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CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

ATTITUDES OF SOVIET LEADERS TOWARD DISARMAMENT

Replies From Experts on the Soviet Union
to Subcommittee Questionnaire

STAFF STUDY NO. 8

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

U. S. Congress. Senate

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PREFACE

By Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Chairman

Negotiations on disarmament appear to have taken an encouraging turn. The change in atmosphere surrounding the London talks now in progress is attributed largely to a recognition of certain circumstances resulting in a modification of Soviet attitude, and partly to a more flexible attitude on the part of the United States. Although it is still too early to say whether negotiations now underway will lead to some limited first measures for inspection and arms reduction, it is important to examine what considerations may be moving the Soviet leaders to take arms control more seriously.

This study presents some of the factors influencing the attitudes of the leaders of world communism. It represents the thinking of authorities who have studied Soviet affairs for many years. While they made their replies to a subcommittee questionnaire at the beginning of this year—prior to the current disarmament negotiations—their statements provide an enlightening background against which to view the proposals now under discussion.

If the Soviet attitude toward arms control has become more serious, I believe there are compelling considerations that may be influencing the Soviet leaders in that direction. These considerations stem from pressures both inside and outside the U. S. S. R.

Among the primary pressures affecting the attitude of the Soviet leaders is the awareness that the new weapons are so destructive that in an all-out war all nations, including their own, might perish. It is becoming more apparent that the Soviet leaders are finding it to their interest to avoid starting or being drawn into a new war. They have shown profound concern in recent months over the eventuality that the United States will achieve an intermediate range ballistic missile before the Soviet Union achieves an intercontinental ballistic missile. This would place the Soviet Union at a strategic disadvantage, for it would be vulnerable to the 1,500-mile missile from our overseas bases but would not yet have acquired the 5,000-mile missile which would make the United States vulnerable from Soviet bases. The anxiety of Soviet leaders is reflected in the campaign of threatening our allies with warnings that guided missiles with nuclear warheads must not be stationed on their territories.

Furthermore, the Soviets have begun to recognize that neither external blandishments on the part of the U. S. S. R. nor internal dissension has resulted in the disintegration of NATO and other free-world alliances. These remain intact and the Russians know that with our strength in Europe and with our bases located in key spots in the world we are prepared to help defend free countries against aggression. They know that if a Soviet attack is launched, we can respond with devastating counterattack from many bases.

The Soviet hierarchy may also be worried about the danger, increasingly imminent, when other nations—some not so responsible as the United States and Britain—may possess nuclear weapons. It must be as obvious to them as it is to us that unless some international agreement over the new weapons of mass destruction is reached soon that nuclear arms in the hands of an irrational dictator may one day threaten the world.

Soviet leaders are undoubtedly concerned about the explosive situation that exists in East Germany and in other satellite countries. If the East Germans should rise up as did the people of Hungary against their Soviet and puppet rulers, the West Germans, the Soviet Army, and ultimately American and Western forces stationed in Germany and Berlin could be drawn into the conflict. The Communist leaders may not intend to give up control in that area, but they could well be serious in seeking some arrangement that would lessen the possibility of conflict.

The experience in Hungary, as well as Poland, must have brought home to them most forcefully that they could not rely on either the satellite troops or the satellite peoples. Furthermore, it may have raised serious doubts about the reliability of their own troops in the event of war, especially those of non-Russian origin. Thus war could present an internal threat to their regime as well as an external threat to the nation. Moreover, the Soviet leaders must be concerned over their loss of prestige and acceptance due to their ruthless suppression of the revolt of the Hungarian people.

In addition to the reasons why it is in the interest of the USSR to avoid war, there is evidence of economic problems inside the Soviet Union which may cause the Soviet leaders to seek limited arms control. The low birth rate and high infant mortality rate during the war years are now resulting in a serious manpower shortage in the Soviet Union that will become even more aggravated in the next few years. The Soviets must be finding it difficult to supply men for their armed services as well as for industry and agriculture. The cost of spending more and more to develop modern weapons also appears to be pressing the Soviet economy. Mr. Khrushchev seems to believe that reorganization of the Soviet economy in the direction of administrative decentralization will make the economy more viable. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the Soviets would begin such a drastic reorientation of their economy with all its consequent dislocations and uncertain results unless they expected a period of peace.

While these reasons may be motivating the Soviet leaders to avoid war and to bring about some slowing down, if not termination of the arms race, the question remains as to how far they would go in accepting effective arrangements for arms control. Significant in this study, for example, is the extent to which the authorities on Soviet affairs stress the difficulty for the Soviet leaders to accept inspection of their territory.

However, the pressures on the Soviet rulers which I have noted may be forcing them to consider measures that are antithetical to the basic nature of their regime. At the same time, the evaluation by the Soviet experts of the problems which the Soviet Union would have in accepting even limited inspection must cause us to proceed cautiously in considering Soviet proposals on inspection.

While the Soviet Union apparently is showing new interest in a limited arms agreement, we should not expect the Soviet leaders to diminish their cold war tactics. On the contrary, we should expect them to persevere with and even increase their broad emphasis on political, economic, and psychological competition. They may decide against blowing the world to bits but their strategy continues to emphasize absorbing the world bit by bit.

With such sober warnings in mind we can proceed to hard bargaining with the Soviet Union about limited measures of arms control that may lead progressively to more comprehensive disarmament. We cannot trust the Soviet Communists, but we can seek arrangements that do not involve good faith to be effective and workable, arrangements which are self-enforcing, adequately inspected, and which are mutually advantageous. We should make every effort to achieve agreement on whatever measures of effective arms control that may be possible with the Soviet Union without endangering our security or that of the free world.

This study, the eighth compiled at my request, offers varied interpretations of some of the key problems confronting those who must negotiate with the Soviet Union about disarmament. The summary was prepared by Dan Jacobs of the subcommittee staff. Neither the summary nor the replies of the Soviet authorities necessarily reflect the views of the subcommittee or any of its members.

JUNE 6, 1957.

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ATTITUDES OF SOVIET LEADERS TOWARD DISARMAMENT

I. SUMMARY

A. Introduction

A key to reaching agreement on the control and reduction of armaments is the attitude of the Soviet leaders. Their readiness to negotiate seriously about disarmament is bound to be influenced by the extent to which they estimate that they and their own power are threatened by the danger of nuclear war. Their willingness to agree to effective measures for the control and reduction of weapons depends greatly on their attitudes toward inspection and enforcement. Their decisions on disarmament are affected by political and economic pressures within the Soviet Union and in the various countries of Eastern Europe under Soviet domination.

In an attempt to acquire an informed opinion regarding the attitudes of the Soviet leaders, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, in December 1956, sent the following questions to some forty authorities on the Soviet Union throughout the United States.

1. It is sometimes assumed that a tacit understanding has been reached by all the major powers regarding the impracticality of nuclear warfare as a means of settling international disputes. *Are there grounds for believing that the leaders of the Soviet Union do recognize the threat of mutual annihilation created by the new weapons? To what extent, if at all, has this assumption entered into the formulation of policy and recent acts of the Soviet Union? What are the possibilities that the leaders of the Soviet, either now or in the foreseeable future will recognize a mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war and seriously seek agreement on control of weapons?*

2. United States disarmament policy holds that measures for the control and reduction of armaments are not possible without effective inspection. The Soviet Union has only agreed thus far to accept limited ground inspection at transportation and communication centers in the Soviet Union and aerial inspection for Eastern Europe. *Given the present situation and the political structure of the Soviet Union, is there any possibility of reaching agreement opening the Soviet Union up to inspection? How far is it likely that the present Soviet leaders would go now in opening their country to inspection? Under what circumstances might they be induced to go farther? If you believe any degree of inspection is unacceptable to the present Soviet regime, what kind of changes would have to come about in the U. S. S. R. or*

outside the Soviet Union before there would be willingness on the part of the Soviet Government to consider agreement involving such inspection? Can you envisage such changes occurring in the near or distant future?

3. Most Western proposals for control and reduction of armaments envisage some sort of enforcement agency that would consider and deal with violations of the disarmament agreement. *To what extent would the present regime in the Soviet Union be willing to submit to and abide by such an enforcement agency? To what extent would any Soviet regime in the foreseeable future be willing to agree to such an enforcement agency?*

4. The Western Powers and the Soviet Union have proposed a number of times, in various forms, the establishment in central Europe of a zone in which the strength of armed forces would be fixed by agreement. The Soviet Union, as part of a wider disarmament program advanced on November 17 proposed the reduction and eventual removal of all foreign forces and bases from nations participating in both the NATO and Warsaw alliances, this to be supervised by aerial and ground inspection.

Under what conditions would the Soviet Union be willing to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe? What is the likelihood of further developments in the direction of liberalization in the Eastern European countries and how might this affect the Soviet Union's readiness to consider the creation of a neutral belt through Europe or otherwise limit and control arms in a zone including the captive nations? To what extent is the domination of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe dependent upon the presence of the Red Army within or near the borders of these nations? How would a marked reduction of the size of Soviet forces or other kind of disarmament control affect Soviet influence over the Eastern European countries?

5. Secretary of State Dulles, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament on February 29, 1956, stated that "there is some reason to believe that the Soviet Union itself would greatly welcome relief from the present burden of armament." He further stated: "The cumulative effect of their military burdens plus these new economic burdens they are at least going through the motions of taking (proffers of assistance to other nations) is such that the Russian people and the satellite people are in a state of very considerable dissatisfaction, and I believe, that, not only because of what is said, but because of the logic of the case, that the Soviet Union would like to be relieved of some of its military expenditure, so it could devote more of its economic productivity to raising the living standards of its own people and the satellite peoples and perhaps have more money to spend on its foreign aid." *What comment do you have on this statement? To what economic considerations, if any, can the announced Soviet troop reductions of 1,800,000 men be attributed? Is there anything in present Soviet economic*

trends that would indicate a need for relief from the present level of arms production? To what extent is the structure and adaptability of the Soviet economy such that it could make the adjustment required by an appreciable reduction in production of armaments with greater or less ease than that of the United States? Are there any apparent difficulties involved in such a transition that might require the Soviet Union to go slow on any disarmament process?

6. What type of controls would be most workable and effective over the Soviet military establishment? What are the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union which should be taken into account on disarmament planning?

The recipients of this questionnaire were advised that they should consider the questions as suggestive rather than as exclusive. As some of them specialize in particular aspects of Soviet affairs, such as the economy of the Soviet Union, it was also suggested that, if they chose, their comments could deal primarily with those areas in which they might have special competence. Some responded only to a single area of questions but most made responses to a number of the problem areas.

This document contains a summary as well as the complete text of the replies. The summary seeks to draw together some of the common threads of agreement and to point out some of the comments which seem to have special relevance for the control and reduction of armaments.

Inevitably any such summary has its limitations. Most of the replies contained extensive presentations which make an adequate correlation of the responses difficult. Except in those instances where there was wide agreement among the respondents on a specific point, each point of the analysis has been footnoted so that the opinion of the authority cited can be traced to its original context.

B. Influence of Nuclear War on Soviet Policy

SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE THREAT OF MUTUAL ANNIHILATION

Most authorities on Soviet affairs who replied to the subcommittee's question as to whether the Soviet leaders recognize the threat of mutual annihilation created by the new weapons stated the belief that the leaders of the Soviet Union do recognize this threat. One cited as evidence the increased attention that is being given within the Soviet Union to preparing the population for the possibility of atomic attack.[1] Another voiced the opinion that Soviet statements and articles in the press indicate that the Soviet leaders do not intend to hide from their people any longer the vast destructiveness that a nuclear war would bring.[2] Others mentioned that it is probable that the leaders have been made aware of the potentiality of the new weapons by their scientists, as scientists in the Soviet Union are accorded considerable respect and, since the death of Stalin, have been less afraid to speak out.[3]

It was stated, however, that Soviet leaders have made contradictory statements regarding the possible consequences of nuclear warfare.

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[1] See Brzezinski, p. 34.
[2] See Kulski, p. 58.
[3] See Meyer, p. 70; and Timasheff, p. 96.

Malenkov, for example, in March 1954 said that war with "the contemporary means of warfare means the destruction of world civilization," but in April of the same year, stated that war would lead "to the collapse of the capitalist social system." Molotov, the following year, in February 1955 said, "It is not 'world civilization' that will perish, however much it may suffer from new aggression, but the decaying social system of which blood-thirsty imperialism is the core." [4] Another respondent asserted that we do not always know what weight to attribute to the opinions of the various leaders of the Soviet Union who participate in policymaking.[5]

Some respondents warned that psychological differences between Soviet leaders and leaders of Western nations toward the annihilation of large masses of people must be taken into account in this matter. As one stated:

> Men like Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, and Malenkov have been conditioned to witnessing masses of men liquidated and to the realization that they were personally responsible for this destruction in detail and in gross. Consequently, while the prospect of the destruction of themselves and of their empire is indeed a most serious deterrent, any feeling of humanitarian horror for what would happen to mankind in general or even to the Russian people as a whole is not a major factor in their calculations and feelings. * * * [6]

While it was generally believed by most of the respondents that Soviet leaders do recognize the threat of mutual annihilation posed by all-out nuclear warfare, important qualifications were made in some of their answers as to the significance of this recognition for preventing war. It was noted that nuclear war need not be precipitated deliberately but might grow from a small war in which one belligerent resorted to nuclear weapons in an act of desperation.[7] Others warned that although Soviet leaders recognize the dangers of modern warfare it would be imprudent to assume they would preclude war as a means of achieving their goals,[8] or that they would refrain from creating situations which might lead to war.[9] One respondent contended that Soviet intervention in Hungary was an example of Soviet readiness to risk general war rather than allow a change in the international status quo to the prejudice of the U. S. S. R.[10] Further, it was felt circumstances might arise within the Soviet Union which would override the Soviet leaders' interest in preventing nuclear war, such as an internal crisis which the ruling leadership felt could be resolved without loss of their power only through war.[11]

EFFECT OF NUCLEAR WAR THREAT ON SOVIET POLICY AND ACTS

Most respondents expressed the opinion that an awareness of the threat of nuclear destruction on the part of Soviet leaders has entered into the formulation of policy and acts of the Soviet Union in recent

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[4] See Reshetar, p. 90 and 92.
[5] See Timasheff, p. 96.
[6] Hoover, p. 47; see also Poppe, p. 75.
[7] See Bauer, p. 29; and Kertesz, p. 50.
[8] See Timasheff, p. 96.
[9] See Kertesz, p. 50.
[10] See Kulski, p. 59.
[11] See Kluckhohn, p. 56; Ulam, p. 99.

years. Some maintained that this has long been a factor in Soviet foreign policy,[12] though doubt was expressed by some that Soviet leaders are influenced by the danger of destroying civilization.[13]

One representative view was that the Soviet leaders' recognition of the possibility of mutual annihilation—

> is reflected in a growing Soviet tendency to rely on indirect, rather than direct aggression, to pursue their aim of world domination by a series of nibbling moves, no one of which seems serious enough to warrant the risk of nuclear warfare, rather than by a spectacular direct attack calculated to precipitate war.[14]

One respondent elaborated this view as follows:

> It would be foolish on the part of the Soviet leaders to risk everything on one card of a general war while they expect to advance their cause by peaceful means. Moreover, they seem to believe that the same cause will be promoted over a period of the next two decades by other nonmilitary developments. They rely on the Soviet relatively higher rate of industrialization regarding the production of capital goods and on the industrialization of China and to some extent also of eastern Europe. This is why they constantly talk about the U. S. S. R. eventually becoming the first industrial power of the world as their eventual target. * * *
>
> If it is true that the Soviet leaders expect that time is working for them, then it is logical for them to formulate such foreign policies which do not clash with the nuclear stalemate. However, it is probable that they would not accept a change in the present international status quo to the prejudice of the U. S. S. R. and would then be ready to face the risk of general war. * * *[15]

A number of recent acts were pointed to as indicating that the leaders of the Soviet Union were proceeding with caution in order not to precipitate general war. One writer went back as far as noninterference by the U. S. S. R. in the Berlin airlift to support this view.[16] Also cited as further instances of this cautiousness was noninvolvement of the Soviet Union directly in the Korean and Indochinese wars and in the Formosa dispute.[17] It was also remarked that:

> The Soviets, despite their brutality in Hungary, and their threats regarding the Middle East, displayed their usual caution.[18]

The fact that the Soviet Union threatened to send volunteers to Egypt rather than regular forces was cited as an instance in which Soviet leaders exercised restraint in view of the nuclear threat.[19] However, the same authority warned:

> But Shepilov's simultaneous ultimatum to England and France which, if misregarded, could have resulted in global

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[12] See Barghoorn, p. 24; Ulam, p. 99.
[13] See Poppe, p. 74; Wolfe, p. 100.
[14] See Chamberlin, p. 41.
[15] Kulski, p. 59.
[16] See Timasheff, p. 96.
[17] See Langer, p. 65; Timasheff, p. 96.
[18] Barghoorn, p. 84.
[19] Timasheff, p. 96.

war shows that there is a limit beyond which the Soviet leaders would not retreat. There is no doubt that if NATO forces would have entered Hungary to help her people win against communism, the reaction of the Soviets would have been A- and H-bomb attack against the United States. * * * [20]

Another respondent commented that—

> * * * it is my own impression that they are restricting their interference in Hungary to the minimum regarded imperative to hold the Communist bloc together. * * * [21]

A contrary position to the foregoing was stated, however, to the effect that the Communist dogma of the Soviet leaders—

> does not allow room in their day-to-day thinking for the idea that mankind could destroy itself utterly.[22]

SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET LEADERS ABOUT CONTROL OF WEAPONS

Opinion was divided on whether the Soviet leaders would seriously seek agreement on the control of weapons either now or in the foreseeable future. The question asked whether they might be led to this by recognizing a "mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war." Two respondents emphasized that while the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the advantages of preventing nuclear war, they are in no sense motivated by the idea of mutuality of interest—"the very concept of mutuality is alien to them." [23]

Doubt about Soviet readiness to seek arms control seriously was expressed by a number of the authorities.[24] Reasons given were such considerations as the rigidity of Soviet foreign policy, and the U. S. S. R.'s unwillingness to permit inspection of the U. S. S. R.

Among those who thought the Soviet leaders would seriously seek agreement on control of weapons, some added significant qualifications. One suggested it is possible they would seek such agreement—

> at a time when their relationship with other Communist countries is appreciably worsening and it appears to them desirable to reduce the hopes of American military aid to those countries.[25]

A number of respondents expressed the opinion that Soviet leaders might be willing to consider control over nuclear weapons if it allowed them to retain what the respondents assumed is their superiority in conventional forces.[26] However, another made the following observation:

> It must be clear to the Soviet leaders that their present position of military equality with the United States rests solely on their possession of thermonuclear weapons. Do away with them and with atomic weapons as well, and the U. S. S. R. will once again be second best. Nevertheless, I believe they are, or could be, interested in the total abolition of

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[20] Timasheff, p. 96.
[21] Langer, p. 66.
[22] Wolfe, p. 100.
[23] Inkeles, p. 48; see also Meyer, p. 70.
[24] See Cattell, p. 37; H. Fisher, p. 44; Kluckhohn, p. 56; Kulski, p. 60; Poppe, p. 75.
[25] Berman, p. 33.
[26] See Bauer, p. 29; Brzezinski, p. 34; Langer, p. 66.

atomic and thermonuclear warfare. * * * Some would challenge my assertion that Soviet military equality depends on their possession of thermonuclear weapons. They would point out that, assuming the absence of such weapons, the Soviet orbit would face the West with a vast manpower superiority. The relative weight of manpower in overall military potential, however, is at least debatable. While Soviet superiority in this field cannot be disputed, the United States, even without thermonuclear or atomic weapons, would still have an overwhelming superiority in industrial potential. In addition, it must be remembered that the U. S. S. R. has some degree of superiority because of America's greater vulnerability, especially as long as both of the big powers continue to possess nuclear weapons. By the time the U. S. S. R. will have caught up with the United States in industrial potential, the power structure of the world will have changed sufficiently to make all present calculations meaningless.[27]

C. Inspection

Soviet attitudes toward inspection of the U. S. S. R.

Nearly all Soviet authorities who discussed the question of inspection for the control of armaments expressed the opinion that the present regime in the U. S. S. R. would not agree to the kind of effective inspection of the Soviet Union usually envisaged as part of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Most stated their conviction that the present leaders not only would not but could not agree to such inspection. Some did, however, describe circumstances or conditions which might at some future date lead to the possibility of inspection.

Various reasons were given for this unwillingness and inability of the Soviet rulers to open their nation to international inspection. Some said that—

> Inspection * * * strikes at the very heart of any controlled state.[28]

and—

> Such a system of inspection would * * * undermine the internal system of political controls essential to the perpetuation of the present regime * * *.[29]

Two mentioned the reluctance of the Soviet leaders to permit contact between the population and inspectors continuously stationed in the Soviet Union as well as their need to maintain the myth of the superiority of their system by not letting the free world get a good look at how it works and not letting their people get a good look at the rest of the world.[30] Others spoke of the forced labor camps which the Soviet Union could hardly open up to inspection and the unwillingness of the Soviet rulers to allow continuous observation of other nonmilitary aspects of the country such as industry.[31]

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[27] Meyer, p. 71.
[28] Barghoorn, p. 25.
[29] Reshetar, p. 93; see also Kulski, p. 60.
[30] See Hoover, p. 47; Wolfe, p. 102.
[31] See Hoover, p. 47; Kulski, p. 60; Poppe, p. 75; Reshetar, p. 93; Ulam, p. 100; Wolfe, p. 102.

One stated the opinion that "a system such as the Soviet has an inherent tendency toward a paranoiac fear of foreign subversion, and foreign inspection would be viewed by it as merely another form of espionage." [32] Others expressed similar beliefs.[33] It was further pointed out—

> that the secrecy mania is characteristic not only of the Communist regime, but has been for centuries one of the most outstanding character traits of Russia.[34]

A number of respondents noted that the Soviet Union enjoys certain advantages over the United States and the West in intelligence activities.[35] One said that the U. S. S. R. has succeeded in keeping much of its military structure a secret while the United States has already made public a large part of its military establishment. Another valuable asset the U. S. S. R. would lose by opening up to inspection, it was contended, is that of forcing the other powers to commit errors of overestimation and underestimation of the true potential of that country.

One respondent proposed the thesis that "Soviet aversion to inspection has been a serious barrier to any agreement to control weapons primarily—

> * * * because the Soviet leadership has not attached very great importance to such an agreement.[36]

Another suggested that "open skies"—

> offers the greatest hope of acceptance by the Soviet Union because it does not involve close inspection, agents moving freely around the country, or any actual reduction of arms.[37]

CONDITIONS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO PROGRESS TOWARD INSPECTION

Some of the experts suggested that progress might be made toward inspection under certain conditions. One, for example, stated that it would have to be developed gradually, piece by piece, and not in one overall agreement. He considered that the rate of progress toward an inspection agreement depends on the state of world tension, as tension goes up the possibility for inspection goes down.[38]

Another respondent, who warned that it seems unrealistic to expect the rulers of the Soviet Union to commit political suicide, said that any concessions made by the U. S. S. R. in the direction of inspection would be of very fundamental importance. It was his opinion that it might be possible to achieve progress toward this goal if we are modest and realistic and avoid the extremes of pessimism or aggressive pressures. Conditions which he suggested as promoting the possibility of inspection would include the reduction of international distrust and perhaps agreement on a general European settlement along with some sort of neutralized zone in Central Europe.[39]

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[32] Brzezinski, p. 35.
[33] See Berman, p. 33; Cattell, p. 37.
[34] Possony, p. 82.
[35] See Brzezinski, p. 34; Cattell, p. 37; Kulski, p. 60.
[36] Berman, p. 33.
[37] Cattell, p. 39.
[38] See H. Fisher, p. 44.
[39] See Barghoorn, p. 25.

One respondent expressed the opinion that the Soviet Government would probably accept comprehensive and effective inspection only under the pressure of great necessity,[40] while another suggested:

> Real inspection is a very threatening idea to them, but they may go along even on this point if it is the ultimate obstacle to secure international agreement with regard to the nuclear issue.

This was qualified, however, by the observation—

> What we must be prepared for, however, is that they will take every possible measure to see to it that the arrangements entered into are in fact nonmutual, that is restrict us in a way that increases their security without in fact restricting them in a comparable degree * * *.[41]

Other circumstances that might influence the attitude of the Soviet leaders toward inspection were given as—

> an international situation which from their point of view is worsening, plus strong indications on our part that we do not intend to exploit the situation to deliver a crushing blow * * *.[42]

or

> * * * if, on the basis of convincing reports of experts, they would come to the conclusion that the relationship of military strength was changing against them.[43]

Others, though expressing doubt about the Soviet leaders' willingness to agree to inspection, suggested they might go along with some inspection measures for tactical purposes or without being completely in good faith.[44]

POSSIBILITY OF CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION

As for the possibilities of changes that might bring about a greater willingness on the part of the Soviet Government to consider an agreement involving effective inspection, few conjectured about such changes or the likelihood of when they might occur. One stated:

> I cannot envisage changes in the Soviet Union which would bring about a greater willingness to permit effective inspection, short of another Russian revolution * * *.[45]

Another expressed the opinion:

> Only a prophet could speculate on the probability of a deep change of the regime in the U. S. S. R. So far the present regime does not seem to be in the immediate danger of being overturned and replaced by another which would resemble even from afar a western democracy. As to a "peaceful" evolution, no regime evolves peacefully to the

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[40] See Langer, p. 66.
[41] Inkeles, p. 49.
[42] Berman, p. 33.
[43] Timasheff, p. 97.
[44] See Kluckhohn, p. 56; Langer, p. 66.
[45] Meyer, p. 72.

> extent of denying its basic nature. For the time being the regime is not altered basically and goes on as before except for some Stalinist trimmings. Moreover, a quick and successful revolution in the U. S. S. R. would not guarantee that a new regime governing a strong Russia would be necessarily more accommodating than the present. Only a protracted revolution and civil war would have the effect of making Russia more accommodating, because she would simply be weaker * * * [46]

One respondent however, speculated that "changes made for tactical reasons may escape from the control of the Communist operators." He stated that—

> Since I do not exclude the possibility of serious transformations in the Soviet Union which would lead eventually to a changed attitude toward the West, I consider as a possibly promising sign, the acceptance by the Soviet Union of an aerial inspection for Eastern Europe and limited ground inspection at transportation and communication centers in the Soviet Union and possibly even the withdrawal of the Russian Army from East Central Europe. The real problem in such an agreement is the quid pro quo involved * * * [47]

However, he also stated that—

> basic transformations in Soviet leadership will not take place overnight. The dream of a sincerely cooperating Soviet Union belongs to the distant future. Until that time, Soviet leaders will not be impressed by arguments unsupported by overwhelming force.

D. Enforcement

SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

Nearly all who responded to the question on enforcement stated that in their opinion the present regime in the Soviet Union would not be willing to submit to and abide by an enforcement agency established to deal with violations of a disarmament agreement. Nor did they express expectation that any Soviet regime would be likely to do so in the foreseeable future. One respondent did suggest, however, that if a—

> really hard-hitting, sweeping proposal—

were made to the Soviet Union—

> the ensuing dilemma might even lead to internal political changes favoring the establishment of effective inspection and enforcement. [48]

Such opinions as the following were expressed about the willingness of Soviet leaders to submit to an enforcement agency:

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[46] Kulski, p. 61.
[47] Kertesz, p. 51.
[48] Meyer, p. 72.

> As long as there is a Soviet regime in Russia, no basic change can be anticipated;[49] * * * In any case it is inconceivable that [they] would do so excepting under direct pressure of circumstances.[50]

One mentioned as a future possibility in connection with enforcement, that—

> * * * if revolutionary trends in various parts of the globe continue to point to further Soviet expansion, then the U. S. S. R. might be more willing to accept some sort of disarmament in order to prevent an armed reaction from the western side when faced with a crisis situation in a number of crucial areas.[51]

A number of respondents stressed that the Soviet leaders fear that the West would dominate the machinery of enforcement and so would insist upon having the right to veto, as in the Security Council.[52] One stated, for example:

> The acceptance of any kind of enforcement agency by the Soviet rulers is unlikely so long as they continue to place stress, as they have so far, upon national sovereignty in their brand of international law. * * * The Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, was vague on the point of enforcement, confining itself to the following statement: "The control [inspection] agency makes recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression as regards violators of the convention on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons." This provision follows logically from the Soviet view of the United Nations, expressed from the moment of its founding, that that organization is based upon the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus the Soviet view implies that the Soviet Union as a great power cannot really be held to account and cannot have sanctions imposed upon it without its consent. Acceptance of an enforcement agency by the Soviet rulers would involve radical revision of their views on international law and organization.[53]

E. Eastern Europe

WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM EASTERN EUROPE

For the most part the authorities on the Soviet Union saw little likelihood that the Soviet leaders would be willing to withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe, although some thought they might consider such a move under certain conditions.

Among the conditions mentioned as ones which the Soviet leaders might require for the withdrawal of their troops from Eastern Europe were: The withdrawal of American troops from Germany and West-

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[49] Possony, p. 84.
[50] Langer, p. 66.
[51] Brzezinski, p. 35.
[52] See Cattell, p. 38; Kulski, p. 61; and Poppe, p. 76.
[53] Reshetar, p. 93–94.

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ern Europe [54] (one thought such withdrawal would have to be from any place in the world outside the United States); [55] abandonment of the rearming of Western Germany and of its inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the neutralization of Germany; [56] recognition by the West of the East German Soviet regime as a coequal in negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany; [57] disbandment of NATO; [58] conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers or an overall settlement of the cold war entailing among other things the neutralization of Europe; [59] assurance that "national Communist governments" of the type of Gomulka's in Poland would be in power in Eastern European countries, not non-Communist or anti-Communist governments; [60] provision that Eastern Europe not be turned into a NATO base or a zone of influence for a reunited and rearmed Germany; [61] or only after the satellites are firmly integrated into the Soviet system.[62] It should be stressed that these conditions were suggested by a number of different respondents and the possibility of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was not necessarily meant as contingent upon all of them being realized.

A number cited the Soviet repression in Hungary as an indication that the Soviet Union would be unwilling to withdraw from Eastern Europe.[63] One respondent, who linked political control to the presence of Soviet forces, stated his view of the probable Soviet attitude:

> * * * a great power does not welcome the establishment of what it considers to be outposts of enemy power in its own security zone. For this reason, together with the factor of economic exploitation of this area, and also the advantages of coordination of the Soviet economy with that of the so-called Socialist camp and also because the Soviets do not like to see any area lost to Communist control for reasons of national pride, it is obvious that Moscow will not willingly give up its control of any of these countries.[64]

However, another respondent suggested alternative possibilities for the Soviet reaction following the Hungarian revolt:

> On the one hand, recent events in Hungary and Poland might make Soviet leaders less willing to withdraw their troops. They must now realize the extreme unpopularity of Soviet-dominated regimes in these countries and realize that Soviet domination would not survive troop withdrawal. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders might now in desperation be willing to jettison their whole satellite position in Eastern Europe on its present basis before they are confronted with a series of major uprisings in all the satellite countries.[65]

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[54] See Berman, p. 34; Chamberlin, p. 42; Fisher, p. 44; Hoover, pp. 47 and 48; Langer, p. 66; Reshetar, p. 94; Ulam, p. 100.
[55] See Poppe, p. 77.
[56] See Berman, p. 34; Barghoorn, p. 26; Chamberlin, p. 42; H. Fisher, p. 44; Ulam, p. 100.
[57] See Reshetar, p. 94.
[58] See Poppe, p. 77.
[59] See Reshetar, p. 94; and Meyer, p. 72.
[60] See Chamberlin, p. 42.
[61] See Brzezinski, p. 35.
[62] See Poppe, p. 77.
[63] See Cattell, p. 39; Kluckhohn, p. 57; Kulski, p. 61; Meyer, pp. 72 and 73; Timasheff, p. 98.
[64] Barghoorn, p. 26.
[65] Hoover, p. 48.

