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STUDY OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

SUMMARY OF VIEWS OF RETIRED
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

PURSUANT TO

The provisions of S. Res. 31, 86th Congress,
1st Session




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SUMMARY OF VIEWS OF RETIRED FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

INTRODUCTION

Senate Resolution 336 (85th Cong., 2d sess.), reaffirmed by Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to "make a full and complete study of U.S. foreign policy." As a part of this review of American foreign policy, the executive committee established to direct and coordinate the project, composed of Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken, on January 15, 1959, sent letters to a limited number of retired Foreign Service officers requesting their views on the foreign policy of the United States. In the selection of retired Foreign Service officers the committee had the assistance of Mr. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

The letter from the committee read, in part, as follows:

My purpose in writing to you and a limited number of former members of the Foreign Service is to endeavor to obtain for the use of the committee the personal views of men of practical experience with respect to the foreign policy of the United States. Certainly your experiences have been unusual. They will tend, I am sure, to provide a realistic background against which we may be able better to evaluate the product of theoretical research. The views which you hold with respect to our policies should be of great weight and of assistance to the committee in formulating its views.

It is my hope that the committee in its final report will be able to recommend courses of action which will serve to avoid transitory issues and concentrate instead upon the fundamental forces at work within and without the United States which must be understood if our foreign policy is best to serve the Nation. For that reason, rather than ask you to answer a questionnaire or comment on selected topics, I believe it would be most helpful to the committee if it were possible for you to give us simply your general commentary on what is right with our policies, what is wrong with our policies, and what action (or inaction) might in your opinion best serve our interests in the future.

The responses, since undirected, varied widely in subject matter. They were generally well considered and contained constructive criticisms and positive recommendations based on long experience. It is believed that this document may prove to be a fertile seedbed of ideas on the substance and execution of U.S. foreign policy.

Except for the organizational structure and brief introductions, it has been our intention to permit the respondents to speak in their own words. Rather than reproduce individual statements in toto, an attempt has been made to give the responses more focus by arranging excerpts in a topical manner. In order not to bias the report, all comments on a particular issue or phase of policy have been printed even though some redundancy may result. Only historical analyses, which were rather lengthy and not particularly germane to current problems, were omitted.

The identity of the authors is not disclosed even though several respondents stated that they placed no reservation on the use of their comments. The committee felt that the retired officers could be more candid in their remarks, and that possible embarrassments and re-criminations would be precluded, if the anonymity of authorship were maintained. Accordingly, the letter of January 15, 1959, contained the following paragraph:

I can assure you that such views or recommendations as you may wish to express will not be attributed to you as an individual. Depending upon the nature of the response to this letter, however, it may be that the committee would wish to make public in a generalized form and without personal attribution the substance of the views of the former members of the Foreign Service who respond to this letter, and I should like your permission, therefore, to make such use of your comments unless you specifically withhold permission.

While it could be argued that anonymity may breed irresponsibility, the stature of the selected group, and their devotion to country largely vitiates this possibility. In sum, although the committee realized that identification of respondents might well have enhanced the usefulness and increased the import of this document, it believed that frankness of response far outweighed the possible disadvantages. And, in fact, it is felt that the comments do stand on their own intrinsic merits.

The responses have been organized under four main headings: "The Framework of U.S. Foreign Policy"; "The Instruments of U.S. Foreign Policy"; "The Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy"; and "U.S. Foreign Policy by Geographical Regions." Under the first title are included remarks on the domestic framework underlying our policies, the general guidelines of our foreign policy, and the fundamental international forces with which U.S. foreign policy must cope. The second section deals with the various means by which we pursue our foreign policy goals: foreign aid, information programs, military alliances, negotiations, international organizations, and military power. The third part discusses the problems of foreign policy administration: the structure and operations of the Department of State; the role of the Foreign Service; and congressional-executive coordination. The last division contains more detailed commentaries on our problems in the various areas of the world.

The scope of the material presented and the diversity in its treatment, the absence of a clear agreement on some issues, and the carefully chosen wording of most statements, would make any attempt at short summarization arbitrary and very difficult. However, it may be useful at this juncture to point out a few of the salient features:

1. Widespread concern was voiced over the defensive posture of U.S. foreign policy: Our seeming inability to grasp the initiative in world politics; a propensity merely to react to Soviet challenges rather than to put into effect our own comprehensive and positive policies; and, especially in recent years, an inability to come forth with any new creative and dramatic programs.

2. Part of the blame for our apparent passivity in foreign relations was placed on the difficulties of conducting a bold, consistent, on-going, and expensive foreign policy in a democracy. The cumbersome apparatus by which foreign policy is formulated and executed was also criticized. The proliferation of staffs, the endless coordination, and the lack of clear-cut lines of responsibility, all inhibit a timely and aggressive policy. Several respondents were appalled by the num-

bers of personnel in the area of foreign relations both overseas and in the United States.

3. Considerable resentment was expressed over the treatment of the Foreign Service. The practice of viewing many ambassadorships as political largesse to reward the party faithful was severely condemned as demoralizing to the career officers and as productive of poor U.S. representation abroad. Likewise, the limitations placed on the appointment of Ambassadors to many posts because of inadequate "representation allowances" was deplored. The bypassing of Ambassadors and the undercutting of traditional diplomatic methods by direct participation of the Secretary of State in negotiations and the holding of high level international meetings, was also felt to have had a deleterious effect on the Foreign Service.

4. Proposed reforms in the Department of State included: revitalization of the Policy Planning Staff as a long-range planning body; delegation of administrative decisionmaking to subordinates to allow more time for policy consideration by higher officials; reform of the burdensome fiscal procedures; organization of a section for consular and commercial affairs under an additional Under Secretary of State; and the creation of an atmosphere more conducive to imaginative and creative thinking. Security procedures were also attacked by one respondent.

5. There were several critical comments on our military strategy which places so much reliance on nuclear weapons on the grounds that it severely restricts the alternatives of our foreign policy. In addition there was some questioning of the military aid emphasis in the mutual security program and the value of such alliances as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

6. A certain dichotomy of view was apparent between those whose primary attention is focused on Asia and Africa and the problems of nationalism, rapid industrialization, and neutralism; and those who are European-oriented and believe that nothing should be done which might impair our relations with our NATO allies. This difference in emphasis has a number of policy ramifications.

7. With one exception general support was expressed for the foreign aid program. However, there was considerable criticism of its composition and administration. Several respondents urged that military aid be clearly separated from economic aid and that the latter be increased.

8. There was no clear agreement on United States policy toward Communist China and Taiwan.

9. The congressional foreign policy role was criticized by several respondents who asserted that Congress has not adapted its procedures to the exigencies of the present world crisis. Cumbersome and repetitious review procedures, diffusion of responsibility within Congress, and inadequate staffing were three major complaints.

While obvious, it seems worthwhile to emphasize that the following comments are the words of professional diplomats whose points of view have been formed by years of service representing the United States overseas. As in the case of any professional person, these men carry the bias of their profession. The impatience with domestic political considerations, the suspicion and distrust of other agencies in the field of foreign affairs, and the concern that military policy is

being given more weight than diplomatic considerations, are evidences of this possible bias. This, of course, does not in any way invalidate what they have to say, or diminish the impact of their analyses. Indeed, since they speak from long practical experience in representing the national interest as a whole, and are not grinding the axe of any particular interest group, their views are of paramount importance.

In an effort to provide a balance to this collection of views, the committee asked the Department of State to cooperate in obtaining similar comments from chiefs of diplomatic missions now on active duty, with similar anonymity as to individual identification of views. The Department of State was not willing to agree to the committee's request.

I believe the views and attitudes expressed in this document deserve the most careful consideration by officials in the executive branch of the Government, by my colleagues in the Senate, and by all citizens interested in the conduct of our foreign policy. I take this occasion on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations to express our deep gratitude to the able men who have contributed to this analysis of U.S. foreign policy and to thank Mr. Howard Swearer, an interne of the American Political Science Association, who was principally responsible for editing this publication.

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

JUNE 15, 1959.

I. THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY

AMERICAN SOCIETY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The letters repeatedly emphasized that foreign and domestic policies form a continuum; and that the character of U.S. foreign policy is largely shaped by the nature of American society. American political and economic institutions and procedures, national traditions and attitudes, public understanding of foreign policy issues, the unique role of the press in the United States, and the psychological state of the popular mind, these are some of the factors which play a prominent part in moulding U.S. foreign policy. Obversely, at a time when the United States has assumed a position of world leadership and is in competition with the Soviet Union in many areas of the world, the health and vigor of American society and the manner in which we handle our national problems, have great influence on the effectiveness of our foreign policy.

Most experienced Foreign Service officers would, I believe, agree with my opinion that many of the problems of our foreign relations begin at home—that a better American public understanding of our foreign problems is a vitally important prerequisite to taking all of the steps necessary to solve them. The “blood, sweat, and tears” technique of Churchill may be needed now in this country more than it was needed where and when those words were uttered. Certainly more straight talk to our people about the hard facts of our foreign problems is almost desperately needed not only to strengthen the sinews of that policy and give it coherence and continuity but to recover some of the prestige abroad which we have lost.

One of our greatest assets for a long time in dealing with foreign countries was an ethical one—the idealism in our history and our tradition. That asset, perhaps needed more today than ever before, has been impaired. Rightly or wrongly many foreigners are convinced that our idealism is too often used as a cloak to conceal materialism or that, when it is genuine, it too often appears to be a combination of naivete and sentimentality which is a feeble weapon against the pragmatic and cynical Communists.

This attitude of foreigners is not one which can be dispelled either by legislation or by the best conceived and executed information program, although an expanded program of productive informational and cultural activities and more personal contacts between foreigners and the United States are objectives of the greatest importance. It can be changed only by a change in the public state of mind and by a conscious and continuous official effort to reinforce our foreign policy with the strength of our traditions. It is surely not impossible to find some means of convincing people in other countries that America still has strong and good ideals and can be steadfast in observing them in its relations abroad. If we cannot do this we will continue to lose an element of moral strength for which no amount of physical strength or material well-being can be a satisfactory substitute.

A nation's foreign policy is, in a sense, a reflection of the nation's state of mind. The confusion which can be discerned in some aspects of our foreign policy in recent years doubtless reflects the confusion of our people. An essential starting point in improving our foreign policy should be a concentrated effort, spearheaded by our leaders, to replace such confusion with understanding. By this means it may be possible to remove from the public mind myths which harm us in our relations abroad—such myths, for example, as those which surround the issue of tariff protectionism, one of the economic shackles which hamper the prosecution of an effective foreign economic policy. It may be

possible to cause more Americans to realize that our democracy is an indigenous growth which may neither fit exactly nor be wholly desired in some other lands and to understand that slogans such as "the American way of life" may to the foreigner appear to be smug, patronizing, and condescending—symbols of a sort of intellectual imperialism which is neither typically American nor truly democratic.

In foreign relations as elsewhere actions still are louder than words. Our democratic leadership will be questioned abroad so long as some of our official actions and public attitudes seem to contradict the principles which we profess. There should be no double standard in our foreign policy.

One handicap stems from the very fact of our being a democracy. There is far too much public talk and debate, too much publicity, too slow a pace in the development and execution of policy. This stems from our ideas of representative government, our electoral responsibility, our coequal branches of Government, our exaggerated notion of freedom of the press, and our undoubted need to carry public opinion along from step to step. I believe that public opinion can be tutored more forcefully, I believe that the press often abuses its freedom, and I believe that there is sometimes a lack of personal responsibility for discretion in high places. But when all is said and done, we compete at a handicap with systems which can operate on a much smaller focus of authority, with great secrecy, and without reference to elections. Even the staunchest Democrat must, therefore, have moments of anxiety about the ability of our slow, awkward, and open system to produce results capable in the long run of standing up to the systems which oppose us.

The first point is my conviction that the most important and effective single thing that our country can do is to furnish proof that representative government can work; that men are capable of governing themselves. I can conceive of nothing else that would so capture the attention of the world or that would contribute so much to strengthen our leadership and influence in international affairs.

In spite of our failures and weaknesses in the operation of our form of government, we have avoided the extremes of anarchy and dictatorship. It will take a major and continuing effort, I am sure, to continue that success and to improve upon the operation of representative government. Other peoples will not find the same solutions that we may find. They have different traditions and histories and resources. Talk about democracy is meaningless to many hundreds of millions of people in the world. The United States for many years was the symbol of liberty to millions in many foreign lands. It seems to me to be within our ability to make our country stand now as a symbol of a government that can find an acceptable balance between individual freedoms and the limitations necessarily imposed on those freedoms by considerations of the general welfare.

A second point has to do with the simple dictionary definition of "policy" as "a course of action decided upon and carried out by a government." First the decision, then the action. In this sense, I think that an effort to place domestic and foreign policies in separate categories results in confusion, at best, and often in failure. What we do at home has a major effect upon our relations with other governments and peoples. The role that we play in world affairs vitally affects our lives at home. It would help the policymaking process to approach the task on the basis that all of our policies are national policies. Some policies are directed primarily to domestic issues and some to our position as a member of the world community, but all are national policies that exert their influence both at home and abroad.

There is an unfortunate tendency among the American people to oversimplify problems in foreign relations and to be concerned less with long-swing consequences than with disembarassing ourselves as speedily as possible of troublesome problems. Let us not delude ourselves that there is a reasonable prospect of achieving today by feasible and acceptable means a settlement of the China problem on a basis that would not seriously prejudice our lasting interests. * * *

The press has assumed the parliamentary prerogative of interpellation. As a result, foreign governments frequently get a premature preview or a distorted vision of American policy. Leaks extend throughout the entire Government, including Congress itself. There have been cases where top-secret dispatches have appeared verbatim in gossip columns. Remedial action should be found to alleviate this situation. Foreign policy cannot flourish in a goldfish bowl. Above all, foreign policy should not be the reflection of pressure groups or of the clamor of the unenlightened or a response to emotional reactions.

Another field of serious inadequacy affecting our relations with the countries of southeast Asia is to be found in our abysmal lack of knowledge concerning the past history and culture of these peoples, which have a profound influence on their present thinking. For the past two or three centuries, that entire area of the world was thought of, if thought of at all by us, as part of the colonial empires built up by Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Likewise, the native peoples were thought of as colonial subjects, perhaps of an inferior order. In consequence, most of us were surprised, when these nations attained their independence, by the vehemence with which they demanded equality in the family of nations, by the vehemence of their nationalism, by their pride in their past history and culture, by their determination to develop and modernize their nation and by their determination to steer their own and independent course. We were surprised because we know virtually nothing about these peoples and we know nothing because we have been taught so little about them. Few of our educational institutions at either the secondary or undergraduate level teach anything about the countries of southeast Asia and less than 50 percent of our universities give courses at the graduate level. This educational void is a challenge to our educational institutions, private foundations, and other organizations. It is a challenge of great urgency and importance.

Lacking substantial background information concerning this area, the general public must rely on spotty and often misleading news reports which are tied, almost invariably, to crisis events. Furthermore, international news is so often served up to us as a series of events in which we are either winning or losing, while the people involved are described as being either for or against us in the "cold war." While I do not question the value of spot news, it seems highly important to me that our people begin to develop an understanding of our Asian friends based on some comprehension of their history, culture, and current problems, and this, of course, should commence in our schools.

The following three quotations contain specific examples of the direct relationship of foreign policy to domestic considerations.

* * * If Japan, discouraged over the prospects for its livelihood in the face of a growing disposition among its allies, especially the United States, to restrict the imports of Japanese manufactures, should transfer its allegiance to the Communist side, the scales would become dangerously tipped against us. This raises the difficult issue of whether we should give priority to our security interest in keeping Japan strong and friendly or to protecting our domestic industry against Japanese competition.

In my opinion the greatest error committed in our foreign policy in the Near East has been the shaping of that policy on the basis of domestic political considerations rather than on the global security interests of the Nation. I refer to the manner in which our support of Zionist interests in Palestine and later in Israel, springing from a desire of the two political parties to attract Zionist votes in the United States, resulted in the undermining of the good will built up for the United States in the Arab and Moslem world over an extensive period, with not only the loss of our influence in that world but the creation of a permanent conflict between Israel on the one hand and the Arab world on the other. For years the career officers of the United States stationed in Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Jiddah gave repeated warnings in their reports of the great prejudice to American security and other interests, as well as the unsettlement of the peace in the Near East, which our espousal of Zionist interests must inevitably have * * *. I observed at first hand the shaping of our policy toward Palestine, and later, Israel, in the light of domestic political considerations and against all the advice of professional Foreign Service

officers to whom the dangers of our policy were clearly apparent. The great lesson to be drawn here is the imperative need of divorcing the direction of our foreign policy, as far as may be humanly possible, from partisan political motives and the basing of it upon the interests of the United States rather than upon the interests of any party or any minority element in our population.

Another great handicap is the American attitude toward both the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The Secretaryship of State is considered a great political plum and has been used, for example, to reward the political services of a William Jennings Bryan. In later years, the Secretary of State has been the whipping boy of public opinion and the prime target of the opposition. The Department of State itself has invariably been regarded with either disfavor or antipathy by both the White House and Congress. This is doubtless due to its having a large number of career functionaries and relatively few jobs for political patronage. Also, the State Department functions slowly and by force of circumstances, cautiously. A negative attitude is all too frequently safe and sound. All this has an unfortunate influence on the formulation and carrying out of policy.

GENERAL GUIDELINES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The voice of professionalism and experience speaks out in the following excerpts for more solid, clearheaded thinking on foreign relations. Because of a tendency to project our own image and conceptions on the world at large, our foreign policy goals are sometimes misdirected and even damaging to our best longrun interests. It is necessary to shun our traditional shibboleths and prejudices and base our foreign policies on a sounder, more objective view of the national interest in the context of the present world situation. Our policies must not be makeshift. They should be carefully planned for the long haul. Moreover, we must take a broad, multidimensional view of foreign relations and overcome the tendency to compartmentalize our foreign policy either by geographic regions or by function.

It is fallacious—and it can indeed be highly dangerous—to think of foreign policy in terms of nice neat packages of objectives, such as one compartment of policies for participation in the international organizations, another for Communist China, another for foreign aid, another for defense, and so forth.

Actually, all foreign policies interact on one another and their relationship is not additive but multiplicative. Where the success of one factor in foreign policy may approach zero, regardless of how large the other factors may be, the product is also going to approach zero. Expressed in other terms, foreign policy is multidimensional; each dimension has its own role to play and can be misjudged or distorted only with risk. The how and the when of foreign policy constitute a dimension in their own right, and this dimension can have a determinative effect on attainment of any objectives. These thoughts are not academic; their consequences affect us all the time.

Looking back over the decade, it is not farfetched to suggest that one reason for the victory of the Chinese Communists on the mainland was that much of U.S. policy toward China in preceding years had been formulated and executed by men whose previous experience was confined largely to China and who were somewhat less than multidimensional in their thinking as to the consequences elsewhere of a Communist victory in China. Certainly anything less than broad, contemporary knowledge in depth of our foreign friends and foes could be a luxury we would not wish to experience again.

Compartmentalization of policy continues to manifest itself in many ways—in the tug of war between the State Department's European divisions and Asian-African divisions over colonial questions; in disagreements between the civilian and military departments over the character of assistance to other countries; in contradictions between our deeds and our public statements in regard to Eastern Europe, and so forth. The great question which arises is: How can the various compartments, with all their contradictions, be coalesced into a more

consistent whole? Another form of the question is: How can the interests of individual groupings be more readily subordinated to the interests of America as a whole?

To the question one partial answer is, I believe, that the highest executive levels of government must in the future devote even more detailed care to smoothing out our foreign policy decisions in all their multidimensionality as well as to evaluating and improving conjointly the how and the when with which decisions are applied. I am out of touch with Washington organization, but I wonder whether some of the solution may not lie in revitalizing the State Department's policy planning staff and making it also a sort of control organ or in converting the National Security Council into the practical equivalent of a Cabinet concerned not only with foreign policy determination but also its execution.

It is in our relations with the free world that our standards require the most basic reassessments. In some more advanced countries the longing for security combined with increased standards of education and living are strengthening the supporters of Socialist programs such as welfare and social security measures. The very same longings for security are producing growing impatience with the stalemate in the German question. In Scandinavia the socialists are in power. In England, they constantly threaten the conservative government. Even in free-enterprise Germany the Adenauer regime owes much of its success to its appropriation of social democratic programs.

In the Mideast the security quest has taken the form of ambitions for Arab unity with strong religious overtones. Here U.S. offers of higher living standards compete sometimes unsuccessfully with less materialistic ambitions. In other underdeveloped areas, impatience for the rewards of an industrial society have given an impetus to various forms of state capitalism similar to that of the Soviet economy.

To a large section of American thought these forces, socialism, nationalism and state capitalism are mistrusted and their sponsors suspect. In Europe, for example, socialism is regarded by many Americans as akin to communism. In Germany the Washington administration has gone so far as publicly to endorse the Adenauer regime for fear of the Social Democrats some of whom cling nostalgically to Marxian slogan and some have Communist pasts. (Heretofore the Bolsheviks have been the bitterest opponents of bourgeois socialism and the most savage enemies of renegade Communists). In Italy, American officials are forbidden to have any relations with the Nenni Socialists.

In the Mideast Arab nationalism is regarded by many Americans as an unreasonable and even dangerous doctrine. In other underdeveloped areas, the popularity of state capitalism as a short-cut to industrialization is condemned by some Americans as dangerous imitation of the Soviet system.

On the other hand, accidents, even mistakes of history have allied the United States in some areas with petty rulers who oppose these trends, and are therefore often regarded as staunch allies and even on occasion are given a determinant role in the formulation of American policy as in the case of Chiang Kai-shek in the periodic Formosa Straits crises.

But, as a French diplomat once put it succinctly: With Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Dalai Lama, it won't work. A Lebanese rebel at the time of the Beirut crisis asked the writer: Why cannot the United States support a single progressive government in the Mideast? He had in mind not the Rhees and the Chiangs but the rulers of prerevolutionary Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, and Kuwait.

That the United States, the traditional defender of free institutions, should thus be cast in the role of Louis XIV with the most reactionary of regimes posing as the champion of liberty among the new nations, is by no means exclusively the achievement of Soviet propaganda. The moralistic attitude of some American policymakers and the urge to make over the world in the American image combined with a puritanical zeal to stamp out Marxian socialism have substantially contributed to the development.

The vehemence of Syngman Rhee's opposition to communism is equaled neither by his strength as an ally today nor by his actuarial prospects for tomorrow. On the other hand the rising level of education and health, the rapid increase in the number of new states and their longing for economic independence would seem to demonstrate with what forces we are to live from the North Cape to Africa and Indonesia in the coming decades.

Two conclusions would seem self-evident: since the Rhees and Chiang Kai-sheks cannot be wished away, they should at least be relegated to the position of our fellow travelers and their influence on American foreign policy curtailed accordingly. On the other hand despite our dislike of some of the economic and social institutions of the new forces we should reaffirm that our aim is not to strangle Marxian socialism or any other system they care to adopt for themselves. At the same time the most careful and respectful attention should be devoted to their proposals for increasing their international security whether we call it disengagement or coexistence and whether its author is called Gaitskell or even Rapacki. * * *

On the other hand there is evidence that our reluctance to consider troop withdrawals in Europe in any form is based on short-term tactical considerations and not on long-term reasoning. It is difficult to reconcile our claims for success in intermediate missiles with our insistence on keeping our troops hard against the German zonal boundaries. As has often been the case in American history, military convenience has perhaps overshadowed political potentialities.

In general: In our thinking concerning the foreign policy of those governments with which our relations are unsatisfactory and possibly hostile, we should endeavor to avoid the pseudomoral attitudes which have in recent years characterized so many of the pronouncements of the Department of State. Perhaps it would be wise to establish in the policy planning staff a devil's advocate whose duty it would be to endeavor to look at questions from the other fellow's point of view. For example: What would be our attitude if the fortunes of war had left half of Paris under Russia's occupation but surrounded by territories belonging to the free world, and constituting a center of Communist espionage and propaganda? What would be our attitude if men whom we considered rebels were to occupy Staten Island with the assistance of some foreign power and use it as a base for espionage and propaganda and a possible jumping-off place for an invasion of the country? What would be our attitude if a former President of the United States, refusing to give up his authority, had retreated with a small army to Puerto Rico and there, with the aid of a foreign power, had established himself and threatened from time to time an invasion and the overthrow of the Government in Washington? What would be our attitude if some millions of foreigners with the aid of several foreign powers were to establish an independent state for themselves in a strip along our sea-coast from New York to Norfolk, splitting the city of Washington in two, and after having driven out the majority of the Americans in the area oppressed the few who remained within the territory under their occupation? What would be our attitude if one of our leading novelists were to write a book which by implication denounced capitalism and democracy and praised communism and totalitarianism and were to receive the Nobel Prize for it? Other similar questions will suggest themselves. The point is that international conflicts, though they may involve questions of right and wrong are primarily questions of conflicting interests and are more profitably treated as such than as questions of ethics.

All that is written above may be so much utter waste if the question of Berlin is not settled without resort to arms. The only suggestion that I venture in regard to that question is that we would do well to stop making provocative statements and to stop hurling notes at our adversaries. If there is any possibility of arranging matters by negotiation that possibility is decreased by every public pronouncement on the subject.

So far as any rule can be applied to the conduct of foreign policy with the present diversity of states and instability of conditions in this changing world it should be the trite "intelligent self-interest." By this I mean pursuing the best interests of the United States to the point beyond which the opposition which they arouse would be counter-productive or they would transgress the accepted rules of decent dealing.

It is obvious that the aims of the United States are to live in peace with other states and to maintain such relations with them that we may procure these goods we need or find desirable and furnish them with our products and materials in return. With this would go the right of our citizens to travel freely and reside in their territories without seeking dominion or monopoly.

While the United States should be ready to meet friendship with friendship I feel that we are sufficiently strong and self-sustained as not to feel we should buy friendship with gifts or concessions. Let others come to us. Sometimes it seems we have gone out of our way to manifest hurried recognition of new states, when a certain reserve would have placed a higher value on relations with us.

It is my belief that our basic foreign policies are sound and that, in general, they have the support of the American people. With respect to our broadly stated aims, however, I would question the wisdom of pursuing the goal of "making the world safe for democracy." Preferably we should strive to bring about conditions in which states wishing to maintain their political independence may do so without outside interference and may develop whatever kind of government they feel best serves their needs in their particular stage of political advancement. In the first place democracy means different things to different people and, in the second, it is futile for us to attempt to make the world over in our own image.

No practical alternative to the decade-old policy popularly called containment seems feasible. However, an alternative way of pursuing this policy based on a more precise definition of our ultimate goal and a more realistic appraisal of both the long range forces opposing and supporting us and implemented by a diplomacy supple enough to take advantages of opportunities for progress would seem preferable to a diplomacy apparently inspired at least in part by the emotions of hatred and fear and periodically rocked by momentary waves of popular indignation at Soviet brutalities or shaken by alarm at exhibitions of Armenian charm.

* * * I felt strongly then and equally so now that if we had displayed from the beginning of the Revolution in 1917 greater resiliency and flexibility in our relations with the Soviet Union, of whose incipient strength I then had no doubt, our subsequent relations might have been altogether different. Closing our minds to any attempt to understand the implications of this vast social upheaval, which was beyond our simplified view of the world, we thought we might escape its influence by quarantining it, as we are endeavoring futilely to do today in the case of Communist China. It seems to me that a serious illusion which has beclouded our appraisal of the Russian, Chinese and other developments has been in persuading ourselves that because democratic institutions, as we have conceived and developed them, are suited to our way of life they must be equally advantageous to peoples of an entirely different background. As a result we have been as insistent on democratizing the world or, in other words of making it over in our own image, as the Russians have in making it over in conformity with their own. This is a parochial view which fails to take into account the great diversity of mores and cultures of the world and ignores the fact that a way of life, adapted to our needs may be quite unsuitable for another people in a different state of development. There would not seem to be, contrary to the widespread belief to which we cling so tenaciously, any magic properties attending particular political institutions when they do not respond to the ways of life of those by whom they are adopted.

* * * foreign policy should establish objectives both positive and negative within a framework as elastic as possible. Extreme attention should be paid to alternatives. Otherwise, foreign policy falls into a rigid pattern that is self-defeating.

On the other hand, one respondent wrote that our main difficulty in the area of southeast Asia was that we had lost sight of our ideals, and that we had been relatively unsuccessful in translating them into effective policies.

What concepts and policies should guide us in our relations with these nations whose future is bound to be of concern and importance to the United States and to the world?

The central concept of United States foreign policy from the earliest days of our history, has been the desire of our people to live in peace with other nations in order that both we and they might grow in mind and knowledge and prosper materially. This concept, which is neither original with the United States or one peculiar to us, is a mixture of idealism and materialism. It contains a definite moral element, best expressed perhaps by the old biblical injunction, "love thy neighbor", which our religious and intellectual leaders have stressed since our country was founded. As an integral part of this concept, we have endorsed such principles of international law and justice as noninterference in the affairs of other nations, the right of people to self-determination and independence, mutual respect for sovereign rights, and strict observance of trade and treaty agreements. Although this concept springs from an aversion to war, we have at times taken up arms to defend our own liberty and freedom or to preserve the peace when endangered by dictators and aggressors.

The record of our foreign policy shows that, in general, we have not lost sight of this our guiding star. However, it cannot be denied that that star has been from time to time, dimmed if not almost obscured, by selfish motives, faulty interpretation of events and conceit, coupled with lack of understanding of other peoples.

Southeast Asia is an area in which this basic concept has been subordinated and almost forgotten in the welter of postwar turmoils and power conflicts. It is not that we have not wanted to be friends with the peoples of these countries. The fact is that we do want their friendship, but this element so vital to the growth of good will and mutual understanding between them and us has been elusive. Our failure in this area may be attributed to many reasons and not all of them can be laid at our door * * *.

A sense of urgency, coupled with frustration over a seeming inability to take the initiative in international affairs, was a common refrain in many of the letters.

Our basic foreign policy problem, in my opinion, is to find means of changing our posture from the defensive position which we seem to occupy so frequently to one of positive, realistic, dynamic action. Only thus can we regain the prestige abroad which we have lost in recent years and maintain the psychological advantages which, in a world of clashing ideologies, may be as essential to the preservation of peace as an adequate physical defense.

