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CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

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STAFF STUDY NO. 7

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

MAY 12, 1957

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STANFORD

PREFACE

(By Senator Hubert H. Humphrey)

For many years the major powers of the world have been engaged in a search for ways to control and reduce their armaments and armed forces. Representatives of the United States and other governments have spent a great deal of time in submitting, examining, and negotiating numerous proposals dealing with armaments, inspection, enforcement, and more effective machinery for insuring peace. What has not been done is to examine sufficiently what has worked in the past and, consequently, what might work today if modified to fit present day conditions.

As this study on disarmament and security in Latin America shows, in our own hemisphere there exists considerable experience which should be brought to bear on future attempts to control and limit the weapons of war. For a long period the 21 Republics of the Western Hemisphere have cooperated in a system of interregional security which is one of the most highly developed the world has ever known. This system, based on the sovereign and independent status of each member nation, recognizes that security cannot be guaranteed by each state acting alone. The American states, therefore, have developed machinery by which various types of controversies may be subjected to peaceful settlement.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted in 1948, are the two basic documents which bind the American Republics together in formal agreement. Since they went into effect no nation in the area has been successful in imposing its will on another by force of arms. With few exceptions, when disputes have arisen an amicable settlement has been made through prompt use of the inter-American peace machinery, or if armed conflict has broken out, the regional defense treaty has operated to help end the warfare.

It is important to note that the success of the inter-American system does not rest on the absence of political disputes among the nations of the area. As in every area, some grievances of long duration remain; certain boundary disputes have not been settled; and economic rivalry persists. Therefore, it is not the lack of political and economic problems which is responsible for hemispheric peace. It is the creation of a system of handling disputes peaceably and the determination by the member nations to make the system work that give the Americas their admirable record.

The rest of the world—the major powers particularly—might examine the Latin American experience more carefully than they have. Those who agree that all political problems must be solved before a reduction can be made in armaments are as unrealistic as those who say disarmament can come about without regard to the presence of international tensions. We cannot expect to eliminate all political problems for all time. We can, however, strive to build

a system whereby the political problems which do arise are solved by peaceful means rather than through the use of military force.

Other lessons can be learned from the operation of the inter-American system. It is the only regional system which provides machinery for handling disputes within the area. Other regional security systems might examine the extent to which the machinery developed in the Americas could be incorporated into their own systems.


The inter-American system, although it is not primarily a military alliance, does have military features. The United States, under the mutual security program, sends a substantial amount of military aid to individual Latin American nations, but there is some question that this aid is being supplied with a proper awareness of its implications.

The executive branch must be careful that military aid sent to Latin American nations does not promote an arms race. Nor should military aid detract from important programs of economic development and technical assistance. What we give to one nation for hemispheric defense may provoke demands by another for an equal amount of aid. This danger is particularly acute since little appears to have been done to integrate the defense functions of the separate countries. If greater attention were given the coordination of military policy and functions, it might result in a decrease in the amount Latin American nations need to supply their individual military establishments. Such a step might also lessen the possibility for arms competition among the several countries and, in turn, might enable more energy and resources to be channeled into constructive measures to increase living standards and develop Latin American economies.

The study was prepared by Rosita Rieck Bennett of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, under the direction of the subcommittee staff. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the subcommittee or of any of its members.

MAY 12, 1957.

INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE



In addition to region defined in article 4, treaty provides for action in event of armed attack "within the territory of an American State" (par. 3, art. 3) which includes more than continental territory of signatories. It includes the islands of Hawaii, Guam, and any other possessions abroad, since they all constitute part of the "territory of an American State."

DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

A. Introduction

The security of the Latin American Nations has been of concern and interest to the United States ever since they achieved their independence in the early 19th century. The vast territory of Latin America, with its large supplies of vital raw materials, affected United States national security long before this country found it necessary to be involved in the security of nations in other geographical regions. When the United States was endeavoring to isolate itself from the conflicts and problems of Europe and Asia it maintained at the same time a keen awareness of what was happening to the south of its border.

The inter-American system of security preceded other existing regional security systems. Indeed, its foundations had been laid before the creation of the United Nations and, in fact, the presence of a regional security system in the Americas influenced in several significant ways the drafting of and philosophy behind the United Nations Charter.

This study reviews the evolution, organization, and effectiveness of the inter-American security system and relates them to broader problems of disarmament and security in the present nuclear age. Much of the development of the inter-American security system may have relevance to the problems of disarmament and security on the larger world scene. Latin America is the only region in recent years which has not been the center of armed conflict of major proportions. That it has not may be of significance as all nations try to devise means of preventing a third world war.

B. Background of the Inter-American Security System

The 20 Republics of Latin America achieved their independence from colonial status not too many years after the United States. As young republics in a new world they were faced with the problem of maintaining their self-governing existence. As the Latin American nations grew and developed they had to meet three main challenges to their individual national security.

Factors influencing the Latin American quest for security

The earliest and for many years the most persistent threat to the independence of Latin American nations was the threat of conquest from Europe. Latin American nations feared that Spain would attempt to recover her lost colonies. The new republics also felt that a reaction in Europe against ideas of popular sovereignty and constitutional and representative government would spill over to the new continent and an attempt would be made by such countries as Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France to exert domination and political control.

During the mid-19th century, when the United States was embroiled in civil war, the Latin American Republics actually experienced several temporary invasions of their territory. Napoleon III's

armies invaded Mexico and established a monarchy in that country for 3 years. Spain reincorporated Santo Domingo into its possession and seized the guano-rich Chincha Islands from Peru in 1864.

In the early 1900's Latin American nations again were threatened with intervention from European nations as a result of Latin American defaults on financial obligations to European governments and nongovernmental economic interests.

The pattern of periodic interference in Latin American affairs by countries of the old world had a profound effect on the early emergence of Latin American solidarity and the consciousness of the need for a regional security system.

FEAR OF THE COLOSSUS OF THE NORTH

Although the successful revolution of the 13 colonies in North America against Great Britain affected and abetted ideas of self-government in the Spanish colonies to the south, the emerging Latin American States developed a strong apprehension of the United States. As the United States was expanding to the south and to the west in the mid-19th century wave of "manifest destiny," Latin American nations feared that they too might become victims of the expansionist urge. Later, the United States caused considerable resentment by assuming the task of redressing European grievances in the Western Hemisphere.[1] This self-appointed police power on the part of the United States had the advantage of preventing intervention from Europe; however, it had the disadvantage of subjecting Latin American States to several acts of armed interference by the United States. United States military occupations occurred in Nicaragua in 1912 and 1926; in Haiti, 1915; and in Santo Domingo, 1916. United States military intervention in Latin America contributed to the desire of these nations to build a security system based on noninterference and sovereign equality.

INTER-AMERICAN DISPUTES

Occasional attempts to settle inter-American controversies by force of arms was a third important factor leading the Latin American nations to seek a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. At various times throughout the history of Latin America the peace of the area was broken by small wars between two or more of the Republics. In the 1860's, for example, a chain reaction of armed conflict involved the invasion of Uruguay by Brazilian troops, the invasion of the Brazilian State of Matto Grosso by Paraguay, and a declaration of war by the latter on Argentina. Some of these disputes were of long duration and left a residue of animosity between the participants which has not to this day been completely obliterated.

EARLY EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE LATIN AMERICAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Since the threat of foreign domination occurred in Latin America immediately after the severance of Spanish control, the first efforts at collective security date back to the early existence of the Republics. Simon Bolivar, the revolutionary leader of Gran Colombia (present-day Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador), called a conference in Panama in 1826 for the purpose of establishing a confederation of the

[1] The announcement of United States intentions was given in the annual message from President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress, December 6, 1904. Gantenbein, James W. The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy, a documentary record. New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, pp. 361–362.

newly independent Republics. Members of the confederation would have been bound to come to each other's defense in case of attack. In addition, the confederation would have provided for a permanent congress which would meet periodically to arbitrate disputes between the members, to interpret treaties, and to serve as a point of contact in time of danger.[2]

Although the Congress of 1826 succeeded in drafting a treaty incorporating some of Bolivar's concepts, the treaty was never ratified by the required number of states. The Congress of Panama is looked upon, however, as the first step in the evolution of an inter-American collective security system.[3]

UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

The basis upon which the United States sought to insure security in the Western Hemisphere for over a century was the Monroe Doctrine, first enunciated by President Monroe in 1823. The doctrine proclaimed the interest of the United States in the independence of Latin American States and, by implication, threatened the use of armed force if any nation from Europe attempted to interfere unduly in the affairs of the hemisphere.[4]

The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration. From the point of view of Latin America, it was considered effective in protecting the area against interference from Europe, but it did invite interference at times from the United States. Latin American States, therefore, became anxious to erect a security system based on the recognition of the independence of all the American Republics.

The United States began to acknowledge the need for an inter-American system when, on the initiative of Congress in 1888, it issued invitations to all Latin American countries to a conference to be held in Washington.[5] At this conference the United States participated with the Latin American countries in a joint endeavor for the first time. It opened an era of cooperation which culminated in the acceptance by the United States in 1933 of the principal that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." [6]

Thus, 100 years after Monroe and Bolivar set forth their own separately enunciated concepts of American security, these concepts were united in the declaration of all the American Republics of their common goals as independent and sovereign states.

During World War II and the years immediately preceding the war, the United States and Latin American nations held many consultations on how best to defend their territory from attack. The principle of consultation through meetings of the foreign ministers established a method of dealing with American security problems that was to form the basis of a more comprehensive inter-American system.

