84th Congress
2d Session } HOUSE COMMITTEE PRINT NO. 261

VETERANS IN OUR SOCIETY: DATA ON THE CONDITIONS OF MILITARY SERVICE AND ON THE STATUS OF THE VETERAN

A REPORT

ON

VETERANS' BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES

BY

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON VETERANS' PENSIONS

STAFF REPORT NO. IV

STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
MANHATTAN
KANSAS

JUNE 21, 1956

Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
76907 WASHINGTON : 1956

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas, *Chairman*

W. J. BRYAN DORN, South Carolina
ELIZABETH KEE, West Virginia
GEORGE S. LONG, Louisiana
JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
ED EDMONDSON, Oklahoma
FRANK W. BOYKIN, Alabama
WAYNE N. ASPINALL, Colorado
LEO W. O'BRIEN, New York
GEORGE A. SHUFORD, North Carolina
GEORGE H. CHRISTOPHER, Missouri
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan
B. F. SISK, California
JAMES A. HALEY, Florida
EDITH NOURSE ROGERS, Massachusetts
BERNARD W. (PAT) KEARNEY, New York
WILLIAM H. AYRES, Ohio
E. ROSS ADAIR, Indiana
PAUL A. FINO, New York
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
WILLIAM H. AVERY, Kansas
E. KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming
EUGENE SILER, Kentucky
CHARLES M. TEAGUE, California

OLIVER E. MEADOWS, *Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEES

ADMINISTRATION

JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania, *Chairman*

ELIZABETH KEE, West Virginia
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
CHARLES M. TEAGUE, California

COMPENSATION AND PENSION

W. J. BRYAN DORN, South Carolina, *Chairman*

GEORGE H. CHRISTOPHER, Missouri
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan
PAUL A. FINO, New York
E. KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

ELIZABETH KEE, West Virginia, *Chairman*

ED EDMONDSON, Oklahoma
B. F. SISK, California
WILLIAM H. AYRES, Ohio
E. ROSS ADAIR, Indiana

HOSPITALS

GEORGE S. LONG, Louisiana, *Chairman*

LEO W. O'BRIEN, New York
B. F. SISK, California
JAMES A. HALEY, Florida
BERNARD W. (PAT) KEARNEY, New York
WILLIAM H. AVERY, Kansas

HOUSING

ED EDMONDSON, Oklahoma, *Chairman*

GEORGE A. SHUFORD, North Carolina
GEORGE H. CHRISTOPHER, Missouri
WILLIAM H. AYRES, Ohio
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska

INSURANCE

WAYNE N. ASPINALL, Colorado, *Chairman*

JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
GEORGE A. SHUFORD, North Carolina
EUGENE SILER, Kentucky
CHARLES M. TEAGUE, California

SPANISH WAR

FRANK W. BOYKIN, Alabama, *Chairman*

W. J. BRYAN DORN, South Carolina
WAYNE N. ASPINALL, Colorado
PAUL A. FINO, New York
E. KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming

COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
MANHATTAN
KANSAS
STATE C

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

This report is reproduced for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs since it involves a subject over which the committee has jurisdiction. The action of the committee or its chairman in printing this report is not to be construed as expressing any view or opinion on the contents.

OLIN E. TEAGUE.

KANSAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
MANHATTAN
JUL 11 1929
LIBRARY

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON VETERANS' PENSIONS

MEMBERS

OMAR N. BRADLEY, *Chairman*

CLARENCE G. ADAMY
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
PAUL R. HAWLEY
MARTIN D. JENKINS
THEODORE S. PETERSEN
JOHN S. THOMPSON

STAFF

E. M. BRANNON, *Executive Director*

MICHAEL S. MARCH, *Technical Adviser*

PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND CONSULTANTS

Thomas J. Alduk
Richard G. Axt
Gordon R. Beyer
Vincent J. Browne
Thomas J. Canty
William P. Dillingham
Donald R. Farrar
Thomas R. Fisher
Joseph B. Glenn
Delphis C. Goldberg
James L. Harbaugh
John B. Herman
William I. Herman
W. Wayne Hield
Alice M. Hill
Hester M. Hood
Milton G. Johnson
Anthony J. Lanza
Russell S. Leone
Charles H. Lewis
John W. McConnell
Arthur L. Moore
C. Esco Obermann
Thomas H. Patten, Jr.
George F. Rohrlich
Theodore Roscoe
J. Hugh Rose
Barkev Sanders
Herman M. Somers
Paul L. Stanchfield
Herbert E. Stats
Roger W. Walker
Leo V. Warner
George H. Webb
Emery C. Wine

CONSULTING FIRM

Stuart Rice Associates

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Norma Lee Albro
Agnes K. Benesh
Lillian F. Black
Maureen T. Canning
S. Marilyn Currey
William N. Dudrow
Roberta Graham
H. Dorothy Henderson
Kathleen J. Lynam
Margaret H. McMillan
Frances V. Maurich
Joseph N. Newman
Eunice Pigford
Gertrude E. Rasmussen
Alice E. Spees
Ruth L. Steiner
Josephine B. Whyte

FOREWORD

The assignment given to the Commission on Veterans' Pensions required it to appraise veterans' benefits in terms of the changing military, social, and economic factors in our society. The Commission's initial review of the subject suggested that the actual conditions of military service—the relative disadvantages and advantages incurred by those who served in wartime as compared to those who remained in civilian life—are an important factor explaining the need for veterans' benefits. Likewise, it appeared that the relative economic and social status of veterans was another significant factor—since it would help indicate whether any handicaps incurred by reason of military service were temporary or permanent.

Despite the obvious importance of factual information of this nature, the Commission found almost no studies along these lines were available. It accordingly undertook to assemble the most important information which could be obtained in a short period of time. Some of this information is presented in this staff report.

Part I of the report presents data on conditions of military service for each war period from the Civil War to the present time. Its various chapters deal with topics ranging from selection processes to mortality rates. This part is largely a summary of over 2,000 pages of research reports prepared for the Commission by the Department of Defense.

Part II presents data comparing the economic and social characteristics of veterans and nonveterans. This information, mostly available for the first time, was largely derived from special tabulations prepared from data in the files of the Bureau of the Census. Related information along this line is included in the Commission's report on findings and recommendations and in the staff reports on readjustment, disability, and pension benefits.

Part III presents survey data on the attitudes of veterans toward various veterans' benefits. This section is almost entirely based on a path-breaking survey by the firm of Elmo Roper for the National Civil Service League.

CONTENTS

Part I. Conditions of Military Service

	Page
Terms of reference	1
Background statistics	2
Chapter I. Enlistment procedures	4
During Civil War	4
Spanish-American War period	8
World War I	8
World War II	9
Korean war and present	10
Trends	11
Inducements (tangible and intangible)	12
Chapter II: Selection processes of conscription	12
Civil War period	12
Spanish-American War period	15
World War I selective service	15
World War II selective service	17
Selective service, Korean war	19
Present situation	20
Trends	21
Chapter III: Duration of service	22
How long is he in?	22
Overseas service	24
Trends	26
Chapter IV: Mustering-out procedure	26
Demobilization and separation (Civil War and Spanish-American War)	26
World I demobilization and separation	27
World War II demobilization and separation	27
Post-Korea demobilization and separation	28
Present situation	28
Trends	29
Chapter V: Nature of military duties (occupational composition of the Armed Forces)	29
The business of soldiering	29
Occupational composition of Armed Forces, Civil War	31
During Spanish-American War	31
World War I period	32
World War II period	32
Korean war and present	33
Trends	36
Summary	40
Chapter VI: Armed Forces training	40
Serviceman education	40
Civil War training	41
Spanish-American War training	42
General training, World War I	43
Specialized training, World War I	44
General training, World War II	45
Specialized training, World War II	46
Training, Korean war period	48
Present situation (July 1954–June 1955)	48
Summary (Korean conflict and present)	49
Conclusion	49

Page

Chapter VII: Military living conditions (diet, clothing, and shelter) 49
How do they compare? 49
Diet 50
Clothing 52
Shelter 53
Trends 55
Conclusion 55
Chapter VIII: Military living conditions (special services) 55
Note concerning report 55
Religious services 56
Educational services 56
Facilities for family life 57
Personal aid 57
Recreation 58
Sports 59
Post exchanges 59
Leave policy 60
Trends 60
Conclusion 61
Chapter IX: Medical care 61
Record of the "Medics" 61
19th century medicine 62
Military medicine, 20th century 62
Contributions of military medicine 63
Medical care in the field 63
Short-term cases and specialty care 64
Availability of medical facilities 65
Trends 66
Conclusion 66
Chapter X: Mortality and combat service 67
Hazards of combat 67
Factors affecting death rate 70
Combat duty and overseas service 71
Trends 74
Conclusion 74
Chapter XI: Military pay 75
Serviceman's stipend 75
Adverse intangibles 76
Higher pay for the Armed Forces 77
Gross compensation (basic pay; "pay in kind"; "fringe pays") 78
Comparison with civilian pay 83
Trends 84
Conclusion 86
Chapter XII: Overall summary 87
Times have changed 87
The technological revolution 88
The improved service picture 90
Favorable trends 92
Selective service equalizes the burden 92
Military living conditions have bettered 94
Modern military occupations have "transfer value" 95
Military pay has improved 96
Medical care has improved 97
Conclusion 98

PART II. COMPARATIVE SITUATION: VETERANS AND NONVETERANS

(A survey of the veteran's status in contemporary society)

Introductory 99
Chapter I: Veterans and nonveterans, World War II 100
Comparison of income 100
Annual incomes, 1947–54 101
Work experience 101
Job status 103
Educational picture 105
Education relative to occupation 106

Chapter I: Veterans and nonveterans, World War II—Continued Page
Marital status 107
Family status (children) 108
Residential picture 109
Mobility (change in residence) 111
Comparative assets 113
Benefit or handicap? 114
Chapter II: World War I veterans 115
Present situation 115
Money income 115
Occupational status 116
Chapter III: Summary conclusion 118
They speak for themselves 118

PART III. VETERANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD VETERANS' BENEFITS

(A survey of veteran opinion)

Introductory (The Roper Study) 119
Chapter I: General findings 120
What veterans think 120
Basic attitudes 120
Attitudinal divisions 122
Chapter II: Veterans' opinion of specific benefits 123
Re benefits all veterans should receive 123
Opinion (by war and overseas service) 124
Opinion (by organization membership) 126
Opinion of specific benefits (con) 127
On benefits for disabled veterans only 129
Chapter III: Civil service job preference 130
Veterans in Government employment 130
Concerning "super seniority" 130
Veterans' views of Government service 131
Chapter IV: Analysis of veteran types 132
Influence of veterans' organizations 132
"Some veteran types" 133
Organization membership breakdown 134
Chapter V: The consensus 137

VETERANS IN OUR SOCIETY

PART I

CONDITIONS OF MILITARY SERVICE

(A Survey From Civil War to Present)

Terms of Reference

The purpose of part I of this study is to describe the conditions of American military service which existed during the periods embraced by the Civil War, Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean conflict, and the present (as of June 30, 1955). The nature of military service has changed greatly in the last 100 years. The periodic changes have, of course, directly affected the serviceman. This report is designed to indicate the relative importance of factors which constitute advantages and disadvantages for the serviceman—factors which have altered as conditions of warfare or military service have changed.

Undertaking this survey, the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions requested of the Department of Defense detailed information on the following subjects: Military-enlistment procedures utilized in the various war periods enumerated; past and present selective-service procedures; durations of service; mustering-out procedures; nature of military duties; nature of Armed Forces training; nature of military living conditions, including diet, clothing, shelter, special services, and medical care; mortality rates with reference to combat and overseas service; and military pay and benefits.

Agreeing to furnish the requested information, the Secretary of Defense set up within the Defense Department study groups to undertake the special-research project. The project was set up by Rear Adm. John M. Will, USN, Office Secretary of Defense, Manpower, and Personnel. It was under the direction of Brig. Gen. L. V. Warner, USA (Retired) of the President's Commission Staff.

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force study groups engaged in service research and joint effort to produce the data for this survey. Comparative factual and statistical analyses were included in a voluminous 12-volume report which definitively covered all subjects under inquiry. Measured in terms of mission, the project's scope and the time limitation, the Defense Department report is a notable accomplishment.

Some factors involving military life or the character of military service lay beyond the scope of Defense Department inquiry. Conditions of military service do not stand of themselves in monolithic singularity, isolated from contemporary conditions in the civilian world. Rather, they reflect, and in many cases stem from, civilian

conditions. The fact is without significance in this survey unless similarities and variances are identified, and pertinent comparisons made. In such matters as training and education, diet, clothing, medical care, and mortality rates how do servicemen fare in contrast to civilians? Did the servicemen of the 19th century benefit from contemporary advances in civilian housing, medicine, or welfare? How do military living conditions compare with current civilian equivalents? Data furnished the President's Commission by the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Census Bureau and other agencies have been used for comparison with the military data of the Defense Department report.

In some instances, trends discussed and conclusions drawn in the present monograph are admittedly broad generalities. Unless otherwise noted, assumptions are not to be taken as official, or the expression of an official policy.

This monograph presents no more than a digest of the volumes of material provided by the Department of Defense and by other departments.

BACKGROUND STATISTIC

An analytical study of the conditions of military service in relationship with civilian conditions must, ipso facto, be based on two fundamental factors.

If military service in the United States Armed Forces is held to be an obligation of national citizenship (and it has been so defined), the democratic principle demands that the obligation apply to all male citizens alike, barring age, health, or dependency exemptions. In respect to numbers serving, table 1 (accompanying) shows the Armed Forces totals and particular service totals, Revolutionary War to present.

Table 2, immediately following, provides a comparative picture—Armed Forces totals and contemporary civilian populations during the various war periods, and the percentages of eligible males in service. The figures in the table are rounded approximates, the percentages based on estimates.

TABLE 1.—*Armed Forces totals: Military personnel (Revolutionary War to present)* [1]

Wars	Branch of service	Number serving
Revolutionary War: 1775–83	Total	(2)
	Army	(3)
	Navy	(3)
	Marines	(3)
War of 1812: 1812–15	Total	286,730
	Army	(3)
	Navy	(3)
	Marines	(3)
Mexican War: 1846–48	Total	78,718
	Army	(3)
	Navy	(3)
	Marines	(3)
Civil War (Union forces only): [4] 1861–65	Total	[5] 2,213,363
	Army	2,128,948
	Navy	(3)
	Marines	84,415
Spanish-American War: 1898	Total	306,760
	Army [6]	280,564
	Navy	22,875
	Marines	3,321
World War I: Apr. 6, 1917–Nov. 11, 1918	Total	4,743,826
	Army [7]	4,057,101
	Navy	599,051
	Marines	78,839
	Coast Guard	8,835
World War II: Dec. 7, 1941–Dec. 31, 1946 [8]	Total	16,353,659
	Army [9]	11,260,000
	Navy [10]	4,183,466
	Marines	669,100
	Coast Guard	241,093
Korean conflict: June 25, 1950–to July 27, 1953 [11]	Total	5,764,143
	Army	2,834,000
	Navy	1,177,000
	Marines	424,000
	Air Force	1,285,000
	Coast Guard	44,143

[1] Data prior to World War I are based upon incomplete records in many cases.
[2] Not known, but estimates range from 184,000 to 250,000.
[3] Information not available.
[4] Authoritative statistics for the Confederate forces are not available. Estimates of the number who served range from 600,000 to 1,500,000.
[5] As reported by the Commissioner of Pensions in his annual report for fiscal year 1903.
[6] Number serving covers the period Apr. 21 to Aug. 13, 1898.
[7] Includes Air service.
[8] Data are for the period Dec. 1, 1941, through Dec. 31, 1946, when hostilities were officially terminated by Presidential proclamation. Numbers serving from Dec. 1, 1941 to Aug. 31, 1945, were: Total, 14,903,213; Army, 10,420,000; Navy, 3,883,520; and Marine Corps, 599,693.
[9] Includes Army Air Corps.
[10] Battle deaths and wounds not mortal include casualties incurred in October 1941 due to hostile action.
[11] Tentative final data based upon information available as of Sept. 30, 1954.

NOTE.—War dates do not necessarily coincide with official dates for "war service" which constitute the cases of eligibility for veterans' benefits.

Source: Department of Defense and Treasury Department.

TABLE 2.—*Civilian population and Armed Forces (Civil War to present)* [1]

End of fiscal year	Total civilian population	Total population 18 and over	Eligible males 18 and over	Total Armed Forces [2]	Armed Forces as percent of total civilian population	Men in Armed Forces as percent of total males 18 and over
1865 (North only)	25,000,000	14,000,000	7,000,000	2,200,000	8.8	31.4
1899	75,968,000	45,508,000	25,200,000	306,700	.4	1.2
1918	99,357,000	65,475,000	33,000,000	4,744,000	4.8	14.4
1943–45	127,260,000	97,173,000	43,200,000	16,353,000	12.8	37.9

[1] Data for 1865 estimated by Commission on Veterans' Pensions. Data for other periods based upon Census Bureau and Department of Defense statistics.
[2] Total number serving during war—not just those in service in any 1 year.

At the outset of this survey one fact becomes apparent: In the past the servicemen in the Armed Forces constituted a relatively small percentage of the national population. The burden of military service invariably fell on a fraction of the citizenry—that fraction sometimes described as the "flower of the Nation's youth." The description is perhaps overly romantic. In simpler terminology, servicemen were "the boys who carried the load."

If the load was considerably eased after the Civil War by improved service conditions, the fact remains: the serviceman's burden of duty was heavier than the average civilian's. In wartime he was called upon to risk, and if need be to give, his life in battle. Any analysis of military service conditions must begin with recognition of that fact.

CHAPTER I. ENLISTMENT PROCEDURES

DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Army Regulations for 1861 authorized the enlistment of any free white male who met the requirements shown in table 3 (accompanying).

At war's outbreak the Federal Government placed primary reliance on volunteers for Army service. Throughout the conflict, the Regular Army retained a separate identity apart from the Volunteers. However, volunteer qualifications were similar to whose applying to Regular Army applicants. Duration of volunteer enlistments varied from 6 months (1861) to 1, 2, and 3 years. Of the 2,128,948 in the Union Army, some 2,082,600 or 98 percent were volunteers (or nondraftees).

As shown in the following table, general qualifications for Navy and Marine Corps enlistment were similar to Army. Navy accepted boys under 13 as apprentices. After August 1861, all Navy enlistees were required to sign an oath of allegiance.

TABLE 3.—*Enlistment qualifications—U. S. Armed Forces*

ARMY, MARINES, USAF (WHERE INDICATED)

Civil War	Spanish-American War	World War I	World War II	Korean conflict	Present time
1. Ages, 18 to 45, inclusive.	1. Ages, 18 to 45, inclusive.[1]	1. Ages, 18 to 40, inclusive.	1. Ages, 18 to 45, inclusive.[2]	1. Ages, 17 to 34, inclusive; 17 years old with parental consent.[3]	1. Ages, 17 to 34; 17 years old with parental consent.
2. Male citizens and declarant aliens.	2. Male citizens or declarant aliens.	2. Male citizens or declarant aliens.	2. Citizens or declarant aliens.	2. Citizens or declarant aliens.	2. Citizens or declarant aliens.
3. Able bodied and free from disease.	3. Able bodied and free from disease.	3. Able bodied and free from disease.	3. Able bodied and free from disease.	3. Able bodied and effective.	3. Able bodied and effective.
4. Good character and habits.	4. Good character and habits.	4. Able to pass Army physical and mental examination.[4]	4. Able to pass Army mental and physical examination.[4]	4. Able to pass Army mental and physical examination.[4]	4. Able to pass Army mental and physical examination.[4]
5. Able to speak English.	5. Able to pass Army physical examination.	5. Minors could enlist only with parental consent.	5. Good character.	5. Good character.	5. Good character.
6. Minors could enlist only with parental consent.	6. Able to speak English.	6. Good character.	6. AAF, age 17 to 34.	6. USAF, special mental test.	6. USAF, full citizenship.
7. Boy 12 years of age or older, with talent for music could enlist.	7. Minors could enlist only with parental consent.		7. Under 18, parental consent for AAF.	7. USAF, no dependents (later, not over 2).	7. USAF, 1 dependent; no married woman or women with dependent minors.
8. Able to pass physical examination.			8. AAF, no dependent.		
NAVY					
1. No boys under 13 except apprentices.	1. Boys 14 to 18.	1. 1st enlistment, up to 35.	1. Age limit: 17 to 31.	1. Men, 17 to 21; women, 18 to 36.	1. Citizen.
2. No landsmen over 38.....	2. Aliens acceptable.	2. Able to read and write.	2. Full citizenship.	2. Full citizenship.	2. Age: 17 to 30.
3. Oath of allegiance required.	3. Maximum ages: landsman, 25; ordinary seaman, 30; mechanics, etc., 35.	3. Citizenship required, with some exceptions.	3. Under 21, need consent of parents.	3. No married men, or with dependents.	3. Unmarried; 1 dependent, 1st enlistment.
(Other qualifications same as Army and Marines.)	(Other qualifications same as Army and Marines.)	(Other qualifications same as Army and Marines.)	4. No married men or men with dependents.	4. Under 18, need parental consent.	4. Psychological examination.
			5. Psychological examination.	5. Psychological examination.	

[1] Marines, age 35.
[2] Marines, age 18–50
[3] Marines, age 17–38.
[4] Mental test exclusively Army (or Navy); Air Force and USAF mental tests more selective.

Evidence suggests that physical examinations were most perfunctory and standards far from high. An Army jest of the period said that a man had only to raise his hand high enough to be sworn in. Vision requirements seem to have been "one good eye." Navy firemen and coal heavers were required to pass special physical examinations, but the service was short-handed and a recruit's physical shortcomings were often overlooked.

Little effort was made to sift wheat from chaff in the matter of experience and aptitudes. The infantry took all comers. Deck seamen and officers for the Navy were largely recruited from the merchant marine and seaboard fishing fleets. Firemen applicants had to show themselves competent to handle smith's tools and maintain boilers and steam machinery. Aside from these rudimentary requisites, the enlistment officers were satisfied that recruits could learn, "monkey-see, monkey-do." In Civil War Army, Navy, and Marine Corps many volunteers were illiterates.

To stimulate volunteer enlistments, the Federal Government adopted the bounty system early in the war.

By act of July 1861, Congress authorized a bounty of $100 to all volunteers who served a period of 2 years (or less), $25 of which was paid upon muster-in and the remainder at expiration of service. The Federal bounty for recruits remained at $100 until July 1864, when, under act of Congress, bounty was paid to recruits on the following basis:

To recruits enlisting for 1 year	$100
To recruits enlisting for 2 years	200
To recruits enlisting for 3 years	300

This bounty was paid in three installments: One-third at muster-in; one-third at expiration of one-half of service; and one-third at expiration of term of service.

As of November 18, 1864, an additional bounty of $300 from the draft and substitute fund was paid to men enlisting in the First Army Corps. A reenlistment bounty of $400 was offered (after June 1863) to stimulate reenlistments for 3 years (or the duration).

State, county, and in some instances municipal bounties were also offered to volunteers. These local bounties often exceeded the Federal. The volunteer was entitled to both local and Federal, and in some cases the total amount went as high as $1,500.

The bounty system raised a bumper crop of inequities and abuses. It produced a parisitical flock of "substitute brokers" who engaged in the private practice of procuring recruits, volunteers, and substitutes. It aroused resentment in men who had volunteered early in the war when enlistment bounties were much less than those paid a Johnny-Come-Lately. Finally, it gave rise to a plague of "bounty jumpers"—men who enlisted, deserted, and enlisted again in order to "cash in" on additional bounties.

Altogether, a grand total of $750 million was paid to Union Army volunteers. Federal bounties amounted to $300 million of the total sum. The bounty bill almost equaled the pay of the Union Army for the entire war—$820 million.

Most historians and many contemporary commentators characterized the Civil War bounty system as utterly vicious. As such it was on a level with the commutation clause which enabled a draftee to hire a substitute or pay $300 and buy himself out of the draft.

Bounties, however, proved a major inducement to enlistment after war weariness set in and morale in the North went dangerously slack. So did the purses and prize money offered by the Navy.

According to the Defense Department report, there were no Navy enlistment inducements "except the possibility of receiving bounty money for ships captured or sunk." The report lists such bounties as: $100 if the enemy vessel was of inferior force, and $200 if of equal or superior force, "to be divided among the officers and crew [sic] in the same manner as prize money." (Navy rules gave the officers about 50 percent in such division, which would leave the men of a large ironclad or steam frigate a bounty of a few cents per man.)

Although the Defense Department report does not discuss prize money, the awards served as a considerable inducement to Navy enlistment, and "prizes" are headlined on many of the recruiting posters of the time. By 1864 the Navy was advertising the distribution of $50 million in prize money to officers and men. Crews on blockade duty often garnered bonanza sums for the capture of enemy vessels with rich cargoes. The commodore of one Federal squadron was paid $109,000 in prize awards, with relative amounts going to the squadron's complement. The crews of two ships shared $494,909 for the capture of the steamer *Lady Sterling*, and the hands of one man-o'-war divided $510,914 for bagging Confederate steamer *Memphis*. Nearly every man on the U. S. S. *Santiago de Cuba*—champion ship-catcher—came into a small fortune. Many enlisted sailors received from $1,000 to $5,000 as their share of prizes.