Among those who saw the latter alternative as a possible Soviet response to the situation in Eastern Europe, one suggested that—

> * * * conditions may well develop in some of these countries to the extent that the Kremlin may think it advisable to withdraw its forces completely. It could probably do this with relative safety, as it could easily proceed to military reoccupation if necessary and in any event could profit from the threat of aerial bombardment (conventional or nuclear) which is always at its disposal. * * * [66]

CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET RESPONSE

A few indicated they thought that pressures for liberalization of the existing regimes or a lessening of control by the Soviet Union would continue within the countries of Eastern Europe.[67] Most respondents, however, emphasized the probable Soviet reaction to such pressures. One said, for example:

> Further anti-Soviet developments in the satellite states are very likely, but it is as likely that the Soviets will intervene to prevent the overthrow of Communist governments. The situation in Eastern Europe probably will not follow one single direction, but for many years will display many ups and downs. * * * [68]

Another warned that, while there is probably good long-term prospect for liberalization of some kind in the area—

> * * * if liberalization is carried out under the direction of the Soviet Union, the area may gradually be incorporated in a vast empire, and its people will probably be Russified.[69]

The recent experiences in Poland and Hungary were cited as not likely to encourage the Soviet leaders in any further liberalization in Eastern Europe.[70]

One respondent stated:

> * * * The policies which the Soviet leadership was following in late summer [of 1956] indicated that they felt that control by coercion had become uneconomical, using the word "uneconomical" in the largest possible sense as referring to the total use of Soviet resources. Events in Hungary underscored, of course, the fact that release of external controls, while meeting some needs of the population, also can unleash the tensions which had been built up under preexisting conditions. * * * [71]

Another made the following comment:

> The type of development which has been going on in Poland cannot but reduce Russia's influence there and also remove whatever hopes the Russian command may have had concerning the reliability of the Polish Army in crisis. I think that the Polish development is not unique and with a

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[66] Langer, p. 66; see also Berman, p. 34.
[67] See Barghoorn, p. 26; H. Fisher, p. 45; Possony, 85; and Ulam, p. 100.
[68] Possony, p. 85.
[69] Barghoorn, p. 27.
[70] See H. Fisher, p. 44; and Kulski, p. 63.
[71] Bauer, p. 28.

reduction of the size of Soviet forces, Soviet influence, in terms of actual control over their satellites, is likely to wither away. There are a few qualifications to the above statement: Thus the Russians have obviously hoped to compensate for their diminishing physical control over the satellites by establishing stronger ideological and self-interest bonds. I am not worried about the strength of ideological and self-interest bonds, for in my opinion they are not likely to prove to be the decisive factor in retaining those countries' allegiance to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the U. S. S. R. may play such angles as economic help and capitalize, e. g., on the fact that up to now she alone of the great powers has supported Poland's frontier with Germany. All in all, barring the unexpected, Russian influence over the European satellites is bound to diminish in the long run.[72]

NEUTRAL BELT THROUGH CENTRAL EUROPE

Those who commented on the Soviet Union's readiness to consider the creation of a neutral belt through Europe, including Eastern Europe, saw very little possibility that the Soviet leadership, now or in the foreseeable future, would be apt to consider such a move seriously.[73] There was such comment as:

> * * * the plan of creating a neutral zone in central and east central Europe must be considered quite unrealistic. Very conclusive is the reaction of the Soviet leaders to the demand of neutrality on the part of the leaders of the Hungarian revolution: the countries of the Warsaw pact were told that they could not be allowed to part company.[74]

However, some did suggest circumstances which might lead to more favorable consideration of this proposal on the part of the Soviet leaders:

> * * * it is not inconceivable that within 10 or 15 years—possibly even less—there could be enough change in the internal power structure within the U. S. S. R. so that a truly neutral zone could be created in central Europe. I think this is most unlikely in the foreseeable future—and this includes eastern Germany. As I think the present leaders (and possible leaders of the immediate future) to have mapped out their "limits of tolerance," they would risk all-out war rather than lose control of East Germany which they consider as essential to their security as we do, say, the Panama Canal or Cuba.[75]

and:

> If for one reason or the other, the Soviets feel that it is too costly, unproductive, impractical, or militarily useless to maintain control over a satellite, they might negotiate an American quid pro quo for withdrawal. In general, the

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[72] Ulam, p. 100.
[73] See Kluckhohn, p. 57; Poppe, p. 77; Possony, p. 85; Reshetar, p. 94; and Timasheff, p. 98.
[74] Timasheff, p. 98.
[75] Kluckhohn, p. 57.

Soviets, due to their geographic proximity to eastern and central Europe, have less to lose from a neutral belt than the United States. Therefore, they can risk playing around with this idea, even though, in my opinion, they do not have the slightest intention of leaving. * * * [76]

DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ARMY OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER EAST EUROPE

There was general agreement on the necessity of the presence or the proximity of the Soviet Army to maintain Soviet-dominated regimes in the eastern European countries.[77] Some difference was noted in the degree and kind of domination by the U. S. S. R. over the various nations in East Europe.[78] One authority, for example, said:

> The presence or the proximity of Soviet troops is very important, I believe, in maintaining Soviet domination in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It may be less important in Rumania and Bulgaria and much less in Albania.[79]

It was also pointed out that even if the Soviets were to withdraw their troops from the territories of the eastern European countries, they could still concentrate the forces just behind the borders and so support pro-Soviet, Communist regimes.[80]

Similarly, it was generally assumed that a marked reduction in Soviet forces would weaken Soviet control over the eastern European countries.[81] Merely a reduction of U. S. S. R. forces on the territory of the satellite nations without withdrawal of Red army troops, however, would not necessarily end Soviet domination over those countries, it was pointed out.[82]

F. Soviet Economy

BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS ON THE SOVIET UNION

Many of those replying to the question asking whether the Soviet Union would welcome relief from the present burden of armaments said they thought it would. A number emphasized the need the Soviet leaders may feel to meet the demand for consumer goods.[83] One declared that they would consider the need to meet this demand, not for humanitarian purposes, but to consolidate their own position.[84] Another also thought that the Soviet leadership would like to provide more consumer goods for the Soviet people in order to strengthen political support for the regime, although he believed it would be a mistake to attribute Soviet armaments policy to any pressing economic needs. He asserted there was this difference between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe:

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[76] Possony, p. 85.
[77] See Barghoorn, p. 26; Brzezinski, p. 35; Cattrell, p. 39; Chamberlin, p. 42; H. Fisher, p. 45; Hoover, p. 48; Kertesz, p. 53; Kuiski, p. 62; Langer, p. 66; Meyer, p. 73; Poppe, p. 77; Possony, p. 84; Timasheff, p. 98; Ulam, p. 100.
[78] See Barghoorn, p. 26; Brzezinski, p. 35.
[79] H. Fisher, p. 45.
[80] See Timasheff, p. 98.
[81] See Barghoorn, p. 26; H. Fisher, p. 45; Ulam, p. 100.
[82] See Hoover, p. 48; Possony, p. 85.
[83] See Bergson, p. 30; Berman, p. 34; H. Fisher, p. 45; Langer, p. 67; Ulam, p. 100.
[84] See Bauer, p. 28.

* * * the effect of the more liberal policies of the post-Stalin regime has been one thing at home, where the Soviet people seem to have responded in general with gratitude, and another in Eastern Europe, where they have been taken as signs of weakness and the people have responded with demands for more * * *[85]

It was also suggested that the Soviet leaders might welcome relief from the burden of armaments in order to put greater effort into the development of industrial potential that would later mean greater military strength.[86] Other comments suggested that a reduction of armaments would also make it possible for the U. S. S. R. to give more technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries,[87] and that the leaders might agree to such reductions to appear peaceful.[88]

Another stated that while the Soviet regime would like to be relieved of some of its military burden, it should be clear that the long-run objectives of the Soviet Union have not profoundly changed:

> They still look forward to and regard it as one of their prime responsibilities to move the world as rapidly as possible toward communism.[89]

It was also maintained by one authority on Soviet affairs that in his estimation—

> this entire set of questions does not address itself properly to the basic facts of Russian and Soviet psychology, but reflects American procedures and thought patterns.

In this connection he also said:

> The Soviet mentality is not like the mentality of American businessmen, and it is conceivable that the Soviets, far from considering military expenditures as burdens, like the Prussians of previous centuries regard military strength as their main and preferred industry. Military power can be a very considerable economic asset and the Soviets are quite aware of this.[90]

While many replies did state the belief that the Soviet leaders would welcome relief from the burden of armaments so as to be able to respond to the pressures from the population for consumer goods, an important qualification was expressed to this view by one respondent. While this authority on Soviet affairs was among those requesting that his answers to the subcommittee's questions not be published, permission was granted for publication of the following portion of his reply without attribution:

> * * * It can be argued, I think, that the Soviet Government has no really free hand in determining the share of consumption in total national output. It is quite reasonable to suppose that in reality that Government must move between the upper and the lower limit of a rather narrow zone.

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[85] Berman, p. 34.
[86] See Kulski, p. 63; Possony p. 86.
[87] See H. Fisher, p. 45.
[88] See Barghoorn, p. 54; H. Fisher, p. 45.
[89] Inkeles, p. 49.
[90] Possony, p. 86.

Clearly, they cannot, except in the case of war, reduce consumption below what is required to maintain the physical stamina of the population. But, on the other hand, strange as it may sound, I believe that the Soviet dictatorship cannot afford to raise consumption above a certain limit. Let me explain briefly what I have in mind.

No government, however ruthless and powerful, can function without a certain minimum of acquiescence on the part of the governed. The instruments of domination at the disposal of such a government, such as the secret police or the Army, can prevent plots, conspiracies, underground resistance; they can suppress an open rebellion. They cannot deal with a universal discontent which would express itself in general passive resistance. Monopolistic use of propaganda is much less effective than is generally thought. In particular, the idea of present sacrifices for the bliss of future generations has long lost its effectiveness in Russia * * * Yet, as long as the Government can represent itself as acting to protect the country against "foreign aggression," against "capitalist encirclement," and the like, people may be willing to suppress their basic disaffection and to lend the Government the modicum of acceptance which it needs. In other words, a dictatorship of this type cannot function except in an atmosphere of stress and strain. The high rate of investment, the high military expenditures—and, obversely, the low rate of consumption—are, therefore, part and parcel of the political system, a precondition for its continuation in power. Rapid increase in consumption would not evoke the gratitude of the population for the regime. In the looking-glass world of the dictatorship, any significant relaxation would arouse the pent-up demand of the consumers for still further increases, and it would almost inevitably raise the basic issue of freedom. Such an increase would be very likely to augur the disintegration of the dictatorship * * *

Other comments presenting views explaining why the Soviet leaders might seek a cutback in armaments include:

* * * On the other hand, it is true that the Soviet economy is now entering a phase where some painful decisions must be made. They [the leaders] will have to raise, to a degree at least, living standards, and there is clearly a conflict between current military expenditures and investment and growth rates. The maintenance of a rapid growth rate is becoming militarily crucial since, due to technological developments, the Soviet strategic planners probably consider that the main conflict with the United States will take place only in the next or in a subsequent technological cycle. To the extent that by maintaining huge armaments now they may inhibit industrial growth, they could jeopardize their future technological posture. If this is their thinking, they might be willing to reduce current expenditures somewhat in order to strike a better balance between present and future military requirements. If so, this would be a rearrangement of armaments schedules, but not a change of priorities, and cer-

> tainly not an attempt to substitute foreign economic aid for a strategy based on military power. By the same token, it might not be in the true interest of the free world if we were to assist them, through armament-limitation agreements, to solve one of their most difficult strategic problems.[91]

An analysis of the problem which the Soviet leaders may be having in offering their people sufficient incentives to keep up the high rate of industrialization follows:

> I think there is no doubt that the Soviet leaders are under great pressure for reduction of their present armament burden. Western observers have seldom seen in proper perspective the remarkable achievements of the Soviet economy, and its equally marked deficiencies. The rapid expansion of Soviet industry and the growth of Soviet military power was accomplished by a formula which placed preeminent emphasis on strong social controls and which deemphasized the spontaneous sources which hold a liberal society together and enable it to function effectively. The success of this formula, as judged against the criteria of industrial and military expansion, cannot be questioned as far as performance over the past two decades is concerned.
>
> While succeeding in its primary objectives, the Stalinist formula I have been describing above failed to reduce, and, in fact, increased, many internal tensions within the system: the population's demand for a better standard of living and freedom from arbitrary arrest, management's demand for greater autonomy (if only to better carry out their own tasks in the Soviet state), and the intellectual's desire for a greater degree of freedom of inquiry.
>
> The effect of these pressures can be seen in both Soviet domestic and international policy. While there is certainly no clear evidence that the Soviet leaders are aiming at creating a welfare state, policy since Stalin's death indicates a continuing vacillation between the desire to grant greater concessions to the population and the reluctance to abandon the older way of doing things for fear that immediate industrial and military goals will be prejudiced. The dilemma in this situation, if I read these vacillations correctly, is that it's clear to the Soviet leadership that if they are to convert their society into an effectively functioning productive unit over the long haul, they must do more to reward the material interests and aspirations of their own populace, but that they can follow this course only at the risk of prejudicing their short-run industrial and military goals, and possibly risking many of the present political forms * * *.[92]

Another respondent, however, while recognizing the pressures for improved living standards, thought these needs might be satisfied without necessarily any reduction in arms production:

> * * * while there are very real economic incentives for reductions in defense outlays, it would be wrong, I feel, to

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[91] Possony, p. 86.
[92] Bauer, p. 27.

suppose that there are irresistible pressures. The Soviet economy is growing rapidly. Despite all their difficulties, Stalin's successors so far have been able to maintain a high rate of growth in industry. As overall growth is realized, it becomes ever easier to support a given level of defense outlays. Even an increase in defense outlays may allow for larger allocations to capital investment and consumption, if only the increase is held below the rate of overall growth of the economy generally.

Stalin's successors have found it possible so far to continue high-tempo industrialization and make some concessions to consumers while still supporting a vast military effort. In view of the record to date, it would be wrong to think that they cannot continue to do so in the future. * * * [93]

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS

The economic consideration most often cited as explaining, at least in part, Soviet reductions in forces—if such cutbacks have, in fact, taken place—was the shortage of manpower in the U. S. S. R.[94] Others thought the announced reductions could be only partly attributable to economic pressures,[95] while some expressed the view that it would be a mistake to attribute any reductions to economic causes.[96] It was also pointed out that a trend toward the use of atomic weapons may have made possible a lowering of the levels of Soviet armed forces.[97] In any event, it was thought that the Soviet economy would benefit from such a reduction.[98]

One opinion, expressed by an authority on the Soviet economy, stated:

> Considering the Soviet secrecy, one hesitates to take at face value the Soviet claims regarding the new cuts in the size of the armed forces. If such cuts are being made, very possibly one consideration was the resultant alleviation of an industrial labor shortage, of which there are many signs. I rather doubt, however, that this alone was decisive. More likely, the cuts reflect a complex of factors, including not least the need to adapt the Soviet armed forces to current changes in military technology.
>
> The foregoing is written on the supposition that the cut in armed forces announced in May 1956 is not being accompanied by any sizable reduction in total munitions procurement. If such a reduction is being made, the question of the relation of the Soviet economy to the Soviet military effort I feel would require review.[99]

Another respondent said that a shortage in the work force is compelling the cut of 1957 and will compel still larger cuts in 1958, 1959,

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[93] Bergson, p. 30.
[94] See Chamberlin, p. 43; Inkeles, p. 49; Kulski, p. 63; Langer, p. 66; Meyer, p. 73; Possony, p. 87; Reshetar, pp. 95 and 96; Wolfe, p. 103.
[95] See Bergson, p. 31; Hoover, p. 98.
[96] See Berman, p. 34; Poppe, p. 78.
[97] See Kertesz, p. 54; Ulam, p. 100.
[98] See H. Fisher, p. 45; Meyer, p. 73; et al.
[99] Bergson, p. 31.

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and 1960. He cited the following figures which estimate the net increase in the labor forces in the year 1950 through 1960:

1950	1,300,000	1956	2,100,000
1951	1,300,000	1957	1,800,000
1952	1,600,000	1958	800,000
1953	2,600,000	1959	300,000
1954	2,500,000	1960	300,000
1955	2,400,000		

These figures were arrived at by taking the birth rate of 16 years earlier, as youths reach a working age at 16, and subtracting from this the rate of diminution of the working force by death, old age, illness, youths not gainfully employed, and similar causes. The figures then arrived at showed the net difference between new youths entering employment at 16 and older workers dropping out of the labor force. The significance of these figures, it was pointed out, is that the years 1953 through 1956 reflect an increased number of births during the prosperious period in the U. S. S. R. from 1937 through 1940 as well as other factors favorable to a marked increase in the labor force. The sharply reduced estimates during the years 1957 through 1960, however, reflect the greatly reduced birth rate coupled with the high infant mortality rate in the U. S. S. R. during the war years of 1942, 1943, and 1944. The authority on Soviet affairs who submitted this information concluded on the basis of these figures that—

> The Kremlin must either abandon its plan for the sixth 5-year plan in industry and agriculture or else cut out its armies and concentration-camp populations. Or which is not unlikely both at once.[100]

ADAPTABILITY OF SOVIET ECONOMY TO ARMS REDUCTION

Opinion was mixed on the question of the ease or difficulty with which the economy of the Soviet Union could adjust to any appreciable reduction of armaments. A number of respondents stated the opinion that such a transition could be made either with little difficulty or with greater ease than in the case of the United States.[101] Two limited their comment to the observation that the Soviet Union would not encounter great difficulties in shifting manpower from the military into the civilian economy.[102] One did not think it would be any easier for the U. S. S. R. to adjust to an appreciable reduction in armament production than the United States, citing the vast Soviet bureaucracy as not insuring a smooth or swift adjustment.[103]

One respondent, who warned that no one really knows how adaptable the Soviet economy would be in such circumstances, emphasized the difficulties that might result if any cutback in arms production were accompanied by a shift to the production of consumer goods:

> * * * It must be pointed out * * * that a centrally planned economy functions most effectively in the area of heavy and military industries, and that its performance is least satisfactory in those economic fields which require decentralization, flexibility, responsiveness to customer's de-

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[100] See Wolfe, p. 103.
[101] See Bergson, p. 31; Chamberlin, p. 43; Hoover, p. 48; Kulski, p. 64; Timasheff, p. 88.
[102] See Meyer, p. 74; Ulam, p. 100.
[103] See H. Fisher, p. 45.

sires, and large distribution mechanisms. As presently constituted, it is my belief that the Soviet economy cannot effectively adopt the satisfaction of consumer's needs as its primary objective. In any event, the vast buildup of light industries, transportation systems, and internal and external trade facilities would require a far-reaching reorganization of the entire Soviet society, in a manner which may be politically undesirable to the Soviet Government. Perhaps all this is feasible, but such changes of the economic structure would require many years. * * *[104]

G. Control of Soviet Armaments

CONTROLS ON SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Differing replies were made to the question as to the type of international controls that would be most workable and effective over the Soviet military establishment. Two respondents doubted that any controls over the Soviet military establishment acceptable to the Soviet Government would be either workable or effective.[105] Another warned that almost any form of control can be obstructed and, if necessary, defied.[106] This respondent suggested that the key factor is confidence, and, while the United States has a moral as well as practical obligation to explore every proposal for a reduction of armaments, the more important objectives must be to remove or alleviate hostility and, insofar as possible, build up a measure of mutual confidence.

Another warned that in the contemporary U. S. S. R. policy is still being made by individuals whose basic character was formed in a revolutionary atmosphere and in a situation of isolation from the rest of the world. He said:

> Hence to speak of "controls * * * over the Soviet military establishment" strikes me as unrealistic for the immediate future. I would urge that we press for whatever disarmament and inspection we can obtain so long as we do not allow the U. S. S. R. to make too shrewd a horse trade.[107]

It was the opinion of this authority on the Soviet Union that as all social systems evolve through time and the Soviet system has by no means remained static up to the present point—

> * * * much to our advantage can happen over the next 10 to 15 years and the aim of wide disarmament and mutual inspection on the necessary scale may become realistic.

Those who discussed the type of controls that would be needed to be effective over the Soviet military establishment included one who stated that, given the strategic and logistical characteristics of the Soviet military establishment, mobile and unrestricted ground control teams with freedom to travel throughout the U. S. S. R. would be necessary.[108] Another emphasized that unlimited aerial inspection

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[104] Possony, p. 87.
[105] See Chamberlin, p. 43; Timasheff, p. 98.
[106] See Langer, p. 67.
[107] Kluckhohn, p. 58.
[108] See Brzezinski, p. 35.

would be an indispensable minimum and that it must be supported by strong ground control units also without limitations on access to any facility at any time.[109]

One respondent listed the following types of controls as most likely to be workable and effective:

> (*a*) Those designed to make a surprise attack with intercontinental missiles impossible;
> (*b*) A step-by-step reduction of forces under arms;
> (*c*) The establishment of a supervisory body under the U. N. in which countries are represented that are incapable of aggression and are greatly concerned to be relieved of the danger of war * * *.[110]

Another also recommended that only a thoroughgoing system of inspection under the direction of an international agency could be effective and workable over the Soviet military establishment.[111] Still another warned that—

> the only effective controls for the time being, when you have to deal with a totalitarian system, are the type of controls which would be self-enforceable and the violation of which would be immediately detected, e. g., physical removal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, and (if this be technically possible and desirable to us) prohibition of nuclear tests.[112]

SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION

It was asserted that the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union are the same as those of any other state, such as assurance against external attack and internal subversion,[113] and that any disarmament agreement must be based on full and unmitigated reciprocity as to the rights, procedures, and operations of the mutual control establishments.[114]

Some respondents, however, stated that "legitimate security interests" means something quite different to the Soviet Communists than it does to people in the West.[115] One suggested the Soviet interpretation would consider such interests as those being advantageous to the U. S. S. R. and detrimental to the other side.

Among the conditions that were suggested as legitimate security interests in the eyes of the Soviet leaders were a guaranty of the frontiers of the U. S. S. R., and assurances that the Soviet Union would not be attacked by any other nation or group of nations, nor would any nation officially support activities directed against the Soviet regime.[116]

Another respondent expressed the opinion that the Soviet rulers would consider their security interests as including military superiority on the Continent of Europe and domination of the satellites, and

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[109] See Possony, p. 88.
[110] H. Fisher, p. 45.
[111] See Kertesz, p. 56.
[112] Ulam, p. 100.
[113] See Barghoorn, p. 27.
[114] See Possony, p. 88.
[115] See H. Fisher, p. 46; Kertesz, p. 56; Poppe, p. 79.
[116] See Poppe, pp. 78 and 79.

that the minimum they would be willing to accept would be the security of the Soviet frontiers of 1945 and demilitarization of the region extending from those frontiers to the western sphere of interest.[117] A similar view was expressed that the Soviet concept of "legitimate interests" includes not only the security of Soviet national territory but also the perpetuation of the division of Germany and control of Eastern Europe.[118] One respondent warned that a rearmed and reunited Germany poses an important psychological factor in Soviet thinking that cannot be disregarded, so that in any disarmament planning a disarmed Germany should be given high priority.[119]

One authority on Soviet affairs said:

> The basic problem with regard to the Soviet military forces is not that of assuring them of their ultimate security under any circumstances, but of assuring them of their security under the unique political objectives of the Soviet system at large. Only a change in those objectives would enable one to significantly reformulate the problem.[120]

One response stressed that the territorial extent of the U. S. S. R. should be taken into consideration for it justifies the maintenance of a proportionately large army.[121] Another indicated that it is as much to the Soviet interest as ours to achieve atomic disarmament.[122]

Another respondent stated his opinion that in disarmament planning no regard can be paid to the particularistic interests of the individual nations on security.[123]

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[117] See Ulam, pp. 100–101.
[118] See Kulski, p. 64.
[119] See Brzezinski, p. 35.
[120] Inkeles, p. 49.
[121] See Kertesz, p. 56.
[122] See Bauer, p. 29.
[123] See Timasheff, p. 99.

II. REPLIES OF AUTHORITIES ON SOVIET AFFAIRS

Reply of Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Department of Political Science, Yale University, January 13, 1957

* * * Before beginning my detailed answers, I should like to point out that it is really impossible to answer these questions, in view of the lack of communication between the Soviet leaders, and Soviet public opinion, if one may use such a term, on the one hand and the non-Soviet world, although I believe that a few of our diplomats, such as Mr. Bohlen, probably know as much about Soviet thinking as an outsider can.

With regard to the first question, I would say that there are grounds for believing that the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the decisive threat created by super weapons. The most open indication was a statement by Malenkov when he was the Chairman of the Council of Minister of the U. S. S. R., I believe in 1954, to the effect that a new war would "destroy civilization." Since Malenkov's resignation from the post of Premier the Soviets have taken the line that a new war would destroy only "capitalism." His return to supreme power might strengthen the forces of reasonableness in Moscow, though he is a shrewder opponent than Khrushchev.

However, I have not the slightest doubt that the Soviet leaders realize as well as the leaders of other major powers that modern weapons, if used on a large scale, mean suicide for civilization. In my opinion, Soviet policy has always been based as much on fear of war as on any factor. This belief was confirmed in my mind by my visit to the Soviet Union last summer. This does not mean that the Soviets are in any sense pacifists. They are convinced that the "capialist" countries would destroy them if they dared, and they believe that they must be militarily powerful in order to prevent such an occurrence. In many ways, it seems to me that the situation between the Soviet Union and the United States resembles that which existed between Germany and England in 1914. Fortunately, there is today a much greater understanding on both sides of the dangers of large-scale war. As for recent Soviet actions, I believe the record speaks for itself. The Soviets, despite their brutality in Hungary, and their threats regarding the Middle East, displayed their usual caution. The one disquieting element in the situation is the possibility that as time goes on the old caution may be reduced. There was some indication that this might already be the case in the belligerency of some of Khrushchev's statements. However, I believe that his statement that the Soviets would "bury" the West fits into the old Soviet confidence that "socialism" will in this century replace "capitalism" as the economic and social system throughout the world. It may not have been related specifically to the use of physical force on a large military scale.

This leads to another point. Inherent in Soviet ideology is the belief that a process of social change is occurring throughout the world in which the capitalist, private enterprise system, because of its stability and "contradictions," will be replaced by "socialism." This is the optimistic aspect of Soviet ideology, which in so many ways is deeply pessimistic. I mean, optimistic from the Soviet point of view, of course. However, with respect to this the growing indications of unrest among youth in all Communist countries, with the possible exception of China, about which we know so little, can give us confidence that the future belongs not to regimentation but to freedom. Here, however, there is perhaps a danger. If the Soviet leaders become desperate may they not make moves which will have incalculable consequences? It will be necessary for us to be wise, cautious and firm in order to keep alive in the minds of men everywhere a realization of the suicidal character of war.

With regard to inspection, I think that we should keep trying but I think that it would be highly unrealistic to expect soon a regime in Russia that would be likely to permit inspection by a West that the Russians have so long been taught to believe is deeply hostile to them. However, I believe that it might be possible to achieve progress toward this goal if we are modest and realistic and avoid the extremes of pessimism or of aggressive pressures. Inspection, like complete freedom of cultural exchange, strikes at the very heart of any controlled state. It seems unrealistic to expect the rulers of such a state to commit political suicide. I think we should realize that any concessions made by the Soviet Union in this regard would be of very fundamental importance. Here again, we must avoid the extremes of demanding too much on the one hand or of failing to ask for enough. We obviously cannot give up the means of retaliation, on which our own security rests, until an effective inspection system is accepted by all powers. But progress toward this goal depends upon relaxing international tensions, as well as upon many other factors. Nobody can be certain whether inspection will ever be accepted by any Russian government, but it does seem possible that if international distrust could be reduced somewhat the possibilities might be greater. Perhaps also there might be a possibility of moving toward this goal if a general European settlement could be reached, in which some sort of neutralized zone in Central Europe could be established. This could only be acceptable to us if adequate safeguards against violations were developed. We must remember that, while Western Europe is probably not capable at present of defending itself against Soviet attack, on the other hand the Soviets are probably genuinely afraid of the possibility of a Western European-German-United States military combination. This may be the reason why they are not willing to make the concessions to the satellite countries which in so many ways would be in their own interests. Of course there are many reasons, besides those connected with overall world strategic considerations, why the Soviets feel reluctant to give up their control of an area the resources of which they have been exploiting.

With regard to point three, concerning establishment of an enforcement agency for a disarmament agreement, I must say that I

am skeptical whether any state is willing to entrust its security to such an agency. I wonder whether it was not because of a feeling that disarmament proposals along these lines would not get very far that the United States proposed the "open skies" concept? This would not require any agency to enforce it. It seems realistic to accept the fact that an enforcement agency would represent the interests of the states composing it. Small powers could furnish the personnel, perhaps, but the experience of the Korean Armistice Commission makes one wonder about the possibility.

With regard to point four, the removal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, some of my statements already made are pertinent, but I shall consider this question in some detail here. Conditions vary among the satellite states. For example, Czechoslovakia seems to be rather quiescent. The Communists have retained control in Albania despite the fact that it is not contiguous to any Soviet-controlled country. On the whole, however, it seems pretty clear that removal of Soviet armed forces would be the first step toward eventual establishment of independent governments in the satellite countries. It is difficult to envisage any powerful government in Russia failing to resist a tendency of these countries to become hostile to Russia. Yet that is what would probably happen in some of them if Soviet power were withdrawn. From the point of view of the peoples of these countries, independence would be far preferable to the present situation. I think we have to distinguish between two main factors in analyzing this situation. One is the fact of control by a foreign power, the Soviet Union, and the other is the nature of the Communist internal regime which results from Russian control. As believers in constitutional government and democracy, we naturally must favor the elimination of Communist, or at least of Soviet, control. But as realistic students of international relations, we must understand that a great power does not welcome the establishment of what it considers to be outposts of enemy power in its own security zone. For this reason, together with the factor of economic exploitation of this area, and also the advantages of coordination of the Soviet economy with that of the so-called "socialist camp" and also because the Soviets do not like to see any area lost to Communist control for reasons of national pride, it is obvious that Moscow will not willingly give up its control of any of these countries. Since this control rests in large measure on the presence of Soviet armed forces, either within the countries concerned, or near them, it is difficult to foresee early withdrawal of Soviet forces without getting something pretty substantial in return.

Many able analysts of European problems now believe that an agreement with regard to Germany might be regarded by the Soviet Union as a sufficient place for withdrawal of its armed forces from this area. If such an agreement were made, we would want to be able to move our forces to areas that would give us a strategic position reasonably comparable to that of the Soviet Union, which, after all, even after withdrawing would still be relatively near to central Europe. Nobody can be sure what the results of negotiation along these lines might be. I am rather pessimistic, but I think that we ought to at least make the attempt. This is very important from the point of view of our own psychological position in the world, in view of fear of war. In any

case, there is probably a good long-term prospect for liberalization of some kind in this area, but if liberalization is carried out under the direction of the Soviet Union, the area may gradually be incorporated in a vast empire, and its people will probably be Russified. It may be impossible to bring this result about, and in this case we may have continual crisis in this area which will be dangerous in the extreme to world peace. It is obvious that the reduction of Soviet armed forces would facilitate solution of this whole problem. With regard to point five, I think it is true that the Soviet Union wants relief from the burden of armament. The Soviets believe that their type of economic system can stand reduction of armaments better than the capitalist system. They attribute our present prosperity to arms production. Furthermore, they are under very great economic pressure, because of a labor shortage and other factors. Finally, they have always cast themselves in the role of champions of world welfare and peace. This is largely demagogy, but it fits into the picture, too. I am certain that the population of the Soviet Union welcomes reduction of armed forces and armament expenditures.