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[2] Argentina, although invited, held aloof from the proposed multilateral alliance. Whitaker, Arthur P. The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1954.

[3] The United States appointed observers to the conference but they were instructed to reject any proposal leading to a defensive or offensive alliance or any project for a superlegislature. Mr. Clay's instructions to United States Delegates to the Congress of Panama, May 8, 1826. In International American Conference, Vol. IV, Historical Appendix. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1890, pp. 113–151.

[4] Gantenbein. Op. cit., p. 324.

[5] Legislation and proposed legislation in the Congress of the United States referring to the International American Conference. International American Conference. Op. cit., p. 330. This conference, held in 1889, was the first of the conferences of the American states. To date, 10 such conferences have been held.

[6] At a special conference in Buenos Aires in 1936, the United States accepted unequivocally a protocol declaring "inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason in the internal or external affairs of any other of the parties * * *" Additional Protocol Relative to Non-intervention. Gantenbein. Op. cit., p. 778.

C. Organization of the Inter-American Security System

After the 1944 conference at Dumbarton Oaks, where a postwar international organization was outlined, delegates from all the American Republics except Argentina met in Mexico City in 1945 to consider the future of the inter-American system. The resultant Act of Chapultepec recommended a reorganization of the American regional security system within the framework of the United Nations Organization. In addition, the act declared that every attack on an American state, from American as well as foreign sources, constituted an attack on all. Collective sanctions that might be taken to prevent or repel aggression were spelled out for the first time. [7]

THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

At Rio de Janeiro in 1947, delegates from the American Republics concluded the pact recommended at Chapultepec.[8] The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly called the Rio Treaty, established machinery by which the principle of collective action in America was to be implemented.[9]

Under the pact, the Organ of Consultation, consisting of the foreign ministers of the member states, is to agree upon those measures of a collective character deemed advisable to meet aggression or the threat of aggression. But to assure rapid action, the pact empowers the executive body of the Organization of American States to act provisionally as Organ of Consultation until the Meeting of Foreign Ministers can take place.[10] The various measures that may be contemplated are stated in article 8 as follows:

> Recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations, or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, and radiotelephonic communications, and use of armed force.

A particularly notable innovation in the Rio Treaty is the formula for voting on what sanctions should be taken. During World War II the American Republics encountered the difficulty of securing unanimous consent among themselves; nor were the lessons of the veto in the United Nations Security Council lost on them. It was provided, therefore, that except in the case of the use of armed force, the decision reached by a two-thirds vote of the Organ of Consultation would be binding upon all parties, including those not concurring.

The Rio Pact defines a number of circumstances that could bring its provisions into operation. Article 4 carefully delineates a hemisphere defense region embracing both North and South America, including Canada and Alaska together with Greenland, the Aleutians, the Falkland Islands, and regions of the Arctic and Antarctic.[11]

Article 3 of the pact covers the case of armed attack within the defined region or within the territory of an American State. The

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[7] Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, at Mexico City, February 21 to March 8, 1945. Declaration and Recommendation VIII: Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity (the "Act of Chapultepec"). Gantenbein. Op. cit., pp. 816–819.

[8] For text of Rio Treaty, see: U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Disarmament and Security, A Collection of Documents, Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956, p. 649. Hereinafter referred to as Collection of Documents.

[9] The pact formally came into existence on December 3, 1948. All 21 American Republics are now members.

[10] Prior to 1948, the executive body was the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. After the Organization of American States was formed in 1948, the Governing Board was replaced by the Council which is composed of one member from each nation and which has been entrusted with executive and administrative functions for the entire inter-American system.

[11] See map, frontispiece.

principle that an armed attack against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States is specified. At the request of a victim of aggression, each member of the pact would take unilateral action to meet its obligations until the Organ of Consultation could agree upon collective measures.

Members of the pact recognized that situations other than armed attack might endanger the peace of the continent. Accordingly, article 6 provides for consultation whenever the territory, sovereignty, or the political independence of any American State is affected by (1) an act of aggression other than armed attack; (2) by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict; or (3) by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America. The broad scope of article 6 makes collective action possible before armed conflict breaks out. Article 6 has been successfully invoked on a number of occasions.[12]

In the event of conflict between two or more American States, article 7 instructs the Organ of Consultation to call upon the contending parties to suspend hostilities and restore the status quo ante bellum, and then to take the necessary measures for peaceful settlement of the conflict. If one of the contending parties rejects these calls, collective sanctions may then be agreed upon. To promote compliance with the call to suspend hostilities, article 7 stipulates that rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and in the application of sanctions.

INTEGRATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Care was taken to mesh provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance with the United Nations Charter. Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Rio Treaty permits measures of self-defense against aggression "until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Article 5 obligates the contracting parties to inform immediately the U. N. Security Council of any action undertaken or in contemplation for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security. Moreover, article 10 specifies that none of the provisions of the Rio Treaty shall be construed as impairing obligations of the contracting parties under the United Nations.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

A year after the Rio Treaty was drawn up, the American Republics took a further step toward defining the basis of their relations. In 1948 at Bogota the Ninth Inter-American Conference wrote a constitution for the various agencies and institutions that had gradually become a part of the loosely knit inter-American system. The Charter of the Organization of American States, the constitution of the new system, came into legal effect December 13, 1952. Supreme authority rests in the Inter-American Conference which is to meet once every 5 years unless called into special session.

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[12] See below, p. 7.

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PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Along with the thorough reorganization of the machinery of the inter-American system at Bogota, the American Republics worked out an agreement on the pacific settlement of disputes.[13] The treaty, known as the Pact of Bogota, was designed to incorporate in a single instrument the wide variety of old agreements between some of the American nations on peaceful settlement.[14]

The gap between the provisions of the Rio Treaty and the unratified Bogota Pact has been partially filled in practice by the Inter-American Peace Committee. The Committee, which has been functioning since 1948, is composed of representatives of five countries whose services are permanently available upon request. Its main purpose is to suggest "the measures and steps which may be conducive" to a peaceful settlement of controversies.[15] The Peace Committee cannot lend its services unless they are acceptable to all parties concerned, nor can it compel compliance with its recommendations.[16]

THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD

One important agency, the Inter-American Defense Board, was purposely excluded from the Charter of the OAS. The creation of the Board stemmed from a decision of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers during World War II to recommend to the American governments:

> The immediate meeting in Washington of a commission composed of military and naval technicians appointed by each of the governments to study and to recommend to them the measures necessary for the defense of the continent.[17]

The commission, called the Inter-American Defense Board, met in Washington for the first time in March 1942. During the war years, it outlined the broad basis for inter-American military cooperation, including recommendations on the elimination of clandestine telecommunications stations, security against sabotage, antisubmarine defense, and the production of strategic materials. During 1945, the Board transmitted to the governments of the American Republics several resolutions embodying long-range recommendations for the cooperative defense of the hemisphere. Among these were resolutions on hemisphere telecommunications, standardization of materiel, utilization of manpower, and standardization in organization and training of the armed forces for inter-American military cooperation.

The Chapultepec Conference of 1945, which looked forward to a postwar inter-American system, recommended the creation of a permanent agency, formed of the representatives of the military leaders of each of the American republics, "for the purpose of proposing to the said governments measures for a closer military collaboration

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[13] For text, see Collection of Documents, p. 654.

[14] At the time of signature seven nations attached reservations. In particular, the provisions for compulsory arbitration of disputes have proved particularly objectionable to a number of states. Turlington, Edgar. The Pact of Bogota. American Journal of International Law, vol. 42, No. 3, July 1948, p. 611. In fact, only nine states have submitted their ratifications to the Pact of Bogota. They are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay.

[15] Pan American Union. Second report of the Inter-American Peace Committee submitted to the 10th Inter-American Conference, Organization of American States, 10th Inter-American Conference, Doc. 11 (English), Feb. 3, 1954, p. 4. The Committee originated with a resolution of the Second Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Havana in 1940.

[16] Under the new statute of the Peace Committee, members will be elected for staggered 5-year terms with no reelection. In August 1956 the Council voted the following membership whose terms were established by lot: Mexico, 5 years; United States, 4 years; Brazil, 3 years; Argentina, 2 years; and Cuba, 1 year. Diario las Americas, August 7, 1956, p. 1.

[17] The Inter-American Defense Board. The Inter-American Defense Board: An Introduction to Mutual Security Planning by the American Republics. Washington, n. d., p. 6.

among all the governments and for the defense of the Western Hemisphere."[18] Until such time as a permanent agency was formed, the Inter-American Defense Board was to continue to function.

Later, at Bogota in 1948, an attempt strongly supported by the United States to get the Defense Board or a similar military advisory group incorporated into the Charter of the Organization of American States on a permanent basis met with resistance from the Argentine and other delegations who argued that it would not be in keeping with the pacific traditions of the inter-American system.[19] A compromise was reached. The charter did provide for an Advisory Defense Committee to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation, but it was to be convoked only when the latter dealt with matters relating to defense against aggression.[20] On the other hand, the Conference at Bogota voted to continue the Inter-American Defense Board until such time as a two-thirds majority of the members should decide to abolish it.[21]

D. Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Collective Security

It has become almost axiomatic that an effective security system must precede disarmament. Nations will be reluctant to abandon their weapons of self-defense unless some alternative method is devised to guarantee their sovereignty and independence.

