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
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84th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF
ARMAMENTS

A DECADE OF NEGOTIATIONS
1946-1956



STAFF STUDY NO. 3

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE



JULY 22, 1956

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1956

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
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
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PREFACE

By Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Chairman

At the present time three nations are known to possess nuclear weapons, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. In the not too distant future other countries are likely to have them. As the stockpiles grow, the shadow of destruction lengthens over the entire human race. Scientific knowledge is now available and, to a considerable extent, so are the weapons, to turn the earth into an empty desert. This is not fantasy, nor is it a prospect about which only future generations need be concerned. The danger of sudden nuclear extinction confronts us. The possibility of the suicide of civilization exists now.

Since the end of World War II, the United States and other nations have sought means to prevent this catastrophe. Proposals have been made to control and eliminate nuclear weapons. These proposals are part of the overall efforts directed toward the control and reduction of all armaments and of the prevention of war itself.


The negotiations to transform the proposals into international agreement have been extensive. Yet, after a decade of negotiations, agreement has not been reached. Let us hope that the period of futile agreement to disagree is now on the wane. Certainly, however, the Soviet Union has resorted in the past to the shadowboxing tactics of seeking acceptance of its proposals only to raise new obstacles when the possibility of success was close. We will have to be alert to be sure their attitude during recent disarmament negotiations is not suddenly reversed by some new tack or diversion.

Of late, there have been indications of changing attitudes and policies which give reason for cautious hope. It may be that a common awareness of the devastating implications of nuclear war is growing in all the principal nations and is impelling them toward agreement. That remains to be seen. In the meantime the nuclear race is being superseded by a new and more deadly contest, the race to develop the long-range ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear destruction. We may be on the verge of a new type of warfare, warfare waged by weapons thrust beyond the earth's atmosphere in flights of devastation between the continents.

This nation has stressed over and over again the urgent necessity of agreement on inspection and control among the principal nations to prevent this nightmare of sudden destruction by surprise attack. The Soviet Union still hesitates while time runs out. If agreement is not reached before the perfection of the long-range missile, the so-called ICBM, this generation may well lose the last chance to provide a reasonable measure of security for all nations through safeguarded disarmament.

Staff Study No. 3, Control and Reduction of Armaments, A Decade of Negotiations, 1946-56, is an analysis of the proposals advanced by the negotiating powers since 1946, the efforts to reconcile the proposals, and the problems which have been encountered in the process. It was prepared by Ellen Collier and Dan Jacobs of the subcommittee staff with the assistance of Mary Fulton of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the subcommittee or any of its members.

JULY 22, 1956.



CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

A DECADE OF NEGOTIATIONS

1946-1956

A. INTRODUCTION

The advent of nuclear weapons introduced an entirely new element into the historic problem of control of armaments. Of theoretically unlimited destructive power, these revolutionary weapons raised in acute form the possibility of the destruction of civilization. As the President has noted, science has brought the world to a point

where war does not present the possibility of victory or defeat . . . only the alternative in degrees of destruction.¹

This knowledge has made the control of nuclear weapons the main concern of disarmament negotiations in the postwar decade. Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States expressed the view in the United Nations that control of atomic energy was the key to the whole problem of disarmament. Until there was progress in this field, this country contended, there could be no success in the general area of the regulation of armaments.² United States policy down to the present has been dominated, in general, by the view that the fundamental problem of disarmament is control of nuclear weapons under an effective system of inspection.

The Soviet position on disarmament has also recognized the central importance of nuclear weapons in disarmament negotiations, but in a different vein. All during the postwar period, as they were attempting to overtake the technological superiority of the United States in this field, the Russians sought the total prohibition of the manufacture, stockpiling and use of atomic weapons. They apparently modified their position in this regard for the first time at the London conference in the spring of 1956, when they dropped this point from their proposals. It is probably not without significance that the change coincided with Soviet claims of having equalled or surpassed the United States in nuclear weapons development.

Until the recent shift, Soviet policy was tied closely to an attempt to label the United States and other major Western powers as "war-mongers" and "aggressors." Communist propaganda used the deceptively simple theme "ban the bomb" to place the burden of blame for the threat of war on the United States.

The United States has held that the slogan "ban the bomb" has no meaning—or poses an even greater threat of war—unless effective means are first provided for insuring that the continued production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons have ceased. In the earlier

¹ Speech at Trinity College Convocation, Hartford, Conn., New York Times, October 21, 1954, p. 1.

² Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, p. 376.

stages, therefore, our policy concentrated on establishing an effective international system of inspection and control of the production and use of atomic materials as the first step toward disarmament. This early approach is now regarded, not only by this country but by others, as no longer entirely adequate to control nuclear weapons. Nations have had several years to produce nuclear weapons and at least three have a supply of such weapons. There is no effective method known of detecting these stockpiles. What this means is that even if production of nuclear weapons were brought under control, there would be no assurance that a devastating supply of such weapons already produced could not be hidden for use in the event of war. In consequence, United States policy has been broadened to include inspection of the means of employing nuclear weapons in a sudden surprise attack.

While concern with nuclear weapons has been paramount, international negotiations during the past decade have also proceeded on the limitation and control of conventional armaments. All sides have advanced proposals in the latter connection.

The effort to limit and control armaments has gone on within the framework of the United Nations. Under the charter that organization was assigned certain responsibilities in connection with the negotiations of disarmament agreements. The General Assembly was expected to develop principles to govern disarmament and the regulation of armaments (art. 11). To the Security Council was given the task of formulating plans for an actual regulatory system (art. 26).

The disarmament proposals which have provided the basis for most of the discussion during the past decade have been advanced by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. In recent years, Canada has also played an important part in the negotiations largely because of its knowledge of the production of atomic energy.

The proposals advanced by the major powers at various times and the difficulties in their reconciliation are a part of the general unfolding of world events. Failures to reach agreement on disarmament are perhaps inextricably interwoven with other international questions. This study, however, concentrates on the disarmament proposals of the principal powers, as they have evolved over the decade since the close of World War II. Where necessary, the intent of a proposal or the underlying reason for its failure of acceptance is described in the wider context of the implications it has held for the negotiating powers. But there is no attempt to relate negotiations directly to the whole fabric of international developments from 1946 to the present. The focus of the study is negotiations on disarmament.

These negotiations are readily divisible into three periods. During most of the period 1946 to 1950 the United States alone possessed atomic weapons. While the United States at that time advanced a plan for international control not only of such weapons, but of the entire field of atomic energy, the Soviet Union concentrated on efforts to "ban the bomb."

