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LANGUAGE AS A COMMUNIST WEAPON

CONSULTATION WITH

DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * *

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * * * *

18. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * * * *

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 86TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 7, 1959

* * * * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * * * *

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * * * *

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* * * * * * *

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

SYNOPSIS

Manipulation of language constitutes one of the Communists' most potent weapons in their drive for world domination, Dr. Stefan T. Possony,[1] political scientist of Georgetown University and authority on psychological warfare and revolution, told the House Committee on Un-American Activities in the accompanying consultation. "To the Communists," he said, "words are tools to achieve effects, not means to communicate in the search for truth."

Dr. Possony explained that, in their early years, the Communists developed a "revolutionary" language of their own which they used not only in their doctrinal works, but also in their propaganda. Because the language included terms such as "class warfare," "terrorism," "labor armies," and "revolution," it revealed the real nature of the Communist movement and "hurt the Communists a great deal," repelling, rather than attracting, most people.

At the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, it was decided that Communists would no longer use this "sectarian language." This meant:

> that the Communist message should be couched in terms which have a positive ring in the ears of the audience. Communism must be dressed up as something like democratic liberalism or patriotic nationalism. Offensive and locally unfamiliar terms must be avoided * * * any good Communist would now be able to use language which is not to be found in the classical writings of Marx and Lenin but occurs in Jefferson, Mill—or Jane Addams.

"The Communists did not change their basic texts," Dr. Possony continued, "but cleaned up the language which they addressed to the noninitiated"—

> Of course, Communist terminology could not be cleaned up entirely, but, briefly, "revolution" became "liberation," and the physical extermination of entire groups of people, "classes," and nations became the "laying of the foundations of socialism." Occasionally, even the word "communism" disappeared from the vocabulary and was replaced by "antifascism" or, more recently, "anti-imperialism" * * *.
>
> Lenin, who invented, among Communists, those tactics of language, occasionally even abandoned the use of his favorite word, "revolution"; instead, he talked about *the* reform, which he contrasted to *reforms*.

---

[1] Dr. Possony is the author of "A Century of Conflict," "Tomorrow's War," "Strategic Air Power," and "International Relations" (with Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé). He has been on the faculty of Georgetown University since 1946. He was born in Austria, educated there and in Germany, and holds a Ph.D. degree from the University of Vienna. After the Anschluss, he made his way to Paris and worked for the French Foreign and Air Ministries. He came to the United States in 1941 and joined the Institute for Advance Study at Princeton on a Carnegie fellowship.

He later served with the Psychological Warfare Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, where he headed the German Section. In 1952 he served on the faculty of the National War College in Washington, D.C., and in 1955 became an associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. He has taught courses on communism, psychological warfare, geopolitics, political philosophy, and on strategy and revolution in the 20th Century. He is currently a special adviser to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, and a trustee of the American Military Institute. He is also a member of the editorial boards of Air Power Historian and of Orbis, a quarterly on world affairs published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Possony analyzed, in his consultation, what Communists actually mean by the high-sounding terms they most frequently use today to mislead people concerning their true intentions—"national self-determination," "people's democracies," "coexistence," "liberation," "democracy," "scientific materialism," and also what they mean by smear words such as "reactionary" and "war monger."

When asked, for example, what Communists mean by the word "peace," Dr. Possony said:

> Oh, that is simple: The non-Communist state does not defend itself while it is taken over or destroyed. To them "peace" means lack of resistance, or Communist operations without the admixture of violent and, specifically, military, means. It specifically *does not mean* the cessation of attempts at conquest nor the end of the "class war." In another context, "peace," for the Communists, signifies preparation for battle and war.

He emphasized that Communists used the word "peace" as both a tactical term and as an objective:

> Peace as a tactical term means, from their point of view, the temporarily exclusive utilization of nonviolent means of conflict; that is, propaganda, infiltration, political warfare, economic warfare, and "revolutions from within," methods suitable for conquest without risk * * *.
>
> As an ultimate objective, "peace" simply means Communist world control. In their Communist world, there would be a proletarian world dictator. Societies no longer would be cleaved by classes and, in the "ultimate ultimate," nations and languages would be merged. There would be no socio-economic basis for conflict. This would be the society of eternal peace, where the state has withered away, public administration could be accomplished by female cooks, and gold would be used largely for washbasins and toilets. These were the terms Lenin used to describe his dream.

Dr. Possony pointed out that there is no peace in the world today and there will be none, according to the Communist interpretation of that word, until they have conquered the world:

> The point is * * * that the Communists operate under the concept of class struggle, national class conflict, international class warfare; and this struggle, conflict, or warfare never ceases *irrespective* of whether people are being killed in military battle.
>
> War in the sense of firepower exchanges is *one* band in a whole spectrum of conflict techniques * * *.
>
> Still, within the military forms of violence, there are gradations of intensity, according to the Bolshevists. But with varying intensities, conflict is incessant. It never stops before the final destruction of all enemies of the party * * *.
>
> Propaganda does not stop. Political warfare does not stop. Infiltration does not stop. The class war, the class struggle, or as it is styled in modern Communist semantics, the struggle between the peace-loving and the imperialist, war-mongering

> forces, never stops. All these things go on. They go on for their own sake, but also—this is an important point—as preparations for a later military phase of the conflict * * *.

Dr. Possony described the Communist concept of coexistence in these words:

> The bone "coexists" with the dog; the rope "coexists" with the man who is hanged; bacilli "coexist" with your body. Coexistence is a transitory matter of fact. The Soviet Union is there; the United States is in existence; and as of today, the 2nd of March 1959, both states live, and various social systems exist, side by side. For the time being, the Soviets cannot stop coexisting with non-Communist nations * * *.
>
> Coexistence is a temporary situation, and it is a description of fact. It also is a slogan to lull non-Communists to sleep and to induce economic and political support for the Soviet Union.
>
> It specifically does *not* mean that any Communists ought to be prepared to coexist with the capitalist system till the end of the world. Essentially, the term is a deception to convey the impression that the world revolution has been called off.

Two of the roots of Communist semantics or language manipulation, Dr. Possony said, are:

> Every Communist communication must convey an orthodox, that is, revolutionarily activating message to the party and its followers.
>
> This same communication must convey a different, i.e., soothing, pacifying, and paralyzing message to the opponent of communism.

The West's difficulty in countering the Communist semantic weapon, he continued, is due to the following:

"Massive" Communist propaganda is poured into the West through statements, books, and broadcasts. It is knowingly spread by some people and sometimes unknowingly by others who are trying, ineffectively, to refute it.

Only a "trickle" of corrections come from Western governments, many of which "have essentially decided not to correct Communist * * * distortions."

The 100-year record of communism and 40-year record of the U.S.S.R. is not presented to the free peoples of the world. Many university texts on communism and the Soviet Union "are distorted, often are false, and usually lack depth of perception."

Many Western statesmen are unaware of the "brute facts" about communism when they negotiate with Soviet leaders. Moreover, they aren't interested, in some cases, in understanding the Communist "grand design." In addition, unfortunately, domestic politics tend to frame foreign policy in the West.

Also:

> The Western World simply does not recognize the fact that political warfare, subversion, infiltration, and prepara-

> tions for war are routine operations for any political system which has any aggressive designs.

In response to the question of what Communists think of negotiations and conferences with leaders of the non-Communist world, Dr. Possony stated:

> To them a conference, an international negotiation, is a tactical maneuver and it can be used whether actually there is an agreement at the end of the conference or there is not.
>
> You use the conference in order to pressurize the West into some concession. If an agreement must be concluded, it can be broken whenever necessary.
>
> Essentially, "negotiation" is one of their conquest techniques. The particular value of this technique is that it tends to weaken our will to resist.

He asserted that not all negotiations with the Soviet Union are necessarily evil in their effect but that—

> The danger arises from "negotiations" about large issues which, at present, are not negotiable, such as world peace, coexistence within spheres of influence, disarmament, and the like. * * *
>
> On the other hand, if the negotiation is designed to eliminate a particular worry from a subjugated population, for example, negotiation about feeding hungry people or even one to prevent a particular war which would be fought on the back of their nation, it may not have that effect. * * *
>
> Worry will come inevitably to all non-Communists behind the curtain as soon as they feel we are falling in a Soviet trap. As soon as we give any evidence that we do not approach the negotiation realistically and that we are willing to be taken in, then they will be very much concerned. * * * After all, we were licked in many negotiations with the Soviets.

Summit conferences, Dr. Possony said, "are worse than useless * * * the more summit meetings, the worse off we shall be." Summit meetings, he said, imply the right of powerful nations to decide the fate of small ones and deny the principle of equality among nations and the right of national self-determination.

Two points made by Dr. Possony in his consultation emphasize the great danger this country faces in communism. One was the following statement made by Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1938:

> Every communist must grasp the truth: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" * * * we can even say that the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun * * * war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand * * * the central task and the supreme form of a revolution is the seizure of political power by force of arms and the solution of problems by war.

The second point made by Dr. Possony was that the Communists proclaim their power to punish for anti-Soviet activity, not only the

citizens of Communist nations, but the citizens of any nation in the world—and that they have exercised this power on more than one occasion.

The (Soviet) Ukrainian Criminal Code, for example, provided that "those in foreign countries whose occupation or the institution to which they belong may expose the Soviet Union to war or may in any other way endanger the structure of the Soviet State will be punished by death or imprisonment."

In concluding his consultation, Dr. Possony proposed a number of methods the free world could use not only to counter Communist manipulation of language but also to achieve victory over international communism in the cold war.

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LANGUAGE AS A COMMUNIST WEAPON

MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1959

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

CONSULTATION

The following consultation with Dr. Stefan T. Possony, author and political scientist at the Graduate School of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, was held at 10 a.m., in room 225, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Committee member present: Representative Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, chairman.

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director, and Frank McNamara, research analyst.

The CHAIRMAN. In the series of consultations which this committee has been conducting over the course of the last several years on the various facets of the international Communist conspiratorial operation, we are pleased to welcome today Dr. Stefan Possony, whose background and experience eminently qualify him as an authority in the field which he will discuss with us.

Do you, Stefan T. Possony, solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes, I do.

STATEMENT OF DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY

Mr. ARENS. Dr. Possony, would you kindly give us just a thumbnail sketch of your own personal background?

Dr. POSSONY. I was born in Vienna, went to school in Germany and in Austria. I am a doctor of philosophy of the University of Vienna and started professional life as a political scientist and writer about 23 years ago, contributing largely to Austrian and Swiss publications.

After the Anschluss I went to Czechoslovakia and then to Paris where, after the outbreak of the war, I worked with the French Foreign Ministry and the French Air Ministry.

After the defeat of France, I came via Spain and Portugal to the United States. In 1941 I joined the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., on a Carnegie fellowship, to study unconventional warfare. After Pearl Harbor, I worked for about a year for the Columbia Broadcasting System, doing shortwave broadcasts in German and occasionally in French. From there I went to the Office of

Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy Department. As a member of the Psychological Warfare Branch, I headed the German section and temporarily, also, the Italian section. During 1944–45, I assisted Admiral Zacharias in his broadcasts, which contributed to the Japanese surrender.

In 1946, I joined the Graduate School of Georgetown University. I am a member of the Georgetown faculty at this time.

In 1952, I was a member of the faculty at the National War College, and in 1955, I joined the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, as an associate.

Mr. ARENS. May I inquire, Doctor, in what courses you have specialized as an instructor?

Dr. POSSONY. For the past 10 years I generally alternated between a course, "Strategy in the 20th Century" and "Revolution in the 20th Century." In addition, I have taught courses on psychological warfare, sociology, geopolitics, political philosophy, and various standard courses.

It might interest you to know that for several years I have conducted extensive research programs on the techniques of revolution. Also, I have taught many courses and given numerous lectures on various facets of communism, ranging all the way from its philosophy through its history, to its techniques of conquest and oppression. I have bored scores of students analyzing the logic or illogic of the Communist Manifesto. This fact may interest those who contend that the teaching of communism is not permissible in American universities. Perhaps I have devoted more scientific attention to communism than most of my counterparts in the Soviet Union; actually, I am sure of this.

Mr. ARENS. As a point of departure in our consultation today, may I ask you if, on the basis of your background and experience, there is a perversion by Communists and by communism of language as we of the free world conceive of it?

Dr. POSSONY. There is no question about it. The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International laid down the law that Communists no longer should use "sectarian language."

This means, quite simply, that the Communist message should be couched in terms which have a positive ring in the ears of the audience. Communism must be dressed up as something like democratic liberalism or patriotic nationalism. Offensive and locally unfamiliar terms must be avoided.

Mr. ARENS. What year was this?

Dr. POSSONY. It was in 1935. Up to this period, approximately, the Communists did themselves disservice by using orthodox Marxian terminology, expressions like "exploitation," "class warfare," "dictatorship of the proletariat," "capitalism," "revolution," "terrorism," and the like. The Communists, ever since the Manifesto, had even talked freely about "industrial" or "labor armies." This term meant roughly what Mao Tse-tung presently is organizing in his communes. Our Western notion of "slave" or "forced" labor was rendered, rather openly, by the Soviets as "corrective" labor.

Of course, Communist terminology could not be cleaned up entirely, but, briefly, "revolution" became "liberation," and the physical extermination of entire groups of people, "classes," and nations became the "laying of the foundations of socialism." Occasionally, even the

word "communism" disappeared from the vocabulary and was replaced by "anti-fascism" or, more recently, "anti-imperialism."

The practice dates back to pre-World War I times when, in Czarist Russia, the Bolsheviks in so-called "legal" publications described themselves as "strict Marxists." Lenin, who invented, among Communists, those tactics of language, occasionally even abandoned the use of his favorite word, "revolution"; instead, he talked about *the* reform, which he contrasted to *reforms*.

This "regulation of language," as the Nazis later dubbed the technique, was used to get around the Czarist censor before the revolution. But the systematic transposition of terms was undertaken only much later, essentially during the thirties. This coincided with the period of the purges and with Stalin's revision of "Leninism" and Communist history.

The originally exclusive use of the orthodox revolutionary language hurt the Communists a great deal. There are many references in Marx, Engels, and Lenin to "democracy" and standard liberal goals but, by and large, the meaning of these terms corresponded to standard Marxian theory, which was mirrored faithfully by their propaganda. The Communists did not change their basic texts in the thirties but cleaned up the language which they addressed to the noninitiated, just as, in the late twenties and early thirties, they began to divorce, systematically and on a large scale, the so-called front organizations from the party and other Communist bodies. In other words, they made every effort to attract and not to repel their prospective audiences in order to enlarge their "mass basis."