The Latin American Republics are no exception. Today they are conscious of three possible sources of danger: (1) Inter-regional situations or disputes by members of the American community; (2) the undermining of public institutions by subversive action; and (3) foreign attack. The regional collective security system forged at Rio de Janerio and Bogota is designed to function in all three contingencies. Its effectiveness can be measured only to the extent it meets threats to hemisphere peace.

MAINTAINING INTER-AMERICAN PEACE

Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 1948–49

The ability of the Rio Treaty to preserve peace in the Americas has been put to test on a number of occasions. Just 8 days after the Treaty came into effect, Costa Rica notified the Council of the OAS that it was being invaded by troops based in Nicaragua.[22] The Council immediately convoked the Organ of Consultation and sent an investigating committee to the disturbed region. The committee's report placed blame for the tense situation upon both parties—on Costa Rica for harboring the international revolutionary group—the Caribbean Legion—and on Nicaragua for permitting Costa Rican exiles to organize a revolutionary movement aimed at the overthrow of the Costa Rican Government.[23] It recommended that both Governments refrain from all hostile acts and prevent the use of their

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[18] U. S. Department of State. Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace. Department of State publication 2497, Conference Series 85. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946, p. 69.

[19] Council on Foreign Relations. The United States in World Affairs, 1948–49. Harper & Bros., New York, 1949, p. 366.

[20] Gantenbein. Op cit. The Charter of the Organization of American States, signed April 30, 1948. Arts. 44 and 46, pp. 862–863.

[21] Inter-American Defense Board. Op cit., p. 10.

[22] Pan American Union. Division of Law and Treaties. Aplicaciones del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca, 1948–55. Washington, 1955, pp. 26–27.

[23] Ibid., p. 28.

territory for military organization by foreign rebels. A military committee was dispatched to the scene to observe the efforts made by Costa Rica and Nicaragua to abide by the recommendations.[24] In less than 2 months a satisfactory settlement was achieved.

Caribbean Imbroglio, 1950

Revolutionary activities in the Caribbean again brought the Rio Treaty into operation in 1950.[25] This time Haiti accused the Dominican Republic of aiding Haitian exiles in a conspiracy to overthrow its Government by armed force. The Dominican Republic countered with charges that similar conspiracies aimed at itself were being countenanced and abetted by the Governments of Guatemala and Cuba as well as Haiti.

The OAS Council followed the procedure utilized in the earlier Costa Rican-Nicaraguan dispute. First, the Council convoked the Organ of Consultation and called a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Then, acting in its capacity as a provisional Organ of Consultation, the Council appointed a five-man investigating committee consisting of the representatives to the OAS of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, the United States, and Uruguay. For more than 3 weeks the committee pursued its investigation, in the process visiting Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Guatemala, and Mexico. In every case the presidents and other high officials of the governments involved in the dispute cooperated. The investigating committee submitted a detailed analysis of the situation to the Council, which in turn recommended measures for removal of the causes of the difficulties, and threatened the application of sanctions on any party repeating the hostile acts. When the governments concerned agreed to remove the causes of the disturbances, the Council dissolved the Organ of Consultation.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1955

In January 1955, Costa Rica requested a meeting of the Organ of Consultation on the grounds that a situation existed, created by Nicaragua, which endangered its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence.[26] An investigating committee was sent to the area and observed both from the ground and air the operations of the invading forces. The committee also interrogated both high officials and captured combatants.

From its investigations the committee concluded that Costa Rica had been the victim of intervention, foreign in its preparation, financing, and supply of arms and munitions. The Council of the OAS recommended that the American governments sell combat planes to Costa Rica which was without an air force. Within 24 hours 4 P–51's sold by the United States to the beleaguered Costa Rica appeared on the scene.

Apparently, the quick aid rendered by the United States on the recommendation of the OAS Council, the presence of five Ambassadors, the military observers from other republics, and the presence of Mexican and United States observation planes convinced the leadership of the attacking force that the Organization of American States would brook no violation of inter-American norms. The belligerents were subsequently disarmed and interned in Nicaragua.

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[24] All relevant documents in ibid., pp. 71–147.
[25] Ibid., pp. 26–27.
[26] All relevant documents in ibid., pp. 159–205.

The Inter-American Peace Committee

Since its installation in 1948, the services of the Inter-American Peace Committee have proved useful in composing differences among some of the American States of a nature not serious enough to invoke the Rio Treaty.[27]

The case of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1949 will serve to illustrate the work of the Peace Committee. Haiti requested a meeting of consultation under the Rio Treaty, charging the Dominican Republic with "moral aggression" for permitting the use of its territory for attacks against the Haitian Government by radio broadcast.[28] After hearing the Dominican Republic's reply to the charges, the Council of the OAS decided that the situation was not grave enough to justify the procedures of the Rio Treaty. Whereupon, the Government of Haiti requested the help of the Inter-American Peace Committee.

With the consent of the Dominican Republic, a delegation of the Peace Committee visited both countries. After a week it succeeded in negotiating a pledge by both parties not to tolerate in their respective territories the activities of anyone seeking to disturb the peace of a neighboring country.

The Peace Committee has not always been so successful. As has been noted, it cannot intervene without the express consent of the parties to a controversy. Nor can it enforce compliance with its suggestions. On one occasion Peru refused to accept its services in a dispute with Colombia.[29] Another time Guatemala delayed in allowing the Peace Committee to concern itself in the anti-Communist revolt in that country in 1954, preferring to carry the case to the United Nations Security Council.[30]

Nevertheless, where there has been willingness to negotiate, intervention by the Peace Committee has facilitated a settlement. Moreover, as one authority has noted, "consent is made easier by the semi-collective character of the intervention." [31]

To date, the successes of the Organization of American States in averting inter-American conflict have been occasioned by disputes between the small nations in the Caribbean and Central America. The inter-American system has not had to prove itself in a test involving the more powerful American Republics.

PREVENTING SUBVERSION

Experience of the Inter-American system with Axis subversive activities

The foreign ministers meeting at Rio de Janeiro 5 weeks after Pearl Harbor was concerned about Axis subversion in the Western Hemisphere. In Latin America Axis subversive strategy was twofold: to cripple Latin American assistance to the Allied cause and to soften the fabric of Latin American institutions to the point where they would be susceptible to Nazi political control without military action. Axis diplomatic missions had become centers in Latin America for directing, coordinating, and financing the program of subversion.

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[27] See Second Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee. Op. cit.
[28] All relevant documents in Aplicaciones. Op. cit., pp. 61-68.
[29] Second Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee. Op. cit., pp. 11-12.
[30] Houston, John A. Latin America in the United Nations. United Nations Studies No. 8. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956, p. 107.
[31] Fenwick, Charles G. Inter-American Regional Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes. International Organization, vol. X, No. 1, February 1956, p. 20.

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To meet the insidious threat posed by subversive activities of the Axis Powers, the foreign ministers recommended a comprehensive policy for tightening individual and collective political defenses of the Americas. At the same time, they directed the creation of a committee to study and coordinate the measures recommended to combat Nazi political warfare and sabotage.[32]

Seven governments were chosen to select members of the Committee, known as the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense.[33] The members were directed to act, not as representatives of their respective Governments, but in the name and on behalf of each of the 21 Republics.[34] A majority of votes was sufficient for approval of any proposal before the Committee, and no member could properly base his negative vote solely on the international policy or other special position of the country by which he was designated.[35] The delegation of authority to 7 individuals of the 21-nation community was a novel arrangement in international bodies.[36]

Liaison officers in each Republic served as direct contacts between the Governments and the Committee. The machinery was rounded out by the use of consultative visits, in which members of the Committee called upon national officials in each country to discuss their problems.[37]

In its 3 years' existence, the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense adopted 25 resolutions designed to combat Axis political aggression in the Western Hemisphere.[38] Its work was directed to such varied measures as the control of dangerous aliens, the protection of ships and harbor installations, the curtailment of supplies to Axis submarines off the coasts of America, and the control of transit across national boundaries. The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense helped the American Republics, individually and collectively, to limit Axis sabotage and propaganda in the Hemisphere.[39]

During the reorganization of the inter-American system that followed the Bogota Conference of 1948, the activities of the wartime Emergency Committee [40] were terminated.

The Guatemalan case

Since World War II the problem of subversion in the Western Hemisphere has been associated with the activities of international communism. In 1950, Communist influence began to increase in Guatemala and reached the point where key posts in the Government were held by Moscow-trained Communists. Not only were the Communists exerting substantial political control over the Guatemalan

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[32] Resolution XVII and attachment. In Gantenbein. Op. cit., pp. 809–814.
[33] Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
[34] Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. Annual report, July 1943. Montevideo, 1943 pp. 10–11.
[35] Ibid., p. 14.
[36] For a full discussion of the representative nature of the committee see Carl B. Spaeth and William Sanders. The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. American Journal of International Law, vol. 38, No. 2, April 1944, pp. 218–241.
[37] Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. Second annual report, July 15, 1943–October 14, 1944. Montevideo, 1944, pp. 40–41.
[38] Comite Consultivo de Emergencia para la Defensa Politica. Legislacion para la defensa politica en las Republicas Americanas. Tomo I, Montevideo, 1947, p. 2.
[39] Argentina, which remained neutral for the major part of the war, did not cooperate fully with the committee. Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. Second annual report. Op. cit., p. 7.
[40] Organization of American States. Committee on Inter-American Organizations. Report of the Committee on Inter-American Organizations relating to the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. Approved by the Council of the Organization of American States at the meeting of November 3, 1948 (*its* Document C–i–4/48–E).

people but it was reported that they were also importing armaments from behind the Iron Curtain.[41]

The threat of Communist penetration caused the United States, at the 10th Inter-American Conference held in Caracas in March 1954, to press for a clear-cut definition of inter-American policy regarding the intervention of international communism in the Western Hemisphere. The result was a resolution which declared:

> The domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international Communist movement * * * would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.[42]

On June 19, 1954, the Communist-influenced Government of Guatemala charged that Honduras and Nicaragua were committing aggression against it by allowing rebels to use their territory as a base for invasion in an attempt to force the government out.[43] Before any of the inter-American peace machinery was effectively utilized, however, the rebels were victorious and the conflict ended.