It will be understood, of course, that by "positive, dynamic" action I do not mean bellicose or threatening moves. I mean a policy of initiating action; not one which is essentially reaction.

If we realistically consider the elements of weakness in our position we find, I believe, three conditions which Moscow and Peiping have been able to exploit most effectively in the prosecution of their aims: One is the force of nationalism—and the often concomitant attitude of neutralism: possibly the strongest political influence, after communism, which has moved men and shaped events since the last World War. Another is political and economic instability—that open invitation to Communist subversion and penetration. A third is a combination of conditions in the United States—political pressures, public apathy, lack of understanding, and complacency; and a governmental organization which has had to assume vast responsibilities in too short a time and with insufficient preparation—which has made difficult a more realistic approach to some of our most critical foreign problems.

The strength of basic American foreign policy is that the United States has no territorial ambitions and wishes only to live in peace. But it has the weakness of being a defensive position.

The United States is a champion of peace and economic progress in the free world. But the American position is complicated by the impossibility of maintaining the status quo in a changing world that is in ferment, with two great predatory powers of constantly increasing strength conniving in direct and indirect aggression. American foreign policy, therefore, has to be adapted to the problems of the various areas of the world, especially formulated for different nations, and with the necessary flexibility to face unexpected exigencies.

The United States is ill equipped to meet the foregoing requirements. The machinery of government has become so vast and cumbersome that rapid decisions are virtually impossible unless a crisis becomes sufficiently urgent and grave for White House intervention.

The crux of the matter [the major problem of our foreign policy] may be expressed in a parallel from the field of sport. If two teams were engaged in a game of football in which one was always in possession of the ball and the other always on the defensive, the one that remained constantly on the defensive would eventually get licked.

COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM, AND ANTICOLONIALISM

The seriousness of the Soviet threat to the interests of the United States and the West was clearly recognized by every respondent. This point, however, was not belabored. Rather it was accepted as an omnipresent fact of international relations. Attention was centered, primarily, on the interrelated forces of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and neutralism; forces which in themselves present a real challenge to the resourcefulness and understanding of our foreign policy, in addition to opening fertile ground for Communist exploitation.

Nationalism and anticolonialism have often put the United States in an embarrassing position of crossfire between our European allies and nationalist forces in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. That the dilemma facing the United States is not easily resolvable is attested to by the ambivalence of our policies during the last 10 years. There is also little agreement among the retired foreign service officers on how best to face this issue. Differing opinions were expressed by those oriented toward the newly emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—and those concerned to maintain the strongest possible bonds with Europe. A man's viewpoint evidently was considerably shaped by the area in which he spent most of his service.

The following comments emphasize our need to aline ourselves with the nationalist forces:

It is colossal irony that the Communists have been able so frequently to place the United States on the defensive with respect to the postwar problem of nationalism. It is easy to consider in retrospect and believe, as I do, that our handling of that problem has not always been deft or consistent. However, to single out significant errors would require an intensive analysis of such developments as the Indochina situation, Irian, and Egypt and other Arab countries. I can only express the belief that in this area of foreign problems our actions have, at times, seemed to belie one of our great traditions—the encouragement of independence movements or have been susceptible to that interpretation—and render us particularly vulnerable to Communist attack.

Here we may have an illustration of the need for better foreign policy planning on a long-range basis. Perhaps a sound policy starting point would have been to recognize that, while the creation of additional sovereign states at a time when more not less political integration is necessary is unfortunate, the nationalist ambitions would be satisfied whether we or our allies liked it or not. With that as a basic tenet, some of our subsequent moves in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa might have been less resented by the local populations and less useful to the Communists.

It may be too late to do much about this situation in areas where we have already committed ourselves, but it may not be too late to make certain that the full implications and strength of nationalist movements are understood by all who deal with our foreign policy and that our future actions, where issues of nationalism are involved, are planned accordingly.

I have had some experiences with such arguments as: "We can't please the nationalists without losing our friends," and, "The nationalists are too arrogant, demanding, inexperienced, and untrustworthy—we mustn't get mixed up with them." To be caught in the crossfire between our allies and nationalist leaders and their followers is not a comfortable position and there is no doubt that nationalist movements are highly emotional and are sometimes headed by corrupt, overambitious leaders. It would be pleasant if the fruition of some of

these movements could be accomplished in a more leisurely manner. If the Communist menace did not darken the situation that might be possible, but the salient political reality in the problem is that the Communists are alert to gain advantages from every move which we make which is, or seems to run, counter to nationalist aspirations. When those advantages result in giving the Communists more influence upon the nationalist adherents we have suffered an important political loss.

I have never been completely convinced that, to improve our position with the Indonesians we would seriously jeopardize our relations with the Dutch and the Australians. Or that, by pursuing a different policy in Indochina we would have "thrown France to the Communists." And so on and on. The essence of leadership is to lead and if it seemed likely that our long-range interests would be best served by acting in a manner which displeased some of our European friends we should, nevertheless, have so acted—reasonably and with courage.

An astute observer of foreign affairs remarked to me a few years ago that our biggest difficulty in the Asian situation was the tendency of Washington to view Asia through the eyes of Europe. My personal experience has tended to confirm that opinion or at least to suggest that our policy thinking concerning Asian problems was heavily weighted by our interests in Europe—perhaps over-weighted. This could be a dangerous fault and some of its consequences may be the root of some of our problems in dealing with Asian nationalism.

There is no doubt that the dominant force animating the countries of southeast Asia today, is nationalism. It is the catalytic agent which within a decade has overcome the most formidable obstacles to gain independence for these Asian peoples. Nationalism is not only the directional force in the policies of these countries with respect to international affairs but is equally apparent in their plans to strengthen and improve their economies and in the development of government and administration.

There are, of course, many factors which united together give rise to nationalism, but certainly one of the strongest is man's determined reaction to alien rule, which was the lot of the majority of the peoples of south and southeast Asia for nearly three centuries. * * *

Only within the last 25 years of colonial rule did the early concept of rule for profit and the glory of the metropolitan government become tinged by more liberal and humanitarian principles. Slowly, there emerged a realization on the part of the colonial powers that self-rule for their colonies was an inescapable historical and political trend which could not be ignored. World War I, concluding with the Treaty of Versailles during the negotiation of which Woodrow Wilson and other statesmen talked much of the peoples' right of self-determination, fanned the embers of nationalism and independence already kindled by a few patriots in the colonies. However, this realization came late and was so slowly translated into action, particularly by France and the Netherlands, that bloodshed and strife flared in Indonesia and Indochina.

In our relations with these nations it is, therefore, imperative that we take cognizance of and realize the deep and grievous wound which colonial rule has made upon the minds and hearts of the peoples of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina. It permeates their consciousness and generates dark suspicion of the Western Powers and all their actions and policies. It causes an emotional state of mind in which a reasonable and dispassionate view of the West, including the United States finds little encouragement. One has only to read the frequent statements of such leaders as Sukarno of Indonesia, U Nu of Burma, Diem of South Vietnam, and Norodom of Cambodia to realize not only that the spirit of nationalism and pride of country and culture burns strongly, but also that it is constantly fed by the gall of an anticolonialism that has not yet been diluted by the passage of time. * * *

I have attempted briefly to outline the principal forces stirring through the countries of southeast Asia. Nationalism stands out as the most dynamic and vital of these forces. I believe it to be good, in the sense that it is striving to bring good government, the expansion of education and knowledge and the peace and prosperity which the people so ardently seek. To say this is not to deny that it has and will continue to have aspects of intolerance, unreasonableness, and rancor. Numerous and complex problems of internal security, the establishment of good and stable governments out of turbulent political and military groups and personalities, the development of viable economies, and the steering

of a sound and careful course through the stormy waters of a troubled world, are all problems which will continue to confront the young nations of southeast Asia during the decade to come. * * *

A third force moving insidiously through southeast Asia today is communism. Communism has battered on the desire of these people to be free, to be independent. It has exploited the new spirit of nationalism and indeed sought to control it. It has used with cunning and telling effect the people's hatred of colonialism as bait to win adherents. Its training and use of the people of the country, its flexible tactics, making possible a sudden shift from naked force to smiling offers of peaceful coexistence, make this force the more sinister. * * *

In the first place, we have failed, it seems to me, to read aright the new chapter of history which is presently being written before our eyes. Developments of the past decade point unmistakably to the fact that the prestige, power, and wealth of many of the nations of Europe, including Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, are definitely on the decline. The destructive forces of two world wars within the short space of 25 years took a heavy toll in lives and treasure and shook these nations to their very foundations. These colonial powers have been still further weakened by the upsurge of the demand for independence within their colonies resulting in the loss of rich and valuable territories in south and southeast Asia.

On the other hand, a steady increase is apparent in the influence of the countries of south Asia, both individually and collectively. We are in the midst of what might be termed an "Asian era" and the next decade will make this fact plainly evident. It is the countries of south and southeast Asia, together with those of the Middle East and Africa, whose opinions and policies will be more frequently heard and felt in the United Nations. It is they who will increasingly influence the course of world events. It is they who will produce, control, and sell many of the natural resources and raw materials so important to the rest of the world for industrial and strategic purposes. It is they who will open or deny their countries as markets for the manufactured goods of the West in their efforts to become more self-sufficient through programs of economic development and industrialization. In short, their impact, both political and economic, during the next 10 to 20 years will be highly significant. We can ignore or misinterpret these new trends, but, if we do, the consequences are likely to be serious to us and to world peace.

I do not believe that we in this country have yet grasped the significance of what has already taken place in southeast Asia. Few of us see the importance of these nations to us as equal partners and collaborators in the maintenance of world peace and in furthering the progress and prosperity of mankind. Because of close cultural, family, and economic ties, our eyes and thoughts are still largely focused on Europe and Great Britain. Our statesmen, having so painstakingly built up the defenses of Europe through NATO and by strengthening the economies of those nations, are deeply involved politically and intellectually, in that part of the world which has seemed all important as a bastion of democracy and freedom.

The maintenance of close ties with our Western allies and partners has been and will continue to be essential to the preservation of freedom and liberty in this troubled world. It would not be the part of wisdom or loyalty to abandon them, and indeed we must not. However, it is equally essential that we correctly evaluate current and future events and demonstrate prescience by recognizing that the states of south and southeast Asia are of growing consequence and importance in the world.

Secondly, a conflicting dualism has marked both the policies we have been following with respect to the nations of southeast Asia and the manner in which such policies have been implemented. On the one hand we have wished to manifest friendship toward them but have been inhibited by the fear that in so doing we would perturb our allies, the colonial powers. This dualism has been particularly noticeable in regard to colonial issues. We have been obsessed with the fear, on which our allies have played from time to time, that if we fail to support them on these issues they may crumble and collapse and thus lay open the citadel of Western Europe to the Communist hordes of Russia and her satellites. In doing so, we have tended to ignore the march of historical and political events which have already resulted in the colonial powers losing their colonies in south Asia and elsewhere and in slowly lowering the curtain on the whole colonial era.

The manifest fact is that our anxious support of the colonial powers has not halted these events and cannot. The tide of freedom and the desire for independence is running too strong. Perhaps it would be well for us to turn back the pages of our own history books to those stirring and dangerous days when the words "give me liberty or give me death" rang through the countryside as our forefathers struggled to shake off alien rule. We have forgotten that struggle and the strong sentiments which it aroused. The emotions felt by the peoples of southeast Asia today are identical.

It is time for us to take a definite and unequivocal stand on issues which are of such paramount importance to peoples whose goodwill and friendship we seek. If we had taken a firm position on colonialism at the close of World War II and had adhered to it, I believe we would have served our allies better in the long run. The dawn of independence would have risen sooner and much of the present bitterness between the colonial rulers and their erstwhile subjects could have been avoided. Certainly, our own relations with the peoples of this area would today be on a more solid and friendly basis.

Today we find ourselves, perhaps somewhat unwillingly, thrust into a position of world leadership as a result of our geographic position, our great natural resources, the industry and ingenuity of our people, and the turn of a historical cycle that is moving us toward a pinnacle at a dizzy pace. With fateful responsibilities on our shoulders, it is more essential than ever that we stand for principle and justice. At the moment it appears to hundreds of millions of Asians that we have failed as champions of right principle and that it is the Communists, against whom we constantly inveigh, who are upholding justice and equality. It is ironical, if not tragic, that we who have stood from the founding of our Nation for liberty and the self-determinations of peoples should, because of faulty and misguided policies on the one hand the Communist propaganda on the other, have been placed in this invidious position.

* * * we live in a time of dynamic evolution. The upsurge of the masses in many parts of the world demanding greater participation in the ordering of their households and more human dignity is to my mind irresistible. It takes various forms in various areas. It can be influenced, but it cannot be stopped. We should bend our efforts, therefore, toward guiding these movements along channels favorable to the free world. In this connection, I have good reason to believe that we still have influence in many important capitals of the world which we have been reluctant to use for fear of offending the susceptibilities of those in control in those capitals. It seems to me that even at the risk of causing resentment we should urge in those capitals the vital needs of facilitating the inevitable evolution taking place. We should seek to woo those seeking change, not antagonize them. This would appear particularly to be the case in Africa, the future political and economic evolution of which will have tremendous impact on the world.

Those primarily concerned with our European allies reason as follows:

It is false to present the country with a choice between a Europe-first or an Asia-first policy. We have vital interests at stake in all hemispheres. The question, rather, is where we can best establish an economic-military-diplomatic lever for use in producing desired effects in a second place.

If the preservation of the political independence and physical integrity of Western Europe must remain our immediate objective, it is not to imply that we have no objectives elsewhere. Rather, it is to recognize that if the human and physical resources of Western Europe fell under Soviet domination, the union of resources that would result would exceed those of the United States. Further than that, it would enable the Soviet Union to extend its dominion all the more readily over Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and perhaps South America. On the other hand, if the human and physical resources of Europe were combined with those of the United States, the aggregate would be far greater than that of the Soviet Union's; and we would be all the better placed to assist the nations in the rest of the world that wanted to preserve their independence and develop in their own way.

Our tendency has been too often a self-righteous one in foreign affairs. This has led us to advance our particular ways of thinking in areas in which other friendly nations have an interest with the consequent disruption of peace and security and prejudice to our own essential interests. I refer in particular to our anticolonial policy. In Morocco in 1942 and subsequently we have gratuitously encouraged the Sultan to adopt an independent line with the French at a time when we were endeavoring at the same time to strengthen France. The result of our quixotic policy was to promote unrest in north Africa, to play into the hands of Communist Russia, and to undermine the French with no readily apparent benefit to the interests of the United States. If we had been more realistic we would have allowed events to shape themselves without incurring the resentment of the French and making their own situation worse with no palpable profit to ourselves. It is not our mission to make good democrats of foreigners or to convert them to our way of thinking. We have derived no advantage in promoting prematurely self-government in north Africa. The end result has been to sow seeds of bitter distrust of us among the French and the stimulation of unrest.

COALITION DIPLOMACY

Coalition diplomacy places a great burden on a flexible and imaginative foreign policy. It is the ultimate test of statesmanship.

Another obvious handicap is the necessity we are under most of the time to find a joint policy with our allies, and especially the British, Germans, and French. No one knows better than I, out of my experience of countless hours spent around the table trying to resolve conflicting views among these allies, how destructive this is to a rapid, flexible, and imaginative pace in foreign affairs. But there it is and we have to make the best of it. Happily there is some evidence that this same handicap has recently begun to be imposed, though to a far lesser degree as yet, on the Soviet regime.

For the foreseeable future, our national security policy must be pursued in the context of a coalition of friendly nation states. In this connection, I think it is false to say that there is no difference between the Eisenhower-Dulles policy and the Truman-Acheson policy. To be sure, both were committed to the containment of communism; and both called for allied cooperation in that venture. Yet the practice of the matter was quite different. It was a difference between the go-it-alone Eisenhower-Dulles policy, signalized in the now discredited theory of massive retaliation, and the Truman-Acheson policy of choosing those means for containing communism which our allies were ready to support in their own interest.

In the whole field of our foreign policy we should consistently bear in mind the necessity of maintaining the most cordial possible relations with our allies, particularly with Canada, Great Britain, and France. Diplomatic maneuvering, such as has on occasion in recent years destroyed the confidence of our allies in our good faith, and careless actions adversely affecting the sensibilities and interests of our allies should be avoided at all costs. We should not be made to face, even in imagination, the prospect of having to stand alone against Russia and China.

II. INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN AID

With one exception, every respondent who mentioned the foreign aid program advocated its continuance; and, in the majority of cases, its expansion. Their motives ranged from the application of the Golden Rule to pure national self-interest. While there was approval of the foreign aid program, there were a number of criticisms of its administration and focus. The large numbers of American personnel overseas administering the program were particularly criticized.

Inherent in the Marshall plan—which was a real major offensive action of the democratic world against communism—was the belief that, by increasing political and economic stability in a country, public discontent could be reduced and the ability to resist communism strengthened. For years, the need for such stability in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa has been perhaps greater, if less dramatically apparent, than it was in postwar Western Europe; but our foreign aid programs for economic purposes for those areas have been hampered and limited by emotionalism with respect to the problem of neutralism by domestic political pressures, and by a reluctance or unwillingness to deal, in a positive and sustained effort, with the difficult problem of economic underdevelopment.

In the latter respect, a careful study of the struggle which took place in the executive branch of our Government in 1954 and 1955 over the question of economic aid for Asian countries would be illuminating. It would disclose the delay which occurred in facing up to the facts in a difficult and dangerous situation as a result of opposition from quarters where primary emphasis seemed to be placed upon economy and where unpleasant or distasteful facts were given scant consideration or received with disbelief.

Foreign aid has become an important arm of American foreign policy and it should be so understood by all of our people. It should also be understood that such aid should be designed not only to strengthen our allies militarily but to reduce economic weakness as a means of facilitating political development and thus strengthening the ability of the assisted countries to resist communism. It should be understood that, to condition such assistance according to the willingness of a recipient country to enter into a military alliance with us or according to the warmth of its expressed friendship for us is to limit by our own actions the effectiveness of our overall aid effort.

Our foreign aid should not be regarded as primarily a means of purchasing friendship abroad, effecting changes in a foreign country's policies which may violate long-standing and deeply rooted traditions and customs, or otherwise obtaining compliance with our wishes. If those results follow the extension of our aid, so much the better; but our basic objective should be to replace weakness with strength, vulnerability with resistance, in countries seriously threatened by communism. Moreover, in simple terms of neighborliness, we should regard the extension of assistance to weaker nations as a responsibility of our position of strength and prosperity.

It would be pleasant if the development of economically underdeveloped countries could be achieved rapidly enough by private means, but it is one of the regrettable facts of contemporary world affairs that the very conditions in some countries which make them most vulnerable to the inroads of communism and most in need of outside aid, render them unattractive opportunities for private capital investment. The Communist leaders have been quick to recognize and play upon that fact. Unless their efforts are to go unchallenged, we shall need a revitalized economic aid program for foreign countries which will be supported

by public understanding of the need for it—a program which will be adequate in amount, sufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet both short-term and long-term needs of recipient countries, and administered with continuity by an organization whose morale and effectiveness are not impaired by uncertainty concerning public and political approval of its functions.

To be outdistanced militarily by the Communists would be fatal; to lose that part of the struggle against communism which involves the economic weapon would be both dangerous and humiliating. That weapon has already been used by us with excellent results, but we have permitted it to become rusty. An intelligent foreigner once said to me that it seemed strange that the United States, which had so successfully developed the free enterprise system, was so timorous in using the resulting wealth in opposing the force which seeks to destroy free enterprise. "I have never understood," he said, "why you Americans don't use your capitalism more effectively as a weapon against communism."

There must be some way of convincing our people that dollars can be as important defensive weapons as bullets—and much cheaper and safer.

A final point in my comment relates to our policies in the field of international cooperation. I believe that we as a people do have an obligation to help less fortunate peoples; provided the latter will join us in an effort to bring about world conditions that could make freedom and decency and human dignity reasonably attainable goals. Such help, freely given and freely accepted, would be in our own national interest. It does seem important, however, to extend the help as a voluntarily accepted obligation.

I believe that under existing circumstances a program of economic aid to the underprivileged is in our national interest. I have the impression, however, that in the past our approach has been faulty. We leave the recipient country with the belief that it is doing us a favor in accepting our aid rather than the reverse. I also have the impression that in selecting the character of the economic aid to be given we have lent credence to that brief by not always being guided solely by the interests of the recipient country. We have undertaken too many large projects where more numerous smaller ones might have been more beneficial to the people of the receiving country. In this connection, I think the point 4 program should be expanded and stressed. It gets to the grass roots of the economy of the country. Also, I have the impression that those implementing the economic aid programs sometimes undertake entirely unjustified projects toward the end of the fiscal year largely, if not solely, to commit allocated funds. They give the impression of believing that the funds having been appropriated must be expended at all cost or they risk being charged with inefficiency.

An integral part of American foreign policy is foreign aid. Such aid is warranted when it is used to meet an immediate emergency or when it serves to create wealth and employment in friendly countries.

In the matter of economic support, much more consideration should be paid to Latin America, framed in a policy ranging from tenderness to toughness. Latin America has in general a persistently declining standard of living which demands attention.

The wife of the Prime Minister of an important country which was receiving substantial aid from the United States once remarked: "It is sad that donors are always detested." This state of mind is accentuated by the cumbersome mechanism involved in the granting of aid, by the timidity and procrastination of officials charged with the granting of foreign aid. Domestic political rather than international political and economic considerations seem to play an excessive role in reaching decisions. Another element is that certain countries have come to feel that they have a vested interest in American aid, that extending such aid has become an obligation on the part of the United States. It might be a good policy to consider extending a part of American aid through regional institutions equipped to assist industry both large and small at reasonable rates of interest. This would serve in certain Eastern countries to undercut the bazaar merchants who exact astronomically high interest rates.

* * * This brings me to the question of our policy of foreign aid on which I have strong opinions, probably in contradiction to the official line. But, our foreign relations are so inextricably entangled with global aid that they cannot be treated without mentioning this aspect of them.

Trying recently to locate the whereabouts of an officer whose address I had lost, I was handed a copy of the latest Foreign Service list (Department's publication of American personnel on duty in foreign missions and Department of State). I was horrified to see that the personnel engaged in the U.S.O.M. and I.C.A. programs in some posts equalled or exceeded the already overswollen staffs supposedly on diplomatic and consular duties. Dishing out the American taxpayer's money has evidently become big business and vested interest. Parkinson's law has been operating in a big way.

For years, American help in goods, money, and services flowed spontaneously and voluntarily from private and governmental sources to the victims of catastrophe; famine in China or India, earthquake in Italy, South America, fire and flood, wherever the ill transcended local means. This help went to the people, not, as a rule, to their governments. Our prestige was never higher although the sums expended were nothing as compared with the present.

Capital investments, construction plans, exploitation of natural resources were considered matters of private concern or government finance carried out by raising funds in the American capital market, freely open to all comers with practicable schemes for development.

How and why this commonsense system became the present great giveaway would repay careful research. I can only infer that the vast amounts mobilized and spent for the conduct of two world wars created, all over the world, a class of public servants whose whole philosophy and training was the spending of other people's money; whose very jobs were dependent on having these tremendous sums to spend.

To help our war-shattered allies to rebuild their weakened economies was a good thing, but subsequent help to all and sundry was not. As our economic aid went to governments and not directly to their people, it tended to maintain the groups of governmental spenders, putting in their hands (and often in the hands of friends and relatives) vast impersonal floods of dollars having no stigma of having been wrung from the local taxpayers, thus providing splendid adjuncts of political power for those who controlled the expenditure.

Our prestige with the bulk of the people has visibly gone down as they are scarcely aware of the source of largesse, particularly as any implication that it should be repaid or even diminished is immediately publicized as another example of Uncle Sam as Shylock or "Imperialist enslaver of the embattled people." Instead of being an obligation, our help has become a propaganda weapon and means of blackmail. Any suggestion that governments, like people, should make an effort to live within their means is an immediate call to turn to the Soviets.

The incredible, to my mind, is the huge sums poured out to governments which openly advocate our downfall and oburgate our mode of life, notably Gomulka and Tito, whose yacht trip we presumably are paying for. We should let them turn to their Russian friends to help keep their populations submissive; not do it for them. In such cases, if the money is actually burning the pockets of our entrenched spenders, let them at least make it contingent on a change of their governmental system and only in exchange for liberalization of commerce, travel, and cultural exchanges. If not acceptable on that basis, return it to the American taxpayer.

Sorry. But when I calculate that about 10 percent of the taxes I pay on my small pension go for purposes which I believe do nothing but harm to our prestige, I am apt to see red, in every sense of the word.

It is with some diffidence that I express my views about the way in which we carry out our international cooperation policies. I have had little personal experience in that field. I do have occasion to use the Foreign Service list frequently. I am appalled by the number of American personnel in our many operations missions abroad. Perhaps they are needed; but almost certainly a very large part of appropriations for foreign aid must go for their salaries and expenses. That means a great decrease in what is available to benefit the peoples and economies of the countries we are helping.

We certainly need people of outstanding ability who are specifically qualified for work on a given project. I wonder if we could not use foreign personnel for a large number of positions now held by Americans. The foreign employees of the Foreign Service of the Department of State have proved their worth over a long period of years. In many cases, they do a better job than an American citizen could do and they can afford to accept salaries much lower than those paid to American employees.

There would be other important advantages in a change in our staffing pattern. The training of foreign personnel by the American technicians and supervisors would provide some assurance that the work could be continued after our active aid had ceased. A much broader use of foreign personnel also might well give foreign peoples and governments a greater sense of participation in and responsibility for these projects. There could be a resulting tendency to regard Americans as friendly partners and to reduce the suspicions about our motives that apparently exist in many cases at present.

I should think that in its economic aid activities the Government could borrow a leaf from American business which today rarely sends out an American to do a job which a native of the country can do or learn to do. Business pursues this policy for fiscal and financial reasons, but the Government might do so as well for equally valid reasons of its own. I doubt whether many would claim that the overgrown embassies, consulates, ICA missions, USIS offices, and so forth of today are more effective than those of a decade ago with their smaller staffs.

In one respect at least they are less effective, for economy and efficiency are not the only considerations to bear in mind. Even more imperative, perhaps, is the need to cope with resentments which arise almost everywhere abroad from seeing well-fed, well-dressed Americans occupying the best houses, driving the best cars, employing the most servants, entertaining lavishly, and obviously living better than they ever did at home. The day of the sahib and the tuan in Asia is past, and it is largely gone in most of the rest of the world. Add to display of the American standard of living the petty gain in which not a few Americans have engaged by selling their duty-free imports and add to that the luxurious office buildings, schools, commissaries, housing colonies, and other facilities which Americans abroad become accustomed to since the war, and it is easy to see how so much envy can be stirred up as to vitiate much of the good work being done.

Besides slashing the number of Americans overseas, there is much to be said for eliminating all commissaries and PX's wherever possible and making up the loss by increased allowances. It is a simple rule that anyone who is a guest in a foreign country should live off the country as best he can and bring with him from home as little as possible. To any foreigner there are few things more irritating than a "little America" in his own country. And, while on this subject, let us recognize that the whole world is sated with hearing about the American standard of living and way of life and that American information specialists and spokesmen would do well to speak more infrequently and more humbly of these great blessings.

Another change which would be immensely desirable in the lesser developed countries would be to cease expecting expressions of gratitude for American economic aid. Gratitude, as Americans know the feeling, hardly exists in Asia. Throughout most of the continent a good deed is believed to reward its doer by "karma," that is, by accumulation of merit or, as Christians might put it, by the laying up of treasure in heaven. The recipient of the good deed feels he has done his bit simply by making it possible for the donor to acquire merit. There are other reasons why such a change of attitude is desirable. Help is to be measured not only in dollars but also in heart and good will; he who measures in dollars alone does America the disservice of confirming what critics already suspect to be true about material values in the West. Consistent with these thoughts, it seems hardly necessary to point out how much more subtle it is to grant low interest loans (which may never be repaid) to "partners in economic development" rather than outright gifts (which rarely earn gratitude) to "indigent neighbors."

I have dwelt on foreign aid and gratitude also for another reason. It seems to me to illustrate how easily and sometimes how unhappily American domestic

issues and values can be projected abroad to the detriment of the "how" and "when" of foreign policy. It illustrates also how easily American policy can get out of harmony with foreign psychology when, with a little more understanding and acceptance of foreign ways and with a little more realism and flexibility in the foreign policy decisionmaking process, it could stay in closer harmony.

The principal interest of these countries of southeast Asia, both for the present and the future, centers around economic development. It is very evident that there is intense preoccupation with this major problem which to them, is only second in importance to the goal of independence. Lacking capital, technical know-how, and trained personnel, they need and want assistance, but only on their own terms, namely, that aid received from foreign government or private sources must be free from political conditions or other strings. Furthermore, there is insistence that foreign enterprises must submit to governmental regulations often highly nationalistic and restrictive in nature. Nevertheless, this desire to develop and expand their economies and to bring prosperity and plenty to their people is not only vital to their growth and progress, but is also one of the most effective antidotes to subversive Communist activities.

The United States is equally desirous of seeing these nations develop sound, viable economies. We have wanted to help them help themselves toward this goal. The point 4 concept, when first enunciated, was enthusiastically hailed as a generous and friendly offer by a great nation to share and impart its scientific and technical knowledge with the free countries of Asia. Unfortunately, this attractive concept has become deeply enmeshed and entangled in our own domestic politics and in international politics. In consequence those we wanted to help in southeast Asia have come to feel that Washington thinks it knows what is best for Burma, Indonesia, and the other countries of the area and that the whole operation is an anti-Communist effort devoid of genuine interest in the economic growth of these countries and the welfare of the people.

These unhappy reactions have been eagerly seized upon by the Communists and aggravated by skillful propaganda which has urged Asians to beware of us since what we were offering was a new form of colonialism. We in turn, were rather bewildered and frustrated by the suspicion with which our offers of help were received by some countries and the lack of appreciation shown by others. We could not fail to see that our aid did not stop the recipients from maintaining friendly relations with the Communist nations and this in turn aroused disillusionment in the Congress and elsewhere. Furthermore, since the Bandung Conference in April 1955 and the unveiling of the new Communist policy of liberal trade and aid, we have been deeply concerned over the eager acceptance of such aid by many of the nations of south and southeast Asia. In short, it becomes increasingly apparent that our own programs have neither won us the goodwill and friendship we desire, nor are they an effective counter to the shrewd and successful political and economic offensive being currently waged by the Communists.