At the Seventh Comintern Congress, which was the last Comintern Congress ever to take place, the party—the "world party" that is—specifically authorized this usage of "nonsectarian language," which simply meant that any good Communist would now be able to use language which is not to be found in the classical writings of Marx and Lenin but occurs in Jefferson, Mill—or Jane Addams.

Mr. ARENS. What is meant by "dialectical materialism" in Communist jargon?

Dr. POSSONY. The term was used by Marx essentially in a philosophic context. From the practical point of view, I do not think it has much significance, although it reoccurs in professorial discussions. It is what you may call a "social register" expression: It gives communism an aura of philosophical or cultural respectability.

The term "materialism" is really a religious point among Communists. They have to be materialists, in terms of the 19th century philosophy: The brain and the inner life of the human being are dominated and controlled by the outer world, by matter. Spirit is a derivative of matter, which means precisely nothing, except that it reflects a phase, long past, in the history of philosophy.

Mr. ARENS. Does the term have any other use in Communist language?

Dr. POSSONY. The term is also used in reference to social conditions. Here it is supposed to mean that the "productive forces" determine all sociopolitical relations and phenomena, or that the economic, material "infrastructure" or foundation determines the entire "superstructure" of thought, political ideology, law, religion, and so forth.

The Communists never settled what belongs to either of the two structures. Western social science does not deny, of course, that

technology influences (but not determines) socio-political organization, but it posits an interrelationship between numerous socially relevant *factors*, and does not single out one predominant, let alone exclusive, *cause*. The Communists have had great trouble with this concept, which already had been strongly modified by Engels.

The chiliastic significance of the concept is the assertion that, as the "infrastructure" be changed through socialism, man and society can be perfected. The perfectability of man and society on earth is the basic axiom of all truly revolutionary ideologies. The Communist contention has been that the Socialist or classless organization of production *inevitably* causes the emergence of a perfect society. The Communist mythology has been prudent enough to leave the criteria of "perfection" undefined. Incidentally, "socialism" as a form of social organization is not a "productive force"; hence it should be classed among the elements of "superstructure." But it would be futile to look for system, logic, or fact in this pseudo-religious part of the Communist ideology.

Mr. ARENS. What about their present concept?

Dr. POSSONY. In more recent times, the Communists changed their approach. Human consciousness is to be formed, not only by a change in property relations, but by action in the field of neuropsychology. In this endeavor, the Communists took their first cue from Ivan Pavlov, discoverer of the conditioned reflex. They are going beyond him at this time. In addition to science, the Soviets also change consciousness by their own peculiar police methods: "Beat, beat, and beat again," as Stalin instructed his henchmen, according to Khrushchev; but also deprivation of sleep and food, glaring lights, unending interrogation. Americans know something of these methods from the "brainwashing" applied to prisoners of war. In brief, "materialism" is the theoretical apologia for expropriation, terror, and torture.

Mr. ARENS. What practical significance do you find in the term "dialectics" today?

Dr. POSSONY. Dialectics originally was a method of disputation and later became a logical tool to handle opposites and contradictions. It has a long philosophical background, but I do not think we have to go into that.

What it means, practically, is that you pose as an axiom that each social organization is inherently contradictory; there are people fighting for power and ideas; societies are divided into classes, castes, or races, leaders and followers, rich and poor, old and young, males and females, Socialists and non-Socialists. Potential and actual cleavages exist in any small organization, and this is certainly true of large societies. There also is a problem of growth and decay, integration and disintegration.

Lenin once described Bukharin as the party's foremost theoretician; yet he criticized him as being too "scholastic" and lacking in true understanding of "dialectics." Lenin meant that Bukharin was not a good operational planner. A Communist, planning operations against a particular organization or society, must take advantage of existing frictions or "contradictions," as the Communists call them, take advantage *and* acerbate them.

Furthermore, he must anticipate the trends which will result from these contradictions, as well as the new directions which will come

about as the old ones lose pertinence. Everything is dynamic. Moreover, the counteractions to Communist actions must be estimated and the result of the clash of forces calculated. The dialectician must expect that perhaps a bit of the opposite will be achieved of what he tried to accomplish. Then he must switch around. In this sense, dialectics is a logical tool to justify "flexibility" and 180° changes of the Communist "line." Thus, I believe dialectics is a method of thinking ahead and operational planning. It involves a full anticipatory development of the opponent's counterplan and adumbrates alternative and subsequent plans, ad infinitum.

Mr. ARENS. That is a classic military device.

Dr. POSSONY. Except that it is a little more dynamic than the military have it. The Communists pay greater attention to the "contradictions" in each plan and to the "contradictions" in the social environment in which these plans are to be executed.

There are three phases in the dialectic: a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

A typical dialectic scheme was laid down by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. The basic, nondialectic idea was that the Communists would cooperate with the Western Powers against the Nazis. The dialectic embellishment was that the Communists should use this "cooperation" to dominate the Western Powers.

They put out this double thesis: The Fascist states are preparing for war against the Soviet Union, and the Fascist states must be weakened by infiltration and their advance must be stopped by war.

Now the antithesis: The main burden of the war should be carried by the capitalist states. The Soviet Union must ally itself with some capitalist states. The Soviet Union must establish partial or full control over its capitalist allies. This control can be obtained by infiltration of the Western political organisms, organizing a people's war, and participation in "coalition governments."

The synthesis was that the war must be used to press forward to gradual seizure of power in the allied capitalist states. The Fascist states, weakened by infiltration, would be defeated in battle. Defeat would lead to revolution. This oversophisticated scheme did not work. But the fundamental dialectic concept that Nazi aggression should be countered in such a way that the Communist world revolution would be expanded was applied successfully, thanks in part to the "non-dialectic" support of the democracies.

Mr. ARENS. Dr. Possony, both at home and abroad, the Communists make much of various key words; one of these key words is "peace." What do they mean by "peace"?

Dr. POSSONY. Oh, that is simple: The non-Communist state does not defend itself while it is taken over or destroyed. To them, "peace" means lack of resistance, or Communist operations without the admixture of violent and, specifically, military, means. It specifically *does not mean* the cessation of attempts at conquest nor the end of the "class war." In another context, "peace," for the Communists, signifies preparation for battle and war.

Their peace propaganda aims at reducing or eliminating all resistance to Communist advance; also, at the concealment of Communist objectives.

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Mr. ARENS. Does their concept of peace coincide with the concept that the free world has of peace; namely, tranquillity, friendship, cooperation, mutual help, lack of hostile intent?

Dr. POSSONY. No, they do not believe in any of these attitudes, vis-a-vis the so-called "capitalist" states.

There is, however, a distinction: peace as a tactical term and peace as an objective. Peace as a tactical term means, from their point of view, the temporarily exclusive utilization of nonviolent means of conflict; that is, propaganda, infiltration, political warfare, economic warfare, and "revolutions from within," methods suitable for conquest without risk.

Peace also means, as I said, nonresistance to their attacks.

As an ultimate objective, "peace" simply means Communist world control. In their Communist world, there would be a proletarian world dictator. Societies no longer would be cleaved by classes and, in the "ultimate ultimate," nations and languages would be merged. There would be no socioeconomic basis for conflict. This would be the society of eternal peace, where the state has withered away, public administration could be accomplished by female cooks, and gold would be used largely for washbasins and toilets. These were the terms Lenin used to describe his dream. Actually, Stalin warned the comrades against assuming that the state would wither away within the foreseeable future or at all.

Still, this chiliastic vision often is used or abused to make points of practical significance. In a recent exchange with the President, I think, Khrushchev made a statement to the effect that, "We are all in favor of disarmament. It is what we ought to have." Yet he is not so much in favor of inspection, which actually would make reductions in armament possible; a little bit of phony inspection, perhaps, but nothing serious. A true inspection system can be installed only, he told the free world, when mutual trust between the nations already has been established. Only when all nations really trust each other mutually can they share their secrets through inspection.

Mr. ARENS. What is the real meaning?

Dr. POSSONY. The real meaning of that is simple: Nations will trust each other only when they have all become good Communists.

In other words, what he says essentially, and what our people do not understand even if you spell it out, is that disarmament and full inspection are possible only at the *end* of the world revolution and after the successful installation of the Communist dictatorship all over the world.

Mr. ARENS. Doctor, at the present time there are no bombs bursting in the air. There is no armed conflict, of any sizable proportion at least, anywhere in the world. So in our free concept of the word "peace" we are now at peace. Are we likewise at peace in the concept of that term according to international communism?

Dr. POSSONY. No.

Mr. ARENS. Why not? What is the difference?

Dr. POSSONY. First of all, the words "war" and "peace" are misleading in this context. In a strictly technical sense, the word "war" implies an exchange of bombs and shells and so on. It is the application and counterapplication of military force. If peace were defined as the temporary nonoccurrence of military violence and if the Communists were to accept that definition, we would be at peace—in that

limited sense. Whether bombs are dropping or not is a matter of observation on which, in most cases, Communists and non-Communists presumably agree.

The point is, however, that the Communists operate under the concept of class struggle, national class conflict, international class warfare; and this struggle, conflict, or warfare never ceases *irrespective* of whether people are being killed in military battle.

Now, according to the Communists, the class struggle or class war is not just a fight about wages or social legislation. It is the basis of military war and at the same time it is part of the military contest. Class war is conceived as the prelude, accompaniment, and postlude of military war, and especially revolutionary military war.

For example Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevski, who was executed in the middle thirties, and who is now "rehabilitated," wrote a book called *The War of Classes*, in which he applied the class warfare concept to international conflict.

Briefly, there is "revolution from within," an uprising, for example. There is also "revolution from without," what we would call war. If the revolution from within does not succeed, it may be supported by revolution from without. Conversely, and this was "codified" at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928, a military war should be brought to a victorious end by internal revolution in the defeated country.

Mr. ARENS. What place, then, does a shooting war occupy?

Dr. POSSONY. War in the sense of firepower exchanges is *one* band in a whole spectrum of conflict techniques. The Communists repeatedly have expressed their willingness to use the tool of war whenever it is convenient, whenever it is useful, whenever it does not entail excessive risk, whenever they cannot reach their objectives by less than extreme violence, or whenever they cannot possibly postpone violent contest.

Still, within the military forms of violence, there are gradations of intensity, according to the Bolshevists. But with varying intensities, conflict is incessant. It never stops before the final destruction of all enemies of the party; that is, in my reading, never before the destruction of the party or before judgment day.

Propaganda does not stop. Political warfare does not stop. Infiltration does not stop. The class war, the class struggle, or, as it is styled in modern Communist semantics, the struggle between the peace-loving and the imperialist, war-mongering forces never stops. All these things go on. They go on for their own sake, but also—this is an important point—as preparations for a later military phase of the conflict, which in their thinking has been and still is considered inevitable.

In their Twentieth Party Congress they modified this latter point just a little bit, that is, they now think that the "forces of peace" are so strong within the Western camp that they can prevent the "aggressors" and "Wall Street capitalists" and all other "scoundrels" from attacking the peace-loving Soviet Union; consequently, chances of peace have improved, which in Communist thinking means that the world revolution might be completed without nuclear holocaust. But this is only a vague possibility.

It would be easy to demonstrate that, with this doctrine, the comrades are departing significantly from the very core of Leninist think-

ing. I do not believe that, as a body, they take their own "deviation" seriously, although some individual Communists may believe this doctrine of the world revolution short of nuclear war or may use this argument to keep their more bellicose comrades down.

At the twenty-first congress this year—these congresses of the Russian party now have taken the place of the old Comintern congresses, or almost so; the Russian party is not beyond regarding itself as the "world party." At this last congress, then, Khrushchev reiterated that the *possibility* of a peaceful transition to world communism has grown. Note that again he talked only about a possibility, not even a probability. What he means—and he spelled this out clearly—is not that the Communists should desist from their plans of world conquest, nor that they expect to win by means of democratic elections. What he is betting on is that the democracies will be so penetrated by agents and so frightened by nuclear war that they would not dare resist the Communists on their road to world domination. This "possibility" Khrushchev is talking about is *not a point of Communist doctrine but an estimate of Western internal security and moral courage.* Fortunately, Khrushchev is not so sure yet that our surrender can be achieved without battle; so he is talking in terms of "possibilities." Personally, I believe Khrushchev is quite a realist. Much of this talk is addressed to foreign Communists, pacifists, fellow travelers, and agents to work harder in weakening the democracies. Some of this talk is needed for Soviet domestic politics.

At any rate, some Russian Bolsheviks don't believe in this possibility of the peaceful transition to socialism at all, and certainly their Chinese comrades don't accept any other thesis but Mao's axiom that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Mr. McNamara. Can this be documented?

Dr. Possony. It so happened I brought Mao's *Selected Works,* volume II, 1937–38, along. This book was published by International Publishers in New York, 1954. I want to read to you the whole quote, reminding you that the printed source is not an anti-Communist publisher but the publication outlet of the Communist Party itself. Let me read it to you:

> Communists should prove themselves the most clear-headed leaders in the war. Every communist must grasp the truth: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the party. But it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can really build up the party organizations, and the Eighth Route Army has built up a powerful party organization in North China. We can also rear cadres and create schools, culture and mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of the political power of a state. Whoever wants to seize the political power of the state and to maintain it must have a strong army. Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war"; yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revo-

lutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist. With the help of guns the Russian communists brought about socialism. We are to bring about a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle of the era of imperialism teaches us that the working class and the toiling masses cannot defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords except by the power of the gun; in this sense we can even say that the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun. As we are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not desire war; but war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand.

Mr. McNamara. It does not seem as though Mao was holding back, does it?

Dr. Possony. Mao certainly wasn't holding back, but here is another example of Soviet word treachery. I am indebted to Mr. Tang Tsou of the University of Chicago who called my attention to the fact that the above quote—Mao made this statement to the sixth plenary session of the Central Committee in 1938—is by no means complete. In fact, two entire paragraphs which appear in the second volume of Mao's *Selected Works*, page 505 of the *Chinese* 1952 edition, were left out from *both* the 1954 and the 1958 English editions. The key sentence which is omitted from the English text reads as follows: "*The central task and the supreme form of a revolution is the seizure of political power by force of arms and the solution of problems by war.*"

Watch these revealing expressions: "central task" and "supreme form." In other words, the main and the most exalted job of a Communist is to solve his problems through war. Prussian militarism at its worst never duplicated this concept of war *ueber alles*.

The other interesting fact is that this statement of Mao's does occur in the 1953 Russian edition of his works, *Isbrannie Sochineniya*, volume 2, page 379.

Let me call your attention also to the following sentence of Mao's in that same Russian edition of his works: "*This principle of Marxism-Leninism holds true everywhere; this principle is absolutely true for China as well as for other states.*"

Mao then goes on to say that this principle must be implemented in accordance with the conditions prevailing in different countries.