The case of Communist penetration into Guatemala raised a number of problems which were not ended with the victory of the Guatemalan exiles. One important problem was that of regional versus universal jurisdiction. The United States believed that the problem should be dealt with in the first instance by the Organization of American States.[44] Guatemala felt that the matter should be handled by the United Nations Security Council. When the case came before the Security Council a resolution supported by the United States, on referring the matter to the OAS, was vetoed by the Soviet Union; a second resolution introduced by France, calling for a cease-fire, was passed; and a third resolution, introduced by the Soviet Union, to handle the case in the Security Council, was defeated 4 to 5 with 2 abstentions.[45] The votes of the non-Communist members of the Security Council on the latter resolution indicated a divergence of opinion as to how the case should be handled.

A second problem raised in the Guatemalan case is the ability of the inter-American peace machinery to operate when one of the parties to the dispute refuses its cooperation. The Guatemalan Government, although it had at first appealed to the Inter-American Peace Committee, later asked that the committee defer action on its case.[46] Guatemala finally accepted the services of the Peace Committee, but this was too late to permit an investigation before its Government fell. In previous cases of conflict the Peace Committee has been successful when the parties to the dispute immediately accepted its services. In the Guatemalan affair only Honduras and Nicaragua immediately accepted the services of the Peace Committee. The Council of the OAS could have considered the problem at any time under provisions of the Rio Treaty, regardless of the position taken by the Government of Guatemala. During the period of the conflict, however, no meeting of the Council was held.

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[41] Communist Influence in Guatemala. News conference. Statements by Secretary Dulles, Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, p. 874; Collection of Documents, p. 663.

[42] Department of State. 10th Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1–28, 1954. Report of the delegation of the United States of America, with related documents, p. 157.

[43] New York Times, June 20, 1954, p. 2.

[44] New York Times, June 21, 1954, p. 3.

[45] New York Times, June 26, 1954, p. 1. The four votes for were: Soviet Union, Lebanon, Denmark, and New Zealand. The five votes against were the United States, Turkey, the Republic of China, Mexico, and Brazil. Great Britain and France abstained.

[46] Inter-American Peace Committee Report on the controversies between Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Washington, Pan American Union, July 8, 1954, p. 21.

The use of foreign territory as a base for arming rebel and exile groups is another problem of the inter-American security system brought to the fore by the Guatemalan episode. In this case Guatemala charged Honduras and Nicaragua with allowing rebels to arm on their territory. Since no investigation of the incident occurred, it was not possible to substantiate the charge. This question, however, has been an aspect of other Latin American disputes, and when an investigation has shown clearly that rebels were arming on foreign soil the OAS has condemned the practice.[47]

A fourth and very important problem is the adequacy of the inter-American system to deal effectively with Communist subversion. The United States and other American States did succeed in calling for a meeting of the inter-American foreign ministers to consider the threat the Guatemalan situation posed for the hemisphere. Before the meeting could be convened, however, the anti-Communist forces won control of the Government. Consequently, the proposed meeting was postponed indefinitely.[48] The Communist-influenced Government of Guatemala fell, not through action by the inter-American security system, but by armed revolution.

HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

The third aspect of the inter-American security system, that of defense against foreign attack, has not yet had to meet trial. The need for coordinated hemispheric defense was demonstrated in World War II, which taught a severe lesson in the costliness of uncoordinated hemisphere efforts. Difficulties arose as a result of lack of common equipment and training. From 1919 to 1941, 12 of the Latin American countries employed European military missions to supply armaments and military equipment.[49] Ships and armaments, largely built by European powers, became in many cases obsolete and incapable of sustaining the operations of modern warfare. Moreover, operations involving Latin American troops or equipment were curtailed by lack of spare parts and ammunition previously supplied by Europe. In consequence, the United States was required to furnish equipment to its Latin American allies at a time when its own supplies were critically short.

At the end of the war, the Inter-American Defense Board pondered the methods best suited to give hemisphere solidarity meaning in military terms. In October 1945, the Board forwarded to the governments of the American Republics its recommendations, among which were proposals to standardize the organization and training of the armed forces of the hemisphere and to standardize materiel.[50]

In May 1946, before the United States began to supply military aid to other parts of the world, the executive branch requested Congress to pass a bill on inter-American military cooperation. The bill would have provided for the instruction and training of Latin American military and naval personnel, for the maintenance and repair of their military equipment, and for the transfer of United States armaments. However, such military assistance apparently did not seem urgent

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[47] See p. 7 and p. 27.
[48] New York Times, July 3, 1954, p. 4.
[49] U. S. House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 1st sess. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rept. No. 996. Contributing to the Effective Maintenance of International Peace and Security. July 18, 1947, p. 8.
[50] Britannica Yearbook, 1946, p. 395.

at the time. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House twice reported the bill favorably but no further action was taken on it by Congress.[51]

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

As Soviet aggressive intentions became more clear, the United States began a program of military assistance to free nations with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The American Republics, however, were not included in the military assistance program until after the Communist aggression in Korea in 1950. In December 1950, the United States Government requested the convocation of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers—

> to consult its fellow members of the Organization of American States with respect to the world situation which we all face and on the coordination of the common effort required to meet it.[52]

The meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Washington in March and April 1951. The final act of the meeting condemned the aggression in Korea, reaffirmed the solidarity of the American Republics, and recommended that each take steps to contribute whatever possible to the defense of the continent and to the collective security efforts of the United Nations. A resolution of inter-American military cooperation recommended that the American Republics:

> orient their military preparation in such a way that through self-help and mutual aid [they can] (*a*) increase those of their resources and strengthen those of their armed forces best adapted to the collective defense, and maintain those armed forces in such status that they can be promptly available for the defense of the continent; and (*b*) cooperate with each other, in military matters, in order to develop the collective strength of the continent necessary to combat aggression against any of them.[53]

The Inter-American Defense Board was directed to prepare plans for the common defense.

The planning which the Board has done provides for broad areas of joint action rather than specifying each nation's precise commitments.[54] One of its principal advantages is that it keeps hemisphere defenses in a posture of readiness for cooperation and obviates the creation of a similar, but less experienced body, in the event of a future crisis.

However, although the Inter-American Defense Board continues to plan for defense on a hemisphere-wide basis, neither its functions nor the provisions of the Rio Treaty for mutual defense against foreign attack have been buttressed by such positive provisions for joint operations as have been made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Military aid from the United States to the American Republics was authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Thereupon negotiations were carried on with eight countries. Some of the Governments approached, principally Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, objected to certain provisions in the bilateral agreements such as those obligating recipients to make their strategic resources available to the United States and to limit trade with the Communist bloc.[55] However,

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[51] U. S. House of Representatives, 80th Cong., Rept. No. 996. Op. cit., p. 3.
[52] U. S. Department of State. Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States. Washington, D. C., March 26, April 17, 1951. Report of the Secretary of State. Government Printing Office, May 1953, p. 2.
[53] Ibid., p. 69.
[54] Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1956, p. 7.
[55] Council on Foreign Relations. The United States in World Affairs, 1952. Harper & Bros., New York, p. 265.

after some delay they did approve the agreements with the exception of Mexico which called off negotiations.[56] To date the following 12 Latin American Republics have approved defense assistance agreements with the United States: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay.[57]

E. Latin America Role in Free World Defense

ARMED FORCES OF LATIN AMERICA

As a region, Latin America is comparatively weak in armed forces. During the Second World War it was necessary to divert some 100,000 men from the United States to insure the security of Latin America.[58] Only the two most populous Republics, Brazil and Mexico, contributed military forces which saw action in the European or Asian theaters of war. Since that time, in response to the threat of Communist aggression, many of the Latin American Republics, aided by military assistance advisory groups from the United States, have undertaken to build up and improve their forces. It is now believed that in the event of a future world conflict it would not be necessary for the United States to divert such a large number of troops.[59]

Military forces in the Latin American States range from a minimum of a civil guard police force in some of the smaller countries to a complete three-service complement of army, navy, and air force in some of the larger countries. While official figures on the size of the armed forces are not available, the estimates in the following table, taken from published sources, present a general picture of the Latin American forces.