Another inducement to Navy enlistment (not mentioned in the official report) was money paid for gallantry in action—also advertised on Navy recruiting posters. These purses were not as common as prize bounties, but they were publicized as a lucrative source of income. Example: $282,857 awarded the crew of a midget torpedo-boat for sinking the Confederate ironclad *Albemarle*. For this exploit the boat's captain, Lt. William Cushing, got $56,000. The lowliest hand in the crew (a landsman) received $4,019. Not bad pay for a night's work, although the job entailed extreme risk. Cushing, incidentally, came into an additional $15,500 in prize-money shares for blockade duty, which made him the highest paid naval lieutenant ($71,500) of the war.

Marines were also entitled to prize money. After July 1864, a Federal bounty of $100 was offered to Marine volunteers. As shown in table 1, approximately 84,415 sailors and Marines—the majority volunteers—served in the Union forces of the Civil War.

In summary it may be noted that Civil War enlistment requirements concerning health, education, and general I. Q. were far below present-day standards. On the march and in battle many were expected to fall; warfare meant only "the survival of the fittest." Excruciating combat losses at Shiloh, Fredericksburg, and elsewhere dampened the ardor which had answered Lincoln's first call for volunteers; thereafter the Government depended mainly on monetary inducements to stimulate recruiting. By 1864 volunteering was highly lucrative. Bounties, purses, and prize money were used as additional lures. They may have been necessary to offset meager pay and risks of combat missions which were recognized as suicidal.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR PERIOD

During the Spanish-American War (April–August 1898) the Regular Army was recruited through the general recruiting service and to some extent by regimental recruiting parties.

Applicants for Regular Army were required to meet the qualifications shown in table 3. In addition to the qualifications listed, applicants for the infantry and the artillery were required to weigh not less than 120 pounds and not over 190 pounds. Applicants for cavalry had to be at least 5 feet 4 inches in height, and could not weigh over 165 pounds.

Qualifications for volunteer enlistment were the same as those for Regular Army service. The volunteer term was 2 years.

Boys between 16 and 18 could enlist as musicians for a 3-year term.

Health standards were better than the Civil War equivalent, for medical methods had improved. Moreover, the war's short duration was foreseen, and Army recruiting officers were not pressed to fill quotas.

Few educational qualifications were specified. A special requirement for artillery recruits demanded that they be "young and active" and have a fair knowledge of arithmetic.

Marine Corps enlistment requirements were similar to Army's. The Navy accepted aliens, and lads as young as 14 could sign up as apprentices. Table 3 shows other minor variations from Army standards.

Army volunteers were offered no monetary inducements by the Government, enlistment bounties having been abolished. Navy and Marine Corps enlistment inducements included a chance for prize money (discontinued in January 1899) and clothing bounties (for certain rates). Marines were offered extra pay for war service.

Enlistment requirements (regular and volunteer) in the three services during the Philippine Insurrection and Boxer Rebellion were similar to those in effect during the Spanish-American War.

In summary, Spanish-American War enlistment requirements did not vary greatly from those of 1861. Soldiering of the period was similar to that of the Civil War, demanding little more than marksmanship and close order drill of the trooper. Technicians served in the mechanized "White Fleet," but the Navy possessed a sufficiency of regulars to meet the wartime need. Moreover, Spanish resistance was feeble. The war's brief duration obviated a sustained recruiting campaign. American combat losses were unusually light, and there was no "war weariness" in reaction to "war fever." Many of the men who went to Cuba joined up for a lark, in the mood of the adventurous Rough Riders. That mood was sustained throughout the war against Aguinaldo and the China Relief Expedition.

It was to be dispelled by wholesale massacres in the Europe of 1914 and the grim realities of trench warfare in 1917.

WORLD WAR I

When the United States declared war on Imperial Germany in April 1917 the Regular Army was relatively small. Much of its existing strength was in remote garrisons (the Philippines, Hawaii, and elsewhere). Army recruiting campaigns were immediately

launched in the States. Concurrently, National Guard units which had served in the Mexican Border Campaign were ordered into the Army, and the various States began intensive guard recruiting.

On May 18, 1917, the Selective Service Act of 1917 was approved by the President. In December 1917, voluntary Army enlistments were prohibited for the 21–35 age group. In September 1918 all voluntary enlistments were prohibited. Thereafter the Army relied entirely on conscription to fill manpower quotas.

Army enlistment requirements for the World War I period are shown in table 3. During the war, enlistments were made for the "period of the emergency." A requirement innovation was that the applicant "read, speak, and write English."

Basic enlistment requirements of Navy and Marine Corps were generally in accordance with Army's (see table 3). With the exception of a few ratings, including seamen 2c, apprentices and landsmen, Navy enlistments were restricted to the 21–35 age group. Term was for 4 years. Marine Corps physical standards were set by the Surgeon General of the Navy.

Late in the war, volunteering for Navy and Marine Corps was prohibited. Thereafter the two services were allotted levies of draftees.

Introducing motor transportation, aerial warfare, tank warfare, gas warfare and submarine and antisubmarine warfare, World War I featured scientific weapons and complex tactics hitherto unknown to military endeavor. To be discussed in greater detail under another heading, the subject is related to enlistment in that it presented the Armed Forces with the problem of recruiting (or training) highly qualified specialists. During World War I, the Army and Navy relied largely on training the volunteer or draftee. As one may note from table 3, educational standards for enlistment were not much higher than those of the Spanish-American War period. Although a "mental examination" was given, there was no system for precise identification of individual skills or aptitudes. College men were given opportunity to sign up for various officers' schools, and a few specialists were recruited for the engineers, Signal Corps, aviation, intelligence and other branches of the service. But in the main, the rookie went to a training camp where he might (or might not) be selected for specialized training.

The Government abolished all bonuses, bounties and prize money for Armed Forces voluntary enlistment in World War I. Such monetary inducements as existed were limited to the possibilities of promotion and pay, the extra pay for "extra-hazardous duty" (flying, submarine service, etc.), and to the benefits offered through war risk insurance and dependency allotments.

As will be presently discussed, intangible inducements brought a large number of volunteers into the Armed Forces in 1917. In part those inducements were produced by the development of high-pressure advertising and its application to war propaganda.

WORLD WAR II

During the prewar emergency period (September 1939 to December 1941) measures were taken to strengthen the Regular Army through Selective Service (Act of 1940) and voluntary enlistment. Enlist-

ments were made for 1-year or 3-year terms. Eligibility requirements were as shown in table 3. Voluntary enlistments in the Army were suspended, with a few minor exceptions, in December 1942.

Qualified men were permitted to enlist in the Volunteer Naval Reserve for general Service (fleet duty, etc.) or for special service (duties of a specialized nature, normally shoreside) during the prewar emergency period. Enlisted volunteers had the opportunity to participate in the volunteer Reserve program (V–1 to V–7) whereby the trainee could "strike for a rating" in some particular branch of the service, or attend various schools devoted to officer training.

Voluntary enlistments in V–7 (a major program) ceased in December 1942. Thereafter the Navy's manpower quotas were largely maintained through selective service inductions. In July 1942 the Women's Reserve (WAVES) was established. Wave volunteers relieved large numbers of sailors at shore stations, releasing them for sea duty.

Navy enlisted requirements (shown in table 3) contain one interesting innovation—the psychological examination given enlistees.

Volunteer enlistments were permitted in the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve during certain periods of the war. Persons in the 38–50 age group were accepted in limited numbers in the Corps Reserve for duty as guards in the United States. The Women's Reserve, established in 1943, recruited lady marines who relieved large numbers of men for overseas or other strenuous duty.

Featuring mechanized artillery, "Buck Rogers" weapons, stratospheric aircraft and electronic fire-control and detention devices, the war put a premium on the fighting technician and uniformed artisan. All services needed qualified specialists or men and women capable of mastering special techniques. Early in the prewar period, experts were called in to devise batteries of I. Q. examinations—psychological and aptitude tests— to screen incoming personnel. Air Force screening was particularly exacting. But all put emphasis on educational and intelligence levels. For perhaps the first time in infantry history, brains were more imperative than brawn.

Health standards, too, were higher than those set for any previous war. Volunteer applicants with imperfect vision or minor physical defects were usually rejected and placed in draft status.

There were no monetary inducements offered World War II volunteers other than standard pay, extra pay for "extra-hazardous duty" (which currently included demolition work and paratrooping), the opportunity for rapid promotion (and more pay) in such a branch as the Air Force, national service life insurance, and some assurance of future veterans' benefits.

Like Villa's raid (the first foreign assault on United States territory since the War of 1812), the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor gave volunteering a tidal wave impetus.

KOREAN WAR AND PRESENT

The Korean conflict found the Army at relatively low strength. Urgency of the situation called for immediate action to mobilize the personnel required for overseas duty. Enlistments for the Regular Army were considerably increased; Reserve Corps personnel, and some Army Reserve and National Guard units were called into active

Federal service. The selective service law was continued in operation to furnish the additional manpower needed.

Army enlistment requirements are shown in table 3.

As was the case in previous periods of emergency, many men enlisted voluntarily rather than wait for their induction under the draft law. Others enlisted voluntarily to complete their required period of service.

Only United States citizens or nationals were eligible for enlistment in the Navy. Men were enlisted between the ages of 17 and 31, and women between the ages of 18 and 26. Mental tests were administered to all applicants. (See table 3.)

At the beginning of the conflict, physical requirements, which were set by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, had most exacting standards. In April 1951 the Navy lowered its standards to those set by Army regulations. Women were not eligible for WAVE enlistment if they were mothers or had custody of a child or children under 18 years of age.

Marine enlistment requirements generally followed Army regulations, as shown in table 3.

No monetary inducements were offered by the Army or Marine Corps during the Korean conflict, although the volunteer was made aware of pay opportunities, free life insurance, numerous fringe benefits and so on. In addition to the benefits in mention, the Navy offered a reenlistment bonus, free correspondence courses, ship's service and small stores privileges. The Air Force offered a special inducement to certain individuals with vocational training, agreeing to assign them to work in line with that particular specialty.

At the present time, enlistment requirements are similar to those which existed during the Korean war. However, personnel now entering the Armed Forces are not entitled to many of the GI benefits available as inducement factors for those who entered military service during World War II and the Korean conflict.

TRENDS

In step with the increasing complexity of modern weapons and modes of warfare, enlistment qualifications for all Armed Forces services have become more exacting. Army, Navy and Marine Corps standards are much higher than they were in the day of the Civil War or Spanish War volunteer. They have "upped" considerably since World War I. The modern Air Force, in need of vast numbers of men with technical aptitudes and capabilities, is particularly demanding in respect to enlistment requirements.

However, the pressures of any modern conflict waged on a major scale preclude the raising of volunteer forces on a free-will enlistment basis. With the trend definitely set toward compulsory military service and universal military training, volunteer enlistment is now recognized as a secondary method for maintaining Armed Forces manpower at required levels. In an all-out atomic war, recruiting would doubtless be prohibited by events if not by law.

Yet mass drafting poses problems for services which demand the utmost in technical competence. Compelled to induct large levies of draftees, these services are presented with a difficult training situation. The dilemma becomes serious as all services bid for specialists and technicians, draft allotments are run-of-the-mill, many are called

but only few can be chosen, and "scientific weapons get ahead of the men." Faced with shortages of skilled specialists, the Armed Forces will probably continue to engage in competitive peacetime recruiting for volunteers who can meet basic educational and aptitude requirements.

INDUCEMENTS (TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE)

The trend has been directly away from cash bonuses and bounties for volunteering, a promise of purses for valor, and guaranties of prize money. Abolishing these archaic devices, the Government has made an effort to invite men into the services by keeping pay scales in fairly even balance with cost-of-living levels and civilian wages and salaries. Extra pay for extrahazardous duty; inexpensive or free insurance policies; improved housing; training courses in subjects bestowing academic credit—these and assurance of other future benefits constitute tangible inducements for today's volunteer.

As intangible enlistment inducements the Defense Department report lists the following: Patriotism; sense of duty; conviction in cause; anger at enemy atrocities; fear of stigma attached to conscript (as in Civil War), or to service evader (World War "slacker"); optional choice of service or branch of service; opportunity to enter service at own convenience; desire for adventure; and sense of the inevitable (sic).

The intangibles enumerated defy accurate assessment, and several defy definition. Patriotism is an abstraction embracing numerous indefinables; the term may include xenophobia as well as "love of country." Fatalism, as implied by "sense of the inevitable," seems a negative resignation rather than a genuine (i. e., persuasive) inducement. Perhaps conviction in cause (e. g., the Four Freedoms) and anger at enemy atrocities (the *Lusitania;* Pearl Harbor) constitute the more important inducement factors. Practical factors lie in voluntary choice of service or branch of service, and the opportunity to enlist "at convenience" rather than report when drafted.

Chapter II. Selection Processes of Conscription (1863–1956)

CIVIL WAR PERIOD

The United States drafts during the Civil War were made in pursuance of the Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, and its amendments. There were four drafts during the war (draft of July 1863; draft under President's call for men of March 1864; draft under call of July 1864; draft under call of December 1864). All conscripts were for the United States (Union) Army; United States Navy and Marine Corps did not procure men by compulsory procedures.

In wake of a Confederate draft, the Federal Enrollment Act was the first draft in United States history. Its objectives seem to have been as follows: (1) To enroll and hold liable for military duty all men capable of bearing arms and not otherwise exempted; (2) to build up the national forces when additional strength was required; (3) to apprehend deserters and return them to their commands.

Perhaps an additional objective (not mentioned in the Defense Department report) was to register the men in certain Midwestern areas where "Copperhead" (pro-South) sentiment was considered dangerously strong and Federal enlistments had gone abnormally slack. Another objective: the general stimulation of enlistments.

If the Federal draft was chiefly aimed at strengthening the Union Army, it obviously failed this purpose. It is estimated that 2,213,365 individuals served with the United States Armed Forces during the Civil War. Of this total, 2,128,948 were in the Army. The great majority of these soldiers were volunteers. Only an approximate 2 percent were draftees.

Civil War conscription procedures were unwieldy. The permission of substitutions and a "buying out" clause provided methods for service evasion that were obvious injustices. The service burden fell on the draftee who could afford neither "buy out" nor substitute.

By statute of the Enrollment Act, all able-bodied males between the ages of 20 and 45 (except those thereafter exempted) were declared to "constitute the national force," and, as such, were held liable for military duty at the President's call.

Names were drawn by lottery wheel. Upon notification, the draftee could, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place. Or he could pay to an appropriate agency the sum of $300 (for the Government's procuration of a substitute). Upon furnishing substitute or making stipulated payment of commutation money, the person drafted was discharged of liability to service.

Exemptions, other than those by way of substitution or commutation, were based on physcial or mental disability, family dependencies, doubtful citizenship status, or marital status (married men over 35 were not drafted). Felons and drunkards were not accepted. Quakers were "furloughed." Indians were exempted. Men who could prove they were rebel deserters were exempted.

Occupational exemption first appeared in the draft of March 1864 when a skilled mechanic was returned to his job. In the ensuing 2 draft calls, 120 skilled mechanics were exempted from military duty.

As stipulated in the Draft Act of February 1864, former servicemen, if honorably discharged after at least 2 years' service in the war, were automatically exempted.

Disability exemptions were, of course, in keeping with contemporary medical knowledge and practice. Evidence indicates that standards were not at 20th century levels. (Statutory disability rates of the general law pension system, as amended in 1866, list "loss of sight of one eye, the sight of the other having been lost before enlistment." Thus it is evident that a man with one eye might be taken into the Union Army).

Dependency exemptions were relatively lenient. They included: (1) Only son of a dependent widow; (2) only son of aged or infirm parents; (3) last son of household with several brothers in service, the family counting on him for support; (4) only brother of dependent orphans under 12 in need of his support; (5) father of dependent motherless children under 12. In special cases of need and dependency, other than those enumerated, the authorities were inclined to grant deferments.

In the draft of July 1863, some 292,441 names were drawn. Of this number, 39,415 failed to report. And 460 were dismissed through "quota discharges." The number examined was thus reduced to 252,566.

Of the number examined, 26,002 furnished substitutes. Some 52,288 paid commutation money. Other exemptees included: 81,121

for physical disability; 257 for mental disability; about 25,000 for family dependencies. All told, there were 164,395 exempted for physical disabilities and dependencies. Of the number originally called up, less than 10,000 were finally drafted into service. The percentages were more or less typical for the subsequent Civil War drafts.

The whole number of men whose names were drawn in the 4 drafts under the Federal Enrollment Act was 776,829. Of this number, 73,607 furnished substitutes; 86,724 paid commutation money; 315,509 were exempted for disability, family dependency or other reasons; 83,398 were discharged because of full quotas or "by order"; and 161,244 failed to report.

Altogether only 119,954 men entered the Army under the Enrollment Act. And of that total, only 46,347 were draftees. The remaining 73,607 were hired substitutes.

As has been noted, men were not drafted for naval service during the Civil War. According to the Defense Department report—

> the existing law did not give relief or credit or mitigation of the draft in consequence of naval service.

The report further states that—

> seamen, acting engineers and petty officers were drafted into the Army even while on shipboard and in naval service * * *. Many ships were [undermanned] in consequence.

However, naval recruiting posters of the period carry the heading: "How To Avoid the Conscript Bill." On this point, evidence and official report seem contradictory.

With respect to Civil War "criteria of selection," the Provost Marshal General concluded in 1918 (on basis of a study prepared by his Civil War predecessor):

> The basic principle employed in the execution of the draft was to secure the filling of allotments by volunteering and to resort to conscription only in the event a quota could not be otherwise filled. Conscription was used as a spur to voluntary enlistment. Local communities immediately upon the announcement of a quota began the most vigorous efforts to fill their allotment with volunteers and to escape what was conceived to be the stigma of conscription.

State, county, and municipal bounties were offered to encourage volunteering. As has been noted, cash bonuses sometimes topped $1,500. Yet bonuses and bounties proved ineffective in slack areas. Nor was the problem solved by conscription as imposed by the Enrollment Act.

Despite the stigma attached to the draft, enlistment figures do not suggest that it put sharp spurs to volunteering. The Defense Department report does not discuss in any detail the draft's worst features—substitution and $300 commutation. These vicious escapes compromised the entire conscription program, and led many dissident northerners to characterize the conflict as a "rich man's war and poor man's fight"—a slogan already popularized in the South where the owner of 12 slaves was exempt from the Confederate draft. Upshot in the North were anticonscription demonstrations and the homicidal draft riots which raged in New York City. In consequence of the rioting, General Dix put Manhattan under martial law, and the Army forces held there on duty probably exceeded the number of draftees from the entire State.

That the Civil War draft sloughed into a swamp is sufficiently evidenced by the 161,244 who failed to report. With draft dodgers

numbering 1 out of 7, and thousands of evaders hiring substitutes, or paying commutation money, the conscription effort was a manifest fiasco. As indicated by table 5 on page 21, some 98 percent of the Union Armed Forces total were volunteers.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR PERIOD

No men were inducted into the United States Armed Forces by compulsory methods during the war with Spain and the ensuing Philippine Insurrection and Boxer uprising. Lasting only a few weeks, the Spanish-American War was largely decided by naval action. The war against Aguinaldo occupied relatively small forces, and only a few hundred troops were dispatched with the China Relief Expedition.

WORLD WAR I SELECTIVE SERVICE

Foreseeing a prolonged struggle in Europe, Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, 6 weeks after the declaration of war on Imperial Germany. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps procured men through the subsequent drafts. But the immediate objective was to register all available males and build Army divisions to required strength.

The act of May 1917 provided that all males between the ages of 21 and 30 were subject to registration for possible military service. On August 31, 1918, the age provisions of the original law were extended to include men aged 45.

Placed in exempt classification at the outset were ordained clergymen or students preparing for priesthood or ministry, certain conscientious objectors, and the employees of specified arsenals. (As during the Civil War, the Vice President of the United States, and Federal and State Government officials were automatically exempted.) A broad occupational exemption was given certain workers engaged in agricultural pursuits.

Local boards were set up for the classification and examination of the registrants. Substitutions were not permitted, and the privileged purchase of commutation was never even considered by the framers of the conscription bill. Liability to service was determined by the order of the lottery drawings and by physical screenings and exemption provisions standard for all draftees.

Men liable to selection were placed in five classes. The group of registrants within the jurisdiction of each local board was taken as the unit to be classified.

Those placed in class I were first to be called up in order determined by the drawing. Those in class II obtained temporary deferment and were not subject to call until class I was exhausted. Similarly, men in classes III and IV were not liable for call until classes II and III respectively were exhausted. Class V was composed of men automatically exempted at the outset and those who failed to meet physical, mental, moral, or other requirements.

Dependency exemptions were distributed in order of stringency (or family need) throughout classes II, III, and IV. For example, the father of motherless children not dependent on his earnings for support was placed in class II. A father with children dependent on his earnings for support was placed in class IV. A man with dependent parents, brothers, or sisters was placed in class III.

A wide variety of occupational deferments was distributed through the various classes. Skilled farm and certain industrial laborers were placed in class II. Highly trained firemen or policemen were placed in class III. So were customhouse and post-office employees holding key positions; farm managers; highly specialized technicians in vital factories; shipyard workers on priority jobs. In class IV (virtually exempt) were the heads of any necessary agricultural or industrial enterprise. Licensed aviators and medical students were ultimately exempted.

But experts in some professions became subject to military call. In May 1918, Congress enacted a resolution whereby the Government was empowered to induct into the services much-needed specialists in scientific, educational, or other fields.

Draftees were given relatively thorough physical examinations. Physical exemptions were based, comprehensively, on organic diseases, marked visual or aural defects, mental diseases and deficiencies, muscular paralyses, disfiguring or disabling deformities, and physical underdevelopment. Minimum height requirement was 5 feet; minimum weight, 110 pounds. Altogether, the standards were considerably higher than those of the Civil War—meaning that the man had a better chance for survival in camp and at the fighting front.

Approximately 4,743,800 persons served in the United States Armed Forces of World War I. Of this number, 4,057,101 were in the Army. About 70 percent of the enlisted men were draftees.

The Navy depended on voluntary enlistments until October 1918. In the closing months of the war (October, November) a total of 3,394 draftees were inducted into naval service. Approximately 9,000 inductees entered the Navy in 1919. The conscripted total (some 12,394) constituted about 2 percent of the Navy's wartime volunteer complement (535,774 men).

The Marine Corps depended on volunteers until August 1918, when recruiting was suspended by order of the Naval Secretary. Drafting began on October 1, 1918. Between that date and November 11 (Armistice Day) the Marine Corps inducted 4,786 draftees. Inductions were continued until December 13, raising the draftee total to 7,088. Of a corps complement totaling 66,359, the number of inducted marines was just under 11 percent.

As shown in table 5 (page 21) a total of 24,234,000 men were registered and classified under the Selective Service law. Of the 3,764,000 examined, some 802,518 were classified as "disqualified". Approximately 2,820,000 (or about 60 percent) were inducted through the draft.

In summary one may note that World War I Selective Service attained the objective of building and maintaining the Armed Forces' requisite strength. Critics, however, remarked various flaws in the draft procedure. Some examining physicians felt that careless acceptances were made. Others thought many rejections were unjustified. A need for tighter medical criteria, better examining facilities, and better-trained examiners was apparent to the authorities.

The broad application of occupational deferments evoked considerable criticism among servicemen. In some areas, "farmer exemptions" were hotly resented. National indignation protested the deferment of some 100,000 shipyard workers. The lesson was learned that blanket exemptions for particular groups of the population generally lead to unfairness and abuses.

Yet most of the occupational deferments were recognized as necessary for a war effort demanding the utmost in agricultural and industrial production. And, unlike the Civil War conscript, the World War draftee was not publicly stigmatized. The fact is not mentioned in the official report, but public resentment focussed on a number of socialites and a champion boxer who escaped the draft. However, as there were no purchased commutations and "influence" deferments were held to a minimum, the World War selective service was a great improvement over the Civil War draft.

WORLD WAR II SELECTIVE SERVICE

The World War II draft was introduced by the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act which required all males between the ages of 18 and 65 to register, and made those from 20 to 45 liable to service in the United States Armed Forces (military and naval).

Peacetime selective service ended with Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). Mass drafting began with the war declaration on Japan the following day. Selective service had a twofold task: building and maintaining the Armed Forces at required strength, and maintaining homefront agriculture and industry at required strength. In a showdown with totalitarian powers long geared for war, the production problem was more vital and perhaps more difficult than in any past conflict. Compelled to feed and rearm her major allies, America was also forced to wage global combat. A delicate balance between fighting forces on battlefront and production forces on homefront had to be maintained.

Automatic exemptions were similar to those in effect during World War I. Local selective service boards registered, classified, or reclassified the registrants and rejected only those with obvious defects. The remainder were later examined at Armed Forces induction stations where final acceptance or rejection was determined.

