as positive sales promotion, quality control, and pricing and credit arrangements with importers.

Aside from the present or former metropolises, and the United States, there are three sources to which independent African countries can turn for economic aid. These are the other nations of Europe, where activities in the private sector will, in all likelihood, continue to be greater than in the public; international bodies of various kinds; and the Sino-Russian bloc.

Of the international organizations that are to be called on, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, and the United Nations Special Fund may be named. The various specialized agencies of the United Nations, which have been active in providing Subsaharan Africa with technical assistance, should also be mentioned. Their African commitments, however, are small when compared to other world areas; during the decade 1946-56, 10.43 percent of IBRD loans went to Africa, 52.06 percent of this amount going to the Union of South Africa alone.⁶³ It is suggested that the United States use its influence on the international level to increase the allocation of funds for African needs. An important new agency, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, with headquarters at Addis Ababa, which like the older Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara is a research body, should make available essential data, hitherto nonexistent, for the promotion of development schemes.

The European Economic Commission (EEC) has pledged about \$550 million for a development fund to be applied to African over-

⁶³ Bolton, Frances P., Report * * *, op. cit., p. 133.

seas areas associated with its European member countries. To the end of 1958, 91 projects had been submitted to this Commission; 4 had been approved for the Congo, and 1 for Ruanda-Urundi, toward the cost of which \$2,786,000 had been appropriated by the beginning of 1959. Because of the nature of the products exported from the African territories associated with its members, the Commission decided, in 1959:

to push forward actively studies of tropical raw materials markets, with the special aim of making its contribution to the solution of the grave problems of stabilization of prices or, at least, of the limitation of the fluctuation of world quotations for the products in general.⁶⁴

The relation of EEC to the newly independent African states, both as regards economic aid and in terms of tariff and other commercial agreements, will be of importance for all concerned with African economic development.

The countries of the Sino-Russian bloc have as yet been able to provide Subsaharan African countries with little economic or technical assistance. The importance of these countries lies more in the interest their own development has stimulated in the Africans. Russian achievements in technology, and the techniques used by China to mobilize her manpower for economic ends, have impressed Africans as possible models for an approach to some of their own problems. The ability of the Communist countries to extend direct economic aid to Africa is not yet known. Because of the essentially political nature of all their operations, it can be taken for granted that they will not neglect opportunities in the newly independent states of Africa when these present themselves.

4. *Cultural relations*

(a) *Exchange of persons*.—As in the economic and political fields, cultural relations between the peoples of Subsaharan Africa and of the United States have not been facilitated by the circumstances of colonial control. The curve of contact has, however, steadily risen with the approach to self-government, though cultural relations with the former territories of French Africa and with the Belgian Congo, for reasons of language, will probably continue for some time to come to be slight in comparison to those with the English-speaking countries. Political restrictions hold contacts between Americans and Africans in Portuguese territories and in the Union of South Africa to a minimum, though here there has been a steady two-way exchange with the European portion of the population.

Aside from the missions and commercial organizations, these contacts have been helped both by the private foundations and by the exchange programs of the U.S. Government. A recent report shows that since 1927 the Carnegie Corp. of New York alone has enabled 276 persons from African countries south of the Sahara to visit the United States and 30 Americans to go to Africa. The number of Africans involved in these exchanges has been small. Since 1952, the Ford Foundation has awarded over a hundred fellowships to Americans for research or travel in Africa.

Under the International Educational Exchange Service, 111 Americans and 271 persons from 17 African countries were recipients of

⁶⁴ EEC, Second General Report, September 1958–March 1959, p. 130; *ibid.*, Bulletin, May 1959, p. 51.

exchange grants from 1947 through the 1957-58 academic year. In fiscal year 1960, 57 Americans are to go to Africa and 173 persons from there are to come to the United States. Nine hundred and twenty ICA American experts have since 1950 worked in seven African countries and 252 African participants in these projects have received training in the United States. The number of African students in American universities, as indicated, has increased from 114 in 1946-47 to its present 1,109.⁶⁵

There is little question of the interest Americans show in knowing Africa; the desire of Africans to know the United States is equally apparent. The problem of arranging exchanges is thus essentially an operational one. What is called for, once financing has been provided, is better liaison, both in African countries and in the United States, to enable visitors in either direction to gain the fullest information possible, in most accurate perspective.

(b) *Aid for institutions of higher learning.*—Requests for U.S. aid in founding colleges and universities in Africa is a recent development, though assistance to established institutions of higher learning there is nothing new. American private foundations have for some years been helping African institutions with funds to establish professorships, to support research programs, to equip laboratories, and to permit members of their staffs to come to the United States. More recently aid has also been extended through U.S. Government-financed contract agreements between American and African universities.

These requests can be expected to increase as more African states come to determine their own educational policies. Increased American influence on African higher education can be anticipated, especially in English-speaking West Africa, where a majority of African students in American universities come from. This is understandable, since returned students who hold American degrees, as they move up in their own countries to academic positions of influence, can be expected to refer to the system under which they were educated when questions of higher education are under discussion.

The United States will thus have increased opportunities to aid in an aspect of the development of African countries that will produce their future educators, their scientists, their technicians, and in all likelihood their leaders. As in other phases of African-American relations, it will require the fullest knowledge of the specific situation into which American aid is to be projected, and skilled handling of issues which may arise if what is intended to be of great benefit to the countries of Africa is not to become a source of irritation and resentment.

In establishing the more than 15 universities, university colleges, and technical schools in the part of Africa that reaches from the Sahara to the Union, the colonial powers patterned them after parent institutions at home. This was true not only of organization and staff, but of curriculum and standards. Here lies both their strength and their weakness. Insistence on standards has provided a sound base of competence, but the curriculum of the metropole has in some respects included matter of little relevance to the world in which the African student must live.