The concept of aiding other free nations to develop and strengthen their economies, the better to remain free and independent, is a sound one. It is one that is in the best interests of these new Asian nations and is also in tune with our own best interests. It is plain, however, that we must discard the idea that aid implies a commitment to us on the part of the recipient. We must also rid ourselves of the conceit that we alone are competent to decide what is best for these nations. This air of superiority, perhaps almost unconscious, does vast damage to our relations with our Asian friends who are extraordinarily sensitive at this stage in their new existence. A further source of irritation to some of our Asian friends has been the dumping of our surplus agricultural products, rice for instance, thus seriously cutting into the normal markets for some of these countries. Thus, a sound concept has gone awry. Not so much because of inadequacy of funds as from faulty planning, frequent and confusing changes in administrative authority, excessive redtape, uncertainty regarding appropriations, unsympathetic and incompetent personnel, and the political strings with which our gifts are tied and which our Asian friends always look for first.

In the preceding paragraphs I have emphasized the meager results obtained through the bilateral approach. For the future would it not be better for us to consider a fresh approach, such, for instance, as utilizing the various agen-

cies of the United Nations and the International Bank and its affiliates? My own recommendations would be that we move along the following lines:

(1) Propose at the next meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations that all future technical assistance between member nations, currently on a bilateral basis, be channeled through the United Nations or other international agencies.

(2) Propose likewise that all future loans and credits for economic development be undertaken by the International Bank and/or its affiliates, including the proposed International Development Association or by the United Nations Special Fund.

Admittedly, bilateral mutual security agreements now in force could not be terminated immediately, but this could be done over a period of years as expanded technical assistance programs by the United Nations and economic development loans and credits by the International Bank and its affiliates take over the important task of developing and expanding the economies of these nations in need of assistance.

The advantages of a fresh approach along these lines seem to me to be:

(1) More effective utilization of capital investment through international agencies employing highly competent and permanent staffs of all nationalities. The economic development of the less developed countries would thus be tied to their real best interests, as it should be, rather than to political considerations motivating either the giver or the recipient.

(2) Such proposals would eventually result in removing our well-intentioned but poorly executed technical and economic assistance programs from a miasma of suspicion, misunderstanding, and redtape. They would eliminate the uncertainties which arise each year with reference to the amount of assistance the United States will extend to a given country, from which political inferences are invariably drawn and from which our friendly relations often suffer. Furthermore, we could not be blamed for the sins of overlapping and inefficiency which have marked so many of our programs in south and southeast Asia because the planning of programs and the approval of projects would be the responsibility of the International Bank or other international organizations. In short, I can foresee the removal of many of the irritants which now becloud our relations with other countries.

(3) Our initiative along the lines mentioned would, I think, be a severe blow to the Communist bloc because it would force them to bow to the will of the majority of the members of the United Nations. If it were clearly the desire of the majority to receive technical and economic assistance through the United Nations or other international agencies, the Communist bloc countries would be virtually forced, it seems to me, to abandon their present bilateral programs and would be deprived of a political and propaganda weapon they have used with telling effect. It is also reasonable to assume, I think, that the removal of these assistance programs from international politics would lead to some easing in world tensions.

(4) Finally, while we would still shoulder the major portion of the cost of these programs, nevertheless such costs would be considerably less than is presently the case, because the total burden would be shared with other countries. Furthermore, as the economies of other countries strengthened and improved, our share in this international program of assistance would steadily diminish. Nor should we overlook the fact that additional substantial savings would arise from the gradual disbandment of the International Cooperation Administration. * * *

To what extent, however, has the security of the United States actually been strengthened by our tremendous annual outlays for military aid of all descriptions? Take, for example, such countries as Japan, Korea, and the Philippines where by treaty agreements we have been granted military bases and the right to station troops. We have been both distressed and a little bewildered by the steadily increasing pressure in both Japan and the Philippines for a return of such bases, the removal of most of our military forces, and the exercise by the Japanese and Philippine Governments of jurisdictional control over them. We have been particularly upset by the anti-American feeling which the existence of these bases and the presence of our forces, intended for the protection of these countries, is arousing. Does it not seem probable that these nationalistic sentiments will eventually force us to give up our bases? Can it be realistically contended that our security is strengthened by trying to maintain military bases in opposition to the wishes of the people of the country and/or their government?

Turning to Thailand and Pakistan, the real facts are that while the military cliques who dominate and rule these countries are avid for more military aid and strong for SEATO for this reason, the man in the street in Bangkok and Karachi wonders whether the United States actually would come to his country's aid and if she did, whether his country would not be blown up in an atomic war. There is resentment too, as in Thailand, over the large number of American military personnel in their countries and the lordly manner in which they live. The reactions of the people in these Asian countries as distinct from the ruling cliques we seldom hear because we seldom stoop to listen. In consequence we are caught by surprise when anti-American riots flare up in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines or when anti-American stories and editorials such as "Jusmag Go Home" fill the Bangkok newspapers.

The lessons to be learned from these reactions in Asian countries and indeed elsewhere in the world, seem to me to be that the value of military agreements, military bases, military rights, and military training programs are strictly limited by the real intentions of the other party to the agreement and by the attitude of the people of the country. We can and have secured military bases in many countries. We can and have spent billions of dollars in developing these bases. But does not a realistic appraisal today show that we are slowly but inexorably being forced to give up these multimillion dollar bases both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean areas by the rising tide of nationalism?

There is the further important consideration that the continuation of the very substantial military programs and spending in these Asian countries is building up armies, navies, and air forces which are becoming increasingly burdensome upon their economies and is encouraging the development of a dictatorship form of government which has taken over control in many of these countries.

We should, I submit, ask ourselves just how much we have achieved through military aid. Politically, we had hoped that such aid would solidly link these countries to us and that friendly bonds would be greatly strengthened. It cannot honestly be said that this goal has been definitely achieved. From the military point of view, we had hoped that each one of the countries aided would become little anti-Communist bastions prepared to resist a Communist assault to the last man. Here again a realistic assessment of the situation underscores the fact that none of these countries with the weapons and training we have given them could stand alone if attacked. Furthermore, if attacked, all of them would look to the United States for massive, immediate aid to drive out the invader even though they have gnawing doubts as to whether or not the United States actually would come to their assistance. Can we ourselves be sure that we would rush to the aid of say Pakistan or Thailand in the light of the awful nature of the next war and our worldwide responsibilities and commitments?

In any event, I think we now realize that the greatest danger to these countries is from subversion. To counter subversion there must be support and respect by the people for their government. There must be intelligent concern by the government for the welfare and prosperity of the people and there must be disciplined, well trained police and military forces of moderate size to preserve law and order. In all of the countries of the Pacific and south Asia we are helping, both the size and equipment of their forces is now adequate to maintain law and order. In none of these countries, in my estimation, will a continuation of our military aid, on the present scale and in its present form, have any appreciable effect upon subversion, the real danger. It is more likely that military aid will prove to be a growing irritant in our relations with these countries and is, of course, a readymade target for Communist propaganda.

I am not advocating the complete stoppage of military aid but I feel quite certain that very substantial reductions in military spending and military staffing can be effected. There is no question in my mind that some of the resultant savings could be used more effectively in sensible programs to strengthen the economies of these countries and to develop closer cultural and educational ties. It is these that engender liking for and friendship toward the United States and in the long run are of more value to us than military programs which are irritants and bases which the peoples of these countries resent.

The skepticism about the value of some of our military assistance programs, which was expressed in the last quotation, is seconded in the following comment by a respondent who has made a study of our

foreign aid program. He advocates a clearer definition and separation of military and economic assistance under the mutual security program.

While continued appropriations for military assistance will undoubtedly be required * * * for many of the free countries of Europe and the Middle and Far East, just what constitutes military and what economic assistance should, I feel, be more clearly defined. I have in mind particularly the term "defense support," one of the categories set forth in the Mutual Security Act itself. This is one of the least understood categories of our aid program and the one capable of creating the most confusion. In fact, one wonders whether this was not perhaps one motive in coining the phrase and establishing the category. The very vagueness of the classification enables it to cover a multitude of things, some completely unconcerned with defense. There was probably no single activity in the U.S. aid program, in one or more of the countries visited * * * which did not directly or indirectly receive assistance from defense support. In some countries defense support was almost entirely military; in others, almost entirely nonmilitary. In some instances, the identical item was being shipped to a country under defense support and under military assistance.

It was impossible to judge conclusively whether the magnitude of aid programs were sound in all instances, when the terminology and assignment of items were so vague. It becomes impossible for defense support funds to be always administered, distributed, and controlled with maximum efficiency when both military and International Cooperation Administration missions are by necessity involved. My understanding has always been that defense support is supposed to assist countries—where the United States has military assistance programs—to support military establishments which are larger than these countries could support without that aid. This could well be the definition of military assistance, or, in many cases, of economic aid, also.

* * * I recommended, and I still do, that the title "defense support" be abolished and that the funds and items under that category be reassigned on the basis of their primary purpose and use to "military assistance" and "economic assistance," or some other relatively clear-cut title. Once this has been done, the road would seem clear for a reconsideration of the suggestion made by certain members of the Foreign Relations Committee—in 1956, I believe—that military assistance be separated legislatively and administratively from economic and technical assistance. Perhaps this has already been done, but I note that in the President's request presented to the Congress on March 12 last, of the \$2,435 million asked for the military aid program, \$835 million was listed for "defense support."

In my visits to Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO, I found a disposition for these Governments to assume, in Turkey particularly, with alacrity, a greater military burden as its NATO share than it would seem the economy of the country could properly support even with our assistance under the categories "military assistance," "defense support," and "economic assistance * * *."

In general, under the foreign aid program, I heartily agree with the enthusiastic reference in the report of the special committee (Rept. No. 300, May 13, 1957) to the technical assistance program (point 4). This type of assistance has, of course, been in operation for many years now in South and Central America, and, during my terms of service in several of the countries of that area, I had ample opportunity to see the program at work and to note the excellent results obtained, not only in improving the health, educational, and agricultural methods in those—many of them backward—countries, but in improving our relations with the governments and people as well.

I also feel that the Development Loan Fund is a fine and imaginative approach to a difficult problem. It is almost axiomatic that countries come to appreciate more those things to which they themselves have contributed. (Under point 4, when I was in Central and South America, the majority of the countries receiving technical assistance contributed a very substantial proportion toward the expense of the program.)

If I might make a suggestion—this to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee himself—that repayment under the Development Loan Fund be made, in part at least, by establishing Fulbright scholarships or the equivalent, both for Americans to go for study in the country in question and also—most important—for extension of the educational and leadership exchange programs

now accomplishing such excellent results under the ICA. I believe this would be one of the most important contributions we could make. A further suggestion, that those Fulbright scholars going to a country from the United States might be asked to sign some form of reasonable agreement or commitment that once their term was completed they would return, or offer to return, for service in that country in one of our Government agencies, i.e., ICA, USIA, or in the Foreign Service in one of its divisions—FSO, FSR, or FSS. This might also lead the way to overcoming the language difficulty which has properly given concern to so many, particularly since the publication of the "Ugly American."

CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

Cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and other nations was described as a particularly useful foreign policy tool.

There is a second fruitful and very important area in which much can be done to stimulate good relations and good understanding. I refer to educational and cultural relationships.

Something of value already has been accomplished in this vital field through educational exchange programs such as the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt programs, as well as through the medium of the contract agreements concluded between American and Asian universities. The furnishing of teachers and professors, the granting of many scholarships to enable Asian students to study in our country, the visits of distinguished Asians to the United States, the visits of American musicians and artists to Asian countries, and the establishment of libraries and reading rooms in many of the countries of south and southeast Asia, constitute the most significant and sensible measures we have undertaken to win the understanding and friendship of these people. These programs, supported by our Government and by private organizations, have been welcomed because they are not regarded with the suspicion that attaches to both military and economic assistance and because the peoples of the area, although feeling an almost fierce pride in their own culture, are avid to absorb as rapidly as possible the essence of the knowledge possessed by other nations and particularly the technology of the West.

Our efforts must be continued in this area of expanding friendship where the exchange of knowledge is enlarging our understanding of one another. Because this has proven to be both a fruitful and successful area in our relations with the peoples of south and southeast Asia, there is every reason to expand and improve our educational and cultural programs through both governmental and private channels.

Please believe me, Senator, when I say I am not trying to curry favor by expressing my hearty approbation of your own Fulbright program of student and teacher exchange. To my mind it is one of the best methods of fostering our foreign relations favorably.

Formerly our privately founded and maintained educational institutions abroad produced several generations of leaders, statesmen, and civic workers favorable to the United States. The history of our relations with Turkey (Robert College), Lebanon (A.U.B.), Pakistan (Forman Christian College), and to a certain extent Egypt (Cairo University) is illustrative.

It is significant that when Communist inspired and directed mobs are on the march, our USIA libraries and offices are the first things sacked. What has happened to our schools and their graduates in China? Here the USIA office is running an excellent program of English teaching with four or five classes every evening. Help to our schools and the extension of library facilities is money well spent, particularly as our Government is, or should be, racking its brains to know what to do with local currency accumulations.

U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH

The three respondents who discussed our military posture were agreed in their concern that the growing reliance on nuclear retalia-

tion and the reduction of conventional forces has severely limited the alternatives of our foreign policy, and has left us exposed to Soviet moves which we cannot effectively counter.

We seem to be steadily decreasing the manpower strength of our Armed Forces and concomitantly increasing our reliance on our power of nuclear attack and retaliation. This tendency found one of its most striking philosophic expressions in the doctrine of "massive retaliation" and one of its most frightening recent confirmations in the President's statement in his press conference on March 11 to the effect that we cannot fight a ground war but are wholly dependent on our nuclear armament. There are two basic dangers in this pattern of behavior and speech. First, it is psychologically wrong in a time of crisis and danger because it is both discouraging and lulling to our own spirit and it encourages the enemy to think we are both irresolute and weak. Second, and worst of all, it leaves us in a weak if not hopeless position against any aggression with conventional forces and weapons.

It is said that we need not worry over this eventuality because we will more than counter a conventional aggression with the use of our nuclear weapons. This does not reassure me because I, for one, am anything but convinced that in a showdown we will dare to loose a nuclear war if the other side does not. The responsibility is too great, the moral obloquy too heavy, the danger to our own existence too overwhelming. If my suspicion is correct, where would this leave us? I suggest that it would leave the enemy free to make conventional thrusts with minimal risks and optimum hopes, thrusts which we, unbalanced and weakened in conventional forces, cannot defeat. The evidence would seem to indicate that we may already have reached this unhappy condition.

Our primary aim is not the discreditation of Marxian socialism no matter how alien it may be to Americans—though not to many of our friends. Our basic aim is to survive Soviet imperialism. Since this may take decades to achieve, our immediate concern is with security.

More adequate defense and particularly special task forces

This requires adequate nuclear weapons, as well as advanced missile delivery systems. However, since it seems unlikely that the Soviets will risk nuclear war in the foreseeable future, it should be expected that they will resort to indirect aggressions fought by satellite forces or volunteers. It is therefore of major importance to maintain special task forces to contain these local conflicts. The contradictory testimony of military experts on this point indicates we do not presently possess such forces. The success of the Lebanese landings was partly due to the fortuitous circumstances that Beirut lies on a sea patrolled by one of our major fleets. Next time we may not be as lucky.

Your statements, as reported in the press, indicate that you clearly see the connection between power and diplomacy; and that on this basis, you have your own doubts about the material means we possess for a successful negotiation of the complex matters which go by the collective name, "The Berlin Crisis." If I read your statements correctly, I share those doubts with you. The policy in force since 1953 of cutting back on our conventional arms, finds us now in the paradoxical position of being disarmed by our arsenal of nuclear weapons—disarmed, because we cannot use them as a credible riposte to the sort of probing operations the Russians are conducting at Berlin. And since we are disarmed in a sense, by our nuclear straitjacket, our diplomacy lacks vigor. * * *

If Western Europe is the place to plant our economic-military-diplomatic lever for use in moving objects elsewhere, it follows that we want a live Europe instead of a dead one. And from this it follows that a military policy that reaches for nuclear weapons as its main ingredient, is a self-defeating policy, in that it guarantees a dead Europe. Moreover, a military policy tailored to the concept of "limited nuclear war" is also a policy which is likely to lose us our European allies. For what this notion comes down to, is confession that America and Russia realize that the nuclear weapons are too dangerous to use against each other. Hence they will be used against Europe or on European terrain alone.

What we need is a military policy leading to military forces in being that will not be more terrifying than the fear of hostile threats. That is to say, we need to raise, without delay, larger complements of conventional forces, though made more mobile and effective from the standpoint of firepower. If such U.S. forces were in being, the diplomatic result would cut two ways. First, it would signal to Russia our own determination to resist their probing operations. Second, it would signal to our European allies that we stand with them in our willingness to preserve their physical integrity and independence, even at the sacrifice of American lives.

The diplomat's concern over the limitations which military strategy places on our foreign policy is implied in the above quotations. It is quite explicit in the following comment:

Bismarck's greatness was illuminated by his ability to hold the Prussian generals in check and subordinate the military machine to foreign policy objectives. In World War II, we had no Bismarck. Much of the evil that came out of it stemmed from the paramount influence of the Armed Forces in setting war objectives. War is political. There is no such thing as "military war." The American military mind seems not to understand that the ally of today can perfectly well be the enemy of tomorrow and that the converse is equally true.

ALLIANCES

Several letters were critical of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. They questioned the military value of these alliances and held that they were a definite political liability.

Let me comment next on a most important part of the policy we have been pursuing with respect to Southeast Asia, namely military pacts and military assistance. When the Communists struck in Korea in June 1950 our reaction to this act of aggression was not only to repel the invader by force of arms, but also to work out plans for the Far East and southeast Asia which it was hoped would build up a defensive ring of sufficient strength to contain and prevent further Communist aggression and/or expansion. For southeast Asia the banding together of eight nations, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States under an agreement concluded at Manila on September 8, 1954, would, it was felt, augment and strengthen the various bilateral military assistance agreements concluded with Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan.

What in point of fact has been the value of this defensive pact as a barrier to further Communist aggression? What effect has it had on our relations with the countries of south and southeast Asia and how effective is it against Communist subversion, the principal danger facing these nations today?

As a deterrent to further overt aggression, I believe it has value, although it must be noted, and the Communists have noted, that the execution of its provisions is made subject to the constitutional processes of each signatory. Furthermore, the Communists are shrewd enough to know that the Western signatories to the pact, including the United States, might well hesitate to commit their forces in defense say of South Vietnam or Thailand for fear that what seemed to be a limited thrust might in fact, be the commencement of World War III. The pact doubtless does make the use of naked force less attractive to the Communists in part at least because of the likelihood of military counter-measures by the SEATO nations and in part because by subversion and a campaign of blandishments they are slowly achieving their objectives.

On the other hand it is clear that SEATO has not attracted the majority of the countries of the area and has not proved to be the political magnet, or anti-Communist nucleus hoped for by the planners. The fact is that although the Philippines, South Vietnam (not a signatory), Thailand, and Pakistan support the Manila Pact, Burma and Indonesia are opposed to it, while Cambodia and Laos have indicated they would rather not have SEATO's "protective umbrella" extended over them. This is also the attitude of the newly independent nation of Malaya, even though it is known to be strongly anti-Communist. As is well known India is openly hostile to SEATO, which her leaders seem to believe is part of a plan to arm Pakistan against her.

We have been disappointed by the reaction of the majority of the Asian nations of the area to a defensive arrangement designed to insure their independence and security and perturbed to find that it is regarded as a device whereby the Western Powers and the United States are seeking to entice Asian nations into a military alliance against the Communist bloc. The fact that Great Britain and France, former colonial masters, are members of SEATO and that the West conceived and dominates the alliance, has been sufficient to arouse their suspicions and sharpen their dislike of this organization. In consequence it has done nothing to improve our relations with Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, and India. If anything, it has aroused further misgivings and strengthened their belief that we simply do not understand their strong desire to avoid entangling military alliances and to pursue an independent course. Even in Thailand, there are those who question the wisdom of their country joining SEATO and thereby risking the horrors of a war which would probably be largely fought on or over Thai territory. We are here face to face with another Asian point of view and state of mind that should be given the most careful and searching examination. Our urgent preoccupation with Communist aggression in Korea and elsewhere in Asia has caused us to believe that the conclusion of regional and bilateral military pacts and the giving of military assistance from Pakistan to Korea are the best preventive to further Communist moves.

As far as one out of official position can judge, we are placing too much reliance on ineffective, weak, "paper" alliances of a military nature. I have in mind SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, as examples. These are provocative, without adding commensurate military strength.

This last commentator goes on to deplore the primarily military aspect of the NATO alliance, advocating the development of economic and political ties among the countries of NATO.

Even in the case of NATO it has always been my strongly held belief, and one which I formerly put forward officially as often and as forcefully as I could, that a purely military alliance is the weakest kind, held together only by fear and subject to the fluctuations of that emotion. Little progress in substance appears to have been made in recent years in the direction of broadening NATO's base in nonmilitary directions. There is an appearance of periodic political consultation which does not go very deep or remain very constant, and of economic cooperation there seems to be very little. Moreover, we have constantly appeared to upset our allies by unilateral pronouncements and actions without prior warning or joint exploration (some of them have done the same, of course). If these appearances are belied by the facts, then there has been a serious failure of government and press to correctly inform and educate the people.

It is my personal belief that NATO should be given common elective organs—at least an Atlantic Assembly—to bring it home to the various peoples as a reality and to foster intimate joint consultation, planning, and actions in political and economic as well as military spheres. Why should there not be a pooling of the resources and actions of NATO countries in a program of aid to underdeveloped countries, for example? It is often said that public opinion in the United States is not ready for any such developments. But I see no evidence that the Government has ever made any attempt to prepare the way for a change of climate.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

While warning against naivete in our dealings with the U.S.S.R., several men asserted that we must be more active and positive in our attempts at meaningful negotiations.

There are still people (not, I think, in the Department of State) who have not been able wholly to rid themselves of the notion that if we will only trustingly lean over backward to demonstrate good will toward Communist regimes—if we will only "go the second mile"—these regimes will be bound to reciprocate. No more dangerous conception could threaten our security than this noble but fallacious idea. We learned through bitter experience in Berlin and Germany, at the Council of Foreign Ministers, and on other occasions since the war, that the only result of such an idea will be that we will not be met halfway, that

what we offer will be taken and more too, that we will, in short, "lose our shirt." * * * in the quadripartite meetings in Berlin after a generous advance halfway in just this spirit to meet the Russians, the latter would reply, "all right, we accept your offer and now let's work out a compromise between that and our position." It seemed to me that this dangerous notion, that a mixture of Christian good will, Rotarian fellowship, American businessman's bargaining, and a dash of Gandhian nonresistance will remove the spots from any tiger, was somewhat exemplified in the pronouncements of the recent Fifth World Order Study Conference in Cleveland, called by the National Council of Churches. * * *

The contest with Soviet policy, specifically with regard to Germany.—In this area, our objectives are correct, in my opinion: elimination of Soviet forces from Germany, unification of the country by free and democratic means, restoration of freedom and democracy to East Germany, and preservation of our hard-won new relationship of cooperation with the (West) Germans so miraculously following decades of quite a different relationship. Our steadfast resistance to increased Soviet penetration has been admirable. But I believe that our execution of policy in detail has been too static and too unimaginative. Our initiative and proposals have been too few and far between and too defensive. The Soviet Union almost invariably "opens the dance" on each new go around on German questions and gets credit in the world at large, however misplaced, for actually trying to change a bad situation. We have relied on somewhat spasmodic repetition of our formula: settlement by the four powers, free elections, no talk of a peace treaty until a unified government exists, and a Germany free to choose her friends and allies in the future. Parts of these formulas are undoubtedly sound. For example, a peace treaty cannot be fully drafted, let alone concluded, prior to unification; free elections are ultimately indispensable; and a neutralized Germany would be a troublemaking delusion as well as a sacrifice of strength and of a new German outlook beyond what we can afford.

However, there is leeway for variations on these themes. I think we could trust and should encourage what the Russians are pleased to harp on as "all-German talks," and I was very pleased that Senator Mansfield vigorously affirmed this same position. I think, too, that we should develop and give early voice to the fundamental principles of an eventual German peace treaty as we see it. This would extricate us from our present unfavorable position in which we oppose an aloof attitude of disinterest to very specific Russian peace treaty proposals. Further, we might propose a confederation of the two parts of Germany in combination with free elections, to give some variety to the discussion and to seem less "sticky." We certainly ought to explore and throw out limited suggestions for a demilitarization and/or a denuclearization of some part of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, but only after unification. I think we ought long ago to have seized upon the Rapacki proposals as a means of opening the door to further talks about German unity. It was right to reject those specific proposals but the rejection, at the same time, of talks about the proposals and other aspects of the German problem was scarcely calculated to advance our policy.

The essence of diplomacy (which is simply the sum total of the political means of advancing foreign policy) lies in motion and thrust, in probing and proposing. Here we have been weak, and have lost not only the initiative most of the time, but also even the appearance of really wanting German unity and peace, to say nothing of the possibility that we have missed some point of contact permitting serious negotiation and solution.

In attempting to discuss this thorniest of all problems in our foreign relations, my first suggestion is that we stop emphasizing our opposition to communism and totalitarianism and talk more about imperialism, which is the aspect of Soviet policy we really ought to reveal and to oppose.

Experience points to the wisdom of dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. Thus I support wholeheartedly our expensive military establishment and our network of alliances for defense purpose. It seems to me, however, that despite the intransigence and unreasonableness of the Russians, it is important to negotiate with them constantly and fearlessly and without too great insistence on the methods which we consider proper. With respect to meetings of Chiefs of State—so-called summit meetings—admittedly preliminary conferences at the Foreign Minister level would be useful, if for no other purpose than to agree upon the agenda, but Russian opposition to this procedure should not prevent the holding of the type of meeting Khrushchev has proposed.

I also feel that trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites could be expanded and liberalized without creating any greater danger to our national security than already exists. Our policies on this kind of trade and the policies we have insisted upon for our allies have been too rigid.

From a long-range standpoint, and taking into consideration the developments and the rapid changes in military weapons, we ought to envisage the eventual removal of our troops and our bases from foreign countries, starting with those in Europe nearest to Russian territory. I do not mean, of course, that this should be done without comparable concessions on the part of the Soviet Union, but the possibility of it should be explored to the utmost. I am convinced that no real progress on disarmament and a reduction of the crushing financial burden of military preparedness will be made until the Russians are satisfied about two things: (1) That they are not in danger of attack by us from nearby bases, and (2) that there is no possibility of the resurgence of Germany as a strong military power. My belief is that, while the U.S.S.R. respects our strength and military potential, it has a mortal fear of Germany, and that no unification of that country will be possible unless a means for removing this fear can be found.

A much harder line was taken in the following quotation:

The Communist revolution, from 1917 to 1921, could have been stopped a dozen times by the exercise of a little firmness and tenacity. In dealing with the Soviets (dislike to call them Russians) it should never be forgotten that they are not governments in our sense. They are and have been a criminal association, holding to power by ruthless exercise of terror like our own gangsters (may I be permitted to say also labor unions?). Look at the progress of all our recent dealings with them. In each meeting they have at once advanced points intended to get our forces eliminated from areas of contact. Just as the gangster or burglar tries to get the policeman off the beat where he desires to operate. It is not that they fear we will attack them. They know perfectly that our own public opinion is conditioned to defense, rather than offense. If, by harping on withdrawal of American and our allied forces from certain areas, they can obtain such weakening of the potential police force it would be no time at all before a series of "peoples' democratic movements" would take over other small peripheral countries as they acquired Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Albania and nearly got Greece. Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan are probable victims. If we tried to act after the event we would be "counter-revolutionary imperialists."

I speak, read, and write Russian fluently; and I have maintained contacts with many Russian groups. All is not sweetness and light and perfect control in Mr. Khrushchev's bailiwick. As was inevitable and has been pointed out by the Yugoslav Djilas, a new class has been created in Communist countries. Lenin ruled by cold intellect and the impetus of the Marxist revolution. To him the common man was an insect or a chemical particle to be manipulated. Stalin ruled by sheer, heavy-handed terror. Mr. K must keep his power by favoring the new class, jealous of their privileges. For the military power which he brandishes from time to time to scare us, and which must not be taken too lightly, Mr. K is dependent on the scientists to whom Marxist slogans are a stale joke. He cannot start a Stalin-like purge. If he did, a nuclear explosion might occur in unpleasant proximity to himself. The young people, also, are getting somewhat out of hand in their desire for capitalistic fleshpots. If those two groups felt that Mr. K was leading them into a war which would, while possibly ending the capitalist world, also deprive them of what little satisfaction they can get out of being a new aristocracy there could be a prompt change of leadership in Russia. At the present Mr. K is top dog because he best expresses the hope of the ruling minority to stay in power. An American politician or party might regret losing an election but could hope for a comeback. A Soviet leader or the Communist Party cannot relax the reins of power for a moment. This is the point that our propaganda should emphasize and our policymakers never forget. By all means let the Soviet Government compete with us and even win the right to pick up the bill for impracticable schemes of underdeveloped (a nice bit of semantics) countries. If they can undertake global economic help it is obvious that their requests for credit to buy our machinery are colossal effrontery and contemptuous presumption that types like Cyrus Eaton can control our foreign policy, and for their own selfish benefit, push us into economic and political suicide.

Summit or any other conference with the Soviets is practically doomed in advance. Soviet delegates other than Khrushchev himself are only office boys bound by instructions from which they cannot budge (hence Mr. K's time limit of 3 months for a Foreign Minister's conference). At the summit, how can President Eisenhower or Prime Minister Macmillan make a promise of concession which their respective parliaments might not approve, thereby giving the Soviets a magnificent propaganda topic showing up the futility of western systems of government? Remember President Wilson and the League of Nations?