Economic pressures caused wide occupational deferment during the latter part of World War II. The payment of monetary allowances to dependents reduced dependency exemptions to a minimum. Legislation permitting the enlistment of women volunteers in the Armed Forces affected the situation in that it released men for combat duty and for essential jobs in various war industries.

Under the Selective Training and Service Act, registrants were placed in four main classes. As follows:

Class I: Men available for training and service after physical examination.

Class II: Persons available, but temporarily deferred as necessary workers or professionals on the homefront.

Class III: Persons with dependency deferments.

Class IV: Persons exempted by statute or other exemption, including failure to meet physical, mental, or moral requirements.

The classification system was made highly flexible. Classes were redefined as the need developed. Within each class there were subdivisions, such as II–A and II–B (men in essential occupations) and IV–F (physically disqualified). Inductions were limited to those in Class I–A.

Records indicate that physical standards were higher than those established in World War I. However, the specifications were

relaxed to permit numbers of men to fill noncombat billets in the service. A unique feature was introduced with the intelligence-testing of draftees in conjunction with literacy standards imposed. Demanding expert handling, modern weapons and war machinery called for men mentally capable of mastering the necessary skills. The earlier soldier or sailor could learn through monkey-see-monkey-do, or robot drill. The modern serviceman had to use his head.

During 6½ years of operation, the selective service boards registered 50,680,137 men. The system accomplished the stupendous task of classifying and reclassifying 36,677,024 who were liable for military service. Some 20 million were given physicals or forwarded to centers for physical examinations. Wartime rejects totaled 4,828,000. Of this number, 2,708,700 failed to meet physical requirements; 1,532,500 were mental rejects; 510,500 were rejected for other disqualifying defects. Altogether (including those in the peacetime draft) rejects totaled about 6,419,700, or 35.8 percent of the number examined.

Some 10,022,000 men were inducted during the war (see table 5). Approximately 7,500,000 inductees (about 75 percent of the total) entered the Army.

Navy and Marine Corps procurement remained on voluntary basis until terminated by Presidential Executive order on December 5, 1942. Thereafter, selective service provided the bulk of their personnel (men between 17 and 18 and over 35 were still permitted to enlist). Navy received some 1,534,200 inductees, while the Marines were allotted 523,014—approximately 48 percent and 43 percent of their respective total complements.

Of the 16,113,000 men who served in World War II, approximately 62 percent were draftees. (See table 5.) In respect to Armed Forces total and Army total, the percentage figures are roughly similar to those of World War I.

As regards World War II draft methods, many of the improvements incorporated in the Selective Service Act of 1917 remained in the Selection and Training Act of 1940. Among the more important were: (1) Selective service from war's outset to duration; (2) no bounties for volunteering; (3) individual deferment for cause only; (4) law enforcement left to Justice Department; (5) registration by voluntary act; (6) local draft boards composed of civilian neighbors.

Monetary allowances to dependents; strict regulation of deferments, and elimination of blanket exemptions; virtual elimination of "influence" exemptions—these factors strengthened public confidence in selective service. While much opprobrium was attached to "dodging" or "evasion," there was no stigma whatever to being a draftee. For that reason the draft threat may not have spurred a stampede of voluntary enlistments.

Selective service was notably successful in meeting the manpower needs of the Armed Forces without stripping the civilian economy. And in maintaining industrial priorities, there was no resort to blanket exemptions; civilian groups were not deferred en masse as were the shipyard workers in World War I. Inductions were spread "across the board" with deferment for no particular profession, vocation, or practice. Perhaps for this reason there was considerable complaint (not mentioned in the Defense Department report), that men were shoved as "square pegs into round holes." Many inductees who were college students or graduates chafed at tasks beneath their

demonstrated abilities. In the older-age brackets, artisans, executives and professional men who had not been followers in civilian life had marked difficulty in adjusting to subservience and the boredom of military routines.

But the assignment of inductees to military duties was not within the mission of selective service. If the Navy made gunners out of truckdrivers, and the Air Force sent lawyers to mechanics' schools, the cause lay in the impositions of supply and demand—civilian vocations are not keyed to meet the emergency needs of the military. Selective service accomplished its mission when it classified and examined the registrants with respect to minimum physical and mental qualifications, and supplied the Armed Forces with requisite allotments of personnel.

And the World War II draft process resulted in the selection of a broader representation of society than did the draft of World War I, as shown by table 4 (accompanying).

TABLE 4.—*Civilian occupational background of Army and Navy personnel*

Civilian occupation group	U. S. Army, June 1943	U. S. Navy, June 1943	U. S. Army, June 1944	U. S. Navy, June 1944	1940 census of experienced labor force
Craftsmen, foremen	12.9	29.2	13.0	20.6	13.0
Farmers and farm laborers	11.4	4.2	11.3	5.9	17.8
Operatives and laborers	41.8	39.4	41.6	35.1	31.0
Professional and semiprofessional	3.7	6.7	3.7	4.2	5.2
Managerial and official	2.8	1.1	2.9	1.8	7.0
Students	4.6	----	5.3	----	5.0
Service, except domestic and protective	4.6	2.6	4.4	2.4	4.2
Domestic service	.2	.2	.2	.1	.4
Protective service	.6	.8	.6	1.5	1.8
Clerical and sales	14.6	15.8	13.8	10.8	13.2
Nonclassifiable	2.8	----	3.2	17.6	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In comparison with Civil War conditions, the trend seems clear. The average Civil War soldier was a semi-illiterate farm boy. The soldiers of World War II were craftsmen, artisans, laborers, clerical workers, office manager, students, professionals, or semiprofessionals. Less than 12 percent were farmers or farmworkers.

Broadly reflected is the country's transition from an agricultural to an industrial nation. Reflected also is the "total war" aspect of modern warfare which calls for united and coordinated effort by all segments of the civilian populance.

SELECTIVE SERVICE, KOREAN WAR

All men between the ages of 18 and 26, except those exempt by statute, were required to register under the Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended. This act became the Universal Military Training and Service Act on June 19, 1951. The 1951 amendments provided, among other things, that liability for service of registrants deferred on or after June 19, 1951, continued until the registrant reached the age of 35. Those under 18½ were not liable for induction. On and after September 9, 1950, physicians, dentists, and veterinarians up through age 50, were classed as special registrants and were required to register and liable for service.

Of some, 3,685,300 selective service registrants who underwent preinduction examination during the war period (July 1950 to July 1953) about 2,496,700 or 68 percent were found acceptable. And approximately 1,188,600 or 32 percent were not accepted. The Army received 1,475,700 (about 94 percent) and the Marine Corps received 84,447 (about 6 percent of those inducted). As shown in table 5 a total of about 5,720,000 served in the Armed Forces. About 17 percent of the 9 million classified by selective service were inducted. Navy and Air Force did not procure men by compulsory procedures.

A registrant could be inducted into the Armed Forces only after he had passed a preinduction examination at an Armed Forces examining station. The establishment and application of the mental, moral, and physical standards for acceptance were entirely the responsibility of the Department of Defense. There were, however, three different stages in the selective service process where registrants might be rejected for service. These were: (1) at the local board; (2) at the Armed Forces examining station upon preinduction examination; and (3) at the Armed Forces induction station during final induction examination.

Following World War II, the military services were unable to maintain the strength required for the American position on global fronts. Induction authority expired in March 1947. Passage of the Selective Service Act in the spring of 1948 immediately stimulated enlistments. With no draft calls during 1950, Armed Forces strength again waned. Explosion of the Korean war made heavy inductions once more imperative.

The Korean conflict, by definition a "police action," imposed draft needs peculiar to the military situation. The Army was caught short-handed for the type of ground fighting that developed. Yet the prospect of a "short war" limited to United Nations objectives obviated the need for massive expeditionary forces. According, a large-scale draft was unnecessary. The consequent selection and induction of relatively young men placed the bulk of the burden on the Nation's youth.

PRESENT SITUATION

Present liability rulings for registration under the Selective Service System are the same as those of the Korean war period, except that the age for special registrants has been reduced to 46. Some changes have been made insofar as liability for service and satisfying the active duty requirements are concerned. Registrants who entered upon active duty after September 9, 1940, are not available for further military service if they have been separated from active duty and discharged after honorable service of 6 months or more.

More than 622,600 chargeable accessions were procured during fiscal year July 1954 through June 1955. The Army received approximately 52 percent of the total accessions; the Air Force, 25 percent; the Navy, 19 percent; and the Marine Corps, 4 percent. Inductions, all in the Army, accounted for 34 percent of the total accessions, and enlistments for the remaining 66 percent. Table 5 (accompanying) shows the numbers classified, examined, rejected and inducted.

TRENDS

The trend of the selective process for compulsory military service from the Civil War to the present has been toward universal military liability for all able-bodied men, with regard for the circumstances of the individual citizen and his family, and for the welfare of the country as a whole. Improvements in the Selective Service System include: (1) Civil control of the operation; (2) broader representation of society among the selected registrants; (3) better correlation in the procurement of Armed Forces manpower needs without undermining civilian economy.

TABLE 5

NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF DRAFTEES CLASSIFIED, EXAMINED, REJECTED OR INDUCTED BY U. S. ARMED FORCES, CIVIL WAR TO PRESENT*

	CIVIL WAR		WORLD WAR I		WORLD WAR II		KOREAN CONFLICT		PRESENT TIME (1955)	
		%		%		%		%		%
Classified	776,800	100.	24,234,000	100.	36,677,000	100.	9,123,000	100.	16,095,400	100.
Examined	522,000	67.2	3,764,000	15.5	17,954,500	48.9	3,685,300	40.4	501,700	3.1
Rejected	160,200	20.6	802,518	3.3	6,419,700	17.5	1,188,600	13.0	208,000	1.3
Inducted	46,300	6.0	2,820,000	11.6	10,022,000	27.3	1,560,100	17.1	212,900	1.3
Armed Forces Total	2,213,363	284.9	4,734,991	19.5	16,112,566	43.9	5,720,000	62.7	2,935,000	18.2

* The number classified is considered as 100% for the basis of comparison.

76907—56——3

As indicated in table 5, increasing reliance has been placed on the draft to raise men for the Armed Forces during wartime. The pressures of modern warfare and the possibility of atomic warfare in the future have made large-scale manpower registration imperative. Universal military training, or its equivalent, is a concomitant of total war. In event of thermonuclear warfare, the entire populace may be exposed to great risks and may be called upon for service. In that event, the oldtime distinction between combatant soldier and noncombatant civilian will no longer exist.

Chapter III. Duration of Service

HOW LONG IS HE IN?

Terms of enlistment for officers and men, Regulars and volunteers, and terms of compulsory service for conscripts—in all branches of the Armed Forces—have varied since the Revolution.

Since the Civil War, however, salutary advances have been made in stabilization of the service periods required of personnel in the military forces. The Government soon recognized the dangers implicit in relying on short-term Army volunteers during the Civil War. Although emphasis was subsequently placed on long-term volunteers, many additional calls for volunteers were made for shorter periods which allowed little time for the training and effective utilization of such troops. As a consequence, national conscription was introduced. The Civil War draft was badly handled, but it did stabilize and standardize the terms of service imposed.

Conscription was not necessary during the Spanish-American War. But the establishment for enlistees of a 2-year service (or duration of emergency) period allowed time for the adequate training and utilization of the troops called up, and provided a means for retaining them in service beyond the 2-year period if necessary. This provision marked a radical departure from the policies used in previous wars when personnel were entitled to discharge upon expiration of the period for which they enlisted.

World War I marked the first time in which compulsory military service was utilized from war's outset as the main source of manpower procurement. Again the authorities followed the policy of setting the period of the emergency as the service period required for all Armed Forces personnel, draftees as well as volunteers. These policies assured the Nation a sufficiency of Army and Navy personnel to fight the war. The definite establishment of the duty of military service as a personal obligation, and the prohibition of bounties, substitutes, and purchased exemptions eliminated the evils which had attended Civil War conscription.

World War policies proved so thoroughly sound that they were recognized as basic principles and have since been incorporated in all succeeding compulsory service legislation. Table 6 (accompanying) shows the terms of service in the Army for the various periods from Civil War to present. The Navy and Marine Corps were composed of Regular personnel during the Civil and Spanish-American Wars. The World War I information shown in the Army table reflects general conditions for the other services in 1918 and in World War II. The Navy and the Air Force had no inductees during the Korean war.

TABLE 6.—*Terms of service for volunteers, draftees, and officers (Civil War to present)*

Civil War	Spanish-American War	World War I	World War II	Korean conflict	Present time
Officers: Officers were called into service for the same periods as were their units.	Officers: 2 years, or period of the emergency.	Officers: Period of the emergency.	Officers: Period of the emergency plus 6 months.	Officers: Voluntary officers—2 and 3 years; some for 1 year. Involuntary officers—21 and 24 months. Certain officers could also qualify for 17 months period of duty during this time.	Officers: Voluntary officers—3 years; now in transition to indefinite tours. Obligatory service—24 months plus required service in Army Reserves.
Volunteers, enlisted: Various periods of service involved. 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 100 days, and 1, 2, and 3 years, dependent on period specified in call. 3 years was the period for which the majority of the volunteers were called into service.	Volunteers, enlisted: 2 years, or period of the emergency.	Volunteers, enlisted: Period of the emergency.	Volunteers, enlisted: Period of the emergency, plus 6 months.	Enlisted: Voluntary enlistment for 3, 4, 5, and 6 years—2-year enlistment for certain men who meet necessary qualifications. Reenlistment on an indefinite basis open to eligible personnel.	Enlisted: Voluntary enlistments are for periods of 3, 4, 5, and 6 years. 24-month enlistments open to certain Selective Service registrants in 1A. Reenlistment may be made for an indefinite period by eligible personnel.
Draftees: 1863 act—3 years. 1864 act—1 year.	Draftees: No draft involved.	Draftees: Period of the emergency.	Draftees: Period of the emergency plus 6 months.	Draftees: 1950–51, 21 months, 1951–53, 24 months plus obligatory Reserve service commitment.	Draftees: 24 months, plus obligatory period in Army Reserve.

Insofar as average duration of service is concerned, it has varied in accordance with the length of the war, the laws involved, the time to complete mobilization, and the enlistment terms under which officers and men may have served during a given period.

Table 7 offers an estimate of the average number of months served in the various wars. It is an approximation based on best available information and statistics.

TABLE 7.—*Average duration of service (number of months), Civil War to present*

	Total	Officers	Enlisted	Enlisted, Regular Army	Enlisted, other than Regular Army
Civil War: April 1861 to June 866	[1] 20	[2]	[2]		
Spanish-American War: April 1898 to November 1899 [3]	8	8	8	9	7
World War I: April 1917 to June 1921 [4]	12	14	12	[5]	[5]
World War II: December 1941 to December 1946	[6] 33	39	33	[7]	[7]
Korean operation: July 1950 to July 1953	[8] 19	24	18	[2]	[2]

[1] Data by officers and enlisted not available; computation for total Regular Army and total other than Regular Army results in the same average, 20 months. Based on the records of 473,807 pensioners, it has been estimated that the average length of service of survivors with honorable service was 23 months.

[2] Not available.

[3] Regular Army other than war-service enlistees credited only with service through Mar. 31, 1899 (final treaty ratification was on Apr. 11, 1899).

[4] Crediting only war service personnel for service after March 1919.

[5] Component distinctions abolished August 1918.

[6] Based on 2 percent personnel survey as of June 30, 1945, plus estimated average additional months served by war-service personnel. Computation would have resulted in 30 months.

[7] Component distinctions not maintained.

[8] Note this is average length of service during period of hostilities only. Based on a 10-percent sample of separations through December 1954, it appears that the average man inducted August 1950–December 1952 completed 23 or 24 months' service; the median lay between the 2; the largest group served 24 months but that with 23 completed months was almost as large; the mean was 22 months, reflecting early discharges to enlist in the Regular Army, or physical disability, etc.

OVERSEAS SERVICE

Aside from minor Navy and Marine Corps operations, the Civil War was confined to the American Continent and the problem of overseas service did not arise. It was not until the eve of the 20th century that United States forces were engaged in major "troop lifts," although a sizable expedition had gone to Vera Cruz during the Mexican War.

The Defense Department report does not go into detail on the point, but it has been generally recognized and acknowledged that overseas war service entails hardships and hazards often greater than those entailed by service in the homeland. A war on foreign shores means the invasion of territory that is not only hostile, but liable to be unknown and uncongenial in respect to terrain, climate, and living conditions. Such invasions can be unusually hazardous, for the transport effort can place troops in peril from the hour of sailing. Even peacetime occupation of foreign territory puts an extra burden on troops by compelling them to remain in an alien land far from home and family contacts.

During the Spanish-American War, Army forces in Cuba and the Philippines encountered tropical conditions for which they were almost wholly unprepared. The result was an unfortunate number of heat and disease casualties. In World War I the U-boats constantly menaced the "troop lifts," although the Navy reduced the menace to zero and not a man was lost in the Europe-bound convoys.

During World War II the convoys were less fortunate, and several sinkings sent down troopships with a loss of lives. Invasion beachheads were, of course, under deadly attack. Air strikes menaced the invasion forces throughout the campaigns in north Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. In the Solomon's and New Guinea areas jungle warfare was continuous and living conditions excruciating. Not the least of the servicemen's trials lay in the nonstop character of the campaigning—weeks and months of frontline duty without leave or other relief. Almost as bad as the strain of combat was the debilitating monotony of life at some isolated post or base where the man with a few hours off duty literally had "no place to go."

Troops in Korea were faced with similar conditions, although a consistent attempt was made to fly men on brief leaves to Japan. But Japan wasn't home, and the occupation forces were still "overseas."

Table 8 shows percentage totals of the Armed Forces that served overseas, Civil War to present. It also shows the average number of months spent overseas by the various services.

TABLE 8.—*Overseas service of Armed Forces (Civil War to present)*

Period	Service	Percent of total who served overseas [1]	Average months served overseas	
			Hostilities only	Hostilities and demobilization [2]
Civil War	Total	Not available	Not available	Not available.
	Army	Not applicable	do	Do.
	Navy	Not available	do	Do.
	Marines	66 percent	do	Do.
Spanish-American War	Total	29 percent	1.5 months	Do.
	Army [3]	do	do	6 months.
	Navy	Not available		
	Marines	56 percent	3.3 months	Not available.
World War I	Total	53 percent	5.5 months	11 months.
	Army	52 percent	do	Do.
	Navy	60 percent	Not available	Not available.
	Marines	57 percent	5.7 months	12.5 months.
World War II	Total	73 percent	16.2 months	Not available.
	Army [4]	75 percent	16 months	20 months.
	Navy [5]	87 percent	Not available	Not available.
	Marines	71 percent	18.8 months	Do.
Korean operation	Total	56 percent	13.4 months	Do.
	Army	66 percent	12.5 months	Do.
	Navy [6]	19 percent	Not available	Do.
	Marines	39 percent	13 months [7]	
	Air Force	39 percent	17 months [8]	
Present	Total	44 percent	Not available	Not available.
	Army [9]	43 percent	do	Do.
	Navy	63 percent	do	Do.
	Marines	18 percent	do. [10]	Do. [10]
	Air Force	35 percent	do. [11]	Do. [11]

[1] Total percentage for Spanish-American War based on Army and Marines only, for Korean operation excludes Navy (see note 6).

[2] Totals (weighted averages) exclude Navy.

[3] Army served overseas represents war service personnel who departed from continental United States through December 1898; for period of hostilities only an estimated 52,000 or 18 percent served outside continental United States.

[4] Army percentage and average months served overseas based on 2 prcent personnel survey as of June 30, 1945.

[5] Navy data for World War II cover period December 1941–December 1946: includes casualties incurred in October 1941 due to hostile action.

[6] Navy data for Korean operation cover period July 1950–January 1955: serving overseas represents Far East area only.

[7] Weighted average computed on basis of tour of duty of personnel in the combat zone and those in other overseas assignments.

[8] Average for airmen based on sample survey November 1952; average for officers was 18 months.

[9] Army total serving and serving overseas represents man-years rather than individuals.

[10] Weighted average computed on basis of tours of duty is 17 months.

[11] Average overseas service for officers was 23 months, for airmen 22 months, based on sample survey August 1954.

Source: Department of Defense.

TRENDS

This section of the Defense Department report does not appear to indicate a definite trend. The unfavorable conditions of military service, as far as duration is concerned, may be considered as increasing in direct ratio to the length of the war or the average number of months spent in the service. On this basis, the trend has not been favorable since World War I. From that date there has been an increase in the length of time that civilian careers or family life have been interrupted by military service.

Aside from the service-period consideration, combat soldiers sufered greater disadvantages in World War II than in World War I, owing to length of time in combat overseas. In World War I, of comparatively short duration, the infantry division was taken out of the line from time to time for rest and rehabilitation. This procedure was made possible by the relatively large number of Allied and American units, which permitted the rotation of Army divisions—a situation which did not prevail during World War II. For example, the infantry riflemen who landed with certain divisions in North Africa in 1942 stayed almost continually in the line until the end of the war. His only hope of "rest" was to be wounded or killed. The same was true of some of the forces which fought in the Pacific.

Occupation commitments in Europe and the Far East held Army divisions overseas after World War II and the Korean conflict. Present commitments demand similar overseas duty. So long as world conditions remain unchanged, American servicemen may face overseas peacetime assignments for lengthy periods of time. Enlistment periods are designed to suit the demands of the armed forces services, and the inductee is given some opportunity of selection. As will be noted, living conditions in military posts have undergone much improvement. But foreign shores remain a "good many miles from home."

Chapter IV. Mustering Out Procedure

DEMOBILIZATION AND SEPARATION (CIVIL WAR AND SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR)

During a 19-month period in 1865–66, slightly in excess of 1 million men were mustered out of Federal service. Demobilization was normally accomplished by the mass separation of all personnel in a particular unit or organization as the requirements of the service and other circumstances dictated.

Officers of the volunteer Army below the grade of brigadier general, who remained in service until the end of the war, received a bonus of 3 months' pay. Volunteer soldiers received $100, $200, or $300, in accordance with enlistment terms of 1, 2, or 3 years. In addition to the enlistment bounties paid at time of separation, Navy personnel received such portions of their shares of prize money for vessels captured or destroyed as remained unpaid. Transportation (or travel pay in lieu of transportation) was provided for personnel of all services on separation.

The demobilization following the Spanish-American War was of relatively small proportions compared with the demobilizations which followed the Civil War and World Wars I and II. During the

period from August 1898 through June 1899, approximately 200,000 men were mustered out of service.

Demobilization of the Army and Navy after the Spanish-American War was on a unit rather than an individual basis. Separation from the Marine Corps was on an individual basis. Army demobilization was a continuous process throughout the war. Whenever a unit which had been mustered into Federal service accomplished its mission, that unit and its personnel were released from Federal service and returned to State control. As concerned the Navy, priority in release was generally accorded personnel serving in the United States and those serving on auxiliary vessels being decommissioned, since they could most readily be spared. Marine Corps personnel who enlisted for the duration were given priority in release over other categories of Marine Corps personnel.

Following the pattern established during the Civil War, extra pay at demobilization was provided for personnel who served during the Spanish-American War. However, instead of fixed dollar amounts—the usual provision for enlisted men during the Civil War—personnel separated after the Spanish-American War were given 2 months' extra pay if they had served overseas, and 1 month's extra pay if their service was in the States. The Army man was given transportation to his home. The Navy's enlisted men were transported to a port on the seaboard where they had enlisted.

WORLD WAR I DEMOBILIZATION AND SEPARATION

Approximately 4 million men were released during the demobilization which followed World War I. The bulk of separations occurred during the year following the Armistice.

World War I featured the development of demobilization centers which were staffed and equipped to process for separation large numbers of persons with a minimum of delay. These centers were the forerunners of the separation centers established in World War II.

World War I separation was on an individual basis except in the case of Army enlisted personnel. During both the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, priority in release from military service was predicated almost exclusively on the requirements of the service. Following World War I, some consideration was given to the personal situation and desires of the individual serviceman.

In most cases, a bonus of $60 to each serviceman was provided. This represented a reversion to the lump-sum type of payment provided for Civil War veterans. Transportation of the separating serviceman to his home or place of entry into service was provided. The legal authority for providing prize money and bounties to Navy personnel had been repealed by the act of March 3, 1899. Accordingly, this type of monetary benefit was not available to World War I Navy men.

WORLD WAR II DEMOBILIZATION AND SEPARATION

At the close of World War II, members of the Armed Forces were serving at stations all over the globe. After V–J Day an immediate campaign to bring the boys home was launched. Within a matter of a few weeks, thousands of men per day were being funneled through

separation centers back into civilian life. During October, November, and December 1945, and January 1946, nearly 1 million men per month were returned to civilian life by the Army alone. Approximately 10 million were separated during a period of less than 2 years.

Separation of all personnel was on an individual rather than a unit basis. It was generally accomplished at separation centers and points strategically located throughout the country. Priority in separation was based upon the number of points credited to the individual serviceman. Point credits were given for total length of wartime service, overseas service, specified decorations, family dependents, and so on. The number of points required for separation eligibility was gradually reduced as the demobilization progressed.