Armed forces of Latin America

Unless otherwise noted, from Aviation Studies (International), Ltd. Air Force and Naval Air Statistical Record. London. As amended to Apr. 10, 1956]

Country	Population [1]	Year	Army	Navy	Air force
	Millions				
Argentina	19.1	1954	107,000	21,500	19,000
Bolivia	3.2	1955	15,000	None	2,000
Brazil	58.5	1955	90,000	8,000	9,200
Chile	6.6	1955	20,500	8,000	13,000
Colombia	12.7	1955	10,000	1,500	200
Costa Rica [2]	1.0				
Cuba	5.8	1955	19,000	2,000	2,400
Dominican Republic	2.4	1955	3,500	[3] 3,000	2,000
Ecuador	3.6	1955			3,100
Guatemala	3.1	1955	21,000	None	400
Haiti	3.2	1955	4,553	None	400
Honduras	1.6	1955	2,500	None	1,200
Mexico	28.8	1955	41,800	2,500	3,500
Nicaragua	1.2	1955	10,000	None	1,300
Panama [4]	.9	1955	None	None	None
Paraguay	1.6	1955	5,800	400	
Peru	9.4	1955	10,000	2,500	5,000
El Salvador	2.1	1955	6,000	400	500
Uruguay	2.5	1955	3,000	1,450	2,000
Venezuela	5.8	1955	10,000	2,240	5,000

[1] National Planning Association. Technical Cooperation in Latin America; Recommendations for the Future; National Planning Association, Washington, D. C., June 1956.
[2] Costa Rican Army abolished in 1948 and replaced by civil guard of 1,200. (Steinberg, S. H., editor, The Statesman's Yearbook, 1955, New York, London, St. Martin's Press, 1955.)
[3] Jane's Fighting Ships, 1955–56; London, 1956.
[4] Defense of Panama Canal handled by United States. Panama has national police force.

[56] Ibid.
[57] U. S. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1956, p. 292.
[58] U. S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1956. Statement of E. Perkins McGuire, p. 313.
[59] Ibid.

Although the military forces of Latin American countries at their present strengths are considered adequate for the maintenance of their internal security, none is capable of individually resisting invasion by a major power. As in the case of other small countries throughout the world, defense against such aggression would require collective measures, either on a regional basis, through the Rio Treaty, or through the United Nations.

ARMAMENTS

As one of the underdeveloped regions of the world, Latin America at the present time does not have the industrial capacity to equip large forces with modern weapons. It is primarily dependent on foreign sources to attain arms.

Much of the arms at the present time are being supplied by the United States, some under the mutual-security program. The Department of Commerce estimates the total amount in deliveries of military supplies to Latin America since the initiation of the program to December 31, 1956, at $294 million.[60] Nineteen Latin American countries have either received United States grants or have purchased military equipment under the reimbursable aid provisions of the Mutual Security Act.[61]

OTHER FOREIGN SOURCES OF ARMAMENTS

The Latin American Republics have not depended exclusively upon the United States for their armaments. In the present global strategic plans of the United States, Latin America has been assigned a low military priority because it is considered to be relatively secure from direct attack.[62] The amount of military assistance provided by the United States under the mutual assistance program is less than 1.5 percent of the total United States military assistance throughout the world. Some Latin American governments have not been satisfied with United States efforts to meet what they believe to be their armament requirements. Consequently, they are purchasing military equipment from sources other than the United States, because prices and terms are usually more favorable.

Information regarding Latin American military purchases from Europe and Asia is fragmentary. It has been reported that since the initiation of the mutual-defense program 8 Latin American Republics have purchased a total of 74 naval ships from Europe and Asian countries.[63] Venezuela presently has on order 3 heavy destroyers in England, a transport in France, and 6 light destroyers in Italy, the fifth of which was delivered in July 1956.[64]

In December 1956, the Brazilian Government purchased a light aircraft carrier from the British Government at a reported price of

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[60] Net grants as reported in: U. S. Department of Commerce. Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government. December 1956 quarter, p. S-9. Of this total $174 million was for materials on a grant basis obtained from appropriations or from excess stocks.

[61] U. S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Report of the Honorable Porter Hardy on Military Assistance Advisory Groups. Military, Naval, and Air Force Missions in Latin America. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956, p. 3, and Department of State.

[62] U. S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1956. Statement of E. Perkins McGuire, p. 313.

[63] U. S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Report of the Honorable Porter Hardy on Military Assistance Advisory Groups * * * in Latin America. Op. cit., p. 3.

[64] Diario las Americas, July 17, 1956, p. 1.

$22 million.[65] Earlier the same year, Brazil obtained a Dutch floating drydock. In the meantime, the armed forces in Argentina put pressure on the provisional government of General Aramburu to modernize Argentina's armed services. Navy Minister Adm. Teodoro Hartung announced near the end of the year that the navy was negotiating with both Great Britain and the United States for the purchase of an aircraft carrier "to offset the carrier bought in December from England by Brazil." [66] In June the keel was laid in a British shipyard for the first of two destroyers on order there for the Chilean Navy.[67]

As to aircraft, it is reported that among the receipts of military aircraft from Europe, three South American countries have purchased 114 jet aircraft from the United Kingdom.[68] Argentina is reported to have bought 20 heavy bombers and 200 basic trainers from England and 100 fighter bombers from Italy.[69] Recently it announced its intention to buy 106 military aircraft for which offers are being considered from the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Italy.[70] Nicaragua received 25 F–51 Mustangs from Swedish surplus.[71] It is also understood that one country is purchasing arms and equipment from the Hertzall factory in Belgium.[72] Guatemala, as indicated earlier, turned to the Soviet bloc for weapons when the Government was under Communist influence.

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Some of the Western Hemisphere Republics have demonstrated an interest in relieving their dependency upon foreign sources for war material. Brazil, for example, is encouraging the manufacture of aircraft. In 1954, Fokker, Industria Aeronautica, S. A., a joint Brazilian-Dutch enterprise, began production of aircraft. By 1955, Fokker turned over to the Brazilian Government the first plane manufactured in Brazil, made by Brazilians, from about two-thirds Brazilian material.[73] At the time 95 more planes were in phases of production in the infant industry.[74]

Argentina has a longer history of aircraft production. Industrias Aeronauticas y Mecanicas del Estado (IAME), organized around 1927, is a state organization employing 13,000 workers.[75] In 1930 IAME began intensive research to develop its own designs, and some 300 observation planes, bombers, training and transport planes were turned out.[76] Later the Argentine factory acquired patent rights for Curtiss Hawk 75 and Fokke-Wulf 44–J Stieglitz, of which 200 and 500 were produced in Cordoba.[77] In 1947 IAME produced the first Latin-American jet-propelled plane. The present Government has indicated its intention of increasing local production with a view to modernizing Argentina's air force.

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[65] Hilton, Ronald (Director) Hispanic American Report. Report for December 1956. Stanford University, vol. IX, No. 12, p. 609.
[66] Ibid., p. 599.
[67] Diario las Americas, June 22, 1956, p. 1.
[68] Hardy report. Op. cit., p. 8
[69] Argentina Fosters Ambitious Air Plans. Aviation Week, May 16, 1955, p. 46.
[70] Diario las Americas, July 7, 1956, p. 1.
[71] Bureau of Aviation Statistics. Airforce and Naval Air Statistical Record (as amended to April 10, 1956). Aviation Studies (International), Ltd., London.
[72] Hardy Report. Op. cit.
[73] Instituto de Engenharia Militar (Brazil). Revista de Engenharia Militar, ano XVIII, Jan./Fev. 1956, No. 205, pp. 7–10.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Aviation Week. Op. cit., p. 49.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.

BASES

The geographic position of Latin America renders it particularly important as a location for bases to be used in the defense of the Western Hemisphere in time of war.

The granting of airbase rights in strategic spots by a number of Latin American countries during World War II was of major importance to Allied operations. There were large installations in Cuba, Brazil, Panama, Ecuador, and Peru, and the air route through the West Indies and Natal to Dakar was one of the most important supply routes to the African, European, and China-Burma theaters.

At the present time there are only two bases flying the United States flag in the Latin American countries. These are the military installations in the Panama Canal Zone and the naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba.[78] Both of these are used by United States forces under treaties of long standing with the respective countries in which they are located. In case of war, however, the United States would probably be granted access to other bases in Latin America, as was the case in World War II.

In addition, the United States maintains stations in Latin America for the tracking and testing of missiles. By an agreement signed in 1951, the United States and the Dominican Republic agreed to collaborate in the maintenance of a long-range proving ground for the testing of guided missiles.[79]

On January 21, 1957, the United States concluded an agreement for the establishment of a guided-missile tracking station on Fernando de Noronha Island, about 200 miles off the coast of Brazil.[80] The site is considered an essential link in the 5,000-mile, guided-missile track between Florida launching sites and the terminal control point, British-ruled Ascension Island. It will remain under Brazilian command and flag. At the end of the agreement, all permanent installations will remain on the island. The agreement was made under provision of the Rio Treaty and the 1952 bilateral pact on military assistance.[81]

RAW MATERIALS

Latin America is rich in raw materials and has many natural resources vital in defense. Among these are oil, iron, tin, antimony, asbestos, bauxite, beryl, cadmium, columbite, copper, cordage fibers, fluorspar, manganese, mercury, molybdenum, quartz, rare earths, tin, uranium, and vanadium. Approximately 30 items in the United States stockpile of strategic materials come from Latin America. In time of war the raw materials of Latin America become more vital to the United States.

LATIN AMERICA AND WORLD COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Besides their commitments for regional collective security, the Latin American Republics have assumed global collective-security obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Communist invasion of Korea in 1950 raised the question of Latin American

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[78] Information from Department of Defense.
[79] U. S. Department of State. Treaties and Other International Acts, 2425.
[80] New York Times, Feb. 10, 1957, p. 1.
[81] For text of agreement, see Current History, April 1957, p. 239.