The one thing which Khrushchev does not want is a war over something outside Russia. While the high Soviet military command would fight like tigers to defend holy Russia there is reason to believe that they are unhappy over the Zhukov episode and would like to get rid of their political commissars and also that they are discontented with the policy of militarizing China. The spectacle of a 600 or 700 million nation, avid for more living space, on their eastern frontiers is enough to give any Soviet general nightmares.

Here then are certain weaknesses or potential weaknesses on which our representatives can harp. In the meantime continue to push the exchange of visitors. The risk of admitting Soviet spies is illusory. They already have most of the information they want and can get the rest from our newspapers and magazines, or regrettably, from our public figures and loosemouthed military spokesmen. The more nationals of the U.S.S.R. see our well-dressed visitors and can observe for themselves the difference in living amenities between their country and the despised capitalist world, the more discontent in Russia will grow.

In the mixture of conflicting statements, threats, and withdrawals of threats, emanating from Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, certain ones can be retained. Mr. K has said he wants to return Berlin to the Germans and proposes to do so by handing it over to East Germany. He also admits the presence of some foreign allied troops in Berlin and that neither the Soviets nor the East Germans have any intention of preventing access to the city. Our present forces in Berlin are too small to be other than immediate victims in case of conflict; a further reduction could scarcely matter.

Why should it not be possible to take Mr. K at his word, publicly call the attention of the world to his declarations and agree with him to turn Berlin back to the Germans, hence we will take similar action and turn West Berlin back to West Germany? In that way our rights and obligations in the city would be preserved, our forces and possibly some United Nations observers would remain as witnesses for the observance of agreements concluded and the magnetic effect of the higher living standards of Western Germany continue to exercise its attraction on the East.

This would probably not please anyone, however, and in any case would have to be discussed and agreed to among our allies and the West German regime as unity of policy among the Western Powers is the absolute essential.

The following reply suggests that we might have at least some indirect influence on internal Soviet developments.

"Containment plus" instead of "containment period"

The ultimate aim of survival presupposes an eventual absorption of Soviet imperialism by less aggressive Soviet ambitions. This is not a Utopian illusion of academic "Bolshevismologists". The widely publicized opposition of such eminent experts on Soviet affairs as Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich to an altered Soviet course indicates their fear that these changes may undermine basic Soviet principles and policies sponsored so vigorously in the past by Molotov himself. The leashing of the police, the extension of policymaking functions to subordinate Party organs, the periodic thaws and the obvious reluctance of the authorities to deal harshly with such recalcitrants, have already produced internal changes some of which neither enhance popular discipline nor strengthen the authoritarian rule essential for a willful, aggressive foreign policy.

Though this trend is relatively immune to outside influence, it can at least occasionally be accelerated and need never be retarded by western policy. The Kremlin's 40-year-old justification for its aggressive policy, the alleged determination of the West to destroy Russia, can sometimes be turned to our own advantage among the population which longs for peace and security by convincing demonstrations that our enmity is illusory. Every additional contact, intellectual, cultural or political assists this effort. But convincing demonstrations of peaceful intentions cannot be achieved by resonant demands for

"deeds and not words". The alternative to sterile stubbornness is not appeasement but careful exploration of all potential avenues for progress.

One respondent analyzed at some length the Soviet approach to the negotiation process.

I think it is important at the very outset of these remarks to note that to a Soviet official the word "negotiations" means something quite different than it does to a Westerner. To one of us the word implies a process of mutual accommodation to reach mutual agreement in mutual long-range benefit. I emphasize the word "mutual" because that is of the essence in the Western concept of negotiations.

To a Soviet the act of negotiation means quite a different thing. It means trying to do one's enemy in. It means trying to achieve by conference the same and which otherwise might be sought by armed force, subversion, propaganda or other means. A Soviet looks upon negotiations as a method to achieve gain, not as a method to adjust differences. To the Kremlin, of course, these differences will always continue to exist with the outside world just as long as that outside world is not controlled by the Kremlin.

The Soviets, however, have also another view of negotiations. In it they separate public negotiations from secret negotiations. Public negotiations they consider to be essentially propaganda or psychological warfare operations. This is their view of the United Nations conferences, meetings of Foreign Ministers and "summit meetings." If such meetings are to have substantive value, the Soviets believe, they have value only insofar as they serve to endorse or "rubber stamp" agreements which were previously developed by secret negotiations. There are bound to be exceptions to any such broad statement as that which I have just made. One was the Panmunjon negotiations which served not only as a propaganda forum but also to buy time for North Korea and Communist China to rebuild the military strength they had lost in the spring of 1951. I suppose the only generalization which can safely be made about public negotiations is that the Soviets believe they can be made to serve almost any purpose other than what the Westerner expects them to serve.

Now, what about secret negotiations? These are, of course, what the Soviets now so ardently seek with the Western World, particularly with the United States. I do not now propose to enter into either the question of Soviet objectives on the question of the negotiability of disagreements which exist. What I should like to present is a brief discussion of why the Soviets are so attached to secret negotiations, of what kind of man the typical Soviet negotiator is, and of what kind of man he expects to meet in serious negotiations.

Why are the Soviets so devoted to secret negotiations?

There must be a number of reasons. One is that secrecy is congenial with the conspiratorial character of communism. Another is that the Russian mind in itself seems particularly prone to secrecy. Perhaps, I may suggest, a thousand or more years ago the early Slavic peoples, living in the defenseless steppes of Great Russia and the Ukraine, had to develop a special brand of duplicity in added defense against the onslaught of the central Asiatic tribes. The inheritance of Byzantium must have added to the Russians' own native secrecy. Tartar rule must have taught them even more.

Still other explanations for the Soviet attachment to secret negotiations come to mind. Any Western observer in Moscow is struck by the old-fashioned appearance of Soviet architecture, theater, manners, political philosophy, and practically everything else. This need not be surprising. Marx wrote *Das Kapital* more than 100 years ago, and the Soviet state was founded on this 19th century underpinning. The 19th century was a century of secret negotiations and secret diplomacy. Finally, of course, secret diplomacy has paid off handsomely for the Soviets. They were well satisfied with the Molotov-von Ribbentrop talks which led to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. They have been pleased by other secret talks they have had. They have never been seriously disappointed by the fruits of secret diplomacy.

What kind of person is the Soviet negotiator?

One could say many things about him. I shall mention only five of his qualities. Firstly, I would say, he knows his subjects very well. He has done his homework. He has a sense of history. He knows his government's policies and his government's aspirations. He knows how far he can bluff, and he has no fear that some colleague is indiscreetly going to tip off his hand. He knows a lot

about his opponents in any negotiations because his MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) has provided ample dossiers on them for him to read. Indeed, he usually knows his Western counterpart far better than the latter knows him.

Secondly, the Soviet negotiator eschews personal publicity. What he says, he says to further his government's interests, and he keeps himself out of the statement as much as possible. In thus de-emphasizing himself he is able to work with singleness of purpose.

By and large, the Soviet negotiator is secure in his job. In many ways he may be a good deal more secure than his western opponent. Any Soviet negotiator entrusted to sit down with a Westerner very probably has behind him a long record of connection with the MVD. Certainly he has been thoroughly "checked out" by the MVD. He may for other reasons feel insecure about his status in the party or government bureaucracy, but he does not feel insecure in his job at the moment. The Western stereotype of the insecure Soviet negotiator should have died at the time of Stalin, if not before.

The Soviet negotiator is patient. He feels that time is on his side and that he is moving with history. One of his characteristics is that he will seldom take any initiative in opening negotiations. He waits for time to bring his opponent to him.

Finally, the Soviet negotiator does not employ personal relations as we do. He never expresses a personal opinion. He will never expound his official point of view and then add that personally, however, he rather thinks such and such. American diplomats have noted that even during the worst of American-Nazi relations just before Pearl Harbor they often managed to retain some sort of personal tie with their Nazi counterparts. This may have consisted of only a fleeting impression or of an obscure gleam in the Nazi's eyes, but something was there. It never is in the case of the Soviet negotiator. The gap, ideological, cultural or whatever it may be, is too great.

What does the Soviet negotiator expect in his Western counterpart?

In dealing with important subjects the Soviet official will treat only with the Westerner whom he takes to be a *syeriozni chelovyek*, that is, a serious man. Better translated, the phrase means a professional, as distinct from an amateur. The Soviet thinks it is not only foolish but even dangerous to try to do business with an amateur. These, then, are a few of the attributes of the *syeriozni chelovyek*.

One is that he knows his subject as well as the Russian.

Another is that he be a man of discretion, that is, that he never violate a confidence. He cannot seek personal publicity for himself. Should press leaks occur, the Soviet blames the Westerner and will no longer take him seriously, even though the leak may not have been the Westerner's fault at all. The Soviet thinks that his counterpart should have taken proper precautions and that failure to do so is unpardonable.

The Soviet negotiator expects all *syeriozni chelovyeks* to be tough minded. He has no use for vague idealists. He could not take them seriously.

The Soviet expects that any man dealing with important subjects is a man of proportionately great influence within his own government or company. The Soviet would not deal seriously with anyone whom he considers a boy sent to do a man's work.

The final attribute of a *syeriozni chelovyek* which I shall mention is that he must be patient. This attribute is not one which is easily gained. It is only natural for a Western negotiator to press for quick results, to want to hurry home to his family, to want to make a name for himself as a man who can influence the Russians. It takes a very special type of integrity not to try too hard.

This brings us to the end of our examination of the *syeriozni chelovyek* except for one more thing which may be said of him. This is that ability in personal relations will be an important factor in his success as a negotiator, even though it is much less important to his Soviet opponent. The *syeriozni chelovyek* must be a man of clear integrity, and he also should be an engaging personality in all social relations with the Soviets. He must never engage in petty meanness with them. It is only this type of man who can ever expect to earn the respect of Soviet negotiators and have any influence at all with them.

All that I have said so far is by no means intended to suggest that Soviet negotiators are supermen but only that they are highly competent people. They can, of course, be matched by skilled negotiators from the West. But negotia-

tors from the West had better be syeriozni chelovyeks in their own right if they are safely to confront Soviet negotiators on matters of importance.

OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAM

While the value of the overseas information program was affirmed, it was generally felt that it was not as effective as it might have been. One respondent, pointing out that an information program can be no better than the material with which it has to work, blamed the ineffectiveness of the U.S. Information Service on a foreign policy which he feels to be insipid and hollow. Suggested changes in the overseas information program ranged from its reincorporation by the Department of State, to further refinement and tailoring of information programs to fit particular countries and to subtly promote certain current policies.

The propaganda of the word is an empty sounding thing without the propaganda of the deed. I mean by this, that it is foolish to expect the U.S. Information Service with its Voice of America, to win "propaganda victories", when there is so very little we have done in the last 6 years that is worth crowing about. We have had no new idea like the Marshall plan, no new idea like NATO, or the like. What we have had instead, is a general slide down hill, with a great deal of moralizing pumped out to fill the gaps in our strength. If the Voice of America seems ineffective, it is simply because it has had no solid stuff fed into it for dissemination throughout the world. So long as wind alone is fed into it, wind alone will be ground out by it.

"With greater coordination and emphasis on timing, the U.S. Information Agency can become an invaluable adjunct to American diplomacy. It is now embarked on a wise program of disseminating news of a factual character. One weakness of the agency is overemphasis on spot news. The Communist derelictions of yesterday are permitted to seek the sanctuary of oblivion. Techniques of mass media could be greatly refined and become of much greater value to foreign policy. This enters into the sphere of the more subtle shades of foreign policy planning.

If we are to make effective use of information media and such media if carefully prepared and sensibly used, can be useful instruments of policy, it is necessary that the subject matter and theme of our programs be thoroughly revised. We must realize that the continuous beating of the anti-Communist tom-tom does not impress neither does it win us friends. The Asians say, "we are not afraid of the Communists so why are the Americans constantly telling us to beware of them." The fact is, they believe we are engaged in a gigantic propaganda effort to win adherents in the cold war.

There is urgent need for our information programs to be tailored to suit each country of southeast Asia and not mass produced in Washington. Such programs can only be produced by Americans having real knowledge and understanding of the individual countries. Careful study will reveal the subjects, both domestic and foreign of principal interest to each country. These should form the basis for the preparation of programs which will be understandable, instructive and entertaining. Let us make it plain that the United States is deeply and sincerely interested in them and their problems, that we are not seeking to aline them with us, that we understand and respect their opinions and views with respect to international affairs, that we stand ready to help them with their problems of development, if they so desire, and finally that colonialism is as distasteful to us, who have experienced it, as it is to them. * * *

Continuous Communist propaganda in support of the peoples of southeast Asia in their struggle to throw off colonial rule has, without question, made a deep impression. It has done much to convince them that it is the Communist countries who understand Asian grievances and injustices long suffered and that the Communists are their true friends.

We have made strenuous efforts to counteract this propaganda and to convince our Asian friends that we are lovers of liberty even as they are. We have sought to turn the tables on the Communists by exposing their doctrines and techniques and the falsity of their peaceful and friendly pretensions. It cannot be said that we have been very successful for the simple reason that we have unfortunately become inextricably linked with the support of colonialism which has bitten deep into the minds and emotions of millions of Asians. On the other hand, communism is a system of government they have not experienced and its dangers, therefore, they do not clearly see. Furthermore, in Indonesia, Burma and some of the other countries of the area, the Communists enjoy a degree of political respectability and influence which is reflected in electoral gains and seats won in parliament, their dominant position in labor unions and trade guilds, and the growing number of their adherents among students, teachers, writers, and intellectuals. The fact is that our counter propaganda is not proving effective. Even in Thailand, where the most friendly and receptive atmosphere has existed, the people are becoming surfeited with anti-Communist lectures, plays, posters and radio broadcasts. Indeed, in some cases our programs have been known to arouse a curiosity concerning the Communists and their doctrines which previously did not exist. It has also engendered unfortunate notions in the minds of village folk, many of whom are beginning to confuse community activities with communism.

It is recommended that careful study should be made of the failure of our propaganda efforts and of the means that should be taken to increase their effectiveness. "Failure" is the proper word, for we are more and more considered in great and important areas of the world as an "imperialist" country, whereas, in those same areas Russia is considered to be the friend of the smaller nations and the enemy of imperialism notwithstanding the Russian annexation of a large part of Finland; the destruction and annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; the annexation of most of Poland, and the subjection of what remains; the annexation of part of Germany and the subjection of East Germany; the annexation of part of Czechoslovakia and the subjection of what remains; the subjection of Hungary and the brutal suppression of the movement for freedom in that country; the annexation of part of Rumania and the subjection of what remains; the subjection of Bulgaria and Albania, and the unsuccessful attempts at aggression against Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

It is suggested that in our propaganda we emphasize the history, culture, and virtues of the countries to which the propaganda is directed, mentioning only infrequently our own history, culture, and virtues, and those aspects of Russian history and culture which it is desirable to bring home to those to whom our propaganda is directed.

An information service is vital to our national welfare. It should be continued and expanded. We are still new at a very complicated game and have made mistakes, but the need is there and we should strive to satisfy it * * *.

May I say further that the task of our information service would be made less difficult if spokesmen of the Government would not summarily reject every Soviet proposal as being old stuff, taking immediately, as it were, a negative position. Even if the Soviet proposal is in fact and on its face worthless and impractical and made perhaps solely for purposes of propaganda, to reject it offhand is to play the Soviet game and give them the propaganda material they seek. Why can we not publicly welcome their proposal, say we will study it, and then later destroy it with logic?

It is further suggested that the Information Agency should be put back into the State Department. The argument that the Department should be divested of "operations" is specious. Diplomacy is itself a highly operative function as the Secretary's travels indicate. Furthermore, the Government agency responsible for defining policy should also be responsible for propagating it. Not only does the separation attenuate the connection between foreign policies and their popularization but it automatically produces a useless duplication of policy, research and analysis and overseas represented staffs. The writer

firmly believes in the value and importance of the information activity. However, he suspects that its potentialities are occasionally overrated. Furthermore its effectiveness is often limited by the unavailability of highly qualified personnel so that numbers are used as substitutes for genuine talents.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

In the section entitled "Foreign Aid" are included several quotations in which it is stated that by extending aid under the auspices of an international organization, U.S. interests would be served while the suspicion and fears of the nationalists would be allayed. In a similar vein, one respondent writes that the critical situation in north Africa can be resolved only by the action of an international organization. Evaluating the U.N. from a rather more narrowly defined national interest point of view, a second letter argues that the United States, unlike the U.S.S.R., has not used the U.N. as an effective instrument of its foreign policy since it has been inclined to regard the prestige and work of the U.N. as a good in itself.

Our continued emphasis on the use of the United Nations facilities to implement our policies is sound and should be extended. The same is true in respect of the International Bank and the Fund. With nationalistic sensitivity emerging so forcefully in so many parts of the world, use of United Nations and other international machinery reduces the fear of the smaller nations that they may be exploited, or as Soviet propaganda would have it, subjected to a "new form of colonialism." * * * Libyan leaders were determined to prevent a return of Italian control in any guise; they feared that the British and the French planned to supplant the Italians; and they sought safety in close ties with the United States and association with the United Nations. On every occasion they expressed their preference for assistance through the United Nations. They felt more secure in accepting the help of an international organization. If they could not get help and guidance from the United Nations, then they hoped the United States, which they were inclined to trust, would come to their aid, but they were most reluctant to look elsewhere.

This same emerging nationalism carries with it a fanatical insistence on equality, both national and individual. This is particularly true in Algeria at the moment, where, I am convinced, mutual distrust is so deepseated no solution will be possible in the foreseeable future except under some form of international umbrella. A United States, a United Nations or some form of international guarantee must be part of any peaceful solution. The emerging nations remain tied to their former masters culturally, economically, and financially and they are deeply suspicious of all moves of the former suzerain. They want a policeman to protect them.

The United States should use the United Nations to advance U.S. interests and avoid having the United States used to advance U.N. interests. Anyone familiar with the atmosphere of Geneva in the days of the League of Nations or with the atmosphere of the U.N. in New York today, will recognize the existence of a sort of dual loyalty. Personnel of the Secretariat and of the delegations of member nations—with the exception of personnel of the Communist states—seem at times involved in a conflict between the interests of their country and the interests of the U.N. There is no question of conscious disloyalty to their own country. There is rather a superloyalty to the ideals of the U.N., a feeling that the future of their own country and hopes of peace depend on the success of the U.N. This conflict obviously does not exist as regards personnel of the Soviet Union or of the delegations from countries controlled by the Soviet Union. They work wholeheartedly for the interests of the Soviet Union and use the U.N. in every way possible to advance Soviet interests.

A case in point is the Hungarian revolution of 1956. After the first phase of the revolution when the Hungarians had defeated the Soviet armies and the Soviet Union promised to negotiate a withdrawal of their forces from Hungary, there were a few days when the frontier with Austria was open and people moved readily from Austria to Budapest. It would have been feasible at this time for a U.N. Commission to proceed to Budapest, install itself in the Parlia-

ment buildings and observe proceedings. The presence of such a Commission, preferably with the Secretary General at its head, could well have deterred the Soviet Union from the course which it later followed and have prevailed on the Soviet Union to carry out its promise of withdrawal from Hungary. There is of course no absolute certainty today that this would have happened, but the presence of a body of delegates from the leading countries of the world, with the Secretary General at their head, would undoubtedly have made it much more difficult for the Soviet Union to have proceeded with the destruction of Hungary and the enslavement of the Hungarian people. At least it was worth trying. And there cannot be any doubt that it was in the interest of the United States to bring about a withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Hungary and the restoration of freedom to that country. Yet our delegation made not a move in this direction but confined itself to declarations and resolutions for the record.

To have dispatched a U.N. Commission to Hungary would have involved risks. The Soviet Union would have resented it, might have arrested members of the Commission or even have withdrawn from the U.N. This would have been a blow to the prestige of the U.N. and could have proved fatal to its continued existence. At this time, however, another serious crisis claimed the attention of the U.N.—the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel. In this crisis a working alliance in the U.N. between the United States and the Soviet Union could force the three countries to withdraw from Egypt and gain a victory for the U.N. while removing the troublesome Hungarian question to the realm of oratory. This was done. The result was a vast increase in Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, with corresponding losses to the United States. The Soviet Union made every possible use of the U.N. to further its own interests. The United States helped save the U.N. but sacrificed its own interests.

III. ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

To many foreigners with whom I have discussed some of our foreign problems our handling of some of the really critical world issues has seemed tired and almost despairing—as if we were resigned to the fact that we were doing all that could be done in an almost hopeless situation. That opinion of intelligent and often friendly foreigners carries the suggestion that it is not so much the basic lines of our foreign policy which need alteration but the method of putting the policy into effect.

We have suffered severely, in my opinion, from a lack of authoritative leadership in foreign affairs. In our system only the President can give such leadership. Well-timed, fairly frequent and purposive speeches and declarations are necessary to coalesce our own public opinion and will, and to project an image of ourselves to friend, foe and doubter around the world. Statements by press secretaries or even Secretaries of State do not serve the purpose. Neither do occasional Presidential press conferences with homely homilies and off-the-cuff pontifications about foreign policy. These serve no calculated purpose and make no strong impression; in fact they frequently diffuse the image. Without strong and consistent leadership, too, the apparatus of worldwide propaganda is hamstrung and ineffective, however rich it may be in radio transmitters, staffs, programs, and budgets. Moral leadership and political leadership depend on having a policy, enunciating it clearly, strikingly, and often at the top, and pursuing it relentlessly. In these respects, we have been less than wholly successful.

Foreign policy, with its many facets, involves planning, the execution of plans and the capacity of decision; otherwise foreign policy becomes an academic study. Its rationale is diplomacy. In it economics plays a major role.

There is no effective alternative in foreign policy to centering the coordinating authority in the Secretary of State, acting under the President. Abroad, the ambassador should be the theater commander with authority over the entire American establishment within the country of his post. This implies the choice of ambassadors with the capacity, judgment and courage to exercise authority with restraint and wisdom. Otherwise, we shall never have the effective planning and execution of plans essential for a successful foreign policy.

* * * action taken in any one area is frequently, if not usually, affected by repercussions to be anticipated in another area. The President, therefore, must weigh the advantages of a proposed line of action in one area or on one problem against its disadvantages in another area or areas. It is for this reason difficult to criticize specific courses of action followed by the President on a particular occasion unless in possession of all of the facts available to the President, which, by the very nature of things, can never be the case.

As many of the principal shortcomings in our conduct of international relations in recent years seem to me to derive rather from faults of organization and methods than from mistaken policy, I shall devote most of this letter to a discussion of rather mundane matters that are of fundamental importance but too often neglected.

For purposes of what follows below, by foreign policy I have in mind overt foreign policy, particularly the policy which governs our relations with other members of the free world coalition and with the uncommitted nations. I do not include secret diplomacy or the covert foreign policy and processes which we have been compelled to adopt in the cold war, and I shall not address myself to them at this time. In covert foreign policy we must be prepared at times to use all the raw power we possess and our policy necessarily has a large military component. In overt policy this is less true; there we often can and usually should employ the faith and moderation which are distinctive of the strong.

I honestly cannot perceive much basic difference between the foreign policy objectives of the present administration and those of its predecessor. Both seem to be well-rooted in the American national interests and American creed. Granting that foreign policy is a human institution and that it can never be perfectly executed, I would still maintain, though, that we as a nation are more tolerant than our present international position entitles us to be of the gap between the ideal application and the actual application of our foreign policies. One measure of success or failure in foreign relations is the magnitude of that gap.

When I speak of application of foreign policy, I have in mind its inner system of priority and emphasis, its timing and patience, as well as the character and professional skill of those who are engaged in the activity. I have in mind, also, all the human beings involved in the process, from the most powerful decision-makers in Washington to the humblest consular clerks in the banana ports.

Purposely to use an oversimplification, I shall define my thesis as being that the "how" and "when" of foreign policy are often no less important than the "what" and that their importance is growing as the cold war stalemate continues and as pressures mount for speedy economic development in the less-favored nations. * * *

This it is, I believe, that even in international relations there is application for the axiom, "Save the pennies and the pounds will take care of themselves." Let us assume that the "what" of our foreign policy is realistic, that it serves our national interests, that it is the kind of policy of which we are proud and which commands respect and understanding abroad. Then the "how" and the "when" come fully into their own. A professionally done "how" and a carefully timed "when" in all the multitudinous little bits and pieces of day-to-day foreign policy conduct will go a long way to heal the irritations and solve the misunderstandings which come from living in a shrinking world. Even a hard-boiled realist in foreign affairs—if he is really a realist—will not deny that development of a standard of values which gives adequate emphasis to good means, understanding, thoughtfulness, and generosity in our overt relations with other peoples will be conducive to good ends, that is, in this case, to foreign policies which will serve America well.

THE ROLE AND NATURE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

The sentiment was widely expressed that the Foreign Service is all too often bypassed in the formulation and execution of policy. International conferences, and the direct participation in negotiations by the Secretary of State and his deputies have usurped the traditional diplomatic role of the Foreign Service officer, oftentimes to the detriment of our foreign relations and to the demoralization of the Foreign Service. One respondent made a very serious charge that Foreign Service officers have been reprimanded and even penalized for sending in reports and recommendations which are unpalatable to some of the higher officials in the Department of State.

In recent times there has been a strong tendency, for which the United States has been in large measure responsible, to substitute statements to the press, notes addressed publicly by one government to another, oratory in international assemblies, and discussions in meetings of Foreign Ministers and Heads of State, for the quiet and unpublicized negotiations between Ambassadors and foreign offices which has in the past been the most fruitful source of international agreements and which still, in the midst of all the hulabaloo created by the more recent practices, remains the most useful and productive means of

transacting business between nations. The United Nations has its place in international relations, but its usefulness has distinct limitations and it is a fundamental error to suppose that its activities can take the place of diplomacy. When we say that we propose to leave such and such a matter to be dealt with by the U.N., we usually mean in practice that we do not propose to grapple with some difficult problem. Statements to the press and public debate of international issues by means of notes exchanged between heads of state also have their uses but these uses are limited too. They should be resorted to only when in some specific case their employment would seem to be conducive to the accomplishment of some specific end. In most cases they militate against agreement and in some cases they make agreement impossible. They are certainly no substitute for diplomacy. "Summit meetings" and formal meetings of Foreign Ministers have perhaps become unavoidable but we should certainly participate in them only in very special circumstances when they seem to be conducive to some particular desired result. Travel abroad by the Secretary of State should certainly be restricted to an irreducible minimum. What little benefit such travel has accomplished recently could have been more easily accomplished by other means; the disadvantages of the practice are numerous and obvious. In particular it tends very forcibly to undercut the Ambassadors in the countries visited, whereas it should be the policy of this Government to build up our Ambassadors and enhance their influence and prestige by every proper means. If the Secretary of State arrives in a foreign capital to deal directly with the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Minister will naturally tend to ignore the ambassador and perhaps to await another visit of the Secretary of State rather than negotiate with our accredited representative in his capital. Many ambassadors feel strongly on this point but for obvious reasons they say little about it.

To sum up, it should be our policy to do everything possible to increase the effectiveness of diplomacy by negotiation between our accredited ambassadors and the officials of the governments to which they are accredited, and between the Department of State and the foreign ambassadors in Washington, and to make clear that it is through those established channels that we propose, except in most unusual cases, to conduct our international relations. In particular the Secretary of State should be primarily the architect of our foreign policy and the effective executive head of the Department of State and the Foreign Service and only secondarily, and in unusual cases, a traveler or a negotiator. * * *

The day has passed when our diplomatic and consular representatives abroad frequently felt that they had been entirely forgotten by the Department of State. There has been marked improvement in recent years in the routine methods of keeping them informed in regard to matters of interest to them. The result, however, of the recent practice of the Secretary of State to deal with important matters himself by travel and personal interviews, has sometimes been that it was thought unnecessary to keep ambassadors fully informed on matters of higher policy. In some cases this tendency has gone so far as to result in the intentional failure to inform ambassadors in regard to matters of vital concern to the performance of their duties. A change of spirit and practice in this matter is much to be desired. * * *

Until recent years diplomatic and consular officers of all ranks in the field were encouraged to report objectively and to make recommendations in accordance with their best judgment. If it ever happened, and from the nature of human beings, it is possible that it did, that any officer was ever reprimanded or penalized for such reports and recommendations no instance, as far as I have ever heard, became known. Now all that is changed. It is common knowledge in the Department of State and in the Foreign Service that Foreign Service officers have been reprimanded and even heavily penalized for making reports or recommendations unpalatable to certain persons in the Department and that they have been ordered not to repeat the offense. Foreign Service officers have been known to state that under present conditions it is unwise to the point of foolishness to send in dispatches which, because of the inclusion of unwelcome facts or unwelcome recommendations, will be displeasing to officers of the Department. This situation and this attitude are said to be characteristic of the Soviet foreign service also. It is a most reprehensible practice and it creates a highly dangerous situation.

In my opinion, too, the Foreign Service is improperly used. One must take Secretaries of State as they come, no doubt, but the present one appears to con-

stitute his own one man Foreign Service and to use the abilities and experience of his worldwide staff in only the most routine way. Frankly, I think this is impossible and wasteful. The Foreign Service is left to revolve and produce endlessly within itself and for itself, knowing that its views and ideas will only meet themselves in the end and have little practical effect. This is damaging to the spirit and growth of a fine body of highly trained public servants, and it also impoverishes our development and execution of policy. I believe it should be recognized that Foreign Service officers have a real and proper contribution to make to the formulation of policy (final determination of policy must always remain in the hands of responsible political officers of the Government of course), and they are grossly wasted when used as the merest routine administrators of policy.

I believe also that morale in the Foreign Service has been impaired by the increase in what might be called peripatetic diplomacy. Our diplomatic mechanism has, rightly and traditionally, been based upon a system of chiefs of diplomatic missions who were once regarded as spokesmen for our chief of State—whose words carried real weight. They were thus properly equipped to negotiate and in other ways put into effect our foreign policy. No one who is familiar with conditions abroad is unaware of the decreased prestige of our ambassadors. This situation will continue as long as foreign governments are conditioned to do business direct with our Secretary of State and other high officials of the State Department which our diplomatic mission chiefs, aided by high-speed communication facilities could do as well—perhaps better. Just so long also will we suffer from the inevitable consequences of the pressures of foreign travel, entertainment, and negotiation upon officials whose time and energy should be carefully husbanded for thoughtful planning and unhurried administration of our foreign relations in Washington.