Personnel being separated were counselled as to their rights and privileges under laws enacted by the Congress for their benefit. Precedent established during the Civil War, Spanish-American War, and World War I was continued by the provision for mustering-out pay up through the grade of captain, in amounts of $100, $200, and $300, the amount payable in a particular case being dependent on such factors as length of service and whether the serviceman had been overseas. The Armed Forces Leave Act of 1946 extended to all personnel who had served during World War II the right to receive compensation for unused leave. Personnel being separated were provided travel allowances to their homes, or places of entry into service.

POST-KOREA DEMOBILIZATION AND SEPARATION

No demobilization such as characterized the termination of previous wars occurred at the close of the Korean conflict. Some reduction in the strength of the armed services was ordered, but it was of minor proportions compared with the demobilizations of 1918 and 1945.

In view of the fact that Korean war draftees were required to serve for specified periods rather than for the duration of the conflict, there was a continuous turnover of personnel when the conflict terminated.

Separation procedures were generally the same as those utilized for World War II demobilization. Mustering-out pay and payments for accrued leave were made on substantially the same basis as those provided for World War II veterans. Travel pay was provided at the rate of 6 cents per mile for officers and enlisted personnel of all services.

PRESENT SITUATION

There is no demobilization as such occurring at the present time, although minor adjustments in strength of some of the services are occasionally required. Separation procedures are substantially the same as those utilized after the Korean war. Mustering-out pay is provided only for those eligible—individuals who entered service prior to February 1, 1955. Separation of Army personnel is normally accomplished at transfer stations or transfer points, which function much as did the World War II separation centers.

TRENDS

The trend from the Civil War to present has favored the individual serviceman. In the earlier periods, separation was by unit based on requirements of the service. Progressively increasing consideration has been given to the individual and his personal situation in determining priority of separation. Mustering-out pay and transportation or travel pay have been provided upon separation in all wars. Compensation for unused leave was introduced in World War II and it is still in effect for servicemen who are being separated.

Chapter V. Nature of Military Duties (Occupational Composition of the Armed Forces)

THE BUSINESS OF SOLDIERING

For centuries the national soldier was a citizen or hireling apart—a professional who practiced the so-called art of war. It was supposed he lived an adventurous life, glamorized by martial pageantry, and dedicated to discipline and sacrifice. If the early footsoldier was an illiterate robot, the cavalryman and artillerist were specialists of a sort, while the officer appeared as a specialist in tactics, strategy, ballistics, topography, or some other esoteric field far removed from any civilian pursuit.

Compared to the soldier's, the Navy man's vocation came "closer to home." Generically a mariner, the man-o-war's man was cousin to the merchant sailor or fisherman who followed the sea. But naval gunnery was an esoteric business. And much that occupied a warship's crew bore little relationship to merchant seafaring.

Advent of the machine age—mechanization of armies and fleets—the technological revolution introducing highly complex weapons and combat devices; aerial warfare, submarine warfare, chemical warfare, electronics warfare, these and the concept of total war drastically altered the service picture. Since the turn of the century the occupational composition of the Armed Forces has expanded into almost every field of endeavor. Today it embraces pursuits ranging from atomic research to zoology. And the man in uniform may be employed at anything from meteorology to the maintenance of hydraulic gear.

In consequence, many specialized military and naval pursuits have become linked to civilian counterparts. What were (and are) the principal skills or occupations in which military personnel served (or serve), as indicated by statistics? How close is the relationship between military and civilian pursuits? What proportion of Armed Forces personnel are serving in skills which have civilian counterparts?

The foregoing questions are answered in the following—a condensation of material and data furnished by the Department of Defense and the U. S. Department of Labor.

(In pursuance of these studies, the military occupational titles and career categories used are those of the Department of Defense September 1954 Occupational Classification System. Table 9 gives the enlisted occupational groups as classified).

TABLE 9.—*Enlisted occupational groupings*

I. Technical and scientific personnel:
   1. Electronic technicians.
   2. Medical and dental technicians.
   3. Intelligence analysts and linguists.
   4. Meteorologists.
   5. Air-traffic control technicians.
   6. Surveyors, draftsmen, and cartographers.
   7. Photographers and allied specialists.
   8. Other technical and scientific personnel (includes scientific research technicians).
   9. Radio operators.

II. Administrative and clerical personnel:
   1. General clerical and administrative (including statistical).
   2. Supply clerks and specialists (excluding supply handlers).
   3. Communications clerks and specialists (communications operations, excluding maintenance).
   4. Disbursing clerks and specialists (including fiscal).
   5. Personnel specialists.
   6. Information and education recreation and welfare specialists (including bandsmen).
   7. Other administrative and clerical personnel.

III. Mechanics and repairmen:
   1. Aircraft mechanics.
   2. Electrical and communications equipment mechanics, nonelectronic.
   3. Precision instrument and specialized equipment repairmen, nonelectronic.
   4. Ship repair and damage control mechanics.
   5. Marine engine and accessories mechanics.
   6. Motor vehicle mechanics (including track vehicle and construction equipment repair).
   7. Railway equipment repairmen.
   8. Munitions and weapons repairmen.
   9. Other mechanics and repairmen.

IV. Craftsmen:
   1. Metal working craftsmen.
   2. Construction, utilities and allied craftsmen.
   3. Printing and allied crafts.
   4. Fabric, leather, and rubber working crafts.
   5. Railroad operating crafts.
   6. Other craftsmen.

V. Service workers:
   1. Security personnel.
   2. Firefighters.
   3. Food service workers,
   4. Medical attendants.
   5. Other service workers (includes animal handling).

VI. Operatives and laborers:
   1. Motor transport operators (excluding maintenance).
   2. Construction laborers.
   3. Supply laborers.
   4. Transportation laborers.
   5. Helpers and other operatives and laborers.

VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified:
   1. Infantrymen.
   2. Fire control and gunnery crews (excluding electronic equipment operation).
   3. Military electronic equipment operators, n. e. c. (radar, sonar, etc.).
   4. Armored vehicle crews.
   5. Naval operations and seamanship, n. e. c.
   6. Chemical warfare crews.
   7. Explosive ordnance disposal specialists.
   8. Air crews.
   9. Other military-type occupations, n. e. c.

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ARMED FORCES, CIVIL WAR

During the Civil War, the Armed Forces were made up predominantly of individuals who performed in military-type skills without civilian counterparts—infantrymen, artillerymen, cavalrymen, and warship crews. Specialists within the combat elements were not clearly distinguishable from noncommissioned officers, petty officers, and privates of the line. Administration within the units of the services was simple, much of it carried out as additional duty by noncommissioned officers and petty officers. The technical establishments of the services were largely manned by civilians, sometimes organized along military lines.

Military personnel were, from time to time, utilized in supporting roles in railroad construction or the movement of supplies. However, large-scale support operations involving military personnel were generally of short duration, with the individuals detailed to perform them being returned to their units to continue their normal duties. Throughout most of the war, military intelligence was conducted by civilians. Many surgeons and doctors at the front were civilians. Civilian photographers worked with the troops, as did civilian storekeepers, embalmers, and aeronauts. As was the case with the Navy man, the soldier's business was largely confined to drill and weapons handling.

As shown in table 10, 93.2 percent of the Civil War enlisted men were engaged in military duties which had no occupational counterpart in civilian life.

TABLE 10.—*Occupational groupings of enlisted military personnel from Civil War to present*

[Percentages by group]

Occupational groupings	Civil War [1]	Spanish-American War [2]	World War I [3]	World War II [4]	Korean conflict [5]	June 30, 1954 [6]
I. Technical and scientific personnel	0.15	0.52	3.66	10.4	12.7	15.8
II. Administrative and clerical personnel	.73	3.13	7.99	12.6	18.1	17.1
III. Mechanics and repairmen	.10	.95	8.49	16.6	15.3	18.3
IV. Craftsman	.50	.14	13.03	5.9	4.7	6.0
V. Service workers	2.41	6.49	12.52	9.6	12.4	12.1
VI. Operatives and laborers	2.91	2.18	20.20	6.1	6.5	5.4
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	93.20	86.59	34.11	38.8	30.3	25.3
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Civil War period covers only Army personnel base of 1,908,800 total.
[2] Spanish-American War period covers only Army personnel base of 246,410.
[3] World War I period covers only Army personnel base of 3,665,000.
[4] World War II period covers all services base of 9,370,986. Navy and Air Force show no strength in occupational group VI.
[5] Korean conflict period covers all services base of 4,428,939. Navy shows no strength in group VI, Air Force shows no strength in group VII. Where no strength is shown in any of the groupings the occupational structure in effect at that time permitted the placing of this type of personnel in other groups because of multiple duties or skills.
[6] Present period is June 30, 1954. Navy shows no strength for group VI; Air Force no strength for group VII. Base of 2,887,851.

DURING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The Spanish-American War brought little change in the occupational pattern established in the Civil War, although some specialties were more precisely defined. For example, cooks were recruited specifically

for the duties of cook in Army units, and reports on their utilization were required. Signal units were organized separately, statutes requiring that two-thirds of the men enlisted for the Signal Corps be qualified telegraphers. Medical and Remount Services were organized as military units intended to accompany combat troops outside the continental limits of the United States. This accounted for some increases in the proportion of service workers with civilian-type skills. (See table 10.)

The Navy employed a variety of specialists—engineers, firemen, water tenders, signalmen, a few electricians. It also trained hospital corpsmen. Such specialists, however, consitituted a relatively small percentage of the service complement.

WORLD WAR I PERIOD

In World War I, motor transportation and the emergence of the airplane as a tactical weapon began to effect lasting changes in the occupational composition of the Armed Forces. All weapons were becoming increasingly complex. Automobiles, tanks, and aircraft demanded highly trained technicians for operation and maintenance. So did communications, now embracing wireless and telephony.

As shown in table 10, mechanics and repairmen, craftsmen and service workers constituted over 33 percent of the enlisted military personnel. Many of their jobs had closely related civilian counterparts.

Statistical data on servicewide occupational requirements are available for the Army alone for this period. These data were based on occupational requirements developed largely from secondary sources. There was no system during World War I for precise identification of standardized duty positions in terms of the occupational skills required.

Data on requirements for specialists in the Army came down in the form of requirement rates for combat divisions and separately for technical support activities. These rates were used to guide the assignment of new recruits to branches and were based on general knowledge of branch functions, rather than on detailed organizational documents. In reality, the proportion of civilian-type to military-type jobs was probably less than indicated in table 10, due to the fact that some of the technical support activities used as a basis for the occupational rate tables were performed by British and French forces. However, within the combat elements of the Army, there were definite increases in the proportion of individuals performing specialized duties in administration, communications, maintenance, and supply.

WORLD WAR II PERIOD

The trend toward technical specialization received its greatest impetus during World War II. The services emerged from World War II with many technological devices that were unknwon before the war. The use of complex electronic fire control equipment; the employment of myriads of aircraft for strategic, tactical, and transportation missions; the expansion of global communications nets; mine and amphibious warfare; the large-scale employment of motor transport and armored forces; the development of large medical centers performing specilized functions; the application of scientific

management techniques to personnel, fiscal, and supply administration; the mapping and charting of worldwide areas—these and many other developments created a need for many new specialties and for a system of classification of the skills, knowledges, and abilities required.

The occupational distribution pattern of World War II veterans was materially affected by the duration and scope of the war itself. Soon after major combat operations began in Europe, the Army devoted its training effort largely to the training of newly inducted men as combat arms replacements. The number of replacements trained and shipped overseas exceeded the original strength of the combat units in the European theater.

In the Navy, policies of rotation between sea duty and shore billets also affected the occupational composition pattern of those who served, as opposed to the occupational composition required to man units at peak strength as of a given date. At the lower pay grades Navy enlisted personnel, initially qualified in general deck and seamanship duties, essentially performed sailor duties rather than those of a specialized character. Replacements for individuals serving in specialties used wholly outside combat areas constituted a small minority of the Navy's personnel. Most of the enlisted men were trained to replace combat personnel.

The World War II situation is reflected in the percentage picture shown by table 10. One may note there was a considerable decrease in the occupational components embracing craftsmen and service workers—5.9 percent and 9.6 percent as compared with 13 percent and 12.5 percent respectively in World War I. The greatest decrease shows in the operative and laborer group—20.1 percent in World War I, and only 6.1 percent in World War II. And a larger percentage of men were employed in military-type occupations in World War II than in World War I (38.8 percent and 34.1 percent, respectively).

However, World War II statistics show a marked increase in technical and scientific personnel, administrative and clerical personnel, and in the mechanics and repairmen group. The latter, a good 16 percent, doubles the corresponding World War I percentage figure.

The technological character of World War II is clearly deliniated by the statistical data; as are the broadening occupational characteristics of the modern Armed Forces.

KOREAN WAR AND PRESENT

The occupational pattern established as a result of World War II developments was little altered during the Korean conflict. Attempts were made to economize on the use of military personnel in support activities through the wider employment of civilians outside the combat zone. However, during the war a large proportion of enlisted personnel was engaged in conducting specialized training of newly inducted and enlisted men to replace losses through expiration of term of service, since there were no involuntary extensions of service enacted. Occupation duties also required a large proportion of individuals in civilian-type jobs. The extensive use of 2-year inductees by the Army raised the proportion of enlisted persons required to administer the activities involved in screening, processing, training, distributing, and separating these inductees.

The factors in mention are reflected in the occupational grouping percentages shown in table 10. These register a sizable increase in

administrative and clerical personnel and in service workers. The slight decrease in mechanics and repairmen stemmed from the war's peculiarly narrow character.

There have been some changes in the conditions affecting the composition of the services since the Korean conflict. But no significant development has made any drastic change in the relationships between this period and the Korean period. Short-term inductees must still be handled on a 2-year cycle, calling for an increase in administrative type personnel. Combat forces are maintained in readiness on nearly the same scale as represented by the forces whlch served in the Korean conflict.

A breakdown of the Armed Forces occupational structure by services, World War II to present, is revealing. Service occupational group percentages are listed in table 11. As is indicated by the figures pertaining to "technical and scientific personnel" (group I), the Air Force stands out as the top technician among the services. The point is important, for the Air Force currently contains almost as many men and women as the Army. It may be noted, too, that during World War II only 19.9 percent of the Air Force occupational structure lay within the military-type category, whereas 36 percent of the Army and 55 percent of the Navy figured in comparison.

TABLE 11.—*Percentage in each occupational group for World War II, Korean conflict, and June 1954*

Occupational group	World War II				Korean conflict				Present as of June 30, 1954			
	Army	Navy	Marine	Air Force	Army	Navy	Marine	Air Force	Army	Navy	Marine	Air Force
I	10.1	6.4	8.9	17.4	10.7	10.8	8.3	21.7	14.5	13.4	8.9	21.7
II	14.6	6.4	16.0	17.5	19.2	7.3	19.3	24.0	17.4	8.0	18.9	23.7
III	8.5	20.0	17.9	28.1	12.1	19.5	16.9	21.9	12.5	22.2	17.4	24.5
IV	7.3	4.9	6.8	3.8	4.9	2.9	5.5	5.2	8.0	3.7	5.6	4.8
V	9.8	7.1	10.4	13.3	11.5	6.4	7.2	21.7	10.4	6.4	6.2	20.7
VI	12.5	(1)	6.3	(1)	8.6	(1)	7.2	5.5	8.4	(1)	7.2	4.6
VII	36.2	55.2	33.7	19.9	33.0	53.1	35.6	(1)	28.8	46.3	35.8	(1)
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Where no percentages are shown services did not have any in the occupational area due to their occupational structure permitting this type of personnel to be placed in alternate groups.
During these periods Navy personnel not rated were carried in group VII.

Statistical summaries showing the occupational compositions of Navy and Air Force, World War II to present, give an interesting structural picture of these two services. (See accompanying tables 12 and 13.) Group totals in the Air Force statistical summary (table 13) convey a general idea of the thousands of servicemen engaged in occupations of a type not exclusively military.

TABLE 12.—*Statistical summary of naval enlisted personnel, World War II to present*

PERCENT ON BOARD [1]

Department of Defense major occupational groupings	World War II [2]	Korean conflict [3]	Present time [4]
I. Technical and scientific personnel	6.4	10.8	13.4
II. Administrative and clerical	6.4	7.3	8.0
III. Mechanics and repairmen	20.1	19.5	22.1
IV. Craftsmen	4.9	2.9	3.7
V. Service workers	7.1	6.4	6.4
VI. Operatives and laborers	0	0	0
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	54.7	50.5	42.6
Personnel not grouped (recruits, etc.)	.4	2.6	3.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Based on total number enlisted personnel at peak strength.
[2] Total enlisted strength, 3,005,534.
[3] Total enlisted strength, 721,638.
[4] Total enlisted strength, 642,048.

TABLE 13.—*Statistical summary of occupational groupings in Air Force, World War II to present*

I. WORLD WAR II

During World War II Army Air Force enlisted strength was 1,900,805 on June 30, 1945.

The table below shows the number and percentage of enlisted Army Air Force personnel in each of the broad occupational groupings listed, based on an inventory on June 30, 1945.

Occupational groupings	Number of enlisted airmen	Percent of total
I. Technical and scientific personnel	330,482	17.4
II. Administrative and clerical personnel	333,904	17.5
III. Mechanics and repairmen	533,830	28.1
IV. Craftsmen	71,789	3.8
V. Service workers	252,047	13.3
VI. Operatives and laborers	(1)	
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	378,753	19.9
Total	1,900,805	100.0

[1] Helper-type airmen not identifiable at this date are distributed among other occupational groupings.

II. KOREAN CONFLICT

During the Korean conflict, Air Force enlisted strength was 818,613, on June 30, 1953.

The table below shows the number and percentage of enlisted Air Force personnel in each of the broad occupational groupings listed, based on an inventory of personnel on June 30, 1953.

Occupational groupings	Number of enlisted airmen	Percent of total
I. Technical and scientific personnel	177,826	21.7
II. Administrative and clerical personnel	196,118	24.0
III. Mechanics and repairmen	178,961	21.9
IV. Craftsmen	42,693	5.2
V. Service workers	177,813	21.7
VI. Operatives and laborers	45,202	5.5
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	(1)	
Total	818,613	100.0

[1] Airmen specialties are identified in other occupational groupings according to the AFSC classification system.

TABLE 13.—*Statistical summary of occupational groupings in Air Force, World War II to present*—Continued

III. JUNE 1954

The enlisted strength as of June 30, 1954, was 793,659.

The table below shows the number and percentage of enlisted Air Force personnel in each of the broad occupational groupings listed, based on an inventory of personnel on June 30, 1954.

Occupational groupings	Number of enlisted airmen	Percent of total
I. Technical and scientific personnel	171,915	21.7
II. Administrative and clerical personnel	188,184	23.7
III. Mechanics and repairmen	194,530	24.5
IV. Craftsmen	37,775	4.8
V. Service workers	164,650	20.7
VI. Operatives and laborers	36,605	4.6
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	(1)	
Total	793,659	100.0

[1] Airmen specialties are identified in other occupational groupings according to the AFSC classification system.

IV. PRESENT TIME (JUNE 1955)

The enlisted strength as of June 30, 1955, was 794,484.

The table below shows the number and percentage of enlisted Air Force personnel in each of the broad occupational groupings listed, based on an inventory of personnel in June 1955.

Occupational groupings	Number of enlisted airmen	Percent of total
I. Technical and scientific personnel	195,814	24.6
II. Administrative and clerical personnel	185,119	23.3
III. Mechanics and repairmen	198,272	25.0
IV. Craftsmen	34,540	4.3
V. Service workers	121,175	15.3
VI. Operatives and laborers	59,564	7.5
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	(1)	
Total	794,484	100.0

[1] Airmen specialties are identified in other occupational groupings according to the AFSC classification system.

TRENDS

The trend is obvious. As indicated in tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 there has been, since 1900, a great increase in the proportion of Armed Forces enlisted personnel engaged in occupations which have civilian counterparts, and a corresponding decrease in the proportion engaged in exclusively military-type occupations with little or no relationship to civilian pursuits.

There remains the important matter of degree. In any comparison of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps occupations with civilian occupations, the question of similarity is manifestly involved. Is the job of an Air Force mechanic identical with that of a mechanic on a commercial air field? Does an Army technician in an armored brigade perform duties similar to those performed by some civilian counterpart?

Evaluations cannot go from broad generalities to exact specifics, for precision yardsticks are lacking. However, the Department of Labor, in undertaking an analysis, employed degree classifications

listed as "close," "some," "none," and "none, but useful." These terms are defined on the following page. They are employed in accompanying tables 14 and 15. Table 14 offers an analytical comparison of Armed Forces occupations with civilian occupations. Table 15 concludes this study with a statistical estimate of the current demand for types of workers in civilian occupations which are related to Armed Forces occupations. The figures in these tables are, of course, only rough estimates.

The conclusions which footnote the study are highly significant.

TABLE 14.—*Estimated comparability between occupations in the Armed Forces and the civilian economy*

[Based on an extensive sampling of specific military occupations [1] allocated to occupational groups of the Department of Defense, September 1954, classification system]

Military occupations (titles not listed) included under the following Department of Defense classification groups	Degree of similarity to civilian jobs, expressed in gross percentages			
	Close [2]	Some [3]	None [4]	None, but useful [5]
I. Technical and scientific:				
1. Electronics technicians	60	40	-------	-------
2. Medical and dental technicians	80	20	-------	-------
3. Intelligence analysts and linguists	35	60	5	-------
4. Meteorologists	100	-------	-------	-------
5. Air traffic-control technicians	90	10	-------	-------
6. Surveyors, draftsmen, and cartographers	100	-------	-------	-------
7. Photographers and allied specialists	90	10	-------	-------
8. Other technical and scientific personnel (includes scientific research technicians)	100	-------	-------	-------
9. Radio operators	100	-------	-------	-------
II. Administrative and clerical:				
1. General clerical and administrative (including statistical)	95	5	-------	-------
2. Supply clerks and specialists (excluding supply handlers)	95	5	-------	-------
3. Communications clerks and specialist (communications operations, excluding maintenance)	80	20	-------	-------
4. Disbursing clerks and specialists (including fiscal)	100	-------	-------	-------
5. Personnel specialists	-------	100	-------	-------
6. Information and education recreation and welfare specialists (including bandsmen)	60	40	-------	-------
7. Other administrative and clerical personnel	85	15	-------	-------
III. Mechanics and repairmen:				
1. Aircraft mechanics	100	-------	-------	-------
2. Electrical and communications equipment mechanics, nonelectronic	90	10	-------	-------
3. Precision instrument and specialized equipment repairmen, nonelectronic	100	-------	-------	-------
4. Ship repair and damage-control mechanics	100	-------	-------	-------
5. Marine engine and accessories mechanics	100	-------	-------	-------
6. Motor vehicle mechanics (including track-vehicle and construction-equipment repair)	90	10	-------	-------
7. Railway equipment repairmen	100	-------	-------	-------
8. Munitions and weapons repairmen	95	5	-------	-------
9. Other mechanics and repairmen	100	-------	-------	-------
IV. Craftsmen:				
1. Metal working craftsmen	100	-------	-------	-------
2. Construction, utilities, and allied craftsmen	85	15	-------	-------
3. Printing and allied crafts	100	-------	-------	-------
4. Fabric, leather, and rubber working crafts	80	20	-------	-------
5. Railroad operating crafts	100	-------	-------	-------
6. Other craftsmen	100	-------	-------	-------
V. Service Workers:				
1. Security personnel	90	10	-------	-------
2. Firefighters	100	-------	-------	-------
3. Food service workers	100	-------	-------	-------
4. Medical attendants	100	-------	-------	-------
5. Other service workers (includes animal handling)	85	15	-------	-------
VI. Operatives and laborers:				
1. Motor transport operators (excluding maintenance)	90	10	-------	-------
2. Construction laborers	100	-------	-------	-------
3. Supply laborers	80	20	-------	-------
4. Transportation laborers	100	-------	-------	-------
5. Helpers and other operators and laborers	60	40	-------	-------

See footnotes at end of table, p. 38.

76907—56——4

TABLE 14.—*Estimated comparability between occupations in the Armed Forces and the civilian economy*—Continued

Military occupations (titles not listed) included under the following Department of Defense classification groups)	Degree of similarity to civilian jobs, expressed in gross percentages			
	Close [2]	Some [3]	None [4]	None, but useful [5]
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified:				
1. Infantrymen	5	5	70	20
2. Fire control and gunnery crews (excluding electronic equipment operation)	-------	-------	10	90
3. Military electronic equipment operators, not elsewhere classified (radar, sonar, etc.)	-------	10	-------	90
4. Armored vehicle crews	-------	100	-------	-------
5. Naval operations and seamanship, not elsewhere classified	100	-------	-------	-------
6. Chemical warfare crews	-------	-------	60	40
7. Explosive ordnance disposal specialists	-------	50	-------	50
8. Air crews	30	40	-------	30
9. Other military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	-------	35	-------	65

DEGREE CLASSIFICATION

[1] Occupations were allocated to the Department of Defense classification structure by interservice committee members representing the Departments of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the Marine Corps.