In my opinion, this statement by Mao is the fundamental axiom of communism. It holds within the Communist creed the same rank that the Sermon on the Mount holds for all Christian religions. A contemplation of the difference would be educational.

There is no other theorem in communism which can possibly measure up to the importance of this lapidary statement. Mao Tse-tung's sentence holds the key to Communist thinking, as well as to Communist action. Anyone who understands this single sentence will find it easy to translate Communist double and triple talk into plain text.

Mr. McNamara. Doctor, could you explain why it is the Communists believe there cannot be peace as an objective—as opposed to a tactical maneuver—until the whole world is Communist? Is that basically because of their belief in the class struggle?

Dr. Possony. I think violence is a dogmatic point in their system. They feel violence is creative. As Lenin put it, war is the locomotive

of history. I am sure they have second thoughts on this point only because of the danger of nuclear war which was one of the things the Communist prophets failed to prophesy. Still, their convictions and traditions dispose them to violence, even when nonviolence would work. The fundamental concept of Marx was that the capitalist system is going down hill and is driven by its own inner frictions to ultimate catastrophe. Since the capitalists are afraid of their own doom, they must become aggressive; consequently, war is inevitable.

I would not think that this original Marxian analysis of the inevitable collapse of capitalism is maintained in the sense Marx had it. This has been substantially modified, but I think they still believe that the "capitalist" system is not here to stay and is not going to go out of business gracefully and peacefully. This anticipated dynamic development is just simply forcing the world into conflict.

Add to this the observation that there are all kinds of revolutions and liberation movements, so-called, in the nonindustrialized areas. The Communists have their hands in practically all these types of unrest. In one way or the other they tend to become embroiled. Moreover, they are in a great hurry. The world revolution is taking much longer than was expected. Things can be speeded up only through violence. And "permanent" solutions cannot be achieved by nonviolent means because these usually do not preclude reversals. Add all these various considerations and you posit the inevitability of continued conflict for the next few generations, that is, the Communists do, and we have little choice but to do likewise.

Mr. ARENS. Doctor, another key word which has gained prominence in the public press is the word "coexistence" which, to the mind of the West, connotes the peaceful existence side by side of two different systems. What do the Communists mean by the term "coexistence"?

Dr. POSSONY. They certainly do not mean live and let live.

Mr. ARENS. What do they mean?

Dr. POSSONY. The bone "coexists" with the dog; the rope "coexists" with the man who is hanged; bacilli "coexist" with your body. Coexistence is a transitory matter of fact. The Soviet Union is there; the United States is in existence; and as of today, the 2d of March 1959, both states live, and various social systems exist, side by side. For the time being, the Soviets cannot stop coexisting with non-Communist nations.

If I am not mistaken, Lenin used the term first, when in the early twenties the peasants were allowed more freedom of producing and selling. The remnants of capitalism had not yet been extirpated, and some resumption of "capitalist" practices was encouraged, for reasons of temporary convenience. Socialism and capitalism coexisted within the Soviet Union. This coexistence did not last long.

Stalin originally used the expression to the effect that different nations were "coexisting" within the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians with the Russians and the Armenians with the Georgians. This is still the official version, although in practice the Russian nation enjoys hegemony.

Subsequently, Stalin applied the term to the international scene, as a corollary to his doctrine on socialism in one country. Whenever the Communists do not attack, they "coexist."

Coexistence is a temporary situation, and it is a description of fact. It also is a slogan to lull non-Communists to sleep and to induce economic and political support for the Soviet Union.

It specifically does *not* mean that any Communists ought to be prepared to coexist with the capitalist system till the end of the world. Essentially, the term is a deception to convey the impression that the world revolution has been called off.

A minute ago, I mentioned Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country"; of course, the Soviet Union never was just one country but always has been a large empire. Socialism never could have been built in a Russia deprived of the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, or the Turkic states in Asia. At present, Khrushchev is making an effort to revitalize the Communist ideology. He claims that socialism has been built, that is, the means of production are owned by "the people" (meaning they are controlled by and for the party bureaucracy). Now, the transition to communism is being initiated—the stage in which the needs of the masses at long last are going to be satisfied. This explanation supposedly will help the Russians understand why so far, after 40 years, there still is a tremendous shortage of consumer goods. At any rate, there are now forthcoming a few statements that, according to the Kremlin, *communism cannot* be achieved in *one* country. It will be interesting to watch this development which may foreshadow a turn to a more offensive revolutionary policy.

Incidentally, Khrushchev has talked about the need to relax tensions on the basis of the status quo. Walter Lippmann asked Khrushchev what he meant by this term. Khrushchev replied that there should be no change of frontiers by military force, but that "the social and economic revolution now in progress in Russia, China, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa *is* the status quo," which the United States should recognize. The "process of revolutionary change" is the status quo, according to the Communists, whereas in customary language, status quo was defined as "no change in existing or pre-existing situations." Khrushchev defines status quo as "change" and, in Lippmann's words, "he wants us to recognize the revolution, not only as it is but as it is going to be."

Mind you, if the West were to play the revolutionary game against the Soviet Union, Khrushchev would rediscover the conventional meaning of status quo—*no* change. Revolution against the Communists is not permissible. If Khrushchev were a true Marxist he would realize that the dialectic of social development is going to destroy the Soviet system, which is cleaved by more "contradictions" than the most undeveloped capitalist society.

Mr. ARENS. What do the Communists mean by the term "people's democracy"?

Dr. POSSONY. A people's democracy is a form of Communist government which falls short of being a dictatorship of the proletariat. It is somewhat less than full-blown dictatorship of the party because a few non-Bolsheviks who, however, are under Bolshevik control are allowed to be in the government. In most instances, a few Socialists and possibly a few, I do not know how to describe them, but let us call them "advanced liberals," as well as "technicians," are in the cabinet as "transmission belts" to keep a predominantly anti-Communist population under control.

There was a previous usage of the term, in the twenties. I think Bukhara and Khiva were the first "people's democracies." Presently the term is used to describe the East European satellite regimes. It is basically a semantic attempt to make the Communist regime a little

more accepted. In all of those countries, the Bolsheviks do not poll a sufficiently large vote, so they establish some kind of coalition with other parties which they control, and this whole thing is called "people's democracy."

It is important to remember that "people's democracy" is a transitory type of regime which, in due course, according to Communist doctrine, must be replaced by a complete dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., of the party. However, the differences between the two types of Communist systems is quite theoretical. There is also involved some Soviet fear that inclusion of truly Communist states into the Russian federal system could not be avoided and might be dangerous to the stability of the regime; the Soviets have more than enough non-Russians within the Soviet Union already.

Mr. ARENS. Khrushchev is reported to have made a pronouncement that the Communists were in essence humanitarians. What did he mean by that?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, it is a matter of definition. Sometimes you might be very humane in liberating a man from the sufferings of this world.

In this sense, of course, Khrushchev is a great humanitarian. He practiced that "humanitarianism" in the Ukraine with telling effect. That the people wanted to be liberated from the sufferings of down here and be redeemed by Khrushchev and Stalin, I doubt very much.

Mr. ARENS. You are, of course, referring to the liquidation of the kulak class?

Dr. POSSONY. That is correct. Khrushchev was the main henchman of Stalin in carrying out the very nasty operation which is sometimes more pleasantly described as the "collectivization of agriculture."

Mr. ARENS. In which millions of people were murdered.

Dr. POSSONY. And died of famine and were expelled into the far reaches of Siberia and the Arctic. However, don't forget the party purges, the slave labor camps, terrorism, and genocide.

We should be careful with this term "liquidation of the kulaks." In the first place, many peasants who were *not* kulaks were physically liquidated, and in a sociological sense the entire peasant class was liquidated inasmuch as it was "collectivized" and expropriated. In the second place, the main blow of this operation fell on the Ukrainians, *both* on the peasants and on the intellectuals.

In another sense, of course, Khrushchev may personally believe he is a great humanitarian. I do not necessarily impute to these people complete cynicism about their own ideals. They have some ideals which they maintain in order, well, to justify their own actions before their conscience. Conscience is not a thing which we can entirely eliminate. Most men need a justification before themselves and those they regard as their betters. Communists must have apologias ready in case they must present their accounts. There also is the need for justification by history. Communists realize they are mortals. They are professed atheists, but they are no more sure than anybody else that eternal punishment is not waiting for them. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Communists, in addition to committing secret crimes, have also made an effort to murder their foes through star chamber "law" courts. The Soviet law has served as a cover for crime—this is a procedure for easing the murderer's conscience.

Marx's thought embodies parts of the humanistic tradition. He seriously wanted to reduce the handicaps on man and terminate his "alienation" from his true, human nature. When Khrushchev talks of humanitarianism, he hardly worries about philosophy, but probably feels that, in the long run, communism is going to improve the nature of humanity. Everyone is going to be happy and to live according to the faculties with which he is endowed.

Remember that the Russian is inclined to use big words. Khrushchev probably thinks that a society in which people have enough to eat and to wear is a humane society. Soviet humanitarianism is a figment of imagination. A materialistic system, even if refurbished by Pavlovian conditioning techniques, denies the primacy of personality and considers personality as a reflex phenomenon. Hence, for Communists, humanitarianism cannot be more than a come-on slogan.

Mr. ARENS. May I interpose this question? When Khrushchev uses the term "socialism" what does he mean?

Dr. POSSONY. He means a system where the means of production are owned by the state, in which the economic life is run according to a centralized and unique state plan, in which the government is in the hands of the Communist Party.

This is putting it without critical connotations. Communism is a little bit farther advanced than socialism. It is a system where, essentially, the classless society has been established, where equality prevails either in the form of equal shares, or in the form—which is Utopian—of the full satisfaction of the needs of every individual. Through the Communist mode of production, Communist society not only allegedly precludes the exploitation of man by man, but also is supposed to guarantee unlimited plenty.

According to the early books, under communism, classes disappear, the state gradually would be getting out of business.

In evaluating this dream, we must ask whether the Communists ever attempted to prove the proposition that the "Socialist" mode of production and the Socialist type of property actually ensure an economy of plenty. This is simply an axiom, and they never bothered to prove it. Marx showed only why capitalism must decay and fall, and this demonstration failed, logically and by experience. Marx gave up writing *Das Kapital* when he discovered that his doctrine of social classes could not be supported. At any rate, the Soviet system has become history's worst tyranny. The "class" of capitalists was liquidated and replaced by a class of bureaucrats and party officials who enjoy all the privileges, while the "people" continue to toil in servitude. In their economy, there is plenty of hardship and scarcity, but no plenitude of welfare.

Mr. ARENS. What is behind this manipulation of language by the Communists?

Dr. POSSONY. This is a complex problem. The various political movements of the 19th century and early 20th century mutually influenced each other.

When the Communists arose, the liberal and democratic movements also were rising. Those movements were not necessarily on the same side of the fence, but all these groups in varying degrees were opposed to the European monarchies and to the old feudal system, whatever was left of it.

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The appeals of the democratic, liberal, and even conservative ideologies are very convincing. In fact, Marx himself started out really not as a Communist but as a democratic liberal. He was very much infatuated with these concepts. He merely believed that socialism was the indispensable method to implement them.

To come back for a second to a previous question, the ideals of Marx's humanitarianism are laid down in a few of his early writings, which have never been translated from his very difficult Hegelian German. Marx was a humanitarian before he was Socialist.

When he conceived socialism or communism as the one and only method to achieve his humanitarian ideals, he subordinated his goals to his means. The method became all important, and Marx stopped being a humanist. Revolution became a purpose in itself, and democracy gave way to dictatorship, albeit dictatorship of a majority. He never would have bought Lenin's concept of party or elite dictatorship.

Over the years, the Communists have soaked up a large number of concepts which are not genuinely Communist, but which they felt they could use because they somehow fitted into their ideal of the perfect society. There also was the utilitarian reason to make a hit with their prospective customers.

For example, the term "national self-determination": Nationalism is a movement which became very strong in the latter part of the 19th century and which had a great deal of impact on Russia, the "prison-house of nations."

The early Socialists believed, as Marx had said in the Communist Manifesto, that "the worker has no fatherland." To them nationalism was bunk and they were on record as opposing the concept of nationalism in all its forms.

In Russia, though, this was a very significant question. The Ukrainians, Poles, Finns, Caucasians, and so on, felt oppressed, and the nationalist question was becoming ever more important as a revolutionary factor.

Finally, the Communists no longer could ignore the national issue. It took a long while before they got around to accepting the validity of the claim to national freedom, but prior to World War I they suddenly embraced the principle of national self-determination. After they came to power, they, of course, invalidated it, lest Russia be divided up; but outside of the "bloc" they are still posing as champions of self-determination.

I think a similar process took place with respect to democracy. They cannot clearly state that they are undemocratic. This just is not accepted. No one wants an undemocratic state.

So they produced a casuistic type of argument according to which they practice a "higher" form of democracy; that democracy is something which they alone know how to apply.

They started out inside the party, which originally was based more or less on democratic principles, namely, that the party members elect their leaders, and decisions are made by majority vote.

When Lenin took over, party functionaries were appointed and decisions made by the senior leaders, actually by Lenin and later Stalin alone, so they developed the theory of "democratic centralism."

Mr. ARENS. What do they mean by "democratic centralism"?

Dr. POSSONY. What they mean is that the few top leaders argue the case pro and con. Then they vote. The majority decides what the top leader wants; usually there is unanimity. Once a decision has been made, military discipline applies; the minority has to shut up. The party is like a military force. Decisions are orders, and there is no freedom of speech or criticism. The boss man runs the show, except for the short periods when three or four men lead "collectively." Discussion is merely tolerated before a decision has been made, within the limitations set by previous discussions. The party is entirely different from American-style parties. There is no control upwards but only strictly hierarchical, disciplinary control from the top.

Party and state functionaries are appointed. Votes simply are in the nature of popular acclamations of appointments already made. The wisdom of such appointments never has been questioned in an election campaign. Granted that appointments were necessary before the revolution, when the election of party officials would have been impractical, it is hard to understand why the party members cannot elect their representatives in a truly democratic fashion, even within the framework of a proletarian dictatorship. Whatever "democratic" motions the Communists are going through are essentially "transmission belts" to enlist support for the decisions by the leader. To them, "democracy" is not a method of decision-making, but of propaganda mobilization, a mechanism of getting the masses to execute the decisions made at the top.

Democracy has at least four component parts: election of executives and lawmakers, decision-making by free discussion and vote, no limitations on the rights of the opposition to oppose and to take power through peaceful elections, and full representation of all citizens to ensure protection of their rights. Democratic systems are associated with a free flow of information and with legal systems based upon the acknowledgment of essential human rights. None of this exists in the Soviet Union at all or as a component of democracy.