⁶⁵ From data furnished by the International Educational Exchange Service and the Cultural Policy and Development Staff, Bureau of International Cultural Relations, U.S. Department of State.

One element in the system of higher education of all Sub-Saharan Africa is the guaranteed degree. Thus, the Belgian universities conduct the examinations of students in Congo institutions, the University of London awards the degrees of most university colleges in British territory, and Paris and Bordeaux underwrite Dakar degrees. With political independence, moves to cut these ties by making the African universities autonomous can be anticipated. This has already occurred in the case of the University of Khartoum, and is projected for the University College of Ghana.

The American university system undoubtedly has elements of value for African higher education. Its flexibility and tradition of experimentation with curriculum and methods of instruction appeal to Africans. U.S. land-grant colleges are being studied as models for African institutions. Here, too, our advisers must exercise the best academic statesmanship, with the fundamental proposition in mind that no educational system, developed in one setting, is transferable as a whole to another. The pattern of the American state university is no more suited to be taken whole-cloth to Africa than is the pattern of Oxford or Paris or Ghent.

In helping to establish new institutions the temptation is to model them on what the planner knows; but in education, as with any other innovation, adaptation must be recognized as the essential mechanism of transfer. The principle of establishing multinational educational advisory bodies should have fullest U.S. support. In this way Africans can benefit from various tested methods of higher education, taking from each those elements adequate for their particular needs, without lowering academic standards.

(c) *The problem of mutual understanding.*—The basic assumption underlying programs of exchange is that good relations between peoples are furthered by knowledge of each other's way of life. In African-American relations, misconceptions arising out of misplaced emphases are critical, since in the play of broader world politics they are capitalized in efforts to promote misunderstanding and suspicion.

Africans who travel in the United States complain of the stereotype of an Africa that overemphasizes the exotic past, and neglects the reality of the contemporary scene. This stereotype comes out of the writings of the early explorers, of missionary accounts of the hardships of life in bush villages, journalistic highlighting of exotic practices, and the repetition of words like "savages," "jungle-dwellers," "witchcraft," "primitive" to describe African peoples and practices. Visitors from Africa who belong to the European community react to attitudes they encounter toward colonialism, which they feel are based on a stereotype that is outdated in terms of current developments.

There are many misconceptions about the United States among Africans in Sub-Saharan Africa. These range from stress on the race problem, as when a labor leader in Senegal asserted that Negroes could not belong to American labor unions, and emphasis on the technological—"materialistic"—as against the human aspect of American culture, to the unrealistic faith, especially in rural areas of southern Africa, that America will come and rescue the African from his present plight, or that the United States will take over and free a given colony. One hears harsh criticism by many Europeans in Africa of American anticolonialist feeling. Our unresolved race

problem is a recurrent theme for them. The values in American higher education, as mentioned, are frequently adversely discussed, while displeasure is expressed at popular American interest in Africa, and the attention paid African leaders and African protest movements in the United States. There is more than an occasional suggestion that U.S. aid programs are but a move toward economic penetration.

Better knowledge of the United States in Africa, and of African countries in the United States, has undoubtedly resulted from the official and unofficial exchanges of the past decade. In the United States, the African students have done much to redraw the picture of "darkest Africa" to bring it in line with present realities. Ten years ago there were few academic specialists in the African field; today there are over 200. Increased American travel and study in Africa have also had an influence. It is instructive, from this point of view, to compare special issues of popular magazines devoted to Africa that appeared a few years ago with current numbers given over to Africa and African affairs, and note the improvement in the degree of sophistication and accurate documentation that marks these later presentations.

Travel in the United States by Africans, and by Europeans brought from Africa, has likewise had its effect. Africans have seen at first hand the problems of race relations, and have come to realize the scope of measures being taken to alleviate racial tensions. Members of the European community have come to understand the nature of American higher education, and are impressed by the tax burdens of U.S. citizens that make possible the aid given economically underdeveloped countries. American scholarly interest in Africa, they come to see, is but part of a postwar development in this country aimed at acquiring the broad base of knowledge of all parts of the world which we need for more adequate scholarly analysis, and by reason of our world position.

5. Subsaharan Africa and the posture of neutrality

(a) *The influence of India and the Indian population of Africa.*—If we consider the growth of interest in Africa, we are struck by how little attention is given its Asian population. Yet the size of the Asian communities is not inconsiderable. Asians have been in Africa almost as long as the Europeans, the Arabs much longer. The Asian rate of natural increase is the largest of any of the groups in the multiracial states. They are far too numerous to permit even the extremists to formulate workable programs of forced repatriation.

In Subsaharan Africa, as a whole, there are about 700,000 Indians, if we use the term in its geographical sense and include Pakistani as well as those whose origin is to be traced to other parts of the Indian subcontinent, and about 80,000 Arabs. Of the Indians, the largest group live in the Union. In 1957, Kenya had about 163,000, Tanganyika 77,000, Uganda, 54,000. There are more than three times as many Asians in the British East African territories as there are Europeans. They are not permitted to live in the Congo, but have recently begun migrating to Ruanda-Urundi, from which they cannot be excluded by virtue of its status as a Trust Territory. Mozambique has 15,000; the Federation as a whole has about 10,000.