Question six seems to me to be a technical one on which it would not be profitable for me to comment. However, with regard to the legitimate security interest part of it, I would say that these are the same as those of any other state, mainly, assurance against external attack and internal subversion. This is the view of the rulers. Probably it is the only realistic way for an outsider to approach the question, since until the people of the Soviet Union acquire more control over their government, it will be impossible to take public opinion, to any large extent, into account in analyzing the Soviet situation.

REPLY OF PROF. RAYMOND A. BAUER, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHOLOGY, FEBRUARY 15, 1957

* * * As you are undoubtedly aware, these questions vary greatly in their susceptibility to being answered with any degree of firmness, so let me begin with item 5, an issue on which I believe the evidence is most firm, and proceed from there as far as I feel warranted in addressing myself to the other questions.

I think there is no doubt that the Soviet leaders are under great pressure for reduction of their present armament burden. Western observers have seldom seen in proper perspective the remarkable achievements of the Soviet economy, and its equally marked deficiencies. The rapid expansion of Soviet industry and the growth of Soviet military power was accomplished by a formula which placed preeminent emphasis on strong social controls and which deemphasized the spontaneous sources which hold a liberal society together and enable it to function effectively. The success of this formula, as judged against the criteria of industrial and military expansion, cannot be questioned as far as performance over the past two decades is concerned.

While succeeding in its primary objectives, the Stalinist formula I have been describing above failed to reduce, and in fact increased, many internal tensions within the system: the population's demand for a better standard of living, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, management's demand for greater autonomy (if only to better carry

out their own task in the Soviet state), and the intellectual's desire for a greater degree of freedom of inquiry.

The effect of these pressures can be seen in both Soviet domestic and international policy. While there is certainly no clear evidence that the Soviet leaders are aiming at creating a welfare state, policy since Stalin's death indicates a continuing vascillation between the desire to grant greater concessions to the population, and the reluctance to abandon the older way of doing things for fear that immediate industrial and military goals will be prejudiced. The dilemma in this situation, if I read these vascillations correctly, is that it's clear to the Soviet leadership that if they are to convert their society into an effectively functioning productive unit over the long haul, they must do more to reward the material interests and aspirations of their own populace, but that they can follow this course only at the risk of prejudicing their short-run industrial and military goals, and possibly risking many of the present political forms.

The situation in the satellite areas can give us a key to the situation in the Soviet Union. You ask under what conditions the Soviet Union would be willing to withdraw its troops from East Europe and to what extent domination over the East European countries is dependent upon the presence of the Red Army. The policies which the Soviet leadership was following in late summer indicate that they felt that control by coercion had become uneconomical, using the word "uneconomical" in the largest possible sense as referring to the total use of Soviet resources. Events in Hungary underscored, of course, the fact that release of external controls, while meeting some needs of the population, also can unleash the tensions which had been built up under preexisting conditions. Actually, in terms of my own long run view of trends in the Soviet orbit, the Hungarian revolution—for all of its inspiring display of human courage—may have been as much of a setback for American policy as for Soviet policy.

It seems to me clear that both at home and abroad the Soviet leaders would like, as gracefully and rapidly as possible, to make concessions to the population, not for humanitarian purposes, but to consolidate their own position. This can be done only if they are able to deflect a considerable amount of economic production away from military uses.

Nothing I have said in the foregoing paragraphs should be construed as implying in any way that the Soviet leaders have relinquished any long-run goals for world domination. I am not sure, however, whether in the present context these long-run goals have as much relevance as is ordinarily assumed. Long-run goals become considerably modified as a result of short-run decisions. I have been talking in the foregoing paragraphs about only 1 of the 2 major short-run problems with which the leadership is faced: Whether it be for purposes of maintaining political power, of strengthening their own position for future world domination, or both, they are under considerable pressure to consolidate their own society and area of domination. On the other hand, they are faced with the problem of an armaments race. Mainly as a result of their own behavior in the past, they are faced with an armed group of Western nations. I would not pretend that I was solving the problem, but admit I am only stating it when I say that it would be in our interest to make the Soviet leaders feel freer to disarm.

I must hasten to point to a paradox in this situation. If we facilitate their disarmament, we are likely—in the short-run—to strengthen their domestic position and their position throughout the Soviet orbit. This risk I would be willing to run because of my confidence that the long-run evolutionary trends of communistic society would transform it politically and ideologically. I would not for a moment, however, blanch at the fact that this course of action would not involve risks for us. Communism would in the short-run become a better export product, and international communism would certainly be free to pursue subversion in the free world—perhaps more effectively. These problems would have to be dealt with in their own terms.

I know little or nothing about technical problems of disarmament and control. It seems to me, however, that our major danger in the future does not lie in atomic warfare deliberately precipitated by either side. The danger of atomic warfare seems to lie more in its following from more minor clashes in which one of the parties, fearing that it's losing ground, may feel that it has no alternative but to use the "ultimate weapons." I can see no inherent reason why it is not as much to the Soviet interest as ours to achieve atomic disarmament. As a matter of fact, a very strong case might well be made that they would have less to lose than we would if atomic weapons were relinquished, since the distinctive military and political advantages of communism do not lie in this area.

On the positive side, I would suggest that it should be a cardinal point of American policy to facilitate, to the extent that our own vital interests are not unduly prejudiced, the transfer of the Soviet economy into a consumer-oriented one. This involves among other things encouraging "peaceful Titoism" in the satellite states.

While I have not answered your questions entirely in the terms in which they were posed, I have tried to restrict myself to those areas in which I feel most confident and competent.

Reply of Abram Bergson, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, January 11, 1957

* * * In my studies of the Soviet Union, I have concentrated especially on economic affairs. Accordingly, I feel I should focus primarily on the economic questions you raise in paragraph 5 of your mimeographed statement.

Stalin died on March 5, 1953. In the period since, his successors have publicized numerous claims suggesting that they have been reducing their defense outlays markedly below the cold-war levels established under Stalin. Although the fact is familiar, it deserves underlining that Khrushchev and his colleagues have continued the extreme secrecy that Stalin maintained regarding military matters. Any attempt at an independent appraisal, therefore, encounters formidable difficulties and your committee must reckon that without a radical change in Soviet information policy, the current and future dimensions of the Soviet military effort must be conjectural.

The Soviet Government has published some data, however, and it should be observed that at least until the manpower cut that was announced in May 1956, they do little to support claims indicating any marked cut in defense outlays. According to incomplete budgetary data, which omit defense plant construction and possibly nuclear stock-

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piling, the Russians spent on defense in 1952 (the year before Stalin's death) 109 billion rubles. In December 1955, the Government announced that its target for defense outlays for 1956 was 102.5 billion rubles. Since 1952, the Government has initiated a number of price cuts which have reduced military procurement costs materially. Allowing for these cuts, the "real" defense outlays planned for 1956 in all probability exceeded those of 1952.

The announced target for 1956 takes into account the claimed reduction of the armed forces by 640,000 men in 1955, but may not reflect the further reduction by 1,200,000 men which the Government announced in May 1956 would be carried out by May 1957. Allowing for the resultant cut in military pay and subsistence, defense expenditures might have fallen to some 95 billion rubles. According to the May 1956 announcement, armament and military equipment of the armed forces are being cut along with manpower. The Soviet Government, however, has thus far released neither a revised target nor a realized figure for 1956 defense outlays, from which one might hope to find some clue as to whether there was in fact any overall reduction in munitions procurement. In view of the extraordinarily expensive nature of many advanced types of weapons, one cannot rule out that total procurements are increasing. In a talk before the Executives Club of Chicago, Adm. Arthur Radford stated: "I have seen no reduction in military capabilities in spite of announced reductions in manpower."

You ask whether there "is anything in present Soviet economic trends that would indicate the need for relief from the present level of arms production?" The present levels of defense expenditures are onerous, and the Soviet Government certainly could use profitably in other ways the resources they absorb. Stalin's successors are seeking to continue high-tempo industrialization. They also wish to provide the population with better living conditions than Stalin allowed. In pursuing these aims, they are encountering many difficulties, especially in agriculture. The capital investments and consumers' goods needed for continued high-tempo industrial expansion and the improvement of living standards would be more easily obtainable if defense expenditures could be reduced, and the prospects for success in both endeavors would be heightened.

The conflicting requirements of defense, industrial expansion, and current consumption, therefore, continually confront the Soviet leaders with hard choices, but while there are very real economic incentives for reductions in defense outlays, it would be wrong, I feel, to suppose that there are irresistible pressures. The Soviet economy is growing rapidly. Despite all their difficulties, Stalin's successors so far have been able to maintain a high rate of growth in industry. As overall growth is realized, it becomes ever easier to support a given level of defense outlays. Even an increase in defense outlays may allow for larger allocations to capital investment and consumption, if only the increase is held below the rate of overall growth of the economy generally.

Stalin's successors have found it possible so far to continue high-tempo industrialization and make some concessions to consumers while still supporting a vast military effort. In view of the record to date, it would be wrong to think that they cannot continue to do so in the future.

Considering the Soviet secrecy, one hesitates to take at face value the Soviet claims regarding the new cuts in the size of the armed forces. If such cuts are being made, very possibly one consideration was the resultant alleviation of an industrial labor shortage, of which there are many signs. I rather doubt, however, that this alone was decisive. More likely, the cuts reflect a complex of factors, including not at least the need to adapt the Soviet armed force to current changes in military technology.

The foregoing is written on the supposition that the cut in armed forces announced in May 1956 is not being accompanied by any sizable reduction in total munitions procurement. If such a reduction is being made, the question of the relation of the Soviet economy to the Soviet military effort, I feel, would require review.

I have argued provisionally against the notion that economic pressures alone will necessitate a curtailment of Soviet defense expenditures. As is already implied, however, if cuts can be made in defense spending, the Russians are bound to gain economically. There is no likelihood, for example, that the defense cuts would result in any wholesale unemployment and an economic depression. Under the Soviet system of economic planning, the Government exercises a totalitarian control over investments and over economic activity generally. The Government can assure that an expansion in investments and civilian employment would go hand in hand with the cuts in defense.

The Russians make quite a point of the fact that under their planning system disarmament need not cause any economic distress. Without trying to debate their further claim that it would cause acute distress in the West, we must concede that with respect to their system they are essentially right, although the necessary readjustment would certainly involve some difficulties.

Economically, then, the Russians have something to gain and nothing to lose from disarmament. Moreover, while there are no irresistible economic pressures for disarmament, the alternatives between which Khrushchev and his colleagues must continually choose are not by any means fully opposed. By using the cuts in defense outlays as a basis to expand capital investments in heavy industry the Russians actually could expand their future defense potential. Their choice is not simply between "guns" and "butter" but between "guns," "butter," and "machines." The "machines" can be used tomorrow at their discretion to produce either more "guns" or more "butter." If we wish to understand Khrushchev's attitude toward defense cuts, we must keep in mind this aspect, for I feel it is a central one.

By the same token, it must also color our own thinking on disarmament. On the record, if the Russians do give up "guns" they very possibly will in fact choose to produce more "machines" to a great extent rather than more "butter," although no doubt some further concessions would be made to consumers. With more "machines," they will have the capacity in the future to produce even more "guns" than they gave up, if they so choose. In any event, they would have made additional headway toward the realization of their cardinal aim to "overtake and outstrip" the United States. Needless to say, this aspect cannot in itself be an adequate basis for the formulation of western disarmament policy, but we should be remiss to neglect it.

It was gratifying to learn that your distinguished committee is reviewing again the vital question of disarmament. Any future progress in this area must be slow and limited, but I join with those who feel that our Government, without sacrificing the essentials of our security, has an obligation to keep the question open and to be ready at all times to explore sincerely any promising opportunities.

Reply of Harold J. Berman, Professor of Law, Law School of Harvard University, January 4, 1957

* * * I think the questions you have put are very important and very searching. I was particularly impressed by the fact that you did not merely ask, "What will the Soviet leaders do?" (a question which may suggest a degree of predictability in their actions which in fact does not exist), but you also asked, "Under what circumstances might they be induced to change their present policies?" The latter question implies that Soviet foreign policy is subject to change, and that our own conduct is one of the factors that can influence such a change. I heartily agree with both these implications.

Soviet foreign policy is often viewed as the inevitable product of Marxist-Leninist theory, on the one hand, or, on the other, of Russian imperialism, or of a combination of the two. In my opinion such interpretations are dangerous oversimplifications.

In the first place, the international situation as such, and not merely internal concepts and pressures, plays a decisive role in the determination of Soviet foreign policy just as it does in the determination of the foreign policy of other countries. International relations have a life of their own, which is more than the sum of the foreign policies which constitute it, and which influences those foreign policies.

In the second place, what might be called the psychology of the Soviet leaders—in the deepest sense, the kind of men they are—is at least as important a determinant of their policy, in my view, as the express philosophies or theories of politics and history which they may enunciate. I have in mind such factors as their self-confidence or lack of self-confidence, their capacity or lack of capacity for calm appraisal of realities and rational adaptation to them, their sense of time, their sense of the urgency or lack of urgency for action of one kind or another, the importance or unimportance which they attribute to various forms of international arrangements, their sense of international obligations.

Concretely, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria, the reconciliation with Tito, the granting of some degree of autonomy to Poland, the crushing of the Hungarian revolt, and many other Soviet actions concerning Eastern Europe during the past 2 years, may be artificially reconciled with, but cannot be explained by, the dream of a world Communist order led from Moscow. The fact is that the Soviet leaders have been conducting a retreat in Eastern Europe, a retrenchment, and have been attempting to make that retreat or retrenchment as orderly, as safe, and as inexpensive, as possible. The retreat was undertaken because of the opposition of Eastern European Communist Parties to further oppression by the Soviet Union, and because of the increased economic burdens of maintaining the Soviet Empire—both these factors being aggravated by the Soviet leadership's decision to relax the pressures of "Stalinist" terror both abroad

and at home. Undoubtedly United States policy in Western Europe since 1945, particularly our aid in the reconstruction and development of the Western European economy, also played an important part in the creation of the conditions calling for a Soviet retreat in Eastern Europe; in addition, it seems very probable that American willingness to follow a policy of reciprocal conciliation, as reflected in the 1955 Geneva meeting of heads of states, encouraged the Soviet rulers to believe that a retreat in Eastern Europe would not be accompanied by American intervention or, equally important, expectations of American intervention in behalf of any groups which would be interested in turning the retreat into a rout.

In Hungary the retreat did turn into a rout, and the Soviet leaders acted with utter ruthlessness to prevent that country from going over to the West. The retreat in Poland, on the other hand, was managed by a faction of the Polish Communist Party which the Soviet rulers can apparently rely upon not to go over to the West, and in that situation they acted rationally to make the best of their predicament.

Thus the decisive factors in Soviet policy toward Poland and Hungary have been, first, the political situation in Eastern Europe in the context of the total world situation, and second, the psychology of the Soviet leaders, that is, their willingness to retreat or retrench when that appears to be the lesser of necessary evils, their capacity in some circumstances to act rationally to make the best of a bad situation, their ruthlessness when threatened with serious defeat.

If such an interpretation—here only very roughly indicated—of the sources of recent Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe is correct, and if it is applicable to the sources of Soviet conduct in international affairs generally, then I believe that it follows that the United States Government should modify certain policies to which it has more or less adhered since 1946 and 1947, which are founded on a different interpretation of the sources of Soviet conduct, an interpretation which overemphasizes, in my view, both the role of Marxist-Leninist theory and the role of Russian imperialist ambitions in the determination of Soviet foreign policy.

My answers to the particular questions which you have put, concerning the feasibility of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit armaments, follow, I believe, from the general approach which I have outlined.

1. There are many reasons to believe that the Soviet leaders do not attach a high value to a disarmament agreement, speaking generally. However, it is very possible that they will "seriously seek agreement on control of weapons" at a time when their relationship with other Communist countries is appreciably worsening and it appears to them desirable to reduce hopes of American military aid to those countries.

2. Soviet aversion to inspection has been a serious barrier to any agreement to control weapons primarily, in my view, because the Soviet leadership has not attached very great importance to such an agreement. In addition, there has been a deep-seated suspicion that we would exploit information derived from inspection to their disadvantage. Given an international situation which from their point of view is worsening, plus strong indications on our part that we do not intend to exploit the situation to deliver a crushing blow, a disarmament agreement would seem more important to them and their suspicions might well appear less valid.

3. I believe that no Soviet regime in the foreseeable future would be willing to agree to enforcement of a disarmament agreement by an agency in which the Soviet Union did not have at least a veto power. The ultimate sanction against violations of such an agreement would have to be, from the Soviet point of view, reprisals. This follows from the premise that the Soviet leaders see a disarmament agreement not as a means of reducing the likelihood of war in general but rather as a political move which has or does not have advantages for them.

4. In view of the catastrophic defeat of Soviet policy in Hungary, with the consequent repercussions throughout Eastern Europe, and throughout the world, it is likely that the Soviet leaders are now anxious to find a dramatic way of recapturing the initiative and of restoring some of the support which they have lost. If the situation in Hungary could be stabilized in favor of some regime friendly to the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders would be willing, I think, to withdraw their troops from all Eastern European countries provided American troops are withdrawn from all Western European countries and provided Germany is neutralized.

5. It is a mistake, in my view, to attribute Soviet armaments policy to any pressing economic needs, though undoubtedly the Soviet leadership would like to be able to provide more consumer goods for the Soviet people in order to strengthen the political support of the regime. In this connection it should be noted that the effect of the more liberal policies of the post-Stalin regime has been one thing at home, where the Soviet people seem to have responded in general with gratitude, and another in Eastern Europe, where they have been taken as signs of weakness and the people have responded with demands for more. The failure of the Soviet leaders to anticipate the non-Soviet response is an important clue to recent developments in Eastern Europe, in my opinion.

REPLY OF ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATE OF THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JANUARY 4, 1957

1. There have been a number of indications that the Soviet leaders are beginning to appreciate the threat of mutual annihilation through the use of nuclear weapons. Malenkov mentioned such a possibility in one of his speeches and in recent months increased attention has been devoted in the U. S. S. R. to the training of the population for the event of an atomic attack. Some pamphlets dealing with this have been published recently in the U. S. S. R. Although the Soviet leaders have not been too explicit about the possibility of mutual destruction in the event of nuclear warfare, at least one Communist leader outside the U. S. S. R. has made such a statement pointblank, i. e. Gomulka of Poland. These factors suggest that an appreciation of this problem is slowly maturing in the Soviet orbit. However, insofar as an agreement on the control of such weapons is concerned, the U. S. S. R. would probably be willing to sign such an agreement if it were allowed to maintain its superiority in the realm of conventional weapons.

2. Such an agreement would not imply acceptance of the principle of inspection. At the present time, the U. S. S. R. enjoys consider-

able advantage in intelligence opportunities and it is unlikely that it would be willing to diminish them in our favor. Furthermore, the U. S. S. R. has repeatedly gone on record in emphasizing its sovereignty and it is not likely that in the foreseeable future the Soviet Government will drastically revise its attitudes in this respect. A system such as the Soviet has an inherent tendency toward a paranoic fear of foreign subversion, and foreign inspection would be viewed by it as merely another form of espionage.

3. Again, it is unlikely that the present Soviet regime would be willing to accept an enforcement agency if such agency were really given "teeth" in its operations. The U. S. S. R. would probably be willing to accept any arrangement which would either decrease our capacities or increase the opportunities for Soviet inspection of our armaments, without yielding a corresponding privilege to the other side. However, if revolutionary trends in various parts of the globe continue to point to further Soviet expansion, then the U. S. S. R. might be more willing to accept some sort of disarmament in order to prevent an armed reaction from the Western side, when faced with a crisis situation in a number of crucial areas.

4. The Soviet Union might be willing to withdraw from Eastern Europe if (*a*) the area is not turned into a NATO base or a zone of influence for a reunited and rearmed Germany; (*b*) the U. S. S. R. is not given the opportunity to repress through unilateral action efforts on the part of the population or even local governments for greater autonomy. In other words, as long as our policy suggests that Soviet departure will lead to the alternative mentioned in point (*a*) while at the same time the U. S. S. R. is given a free hand to repress any local movements for autonomy then it is unlikely that the U. S. S. R. would consider leaving the area. The reliance of Soviet control in the area on Soviet military strength has recently been amply demonstrated. This reliance, however, is not the same in all the countries concerned. It appears, for instance, that in Czechoslovakia the Communist regime is more able to maintain itself without foreign support than its counterpart was in Hungary.

6. The only effective type of control given the strategic and logistical characteristics of the Soviet military establishment, would be in the form of mobile and unrestricted ground control teams. Such teams would have to have freedom to travel throughout the U. S. S. R. Insofar as legitimate security interests of the U. S. S. R. are concerned, my strong impression (reinforced by a recent trip to the U. S. S. R.) is that a rearmed and reunited Germany poses a genuine psychological factor in Soviet thinking which cannot be disregarded. This element, in fact, applies not only to the U. S. S. R. but to many other European countries, both in Central and Western Europe. It seems that in any disarmament planning, the possibility of a disarmed Germany should be given high priority, especially as the nature of nuclear warfare seriously puts to doubt the military value of a rearmed Germany while the political liability of the policy of rearmament is best reflected in the inability of the parties concerned to make any headway is resolving the German and East European problems.

REPLY OF DAVID T. CATTELL, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES, JANUARY 4, 1957

The initial attitude of the Soviet Union toward atomic warfare was determined by Stalin at Potsdam. He remained outwardly indifferent to the report that the United States had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. This apparent unconcern toward atomic warfare persisted, and the Soviet leaders refused to be moved by the alarm sounded by the West concerning the dangers to the future of mankind. They appeared interested for propaganda purposes, at least, in its curtailment but wanted it to be considered as merely one more weapon to be handled in a general program of disarmament. This disinterested attitude on the part of the U. S. S. R. to the special problem of atomic weapons was, however, feigned indifference because under the surface Soviet agents and scientists were feverishly trying to find out the secrets of atomic energy and build an atomic bomb. Nevertheless, it is possible the Russians only realized the full implications of atomic warfare after they possessed the bombs and began testing them out. Although they exploded their first bomb in 1949, because of the rigidity of foreign relations during Stalin's last years, it was necessary to wait for his death to reformulate policies and take into account Soviet recognition of the peril.

Beginning with a speech of Premier Malenkov in March 1954, the Soviet Union publicly acknowledged the danger of atomic warfare and a new Soviet foreign policy gradually unfolded with the same aims but some new methods. One aspect of this new program was a continuation of the old propaganda line, which still had some popularity, pleading for a ban on the use of atomic weapons but with a new significance because by this time their own stockpile of bombs had become well supplied. In the field of diplomacy the new policy meant the reversal of old patterns. The futility of Stalin's tactics and the fear of a hot atomic war based on the United States policy of mass retaliation led to the realization of the cold war on the West. Thus in the summit Conference at Geneva in 1955 it was one of the Soviet purposes to have both the East and West confirm the calamity of a nuclear war and to end the war of nerves. In place of the cold war the post-Stalin leaders have attempted to choose tactics which would keep away the dreaded atomic holocaust. Primarily the emphasis has been a program of peaceful coexistence, economic grants and technicians for underdeveloped countries, military aid, and diplomatic support for unstable areas. Although Soviet policy has been to promote small conflicts, in all cases the Soviet Union has avoided direct participation. In the case of the Middle East crisis during the fall of 1956 the U. S. S. R. went so far to threaten sending "volunteers" to aid Egypt, but never actually did so. Furthermore, the West was so divided itself over the Suez conflict that there was every reason to assume England and France, in particular, would take every precaution to avoid a large conflagration. It also involved an area not immediately contiguous to the Soviet sphere and therefore it would not have been a strategic threat to the U. S. S. R., if the United States had moved troops in.

Although the Soviet leaders seem to recognize the disaster and futility of an atomic war, they have given no indication at the present time of considering seriously an effective means of control for

atomic and other weapons. Underneath their soft talk and frequent counterproposals their position in opposition to disarmament control is as immovable as was Stalin's. There are several reasons for this. First the U. S. S. R. is still not willing to accept international inspection of her own country or the satellites except on a restricted and superficial basis because she is convinced that the West would use inspection as a means to infiltrate and incite revolt. This danger seems all the more real after the Hungarian uprisings and reports of stirrings within Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union. The Soviet allegation that American imperialists infiltrated into Hungary and initiated the revolt is not simply propaganda opportunism. From the actions (such as rearming satellite armies) and statements of the Soviet leaders before the outbreak of strikes and revolution, it is clear that the Communists were confident they had a strong grip on the satellites and that among the youth, the workers and part of the scientific and artistic elite the satellite puppet regimes were finding a broader support.

The Soviet leaders counted on relaxing the worst features of Stalin's repression to further solidify the regimes. When the very opposite occurred and the leaders found they had no support in Eastern Europe and only Soviet troops, terror, and war exhaustion had kept the people in hand, they could not admit the complete failure of their policies and doctrine. It would have meant the absolute rejection of Communist ideology. Consequently, it was necessary to rationalize the revolt, not as a doctrinal failure but to concede a tactical failure in not doing more to remedy the economic deprivation of the worker, to accuse Tito of disrupting ideological unity, to condemn Beria and Stalin for their excesses of terror and to put primary blame on the West for conspiring and provoking the rebellion. The proclaimed United States policy of liberating the satellites, the plotting and underground nets formed by satellite emigré groups which are encouraged and supported by money from the West, and the Communists' own conspiratorial education and practices in attempting to bring down capitalist governments convince the Communist leaders that the popular stirrings and disturbances in their sphere are imperialist plots. Under these circumstances the Soviet Government would be unwilling to permit new "agents" under the guise of a disarmament inspection team to move freely about the country.

Second, like most states, the U. S. S. R. is reluctant to release data on or allow access to military establishments because one well-confirmed principle of warfare is to withhold as much information from the enemy as possible. In the case of the Soviet Union this is even more important because she feels she has succeeded in keeping much of her military structure a secret while the United States has already made public a large part of her military position. Thus in any reciprocal investigation or exposure the Soviets would have the least to gain and the most to lose. In addition if there is any reality in the rumors that the Soviet Army is growing politically stronger, there is even less ground to hope for an adequate inspection system, since military personnel are consistently less willing to expose their armed strength to public view.

Third, the Communists fear that any international control and inspection would be dominated by the non-Communist states. The prac-

tice in all non-Communist international organizations confirms this view. In almost every case the western democracies have dominated these bodies and, when the U. S. S. R. has employed hostile acts or policies, nearly all non-Communist states have tended to "gang up" on her. The overwhelming votes against the Soviet Union on the Hungarian question in the United Nations General Assembly are examples in point. Only the Soviet veto has saved her in the Security Council. Thus, in any control body for disarmament, at the very minimum she would demand a veto and, considering the almost inevitable hostility of the majority in any of the contemplated disarmament authorities, she would probably refuse at the present time to participate in such an organ. In the case of the United Nations, she joined it largely because it would have gone ahead without her and it was easier to prevent it from becoming a hostile coalition and sabotage it from within than from without. The case of disarmament, however, is entirely different because, without the cooperation and active participation of the Soviet Union, and this she well knows, there can be no disarmament control.

Finally, the U. S. S. R. is afraid that with the West dominating the machinery, inspection and control would be effective only against herself and not the West, and, furthermore, all the peaceful benefits which might be a part of the scheme would be monopolized by the capitalists. The western states, they would expect, would manipulate the mechanism in such a way as to restrict and even exploit the economic development of communism for their own benefit. Since this is exactly what the Soviet Union has done in her relations with her satellites, turning them into colonies, it is not surprising that she would expect similar treatment from the West, given the slightest opportunity.

In sum, the Communists are convinced that a disarmament inspection and control system in the present context of international relations could only work against them. They, therefore, feel that their chances of preventing an atomic war are better in creating a stalemate by the stockpiling of atomic weapons.

The next question is whether the Soviet Union at present is disposed to accept a partial solution to the disarmament problem. One possible answer would be to concentrate on conventional armaments, which would bring an end to small brush wars and leave the security of the world dependent on the ability of instant atomic retaliation by the two great powers. There is no concrete evidence, however, that the Soviet Union is ready for even this limited disarmament, in spite of her propaganda pleas to this effect. In fact, the Soviet leaders are less interested in the disarmament of conventional than atomic weapons. Although they are convinced of the futility of an atomic war, small wars conducted with conventional weapons have not been abandoned as instruments of their foreign policy. Extensive Soviet military aid to Egypt and now Syria is evidence of this. They also feel that in conventional weapons they can compete favorably with the West. They already possess an impressive stockpile, and feel that in the long pull, psychologically and economically, their system can sustain arms production better than the West. Militarily prepared for all types of war they can better take advantage of divisions and weaknesses within the free world. Finally, a strong army, conven-

tionally armed, has become necessary to keep the subjected peoples in control. Therefore, the declaration by the Soviet Union that she has cut her armed forces by 2 million troops, even if true, does not indicate a wish for disarmament of conventional weapons and forces under international agreement and control. It means that, for major conflicts, the U. S. S. R. now has her own atomic arsenal for instant retaliation and that, for the brush wars, which she actively contemplates, she does not require an army of 6 million or more. The released personnel can be used more effectively in industry and in agriculture. Furthermore, more emphasis, as in the United States, is being put on military equipment and the skilled personnel necessary to operate it rather than a mass force. Finally, the proclaimed reduction was an attempt to lull the fears of the West and bring about a reciprocal decrease in the NATO forces.

In the present context of international relations, the Soviet Union likewise would be unwilling to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe. Her intention was made clear by her brutal repression of the Hungarian revolt and the conclusion of new agreements with East Germany and other satellites concerning the right of Soviet troops to remain in the area. Only in the case of Poland did she concede some of her freedom of operations. The grant of several billion dollars' aid to Eastern Europe by the U. S. S. R. in the last few months is further evidence of her desire to stay in the area. And, without the presence of troops, it is clear her hegemony would be lost. After the recent events, even fanatic Communists cannot delude themselves as to the disloyalty of the satellite peoples.

President Eisenhower's "open skies" alternative offers the greatest hope of acceptance by the Soviet Union, because it does not involve close inspection, agents moving freely around the country, or any actual reduction of arms. As mentioned previously, the Soviet Union is not thinking in terms of major wars, not only because it is self-defeating but because she is already accomplishing much through diplomacy, propaganda, economic and military aid, and because she is convinced of the basic weakness of capitalism and the inevitability of world communism. Therefore, as long as the West has the means of retaliation, the Soviet Union is not likely to contemplate a surprise attack which the "open skies" plan is designed to check. Thus, fundamentally, there is some basis for an agreement on aerial inspection between the Soviet bloc and the West; however, important difficulties exist. First, there is the basic inequality of the plan in favor of the West, because the United States would find it difficult under any circumstances to hide mobilization for a surprise attack. Secondly, it would be difficult to make a workable arrangement for the actual execution of the plan. From experiences during World War II in attempting to negotiate Allied use of Soviet airfields, serious obstacles can be expected.

It must be concluded that the Soviet Union is not really in favor of even a modified system of international controlled disarmament. Although she might consent to the "open skies" proposal after long negotiations, this is really not disarmament, and was not intended so by Eisenhower, who considered it merely as a means of reducing some of the tension preparatory to arms limitation. This does not mean, however, the Soviet Union is against all disarmament. Her unilateral reduction of troops is evidence of her desire for partial disarmament on

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a voluntary basis by both sides but without international control or agreement. She particularly has no incentive to use international means when her unilateral actions continue to inspire the NATO countries to slow down their armament efforts. The maintenance of a garrison state is no longer her wish, because at present she does not want a major war, and it is quite clear that the Soviet peoples no longer want to bear such a heavy burden but want to share some of the fruits of their labor. But in her policy she does not have in mind anything close to total disarmament. Russia's security, both within and without her sphere, still requires a strong army, professional and well indoctrinated. In concrete terms it will mean at least 3 million men in arms with many more millions in reserve. They will be equipped with the most advanced weapons, and for this purpose the Soviet Union will spend a minimum of 10 percent of her national income for military purposes.