One may not deprecate the importance of international conferences, held under suitable circumstances, or the value of high level contacts when necessary, but there is no substitute in diplomacy for the competent ambassador. He is the essential catalysis of foreign policy.

Finally, while it has nothing to do with policy per se, I cannot refrain from saying that, although I have great admiration and respect for the sincerity, dedication, and ability of the present incumbent, I do not believe that the interests of our country and the morale of the Foreign Service are best served by having a peripatetic Secretary of State who apparently leaves little of importance to be done by his subordinates and our ambassadors abroad—and this to the point of physical and mental exhaustion.

Replacement of "personal diplomacy" by more orthodox methods

With regards to the machinery of policymaking and policy execution the American system has made considerable strides in the very few years since the United States emerged as a great power. However, a number of relics of the past still hamper our diplomacy. For example our lack of a professional tradition has encouraged expedients such as "personal diplomacy"—the practice of bypassing established diplomatic channels.

The leading British authority on professional diplomacy, Sir Harold Nicolson has perhaps best characterized this practice.

"Nothing" he wrote, "could be more fatal than the habit of personal contacts between the statesmen of the world * * * Repeated personal visits on the part of foreign secretary of one country to the foreign secretary of another should not be encouraged. Such visits arouse public expectations, lead to misunderstandings and create confusion. The time at the disposal of these visitors is not always sufficient to allow for patient and calm deliberation. The honors which are paid to the minister in a foreign capital may tire his physique, excite his vanity or bewilder his judgment. His desire not to offend his host may lead him with lamentable results to avoid raising unpalatable questions or to be imprecise regarding acute points of controversy. Locarno" Nicolson concludes "should have convinced us of the desirability of keeping our statesmen segregated, immune and mutually detached." To Locarno, he might have added the Suez crisis and the negotiations preceding it.

There are of course further arguments against the practice: The temporary paralysis of the decisionmaking process in the absence of the secretary; the tendency for the established channels of communication to atrophy leaving a dangerous vacuum when the Secretary is no longer in office; and finally the personal antagonisms which personal contacts produce almost as frequently as friendships.

Bypassing the Foreign Service is not a unique phenomenon of the last few years as the following quotation makes clear:

* * * The application of our foreign policy in that area [Morocco, 1942-43] was taken largely out of the hands of agents of the Department of State but was directed personally by the President and his special representative. The result was a lamentable lack of coordination between officers reporting directly to the Department of State and the instruments of the President * * * A subordinate vice consul in Casablanca was chosen—without even the knowledge of the Consul General himself—to notify General Nogués [French Resident General in Morocco] of the landings. In view of the subordinate character of this emissary Nogués refused to take the operation seriously with the result that there were more than 3,000 needless casualties among American and French troops which might well have been avoided (as Nogués himself later stated to me) if there had been the proper coordination between agents of the White House and those of the Department of State in the field. The President, of course, has the primary responsibility for the direction of our foreign affairs but if these are to be conducted in an orderly manner and most effectively it is essential that care be taken to make the fullest possible use of our regularly appointed representatives abroad and that there be the fullest coordination of effort on the part of all those concerned.

The following quotation contains a number of perceptive comments on the professional qualifications of America's overseas representation.

I suppose in the final analysis that improved application of U.S. policies abroad will depend more than anything else on improving the attitudes and qualities of the men and women who are engaged in the activity. Such improvement will be hard to make. To raise morale and performance in any large organization is immensely difficult. Yet, the logical place to start creating the required "How" and "When" in our foreign policy is in the Federal organizations which operate abroad, particularly the Foreign Service.

I think by far the best source of good ideas about improvements in the performance of the Foreign Service, USIS, ICA, and other Federal organizations would prove to be the members of these organizations. What are their grievances and constructive suggestions? Who better than they, for instance, might explain and draw useful conclusions from the intriguing circumstance in South Asia that ICA success in Ceylon is generally reputed to be very good, in India to be good, and in Pakistan to be poor? Who better than they might point the way to how the tactical conduct of America's relations with foreign governments and peoples can be more decentralized from the sprawling, brawling machinery of government in Washington? Who better than they might offer workable recommendations on how to make a foreign career in Federal service so satisfying and meaningful that it will attract the best talent? Have their thoughts ever been collected systematically? I doubt it. Yet one of the first steps in improving any organization is to consult the human being in it. Failure to do so is to be authoritarian, and in these days authoritarianism is poor management.

Not that I wish to be alarmist about the qualities of Government representation overseas, for I cannot see much deterioration since the war, but I do fear these qualities may not be growing as rapidly as the heavier demands which each successive year makes on them. My own observation is that the principal competitive representation overseas, that is, the Soviet, has undergone considerable improvement in the last 5 years or so. This is not too surprising when one considers that Soviet Russia has authority to train and assign any citizen for duty abroad. We do not. Our representation has to meet the competition of alternative careers.

An acid test could be made of the management of our representation abroad. Ask of their college professors about the human qualities of the young men who have recently entered the Federal organizations overseas. Were they among

the best of their class, the leaders, the creative, the daring? Only to the extent which they were can one be at ease that the United States is developing the kind of professional corps of overseas foreign policy administrators which these times require.

I have at last reached the point of speaking about a professional corps of foreign policy administrators. This is, I believe, one of the most important elements in our whole foreign policy process, because only a professional corps can be expected to deal competently with the "how" and the "when" of today's problems. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to try to lay down a detailed description of a professional corps. A few attributes may, however, be mentioned.

A professional corps no longer has any room for chiefs of diplomatic, ICA, and USIS missions who are qualified mostly by reason of domestic politics or personal friendships. Wherever they may come from (and certainly many will and should continue to come from outside government), American interests require that they be men of demonstrated competence at living abroad and dealing with foreigners of all categories. They should be of that breed of men who can inspire skill, satisfaction, and teamwork everywhere around them. While their role has changed greatly in recent years, chiefs of missions are still the spearheads of American influence in foreign communities. Is it unrealistic to expect that an impartial control group at the highest level of government may be formed some day to pass on nominees for these positions?

There is little to be added to what Sir Harold Nicolson has already described as the attributes of a professional diplomat. Certainly his definition could be expanded to refer to USIS, ICA, and other Government personnel serving abroad. It might in these times be expanded also to caution against too frenetic activity, particularly in the less-developed countries. The freshet of Quiet Americans and Ugly Americans would subside were Americans overseas to slow down, to listen more and talk less, to be more patient and tolerant. Few foreign operations are benefited by a crusading approach or by American competitiveness, "hard sell" and hustle. One mark of the professional is that he does not try too hard, too obviously.

How closely America's representation abroad can approach these standards of value and conduct depends in large measure, I suppose, on how clearly Government leadership sees the need and how much priority it is prepared to give to improvement. But, even despite this, I daresay that current history may be readying some pretty stiff decisions in regard to our foreign representation.

Our principal competitor—the Soviet—stints no more on foreign representation than he does on propaganda and military outlay. And he is showing results. His representatives are becoming more polished all the time, more subtle and extremely good linguists. If over the long run we are to meet the competition, not only from the Soviet and private enterprise, but also from the comforts of life at home nowadays, it is going to cost money. Provided the money is well spent in developing the kind of professional corps which America needs, I personally would not mind too much if it even came off the top of the foreign aid budget. The few tens of millions of dollars a year needed to do the job would be money far better spent than some of the military aid programs in recent years.

Money alone, though, is not enough. Sooner or later there will have to be a more sharp distinction within the Federal Government between foreign service and domestic service, with considerable advantage going to the former not only in financial emoluments but also in more favorable employment regulations and in the multitude of small intangibles which go to make a satisfying career. The unhappy trend since the war to amalgamate foreign service and domestic service will have to be reversed if for none other than the simple reason that the standards of value and conduct of Federal domestic service are not very effective in foreign countries.

One retired diplomat blames the low repute of the U.S. diplomatic service on unwise administrative procedures connected with the consolidation of the consular and diplomatic services into the Foreign Service in 1924.

To find an explanation for the American blindspot toward diplomatic representation, one must go back to the old consular service. American trade and commerce and the annual flood of American tourists made a career consular service necessary. It became well organized, efficient and popular with Ameri-

cans. Subsequently a career diplomatic service came into being. It included only the subordinate ranks. (Only in 1946 was the class of career minister established.)

The consular service was dominated by a consular clique made up of a group of highly competent, dynamic individuals. Abroad, in the old concept of life, consuls were not considered socially eligible and were not admitted to good clubs. They were never invited to court or governmental functions in the capital. Usually, their existence was ignored by their own diplomatic mission.

The result was inevitable. The consuls looked with envious disdain on their career counterparts in the diplomatic service whom they regarded as Ivy-league snobs and dilettantes. As a result of consular pressures, the Rogers Act became law in 1924. It consolidated the consular and diplomatic services into the Foreign Service.

While this consolidation was and is desirable, through unwise administrative measures of the past the results have been unfortunate in the extreme. The diplomatic service has been consularized, the consular service downgraded.

In the old days, the consul general in the great capitals was a personage of very considerable importance. Today, he is a semianonymous subordinate on the staff of the Ambassador, and the Ambassador finds himself in reality filling the role of consul general.

In less important posts, there is no consul general, frequently only a vice consul or two. There the Ambassador is inescapably the consul general.

The result is, of course, that the Ambassador becomes deeply involved in executive and administrative functions that are unrelated to his diplomatic functions. In certain posts, the minister counselor has ceased to be a political officer because of the pressure of his executive and administrative duties.

All this is accepted in the United States with complacency and even the word "diplomatic" has fallen into disrepute. As an adjective it is used only in connection with immunity and the pouch and then only because it is irreplaceable. Otherwise it is carefully avoided. This is a state of mind that militates against successful carrying out of foreign policy.

AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS

In discussing the effectiveness of the Foreign Service, there was considerable criticism of the manner in which ambassadors are selected. It was repeatedly asserted that abuses in the appointment of political ambassadors not only frequently result in poor representation of American interests abroad, but are also damaging to the morale and quality of the Foreign Service. There was also a complaint that ambassadors are not allowed to remain a sufficient length of time at one post.

The efficiency of the Foreign Service, is, of course, a basic element in shaping and applying a satisfactory foreign policy. In that respect I cannot refrain from a reference to the anachronistic practice of appointing chiefs of diplomatic missions on a political or other noncareer basis. In the past we may have been able to afford this luxury, but we can no longer do so. We use experts for those needs in our daily lives where professional services are obviously required but we entrust the top representation of our country in some foreign countries to amateurs at a highly critical time. I would not deny that some "political ambassadors" have been able and highly effective but that fact does not at all justify the continuance of a practice which is outmoded, unsound, and damaging to career morale.

Foreign policy without efficient, competent diplomatic representation abroad is under a grievous handicap. Such representation abroad the United States has very rarely had. The fault lies with the White House and the Congress. The question is of sufficient importance to foreign policy that it merits analysis.

At the birth of the Republic, diplomacy was of paramount importance. American emissaries abroad included the outstanding figures of the American scene: Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, Gallatin—indeed our greatest names. Perhaps no individual contributed as much to American independence as Franklin, the representative of the American Colonies in Paris.

After the War of 1812, interest in diplomatic representation abroad waned. It has never revived. Until recent years, all appointments of chiefs of mission were political, and many still are to this day, especially to the more important embassies. Occasionally, political appointees have been men of ability. Frequently they have been unsuited for their responsibilities and some have been ludicrous. It is obviously difficult for foreigners to view such appointments as an indication of American interest in a serious and consistent foreign policy. Indeed, these appointments represent a supreme anachronism.

There is not much use in trying to improve our foreign policy unless we provide means to make it effective. One of the most important means is our Foreign Service. The greatest weakness of the Foreign Service today is the traditional practice of making political appointees chiefs of missions—men who contribute to the campaign funds of the political parties, lame duck politicians, etc. Certain of the most important and responsible ambassadorships are reserved for political appointees: London, Paris, Rome, Madrid. This discourages many able young men from seeking a career in a profession in which the highest posts are closed to them. What young man would enter the Army, Navy, or Air Force if he knew that he could never become one of the top generals or admirals? Or what young man would enter the profession of law or any business firm or bank if he knew that he could never aspire to be one of the heads of the organization? This creates a vicious circle: There are not as many outstanding Foreign Service officers as there should be capable of serving as Ambassador at London, Paris, etc.; but as long as outsiders only are named to these posts, this condition will continue. There are, however, at present enough officers in the Foreign Service capable of filling effectively these top diplomatic posts; if they were appointed to such posts, this would have the immediate effect of encouraging others in the Foreign Service as well as the most able young men in and just out of college to plan to make the Foreign Service a career.

Countries that have been in this business of foreign affairs longer than the United States—Britain, France, etc.—make it a general rule to name professional officers to their top embassies.

This is not to state that situations may not arise in which it would be wise to appoint some outstanding leader from civil life, a well-known educator or financier, to London or Paris, to carry out some particular mission requiring special experience and abilities which can scarcely be expected from even the ablest foreign service officer. But such cases should be the exception.

But it is not only these top diplomatic posts which are filled with political appointees. Other posts of importance to the interests of the United States are also often given to men of no experience in foreign affairs. These men sometimes get the United States into trouble or they fail to keep the United States out of trouble. Then there is a general demand for the appointment of a capable professional officer to save the situation. Cuba is a recent case in point.

Today, when it is a truism to say that we are engaged in a life and death struggle with the Soviet Union for the preservation of our way of life, when 76 cents of the tax dollar goes for the cost of past wars or for preparation for possible future wars, it would seem that the time has come to end the easygoing business-as-usual practices of the past, and to take every possible measure to strengthen that arm of the Government dealing with foreign affairs. A self-denying ordinance by the leaders of the two political parties that they would henceforth refrain from making political appointments to the Foreign Service would be a highly encouraging move in this direction.

If we are to have the most effective foreign policy it is essential that we strengthen our Foreign Service. President Hoover took a great step forward to this end when he insisted that the chiefs of mission in Latin America be professional career officers. President Roosevelt, in general, with a few notable exceptions, continued the trend toward appointment of career diplomats as ambassadors and ministers, as did President Truman. President Eisenhower has to a certain extent reversed the process by his greater emphasis of service to the party in the selection of diplomatic chiefs of mission.

It is difficult to see how competent and ambitious young men can be induced to give their lives to a service wherein the top posts are reserved for political

appointees. No successful commercial enterprise in the United States would tolerate or would be likely to remain solvent if some 50 percent of its principal executives were selected on the basis of their friendship for the president and irrespective of their technical qualifications. This is not to say that certain key posts in the Foreign Service should not always be open to Americans of outstanding attainments whose background may make them more suitable and effective as American representatives than a professional officer. There are, however, many regions of the world where the problems of foreign relations, by their complexity, demand a background only attainable by long professional experience. These posts should be manned, generally, exclusively by career Foreign Service officers. It would be, nevertheless, shortsighted to confine appointments of career officers to these more difficult posts where, as it generally happens, the amenities of life are largely lacking. To attract to the Service our best brains young officers must be given the assurance that they may aspire, on the basis of their merits, to the highest and most attractive foreign missions, not excluding the larger and more important capitals. In the study which I made * * * after the last war, I found that in the entire British diplomatic service only one post was occupied by a political appointee. As late as the Spanish-American War high-ranking officers were being appointed to the Army for political reasons. The folly of this practice resulted in its discontinuance. It should be today as anachronistic as it is now in the case of the Army if we are to have the strongest possible cadre of professional officers.

In part, personal diplomacy has been encouraged by another and perhaps even more serious defect in our system: the inadequacy of our representation abroad by persons with no demonstrated ability, experience, or training. It is not suggested that only career diplomats should be made Ambassadors. There are frequently a half dozen or even more experienced political leaders, Government officials, and others with demonstrated experience and ability in the conduct of international affairs who should be utilized as Ambassadors not only to make the most of their talents but also to prevent ingrown complacency and provide fresh blood in the professional career service.

There is, however, no justification of continuing the system, inherited from an era when foreign affairs played no great role, of appointing as Ambassadors congenial businessmen or loyal wardheelers. At the present time, the United States cannot afford the luxury of depriving itself of professional observers and negotiators in the key positions in our embassies abroad. Furthermore, it undermines American prestige when we need it most. It is overstraining the credulity and good will of governments and their publics to expect them to believe that the United States has a serious interest in international relations if its top representatives are prominent bankers, successful merchants or even wealthy racehorse breeders with no demonstrated professional skills in foreign affairs.

The complacent defense of this practice with the oft-made remark that so-and-so, though initially unqualified, did not do a bad job, is too often only justified by the good manners of foreign governments in refraining from outright complaint or by overlooking the costly precautions the State Department has devised for preventing blunders and neutralizing incompetence by backstopping amateurs with valuable deputies badly needed elsewhere.

Occasionally, the practice of filling our ambassadorships by the system used to officer armies prior to the Crimean War is justified by pointing out, as one recently did, that in all its history the United States has not yet made an irrevocable diplomatic blunder. Doubtless Lord Raglan used the same defense for his officers while the Light Brigade was galloping up the Valley of Death.

If the career service is not providing adequate professionals the remedy would be to improve its recruitment and training programs—not to supersede it with known nonentities.

The practice of appointing Ambassadors whose principal or only qualification is political services and campaign contributions to the party in power is often considered to be so deeply imbedded in our political mores that it is useless to suggest that it be discontinued. We have, however, in the course of our history succeeded in discarding other equally undesirable practices. There was a time when our entire diplomatic and consular services were filled with political appointees. Has not the time come when the importance of our foreign relations makes it imperative that our Ambassadors should be the most highly competent professional diplomats available, with the proviso, of course, that in

highly important posts in highly exceptional circumstances it may be advisable to appoint as Ambassador a statesman of the first rank who may not have had professional diplomatic experience? It would seem to be unnecessary to adduce all of the sound arguments in favor of this reform. It is obvious that it would enhance the morale of the Foreign Service and increase the efficiency of our representation abroad. If it is politically impracticable, I venture to suggest that there could at least be effected a very considerable reduction in the percentage of the political Ambassadors and that the Committee on Foreign Relations could make it a practice to insist that any political appointees possess, in a high degree, at least some of the qualifications desirable in an Ambassador.

There has recently developed a most unfortunate practice of recalling or transferring Ambassadors after 1 or 2 years in a given post. The very nature of the ambassadorial function—that is, establishing friendly relations with and gaining the confidence of the most influential officials in the governments to which the Ambassador is accredited in order that he may discover what they are thinking and planning, in order that he may influence their thinking and planning, and in order that he may negotiate agreements with them—requires a tenure of office of several years. Among the most successful Ambassadors in history some have remained at a single post for 10 years or more. It is recommended that a tenure of office of at least 4 years become the ordinary practice in this country.

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

In addition to the difficulties of recruitment which were posed in the previous section, it was charged in one letter that the alterations in the admissions procedure which were effected in 1953, have seriously lowered the standards of the Foreign Service.

However wise our statesmen may be they must rely in the conduct of our foreign relations on the Foreign Service of the United States. A well-organized Foreign Service of superior quality is essential if we are to have a sound foreign policy. From the time of the Rogers Act, an effort was made to recruit systematically highly qualified men for this Service. For many years, inadequate appropriations made the process extremely difficult, as selection was necessarily limited to men of means prepared to use their own resources in their country's service. As the importance of the Service became better understood, particularly after World War I, appropriations were gradually increased and the system of selection on a wider basis was vastly improved. In 1931 a committee, including the best men available from the universities, business, and diplomacy, was appointed to revise the system of examination and selection. The committee was reorganized in 1946, and from then until 1953 it continued to function in an advisory and supervisory capacity. Its members included such men as the president's of Harvard University and of the University of Minnesota and the dean of Stanford University, the secretary of the college entrance examination board, and the Director of the Educational Testing Service, two former Under Secretaries of Commerce, personnel officers of several large corporations, and others with particular competence and experience in the techniques of examination and the selection of personnel. In 1953, during the wave of anti-intellectualism associated with the name of Senator McCarthy, the whole system set up by this committee and operated under its supervision was summarily destroyed without even an attempt by those who carried out the work of destruction to understand just what it was that they were destroying. The Foreign Service was wristonized and debased by the admission at all levels of a large number of unqualified men and women and by a general lowering of intellectual and educational standards. It may require 20 years to undo the damage that was done to the Service by wristonization, but the attempt should be made and should begin as soon as possible.

Proposals, current for several years, to create a Foreign Service Academy were vehemently rejected by one 30-year veteran of the Foreign Service.

In the training of Foreign Service officers, I would resist all proposals for the establishment of an academy, after the model of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Academies. If a Foreign Service Academy were established, we would probably find it caught like the military academies, in a narrow, parochial groove. From what I have been able to see after 30-odd years in and about the Foreign Service, the best officers we produced came from among those who had the most extensive and intensive training in the liberal arts, including languages. Our object must be to attract men of this sort as they are produced by our colleges and universities across the Nation. It is not to restrict the range of choice to any machine-produced class of graduates such as an academy might turn out.

The importance of language training as a primary tool of the Foreign Service officer was stressed in one reply:

The current drive in the State Department to improve language acquisition is of tremendous importance and should be expanded and stressed until every representative abroad of the U.S. Government who is implementing our foreign policies is fluent in at least one of the major foreign languages and has a working knowledge of the language of the country to which he is assigned. It is just impossible for a Foreign Service officer effectively to implement the policies of the Government and keep it informed of developments unless he speaks fluently the language used by the people among whom he is operating. Although English is spoken with varying degrees of fluency by officials of most foreign offices, a Foreign Service officer cannot mingle as he should with persons of influence in the country or with its people unless he knows the language.

The lack of area specialists was bemoaned in another letter:

The Congress should review its attitude in the matter. Also, it should generously provide funds for the training of area specialists. The United States is woefully lacking in area specialists for the Middle East, southeast Asia, Africa, and even Latin America. On the other hand, these regions do not appear to lack area specialists for the United States.

REFORMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Reforms in the Department of State were suggested that would allow top officials more time for reflection and long-term planning. It was also asserted that the Policy Planning Staff should be allowed to fulfill the function of long-range planning for which it was originally established. Other proposals included the organization of a section for consular and commercial affairs under an additional Under Secretary of State and an overhaul of the Department's burdensome financial procedures. One respondent warned that the atmosphere in the State Department was not conducive to imaginative and creative thinking.

The nature of the work of top officials in the Department makes it essential that they should be able to devote ample time to the consideration of important matters about which they must make decisions or recommendations. However, the top echelons of departmental officers, at the peak of the organizational pyramid, are under heavy pressure from the work moving upward from the pyramid's base. Consequently, the highest officers, whose decisions are of the greatest importance, not only are unable to devote enough time to all of the important matters which come to them but they often have insufficient time for the kind of deliberate, contemplative approach to a problem which may be required to produce the wisest decision. The more important the officer, the greater is the pressure.

This situation could be corrected by two means: First, the provision of more officers at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and, in some cases, at the next echelon below; and, second, the strict enforcement of a policy of delegating more responsibility for decision making from the Secretary down through the Deputy Assistant Secretaries. It is obvious of course, that this process of delegating responsibility should begin at the top.

As our foreign problems become more complex and dangerous the need for adequate foreign policy planning becomes more acute. The policy planning

staff of the State Department represents a desirable concept which has never been properly effectuated. Too much of the time of the head of that important office and his staff is devoted to working on current emergencies or to functions other than real planning.

The Department is badly in need of a group of properly qualified officers who will be required, and permitted, to plan in the true sense of the word. Their planning should be comprehensive and farsighted and they should never be employed for any other purpose. A more effective coordinating mechanism should be created to relate their work to the work of the bureaus.

It is, of course, of first importance to maintain in the Department of State and elsewhere in our Government an atmosphere which encourages the freest thinking, both orthodox and unorthodox, about our foreign relations. The kind of foreign policy which we must have cannot emerge from planning which is circumscribed intellectually by "out of bounds" marks. In recent years, complete freedom of thought in exploring all avenues down which our foreign policy might best be diverted has not always been encouraged. Nor has there always been a disposition to face distasteful facts. Wishful thinking is dangerous in foreign policy formulation.

In a rapidly changing world, the exact blueprinting of our foreign policy is, of course, impossible. Main lines of firm policy (strategy) should, however, be evolved from a process of careful planning; tactics can be changed as necessary. I believe that many senior Foreign Service officers feel that there is need for better planning of our foreign policy in the State Department, where that planning should properly take place.

Only good planning or good luck can substantially reduce the hazard of embarking on policies which we might later wish to abandon if we could do so without serious loss of prestige. Is it not possible that, with better long-range planning, we might have moved differently in the early months of the Indochina crisis? Or that we might have rid ourselves of the embarrassment of Quemoy and Matsu before we had permitted ourselves to be placed in an awkward and dangerous position—which we still occupy? Or that many aspects of the Arab problem, including Egypt, could have been handled with better results? Or that we might have launched adequate economic development programs for some countries before they moved so far toward the Communist orbit?

* * * the policy planning staff of the Department of State has often failed to fulfill its original long-range planning function because it has become involved in day-to-day problems and "crises."

It would be very timely to consider a reorganization of the Department. If such a reorganization were to include a large section for consular and commercial (not economic) affairs under an additional Under Secretary of State, the political and economic officers of the Department would be relieved of a great volume of time-consuming nonpolicy functions.

Another element which impedes the functioning of the Department of State and the Foreign Service is that both are hemmed in by a jungle of fiscal fungus in which laws, rulings, regulations and procedures have wildly proliferated. Both the Bureau of the Budget and the General Accounting Office wield dictatorial authority. Then there is the annual, protracted, and fine-combed inquiry in the Halls of Congress. All this has added enormously to the expense of administering both the Department and the Foreign Service.

In World War I, when the United States was neutral, the American Embassy in Paris was charged with the protection of the interests of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman Empires and of Bulgaria. Large sums were disbursed. One young clerk was in charge of the bookkeeping and accounting. He never worked overtime and, so far as is known, not a cent went astray. Today an enormous staff would be required to do the same work. All this is a particularly glaring example of the evils of the bureaucracy of the fiscal jungle. It should be the policy of Congress to remedy this situation as rapidly as possible. Also, from a foreign policy point of view, the fiscal year is a ball and chain on long-range planning, which is frequently essential. It also makes the administration of foreign aid more difficult.

SECURITY PROCEDURES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

State Department security procedures were scathingly condemned in one letter which described a rather frightening, all-pervasive, apparatus which constantly checks both the public and private lives of State Department personnel.

The exaggeration beyond all reasonable limits of the attempt to achieve security in Government personnel is one of the great misfortunes of our times. The Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States have been among the principal victims. There is a widespread impression that since the death of Senator McCarthy and the removal of McLeod to a post where his influence for evil is greatly reduced the excesses and injustices of the security program have come to an end. It would indeed appear from all reports that they have been greatly reduced but it must not be forgotten that the security program has become institutionalized. There is a large organized body of men in the Department of State—I have no knowledge of their present number but they were several hundreds a few years ago—whose sole business is to spy upon and report upon their colleagues and associates. It can hardly be supposed that these men, many of whom have little capacity for anything else, have ceased the practices which they were originally organized to perform. I know that desks were periodically searched, that private correspondence, even while going through the mails, was opened and read, that telephones were tapped, that servants were asked to spy upon their employers, that secretaries were asked to report upon the men for whom they worked, and that Foreign Service officers were asked to make a practice of spying upon and reporting anonymously upon their colleagues. I do not know whether it is true or not but it is very generally supposed that listening devices were installed far and wide in offices and presumably also in private homes. It must be emphasized that these activities were directed not against persons individually suspected of disloyalty but were directed against the generality of officers and employees in the Foreign Service and in the Department of State. It was widely believed, and I think correctly, that much of the information collected by these nefarious means was used for purposes that had no relation to the loyalty and security program. It was said that only the guilty would suffer and that the innocent had nothing to fear, but there are many men and women, perhaps oversensitive by nature, whose virtue is above reproach, who cannot live and work happily in an atmosphere of suspicion as the victims of constant espionage. That such a system is susceptible of abuse and that outrageous abuses have actually occurred cannot be denied. I have myself, in the performance of duty, seen enough reports of security officers and dealt with enough cases of outrageous injustice to have some idea of what a system of this kind accomplishes.

The whole loyalty and security program in the Department of State should be carefully and radically reformed. A principal feature of this reform should be a careful tabulation of the men and women who have left the Foreign Service during these last years:

How many were dismissed for due cause?

How many were dismissed unjustly and should be reinstated?

How many were forced by improper pressure to resign or retire?

How many resigned because they could not afford to continue in the Service?

How many resigned because they would not tolerate the espionage to which they were subjected?

The answers to these questions would, I am sure, produce some highly significant material. The reform should involve not only changes in spirit and practice but also the replacement of such personnel as has demonstrated and sometimes expressed its belief that Democrat, New Dealer, Radical, Socialist, Leftist, Communist, and subversive are synonymous terms.

SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS AND PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION

A number of the retired officers were appalled by the increase in personnel, the multiplication of staffs and bureaus, and the accompanying sluggishness of operations. They were also concerned with

the growing number of agencies now involved in making and executing our foreign policy.

The machinery of Government has become so vast and cumbersome that rapid decisions are virtually impossible unless a crisis becomes sufficiently urgent and grave for White House intervention.

* * * we seem to have a superfluity of personnel abroad to accomplish our purposes and I think that it results in a lack of human touch in our relations with other countries.

Our present machinery for formulating policies in the executive branch seems to me unwieldy and cumbersome, and as time goes on the situation is becoming worse rather than better. In general, I feel that on the executive side altogether too many departments or agencies, with only a peripheral interest in the question or issue involved, have a voice in the formulation of a given decision or policy with the result that an inordinate amount of time and effort is consumed and action is delayed to our national detriment. Likewise, procedures within the State Department are apt to be cumbersome: again too many offices or bureaus have a finger in the pie, with the result that agreement is needlessly delayed while the question at issue is being mulled over at one level after another. Streamlining of the machinery and the procedures is indicated, although I realize this is easier said than done. I do hope, however, that action can be taken to reverse the creeping paralysis which seems to be overtaking those agencies of the executive branch of the Government concerned with one phase or another of our foreign relations.