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participation in collective action against aggression occurring outside the Western Hemisphere.

On June 27, 1950, 3 days after the North Korean Communists crossed the 38th parallel, the Security Council adopted a resolution which recommended that the members of the United Nations "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore peace and security in the area." [82]

The two Latin American members of the Security Council supported the resolution. The following day the Council of the Organization of American States voted to support the Security Council's resolution. The OAS Council, although under no obligation to go on record in the matter, unanimously declared "its firm adherence to the decisions of the competent organs of the United Nations," and affirmed "the pledges of continental solidarity which unite the American States." The preamble of the resolution stressed that all of the members of the Organization of American States were members of the United Nations and therefore bound to comply with its decisions.[83]

Following the Security Council's June 27 resolution, the Secretary General cabled all the United Nations governments to inquire what assistance each would be able to provide "including combat forces, particularly ground forces." [84] Requests were also made by the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council for food, clothes, medical supplies, and other items for civilian relief in Korea.

Seventeen of the twenty Latin American Republics responded promptly with varying offers of assistance.[85] Proffers of military assistance were few. Costa Rica and El Salvador offered to send volunteers to the United States for preliminary training for service in Korea. Bolivia placed 30 officers of its regular army at the disposal of the United Nations. Both Panama and Costa Rica offered bases, and Panama offered a corps of volunteers as well as the use of its merchant marine for the transfer of food and supplies. Acceptance of all these offers was deferred. Later, after the Chinese Communists had entered the conflict and attrition on U. N. manpower became severe, Colombia offered to provide an infantry battalion of 1,080 men and a frigate, both of which were accepted by the United Nations Command and saw action. Other Latin American States offered economic assistance.[86]

THE "UNITING FOR PEACE" RESOLUTION

In the session of the General Assembly meeting in the fall of 1950, the United States introduced a plan (known as the Uniting for Peace resolution) to circumvent if necessary the veto in the Security Council.

Several provisions of the resolution as adopted on November 3, 1950, were particularly significant from the point of view of the participation of smaller nations in the collective maintenance of peace. The General Assembly was empowered to assume responsibility in the event of a breach of the peace should the Security Council be

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[82] United Nations. Korea and the United Nations. United Nations publications, 1950, 1–8, p. 12

[83] Pan American Union. Annals of the Organization of American States, vol. II, No. 3, 1950, p. 222.

[84] Korea and the United Nations. Op- cit., p. 89.

[85] Complete list of offers by member states of assistance for Korea as of September 15, 1950, in Korea and the United Nations. Op. cit., pp. 89–93.

[86] Uruguay offered $2 million for civilian relief. Venezuela offered medical supplies valued at $100,000 for civilian purposes. The Unified Command Emergency Relief Program for Korea received delivery of a variety of contributions from Latin American Republics.

prevented from acting, and to recommend appropriate collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary.[87] The resolution further recommended that each member—

> maintain within its armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available in accordance with its constitutional processes for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation of the Security Council or General Assembly.[88]

Only Argentina among the Latin American Republics withheld its support from the draft resolution. The Argentine delegate was not convinced that the earmarking of national contingents for United Nations use had been proved to be an extension of the General Assembly's power.[89]

The significance of the resolution for the smaller nations was summarized by the Uruguayan delegate. He said:

> While this draft resolution calls upon the small states to play an active part in maintaining peace and security, it also imposes upon them grave and weighty responsibilities already laid down in the charter. In voting for this draft resolution, every one of us will shoulder a serious obligation, a heavy responsibility. Every one of us must return to his country conscious of his duty to do his utmost for the adoption of the legal, economic and military measures required to place our countries in a legal and material position to discharge, whenever necessary, the responsibility which we are assuming in this historic hour.[90]

As matters developed, the exhortation of the Uruguayan delegate went almost unheeded by his fellow Latin Americans. On April 16, 1951, the United Nations Collective Measures Committee [91] circulated a letter to member governments inquiring about the elements within their national armed forces which would be available for service as a U. N. unit or units in accordance with the Uniting for Peace resolution. Five months later, and almost a year after the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution, the report of the Committee indicated that only 11 Latin American governments had replied. The following table summarizes the Latin American replies:[92]

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[87] Collection of Documents p. 166.

[88] Ibid., p. 167.

[89] United Nations General Assembly Official Records, fifth session. 301st Plenary Meeting, November 2, 1950. A/PV. 301, pp. 335–336. Costa Rica ran into a constitutional problem, since the Costa Rican Constitution specifically forbids "a permanent army." (Ibid., 302d Plenary Meeting, November 3, 1950. A/PV. 302, p. 344.) But the clause, "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes," amended to the original draft, paved the way for Costa Rican approval.

[90] Ibid., 299th Plenary Meeting, November 1, 1950. A/PV. 299. p. 293.

[91] Fourteen member committee established by the Uniting for Peace resolution to study and recommend methods, including military, for maintaining peace.

[92] Based on data published in United Nations General Assembly Official Records, sixth session, 1951. Supplement No. 13 (A/1891). Report of the Collective Measures Committee, pp. 37–42.

Country	Troops already serving United Nations (1)	Future earmarking of contingents (2)	Special circumstances influencing earmarking of troops (3)	Remarks (4)
Bolivia		Simple acknowledgment.		
Brazil		Will do utmost to maintain elements within national armed forces for service with the United Nations.		Chief of Brazilian General Staff will shortly arrive in New York to discuss part to be played by Brazilian armed forces under uniting for peace resolution.
Chile		Government of Chile wishes to fulfill the recommendation and is undertaking studies of the problem.	Lack of raw materials and financial and economic situation are important factors affecting Chile's possible contribution.	Chilean permanent delegate authorized to hold consultations on these matters.
Colombia	Frigate *Almirante Padilla* and 1 battalion in Korea.	Will train new battalions for service with U. N. in future.		Commitment in (2) dependent on U. N. or unified command facilitating training and making armaments available.
Ecuador		Will devote special attention as far as possible to development and maintenance of elements trained, organized, and equipped to be available both for the defense of the continent and for service under uniting for peace resolution.	Scanty resources necessarily limit contribution and Ecuador will require assistance of better equipped countries in technical instruction and provision of war supplies.	
Guatemala				Economic capabilities and limited resources do not permit maintenance of elements of its armed forces for service with U. N.
Haiti			Weak economy does not allow rapid increase in military forces.	Troops now being trained on United States pattern and future expansion of forces may allow for participation in action under uniting for peace resolution.
Honduras		Possible organization and training of infantry battalion in conformity with U. S. Army standards now being studied.	Battalion in (2) for service within Honduras only.	Will cooperate for defense of continent.
Mexico		Simple acknowledgment.		
Uruguay		2 destroyer-escorts, combat team on basis of an infantry regiment (in planning stage).		
Venezuela			Large area, geographical situation and strategic resources of country require from military authorities special attention to self-defense, and energies are being concentrated to this end.	National armed forces need both technical training and modern equipment if they are to be effective in support of U. N. action.

Measured against the overall effort of United Nations members, Latin American assistance appears small.[93] However, if compared with the aid from other countries of comparable size and development, especially in the Near East and Asia, Latin American support for United Nations enforcement action was comparatively generous.

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

The invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France in the fall of 1956 led to a second call for national units to serve the international organization. Twenty-four members of the United Nations responded to the Secretary General's call for troops to serve in the United Nations Emergency Force. Among these were five Latin American countries. Brazil offered 500 troops; Colombia offered 1 infantry battalion and 2 companies, a total of 550 men; Ecuador offered up to 500 troops; Peru offered up to 500 men; and Chile offered the services of an unspecified number. Colombian and Brazilian troops are serving with UNEF in Egypt.

F. Latin America and Disarmament

EARLY DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN LATIN AMERICA

During the long quest for a system of security in Latin America disarmament was rarely considered. In the postrevolutionary period the new nations of Latin America felt obliged to maintain military establishments adequate to defend their newly acquired independence. Moreover, Spain's departure from the American continent signaled a long turbulent interval in which rival claims and ambitions were frequently supported by the sword.

Nevertheless, at the same time there existed a strong sentiment against war. The frequent conflicts in the Old World were universally deplored among the new nations, and the belief had taken root that the New World must and could rid itself of the cycle of war that infected Europe. Thus, in spite of some bloody conflicts that marred the peaceful vision Americans had of themselves, the record of amicable settlement of disputes does show a tendency toward peaceful settlement. Leo S. Rowe, former Director General of the Pan American Union, has pointed out:

> * * * since the early part of the 19th century, no fewer than 78 boundary and territorial disputes have been ended by the orderly processes of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration.[94]

DEMILITARIZED FRONTIERS

In line with the desire to prevent war, several attempts were made by Latin American nations to lessen tensions by demilitarizing border zones. Peru and Colombia in 1829 agreed to reduce the military forces in the northern departments of Peru and in the southern ones of Colombia to garrisons and troops absolutely nesessary for maintaining

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[93] Listing of the deliveries to the Unified Command Emergency Relief Program for Korea as of December 31, 1954, in: U. S. Department of State. United States participation in the United Nations; report by the President to the Congress for the year 1954. Department of State Publication 5769. Government Printing Office, August 1955, pp. 211–216.