From 1950 till 1955 the Western Powers enlarged their approach beyond control of atomic weapons to consider jointly the problem of limitation of conventional weapons and armed manpower, a problem which the U.S.S.R. had insisted should become a part of disarmament discussions.

The period from May 10, 1955, to the present has been marked by intense efforts in the field of disarmament negotiations. Both sides have altered their positions in some degree. These changes come at a time when there is a general shifting of emphasis in Soviet foreign policy and tendencies in other countries to reduce the effort and expenditures devoted to military measures.

B. THE PERIOD 1946-50

At the outset of postwar negotiations the United States and the Soviet Union made the principal proposals on disarmament. Other nations have made recommendations from time to time. In general, however, the main lines of discussion were set by the United States and the U. S. S. R. and for nearly a decade neither nation departed appreciably from its initial position. The view of the United States for the most part was endorsed repeatedly by a great preponderance of the other nations of the world. The Soviet position drew consistent support only from Communist states.

Underlying the negotiations during most of this period was the fact that the United States alone held atomic weapons, while the Soviet bloc possessed a preponderance of strength in armed manpower over the western powers growing out of the rapid demobilization of the latter after World War II. In the circumstances, the Soviet Union called repeatedly for prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons, while refusing to accept international control and inspection over atomic power which were at the heart of the United States proposals. The United States and other western nations found the Soviet proposals on conventional armaments unacceptable both in the form in which they were advanced and because the U. S. S. R. insisted that limitation of conventional weapons be linked to an absolute prohibition of atomic weapons but without provision for adequate international inspection.

Discussion and debate of the conflicting points of view took place mainly in two commissions of the United Nations. Of these, the first to be established was the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Soviet Union, France, and China joined Britain, Canada, and the United States in sponsoring the establishing resolution which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on January 24, 1946. The Commission was directed to study methods to control the newly devised atomic weapons and to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy.

The following year, the United Nations Security Council established a Commission for Conventional Armaments. This Commission was directed to deal with questions of limitation of forces and armaments, which did not come within the purview of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. While the Soviet Union had been insistent on the need for limitation of conventional weapons, it abstained from voting for the resolution to establish the Commission because of objections to the exclusion of atomic energy matters from its jurisdiction.

Negotiations during the period 1946-50 were pursued against a background of deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the western nations. As the world political situation grew worse, national positions on disarmament tended to harden. The general

international atmosphere became increasingly hostile to the reconciliation of differences. The same proposals on armaments control were advanced again and again by both sides and rejected repeatedly and with increasing acrimony by both sides.

During this period the conventional armed forces of the United States and other western nations were maintained at a very low level as compared with those of the Soviet bloc. The offset to greater Soviet superiority in this category rested in the United States possession of atomic weapons. As the Soviet Union grappled with the scientific problem of producing the atomic bomb, the United States led an attempt to restore other sources of strength in the Western World. There followed in quick succession aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic Treaty, all of which were aimed in part at strengthening the defense of independent nations against possible aggression.

While these developments were taking place, session after session of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments was consumed with repetition and rejection of the same proposals. The reiteration undoubtedly helped to clarify the positions and the sessions undoubtedly had an impact on world public opinion, at least initially. Beyond this, however, little progress was made, in the sense of the nations involved moving toward agreement on control of weapons.

1. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The United States position: The Baruch plan

At the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, the United States proposed what became known as the Baruch plan. The proposal called for the setting up of an international authority within the framework of the Security Council to own, control, or license all atomic fuel facilities from mine to finished product. As proposed, the international authority would have conducted continuous inspection of all phases of the production of fissionable materials. It would also have had the exclusive right to conduct atomic weapons tests and to carry on research in atomic weapons. Finally, it would have been charged with the task of promoting peaceful international uses of atomic energy.

The Baruch plan meant, in effect, a shift from national to international control, not only of atomic weapons but of all the principal aspects of development of atomic energy. The actual transition from national to international control, however, was not to take place immediately. It was to be phased, that is, to proceed step-by-step over an indeterminate period of time.

The Baruch plan provided ultimately that—

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control,³

the national manufacture of atomic bombs would cease and all existing bomb stockpiles be destroyed. An essential feature of the plan was that once established, international control of atomic energy

³ U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55. 84th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956, p. 192. Hereinafter referred to as Collection of Documents.

including the application of sanctions for violation was not to be subject to the veto of any single power.⁴

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly, with only the Soviet bloc voting in the negative, approved proposals of the Atomic Energy Commission which in effect endorsed the Baruch plan. A year later the General Assembly recommended that all nations join in mutual agreement to limit the individual exercise of their sovereign rights in the control of atomic energy "to the extent required * * * for the promotion of world security and peace."⁵ The recommendation in substance lent further support to the Baruch plan to which the Soviet Union was by this time unalterably opposed. It meant also that the United States and 48 other countries had endorsed in principle a far-reaching course of action involving, if adopted, an extensive measure of international control over the development of atomic energy.

Soviet proposal for the control of atomic energy

The Soviet Union, which in 1946 had not yet developed atomic explosives, insisted on a sharply different approach to the problem. In June of that year it advanced proposals which called for a multilateral treaty prohibiting atomic weapons "in any circumstances whatsoever," and the destruction of all existing stocks of such weapons. Thereafter, under the Soviet plan, steps were to be taken to provide some type of international control machinery and periodic international inspection of the production of atomic materials in each nation. Atomic energy was to continue to be developed exclusively by the individual states and not primarily by an international authority such as the Baruch plan had envisaged. The power of punishment for violations similarly was to reside in each nation itself. Moreover, such international authority as provided for in the Soviet plan was to come under the jurisdiction of the Security Council where the veto power would be operative.

The Soviet Union sought to advance its position on control of atomic weapons, not only in the United Nations, but by worldwide propaganda campaigns. In 1950, for example, the Communists launched the "Stockholm peace appeal." This campaign consisted of the circulation of petitions for signatures in virtually every nation in the world, calling for the unconditional abolition of atomic weapons and the branding of any government which first used such weapons against another as guilty of war crimes against humanity.⁶ A few months after the "Stockholm peace appeal" was launched and while it was still in progress, the North Korean Communists began a military attack on South Korea with conventional weapons.

2. CONTROL OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

Soviet proposals

In November 1946 the U. S. S. R. opened the question of control of conventional armaments. It advocated in the United Nations the reporting by member states of information on armed forces which they maintained in foreign countries. This proposal was coupled with

⁴ Collection of Documents, p. 189.