[2] *Close.*—Either identical or closely related knowledges and abilities which enable direct application to an identical or very similar civilian job or jobs. Equivalent training and/or experience in all major respects, requiring only orientation training. Examples: Machinist, automobile mechanic, truckdriver, and X-ray technician.

[3] *Some.*—Some of the job elements are identical or similar. Full qualification for civilian employment is deficient because of specialized nature of military jobs, incomplete knowledge or experience on related civilian techniques, equipment, procedures, etc. Additional training in excess of brief orientation is required. Examples: Amphibious vehicle driver, boat electrician, pharmacy technician.

[4] *None.*—0.

[5] *None, but useful.*—General educational knowledge such as elements of mathematics or foreign languages; or practical know-how of potential employment value, such as blueprint reading, use of common machinist's tools, making minor electrical repairs, office techniques, general mechanical knowledge, food preparation, and materials handling.

TABLE 15.—*Estimated current demand for workers in civilian occupations which are related* [1] *to occupations in the Armed Forces*

[Based on extensive sampling of specific military occupations allocated to occupational groups of September 1954, Department of Defense classification system]

Military occupations (titles not listed) included under the following Department of Defense classification groups	Percentage of estimated civilian labor demand	
	Significant	Little
I. Technical and scientific:		
1. Electronics technicians	100	-------
2. Medical and dental technicians	80	20
3. Intelligence analysts and linguists	10	90
4. Meteoroligists	-------	100
5. Air traffic-control technicians	-------	100
6. Surveyors, draftsmen, and cartographers	70	30
7. Photographers and allied specialists	25	75
8. Other technical and scientific personnel (includes scientific research technicians)	50	50
9. Radio operators	25	75
II. Administrative and clerical:		
1. General clerical and administrative (including statistical)	45	55
2. Supply clerks and specialists (excluding supply handlers)	10	90
3. Communications clerks and specialists (communications operations, excluding maintenance)	20	80
4. Disbursing clerks and specialists (including fiscal)	25	75
5. Personnel specialists	-------	100
6. Information and education recreation and welfare specialists (including bandsmen)	35	65
7. Other administrative and clerical personnel	30	70

See footnote at end of table, p. 39.

TABLE 15.—*Estimated current demand for workers in civilian occupations which are related* [1] *to occupations in the Armed Forces*—Continued

Military occupations (titles not listed) included under the following Department of Defense classification groups	Percentage of estimated civilian labor demand	
	Significant	Little
III. Mechanics and repairmen:		
1. Aircraft mechanics	100	----------
2. Electrical and communications equipment mechanics, nonelectronic	70	30
3. Precision instrument and specialized equipment repairman, nonelectronic	50	50
4. Ship repair and damage control mechanics	----------	100
5. Marine engine and accessories mechanics	50	50
6. Motor vehicle mechanics (including truck-vehicle and construction-equipment repair)	80	20
7. Railway equipment repairman	20	80
8. Munitions and weapons repairmen	----------	100
9. Other mechanics and repairmen	50	50
IV. Craftsmen:		
1. Metal working craftsmen	80	20
2. Construction, utilities, and allied craftsmen	60	40
3. Printing and allied crafts	60	40
4. Fabric, leather, and rubber working crafts	30	70
5. Railroad operating crafts	20	80
6. Other craftsmen	----------	100
V. Service workers:		
1. Security personnel	30	70
2. Firefighters	40	60
3. Food service workers	80	20
4. Medical attendants	80	20
5. Other service workers (includes animal handling)	25	75
VI. Operatives and laborers:		
1. Motor transport operators (excluding maintenance)	40	60
2. Construction laborers	50	50
3. Supply laborers	20	80
4. Transportation laborers	20	80
5. Helpers and other operators and laborers	30	70
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewsere classified:		
1. Infantrymen	----------	100
2. Fire control and gunnery crews (excluding electronic equipment operation)	----------	100
3. Military electronic equipment operators, not elsewhere classified (radar, sonar, etc.)	10	90
4. Armored vehicle crews	10	90
5. Naval operations and seamanship, not elsewhere classified	----------	100
6. Chemical warfare crews	----------	100
7. Explosive ordnance disposal specialists	----------	100
8. Air crews	20	80
9. Other military-type occupations not elsewhere classified	----------	100

[1] *Current demand for workers.*—The information is presented only as a general guide. No attempt should be made to interpret this summary as an exhaustive study of the labor market. The findings are not based on statistical data, but are the judgments of analysts who are familiar with general labor-market conditions. The following factors were considered in arriving at these judgments:

1. There is a wide range of occupations assigned to each occupational group; some are more in demand than others.

2. Restrictive hiring practices which occur in certain employment fields prevent immediate utilization of some workers at their highest ability level. Company policy, union practice, or other reasons may require initial employment at a skill level lower than that experienced in the Armed Forces.

INTERPRETATION OF ANALYSIS

Several considerations should be kept in mind in interpreting data contained in tables 14 and 15.

1. All data are presented on a composite basis. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the nature of jobs in any separate branch of the Armed Forces.

2. Wide variation exists in the number of specific military occupations allocated to individual subgroups of the Department of Defense classification structure. The percentages listed should therefore not be used in statistical or arithmetical computations to measure the total extent of comparability between all military and civilian occupations.

3. The data do not afford a means for drawing inferences on skill levels of military jobs. This is due to the incompleteness of the Department of Defense

classification structure, variations in the nature of jobs among the several branches of the Armed Forces, and lack of uniformity encountered in allocations of certain occupational areas to the interservice classification structure.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are drawn from this analysis:

A. Close comparability exists between the majority of military occupations and their civilian counterparts. A direct transfer of skills, with little or no additional training, is possible.

B. For a significant number of military jobs there are no exact civilian counterparts. Experience in such occupations, however, provides partial qualification for related civilian employment. Job content and worker ability requirements are identical in some respects.

C. Certain occupations, exclusively of a military nature, may provide experience of potential employment value. They include some elementary trade skills and/or general educational knowledges which may supply a foundation for further training required for performance of civilian jobs.

D. A limited number of military occupations have no aspects which appear to be relatable to civilian employment.

SUMMARY

The picture of the man in uniform as a unique practitioner of esoteric "war arts" is no longer valid. Today's Armed Forces complements are highly versatile. The exactions of modern warfare have brought into service a great variety of skilled specialists whose duties parallel those performed by civilian workers in similar fields.

It must be conceded, however, that the average rifleman and the Navy seaman continue to perform duties which have little relationship to civilian occupations. Personnel whose jobs have little or no "transfer value" now constitute about one-fourth of the servicemen in the Army and some 46 percent of the Navy's complement.

Finally, it is apparent that many military occupations do not directly lead to employment possibilities for the veteran. Even where military occupation and civilian counterpart have been closely similar, perhaps identical, the matter of employability for veterans has not followed as rule-of-thumb consequence. The point is as evident as the need for hundreds of skilled meteorologists in the Armed Forces as opposed to the relatively few civilian weather bureaus which could hire such veteran specialists.

By and large, however, it may be said that the occupational composition of the Armed Forces bears a broad resemblance to the civilian picture. The soldiers and sailors of the 19th century engaged in occupations generally divorced from civilian pursuits. As has been detailed in the earlier discussion of Armed Forces training, many of the servicemen of today usually acquire skills or knowledge applicable to the pursuit of a civilian vocation or career. Beyond this, of course, the general experience and training obtained in the Armed Forces must also be considered as having considerable value.

Chapter VI. Armed Forces Training

SERVICEMAN'S EDUCATION

What type of training was provided for American servicemen, and how long were they trained? Were inductees given specialized training, and if so, what training facilities were available, and how were trainees selected? What numbers were trained in major skills?

What inducements, if any, were offered? And to what extent was Armed Forces training, purely military or otherwise, of value to the servicemen's future civilian career or pursuits?

The foregoing and pertinent questions were asked in regard to the serviceman's education. For it is obvious that his Armed Forces training has an important bearing on his situation as a veteran. A study of the nature of military duties and the occupational composition of the Armed Forces has shown an increasingly close relationship between military endeavors and civilian occupations. But how well was the serviceman trained? Was his training comparable to that he might have received in a vocational school? If he were a college student or aspirant, was his time in service a drastic setback, or did he acquire some degree of knowledge useful for academic work? Did the farmer, or the laborer, or the semiilliterate have a chance, through training, to acquire education of a lasting value?

Before undertaking this survey, the Defense Department study groups adopted a set of standard definitions applicable to the subject of Armed Forces training. They are as follows:

DEFINITIONS PERTINENT TO SUBJECT OF ARMED FORCES TRAINING

General training.—All military training except that which takes place in formal specialized service schools. This training encompasses all phases of basic or recruit training in the fundamental military skills.

Types of general training.—Generally considered as the progressive phases of individual and unit training including broad categories of subject matter. In this section, "Type" is not related to the "military specialties" discussed in the previous section: "Nature of Military Duties."

Specialized training.—Formal schooling. This is the focal point of the report in hand. Since specialization is a matter of degree, it was decided that the Commission's purposes would be best served by furnishing data on the experiences of the services in the field of intensive specialization—graduation from a formal school.

School.—As used, the term refers to the designated service schools and to the civilian educational institutions and factories in all of which more or less formal academic training was given.

Facilities.—Identified with physical plants; technical training aids and equipment; teaching methods, instructors, etc. The data on facilities are related only to specialized training.

Selection.—"Who" is defined on the basis of qualifications and prerequisites for selection to a school. "How" methods and procedures used in the selection process.

Proportions.—The relationship between the total number who graduated from formal schools and the total number who served during a specified period. The proportion is at best only a good estimate since there are obvious duplications where the same individual graduated from more than one school during an extended period of warfare.

Major skills.—Military skills acquired through specialized training and identified by the types of schools and/or courses. For the purpose of standardizing the dissimilar skills developed in the 4 services, all skills have been translated into the 7 major occupational groupings defined by the Department of Defense September 1954, in the Study of Career Personnel Needs, and 3 additional categories (VIII, IX and X) selected by this working group as significant for the purpose of this report. (See table 14.)

Servicemen: All men, all women, officers and enlisted.

CIVIL WAR TRAINING

The average Civil War recruit received no specialized training. Aside from military indoctrination (discipline, military courtesy, etc.), he was taught the rudiments of soldiering or sea-fighting (close-order drill, marksmanship, bayonet handling for Army; cutlass handling

and gunnery for Navy). Proficiency in land or sea artillery demanded little more than manual labor of the gunners. Training in elemental naval seamanship was obviated by the Navy's practice of enlisting experienced merchant hands or fishermen.

There were no formally organized basic training centers for recruits. Responsibility for training was delegated to the operating forces; soldier and Marine recruits were trained with their units, and bluejackets were instructed aboard ship. There were no fixed schedules for such training, nor was it supervised by War and Navy Departments.

Although technical specialists were required in the three services (for such specialties as signals, engineering, and medicine) the Armed Forces contained no formal specialists' schools other than the Military and Naval Academies, which were devoted chiefly to the education of field and line officers. Specialists were procured primarily from civilian life. And in such esoteric specialties as railroad construction and aviation, civil engineers and balloonists worked as "contract employees" with the troops. Similarly, for the greater part of the war, military intelligence was handled by civilian experts (viz, Pinkerton men).

A minute percentage of servicemen specialists received on-the-job training or instruction in unit schools. Medical students received such training, and selected personnel were given signal schooling (courses in code and telegraphy). Little information exists on the selection methods, if any. Apparently, men with demonstrated aptitudes or previous experience or education were chosen for specialist billets.

General information is also lacking on contemporary training facilities, major skills and trainee availability.

Obvious conclusion: Only a very small percentage of the men who served in the Civil War received training subsequently applicable to future civilian employment.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR TRAINING

Recruit training had not altered in purpose since the Civil War. Army and Marine Corps continued to train their men in troop units; Navy instructed most of its complement aboard ship.

Volunteer units, mostly from the National Guard, were brought into Federal service and sent to training camps for brief periods. A few hundred naval apprentices (boys between 16 and 18) were given 5 to 6 months of instruction at the Naval Training Station, Newport, R. I. Courses included reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as seamanship and gunnery. About one-eighth of the Navy enlisted men who served in the war with Spain entered through apprentice ranks. The war's brief duration precluded advanced instruction for recruits.

During the war, some limited specialized training was undertaken. Advanced schools were operating prior to the war's outbreak, but most of them were closed when hostilities began. Two Navy seaman gunners' schools and the Army Hospital Corps School remained more or less active.

Again, men trained on the job and skilled technicians recruited from civilian life continued to supply most of the specialists needed in the services. This group embraced engineers, doctors, signal

experts, and clerical personnel. Navy engineering had come to require a fairly large number of Regular service technicians and mechanics, and Naval Intelligence was no longer handled by civilian agencies. Men attached to these services were given considerable instruction in skills with civilian counterparts.

By a process not explained in existing records, seamen were selected from the fleet for training as gunners. The operation and maintenance of Spanish-War naval weapons (including 13-inch breech-loading turret guns and the Howell torpedo) demanded considerable technical ability. Probably trainees were selected because they had demonstrated the necessary capabilities for handling machinery and mechanical tools.

On each ship a few men served as hospital attendants in the sick-bay. Selection data remains unavailable. The Army maintained a hospital corps school of instruction for recruits, but the urgent needs of the war sent many of these men to their units with little or no training.

Regarding proportions, major skills, and availability of specialized training, general information is lacking for the period.

With the introduction of telephony, electrical devices, special office equipment (e. g., typewriters) and dawning mechanization (automatic guns), it seems probable that the War of 1898 would have required the training of many specialists, had it lasted longer. As it was, much of the United States Army equipment was obsolescent. The Navy (ultramodern in comparison with Spain's) was not up with the British, French, and German in mechanization and scientific gear.

GENERAL TRAINING, WORLD WAR I

The abrupt transition at century's turn from horse and buggy era to automotive age wrought an almost overnight revolution in military and naval equipments and operations. Weapons used by Spanish War soldiers and sailors would have been understood by their Civil War predecessors. Many of the weapons in use by World War I would have utterly baffled the artillerist who went to Cuba or the gunner who fought at Manila Bay. Tank warfare, gas warfare, camouflage warfare, aerial warfare, submarine warfare, and antisub warfare—all put a premium on the mechanical and electrical engineer, the highly trained technician, the skilled specialist. Even the doughboy infantryman was required to use tools and weapons which demanded technical knowledge and training beyond the range of robot drill.

Thus World War I marks a milestone in the history of training in the Armed Forces. It was the first war in which the American citizen servicemen were thoroughly and systematically trained before they went into battle. It was also the first war in which it was considered necessary to give prospective officers from civil life a military education before they were commissioned.

In the summer of 1918, plans for the training of new Army divisions provided for a 16-week training period. However, the average division had been organized for 8 months before sailing overseas. And in Europe it received further training before entering combat. The amount of general training received by the individual soldiers varied widely. The average doughboy received about 6 months' training

in the States and 2 months' training in a quiet sector behind the line in Europe before he was sent to the fighting front.

The Navy maintained four training stations during World War I. At these stations recruits were given general training courses of from 3 to 6 months duration. Marines were given 8 weeks' basic training, then personnel selected as combat replacements were given special combat training. Combat units were trained in the tactics and techniques necessary for their missions.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING, WORLD WAR I

Formal schooling on a large scale as a means of training enlisted specialists in military skills began with the First World War. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps utilized the facilities of civilian educational institutions and industrial plants for specialized training of enlisted and officer personnel. However, the fundamental principle governing specialized training still remained on-the-job training.

The emphasis in Navy training was, and still is, aboard ship. But formal training ashore was provided in Navy service schools, civilian educational institutions, and industrial plants designed to meet the specific needs of a vastly expanded service. The four training stations in existence at the time were expanded, and many naval units were established at such educational institutions as Harvard and Columbia Universities and Dunwoody Industrial Institute in Minneapolis.

The Army met its specialist requirements by supplementing on-the-job training in two ways. It embarked on an ambitious formal school program and used special drafts of men with particular skills or qualifications. About 14 percent of the men drafted, or approximately 425,000 men, were inducted under special or individual calls.

The Army's civilian institution program was highlighted by the formation of National Army Training Detachments and the Students' Army Training Corps. The National Army Training Detachments were units organized at technical schools and colleges throughout the country to provide training for technicians and mechanics. The Students' Army Training Corps was composed of regularly enrolled students in the higher educational institutions who were volunatrily inducted into the service at the institutions and formed into training corps units. This training offered the Army a means of selecting qualified officer candidate material and technical experts, such as medical officers, engineers, and ordnance officers.

Some attempt was made to insure objectivity in evaluating applicants for specialized training. The determining selection factors for all services were the needs of the particular service, the facilities available, and the urgency of the situation. Selection of a trainee for specialized training was usually based on the recommendation of the commanding officer or by preliminary screening to determine aptitude, experience, and education. Final selection of officer candidates was usually by boards of officers or by the military representative at a civilian educational institution. Eligibility depended on age limitations, educational standards, Reserve status, and exceptional civilian qualifications.

No direct rewards or other forms of inducement were offered servicemen who participated in the specialized training program. Obvious personal benefits such as possible promotions, desirable assignments, and utilization of known skills definitely served as incentives to such schooling.

Table 16 gives available figures. Because statistics on school graduates for this period are incomplete in the official records, the figures are rough approximations. The figure shown as the total number who graduated from formal schools includes those men who may have attended more than one school.

TABLE 16.—*Proportion of personnel in Armed Forces who received specialized training* [1]

	Present time [2]	Korea	World War II	World War I
Army:				
Number who served	1,311,352	2,834,000	8,176,000	[3] 4,057,101
Number who received specialized training [4]	220,894	769,589	2,324,658	[3] 735,290
Proportion who received specialized training (percent)	16.8	27.2	28.4	[3] 18
Navy:				
Number who served	683,137	1,177,000	3,883,520	599,051
Number who received specialized training [5]	416,111	803,781	3,114,220	56,258
Proportion who received specialized training [5] (percent)	60.9	68.3	80.2	9.4
Marine Corps:				
Number who served	216,859	424,000	669,100	78,839
Number who received specialized training [4]	[6] 25,775	(7)	(7)	(7)
Proportion who received specialized training (percent)	12	(7)	(7)	(7)
Air Force:				
Number who served	957,609	1,285,000	2,244,000	(3)
Number who received specialized training	(8)	(8)	(8)	(3)
Proportion who received specialized training	(8)	(8)	(8)	(3)

[1] Proportion who received specialized training is approximate.
[2] "Number who served" for "Present time" represents average strength for fiscal year 1955. Navy figures exclude Naval Academy and naval aviation cadets.
[3] World War I Army figures include Air Service.
[4] The Army and Marine Corps "Number who received specialized training" and resulting proportion do not include graduates from short-term courses conducted in informal schools in training centers, camps and unit headquarters.
[5] Navy "Number who received specialized training" and proportion include graduates of short-term courses (up to 1 week) provided at areas of fleet concentration for the instruction of shipboard personnel. Naval Academy and NROTC graduates fiscal year 1955 are not included.
[6] This figure represents planned input.
[7] Data not available.
[8] Air Force proportions based on the relationship between total number who served and total number who graduated from schools are not available.

Source: Department of Defense.

Major skills are identified with courses of training given at formal schools. These courses have been translated into the occupational groupings prepared by the Defense Department and classified under the appropriate major category. See table 17 (p. 47) for an estimate of numbers who received training in major skills.

Specialized training was limited to the specific needs of the service and therefore was not available to all who qualified by experience or tests to receive such training.

GENERAL TRAINING, WORLD WAR II

World War II featured the greatest emergency training program in history. Millions of men and women were taught to perform expertly in the special fields which were expanded for the conduct of modern technological warfare.

An incredible variety of subjects and skills were taught. To carry out a program of such magnitude called for the expert selection of trainees. One of the tools for selection was the system of classifying servicemen according to aptitudes and previous experience. The classification and assignment systems had a direct and important bearing on the incidence and distribution of specialized training in

the Armed Forces. Those selected were given the benefits of the latest developments in teaching methods and techniques. It was an educational undertaking of tremendous scope. Following is a description of the program by Alonzo Grace in the American Council on Education report, Educational Lessons from Wartime Training:

> The training programs of the armed services provided for almost as many kinds of specialists as there are in civilian life. For example, in an infantry division of 15,000 men, as many varied skills as might be found in a civilian community of the same size were required. Transportation, equipment, and supply demanded the services of more than 1,500 men; communications, nearly an equal number; administration, 700; repair and maintenance of equipment, 450; preparation of food, 650; medical care, 600; and a variety of minor duties occupied about 1,600. All of these men had to be given specialist as well as combat training. Other branches of the service used even more specialists than did the infantry.

Another example may be cited from the Navy:

> Of the 2,000 enlisted men in a battleship crew, all were required to have 8 weeks of basic training; 500 were required to have an additional 16 weeks of naval technical training; another 500 must have this training and an additional advanced course requiring 32 weeks or more; another 500 must have sea experience, or at least 1 term in fleet school or another of the advanced training schools. About 80 percent of the men completed the equivalent of trade school courses during their naval service. All were required to continue study and to undergo training as long as they were in active service. For the complement of 2,000 men there were 2,000 assigned jobs, each one specialized.

Space does not permit detailed discussion of all the aspects of training in regard to each of the services. Army Air Force training may be taken as an exemplary sample at the general level. The Air Force system embraced recruit training (4 to 8 weeks) for normal indoctrination and basic military training; preflight training for aviation cadets (standardized at 10 weeks); officer basic military training (6 to 8 weeks) for newly commissioned officers from civil life. In preflight and officer basic the trainee was exposed to academic as well as military subjects.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING, WORLD WAR II

School training during World War II was designed for both officers and enlisted men, and included all types of formal specialized training at service schools, civilian educational institutions, and industrial plants. Many of the Nation's major universities and industrial firms (such as General Electric) were engaged in the program. As a rule the schools offered courses expressly designed to suit a specialty, the courses ranging from administration to technical skills. The training was usually continued in various centers, depots, posts, camps, and stations in cycles becoming more advanced and intensive.

Some 678 service schools and 790 civilian institutions were engaged in the specialized training program. Approximately 5 million trainees went through the service schools, and 1,300,000 went through civilian institutions. Marine Corps and Air Force figures are lacking, but an estimated 7½ million comprised the total number of trainees.

The criteria of selection for Army school training varied with the type of personnel to be trained (officer and enlisted) and the specific prerequisites of the courses offered. Individual qualifications were generally based on such factors as education, efficiency rating, background, experience, demonstrated aptitudes. Few distinctions were made because of sex or race. Though Wacs did not receive combat instruction, they entered the same courses as men.

The Army's specialized training program included the operation of special training units (STU's) which provided a minimal fourth-grade education for illiterates, non-English-speaking soldiers and grade V scorers in the lowest intelligence group. In May 1945 more than 1 of 6 inductees were sent to STU's. Average at war's end was about 1 out of 10, reflecting an illiteracy rate that shocked the authorities. Almost 86 percent of STU entrants completed the course successfully. About 14 percent failed and were discharged from the Army.

Air Force selection featured a psychological testing program that proved an outstanding innovation in the classification and screening of men for specialist jobs. For similar purpose the Navy used a battery of aptitude tests. Marines were selected by means of qualification standards largely subjective in character.

Physical condition, service need, and quota limitations were factors influencing selection of all Armed Forces trainees. Many qualified individuals were ruled out by service need and quota restrictions.

In general, there was no need to provide inducements for participation in the specialized-training program. Benefits to be derived from military schooling were self-evident in most instances. Obvious rewards were (1) officer's commission, and/or (2) opportunity to continue academic education at civilian institution, or (3) opportunity to acquire technical training or knowledge useful for career, plus (4) chance for desirable assignments and pay increases. The STU entrant was given schooling to overcome the severe handicap of illiteracy.

Table 17 (accompanying) shows the numbers of servicemen who received specialized training in major skills during war periods. As indicated, the figures are approximates. Also, they do not exclude duplications (men who attended two or more schools). Hence, final totals would be somewhat reduced.

TABLE 17.—*Number of personnel in Armed Forces who received specialized training,*[1] *major skills trained, by occupational groupings*

Major categories [2]	Combined Armed Forces					
	Present	Korea	World War II	World War I	Total	Percent of total number trained
I. Technical and scientific	202, 652	555, 108	1, 327, 388	39, 789	2, 124, 937	18. 8
II. Administrative and clerical	67, 057	183, 685	381, 635	19, 556	651, 933	5. 78
III. Mechanics and repairmen	108, 410	324, 510	1, 695, 650	137, 761	2, 266, 331	20. 10
IV. Craftsmen	19, 972	55, 200	102, 087	29, 081	206, 340	1. 83
V. Service workers	26, 338	135, 648	376, 267	120, 561	658, 814	5. 84
VI. Operatives and laborers	7, 010	35, 621	25, 471	4, 304	72, 406	. 642
VII. Military-type occupations, not elsewhere classified	368, 623	678, 929	2, 633, 290	45, 225	3, 726, 067	33. 0
VIII. Officer-candidate schools, military academies, and officer orientation courses	14, 972	38, 416	464, 209	108, 271	625, 868	5. 55
IX. Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), V-courses (Navy and Marine), NROTC and World War I SATC	2, 488	7, 452	146, 600	158, 000	314, 540	2. 79
X. Illiterates, non-English-speaking, and below 4th grade educational level	19, 505	146, 785	328, 149	129, 000	623, 439	5. 53
Total	837, 027	2, 161, 354	7, 480, 746	791, 548	11, 270, 675	100. 0

[1] Major skills. See section on definition of terms for basis of classification.
[2] Major categories. See tab for list of specialties within major occupational groups I through VII. Categories VIII, IX, and X were added to original Department of Defense list by authors of this report as supplemental fields of specialized training.