The final problem to be analyzed is the conditions under which the Soviet Union might be willing to accept some kind of international control of armaments or the establishment of a neutral zone in central Europe. One possibility and the most hopeful for an enduring peace would be a basic change in the political structure of the Soviet Union. Any major alteration internally, immediately opens up many new opportunities and the whole problem will need to be reevaluated. Another chance might be offered by the continued development of Western military strength. If the forces of the West began to surpass significantly those of the Soviet bloc and if the Soviet Union internally felt unable to meet the challenge then it would be to her advantage to seek international disarmament. The present unrest in the Soviet sphere denotes a limit beyond which the intellectuals and workers, in particular, refuse to be driven. Another but dangerous method would be for the United States to threaten instant and massive retaliation against the Soviet Union for any small breach of the peace. If the Soviet leaders were convinced the United States meant it, the future might appear uncertain enough for them to consider atomic and long-range missile control. A fourth possibility would be if small nations became capable of building their own stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Although the Soviet Union has reason to trust the sanity of American leaders, they might well fear the atomic weapon in the hands of dictators like Peron, Franco, or Nasser who might use them irresponsibly in a crusade against communism. Finally, if the positions of the East and West became reversed and the Soviet Union was able to dominate the international control body, her attitude toward an international control authority would also change. Except for an internal revolution in the U. S. S. R. none of the above represents a feasible aim or policy for the United States to pursue, consequently the West will also have to be content with stalemate as the main guaranty of peace.

Soviet evacuation of Eastern Europe in the future is a more likely step toward greater world security. The strategic concept of Eastern Europe as a necessary zone of security for the Soviet Union has been in good part outdated by intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. If the Soviet Union does not contemplate overrunning Western Europe by force, and if central Europe is not used as bases for NATO troops, strategically the area serves little purpose. Neu-

tralization also becomes more a prospect as the cost of Soviet hegemony in the area rises. Until recently these countries have been a source of tribute, but in the last few months Russia has been forced to reverse the flow, spending large sums in Hungary to put down the revolt and granting important economic concessions and aid to the other satellites. If the resistance, particularly passive resistance, grows and the Soviet Union finds the area an increasing burden, she may feel better out of it. In such a case she will certainly bargain for the removal of American troops from Europe and the neutralization of Western Europe or at least Germany. What solution, if any, she might be ready to accept on these issues is impossible to tell and depends on the burden of Eastern Europe and the disposition of the West to make adjustments. A settlement, furthermore, assumes a completely rational approach to the problem by the Soviet leaders and overlooks the psychological importance of a wide barrier between Russia and her old enemy Germany and the inability of the Russian people and leaders to give up peacefully their empire. Nevertheless the evacuation and demilitarization of Eastern Europe in contrast to general disarmament controls is a project which may in time be negotiable. The West, however, must be certain that before a compromise is reached the Soviet Union has felt the maximum burden of satellite resistance.

In conclusion the Soviet leaders do recognize the peril of an atomic holocaust but fear any type of international control and are willing to take their chances on their ability to deliver instant and complete retaliation. They are even less inclined to accept agreement on conventional armaments. Except for the "open skies" proposal there is also little prospect for a partial limitation of arms on an international control basis and even in the case of air inspection a final arrangement will be difficult. A change in the Soviet attitude toward disarmament depends on a radical change of the political composition of the Soviet state, a significant alteration of the world balance of power, or a vigorous and dangerous cold war of threats and armament buildup by the West against communism.

Reply of William Henry Chamberlin, Writer on Soviet Affairs, Editorial Commentator for the Wall Street Journal and Contributing Editor of the New Leader, December 23, 1956

1. I believe the Soviet leaders realize the possibilities of mutual destruction involved in the use of nuclear weapons. I think this is reflected in a growing Soviet tendency to rely on indirect, rather than direct aggression, to pursue their aim of world domination by a series of nibbling moves, no one of which seems serious enough to warrant the risk of nuclear warfare, rather than by a spectacular direct attack calculated to precipitate war.

I do not believe, in the light of the long series of broken treaties and promises in the Soviet record, with its climax in the treachery which marked recent actions in Hungary, that it would be wise or safe to trust our national security, even in limited degree, to any Soviet verbal assurances. The only steps that could be wisely taken in arms limitation would be of the self-enforcing type, where it would be possible to have a constant reliable check on Soviet performance.

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2. I do not think the present Soviet Government, a collective dictatorship of Stalin's political heirs, could be relied on to fulfill in good faith any measures of international inspection, even if, for reasons of expediency, it would outwardly accept such measures. A good preview of what would be likely to happen in such a case was furnished by the Korean armistice agreement. The genuinely neutral Swiss and Swedish members of the International Inspection Commission never received satisfactory facilities for inspecting points of entry for munitions in North Korea. As a result there has been a steady buildup of jet planes in North Korea, although these were nonexistent at the time of the armistice, which forbade the introduction of new weapons.

There are two features of the Soviet Union, one geographical, the other political, which make the enforcement of inspection doubtful and difficult. The first is the vast size of the country and the inaccessibility of many areas, especially in Asiatic Russia, to foreign travel. The other is the strict control of expression, so far as the people are concerned, the terror which is still inspired by the political police. This, I think, considerably reduces the likelihood of any disclosures of secret violations of an arms agreement.

I am inclined to stress the point that only self-enforcing measures such as mutual agreement on ground and aerial inspection for a specified distance on each side of the present military frontier would be likely to yield favorable results. So far as I know there is no means of detecting concealed stocks of nuclear weapons and it is difficult to imagine any system of inspection in regard to which the Soviet Government would not have a great advantage in possibilities of evasion.

Only a fundamental change in present Soviet political, economic and social institutions, making for free expression of opinion and some kind of representative government would, in my opinion, make a Russian regime more trustworthy. I doubt whether anyone is in a position to say if, when or how this might come about.

3. For reasons outlined in my reply to (2) I am very skeptical as to the willingness of the present Soviet Government to cooperate sincerely with an enforcement agency. It is my belief, therefore, that only self-enforcing agreements, which do not involve even a small degree of reliance on Soviet good faith, could be advantageous to American interests.

4. The Soviet Government might be willing to withdraw its armed forces from Eastern Europe and from Germany (Soviet troops could hardly be left in Germany if there were a complete withdrawal from Poland) on three conditions: Withdrawal of other foreign troops from Germany, assurance that a united Germany would have a neutral or neutralized status and give up its membership in NATO; assurance that "national Communist" governments of the type of Gomulka's in Poland and not non-Communist or anti-Communist governments should be standard in the east European states.

This poses large and delicate questions for American policymakers.

Negotiation along these lines under present conditions does not seem quite such a hopeless boobytrap as it would have seemed before the death of Stalin and the outbursts of revolt in the Soviet Zone of Germany, in Poland and in Hungary. It can now be assumed that in these countries, and probably in other satellite countries as well, local Communist regimes would have to make big concessions to survive

without the presence or threat of Soviet troops and might well be swept away altogether.

It is my belief that, on any deal involving big military withdrawals on our part, it would not be good enough to settle for national Communist regimes. The danger about accepting such regimes is that they might call in Soviet troops in the future, in the event of a real or alleged political emergency. What we should hold out for, as regards the present satellites, is the status not of Poland today or even of Yugoslavia, an independent Communist dictatorship, but that of Austria and Finland, governments based on free elections but not participating in any western alliances.

5. Soviet manpower shortage, as a result of vast war losses and low birthrate during the war years may have induced the Soviet Government to consider favorably a reduction of the standing army. Because it is totally planned from the top the Soviet economy could perhaps switch more easily from war to peace production than our own. I should greatly doubt, however, that there is sufficient pressure from the people, under the present Soviet setup, to bring about any substantial reduction in military output in order to push up the standard of living. It is the estimate of Dr. Alexander Gerschenkron, of Harvard University, a specialized student of the Soviet economy, that, while industrial output in the Soviet Union has increased about six times since 1928 real wages are still below the 1928 figure, especially as regards food. This shows how people are exploited under communism, largely by military buildup.

6. I greatly doubt that any controls over the Soviet military establishment which the Soviet Government would accept could be safely considered either workable or effective. The problem of establishing such controls is enhanced because a mere checkup of men under arms would be of minor importance. I strongly doubt that it would be possible under any conditions to control effectively such things as hidden stocks of atomic weapons and the progress of research on guided missiles.

JOINT REPLY BY TELEGRAM OF ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; PROF. GEORGE FISCHER, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY; AND MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JANUARY 16, 1957

* * * Following paragraph represents our general response to the questions raised: It seems to us that the central problem is that the Soviet Union can scarcely accept the degree of penetration required for a thoroughgoing inspection and enforcement without a fundamental change in the character of the system having taken place. We also recognize that technological developments may change the problems of inspection and enforcement so that these objectives can be achieved with a less complete penetration of the countries involved and we therefore urge that thinking in this direction be continued and augmented. In response to your question four, we believe that a distinction needs to be made between the disarmament question and the question of the possible neutralization of Eastern and/or Central Europe. Even if it were possible to obtain a withdrawal of forces under some such agreement the problem of disarmament,

especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction, would remain. In general it is our conclusion that disarmament must on the whole follow rather than precede a lessening of international tensions. By this we mean not merely changes in atmosphere, but a series of settlements of outstanding problems which would make an appreciable dent in the underlying causes of tension.

REPLY OF HAROLD H. FISHER, CHAIRMAN, EMERITUS, HOOVER INSTITUTE AND LIBRARY ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, AND PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT SAN FRANCISO STATE COLLEGE, FEBRUARY 16, 1957

1. I believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the threat of mutual destruction in the new weapons. The "softer" policy advertised by Khrushchev and Bulganin was inspired in part, in my opinion, by a recognition that the destructiveness of the new weapons makes it even more impossible than ever to "win" a total war. Events in Hungary and Poland have undoubtedly shaken the sense of security of the Soviet leaders and revived the tension between the Communist regimes and the West but I do not believe that these events will obliterate the realization of the dangers of atomic war. The Soviet leaders apparently already recognize the mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war but they are likely to be even less conciliatory now than they were before the Hungarian uprising in negotiating an agreement for the control of these weapons.

2. I believe that inspection in the Soviet Union is a possibility but that it will have to be developed gradually, piece by piece, and not in one overall agreement. It will take a long time. The rate of progress toward an inspection agreement depends on the state of world tension. As tension goes up the possibility of an inspection agreement goes down. The United States, by itself, cannot control the state of tension. The Soviet oligarchy has, in the past, on many occasions, deliberately increased international tension. But the United States can adopt policies that would permit the relaxation of tension if the Communists would actually follow a policy of peaceful coexistence and competition. If the United States bases its policies on the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union or on the necessity of liberating some or all of the countries now held captive by the Communists, the Soviet leaders are not likely, in my opinion, to agree to inspection.

3. It will take a long time before national governments in general and the Soviet Government in particular will be willing to submit to international enforcement agencies, especially those that deal with matters affecting national security. I suspect that regardless of how far apart they may be on other matters, the Soviet leaders and some of the members of your subcommittee might have very similar views on international enforcement agencies.

4. One condition for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe would be the neutralization of Germany. Another would be the one mentioned in your questions—the removal of foreign troops and bases in NATO countries.

The recent events (autumn 1956) in Poland and Hungary and the failure to reestablish cordial relations with the Yugoslav Government will not be likely to encourage a liberalization of the Communist

regimes in East Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Albania, but in the long run the influences that inspired the revolts against Russian-Communist domination, first in East Germany and then in Poland and Hungary may bring about a liberalization of the regimes in these countries and possibly in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

The presence or the proximity of Soviet troops is very important, I believe, in maintaining Soviet domination in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It may be less important in Rumania and Bulgaria and much less in Albania.

The Soviet Communists can be expected to do everything they can to discourage national communism and to keep subservient Communists in power in Eastern Europe. A marked reduction in Soviet forces and their withdrawal from these countries would make Moscow's task much harder. An American policy that refuses all aid and comfort to such national Communists as Tito, Gomulka, Nagy will obviously aid the Kremlin by discouraging resistance to Russian domination.

If the Soviet Communists agree to a neutral zone, they will not be easily persuaded to include any satellite territory in it unless, perhaps, Eastern Germany. In answers to the questions of the British Labour M. P.'s, Pravda recently said that neutrality was impossible for the members of the Warsaw pact so long as the "aggressive" NATO existed.

5. I believe that the Soviet Union would welcome relief from the present burden of armament for several reasons: (*a*) to be able to use more of the national product to raise the levels of living in the Communist-ruled countries; (*b*) to enable the Soviet bloc to give more effective and technical assistance to economically underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; (*c*) to gain prestige and goodwill for communism by representing the Communists as the leaders in making swords into plowshares; (*d*) to create difficulties for the capitalist regimes, which according to Communist belief, cannot escape economic depressions or avoid intensifying competitions among themselves for markets and raw materials. To the best of my knowledge the present ruling circle in the U. S. S. R. has not repudiated Stalin's assertion a few months before his death that there was more likelihood of war between capitalist nations than between the capitalist nations and the Soviet Union. I believe that Soviet policies regarding disarmament and other international matters are based on the Communist dogma that the capitalist countries, because of the very nature of capitalism, cannot solve their economic problems and in their desperation will carry their competition with each other to the point of mutual destruction.

It would seem reasonable to believe that the economy of the U. S. S. R. would benefit by the transfer of men from the military force to the labor force.

I should not think it would be any easier for the U. S. S. R. to adjust to an appreciable reduction in armament production than for the United States. The vast Soviet bureaucracy would not insure a smooth and swift adjustment.

6. The type of controls most likely to be workable and effective would be: (*a*) Those designed to make a surprise attack with intercontinental missiles impossible; (*b*) a step-by-step reduction of forces

under arms; (*c*) the establishment of a supervisory body under the U. N. in which countries are represented that are incapable of aggression and are greatly concerned to be relieved of the danger of war; for example, Sweden, Finland, Burma, Indonesia, Netherlands, Ceylon, Greece, Uruguay, New Zealand, Poland, Rumania, Austria, perhaps under the chairmanship of a nonmember, Switzerland.

The Communist view of "legitimate security interests" is likely to be very different from ours. I do not see much possibility of reconciling these different views until international tension has been diminished and confidence in peaceful procedures has been built up. This will be very difficult to do. It may be, as some contend, that the Communists will never allow this détente to take place. But it seems to me that if we wish to achieve the benefits of peace and avoid the awful consequences of war we must base our policies on the belief that it is impossible to maintain peace and avoid war. This would seem to mean that in spite of the provocation and difficulties involved, we must work with patience and fortitude for a system of international relations based on a real acceptance of peaceful coexistence and competition between different political and social systems. Those who believe in freedom and human dignity should have no doubts about the outcome of that competition.

Reply of Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., Assistant Professor of History, Yale University, February 3, 1957

I know that your subcommittee has had access to the views of persons far more expert in this matter than I. I answer, therefore, not so much out of a conviction that I can add anything of value as out of a desire to express my gratitude for your invitation, and I shall merely state my viewpoint in very general terms.

My attitude is, I regret to say, rather pessimistic. I see little likelihood that in the foreseeable future the Soviet leaders will seriously seek agreement on control of weapons. I doubt that the Soviet leaders will soon permit the sort of inspection or enforcement that such an agreement would entail.

At the same time I believe that dark picture must never cause us to surrender all hope. We must continue, as your subcommittee is doing, to examine every conceivable solution. We must remain militarily strong (stronger in ground forces than we are at present, I think), yet we must endeavor constantly and in all ways to convince the Soviet leaders that we sincerely desire peace and are ready to discuss behind closed doors any proposals they may make in good faith. We must do all we can, swallowing our pride, suppressing our annoyance, and suffering, perhaps, frequent embarrassment, to maintain contact between individuals across the Iron Curtain. And we must through education prepare our own countrymen for the day when, in the interests of survival on this globe, we may need to surrender some of our own cherished sovereignty.

Reply of Prof. Calvin B. Hoover, Duke University, December 12, 1956

1. I believe the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the threat of annihilation created by nuclear weapons. Consequently, this threat has entered into the formulation of policy and recent actions of the

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Soviet Union. It was probably our temporary monopoly of nuclear weapons which prevented the Soviet Union from occupying Western Europe.

However, there is a distinct difference between the psychological set of mind of the Soviet leaders and that of the leaders of the United States and of western countries on this matter. Men like Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, and Malenkov have been conditioned to witnessing masses of men liquidated and to the realization that they were personnally responsible for this destruction in detail and in gross. Consequently, while the prospect of the destruction of themselves and of their empire is, indeed, a most serious deterrent, any feeling of humanitarian horror for what would happen to mankind in general or even to the Russian people as a whole is not a major factor in their calculations and feelings. In a sense this might not seem to make much difference since what happens to the Russian people would naturally be of most serious importance to the leaders also. Nevertheless, psychologically the distinction is extremely important.

In spite of the reservation mentioned in the above paragraph, I believe the Soviet leaders recognize some mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war and that they would seek agreement on control of weapons. This is true in considerable degree because if weapons were controlled they would probably believe that the possibility of intervention in foreign countries for the purposes of Soviet expansion might even be facilitated by such an agreement. It would not necessarily follow that this would be so, but I think the Soviet leaders might reason this way.

2. It is unlikely that the Soviet leaders would be willing to accept more than limited ground inspection at transportation and communication centers in the Soviet Union and air inspection of Eastern Europe. The unwillingness of the Soviet leaders to accept a greater degree of inspection is due not only to military considerations but to their unwillingness to open up the Soviet Union to continuous observation of nonmilitary aspects of the country as well and to their reluctance to permit contact between the Soviet population and inspectors continuously stationed in the Soviet Union.

(In view of the hatred of the Soviet Union which exists in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, if it were possible to work out some kind of mutual withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe and Soviet troops from the satellite countries even the limited degree of inspection referred to above might be worth our agreeing to. In view also of the declining importance of our land forces in Europe under present circumstances and in view of the logistics problems which the Soviet forces would encounter in moving large land forces through the hostile populations of the former satellite countries, an agreed upon withdrawal of forces might well be in our interest. It is, of course, impossible in this brief space to point out all of the complicated aspects of these matters.)

3. The present regime in the Soviet Union would be willing to submit to and abide by such an enforcement agency only to the extent to which they found it necessary and/or advisable. It is indeed doubtful whether the Soviet Union would be willing to agree to an enforcement agency which would in fact have power to carry out enforcement. We would have to be prepared to denounce such an agree-

ment whenever it was violated by the Soviet Union. This would have to be the real sanction.

4. Question 4 has been partially answered in the second paragraph of my answer to question 2.

The Soviet Union might be willing to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe if the United States were willing to withdraw its troops from Western Europe. On the one hand, recent events in Hungary and Poland might make Soviet leaders less willing to withdraw their troops. They must now realize the extreme unpopularity of Soviet dominated regimes in these countries and realize that Soviet domination would not survive troop withdrawal. On the other hand the Soviet leaders might now in desperation be willing to jettison their whole satellite position in Eastern Europe on its present basis before they are confronted with a series of major uprisings in all the satellite countries.

It is now apparent that the domination of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe is almost wholly dependent on the presence of Soviet armed forces within and near the borders of these nations. Mere reduction of the size of Soviet forces in these areas would be of little importance since in the event of trouble such forces could be reinforced rather quickly. It would be quite a different matter if the Soviet forces had been completely withdrawn. In this case, bases would not be available immediately to them in these countries, the national governments of these countries would have been able to have built up military forces of some degree of reliability who could be depended upon to cause great difficulties to the Soviet forces in their reoccupation of these countries in case of a land invasion of Western Europe.

5. I believe it is true that the leaders of the Soviet Union would be glad to be able to reduce military expenditures. The living standards of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries are very low. Particularly in the satellite countries, there is apparently the most active dissatisfaction with this low standard of living. This dissatisfaction is not so apparent in the Soviet Union itself, since living standards have improved since the end of World War II. Nevertheless, the pressure for improved standards of living particularly in food and in housing is very great. The announced Soviet troop reduction can be partially attributed to this cause.

The nature of the Soviet economy is such that the adjustment required by an appreciable reduction in the production of armaments could be carried out with little difficulty. Consequently there are no purely economic difficulties which would discourage transition from greater to less armament production.

6. I doubt whether my comments on No. 6 would be particularly valuable.

ALEX INKELES, LECTURER ON SOCIOLOGY AND SENIOR FELLOW OF THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 21, 1956

1. I believe that there have always been grounds for assuming that the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the advantages of preventing nuclear war, but are in no sense motivated even at the present time by the idea of mutuality of interest. The very concept of mutuality

is alien to them. Since in this case, however, they can only secure their objective by joining us in a program I think the prospects are very substantial. What we must be prepared for, however, is that they will take every possible measure to see to it that the arrangements entered into are in fact nonmutual, that is, restrict us in a way that increases their security without in fact restricting them to a comparable degree. Nevertheless the general advantage which will likely occur to them from the other steps they can take once this issue is brought under control is so great that they are likely to go to surprising degrees to work out and accept a program that meets our requirements.

2. I believe that my comments in answer to the first question cover the answers to inspection raised here. Real inspection is a very threatening idea to them, but they may go along even on this point if it is the ultimate obstacle to secure an international agreement with regard to the nuclear issue.

3. Again I believe my responses to 1 and 2 cover this point.

4. I do not feel I have any special competence with regard to these issues.

5. Without question the Soviet regime would like to be relieved of some of its military burden as would any leadership if it could accomplish its objectives at less cost. The one thing we should be clear about is that Soviet long-run objectives have not profoundly changed. They still look forward to and regard it as one of their prime responsibilities to move the world as rapidly as possible toward communism. Their assessment of the present period, however, is that the greatest opportunities for such development lie through an exploitation of nationalist feeling and economic strains in the former colonial areas. Greater investment in these directions obviously will be possible if the military burden which was earlier endured because of the focus of armed action in Europe could now be reduced. In particular the Soviet Union is desperately in need of labor and especially the kind of quality labor that is often found in the army. Here again, however, reduction in size of the domestic military forces should not be misunderstood with regard to the ultimate motivation lying behind it.

6. The basic problem with regard to the Soviet military forces is not that of assuring them of their ultimate security under any circumstances; but of assuring them of their security under the unique political objectives of the Soviet system at large. Only a change in those objectives would enable one to significantly reformulate the problem. If it became clear that the hopes for the spread of world communism had become greatly tempered, then I do not seriously believe that it would be unusually difficult for us to take action which would persuade the Soviet military that they were indeed in a highly defensible position. It is of course possible that Soviet military leaders realize that it is Soviet foreign policy objectives that make it so difficult for them to attain a position of real armed security. If so, we ought to make the most of this in our communications directed to the Soviet elite. If, however, the Soviet military share the aspirations of the political leaders, then I frankly do not know of any measures we can take which would convince them of their security, nor indeed do I believe it would be wise to do so. So long as their policy remains expansionist, I think it is to our interest to keep them persuaded that we mean business.

Reply of Prof. Stephen D. Kertesz, Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame, January 11, 1957

1. We may assume that at the present moment all major powers are aware of the impracticality of an all-out nuclear war as a means of settling international disputes. Leaders of the Soviet Union have recognized the possibility of mutual annihilation through the large-scale use of thermonuclear and other new weapons. This fact has influenced the formulation of their foreign policy. They probably do not believe that a nuclear war could be useful or even necessary for the achievement of Communist objectives. For these reasons Soviet policy is not seeking but apparently is trying to avoid a nuclear war. Today, events sliding out of control are more likely to be the cause of a general war than a planned aggression.

Although we may accept these assumptions, it does not follow that the leaders of the Soviet Union would refrain from creating situations leading to war or would have the intention of seeking an honest and mutually beneficial agreement with western states on control of weapons. It is difficult to make a judgment on the seriousness of Soviet intentions with regard to an agreement without considering briefly the general behavior of Soviet leaders toward the non-Soviet world.

The fact that Foreign Minister Molotov took a gun with him and put it under his pillow while he was a guest in the White House or in Winston Churchill's country home, is characteristic of the Soviet leaders' mental outlook. Ever since Lenin defeated the revolutionary government with its western ideas, and turned Russia deliberately and resolutely against the West, Soviet leaders have been prisoners of their own doctrines and practices and cannot be judged or categorized by normal western standards. Their mental picture of the world has not been less unbalanced than that of some who are living in an asylum or are accustomed to the ways of the underworld. The unattractive fate of so many Soviet leaders exposed the inherent characteristic of Soviet totalitarian dictatorship. Although these conditions are a misfortune not only to the Russian people but to all mankind, we have to take them into account.

In this sorry picture I would like to emphasize a basic factor which we should keep in mind in the course of all negotiations and agreements to be concluded with the Soviet Union. This is the necessarily ambivalent attitude of Communist leaders in all their dealings with non-Communist states. This psychological attitude is one of the consequences of some fundamental doctrines of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin which create an almost unavoidable duplicity in Communist thinking in its relations with non-Communist states.

After Hitler's seizure of power, the Soviet Government decided to make common cause with the western democracies. During this period the Kremlin was forced to assume that the western democracies, obviously on the defensive, were genuinely interested in combining forces in order to restrain or if necessary defeat Hitler. At the same time Soviet revolutionary dogmatism compelled them to believe that somehow the capitalist countries were conspiring together against the Soviet Union. The same ambivalent Soviet attitude prevailed during the Second World War in regard to the capitalist countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain. We do not have

reason to believe that this basic Soviet attitude toward the non-Soviet world has changed.

Although the Soviet Government has proposed cuts in armed forces and has showed willingness to conclude a limited agreement on the control of weapons, the coexistence of two different and mutually contradictory sets of assumptions in Soviet political thinking make the seriousness of their peaceful intention doubtful. After experiences during the past four decades with the methods of Soviet diplomacy, it would be folly to rely on Soviet promises.

The present leaders of the Soviet Union are typical products of the Russian Communist world. They are even less influenced by western thinking than their predecessors, and the hostility toward the non-Soviet world has not changed in Soviet leadership. Changes in their attitude have occurred so far only on the tactical level. Thus the greatest possible mistake would be to negotiate with Soviet representatives according to western ways and attribute much significance to their promises. Numerous disappointments in the past originated from the fact that American negotiators handled Soviet representatives according to western standards. Since Soviet-American relations produced an almost unbroken record of broken pledges, American diplomacy had to learn the hard way that possible reactions of Soviet leaders to future contingencies cannot be judged on the basis of normal western expectations.[1]

2. Without fundamental and officially stated changes in Soviet political doctrines and practices, there is little if any likelihood of reaching an agreement opening the Soviet Union to effective inspection. It is true that since Stalin's death many important changes have taken place in the Soviet Union, but these changes have occurred only on the tactical level and have certainly not yet reached the point of no return. For a variety of reasons Soviet leadership might again introduce some kind of harsh Stalinist system. But in the long run, important factors inherent in human nature are working against putting an end to the liberalizing tendencies. This is particularly conspicuous in the attitude of the university students in the Soviet Union and other Communist-dominated countries. Mainly because of the attitude of the youth, concessions by the Kremlin may release forces of great significance, and changes made for the tactical reasons may escape from the control of the Communist operators.

Since I do not exclude the possibility of serious transformations in the Soviet Union which would lead eventually to a changed attitude toward the West, I consider as a possibly promising sign the acceptance by the Soviet Union of an aerial inspection for Eastern Europe and limited ground inspection at transportation and communication centers in the Soviet Union, and possibly even with withdrawal of the Russian Army from east-central Europe. The real problem in such an agreement is the quid pro quo involved.

What is the price the Russians are asking for moving out of east-central Europe and what is the price we reasonably can pay? We must have realistic answers to these questions before making any commitments. While the Red army would be stationed along the frontiers

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[1] See for details the enclosed study entitled "Reflections on Soviet and American Diplomacy," by Stephen D. Kertesz. Review of Politics, vol. 19 (1957), pp. 3–36. (The study referred to is on file with the subcommittee.)

of the evacuated states and thus within easy striking distance of the heart of Europe, the American Army would retreat 3,000 miles and would be separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, a limited ground inspection system in the Soviet Union might be meaningless in view of the vastness of the land. Only an ironclad system of general inspection would mean assurance against Russia's capacity for a surprise attack. Such a system should include aerial inspection as well as ground control posts in sufficient number. The West cannot allow the deterioration of its strategic position, with possible adverse political consequences, in return for marginal Soviet concessions in disarmament within the framework of an inconclusive settlement.

Basic transformations in Soviet leadership will not take place overnight. The dream of a sincerely cooperating Soviet Union belongs to the distant future. Until that time, Soviet leaders will not be impressed by arguments unsupported by overwhelming force. Thus in the foreseeable future the strength and unity of the Western World will be the most effective deterrent to Soviet expansion, and these may be the only inducements to conciliatory attitudes in the field of disarmament on the part of the Russians. For the time being, however contradictory it may seem, further building up of western strength seems to be the only realistic step toward a general disarmament. We must rely on strength to buy time in the expectation of better developments in the countries living under Communist domination. A strong and united West might have an influence on Soviet leadership and eventually might crystallize prowestern forces willing to settle realistically the outstanding political issues, including disarmament, which exist between Russia and the Western World.

3. It is not likely that the present regime in the Soviet Union or any Soviet regime in the forseeable future would be willing to submit itself to an effective enforcement agency destined to deal with violations of the disarmament agreement.

4. The creation in central Europe of some kind of neutral zone in which the strength of armed forces would be fixed by agreement is probably the most realistic part of the disarmament proposal under discussion. This means at least implicit recognition of the idea that armaments are symptoms and not causes of international tension. Sources of trouble are not the actual or potential armaments but the many unsettled political questions in the heart of Europe. Without their solution, disarmament alone would be meaningless, if not positively harmful. First of all the political climate should be improved through settlement of outstanding issues. Reduction of tension between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds would be necessary as a first step. Withdrawal of American and British armies from Europe before solution of the underlying political problems would only create new volcanoes. A new system of security for the whole of Europe could be combined with disarmament but disarmament alone would not do the trick.

No disarmament is possible without a minimum degree of mutual trust. The real roadblock on the way to disarmament is the mutual lack of confidence. The Washington Conference in 1921–22 was successful in establishing qualitative disarmament among the five major naval powers in a limited field because it established a political equilibrium in the Far East simultaneously with the agreement on dis-

armament. In the same way, disarmament in central and Eastern Europe would be a relatively easy problem if mutually satisfactory solutions could be worked out for such problems as the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, civil liberties and free elections, the unification of Germany and an agreed boundary settlement between Poland and Germany, and settlement of the problem of the German expellees. In this process disarmament cannot be the first step but rather a byproduct of political solutions.

At this critical juncture of world affairs the cause of peace and disarmament would be best served if the United States would put forward bold and imaginative concrete plans for the settlement of the most troublesome international problems. At an appropriate moment, the President of the United States could propose the convocation of a world conference, perhaps within the framework of the United Nations, for the solution of some fundamental issues which block peaceful cooperation between nations. If leaders of the Soviet Union are unwilling to participate or would sabotage constructive arrangements that would reduce world tension, at least the bluff of their phony peace offensive would be called and the uncommitted peoples would see the real obstacle to a better future for mankind. Soviet duplicity would be made clear once more through confrontation of Soviet policies with worldwide aspirations.