⁵ U. N. General Assembly. Official records of 4th session. Resolutions, September 20-December 10, 1949. Lake Success, N. Y. A/1251, p. 22.

⁶ New York Times, March 30, 1950.

a general demand for a reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the production of atomic energy for military purposes.⁷

In the situation which existed at that time, the Soviet proposals had the effect of providing both military and psychological advantages for the Communist nations. They permitted the U. S. S. R. to capitalize on the worldwide popular reaction to the sacrifices of World War II. At the same time, if adopted, they would have permitted an improvement in the Soviet military position, by exerting pressure on the United States and Great Britain to hasten the withdrawal of their forces which still remained overseas in the aftermath of that conflict.

The Western position

While various points of view developed in the debate on the Soviet proposals, an area of agreement grew up around the broad principles of disarmament. A resolution was adopted by unanimous vote of the General Assembly late in 1946. It recognized the necessity for early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.⁸

The following year the Security Council established the Commission for Conventional Armaments. At the insistence of the United States, its jurisdiction was restricted to nonatomic weapons. From the outset, attitudes proved as irreconcilable as those which had characterized the discussions of atomic energy. The United States position, which was shared by the United Kingdom and others, held that control and reduction of conventional armaments would be brought about only under conditions of international confidence and security. The two countries, for example, urged prompt action to provide armed forces under the Security Council, in accord with article 43. They asked also for international control of atomic energy, and the arrangement of a peace settlement with respect to Germany and Japan.

Soviet proposal for one-third reduction

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, insisted that a reduction in armaments would in itself help to create an international climate conducive to peaceful relations.⁹ In 1948, it proposed a one-third reduction in the land, naval, and air forces of the permanent members of the Security Council¹⁰ which was tied, however, to a demand for an unconditional banning of all atomic weapons. This twofold proposal was made repeatedly in subsequent discussions. The Soviet Union insisted that the question of atomic weapons was so closely related to the reduction of conventional armaments that the two problems could not be considered separately.

The proposal for a flat one-third reduction in armaments and armed forces coupled with a ban on atomic weapons was unacceptable to the western powers. These nations not only challenged the sincerity of the proposal but continued to insist that conditions of international confidence had to be established before reductions in conventional weapons could begin.

The question of verification also entered into their considerations. Unlike the western powers, the Soviet Union had never officially revealed the actual size of its armed forces. On each occasion that the

⁷ Goodrich and Simons. *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Washington, 1955), pp. 542-543.

⁸ Collection of Documents, p. 82.

⁹ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48, p. 478.

¹⁰ United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union.

"one-third reduction" proposal was introduced in the U. N. Security Council and the General Assembly, it was rejected by the majority of the member states in part because of its failure to provide an effective verification system.

French proposal for a census of armed forces and armaments

As a preliminary step, France advanced in 1949 a plan for the collection, verification, and publication of information on existing armaments and armed forces. The plan provided for an international control organ and it detailed methods for collecting and verifying data.

Although approved by both the Commission and the General Assembly, the French proposal was opposed by the Communist bloc and vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council.¹¹ The Soviet representatives denounced the plan on the grounds that it did not include atomic weapons and further because it provided for the collection of information on armaments instead of considering their reduction. What was not mentioned, however, was that in the Soviet Union the net of secrecy was much tighter than in the West. An arms census would have had the effect of bringing to light information which, for whatever reason, the U. S. S. R. was more anxious and able to conceal than the western nations. Yet, without such information, the "one-third cut" proposal lost much of its significance, especially in the atmosphere of international tension and mistrust which existed when it was made.

C. The Period 1950-55

Disarmament proposals during the years 1950-55 were marked by growing flexibility. A modified United States approach was set forth by the President in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1950.¹² In his address he indicated a willingness to consider together two problems which the United States had previously held to be separate, that of control of atomic weapons and that of regulation of conventional weapons. This offer led to the establishment in 1952 of a single United Nations Disarmament Commission to replace the separate Commissions for Conventional Armaments and Atomic Energy.

Even before the President made his proposal, however, conflict had broken out in Korea. It created an atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations had little relation to reality. The aggression against South Korea shocked the western nations into rapid acceleration of the rebuilding of their conventional armed strength to counterbalance the Soviet and Communist Chinese forces. The pressure for this restoration intensified especially when it became clear that atomic weapons were not going to be employed in the Korean war.

While the western nations strengthened their conventional forces, the Soviet Union pushed its efforts to close the gap in nuclear weapons development and both sides entered into a race for even more destructive weapons. In 1952 the United States produced a thermo-nuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb, followed the next year by Soviet production of the same.

¹¹ The Soviet representatives had themselves in 1946 proposed that nations should submit information regarding all their armed forces and armaments but without verification.

¹² Collection of Documents, p. 985.

Some observers theorized that the new nuclear weapons, far more powerful than their predecessors, produced a "balance of power," or more properly a "balance of terror" based upon a mutual capacity to wreak overwhelming devastation. It is conceivable such a balance, among other factors, gave rise to the succession of events which began in 1952 with the Korean truce. These events had the cumulative effect of reducing military tensions throughout the world, at least for the moment, and were accompanied by intensified negotiations on disarmament.

1. JOINT CONSIDERATION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Western proposals

In November 1951, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented a tripartite proposal to the General Assembly. It called for a census of all military forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, and ceilings on armed forces and arms output. This proposed program, which was to be verified by "effective international inspection," was made contingent in effect on adoption of the Baruch plan and a general political settlement, including a Korean truce.¹³

Although rejected by the Soviet Union, a byproduct of the western proposal was the merging of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments into a single United Nations Disarmament Commission.¹⁴ The new Commission met in March 1952 and began discussions on the basis of a French plan which was designed essentially to reconcile the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. It provided for the simultaneous consideration of the regulation of all armaments and the problems of disclosure and verification.

In April 1952, the United States submitted a proposal on the question of disclosure and verification.¹⁵ Set forth was a plan of procedure divided into 5 stages, proceeding from disclosure and verification of the less secret to the most secret weapons, over a minimum period of 2 years. It involved the disclosure of (1) overall manpower strength and the location of military (including atomic) installations and facilities; (2) details of organization of armed forces and installations and of armaments and atomic energy producing facilities; (3) details of all except novel armaments and of stockpiles of fissionable materials and production facilities; (4) details of facilities for producing novel armaments, and (5) details of novel armaments on hand. Aerial surveys were proposed as part of the machinery to verify the adequacy of disclosure in each stage.