Mr. ARENS. What do the Communists mean by "democracy"?

Dr. POSSONY. To the Communists, democracy is a technique for the control of large numbers, a method to familiarize the "masses" with decisions already made at the top, and to ensure that the entire nation does its utmost to implement those decisions.

To the extent that some discussion is allowed, Communist "democracy" serves as a safety valve for the dictatorship.

Similarly, the Soviet trade unions are not professional associations to protect the interests of their members, but "schools of communism" and tools to obtain the biggest effort for the benefit of the Communist dictatorship. It is my conviction that in their unreasoned fear of democracy, even democracy within the party—the forming of "factions" has been forbidden within the party since 1921—the Communists are hurting their own cause, especially from the point of decision-making. The Communist Party would be immensely stronger if they were more democratic, or so it would seem. However, the comrades have become so unsure of their creed—they realize their vulnerability to any objective criticism, they distrust the members of their party, and the men in power just can't allow intraparty democracy to disprove the myth of their irreplaceability—that they won't experiment. The concept of the party as a political "army" with

discipline rather than discussion provides the intellectual cloak for this system, which is considerably less democratic than even Lenin's "democratic centralism."

If you follow the tortuous approach through which they tackle problems that arise, for example, national self-determination or democracy, you find that they first refuse to acknowledge that the problems exist at all. Then suddenly they take them up and try to exploit them for their own purposes.

Within the intraparty discussion, there usually is a group which is impressed by the new argument and proposes to enrich the traditional ideology. Others reject the argument as a bourgois or, even worse, petty bourgeois concept, but they usually end up accepting the point as an operational slogan, with clear propagandist or apologetic intent.

Mr. ARENS. What are the roots of Communist semantics?

Dr. POSSONY. Communist semantics have the following roots:

1. Every problem, however unprecedented it may be, must be handled in original or purified Marxist-Leninist terminology.

2. Every change in doctrine or "line" must be dressed up as a "restatement" and its "deviationist" character must be concealed.

3. Every Communist communication must convey an orthodox, that is, revolutionarily activating message to the party and its followers.

4. This same communication must convey a different, i.e., soothing, pacifying, and paralyzing message to the opponent of communism.

5. Every communication has a specific meaning within the context of the incessant intraparty struggle.

6. Every communication must be proof against counterpropaganda by all external and internal opponents of communism.

Communist semantics are more than a tool of deception and concealment. They also are a tool of legitimacy—the Soviet regime can assert its legitimacy only within the framework of its sacred ideology. But it also is characteristic of the Communists that they fight against each other by semantic means—until the loser is liquidated. To them, struggle is everything. Even language is part of the struggle.

Mr. ARENS. What is the object of Communist manipulation of language?

Dr. POSSONY. The deception of the non-Communist world is, of course, a main objective of their language manipulations. Actually, they do not need to devote much brainwork to this task. Non-Communists are easily deceived, because they rarely bother to get full Communist quotes, usually misunderstand their context, and hardly ever master the Communist jargon. The Communists really are far franker than most people believe. The deception frequently is fabricated by the Western audiences themselves, that is, there is more Western self-deception than Communist deception.

Mr. ARENS. Doctor, when Khrushchev announces to the world and to the people from the free world who are visiting him in the Kremlin his desire for peace and peaceful coexistence, how in your judgment can the representatives of the free world point up this very concept that he has in mind, namely, that peace in his concept is a status in which the free world is not resisting encroachments of the international Communist movement?

Dr. POSSONY. Khrushchev made no bones about this to Walter Lippmann. However, the difficulty of the Western World is that the Communists oppose us by massive propaganda, which is poured out every day in dozens of statements and hundreds of radio broadcasts and books. This propaganda is distributed throughout the free world by a large number of people who either knowingly or unwittingly are spreading the Communist line, sometimes by trying, ineffectually, to refute it.

There is the weakness of the free press involved. Statements by important personages are "news" and hence are automatically reproduced.

Against this massive barrage you have only a trickle of corrections coming out from the Western governments; in fact, many Western governments have essentially decided not to correct Communist assertions and distortions.

The record of more than 40 years of the Soviet Union and about a hundred years of world communism is not presented to the Western World, certainly not in the same quantity and intensity as the Communists are putting their message across.

The facts of the Communist record have not been properly determined. This means that in the universities many of our textbooks on the subject are distorted, often are false, and usually lack depth of perception.

Many Western statesmen, when they talk or "negotiate" with the Communists, are often unaware of what the brute facts are. Nor are they necessarily interested in understanding the Bolshevik "grand design." The Communists thrive on the circumstance that in the free world, domestic politics frame foreign policy.

For example, we may have a person who knows a fair amount about Communists. He does not necessarily interpret it as realistically as he should, but his grand design is to achieve disarmament. Disarmament, he hopes—without factual or logical reason—would prevent nuclear war and also allow the reduction of taxes. Briefly, disarmament is a panacea well suited for an outstanding political career.

In order to put this project through, such a person would be reinterpreting the record as he sees fit. When he talks to the Bolshevists, he would stress the things that the free world allegedly has in common with the Communists. The Communists would not be told by him that peace—in the true sense of the word—can be achieved as soon as they abandon their revolutionary intents and organizations. No, he invites the free world to lower its guard, to stop arousing the Communists, to make the first step on the road to confidence. In short, our main weakness, irresolution of will, is accentuated.

Then there is, I think, the basic weakness in the Western World, the assumption that all nations are very good people and that all are peace-loving. "We do not attack anyone, so why should anyone attack us? This is crazy. We are in peace. We all profit from peace." "Nobody wants war, certainly not the Russian people, who have suffered more than any other"—which, incidentally, is not true. "War has become impractical," and so on, very praiseworthy sentiments, but not demonstrable facts on which national policy can be built.

The Western World simply does not recognize the fact that political warfare, subversion, infiltration, and preparations for war are routine

operations for any political system which has any aggressive designs. There is nothing new in this.

The French Revolution was in part brought about by these techniques. Bismarck was a master in "revolutionizing." What is going on today is merely on a vaster scale, because the whole world has been drawn into this political process. Furthermore, the Communists have perfected these methods. Our people find it difficult even to acknowledge the fact of their existence, because the schoolbooks do not cover such unpleasant topics. In this field, the Communists, and especially their leaders, unquestionably possess superior education.

Mr. ARENS. Dr. Possony, except for the fact that as of today there are no bombs exploding in the world, are we in truth and in effect the victims of a total war?

Dr. POSSONY. That is correct.

Mr. ARENS. By the Soviet empire?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes; we are. By the entire Soviet bloc, especially Soviet Russia and Soviet China, and most especially the Communist leaders of those countries, supported by many Communist organizations all over the world.

Mr. ARENS. How would you describe or characterize that war?

Dr. POSSONY. The present phase is a preparatory phase for the final battles. The preparation is designed to weaken and disarm us; to undermine our powers of resistance, our intentions, and our resolve; to disintegrate social structures, partly by infiltration, partly by mental disorientation, partly by splitting our larger entities such as, let us say, the Common Market, the British Commonwealth of Nations, NATO, SEATO, and the like; and even to loosen the moral cohesion of individual nations.

All this is capped by a major effort on the part of the Soviet bloc to outstrip us in the military, industrial, and technological fields.

The goal which they are driving at is essentially this: that sometime in the future, the Western World be split, be undecided, be defeatist, and have no capability of taking proper defensive actions. At that point, the Soviet bloc would have superior military and moral power. Then they would be able to carry through what they set out to do.

Unfortunately, there is in the Western World a feeling that by resisting Communist propaganda and infiltration and by preserving a clear-cut military superiority, the free world, on the one hand, would destroy its own integrity—which I do not believe is at all true—and on the other hand, that firm actions would aggravate the situation—which I believe is even less true because as soon as the Communists cannot make any headway, a new situation would have been created. In this case, they would be forced to reconsider their design; but right now they are still making headway. We, ourselves, are making some of Marx's and Lenin's predictions come true. A policy of weakness is a policy of suicide.

Mr. ARENS. Are the present leaders of the Kremlin sincere adherents to the basic concepts of communism or are they using communism as a vehicle just for the attainment of power?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, that is a question about their psychology. My reading of it is that they entered the movement as sincere Communists when they were young. By the time they were getting older and more powerful, most of them could not care less, really, about the nice points of Marxian ideology. But they still adhere to many of the

fundamental concepts. For example, I don't believe they even can visualize a non-Socialist economy.

Right now, the Soviet system is in an ideological crisis. I do not think there is any question about that. It is clear that the old Marxian and even the Leninist concepts have become outdated and no longer are applicable. Many of the predictions have not come true. For example, the "capitalist" economy is not collapsing. On the contrary. They have modified their original Communist doctrine in practically every point except that the final objective is still the same.

They do not hesitate to modify anything or everything, and they also have a very good technique at hand by which they switch their doctrinal points around.

You can say that there is a new communism every 5 years or so. The ultimate objective still is adhered to, although, perhaps, the point is academic: Communism definitely has become a tool of Soviet power. It is a legitimation of the Communist rulers to rule and conquer. A great deal of age-old Russian chauvinism and imperialism has entered the picture. And a new ruling class has been erected in the "classless" society. Yet the Kremlin rulers need not be, and probably are not, entirely cynical. Their inner honesty, of sorts, their belief in their professed faith can be maintained simply because they have this technique of ideological or dogmatic flexibility. The creed can be refashioned to meet the exigencies of every situation.

Mr. ARENS. You mean words mean one thing today and another thing tomorrow?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. Could you give us an illustration of this?

Dr. POSSONY. Let us take national self-determination. What it boils down to is this: The right of self-determination must be granted to every nation, but, of course, when the Communists grant this right, in an abstract way, they do not advocate that a particular nation aim at self-determination. By granting, theoretically, to the nations in the Soviet Union the right of self-determination, they attempted to insure themselves against secession. Incidentally, that abstract right is granted to nations, but not to the Communist parties which run these nations. The parties must remain subservient to *the* party and must oppose any nationalism directed against the Soviet Union.

Mr. ARENS. Is that not contained inherently in the concept of the Soviet Union? That is, according to the Soviet Constitution, the states have the right to secede?

Dr. POSSONY. That is right. There is a long prehistory to this. The final struggle between Lenin and Stalin, which the moribund Lenin lost, is tied up with this problem. Article 17 of the Constitution of 1936 gives every "union republic"—for example, the Ukraine or Georgia—the right "freely to secede." However, Article 14 assigns all important state functions, including the coordination of the constitutions of the union republics, to the central government. In contrast to the concept formulated by Stalin, "national in form and socialist in content," this article gives to the central government the right to determine, in all union republics, the basic principles on which local education must be based. Thus, not even education is in the hands of the "federated" nations. To top it all, Article 20—if I remember correctly—states that in cases of divergence, the laws of the central government prevail.

Mr. McNamara. Does the Soviet Constitution indicate any procedure through which this supposed right to secede could be implemented? This would indicate how seriously they are taking this right.

Dr. Possony. No implementing procedure is indicated. This is a purely declaratory "right." The Communists pay obeisance to principles by parroting them but to them rights are abstractions, with very little concrete meaning. Actually, paragraph 58 of their Criminal Code defines "separatist" propaganda—this is the negative name for the same policy which, positively, is described as "secession." Separatist propaganda is a counterrevolutionary crime and carries the same penalties as treason. I am not sure what these penalties are according to the latest revision of their Code, but for about 40 years of Soviet history, so-called treason was punishable by death. Thus, the constitutional "right of secession" is negated by the Criminal Code. Russian nationalism has been rechristened "Soviet patriotism" and is good. National liberation movements against non-Communist states also are good. But *non*-Russian nationalism in the Soviet bloc is dubbed "bourgeois chauvinism" or separatism and is bad, a crime.

Mr. McNamara. Do the Communists not claim that citizens of foreign countries, that is, non-Soviet citizens, can commit acts of treason against the Soviet Union?

Dr. Possony. This is quite correct. The meaning of this term is different from ours. To them, anybody who opposes the Soviet Union or even communism is a traitor. This means that anyone who is committed to the idea of America is a traitor even though he is an American and not a Soviet citizen. They used to have a law—I presume they still have it—which says that foreigners who belong to institutions which may prepare for or take warlike measures against the Soviet Union and whose activities endanger the structure of the Soviet State are traitors. Wait a minute; I think I have a reference with me. Here it is. In Edward J. Rozek's book *Allied Wartime Diplomacy, A Pattern in Poland*——

Mr. McNamara. Where was this book published?

Dr. Possony. In New York by John Wiley, a very reputable academic publisher. The author, who used to be at Harvard and who teaches now at the University of Colorado, based his researches on documentation in the files of the Polish Government-in-Exile. These files date back to 1939. Here is the reference on page 103. The author quotes Article 54, paragraph 13 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code which states that—

> those in foreign countries whose occupation or the institution to which they belong may expose the Soviet Union to war or may in any other way endanger the structure of the Soviet State will be punished by death or imprisonment.

Mr. McNamara. Have they ever used this?

Dr. Possony. Well, in 1941 they executed a number of Polish judges, civil servants, and military officers under that law. I would not be surprised if this were the law which brought death to the hapless victims of Katyn.

Here is a document which the American public really should know. The Poles protested against these Soviet barbarities. The answer they received and which is on file with the Polish Government-in-Exile reads as follows:

> The Red Star—the symbol of Communism—has five arms. Each stands for one continent of the world. Sooner or later Communism is going to dominate the whole world. Therefore, every person, in spite of his present nationality, is subject to Communist authority. Every act, even of non-Soviet citizens, may be and must be punished by the Soviet authorities if that act was committed against the Soviet State in the course of fulfilling one's work in his own country.

Of course, this means that all of us here in this room, as well as the inhabitants of the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department, Members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and so forth, are punishable by "death or imprisonment"—it is not said by which death or how much imprisonment. The remarkable thing is that this document is an *official* diplomatic communication by the Soviet Government to a foreign government.

Mr. McNAMARA. Well, the very monstrosity of communism is its own best camouflage. Let's get back to the semantics of secession and separatism. What does it mean?

Dr. POSSONY. The meaning of all this semantic trickery is as follows: In the non-Communist world the right to secession must be enforced whenever possible. If they could get South Carolina or North Dakota to secede from the United States today, they would press it by all means; but if the Armenian Republic inside the Soviet Union would like to secede, of course that would be counterrevolutionary, and as a counterrevolutionary movement, Communists are entitled to suppress the secessionist movement.