[94] The Problem of Inter-American Organization. Stanford University Press, 1944, p. 48. (Quoted by M. Margaret Ball.)

the country in tranquillity.[95] In 1881 Chile and Argentina signed an agreement by which the Strait of Magellan, the major water passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans prior to the Panama Canal, would be neutralized forever and fortifications or military defenses would be forbidden.[96]

A protocol between Chile and Peru in 1929, which settled the long-festering Tacna and Arica dispute, contained a clause calling for the dismantling of fortifications on the Morro de Arica (Hill of Arica).[97] The hill is still without fortification.

The same year Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which share the island of Hispaniola, signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and arbitration in which it was stipulated that no fortification or other military works could be erected within a limit of 10 kilometers from the frontier line.[98]

OTHER DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

Two agreements to limit armaments other than on frontiers have been undertaken in Latin America. The first, a bilateral pact between Argentina and Chile signed in 1902, limited naval armaments.[99] The two countries pledged not to acquire the vessels of war then in the course of construction or to increase their naval armaments during the next 5 years without giving the other 18 months' notice. However, when neighboring Brazil initiated an ambitious naval construction program 2 years later, Chile and Argentina canceled their pact.[100]

More far-reaching was the treaty signed in 1923 by the Central American States—Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.[101] The contracting parties limited themselves to the possession of no more than 10 military aircraft each. None was permitted at any time to acquire war vessels, except coast-guard boats. After taking into consideration their relative population, area, extent of frontiers, and other factors of military importance, they fixed for a 5-year period the following limitation on the number of troops each country could maintain in its army and national guard:

Guatemala	5, 200
El Salvador	4, 200
Honduras	2, 500
Nicaragua	2, 500
Costa Rica	2, 000

The treaty made no provision for inspection or enforcement. On March 26, 1953, Honduras formally denounced the limitation of armaments provisions along with other terms of the 1923 treaty on the grounds that circumstances had altered measurably since the treaty became effective.[102] But long before Honduras withdrew from

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[95] Marshall-Cornwall, Maj. Gen. J. J. Geographic Disarmament, Study of Regional Demilitarization. London, Oxford University Press, 1935, pp. 83–84.

[96] Ibid, p. 64. In 1942, the United States tried to get permission to establish air and naval bases in the Strait of Magellan, but was unsuccessful. Whitaker, Arthur P. Argentine Upheaval. New York, Praeger, 1956, p. 102.

[97] Geographic Disarmament. Op. cit., p. 124.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Pan American Union. Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace to Assemble at Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 1, 1936. Special Handbook for the Use of Delegates. Washington, 1936, p. 44.

[100] Whitaker, Arthur P. The United States and Argentina. Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 98.

[101] Collection of Documents, p. 28.

[102] Republica de Honduras. Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1952–53. Talleres Tipograficos Nacionales, Tegucigalpa, 1954, pp. 183–184

the agreement formally, the convention on the limitation of armaments seems to have been generally ignored.[103]

GENERAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL ARMAMENTS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA

In 1923, at the Fifth Pan American Conference, held in Santiago, Chile, the American Republics included for the first time the following topic on their Conference agenda: Consideration of the Reduction and Limitation of Military and Naval Expenditures on Some Just and Practicable Basis.[104]

The delegates who worked on the committee for limitation of armaments were in complete accord as to the desirability of reducing armament expenditures. But a sharp divergence of opinion occurred over the criteria by which the objective might be achieved.[105] Brazil, especially, held that considering the vast differences in population, area, extension of frontiers, and so forth, a single standard for land forces would be impractical. The Honduras delegation proposed, in view of the difficulties attending the limitation of land armaments, that the conference limit itself to consideration of the question of naval armaments. Although both Argentina and Chile came forward with concrete proposals fixing maximum tonnage for war vessels, no agreement among the States represented could be reached. Under the circumstances, the best the committee could produce was a resolution condemning "armed peace which increases military and naval forces beyond the requirements of internal security and the sovereignty and independence of the States." [106]

In the midthirties, the American Republics again discussed the possibility of limiting armaments. But aggression in Europe and Asia dissuaded the countries of the Western Hemisphere from reducing what armed strength they had built up. The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in 1936, recommended that the governments conclude general or bilateral agreements to limit their armaments but no specific arms-control arrangements were negotiated.

LATIN AMERICA'S STAKE IN WORLD DISARMAMENT

Although the existence of world tension and the uncertainties about continued peace have caused Latin American countries to strengthen their defenses, other considerations lend weight to the desire by these countries to see armaments reduced and controlled. The frequently reiterated belief that the next war would be global has aroused apprehension about the possible involvement of Latin American countries if it should take place and, therefore, increases their interest in an effective international disarmament agreement. Furthermore, the procurement of armaments has often meant the diversion of scarce foreign exchange from the purchase of equipment vitally needed for economic development. And finally, many people within the hemisphere are aware that the existence of world tension can be used as the

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[103] Herrarte, Alberto. La Union de Centroamerica, Tragedia y Esperanza. Editorial del Ministerio de Educacion Publica, Guatemala, 1955, p. 275.

[104] Pan American Union. Fifth International Conference of American States, Special Handbook for the Use of the Delegates. Washington, 1922, p. 30.

[105] Verbatim record of the plenary sessions of the Fifth International Conference of American States, Journal of Sessions. Report of the Committee on Limitation of Armaments on Topic XII, vol. 1, Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Universitaria, 1923, pp. 661–695.

[106] United States Delegation to the International American Conference. Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Fifth International Conference of American States, with appendixes. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1924, p. 195.

rationale to maintain large police and military forces which could be employed for purposes other than defense.[107]

POLITICAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO DISARMAMENT

As a region, Latin America presents perhaps the fewest problems to those engaged in arriving at a world disarmament formula. The 20 American Republics are relatively lightly armed. None presently possesses nuclear weapons. Moreover, there appears to be no political problem in the area of such magnitude that its existence would preclude a disarmament agreement. In the current world situation, the geographic position of the area seems to diminish the possibility that any Latin American Republic will become a major object of contention although, as in other regions, there is the ever-present danger of Communist subversion and aggression.

However, the area is not without possible points of friction. One of the chief sources of political tension in Latin America appears to be the practice of exiles from one state using a neighboring state as a base for military operations to gain power in their own country.[108] In the cases of the settlement of disputes between Latin American nations outlined earlier, the charge was made by one government that a neighboring state was harboring exiles who were equipping themselves with arms in preparation for a revolution or civil war.

There are other inter-American disputes and rivalries, for instance, those over territories or boundaries, which conceivably could affect the willingness of the Latin American states to reduce their arms. Thus even though the regional peace-keeping system has diminished the necessity of maintaining large armed forces to deter attack by a neighbor, some inter-American tension remains.

In addition, there are some points of friction which involve nations outside the Western Hemisphere. The Falkland Islands offer an example. Three hundred miles off the southern mainland of Argentina, the islands have been occupied by Great Britain since 1833 but are claimed by Argentina. In theory they could protect the Cape Horn Passage and guard the southern entrance to the Atlantic,[109] but the opening of the Panama Canal diminished their strategic importance in this respect.

The Antarctic is also a possible scene of international friction. Argentina and Chile claim large stretches of the Antarctic continent, as do the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, France, and Norway.[110] Since 1948, the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile

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[107] Recently Eduardo Santos, former President of Colombia, stated in a speech at Columbia University: "Against whom are we Latin Americans arming ourselves? Why are our countries ruining themselves buying arms which they will never use? * * * We have no reason to fight one another; we have only reasons to live together in peace and harmony.

"Have we perhaps a military role to play in the great international world conflicts? This is an attitude worthy of a Tartarin which could not be kept up for 5 minutes. In this day of the atom bomb, with the new arms whose cost is fabulous, with technical systems involving thousands of millions, what are our poor countries about, bankrupting themselves on armaments which in the event of an international conflict would spell absolutely nothing. Then, what we are doing is building up armies which weigh nothing in the international scale but which are Juggernauts for the internal life of each country. Each country is being occupied by its own army." (Del Rio, Angel, ed. Responsible Freedom in the Americas. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955, pp. 200–221.)

[108] For examples, see above, pp. 7–8.

[109] Roucek, Joseph S. Geopolitics of Antarctica and the Falklands. World Affairs Interpreter, spring, 1951, vol. XXII, No. 1, p. 44.

[110] Jenks, C. Wilfred. An International Regime for Antarctica? International Affairs, October 1956, vol. 32, No. 4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, p. 416. Although the United States has never filed a formal claim to any part of the Antarctic Continent, considerable interest on the part of the Government has been maintained in it. In a letter dated, March 28, 1957, to Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State, Senator Theodore Francis Green, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, inquired whether the Department of State "feels that recent developments in that area make it appropriate to clarify United States policy toward Antarctica * * * [and] that at the appropriate time 'Executive and congressional action' might 'be coordinated along whatever lines appear most desirable.' "

have had an agreement, renewed each year, to refrain from sending warships south of 60° of latitude.[111] The Indian Government has voiced concern that a 20th century scramble for the Antarctic will create new tensions between the big powers, and has asked that the United Nations consider the Antarctic problem.[112] But Argentina and Chile have resisted attempts to carry the question to the United Nations. In the meantime, concern has been voiced in Argentina over the possibility of the installation of naval-military bases and the conducting of atomic experiments in the region.[113]

EFFECT OF CURRENT DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS ON LATIN AMERICA

Negotiations for disarmament have been directed primarily to preventing a third world war by bringing under control the armed forces and armaments of the major powers. However, the proposals introduced in the negotiations have also encompassed other countries.