Though customarily treated as though they were one group, the Asians, or Asiatics as they are called in the Union of South Africa, are

by no means homogeneous. Pakistani and Goans differentiate themselves from Bengali; the Sikh maintains his separate identity; and among the Moslems those who are followers of the Aga Khan are set off from others of the same faith. Arabs in Kenya and Tanganyika are socially classed as between Europeans and Africans, but by their own preference, they are both officially and unofficially set off from other Asians. The economic position of the members of the Asian community also varies widely. In the Union, the Moslems of Durban are, generally speaking, prosperous and conservative, while the Hindus are predominantly small shopkeepers, or poverty-stricken wage workers. In Uganda, there is as much of a social and economic gap between the Asian estate owner and the small merchant in Kampala as there is in the European community between the high government official and the minor supervisory employee on the railway.

The Indians, the largest group of Asians, no more look to India or Pakistan or even Goa as their homeland, than the English-speaking South Africans look to England. Africa, they maintain, is their home, and in fact most of them know no other. With strong controls over Asian immigration, they are increasingly of African birth. Recent regulations of the countries where they are most numerous, which stipulate that if they visit India they cannot return, intensify their isolation.

The Asians in Africa are not encouraged by the Indian Government to turn to it for the solution of their problems as a minority group. In all official Indian pronouncements, they are admonished to give their loyalty to the country of their birth and citizenship. In the United Nations, India has consistently protested against measures taken by the Government of the Union of South Africa to increase the disabilities of Africans and other non-Europeans, but this has been in consonance with its stand against racial discrimination and its broader anticolonial position. In its protests, it has been joined by other Asian and African nations, with the support of many other countries.

Despite their identification with the countries where they live, and despite the declarations of the Indian Government, the Indians, like others in the Asian category, are nowhere fully accepted as fellow citizens. Characteristic of the African attitude is a statement made by a leader of the South African Africanists, the extreme anti-European wing of the African group there, at a regional conference held at Johannesburg in June 1959. In this statement, he classified the south African population in this manner:

We recognize three national groupings in South Africa. There are the oppressing European minority, the Indians, who are an oppressed foreign minority, and the oppressed African majority.⁶⁶

Similar statements, less charitably phrased, are frequently heard from non-Asians, African and European, in all the eastern, central, and southern parts of Africa. The feeling of the Europeans about the Indians leads them, on occasion, to assert that the present group is but the vanguard of hosts to come when population pressure in India will cause her to turn to Eastern Africa as an outlet for her surplus. There is no question that were immigration free, many more

⁶⁶ Press Digest (South Africa), No. 23, June 11, 1959, pp. 218-219, from *The World*, June 6, 1959.

Indians would migrate there. The standard of living of even the poorer Indians in Africa is above that of comparable classes in India, and the opportunities for their economic advancement greater. There are few Indians in Africa who, despite the legal and social disabilities under which they live, are contemplating returning or emigrating to India.

The prestige of India elsewhere in Subsaharan Africa is high. Her role in the Bandung Conference, her leadership of the neutralist powers, her anticolonial sympathies have strong appeal for West African leaders, particularly in countries where English is spoken. In West Africa, the number of Indians is small and they are not a social or political issue. They are mainly traders, like the Lebanese or "Syrians," as they are called, but even in the economic field they are too few to figure importantly. Such popular resentment as exists against foreign traders, who are said to exploit the native population, in West Africa focuses mainly on the Levantines, who have been in the area longer, and here have something of the economic role that Indians have in the territories to the east and south.

The visit of Prime Minister Nkrumah to India at the end of 1958 attracted widespread interest in all of Africa. Expressions of good will and of solidarity in fundamental aims marked its conclusion. The communique issued by him and Prime Minister Nehru welcomed—the awakening of the peoples of Africa and their desire for independence and liberty.

The two Prime Ministers—

expressed the hope that the countries of Africa not yet free will attain their independence by constructive and peaceful means.

They pledged their governments to work for the—

lessening of international tensions, removal of colonial domination, and promotion of understanding between nations.

Approving the association of Ghana and Guinea, they voiced the hope that other African governments would develop modes of closer cooperation. Their statement underlined their conviction that the most urgent task facing both countries is "to give economic and social content to political liberty."⁶⁷

Common ties of colonial experience unquestionably continue to bring India and the peoples of Africa together. What is to be anticipated is concerted action in the United Nations on such issues as bringing before the Assembly the question of the discriminations under the doctrine of *apartheid* in the Union of South Africa, and the Algerian question. Other moves on the international level involving the encouragement of self-government in Africa will undoubtedly find them combining forces. Common interests of a positive character that will act to cement the ties for which a foundation has been laid have, however, not as yet become apparent.

(b) *Attitudes of Africans toward East and West.*—One of the most widely distributed fables in Subsaharan Africa tells how a small, clever creature—a rabbit, or spider, or antelope—becomes ruler of the beasts. He challenges first the elephant, then the rhinoceros to a tug of war, stipulating only that the rope be a long one. Setting the

⁶⁷ London Times, Jan. 5, 1959, p. 7; Le Monde, Jan. 4-5, 1959, p. 12.

same time for the two contests, he causes the powerful animals, who cannot see the other end of the rope, to pull against each other. When neither can prevail, he comes forward to proclaim himself the winner over each.