The number of Government employees overseas has, I think, passed all bounds of reason. The ideal rule would be that no American is sent overseas unless there is a demonstrable need for him, and that by the strictest of standards. It is hard to see, for instance, how American interests are advanced by appointment to ICA positions of men well past their prime. Better no appointment than an unsuitable one. To fill a job vacancy is no reason; abolish the job. More selective security measures as applied to routine activities could help also to reduce the number of clerks, marines and security officers abroad. (After all, few of these categories were sent abroad before the war, and American interests suffered little thereby.) Perhaps the greatest reduction of all could come from determined rejection of end-user requests from the proliferating Government agencies in Washington. Federal agencies abroad are spending far too much manpower and energy meeting the intelligence requirements of agencies in Washington; such a situation results not only in duplication and excessive attention to detail but also stimulates further growth of Government agencies, both at home and abroad.

A further improvement in the conduct of diplomacy could be achieved by cutting personnel concerned therewith to a manageable size. Every professional diplomat with whom this writer has discussed the problem in the past years has complained that his staff is anywhere from 40 to 60 percent too large. The amount of duplication and superfluous work generated by Government agencies with a tenuous interest in foreign affairs including the military, economic analysts, information officers, and finally administrative staffs to take in their laundry is illustrated by the Bonn Embassy to the rump German Federal Republic which is more than 10 times as large as the Berlin Embassy which satisfactorily represented the United States when Hitler was calling the tune throughout Europe.

The embassies cannot, however, be cut back until the Washington agencies which swamp them with questionably useful assignments are themselves curtailed. It is suggested that a thorough examination of the production of overseas missions would reveal not only duplication of adequate international organizations such as NATO and U.N. subsidiaries but also of other U.S. Government agencies themselves.

One wonders how many periodic reports, slots, divisions, and even bureaus at home and abroad would die unsung and unmissed if the personnel involved were simply dropped.

The size of our overseas staffs is not only an unreasonable drain on the taxpayer but it seriously hampers our relations by creating American ghettos isolated from events and often a source of envy and friction with local communities.

A concomitant of the proliferation of staffs within the Department of State and of other governmental agencies in the field of foreign policy and the resulting diffusion of responsibility and authority over the direction of our foreign policy has led to the replacement of decisive decisionmaking by the art of coordination most often manifested in the interdepartmental meeting.

You will note in one of the concluding paragraphs that I express the hope that our Government might find a better means of formulating a new policy than through an interdepartmental committee. However, this course was followed and, to judge by the remarks of Under Secretary Dillon before the Special Committee of the Organization of American States on November 18, 1958 (State Department press release No. 698), our Government is still rehashing the same old topics in the same old way.

A great disability of the Government is the growing habit of discussing any question that may arise in a meeting. These meetings are too frequently inconclusive. One meeting begets another and often the result is collective irresponsibility. The only remedy is to insist on individual responsibility with the individual undertaking the necessary consultation with the other interested branches of the Government. One particularly great defect in reaching policy decisions through meetings is the excessive weight of a negative attitude. Frequently one voice in opposition can carry the day against the majority, or at least postpone, sometimes indefinitely, any decision at all. One cannot escape the conclusion that the staff work of the National Security Council has some of these disadvantages.

Above all there should be one and only one foreign policy. Different departments and services of the Government should not embark on tangential, even contradictory courses. The United States in foreign affairs must speak with one voice, not in a chorus of discordance. Otherwise, the impact on public opinion abroad can be most unfortunate.

The problem of coordination and control is not confined entirely to Washington.

Over the long haul I think the Information Service should be reincorporated within the Department of State. I say this, not only because as an integral part of his staff the Secretary of State would have more direct and secure control, but also because the ambassador in the field would likewise have the control he must have if he is to avoid risking disaster. (Incidentally there is a similar and perhaps more serious danger to the ambassador from some CIA operations abroad, and from a tendency of CIA to duplicate State Department reporting activities, which might bear looking into.)

The proliferation of American programs all over the world, has led in many places to a proliferation of responsibility abroad from what is done. In France, for example, a few years ago there were four American ambassadors; one accredited to the French Government proper; another accredited to NATO, and the third and fourth to special agencies. The arrangement there may have been unavoidable. Yet the natural tendency is to create a situation in which the voice of the ambassador accredited to the government is drowned out by the additional voices to his side—especially by those with millions of dollars in U.S. funds to spend.

It might be helpful if your committee looked into this type situation as it might exist here and there, and determine whether anything can be done to have American policy abroad speak through a single, coherent voice. In this same connection, it might be useful to glance at British practice. I believe that the British ambassador accredited to a foreign government is in fact, the real boss of the whole British effort in the country to which he is accredited. Moreover, the

governments to which he is accredited know that he is the real boss, and so do not try any end-run plays.

Now and again, we get an inspection committee that looks into the so-called outside missions working in foreign countries along side the regular foreign service. Recently, for example, we have had the Draper Commission which has looked into the question of military aid. Unfortunately, these tend to be one-shot affairs. Reports are made back to Washington; the commission disbands, and there is no followup. It seems to me that what we need is a constant running check on the performance of these outside missions, with the inspection system headed by an individual or a committee with the power to get action on what it reports, and with the power to see to it that its reports are carried out in the field. For example, I would not hesitate to close up a mission abroad, if the reports plainly showed that the foreign government involved failed to give the mission the cooperation that was needed.

It was also suggested that proper cooperation and coordination in the field between American businessmen and Government agencies would reap considerable benefits in a more understanding and effective implementation of foreign policy.

The time is approaching (if it is not already here) when Americans, particularly in the lesser developed countries, should feud less among themselves and begin to cooperate more in dealing with problems of mutual concern. American businessmen abroad usually take a different view of development than do Government officials, and academic people take still another view; this is rightly so because each has different responsibilities and different resources. But different views need not mean disagreement; they can lead as well to wisdom. If done carefully and purposefully, periodic exchange of ideas, for instance, between senior businessmen and senior Government officials could be beneficial to both. Let me give an example: Businessmen are usually not transferred as frequently as Government personnel from one country to another and they have proportionately more opportunity to probe their environment. Often they associate more closely with residents of the country and acquire better insight into their mental processes. Machinery to collect and consider views of non-Government Americans abroad on the "How" and the "When" of U.S. foreign policy might provide some useful checks on Government methods. The converse also is true: Government cooperation and understanding is becoming more important each year to American business abroad, particularly in this period of economic expansion overseas.

The CIA poses a unique problem of coordination in both Washington and in the field.

It is recommended that members of the Committee on Foreign Relations read Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Harvard University Press, 1958. This is as authoritative a book on the CIA as is available. The author is an enthusiastic supporter of the CIA, but in spite of himself, he presents a frightening picture of an organization twice as big as the Department of State spending tremendous sums under little or no supervision and he questions its compatibility with the American democratic system. He speaks of "undercover political intrigue" and "backstage political action," and states that "little reliable information exists as to the extent to which CIA has aided foreign rebellions." It is true that there is little accurate information available, but every senior officer of the Department of State and every senior officer of the Foreign Service has heard something of CIA's subversive efforts in foreign countries and probably most of them have some authentic information about CIA operations of this nature in some particular case. Unfortunately, most of these activities seem to have been blundering affairs and most, if not all of them, seem to have resulted to the disadvantage of the United States and sometimes in terrible failure.

Ransom says: "Perceptive students of public affairs visiting or working overseas often get the impression that CIA agents, and the intelligence operatives of other Government agencies, are operating in uncoordinated fashion in every dark alley, behind every bush, and apparently often in each other's hair." Most diplomatic and consular officers abroad can vouch for the accuracy of this statement. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that in most diplomatic and consular establishments abroad espionage agents of the CIA are stationed masquerading as diplomatic and consular officers.

Ransom says again: "* * * the scope of CIA operations is to a large extent self-determined. * * * Certainly the Congress has no voice as to how and where CIA is to function, other than prohibiting it to engage in domestic security activities. * * * the existence of a massive institution possessed of secret information and operating invisibly at home and abroad is a locus of power unchecked by the normal processes of democratic government."

It is recommended: (a) That if the subversive activities of CIA in foreign countries are to be continued at all they be carried out very, very rarely, be subjected to greater control than at present, and be carried out more secretly and skillfully than at present. (b) That the espionage activities of CIA be no longer carried out from the protection of embassies, legations, and consulates. And (c) That Congress exercise greater control over the activities of CIA.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN POLICY

Congressional participation in the formulation and execution of foreign policy did not escape criticism. It was asserted that Congress has not adopted its procedures to the exigencies of the present-day world situation and, consequently, is endangering the effectiveness of our foreign policy. One retired officer disapproved of the present staff structure of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Another pointed out that a large number of congressional committees have a finger in the foreign policy pie, and that the fragmentation of responsibility for our national security policy prohibits Congress from playing as full a role as it should in these crucial times. Finally, congressional handling of the purse strings was criticized.

As I think of the problems of foreign affairs from a congressional standpoint, I am struck by the fact that the very organization of the Congress along committee lines, tends unwittingly to fragmentize the vision of what is going on in the world. One committee, for example, deals with "foreign affairs"; another with "military affairs"; and a third with "finance"; "banking and currency"; and the like. The public effect is to create the impression that all these are somehow separate from each other, when in fact, they are indivisible. That they are indivisible is recognized, for example, in the work of the National War College with its allied Industrial War College—where Foreign Service officers join with officers from the Military Establishments in their approach to security problems. That they are indivisible is also recognized in the existence of the National Security Council.

Yet when it comes to the articulation of this fact in the political sphere, the institutional mechanism is missing. To be sure, from 1933 to 1953, the President took upon himself the work of relating the parts to the whole; and by doing this, helped create an overarching climate of opinion which gave vitality to a successful foreign policy. But it needs no laboring of the point to say that since 1953, the White House has not been the source of any synthesizing vision. And since it has not, the committee structure of the Congress has been all the more at liberty to present to the public but fragments of a general problem.

I realize, of course, that the committee structure is here to stay; and indeed, that the Congress could not very well function without it. I also realize that it might prove politically awkward and physically cumbersome for the various committees of the Senate to hold joint hearings so that questions of foreign policy can be examined simultaneously from every angle, followed by a joint presentation of any conclusions that are reached. Yet as an instrument of public education, might it not be possible to take a chapter from the relationships between the Joint Committee on the Economic Report and the Council of Economic Advisors? I mean specifically, might it not be possible to establish a Joint Committee on National Security Policy, as a congressional counterpart to the National Security Council? This would not be a legislative committee, and thus would not call for any surrender of power by those in existence. Yet I think it might prove a useful instrument in the service of public education.

Short of that innovation, it seems to me that your own Senate committee, given the default of the President, must try by every means at its disposal to implant certain general but very meaningful ideas in the public mind.

CURRENT REALITIES OF CONGRESS' FOREIGN POLICY ROLE

Before discussing modified roles and machinery which I believe are desirable and practical under existing structures. I should like to list a few broad-gage hypotheses about Congress and foreign policy which can serve to point up the nature of some of my concerns as well as provide some background for this discussion. I would suggest that:

1. It is neither logical, necessary, nor proper, either constitutionally or functionally, for the resources of foreign policy formulation and administration to reside almost entirely in the executive branch while there exists a concurrent scarcity of vigorous and continuing countervailing expertise in the foreign policy committees of Congress. Insofar as Congress fails to provide itself with adequate internal facilities for obtaining valid, independent assessment of foreign policy execution, it proportionately reduces its ability to fulfill one of its most essential constitutional requirements: Namely, to provide itself with instruments for determining with ability and confidence whether, where, and how Congress should ratify, reject, modify, or supplement executive foreign policy proposals.

2. The disturbing communications gap which exists and grows between executive and legislature is in large measure a natural consequence of Congress' inadequate facilities for providing its own foreign policy resources and specialists. Either related to or flowing directly from this hypothesis are the following corollaries:

- (a) Increased executive facilities for the acquisition of foreign policy knowledge and the absence of a corollary increase by Congress of adequate internal information and means of surveillance tends to intensify, rather than reduce, congressional distrust about the validity of executive programs.¹

- (b) Because novel challenges frequently indicate novel solutions and because, when new challenges are not clearly understood, new solutions tend to create distrust, congressional resistance to foreign policy innovation is likely to increase in proportion to its lack of internal resources for information. This in turn reduces congressional support of valid programs when they appear; it diminishes congressional ability to recognize less valid executive proposals; it tends to undermine the quality of debate; and it contributes to public mistrust of foreign policy innovation and public inability to judge foreign policy alternatives rationally.

3. The same congressional scarcity of internal resources for adequate assessment and surveillance also tends to deprive the system of its best available means to prevent deterioration in executive conduct of foreign policy. It can, I believe, be cogently argued that some of the most familiar instances of executive ineptitude in foreign policy formulation and administration can be traced in good part to a prior scarcity in Congress of adequate facilities for monitoring the alternatives and mechanisms of executive conduct of foreign policy.

4. The scope and quality of problems in American foreign policy have so changed since World War II that the growth of executive facilities for foreign policy conduct has been a natural and proper development (though the dispersion of responsibilities for these functions inside the executive is frequently scandalous). It does not follow, however, that increased responsibilities and facilities for the executive justify either a proportional increase of executive independence or a relative decline in congressional provision for its own foreign policy information and staff proficiency. The constitutional requirement, the functional necessity for public and congressional understanding and the need for congressional assurance of rational executive performance all present a compelling logic for an increase rather than a relative decrease in legislative intimacy with the desiderate of the foreign policy process.

5. Finally, the modern increase of complexity in foreign policy factors also suggests that Congress seriously consider the possibilities that (a) the revised nature of the problems themselves may have caused antiquation of once-adequate congressional facilities for coping with congressional responsibilities in foreign policy; and (b), as congressional facilities lag, constitutional and functional

¹ It should not be inferred from this or any other part of my discussion that I see a "natural compatibility" between executive and legislative in foreign policy which is being "disturbed" by inadequate congressional resources of one sort or another. To the contrary, because of different problems, different mandates, different publics, and the different private ambitions of the personnel involved, the objective here is in part to pursue devices for minimizing "natural incompatibilities." The underlying proposition is that this is not only badly needed, but possible.

requirements demand congressional reappraisal of its role, facilities, and conduct of its foreign policy responsibilities.

The above hypotheses suggest inadequacies of which, I suspect, you already are aware. To the extent that you concur on the validity of these propositions, I am sure you would also agree that the competency of foreign policy legislation and execution has thereby suffered. And it would seem to me doubly imperative for congressional leaders to seek remedial devices to promote rationality in the foreign policy process during eras when the Executive fails to provide the necessary scope, candor, and creativity.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRESCRIPTIONS VERSUS CURRENT REALITIES

At the outset, I should like to record a view of my own frequently noted by other observers, that in modern times the congressional role in the foreign policy process has tended to reflect a loss of confidence by the individual in his capacity to influence the affairs for which democratic doctrine holds him ultimately responsible. The portents in the public sector of this "moral disengagement" from the system were aptly characterized by Eric Fromm more than 20 years ago as the tendency of individuals in modern society to "Escape From Freedom."

The evidence of congressional disengagement, particularly the decline in Congress countervailing expertise relative to the executive, are too widespread to enumerate here. I believe that some of the most revealing evidence is found in clichés about the character of the legislative-executive relationship which have become commonplace among otherwise informed circles. As time passes, one perceives a mounting note of abdication among growing numbers of legislators, illustrated, for example, by the lamentable philosophy inherent in the oft heard comment: "We're not in any position to judge on foreign policy matters; anyway that's the job of the executive branch." Another assertion, with which most of us are familiar and which totally ignores constitutional as well as functional requirements, is the banality: "The executive proposes—the legislative disposes." Political journalists and even teachers of government have come increasingly to purvey these statements as if they were assertions of how things should be rather than of how things have become. Only last month Douglas Cater reminded readers of the Reporter magazine of this remarkable congressional departure from basic American doctrine:

"In recent years the U.S. Government has, in fact, experienced a curious turn-about in the exercise of powers from what was envisaged in constitutional doctrine. The President, aided by a growing staff of experts, has become a prime formulator of legislative programs and the chief budgetmaker. Congress, on the other hand, with the proliferation of its investigative committees, ever attempts to serve as a board of review and veto over the ordinary administration of the executive departments. * * * [Issue of Mar. 16, 1959, p. 16.]

A quick review of the Constitution supplies the reader with an emphatic reminder of the impropriety of the development which Douglas Cater describes, as well as providing added suggestion of the validity of the hypotheses I laid down above. Reviewing the Constitution reminds me, for example, that supreme foreign policy powers are given to Congress. While the Founding Fathers attempted the separation of powers, they would doubtless have viewed it a deplorable development if the concept evolved into one of isolation of powers such as is suggested in the false "proposes and disposes" dichotomy or the "none of our business" philosophy.

For example, while the President is given the veto, Congress is empowered to override vetoes as well as to impeach the President. While the President is Commander in Chief of the militia, it is Congress which is mandated to ascertain when it is appropriate to muster it out.

This, to me, means that in a "balance of power" system Congress is most certainly required to possess the internal countervailing expertise without which balance, circumspection, and wise policy are impossible. Not the Executive but the Congress is mandated to determine when it is or is not in the national interest to ratify treaties and appoint particular diplomatic representatives. As I read the Constitution, I see a demand primarily upon Congress, not the Executive, to possess the internal intelligence for determining which and what aspects of foreign commerce shall be the law of the land or what shall be the appropriation for and size and composition of the Army and the Navy. I found no clauses which release Congress from constitutional responsibility to possess adequate internal mechanisms for assessing the validity and reliability of Execu-

tive proposals. And I certainly found no indication that creative foreign-policy roles for Congress were either unavailable or undesirable.

The fact that the Constitution has laid down major congressional foreign-policy responsibilities in both policymaking and review emphasizes the gravity of the modern relinquishment of congressional capacity for initiative and surveillance. It is inevitable and is certainly proper that the Executive's capacity for intelligence and initiative in foreign policy should multiply with increased and more complex challenges. It is altogether improper that this should occur without a proportionate development in Congress of internal instruments for foreign policy competence. In other words, we have been discussing little less than a decline in Congress' capacity to unite intelligence responsibilities with power responsibilities and a consequent growth of its nonresponsibility and isolation in the administration and formulation of foreign policy.

STATUTORY PRESCRIPTION VERSUS CURRENT REALITY: THE LEGISLATIVE
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946

My homework preparatory to this letter led me to review, among other things, the La Follette-Monroney Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, since, in my eyes, this document provides the most valid and recent official statement of the congressional self-image of its foreign policy role and responsibilities. What I discovered was more than intriguing. While (as I shall presently note) I discovered foreign-policy ramifications in the act which appear outdated and crippling to the proper exercise of Congress' responsibilities, I did note that the authors clearly understood the surveillance and policymaking requirement placed upon Congress by the Constitution. Section 136 of the act, for example, mandates the standing committees as follows: "To assist * * * in *appraising the administration of the laws* and in *developing such amendments* and related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee * * * shall exercise *continuous watchfulness of the execution* by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee * * *"²

While the 1946 act seems successfully to integrate, in its statements of purpose, the constitutional requirements placed upon Congress, it seems equally to provide structures which, if followed, would seriously handicap the Senate in the exercise of the responsibilities which the act itself prescribes. However, when adherence to the purposes stated in the act came into their inevitable conflict with prescribed committee structures, apparently (and fortunately) most committee chairmen sacrificed structural prescription in order to comply with functional requirement. Had the structural prescriptions of the act been more rigorously adhered to, it seems obvious that the Senate and the other body of Congress would be far less efficient than they in fact are today.

After making several informal inquiries among friends more or less closely acquainted with Congress and after doing some library research, I have encountered some remarkable realities. For example, the Legislative Reorganization Act prescribes staffs for standing committees at: "* * * four professional staff members in addition to the clerical staffs on a permanent basis without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of fitness for duty * * * [and] clerical staff of each committee * * * shall consist of not more than six clerks [sec. 202].

However, a phone call to the Congressional Quarterly disclosed that there are, for example, 102 members of the staff of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and parallel developments across the board (an exception being the committee of which you have recently become chairman). I suspect nonetheless that this reflection, on judiciary and elsewhere, of structural adaptation to functional and lawful requirement is a necessary and desirable development.

I find that the 1946 act does not mention subcommittees. I recall that the authors of the act were strongly motivated by the desire to simplify the organization of the Senate, and this stipulation is doubtless a reflection of a forlorn hope. However, outside the Foreign Relations Committee, it is clear that few, if any chairmen found it possible to avoid subcommittees staffed permanently with top experts. Equipping subcommittees with the staff skills necessary for adequate committee intelligence also seems natural and desirable.

I even discovered one committee (Labor and Public Welfare) which apparently decided that political accountability was at least as important in the

² Public Law 601, 79th Cong.; ch. 753, 2d sess.; S. 2177, pp. 23-24. Emphasis is mine.

service of its responsibilities as professional aptitude. Here is another departure from strict construction of the 1946 act which may in fact be desirable in terms of the committee function, but in any case illustrates the philosophy of various chairmen that prescribed function merits consideration above prescribed structure.

I am told that this impressive record of the committee adaptation to evolving policy needs has been possible because a committee in effect can and does mirror the philosophy and creativity of its leaders, the chairman in particular. This too seems natural and clearly desirable. The chairman, I am told, is not and need not be controlled by the structural provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act when they tend to impede exercise of the committee's mandate. I am informed that at the beginning of every session chairmen go before the Committee on Rules and seek a ruling for a resolution allocating funds necessary to adequate staff increment to structure the committee to meet any functional requirements within reason. This freedom to adjust to changing challenges and developments in the executive seems highly desirable.

THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: SOME NOT-IMPARTIAL QUOTES

My inquiries about existing Senate machinery for the exercise of its foreign policy responsibilities brought many interesting answers in quarters quite intimate with the Senate foreign policy process. Prior to the proposals which I shall presently submit to your consideration, permit me to disclose some of the less happy comments I have received:

"The Foreign Relations Committee is my best evidence for a little generalization about Congress which I made up a long time ago. Namely (and you can quote me on this), the degree of importance and complexity of the subject matter with which a committee has to deal is in inverse ratio to the size of its staff. I think the most important and complex subject matter before Congress is foreign policy, so you can draw your own conclusions about how helpful the committee staff is or how much confidence we have in their services."

"An administrative assistant friend of mine asked the chief clerk of the Foreign Relations Committee just a few months back why there wasn't a larger and more specialized expert staff on the committee so we could look for more intelligent and comprehensive answers to foreign policy problems when they were posed by our office. Do you know what he actually said? He said the staff was fully adequate to communicate between State and the committee any and all requests from the Senate. That's why he apparently thinks they're there. Hell, if that's the case, they may as well fold up because I now get quicker and better service by dealing directly with congressional liaison over at State. We don't need committee staffs to carry messages. We have good phones in our office."

"* * * The Judiciary Committee has six lawyers working in petty claims and immigration cases while, as far as I know, there is absolutely no permanent staff on the Foreign Relations Committee which specializes in the vast area of mutual security, Soviet foreign or economic policy, or even on geographic areas * * *"

"* * * Sixteen messenger boys running between the Senate and the State Department. * * * We don't have any foreign policy resources in the Senate."

[The staff of the Foreign Relations Committee] "is little more than a rump staff of the State Department. The incentives not to rock the boat downtown are built into the system. They're all aiming for Bill Macomber's job. They all have a vested interest in serving State. * * * and this is quite satisfactory to most members of the committee who think that's the staff's job anyway. * * *"

I have little doubt that there is much in the above excerpts which on close examination would be found to be exaggerated or misleading. I cite them in part because, as I implied above, I believe your very intimacy with the process may deprive you of access to criticism which is obtained with relative ease on the outside. Moreover, I would say that, insofar as such allegations in fact contain partial truths, the corrective measures would lie primarily in the province of the chairman and possibly in that domain alone. From what I was able to learn about the rich and variegated structural approaches to recent challenges which have confronted other standing committees since 1946, I am convinced, despite my distance from the operational realities of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the solutions are possible and available.

My cursory across-the-board perusal of Senate committee organization does suggest that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is lacking, apparently in scope of concept of its role and obviously in its structure to address either the needs posed in the foregoing hypotheses or those advanced by the constitutional and statutory prescriptions to which I have referred. I have likewise found strong evidence that in this area of serious lag resides one of the greatest single undeveloped foreign policy resources for yielding significant improvement in the formulation and administration of American foreign policy.

What is to be done? Granting that to a large degree my research has been brief and impressionistic, my inexperience may be offset to some degree by the very advantage of distance. On that basis I shall now presume to submit several proposals for your forbearant consideration.

PROPOSALS

1. The foreign policy role of the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should be promptly reassessed by the chairman in terms of the functional requirements dictated by the Constitution and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.³

Comment: My research failed to disclose one committee in the Senate which came close to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the paramount role of staff as a communications conduit between the members of the committee on the one hand and the counterpart executive departments on the other.

While the "conduit" function is unquestionably essential to all committees, it has frequently appeared to outsiders as a virtual *raison d'être* for the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. A reassessment would recognize that the paramount role of congressional standing committees must always be to provide the respective Houses of Congress with internal means for generating self-confidence about their capacity for surveillance as well as the facilities necessary to guide and innovate policy and to supplement, reject, or modify Executive proposals and administrative methods. Or, repeating the mandate of the 1946 act, "To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments and related legislation as it may deem necessary * * * [to] exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution * * *."

2. Functional areas as well as geographic areas in the field of foreign policy should be accorded subcommittee status. The current geographic designation of subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should be reassessed in terms of policy problems and challenges which are independent of geographic situations.

Comment: With the exceptions of the two Subcommittees on State Department Organization and Disarmament, the 1958 Congressional Quarterly shows all Foreign Relations subcommittees isolated according to total foreign policy problems by specific geographic regions. I believe this reflects a particularly challengeable concept, and recent behavior of the committee shows a paradoxically keen awareness of this fact. Apparently conscious of its structural and staff incapacity in nongeographic foreign policy problem areas, the committee is again spending a large sum of money by awarding outside academic subcontracts in order to compensate quickly for its own lack of internal expertise. (It did this also on mutual security in 1956.) I shall refer to other implications of this below; but for the moment I believe it is significant that, of the 11 studies announced in the present subcontract exercise, 8 deal with foreign policy problems which are not focused geographically. Although staff proficiency in these fields is imperative for effective operation of the committee, there is no counterpart structure in the committee to evaluate or supplement any of the eight studies. Present staff structure fails to suggest that there are adequate tools at hand to properly analyze and translate into practical legislation any findings the studies produce. Since the present size and structure of the Foreign Relations staff clearly blocks members from specializing in functional problems, who will have time even to read the various reports carefully and with expert scrutiny?

³ Throughout this discussion on proposals I use quotes and imply sources. This is a result of private queries among friends and acquaintances intimate with the foreign policy process in Congress. I hope you will understand, Bill, if attribution is absent. You have my word that the comments I have received are accurately quoted. You may also be sure that the purpose of my inquiries were concealed with great care.

Titles of many of these studies reflect the very grist and marrow of the foreign policy challenge before us and of the type of knowledge and skills which must be integrated into the continuing internal facilities of any useful foreign policy committee. The New York Times reported the titles of the first 8 of the 11 studies as:

I. "The Nature of Foreign Policy and the Role of the United States in the World."

II. "The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact Upon the Foreign Policy of the United States."

III. "Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States."

IV. "Foreign Policy Implications for the United States of Economic and Social Conditions in Lesser Developed and Uncommitted Countries."

V. "Possible Developments in Military Technology, Their Influence on Scientific Doctrine, and the Impact of Such Developments on U.S. Foreign Policy."

VI. "Possible Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy in the United States."

VII. "The Role of Multilateral Organizations on the Formulation and Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy."

VIII. "Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy."

Bill White, in the current (April) issue of Harper's Magazine (p. 65), speaks of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate as "the greatest of its committees," working opposite an administration "hardly able to cope with even the pettiest tasks, let alone a world crisis." He claims that it is imperative in the coming years for the Foreign Relations Committee to "help guide and support the foreign policy of an administration unable to do the whole job for itself," and he believes, "What will in fact unfold * * * is a creative and eminently constitutional partnership in foreign policy. The Senators of the committee will progressively give the administration their best ideas and their true support—a support going beyond the traditional and the obvious."

I do not believe Bill White exaggerates the gravity of the tasks before your committee nor the vastness of its potential. I suspect he would agree with me that internal regeneration and reorganization of your committee staff are prerequisite to the accrual of the "best ideas" which he demands of the committee. At the very minimum the scope of your professional staff must broaden into problem and functional areas in the coming years of desperate challenge.

3. Permanent, expert, and specialized staffs must serve the current and added subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Comment: As one who is acquainted by experience with the divergent politics and problems of variegated cultures, it is difficult to understand the lack of developed specialization which apparently exists in the Foreign Relations Committee staff. I am told that the Disarmament Subcommittee is the only subcommittee with a permanent, specialized staff. The complexity of policy in international relations is so vast that, as a U.S. Senator either on or off the Foreign Relations Committee, I would be at a loss to find policy alternatives in crises or in the prevention of foreseeable crises when my own legislative body took a haphazard approach to the study of these core problems.

The academic subcontracts mentioned above are sporadic, uneconomic, and inefficient methods of tapping specialists' intelligence for the knowledge and ideas needed by the committee to play its required role in the formulation and guidance of U.S. foreign policy in our present critical period. As a result of these subcontract exercises, the talents of dozens of bright men in universities and research agencies around the country will doubtless be sharpened: in some instances they will become better teachers and writers as a result. Surely the academic and private research institutions must have clamored for these contracts. But none of this fine development of talent will immediately or continuously redound to the day-to-day advantage and sophistication of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Ideas generated under the subcontracts will often be outmoded by new developments before they can be translated into legislation; many will die in the fourth dimension of time even before the reports are printed. Equally regrettable is the obvious fact that there is little chance that the expert committee staff's unique vantage point, access to resources, and knowledge of political and congressional realities will be programed into the findings and recommendations of the noncongressional experts now doing the \$350,000 worth of summaries and term papers. This is unavoidable in the nature

of the present exercise if only because there are not even counterpart subcommittee experts and structures to properly utilize such findings as there are.