As to the presence of the Soviet Army in east central Europe, it is generally recognized that Communist regimes in this area could not survive without the actual or potential threat of the Red Army. After a Soviet evacuation, there would be a good chance for a really democratic evolution. But economically most of the states in east central Europe would probably continue to cooperate with Russia. As a result of Communist directed planned economy, the traditional relations between the highly industrialized western Europe and the predominantly agricultural eastern part of the continent have been considerably disrupted. Since the captive countries were cut off from the West, the orientation of their trade changed and the Soviet Union acquired a monopolistic position in the area in more than one way. Heavy industry in the satellite states was made increasingly dependent on deliveries of Soviet industrial raw materials for which the Soviet Union has received manufactured goods. The fact that Moscow was in a position to determine the prices for many finished products and raw materials in export and import relations amounted to an additional control over the economic growth and living standard of the captive peoples.

As a result of all these developments, economic relations between an industrialized eastern Europe and the western part of the continent would greatly differ from the ones which existed before the Second World War if by a miracle Soviet Russian control should disappear overnight. A free economic cooperation between the east central European states or possibly between an east central European federation and Russia could be mutually beneficial. The elimination of political oppression and economic exploitation could be the basis of friendly relations between them.

Soviet Russian influence in the area thus could be similar to United States influence in Mexico or Canada. Unfortunately, there is little likelihood of such a development because Russian policy in general and Soviet Communist policy in particular is unable to cooperate on

the basis of equality. Soviet leaders hate and distrust the western states. This is a major obstacle to all reasonable settlement. The picture of the world in their mind is distorted by outdated Marxist theories and by the ruthless practices of a police state. According to well established Soviet views, no free people are reliable. In Communist usage "cooperation" means oppression and exploitation and "friendly government" means Communist dominated government. Communist fear of freedom is a psychopathic mental block in their thinking. This constitutes the greatest impediment to the creation of a truly neutral belt in Europe. Negotiations on disarmament could not eliminate this obstacle.

5. Secretary of State Dulles in his testimony of February 29, 1956, before the Subcommittee on Disarmament, referred to a few probable motives of the recent Soviet disarmament proposal. He suggested that "the Soviet Union would like to be relieved of some of its military expenditure, so it could devote more of its economic productivity to raising the living standards of its own people and the satellite peoples and perhaps to have more money to spend on its foreign aid." These motives certainly exist, but the background and implications of the Soviet disarmament proposal are more complex.

Probably it is safe to admit that the Soviet Union, like most countries would welcome relief from the present burden of armament. But at the same time we should note that disarmament proposals have been traditionally used in Russian foreign policy for a variety of purposes. In 1816 Alexander I proposed to the British Government the simultaneous reduction of armaments of every kind and Nicholas II proposed the convocation of the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 mainly for the limitation of armaments. The Soviet Government diligently participated in the disarmament efforts of the League of Nations and advocated drastic measures for disarmament. For example, a Soviet declaration of November 30, 1927, proposed "the complete abolition of all land, naval and air forces." Such proposals were in harmony with Russian power political interests of the time and made clear the fact that Russian diplomacy was using disarmament proposals mainly as diversionary moves in order to improve Russia's international position. This is as true today as it was in the past.

The announced Soviet troop reduction of 1,800,000 men, if true, can be attributed not only to economic reasons but perhaps primarily to the gradual introduction of atomic weapons in the Soviet Army. Since the cost and manpower saving character of nuclear weapons are probably as valid in the Soviet Union as in the United States, production of tactical atomic weapons may bring relief to Soviet economy with a simultaneous increase of the firepower of the Soviet Army. Reduction in manpower is not equivalent to disarmament in the contemporary world. If associated with reorganization of an army it may even increase the nation's military potential. Great caution should be observed in the atomic age in attempting to measure disarmament by the conventional military yardsticks.

We should also note at this point that a census of arms and armed forces could be the only realistic point of departure in a general disarmament scheme. The disarmament plan proposed by the Western Allies in November 1951 rightly considered a continuing inventory

of all armed forces and armaments combined with international inspection as the core of any solution to the problem. Moreover, reductions in themselves are not meaningful as long as great disproportion exists in the number of Soviet and non-Soviet combat-ready divisions in Europe. Leaders of the Soviet Union even boasted recently of their military superiority over Western Europe and used it as a threat. Since the Soviet Union did not carry out a full demobilization after World War II, and continued to develop its armaments ever since, it would not be reasonable to accept an unbalanced situation as a basis for future disarmament.

We may assume that a reduction of Soviet armed forces would make possible some more foreign aid and the increased production of consumer goods in the Soviet Union and in the captive countries. But there are fundamental differences between the possibilities open to a democratic and a totalitarian government in the economic sphere. Soviet industrial progress is prodigious in many important fields. Moreover, the possibility of diverting raw material and other goods from civilian consumption to military uses is almost limitless in a totalitarian dictatorship. Although the production of steel in the Soviet Union is still considerably less than in the United States, in absolute figures probably more steel has been used for armaments in the Soviet Union than in the United States. It is pleasant to have many cars, television sets, and refrigerators, but these gadgets do not increase the military strength of America.

While in the Soviet Union even a slight improvement of the living standard is greatly advertised and appreciated by the people, the danger exists that the American society, amidst the legitimate enjoyment of the highest living standard on the globe, may under a given set of circumstances refuse sacrifices involving a temporary lowering of the living standard. Such attitude significantly weakened the French and British power position in the crucial years preceding the Second World War. A similar disposition in the society was the overture to doom of several empires in the past. I, for one, believe that this will not be the case in the United States. No sacrifices are too great for freedom. But it is a more difficult and usually time-consuming task to persuade societies with representative forms of government of the necessity of sacrifices than to impose restrictions from above in a totalitarian country. The great flexibility of democracies may not have an opportunity to prevail over dictatorships after the devastation of a nuclear war.

If we compare the number and fire power of the combat-ready divisions and the armaments of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds at the end of the Second World War and today, it is impossible not to feel some uneasiness. Although numerous blunders of Soviet diplomacy prompted the creation of NATO and other security arrangements of the West, still a disturbing feature remains in the picture of western inclination to give preference to an easy life over security, and its consequent military weakness. One of the worst political effects of the Suez crisis was the fact that it exposed the suspected military weakness of France and England.

The Soviet Government undoubtedly has greater freedom for maneuvering in regard to the question of increasing the production of weapons or consumption of goods or using them as means in diplo-

macy. This freedom is particularly characteristic in the field of foreign aid. Although Soviet foreign aid is insignificant compared to United States foreign aid, gifts, loans, and investments abroad, it is used with great flexibility in such strategic areas as Afghanistan or the Middle East. The cases of Iceland and India are other examples of how Soviet economic activity outside the Communist orbit was shrewdly calculated and timed in order to bring the maximum political benefit to the Soviet Union for relatively small investments.

6. It is a sound view expressed by the United States Government that only a thorough-going system of inspection under the direction of an international agency could be effective and workable over Soviet military establishments. Mutual guaranties and an international agency could satisfy the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union as well as those of other states. On disarmament planning the great territorial extent of the Soviet Union should be taken into consideration. This creates a special security interest which would justify the maintenance of a proportionately large army. We may add that the word "legitimate" often means something entirely different to the Soviet leaders than it does in the West.

REPLY OF PROF. CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JANUARY 14, 1957

1. There are grounds for believing that the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the threat of mutual annihilation created by nuclear weapons. So long as this threat exists, I believe that Soviet foreign policy will be cautious when they are convinced that the alternative is nuclear war. I do not, however, think that they will seriously seek agreement on control of weapons except for "tactical" purposes. Such purposes would include one or both of the following objectives:

(*a*) Psychological warfare; i. e., they could be placed in a position where failure to seek, or accept, such control would be seriously damaging vis-a-vis their relations with "neutral" nations or internally (including the satellites).

(*b*) A conviction that it would be to their interest to keep the peace because economic collapse in the West was imminent and they could therefore win the struggle more cheaply and without danger of destruction of their own industry, etc.

I can conceive of two circumstances under which they might simply have no interest in preventing nuclear war: (1) An internal crisis which the ruling leadership felt could be resolved without loss of their power only through war; (2) if they were to gain decisive superiority in intercontinental missiles.

2. So far as the present leadership is concerned, the attitude toward inspection will, again, be purely "tactical." I think it is quite possible that they might accept a certain degree of inspection provided they felt they had something to gain from it (e. g., psychological warfare aims and/or a throwing the West off its guard). I cannot overemphasize my conviction that the long-term aim of the present leadership is unchanged and unchangeable: Communist control or, at very least, unquestioned preeminence in the world. This will alter, as Khrushchev said in speaking to the East German delegation in Moscow in September 1955, only "when shrimps in the sea learn to whis-

tle." To be sure, many gambits are possible within the limits of this game. One is inspection. The Soviet rulers are determined to split NATO and to weaken the economy of the West. There are many indications that Soviet leaders are convinced that our economy would go into serious difficulties once we ceased spending such large sums for military preparedness. If they believe that inspection is likely to cause the people of the United States and the democracies of Western Europe to become divided among themselves and to cut military budgets, inspection would be worth a considerable price to the U. S. S. R.

As to the more distant future, there are, of course, so many unforeseeable variables that one can do no more than point to certain probable and relevant trends. Assuming that we do not permit further major expansion or aggression on the part of the Soviet Union and assuming that we do not allow them to surpass us decisively in airpower, nuclear weapons, or intercontinental missiles, I firmly believe that it is in the best interests of the United States to keep the peace. For, as Mr. Justice Holmes remarked: "Time wears away many fighting faiths." I do not believe that the ruling elite in the U. S. S. R. (China is another story) can continue for another 15 or 20 years to keep its people terrified of "capitalist aggression" (nor in general so badly and incorrectly informed as to the outside world), let alone committed to a messianic imperialism of world communism. Already there is trustworthy evidence on two points:

(*a*) The new bureaucratic and managerial "middle class" has enough stake in the status quo to exhibit little enthusiasm for risky adventures.

(*b*) The younger generation (particularly the students) shows enough dissatisfaction with present conditions in the U. S. S. R. to give even a dictatorial leadership pause.

4. I do not think the present leadership will ever relinquish its control of Eastern Europe (and this means withdrawal of troops) except under circumstances where they were sure that the West no longer represented an effective challenge (economic collapse, complete disunity of the West, extreme leftist governments in control of all or most of the continent—plus, probably, Britain). The proof of this statement seems to me to lie in the Hungarian episode. A majority of the present Presidium had apparently agreed to go a considerable distance in the case of Poland. But Hungary was too much and not least, I suspect, for the top Soviet military. There are tantalizing fragments of evidence that suggest Zhukov and others were prominent in demanding that Hungary be crushed because a genuinely "neutral" nation in the geographical position of Hungary was conceived to be an intolerable danger to the security of the U. S. S. R.

Once more, it is not inconceivable that within 10 or 15 years—possibly even less—there could be enough change in the internal power structure within the U. S. S. R. so that a truly neutral zone could be created in central Europe. I think this is most unlikely in the immediately foreseeable future—and this includes Eastern Germany. As I think the present leaders (and possible leaders of the immediate future) to have mapped out their "limits of tolerance," they would risk all-out war rather than lose control of East Germany which they

consider as essential to their security as we do, say, the Panama Canal or Cuba.

6. To expect the Soviet rulers to accept proposals which would inevitably presuppose such drastic change in their regime is not warranted by any observation of the Soviet system. I do not see the possibility of such a radical transformation in the near future.

Even if the Soviet leaders prefer to achieve their goals without war (and I think they do), it does not follow that these goals are compatible with the survival of our society. It is still more clear that war cannot be excluded as an instrument of Soviet policy if their leaders conclude that their objectives can be attained only through force.

On the other hand, all social systems continue to evolve through time. The Soviet system has by no means remained static up to the present point. Yet, in contemporary U. S. S. R., policy is still being made by individuals whose basic character was formed in a revolutionary atmosphere and in a situation of isolation from the rest of the world. Hence, to speak of "controls * * * over the Soviet military establishment" strikes me as unrealistic for the immediate future. I would urge that we press for whatever disarmament and inspection we can obtain so long as we do not allow the U. S. S. R. to make too shrewd a horse trade. I think the present "limits of the possible" are within this realm of tactics and that it would be a great mistake for us to plan in too utopian a way. If we "keep our powder dry," much to our advantage can happen over the next 10 to 15 years and the aim of wide disarmament and mutual inspection on the necessary scale may become realistic.

REPLY OF PROF. W. W. KULSKI, MAXWELL GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 23, 1956

1. Soviet statements and press articles on the risks of vast devastation which could be caused by a nuclear war seem to warrant the opinion that the Soviet leaders do not intend any longer to hide before their people the danger of such a war. The Soviet foreign policy has been careful enough since 1953 to avoid the risk of a general war which could become also a nuclear conflict.

This foreign policy seems to be founded, at least since Stalin's death, on three main postulates:

(1) That the nuclear stalemate precludes the possibility of modifying by force the existing status quo.

(2) That there is little chance of changing this status quo in Europe by other means.

(3) That the only battlefield open to a Soviet nonmilitary offensive is that of the underdeveloped countries where the so-called peaceful competition may be successfully waged by nonmilitary means.

The U. S. S. R. has been paying a steadily increasing attention to those underdeveloped areas, be they in Asia, Africa, the Near East, or Latin America. They, obviously, hope to increase progressively the Soviet influence there and also expect, in addition, to gather eventually the fruits of the activities of the local Communist parties. To wage this offensive they do not need to use military means. A skillful

use of other means does not involve the risk of a general war and yet promises success. Certain means are used both by the Soviet Union in her official foreign policy and by the local Communist parties. Such are the following means: anticolonialism, which allows the Soviet Union to appear as an ally of dependent nationalities and also of such formerly colonial countries which continue to be very sensitive to this particular issue, while the Soviet Union, for her own reasons, is always ready to prove her "sincerity" regarding anticolonialism by espousing every grievance of a colonial or formerly colonial country against a western power.

This same anticolonial theme makes it possible for the local Communists to masquerade as extreme patriots in espousing every anti-western cause. Another such nonmilitary mean, is the antiracialist propaganda directed against the Western Powers and exploiting another sensitive topic for nonwhite populations. A third is psychological; namely, a "fraternal" approach to the underdeveloped areas while avoiding the display of any national or great-power superiority complex. A fourth one is acquiring steadily increasing importance; it is a new economic approach to the underdeveloped areas through a barter trade which, basically, consists in the exchange of Soviet capital goods against the local agricultural produce, including the unmarketable surpluses, loans on convenient terms and without any visible strings attached, technical assistance tied up to the mutual trade, and so forth. The Soviet Union encourages, in addition, the policy of noncommitment, an attitude obviously welcome to such underdeveloped states which follow a policy of noncommitment. To increase the Soviet popularity two slogans are used: Peace, and the prohibition of atomic experiments. All those means have produced already some results in increasing the Soviet prestige. The basic aim is to create a gulf between the highly industrialized western nations and the underdeveloped areas which represent the majority of mankind. The goal is ambitious, and yet the means are nonmilitary. Thus the Soviet Union may pursue a dynamic foreign policy without endangering the nuclear stalemate.

It would be foolish on the part of the Soviet leaders to risk everything on one card of a general war while they expect to advance their cause by peaceful means. Moreover, they seem to believe that the same cause will be promoted over a period of the next two decades by other nonmilitary developments. They rely on the Soviet relatively higher rate of industrialization regarding the production of capital goods and on the industrialization of China and to some extent also of Eastern Europe. This is why they constantly talk about the U. S. S. R. eventually becoming the first industrial power of the world as their eventual target. The new program of a 10-year (senior high school), technological school training for all Soviet children, to be realized basically during the present 5-year plan and completed during the following plan, promises to yield within the next 15 years a highly skilled young manpower. This, also, is bound to increase the relative power of the U. S. S. R.

If it is true that the Soviet leaders expect that time is working for them, then it is logical for them to formulate such foreign policies which do not clash with the nuclear stalemate. However, it is probable that they would not accept a change in the present international

status quo to the prejudice of the U. S. S. R. and would then be ready to face the risk of a general war. The Soviet policies during the recent Near Eastern and Hungarian crises support this interpretation. Although the Soviet Government skillfully manipulated the threats of force to influence Britain and France, it was careful not to commit itself formally to any Arab country concerning the actual use of force against the West. It exploited and will exploit the recent events in the Near East for its own political benefit, but seemed reluctant to take any action which could possibly involve it eventually in a war with the United States.

At the same time, the U. S. S. R. proved in the Hungarian case that she would defend at all cost her acquired positions. She undertook a brutal action of suppression of the Hungarian revolution even at a price, heavy for her, of losing, at least temporarily, her political prestige among the Asians.

But all this does not mean necessarily that the Soviet Government sincerely seeks a general and effective agreement on nuclear weapons. They may be sincere in regard to a limited agreement forbidding further atomic experiments; they are committed to it by a long propaganda, and would be placed in an awkward position if they were to reject such an agreement. They would do it only in case where they would believe that a sudden suspension of atomic explosions would deprive them of an expected advance in the nuclear competitive knowledge.

2. A general agreement on nuclear weapons that would include provisions for an effective and tight control is a different story. The nature of the nuclear weapons would probably require opening for international inspection of every square mile of the territories of the contracting parties, of every plant and every industrial secret. Even so, the existing stockpiles of atomic weapons would be probably hard to detect. Without such a thorough control, the obligations of the contracting parties could be evaded. An international commission would have to work permanently on the territory of each contracting party. It could hardly rely on the cooperation of the local population, which would consider such a cooperation as close to treason; moreover, the Soviet population would be deterred from such a spontaneous cooperation by the additional threat of a quick governmental retaliation. The prospective conditions of work of the international commission of control would require, for this additional reason, very extensive powers and an unhampered access to the whole national territory.

The U. S. S. R. could hardly agree to it. The political operations of the regime require a certain amount of secrecy. For instance, the Soviet Government would hardly be pleased by the prospect of an international control commission's visit to the forced-labor camps or to places of production operated with forced labor. Morever, opening the gates of the whole Soviet territory to foreigners belonging to an international commission of control would make the U. S. S. R. lose a valuable asset, namely forcing the other powers to commit constantly errors of over or under estimation as to the true potential of that country. It is well known that the Soviet statistics are inadequate and that the actual production is partly shrouded in a state secret.

It is more probable that the Soviet Union would agree to a system of control with loopholes, if such a system were acceptable to the West-

ern Powers regarding the personnel of the armed forces and possibly the conventional armaments. A less than thorough system of control would be rather ineffective also in the case of the limitation of numbers of the personnel of the armed forces and of the conventional armaments. We know this from two sources: the inability of the Inter-Allied Control Commission in Berlin to detect all secret German evasions of the limitative provisions of the Versailles Treaty (1921–27), and the records of long discussions of the problem of control at the Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932–33).

It is a matter for the military experts to say whether an incomplete and therefore not very effective system of international control would be acceptable to the Western Powers in regard to the limitation of the personnel and conventional armaments. Assuming that such an international agreement were concluded, its serious evasions could be counterbalanced by the nuclear weapons. In case of the conclusion of such an agreement without truly effective control the absence of a parallel agreement on nuclear weapons would be in a sense an advantage; the nuclear weapons would remain an effective and ultimate sanction against a contracting power which would be tempted to make use of its armies and conventional weapons accumulated in violation of the international agreement.

Only a prophet could speculate on the probability of a deep change of the regime in the U. S. S. R. So far the present regime does not seem to be in the immediate danger of being overturned and replaced by another which would resemble even from afar a western democracy. As to a "peaceful" evolution, no regime evolves peacefully to the extent of denying its basic nature. For the time being the regime is not altered basically and goes on as before except for some Stalinist trimmings. Moreover, a quick and successful revolution in the U. S. S. R. would not guarantee that a new regime governing a strong Russia would be necessarily more accommodating than the present. Only a protracted revolution and civil war would have the effect of making Russia more accommodating, because she would simply be weaker. Political wisdom would require not to rely on happy expectations but rather to take for granted for the time being that we shall continue to face the same Soviet regime.

3. The U. S. S. R. does not intend to waive her right of veto for the simple reason that she knows from experience that she could not expect to muster a majority in any international body. Therefore, it is improbable that she would accept any enforcement agency to whose decision she could not oppose her veto especially on matters concerning herself or an allied state.

4. One should carefully distinguish between Soviet proposals which may be genuine and such others which are advanced for the sake of propaganda and in the hope that they would be rejected by the Western Powers. It seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union seriously contemplates withdrawing her troops from Eastern Europe, if even such a move were counterbalanced by a withdrawal of other foreign troops, notably the American, from another part of Europe. This prospect seems even less likely after the events in Poland and Hungary. One must remember that Communist regimes were installed in Eastern Europe by Soviet bayonets. The recent events in Poland and Hungary proved that even 11 years were not enough to

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implant the habit of those regimes in the native minds. It is therefore more than probable that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe would be soon followed by a collapse of the local Communist regimes in all or most of those countries. Today a revolt against a local Communist regime entails the risk of a dreadful retaliation on the part of the U. S. S. R. which may swiftly intervene having her troops in or around all countries of Eastern Europe.

Hungary will remain as a tragic warning to other nations of Eastern Europe. But the Hungarian experience proved also that a local Communist government faced with a popular uprising could not rely on the loyalty of its own troops. Left alone those local governments would be constantly threatened by a possible revolt; a revolt in one country could then spread like a wildfire all over Eastern Europe emboldened by the absence of Soviet troops. A mass military action of the U. S. S. R. against the total insurrection of Eastern Europe would be of necessity a protracted operation with uncertain results and possible risks of a general war.

But the withdrawal of Soviet troops would entail another risk. Assuming that for reasons, unknown to this author, the Soviet Government were prepared to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe and to run the risk of seeing the present Communist governments being replaced by non-Communist, could it expect that those governments would truly subscribe to a policy of noncommitment? A natural reaction against the Soviet domination could produce a powerful and spontaneous anti-Soviet trend in the local populations. Rumania, Hungary, and Albania have no state interests that would incline them to cooperate with the Soviet Union if they had non-Communist governments. But it is also doubtful whether the fear of Germany in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the traditional quarrels with her neighbors in Bulgaria, would be strong enough to contain a popular wave of anti-Soviet revulsion in those countries. The U. S. S. R. could not be certain whether the Eastern European states, free of Soviet troops, would stay long neutral and would not try to be integrated within a western defense system. Could she be absolutely sure that the Western Powers would resist the temptation of such an extension of their defense system?

Moreover, why should the U. S. S. R., without being defeated in a general war, consent to abandoning Eastern Europe with its approximately 100 million people forced to work and thus increase the total economic potential of the Communist bloc? The Hungarian events might have the opposite effect of proving to the Soviet leaders that they must keep their own troops in Eastern Europe.

The so-called liberalization is now basically limited to Poland alone. The Hungarian revolution hardly encouraged the Soviet leaders to indulge in any further experiments with liberalization whose far-reaching effects they could not control.

As the satellite armies proved in Hungary and Poland to be unreliable, the U. S. S. R. could perhaps offer a reduction of those troops without withdrawal of her own as a "compensation" for, for instance, a sharp reduction in the Western German rearmament.

For the reasons indicated above, a neutral belt (without Soviet troops in Eastern Europe) covering Eastern Europe and some part of Central Europe now within the western sphere would not be

acceptable to the Soviet Union, whatever the Soviet Government may say to the contrary for propaganda reasons.

5. It is possible that the U. S. S. R. would accept an agreed-upon reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments if such an agreement would not entail a thorough international inspection. Her attitude in this respect might be sincere. Even reduced numbers of the Soviet troops would be sufficient to cope with the problems in Eastern Europe. The Soviet main protection against a general war is the capacity of a nuclear retaliation. If she does not intend to change the present status quo by military means, a reduction of armed forces and of the conventional armaments, compensated by equivalent reductions on the part of the Western Powers, might be welcome for certain domestic and even international reasons.

The extremely heavy human losses suffered during the Second World War and hence a reduction in the number of expected births, the lower postwar birthrate, the inadequate labor productivity in agriculture, have created a problem of manpower. Manpower is the limit of Soviet industrial progress. Therefore, an effort to increase the available manpower would be in the Soviet interest. Hence the announcement concerning a reduction of Soviet armed forces may correspond to actual facts and a further reduction through an international agreement might be welcome to the Soviet Government.

The matter of reducing conventional armaments is more complex. For instance, it is possible that this matter will be complicated by arming ground armies with tactical atomic weapons, because then the segregation of armaments into two separate categories, conventional and nuclear, might tend to become obsolete. But assuming that the Great Powers were able to solve to their mutual satisfaction this and other technical matters, including some sort of intermittent international control, the U. S. S. R. could welcome an international agreement on the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments for the following reasons. Most of the conventional armaments become obsolete after a certain time which is shorter if the armament competition is more intense. If the Soviet Government does not fear a war in the near future, it may be willing to conclude an international agreement on the mutual reduction of conventional armaments which would allow the U. S. S. R. to spend more effort on developing her capacity of manufacturing the so-called means of production. Those means of production represent the basis of the economic and hence military potential of any country. Thus the economic-military potential could be more rapidly increased by economizing on the national effort devoted to the production of conventional armaments. In case of emergency the U. S. S. R. would rely on her capacity of nuclear mass retaliation and the conversion of industrial production to the required level of output of conventional armaments.

The events in Poland and Hungary might have made the Soviet leaders more alert to the problem of consumer goods; the low standards of living in those two countries certainly contributed greatly to the unrest. The U. S. S. R. is not herself immune to a wide popular dissatisfaction with shortages of consumer goods, especially as the purchasing power of the population often exceeds the supply of those goods. The Soviet leaders were aware of this problem in 1953–54, but later returned to the Stalinist line of relegating this problem to a lower level of their planning.

A reduction in the output of conventional armaments achieved through an international agreement would allow for a greater output not only of capital goods but also of consumer goods. This in turn would keep the Soviet population more satisfied and would enable the U. S. S. R. to alleviate somehow the same problem in the satellite countries to avoid a repetition of the Hungarian events.

Finally, a conversion of industrial production to a greater production of capital goods would increase the Soviet capacity in assisting China and Eastern Europe in their process of industrialization and in extending the trade with underdeveloped countries.

Any such transition to a different type of production is much easier in the U. S. S. R. than in the democratic countries because of the Soviet centralized economic planning.

6. I am unable to answer the first half of this question. The second half begs the question of what one understands by the legitimate interests of the U. S. S. R. If one understands by these terms the security interests considered by the U. S. S. R. as her minimum requirement, then it becomes possible to answer the question. Beyond any doubt the Soviet concept of "legitimate" interests includes not only the security of the Soviet national territory but also the perpetuation of the division of Germany and the control over Eastern Europe. The latter control is conditioned by two minimum conditions spelled out by the U. S. S. R., namely the participation of the satellite countries in the Warsaw Pact and the existence of such satellite Communist governments which do not repudiate their allegiance to Moscow and do not follow the Yugoslav policy of noncommitment.

Any global deal, which would include an agreement on the reduction of armaments but was conditioned on the Soviet renunciation of those "legitimate" interests, would have hardly any prospect of being accepted by Moscow. Hence the concept of a neutral belt, combined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe, does not seem realistic. First of all, a plan for a unification of Germany after truly free elections in Eastern Germany would imply a major defeat for the U. S. S. R. It is sure that free elections in Eastern Germany would produce two effects: the end of the Communist regime, and the union of Eastern Germany with the German Federal Republic. Thus the U. S. S. R. would not only be deprived of the human and economic potential of Eastern Germany but would contribute to the re-creation of Germany as a first-class great power.

There is no doubt that the U. S. S. R. is completely serious in objecting to such a unification of Germany which would leave a unified Germany free to remain associated with the NATO. But one may doubt the sincerity of the Soviet statements to the effect that a unified and neutral Germany could be considered as a basis of discussion concerning the Germany unification. Even a unified Germany uncommitted to the NATO would represent a new powerful factor in European politics. The U. S. S. R. would have no means of controlling her foreign policy. She could prevent neither her massive rearmament nor even her reaccession to the NATO. Moreover, even a neutralist but unified Germany would be strong enough to press with new vigor for the return of those Germany territories which had been annexed by Poland and the U. S. S. R. (Eastern Prussia, northern

part). The U. S. S. R. would be placed before a difficult alternative: either to resign herself to the existence of an unfriendly Germany voicing her territorial grievances or to make concessions. A retreat from the Elbe through the unification of Germany might entail a further retreat from the Oder; this is surely realized in Moscow. But a retreat from the Oder might in turn weaken the Soviet position in Eastern Europe where she would have possibly to cope again with the German competition. One does not see any pressing reason why the U. S. S. R. should assent to a rapid unification of Germany even within some sort of a neutral belt.

The Soviet leaders have often stressed since the first Geneva Conference of 1955 that a unification of Germany requires two conditions: (1) That a unified Germany would not be committed to the NATO; (2) and that the economic and social "gains" realized in Eastern Germany would be safeguarded. This second condition is politically more important, because it cannot be accepted either by the West or the German Federal Republic. Its real meaning consists in conveying the Soviet unwillingness to consider seriously the unification of Germany and by implication any withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany or the creation of a neutral belt.

Therefore, it seems highly doubtful whether the U. S. S. R. would barter Eastern Germany and even more Eastern Europe for some sort of a neutral or demilitarized zone in central-eastern Europe. The U. S. S. R. would have to be faced with a complete breakdown of her satellite system and feel completely unable to cope with such a situation, to discuss seriously the concept of such a neutral belt even if the latter belt involved some areas now within the Western Zone.

A western proposal to create such a neutral belt covering Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe as well as some specified areas within the Western Zone in Europe would have nevertheless a certain undeniable value. It would show the western willingness to meet the Soviet Union halfway, a consideration important for the western relations with uncommitted nations. It would probe the Soviet sincerity in the disarmament discussions. If the U. S. S. R. would accept the concept of such a neutral belt, it would reveal the extreme seriousness of the situation in Eastern Europe and the inability of the Soviet Union to cope with it without running the risk of such implications which could lead to a general war (for instance, the need for a large-scale Soviet military action in both Poland and Eastern Germany). Therefore, a western proposal to this effect would make sense even if the probability of its being accepted by the U. S. S. R. does not seem, under the present circumstances, to be great.

Reply of William L. Langer, Director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, December 18, 1956

1. It seems to me that Soviet leaders cannot have failed to recognize the threat of mutual annihilation implicit in the new weapons. It is at least plausible that such recognition may have underlain their efforts of recent years to avoid involvement in major conflicts. It is, of course, difficult to point to any one such instance, but it should be remembered that the Soviet Union might have taken a more active and aggressive role in various areas and issues, such as Korea and

Indochina, to say nothing of the Taiwan dispute, the German problem, etc. It is my own impression that they are restricting their interference in Hungary to the minimum regarded imperative to hold the Communist bloc together. Whether and when their appreciation of the situation may lead them to seek agreement on control of weapons it is hard to say. It would, in fact, be difficult to recognize such effort as sincere even if it were so. I suspect that the Soviet Government would even now welcome agreement on nuclear weapons if such agreement did not involve too close inspection or control, and if it left more or less intact the Soviet superiority in conventional forces and equipment.

2. The Soviet Government would probably accept comprehensive and effective inspection only under pressure of great necessity. The second part of this question is too far-ranging to be answerable, but I would doubt whether, in the foreseeable future, one could expect the Kremlin to go beyond inspection in the satellite area. Conceivably it might accept a greater measure of inspection if United States forces were withdrawn from Europe and the United States abandoned its European bases. In such case the Soviets might permit inspection in the thought that they could, if necessary, ignore the consequences of such inspection. It would seem reasonable to suppose that a more democratic system of government in the Soviet Union would facilitate agreement on inspection, but this is purely conjectural.

3. This question is for the most part subsumed in question 2. I do not believe that the Soviet Government would accept any agency, such as an enforcement agency, that would infringe its sovereignty. In any case, it is inconceivable that it would do so excepting under direct pressure of circumstances.