Africans are a proverb-using people, and the fable is often the elaboration of a social value. This tale evokes for them a congenial answer to the question of their position in the East-West struggle. From a hardheaded African point of view, nonalignment means non-interference in the quarrels of others. The African position on non-alignment has been explicitly stated many times; a few examples will make the point. "We have no part in the East-West conflict," wrote M. Alioune Diop, publisher of the influential journal *Présence Africaine*.⁶⁸

We offer to everyone the hand of friendship. We neither take the East nor the West. We are going forward to produce a positive African personality—was the way Mr. Tom Mboya, president of the All-African People's Conference, put it in his closing address.⁶⁹ A "Draft Memorandum," prepared by Ghana in connection with the April 1958 Conference of African States, said:

The time has come for Africa to view the international situation in the light of her own interests. Where it suits her long-term interest to ally herself with particular countries in Europe, the Western Hemisphere and Asia, she might come to specific arrangements to safeguard her interests.⁷⁰

At the present time, the concerns of Africans are so centered on attaining their objective of freedom from colonial controls that for them other issues are secondary. Alinement with East or West, that is, enters into the African position only to the extent to which it bears on the major question of the achievement and maintenance of self-government. As all who know at first hand the ordering of personal relations within African societies can testify, Africans have long been skilled in the strategy of bargaining with those who wield power. No better expression of this traditional approach as applied to the world scene could be had than in the assertion last April by M. Sekou Touré at the Conakry meeting of the Executive Committee of the All-African People's Conference that—

Africa will never become the vassal of any bloc, of any group, but she will of necessity have to take account of the external forces working in her behalf or to her detriment.⁷¹

While the position taken by African leaders is essentially the traditionally congenial one of noncommitment, there is good evidence of an underlying pro-Western orientation. As we have observed, Africans are impressed with Russian scientific and technical achievement; but we find few indications of their acceptance of Communist ideology. The Sudan is reported to have banned attendance at the Communist-sponsored World Youth Festival held in Vienna last summer, and the Government Party in Ghana to have publicly expressed its disapproval of it.⁷² As we have said, Africans are keeping themselves informed of Chinese methods of mobilization and use of

⁶⁸ Foreword, "Africa, Seen by American Negroes," p. xii.

⁶⁹ All-African People's Conference, Conference News Bulletin, vol. 1, No. 2, p. 3.

⁷⁰ Hovet, T., Jr., "Bloc Politics in the United Nations," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, p. 185.

⁷¹ Le Monde, Apr. 17, 1959, p. 4.

⁷² New York Times, July 19, 1959, p. 5.

manpower in furthering economic development and the most effective use of natural resources; but they are also impressed with what Israel has accomplished along the same lines since she has become self-governing.

Ideological considerations aside, the Africans would prefer to deal with the countries of the West rather than those of the East, if only because they are more familiar with them and their ways. When Guinea, following her vote for independence, needed arms because of the withdrawal of all French equipment, she turned first to the United States. According to report, this was not done through customary diplomatic channels, and the request is said never to have reached the responsible American officials. Parenthetically, we might recall here that the United States had no official representation in Conakry, while the French had trained no Africans for the diplomatic service. Only after her overtures to the United States brought no reply did Guinea accept arms from Czechoslovakia. When the President of Guinea in Conakry was making the statement just quoted, his Ambassador in Paris, M. Nabi Youlu, in emphasizing that Guinea had made no political choice between East and West, said:

Guinea has concluded economic agreements with the countries of the East, but no proposition for aid has been made by the countries of the West.⁷³

Relations of the West with Guinea have become less equivocal with the writing of monetary agreements with France, with the appointment of a U.S. Ambassador to Conakry, with the continuation of mining and other activities by American, Canadian, and European interests. It is also well to bear in mind that Guinea, as the African independent country oriented farthest toward the left, is not typical. It is, rather, a test case. Elsewhere in Africa, in the independent countries and those moving toward independence, the United States, particularly, profits from the many years of scientific and educational work American agencies have carried on there, while our technological resources and financial position, the more taken for granted because they do not have the dramatic character of new developments, nonetheless set goals for African striving.

As every American with specialized knowledge of Africa has stressed, there is little question that though Soviet advance in Africa has thus far been negligible, the countries of the Communist bloc can be expected to take every opportunity to fish in troubled waters. For the United States, in its global concern with international alignments, the importance of the position taken by independent African nations cannot be overstated. In this part of the world, the democracies retain the initiative; it is essential that they do not give it over into other than African hands. By their understanding and their acts they have it still largely in their power to determine the extent to which Africa will remain friendly to them, or drift toward the Soviet orbit.

⁷³ *Le Monde*, Apr. 17, 1959, p. 4.

D. THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND AFRICA

The degree to which the position taken by the United States on questions having to do with Subsaharan Africa demonstrates an alinement with the colonial powers has given rise to much discussion. Conclusions, in general, have followed the biases of those intent on proving American sympathy for the colonial or anticolonial point of view. As far as can be determined, no analysis of the facts is available; that is, no study has been made of the comparative voting record of the United States on questions affecting Africa, as these have come up in the General Assembly or the various organs of the United Nations. From United Nations published sources, it is not possible to ascertain more than the numbers of delegations voting for or against a given resolution, or abstaining.

The Historical Division of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, has furnished the voting records of member nations on some of the more important resolutions treating of Africa for use in preparing this report, plus the vote of the United States on other questions where rollcalls had not been taken. Of the 97 votes thus reported, 40 provided data for the analysis of rollcall responses. These run the gamut of the African questions that have been before the United Nations. The treatment of the Indians in the Union of South Africa and the status of South-West Africa figure most prominently on the list. Also included are the votes on the future of French and British Togoland and the Cameroons, on requiring the transmission of information on non-self-governing territories by metropolitan powers, on the Ethiopia-Somaliland frontier question, and on the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

We have analyzed these votes to clarify the position of the United States on African matters as this is reflected in its degree of consonance with other voting members. Specifically, we have inquired into the extent to which the votes of the United States have been in accord with those of the colonial powers, as represented by the United Kingdom and France, with such anticolonial powers as India and Liberia, with Latin American countries as represented by Chile and Brazil, with Canada, and with Russia. We have also asked how these results compare with the voting record on African questions of some of the countries that belong to caucus or regional groups.