Mr. ARENS. Again we are back to semantics.

Dr. POSSONY. We are back to semantics, and to dialectics. A may mean A, but also B, C, and D. It all depends. Truth is a matter of circumstance. These mental gymnastics are techniques of power for power's sake. Yet the Communists stick to their flexible ideological orientation for their own justification. They have to live with their own conscience. Moreover, to keep Stalin or Khrushchev in power is not a cause for which soldiers want to die. Communism is a better motivator, and the denial of free speech conceals the ideological merry-go-round.

Mr. McNAMARA. According to what you said, the principle of self-determination has no meaning within the Soviet Union. Is this correct?

Dr. POSSONY. Not quite. The Communists recognize the power of the national idea within their empire. They fear this nationalism more than anything else, including U.S. bombs. Their job, as they see it, is to render this national idea meaningless. Since they understand that this cannot be done by argumentation or by force, they ostensibly acknowledge it and otherwise do their best, or worst, to Russify the education of the younger generation. They also disperse nations, so far as this is practical.

Their language policy is a major surgical tool. In the first place, the local languages are used extensively to carry out the government's agitation. Those languages are "transmission belts" to enlist popular support in the non-Russian areas. This has the double advantage of humoring nationalism and, at the same time, contributing to the effectiveness of the Soviet system. Note that the printed output in the local languages is restricted to popular types of information and messages. If they had our system, we could say that the tabloids, the comics, the soap operas, and the dime novels are presented in the local languages; as well as traffic signs, public health posters, and invitations to give money.

As to cultural and scientific works, a major effort is made to have all this done in Russian. Moreover, the histories of the local nations are fabricated in Moscow. So are the dictionaries, which are designed to put as many Russian words into the local language as possible. The purpose of this language pollution is to weaken national consciousness and facilitate the adoption of Russian. Furthermore, the non-Russian elites are educated in the Russian language, the language of the "big brother." They are frequently given jobs away from home, while Russian elite types take positions in the non-Russian republics. Local cultural groups, for instance, groups of poets, are dispersed. For example, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences is perhaps the most frequently purged body in the U.S.S.R. All this can be summarized by saying that the Communist intent is to transform the non-Russian languages within the Soviet Union into very secondary, primitive, out-of-date tools of communication, in the hope that gradually they would fall out of use. You may call this language strangulation.

Mr. McNamara. Is this in line with the Constitution?

Dr. Possony. Well, the Constitution says that judicial proceedings are to be conducted in the language of the union republic, that all individuals can use their own languages in court, and that everybody has the right to education in his own language. All this is fine, though partly theoretical. The Constitution also guarantees "inviolability of the person," including inviolability of the home and of correspondence, freedom of speech and assembly, and so on. This Constitution was adopted during the very period when Stalin was purging thousands of his party comrades and was sending millions of his compatriots into slave labor camps, where a large percentage of them died. The Constitution was adopted to deceive the world, including the Russians. To the Communists words are tools to achieve effects, not means to communicate in the search for truth. Constitutional commitments are subordinate to the supposed requirements of Communist tactics. They have less validity than a quote from Lenin. And they cannot be enforced. Of course, this perverted use of men's greatest single resource, language, cannot fail but harm the Communists also. I doubt that many of them still know what their ideology really is. You remember Confucius' idea that bad government must result from disorder in language. Well, the Chinese sage is borne out in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Arens. If there are constant modifications of the ideology of communism, what is the stable element in the philosophy which binds Communists together?

Dr. POSSONY. The world revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, or rather the party, as well as the Socialist-Communist mode of production.

Mr. ARENS. Does the language or jargon of international communism vary with geographical or cultural areas of the world?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes and no. There are common elements in all Communist propaganda efforts. That is why you can go to any country, I think, and identify Communist outlets.

On the other hand, they will avoid the usage of terms which are offensive in a particular area. In the United States, the word "dictatorship" has completely gone out of the Communist vocabulary; so has the term "violence."

They may use words such as "discipline" or "state direction" or "democracy" or something like that; but not "dictatorship." An American does not go for that, and they are not going to use tabu expressions. In Eastern European states or in Asia, they do not have any particular compunction about these terms, but they always avoid offensive words.

Practically everywhere they conceal that they are, usually, a small minority. They identify themselves with the "people," give the impression that their proposals are only what the "people" want, and actually, very often, adopt the most popular desires in a given area; except that they secretly interpret them in their own fashion. For example, they almost everywhere espouse agricultural reform, in the hope of getting the "masses" behind themselves and also of destroying the social structure, if such a reform came about. Of course, they do not aim at agricultural reform, i.e., better distribution of landownership. Their goal is the collectivization of agriculture—no private ownership of land.

Mr. ARENS. Is the objective of international communism conversion or conquest?

Dr. POSSONY. They see this as two sides of one coin. They recruit Communists by strife and conflict and by fighting in combat, in addition to using propaganda. The actual exercise of strength is a recruiting element.

Then as they convert many people to their organization and line of thinking—whether they be truly convinced or not—they gain more strength. Then this greater strength is applied again, and again they garner new recruits. This is an unending process.

The man gets into the apparatus in some way, it does not matter how. Then they subject him to indoctrination, and make him into a Communist.

"Brainwashing" is a term which Ed Hunter produced on the basis of his knowledge of Communist China, but this is standard operating procedure for them. They use this all the time. The way they do it is the same: it is by disciplinary mental exercises.

They put the man into an indoctrination course and he has to memorize the message. The brain can hold just so much information and it will be filled up with communism; they force him to rationalize, to think in Communist terms time and time again; and finally he becomes a true Communist.

It does not necessarily work because the turnover in all Communist parties is very great. The human mind is more than putty. On the

other hand, they have gained a lot of very disciplined members by this method.

But conversion is not enough. Enemies will remain, considerably more enemies than comrades and fellow travelers. Those enemies must be liquidated as social forces and organizations, and many must be destroyed physically. Save for one or two dubious exceptions, communism has not expanded by conversion but by conquest. Conversion—or at least intellectual neutralization—plays a role in their conquest, but power comes from the barrel of the gun. In future, undoubtedly, it is going to grow out from nuclear bombs and missile warheads. They want to conquer the world and they want conversions to facilitate the conquest.

Mr. ARENS. Can we recognize a Communist from the language which he uses?

D. POSSONY. In most instances, yes. You might not always be able to recognize him if he makes a particular effort to escape detection at a given time. However, over a long period of time, any person who is a Communist, any organization that is under Communist control, is detectable from their language except, probably, secret agents, espionage organizations, and the like, which can be detected only by counterintelligence techniques.

Mr. ARENS. Why and how?

Dr. POSSONY. The semantic detection of Communists and Communist propaganda can be achieved through a straighforward scientific method known as "content analysis." You count and evaluate statistically the various phrases and terms they are using. Furthermore, you compare the particular lines they are pushing at a given time with the lines that are pushed in self-acknowledged Communist organs.

This line is not necessarily always the same in London as it is in Moscow. Yet, if there is a publication in England which does not admit it is communistic, you still can compare it with the local Communist outlets and you will find the coincidence.

Furthermore, you will find that sometime back the key publication of the communistic party in a particular country issued a directive. If you find that directive—and in many instances it is in print—then you can take your cues from your analysis of this directive and you will find the various organs which follow this directive.

It is true that, on a particular issue, the Communists may be pushing a line which also is the argument of a non-Communist group. To determine the character of this group, the frequency of coincidence supplies the answer: the more often the "lines" coincide, the more closely that group is affiliated with the Communists.

The Communist character of a person or a magazine can be established also by an analysis of what they don't say rather than what they say. Communists, generally speaking, will never criticize the Soviet Union or a Communist party, they will not extol the accomplishments of the American economic system, they will not counsel moderation or objectivity or evolution, and they will rarely fail to lambast one or the other force of "reaction."

Mr. ARENS. What do the Communists mean by the word "reactionary"?

Dr. POSSONY. Generally speaking, anyone who at any given time is opposed to them or the programs they are advocating is a reactionary.

Mr. ARENS. Why do they use the word "reactionary"?

Dr. POSSONY. No one likes to be called a reactionary. The term denotes hostility to progress and improvement, as well as satisfaction with evil conditions. Of course, just because the Communists call someone a reactionary does not transform that person into a reactionary character. Take as an example: in the Russian Revolution of 1917 the term reactionary was applied to Kerensky and to many Social Democrats and Mensheviks, as well as liberals and democrats. The Kerensky government was a Socialist government. I do not think there was a non-Socialist in it at the time of its demise. Well, this not-so-moderate Socialist government was described as "reactionary." If they would have described this government as what it was, namely, Socialist, their propaganda would not have been so effective.

Mr. MCNAMARA. "Socialist" is not a smear word.

Dr. POSSONY. That is correct. Socialism allegedly denotes a social consciousness, social justice, eagerness for reform, an ambition to end exploitation and discrimination. The fact of the matter is that, by all objective criteria, the Communists, with their tyrannical system based upon the bureaucratic class, are reactionaries through and through. Yet they put this label on their opponent, for example, the United States, which historically and by achievement has been the most effective and successful opponent of reaction.

Incidentally, they are perfectly happy to collaborate with true reactionaries. Their collaboration with the Kaiser's agents got them into power; they helped—deliberately or not—Hitler to take power in 1933; and they now employ numerous former Nazis in East Germany, many of them in the security police, of all places.

You said that "Socialist" is not a smear word. Quite so. Whenever they attacked the Social Democrats during the twenties and thirties, they called them "Social-Fascists." Then they turned around and invited them to participate in a "united front" against the liberal and conservative parties.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Is there a relationship between present-day Communist use of semantics, twisting the meaning of words, and the old Aesopian language used by Lenin?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes. This is a standard technique. The Aesopian language is developed with particular care in areas where there is some kind of censorship or a great deal of critical attention to Communist publications.

I would refer you to the place where Lenin defined the Aesopian language. This is in the preface to his book on imperialism. When he wrote that preface, in 1917, before he had seized power, he was very enthusiastic about the freedom of speech which was then permitted in Russia, which was really unlimited, following the defeat of the Czar. The body of his book, however, had been written before the overthrow of the Czar and written in view of the Czarist censor. Lenin planned to publish the book in Czarist Russia, during wartime.

"Aesopian language can now be dropped," he said in effect. "The reader will have little trouble understanding what I meant. When I was talking about Japan or Korea, I really was talking about Russia and Poland. References to Russia and Poland would have been scratched by the Czarist censor, so instead of arguing with him I used Japan and Korea." This was the gist of Lenin's statement. I do

not think Lenin anticipated at that time that the Aesopian language would later be reintroduced by the Communists.

This technique of getting around the censor has been a well-known practice in many countries. Communist semantics, the use of language as a weapon, goes beyond Aesopian language. Aesopian language is designed to produce a message through a veil. Communist semantics are designed to disorient the noninitiated. Obviously, the distinction is sometimes blurred.

Mr. ARENS. What do the Communists mean by the word "progressive"?

Dr. POSSONY. Everybody who is supporting them is progressive. A person can be progressive at one time, reactionary another time. Chiang Kai-shek was very progressive when he ordered the Kuomintang to go with the Communists in the twenties and he became reactionary when he kicked out the Communists.

Mr. ARENS. What do they mean by the word "imperialist"?

Dr. POSSONY. An imperialist state is any state which opposes the Soviet Union. The term is usually addressed to a larger state which has the power to damage the Soviet Union, and a state which takes care of its own security interests.

For example, when the United States went into Lebanon, we were imperialists. In their jargon we are imperialists anyway, but in this particular way we applied imperialism. This meaning has changed slightly, because in the early days they employed the term in the same sense as the word originally came into use in the Western World, namely, any imperial power like the British Empire; specifically, a nation which has colonies.

The "imperialist war" is essentially a war between imperialist powers and is, in some ways or many ways, fought for the control of these imperial possessions or colonies.

There also is the meaning of "imperialism as the last phase of capitalism." Lenin argued that after the full development of the internal market, capitalism could exist only by developing external markets; as these markets are developed, capitalism has reached its end. Lenin's analysis was wrong. He did not understand that "markets" can be developed indefinitely, and he made the logical error of confusing the completion of the political distribution of the colonial areas with the completion of the development of the economic markets. The dynamic progression of the free enterprise system remained a closed book to him.

Under the guise of "federation" and of associated "people's democracies," modern Soviet Russia has become the foremost imperialist power in the world. The Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Yakutia are just as much Russian colonies as East Germany and Poland. The much publicized "freedom of secession" never has been practiced by the imperialist Soviet Union, but it was practiced by the French Union under General deGaulle, just as it was practiced by Britain and the United States, for example, in the cases of India, Ghana, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.

Communist propaganda has been very effective concealing the imperialist character of Soviet Russia.

Mr. ARENS. What do the Communists mean by "warmongering" and "warmongers"?

Dr. POSSONY. Anyone who advocates that the Western nations—at present, of course, specifically the United States—maintain military strength at a truly effective level, is a warmonger.

Anyone who considers that the national defense is an important problem and anyone who advocates that military force be used whenever necessary, in the defense especially of national and freeworld interests against the Communists, is a warmonger.

The Communists are great experts in "labeling" and name calling. They usually refrain from attacking a person on grounds of real or pretended turpitude—they may still need and exploit those same venal or vulnerable men—but they like to label their opponents in a political sense. This is an old Russian custom. You find in early Russian political writings, especially of leftwing orientation, that a person's party affiliation or ideological bent are considered the most important piece of information about him.

The free world has not yet learned that when someone is labeled a reactionary, a Fascist (a label the Communists, strangely enough, prefer to the term "Nazi"), a feudal lord, a Wall Street banker, an oppressor, or an exploiter, he actually may be something quite different; and he usually also is a human being, a fact the Communists want to conceal. During the Russian civil war those who disliked the Bolsheviks were accused of trying to restore the monarchy, yet about 95 percent of the Russian electorate at that time was opposed to restoration. After World War II, agrarian reform parties were hit as clerico-Fascist; and liberal democrats like Benes and Masaryk were described as though they were degenerate descendants of Metternich. Yet then, the Communists turn around and praise Ivan the Terrible's and Peter the Great's contribution to Russian history, ship oil to Mussolini's Italy after the League of Nations declared sanctions against that country, and enter a prolonged flirtation with Peron of Argentina. And we allow them to get away with all that.

Mr. ARENS. I do not believe that our record is quite clear, Dr. Possony, respecting your appraisal of why the Communists use words or attribute to words meanings different from the meanings attributed by the Western mind.

Is it because they want to deceive the West or is it because they in truth and in fact have a different connotation to the Communist mind?

Dr. POSSONY. Both; it is both.