This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union on the grounds that it did not offer any actual reduction of armaments. The United States, in turn, proposed that the Disarmament Commission establish basic principles to guide deliberations on actual reductions. This country suggested "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program" in an effort to make clear that the goal of disarmament was not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions created by armaments and making war inherently impossible as a means of settling disputes. The ultimate objective, it was proposed, should

¹³ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, p. 161.

¹⁴ The Disarmament Commission is composed of all the members of the Security Council, plus Canada.

¹⁵ Collection of Documents, p. 318.

be "an open world" substantially disarmed, in which states would not be adequately prepared to start a war and any preparation for war would be detected long before an attack would be launched.¹⁶

Further suggestions were presented jointly by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on May 28, 1952. In a tripartite working proposal, they suggested, for illustrative purposes, numerical ceilings on armed forces—between 1 million and 1,500,000 for the armed forces of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, between 700,000 and 800,000 for the United Kingdom and France, and normally less than 1 percent of population for other countries.¹⁷ The following month France proposed a general plan for synchronizing progressive disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments with parallel stages for actual reduction.

Again, the Soviet response was negative. Ignoring the fact that it had been specified in the western proposals that they were to be regarded as only one component of a comprehensive plan of disarmament, the Soviet spokesmen dismissed these proposals as dealing only with the problem of overall armed forces, for failing to consider allocation of manpower strength among the various branches—army, navy, and air—and for not including armaments along with manpower reductions. Subsequent efforts by the western powers to refine the proposals along these lines, however, were also rejected by the Soviet Union.

Soviet position

The Soviet Union's often-repeated demand for a one-third percentage reduction in conventional armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons was brought forward again when the Disarmament Commission met in 1952. At that time it was linked with a new proposal which appeared to move in the direction of the western position. Under the new approach, strict international control of atomic energy was to be instituted simultaneously with a ban on atomic weapons. However, the Soviet Union could not be brought to elaborate on the details of this proposal.¹⁸ Further doubt was cast on the sincerity of the proposal since it came at a time when the Russians were using the Disarmament Commission as a forum in an attempt to convince the world that the United Nations forces in Korea were employing bacteriological warfare.


The western powers contended that the Soviet plan would actually result in an undependable prohibition of nuclear weapons in view of the lengthy process involved in setting up a control system. The one-third reduction of conventional armaments was also rejected, as it had been previously, on the grounds that it would preserve the existing imbalance in armed forces which favored the Soviet Union.

In reply the U. S. S. R. argued that insistence on control measures as a prerequisite to disarmament would give the western powers access to information about the Soviet Union before any actual arms limitation or reduction took place. Further, the Soviet Union held that western proposals for numerical ceilings on armed forces did not take into consideration military bases or military alliances, such as NATO.

¹⁶ Collection of Documents, p. 86.

¹⁷ Collection of Documents, p. 287.

¹⁸ Great Britain, Central Office of Information. *The Disarmament Question, 1945-54*, London 1954. Pp. 9-13.



United States proposal for an international control organ

In November 1953 the U. N. General Assembly established a subcommittee of France, Canada, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to negotiate in private a disarmament formula. Implicit in this action was the belief that discussion of disarmament in the United Nations had become so enmeshed with the seeking of propaganda advantage that it hindered the achievement of agreement.

At the London meeting of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament in May 1954, the United States introduced a proposal for an international control organ¹⁹ which marked a major departure from the Baruch plan of 1946. While the latter had called for international ownership of fissionable material the new proposal omitted all reference to this point. Moreover, it called for only limited international management of atomic energy resources,²⁰ whereas the Baruch plan would have given this power largely to an international control authority.

Under the 1954 proposal the international nuclear control organ would have had its authority and power defined in a disarmament treaty. It would have been empowered to control atomic energy only to the extent necessary to insure prohibition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear materials exclusively for peaceful purposes. It would have determined the methods of enforcing reductions in armaments, and of conducting unlimited inspections, including aerial surveys. It would also have been empowered to take emergency action upon the discovery of any violation of agreed upon regulations. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal on the grounds that the international control organ could be empowered to interfere with the internal affairs of individual nations.

2. "ATOMS FOR PEACE" PROPOSAL

The stalemate in disarmament negotiations despite rapid developments in nuclear weapons prompted the President of the United States to address the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. In this address he appealed to all nations to cooperate in finding ways to control the tremendous power of nuclear energy. The President also suggested that a start be made on peaceful use of the atom under international sponsorship and to that end—

the governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, * * * begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency, * * * set up under the aegis of the United Nations.²¹

The President expressed the belief that his proposal might at least—

initiate a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both public and private conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress toward peace.²²

In the midst of general approval of the President's proposal, the Soviet Union contended that diverting a small part of atomic materials to peaceful uses while allowing production of atomic weapons to continue unrestricted would "play into the hands of aggressive

¹⁹ Collection of Documents, p. 325.

²⁰ Collection of Documents, p. 329.

²¹ Collection of Documents, p. 1000.

²² Collection of Documents, p. 1001.

forces." The Soviet Union indicated it would take part in the talks on peaceful uses as proposed, but did not alter substantially the position it had maintained in years of deadlocked debate.²³

3. ANGLO-FRENCH MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 11, 1954

In June 1954 international attention respecting disarmament shifted to a joint Anglo-French proposal. What was called for was a phased disarmament program providing at the outset for the constituting and positioning of an international control organ. This step was to be followed by first a limitation on armed forces and expenditures, then reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments and finally, prohibitions respecting nuclear weapons.

In summing up the British-French position, the Minister of State for the United Kingdom, said:

First, our concept includes specific provision for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, and secondly * * * that conventional armaments and nuclear weapons shall be dealt with together. Thirdly, when [the proposed] treaty comes into effect, those who have ratified it are committed from that moment to a process which ends and is bound to end in comprehensive disarmament. Fourthly, we have made it abundantly clear that disarmament and not just disclosure and verification is our essential objective.²⁴

In September 1954 the Soviet Government announced that it would accept the joint Anglo-French plan of June 1954 for a "phased" disarmament program as a basis for discussion. It suggested, however, modification in the timing, reiterated earlier proposals for an immediate "one-third reduction" and opposed the establishment of a control organ before disarmament actually began. Subsequent discussion in the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee early in 1955 developed compromise suggestions for reconciling the Anglo-French and Soviet positions on the timing of control measures and on the powers and functions of the international control organ.