To ascertain the answers, we computed the percentages of agreement in the 40 votes cast by those countries on African issues. Only exact coincidences were counted—"yea" for "yea," "nay" for "nay," and abstention for abstention. This understandably introduces a bias toward lowering the percentages, and thus accentuating disagreement, since the difference between "nay" and "abstain" need not represent a real divergence in point of view. Thus, if we take Brazil as an example, only in one instance did the United States vote "aye" and Brazil "nay"; the other seven disagreements were between abstention

and a position vote. Such instances, however, indicate the presence of something less than solidarity, and in all cases express the absence of complete agreement.

Turning to the results, we may first of all consider how the votes of the United States agreed with those of the majority, and with those of each of the other countries whose votes were tabulated. In reading these figures, it must be remembered that the higher the percentage, the greater the agreement:

<i>United States, with—</i>	<i>Percentages of agreement</i>
<i>Majority</i> -----	77.5
Brazil-----	80.0
Canada-----	72.5
Chile-----	70.0
India-----	60.0
Liberia-----	52.5
United Kingdom-----	47.5
France-----	42.5
U.S.S.R.-----	27.5

As far as our data are representative, they show that the United States was in greatest agreement with the countries of the Americas, and that we agreed substantially more with the anticolonial powers than with our NATO associates. The low figure of concordance with Russia reflects divergence on wider world issues.

Further analysis of the data throws light on our second question. The U.S.S.R. was in agreement with Liberia on 62.5 percent of the issues, as against our 52.5 percent; with India 65 percent as against our 60 percent. The U.S. figure of 27.5 percent agreement with the Soviet Union may also be compared with that of 17.5 percent between the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, or of 30 percent between it and France. Turning to the anticolonial countries, we may compare our 60 percent of agreement with India with that of the United Kingdom, which was ranged at the side of her fellow member of the Commonwealth on only 27.5 percent of the votes. The index for Franco-Indian concordance is 47.5 percent. The United Kingdom agreed with the Liberian vote to the same extent she agreed with that of India, 27.5 percent; France was on the same side as Liberia in 40 percent of the voting. Both these contrast with the United States-Liberian index of concordance, which is 52.5 percent. As regards consistency between powers having similarity of interests, the solidarity of the United Kingdom and France on African issues is reflected in the percentage of agreement in their voting, the figure being 72.5 percent. Even greater agreement is to be seen in the record of our two anticolonial countries, India and Liberia, the figure here being 82.5 percent.

It is clear that, as far as these results permit generalization, the United States, belonging to no caucusing or geographical group, has nonetheless taken what may be called a New World position on African matters. To what extent the degree of agreement found between the votes of New World powers represents U.S. influence on Latin American countries where questions not to their immediate interest are involved cannot be said, and in any event is outside the terms of reference of this report. The fact that the coefficient of agreement between Canada and the United Kingdom, 72.5 percent, is identi-

cal to that between her and the United States would seem to indicate that in respect to African affairs, Commonwealth ties have not over-balanced her role as a great New World power.

The cumulative devolution of power to African peoples will for the United States both simplify the problem of voting in the United Nations, and make it more complex. It will do this in much the same way as these changes affect our operations in Africa itself. Each new commitment by one of our NATO associates to the principle of self-government for an African territory renders less difficult our ambivalent position. Concomitantly, each time the principle of self-government is implemented, the number of African states in the United Nations increases, and the complexity of mediating specific issues increases as well.

The change in the position taken by the United States in the Trusteeship Council on the future of Tanganyika provides an illustration of the first of these points. In 1955 a statement of the American representative concerning a timetable for the attainment of self-government was withdrawn because U.S. policy at that time held that "as a general rule the setting of a timetable tends to be too rigid."⁷⁴ In 1959, however, when the situation in Tanganyika was under review, two "basic requirements" were declared essential, in American opinion, "if effective and orderly progress toward independence is to be maintained." The first was "a clear understanding and acceptance by the Africans of the political goals which they are headed for." The second was that "Africans must have satisfactory evidence of the plans being made for their progress toward independence." This, it was felt, "can best be accomplished by expressing from time to time the period within which the Government hopes to accomplish the next step in its program heading toward self-government." The first of these suggested steps was to institute a "fully responsible ministerial government in the territory." The second, provision for universal suffrage, was justified by reference to the fact that this system had been instituted in various of their possessions by the British, the French, and in limited form by the Belgians.⁷⁵

The most difficult questions having to do with Africa that the United States faces in the United Nations are those of Algeria and of the Union of South Africa. In each, the tensions responsible for bringing it before the United Nations have arisen out of a conflict between a large European minority and an indigenous majority. In both, the minority holds political control, and uses it as an instrument to maintain and enhance its economic and social status.

The case of Algeria presents us with our classical dilemma in sharpest outlines. Pressure from France, and policy decisions based on a predominantly European orientation, pull us in one direction, while our traditional sympathy for independence movements and pressures from the Africa group constitute strong counterinfluences. The difficulty of decision has in this instance been compounded by three factors. The first is that France has made the continuation of Algeria as a part of the metropole a matter of principle, so that any challenge to this position arouses the emotional responses of affronted national

⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. xxxii, No. 826, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 703.

⁷⁵ U.S. Mission to the United Nations, press release No. 3148, Feb. 6, 1959.

pride. Not so immediately on the surface, but very influential, is the economic reason for the preservation of metropolitan control. This derives from the proved existence of vast oil and other mineral resources in the Sahara, that are just beginning to be tapped. They are so great that, if retained under French control, they will not only free France from dependence for oil on outside sources by 1963, but will make of her a substantial petroleum exporter. The third factor is the strength of the counterpressures of the Asia-African group, more especially those of the newly formed African Caucusing Group, which can be measured by the fact that for them the Algerian issue today has first priority, and has become the symbol of its continental solidarity.