Mr. ARENS. Would you give us a little elaboration on each of the two elements?

Dr. POSSONY. All right. Let us take the word "democracy." They want to deceive the West by using this term, because if they were to say what they really believe, namely, dictatorship, such usage would be bad from the propagandist point of view.

They have to claim that they are superior in terms of the Western or liberal system of values. They must claim success in terms of truly progressive standards. This is really in some ways a compliment to the Western system of values, because they are not saying, certainly not to the West, that dictatorship is a superior form of government.

They say democracy is superior, and claim that they are a democracy, even of a higher type. This is where the deception comes in, often in a deliberate form.

At the same time, we must not forget that, within the Russian and Communist context, most of these terms have had a history different from that of the West. In many ways their usage reflects a different history of meaning and interpretation. Russian psychology also enters the picture—for example, their traditions of free speech and discussion differ significantly from ours. Sometimes they are aware of these differences, sometimes they are not. Irrespective of any "natural" or naive usage of political terminology by the Communists, whenever they see an opportunity to deceive, they use it, especially if it is a matter of sugar-coating the pill. This tendency to deceive often assumes the form of hairsplitting about terminological meanings.

Then they must use many of the Western terms in one interpretation or the other—this includes specifically democracy—in order to justify themselves before their own peoples.

The word "socialism" is in that category because, after all, their ideological strength derives from the expectation of many people that social problems will be solved through communism.

As a party, they of course know that they are not democratic. They know that whatever democratic procedures they are applying are pretty much of a sham or, at any rate, different from the conventional meaning of the term.

I think this is very clear in the case of "democracy"; I do not think this is quite so clear with respect to the term "socialism." With respect to that term they probably have illusions as to what they are actually doing.

There is another group of terms about which they just have not done too much thinking. For example, their notions of "property" are rudimentary, if not primitive. I do not believe they—and this includes the average Russian—are capable of understanding that private property as constituted in the United States is one of the conditions of freedom. Most Russians tend to understand the significance of landownership, but stockownership, for example, is utterly beyond their comprehension.

Hence, you have a very complex situation. Even if the Communists were to abstain from deliberate deception, the semantic difficulties of mutual understanding would remain enormous. To obtain a real understanding, the differential meaning of practically every term would have to be determined.

Mr. ARENS. Is there a comparable deception in the concepts which the international Communist movement would foist on the West by such programs as the exchange programs, freer travel, and the like?

Dr. POSSONY. In the first place, whether they want to deceive or not, they have no choice but to act according to their own principles and to their own structure; and their own structure is that when a man goes abroad there is fear that he may defect. Therefore they must select their man properly. They must know whether they can trust him from the point of view of the Communist state.

Furthermore, the secret or political police is around; it has to supervise the man. The man knows that he is being watched; consequently when he is in the free world here, he cannot talk out of tune because if he goes back he is going to be in trouble. Even if he is separated from other Soviet citizens, he will be afraid that his utterances will be reported—the myth of MVD omniscience is deeply rooted in all Russians.

However you slice this, those are the facts of life. Sometimes they are more in evidence; sometimes they are slightly less.

Consequently, anyone who comes over here must be assumed to be a stalwart Communist, or a person who at least has excellent connections inside the Communist Party. Otherwise he would not have been permitted to travel.

Some of these travelers must be assumed to be in contact with the secret police or with other Soviet conflict agencies. This may include political agents who are supposed to get a point across or scientists who are expected to acquire some kind of knowledge which would be useful to the Soviet Union.

As to the chances of "understanding," remember these Soviet travelers are not permitted to depart from the script in any significant manner; that many never lose their shadow or chaperone; and that even if all these circumstances were quite different, they do not have the psychological background nor even the knowledge to understand free and particularly American institutions. Any of us who has had contact with bona fide Russian exiles knows how difficult it is for these people, even the non- and anti-Communists, to get the feel of American life. I would not be at all surprised if some of these Soviet travelers, upon seeing our parking lots, would jump to the conclusion that the cars have been put there for their benefit. The mistrust of these people is unimaginable, and nothing is more ridiculous than the frequent comment that those Russians are just like Americans. If this were true, hundreds of years of history would have left no psychological traces. From the human point of view, dictatorship would be just as good as democracy. The Russian nation has splendid characteristics; one of them is their ability to survive perennially bad government. Every human has many things, perhaps most things, in common with every other human. But insofar as politically relevant attitudes are concerned, there cannot but be a significant difference between Russians and Americans, and especially between Communists and Americans.

Unfortunately, Americans are quite naive on this point. They easily take to liking a person for his personal characteristics, but they do not quite understand that the language barrier conceals a person's true characteristics and that most of their Russian interlocutors are play-acting in one way or the other. Of course, there are many splendid Russians to be met, but then the mistake often is made of transferring the good and likable qualities of the Russian travelers and chance acquaintances to the Soviet Government and the Communist Party and to mistake the Communist Soviet Government for the Russian people.

Americans are accustomed to a government which must take account of public opinion. They cannot conceive that this is not the case in the Soviet Union. I am utterly convinced that the majority of Soviet citizens want peace, just as I am convinced, on the basis of considerable evidence, that the Soviet Government is hostile to us and, given a favorable opportunity, would not hesitate to go to war against us. The peacefulness of the Soviet citizen becomes clear to the Americans meeting him, and since the Communists are a hopeless minority, most people in Russia should voice anti-Communist sentiments which, in actual fact, they fail to do. If the American tourist assumes that the Soviet Government is as friendly as its sub-

jects, he falls into the very trap which the Communists prepared for him. A friend of mine, far from any left, let alone Communist, sympathies, a few months ago, traveled to Russia where he had been during the thirties. He found the people more relaxed and more outspoken than before, and he was fast to jump to optimistic conclusions. Soviet psychological warfare had scored one point. In other instances I know of, they were not so lucky.

It may be argued that increased contact could not hurt, but would tend to improve the situation. I am inclined to agree with this to a point, in the realization that there also is a distinct possibility that misunderstandings may grow. I do not fear that the Soviet travelers will gain converts to communism, but I am afraid that the utility of such programs, as means of peace, is highly overrated. There were innumerable contacts between Germans and French throughout centuries. These people knew a great deal about each other and shared, more or less, the same culture, but they fought bloody wars.

Yet, on balance, there are two advantages to exchange programs:

1. The Soviet traveler will get an impression of the American economy and thus acquire some kind of yardstick to evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet socialism, and he may gain numerous impressions about the differences between the American and Soviet system; a number of these inevitably will be to our advantage.

By advantage I do not mean that these Soviet visitors necessarily will get friendly to the United States. On the contrary, we must expect that some of them will become really hateful and envious *because* they have visited this country. But their observation of the American scene will enable them to evaluate the performance of their own economic system and to see "capitalism"—which they were told produces only misery and unemployment—in an entirely different light. I believe that these visits could influence, in a modest way, the future evolution inside Russia.

Yet the more sophisticated visitors undoubtedly will understand that some of our significant devices, such as self-service in food chain stores and free credit, would be difficult to use in Russia. Popcorn machines, cigarette vendors, candy automats wouldn't survive long in the Soviet Union. We also should remind ourselves that we may be better off if Russia retains its present system, which presumably gives us less competition than we might be getting from a system in which the creative abilities of the population were allowed to make themselves felt. Since, according to Tocqueville, the Russo-American clash was inevitable, we might as well be grateful that Russia is governed by a doctrinaire bureaucratic ruling class.

2. Exchanges of a scientific and perhaps technical type—let us say in the fields of cancer, heart diseases, plant breeding, and the like—would be mutually beneficial. If I am not mistaken, we learned from Russion medicine about blood transfusions. There are many things which the free world could learn from Russian science. Scientific contact and even purely human contact have a value in themselves.

This idea of the innate value of scientific contacts is entirely within the traditions of the enlightenment. We could profit from the intrinsic worth of this concept if we were to recognize its limitations, especially as this concept is to be applied not to our friends in Western Europe, but to the Communists. One limitation is that such scien-

tific contacts can be abused for military and economic purposes. Another is that the Soviets are not above feeding us a lot of misinformation. A third one is that some of their sciences are in the nature of propaganda—particularly some of their historical and social sciences.

The Communists want these contacts in order to strengthen *their* country, and secondly to influence the minds of *our* own scientists. Some of our men are coming home praising the enormous support the Soviet Government is giving to science; the implication is that communism may be a better system for scientists than democracy. In due time this implication will be spelled out more clearly. In the meantime, though, some of our gullible scientists better bone up on the Russian tradition of Potemkin villages: a stone throw from some of the most modern medical facilities in Moscow which so impressed our visitors, Russian children are given tonsillectomy without benefit of full anesthesia. Nor are the children kept in the hospital. Perhaps the next batch of visitors would inquire not about socialized but about *class* medicine in the Soviet Union. It is a fascinating subject.

Mr. ARENS. How does the international Communist movement benefit by this process?

Dr. POSSONY. I do not know that it does. The Communists initiated the exchange program but they are very reluctant to agree to more than token exchanges. They could benefit by persuading naive members of the free world, of which there are many, that "Communists" are human beings, who do not have a tail and do not look like a devil.

They also would acquire knowledge and know-how which we have and bring it back to strengthen their own structure.

Furthermore, by just traveling around here and by learning more about foreign countries, they gain a better knowledge of these countries and possibly acquire contacts.

They could learn a great deal of our political, economic, and other problems; and this would help their operations against us.

They will become very interested in large-scale exchange if they persuade themselves that there is no significant danger of defection among Soviet travelers and that this mutual acquisition of knowledge strengthens the Soviet Union more than it does us. This is their ultimate criterion.

But suppose this knowledge bears, almost exclusively, on matters related to human welfare—we still may gain if the Soviets at long last may direct more of their attention to the health and well-being of their citizens.

Mr. MCNAMARA. If we might gain, how can you explain that the Soviets have been pushing this program? Khrushchev and Mikoyan, numerous Soviet publications, and the U.S. Communist Party are engaged in an all-out effort to promote these exchanges. Is this not an indication that Moscow feels it is they who are gaining through this program?

Dr. POSSONY. I have no doubt that this is their evaluation. Whether they are right is another matter. The fact is that they have found a few Americans who dislike this or that in our country and are concluding, from real or alleged American shortcomings, that the Soviet Union must be peace loving. Others think that the Soviet Union arouses our anger because it is so successful, exactly as—

allegedly—the United States aroused British envy. Mr. Eaton reasons that we have a Gestapo in America, hence the Soviet Union knows no purges, no slave labor, no dictatorship—and of course, it just loves this Gestapo-ridden America.

With due respect to Communist psychological warfare, I believe this type of thinking is "made in U.S." These people cannot get more befuddled even if they travel through Russia, from Brest to Vladivostok. I don't think that our tourists in the Soviet Union will be taken in so easily. The greater danger is that Russian tourists in *this* country will succeed in scoring hits with many of our organizations which espouse various worthy causes, such as international cooperation, without realizing that more is involved than after-dinner speeches. Undoubtedly here is an opportunity for the Communists to influence American opinion, to a degree. Still, Stalin hardly would have agreed to this exchange program; he was not about to take the risk of exchange backfiring on him. I would not be surprised if, at a later day, Khrushchev and Mikoyan will be called on the carpet and be criticized for a right deviation and for "adventurism." We should recognize that in many ways, insofar as American travel in the Soviet Union is concerned, this program is a departure from both the age-old Russian and the newer Communist tradition of keeping all foreigners out from everywhere, especially the gold-plated toilets they never built.

It is easy to see why the Communists are so hopeful. To them, the exchange program is above all a propaganda maneuver. It is connected with their "peaceful coexistence" campaign. They hope that select contacts will soften U.S. attitudes vis-a-vis the Soviet Union—this might lead to a reduction of U.S. armaments, to withdrawal from forward bases, to abandonment of Berlin, increased trade with the Soviet Union, and so on; in short, to a boost in the relative power position of the Soviet Union.

The danger that many of our tourists in the Soviet Union—and the many American hosts to Russian tourists, who go out of their way to be nice to their guests—will fall into the Communist trap must not be underrated. I feel that we may be handling the situation a little too optimistically.

One thing our travelers must attempt is to get out from the Intourist showplaces and look into the real Soviet Russia. Somehow I can't visualize that sturdy character, the American tourist, coming home enthusiastic about the pleasures and comforts of Russian manners and life. But he may be impressed with the suggestion that the Soviet Union is, as they put it, "peace loving." To guard our many little Red Riding Hoods, we should see to it that all travelers to the Soviet Union be given a short travel guide, a sort of propaganda vaccination, or an ideological Baedecker. I also feel that the present levels of the program are not satisfactory. It would be better if *more* traveling were done on both sides, at least for 1 or 2 years. Then we can take stock again.

The exchange program is an experiment, as well as a risk. We have to watch how it works out.

Mr. ARENS. Related to this general subject matter, Doctor, is there a comparable twisting of the concepts which the Western mind has of an international conference or an international forum in which we would sit down with leaders of the Kremlin and negotiate for peace within the framework of this term as conceived by the Western mind?

Dr. POSSONY. Definitely. I think that the Western approach to this is that of a businessman who transacts some business: you exchange value for value. Each transactor is interested in his profit and benefit, and the transaction serves the interests of both. Agreements or contracts are honored because this is in the interest of the contractors.

We assume that when we go to a conference with the Soviets, very often they are anxious—perhaps for their own reasons, but nevertheless anxious—to further the particular object under discussion for its own sake, and in the end conclude an agreement.

Well, the Communists do not think that way at all. To them a conference, an international negotiation, is a tactical maneuver and it can be used whether actually there is an agreement at the end of the conference or there is not.

You use the conference in order to pressurize the West into some concession. If an agreement must be concluded, it can be broken whenever necessary.

You will find that whenever the Soviets come to a conference, they want *us* to give something. This is beautifully prepared, why it would be advantageous for us to give and why, if we were to give, peace would be assured—for another interim period.

The Communists do not even bother to conceal this concept of negotiation. When Mikoyan was in America, he was queried about the notion that Berlin should be internationalized. He thought this was a good idea, but after a while it turned out that he suggested only the internationalization of *West* Berlin. As to East Berlin, of course, this was the capital of East Germany, hence no change in the status quo was possible. In other words, the West is invited to give up West Berlin, but the Soviets would not give a *quid pro quo*. The amusing thing about this was that Mikoyan seemed genuinely surprised that anyone could even be thinking about the internationalization of *both* Berlins. We are beginning to learn that the Communist Russians are *rusé* and devious. We do not yet quite realize that their sense of objectivity is truly "underdeveloped" and their sense of fair play nonexistent. Many of them don't even understand what those terms mean. And we find it difficult to grasp this central fact.