The Anglo-French proposals were revised further and presented in March 1955 as a common position in which Canada and the United States concurred.²⁵

D. THE PERIOD MAY 10, 1955-1956

By the spring of 1955, it was clear that a change had appeared in Soviet tactics under the general slogan of "peaceful coexistence." This change brought with it a significant alteration in the Russian position on disarmament. New proposals were put forward on May 10, 1955, the day after West Germany was brought into full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The change in the Soviet position also coincided with an important technical consideration which entered into disarmament negotiations in this period. For the first time there was general recognition that no method of inspection known to science could detect with any degree of certainty the existence of stockpiled nuclear weapons.

This fact influenced United States policies on disarmament. We had previously held to the principle of the elimination of nuclear weapons on the basis of fool-proof inspection. It was a position,

²³ Great Britain, Central Office of Information. *op. cit.*, p. 312.

²⁴ Remarks in a House of Commons debate on July 31, 1954. Great Britain, Central Office of Information. *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²⁵ Collection of Documents, pp. 334-335.

however, which was no longer tenable since science could not detect the existence of nuclear weapons already manufactured and the Soviet Union had begun stockpiling them, presumably in 1949.

In March 1955, the United States undertook a reappraisal of its disarmament policies. Subsequently the President proposed his "open skies" plan of aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints and in September 1955 the United States placed reservations on all its previous proposals.

During the London meetings of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament in the spring of 1956, the Soviet Union departed from its long-standing insistence on absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons. The United States as well as Britain and France advanced new proposals which took into consideration those of the Soviet Union. While no agreement was reached, the meetings were carried on with less vituperation than had previously been the case and the President's Special Assistant on Disarmament reported that progress had been made.

1. SOVIET PROPOSALS, MAY 10, 1955

The new Soviet approach to disarmament was set forth on May 10, 1955. The Soviet Union accepted the western position on the timing of complete prohibition of atomic weapons in relation to reduction of conventional armaments. Abandoning the argument for a one-third cut in conventional armaments and armed forces, the Russians endorsed the specific numerical ceilings for each of the powers as set forth in the joint Anglo-French proposals of 1954.²⁶

The Soviet proposal also acknowledged that there were "possibilities beyond the reach of international control for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise attack" even though it continued to call for their total prohibition. It recognized, finally, the need for a permanent control organ which would establish inspection posts to warn of dangerous concentrations of military forces or equipment.²⁷ The Soviet position, in short, shifted as did that of the western nations, in that it recognized that the principal problem of inspection had become the prevention of surprise attacks rather than past production of fissionable material.

To the western powers the new Soviet proposals did not constitute an acceptable basis for disarmament. In particular, the control system against surprise attacks which the Soviet Union advanced was similar to the ground inspection system operating in Korea. On the basis of the experience with the Korean truce, this system was regarded as altogether inadequate by the western powers. One of its principal weaknesses was that Communist North Korea had required in one fashion or another advance notice whenever the United Nations "inspectors" intended to visit its installations.

Further, the western nations objected to the manner in which the Soviet suggestions were linked to a German settlement. The link involved the withdrawal of the forces of the occupying powers from Germany and the liquidation of military bases in that country. By freezing armed forces and conventional armaments at the levels of December 31, 1954, moreover, a German military contribution to

²⁶ For the United States, the U. S. S. R., and China, 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 and 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. The Soviet ceilings differed from those proposed by the United Kingdom and France in only one respect, that levels for states outside the five big powers were specified only to be "considerably lower" than levels outlined for the big powers, rather than roughly 1 percent of population.

²⁷ Collection of Documents, p. 390.

NATO would have been prevented. The Soviet proposal also called for the inclusion of Communist China in any talks concerning the limitation of China's armaments and finally a reciprocal agreement to halt atomic tests.

2. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The Eden plan

At the Geneva Conference in July 1955, the British Prime Minister proposed a joint inspection of the armed forces in a specified zone on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe. This proposal was designed essentially as a pilot project. It was not a proposal for disarmament as such, nor was it a proposal for a system of European security, nor for total inspection. The plan sought merely a trial run in the practical problems involved in international inspection and was designed to give both the western nations and the Soviet Union an opportunity to see how it would function. Further, the plan was expected to increase mutual confidence. On September 13, the United Kingdom supplemented the Eden plan with a memorandum detailing the rights, powers, and methods of an international control organ. In presenting the memorandum, the British noted that they had reached the conclusion that "no machinery of control at present conceived can be 100 percent effective in insuring the security of all states against deception and foul play in this nuclear day and age."²⁸

The Faure plan

At the Geneva Conference, France urged that the economic aspects of worldwide disarmament be emphasized. Premier Faure proposed that the nations agree to restrictions on their military expenditures and allot savings to an international fund for economic development and mutual assistance.²⁹ The concept of applying financial and material resources diverted from armaments to underdeveloped regions was similar to one previously expressed in congressional resolutions in this country³⁰ and by the President in an address in April 1953.³¹

The "open skies" and exchange-of-blueprints proposal

At the Geneva meeting, the President of the United States proposed that the Soviet Union and this country arrange for the exchange of complete blueprints of military establishments and provide facilities for aerial reconnaissance of each by the other—

to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.³²

This proposal was presented as a "confidence-building" agreement between the two major powers. The concept of aerial surveys had been included in the original Baruch plan in 1946 and specified as essential to the program of disclosure and verification suggested by the United States in April 1952. It was, however, given a new role and emphasis in the President's proposal in 1955 since, in this instance, it was addressed to the problem of preventing surprise attacks.

²⁸ Commonwealth Survey, vol. 1, September 6, 1955, p. 761.

²⁹ A draft elaborating the French proposal was submitted to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on August 29, 1955. Subsequently the French presented three working papers outlining the structure of an international disarmament organization and defining the powers of the control authority and the objects which should be subject to control. See Collection of Documents, pp. 355, 360, 363, and 365.

³⁰ S. Res. 150, 83d Cong., 1st sess., and S. Res. 71, 84th Cong., 1st sess., Collection of Documents, pp. 188 and 196.

³¹ Collection of Documents, p. 990.

³² Collection of Documents, p. 339.

The "open skies" plan was elaborated in the fall of 1955 to include (1) a stage-by-stage exchange of "complete blueprints" by principal nations beginning with the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) machinery for verification manned by permanent on-the-spot observers to certify the accuracy of information disclosed and to give warning of preparation for surprise attack; and (3) "ironclad" agreement under which each country would submit to the other's unrestricted—though monitored—aerial reconnaissance.