The tale of this African Caucusing Group is told in the spread of self-government in Africa. It is a development out of the Asian-African group, which began on an ad hoc basis in 1950, and was formally organized 5 years later. The possibility of forming a separate African Caucusing Group was discussed at the Ghana independence celebration, and it took shape after the 1958 Conference of African States in Accra. The problems of primary concern to these states were declared to be "self-determination, racial equality, as well as economic development and matters regarding collective measures for the reduction and control of armaments." During the 2 years this group has been in existence, the overall voting record of its members shows that they cast identical ballots 46.7 percent of the time, and were divided in 20 percent of the votes. The group has consistently promoted its objectives, as is evident from its voting record in the General Assembly for the two sessions it has been in existence. An analysis of this record shows that its members, in voting with the Assembly majority 60 percent of the time, were in accord on questions of human rights, collective measures, peaceful settlement of disputes, and economic cooperation.⁷⁶

This group has a coordinating body, chaired by each African state in turn. It meets once a month, or at the request of any member. Ghana, Liberia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic are members of its secretariat, which is selected on a revolving basis. Ghana's representative is its executive secretary. In 1958, the group sent three ambassadorial delegations to South America, Central America, and northern Europe to solicit support for its stand favoring Algerian independence. The recognition by Ghana of the Provisional Algerian Government in July 1959, the position of this topic on the agenda of the Saniquelli meeting of the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia, and the fact that it was a principal question discussed at the Monrovia meeting of African foreign ministers indicates the importance assigned to it by this group. The African states have also urged the setting of specific dates for the independence of Trust Territories; they have pressed hard to require Portugal to submit reports on its African possessions. The group has presented its own candidates for United Nations committee posts; it has assumed the role of sponsor for newly independent African states seeking membership, and acted to help obtain this for Guinea.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Hovet, T., Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁷⁷ Gillespie, Joan, "Africa's Voice at the U.N.," *Africa Special Report*, vol. iv, June 1959, pp. 13-14.

The position of this group is to be seen as one of growing influence. As to its internal composition and its relations to other groups, many possibilities suggest themselves which must be anticipated where questions bearing on future United States-African relations are concerned. The fact that its members also belong to the Asian-African group cannot be overlooked. The problem will present itself regarding the future relations between the North African and Subsaharan members of the African group itself, as well as that of the future relations between the organizing countries of the group and new Subsaharan member states, such as Nigeria and the Congo, whose size and population will give them major standing among the countries of the world.

In U.S. relations with Africa, the United Nations is a world forum, from whose platform our actions are closely followed. Here we are called on to take a stand for all to see, on issues that arise principally out of colonialism or that are the legacy of colonial systems that are giving way to self-government. The declarations we make, no less than our voting record, can gain us added African good will or cause us to forfeit it. This is not intended to suggest that in all cases we follow the lead of the African countries. Africans are as capable as any other people of understanding, and respecting, honest disagreement. But if they are to agree in such cases to disagree with us, they must see that the position we take on a particular issue reflects a consistent point of view, and arises out of basic aims unambiguously stated.

E. SOME FUTURE POLICY CHOICES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN AFRICA

Given the diversity in natural setting and resource base, in ethnic composition and cultures, in movements for self-government and projected governmental forms under independence, in level of technical and educational achievement, it is apparent that there can be no single policy for Subsaharan Africa. Rather, each situation must be evaluated in the light of general principles which are to serve as guides for determining decisions. American reactions to the African scene will thus depend on the country concerned, the exigencies of the situation, and the demands of overall U.S. foreign policy.

This study affords documentation of the differences that are present in Subsaharan Africa; it also shows the many instances in which these must not be permitted to obscure the historical and cultural unities of the area as a whole. The differences and unities are not in opposition, but are in fact complementary, and it is incorrect to focus too closely on the one or the other. The interplay we witness between antecedent tradition and the innovations that have resulted from later contact with the outside world will shape the Africa of tomorrow.

1. *Colonialism*.—As a guide for its African policy, the United States should accept the fact that the colonial system in Africa, as elsewhere, is fast running its course. To support its continuation would be to move against one of the strongest world currents of our day. We should, rather, favor and support the position of those colonial powers who, recognizing the force of African aspirants, are moving to accord self-government to their African dependencies. The United States should facilitate peaceful transition to independence by urging our friends who have colonial possessions in Africa to make explicit the successive measures planned, and their timing, for the devolution of power. We should also help to further their policies of Africanization by aiding in the extension of existing programs of training to meet the administrative, technical, and educational needs of new nations, so that a vacuum is not created in the event of unanticipated change.

2. *Race*.—Questions of racial differences do not, and in the foreseeable future should not, enter to complicate U.S. relations with western and central African countries. Racial tensions in the multi-racial societies of British East Africa, in the Federation, and in the Union of South Africa do pose serious problems, however, for the shaping of a policy consonant with our declared basic position. As a world power, complete noninvolvement in these African areas of racial tension is neither feasible nor possible. The Union and the Federation are the two most highly industrialized countries of Africa, and their total resource potential in primary and processed materials is of appreciable, and in certain eventualities, of vital importance. Neither of the extremes of policy that are being urged on the United States—

full support for the existing regimes or withdrawal of recognition from them—is realistic.

The United States can take no better guide for policy here than the constitutional principles which underlie measures to resolve our own domestic interracial tensions. For the furtherance of world peace, we should, where we can, support moves to abolish inequities in these multiracial societies, and take as vigorous action in relieving the tensions that these inequities have brought into being as is within our means.