4. The presence or near proximity of Soviet forces probably has much to do with maintenance of Communist control over the states of Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, conditions may well develop in some of these countries to the extent that the Kremlin may think it advisable to withdraw its forces completely. It could probably do this with relative safety, as it could easily proceed to military reoccupation if necessary and in any event could profit from the threat of aerial bombardment (conventional or nuclear) which is always at its disposal. It seems to me highly unlikely, however, that the Soviet Government would withdraw its forces from the satellites unless at least United States forces were withdrawn from Europe, and American bases, at least in Europe and the Mediterranean, were given up. It might then agree to a neutral or disarmed and supervised belt, the more so as such a situation would be greatly to its advantage, considering its proximity to the area. In my opinion, the Soviet Union would go a long way, especially toward paper agreements, in order to secure the withdrawal of United States troops from Europe and the abandonment of United States bases.

5. One might reply to this by asking the question whether there is any nation that would not like a reduction of the crushing burden of armaments? I regard it as highly likely that the announced troop reduction of 1,800,000 men by the Soviets is due to the desire to secure more manpower for industry. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union can maintain its high productivity in the field of capital goods and at the same time increase production of consumer goods without

securing additional manpower. It may well be that it would like to divert part of its industrial potential from war production and it is highly probable that the popular pressure for more consumer goods will weigh heavily in the making of future decisions. I believe that the greatest likelihood of a change in policy on the part of the Kremlin may come from such internal pressures, both in the Soviet Union and in the satellites and I would think that the best hope of some progress toward disarmament may result from domestic needs and developments.

6. We have no experience to guide us in the matter of effectiveness in disarmament controls, especially in the atomic age. In general, however, it should be said that almost any form of control can be obstructed and, if necessary, defied. In the whole matter of disarmament it seems obvious that the key factor is that of confidence. Two nations that trust each other are not apt to have grave misgivings about their armaments. On the other hand, it is most improbable that either one of two nations hostile and suspicious of each other's intentions, should accept any agreement in good faith that might conceivably reduce its relative capability either for offense or for defense. While I agree that the United States has a moral as well as a practical obligation to explore every proposal for reduction of armaments, it strikes me that the larger and more important objective must be to remove or alleviate hostility and build up, so far as possible, a measure of mutual confidence.

Reply of Alfred G. Meyer, Director of the Research Program on the History of the CPSU, Columbia University, December 18, 1956

A. GENERAL REMARKS

1. Soviet policies and attitudes cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but only in their interdependence with the world situation, including the policies and intentions (real or imagined) of the United States.

2. The disarmament problem cannot be separated from the world situation in general, and the cold war in particular.

3. The cold war (i. e., the rivalry between the U. S. S. R. and the United States) is no longer the dominant feature of contemporary world politics. True, these two countries are today the dominant powers; their influence, wealth, and might towers over that of all other nations, and their exclusive possession of thermonuclear weapons symbolizes their dominant position But tomorrow, i. e., within the next 10 years, there will be additional great powers, such as India, China, a possible United Europe, etc., possessing the same attributes, including thermonuclear weapons. Tomorrow's world will be a pluralistic, not dualistic one. For this reason, the view of the Soviet Union as America's sole antagonist in world affairs is shortsighted; and the widely held idea that the destruction of the Soviet state (at least in its present form) would assure the world continued peace and prosperity is nothing short of foolish. It can be argued with a great deal of evidence, for instance, that the progress of international communism has been considerably retarded since 1917 by the existence of the U. S. S. R. as the self-styled leader of the world revolution. Had Russia not been communistic, or had communism not started in Russia, the victories of communism might have been far more

important. Today, too, if the Soviet Union were destroyed or weakened, world communism would thereby be invigorated, and the revolution of our age would proceed at an accelerated pace. This assertion may startle you, but I think it can be backed up by a mass of evidence.

4. The main objectives of United States foreign policy must be seen in terms of such developments. In connection with the disarmament problem, such objectives may be defined in the following manner:

(*a*) The main objective to be safeguarded is the security of the United States. Security lies, among other things, in the possession of thermonuclear weapons, and in every potential enemy's knowledge that we are ready to use them. In opposition to the widespread feeling that in view of the "nuclear stalemate" "there is no alternative to peace," more realistic political scientists have argued that only a skillful brink-of-war policy can give security to the United States.[1]

(*b*) The possession of thermonuclear weapons can be a deterrent, but does not constitute a defense against thermonuclear aggression. On the contrary, it has been argued convincingly that there is no defense against such aggression. For the first time in history, even the greatest powers can no longer defend themselves adequately against existing means of destruction.[2]

(*c*) The limited security-through-deterrence which lies in the possession of thermonuclear weapons is provided only as long as they are not used by others or by our own selves because the destructive energy of these weapons is not subject to adequate control, all destruction wrought by them means at the same time the self-destruction of the user.

(*d*) Security therefore lies not only in the possession of thermonuclear weapons, but also in their destruction. The interest we have (as Americans and as human beings) in the destruction of such weapons is so great that it is worth substantial sacrifices in the temporary position the United States maintains in the world power alinement. Of course, one concession we cannot afford to make is to destroy our own weapons while another power retains its stockpile. In talking about the destruction or dismantling of thermonuclear weapons, I am aware that due to my ignorance of the scientific and technical questions involved I may be talking nonsense. Clearly, a dismantling of existing weapons which would permit rapid reassembly will not do. Instead, it might be necessary to dismantle entire industries devoted to the manufacture of essential parts of such weapons. But, since it would be foolish to posit the dismantling of any industrial or scientific establishments that will advance man's scientific and technological progress through the peaceful and constructive use of fission and fusion energy, it would make sense to talk about the destruction of weapons only if activities devoted to the manufacture of death could be distinguished clearly from activities devoted to more productive efforts. Here the statesman must rely on the advice of the scientist.

(*e*) In addition to security from destruction and security from self-destruction, one other objective of United States foreign policy is to

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[1] See, for instance, Henry A. Kissinger, Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, Foreign Affairs, April 1956, pp. 349–366. Hans J. Morgenthau, Has Atomic War Really Become Impossible? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XII, 1 (January 1956), pp. 7–9.

[2] See Eugene Rabinowitch, Ten Years That Changed the World, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XII, 1 (January 1956), p. 5.

maintain or obtain the good will of the governments and peoples abroad. We should strive to obtain this good will not because it tickles our pride, but because it is a power factor of growing importance in world politics. Modern technology has given the material preconditions for the growth of a world community transcending national bounds. Political developments are slowly but perceptibly catching up with technology, and we have witnessed in the past decade the first beginnings of the formation of a worldwide political community. In the measure in which its development continues, public opinion—in this instance, world opinion—will be a factor of increasing importance to the Government of the United States. World opinion can be expected to acquire a growing tendency to restrain governments and to force their hands; and this will come to include even the superpowers, ourselves and the Soviet Union. In acquiring the good will of the world, a government will therefore be able to exert considerable influence on other governments.

The good will of world opinion can be obtained only by that moral superiority which is expressed in forthright and generous deeds, not unctuous words; or, if not in unilateral deeds, then in workable and acceptable proposals for joint action. Applied to the disarmament problem, this means that we shall have to force the U. S. S. R. into disarmament by morally impeccable proposals containing no escape clauses for ourselves or afterthoughts. On the contrary, any honest proposal made by us must contain the possibility that the position of the United States in relation to the U. S. S. R. might be weakened temporarily. The long-run benefits will far outweigh the sacrifice.

An example of such a proposal would be to let a United Nations team or another supranational force[3] simultaneously dismantle all Soviet and United States thermonuclear weapons. This may sound utopian. But it is in fact based on the realistic argument that either we do or do not destroy these weapons. There is no workable middle way.

B. ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union recognizes the threat of mutual annihilation and therefore shares with the United States the general aims outlined in A, 4, a–d, above. One might cite Malenkov's unequivocal statement that atomic war will mean the end of civilization, or the text of the Indian-Soviet joint declaration of December 13, 1955.

One could also infer such awareness from other signs of a conciliatory mood in the Kremlin, signs which are neither unambiguous nor necessarily derived from a horror of atomic warfare. Still, it is at least a straw in the wind to find, for instance, that Soviet international law authorities have recently tended to accept peaceful international processes in Soviet relations with the West rather than assume the inevitability of struggle. Still, even at the XXth Party Congress, the admission that world history might henceforth proceed by peaceful evolution was hedged in. Obviously, the Kremlin leaders themselves are not of one mind in this matter. Nor should we be deceived

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[3] For an interesting proposal of such a force, see Hans Apel, Proposal for a Surnational Peace Authority, Bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, IV, 3–4 (May–July 1956), pp. 37–41.

by their eagerness to show monolithic unanimity into believing that they are of one mind on any important issue.

Two facts make it fairly plausible that Soviet leaders are conscious of the threat of mutual annihilation. One is the considerable respect they afford to their scientists. Since in this country it has been the lobby of atomic scientists which has forced our Government and some sections of the public to recognize the threat, it is plausible to assume that a similar process has taken place in the U. S. S. R. The other is the fact that for some time the U. S. S. R. faced a hostile America having sole possession first of atomic and later of thermonuclear weapons. There is overwhelming evidence that the Kremlin was aware of the gravity of this threat, hence the disastrous consequences of nuclear warfare in general.

On the basis of such arguments, it might be possible that Soviet leaders (some if not all) will recognize a mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war. The possibility of this must be seen in the light of the following considerations:

(*a*) Soviet leaders have almost unsurmountable difficulties in recognizing any mutuality of interests. Instead, their entire way of thinking and policymaking is based on the assumption of a hostility between the Soviet and non-Soviet world that may be alleviated temporarily, but is unbridgeable in the long run. This feeling of basic hostility is partly based on Marxist-Leninist principles and beliefs, such as Lenin's conviction that politics is war of all against all, and that the guiding idea in politics is to see who "gets" whom. But, to an equal degree, the feeling of hostility is based on experience. A look at the map will show that the U. S. S. R. before 1949 did indeed face "capitalist encirclement," being a Communist island surrounded by a non-Communist sea. And ever since the revolution they have faced diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military threats. Soviet thought about world affairs has therefore been marked by a very aggressive defensive attitude—an attitude of defiance and morbid suspicion, a readiness to sound the alarm at the slightest provocation, real or imagined.

(*b*) Since the battle of Stalingrad, or more generally since the middle of the the 1940's the U. S. S. R. has emerged as 1 of the 2 great powers, and since the defeat of the Kuomintang the Communist world has broken out of the ring that surrounded it. The Soviet Government has shown itself aware of its new status, but its reaction to the new situation has been highly ambiguous. On the one hand, its leaders show a cockiness which corresponds to their country's strength; on the other hand, this same strength allows them to be more conciliatory. The same conflicting postures, however, were taken also in previous times, when all Soviet policymakers still seem to be divided over the stress they should give to their country's new strength. Quite rightly so: technologically, militarily, economically, the U. S. S. R. is one of the Big Two; but among the Big Two she is only second best. But to be second best in war means to be the loser.

(*c*) In the question of disarmament, the leaders of the Soviet state have, from the very beginning of its existence, been interested in disarmament and vigorously, though completely unsuccessfully, promoted it. They have always been perfectly sincere about these efforts to promote disarmament for the simple reason that militarily they

have always been outmatched by their potential enemies. To this must be added a double economic reason: to the U. S. S. R. armaments have been a terrible burden, while in their Marxist views the western system of free enterprise has depended on the systematic waste entailed by armaments to keep functioning.

(*d*) The position of the U. S. S. R. as underdog in the armaments race has now changed; and it can be expected, therefore, that on these grounds at least the Kremlin has lost its previous great interest in disarmament. Other motives supporting disarmament, however, remain or have been added. In addition to the economic motive, there is Soviet awareness of world opinion. While the Kremlin has shown itself extremely skillful in taking advantage of favorable world opinion and in promoting its own cause in the world, they have at crucial points been ready to disregard world opinion entirely or give it only slight consideration. Their awareness of world opinion is, therefore, a factor which cannot be weighed accurately.

(*e*) A much more important factor is the domestic problem the Kremlin faces in case of war. Most American political scientists unthinkingly repeat the theory that totalitarian dictatorships depend on war and that indeed the Soviet regime would collapse if it were "contained" from waging aggressive warfare. This may have been true of the German and Italian brands of totalitarian dictatorship, but the contrary is true for the Soviet Union. While it is useful for Soviet rulers to maintain a warlike xenophobic spirit among its people, the experience of World War II has shown clearly that the danger of internal collapse approaches precisely when the country gets involved in a foreign war. Never was the Soviet regime in so immediate a danger of internal defeat as in the fall of 1941. Knowing this, it is my firm belief that the Soviet leaders regard it as an essential element of their national interest to stay out of war. They still think primarily in terms of defense rather than expansion. Even today they seem to stress defensive as against offensive weapons in their ambitious armament effort (for instance, submarines rather than aircraft carriers).

(*f*) It must be clear to the Soviet leaders that their present position of military equality with the United States rests solely on their possession of thermonuclear weapons. Do away with them and with atomic weapons as well, and the U. S. S. R. will once again be second best. Nevertheless, I believe they are, or could be, interested in the total abolition of atomic and thermonuclear warfare for the reasons given above. Moreover, the Soviet leaders still seem convinced that time is in their favor. Economically and politically, they believe they have nothing to lose by peaceful isolationism, whereas they expect that we are threatened with great difficulties if our worldwide expansion is contained. And in their view, our expansion is already being contained, and our strength being sapped by the ever spreading fire of revolution in Asia, Africa, and South America. At the same time, they will not lose an ounce of their morbid suspicion and nervous vigilance against the slightest increase in our strength or stiffening in our attitude.

Some would challenge my assertion that Soviet military equality depends on their possession of thermonuclear weapons. They would point out that, assuming the absence of such weapons, the Soviet

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orbit would face the West with a vast manpower superiority. The relative weight of manpower in overall military potential, however, is at least debatable. While Soviet superiority in this field cannot be disputed, the United States, even without thermonuclear or atomic weapons, would still have an overwhelming superiority in industrial potential. In addition, it must be remembered that the U. S. S. R. has some degree of superiority because of America's greater vulnerability, especially as long as both of the big powers continue to possess nuclear weapons. By the time the U. S. S. R. will have caught up with the United States in industrial potential, the power structure of the world will have changed sufficiently to make all present calculations meaningless.

2. Inspection: Any answer whatsoever must assume that once all weapons are destroyed an effective method of inspection could be devised. Whether this assumption is realistic is for the scientists to determine. My impression is that scientists have grave doubts about the feasibility of an effective inspection system. But, given the above assumption, my feeling is that the Soviet leaders might permit two types of inspection, on the basis of the strictest reciprocity:

(1) Harmless, ineffectual schemes, such as a limited adaption of the "open skies" proposals.

(2) Really effective inspection by a supranational body, combined with or following the destruction of all thermonuclear weapons. But the chances for this are very slim indeed.

I cannot envisage any changes in the Soviet Union which would bring about a greater willingness to permit effective inspection, short of another Russian revolution. At the same time, an overall settlement of the cold war might bring about such willingness even without any structural changes in the Soviet political system.

3. It is very hard to say to what extent present or future Soviet policymakers would submit to an enforcement agency. The reason is that they have never been confronted with a really hard-hitting proposal. It is time a really sweeping proposal for enforcement were made to them, forcing them either to put up or shut up. The ensuing dilemma might even lead to internal political changes favoring the establishment of effective inspection and enforcement.

4. Prior to the events of last fall in Poland and Hungary I would have said that the U. S. S. R. might consent to withdrawal of its troops from Eastern Europe if NATO were dissolved and Western Europe sailed into neutralist waters. While a withdrawal now seems entirely out of the question, I should still say that even now the U. S. S. R. might withdraw from Eastern Europe in conjunction with an overall settlement of the cold war, entailing among other things the neutralization of Europe.

The events in Hungary have somewhat confounded us all. Immediately after making a surprisingly meek withdrawal in Poland, Moscow brutally reasserted its tottering supremacy when the Hungarian revolution went out of control. It is possible that we attach too much significance to this Soviet about-face. The military interest that the U. S. S. R. has in Hungary and in the rest of Eastern Europe is very great indeed, but it would decline somewhat were all of Europe, especially Germany, neutralized. The economic benefits the U. S. S. R.

has derived from exploiting Eastern Europe are far less important to Moscow, in my estimation. Finally, politically, Eastern Europe might become such a liability to the Kremlin that they would make the decision to release these countries with a good deal of relief some day.

The events in Hungary have shown that the allegiance of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe depends on the presence of the Soviet Army. If they pulled out, each one of the satellite states would be shaken by revolution. But even if they do not pull out, the unrest in Eastern Europe is not likely to abate; on the contrary, I foresee possible years of continued restiveness and rebellion, keeping the Red Army busy, draining Soviet economic resources or at least negating all economic benefits, voiding all political credit that the U. S. S. R. might have in the world, and nurturing discontent among the Soviet citizens at home. Everything and anything is possible in revolution. But the United States should at least make efforts to channel spontaneous events into desirable directions (for that is the essence of political leadership). And we should be guided in this not only by our own ideas concerning the best form of government and the most desirable structure of society, but even more by the genuine wishes of the people in the areas affected. This means that in some areas the wisest policy would be to give support to democratic socialists or even to parties experimenting with democratic communism; for the only alternatives to such regimes might be either chaos, stagnation, or totalitarian dictatorship of the right or the left. Whatever party or coalition we decide to support, our support should be given vigorously and unhesitatingly.

5. I fully agree with the Secretary of State in his analysis of the burden which the armaments race places on the Soviet economy and the consequences disarmament would have on it. But I totally disagree with him in the conclusions drawn from it. To Mr. Dulles, the economic benefits that the U. S. S. R. would derive from disarmament appear to be an argument against disarmament. I, on the contrary, believe that a farsighted United States Government should welcome the relief of economic distress wherever it may be brought about. In the long run, the interests of the United States will be promoted most effectively by policies based on the principle, what is good for the world is good for America, on the belief that by aiding the economies of less richly endowed nations, either directly or indirectly, we will be aiding our own economy and improving our own political position. The United States will be able to maintain world leadership only if it uses its wealth of resources, skill, and productivity for the benefit of the world at large and enables or prods Soviet Russia to rival us in this constructive endeavor. In promoting realistic disarmament proposals, our Government should therefore stress the benefits accruing not only to the Soviet economy and the Soviet consumer, but also to the underdeveloped nations, as potential beneficiaries of Soviet aid.

While economic problems are outside my narrow field of studies, my impression is that for the last quarter of a century the Soviet Union has been short of manpower. If this is true, then a reduction of her armed forces would directly benefit her economy. In any event, Soviet manpower seems to be more easily converted and shifted, so

that the U. S. S. R. would probably face less difficulty in converting soldiers to civilians than this country. This should not, of course, blind us to the tremendous economic benefits our country would derive from disarmament. Certainly we would forfeit all claims to leadership and imagination if we let ourselves be scared by the brief pangs of conversion into overlooking the fantastic possibilities of enriching ourselves and the entire world by putting to constructive use the vast resources now being invested in the manufacture of means of destruction.

6. What are the legitimate security interests of the U. S. S. R.? The concept of legitimate interests is a political concept, not a legal one. That means that it is defined not on the basis of abstract (legal) principles or rules, but on the basis of power. A legitimate interest is that interest which a sovereign state can defend successfully.

If the world is regarded as a jungle in which sovereign states, responsible to none, fight for power in peace and war, this definition of legitimate interest prevails. But if the world is seen as one political community, in which each nation represents an interest group comparable to the multitude of groups in smaller political communities, then only those interests can be recognized as legitimate which do not conflict with the interests of the community as a whole. Again, the nature of these various interests is in every case decided in the political process. That means that the irresponsible interests of powerful groups (monopolies, national minorities, unions, ruling classes, sovereign states) will be curbed in the measure as the community as a whole emerges as a political force.

Disarmament, peace, worldwide democracy, and worldwide prosperity today depend on the promotion of such a political community. The very concept of a national interest in the traditional sense of the word (linked with the concept of sovereignty) is one of the major obstacles in this. The cold war has stiffened both major powers in their defense of the national interests, and the rising nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are following our example. This stiffening expresses itself in the rigid legalism, in which Soviet diplomats especially have become past masters. Again the United States can take the lead. By making bold, pioneering steps in promoting the growth of a world community, it can shame the U. S. S. R. into gradual abandonment of this legalism. We should, by our own example, show the world that sovereignty is as reactionary a concept as old-fashioned, irresponsible insistence on the absolute sanctity of private property, as against the right of eminent domain, and that the legitimate interests of even the leading powers must be curbed by the overriding interest of mankind.

Reply of Prof. Nicholas N. Poppe, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, December 16, 1956

Question No. 1

Answer: I do not believe that the leaders of the U. S. S. R. recognize the threat of mutual annihilation created by nuclear or thermodynamic weapons, in the same manner as the non-Communist world does. I base this statement on the words spoken by Khrushchev who said that it is impossible that the entire human race could perish in

consequence of nuclear warfare. He said that large groups of people would survive. I think that the number of people killed or crippled will be enormous if nuclear weapons are to be used. And it is easy to understand why the non-Communist world is so afraid of an atomic war. But the Soviet leaders do not think so. They do not care for how many people might be killed. Sufficient evidence is given by the mere fact of existence of concentration camps in the U. S. S. R. It is commonly known that the concentration camps in the U. S. S. R. have killed about 25 million people in these 30 years or so after the first concentration camp had been organized in the former Solovetski monastery on an island in the White Sea which is part of the Arctic Sea. It is also known that in World War II the Soviets were very little concerned about casualties. Very often they would attack a position, held by one German regiment, with 10 or 20 divisions and take it at the price of thousands of casualties. Sacrifices of human lives do not mean anything to the Soviets. If they could achieve a victory over the free world at the price of 75 percent of the entire population of the U. S. S. R. dead, they would gladly wage such a war promising them victory over the non-Communist world. If the free world thinks that the Soviets will never wage an atomic war out of fear that it might cost them millions of dead, then the free world is greatly mistaken. Human life does not mean anything in the U. S. S. R. It is manure for the Communist crops.

I do not see that the recent policies of the Soviets reflect the assumption that prevention of a nuclear war is in the mutual interests of both the free world and the U. S. S. R. On the contrary, they explode more and more nuclear bombs, and not so long ago, the Soviet leaders even threatened Great Britain by saying that the latter could easily become a victim of modern methods of warfare used against that country by a "stronger nation." It is not hard to guess who is meant by that "stronger nation." To this should be added the recent abusive address of foreign diplomats by Khrushchev who bluntly said that the Soviets would bury "all of you." Thus, Khrushchev uses threat. He is aggressive and his speeches can be interpreted only as a threat to use the most destructive weapons which will enable the Soviets to bury the non-Communist world.

Therefore, I do not believe that the Soviets will seriously seek agreement on control of weapons. This disbelief of mine stems from my general mistrust of whatever the Soviets say or do. Their disarmament talks are only propaganda.

Question No. 2

Answer. I do not believe that the U. S. S. R. will be opened to inspection. The Soviets may propose to create a 500 or 1,000 miles wide border line open to inspection, but they will not open the whole of the U. S. S. R. It is commonly known that supersonic aircraft and installations for launching of rockets must not be necessarily stationed in the immediate vicinity of a nation to make the latter vulnerable. As the whole of the U. S. S. R. will not be opened to inspection, the question about how much of it should or could be opened becomes rather irrelevant.

Why will the leaders of the U. S. S. R. not open their whole territory to inspection? Suppose military observers will be admitted. But will they not see there concentration camps, jails, teams of slaves

digging canals, building railroads, etc.? Can the Soviets expose the side of Soviet life to foreign observers? And if the Soviets try to conceal their concentration camps and succeed in doing so, where is there a guaranty that they will not try to conceal also other things such as atomic installations, rocket bases, etc.?

And who will believe in the willingness of the Soviets to admit observers after the Secretary of the UNO was not permitted to enter Hungary?

I see no future changes in this attitude of the Soviets. On the contrary, the Soviets will be even less easy to deal with after these recent revolts in Poland, Hungary, etc.

However, to leave for a moment the world of reality and move into the realm of speculation and fantasy, let us assume for an instant that the Soviets might agree to open their territory to inspection. This might be possible in a very remote future and only if—

1. All concentration camps are closed and no equivalent of such camps is tolerated in the U. S. S. R;
2. Slave labor is abolished;
3. General economic and political conditions greatly improve;
4. The collective farms really produce more and better grain and other products than the old, privately owned farms;
5. In one word: if there will be nothing to hide, nothing to conceal, and if the Soviets, on the contrary, will be even eager to demonstrate the "decadent capitalist world" their "happy people and their prosperous and cheerful life."

However, I am sure everyone will agree with me that this picture is highly unrealistic. Therefore, my opinion is that the Soviets will never open all areas of the U. S. S. R. And as the U. S. S. R. is vast and in the woods and marshlands of Siberia anything and in any quantity can be hidden, the free inspection in some areas will be of little real value. Perhaps, the military experts will correct me and say that even this sort of inspection will be valuable, but I reserve for myself the right not to agree with them in this point.

Question No. 3

Answer. The Soviets will never agree to an enforcement agency which will consider and deal with violations of the disarmament agreement. Such an agency could practically be either a UNO or a United States agency. The Soviets have not permitted their Hungarian puppet government to admit an observation team of UNO representatives and even the Secretary of the UNO, Hammarskjöld, could not enter that country at the time of the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution. It is still less probable that they will admit a UNO or United States agency into their sacrosanctum, the restricted areas of the U. S. S. R. where all their military secrets are guarded. The Soviets have so often used their veto to frustrate any decision by the UNO which might be unfavorable to the Soviets that it is beyond doubt that no such agency will be able to carry out its tasks.

Question No. 4

Answer. The Soviets might be willing to withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe only after they are absolutely sure that the Communist regime in their satellites has been so firmly established

that no changes in the political structure, no revolts or revolutions will be possible. This means that the Soviets might withdraw their troops after their satellites are firmly integrated in the Soviet system, as firmly as any Soviet union or autonomous republic within the framework of the U. S. S. R. Besides, a precondition for withdrawal will certainly be the withdrawal of all United States units from any place in the world outside the United States. And finally, the third prerequisite will be the disbandment of the NATO.

The question about the "likelihood of further developments in the direction of liberalization" can be left unanswered in view of the recent events in Hungary which have clearly demonstrated that the de-Stalinization has not brought any essential changes and that the Comunist regime in the U. S. S. R. has remained absolutely the same in essense as under Stalin. The "further" liberalization is still less probable.

The events in Hungary have also demonstrated that the creation of a neutral belt is impossible, because that hypothetic neutral belt must be a pro-Communist belt and not simply a neutral one, in order to be acceptable to the Soviets. And what does the word "neutral" mean? We understand it as impartiality or as taking neither side in military questions, and a neutral country is, as we understand it, a country which would never conduct a war (unless it is attacked). But the Soviets do not accept this idea. Communism is an ideology but not merely a political system. An ideology can never accept neutrality, absolute neutrality. "Either someone is with us or he is against us," said Lenin and continued, "One who is not with us is against us."

And finally, let us assume for a moment that the Soviets will agree to a neutral belt. Is there a guaranty that those "neutral" countries will not have a strong police force with planes and tanks similar to the "people's police" in East Germany? And is there any guaranty that in the case of an armed conflict somewhere in the world those "neutral" countries will not send armies of "volunteers" to help Communist rebels against their legitimate government? There is no guaranty and I am absolutely sure that this is exactly what the "neutral" pro-Communist belt will do. Such a belt can become a really neutral one only in the case of a complete change of the regime. As one will remember Hungary wanted to become a neutral country. This desire was one of the leading ideas underlying their struggle for independence, but the Soviets have not permitted the Hungarians to become a neutral and democratic country. After this example of the Soviet attitude toward neutrality and democracy, one can hardly expect sincerity and honesty on the Soviet side.

The question about the extent of the dependency of the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe upon the presence of Soviet armed forces in those countries has been fully answered by the events in Hungary. The Communist regimes in the satellites would instantly topple the same moment the Soviets leave. Only the brutal force of the Red army can guarantee the Soviet leaders the further existence of the Communist governments in the satellites.

Question No. 5

Answer. One should not exaggerate the cost of rearmaments to a regime such as the Soviets. In a country where all the industries, raw materials, soil deposits, transportation means, banks, etc., are government owned, and where the labor is extremely cheap (an average Soviet

worker earns one-tenth of what an American worker earns), and where slave labor is abundant, the production cost is much lower than in a country like the United States. The basic axiom is that the lower the living standard, the lower the production cost and vice versa.

The conclusion from this is that the high cost of rearmament is much less burdensome to the Soviets than it is to the free world.

To this the following should be added. Some students of Soviet affairs believe that the rearmament of the Soviets in the postwar period is particularly burdensome to the Soviet economy. However, the truth is that the Soviets have not started spending their money in such large amounts recently. They were always spending billions of gold rubles on items which do not bring any returns to the Soviet economy. First of all, since 1921 the Soviets maintained schools and universities for Chinese, Malayan, Indian, Moslem, etc., Communists in the U. S. S. R., and various training and indoctrination centers where foreign Communists were trained. They published propaganda books and papers in all languages of the world and sent them free to all countries. The Soviets equipped the Chinese Communist army, trained Red Chinese officers in Soviet military academies. The Soviets supported the anti-Franco Communist movement in Spain in 1936–38, equipped Red Spanish military units, trained their officers, sent them ammunition, etc. The Soviets give full economic support to their satellites in Asia, e. g., Outer Mongolia or the so-called Mongolian People's Republic which costs them millions every year. The Soviets have been spending these millions and billions for at least 30 years. Thus, the new expenses on supersonic aircraft, atomic bombs, etc., are nothing new in the Soviet budget. The Soviets have always had a special item in their budget; namely, allotments for the "export of revolution" and for subversion in other countries.

The recent reduction of the Soviet troops by about 1,800,000 men can hardly be attributed to economic consideration.

As a matter of fact, the Soviet Army has been, for many years, overmanned. The Soviets have been keeping an army of approximately 4 million men. This is, of course, too much for peacetime. Even in the event of an emergency the remaining 2,200,000 men represent an army by far exceeding anything on the European or Asiatic Continent. The main point, however, is that in the atomic age the Soviets need not a 4 million army. And this reduction is, to me, an irrefutable evidence that the Soviets do not believe in an agreement on atomic weapons and their abolition.

It is doubtful that the Soviets will reduce their armed forces still more in the future, because the Soviet military doctrine recognizes, even in the atomic age, the necessity of a large land army for occupation purposes.

Question No. 6

Answer. The legitimate security interests of the U. S. S. R. can be easily formulated. They are the same as the legitimate interests of any past or future regime in Russia. These interests are:

1. The guaranty that the U. S. S. R. will not be attacked by any other nation or group of nations.
2. A guaranty of the U. S. S. R. frontiers (which must be defined in view of the fact that the annexation of the Baltic States has not been recognized by the United States and some other nations).

3. A guaranty that the interests of the U. S. S. R. in areas defined under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements will be safeguarded.

4. A guaranty that no nation will officially support or tolerate any activities directed against the Soviet regime.

This does not mean, of course, that refugees and emigrants must be deprived of the right to express their ideas about the Soviet regime, but they must not overtly enjoy support by any government which has diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R.

These are the minimum requirements. As a matter of fact nobody is going to attack the U. S. S. R. or to revise its frontiers, but it will be hard to convince the Soviets that this is so. The matter is that the Soviet interpretation of many words and terms is different from our interpretation. Thus, the Soviets regard as spy work thousands of activities which are not spy work as we understand them. Photographing of cities, railroad stations, factories, military parades, ships, airplanes flying high in the sky, etc., is looked at suspiciously by the Soviets. Frank discussion of what is going on in the U. S. S. R. is labeled as anti-Soviet propaganda, slander, subversion, etc. And the most crucial question is: What should be meant by "interests of the U. S. S. R. in areas as defined under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements"? What are "interests"? The Soviets understand this as full communization. This is obviously very different from our semantic of the word "interests."