A sequel to the "open skies" proposal was advanced in a letter from the President to Soviet Premier Bulganin on March 1, 1956. He stated that, assuming the satisfactory operation of the proposed air and ground inspection system—

the United States would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons.³³

This proposal was directed toward "bringing under control the nuclear threat." It stressed the possibilities for peaceful utilization of atomic energy and served to demonstrate this country's concern with an actual limitation of the nuclear race. The President's letter was significant also in that it shifted the emphasis in our approach from the limitation of armed manpower to limitation of armaments and weapons which, he said, were "more subject to supervision, regulation, and control."

In the exchange of correspondence, the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on inspection for a time seemed to be moving closer together. In May 1956, however, Russian spokesmen denounced the "open skies" proposal as an interest of "intelligence services" which would not contribute to disarmament or the establishment of control over the reduction of armaments.³⁴

On December 10, 1955, the General Assembly, by a vote of 56 to 7 (dissents by the Soviet bloc), called on the United Nations Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee to continue negotiations and to give priority to such confidence-building measures as the President's proposals on aerial inspection and the Soviet Premier's proposal on ground control posts. The Assembly also suggested that account should be taken of the proposals of the other heads of government at Geneva and of a proposal by India for the suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an "armaments truce."

3. DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS IN LONDON, MARCH-MAY 1956

United States proposals

The reappraisal of disarmament policy which the United States had undertaken in March 1955 formed the background for proposals presented in March 1956. First, the United States suggested that two "preliminary steps" be taken immediately to facilitate negotiation of an agreement.³⁵ These were: (1) Designation of areas of 20,000 to 30,000 square miles in the Soviet Union and the United States to provide testing ground for methods of control and inspection; (2) exchange of technical missions of 30 to 70 persons among the 5 member

³³ Collection of Documents, p. 352.

³⁴ New York Times, May 15, 1956, p. 8.

³⁵ U. N. Document DC/83, annexes 3 and 4.

states of the subcommittee to study the problem of inspection and control.³⁶

Subsequently, in a tentative proposal the United States set forth step-by-step measures of disarmament which might take place during the first phase of a disarmament agreement.³⁷ These steps would begin with the designation of test areas, and the exchange of the technical missions previously noted. The next step would be the establishment of a preparatory commission which would set the reductions in manpower for each state during the first phase of disarmament. The United States suggested that in this phase the United States and the U. S. S. R. should cut their armed forces to 2,500,000 and the United Kingdom and France to 750,000. Corresponding reductions fixed by "an agreed application of the manpower levels as a basis for measurement," would be applied to armaments and military budgets. The exchange of full military blueprints, the freezing of defense budgets as of December 31, 1955, and the control and full inspection system would then go into effect concurrently. Subsequently, with other States joining, a permanent "armaments regulation commission" would be set up to which each nation would make available information on its possession and production of fissionable materials, nuclear weapons, and plans for nuclear tests. There would then be a "freeze" on fissionable material produced for nuclear weapons, limitation of nuclear tests, and the scheduled reductions of manpower. If these steps during the first phase of disarmament were accompanied by an easing of international tension, the nations could then proceed to consider measures of even greater disarmament.

The Anglo-French synthesis

Great Britain and France submitted joint proposals at the London meeting. These were revisions of earlier positions, some of which had been supported by the United States. Like the United States plan, the Anglo-French approach suggested disarmament by stages.

The joint proposals called first for a declaration of the participating states that they considered themselves prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression. This declaration would be accompanied by a freeze on current armaments levels and effective control machinery including aerial and ground inspection. From this point, the nations would proceed to reductions in conventional armaments and restrictions on nuclear tests. In the final stage, conventional armaments would be cut to the lowest possible levels. Nuclear tests would then be banned and the production and use of nuclear weapons prohibited.³⁸ Progression from stage to stage would require unanimity in an executive committee set up to supervise the plan, with provision for referral of disputes to the Security Council.

The Anglo-French plan was aimed at reconciling the United States demand for effective inspection and control first and the Soviet demand for agreement on reduction prior to inspection. This policy of reconciliation was expressed by Jules Moch, the French representative, in the formula adopted by France: "Neither control without disarmament, nor disarmament without control, but, progressively, all the disarmament which can be controlled."³⁹

³⁶ U. N. Document DC/83, annexes 3 and 4.

³⁷ U. N. Document DC/83, annexes 6 and 9.

³⁸ U. N. Document DC/83, annex 2.

³⁹ U. N. Document DC/SC 1/PV.69, p. 10.

Soviet position

At the London Conference the Soviet Union omitted the usual demand for a ban on nuclear weapons as the first step toward armaments limitation. Its proposals stressed controlled reduction of conventional arms. They called for a freeze on current levels of armed forces, armaments, and military budgets within the first 3 months of agreement and the creation of an international disarmament control agency with "unimpeded" access to certain ground installations for inspection against preparations for surprise attack. They also envisioned a reduction in military forces to a maximum of 1.5 million troops for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, 650,000 for Great Britain and France, and 150,000 to 200,000 for all other nations. In addition, they suggested the "creation in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments" composed of Germany and "adjacent" states, in which foreign troops would be limited and atomic weapons banned. Independent of agreement on disarmament, the Soviet proposals also called for a discontinuance of thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bomb) tests, the banning of atomic weapons in Germany, and reductions of 15 percent in military budgets.⁴⁰

Significance of London talks

The London sessions reflected some mutual accommodation in the positions of participating nations. As the U. S. S. R. had once requested, the United States agreed to consider certain reductions in armed forces prior to settlement of political issues and offered to include foreign bases and facilities in the first step in establishing control procedures. The American proposals also contained the possibility of setting a numerical ceiling for the armed forces of nations not ranked among the great powers. Most significant, specific steps in the progressive reduction of all armaments were listed, at least for the first phase of disarmament.

The Soviet Union, on its part, agreed that international inspectors should be at their posts before reductions actually began, with the power to check agreed reductions of arms, as well as concentrations for surprise attacks. It also named the types of installations, such as airfields, sea and land bases, factories, and munition dumps, which would be subject to ground inspection. Not included, however, were installations related to nuclear energy.