3. *The future political units of Africa.*—The many permutations and combinations that can develop out of the present scene makes hazardous an attempt to forecast the future political face of Africa. It is important, however, in envisaging alternatives for formulating and implementing U.S. policy, that answers to two questions be suggested. The first has to do with the number of the present political units we may be dealing with directly in 1970; the second has to do with the extent to which we can expect these units to decrease in number through combination or increase through fission.

We may recall that today the independent countries south of the Sahara number six—Ethiopia, Liberia, the Union of South Africa, the Sudan, Ghana, and Guinea. In 1960 four or five more will be added—Nigeria, Togo, Somalia, the French Cameroons and, should it elect not to join Nigeria or to amalgamate with the part of the Cameroons now under French trusteeship, the British Cameroons. There is some possibility that during this “magic year of 1960”, as it is being called in Africa, the Republics of Senegal and of the Sudan, which comprise the Federation of Mali within the French Community, may also become fully self-governing.⁷⁸

Beyond this we move to speculation. It would be invidious to name specific territories, but in view of announced policies it is reasonable to estimate that by 1970 between 20 and 25 Subsaharan African countries will be independent. On the basis of past experience and present trends, we can reasonably hope that these new countries will attain their independence by peaceful, constitutional transfer of power.

This does not mean, however, that we will necessarily be dealing with this number of political entities. Proposals for the unification of various parts of West Africa, as this report has shown, were advocated long before any of the more recently established self-governing States attained their independence. The advantages to be gained from bringing West African countries together in various degrees of closer union are recognized by leaders in all the area. Africans in British East Africa speak of a union of its three territories as a logical step, once the fear of settler domination is removed. Should the protests of Nyasaland against inclusion in the Federation continue, it has been suggested that it might amalgamate with Tanganyika. The possibility of Southern Rhodesia joining the Union of South Africa if Federation fails and African pressure for greater participation in its government increases has often been advanced.

On the other hand, potentialities for fission, particularly those deriving from tribal affiliation, should not be overlooked. We still hear the question posed, though less frequently than earlier, whether the

⁷⁸ New York Times, July 31, 1959, p. 3.

central government of Nigeria can hold the regions together. Tribal rivalries in Uganda are at the base of political difficulties there, even at the present stage of its history. The most aggressive movement in the Belgian Congo at the present time is Bakongo nationalism; there is unrest in the neighboring Republic of the Congo, due to tribal rivalries.

The way in which Africa sorts itself out in the next decade or two has many implications for U.S.-African relations. All these countries will require economic aid, and it will be much simpler to care for the needs of a few large entities than to deal with a larger number of small ones. Again, while most African territories are viable in terms of their indigenous economic systems, with an expectation of higher standards of living, small countries in the less economically developed parts of Sub-Saharan Africa will require more aid proportionately, and for a longer time, than larger ones. Should the Gambia, for example, become an independent state, it is difficult to envisage it as economically self-sustaining. On the level of international politics the number of independent units is of particular importance in the area of United Nations operations.

While U.S.-African policy must be shaped within the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, we can, when opportunity offers, encourage and support the establishment of larger entities in Africa, provided that these are freely entered into by the countries concerned. We can properly speak in favor of such developments because of our own historical experience; we can express our views on developments of this kind as we have expressed them with respect to the Common European Market.

4. *Rectification of boundaries.*—It is just 75 years since the Treaty of Berlin, in which the United States concurred, laid the groundwork for the partition of the African Continent and the establishment of boundaries of its colonial territories. One of the least predictable aspects of the African future is the extent to which the resultant administrative units will continue in their present form. Informed opinion holds that some rectification of the boundaries thus arbitrarily drawn will occur. The question is where, and to what extent, and by what means.

That older precolonial loyalties have persisted is self-evident; on the other hand, it is equally true that identification has been established with the countries of Africa as at present delimited. The Ewe Unification Movement that preceded the independence of Ghana was founded on such an antecedent loyalty. When the decision had to be made, however, the Ewe of southeastern Ghana did not move for separation, while a considerable proportion of those in British Togoland chose amalgamation with their newly independent neighbor. Earlier affiliation, on the basis of an arbitrary delimitation originally made by the Germans, underlies moves toward the unification of the Cameroons.

Insofar as free African states will in the future be involved in this process of boundary revisions, American reactions based on the approaches of the colonial period will be irrelevant. Assessment of the play between traditional orientations and the response to innovation is the surest way of determining the position to take when such situations arise. Insofar as present indications permit prediction, it is not likely that boundary rectifications will be made by force.

The probability on the side of peaceful settlement is strong. It would, however, be ill-advised for the United States not to be alert to the possibility of the rise of movements for unification of ethnic groups across present boundaries, or for separation from existing territorial units.

5. *Democracy in Subsaharan Africa.*—Emergent African states, faced with pressing problems of implementing rapid social change despite an insufficient economic base, must have effective, well-functioning governments to mobilize their human and material resources and create the infrastructure they need to train their people and raise standards of living. Certain aspects of the American system of government, such as its federal structure, are being studied by African leaders to determine their utility for their own countries. But the system as a whole cannot be expected to fit into the African scene in unmodified form any more than the systems of England or France or Belgium.

In framing policy toward African countries, the United States, faced with a choice, will obviously favor democratic regimes. In the final analysis, however, the United States, if it is wise, will not intervene in these matters. Abstention is the more logical for the United States, since it follows a policy of noninterference in Subsaharan Africa that has been a consistent theme in the history of our relations with the peoples of the area. Only where an African government, by aggressive acts, poses a threat to world peace will the United States have to take a position, preferably in support of multilateral action, through the United Nations.