Source: Department of Defense.

As regards the number of servicemen trained in major skills, the enormous increases over World War I totals (see table 17) speak for themselves. World War II demanded "educated" servicemen for specialist tasks. To meet the urgent need, the services schooled and trained some 7,480,000 individuals.

Specialized training was not available to all who qualified by experience or basic tests. Service needs, available facilities, and the military situation governed the quotas for school programs.

The Defense Department report offered no commentary concerning the value of training to the veteran. But the following assumptions seem obvious.

From the variety of occupational groups, previously discussed, and in light of the almost unlimited scope of the training and educational program, the observer may readily conclude that the average World War II serviceman received some degree of training or instruction of subsequent (civilian) value. The technician or officer candidate who took specialized courses undoubtedly profited to some extent careerwise.

TRAINING, KOREAN WAR PERIOD

During the Korean conflict (July 1950–June 1953), general training, recruit training, and specialized training in the armed forces followed the patterns established in World War II. There were, of course, refinements tailored to meet technological advances and the emergency pressures of the war. Because of the pressures, basic training and perhaps elements of specialized training were in some cases not up to World War II standards.

Facilities for conducting formal school programs were at first not readily available. Specially qualified instructors utilized modern training aids and teaching methods developed through World War II experiences. Lessons learned in the global war sharpened much of the training effort.

Compared to its World War II forerunner, the instructor corps in the Air Force was much improved. A sizable number of civilian instructors was immediately available. Full-fledged instructor-training programs were in operation at service schools before war's outbreak. Professional training for career personnel was in full swing, and technical training was in high gear at USAF schools. The high degree of specialization in the air arm required intensive schooling of recruits and exacting selection standards for trainees.

Navy and Marine Corps training programs for the Korean period followed patterns established in World War II. Increasing reliance was placed on trained or professional teachers and educational specialists.

PRESENT SITUATION (JULY 1954–JUNE 1955)

During the period indicated there were no significant changes in the armed forces training programs, general or specialized. One may note, however, expanding curricula as weapons become increasingly complex and warfare more dependent on scientist, engineer, and skilled technician.

A notable emphasis was placed by all services on career planning, as exemplified by the Army's selection procedures. Army policy provided that officers be selected by the career-management office of that service branch to which they were assigned. Warrants and

enlisted men could express to unit commanders an interest in attending a particular course. Selection was based on unit requirements and individual abilities.

SUMMARY: KOREAN CONFLICT AND PRESENT

There were no direct inducements offered for specialized training.

The proportion of specially trained servicemen, as shown in table 16, decreased considerably after World War II.

Table 17 shows an expected peacetime decline in the numbers trained in major skills, but the percentage of specialists trained remains high. The "present" figures cover only 1 year, so actual training during a normal 2-year tour of duty would be higher.

During the Korean war, emergency pressures precluded the training of many qualified applicants.

The Defense Department report did not present data or assumptions on the value of present training in respect to civilian careers.

CONCLUSION

From Civil War to present, the trend reflects the mounting importance of general training and specialized schooling, with specialization in all services rapidly climbing from the mechanical heights of World War I to the electronic peaks of World War II and today's atomic summit. Once largely confined to marksmanship and robot drill, military training now demands a relatively high order of intellectual endeavor, initiative, and technical capability.

While the Defense Department report does not venture assumptions in this respect, it seems reasonable to assume that the average serviceman, from World War I to present, acquired (or currently acquires) experience and education valuable for the pursuit of civilian vocation or career. Undoubtedly many wartime servicemen were compelled to train in occupations which they had no intention of pursuing in civilian life—architects were made Army cooks and incipient lawyers learned how to maintain the hydraulic mechanisms of naval guns. But thousands of men acquired know-hows and skills which enhanced their postwar careers.

Chapter VII. Military Living Conditions: Diet, Clothing and Shelter

HOW DO THEY COMPARE?

In general, Army and Navy life—for the enlisted man, at least—has always been rugged. Certainly the adjective applied in that early American period when troops manned isolated outposts in frontier wilderness, and Navy crews spent years in remote stations literally on the other side of the world. Does it apply today when the average Army post is within driving distance of a movie (if it does not itself contain a motion-picture installation)? When many posts are furnished with baseball diamonds and swimming pools? When privates and noncommissioned officers have their gamerooms and jukebox clubs? When the phone booth keeps them in touch with girl friends and family? When the bluejacket sails on a warship that boasts a soda fountain, bunks with mattresses, movie gear, and

comforts once obtainable only on passenger liners? On the surface it seems obvious that military life is not so rugged as once it was.

However, it may be well to note at the outset that the mitigating factors in reference are in the main confined to peacetime service. Even so, they do little enough to relieve fatiguing exercises, marches, and drills, the severe restraints and disciplines imposed by military duty, and the hard-to-take boredom of military routine. Watching troop maneuvers, or a war game, or a Navy crew at work, no one would say that the services have gone soft. Nor could anyone blink the fact that duty in such a limberlost outpost as Thule or at a station in the Central Pacific is not equivalent to life in the States. At Thule the showers are steamheated. The remote Central Pacific station owns an automatic laundry and an ice machine. But as someone has remarked, today's model prisons are equipped with showers, laundries, and refrigeration gear. Material comforts are not easily evaluated. Nor does the soldier always have access to them, even in peacetime.

Combat conditions are something else again. Ground troops still bivouac in muddy foxholes, and may be forced to exist for many days on forage or meager K-rations. The ship's piano is jettisoned in wartime, and naval service can become as Spartan as an Aleutian patrol or bitter duty on the Iceland Shuttle.

But volumes of data are not needed to show that living conditions for the serviceman in war as well as peace have greatly improved since the Civil War. It goes without saying that such basic necessities as food, clothing, and shelter are today superior in quality and far more adequate than their military equivalents in the past.

The question resolves to one of degree—how much more adequate; how superior? And to one of comparison—how do these basics, as provided in the Armed Forces, compare with those enjoyed by civilians at home? Have improvements in military food, clothing, and shelter kept step with civilian improvements in these items?

Pertinent information was furnished by the Defense Department report and data from the Department of Labor. Some of the Civil War and Spanish-American War detail was researched in the Library of Congress.

DIET

Army and Navy foods and rations have generally paralleled the dietary habits and conditions of American civilian life. Both services kept abreast of the changes introduced in the civilian world in respect to foods, their preparation and their processing.

During the Civil War the individual or mess plan of cooking was followed by units in the field. Messes normally consisted of 4 to 8 men who took turns serving as cook. On the march or in contact with the enemy, the soldiers often found it more convenient to prepare their food individually. Forage was where one found it. Herdsmen drove great parades of beef cattle on the heels of advancing armies. The troops consumed pork as another basic meat, and drank gallons of thick coffee cheapened with chicory.

On board ironclads Navy enlisted men sometimes messed on deck, cooking al fresco. Normally the sailor sat tailor fashion with an oilcloth apron in his lap, munching his bread and pork. Emergency rations consisted of hardtack and bullybeef called "monkey." Grog

STATE COLLEGE LIBRARY JUL 17 1956 MANHATTAN KANSAS APPLIED SCIENCE

was standard issue until discontinued early in the war. Beans were the major staple. The sailor tried to vary his diet with fresh vegetables to avoid scurvey, but on a long voyage the variety could boil down to mush. A few vessels had ice refrigeration; cows and chickens were sometimes carried on deck. The Union Navy had several refrigeration ships which traveled with the fleets. As in the Army, dried fruits, and vegetables were much used.

The advent of canning was a boon to the Armed Forces of the Spanish-American War. Dried fruits and vegetables were largely replaced with the canned (fresh) variety. In lieu of beef on the hoof, the Army utilized refrigerated or chilled beef. Unfortunately, the refrigeration was inadequate, and hundreds of men were fatally stricken with ptomaine or botulism poisoning. Scandal exploded, Gen. Nelson A. Miles charging that the troops had been furnished with "embalmed beef." The charge was refuted by an investigating commission. But widespread sickness during the war directed attention to the feeding of troops under tropical conditions. From that time dates the emphasis placed on scientific treatment and preparation of Army and Navy foods.

Immediate efforts were made to improve cooking methods. Results took shape in 1905 when Commissary Gen. Henry G. Sharpe established the first cook's and baker's school at Fort Riley, Kans. Training has been continuous and much improved since that time.

In the Navy, cooks were as traditional as the ship's galley with its "Charley Noble." As early as 1824 cooks and cooks' mates were assigned on Navy ships. But there was no training program at this early date. At the time of the Civil War, cooks were preparing food and baking bread in ship's galleys according to individual taste and recipe. Formal training of Navy cooks did not come until 1907 when the first Navy cook's school was established. The first Navy cookbook had been issued in 1902. For the guidance of personnel it offered 100 standard recipes. By contrast, the World War II Navy cookbook contained 900 recipes.

Another innovation was the practice of the military services to follow and adopt improvements made by industry in the field of food processing and handling. Wartime military requirements served to stimulate and accelerate these developments. Today's rations reflect these developments in the large-scale use of dehydrated foods, boneless beef, and soluble coffee. The introduction of automatic refrigeration has changed the mode of handling foods, making possible the use of many perishable items which would otherwise spoil. Ptomaine and scurvey are almost unknown in the services today, having become as rare as they are in civilian life.

Most of the improvements in the equipment used in Navy galleys date from the beginning of the 20th century. The first dishwashing machine was installed in 1904 on the USS *Missouri*. Coal stoves of the Civil War period have long since been replaced by oil and electric ranges. Gear of all types, ranging from potato-peelers to ice-cream machines, has been introduced. Nothing on the sea is more spic-and-span than the modern naval vessel's galley.

In the Army the introduction of mobile kitchen equipment made possible the preparations and service of hot meals virtually on the front line. In Korea troops at the front received hot meals twice a day and an operational ration at midday whenever possible. Thanks

to advances made in the field of nutrition and to industrial progress in food processing and handling, ration allowances in the Armed Forces have been greatly increased in quantity over the years. Evidence of vast improvement was spoken by the troops in Korea who offered a minimum of complaint at the Army ration.

Manifestly the trend in military diet from Civil War to present has been progressively favorable. The Defense Department report does not venture the assumption, but it seems clear that the meals issued today's servicemen under normal conditions are as wholesome and sufficient as those enjoyed by civilian workers performing comparable jobs in industry or agriculture.

CLOTHING

Military clothing has improved in usefulness, durability, and quality much as civilian clothing has improved over the years. During the early Victorian era the standard male civilian suit was heavy black wool or some harsh fabric like bombazine. White linen or duck was worn by the well-to-do in summer. Shoes were made to order by cobblers. They were expensive and accordingly worn for many seasons. Altogether, the average man's wardrobe was meager, his garments rough and ill-fitting.

Army and Navy clothing was similarly rough, sloppy, and uncomfortable, as any Brady photograph reveals. The Civil War soldier was issued one all-purpose blue wool uniform. It was worn in camp, on the battlefield, on parade, or for fatigue duty. In it the soldier sweltered in summer and (when it went threadbare) shivered in winter. Sherman's "bummers" wore a patchwork costume of anything at hand. Flannel underwear was standard from autumn to late spring, no matter unseasonable weather. The Navy seaman boasted two uniforms—blue wool for winter, white duck for summer The sailor costume served for work and dress alike.

During the Spanish-American War the Army went to tropical Cuba in blue wool uniform. At Santiago and elsewhere the men panted and steamed in the heat. Sunstroke and heat exhaustion debilitated the troops to a dangerous degree that aroused official reaction. Eventually khaki clothing was issued to the field forces. Rubber ponchos also appeared about this time. The advances of the clothing and textile industries, and machine-manufactured footgear, brought standard sizes and makes into the Armed Forces and went far to increase the quantity and comfort of military uniforms.

Regular officers have always purchased their own uniforms in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. In 1940 a uniform allowance was granted to Reserve officers. And during the Korean conflict organizational field clothing was for the first time issued in kind to all Army officers. From regular fatigues to full dress, the service officer's uniform includes many costumes, and the wardrobe is quite expensive.

The trend toward a distinction between garrison and combat clothing in the Army did not develop much before World War II. The standard Army uniform served both purposes in World War I. Interest in developing functional clothing for field service was spurred by the establishment of new types of military organizations and by the impact of global war which resulted in men being stationed in

areas of climatic extremes where they required specialized clothing for their protection.

Air Force pilots, parachutists, armored and mechanized forces, ski troops, and other special-type forces demanded and received clothing that was especially developed to meet their specific needs. By the middle of World War II this temporary trend toward specialization in the design of clothing was abandoned in favor of the development of an all-purpose combat uniform in the design of which the layering principle was adopted. As a consequence of the adoption of this principle there was a marked change in the clothing provided the enlisted man. The Army and the Marine Corps abandoned the traditional use of wool in the outer garments of their combat uniforms. They turned to wind-resistant water-repellent cottons to provide an outer shell that could be worn over varying layers of woolen clothing to provide the desired warmth and the protection required.

Both the Army and the Marine Corps made use of jacket and trouser shells and liners in the Korean conflict. The nature of naval operations did not make it necessary for the Navy to follow this trend of development. But it did provide specialized clothing to afford protection in foul weather and to serve the needs of naval aviators. Special clothing, such as firefighters' outfits and clothing for fliers had been developed during the war.

The clothing trend over the years, and particularly since scientific principles have been applied, has been definitely favorable. Today the Armed Forces provide uniforms that meet specific needs, afford the maximum amount of comfort, and protect the health of the enlisted personnel.

SHELTER

At the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the bulk of Army enlisted men were housed in permanent wooden or adobe barracks. Marine Corps barracks were similar to the Army's. In line with their rank, Army officers at permanent posts were allowed from 1 to 6 rooms in specially built brick or frame quarters. Most Navy officers and men and fleet Marines lived on board ship, even when their vessel was at a repair yard. The men slept in canvas hammocks, and kept their few possessions in sea bags. Toilet facilities were primitive, and bath equipment consisted of a cake of soap and a bucket or the sea itself. But Army quarters and Navy facilities were not greatly inferior to civilian habitations and merchant marine facilities of the period.

The Civil War brought little change in Naval accommodations, but it caused drastic modifications in Army quarters. Most of the permanent posts became camps of rendezvous, and housed only a few troops. The soldier's normal home in warm weather was a cotton pup tent. The most common type of housing in winter, when troops were encamped for long periods, was a stockaded log-walled tent usually built by the men who were to occupy it. At Petersburg and elsewhere the troops built log houses and huts. In the field, general officers and colonels were supplied with wall tents.

Between 1865 and 1898 the living quarters of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel were gradually improved. Plumbing, lighting, and central heating facilities were on order for officers' quarters at Army and Navy posts. Barracks furniture was better than formerly. Iron or wooden beds or cots with mattresses began to replace

76907—56——5

Army bunks and bed sacks. A few recreational facilities was provided.

At the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, tents—especially shelter tents—became the abode for Army troops, whether they were at reception or training camps or in the field. Shipboard improvements included berths for some of the crew, messrooms for enlisted men, modern plumbing facilities. In general, these improvements reflected the rise in American living standards.

By 1917 Army barracks were even more habitable. Running water, showers, lavatories, messhalls, kitchens, and recreational facilities were ordinary features. However, with the coming of war the millions of men who constituted the American forces received their basic training in 32 hastily built cantonments, half of them tent camps and the other half cantonments with temporary barracks. Many of these "tempos" were substandard. The early influx of men into Navy training stations in the spring of 1917 swamped housing resources of that service, and forced the establishment of tent camps. During the shortage, however, everything up to Harvard dormitories and leased hotels was used. Eventually, emergency barracks were built for Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Marine Corps officers on shore duty were entitled to quarters or commutation. Enlisted Marines afloat received the same quarters as Naval enlisted men. Shipboard showers had come into being, and messing facilities were much improved. It should be noted, however, that civilian habitations now included many comforts and luxuries which could not be matched by military facilities.

In France, the American Expeditionary Forces provided shelter for marines as well as for Army troops. Tents were used only if other means of shelter could not be obtained. Billeting was the favored method of furnishing shelter. About a third of the AEF was quartered in barracks. Some were entirely of wood, and others were of wood with corrugated iron roofs. The trenches, of course, were another matter. In some sectors the troops lived in primitive dugouts or patched-up ruins.

In 1940, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army, which also provided shelter for the Air Corps, were again obliged to resort to emergency housing. Rapid construction was essential and this factor, along with mounting shortages of labor and building materials, forced a reduction in standards. All the Armed Forces were again obliged to use tents or prefabricated huts at training installations.

When the United States sent large forces to the United Kingdom and Australia, housing conditions proved much like those at home. British and Australian barracks were extensively used, as were tents and Nissen and Quonset huts. In some cases billeting was utilized for officers in the United Kingdom.

On the Continent, there was little housing construction before the surrender of Germany. Billeting was resorted to much less than in World War I, and tents were extensively employed. In forward combat areas troops took advantage of such shelter as they could find or improvise. In combat areas of the South Pacific—more or less typical of the entire Pacific Theater—enlisted men and officers were usually housed in tents. Whether stateside or overseas, military housing during the war was not up to the civilian standard.

When the Korean conflict broke out in 1950, tents were once more employed to house Army and Marine Forces in the war area. Prefabricated huts were also used. Except in a few local instances, Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force camps and stations in the United States were not compelled to reduce housing standards.

TRENDS

To the extent permitted by circumstance, there has been progressive improvement in peacetime housing standards for the military since the Civil War. Today, Armed Forces personnel are given quarters furnished with nearly all the facilities which could reasonably be provided for troops at home or overseas.

In wartime, however, housing standards must be lowered. And in active campaigning, troops in the field must usually endure miserable housing—a condition inevitably associated with combat operations. Shelter is bound to deteriorate when the campaign is conducted in wilderness or jungle or in some backward and undeveloped country. As long as war is waged in the field, troops will burrow in foxholes, huddle under tent halves or sleep in the open.

CONCLUSION

Keeping pace with civilian improvements, military diets have greatly improved since the Civil War. So have clothing and shelter provided for Armed Forces personnel. Today, the enlisted man's everyday living conditions are relatively healthy and comfortable. However, he does not live in luxury. Military fare tends to grow monotonous. Uniforms are functional costumes except for dress, and dress uniforms (and work uniforms, as well) can be expensive items on an officer's budget.

Peacetime housing facilities are, today, relatively good for officers and families on stateside post or overseas station. In some cases, however, they remain substandard and on many posts they are too few to meet the demand. Barracks facilities are better than they used to be, but the enlisted man is still deprived of one accommodation cherished by most civilians—privacy.

And under combat conditions, military housing and diet inevitably fall far below civilian standards. For troops long in action overseas there are no substitutes for home.

Chapter VII. Military Living Conditions: Special Services

NOTE CONCERNING REPORT

The material submitted by the Defense Department on this subject occupies a voluminous dossier which, by its very bulk, reflects the progressively increasing number of special services developed for the men in uniform. In the present brief it is possible only to name the types of special services in existence throughout the various war periods, and to indicate a few examples of their functional operation. In the previous section of this report great improvements in military diet, clothing, and shelter (in keeping with corresponding trends in civilian life) were noted. But the serviceman needs other basics—basics which bear on morale, élan, and which ease the burden of duty.

RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Pioneer chaplains were usually amateur parsons who preached to troops and warship crews. In 1823 it was ruled that Navy chaplains must be ordained clergymen. During the Civil War, 24 chaplains served in the Navy at a ratio of 1 to every 2,450 men. The same situation prevailed in the Army. There was no significant change in religious services during the Spanish-American War. By World War I, however, the program had been expanded, and the chaplains were assigned to teach social hygiene and related subjects in addition to their regular religious duties. By World War II, the most significant change lay in the creation of the Chaplaincy as a separate branch of the Army with a Chief of Chaplains. Of equal importance was the recognition of religion as the chaplain's primary duty—a development which released him from unrelated activities. The work of the chaplains of World War II and Korea is too well known to need a detailed description. In every combat area, the chaplains served with the troops and were available to minister to the spiritual needs of the men. Every Army post has its church or chapel, and Sunday services are a tradition on men-o-war. Armed Forces chaplains minister to all faiths and creeds.

EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

Both the Union Army and Navy made an effort to eliminate illiteracy during the Civil War. However, with the exception of rudimentary lessons aboard ship, little or no formal educational services were provided. Instead, various unorganized efforts were made to provide reading materials. Libraries were not established until the Spanish-American War. The following extract from General Pershing's report illustrates the advance in education during World War I:

> Prior to the Armistice, educational work was conducted through the organization of voluntary classes under the YMCA, the popular subjects studied being French language, French history, and the cause of the war. After the Armistice, measures were taken for a systematic organization of nonmilitary educational training.
>
> The formal schoolwork began January 2, with post schools. Then divisional educational centers gave the equivalent of high-school instruction and specialized on vocational training. The American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune carried on undergraduate and graduate work for the technical professions while postgraduate work was provided by the entrance of our officers and soldiers into French and British universities. Special schools were organized to meet demands, such as the Practical Agricultural School at Allerey and the Art Training Center at Paris, for painting, sculpture, architecture, and interior decoration, advanced students being entered in the best ateliers of Paris. Active instruction was carried on in the base hospitals and convalescent camps.

During World War II a program of voluntary off-duty education was inaugurated. It was designed not only to furnish the individual an opportunity to become more efficient from the standpoint of performance of duty, but to help prepare him for the return to civilian life or to continue some course or educational interest that was interrupted. Under the auspices of the Armed Forces Institute, texts were furnished for use in off-duty classes. A total of several thousand correspondence courses, from elementary through junior college level, were available. The library services were also part of the educational program.

From the Korean conflict to the present, off-duty classes have been encouraged, and higher education has gone abroad with the establishment of branches of the University of Maryland and the University of California in the overseas commands. As was noted in the detailed discussion of Armed Forces training, illiteracy in the Army has been greatly reduced.

FACILITIES FOR FAMILY LIFE

During the Civil War period, family life was not awarded the importance attached to it in later years. Prior to the war, the Army discouraged the enlistment of married men. Sailors liked a traditionally bachelor existence, and Civil War seamen were no exception.

The same conditions existed during the Spanish-American War. Some of the officers maintained families at permanent posts, but most of the enlisted men were unmarried.

With the exception of public quarters on permanent installations, and commissary privileges and limited medical care, there were no military facilities for family life during World War I. The tents and temporary structures which housed the troops at that time afforded no facilities for family living.

Little or no change in this condition was evident during World War II. To the extent available, wives and children of service personnel were entitled to the use of recreational facilities. Some of the large forts and bases could house the families of officers and NCO's. But the great majority of families were not able to find even substandard living accommodations in the vicinity of posts and camps.

Since World War II, some progress has been made in establishing facilities for family life for servicemen. The first emphasis was placed upon overseas facilities. Housing for officers and the higher grades of enlisted men was requisitioned from governments of the occupied countries. But the waiting period for some of the families scheduled to proceed overseas was often long. Family quarters were usually the equal of those in the average stateside community, but the housing shortage was not readily overcome.

In the United States the housing problem during the Korean conflict became intensified with the reopening of many camps, bases, and stations, often located far from large communities which might have provided adequate rental housing. Temporary structures, such as mobilization barracks, were modified to provide family domiciles and all other feasible measures were pursued. By 1953 the shortage had been partially alleviated. But it remains one of the more acute problems confronting the Armed Forces.

PERSONAL AID

National welfare organizations were unknown at the beginning of the Civil War. Some organizations were established later and became national in scope. Among them was the United States Sanitary Commission, organized in June 1861. Later came the American branch of the International Red Cross.

During the Spanish-American War the newly organized Red Cross extended its activities and services to camps and battlefields.

The efforts of welfare organizations were coordinated by the Commission on Training Camp Activities during World War I. Each participating organization was assigned a definite function in given

areas. Those working with the AEF were under military control for purposes of coordination. Under this control the American Red Cross concerned itself principally with care of the sick and wounded, while the YMCA was occupied primarily with instruction, amusement, and moral welfare of the troops. Smaller organizations such as the American Library Association and the Jewish Welfare Board, were affiliated with the YMCA. Huge sums were spent, both at home and abroad, for troop welfare. Receipts reported by various organizations included the following: American Red Cross, $400 million; YMCA, $125 million; Knights of Columbus, $28,350,000; Salvation Army, $2 million; American Library Association, $1,750,000.