The positions of the Soviet Union and the western powers were not reconciled at London. For the western powers, the principal shortcoming of the Soviet approach was its failure to do more than make a reference to aerial survey, a matter which they regarded as essential to effective inspection. The lack of consideration it gave to nuclear weapons was also considered a serious drawback, all the more because, with the spread of the knowledge of atomic energy, such weapons were likely to come into the possession of countries other than the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, thus raising "fourth country" problems. Moreover, although the numerical levels of armed forces advocated by the U. S. S. R. had been advanced for illustrative purposes by the United States, Great

⁴⁰ U. N. Document DC/83, annex 5.

Britain, and France in 1952, in 1956 the western powers did not include these figures in their proposals.

As the French delegate pointed out to the Soviet delegate in connection with the Soviet advocacy of the 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 level:

* * * [When] you say that the U. S. S. R. has taken over the levels proposed by the western powers you are correct arithmetically, but not politically, since the levels we proposed were placed in a different context from that of your proposal. It was different * * * both because the levels in question were reached at the end of a number of general operations covering all aspects of disarmament and because provision was made for a scheme of stationary or mobile ground and aerial control systems which does not appear in so complete a form in your proposal. Accordingly, there is a similarity in the figures, but not in the facts.⁴¹

In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the talks on May 4, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States noted that the differences between the Soviet Union and the other participants had not been reconciled. However, they expressed their "conviction that a reconciliation of the opposing points of view is possible and necessary * * *." ⁴²

This statement revealed that the western powers held in common the following principles of disarmament: First, that disarmament should proceed by stages, with progress to a new stage depending on the satisfactory execution of the preceding one and "upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems." Second, that the program of disarmament should begin, under a system of effective international control, with significant reductions in armed forces and with corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and military expenditures. Third, that the program should at an appropriate time and with proper safeguards halt buildup of stockpiles of nuclear weapons with all future production of nuclear materials devoted to peaceful uses.

Other views included by the western powers in their statement called for a strong control organization with inspection rights, operating at the outset of actual disarmament; preliminary experiments with inspection methods on a limited scale; and provision for the suspension of the program, in whole or in part, if a major state failed to carry out its obligations or if a threat to the peace should develop which would be subject to chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.⁴³

E. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

In a decade of negotiations on disarmament there has been some evolution of the positions of the western powers and the Soviet Union. Modifications appear to have been induced by changes in the world situation and technological advances, and to accommodate the views of each other and other countries. In spite of changes in policy, however, significant differences continue with respect to all of the principal issues which have arisen—control of nuclear weapons, level of armed forces and armaments, inspection and control, phasing and the relation of disarmament and political settlements.

⁴¹ U. N. document DC/93, annex 12.

⁴² U. N. document DC/93, annex 10.

⁴³ Ch. VII provided for enforcement action by the Security Council if that organ determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

1. CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A major part of the negotiations on disarmament have dealt with control of nuclear weapons. The United States initiated these negotiations in the Baruch proposal, and the Baruch proposal remained the basis of United States policy for many years. A shift did not become apparent until 1954 when the United States ceased to call for international authority over all atomic energy activities and suggested instead a more limited international role in this area.

Through the long period in which the United States had either a monopoly or preponderant superiority in nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union argued for the immediate and complete prohibition of atomic weapons "in any circumstances whatsoever," and the destruction of all existing stocks of such weapons. At the same time, however, the U. S. S. R. pressed the development of its own technology in nuclear weapons. As it progressed in this effort, modifications appeared in the Soviet position on disarmament. In the May 10, 1955, proposal, for example, the Russians no longer called for an absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons during the first stage of disarmament. They also recognized the validity of the employment of such weapons in defense against aggression, at least as defined by the Security Council, during that stage.

The Soviet proposals at the London meeting in 1956 omitted the problem of atomic weapons entirely, except to call for a ban on the testing of hydrogen weapons. The Soviet representative expounded the view that since agreement on control of nuclear weapons was difficult, the negotiating countries should concentrate instead on reductions in conventional weapons. In a statement in May 1956, announcing cuts in its armed forces, the Soviet Union still claimed to favor "the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the ending of their production and the destruction of existing stocks of these weapons."⁴⁴ That, however, was a statement of a general principle or ultimate aim and as such did not differ from the position of the other principal powers including the United States.

In one area, the Soviet position has drawn closer to that of the United States. In 1956 the Russians agreed to the basic principles of the atoms-for-peace plan. Under this plan originally advanced by the President of the United States "have nations" are to contribute fissionable materials to "have-not nations" to assist the latter in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The atoms-for-peace plan is not presently involved directly in disarmament negotiations. It is not inconceivable, however, that eventually it might be since there is general agreement on the desirability of diverting fissionable material now used for armaments production to peaceful purposes. Moreover, it is possible that some experience in inspection and control might be gained under the plan which could be applied in a disarmament program particularly as "fourth countries" become producers of atomic energy.

British and French policies for many years suggest an effort to achieve a synthesis which would include features of both the United States and the Soviet positions on control of nuclear weapons. The two countries originated a plan of gradual progression toward prohibition of nuclear weapons and tests for military purposes which

⁴⁴ New York Times, May 15, 1956, p. 8.

would be paralleled by the establishment of a nuclear control system and a reduction in conventional weapons. The United States joined in sponsoring this plan on March 8, 1955, and the Soviet Union adopted a similar approach in its May 10, 1955, proposals.

Since that time, however, the United States and the Soviet Union have been less specific in their proposals on nuclear questions. When the British-French synthesis was presented at London, the Soviet Union held that it did not solve the problem of nuclear weapons. It specifically objected, moreover, to recognizing the validity of the employment of nuclear weapons against aggression even during the first stage of disarmament unless the Security Council (where the veto applies) were given the right to define "aggression."

In its most recent proposals the United States has sought to work out with other nations—

suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons.⁴⁵


As far as specific steps in this direction are concerned, the United States at the London Conference, as part of its tentative proposal for a first stage, called for agreement not only to end the use of such materials for the manufacture of explosive weapons, but also to provide regular transfers from past production of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In addition, this country asked for agreement to limit and monitor nuclear weapons tests.

2. LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

Until 1955 the Soviet Union proposed a reduction by one-third in conventional armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. The western powers were opposed for two principal reasons. First, the actual size of the Soviet forces were unknown and the U. S. S. R. consistently rejected the taking of a verifiable census. Second, the forces of the Soviet Union were believed to be far larger than those of the western nations. A percentage cut, therefore, would have left the U. S. S. R. in a position of superiority while the free nations would have had to strip themselves of the counterbalancing factor of nuclear superiority which the Soviet Union demanded as a condition for the one-third cut.