What is negotiation, Communist style? First, the Communists reap the propaganda benefits. Second, as to the object of the negotiation, they take and the West gives.

So "negotiation" is essentially a method to get something from us in a pleasant way, which otherwise they would have to get by forceful means.

When we make a concession, we think that we have stabilized the situation; to them, when we have made a concession, this leads to the further disruption of our system. Moreover, one concession must lead to the next.

If one particular element is broken out of our system, another opening for a new wedge that can be driven in has been created. Essentially, "negotiation" is one of their conquest techniques. The particular value of this technique is that it tends to weaken our will to resist.

Naturally, some negotiations about a concrete issue always will be necessary. Those specific negotiations need not be harmful. The danger arises from "negotiations" about large issues which, at present,

are not negotiable, such as world peace, coexistence within spheres of influence, disarmament, and the like.

Mr. ARENS. What does this process of sitting down at a conference table do from the standpoint of affecting the minds of the people who are presently held in subjugation by the leaders of the Kremlin?

Dr. POSSONY. If the Western Powers sit down with the Communist leaders they, ipso facto, treat them as equals. They, ipso facto, acknowledge that the Bolshevist leaders represent a legitimate government, represent a government which is like any other government, a decent member of the family of nations. In some instances, such a negotiation may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the status quo, that is, American acquiescence in continued subjugation and continuing "revolution."

Whether this implied acknowledgment of their alleged legitimacy has a negative impact on the subjugated peoples depends on circumstances and on the topic of negotiation. I think that in many instances it will have this effect and thus would tend to strengthen the Bolshevik camp.

On the other hand, if the negotiation is designed to eliminate a particular worry from a subjugated population, for example, negotiation about feeding hungry people or even one to prevent a particular war which would be fought on the back of this nation, it may not have that effect.

I think that there always is a difference between a negotiation with the Russians or with the satellites or the Chinese. A particular negotiation may have a negative impact on a satellite nation, but not on the non-Communists among the Russians. The significant question always will be whether we negotiate from strength or weakness and whether we stand up to the Bolsheviks or cave in.

Worry will come inevitably to all non-Communists behind the curtain as soon as they feel we are falling in a Soviet trap. As soon as we give any evidence that we do not approach the negotiation realistically and that we are willing to be taken in, then they will be very much concerned. Our allies within the Soviet bloc are weaker than they need to be, because American stamina and resolve are regarded with considerable skepticism. After all, we were licked in many negotiations with the Soviets.

Mr. ARENS. What is the net result of pronouncements made by leaders of the Western World to the effect that we believe that the leaders of the Kremlin are sincere devotees of peace?

Dr. POSSONY. I think that is definitely negative.

Mr. ARENS. Why and how?

Dr. POSSONY. I cannot conceive that any reasonable Russian believes in the peacefulness of the Bolsheviks. If we give the appearance of believing in this, they cannot help but think we are stupid and the Communists will outwit us.

Furthermore, these non-Communists are afraid that we are operating on what is at best a very unproved assumption, and that, on the strength of this assumption that the Communists are peace-loving, we are reducing our own strength. In case of American weakness, the chances that war will occur are increased and so are the chances of Communist victory. So the majority of the non-Communists will find it advisable to accommodate themselves to the system.

I think that any statement on our side which leaves the slightest doubt as to how we evaluate Communists, any assertion that we give them the benefit of the doubt, has a negative impact, because it is either a lie or a stupidity. As the leading nation in the world, the United States is deprived of the privilege of mendacity or idiocy. This type of thing also is dangerous inside the United States.

Mr. McNAMARA. Should the policy of the free world be to lessen tensions with the Soviet empire or increase tensions?

Dr. POSSONY. The word "tension" is a very interesting term. It was originated by American social scientists and later was taken over by Communist propaganda. It is a beautiful device to get us into trouble.

The term implies that lowered "tensions" would serve the cause of peace. But when we reduce tension, we give in to the Communists, while we increase tensions when we resist.

I would leave the word "tension" out of this discussion entirely. I would say that we should do nothing, absolutely nothing, which undermines our own strength. We should make no concession to the Soviets on any of their aggressive moves.

We should not necessarily go out of our way in threatening that we would attack them, because that might not be a good way of doing it; but tension or no tension, peace is up to them. Tension has been produced by them and is continued by them and by their desire to take over the whole world.

If the Soviets should decide that the world revolution is a stupid idea and cannot be realized in the first place and that, therefore, this operating all over the world in order to advance their cause is, in the long run, counterproductive and if, consequently, they call off the world revolution and Russian imperialism—and I am not saying they can or would—but if they were to do that, there would be little tension left. If we reduced tension and became more and more accommodating, the danger would be increased. If they were to abandon their objective, tension would be reduced and so would the danger of war.

Tension is a sympton of Communist goals and actions, an effect and not a cause. The whole argument is typical of the soporific and sophomoric "solutions" which are hatched on American campuses. A physician who would prescribe throwing away the handkerchief in order to cure the cold would not stay in the profession too long. The situation in the social sciences is different, unfortunately. In brief, we can lower tensions only by sacrificing our survival interests. Genuine lowering of tension is an action only the Communists can take—by abandoning their basic objective. Presumably, though, the leopard cannot change its spots.

Mr. ARENS. There would not be any international Communist movement if they decided to call off the world revolution, would there?

Dr. POSSONY. No, there would not. But can they call it off if they wanted to? I doubt it.

Mr. ARENS. What observations do you have, on the basis of your background, intensive experience, and study of the international Communist operation, with reference to the subject of atomic warfare, threat of atomic warfare, and creation of fears of atomic warfare?

Dr. POSSONY. In the early period of communism, one of their stronger slogans was that communism had to be installed because, otherwise, people would fall into ever greater misery. Communism was to be the corrective against all social ills: hunger, unemployment, and resultant political and social handicaps.

At first, this was stated in terms of actual food: the longer capitalism exists, the less people are going to eat; and the rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer.

In the later twenties, during the world depression, this was replaced by the slogan that capitalism means unemployment. Occasionally, it also was emphasized that capitalism means war.

Now, the Soviets think they have found a real fear-producer, the nuclear weapon. As long as capitalism exists, atomic war is inevitable. Hence to prevent war, the Communists outside the Kremlin must do their utmost to overthrow capitalism. If you really believe in peace, you must become a revolutionary or, at any rate, do the bidding of the Soviet Union.

In the image they project, nuclear war means that practically everyone is going to be dead. Not only the nations of today will be obliterated, but all offspring, 600 generations down, in time will deteriorate into monsters; although I have difficulty in visualizing any offspring of obliterated populations. The imperialist nations will be destroyed; the Communist nations will not be destroyed. Never mind the logic, this is nuclear politics, Soviet style. This is the official line on that.

The genetic argument is tailored to the atomic test cessation issue; it serves as a tool to reduce our lead in nuclear technology. The obliteration argument serves to frighten the free world into disarmament and then into surrender. And the argument that the Soviet nations can survive nuclear war serves to prevent internal pressure toward peace upon the Soviet governments.

Fear inhibits clear thinking. The more fear the Soviets can instill into the free world, the easier it will be to get away with tricks of that sort. Mind you, it is they who should fear our atomic power and it is they who should be worried about our superiority in most fields of conflict, which makes it likely that we will survive a nuclear war while they will not. I mean, a nuclear war is far more likely to destroy the unwanted and unloved illegitimate Soviet regime than the American constitutional system, granted that it would be a catastrophe for all belligerents and neutrals. The point is that despite our physical capability to deter, they have, by mere propaganda, developed a psychological deterrence capability that is working against us.

You can find this reflected, for example, in the subject of the debate which took place between Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook. In the face of a threat of atomic obliteration, is it advisable to surrender to the Communists because, if we do, at least we will preserve the human stock and will survive—under a Communist regime, to be sure—but mankind will at least remain alive?

This contention that survival must be bought by surrender is projected forth not only in relation to nuclear war, but even to nuclear testing, which is described as being a major threat to humanity and peace although, according to the risk statistics—most of which ar fanciful in my opinion—testing, even on a large scale, cannot come

anywhere near to the level of danger caused by automobiles or pollution. Yet the radiation hazard is an outstanding fear-producer, and many of our scientists are so uncritical and naive, obsessed or so deliberate that they do their best to increase apprehension and hysteria.

Now this ties in with Communist conflict methods. Only if communism comes to power can peace be established; only then will the nuclear threat be eliminated, definitely. This is the notion which is to be drummed into people's heads.

How can communism be established without a war? The nuclear danger, undoubtedly, has led the Communists to an upgrading of the "peaceful" methods of conflict. What they have been saying, at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and since then, is that nations are not going to be destroyed by atomic weapons if they surrender to the Communists.

This alternative, nuclear death or communism, is terror, pure and simple, but it is probably more effective than the more benign Communist slogans of earlier years. Obviously, surrender to communism is most unlikely to keep the casualty rate down, because after victory, the Communists will "liquidate," that is, exterminate, all those classes and nations they fear, hecatombs of them; and after a while the Communist nations will fight each other, and nuclear explosives will fly around after all.

The argument that slavery is better than the extermination of the human race carries a somber conviction to many. I think it is a faulty argument because it postulates a fact which is not in evidence, namely that a future war would lead to total extermination. Further, proud nations never accepted this type of reasoning, but risked death rather than accept slavery. Those attitudes have not changed.

This argument has no chance of influencing the policy of great powers at the critical moment, but it may weaken resolution, interfere with security, and therefore jeopardize survival.

On logical grounds, the fundamental objection to this argument is that surrender to communism will *not* eliminate war, first because such surrenders cannot in fact be carried out—there would be widespread resistance and the capitulating government, if there were such a group, would be disobeyed and overthrown; and second, because the Communist leaders who always loved to exterminate each other would go to war among themselves within a year after the surrender. I would not be surprised if an American-Russian war would take place even after this country had surrendered to the Communists. Which one would be the big brother party? This question can be decided only by nuclear bombs. The whole notion is childish—conflict cannot be eliminated by a single desperate political act. Since nuclear weapons have been invented and can never be undone—not even at Geneva—we must realize that nuclear war henceforth will be an ever-present danger, regardless of whether there is communism, or any other "ism," and regardless of whether the United States commits political suicide which, in my judgment, however, it would have no capability of committing in a real sense.

This type of propaganda does not prevent war but renders wars more bloody, because it disarms the truly peaceful nations and induces the would-be aggressor to miscalculate.

If we want to preserve our security in the nuclear age, we had better rely on superior strength, nuclear strength, rather than on the Communist promise that they would not hurt us if they only come to power.

This is the typical blackmail situation. It is always better to resist from the start, rather than give the blackmailer an opening.

Mr. ARENS. What do the Communists mean by the term "liberation" or "liberation movement"?

Dr. POSSONY. A liberation movement in so-called undeveloped countries is a local movement, mostly of nationalist orientation, which operates to overthrow the control of an imperial power. Originally this was the meaning.

Subsequently the meaning has changed. Now, *any* movement in any country that is of nationalist orientation and which aims at undercutting Western interests may be described as a liberation movement; if so, it is entitled to Soviet aid, directly or indirectly. For example, any movement that would undermine the arrangements which the Western oil industry has in the Middle East is described as a liberation movement.

In Europe, during World War II, we also used that term and meant the "liberation" of France, for example, from Nazi oppression. Even then the Communists described as "liberation" movements only those which had Communist participation or were under Communist control. In present nomenclature, the "liberation" movement usually is a Communist guerrilla force which paves the way for the occupation of a country by Communist military forces and the imposition of a "people's democracy" and, subsequently, of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Would you make some suggestions as to means of counteracting Communist propaganda in the field of semantics, their twisting and misuse of words?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, what about a dictionary, a dictionary to be brought up to date constantly? Prior to World War II there were several institutes which did systematic work exposing Nazi propaganda. This was quite effective. Efforts like that I think are necessary. Furthermore I think that case studies should be produced and the individual Communist operations analyzed, case studies dealing with specific countries and various Communist techniques.

The United States has not really come to grips with this problem yet but it has acquired a very good working knowledge of many of the Communist methods, there is no question about it, both in academic and political circles and, to a lesser degree, in newspapers. But much needs still to be done. Too many misconceptions still are rampant.

Public information about the Communist threat in this country is very superior to other countries I know, including the leading European countries. Many Europeans think they understand communism, but they often are in error. Still, there is useful knowledge in Europe, and NATO-wide pooling of this information, close cooperation between legislatures, for example, would be beneficial.

If it were possible to go into some places like India, Burma, and many of the Latin American countries and so on, and really explain the facts of life to them on the basis of documentation which is of real relevance locally, we should make quite a few dents in Communist strength. Unfortunately, the documentation is still very poor.

You need truly scholarly textbooks on the subject; that is, not only textbooks dealing with communism as such, but a lot of textbooks on other subjects, such as history, economics, political science, which present the basic facts about communism. As it is now, textbooks often ignore the subject or spread misinformation. In academic hands the conquerors and conspirators tend to become professors who study Hegel and Marx and invent new techniques of economic management. The result is that many Asians have persuaded themselves they have a genuine choice between two different but equally useful methods of development, the American and the Soviet. It is high time that the methods of "debunking" be applied to the Communist record.

You need also, I think, a much more broadly gaged counterideological effort. What I mean by that is two things: First of all, the average fellow who is a prospective Communist recruit sympathizes with the Communist movement because he has the vague feeling that whatever he wants, communism is going to offer it to him. He has no more notion about what communism is about than he has about higher mathematics.

This is true of many intellectuals. You will hear, innumerable times, statements like these: "Well, obviously, the Russians are not the right men to realize such a program, but the idea of communism as such is a good idea, isn't it?" "If we Americans or we British would experiment with it, we would do an excellent job—and what is wrong with an experiment?"

Of course, this type of preconception, this preexisting sympathetic attitude, is a terrific asset to the Communists.

If the opposite notion were understood, namely, that communism is not a good thing, whoever might try it, even if Americans were to do it, let alone less experienced nations, then ideological vulnerability would be reduced.

What is required is to have a proper understanding of why the Communist ideology is wrong. This understanding you do not find at the present moment. Socialists are particularly vulnerable because they assume that communism is just a more radical version of socialism. One glass of brandy is good, so why would ten glasses be bad?

The other point is that our own, I would not call it "ideology," but our own operational concepts, have not been presented effectively and forcefully. Why our democracy works, why our economic system is growing, why it is better, why we have and respect human rights, why we both want and still increase our freedoms, and how a similar system—not the same but a system which would produce similar advantages to other nations—can be installed in foreign countries, this type of demonstration has not been made either. Hence the people of Burma or India or Ghana do not know what the proper alternatives really are.