Facilities for personal aid were available during World War II through such organizations as the Navy Relief Society, the Army Relief Society, and Army Emergency Relief. The Red Cross furnished traditional camp service to posts and stations. The USO provided off-post entertainment and recreational facilities, including clubs, hotels, and information centers for transient and leave personnel.

In 1946, the Air Force Aid Society began operations in serving emergency financial needs of Air Force personnel. Thus each service has its own society which provides emergency aid. Each is supported by contributions from the members of the respective services. And all have working agreements with the American Red Cross.

RECREATION

Soldiers, sailors, and marines during the Civil War enjoyed very little in the way of recreational activity and entertainment. Such sports and entertainments as existed were usually initiated by the men themselves. Singing and music seem to have been the main recreational group activity in camp. Of course, the soldiers went in for cards and dice. A few professional singers and dancers entertained the troops, but they were the exception.

Probably the most popular form of entertainment during the Spanish-American War was the minstrel show. In World War I there was organized group singing. Liberty theaters were built in 30 camps and equipped for stage presentation as well as for motion pictures. Many soldier shows were produced in these world war theaters. After the armistice in 1918 provision was made for using professional entertainers.

Crafts and hobbies were sponsored as a limited program by the Red Cross. The service club did not evolve during this period. However, the inception of the idea had its origin in the 1918 canteen and YMCA "hut." Practically all recreation service was provided by privately supported agencies.

Organized efforts to provide recreational facilities and entertainment for sustaining Armed Forces morale were greatly expanded during World War II. Special clubs and messes multiplied, not only for officers but also for petty officers, and enlisted men. Entertainment included motion pictures, USO camp shows, soldier shows, and the distribution of musical instruments. In addition, there were dances and other organized social activities arranged through clubs and messes on military reservations or at USO recreation centers in cities or towns. Even the troops in the Solomon Islands and the

forces in North Africa enjoyed Broadway torch singers and Main Street movies on occasion.

During the Korean conflict recreational and entertainment facilities and organizations were on a par with those of World War II. Today every major post and base has its theater, its clubs, its occasional stage shows. Broadway and Hollywood stars have even appeared at Thule.

SPORTS

With the exception of boat racing, tugs of war, and similar contests, there were no organized sports in the Civil War Army or Navy. During the Spanish-American War such sports as existed in the Army were largely initiated by the soldiers themselves and never included participation by all personnel, even at unit level. In the Navy, however, sports programs had become well established under the sponsorship of Commodore S. B. Luce. Boxing and fencing were most popular.

During World War I sports activities had begun to develop by the summer of 1918. A well-integrated sports program for recreation was under the direction of trained coaches and directors. In the Army, baseball was popular. Boxers won laurels in the Navy. With the armistice, emphasis was placed upon sports for recreation not only from a participant standpoint, but for spectator interest as well. The sum of $1,400,000 was appropriated for athletic activities, and over $1 million was raised from other sources.

The mission of the sports program of all services during World War II was fundamentally to provide maximum opportunity for participation in a well-balanced program of popular sports and athletic games at all levels of command and all levels of proficiency as a means toward developing and maintaining physical fitness and esprit de corps. Supplies and equipment were generally procured in bulk for issue to the troops. Companies and ship's complements were equipped with everything from medicine balls to badminton birds.

In the early days of the Korean occupation an organized sports program became a necessity for troop morale. During the Korean conflict the mission of the sports program had been substantially what it was in World War II. But occupation forces, faced with boredom, needed and got a morale boost.

POST EXCHANGES

From the Revolution to the Civil War, civilians were given sales concessions to supply the needs of Army personnel. Peddlers, who operated under the name of "sutlers," hung about the camps. Swindling was a common practice. Within the Navy the counterpart of the sutler's cart was the "bumboat." Post exchanges were not established until the Spanish War period. The Army PX and the Navy "gee-dunk" were a boon to the serviceman who could buy quality products at nonprofit prices.

With the rapid expansion of the Army in World War I, post exchange facilities became badly taxed. The welfare agencies were called upon to meet the emergency through the establishment of canteens. These supplied the doughboy with candy, cigarettes, toothpaste and other items considered as a necessity or convenience. Ships' stores performed the same function in the Navy. Profits of

15 percent were permitted, and the money was spent for the welfare and recreation of enlisted men.

With the expansion of the services in World War II, exchanges were of particular importance to all military personnel. Items now considered necessary included many new types to meet the needs of the servicemen, and their dependents. Because of the limitations on private transportation, and the isolation of many of the military bases, it was essential for morale and welfare to have a locally convenient and adequate exchange service. The post exchanges not only supported recreation and welfare programs, but provided facilities and services such as free movies, gymnasiums, theaters, and enlisted men's clubs.

LEAVE POLICY

In the Civil War leave did not accrue to officers and men on an established scale as in later years. It was granted as a reward for faithful duty, and men were occasionally furloughed to vote. After 1865, leave not exceeding 1 month a year was authorized. In the Union Navy, commanders were given authority to grant leave or shore liberty as a reward for faithful and obedient service. Only the Secretary of the Navy could approve a leave of more than 1 week. Sick leave was also authorized with the approval of the surgeon on the basis of a medical certificate.

The leave policy in effect in World War I remained substantially the same as that in effect in 1865. Furloughs were still considered as a reward for faithful service. Preembarkation furloughs were authorized to men shipped overseas. But leave was not held to be a matter of right or privilege, available to all. After the armistice, personnel in France were authorized leave to permit them to visit Paris and other points of interest. But the furlough was still by way of a reward. Sick leave was, of course, another matter.

By World War II, accrued leave was in existence. Under basic leave laws, officers accrued leave at the rate of 30 days a year, not to exceed a total accrual of 120 days. Both officers and enlisted men, however, were generally limited to 15 days leave a year. Moreover, not all services were uniform in granting leaves or in the policies of application. Sick or convalescent leave could be granted and not charged against accrued leave. Toward the end of World War II period compensation was granted to officers upon separation for leave that had been earned and not taken. In 1946 Congress enacted the Armed Forces Leave Act which provided that every member of the Armed Forces would accrue leave as a matter of law and right at the rate of 2½ days a month. This Act was made retroactive to early 1940, and enlisted personnel were reimbursed in cash for leave not taken. Under this law personnel are authorized to accrue not more than 60 days leave. But the leave is recognized as a serviceman's right, and every man has a chance to enjoy it.

TRENDS

Religious services, educational and personal services, recreation, family life, leave—from the Civil War to the present time the trend in all these items has been favorable. However, the facilities for

family life leave much to be desired. They have undoubtedly improved for families living on permanent posts, bases and stations. But in time of war very few military personnel are able to enjoy this advantage. Even though the serviceman may not be overseas, his family ordinarily will not be able to find living accommodations in the vicinity of posts and camps where large concentrations of troops are located.

One of the tragedies of war for which there is no recompense is the disruption of the family unit and the attendant feeling of insecurity of children from whom the father is separated. The lack of paternal care and discipline as an adverse factor in child development cannot be measured, neither can it be disregarded. Naval service is particularly trying in this respect. Navy men on foreign station are given some opportunity to have their families in the area, but those on sea duty in the Mediterranean or Western Pacific may be separated from their families for many months. The same is true, of course, of fleet marines.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with similar trends in civilian life, living conditions in the Armed Forces are far better than they were during the Civil War. They are an improvement over the conditions which existed in 1918. But if today's service-man enjoys wholesome food, adequate clothing, comfortable housing, religious ministration, educational and recreational facilities, accrued leave and a dozen minor advantages unknown to the Union serviceman, he is still subject to a disrupted family life. If a sailor, he may spend many months at sea. If a soldier, he is "in the Army now." He cannot enjoy the freedom of a civilian under any circumstance.

Aside from that fundamental of military service, the American serviceman "never had it so good."

Chapter IX. Medical Care

RECORD OF THE "MEDICS"

It goes without saying that, aside from the basic necessities (food, clothing, shelter), medical care constitutes the most important feature of military life. Medical knowledge (or practice) keeps the troops fit for service duty. It hardens the men for combat. It succors the wounded and preserves their lives.

Since the day of barber surgeons, amateur stretcher bearers in the Army and clumsy "loblolly boys" in the Navy, medical methods and practitioners in the Armed Forces services have progressively improved.

What was (and is) the extent and quality of medical care provided for American servicemen? How did (and does) it compare with that available to civilian citizenry? As might be expected, the Defense Department report on this subject is as encouraging as the advance of 20th century medicine. That advance ranges the field from anaesthesia to antibiotics, from preventive hygiene to scientific rehabilitation, from appendectomies as a major (and often fatal) operation to appendectomies as safe as tonsil removals. No men in uniform marched faster than the military medics. Theirs is a record unparalleled in history.

19TH CENTURY MEDICINE

The medical care received by members of the Armed Forces during the past century has reflected the current state of medical knowledge and practice. It has consistently matched, when it has not exceeded, the care received by the civilian population.

Advances in medical science and art since the Civil War have been remarkably rapid, benefiting servicemen and civilians alike. During the Civil War the lot of the patient, military or civilian, was a sorry one. There was little knowledge of the principles of sanitation and personal hygiene, or of their importance in disease control. Surgery was crude, performed without benefit of antiseptics or sterilization. Gangrene was a constant threat. Amputations were always a cruel ordeal, and only the hardiest survived. Wounds were cauterized with branding irons. During the war a New York newpaper reported the work of an Army surgeon who tried to amputate with a red hot wire—an experiment reported highly successful "except all the patients died."

At that date the medical profession had neither the benefits of extensive training nor adequate facilities in which to practice. The number of hospital beds in relation to the population was less than one-tenth of what it is now—not an unmixed evil, for hospitals often served to spread as much disease as they cured. Medical schools were not standardized as they are today—a student might graduate as a physician after a 2-year course. A medical college at St. Louis featured a course in astrology. Barbers might perform minor surgical operations (such as the removal of a wen) and blacksmiths might pull teeth.

MILITARY MEDICINE, 20TH CENTURY

Progressively through the post-Civil War decades the causative factors in disease and infection became known. Principles of sanitation and personal hygiene were translated into practice. During the present century it has become possible to immunize personnel on a large scale against typhoid, yellow fever, typhus, plague, cholera, diphtheria and influenza. With advances in chemotherapy and antibiotic therapy during World War II, venereal disease in the armed services became a command rather than a medical problem. With increasing knowledge of nutrition the pork-and-bread rations of the Civil War were replaced, as has been noted, with a better-balanced diet. Advances in the health of the general population were indicated by growing life expectancies at all ages.

Direct comparisons between the medical care received by servicemen and civilians are for the most part invalid. Military personnel have passed through a process of selection—by sex, age, physical examination, educational requirement and the deferment of special groups. The net result is certainly to place in military service a group which initially needs less medical care than the deferred and rejected males of similar ages who remain in the civilian population. Moreover, there is a fundamental difference in the two situations. Medical care, including hospitalization for bed patients, is unavoidable, even mandatory, for service personnel, but it is largely voluntary for the civilian.

It is axiomatic that members of the Armed Forces must keep fit. Since the Civil War they have been the recipients, without cost

to them, of hospitalization, outpatient and dental treatment. It is not surprising that the military population uses roughly, according to some studies, from 3 to 5 times as many physicians, from 3 to 4 times as many dentists and from 1.2 to 2 times as many nurses as the civilian population for each 1,000 persons to be cared for. Hospital beds per 1,000 population are 3 to 4 times as plentiful for the military as for civilians.

There is little doubt that the serviceman's immediate access to medical facilities and his incentives and compulsions to use them give him a health advantage—battle casualties aside—over his civilian counterpart. In July 1944, the medical director of Selective Service gave as his considered opinion that "from 15 to 20 percent of men rejected for military service are rejected because of disqualifying defects which could have been easily remedied." If, despite defects, they are admitted to the service, there is a high probability that their defects will be remedied. In World War II some 1 million men with major dental deficiencies were inducted and treated in the service; the eye defects of more than a quarter million men with impaired vision were corrected. Men inducted with venereal disease were treated with a success rate of about 84 percent.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF MILITARY MEDICINE

Advances in many specialized areas of medical science have received impetus from battlefield experience. Nearly everyone is acquainted with the fact that Army doctors and researchers joined civilian physicians in the effort to conquer yellow fever—and "Yellow Jack" was eventually conquered through United States Army experiments in Cuba. More recent successes include thoracic and plastic surgery; the rehabilitation of the wounded (including prosthetic devices); psychology and psychiatry.

In aviation medicine, the talents of physician, physiologist and engineer are joined in a continuing and systematic research program to cope with such problems as high-speed and high-altitude flight. Submarine medicine involves entirely unique problems of decompression and of survival under hazardous conditions. Explorers in environmental medicine consider that servicemen may have to live and fight from the equatorial Tropics to the nethermost Arctic. Systematic research in the hazards of irradiation is currently in progress. Much of this work is the responsibility of governmental agencies, including the three services and their research establishments, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, the Armed Forces Library, etc.

Now, at the midcentury point, both military and civilian medicine stand together at their highest level in history.

MEDICAL CARE IN THE FIELD

The quality and extent of medical benefits provided to servicemen cannot be appraised apart from the basic military mission of the medical service. That mission is to maintain the highest possible level of combat effectiveness in peace and war, and to this end the skills of the medical profession are exercised within the rigid framework of command. Their exercise is conditioned by the nature of the major force mission, the mode of warfare, the type of battlefield encountered, and the hazards of environment. These latter increase as man

leaves his terrestrial environment and engages in aerial or submarine warfare.

The care provided in the armed services is further conditioned by the type of population served. Fighting forces are mobilized from the younger male population who meet certain physical and mental standards. Hence, care does not have to be provided, as in the civilian population, for the chronically ill. On the other hand, new and specialized problems arise. There are intangible problems associated with the sudden transplantation of a young civilian into a regimented military pattern. There are the inevitable hazards of disease and epidemic when a large cross-section of the civilian population is suddenly brought together in crowded barracks or tents. Finally, combat injuries and wounds are complicated always by the danger of infection.

As the periphery of the battlefield has become world-wide, systems of hospitalization and evacuation have been developed to provide the seriously sick and wounded with specialist care with the least possible delay. The Letterman system developed during the Civil War provided for the systematic controlled evacuation of the sick and wounded from the battlefield. For overseas forces during the two subsequent wars—Spanish-American and World War I—hospital ships traversed the ocean lanes to carry the patient from the overseas battlefield to the Zone of Interior. In World War II the use of mass air evacuation made it possible to transport the patient from the battlefield to a hospital with such speed that he sometimes arrived before he had recovered from the effects of analgesia. During the Korean war the helicopter picked up the wounded from the scene of battle, sometimes within a matter of minutes. In addition to speedy evacuation, the administration of whole blood to the patient at the front and in flight increased his chances of survival immeasurably. Another important development has been the organization of surgical teams of specialists who are flown to the battlefront.

This complicated system of logistics from which military patients benefit has no counterpart in civilian circles. On the other hand, the civilian has not been arbitrarily placed in a danger zone where he is subject to the hazards of warfare and disease.

SHORT-TERM CASES AND SPECIALTY CARE

Having been wounded or stricken with disease, the serviceman receives medical care of a caliber equal to the best available to his civilian contemporaries. Short term cases may be treated on a day-to-day basis. Specialty care is provided at such large centers as the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md., which rate among the finest in the land. Centers located at geographically dispersed points concentrate on certain specialties such as thoracic or plastic surgery.

Where the civilian might be ordered home for rest and family care, the serviceman is hospitalized to prevent the spreading of infection. Comparisons of the quantity and quality of medical care received in the Armed Forces and in civilian life obviously cannot be based upon the relative frequency of hospitalization or its duration.

AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL FACILITIES

The medical care received by either servicemen or civilians must be within the range of available facilities. Shortages of physicians, nurses and others with related skills have been felt throughout our history. Since the Armed Forces take first priority in time of emergency, civilian shortages of medical and dental service tend to increase as a war continues. At the beginning of World War II there was approximately 1 effective private practitioner of medicine to every 1,022 persons in the United States. By the end of 1943 the number had been reduced to approximately 1 to 1,500. Nor was the shortage uniform. In 1944 almost all of the Southern States and 1 or 2 Mountain States had ratios approximating 1 effective physician to 2,000 population.

Nor have the armed services always been adequately supplied with medical services. In a period of rapid mobilization there has often been a timelag before the resources of the medical profession could be organized. Once the organization has begun to function at full speed, however, the staffing ratio of medical officers has catapulted and the composition of the medical organization by specialty has become both balanced and effective.

Tables 18, 19, and 20, which follow, show the rates of admissions, noneffectiveness, nonbattle death rates and case fatality rates for the various armed services in each conflict since 1861.

TABLE 18.—*Selected indexes of the extent and quality of military medical care: U. S. Army during war periods*

Period	Admissions, all causes		Noneffectiveness, total		Wounded who died subsequently (percent)	Annual nonbattle death rate [1]
	Number	Annual rate [1]	Man-days lost	Daily rate [1]		
Civil War (May 1861 to June 1866)	[2] 6,454,834	[2] 2,477.9	([3])	([3])	13.3	[4] 68.69
Spanish-American War (1898)	317,195	2,146.2	[5] 4,355,000	[5] 80.7	6.3	25.94
World War I (April 1917 to December 1919)	4,038,622	978.2	86,946,648	57.7	[6] 8.1	15.43
World War II (1942–45) [7]	17,919,340	704.4	413,393,000	44.5	4.5	3.03
Korean conflict (1950–53)	2,716,763	511.3	49,810,049	25.7	2.6	1.99
Present (1954)	554,320	390.5	[8] 7,467,503	14.4	----------	1.48

[1] Numbers per 1,000 average strength.
[2] Based on incomplete reporting; rate has been computed on the basis of the strength of units reporting.
[3] Data not available.
[4] Rate applies to the period April 1861 to July 1865 only.
[5] Estimated separately for disease and injury for the total Army on the basis of average duration in the Regular Army and admission rates in the total Army 1898.
[6] Excludes gas casualties.
[7] For data on battle cases, the period used was Dec. 7, 1941 to Dec. 31, 1945.
[8] Estimated from the number of patients remaining weekly, based on the morbidity report (DD form 442)

TABLE 19.—*Selected indexes of the extent and quality of military medical care: U. S. Navy and Marine Corps during war periods*

Period	Admissions, all causes [1]		Noneffectiveness, total		Wounded who died subsequently (percent)	Annual nonbattle death rate [2]
	Number	Annual rate [2]	Man-days lost	Daily rate [2]		
Civil War (May 1861 to June 1866)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Spanish-American War (1898)	24,885	1,037.5	247,705	28.3	5.9	17.6
World War I (1917–19)	1,073,453	1,024.1	12,705,303	33.2	9.0	11.6
World War II (1942–45)	5,514,347	553.3	115,700,054	31.8	3.2	2.8
Korean conflict (1950–53)	1,199,935	337.3	23,997,635	18.5	2.2	1.9
Present (1954)	285,241	296.7	4,805,866	13.7	(4)	1.8

[1] Includes battle casualty data. New admissions from a duty status only.
[2] Numbers per 1,000 average strength.
[3] Not available.
[4] Not applicable.

TABLE 20.—*Selected indexes of the extent and quality of military medical care: U. S. Air Force, Korean conflict and 1954*

[USAF personnel, worldwide, wherever stationed]

Period	Admissions, all causes		Noneffectiveness, total		Wounded who died subsequently (percent) [2]	Annual nonbattle death rate [1]
	Number	Annual rate [1]	Man-days lost	Daily rate [1]		
Korean conflict (1950–53)	1,006,586	321	14,952,312	13.1	2.9	2.50
Present (1954)	249,779	279	3,590,496	11.0	----------	2.08

[1] Expressed as numbers per 1,000 average strength.
[2] Case fatality based on 11 died of wounds among 379 wounded in action.

TRENDS

The foregoing tables bear indelible evidence to the remarkable progress of medical science and its applications during periods shown. Such reductions as those for the Navy and Marine Corps in the annual nonbattle death rate, from 17.6 in 1898 to 1.8 in 1954, can be described as astonishing. So can the fact that the man wounded in Korea had six times the recovery chances of the serviceman wounded in the Civil War. The drop in the nonbattle death rate (Army) from 68.69 in the Civil War period to 1.48 per 1,000 average strength per year, as shown in table 18 is nothing short of incredible.

The trend is obvious.

CONCLUSION

Like that of the population generally, the level of health enjoyed by servicemen and women in 1955 exceeded the level for any previous generation. The individual who serves in peacetime receives medical care that is probably better than that afforded by the average civilian. And combat medicine has reached the stage where a Navy surgeon could boast, "If the man was alive when we reached him, 99 times out of a hundred we could pull him through."

The Defense Department report does not contain the significant story, but nothing could be more indicative of the efficacy of modern military medicine than the recent statement of a Navy surgeon. "I'm getting worried. I've performed over a thousand amputations

without the loss of a single patient, and I figure the percentage is getting too good. There's always got to be a first time." The percentage was almost the other way around when the Navy launched its first hospital ship—the *Red Rover*—in 1863.

In spite of chronic shortages of professional personnel, and the potential threat of new health hazards from thermonuclear warfare, the future for continued topnotch medical care for servicemen and civilians alike seems bright. And in the event of an atomic war, it may be far brighter for the well-protected serviceman than for the average civilian. On this point, the Defense Department report does not prognosticate.

However, the report does point with justifiable pride to the record of modern military medicine. A record directly related to statistics concerning mortality and combat service—a subject discussed in the following brief.

Chapter X. Mortality and Combat Service

HAZARDS OF COMBAT

No one can (or would want to) gloss over the fact that war means killing, and servicemen face possible death the moment they come in contact with the enemy. From American Revolution to Civil War, "contact" literally meant just that. Fought at close range, battles began when opposing forces drew within gunshot of each other, and often ended with bayonet or cutlass assaults and desperate hand-to-hand grappling.

The increasing range of artillery and the introduction of high-altitude bombing extended "contact" distances until the term, as used today, is almost metaphorical. So-called storming operations and occasional assault missions to wipe out stubborn "points of resistance" incurred close-contact fighting in World War II and Korea. Soldiers hurled grenades and Marines cleaned out enemy strong points with liquid fire, but bayonet attacks became as obsolescent as torpedo attacks delivered by Navy destroyers. Modern battles are usually fought at long range. Sweeping with radar, opposing naval forces opened fire or launched air strikes at enemy ships miles over the horizon. Similarly, land artillerymen fired at targets many miles away. Seldom was the enemy visible to the infantryman in battle. Today the cutlass is as obsolete as the cavalry saber. Rockets, guided missiles, and buzz bombs extended combat ranges to incredible distances during World War II, and added incredible destructiveness to firepower.

In addition to increased range and firepower, weapons have acquired in the past several decades incredible accuracy. Civil War marksmanship was about what it had been during the Revolution. The infantryman's rifle was a considerable improvement over the old smoothbore musket. But artillery fire control was largely hit or miss, and in naval actions (e.g., *Monitor* bersus *Merrimack* and *Hartford* versus *Tennessee*) the cannon literally blazed mouth to mouth. Naval-gun range during the Spanish-American War was about 3 miles. The German "Big Bertha" of World War I lobbed a projectile about 75 miles, but the aim was highly inaccurate. However, by World

War II a battleship salvo could land squarely on a target 20 miles distant—and spot the sinking by means of electronic radar.

In the face of weapons possessing such destructive power and pinpoint accuracy, one might expect a concomitant rise in combat casualties and fatalities. Somewhat surprisingly, statistics show the reverse to be true in the periods covered by the Civil War and World War I.

As shown in table 21 battle deaths on the Union side during the Civil War were approximately 140,000. Of the total serving in the Federal Armed Forces almost 1 out of every 16 men met death by combat.

TABLE 21.—*Service and mortality experiences of Armed Forces from Civil War to present*

Service [1]	Total number serving	Number serving overseas	Deaths among battle casualties	Wounds not mortal
Civil War (Union Forces) (April 1861–April 1865), total	2,213,363	(2)	----------	----------
Army	2,128,948	(2)	138,154	288,040
Navy	84,415	(2)	2,112	1,710
Marines			148	131
Spanish-American War (April–August 1898), total	307,296	(3)	386	1,654
Army [4]	280,564	80,000	369	1,594
Navy [5]	22,875	(3)	10	47
Marines	3,857	2,171	7	13
World War I [6] (April 1917–November 1918), total	4,734,991	2,523,706	53,398	203,376
Army	4,057,101	2,120,000	50,510	193,663
Navy	599,051	358,474	431	819
Marines	78,839	45,232	2,457	8,894
World War II (December 1941–August 1945), total	15,203,159	11,166,416	291,557	670,846
Army	10,420,000	7,100,000	234,874	565,861
Navy [7]	4,183,466	3,639,615	36,950	37,778
Marines	599,693	426,801	19,733	67,207
Korean operation (July 1950–July 1953), total	5,875,331	2,786,661	33,647	103,259
Army	2,830,800	1,863,800	27,704	77,596
Navy [8]	1,335,657	254,590	476	1,551
Marines	423,897	164,800	4,267	23,744
Air Force	1,284,977	503,471	1,200	368
Present (July 1954–June 1955), total	3,616,357	1,573,289	(2)	(2)
Army [9]	1,336,000	576,000	(2)	(2)
Navy	864,984	543,210	(2)	(2)
Marines	259,176	47,582	(2)	(2)
Air Force	1,156,197	406,497	(2)	(2)

[1] Concerning war dates, see footnote a, table 1.
[2] Not applicable.
[3] Not available.
[4] Army served overseas represents war service personnel who departed from continental United States through December 1898; for period of hostilities only an estimated 52,000 or 19 percent served outside continental United States.
[5] Navy deaths among battle casualties do not include those lost in the sinking of the *Maine*. The *Maine* disaster occurred in February 1898, two months before hostilities.
[6] Army and Marine casualty data include gassed in action; Army data include casualties in northern Russia to Aug. 25, 1919, and in Siberia to Apr. 1, 1920; Marine data represent casualties in Europe only.
[7] Navy data for World War II cover period December 1941–December 1946; includes casualties incurred in October 1941 due to hostile action.
[8] Navy data for Korean operation cover period July 1950–January 1955; serving overseas represents Far East area only.
[9] Army total serving and serving overseas represents man-years rather than individuals.