Here in fact seems to be the ultimate in the separation of foreign policy competence from political reality. I believe a 1956 study, under the sponsorship of your distinguished predecessor, likewise carried an appropriation of \$350,000. A top professorial salary is about \$15,000. That is the annual income of the best American specialists in the field of international relations. Some tablecloth arithmetic tells me that the \$700,000 spent in these two exercises would have purchased the services of nine top professional experts for 5 years at \$15,000 apiece. The entire committee would have had daily access to their brilliance. The entire staff would have had daily access to their knowledge. The new professionals themselves would have had daily access to the intelligence available throughout all branches of Government in Washington as well as access to Senate materials otherwise unavailable to universities. Finally these professionals would have had access to the experience and invaluable political realism which are the unique possession of the Senators of the committee. It seems impossible for the bloodstream of congressional foreign policy intelligence to be enriched in anywhere near such proportion in what seems a misguided subcontract approach. These Foreign Relations Committee responsibilities can never be farmed out. It seems imperative that they be internal to be either economic or effective.

An enlarged and specialized staff is needed by the Foreign Relations Committee to help it both in filling the gaps in our present foreign policy formulation and in checking on the administration of our foreign affairs. How can the efficacy of State Department desk administration ever be guessed at without an intelligent monitoring group in the legislative branch. How can the devices for communication between desk and field be surveyed without a knowledgeable legislative staff? How can a frustrated, clogged channel in the Department be unstopped when there is no external facility within the foreign policy process for discovery and ventilation? Without specialized staff, how can the resources of universities and other centers of foreign policy specialization be continuously tapped by the committee short of resorting to futile, ad hoc, and sporadic subcontract exercises? Indeed, how can subcontract exercises yield their own very limited potential without an adequate receptacle for their product? While the need structurally and functionally to address these gaps appears urgent, one can find no valid objection to an expansion and reorganization of the Foreign Relations Committee staff to close them. For a chief clerk to assert to a member of the press that, "even if it were desirable" for the committee to broaden its professional staff, "it would be unlawful," seems to me possibly specious or at best an egregious display of misinformation and misconception about the role of the committee as well as the laws governing it. Other Senate committees have obviously not felt themselves legally restrained in expanding their staffs. The Foreign Relations Committee must have permanent, specialized staffs not only for the geographically oriented subcommittees in existence but also for the much needed functionally oriented, problem-area subcommittees.

4. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should establish an internal systematic facility for interacting with the staffs of other Senate committees involved with the desiderata of foreign policy.

Comment: In my hypotheses relating to the redefined nature of foreign policy challenges, I had in mind a particular legislative dilemma known to all of us; namely, that the scope of present foreign policy problems touches on the mandates of several committees of the Legislature outside the foreign policy committees. Whether we speak of patent law, armed services, reciprocal trade, valuation of the dollar, taxes, civil rights or even control of outer space, we are involved with issues of major foreign policy consequence.⁴ But when an outsider, even a superficial student of Congress such as myself, looks for some *modus operandi* on which the foreign policy factors dealt with by various Senate committees

⁴In the current (Apr. 30, 1959) issue of the Reporter magazine, in an article titled "Foreign Policy on Capitol Hill," Thomas L. Hughes observes on p. 29 "the hobbling effect of jurisdictional overlap (in foreign policy in Congress)." The author considers foreign policy jurisdictional overlap in the Senate to "include at least the following: Foreign Relations, Aeronautical and Space Sciences * * * Finance * * * Appropriations, Agriculture, Armed Services, Government Operations, Commerce, Judiciary, Banking and Currency, Interior and Insular Affairs, plus the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy." Because this article deals with vital aspects of the congressional crisis in foreign policy of which I do not treat in these pages, I heartily commend it to your attention.

may be programed into the total foreign policy considerations of that body of Congress, he looks in vain.

In seeking a more integrated approach to the total Senate purview of foreign policy, one is inevitably reminded of the growth and sophistication of activities in the executive in this area. While I am a strong critic of Cabinet-level interdepartmental committees in which policy alternatives are sterilized by identification with parochial departmental goals, I nonetheless am led to the conclusion that executive attempts at factorial integration have been more sincere, energetic, and creative than those of the legislative branch, where the problem seems largely to have been ignored. For example, I do not see any committee of Congress, much less Foreign Relations, which has made an attempt to program into its considerations the range of security and foreign policy factors approached by the National Security Council. While no doubt the attempts at coordination and interpolation in the executive have doubtless burgeoned on the side of overquantity, one is struck by the minute degree to which the need has been addressed in the Legislature. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Relations Committee has never materially approached the need for an "Intercommittee Subcommittee on Foreign Policy."

When I propose coordinated consideration of foreign policy factors on a cross-committee basis (at the staff level), I am told that motivations of ego tend in practice to preclude such approaches. For example, I looked at a book recently which stated, "Members of Congress dislike the term 'coordination.'" It conveys an impression of discipline. It usually implies that jealously guarded jurisdictions must be exposed to the consideration of some other group's point of view * * *.⁵

Here the subcontract exercise is again revealing, for, in this context, it confesses a need felt for this type of cross-committee purview. I contend that any ego or other interferences with coordinated foreign policy consideration inside the Senate must be subordinated to the superior interest of the responsibilities of the Foreign Relations Committee to Congress and the executive. Orators and writers lecture everywhere about their fear that our "system" may be "incapable" of confronting the "coordinated attack" of the enemy due to the superior "integration of resources" which constitutes the "greatest danger of the Soviet threat." Perhaps if there is any place at all where a truly effective beginning toward this integration of intelligence and resources, it would be in the institution of such a Foreign Relations subcommittee. Among other staff assignments for on "Intercommittee Subcommittee on Foreign Policy" would be the periodic preparation of position papers on various aspects and estimates of current and projected foreign policy challenges with which the Senate will be faced. Annexed to such papers, using all possible university, committee staff, and executive resources, would be proposals of legislative alternatives for the consideration of the members of the committee. Indeed, I can envisage that the cross-committee staff conferences which would result from such vital assignments by the Committee on Foreign Relations would have such superbly educative value and be so unique and altogether fascinating that the well-intentioned foreign policy seminars being attempted by Senator Gore would pale in their relative importance to the foreign policy process. The need to integrate and rationalize the broadened and variegated components of the foreign policy process in the Senate committees seems urgent. It seems to me that an "Intercommittee Subcommittee on Foreign Policy" or some similar Foreign Relations subcommittee addressing itself to the denominator of foreign policy desiderata which transcends several committees, could go far in this direction.

5. The concept of responsibility and tenure of the professional staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should be reassessed and revised.

Comment: I suspect that the strict professional tenor of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 constituted a reaction to earlier days of extreme partisan considerations and lack of concern with professional qualifications in hiring staffs. Now the chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee has virtually permanent tenure (despite the technicality that he can be removed by the committee).

I submit that for the chief of staff there are two prime requisites to adequate performance: (1) professional competence and (2) identification with the policy goals and organizational principles of the chairman. Requisites for

⁵ Holbert N. Carroll, "The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs" (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 195.

staff competence are: (1) professional competence; (2) responsiveness to the staff chief; and (3) staff continuity and equitable treatment of tenure.

My own experience in administration has led me to note that optimum performance can only result when the staff chief is the nominee of the chairman of an organization. I would, therefore, propose the following: The chief of staff of the committee should be required by committee law automatically to tender his resignation at the time of a change of chairmen. In the interest of staff continuity, expertise, and morale it may be wise to retain former staff chiefs as a senior professional on the staff. But he should in no case be permitted to serve consecutively under two different chairmen. Were this statutorily prescribed, the possibility of embarrassment would be omitted as it would be a regular, prescribed procedure over which no incumbent chairman had responsibility.

While, as I urge, subcommittees be broadened into functional areas and staffs made permanent and specialized, I would also urge that the chiefs of subcommittee staffs be responsible to the committee staff chief. This would obviate the alleged tendency for the chairman to feel that professional subcommittees jeopardize responsiveness and responsibility to the chairman. I cannot help but feel that this reassessment of the role of the chief of staff is almost prerequisite to the successful accomplishment of the gross reformulation of the function and structure of the committee staff which I have suggested throughout the course of these proposals.

I hope sincerely and deeply that this has been useful. My wishes are high for you to make a mark of historical importance upon the Committee on Foreign Relations, and through it on our foreign policy, a mark for which I believe the need and opportunity are now very great. If I were seeking a summary paragraph—a "clincher"—to deliver the message of why I think this reassessment of your committee is imperative, I could do no better than quote two sentences from the new Harper's article by William S. White, to which I referred above: * * * On this committee will increasingly rest our hopes for the proper conduct of our affairs abroad, and also for a vindication of our governmental system. Upon this committee, if I do not mistake all the signs, will rest a burden the like of which has lain on no agency of Congress in our lifetime.

I will project from Mr. White's comment and state the belief upon which this letter rests: Unless the staff structure and organization is quickly prepared for the burden—a task as of now unaccomplished—the grave challenges before the committee cannot and will not be met.

It would also be most desirable for Congress to review the procedures whereby the Department and the Foreign Service receive their appropriations. It seems that first of all, the Department, browbeaten for decades, timidly prepares its estimates. The Bureau of the Budget intervenes and the proposed budget is cut to the bone. Then the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives wheel into action. As a result, it is nothing short of a miracle that the United States has a Foreign Service as good as it is.

If the United States desires to have a foreign policy that is effective, there must be a reorganization of the State Department and the Foreign Service based on adequate appropriations for handling matters connected with foreign policy.

There is no service in the Government that merits more generous appropriations than the Foreign Service. The new generation of Foreign Service Officers do not have private means. At the end of their careers, their home ties have disappeared. They are too old to find profitable employment. Unlike retired generals and admirals, industry is not waiting to snap them up. Also, in the vast majority of cases they have had to go to great expense to educate their children. Schools and colleges in the United States have become increasingly expensive.

A cheap embassy is not a good embassy. And a Foreign Service Officer who has not the means to make and maintain contacts in the country of his post is not an effective officer.

Edmund Burke has said in substance that any idiot can be parsimonious but that it requires wisdom to be economical. He added that true economy frequently required spending money.

Finally it is suggested that foreign policy operations could be made more efficient by improving the machinery within the Congress for handling its constitutional responsibilities. For example more time for the study and discussion of substantive problems of foreign affairs could be made available to legislators and harried Department officials if the examination of trivia could be delegated to subordinate expert staffs so that, for example, Ambassador Lodge would not have to take the valuable time of a dozen Senators and himself to explain why he needs a longer dining room table in his official residence. (Appropriations hearings 1958.) The holding of joint hearings by various overlapping committees would serve the same end.

The security procedures of executive sessions could likewise be strengthened to provide adequate secrecy for the discussion of security matters and subjects under diplomatic negotiation.

Finally unless the legislative process can be accelerated so as to keep pace with international development, diplomacy by legislation should be curtailed in order to restore to U.S. diplomacy the suppleness it now lacks in such fields as international loans and credits and security restrictions on immigration and cultural exchanges. The failure to take full advantage of the Soviet-Polish friction by prompt financial assistance to Warsaw is a case in point.

Two thousand years ago the Greek City States succumbed largely because of their failure to reconcile public control of foreign affairs by the popular assemblies with the requirements of a supple and effective diplomacy. There is considerable evidence that the problem has not yet been satisfactorily solved.

Besides these very general ideas, I think that your committee could profitably address itself to the following housekeeping details:

Apart from the need to reward big contributors to campaign war chests, the appointment of "political ambassadors" to sensitive posts, is justified on the ground that the Foreign Service officer may not have the means to dip into his own pocket and pay the bills that go with these posts. This is a serious matter. In my own case, when I served as the American Ambassador to ——— my out-of-pocket expenses came to around \$18,000 a year—and—from this standpoint, was not regarded as a costly assignment. It seems to me, therefore, that if we want qualified Foreign Service officers to represent us abroad, the "representation allowances" should be increased and without delay.

I would certainly not foreclose the appointment of men as ambassadors who are selected, sometimes on a political basis, from ranks outside the Foreign Service. Some of them may be specially well suited for a particular assignment at a particular time. Yet it seems to me that your committee can widen the range of choice of appointees, by removing from Foreign Service Officers, the artificial barrier to the exercise of their specialized talents—a barrier represented by their inability personally to shoulder all the extra economic costs of their posts. I have the impression that counterpart funds exist in many places which, by the direction of the Congress, might be used for representation allowance, provided the Congress approved.

One of the disadvantages under which the Foreign Service has suffered has been the wide variation in appropriations causing wide variations in the number of Foreign Service officers appointed from year to year and making impossible the administration of properly devised policies of selection and replacement. Perhaps it is not consonant with our system of Government to make any arrangement to put an end to wide variations in a particular appropriation, but Members of Congress who are particularly interested in the efficient conduct of our foreign policy might perhaps exert their influence to that end in this.

When Benjamin Franklin was appointed our diplomatic representative at Paris he said that he would act without salary and would request only the payment of his expenses. Most American Ambassadors today would be delighted to serve on those conditions rather than continue to pay a considerable proportion of their necessary expenses out of their own pockets. The salaries are reasonable, but the allowances are definitely insufficient. This is particularly the case in respect to the so-called representation allowance. The result is that there are many posts to which qualified Foreign Service officers cannot accept appointment and that to some posts only men of very great wealth can be appointed. This situation limits the President very drastically in his selection

of Ambassadors. It would seem to be clearly incompatible with our claim to be the leader among the democracies.

The inadequacy of representation allowances is not confined to Ambassadors. There are many secondary diplomatic posts and consular posts to which only men of means can be assigned. This produces a necessary undemocratic discrimination among Foreign Service officers. The point need not be labored. Any unprejudiced investigation of the matter will demonstrate that the allowances are inadequate. Might it not be possible for the members of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, and other Members of Congress interested in the efficient conduct of our foreign relations, to exert their influence upon the members of the Appropriations Committees who habitually reduce the pertinent appropriations?

Finally, there was a recommendation that Senators be included in any delegation charged with treaty negotiations.

Finally, I would revert to the practice of appointing Senators to the U.S. delegations charged with the negotiation of treaties. This has proved of much value in the past, not only in the negotiation of the treaty, but in its subsequent ratification by the Senate. We are on the right track in appointing Senators to our United Nations Delegation in the General Assembly, but it should be made standard practice in all treaty negotiations as well.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION

Many of the commentaries touching upon geographic regions have been included under previous topics. In the following excerpts, the respondents were primarily concerned with the problems of a particular geographic region.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

While most of the comments on the Middle East agree in their evaluation of the major problems and the dangers to U.S. interests in this area, they vary considerably in their judgment of our policies and in recommendations for future action. It was unanimously agreed that the manner in which Israel was created had an unfortunate effect on our relationship with the Arab nations. Events have moved rapidly in the Middle East in recent months and most of the replies inevitably suffer somewhat from a lack of timeliness. In particular, they have been overtaken in large measure by developments in Iraq.

Mr. Harold B. Minor, in reply to the committee's request for his views on U.S. foreign policies, submitted his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of May 9, 1958, as the clearest expression of his views on the Middle East. The first quotation contains excerpts from this testimony.

The American position in the Middle East has declined alarmingly in the last decade. Unless this decline is arrested, there is grave danger that American influence in that part of the world will be eliminated within a relatively short period of time. The result will be a drift, negative and unwanted by the peoples of the area, toward Soviet influence. * * *

Let me, finally, consider some of the things which may be done to arrest the drift toward disaster in the Middle East and to reassert an American leadership position there. The following policies and attitudes might help to accomplish this purpose.

1. First of all, we should look at the Middle East problem through American eyes and in the light of the American national interest. We should be prepared to resist minority pressures from within this country, as well as pressures from our allies or Middle Eastern countries where these do not correspond with our greater need to win and hold the hearts and minds of countless millions.

2. We should develop a better understanding of the forces of nationalism and neutralism as they are developing in the Middle East. Nationalism cannot be put down frontally nor can it be appeased. It can only be met with comprehension, guidance, and understanding. We should realize that President Nasser is a symbol of resurgent Arab nationalism in the minds of most people in the Arab world. His strength is great among the people, even of the countries which appear to oppose him. By opposing this force, we strengthen it and at the same time cause it to turn elsewhere for solace. * * *

But whatever our actions to strengthen relations with Arab nationalism, these should not be taken belatedly or grudgingly. This approach will merely give the appearance of an unwilling American retreat before triumphant nationalism. If we give ourselves with our actions, these deeds can have a lasting effect instead of appearing to be but new moves on the chessboard of power politics. Arab nationalism and unity, in my opinion, is a winning cause, whatever form it takes and whoever is the leader. We should be associated with this movement voluntarily and not merely for the purpose of preventing Soviet domination of the Arab world. In the development of Arab unions we should show no preference of one for the other, but give our full sympathy to such movements when they arise indigenously and spontaneously. In brief, what we need to do is to get on the side of the people.

3. We should recognize that, although there are innumerable problems in the Middle East which cry for solution, the relationship between Israel and the

Arab world is a primary cause of tension and a roadblock to peace. The exploitation of this issue by the Soviet Union can lead to Communist domination of the area and the loss of an American position before there is time to deal with other social, economic, and political problems.

It is essential, in my opinion, to implement in fact the laudable policy of this Government of friendly and sympathetic impartiality as between Israel and the Arab world. The test of impartiality does not lie in the frequency or firmness of its avowal as a policy or in the good will of persons in the Department of State who endeavor sincerely to carry it out. In my view, it is the totality of the policies and attitudes of the American people—public, press, policy, and purse. There can be no question but that we have in these attitudes and policies preferred and supported a State of Israel as against millions of Arabs who must turn elsewhere than to the West for what they believe to be justice and understanding. I suggest that a policy of favorite nations is prejudicial to the interests of this country. * * *

We should not for one moment suggest the elimination of Israel or its people. But we should endeavor to extend to all other peoples equal understanding, sympathy, support, and justice. We must recognize that only a nonexpansionist Israel, depending on its own resources, devoted to the great Judaic principles of love and understanding, not based upon military power, can hope eventually to find accommodation and acceptance in the Middle East. Any other policy will bring Israel's own future into great jeopardy.

I do not wish to go into the specifics of solution of this problem. Ultimate solution of the specific problems can be brought about only in an atmosphere in which confidence in American leadership has been restored. As a minimum we must give an earnest to the Arabs that we are prepared to face this problem boldly and realistically. As an example, the Arabs regard the collection of American private, tax-free funds for Israel as an American official subsidy for a foreign state. Such a problem is difficult to face in this country. But, we delude ourselves if we believe that the drift away from us can be stopped without meeting such problems frontally.

4. We must be prepared to meet the question of the Palestine refugees more boldly than we have done in the past 10 years. We should openly espouse the right of these unfortunate persons to return to their homes or receive adequate compensation. A resolution to this effect has long been on the books of the United Nations.

5. We must recognize that all mechanisms of power—pacts, doctrines, aid programs, and alliances—are handmaidens of policy and not substitutes. Too frequently the impression has been created that such programs are geared to our overriding need to restrain Soviet Russia and not to the needs of peoples themselves. Thus, they fail in their primary objectives. Programs of this kind are excellent where there is understanding and mutuality of interest in which they can flower. Private agencies could be used to a much greater extent in the carrying out of some programs.

6. We should avoid the erroneous and easy assumption that there is a deliberate trend in any Middle Eastern country toward communism. There is an ideological gulf between Islamic and other Middle Eastern cultures on the one hand and communism on the other. But, it would be equally dangerous to assume that communism cannot penetrate this area. It has done so to some extent for reasons which are negative and which derive from the belief of the peoples of the area that they cannot obtain understanding and justice elsewhere. In China we lost by treating Communists as nationalists. In the Middle East we may lose by looking on nationalists as Communists.

7. Finally, we should consult the American people more than we have done on subjects of this kind. I find in public speaking and meetings with Americans throughout this country a great desire to know and to contribute. I believe that the American people should be told constantly of our policies and motivations in the Middle East so that they may understand our interest and the true facts. On the other hand, it seems to me we should pay more attention to what the people are thinking and saying. I find in my contact with the American people a real awareness of the American interest in the Middle East and a willingness to follow if leadership is given. It seems to me that the people are ready to follow bold leadership in the assertion of an American position in the Middle East, even if this means the taking of new and bold actions. The American people may well be ahead of the Government and the Congress in this respect. In conclusion, it is evident to me that the American position in the Middle East is drifting toward disaster. A new idea must be sought if we are to keep pace with the

peoples of the area in their revolution of rising expectations. We must seek ways to get on the side of the people. We must be prepared in the Arab-Israeli question to take immediate and bold steps. Otherwise, the American national security will be placed in real jeopardy. I do not believe we are allotted more than a brief interval of time in which to act.

It was an error for us to support in any way the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Israel cannot now be abolished, as even its Arab enemies must realize, but it should be a firm policy of our Government to oppose its further territorial expansion.

It seems to me that, with the exception of this error, our policies in the Near East have been sound. It is clearly in our interest to support the Baghdad Pact and to take every practicable measure to prevent Soviet penetration and subversion in the area. Also, despite the painful effect on Britain and France, we were unquestionably correct in the position we took during the Suez crisis.

Of equal importance with the problem of the extension of Russian influence in this part of the world is that of Arab-Jewish relations. Our current and long-range policy should be to try unremittingly to convince the Arab nations and Israel that they should live in peace and that they could, by economic co-operation, improve considerably the well-being of their peoples.

It would seem that any voluntary federation or unification of Arab States should have our support. While it may be advisable, under present circumstances, for us to subsidize the Government of Jordan, this small country, which offers no hope of ever being able to maintain itself economically, should eventually be united either with the U.A.R. or with Iraq, as was originally contemplated.

If a man goes to a doctor and is told that he has an incipient cancer that can almost certainly be eradicated by an operation and he then goes home and, although his condition deteriorates from year to year, does nothing about it, the time will eventually come when nothing can be done to save him. I fear that that is the history of our policy in the Near East during the last 12 years. The foundation of Israel in an Arab country and our subsequent military, financial, and political support of that state is an outstanding example of the way in which in a democracy the interests of our country are, and perhaps must be, sacrificed to the interests, or supposed interests, of a determined minority. The crux of the problem was summed up by President Truman when he said: "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents." The Arabs who until the establishment of Israel had considered the United States the one foreign power on which they could rely and who had in Americans a confidence which they could give to no other foreigner, became alienated by what they considered our breach of faith. Perhaps the situation was hopeless from the beginning, but there have been several occasions when we had what at least seemed to be a fair opportunity of bringing about peace between Israel and her neighbors and thereby restoring, to the great advantage of this country, something of the former relations of confidence between the United States and the Arabs. Our attention was elsewhere; we neglected the opportunities. In the meantime, while we ignored the fundamental political problem in the area, we vainly attempted to ameliorate the situation by spasmodic military and economic measures and by the most unwise attempt to bring some of the Arab States into the Bagdad Pact and by the Eisenhower doctrine, so ill considered and so unwelcome to the Arabs whom it was supposed to protect.

It now seems unlikely that we can ever restore the American position in the Near East. Our policy should be to accept the neutrality of the Arab States as between the Soviet Union and the West and to do what we can to prevent the area from falling entirely under Russian influence. I doubt whether we can be successful but at least we can try.

There is probably no area where our foreign policy has been more criticized as vague, vacillating, and ineffective than in the Middle East. Various reasons have been offered to explain the serious setbacks suffered by the Western Powers in that area, but the real underlying cause that got us off to such a bad start

shortly after the conclusion of World War II is seldom mentioned, publicly at least. I refer to the creation, largely with the support of Great Britain and the United States, of the State of Israel. It certainly did not require a Talleyrand to foresee the trouble and bitterness which this act was bound to create in our relations with the Arab and Moslem world. Not only was the act itself bound to bring about a crisis in our relations with these countries but the way in which our Government proceeded, in according *de facto* recognition on the same day that Israel proclaimed its independence as a state—May 14, 1948, was unpleasantly reminiscent of the action of President Theodore Roosevelt in recognizing the *de facto* Government of Panama 10 days after the latter's declaration of independence from Colombia on November 3, 1903.

However, all that is now presumably water over the dam (not Aswan, of course) and probably the action was bound to come sooner or later; although one would hope, done with more consideration for Arab feelings and the thousands of Arab refugees that it left to seek asylum somewhere outside the borders of their own country. But to take an ostrich-head-in-the-sand attitude, as most people seem to do today, preferring not to know what was really responsible for our having lost, almost overnight, the friendship and respect of the Arab countries which, up to that time had looked to us as the one disinterested country on whose support they could count is, in my opinion, both stupid and hypocritical.

Of course, the Soviet Government lost no time in taking advantage of our unpopularity (they had recognized Israel 3 days after ourselves, but soon saw on which side their bread was buttered and took steps to assure the Arabs of their sympathy and support) to establish a position for themselves, which they had so long coveted, even during the Czarist days, in the Middle East.

The Truman doctrine of military and economic aid to Greece in 1947, which undoubtedly saved those countries from following the fate of the other Balkan States, followed shortly by the Marshall plan for European recovery, were both statesmanlike concepts, well prepared and brilliantly executed, and did much to establish our position of leadership of the free countries, in the face of the challenge presented by Russia's plan for world domination now cynically unmasked. NATO followed in 1949 and SEATO in 1954, and it was in the following year, 1955, that an attempt was made to fill the gap in the defense line—"the northern tier"—between Turkey, the southern terminal of NATO, and Pakistan, the beginning of SEATO. I have always understood that our Government played an important role in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, and it is therefore all the more incomprehensible why, when the time came, we refused to join the pact and contented ourselves—but no one else—with representation on three of the principal committees. The reasons generally given are that we hesitated to offend Egypt, Israel, and India—but as Senator Green remarked during a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Why, if we undertake these obligations (membership on the three committees) in spite of the objections on the part of some of the Arab nations, should we not take the whole thing? What would make it any worse if we became a member of the pact?"

I was told by a high Turkish official that were the United States to join the pact he was reasonably confident that Saudi Arabia and possibly one other Arab country would come in, in which case the pact would have included the three great oil-producing countries (excluding the independent sheikdom of Kuwait), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. As it is, Iraq has now left the pact for closer relations with Moscow while our Government has found it necessary, in order to make up for our failure to join originally, to conclude bilateral defense pacts with Iran and Pakistan, thereby creating even greater antagonism against them; on the part of Russia against Iran, and India against Pakistan.

Our policy with respect to the dependent and colonial areas of Africa has been a wise one. We have encouraged the granting of independence to them as soon as they were fitted for it. At the same time we have not embarrassed our Western European allies—at least not in recent years—by supporting revolts against their authority by their colonial subjects. It is clear that the strong and rising spirit of nationalism among these people has brought independence to some countries that are hopelessly incapable of governing themselves at present or of developing any sort of viable economy; e.g., Libya and parts of the former French Empire. Nevertheless we have to face the situation as it exists. Our long range policy should be to give technical and economic aid

to these newcomers to the society of free nations and, where feasible, to encourage some sort of rational union that will strengthen their economies and make for a greater degree of political stability.

North Africa.—An unfortunate and common fault of the Islamic world is the complete inability of its leaders to visualize themselves as owners and managers of great industrial establishments. They cry for industrialization without in the least possessing a conception of its difficulties, obligations and methods. They can see themselves as vast landowners with many semislave tenants, paying from 50 to 75 percent of their production to the landlord, or as great merchant princes, sending their caravans or laden ships to the ends of the earth to bring back great profits, or again as proprietors of immense herds of cattle, sheep, or goats—certainly not pigs who are sedentary animals. They can even imagine themselves as artisans, producing beautiful, individual jewels, carpets, textiles, or pieces of furniture and leatherwork, these latter splendid on the outside and miserably finished where it doesn't show.

The bright young men have been educated usually as lawyers, sometimes as doctors, rarely as engineers or economists, scientists requiring difficult educational disciplines and hard work and not directly leading to politics and the power aspects of politics. They know nothing and care less about the drudgery of studying markets, gathering capital (always in short supply), laying out factories, teaching workmen and planning the acquisition of raw materials, deciding the quality and style of the product and its ultimate disposal at prices low enough to attract buyers and meet world competition while producing sufficient profit to carry the enterprise through.

For these reasons the industrial development of the North African countries, Morocco, Tunisia, and ultimately Algeria, has been and must continue in the hands of Europeans (Americans included). Cash advances to the newly independent governments are quickly dissipated in nonproductive ways; travels; opening of unnecessary embassies; bigger cars and offices for ministers, and so on; awakening appetites in the process so that, later, any diminution of regular subsidies "with no strings attached" is taken as insulting to the patriots escaping from "imperialist colonialism." The United States should try to avoid getting into the vicious circle of being blackmailed into ever increasing handouts, although I fear it is already late. In any case, the first threat of turning to the Soviets should be met with a bland acquiescence, such as, "Why, by all means get what you can from the Soviets. We wish you better luck than Nasser and Kassem have had."

LATIN AMERICA

The committee received two divergent evaluations of our relations with Latin America and the course that our policies should take in this area.

I feel that we will be unable to develop a successful Latin American policy until we have a worthwhile objective in mind. During the twenties we wanted to erase some of the misunderstandings of the past; in the thirties, we had the bright image of continental solidarity to lead us on; and during World War II there were many and pressing reasons for an active and dynamic approach to our relationships with Latin America. In the immediate postwar period our urgent preoccupation with the problems of other areas led us to forget just where Latin America fitted into our scheme of things while after 1954 the dominance of business and banking thinking let to setting up the objective of making Latin America safe for American private initiative.

The policy naturally flowing from this dominant philosophy was reflected in (1) efforts to get Latin America to follow sound monetary and fiscal policies; (2) the grudging provision of minimum public credit facilities for fields in which private capital had no interest; (3) the almost exclusive emphasis on the role of private capital in the economic development process; and (4) demands for a better general atmosphere for private investment. While the pressure of events has caused some softening in this approach, it is still essentially the policy of the present administration.

If these were normal times, I would have little objection to this sound if somewhat narrow and unimaginative approach. But these are not normal times. Against a background of world ideological conflict and social unrest, our policy must be more dynamic and immediate than this. What we need is an affirmative, a promotional approach to economic development plus a sympathetic and realistic understanding of the very real problems which Latin America faces in the production and marketing of raw materials. Experience assures me that such a policy could be developed without doing undue violence to reasonable economic principles.