We sometimes forget that our democratic and constitutional concepts have been formulated about 150 years ago. The classical writings of our political philosophy address themselves to the problems of presently awakening nations only by implication. The founders of this Nation, and their intellectual ancestors and contemporaries in Europe, did enormously creative thinking. The accomplishments of the present generation in political philosophy are less impressive. Fundamental principles are eternal, but the practical concepts and procedures derived from them must be rethought and restated as generations

and situations change. Our society is so much of a going concern that no one seems to have felt the need to discover its inner springs, to formulate how it works—or how it *should* function. This is a symptom of America's basic stability: at present, we don't seem to need a political philosophy.

But how can we carry a persuasive message to those who want to learn from us? How can we advise them if we are uncertain which of our principles and procedures can be applied and, if so, how? How can we make the world "safe for democracy" which, incidentally, is not such a bad objective? How can we disprove the message of dictatorship—a message which is poor but which is presented on a mass basis and does reach the oversea audiences? The plain fact is that the United States displays productivity in hard industrial goods. But book publishing, the industry which distributes thought, is probably the most ineffective American industry. We better face the facts on this, especially since mass communications are not suitable for carrying intellectual messages.

The greatest advantage the Communists enjoy in the semantic war derives from the fact that quantitatively they are reaching the audiences with their books, at cheap prices. Those Communist books sometimes are the only intellectual fare of oversea students. What has saved us so far is the poor quality of those Communist writings. For all their seeding, the Communists harvest little, but they disorient and produce prejudice. They have sold only few individuals on communism and dictatorship but many on planning and "guided democracy." Thank God that we still can score a few points with Thomas Jefferson and the *Federalist Papers*.

Our intellectual resources have not been mobilized; they are being used for entertainment, on the butter-rather-than-guns principle. I believe the book industry makes one of the relatively smallest contributions to the defense of the United States. We should not be surprised if we find so few foreign intellectuals on our side. I don't want to apologize for their mistakes and misconceptions, but much of this has been due to our failure in the field of creating viable political ideas and keeping a useful political discussion alive through the only medium in which this can be done—books.

Very often we are engaged in claiming that we have a terrific industrial productivity without recognizing that there is a potent counterargument on the part of a poor Asiatic or African. He says: "You have a great productivity which I admire, but I have no chance to get anywhere close to that; consequently, I have to pick the Russian system."

This argument is profoundly mistaken, if only because resources, trade, and credit are no longer what they were when the United States began its development, in full geographic isolation and also because U.S. industrialization was made possible, in large degree, by factors of economic international cooperation.

The point missed is that our productivity does not rest on abundance of raw materials. Nor was this productivity handed to us. We created it through an appropriate system, which included international cooperation but which, above all, consisted in the freeing of individual initiative within a legal system based upon the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The nationalism preached in many Asiastic countries labors under the misapprehension that individual

countries fare best when they cut economic cooperation to a minimum, when they use it to build self-sufficient economies and socialist systems, restricting economic freedom. They confuse credit with slavery, just as they confuse sovietism with liberty.

The average European or the average Asiatic knows about the American example but he does not connect that it has any relevance to him. Given his utterly different experience, this is not so surprising. It simply means that so long as the argument and the underlying experience are not brought home to him in terms he can understand, he will not get the point. What the underdeveloped countries need is economic aid, all right, but this aid will do little good if it is not supported by intellectual assistance. In this area, we have failed—so far.

Mr. McNamara. Dr. Possony, if I might particularize my question a bit more: How about the average man-in-the-street in the United States? He does not read the college textbooks on economics, sociology, and so forth. Hundreds of books have been written on communism, exposing its actual and theoretical evils and crimes. Yet we will have the Soviet Union launch intensive propaganda on some subject—maybe the danger of atomic radiation—and you can see, if you read the newspapers, the letters to the editors and so on, how the people are affected by this.

Do you have any suggestions as to how, on this particular issue, we could counteract the effect of Soviet propaganda on the average man-in-the-street in the United States? Is that a Government project or a private project?

Dr. Possony. It is both. I do not think you should address yourself to the average man-in-the-street directly because this requires very large mass media which are not available and may not be effective.

The man-in-the-street is reached through the organs of public opinion, through the mass media that are in existence, which for political communications are not mass media at all, and at best are potential mass media. So what you really are confronted with is a need to inform the people who run these organs of mass communication.

It is in this line that I believe the textbooks, historical and strategic analyses, and efforts such as propaganda analysis institutes and so on, are really quite important, because I believe that many of our editors just simply have remained uninformed on the subject. They are not in a position to do much about it because they do not realize that their knowledge of what is at stake is inadequate and often implanted by artifice.

They very often "smell a rat" but then they do not know how to identify the particular gap of knowledge or a particular operation of "conditioning" and "disorienting" or how to trace the "line" back to its point of origin.

The Communists usually are skillful enough to pick a subject which can stand on its own merits. If, for example, it were true that nuclear testing would produce a certain number of harmful mutations per generation, this is obviously a matter of public concern. I do not argue this.

But irrespective of whether such a contention is true, the question that should be raised always is: How is it that this subject comes up at this moment? Who brings it up? How is it that this is brought

up in a context that benefits the Soviet Union? Is the contention true or inflated? Is there concerted agitation? Is there not a solution to the problem so that the Soviets do not reap advantage for themselves, but that United States security is not harmed?

After all, we have safety experts for all of our activities. Once we recognize a danger, we can correct it and always do so. The fallout danger was recognized by the Atomic Energy Commission from its inception, and the safety record of the atomic program is excellent. Unless such points were made, the assumption would be that the agitators are less interested in preventing the future birth of monsters than of making monkeys out of the U.S. Government.

Many of the so-called molders of public opinion recognize all this, but they are busy men. They do not have the time to read, let alone assimilate, the documentation on communism. We now have far more documentation on communism than we can use effectively, largely because the materials are bulky, sometimes hard of access, complicated, and unaccustomed. A rather large collection effort is needed, merely to present the data available in congressional hearings in usable form. Perhaps one method would be if the wire services, the great dailies, and the magazines were to assign correspondents not only to countries, to the White House, the Pentagon, the sciences, crime, and sports, but also to world communism. It is amazing that this has not been done. Perhaps we are caught in a vicious circle: If the Communist danger were really recognized, it would be fully covered. How to get the danger recognized—that is a question to which no one has as yet found an answer.

Mr. ARENS. Doctor, you have given us this morning analyses of Communist strategy and tactics, more particularly in the use of language. Before concluding our consultation I should like to ask you to express your views as to the strategy and tactics which you feel the free world should follow in undertaking to meet the threat of international communism.

Dr. POSSONY. Basic to any successful free world strategy is military strength: military strength in being and military strength in terms of modern technology and proper organization of forces. Our programs in both the acquisition of existing weapons and the development of future weapons must be stepped up in the United States, and especially among our allies.

We must realize that we are in a race of technologies: the Soviets are pushing extremely hard to gain a substantial lead over us in the quality of weapons. Furthermore, they are trying to maximize the advantages which could accrue to them if they were to capitalize on military surprise; we always must remember that in modern war the side which strikes the first blow may succeed in cutting the opponent's military strength before that opponent can drop his first bomb in retaliation. We also must realize that the cost of weapons is increasing; therefore, regardless of our desires for economy, if we want to stay in the power game, the cost of our military establishment must rise. This means that the productivity of our economy must continue to grow.

Military security is an all-embracing task, the scope of which usually is underrated. Add to it the need that gradually steps must be taken to reduce the free world's vulnerability against the hazards of nuclear war. In the long run, the prospect of mutual devastation is not a

good deterrent to aggression. From all considerations involved, it is far better if the would-be aggressor were made to know that he cannot possibly destroy our Nation. But this requires a true posture of invulnerability.

The free world nations, furthermore, must develop better methods of cooperation with each other, especially in the scientific technological fields, but also in all political, economic, and military areas. This is a long subject; I am not going to go into details on that.

Let me just say that the danger of direct, as well as indirect, Communist aggression would vanish if the free world were to become as strong as it is potentially capable of becoming. I mean our military strength should exceed that of the Soviets by a broad margin and should be sustained with a large degree of superiority.

If the free world were truly united in its purpose of defending its liberty against communism, if it were militarily really strong rather than finding itself in various stages of disarmament, and if it were to achieve true cooperation in the economic, scientific, and cultural areas, then—and only then—might the Soviet leadership realize that the Communist world revolution cannot be completed. Only after they have understood this impossibility of winning will they consider changing their policy.

The preservation of peace depends, not on negotiation with the Soviets, not on so-called self-enforcing disarmament schemes, not on trade, not on peoples-to-peoples contacts and exchange programs, but on the creation of a truly united free world with broadly superior power and ready military strength. Of course, lest we dissipate our substance, we must cooperate most intimately with those nations which are most willing to cooperate with us. The foreign policy of a frustrated Romeo which we sometimes adopt in Asia and Africa does not promise much success.

The third basic point is that the free world must acquire a full understanding of the Soviet strategy and tactics and must publicize what the Soviets are doing at any given time; must never allow any Soviet deceptive movements or maneuvers to go unchallenged; must always try to impress the public of the free nations that the Soviets are operating in order to hurt us; and must indicate the precise ploy that the Soviets are attempting.

Fourth, I think that our efforts in the field of propaganda are fantastically inadequate. I do not mean to use the word "propaganda" as in any sense denoting a slanting of the truth or a deviation from the truth, but the facts of life must be presented both to ourselves and to the so-called uncommitted nations who are largely ignorant both about communism and about free enterprise and democracy.

Fifth, we must realize that programs of free world cooperation and partial integration, as well as constant vigilance, require full-grown intellectual rapport. The free world cannot be transformed from a group of merely formally allied nations into a viable interrelated society without a genuine exchange of ideas, without mutual intellectual understanding, and without a set of political ideas which are persuasive *as well as* applicable throughout the free orbit. Ideas are the prime movers of history, they grind slowly but exceedingly fine. We cannot afford to ignore political thought much longer. A new and convincing political philosophy has brought this Nation into being. Political

ideas were historically the prime element of American power, long before we had economic and military strength. Right now, we tend to operate on the Marxian concept that economics is the prime element in the struggle; and we count on the formulas which our ancestors worked out to solve *their* problems. Superiority in political thinking and creativity in statecraft have been the birthright of America and its main European allies. It is high time that we reclaim this birthright.

We also must obtain better rapport with the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. In this case the problem is not necessarily to explain to them what communism is, because they know this better than anyone else. For that matter, we should not give the impression that we see only the Communist aspect of their troubles and ignore national oppression. The United States has been the historical champion of national self-determination. If we act as though this principle were applicable only against Turkey and Austria-Hungary in the post-World War I period, and only against the British and French empires in the post-World War II period, but that for obscure reasons it could not possibly be applicable to the Russian empire—applicable, that is, *if* the peoples concerned so desire—then we are untrue to ourselves, as well as to our real and potential friends. What is missing here is to project across to them a feeling that the Western World is resolved to win this conflict and that their life and future will be far better cared for if communism and Russian imperialism were to go out of business.

In taking such a stand we also would be dealing with the Russian people in a straightforward and honest manner; and we must be sure that our policy *not* be designed to hurt the national interests of any nation, including the Russian nation. The Russians, too, are longing for freedom. I find it difficult to accept that a true Russian libertarian and humanist conceives it to be the interest of his people to continue the subjugation of other nations. At any rate, in problems of this type we must take our stand on the side of principles; those include the notion that moderation be exercised in the practical application of all abstract principles.

This projection of firmness would accomplish more than anything else. The nations subjugated by *both* Russia and communism do not get at the present moment a feeling of free world resolve nor any clear notion of what they could contribute. We must project to them notions and concepts as to how they, themselves, can work toward a better future and a better society without necessarily rising and being shot down at the wrong moment. These people must be taught how they can contribute, by evolutionary means, to a change toward freedom inside the Iron Curtain.

I think a dialog with the nations behind the Iron Curtain is one of the most important things we can undertake if the present negative trends in the world situation are to be reversed. There really is no such dialog at this time, partly because our propaganda techniques are faulty and partly because our propaganda is premised upon false assumptions.

The persistent hankering in the West to "negotiate" with the Soviets is clearly not the way to produce this sort of a dialog. Negotiation is not even a dialog with the Soviets themselves, but signifies our acceptance of a Communist tactic of expansion against which we do not desire to interpose any worthwhile resistance. Negotiations at the "summit"—this is another Communist expression which entered into

our vocabulary and which signifies an implicit abandonment of the principles of equality among nations and of national self-determination. A conference at the "summit" arrogates to the "summit" the right of deciding the fate of nations in the valley. How can we lend ourselves to such a step?

At any rate, such conferences are worse than useless. They cannot but lead to a strengthening of the Soviet bloc and to a weakening of free world cohesion. They definitely do not lead to a solution of major international problems. The Communists would not insist on summit meetings if those were not to their advantage. Certainly, there is no reason why our statesmen should not talk with the Soviets. The trouble is, unfortunately, that such talks raise unwarranted hopes; frequently our policy grows soft when hopes are aroused. We tend to act on promise and do not wait for fulfillment. I am just as much in favor of minimizing the danger of war as the next man, but it is my conviction—based upon a close study of Russia as well as communism—that we would fare better if we refused to "negotiate." If and when the Soviets have a real offer to make, we should take them up, but only then. Our acceptance of "negotiation" for negotiation's sake only delays the day when the Soviets would be willing to stop creating tensions. The more summit meetings, the worse off we shall be. And, incidentally, it is not "public opinion" which clamors for such meetings. It is those who made that public opinion, including many Western statesmen.

The only real hope we have is that the Soviet system is about to reach an impasse and that sooner or later new policies must be adopted. Such a change in policy may be harmful or salutary. It is essentially up to those nations themselves to press in the direction of a healthy evolution, press in the direction of a better government inside the Soviet Union and inside the satellites. No one can do this job for those nations and for the world but the subjugated nations themselves.

I believe it is fundamentally true that the Bolshevik government could not have maintained itself in power and certainly could not have engaged in all their fantastic and criminal policies, from mass murders down, in which they have indulged, if the nations in Russia really had opposed the Communists strongly and with conviction and had had a true concept of their own interests. Since it is impossible for them, under Soviet conditions, to think their political problems through, I believe it is up to us to fill, with their help, what essentially is a great gap in their intellectual strength. If we cannot be successful with our techniques of persuasion, in my judgment war will be inevitable.

Mr. WALTER. We will close the record with our thanks to you, Dr. Possony, for the splendid contribution which you have made in this consultation.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., Monday, March 2, 1959, the consultation was concluded.)

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