In 1952 the western powers proposed as an alternative to a percentage cut, a reduction of force levels. They suggested as illustrative maximum forces of 1 to 1.5 million for the Soviet Union, the United States, and China; for Great Britain and France 700,000 to 800,000; and for other countries generally less than 1 percent of their population. Britain and France advocated these levels again in 1954 in modified form, but the United States did not continue its endorsement. At the London meeting in 1956 this country discussed as part of the first stage in a broad disarmament program a ceiling of 2.5 million for the United States, the U. S. S. R., and China, 750,000 for the United Kingdom and France, and 500,000 for other states. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, endorsed the million to a million and a half level, with 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom and, subsequently, 150,000 to 200,000 for all other states.

⁴⁵ U. N. Document DC/83, annex 9.



As previously noted, the Soviet Union has emphasized in public statements that it has accepted the levels formerly advocated by the western nations. The latter, however, point to the changes in the framework of negotiations since these levels were originally put forward. Further, they hold that the Soviet acceptance of the earlier levels is in the context of an unsatisfactory system of control and staging and without agreement on nuclear weapons. Recent statements by western leaders have also emphasized that cuts in manpower are not as meaningful as cuts in armament since reserves can be augmented and men can be remobilized with relative ease. Finally, the United States has taken the position that reduction to low force levels should be accompanied by major political settlements. In the absence of such settlements, it is contended, drastic reductions "would increase the danger of the outbreak of war at some points in the world, and of such a war in turn spreading to involve all nations, particularly major nations."⁴⁶

3. INSPECTION AND CONTROL

From the outset a basic cleavage has existed over the question of inspection and control. The Soviet Union has generally resisted proposals which involve verifying the carrying out of disarmament obligations. The western nations, on the other hand, have placed great emphasis on inspection. They stress that without effective inspection, disarmament can give rise to a sense of security when, in fact, security does not exist. Since the Soviet Union has followed in the past far more stringent policies of secrecy than the western nations, inspection undoubtedly entails greater adjustments for the former, particularly with respect to conventional weapons. From the western point of view, however, Russian refusal to accept inspection plans arouses suspicion as to good faith and so remains a principal barrier to disarmament.

Inspection is now regarded by the western powers as necessary, not only to insure that disarmament agreements are being observed, but also to prevent surprise attacks. During the past year the United States has championed aerial inspection. Soviet acceptance of this approach, which involves the use of advanced aerial photographic techniques, has not been forthcoming.

The Soviet position on inspection, nevertheless, now appears to be closer to that of the western nations. From the barest mention of the subject in 1946, it moved to acceptance of the concept of periodic inspection and special investigations conducted in case of suspicion. By 1954 the Russians had agreed to the principle of inspection on a continuing basis. In May 1955 they called for an international control organ which would establish in all states concerned control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in airports. Most recently the Soviet Union has recognized that an international control organ should have a staff of inspectors, recruited internationally, permanently stationed in the participating nations. Within the bounds of their control functions, the Russians have recognized that the inspectors should have "unimpeded access" to areas and installations even beyond those necessary to check on

⁴⁶ U. N. Document DC/83, annex 12.

concentrations of forces. In their London proposals, however, the Soviet Union's only mention of aerial inspection was:

At a specified stage of the execution of the general disarmament program, when confidence among states has been strengthened, the countries concerned shall consider the possibility of using aerial photography as one of the methods of control.⁴⁷

With respect to violations of disarmament agreements, another aspect of the control problem, the Soviet Union has not accepted the position of the western nations. The western approach on this point is suggested by the Baruch plan which specified that the veto was not to apply in meting out penalties for violation of an agreement on international control of atomic energy. Later the western powers indicated that they favored having violations of a control agreement reported to the United Nations, and to the participating states which could then impose sanctions or take appropriate defensive measures.

The Soviet Union has opposed control plans of this kind for a decade, insisting that any punishment be carried out only according to national legislation of the individual states, and resisting any move to circumvent the veto in this connection. It has refused to accept the United States suggestion that an international control agency have authority to impose penalties. When the Soviet Union included an international control organ in its proposals of May 1955, and later, it still sought to limit the enforcement powers of such an agency to making recommendations to the Security Council.

4. PHASING

At the present time, some of the issues of disarmament revolve less around what is to be done than when it is to be done. As early as 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada advocated that disarmament should proceed by separate stages, "the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken." Since that time, the West has devised various timing schemes to bring about gradual, safeguarded reductions in armaments.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, began with an advocacy of the immediate abolition of atomic weapons and in later proposals called for other precipitous action. It was not until 1954 that the Soviet Union dropped its insistence that the use of nuclear weapons be prohibited prior to the adoption of a more comprehensive plan of disarmament. At the same time the Russians introduced a two-stage concept of disarmament. The concept was similar to one previously advanced by the British and French. It varied, however, in that the control organ would not have been required to be in effective operation before reductions of armaments began. Most recently, the U. S. S. R. has accepted the western view that control facilities should be in place before actual reductions start.

Differences persist on the question of whether a full disarmament program should be laid out at once, with an agreement signed covering the entirety, or whether agreements should be concluded to cover each stage in turn. The United States has proposed the latter approach. Britain and France look to a comprehensive plan and in this respect

⁴⁷ U. N. Document DC/83, Annex 5.

are at variance with the United States position. These two nations, though, have made clear that there should be unanimous assent in the control organ or the Security Council that the provisions of one stage were complete, that the control facilities were in existence and that the necessary conditions of confidence in international relations existed, before proceeding to the next stage.

The four western powers are agreed that provision should be made for part or all of the disarmament program to be discontinued if a principal state fails to carry out its obligations or a threat to the peace arises. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, favors the adoption of a treaty which would bind the parties to a 3-year program. It is skeptical of disarmament in partial steps without a firm commitment on a whole program, but has not taken a public position on the recourse of a country abiding by disarmament obligations should another state act in violation of them.

5. DISARMAMENT AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The United States and the other western powers generally hold that comprehensive and drastic reductions in armaments can be carried out safely only as parallel progress is made in the solution of important political issues in the world. Although the Soviet Union in May 1955 agreed that political settlements were a necessary condition of large-scale disarmament, it also argues that armament reduction in itself will serve to ease tensions and in general opposes linking disarmament with political settlements.

The western powers have made some alterations in their views on the relationship of disarmament and political settlement in the light of the Soviet position. They have agreed that limited measures of disarmament might be undertaken for the purpose of building international confidence even before progress in settlement of outstanding political issues.

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