The armed forces and armaments of smaller states are especially important in regional conflicts and in localized aggressions. Moreover, the development of defense pacts, such as the Rio Treaty, and the formation of military alliances among Communist states have, in varying degrees, rendered the military strength of states within these groupings a factor to be considered in establishing the ceilings for the major powers. As long as its allies are not in a position to defend themselves adequately in case of aggression, the United States must consider this in establishing its force levels. On the other hand, if the military strength of its allies is such that they can make a real contribution toward regional defense, then the United States may be able to make a reduction in its forces without risk to the free world.

The United States draft working paper for the first stage of a disarmament program, presented to the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament on April 3, 1956, suggested that a preparatory armaments regulation commission be established by the five members of the Subcommittee (United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Soviet Union). After these states had taken certain preparatory measures, such as the installation of an inspection and control system, the working paper proposed that the Disarmament Commission "be requested to invite other states having a significant military potential to join in an armaments regulation organization.[114]

For each state, according to the working paper, a reduced level of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures for the first phase would be established. This level would be "considerably below" the ceiling set for the four major members of the Subcommittee (2,500,000 each for the United States and the Soviet Union and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom), and would not exceed 500,000 men except in the case of China (which would be permitted 2,500,000 troops) or unless "special circumstances" required an exception. In fixing the levels, account would be taken of "agreed criteria, including demographic, geographic, economic, and political factors." Inspection and control obligations would then apply to these states too.

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[111] Jenks, C. Wilfred, op. cit.

[112] Kaskeline, Egon. Soviets Push Efforts To Snatch Polar Edge. Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 1956, p. 7.

[113] Whitaker, Arthur P. Argentine Upheaval. Praeger, New York, 1956, p. 103.

[114] United Nations Document DC/83, annex 6. The Disarmament Commission is composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada. Two seats on the Security Council, and hence also on the Disarmament Commission are always filled by Latin American states.

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The "proposed synthesis" submitted at the same time by the United Kingdom and France left the levels of all states to be agreed upon later, and in respect to the smaller states, said only that the levels should be "considerably below" the levels fixed for the five permanent members of the Security Council.[115]

The proposals presented by the Soviet Union during the 1956 disarmament negotiations set the maximum for countries other than the major powers at 150,000 to 200,000 each.[116]

Since none of the Latin American states has armed forces approaching 500,000, the United States proposals would not affect the size of any of their armed forces. The Soviet proposal would at most require only minute reductions on the part of the larger South American states, and even this effect could probably be readily offset by modernization and training to increase the effectiveness of the remaining forces permitted under an agreement.

ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN BASES

The security of the Western Hemisphere might also be affected if the frequently repeated Soviet proposal "to liquidate within 2 years the foreign military, naval and airbases in the territory of other states," were ever adopted.[117] Although disarmament discussions have never reached the point of specifying what constitutes a foreign military base, the United States does maintain two bases in Latin America which have some military significance. One is the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo, Cuba. This is considered an essential peacetime training base for the United States Navy.

The second United States base in Latin America is a training base in Panama. In addition, military installations have been erected and maintained by the United States in the Panama Canal Zone as a means of insuring the availability of the Panama Canal, not only to all the countries of the Western Hemisphere but to nations all over the globe. The security of the United States, Latin America, and the entire free world would suffer severely if their access to the canal were denied or curtailed in any way.

CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

Thus far proposals for the reduction and control of armaments of the smaller powers have not been spelled out in any detail. The United States working paper of March 1956 for the first stage of a disarmament system suggested that all states having a significant military potential agree on a reduced level of armaments and reduce to this level by destroying armaments under the supervision of international inspectors, the salvage material to be used for peaceful national purposes.[118] Proposals by the Soviet Union have called for the reduction of armaments by the smaller states, but they have not indicated the levels to which armaments would be reduced or the manner of their reduction.

The Latin American States, with the possible exception of Argentina and Brazil, appear to be largely dependent on foreign sources for

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[115] United Nations Document DC/83, annex 2. As of this printing the proposals do not appear to have been changed substantially in this respect.
[116] United Nations Document DC/83, annex 5.
[117] Soviet statement of November 17, 1956. New York Times, November 18, 1956, p. 33.
[118] United Nations Document DC/83, annex 6.

their armaments. One method of controlling armaments in Latin America, therefore, would be through control of the arms traffic. For many years the United States and other nations have regulated private arms shipments on a unilateral basis. The United States began applying controls on exports of arms to Latin America even before it established a system for regulating all commercial arms exports in 1935. Beginning in 1905 the United States on several occasions applied arms embargoes or other restrictions with a view to promoting stability and discouraging revolutions in Latin America.[119] In this hemisphere, 17 of the 21 republics are bound by the Pan American Convention of February 20, 1928, concerning the duties and rights of states in the event of civil strife, to prohibit the export of war material to any unrecognized revolutionary groups in a contracting state.[120] A draft protocol to this convention defined the obligation of a state to include keeping under surveillance and prohibiting the exportation or importation of war material which it has reason to believe is intended to start or promote civil strife in another American state.[121]

Continuing international supervision and control of the traffic in arms has never been established although there has been some international cooperation on the matter. At the end of the First World War, there was a great deal of discussion of the control of arms traffic as a method of arms control, and two international conventions providing for a system of national licensing and publicity for the exportation of arms and munitions were negotiated but never came into effect.[122]

Since the Second World War very little emphasis has been given to the control of arms traffic as a method of disarmament. Nevertheless, in regard to those nations which do not manufacture all of their own arms, the control of arms traffic could reduce their source of supply and control their levels of armament. Unless the security of the nonproducing states was assured by other means and an arms control system was instituted over the major powers any limitation of the supply of arms might eventually force nonproducing states into manufacturing arms for themselves.[123]

International control over the arms traffic would not necessarily involve a reduction of the arms trade. However, in the Western Hemisphere it could mean agreement by the American Republics for the most effective utilization possible of arms purchases for the defense of the Hemisphere.

CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Proposals on the control of atomic energy would have at the present time little direct effect on Latin America since none of the Latin American Republics possesses atomic weapons. However, each may eventually receive technical information concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy and fissionable material under the United States

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[119] Stedman, Murray S. Exporting Arms. New York, Kings Crown Press, 1947, p. 2.

[120] Ibid., p. 163. The states which have ratified this convention are Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay.

[121] The protocol was opened for signature May 1, 1957. Text available from Pan American Union.

[122] One of these, the Geneva Arms Traffic Convention of June 17, 1925, was ratified by the United States in 1935.

[123] The American delegation which negotiated the Geneva Arms Traffic Convention felt it would be futile to attempt to restrict the volume of the trade in arms because it might force arms production by all powers. See: Collection of Documents, p. 808.

bilateral "atoms for peace" program and the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. The sharing of fissionable materials envisioned in these programs might be increased if countries now possessing nuclear armaments diverted, under a disarmament agreement, some of the fissionable material in these weapons to peaceful uses.

All the South American countries with the exception of Ecuador, Paraguay, and Bolivia have bilateral agreements with the United States for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, the agreement with Ecuador, which is not effective, is awaiting statutory approvals. In Central America and the Caribbean there are agreements with Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. Similar agreements with Cuba, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua are in various stages of being approved.[124] Moreover, all the Latin American states would be eligible to participate in the International Atomic Energy Agency when it comes into being.[125] Both of these programs will provide safeguards to assure that the materials supplied under them will be used only for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the fact that these and other countries may someday have the skill with which to manufacture atomic weapons points up the necessity of achieving some system of international control of atomic energy before more countries have an opportunity to produce and surreptitiously stockpile atomic weapons.

The principal result disarmament proposals might have on Latin America, however, lies in the effect they would have on the ability of the United States to aid in the defense of the hemisphere. If an agreement weakened that ability without providing an acceptable substitute security system, the freedom of Latin America, like that of the United States, would be jeopardized. On the other hand, if a disarmament agreement led to the reduction of international tension and decreased the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, then Latin America, like the United States, would reap many benefits.

G. Concluding Observations

The place of Latin America in today's world points up the important relationship of disarmament, security, and peaceful settlement. In the area there has evolved a system which goes a long way toward establishing inter-American security through the substitution of peaceful settlement for excessive armaments. The Organization of American States along with the Rio Pact constitutes the only regional organization which provides the members with machinery to settle their political disputes by peaceful means. The existence of this regional organization machinery has fostered a security for Latin American nations from a wide variety of dangers, including attack from outside the Hemisphere, conflict with neighbors, and interference by the largest power in the area—the United States.

The great diminution, if not removal, of the early security problems facing Latin America has freed the countries from the necessity of maintaining huge defense establishments. It has allowed the several republics to concentrate more on the development of their economies and on the larger problems of hemispheric defense and world collective security.

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[124] Information from the Atomic Energy Commission.

[125] The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was approved at an international conference on October 23, 1956. The statute has been referred to the signatory governments for ratification.

Latin American countries, to defend themselves from foreign attack, are relying on cooperative measures with the United States to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the Western Hemisphere, and on the United Nations in its efforts to build a workable system of collective security.

Current disarmament proposals of the major powers, if adopted, would not result in a reduction of Latin American armed strength. A reduction of armaments within a region, however, need not always await a universal agreement on arms control. It is possible that with greater coordination of the regional defense functions of the individual countries, the size of their armed forces and armaments could be reduced. Such a step would redound to the economic and political well-being of Latin American nations.

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