I only know one thing, that the Soviets have their own ideas about "interests." Everything that is profitable to somebody while not bringing damage to others is in our opinion "the legitimate interest" of that person. The Soviet interpretation is different. The "legitimate" interests of the U. S. S. R., as the Soviets understand them, require that any agreement, any deal, and any measure taken by anybody be profitable and advantageous to the U. S. S. R., on the one side, and detrimental to another side, on the other hand. It is our principle to live and to let the others live, but the Leninist wisdom teaches: "Who will beat whom?"

Under such conditions, the prospects of reaching any sort of disarmament and inspection agreement with the Soviet Union are rather poor, and the world picture remains dark and gloomy. I would be very happy if the future developments show that I am absolutely wrong, but I am afraid my 40-year experience in Soviet affairs has not misled me.

Reply of Stefan T. Possony, Professor of International Politics, Georgetown University, March 7, 1957

The subject of disarmament obviously is of great importance to the security of the United States. It is a subject which has come up repeatedly during the last 60 years, and which will continue to arrest attention. On the whole the historical record shows that the various disarmament programs which were proposed and initiated in the past have operated to the detriment of the democratic nations. More specifically, unreasoned Western disarmament during the twenties and thirties was one of the prime conditions of World War II.

The record also shows that many of the specific disarmament or limitation of armaments concepts were faulty in design and not en-

forceable in practice. This particular remark refers to such ideas as the attempted outlawing of offensive as against defensive weapons, the establishment of international police forces, as well as to attempts of combining disarmament with collective security. The most carefully thought out security system—the Geneva Protocol of 1924—could not be made foolproof and it was not adopted because it would have all but destroyed national sovereignty. The more reliable a security system is from the technical-military point of view, the less compatible it is with the political system of the nation-state. For many reasons I doubt that the security situation could be changed fundamentally through the abolition of the nation-state structure, disregarding the fact that such a transformation could be accomplished only through war and probably never will be brought about deliberately by any government as a means of securing peace.

In previous years I devoted considerable study to disarmament. You will find many of the results at which I arrived, laid down in the book published by Professor Strausz-Hupe and myself, entitled "International Relations," McGraw-Hill, first edition, 1950, chapter XX, Armament, Disarmament, and National Security; chapter XXI, Atomic Bombs and Atomic Politics; chapter XXVI, Peace Enforcement; and chapter XXVII, Peace Enforcement: Prevention of War. (These last two chapters discuss the problem of international forces.) In a shortened version, and with added conclusions, these studies were rewritten for the second edition of the same book published during 1954, especially chapter 26, Waging the Peace. I call your attention to the subchapter called Peacefare: A Political Task, pages 719–726 of the second edition. You or your staff might find it useful to consult these writings.

I now will turn to your specific questions.

Question 1a:

> Are there grounds for believing that the leaders of the Soviet Union do recognize the threat of mutual annihilation created by the new weapons?

Answer: All powerful weapons of history could have been employed for mutual annihilation. Wars of mutual annihilation have taken place, for example during the 17th century, without benefit of nuclear explosives. That the new weapons have increased lethality exponentially is a fact of which the Soviets, of course, are fully aware. Your question implies, however, that the lethality of weapons has a clear-cut relationship to the possibility of mutual annihilation. While highly lethal weapons unquestionably can lead to annihilation, these two factors have many interrelationships. I do not think that the Soviets—who are no amateurs in military affairs—would think in the framework that is suggested by your question. They will recognize lethality and they will draw the conclusion that nuclear weapons must be used in such a way that Soviet strategic purposes will be achieved. Obviously, the annihilation of the Soviet Union is not one of their strategic purposes, but the annihilation of the United States is. In my judgment, the Soviets are aiming at a strategy of unilateral nuclear war. I explained some aspects of this concept in Air University Quarterly Review, Winter 1954–55, page 43, et seq.

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Question 1b:

To what extent, if at all, has this assumption entered into the formulation of policy and recent acts of the Soviet Union?

Answer: Since I do not believe that they make this assumption, the answer would be that their policy is influenced by the fear of mutual annihilation only to the extent that the Soviets exploit this fear, which is widespread in the United States and other free nations. They formulate policy partly in order to take advantage of the nuclear apprehensions prevalent in the West. The question also presupposes that the Soviets think and act as though they consider themselves to be the representatives of Russian national interests. Without entering into the merits of this hypothesis, I shall point out merely that an international organization, or conspiracy, is vulnerable in a different way from a nation. It may not be really vulnerable to atomic weapons.

Question 1c:

What are the possibilities that the leaders of the Soviet, either now or in the foreseeable future, will recognize a mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war and seriously seek agreement on control of weapons?

Answer: The Communists recognize that they have a great interest in preventing the United States from attacking the Soviet Union with its full power, but they do not by any means recognize that it is in their interest to preserve the United States from nuclear attack. The mutuality of interest to which your question addresses itself would be recognized by them only if they have concluded that under no circumstances will it be possible for them to achieve military surprise, technological and qualitative superiority, or the unilateral disarmament (or substantial reduction of armaments) of the United States. There never will be a situation where such a recognition can be made with assurance and for long (as distinguished from fleeting) periods. At any given time the Soviets may judge that their capabilities are inadequate for attack. At such a moment they will attempt, either to bluff the United States, or to persuade it to reduce armaments. Simultaneously, they will do everything in their power to acquire a situation of superiority. As time goes by, their chances to achieve a superior posture are increasing—they really should have been interested in disarmament in the past. Hence, I do not believe that they ever will recognize this presumed mutuality of interest.

However, this answer is predicated on the assumption that the intentions and structure of the Soviet Government, and the pressures upon the Soviet system and its decision making personalities, will remain substantially unchanged, and that Soviet technological capabilities will continue to grow, in both absolute and relative terms. If the Soviet Government should undergo significant transformations, and if the United States should pull ahead markedly in the technological race, the Soviet Union may seek some kind of provisional disarmament agreement. To the extent that some Communist "deviationist" group becomes influential, we may speculate that such a group might try to use disarmament mechanisms in order to make it more difficult for the aggressive wing of the Communist party to regain the upper hand.

In the absence of such changes—and there is no indication that the Soviet evolution has moved in any manner far enough to assume that such changes even are in the making—the Soviet Government will seriously sanction agreement on weapons control only if it has decided that (*a*) nuclear weapons are unnecessary or harmful to its strategy; (*b*) the control of nuclear weapons has becomes militarily pointless due to technological changes, such as space flight; (*c*) the controls which have been found acceptable can be circumvented by the Soviets in furtherance of their strategy, or could be employed as a suitable cover for surprise attack; and (*d*) other reasons with similar logic.

Question 2a:

> Given the present situation and the political structure of the Soviet Union, is there any possibility of reaching agreement opening the Soviet Union up to inspection?

Answer. No.

Question 2b:

> How far is it likely that the present Soviet leaders would go now in opening their country to inspection?

Answer. It is possible that the Soviets will allow a somewhat increased volume of personnel exchanges, including visits of scientists, military officers, newspapermen, and tourists. They will not, except by unlikely inadvertence or as a part of a deliberate program of exhibiting military strength, grant access to any installation or activity related to current or future military capabilities, let alone operations. It must be borne in mind that the secrecy mania is characteristic not only of the Communist regime, but has been for centuries one of the most outstanding character traits of Russia.

Question 2c:

> Under what circumstances might they be induced to go farther?

Answer. On a tit-for-tat basis they might allow visits to installations they otherwise would keep closed. Any such decisions would be made in the light of the then existing political situation, for a specific benefit, and would apply only to an individual case. In general, it can be assumed that if on a quid-pro-quo basis the Soviets were to grant broader concessions, they will have estimated that a greater advantage is accruing to them than to the United States.

Question 2d:

> If you believe any degree of inspection is unacceptable to the present Soviet regime, what kind of changes would have to come about in the U. S. S. R. or outside the Soviet Union before there would be willingness on the part of a Soviet Government to consider agreement involving such inspections?

Answer. Changes outside the Soviet Union presumably have no bearing, except if the Soviets would judge that foreign powers were getting ready to attack with weapons systems which the Soviet forces cannot intercept and against which they cannot retaliate. Changes inside the U. S. S. R. which would induce them to consider inspection were mentioned under 1c. In general, the answer must be, I sup-

pose, that Russia will have to get a democratic government, that this government must acquire a true and tested stability and that the orientation and habits of the Russian bureaucracy must change in direction of honest cooperation with foreign officials. It is not only the political system which is relevant to this problem, but also the mores of the nation. So long as the dictatorship lasts, the Soviets will not accept any broad inspection, because it would undermine the stability of the system. On the other hand, if there is a truly democratic government in Russia, the utility of an inspection system would be considerably reduced because, presumably, such a government would not be aggressive. I want to qualify the foregoing remarks by saying that of all types of inspection, aerial inspection is the one which would pose the least political danger to the survival of the Communist regime while, by contrast, it would be the least acceptable inspection method as long as they are toying with the idea of surprise attack. The capability to hold on to strictly military secrets is minimal against aerial inspection, but can be quite considerable against ground inspection.

Question 2e:

Can you envisage such changes occurring in the near or distant future?

Answer. I can envisage that the present rate of change within the Soviet Union will be accelerated, although this need not be the case. However, as the Soviet system is undergoing transformations, it will be especially careful not to expose itself to dangers that might arise from an inspection system (except as stated above that one of the groups fighting for power might consider that an inspection system would be helpful to them in their internal struggle). As these changes continue, they ultimately will culminate in a structural crisis and lead to the replacement of the Soviet Government. This is almost certain on the basis of historical precedent. It is less certain, of course, that all this will happen in the absence of war, that the direction of the change will be in line with our wishes, that the Soviet Government will be succeeded by a democratic government, and that this government can stay in power. Assuming that war can be avoided, the time parameters of such a historical development must be figured approximately as follows: 15 to 20 years, with a margin of error of about 10 years either way, before the Soviet system goes out of business. (The decline of the Czarist system lasted about 30 years, including about 5 war years.) Subsequently, at least 2 years will elapse before a democratic government can function properly, and perhaps an additional 5 to 10 years before this government will become stable and be accepted generally by the Russian people. In other words, the time parameter before an inspection system of a truly effective type (if it could be devised technically) can be instituted, may be estimated at 25 to 30 years. It should be added that by 1980 or 1990 military technology will be entirely different from what it is today, so that we may assume that at that time the inspection system we have in mind presently no longer would have the value it could have today, or no longer would be technologically applicable. In amplification of my time "estimate," let me say that historical processes in general have been accelerated during the 20th century. Sudden crises are possible

at an early time and incidentally, may be accompanied by international conflict. The earliest time by which it is conceivable that a basic change will have occurred, would be within 10 years. Prudence dictates that a larger interval be anticipated.

Question 3a:

To what extent would the present regime in the Soviet Union be willing to submit to and abide by such an enforcement agency?

Answer. The present regime? To no extent.

Question 3b:

To what extent would any Soviet regime in the foreseeable future be willing to agree to such an enforcement agency?

Answer. Probably to no extent except as the enforcement agency might be used to the disadvantage of the United States. As long as there is a Soviet regime in Russia, no basic change can be anticipated. We can only have hopes in this matter—after all, Saulus became Paulus. However, a regime of the dictatorial type does not usually change. It must be replaced. The danger exists that the United States, in implementation of a disarmament agreement, might disarm at full speed but the Soviets would delay. It is conceivable that the Soviets would anticipate full American compliance with agreements. Therefore, they may calculate that an agreement through which the United States could be induced to disarm at a substantially faster rate than the Soviet Union, might offer them a most useful opportunity for attack.

Question 4a:

Under what conditions would the Soviet Union be willing to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe?

Answer. I believe that the Soviets do not want to withdraw troops from Eastern Europe under any conditions except that they would be willing to give up territory which, like Hangoe or Austria, is of little importance to them. Disregarding the question of whether or not there are Russian forces in the country, I believe that they might be willing, at some time, to give up Albania and conceivably Bulgaria. Poland would be the most unlikely country for them to abandon. We should not be overimpressed with the physical presence of Russian troops in a specific Eastern European country. The Communists might work some kind of an internal security arrangement through which, despite troop withdrawal, they would retain control over the satellite, as they have done in Czechoslovakia. It would follow then, that the significant question to ask is not whether or not they will withdraw troops, but whether they will withdraw troops plus allow the reestablishment of democratic government based on free elections, whether they would acquiesce in the downfall of the local Communist government, and whether they would permit liberated states to pursue an independent policy in every respect, including the participation in security agreements. (The significance of security agreements, of course, is that they would preclude the Soviets from reoccupying liberated states by means short of war.)

Question 4b:

What is the likelihood of further developments in the direction of liberalization in the Eastern European countries and how might this affect the Soviet Union's readiness to consider the creation of a neutral belt through Europe or otherwise limit and control arms in a zone including the captive nations?

Answer. Further anti-Soviet developments in the satellite states are very likely, but it is as likely that the Soviets will intervene to prevent the overthrow of Communist governments. The situation in Eastern Europe probably will not follow one single direction, but for many years will display many ups and downs. If for one reason or the other, the Soviets feel that it is too costly, unproductive, impractical or militarily useless to maintain control over a satellite, they might negotiate an American quid pro quo for withdrawal. In general, the Soviets, due to their geographic proximity to Eastern and Central Europe, have less to lose from a "neutral belt" than the United States. Therefore, they can risk playing around with this idea, even though, in my opinion, they do not have the slightest intention of leaving. In the particular case of Germany, the significant question is not whether the Russian and American forces would be withdrawn in exchange of a German commitment to neutrality (which is another illusion), but whether the Soviets would tolerate the unification of Germany as a fully sovereign state which has complete freedom to develop and maintain its own defenses. The Soviets are all in favor of a Germany which they can reoccupy within 48 hours or bomb at will at even shorter notice, but they are opposed to a "neutral" Germany which could effectively defend itself against Soviet attack.

Question 4c:

To what extent is the domination of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe dependent upon the presence of the Red army within or near the borders of these nations?

Answer. Despite the fact that some of the satellites are not effectively occupied by Soviet forces, the Soviet Union maintains its power in Eastern Europe largely by military means. Since it is very difficult to overthrow a well-armed dictatorship, especially if it is supported from the outside, it could be argued that, despite the Hungarian example, communism can maintain itself in these states (except, probably in Eastern Germany) even after Soviet troop withdrawal. The situation might be different if it were clear that the Soviet military forces would not return. Moreover, the way by which the withdrawal is brought about would play a role. On balance, it can be said that the Soviets probably estimate that their military presence in at least some of the satellite countries, as well as easy military access to Eastern Europe, is an indispensable element of their rule over those nations, as well as a key factor in their overall strategic position.

Question 4d:

How would a marked reduction of the size of Soviet forces or other kind of disarmament control affect Soviet influence over the Eastern European countries?

Answer. A marked reduction of the size of Soviet forces need not seriously weaken their hold over Eastern Europe. This depends in part on what type of forces they will retain. To the extent that, qualitatively and quantitatively, Soviet military strength really would be reduced and be limited as to its employment possibilities, the Soviet position over Eastern Europe would weaken. If such a reduction of military strength (not size) can be brought about by disarmament, armament limitation agreements would promote the liberation of Eastern Europe. I consider this a fanciful idea, however. The Soviets hardly will want to pay an excessive price for disarmament, and the elimination of communism from Eastern Europe would be an excessive price for them, especially since the event would have repercussions in Russia and also would be incompatible with the concept of world revolution. If in its ultimate consequences, disarmament would lead to the destruction of communism, can we seriously expect the Communists to agree to such a scheme?

Question 5a:

What comment do you have on Mr. Dulles' statement?

Answer. I think that Mr. Dulles has a point: everybody wants to be relieved from burdens. The question is: What priority will the Soviets assign to this imputed desire to save money on military expenditures? The record of the last 25 years is that they have constantly assigned highest priority to military preparedness. At the present time there is not one solitary fact which would indicate that this priority has ben changed or watered down. The Soviet mentality is not like the mentality of American businessmen, and it is conceivable that the Soviets, far from considering military expenditures as burdens, like the Prussians of previous centuries, regard military strength as their main and preferred industry. Military power can be a very considerable economic asset, and the Soviets are quite aware of this.

On the other hand, it is true that the Soviet economy is now entering a phase where some painful decisions must be made. They will have to raise, to a degree at least, living standards and there is clearly a conflict between current military expenditures, and investment and growth rates. The maintenance of a rapid growth rate is becoming militarily crucial since, due to technological developments, the Soviet strategic planners probably consider that the main conflict with the United States will take place only in the next or in a subsequent technological cycle. To the extent that by maintaining huge armaments now they may inhibit industrial growth, they could jeopardize their future technological posture. If this is their thinking, they might be willing to reduce current expenditures somewhat in order to strike a beter balance between present and future military requirements. If so, this would be a rearrangement of armament schedules, but not a change in priorities and certainly not an attempt to substitute foreign economic aid for a strategy based on military power. By the same token, it might not be in the true interest of the free world if we were to assist them, through armament limitation agreements, to solve one of their most difficult strategic problems.

Question 5b:

To what economic considerations, if any, can the announced Soviet troop reductions of 1,800,000 men be attributed?

Answer. There is a distinct manpower shortage in the Soviet Union—but how sure are we about the facts alleged in this question?

Question 5c:

> Is there anything in present Soviet economic trends that would indicate a need for relief from the present level of arms production?

Answer. Answered under 5a.

Question 5d:

> To what extent is the structure and adaptability of the Soviet economy such that it could make the adjustment required by an appreciable reduction in production of armaments with greater or less ease than that of the United States?

Answer. I believe the honest answer to this question is that no one really knows. It must be pointed out, however, that a centrally planned economy functions most effectively in the area of heavy and military industries, and that its performance is least satisfactory in those economic fields which require decentralization, flexibility, responsiveness to customers' desires, and large distribution mechanisms. As presently constituted, it is my belief that the Soviet economy cannot effectively adopt the satisfaction of consumers' needs as its primary objective. In any event, the vast buildup of light industries, transportation systems, and internal and external trade facilities would require a far-reaching reorganization of the entire Soviet society, in a manner which may be politically undesirable to the Soviet Government. Perhaps all this is feasible but such changes of the economic structure would require many years.

Question 5e:

> Are there any apparent difficulties involved in such a transition that might require the Soviet Union to go slow on any disarmament process?

Answer: If the Soviets were to switch from heavy industrial and armaments priority production, much more than a simple transition would be involved. It probaby would be unavoidable to reorganize the Soviet economy in a very fundamental manner. Whether this difficulty per se would be a reason to go slow on disarmament—assuming that, for strategic reasons, the Soviet Union desires to execute a disarmament program—can be answered only by speculation. To a large extent, the answer will depend on concrete circumstances, including domestic hazards which may arise in various forms. Naturally, if the economic reorganization should prove more difficult and time consuming than anticipated, the Soviet Government may have no choice but to slow down disarmament. It is only prudent to recognize that the Soviet Government has less freedom of action in this matter than the United States and that, therefore, any agreement with them contains uncertainty factors, even if we give them the benefit of doubt insofar as their intentions are concerned. I am not sure to what extent the Soviets are aware of the inherent limitations of their economic system and I do not think that their awareness on this point, if any, is very sophisticated. I do not believe that the

Soviets would ask themselves such a question before deciding on a disarmament policy, let alone that they would really try to get, objectively, to the bottom of this problem. I may take this opportunity to point out that in my estimation this entire set of questions does not address itself properly to the basic facts of Russian and Soviet psychology, but reflects American procedures and thought patterns.

Question 6a:

> What type of controls would be most workable and effective over the Soviet military establishment?

Answer: Aerial inspection would be an indispensable minimum. It must be supported by strong ground control units without limitations on access to any facility at any time. Moreover, no limitations must be placed on aerial reconnaissance operations, in particular no limitations as to frequencies of flight, altitude, equipment, and utilization of equipment, except to check airplanes as to whether they carry bombs.

Question 6b:

> What are the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union which should be taken into account on disarmament planning?

Answer: The legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union are exactly the same as those of the United States. Any agreement must be based on full and unmitigated reciprocity as to the rights, procedures, and operations of the mutual control establishments.

In conclusion I would like to say a few words about my own philosophy on the inspection proposal. The emergence of a mature air inspection capability is a new fact which has changed disarmament problems to the better. In previous times it was quite impossible to keep track of a country's armaments if that country wanted to prepare itself secretly. Henceforth a proper aerial inspection system could make it extremely difficult for any country to carry out clandestine armaments on a substantial scale or to put it differently, the existence of an aerial inspection system would render clandestine armaments very costly and hazardous. It is, therefore, advisable to explore all the technical problems which must be solved in order to improve the reliability of aerial inspection. It also is politically wise to keep the world informed about the fact that a technical instrument for mutual military supervision has become available. There is no reason to be pessimistic about the purely technical aspects of the problem and certainly, no reason not to try to take full advantage of an existing capability which if it were used properly, could reduce the danger of full-fledged war. In my opinion, the United States was well advised to present these facts to the world and to invite the Soviet Government to explore methods by which this new technology could be utilized to mutual advantage.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that aerial inspection by itself can be developed into a fully reliable instrument. So far as I understand the problem, there is no question but that aerial inspection will have to be supplemented by elaborate ground and communications systems. This means that states will have to maintain extensive facilities and

large operating units on the territories of other states where they will be checking up on major activities of the foreign government. Consequently, no government could remain master in its own house. Thus, the establishment of an effective and reliable inspection system which includes, and also is responsive to the entire game of modern technology, can be undertaken only if the principles of national sovereignty are abandoned. Moreover, as technology changes, the inspection system would have to be readjusted frequently which, of course, might open up various possibilities of foul play. Another difficulty would be that such an inspection system might all but destroy the workings of an industrial economy based on competition.

Whether these various prices should or should not be paid for an inspection system is a philosophical matter. A person who considers the maintenance of peace to be the overriding objective of all political action probably will be ready to pay any price. Others who are aware of the rapidly changing nature of modern technology and impressed by human ingenuity may well argue that even under best conditions, inspection systems can be reliable only for interim periods, and therefore would not be worth the effort, despite the high utility of peace. I merely want to stress that the adoption of a truly reliable inspection system presupposes very fundamental changes of the governmental and political structures of the participating nations. These changes really require social transformation or revolution, and must be so radical that they may well be beyond the capability of governmental decisions but can result only, if they will occur at all, from protracted historical processses.

In the absence of a capability to institute a fully reliable inspection system, the question arises whether we should be satisfied with less and settle, for example, for purely aerial inspection. I believe that, unfortunately, the discussion about inspection systems has been connected improperly with the disarmament issue. Under conditions of limited reliability, an inspection system that may be politically and socially feasible, can do one job: reduce but not eliminate the danger of surprise attack.

I consider such a prospect sufficiently attractive so that we should not abandon our efforts to achieve some progress toward mutual aerial inspection. I have no illusions about Soviet willingness to contribute to human welfare. Our efforts in the cause of true peace should not be made conditional on Soviet cooperation, just as little as the preaching of religious and ethical truths should be made conditional upon the assent of people professing antireligious beliefs and of persons indulging in unethical practices. The law exists irrespective of its "acceptance" by the criminal. The United States was entirely right when it disclosed, and emphasized, that a new technology has become available which could be exploited for security. The world must know this technical fact which, too, exists irrespective of its popularity in the Soviet Union. It is to our advantage to make the world realize that, while the United States is ready to act upon the new technology, the Soviet Union is not so inclined.

However, we must guard against our own confusions. A reduction in the capability of achieving nuclear surprise naturally may reduce the probability of war, but war still would remain entirely practical,

hence possible and therefore we must remain ready to defend ourselves. Since the danger of surprise attack only can be reduced but not eliminated, it would follow that, unless we take undue risks, military preparedness must continue to be the foundation of national security. To the extent that conventional military expenditures are needed in order to deal with the threat of surprise attack, such expenditures could be reduced in proportion to the diminution of the possibility of surprise attack, except that the cost price of modern weapons and operations continues to rise, with the result that such savings—which would be the only ones which could be made with impunity—will not allow us to reverse the upward trend of defense budgets.

I believe that at present only limited progress can be made at best. I certainly would look with favor on any progress, yet we never must forget that this progress has a considerable price tag attached to it. Disregarding the political and social costs involved, the inspection system in itself will be a costly operation. If we try to economize on inspection, it will become ineffective or, to turn this argument around, the greater our investment in inspection, the more we can rely on the system within its technical and practical limitations. For all these reasons, I consider it inadmissible to argue that the adoption of an inspection system could lead to reductions rather than increases in security expenditures; at this stage to tie the inspection program to disarmament or limitation of armaments problems; to expect from inspection that it can do more than reduce the danger of surprise attack; and to foster the illusion that aerial—or any inspection system—can be relied upon to eliminate war. Good things cannot be improved by overburdening. Mankind will be satisfied by the limited achievement of lessening the threat of nuclear surprise attack.

Reply of John S. Reshetar, Jr., Staff Member of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and Visiting Lecturer in Political Science at Yale University, January 14, 1957

1. There is a small amount of evidence which indicates that there is some awareness within the Soviet ruling circle regarding the horrendous destructive power of modern thermonuclear weapons. This was contained in a statement which was included in a preelection address delivered by Georgi M. Malenkov on March 12, 1954. On that occasion, in the course of attacking the "policy of the cold war," the then Soviet Premier made the following statement:[1]

> It is untrue that humanity is limited to a choice between two possibilities: either a new world war or the so-called cold war. Peoples are vitally interested in a firm strengthening of peace. The Soviet Government stands for the further weakening of international tensions, for a stable and protracted peace, and resolutely opposes the policy of the cold war because this policy is the policy of preparing a new world slaughter which, with the contemporary means of warfare, means the destruction of world civilization.

However, this revealing statement should not be taken out of context. Malenkov was specifically attributing the "cold war" to United States

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[1] Pravda, March 13, 1954.

foreign policy and may have been more interested in painting the alleged possible long-range results of this policy in the starkest of colors rather than honestly coming to grips with the problem of international control of nuclear weapons. It should also be noted that Malenkov called for a "stable and protracted peace" rather than for a lasting or permanent peace or the creation of conditions which would mean genuine banning of these weapons by establishing the necessary supranational machinery. Yet Malenkov's statement was followed by the publication in the March 26, 1954, issue of the Soviet military newspaper Red Star of a detailed article in which the construction of a hydrogen bomb and the effect of its explosion were described.

However, this approach was abandoned within 6 weeks at the U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet session in April 1954. N. S. Khrushchev, speaking on April 26, 1954, revived the earlier line which had been so evident at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952. Khrushchev expressed it in the following terms:[2]

> The lessons of history are impossible to forget. And these lessons state that World War I led to the victory of the Socialist revolution in our country. * * * As a result of World War II a series of countries of Europe and Asia fell away from the capitalist system, peoples who irrevocably set out on the path of Socialist development. * * * If the imperialists attempt to loose a new war, it will inevitably end with the crash of the whole capitalist system.

Significantly, Malenkov followed suit by warning that:[3]

> if * * * the aggressive circles, trusting in the atomic bomb, were to decide on lunacy and would want to test the strength and might of the Soviet Union—there can be no doubt that the aggressor will be crushed with that same weapon and that such adventure will lead to the collapse of the capitalist social system (stormy, prolonged applause). It is precisely of this that the lessons of history graphically testify as related to the First and Second World Wars from which capitalism emerged with a significant shrinking of the spheres of its domination. Everyone knows that as a result of two world wars already more than a third of humanity has forever broken with capitalism.

When Malenkov was compelled to resign the premiership in February 1955, V. M. Molotov, then Foreign Minister of the U. S. S. R., declared in an obvious reprimand of Malenkov that:

> It is not "world civilization" that will perish, however much it may suffer from new aggression, but the decaying social system of which bloodthirsty imperialism is the core.[4]

However, a somewhat more sober view was evident in the joint communique of December 13, 1955, issued by Soviet Premier N. A. Bulganin, Party Secretary N. S. Khrushchev, and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. That document included a statement regarding the

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[2] N. S. Khrushchev, Rech' na pervoi sessii verkhovnovo soveta SSSR, chetvertovo sozyva, 26 aprelya 1954 goda (Moscow : Gosizdat Politlit, 1954), p. 16.
[3] Pravda, April 27, 1954.
[4] Pravda, February 9, 1955.

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> futility of war which, owing to the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, could only bring disaster to mankind.[5]

Nevertheless, these statements, followed by Khrushchev's assertion at the 20th Party Congress on February 14, 1956, that

> capitalism will find its grave in a new world war * * * the Socialist camp is invincible—[6]

do not provide great reassurance regarding the Soviet rulers' intentions or their recognition of the danger involved. Yet there are the several statements cited above which do indicate a certain level of awareness of the threat of mutual annihilation. The disturbing element in the Soviet picture derives from the "lessons of history" alluded to above and from the fact that World War II, whatever its cost to the Soviet Union, did enhance the Soviet power position immeasurably.

Now it can be argued, and with some validity, that each of the above statements was calculated in terms of a particular desired effect which it was designed to create, and therefore the extreme assertions regarding the destruction of "capitalism" as a result of World War III need not be taken as more than calculated threats. In other words, the Soviet assertion that World War III will end in Communist domination of the globe is not in itself, it is argued by some, a guarantee that the Soviets desire World War III. However, it cannot be denied at the same time that the statements of Soviet leaders quoted above are of a disquieting nature and hardly testify to the ability of the Soviet leaders to grasp the seriousness of the problem.

Yet it may be that the Soviet ruling circle does "recognize a mutuality of interest in preventing nuclear war" but this interest does not, from their point of view, outweigh other interests. For example, the Soviet rulers assert that they have no intention of employing these weapons unless attacked but propose that they be banned without proper safeguards and under conditions palpably unacceptable to the democracies. It would appear that there are more immediate interests which have prompted the Soviet rulers to take this position; among these are the need to have an external threat—whether real or imagined is irrelevant for their purposes—which can be denounced and can be employed to exact sacrifices from the subject populations and to facilitate generally the control which the regime exercises over these populations. The Soviet rulers have a real interest in the continued existence of a controlled tension between the democracies and the Communist bloc. Indeed, in internal affairs the Soviet rulers have, in a variety of ways, institutionalized tensions so as to reduce their subjects to pliable instruments. Any really effective system of international controls would, in effect, render the Soviet system of internal political controls ineffective because it would liquidate the tension which is a sine qua non of that system.

2. Genuine inspection by an international agency—which would really have to be a supranational body—would require that the representatives of this agency not be restricted to certain points, however "large" and "important" they may be, as provided in the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, and in Premier Bulganin's statement of July 21,

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[5] New York Times, December 14, 1955.
[6] Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 15, 1956, p. 3.

1955, at the Geneva Conference; they must ultimately have complete freedom of movement and access at will to any military installation and industrial enterprise. Such a system of inspection would, in effect, undermine the internal system of political controls essential to the perpetuation of the present regime, given the particular mental stereotypes of its leaders.

The record of Soviet behavior indicates that the presence of any alien non-Soviet bodies on Soviet territory has been a cause for some concern and the activities of such bodies have been restricted. For example, the UNRRA mission in the Ukrainian S. S. R. following World War II, although it had to be tolerated because of the economic aid which it brought, was restricted in many ways and its representatives did not always enjoy real freedom of movement. It is difficult to conceive of a Soviet Government permitting the fulfillment of a genuine plan of inspection.