6. *Nonalinement.*—The fact that most African leaders, both of newly independent states and in dependent territories have unequivocally supported a policy of nonalinement in the East-West struggle, and the implications of this for the United States, have been discussed in the preceding pages. The problem that we face is in essence how best to retain the good will of the peoples and governments of Subsaharan Africa so that in the event of threat they will turn to the West rather than to the East for aid, and in the event of open East-West conflict their sympathies and even their support will be on the side of the democracies.

The multiracial states pose different, and in some respects much more difficult problems, though their alinement with the West is positive. Leaders of the European groups in the non-self-governing territories, and government agencies in the Union and the Federation, stress the threat of Communist penetration to a degree which, in the opinion of objective observers, tends to go beyond the known facts. This applies as well to those who speak for the Portuguese territories. Here the alternatives for the United States are essentially those that apply to our position regarding racial tensions and colonial controls. That is, we must determine the seriousness of the handicaps imposed on us, in the ideological contest between communism and democracy, when these countries identify themselves with U.S. aims.


That we are not unmindful of these difficulties is shown by our voting on South African questions in the United Nations. On 18 resolutions concerning the unilateral action of the Union incorporating Southwest Africa into her territory, we voted against her 13 times, abstained 4 times, and were on her side once. On 16 resolutions hav-

ing to do with the position of her Asian population, we voted against her three times, with her four, with nine abstentions or affirmative votes on proposals not concerned with action, but urging discussions between South Africa, India, and Pakistan. On eight resolutions deploring racial discrimination in the Union, we voted twice in the affirmative, and abstained six times.

It is on the basis of this record that the United States is frequently accused of being unwilling to take a position in Africa which its role of leader demands, and thus, by default, of sanctioning racial discrimination. There is no question as to the importance of race in the ideological conflict, and the ease with which race may be used as a symbol to promote hostility. It is therefore doubtful whether any immediate or foreseeable dependence of the United States on the governments of those multiracial societies of Africa that are unwilling to grant their majority populations rights of free choice and opportunity can balance the gain from clearly stating our position, and implementing that position by action, whenever opportunity offers. Nor will those multiracial societies fail in the long run to profit from such a U.S. policy.

7. *Aid programs.*—In giving aid to African countries, we must balance making funds available for military purposes against helping them with their developmental requirements. In this case, we have already found that the best interests of the United States dictate that economic and technological aid programs should take precedence over allocations for military purposes. This choice becomes the more important in view of the fact that the good will we seek in Africa will be largely dependent on tangible evidence of our willingness to promote internal development and mutual trade, without generating fears of involvement in military undertakings, and without suspicion of helping promote an arms race, in any proportion, in the area.

Finally, we must make our choices as to the nature and purpose of our aid to African countries. Here it would seem that a policy of giving long-term, low-interest loans will be to the best advantage of the United States; and that wherever possible, economic aid should be made on a multilateral basis, and by international agencies. As regards purpose, we should as a matter of policy favor assistance for projects initiated by a given country, especially where these are calculated to broaden the educational and technological infrastructure and thus lay the basis for future growth.



APPENDIX

STUDY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

Submission Date: September 1, 1959

OUTLINE OF STUDY XIII

- I. Summary of principal findings.
- II. Conclusions and recommendations.
- III. Body of the report.
 - A. Survey of the present situation.
 1. Economic factors.
 - (a) The resource base.
 - (b) Utilization of resources.
 - (c) Planning schemes.
 - (d) Actual and potential contributions of Africa to world economy.
 2. Political factors.
 - (a) The nature of African nationalisms.
 - (b) The constitutional problems.
 - (c) Independence, local autonomy, and colonial control.
 - (d) Tribalism and parliamentary democracy.
 - (e) Movements for a United Africa; the Ghana-Guinea agreement; the 1958 Accra Conference.
 - (f) Northern and Subsaharan Africa; the general role of Islam; Egypt-Ghana tensions; the role of a self-governing Nigeria.
 - (g) Communist penetration and influence.
 3. Social factors.
 - (a) Indigenous patterns of stratification.
 - (b) Multiracial societies and interracial relations; the Ghana-South Africa polarities.
 - (c) Education and the language question.
 - (d) Urbanization and industrialization.
 - B. The United States and Africa.
 1. The nature of U.S. interests and commitments in Africa.
 - (a) Strategic.
 - (b) Economic.
 - (c) Missionary.
 - (d) Educational.
 - (e) Diplomatic.
 2. The evolution of official U.S. policy as regards Africa.
 - (a) Liberia.
 - (b) The circumstances of colonial control and African movements for independence.
 - (c) The semiautonomous states.
 - (d) The newly independent states.

III. Body of the report—Continued

C. Problems for the immediate future affecting U.S.-African relations :

1. Nationalism and colonial control.
 - (a) African and white nationalisms.
 - (b) Belgian colonialism in transition.
 - (c) The Portuguese territories.
 - (d) Effects of North African developments.
2. Racial tensions.
 - (a) In East and Central Africa.
 - (b) In the Union of South Africa.
3. Economic development.
 - (a) In dependent territories.
 - (b) In independent states.
 - (c) Public and private sources of American financial aid.
 - (d) Other sources of external aid.
4. Cultural relations.
 - (a) Exchange of persons.
 - (b) Aid for libraries and institutions of higher learning.
 - (c) The problem of diffusing knowledge of changing Africa in the United States.
 - (d) The diffusion of knowledge of American life and values in Africa.
5. Subsaharan Africa and the posture of neutrality in the East-West struggle.
 - (a) Attitudes of Africans toward East and West.
 - (b) The influence of India and the Indian populations of Africa.
 - (c) The historical pulls and economic balancing.
 - (d) The expressed position of Africans as indicative of future attitudes.

D. The United States, the United Nations, and Africa.

E. Evaluation of future alternative U.S. policies toward Africa.