As for objectives we have never had better ones. We have all wondered why the hundreds of millions spent for propaganda and for grant aid have not done a better selling job for us. Perhaps it is because we are too rich, too powerful, and perchance too self-satisfied to sell ourselves and our ideas directly. We might well do better if we had others to bear witness for us. Who would be better qualified—if the old sense of solidarity could be reawakened—than our Latin American neighbors who not only know our good and bad points, but understand the problems of the underdeveloped areas and largely share their aspirations. But influencing the outcome of the cold war is less important than insuring the role that we would want Latin America to play if there ever should be a hot war—for in such a case the friendship of our southern neighbors might mean the difference between life and death to our country.

I am likewise of the opinion that, despite their frequent criticism, we have followed fair and friendly policies toward our Latin American neighbors. Our support of the Organization of American States, our abstention from interference in internal matters, and our generous technical and economic assistance should provide ample evidence to these countries of our desire to help them and to cooperate with them. We cannot solve all of their problems for them. They have to help themselves, and many of them could make a good start by trying seriously to create a climate more favorable to the investment of private American capital. With respect to their frequent demands for greater financial assistance, I am convinced that one of the most serious disservices we could render would be to make government-to-government grants unaccompanied by stringent controls on the methods of expenditure. The Export-Import Bank, the International Bank, and the Development Loan Fund, plus private capital, should be able to provide all the funds Latin America is capable of employing usefully.

FAR EAST AND ASIA

Many of the comments apropos the Far East have been included under other topics in this report, e. g., "nationalism," "foreign aid," and "alliances." This section contains two broadly painted sketches of the challenges for U.S. foreign policy in the Far East, a brief statement on Japan, and rather lengthy discussions of the China problem.

An overall problem in relation to the Far East, which in my opinion transcends all others in urgency and importance, is that of restoring our lost leadership among the countries of that region. Our decisions in regard to how best we may serve this objective should provide us with a useful guide toward achieving a consistency of policy in dealing with other questions that confront us there.

In approaching this task we might profit from comparing our failure during the war to arouse among the Chinese the degree of enthusiasm for our common cause that would have assured China's playing its full part in the struggle against Japan with the success of the Soviet Union a few years later in converting China with amazing rapidity into a military power that was able to defy the might of the Western World in Korea. Among the factors responsible for the failure perhaps the most important is the existence of a strong nationalistic feeling—shared by most Asians—which renders its possessors resentful of any implication of inferiority—politically, socially, and culturally—to any other people. There has been no little criticism, both by Americans who understand Chinese susceptibilities and by the Chinese themselves, of the ineptness of many Americans in dealing with China during the war years and after. The critics contrast the conspicuous assumptions of authority made by Americans in guiding the war effort with the unobtrusive manner in which later the Russians exerted

their influence. They compare unfavorably the frequency with which Americans, including official spokesmen, publicly berated their Chinese allies for their shortcomings with the care taken by the Russians to avoid depreciation of the Chinese who were their proteges. Such American practices, the critics insist, were anything but conducive to the promotion of a cooperative spirit on the part of the Chinese. At no time were the Chinese Communists subjected to the discouraging effects of being shoved about and disparaged by patronizing allies.

We must realize at the outset that, as the overwhelming majority of Asians view their prospects for the future, the margin between the utmost they can reasonably hope to achieve toward improving their present lot through the triumph of our cause and the worst that could happen to them as a result of Communist ascendancy is too narrow to be worth incurring great risks for. On the other hand, neither the peoples of Asia nor the American taxpayer are going to tolerate indefinitely the presence of large peacetime American garrisons on the other side of the Pacific. In the long run, if Asia is going to be saved from communism, it must be saved by Asians. And it is obvious that they will not put their heart into such an effort unless the margin of advantage to them of being on our side is substantially widened.

In this matter we can help and should help, but it is not merely a question of economic and military aid. Such aid is looked upon by most Asians as having been prompted by a selfish desire on our part to build them up as buffers against the threat posed to us by militant communism. They believe that prior to the emergence of this threat our Government was indifferent to their welfare and that if this threat were removed we would leave them to their own devices. They reason also that being nearer the firing line than we and lacking our strength they incur a much greater risk than we in opposing communism and stand much less to gain. Therefore, if Asians are to accept our leadership they must become convinced that it will serve their best interests to do so. Such conviction can come only with confidence in both our motives and our capabilities. In addition to the ponderable factors of our military and economic power, they will make assessment of our resourcefulness, diplomatic skill, political vision, and moral qualities, such as tenacity of purpose, loyalty to associates, faithfulness to declared principles and commitments, and willingness to accept risks and make sacrifices.

Much of what we do and say creates an appearance that American policy is halting, inconsistent, timid, shifting, uncertain, and unpredictable. In the relations of the United States, both with friendly and unfriendly powers the appearance of instability is unfortunate. It not only impairs confidence in American leadership among the nations of the free world but it also encourages aggressor nations to trifle with the American temperament.

A primary aim of our policy in east Asia might therefore be formulated somewhat as follows:

We must strive to convince our Asian allies, by actions consistent with our words, that we are firmly determined to come out on the winning side, cold war or hot war, and to stand by our friends through thick and thin; and that when our cause has finally triumphed, we intend to see to it that they shall share in generous measure the rewards in prosperity and security that we expect to achieve.

Such a policy, if carried out wisely and vigorously, would contribute not only to the strengthening of our bonds with our existing allies, but also to winning the adherence of the neutral nations to our cause and to render more precarious the grip of the Soviet Union on its Asian associates.

In considering how best we may prepare ourselves for an important role in the future of Asia we must not proceed on the basis of an assumption of our own superiority, nor should we assume that all we find good in our civilization must also be good for the people of Asia. It is to be hoped that our contributions will be large along spiritual and intellectual lines—especially in the field of political ideologies—as well as along material and scientific lines. We must clearly recognize, however, that it is for the Asians to decide what they are going to take of our civilization. We must also remember that much that we have come to regard as axiomatic is not necessarily so to them.

The importance of the role we play in Asia in the future will depend not only upon the intrinsic merits of our civilization and our culture but also upon the measure of our success in gaining the respect and confidence of the people of Asia. Our success in that direction will depend in turn upon the results of our efforts to develop a genuine sympathy for these people based on an understanding of their problems and aspirations and an appreciation of their human worth.

With such a beginning we shall be better able to address ourselves to concrete measures of practical cooperation in the task of laying the foundation for a regime of peace and progress, with justice and fair dealing in the Pacific area—and wherever we have relationships.

If we intelligently and realistically appraise the future, it seems to me we must recognize that the next two or three decades will witness the growth in importance and prestige of the countries of south and southeast Asia. This fresh assessment of the future should, I feel, be reflected in our policies toward these Asian nations. There is no question of abandoning our allies but it is essential to a correct evaluation of future developments that our policies be based on the new status of these Asian nations and the increasingly significant part they will play in international affairs.

The bright future of these countries is clouded by many problems, the most serious of which arises from Communist machinations, presently hidden by a benign and smiling mask. We have been fully conscious of this threat. However, our efforts to help our friends preserve their liberty and freedom through defensive military measures, have led to serious misunderstandings and are proving to be of little avail against the real danger, subversion.

Inasmuch as economic development is of consuming importance to these nations of south and southeast Asia, let us give fresh consideration as to the most effective and useful manner in which we can assist them in consummating their plans. It is my belief that a worthwhile move in this direction can be made by presenting to the United Nations, carefully formulated proposals which would call for the channeling of all future technical and economic assistance through that organization or through the International Bank and its affiliates.

Finally, solid benefits have resulted from our educational and cultural programs. In consequence they should be substantially expanded and placed on a continuing basis. Their importance is immeasurable because they constitute the bridge over which we may hope to see in the future an increasing flow of harmonious comprehension between the governments and peoples of south and southeast Asia and ourselves.

During the past decade we have wanted the friendship and good will of the nations of south and southeast Asia, but our policies have been marred by misunderstanding, inconsistency, and duality that has left our Asian friends bewildered and dubious of our intentions. For the future, this can and must be remedied by an intelligent and sympathetic pan-Asian approach that will leave no doubt in their minds that the United States is indeed their sincere and good friend and one who stands with them on issues of justice and principle.

There is also a serious problem in relation to Japan. If Japan, discouraged over the prospects for its livelihood in the face of a growing disposition among its allies, especially the United States, to restrict the imports of Japanese manufacturers, should transfer its allegiance to the Communist side, the scales would become dangerously tipped against us. This raises the difficult issue of whether we should give priority to our security interest in keeping Japan strong and friendly or to protecting our domestic industry against Japanese competition.

CHINA

The China issue merited extensive comment. While there was little agreement on measures we should adopt toward Communist China and Taiwan, there was a universal recognition of the difficulty of the situation and the resulting necessity to move cautiously and slowly. Even those who favored recognition of Communist China were painfully aware of our conflicting commitments and the dangers involved, and cautioned against precipitous action.

The Far Eastern problem which today is engaging more public attention in the United States than any other is the one presented by the two Chinas, presumably because its settlement is regarded as the key to the establishment of political stability in east Asia. Much of the advocacy of recognition of the Communist regime is predicated on an assumption that Red China would be willing to renounce its claim to Taiwan in exchange for recognition. This

assumption is unwarranted; no Chinese government, Communist or non-Communist, would assent in good faith to a partitioning of the country. Another argument is premised on the illusory prospect of loosening Peking's ties with Moscow: it seems hardly conceivable that we can outbid Moscow for Peking's favor. Important arguments against recognition of the Communist regime that are given little public prominence may be briefly stated:

The National Government of China, though its territorial base is now restricted to Formosa and a few islets off the adjacent mainland, represents the direct succession of authority in the national life of China as a free people. To all of them, except the Communists, it remains the symbol of the cultural unity of their race and the rallying point of their hopes of eventually reinstating a government of their own choice on the Chinese mainland. If Formosa were taken over by Peking it would result in the loss to the Chinese people of the means whereby they might eventually regain the national independence and the personal liberties of which Communist imperialism has deprived them. Contrariwise, Formosa affords the National Government an opportunity to develop enlightened political institutions. It is already making commendable progress in this direction in spite of its preoccupation with defense against the threat of Communist aggression. Likewise the island provides a channel for outside contact with the Chinese people, and aid rendered there by the United States is signaling to that people the abiding character of American friendship and the traditional desire of the United States to see that China survives and that its rights are respected.

In preserving the integrity of abiding concepts and long-range objectives, statesmen may not be expected to overlook considerations of the significance of an ultimately free China to the entire free world. China occupies a large and strategically located part of the earth's surface. Its hundreds of millions of people, with their heritage of sturdy individualism and habits of industry and thrift, have a potential capacity of contributing much, under favorable circumstances, to the common well-being of all mankind. This has been demonstrated by the richness of China's cultural gifts to surrounding peoples. Conversely, the stultification and perversion that the Chinese people have undergone under communism can do—and is already doing—incalculable harm to the peace-loving peoples of the world.

There is an unfortunate tendency among the American people to oversimplify problems in foreign relations and to be concerned less with long swing consequences than with disembarassing ourselves as speedily as possible of troublesome problems. Let us not delude ourselves that there is a reasonable prospect of achieving today by feasible and acceptable means a settlement of the China problem on a basis that would not seriously prejudice our lasting interests. It would therefore seem to be the part of wisdom to lay it aside in the hope that some more favorable turn of events will open the way for disposing of it. An opportunity might arise if, through our strenuous efforts, there was made to come about a marked shift in our favor of the present balance of power in the Far East among the nations ranged by conflicting interests and objectives on opposing sides.

The tensions that threaten unity within the bloc can on occasion also be exploited provided they can be identified and acted upon in time—for example the Chinese Commune experiment. Our nonrecognition of Communist China based on moral considerations is in the last analysis a self-denial of opportunities to progress in that area. Since Peking is unlikely to agree to the establishment of relations without unacceptable modifications of our unfortunate commitments to Chiang Kai-shek, the best we can do to mitigate our disadvantages is to raise the ban on China travel.

The Communists are in power in China and will control that country for a long, long time. Communism is not the Chinese way of life. They accepted it in their ignorance of its perfidy because they had lost faith in Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang; but they will discard it in time. There will come a day when developments within China will bring about conditions under which we can once more deal with the Chinese people. We must not alienate them in the meantime and we must be prepared at that time to discuss with them the desirability of re-establishing diplomatic relations. Recognition between states is negotiable. It is entirely possible that in negotiating recognition we might some day even influence events within China. In the meantime, I agree that recognition of the Chinese Communist government could do much harm to our cause in southeast Asia.

The firmness we have shown in resisting Russian and Communist Chinese aggression in Korea, Vietnam and the Taiwan Strait has been based on a wise, although not always consistent, policy. It is nevertheless patent that we cannot for an indefinite period continue our present attitude toward Communist China. We shall have to accommodate ourselves to the situation there just as we eventually did with respect to the Soviet Union, even though it took 15 years to get around to it. Khrushchev is not completely unreasonable when he points out that it is a political absurdity to have Nationalist China as a senior member of the Security Council of the United Nations. We are committed to support Chiang Kai-shek for the moment, but when he passes from the scene, we should advocate the holding of free elections in Taiwan for the purpose of determining whether the people of that island wish to remain independent or to unite with Communist China. In any event, we shall have to recognize the latter in the long run and agree to its having a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations.

Our relations with China, which for the time being would seem to constitute our second most important problem of foreign policy, should be recognized as a source of terrible potential danger. We cannot afford to continue to play the ostrich in dealing with China. We cannot afford to continue the pretense that Formosa is China and that the Chinese Government with full control over 600 million people is a negligible quantity. The Chinese, after all, not long ago inflicted upon us the most dreadful military defeat in our history. They are openly preparing to repeat that performance on a larger scale. We should begin by recognizing that the Chinese regimes of the past are dead and as gone as the Czarist regime in Russia, and having recognized that fact, we should act accordingly. Let us remember that for many years our relations with Soviet Russia were dominated by wishful thinking that the Communist regime would soon collapse and that even during the last few years that type of wishful thinking has colored public statements by the Secretary of State. How foolish that all seems now. Let us not continue to make the same mistake again. It is vitally necessary that we know what is going on in China, and our first step toward establishing reasonable relations with that country should be to permit travelers, and in particular newspapermen and qualified scholars, to travel there in order that the facts of the situation may gradually become known in this country. Our second step should be the giving up of Quemoy and the other offshore islands as soon as that can be conveniently brought about.

The problem of recognition is interwoven with the problem of our relations with China. We should recognize the Chinese Government as soon as we conveniently can, but the problem of recognition transcends the problem of our relations with China.

It was long American policy during the 19th century to recognize without delay any government exercising effective political control over a given territory and able to carry out its international obligations. That policy was first discarded when President Wilson refused to recognize a Mexican government that had come into power by particularly brutal means. After that incident, there grew up a new policy, that of selective recognition, which came to be generally understood to be a policy of recognizing governments of which we approve and refusing to recognize governments of which we disapprove. In view of the widespread acceptance in this country of that policy, it would require a difficult campaign of education to produce the necessary popular and political support for a return to our traditional policy of recognition.

It is recommended that we return to our traditional policy of recognition as rapidly as we may find it possible to do so. American interest has gained little and has suffered much as a result of our present policy in this respect. It is when we thoroughly disapprove of a government, when we have reasons to fear the intentions of that government, when we are faced with the hostility of that government to a point just short of war—in other words, when we have to face a government like the present government of China, that diplomatic relations are most important. We should not only recognize the Chinese Government but we should send to China the ablest Ambassador in our service with an exceptionally able staff and neither he nor they should be vilified for attempting to establish friendly and confidential relations with the most influential persons in the Chinese Government, in order to lay the foundation for possible eventual negotiations.

Whether or not the United States should recognize Communist China is a question that increasingly preoccupies thoughtful persons in this country. This may be attributed in part to a dulling in the minds of our citizens of the harsh realities of the Korean war and the grim casualties inflicted on our forces by Red China's hordes of "volunteers," in part to the constant reiteration by the statesmen of many countries that recognition would ease tension in the Far East, and in part to the growing number of nations in the United Nations who each year vote in favor of the admission of Communist China which gives the whole matter a considerable degree of urgency. I suspect that the prospect of easing tensions in the Far East is what is uppermost in the minds of many persons in this country.

What should the United States do? My own thoughts on the subject are briefly set forth below:

(1) The United States has never followed a completely logical and consistent policy with respect to the recognition of other governments. We have, in some cases, been motivated by strictly legalistic and realistic considerations of de facto control exercised, and in other instances, by moralistic and sentimental considerations. There is unquestionably much to be said for and against both approaches to the problem of recognition. However, it is clear, with respect to Communist China, that we have chosen to ignore the fact that this regime does actually and effectively control the entire mainland of China as well as many offshore islands, including the sizable island of Hainan. The nonrecognition of Red China must be attributed in large measure to sentimental and moral consideration. There is the sentimental reason that because of our close association with and attachment to our wartime ally, Nationalist China, which we made great after the war by seating her permanently on the Security Council of the United Nations, we must not abandon her. From the moral point of view we condemn the Chinese Communist regime for its inhuman purges and executions, its concentration camps, its slave labor and its communes. We regard Red China as an outlaw country, unfit to be recognized, or to be admitted to the family of nations. We find support for these sentimental and moralistic feelings in the fact that the United Nations has branded Red China as an "aggressor" and that we and the forces of the United Nations are still technically at war with that regime. However, it should be noted that these reasons for a policy of nonrecognition can hardly be described as logical, because we have in fact recognized a number of other Communist governments, as well as totalitarian governments, who have equally indulged in blood baths and who have cruelly mistreated their people.

Nevertheless, I believe that at the present time the general sentiment of our people continues to be opposed to the recognition of Communist China and that our leaders, whether Democrats or Republicans, are wise to head this popular feeling. Furthermore, I think we should take a hard look at the following questions:

(a) Will recognition by the United States of Communist China ease tensions in the Far East and southeast Asia? I for one, seriously doubt that recognition is, in itself, of such paramount importance to the Chinese Communists. In my opinion, admission to the United Nations would for them, be of much greater significance. It would represent a defeat for the United States. It would enable the Chinese Communists to exert a strong influence upon the member nations both individually and collectively because of their enhanced prestige, particularly among the nations of Asia and Africa. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists must realize that recognition by the United States would not necessarily mean withdrawal by us of recognition of the Government of Taiwan, or that that island would be handed over to them.

I see absolutely no evidence to support the belief held by some that recognition by the United States would be followed by a significant easing of subversive activities in the Far East and south Asia. The plain fact is that there has been absolutely no diminution in the skillful and flexible efforts of the Communists to infiltrate and subvert in the countries of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia who have diplomatic relations with Communist China. Nor is it reasonable to suppose, with respect to such countries as Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, and South Vietnam, who have not recognized Red China, that the subversive activities being carried on in those countries would cease if we should recognize that Communist regime.

(b) On the contrary, we should realize that recognition by the United States would almost certainly increase the difficulties confronting the countries in the Pacific area and southeast Asia who have not established diplomatic relations

with Communist China. If we extended recognition, most of the countries mentioned would follow suit. What would this mean? It would mean the opening of their doors to large Communist diplomatic and consular missions with unlimited opportunities to engage in all sorts of machinations with diplomatic immunity. Furthermore, the act of recognition and the arrival of numerous Communist representatives is bound to have a profound impact upon the many millions of Chinese resident in these countries. It is almost certain that the majority of the overseas Chinese who have been "sitting on the fence" would then jump over into the Communist pastures for reasons of expediency. The above are some practical considerations which seem to me to have a bearing on the question of recognition.

On the other hand, I do not believe there is much validity in our continuing to pressure our friends to refrain from trading with Communist China who is obtaining all essential raw materials and capital goods from other sources. It seems to me that such pressure is an unnecessary irritant to our friendly relations with them. Likewise, I do not believe there is validity to our rigid position with respect to the exchange of newsmen and journalists between Communist China and this country. A freer exchange of information would be to our advantage and in the long run might have some effect upon the Chinese. The *de facto* contacts we have established through talks with Chinese Communist representatives at the ambassadorial level should be maintained and expanded to the extent practicable. Finally, I believe that our policy with respect to Communist China should be marked by an intelligent flexibility that will be prepared to take the initiative whenever an opportunity presents itself.

THE PROBLEM OF TAIWAN

Of the many postwar problems which confront this country, assuredly the problem of Taiwan is one of the most complex and dangerous. It is complex by reason of historical, ethnic, and legal considerations and dangerous because Communist China is insistent upon the "liberation" of the island, by force if necessary. On the other hand, the United States is committed to the defense of Taiwan because of treaty and other obligations and because we presently deem the island to be an important part of our defense perimeter. Moscow and the entire Communist bloc supports Red China on this issue, while the position of other countries ranges from lukewarm support for us, as manifested by our European allies, to outright opposition on the part of the Asian and other "neutrals". I do not propose to delve deeply into the involved historical and legal aspects of this problem, but merely to set down a few thoughts on the present and future status of Taiwan.

(a) *Present considerations.*—We are presently bound by formal treaty as well as by moral and sentimental considerations to defend Taiwan against attack. Furthermore, as mentioned above, we have felt that Taiwan is essential to the security of the United States in that it forms an important part of the island chain of defense which we have established in the far western Pacific. For these reasons, our thinking has been almost wholly in terms of denying Taiwan to the Communists and strengthening the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as well as our own in the Taiwan area. This position has been repeatedly affirmed by Democrat and Republican leaders alike. It has been supported by both houses of the Congress and receives the general support of our citizens.

All these considerations have validity and are not to be lightly brushed aside. Nevertheless, they represent support of the status quo and do not look to the future. The time has come, it seems to me, when we not only should but must, give serious thought to the future of the island and the following developments which are taking place.

(b) *The future of Taiwan*

The population of Taiwan totals approximately 10 million. Of this total at least 8 million were native-born Taiwanese in 1949 when Generalissimo Chiang, together with the remnants of his army and his followers, retreated from mainland China to Taiwan after suffering defeat at the hands of the Communists. The influx from the mainland has been estimated to number from 1½ to 2 million persons, ranging in age from 20 to 60. This group, which has held political and military power in Taiwan for the past 10 years, is steadily decreasing in numbers each year due to various natural causes. In consequence the disproportion between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, in the ratio of 4 to 1 in 1949, will be very much greater by 1969. In fact, one can foresee that

this group will eventually disappear unless the unlikely happens and there is an influx of mainland Chinese.

What is the significance of these population factors? There are today three important and discernible developments.

Firstly, replacements in Generalissimo Chiang's forces are being increasingly rapidly drawn from young Taiwanese as Chinese personnel becomes overage. Today, between 40 and 50 percent of the 600,000-man army, navy, and air force consists of native-born Taiwanese. This process, which inevitably will be accelerated since Taiwanese constitute the only source of manpower available, is also extending into the ranks of noncommissioned and junior officers. In another 10 years the military forces on Taiwan will be predominantly Taiwanese, not Chinese.

Secondly, at the level of the village and the province, government is almost entirely in the hands of Taiwanese. Although thus far few Taiwanese have been admitted to the Central Government, which is well overstaffed with middle-aged and aging Chinese from the mainland, it is inevitable that Taiwanese demands for greater representation in the Central Government will have to be met.

Thirdly, because of the high rate of literacy (90 percent) among the Taiwanese and our own technical assistance and other programs which are producing well-trained managerial and executive personnel, Taiwanese are rapidly gaining control over the island's commerce and industry.

The next decade, therefore, will be marked by increasing dependence by a diminishing, aging Chinese minority from the mainland, upon a vigorously expanding and highly intelligent native population. Inevitably, a point will be reached when the Taiwanese will assert themselves and demand control of the island, its government, its armed forces, and their own destinies. This might take a decade, but more likely will follow closely upon the death of the generalissimo.

What is likely to be the attitude of the majority of the Taiwanese toward Communist China and its claim to the island and what will be their attitude toward the United States? Judging from the views expressed by articulate Taiwanese, they will probably ask for complete independence, guaranteed by the United Nations. They would, they believe, thus avoid falling under Chinese Communist rule and would at the same time remove their country from involvement in the East-West conflict. There is every reason to expect that they would wish to maintain cordial relations with the United States and the West, but the guaranteed neutrality they have in mind would almost certainly mean the giving up of our bases and a totally new relationship with an independent Government of Taiwan.

What should be our attitude toward these probable, almost inevitable developments? I do not see how we can prevent them, and it would, in my opinion, be foolish to seek to oppose them. We would be wise to give careful thought to these new and important developments unfolding on the island of Taiwan and to shape our policies accordingly. It is my feeling that an independent Taiwan under the aegis of the United Nations is a sensible solution to a complex problem.

PROBLEM OF THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

I do not see that we are under any treaty or other obligation to assist the Nationalist Government in the defense of these islands which should have been quietly evacuated long since. They are not essential to the security of the United States. They are also of doubtful military value to the Nationalists whose retention of the islands constitutes a constant provocation to the Chinese Communists that may easily lead to the outbreak of hostilities on a major scale in which the United States might become involved because of our ambiguous attitude.

Ambiguity is sometimes a useful instrument of diplomacy, but not in this case.

RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE

On the grounds that the Vatican is an important source of world information and intelligence; that it would enhance our position with our Latin American neighbors; and that we should ally ourselves with an important anti-Communist force, it is argued in the following statement that a U.S. Chargé d'Affaires should be appointed to the Holy See on a permanent basis.

1. The Holy See, especially in recent years, has used the weight of its spiritual and moral influence to further the cause of peace and stability. The United States today is the chief champion in the political, economic, and social field of that same cause. There is, therefore, a fundamental similarity of purpose between the Holy See and the United States, and at this particular time, when American interests are more widespread than ever before, the opportunities for parallel action looking to the achievement of that purpose have been vastly increased. It should also be borne in mind that the Roman Catholic Church is the implacable foe of atheistic communism. The United States has no better ally in its struggle against the Communist ideology and in the preservation of Christianity.

2. The Vatican is one of the oldest and most influential organizations in the world. It directs the moral and religious lives of over 300 million Roman Catholics residing in the four corners of the earth; it has developed farflung and, in peacetime, highly effective channels of communications. Through these channels flow the Vatican's instructions and directives to the bishops and representatives of the Holy See throughout the world, while in the opposite direction a vast amount of material relating to world conditions is constantly being received, assembled, and coordinated at the Vatican. Permanent relations with the Holy See would make it possible for the U.S. Government readily to avail itself of much of this material which otherwise might not be accessible. Indirect use could also be made by us, especially in emergencies, of the Vatican's outward channels of communication where our own channels do not exist or may be insufficient.

3. At the present time (March 1959) 48 sovereign States are maintaining permanent diplomatic representations at the Holy See. The so-called Protestant countries are Great Britain, Holland, Finland, and Liberia. Other non-Catholic countries are China (non-Communist), Japan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan. Every one of the Latin American States with the exception of Mexico are represented, as are the Philippines. Other countries are Syria, Lebanon, and Ethiopia. The Iron Curtain countries such as Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are no longer represented, but the Vatican keeps Lithuania on the list, and, until a few weeks ago, Poland as well. The position of the United States is that from 1939 to 1950 a personal representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador was accredited to His Holiness the Pope, but that since 1950 the United States has had no formal or informal diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

4. Chiefs of mission at the Vatican are often outstanding citizens of the countries they represent. Many missions maintain relatively large staffs; for instance, Argentina, eight; France, six; Spain, six; and Germany, five. The diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See constitutes an important group of official representatives from most of the countries of the world and, therefore, is in itself a useful source of information on current events and international discussions and affairs, many of which bear on U.S. interests.

5. In connection with the furtherance of our "good neighbor" policy toward the Roman Catholic countries of Latin America, the presence of a permanent U.S. representative near the Pope would undoubtedly prove helpful to us from the psychological point of view. As an indication, the representatives of the seven Latin American countries who during the last war resided in the Vatican City as internees, along with their U.S. colleague, often expressed to the latter their gratification and satisfaction that the President of the United States should have decided to send his personal representative to the Pope. There can be little doubt that the establishment today of a permanent U.S. mission to the Holy See would tend to renew and increase to our advantage this favorable impression that was once created throughout Latin America.

6. In the light of the foregoing, the Vatican must be recognized today as a source of world information and intelligence and it follows that the United States, if only for national security reasons, cannot afford to be absent from such an important listening post. Clearly, the establishment of some sort of a permanent contact at the Vatican by our Government should no longer be delayed. But how can this be done?

7. The appointment of a full-fledged permanent American Ambassador or Minister to the Holy See would appear for the moment to be out of the question because of the political and other opposition that such action is bound to encounter in the United States. On the other hand, any revival of the previous personal representative (Myron Taylor) arrangement, even if regarded

as a possibility by the United States, would find little enthusiasm today in Vatican circles because of its equivocal and temporary nature. The idea of our having an Ambassador, Minister, or personal representative of the President at the Vatican must therefore be excluded.

8. However, the appointment of a U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to the Holy See on a permanent basis might prove to be a viable undertaking. In the first place, there should be no objection on the part of the Holy See, since a formal, permanent diplomatic mission is planned; and second, insofar as the United States is concerned, the proposal would have advantages. For instance, congressional action would not be involved either in the matter of appointment (no Ambassador or Minister is contemplated) or the appropriation of funds (the mission at the start would be an extremely unpretentious one and therefore the financial demands for its establishment and maintenance would be modest). The Chargé d'Affaires (probably a Foreign Service officer of class 1 or 2) and his assistant (a State Department staff member) would be all the personnel needed and these two would already be on the State Department payroll. Therefore, no funds would be required for salaries, etc. Actually, the only expense not already covered would be for the rent and equipment of the office which might consist of two or at the most three rooms. This item could be taken care of from current allocations of the State Department without having to look elsewhere.

9. In line with this unostentatious beginning of our new diplomatic mission to the Holy See, the Chargé d'Affaires should be instructed to make every effort to keep himself and his work at the Vatican out of the public eye. If the new procedure were left to function quietly and without attracting too much attention, it is conceivable that the non-Catholic opposition in the United States would lose some of its momentum as it grew accustomed to the fact that we had someone at the Vatican. Those who are objecting today might even become convinced with time that U.S. official contacts with the Holy See had nothing whatever to do with religious matters, but were concerned solely with our national security, as, of course, would be the case.