President Eisenhower's bold aerial inspection plan, first proposed at the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1955, can be regarded as something less than a full and adequate inspection system, although as an initial effort for a more comprehensive plan it merited serious consideration from the Soviet rulers; yet it was rejected by Premier Bulganin on September 19, 1955, and on February 1, 1956. While the Bulganin proposal of November 17, 1956, admits of the possibility of the Soviet Union's agreeing to aerial inspection to a depth of at the most 500 miles (800 kilometers) on each side of the line along which the troops of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact signatories are presently disposed, this Soviet counterproposal had the disadvantage of not opening up the heartland of the Soviet military base to inspection while at the same time throwing open the heart of Western Europe to such inspection.

3. The acceptance of any kind of enforcement agency by the Soviet rulers is unlikely so long as they continue to place stress, as they have so far, upon national sovereignty in their brand of international law and rationalize, by means of the domestic jurisdiction and internal affairs argument, actions which have been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, was vague on the point of enforcement confining itself to the following statement:

> The control [inspection] agency makes recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression as regards violators of the convention on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.[7]

This provision follows logically from the Soviet view of the United Nations, expressed from the moment of its founding, that that organization is based upon the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus the Soviet view implies that the Soviet Union as a great power cannot really be held to account and cannot have sanctions imposed upon it without its consent. Acceptance of an enforcement agency by the Soviet rulers would involve radical revision of their views on international law and organization.

(4) The conditions which the Soviet Union would probably desire as the price for the ultimate withdrawal of its military forces from

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[7] New York Times, May 12, 1955.

the East European States which are now signatories to the Warsaw Pact are the following:

(*a*) Recognition by the West of the East German Soviet regime, the so-called German Democratic Republic, as a coequal in negotiations between that regime and the German Federal Republic. This would mean abandonment of the basic condition of all-German free elections demanded by the democracies since the commencement of serious negotiations on German reunification.

(*b*) Abandonment by the United States of all or the greater part of its bases in Western Europe (and possibly in north Africa as well).

(*c*) The conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—a condition specifically mentioned in Premier Bulganin's letter of November 17, 1956, to President Eisenhower.

The question of whether or not the United States and its West European allies could accept such conditions goes beyond the bounds of this paper.

The presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe is so closely related to the German problem that the former cannot be discussed without reference to the latter. The Soviet rulers apparently cannot accept the principle of all-German free elections since it would probably lead to the establishment of an all-German government in which the Communists would be in a minority. Thus it is preferable, from the Soviet point of view, to place the blame for the perpetuation of the partition of Germany on the "remilitarization" of the German Federal Republic and on the establishment of NATO. Unless the Soviet ruling circle were to agree to lose all of Germany, it has little alternative but the profess to favor reunification while in fact favoring continued partition on the assumption that part of Germany under Soviet military occupation is preferable to a reunited Germany which would either be neutral or a member of NATO. While the Soviet Union appeared to have been willing to accept a reunited neutral and partly remilitarized Germany in its unusual note of March 10, 1952, it is doubtful whether that proposal will be revived. The Soviet Union's present insistence upon western recognition of the East German Communist regime appears to be a relatively fixed principle of its German policy. When diplomatic relations were established between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union in September 1955, N. S. Khrushchev asserted that a reunited Germany could not be permitted to enter NATO, and he recounted how the Soviet Union had requested entry into NATO (on March 31, 1954) and had been refused because, according to Khrushchev, NATO is directed against the Soviet Union and the East European Communist regimes. Khrushchev stated the matter bluntly when he declared:

> If the German Federal Republic joined NATO and the German Democratic Republic does not participate in NATO, we would be fools if we were to concur in all of Germany's entering NATO and in that way strengthen the forces directed against us.[8]

[8] Pravda, September 12, 1955.

Khrushchev went on the declare to Chancellor Adenauer in connection with the German Federal Republic's refusal to recognize the East German Soviet regime:

> I do not demand that you agree with me. I know full well that you will not agree with this. But the German Democratic Republic is the future. It is the future not only of the German people. Marx Engels spoke of this future.[9]

Less than 1 week later, Premier Bulganin, in playing host to the representatives of the East German Communist regime, declared that—

> The difficulties which the German Democratic Republic is encountering are difficulties of growth. It should be said that in its time the Soviet people lived through incomparably greater difficulties. We were alone, against us there was the whole capitalist world. The German Democratic Republic is not alone.[10]

This uncompromising Soviet position regarding the East German Communist regime was restated by Khrushchev at the 20th party congress when he asserted that:

> The German Democratic Republic, which is opposed to war, has gained in strength to such an extent that today it is no longer possible to speak of a solution of the German problem without its participation or at the expense of its interests.[11]

This position was repeated in the Soviet note of October 23, 1956, to the German Federal Republic. Significantly, this note referred to the Soviet losses in World War II and declared that "all this cannot be forgotten."

Thus, Soviet policy toward Germany is prompted by fear and suspicion as well as by obduracy. The unrest which manifested itself in the states of Eastern Europe during the latter half of 1956 has probably reinforced this attitude and the Soviet view that troops must continue to be stationed both in Germany and on the territory of signatories of the Warsaw Pact.

5. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union, given its very high rate of capital investment, has been experiencing a labor shortage in industry as well as the need to resettle thousands of young unmarried persons on the newly cultivated "virgin and fallow lands" of Kazakhstan and Siberia in accordance with Khrushchev's agricultural policies. The planned reduction of Soviet armed forces by 1,200,000 men by May 1, 1957, in addition to a cut of 640,000 which was supposed to have taken place between August 1955 and February 1956, can be explained, if they are taking place, in terms of the general Soviet manpower shortage and the disproportionate sex ratio of the Soviet population. It should also be recalled that there is a shortage of men in their midtwenties as well as of boys aged 13–15 in the Soviet Union as a result of the decline in natality which occurred during the 1932–33 famine and during World War II. This has meant, in the former case, that some troops have had to be kept in

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[9] Ibid.
[10] Pravda, September 17, 1955.
[11] Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 15, 1956, p. 3.

military service longer than would have ordinarily been the case. Of course, we are not told by the Soviet rulers what the exact size of their armed forces will be following these announced reductions. Another factor which may have prompted such reductions is the announced completion of the motorization and mechanization of the Soviet Army, according to Defense Minister Zhukov's statement at the 20th party congress.[12]

Announced cuts in the Soviet military budget must be regarded with considerable caution, since the prices of military goods in an economy of the Soviet type are artificial. In any case, the trend has probably been away from an army in which sheer manpower has been the predominant factor toward a mechanized force relying more upon advanced weapons than was the case previously.

REPLY OF PROF. N. S. TIMASHEFF, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, JANUARY 6, 1957

1. There are reasons to believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union are aware of the possibility of mutual annihilation by nuclear weapons. The doctrine to which they adhere emphasizes technical achievements, and throughout the years they have discussed the situation in terms of technological competition between the United States and the U. S. S. R. They have able and well informed experts to consult, and it seems that, since Stalin's death, these experts are no longer scared to tell the leaders what they think about the situation.

The awareness of the danger and perhaps the inferiority of the U. S. S. R. relative to nuclear weapons has evidently contributed to many policy decisions of the Soviet leaders. Their noninterference with the Berlin airlift, their declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the Korean war, and their threat to send volunteers (not the regular air force) to Egypt are salient instances. But Shepilov's simultaneous ultimatum to England and France which, if disregarded, could have resulted in global war shows that there is a limit beyond which the Soviet leaders would not retreat. There is no doubt that if NATO forces would have entered Hungary to help her people win against communism, the reaction of the Soviets would have been A- and H-bomb attack against the United States.

There is one point which deserves special attention. We speak of the Soviet leaders, but we do not know exactly who they are; in other words, who participate in policymaking on the highest level. Neither do we know the relative weight of the opinions of the participants. It is, however, known that the real power center does not coincide with any institution, for example, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It seems that the so-called collective leadership is a dynamic equilibrium of 10 or 12 persons whose grouping into factions and relative influence is subject to continuous change. Under these conditions, the predictability of the decisions which might be conducive to the outbreak of a third world war is very low indeed.

In any case, it would be very imprudent to take it for granted that, recognizing the dangers of modern warfare, the Soviet leaders alto-

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[12] Pravda, February 20, 1956.

gether preclude war as a possible means of achieving their goals. There is, moreover, no process going on which would indicate a favorable change of attitudes—so long as the structure and the personal composition of the ruling circle remains approximately what it is today.

2–3. This does not, however, mean that the Soviet leaders would reject any agreement eradicating nuclear warfare, provided that they could preserve their superiority as to conventional weapons. But, because of the many peculiarities of their social and political structure, they never would agree to an unlimited inspection, on the part of the U. N. or of a special international body. The type of inspection they would allow can be easily imagined by analogy with the inspection of the troop movements and transportation of military equipment after the Korean truce; it is obvious that it would be inefficient and unreliable.

Further concessions on the part of the Soviet leaders could be expected only if, on the basis of convincing reports of experts, they would come to the conclusion that the relationship of military strength was changing against them. Such an eventuality could occur only if, in the United States or the allied nations, new spectacular inventions were made, not duplicated by similar inventions in the U. S. S. R., or if, in the Soviet Union, it would become inevitable to allocate a much higher portion of the national resources to the satisfaction of consumers' needs. At the present time, a certain lift of the standard of living of the Soviet population seems possible without slowing down the production of munitions and military equipment. All that would be necessary would be slowing down the rate of acceleration of armament production. Since the United States is not inclined to raise its expenditure on armament, such a policy on the part of the Soviets would keep stable the equilibrium between the two camps and still let the people have more than they do. This was the Malenkov plan (announced in August 1953 and carried out through 1954 but abandoned early in 1955). In the December 1956 resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party one can perhaps find some signs of the intention to return to the plan.

Of course, the pressure on the part of the population could become stronger and stronger, so that the limited improvements on the basis of the policy sketched above would no longer suffice. The existence of widespread dissatisfaction engendering such a pressure is undeniable. It is manifested in the efforts of the Soviet leaders to appease the population by mitigating the system of organized terrorism and by achieving "Socialist legality" (without granting the people real rights enforcible by independent courts). A number of decrees to this end have been enacted during the past 2 years and the same preoccupation appears in some recent writings of such persons as the Prosecutor General of the Soviet Union. The plan of appeasement through concessions on "the legal front" was, curiously, the Beria plan and seems to have been partly adopted now. As it always happens under similar circumstances, a controversy is going on among the Soviet leaders—whether such concessions would really appease the people, or would only incite them to demand more concessions. If the latter idea wins, and no further concessions on the legal front are made, more economic concessions will become necessary, and,

indirectly, this would make the Soviet leaders more inclined to discuss and even seek an agreement on the control of armaments.

4. Until recently, one could assume that the Soviet leaders would be willing to withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe provided that the Americans and British "go home." The latest events in Poland and Hungary have demonstrated that, without direct support of Soviet troops, the puppet regimes in the satellites would fall. Of course, the Soviets could withdraw their troops and concentrate them just behind their borders; the distances are small, and a satellite nation overthrowing its Communist government could be invaded in no time. But the Hungarian events, without having inflicted a mortal blow on communism (as is sometimes stated), have been a serious warning and have cost the Soviet Government a good deal of friendly attitudes among the nations which recently gained independence.

In consequence, today one can hardly expect that a deal concerning the withdrawal of troops from the satellites and the NATO countries of the European Continent could be arranged. By the same token, the plan of creating a neutral zone in central and east central Europe must be considered quite unrealistic. Very conclusive is the reaction of the Soviet leaders to the demand of neutrality on the part of the leaders of the Hungarian revolution: the countries of the Warsaw pact were told that they could not be allowed to part company.

As to the liberalization of East European countries, among the Soivet leaders this idea is as controversial as the idea of legal appeasement within. The inconsistent management of the Polish and Hungarian problems by these leaders proves this beyond doubt. Most probably, the antagonists of further liberalization will win: it is apparent that, concessions or no concessions, the peoples of the satellites will not become willing and wholehearted allies of the Soviet Union. The concessions granted to the Poles may stay, at least for a while; but their expansion through the area of the captive nations is improbable. The Soviet leaders will know the principle divide et impera and will not commit the blunder of creating a zone of semi-independent states which, perhaps under Tito's leadership, could amalgamate into a union with the point against the U. S. S. R.

5. The question raised by Secretary of State Dulles has been partly answered under 2–3. The Soviet Union could allocate more labor force and material to the production of food and consumers' goods by letting the armament production stay on the present level.

There is, on the other hand, no reason to believe that the Soviet economy would meet great difficulties in reducing armament production and simultaneously increasing the production of consumers' goods. Of course, the Soviet economic system is cumbersome and burocratic; but, on the other hand, no problems concerning private interests and profits arise. One has again to emphasize that the problem of reconversion could be solved by allocating to light industry all or almost all the increase of productive capacity foreseen by the 5-year plan for given years. But it is doubtful whether the Soviet leaders are ready to do so.

6. I do not see any type of control of the Soviet military establishment which would be both effective and acceptable to the Soviet leaders.

As to the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union, one must take in consideration that, throughout history, not only Russia but the

majority of European states were open to invasion. Attempts to create security zones beyond the boundaries of a state have always resulted in overexpansion and final collapse. For instance, Napoleon created around France a belt of satellites extending up to the Russian boundary; but finally he decided that so long as Russia remained independent, he was not safe, and launched the war of 1812 which resulted in the downfall of his empire. Especially under the present conditions of warfare, the security of the Soviet Union could be guaranteed only by expanding its boundaries up to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean. And even then it would be exposed to an eventual attack by American superbombers. So, today, complete security coincides with world dominance. The corollary is: in disarmament planning, no regard can be paid to the particularistic interests or ideas of the individual nations on security.

REPLY OF ADM. B. ULAM, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 20, 1956

Before replying to the specific questions in your letter of December 7, 1956, I would like to state a few facts as I see them about the Soviet Union at this particular point in history. Ever since Stalin's death Soviet Russia has been in a state of political flux. It is almost certain that there will be considerable changes in Russian society and in the present setup of her Government within the next 2 or 3 years. This state of flux makes any statements about the Soviet Union highly hypothetical.

1. Although I am not qualified to comment on the purely scientific and technical aspects of the questions, I am entirely convinced that the rulers of Russia are fully aware of the vast destructive potentialities of the new weapons. Soviet foreign policy has for some time been geared to the idea of avoiding an all-out war, though I must add that in my opinion Soviet Russia would not have risked, except under extreme circumstances, a worldwide war at any time since the end of World War II. The development of the H-bomb has undoubtedly heightened their desire to avoid an all-out war.

At the same time, it must be recognized that under the circumstances of dictatorship whether by one person or a group of persons, there is always a possibility that the regime, in order to avoid a complete political defeat or a certain loss of political power by the ruling elite, may have recourse to steps which would precipitate a world conflict and in turn bring about a situation where the use of nuclear weapons would become necessary. Thus the possibility is not excluded, though highly unlikely, that in an extreme situation and under circumstances which would give them at least a small chance of total victory by surprise the rulers of Russia would use the ultimate weapon.

2. Under present circumstances I am dubious about the possibility of any agreement under which the Russians would honestly agree to any thorough workable system of inspection which would open their country to inspection which would mean, in a sense, supervision by an international agency. I can see in the near future no possibility of any probable Russian regime agreeing to a thorough inspection, and I believe no agreement would be enforceable. I just cannot see

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the Soviet Union opening its industry and territory to a large number of foreign observers and complying 100 percent with any such setup.

3. My answer to question 2 is relevant to the question you pose here.

4. I believe that the problems you ask under 4 are much more practical, and offer a more fruitful basis for bargaining with the Russians than any of the problems considered under the first three questions. It is not inconceivable that under certain conditions, like the withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe or the abandonment of the remilitarization of Germany, the Russians would agree to the withdrawal of their troops from the present satellites. I think changes are very strong that in the long run social, economic, and political forces in Eastern Europe would make the present satellites a drag rather than of advantage to the Soviet Union. Their domination by Russia has from the beginning been enforced laregly, if not completely, by the presence of the Red army troops or the threat of the Red army.

The type of development which has been going on in Poland cannot but reduce Russia's influence there and also remove whatever hopes the Russian command may have had concerning the reliability of the Polish Army in a crisis. I think that the Polish development is not unique and with a reduction of the size of Soviet forces, Soviet influence, in terms of actual control, over their satellites is likely to "wither away." There are a few qualifications to the above statement: thus the Russians have obviously hoped to compensate for their diminishing physical control over the satellites by establishing stronger ideological and self-interest bonds. I am not worried about the strength of ideological bonds, for in my opinion they are not likely to prove to be the decisive factor in retaining those countries allegiance to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the U. S. S. R. may play such angles as economic help and capitalize, e. g., on the fact that up to now she alone of the Great Powers has supported Poland's frontier with Germany. All in all, barring the unexpected, Russian influence over the European satellites is bound to diminish in the long run.

5. It is quite possible that in view of the swollen state of the armed forces and their progress in developing nuclear weapons, the Soviets might have decided that it was entirely feasible even militarily to reduce their forces and yet not to endanger their military potential. From the economic point of view, with the Soviet masses crying for consumer goods, any reduction on such a scale redounds to the economic advantage of the U. S. S. R. I see no major difficulties for a totalitarian system like the Russian to absorb any amount of released army men into their economy.

6. The only effective controls for the time being, when you have to deal with a totalitarian system, are the type of controls which would be self-enforceable and the violation of which would be immediately detected, for example, physical removal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany and (if this be technically possible and desirable to us) prohibition of nuclear tests.

As to the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union, the question is rather hard to answer since in the eyes of the rulers of the U. S. S. R. their "legitimate" interests include absolute military superiority on the Continent and their domination of the satellites. In my

opinion the minimum security interests which the Russians would be willing to accept, and that after a lot of hard bargaining, would be the security of their 1945 frontiers and the demilitarization of the region extending from those frontiers to the western sphere of interests.

In general I believe that the Russians do not think of disarmament as an isolated subject but in connection with their whole international and even internal situation. Thus, disarmament in a real sense would come only as a part of a general international settlement preceded by the Russians' realization of (*a*) that the Western Powers are determined and capable of not tolerating any further Soviet expansion, either direct or indirect, and (*b*) that the West has no intention, once its legitimate interests of self-protection are satisfied, of attempting by force to damage or destroy the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, that is, physical security of Russia within her present frontiers.

Reply of Bertram D. Wolfe, Writer on Soviet Affairs
December 17, 1956

1. The leaders of the Soviet Union are set on winning the world for their system, and their dogma teaches them that the ultimate victory of communism is "scientifically demonstrated and inevitable." This does not allow room in their day-to-day thinking for the idea that mankind may destroy itself utterly. Their dogma teaches them that not mankind but capitalism will be destroyed in a future war, or by limited and partial wars and struggles and gradual erosion. As recently as on their visit to England during the past year they threatened their hosts in public banquet speeches with the few minutes that would elapse between the launching of rockets and supersonic bombers from their bases and the destruction of England. Of all their public utterances on this question only one that I know of (that of Malenkov) spoke of the possible destruction of mankind without regard to class or system, and that was later specifically repudiated by Molotov, and impliedly by Khrushchev and Bulganin. That they are willing to destroy an entire economy and a people in order to make their system prevail is now being demonstrated in Hungary. The "system" has come to mean to them not a certain level of productivity or well-being but a total statification of industry, agriculture, political power, culture, force, a total control best designated as totalitarianism. This can prevail in a ruined country as well as one with a going economy—at least that is their outlook, and as far as we can judge by their actions, in the war for the victory of their system they can take economic ruin and mass annihilation in their stride.

2. If they have private second thoughts on this matter, they hide them from their own consciousness, and especially from each other, for it would be a sign of "softness," of unfitness for Communist leadership, a sign of a willingness to consider questions "classlessly," involving an agreement to permit the dying capitalist system to live indefinitely in defiance of the "laws of science and history."

3. In their peace campaigns and peace societies in the free world, they are delighted to spread the idea that the use of atomic weapons, or, indeed, the breakout of a general war, would mean the destruction of mankind. This is a species of valuable blackmail in their eyes, for if the free world lets them cut to pieces first Hungary, then perhaps Poland, or Germany, penetrate and take control of the Middle

East, and is afraid to draw the line anywhere lest that might entail all-out war and "the end of civilization as we know it," then they can continue to feel out the weak spots, nibble off piece by piece, conquer and slaughter single peoples, enlarge their controlled area through little wars, civil wars, "punitive expeditions to prevent the recurrence of fascism," etc., and thus further the "historical process" unhindered by anything more than resolutions and protests. And even these will gradually diminish, for neighbors like Finland, knowing that they are unprotected, will prefer to abstain from protest lest they too be locally "rescued from fascism and reaction."

4. They cannot allow free inspection of their world by our inspectors, or of our world by their people, and that for two reasons:

> First, the myth of the superiority of their system is maintained only by not letting the free world get a good look at how it works, and not letting their people get a good look at the rest of the world.
>
> Second, a land which makes even economic facts into state secrets and is dotted with concentration camps and secretive preparations for war cannot permit general inspection.

Yet, if our nerves grow weak, if our negotiators tire of endless repetition of the few elementary things we must forever repeat, then we will settle for pseudoinspection, and be deceived, and deserve to be deceived.

They do not get tired of repetition, nor of finding new dress for the same old proposals. If we are eager not to prove intractable, they will consider it a sign of the weakness of a doomed order, and take advantage of it. Our negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam, and in the tents of Panmunjom, should have taught us that. We have to make up our minds on a few fundamentals: Is the insistence on a safe, genuine, enduring peace worth clinging to, no matter if it takes decades and as yet unforeseen occurrences before it is realized? Or shall we settle for a false peace, under the cover of which the drive for world conquest is relentlessly continued? Is "disarmament," without as foolproof an inspection system as can be devised, not a snare to be avoided as a plague?

5. To remain forever on guard as long as there is danger may seem intolerable, but its only alternative is to be off guard. It is fashionable to talk of the "lessening of tension," tension being a word with bad connotations of which they are quick to take advantage. But if we translate the word "tension" out of their jargon into its real meaning—"concern"—then it becomes clear that we must cling to our concern (cling to our "tension") as long as there is good reason to be concerned, with the fate of peoples and of freedom. What our negotiators need is clear heads, steady nerves, an ability to distinguish between fundamentals and the trivia of protocol and face, and to cling, for weeks, for months, for years, for decades if necessary, to those fundamentals.

6. Actually, their system is not as mighty as it looks for it involves unending war on their own people as well as an unending effort to win the world. Even the death of a dictator weakens this inhuman "monolith" as East Germany, Pilsen, Vorkuta, Poznan, Warsaw, and Budapest have shown. Our task is to make forever clear that we know how to distinguish between the enslaved peoples and their rulers,

for they are the first victims of the totalitarian Communist system. In our negotiations with the tyrant it is necessary always to watch that we do not strengthen his hand against his domestic victims. You ask what changes are necessary in the Soviet system before we can make genuine agreements of peace as against the present on-guard agreements to try to avoid war. I can only answer: When the rulers of the totalist state make peace with their own peoples, then and then only will they be able to make peace with other peoples. But that involves a tolerance of man's diversity and right to freedom which is alien to their dogma and their system. Poland and Hungary, no less than Korea and the Berlin airlift, show that they tolerate what they are forced to tolerate, and only as far as they think they are forced to tolerate it.

7. In the proposal to withdraw part and later all of our troops from Western Europe in return for the Russian withdrawal of part and later all of their troops from their satellites, there is a double trap. On the one hand, our withdrawal would be overseas and theirs only a few hundred land miles. On the other, they have already shown in their negotiations with Hungary how swiftly they will ignore any promise if their power is threatened. If the satellites could be held down by puppet armies alone (an impossibility) they would keep out their troops. But if not, they would send them back in a matter of hours, or use auxiliary troops of one satellite against another.

8. Finally, I wish to make part of this letter an analysis of the Soviet Army Manpower Reduction and Reduction Promises, which I did first for Life magazine, then for the Research Institute of America, and finally, in its simplest and most complete form, for the New Leader. It is important that it be made part of the record in considering the matter of manpower cuts.

I should also like to call the attention of the subcommittee to my 7-minute presentation on the subject of Peaceful Coexistence in a symposium with Harry Schwarz of the New York Times, Arthur Schlesinger of Harvard, et al., under the chairmanship of Senator Neuberger (on file with the subcommittee), and to my remarks on peace and peaceful coexistence on pages 10, 12, 44–48, and 83 of my recent book entitled "Krushchev and Stalin's Ghost."

(Following is the article referred to: "Why Russia Had To Cut Its Armies," by Bertram D. Wolfe, The New Leader, June 25, 1956:)

Why Russia Had To Cut Its Armies

FIVE-YEAR MANPOWER SHORTAGE NOW LOOMS AS RESULT OF WAR'S LOW BIRTHRATE

(By Bertram D. Wolfe)

The Kremlin recently announced that love of peace was impelling it to cut its armed forces next year by 1.2 million men; that is, by approximately one-third. To date, the comments of the leaders of the free world on this announcement have been defensive and confused. "It's only a promise for the future. * * * How do we know they will really do it? * * * It is belated, since we cut our armies below that scale immediately after the war. * * * Mass wave tactics are out of date anyhow, and fewer men with better equipment make a more

powerful armed force. * * * We have no way of checking and controlling the cut. * * * *"

All these comments are sound, but they miss the main point. That point is: *The Soviet Union is being compelled to cut its armed forces for demographic reasons, not love of peace. And the same demographic reasons will compel it to make even more drastic cuts in each of the next 3 years.*

A careful student of Soviet population trends could have predicted the first cut, as we can predict at least three more. As a matter of fact, basing myself on the same population-trend figures, I last year outlined the reasons for a cut in the concentration camp population as well as the armed forces. (See my Six Keys to the Soviet System, pp. 146–147.)

In the Harvard Review of Economics and Statistics for May 1954, Dr. Naum Jasny, a leading expert on Soviet agriculture, published population tables which make it inexcusable that our country's leaders should have failed to predict the cuts or to know how to explain them. Those who do not read statistical journals could have found Dr. Jasny's figures in brief and simplified form in the Russian-language journal, Socialist Courier. Here are the facts once more, as clearly and simply set down as they can be—

> The shortage in industry: Each of the 5-year plans has one-sidedly expanded Soviet industry, especially heavy industry and war industry. Each expansion has called for an increase in the number employed in industry.
>
> The shortage in agriculture: Throughout the history of Russia, there has been an excess population in the countryside. Thus, when industry expanded, it could always get fresh recruits from the villages.

Under the last two czars, as under Stalin, industry expanded with enormous rapidity. Under Nicholas II the expansion was less one-sided but no less astoundingly rapid than under Stalin. And, under both, the secrets of the rapid expansion of industry were (1) the borrowing of advanced techniques and machinery from older industrial countries, and (2) the drawing of fresh labor force from the surplus population of the villages. If there was yet a third secret, it was the rapid birthrate.

But under the fifth 5-year plan (the one that has just ended) the unexpected occurred: *For the first time in all the history of Russia, there is now a shortage of manpower in agriculture.* Since 1954, it has been necessary for Khrushchev to send young people not from the village to the city, but from the city to the village.

How explain this reversal of the age-old historical trend? Again, the answer is painfully simple:

> The Soviet system has been wasteful, even reckless, with human life. The forced collectivization, the liquidation of the independent peasants as a class, the state-made famine, the life-destroying concentration-camp system, the pact with Hitler which unleashed World War II, the mass-wave tactics of fighting battles—each of these took its toll of Russia's "limitless" human resources.
>
> The use of coercion in place of generous distribution of the fruits of their toil has made the workers' productivity per capita

much lower than that of any other land with modern machinery.

Collectivization has taken the heart of out the peasants, so that they barely produce enough to keep body and soul together. Whatever surplus they produced above their animal needs is taken by the state at confiscatory, token prices. They are reduced to spiritless state serfs.

The figures in agriculture are eloquent. In Russia with its multitude of tractors and combines (perhaps the most highly mechanized agriculture in the world), it takes approximately 50 percent of the working population to feed and provide hides and fibers for the other 50 percent, for those in the cities, in the swollen bureauracy and in the swollen army. One out of every two producers is in agriculture, yet there is a perpetual shortage of meat, butter, milk, grain, hides, cotton, and wool.

In the United States, only about 10 percent of the total productive force of the country is in agriculture—10 percent can feed and clothe the other 90 percent. Though only 1 out of 10 is a farmer, our farms still produce too much wheat, too much corn, too much cotton, and too much wool.

Keeping in mind these facts, that industry, agriculture, and the army are all straining the manpower resources of Russia to the utmost, let us look at Dr. Jasny's table. The latter, after consulting with 2 demographic experts, the late Eugene Kulischer and Warren Eason, drew up a table of the increase in working force to be expected by normal population growth during each of the 10 years from 1950 to 1960. He arrived at each year's figures by taking the birthrate of 16 years earlier (youths reach a working age at 16) and subtracting from this the rate of diminution of the working force by death, old age, illness, youths not gainfully employed, and similar causes. The net difference between new youths entering employment at 16 and older workers dropping out gives the annual figures shown below for increase in the working force:

1950	1,300,000	1954	2,500,000
1951	1,300,000	1955	2,400,000
1952	1,600,000	1956	2,100,000
1953	2,600,000		

At this point, let us note that the last 4 years have been exceptionally fat years. The war had ended, and the war ruin had been restored. Demobilization had increased the working force. And the babies born in the years 1937–40 were reaching the age of 16.

Those had been relatively good birth years between two periods of nightmare. In the early thirties, births had diminished and infantile mortality had shot up because of the famine, the liquidation of the peasants as a class, the forced collectivization, the concentration-camp deportations. Then life became "brighter." Stalin promised every kolkhoznik a private plot and a cow. He killed mostly Communists in the blood purge, charging them with "wrecking" and other responsibility for the miseries of the early thirties. The ordinary mass of people was let alone. Births increased. More children survived infancy and reached 16. Therefore, 1954, 1955, and 1956 were the fat years in which roughly 2.5 million were added each year to the net working population.

But in 1941 disaster struck again. Late in June, Hitler double-crossed his partner and attacked Russia. The birthrate fell rapidly in the second half of that year, and infant mortality rose. And each year thereafter, 1942, 1943, 1944, the number of births dropped further and the number of child deaths rose. Therefore, returning to the table, we are now dealing with years in which the numbers reaching 16 are fantastically diminished. After deducting those dropping out of the labor force, we get net increases not of 2 or 2.5 million, but:

1957 (born, 1941)	1,800,000
1958 (born, 1942)	800,000
1959 (born, 1943)	300,000
1960 (born, 1944)	300,000

Isn't it clear that not love of peace but a simple shortage in the working force is compelling the cut of 1957 and will compel still larger cuts in 1958, 1959, and 1960? How can Khrushchev maintain, not to mention increase, his lagging agricultural output without sending some young men from the cities? How can he continue the "priority of heavy industry" and the expansion of the complex new war industries without taking men from the army? The Kremlin must either abandon its plans for the sixth 5-year plan in industry and agriculture or else cut its armies and concentration-camp populations. Or, which is not unlikely, both at once.

Dr. Jasny's table does not go beyond 1960. But is it hard to see that the young men reaching 16 in 1960 will be of military age in 1962? This is less than an eighth of the increase of the fat years to satisfy the demands of swollen armies, depleted and lagging agriculture, and topheavy large-scale industry. When Stalin did not like the census figures, he killed the census takers as "wreckers." But no killing of census takers will alter these facts.

None of this will prevent the Kremlin from making a virtue out of this dire necessity and trying to use their compulsory cuts for propaganda purposes. But the least we can expect of our experts and our leaders is that they make clear to themselves and to a listening world that not sudden love of peace but the bitter facts of biology, of demographic statistics whose gyrations in Russia so often spring from political acts, are forcing the Kremlin to reduce its swollen armies from year to year.

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