Source: Department of Defense.

Some Civil War battle casualties were terrific. The Defense Department report does not detail these specifics, but at Shiloh the Union Army lost 13,000 out of 63,000 engaged—about 1 man out of 5. In the Battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam), Union casualties were 11,500 out of 70,000. At Cold Harbor, Grant lost 12,000 out of some 90,000 men in an engagement that lasted about half an hour. Casualties suggestive, if not typical, were suffered by the 108th New York Volunteers—a regiment that entered the war in 1862 a thousand strong and ended up at Appomattox with 101 survivors.

By comparison, Spanish-American War combat casualties were light, indeed. But Spanish resistance in Cuba and the Phillippines was so weak as to be almost negligible. The enemy's vaunted Gonzalez Hontoria gun was nine-tenths propaganda. Spanish marksmanship was substandard, and so were Spanish infantry rifles. At San Juan Hill they used a spring-gun which lobbed sticks of dynamite like a sort of slingshot. The Spanish Navy's battle fleet proved a joke—a mythical armada invented by yellow journalism. Crossing the Atlantic, half of the squadron broke down. The Spanish flagship had lame engines, and Spain's best cruiser, the *Cristobal Colon*, sailed without her turret guns. Opposing these crippled and rusty warships were the new steel cruisers and heavily armed battleships of the United States Navy. No contest.

But enemy forces in World War I—the Imperial German U-boat fleet and the crack armies of Von Hindenburg and Ludendorf—constituted stupendous and deadly opposition. However, there is a surprising contrast between Civil War casualties and those suffered by the A. E. F. in World War I.

Table 22 shows the number of deaths and rate per 1,000 man-years—a revealing statistical picture. Note the Civil War combat mortality rate of 40.1 and the World War I combat mortality rate of 17.1. And the rate drops to 8.6 in World War II, and to 3.4 in the Korean war.

76907—56——6

TABLE 22.—*Mortality rates of Armed Forces from Civil War to present*

Period and service	Man-years	Number of deaths and rate per 1,000 man-years					
		Total		Among battle casualties		Other	
		Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
Civil War, total	(1)	364,471	104.4	140,414	40.1	224,057	64.3
Army [2]	3,437,000	359,528	104.6	138,154	40.2	221,374	64.4
Navy	(1)	4,523	(1)	2,112	(1)	2,411	(1)
Marines	11,115	420	37.8	148	13.3	272	24.5
Spanish-American War, total	(1)	2,695	36.6	386	(1)	(1)	(1)
Army [3]	65,700	2,430	37.0	369	5.6	2,061	31.4
Navy	(1)	248	(1)	10	(1)	0	(1)
Marines	1,155	17	14.7	7	6.1	10	8.6
World War I, total	(1)	116,950	35.5	53,398	17.1	63,552	18.4
Army [4]	3,021,000	106,378	35.2	50,510	16.7	55,868	18.5
Navy	(1)	7,287	(1)	431	(1)	6,856	(1)
Marines	66,296	3,285	49.9	2,457	37.1	828	12.4
World War II, total	33,714,485	393,050	11.6	291,557	8.6	101,493	3.0
Army	23,407,000	306,874	13.1	234,874	10.0	72,000	3.1
Navy [5]	8,862,225	62,614	7.1	36,950	4.2	25,664	2.9
Marines	1,445,260	23,562	16.3	19,733	13.7	3,829	2.6
Korean operation, total	10,013,158	54,721	5.5	33,647	3.4	21,074	2.1
Army	4,418,500	36,704	8.3	27,704	6.3	9,000	2.0
Navy [6]	2,230,503	4,543	2.0	476	0.2	4,067	1.8
Marines	830,084	5,785	6.9	4,267	5.1	1,518	1.8
Air Force	2,534,071	7,689	3.0	1,200	0.5	6,489	2.5
Present, total	3,202,851	5,399	1.7	(7)	(7)	5,399	1.7
Army	1,336,000	1,900	1.4	(7)	(7)	1,900	1.4
Navy	692,383	1,145	1.7	(7)	(7)	1,145	1.7
Marines	216,859	415	1.9	(7)	(7)	415	1.9
Air Force	957,609	1,939	2.0	(7)	(7)	1,939	2.0

[1] Not available.
[2] Army man-years and deaths other than battle casualties cover period April 1861–June 1866.
[3] Army man-years and deaths other than battle casualties cover period April–December 1898.
[4] Army man-years and deaths other than battle casualties cover period April 1917–December 1918.
[5] Navy data for World War II cover period December 1941–December 1946; includes casualties incurred in October 1941 due to hostile action.
[6] Navy data for Korean operation cover period July 1950–January 1955; serving overseas represents Far East area only.
[7] Not applicable.

Source: Department of Defense.

In the light of tremendous increases in weapon range, firepower, and the destructive power of modern bombs and projectiles, the precipitate decline of United States combat losses since the Civil War seems phenomenal.

FACTORS AFFECTING DEATH RATE

Of course there are many factors contributing to the phenomenon in discussion. Even as ancient warfare featured a contest between sword and shield, modern warfare features the opposing symbols of projectile and armor. High-powered weapons are countered with scientific defenses. Pinpoint marksmanship is answered with cunning camouflage, and super blockbusters may be countered with underground forts or evasive, high-speed maneuvering.

As has been noted, military medicine has paced the march of 20th century science, and combat wounds once considered deadly are no

longer fatal. Another important factor affecting the combat-death rate lies in the application of modern survival techniques—the manner in which modern servicemen are trained to avoid needless exposure and to employ concealments and cover.

The Defense Department report does not emphasize the fact, but a major factor in the decline of American battle deaths manifestly has to do with the manner in which American troops have been employed in combat operations. Not since the Civil War have American infantrymen been hurled in frontal assaults at enemy fortifications which have not been previously softened by prolonged bombardment. The wholesale sacrifice of troops might be used as a measure of extreme desperation, but such sacrifice is no longer tolerated as a normal tactic for either offense or defense. The American character abhors suicide missions. Neither in World Wars I and II, nor in Korea, was there an American combat leader like Nazi General Von Bock. Known as The Deather, Von Bock expounded the maxim, "A soldier's life is like a coin; it is no good until it is spent." The modern American leader who espoused such a spendthrift policy would have been court-martialed.

COMBAT DUTY AND OVERSEAS SERVICE

It has been remarked that overseas service in wartime is usually associated with combat duty. However, there is no precise definition of "combat area." Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps variously interpret the term. Because of submarine warfare, any part of the ocean anywhere on the globe may be a potential naval combat area. During World War I, U-boat water was largely confined to the eastern Atlantic—the so-called Red Zone. Soon after America's entry into World War II, the Germans launched operation Paukenschlag off the coasts of Jersey and Florida, and thousands of tons of shipping were sunk in American waters. A U-boat even penetrated the harbor at Casco, Maine, making a combat area of that region. Late in the war a massive schnorkel submarine strike was launched from the Baltic, with Boston and New York as intended targets. Fortunately alerted, Navy hunter-killers intercepted the Nazi subs in mid-Atlantic. But the last U-boat was downed at the entrance of Long Island Sound—another local combat area.

Similarly aerial warfare extended combat areas across seas and continents, blanketing the skies over battlefields and homefront cities. Today there is virtually no geographic dividing line between forward and rear ground area, advance post and no Man's Land, battlefront, and homefront. Long-rage bombers, rockets, and guided missiles tend to obliterate these once-recognized distinctions.

But in consideration of the fact that World Wars I and II and the Korean war were waged overseas, one may generally construe that the troops who went overseas served in combat areas, if only while crossing the ocean (Korean troop lifts excepted). It did not follow, however, that all of the personnel shipped overseas saw actual combat. Thousands of troops arrived at the tag-end of hostilities. Many thousands more served with support forces far from the scenes of action. They were in combat areas subject to possible air raid or V-bomb attack, but such attacks failed in many instances to materialize.

The first part of table 23 (below) gives the number of soldiers and marines who served in combat during World War I. It also gives the ratio of battle deaths and casualties for those who saw combat.

Similar statistics are lacking for other war periods. However, table 23 (B) gives the percentages of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel sent overseas during World War II and the Korean war. Also shown is the average time (number of months) served overseas during hostilities and up to demobilization. Reference to battle deaths and casualties among the services (table B) will afford a rough percentage picture of service losses in relation to combat duty during World War I, World War II, and the Korean War.

TABLE 23

A. RATIO OF PERSONNEL IN COMBAT SERVICE

	Total Army and Marines	Army	Marines
World War 1:			
Number served in combat	1,421,062	1,400,000	21,062
Ratio of total served (percent)	34	35	27
Duration of combat service (days)	(1)	(1)	49
For those who saw combat:			
Ratio of deaths (percent)	4	4	12
Ratio of nonmortal wounds (percent)	14	14	42

[1] Not available.

STATE COLLEGE OF APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
73
MANHATTAN
KANSAS

TABLE 23—Continued

B. PERCENT OF PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

Period and service	Percent of total who served overseas [1]	Average months hostilities only	Served overseas hostilities and demobilization (months) [2]
Civil War, total	(3)	(3)	
Army	(3)	(3)	
Navy	(3)	(3)	
Marines	66	(3)	(3)
Spanish-American War, total	29	1.5	(3)
Army [4]	29	1.5	6
Navy	(3)	(3)	
Marines	56	3.3	(3)
World War I, total	53	5.5	11.0
Army	52	5.5	11.0
Navy	60	(3)	(3)
Marines	57	5.7	12.5
World War II, total	73	16.2	(3)
Army [7]	75	16.0	20
Navy [4]	87	(3)	(3)
Marines	71	18.8	(3)
Korean operation, total	56	13.4	(3)
Army	66	12.5	(3)
Navy [5]	19	(3)	(3)
Marines	39	[8] 13.0	
Air Force	39	[9] 17.0	
Present, total	44	(3)	(3)
Army [6]	43		
Navy	63		
Marines	18	(10)	(10)
Air Force	35	(11)	(11)

SOURCES AND NOTES

Data herein, representing the latest available information, may differ from previously published data because of differences in period covered, additional research, and refinement of definitions.

[1] Total percentage for Spanish-American War based on Army and Marines only, for Korean operation excludes Navy (see footnote 5).

[2] Totals (weighted averages) exclude Navy.

[3] Not available.

[4] Army served overseas represents war service personnel who departed from continental United States through December 1898; for period of hostilities only an estimated 52,000 or 19 percent served outside continental United States.

[5] Navy data for Korean operation cover period July 1950–January 1955; serving overseas represents Far East area only.

[6] Army total serving and serving overseas represents man-years rather than individuals.

[7] Army percentage and average months served overseas based on 2 percent personnel survey as of June 30, 1945.

[8] Weighted average computed on basis of tour of duty of personnel in the combat zone and those in other oversea assignments.

[9] Average for airmen, based on sample survey, November 1952; average for officers was 18 months.

[10] Weighted average computed on basis of tours of duty is 17 months.

[11] Average overseas service for officers was 23 months, for airmen 22 months, based on sample survey, August 1954.

TRENDS

In respect to the number of military personnel sent overseas for service in actual or potential combat areas, and the average time served overseas, the trends are unfavorable.

In respect to combat fatalities and deaths from other causes, the trend for American servicemen has been phenomenally favorable since the Civil War.

There remains the problem imposed by the advent of the atom bomb and thermonuclear warfare (not discussed in the Defense Department report). The A-bomb and its H-bomb successor have unquestionably introduced combat hazards beyond anything known to warfare in the past. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki all the strategic and tactical concepts of Jomini and Clausewitz expired in the mushroom holocaust. Adding many megatons to firepower and destructiveness, the H-bomb defies anything more than conjecture concerning so-called mega-deaths.

If such information as has been published on the subject is reliable, fatalities and casualties from atomic warfare are certain to be extremely high. But it seems a safe assumption that some measure of defense against thermonuclear weapons will be devised by the military. As in the past wars of this century there will be no deliberate, wholesale sacrifice of American troops in the field.

CONCLUSION

While American military casualties and fatalities have precipitately declined since the Civil War, this phenomenon may not be taken as indicative of a decline in war's destructiveness.

Civilian casualties have mounted to ghastly figures during the "total wars" of the present century. As those wars were waged overseas, the American public has been spared the death and devastation wrought by modern weapons—an American city has not been under siege since Vicksburg. But almost every civilian populace in Europe has suffered from bombardment, blockade, aerial assault, or military invasion.

Governments are reluctant to publish vital statistics on civilian war casualties. For example, the British authorities maintained a tight censorship of casualties incurred by the Zeppelin raids on London in World War I and by the Luftwaffe raids of World War II. German and Russian official statistics were similarly censored or "juggled." It would appear that in such cases the figures should be revised upward.

Careful estimates indicate that over 10 million European civilians perished in World War I—either slain outright, dying of wounds, or succumbing to disease and starvation incident to the war.

During World War II the civilian death toll rose to an estimated 23 million. The figure includes the vast slaughters in China and Russia (1 million deaths in Leningrad alone) and the casualties inflicted on the Japanese.

Some idea of civilian casualties in the event of a thermonuclear war may be conceived by reference to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1949 the Hiroshima civilian casualty toll was estimated by United States authorities as 78,150; the Nagasaki toll as 23,753. However, the

mayor of Hiroshima reported 247,000 casualties, and Japanese statisticians totaled Nagasaki civilian casualties as 73,884.[1]

Subsequent development of the thermonuclear H-bomb, guided missiles carrying atomic warheads, and intercontinental atomic rockets promises wholesale massacre of civilian populations in the event of another major war.

According to Civil Defense estimates [2] some 8 million American civilians would die on the day of attack, assuming 14 out of 58 target cities were struck by bombs in the "megaton range bursting at ground level". Another 8 million people would die after the first day. An estimated 8 million would require "varying degrees of medical care".

The Civil Defense assumption relates to only one (the first) attack. And the attack described does not feature the newly developed H-bomb.

A study of the situation leads to the conjecture that the trained serviceman, in such a war, may be in a far safer "spot" than the civilian noncombatant.

Chapter XI. Military Pay

serviceman's stipend

It was long the contention of the man in uniform that he was grossly underpaid for his services. Certainly this was true in early times when the conscripted peasant or the impressed seaman was so much "cannon fodder" in the wars that were the sport of kings. To a great extent it remained true of the handful that held the line at Valley Forge and Yorktown in the bankrupt Continental Army. Again, the American forces who won the Great Lakes in 1812 received a pittance for their exploit. So did the pioneer troops who gained for the Nation the golden Pacific Coast. So did the volunteers who fought through campaign after campaign in the war to preserve the Union.

It was in recognition of the meager stipends paid the Revolutionary soldier, the 1812 volunteer, the Mexican War trooper and the average "Boy in Blue" that an indebted country initially approved generous pensions as fair awards due valient fighting men. The Nation was unwilling to see deserving veterans—especially those disabled in line of duty or those who had failed to share in the national prosperity—suffer from eventual poverty or lack of care.

Moreover, many contemporary Americans who had been in the wartime civilian populace—in particular those who had profited from war-boom enterprises—felt deeply obligated to the Nation's defenders. Pensions, purses and bonuses were a means of compensating for the disparity between serviceman's pay and civilian's earnings.

However, that disparity in many cases was not so great as the advertised military pay rates made it appear. Except when campaigning in the field under adverse conditions, the average early-American trooper or the Union soldier fared about as well at mess and was clothed about as well as his civilian counterpart on the farm or in the primitive factory. The serviceman was clothed and fed (officers excepted) at Government expense ("pay in kind"). Also, he

---

[1] Statistics from Life's History of World War II.

[2] Exhibit No. 17, Report by Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration, to Armed Services Subcommittee on Civil Defense, August 5, 1955.

received various monetary allowances, extra rations which he might consume or sell, free rum, and so on—small items in themselves, but in sum a considerable amount to be added when computing total pay or "gross compensation."

And the early serviceman's "basic pay" was not entirely out of line with the pay of civilian workers on comparable occupation levels. In some instances, it was better. Fathering the American Navy, John Adams sponsored a bill (subsequently passed by Congress) to pay naval seamen and officers amounts higher than counterpart merchant sailors would receive. Revolutionary soldiers suffered when paid off in dollars "not worth a Continental." But many civilians, too, were paid in devaluated Continental dollars. If times were hard at Valley Forge they were equally bitter for many an impoverished family on the Allegheny frontier, or for many a ruined tradesman in areas occupied by the Red Coats. They were similarly desperate in 1815 and in 1865 for civilian workers and tradesmen in some war-blighted occupations in depressed areas of the country.

In assessing the early serviceman's "gross compensation" another item must be taken into account. In reference: military "loot" (or comparable Navy "prize money"). The matter is not discussed in detail in the Defense Department report on military pay. But booty and prize money were authorized "gains" in the early American military forces. They comprised a substantial dividend for many a uniformed fighting man.

Of course, not every serviceman shared in military loot or naval prize money. Luck was where one found it. But even during the Revolutionary War some of the troops, raiding enemy supply bases or pillaging Tory households, garnered bonanzas. Numbers of American soldiers returned from Mexico with their packs laden with valuables. "To the victor belongs the spoils," said War Secretary Marcy. Although wholesale looting was frowned upon by many American leaders, the practice was continued during the Civil War as consonant with military tradition. Outstanding examples: The loot garnered by Butler's invading forces at New Orleans and by Sherman's troops storming through Georgia. (Parenthetically, the spoils were not generally composed of "old family silver." They included clothing, furniture, and almost anything the trooper could carry or ship home. The Union soldiery also cashed in on great tonnages of captured cotton and on cattle herds. Enormous prize-money awards went to Union sailors who captured blockade runners laden with million-dollar cargoes.)

When one considers the record, then, it becomes apparent that although the basic pay rates were relatively low, the serviceman gained additional emolument through allowances, "pay in kind," and, perhaps, authorized booty or prize money recognized as spoils to be won through the "fortunes of war."

ADVERSE INTANGIBLES

The foregoing, of course, shows the best side of the military pay coin, circa 1780–1865. On the other side of the coin were a number of devaluating intangibles. Not the least of these was the fact that the serviceman in wartime was often put to grueling tasks which had no counterpart in civilian life. For example, the civilian laborer of the Civil War period might work for 10 or 12 hours a day, but the service-

man on a work detail might labor from dawn to dark, then be ordered to mount guard half the night. In addition to exhausting workloads, servicemen were forced to endure disciplines and restraints which civilian workers would have considered intolerable. (No shop foreman had the authority of an infantry sergeant, and in the Navy minor mistakes as well as offenses were punishable by cat-o'-nine-tails.) The difference between the military and the civilian job was, and is, of course, compulsion.

There were other deleterious intangibles. Not the least of which was service on foreign station or in region far from home—meaning disruption of the serviceman's domestic or family life. For the non-professional citizen soldier, military pay might prove slim compensation for long separation from farmstead or urban home.

Again, in recognition of these adverse intangibles and manifest ordeals, the Government endeavored to balance the military-pay rates with civilian by increasing the serviceman's pay and allowances, and bettering service conditions. In the post-Civil War period workloads were reduced to bring them into conformity (under normal situations) with civilian counterparts. As noted in a previous section of this monograph, military foods, clothing, and housing ("pay in kind") were consistently improved. Draconian disciplinary measures were outlawed (for example, Army offenders could no longer be "spread-eagled", and flogging was abolished in the Navy). All of which made military careers more attractive for enlisted men and officers alike.

A comparison of present military-pay rates with modern civilian wages and salaries shows a considerable abbreviation of the gap which formerly existed and a great improvement insofar as enlisted ranks are concerned. True, the pay for officers and for service technicians and specialists is not up to civilian levels in comparable fields, and one must take into account the adverse intangibles that remain on the military side of the ledger. Compulsory service, military discipline (imposed on officers and men alike), service far from home, with consequent domestic maladjustment and financial strains—these remain to be borne "out of pocket" by the man in uniform. But there are civilian intangibles, too. For example, layoffs and shutdowns—costly earning breaks which do not occur in military service. Also many civilian jobs prove onerous. Many professions exact severe disciplines, long hours, intensive effort, grueling drill (the medical profession, the stage, scientific research, music). The policeman and fireman, the "sandhog", the high iron-worker, the steel puddler, the troubleshooting lineman—these and many others hold jobs that entail discipline, long hours, and risk.

Thus it seems apparent that differences between military compensation and civilian wages and salaries have, to some extent, diminished. Data from the Department of Defense and from the Department of Labor provide the material for a statistical picture of the pay situation, as follows:

HIGHER PAY FOR THE ARMED FORCES

The pay of military personnel has been increased materially since World War I and, in particular, since the enactment of the Career Compensation Act of 1949—legislation designed to establish rates of pay for military grades comparable to those paid in industry for jobs

demanding equal responsibility or capability. Additional increases were enacted in 1952 and 1955 to offset increases in the cost of living after 1949, and to provide incentives for military personnel to serve on a career basis. If one notes the high preponderance in the Armed Forces of young and inexperienced men, and the various items of pay "in kind" or in the form of special compensation, it becomes apparent that a pronounced disparity between the pay of military personnel and that of civilian workers no longer exists, particularly for enlisted personnel.

GROSS COMPENSATION

In appraising the compensation of military personnel, one must take into account the elements which make up the total or "gross" compensation—an amount roughly comparable to what a civilian worker might earn. The three elements are (1) "basic pay"; (2) allowances in cash to officers, and maintenance "in kind" or "quarters" and "family" allowances for enlisted men; and (3) special items, such as incentive pays, Government services including medical care, and tax exemptions.

"Basic pay" represents only that part of the total compensation which an enlisted man receives in cash. Since the man also receives food, clothing, and shelter, his basic pay usually represents about half of his true compensation. The misconception that today's servicemen are grossly underpaid derives in part from thinking in terms of the rates shown in "basic pay" tables and failing to take into account the maintenance provided "in kind." (For officers, "basic pay" rates are supplemented by cash allowances for quarters and subsistence, which increase basic pay by about 35 percent at the present time.)

The following tables show a comparison of the average pay in the Armed Forces, first (table 24) on the "basic pay" basis and secondly (table 25) on the more inclusive basis, embracing the value of food, clothing, and shelter provided "in kind" (or as family allowances) to enlisted men or as cash allowances to officers.

As is shown in table 24, the average "basic pay" in the Armed Forces from Civil War days to the present has increased from $231 per man to $2,067—a ninefold increase. From the index in the lower half of the table it can be seen that "basic pay" on the average from World War I to the present has undergone a fourfold increase for enlisted men and little more than doubled for officers. Of course, civilian pay also increased nearly fourfold between 1918 and 1954. (See table 27, p. 84.)

TABLE 24.—*Military basic pay rates, 1865–1955*

[Weighted averages, annual rates]

Year	Basic pay (excluding allowances) in current dollars			Cost-of-living index 1947–49=100	Basic pay (excluding allowances) in constant 1947–49 dollars		
	Officers	Enlisted	All personnel		Officers	Enlisted	All personnel
BASIC PAY RATES							
1865	$717	$202	$231	43	$1,667	$470	$537
1898	2,101	205	282	32	6,566	641	881
1918	2,141	417	510	64	3,345	652	797
1945	2,442	856	1,017	76.9	3,176	1,113	1,322
1952	4,453	1,473	1,776	113.5	3,923	1,298	1,776
1955	5,004	1,672	2,067	114.5	5,004	1,460	1,805
INDEX OF BASIC PAY RATES (1918=100)							
1865	33	48	45	67	50	72	67
1898	98	49	55	50	196	98	111
1918	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1945	114	205	199	120	95	171	166
1952	208	353	348	177	117	199	223
1955	234	401	405	179	150	224	226

NOTE.—These figures cover only the basic pay rates and do not include either allowances or the other items noted at the bottom of table 25.

TABLE 25.—*Military gross compensation rates, 1865–1955*

[Weighted averages, annual rates]

Year	Basic pay plus allowances (including "in kind") in current dollars			Cost-of-living index 1947–49=100	Basic pay plus allowances in constant 1947–49 dollars		
	Officers	Enlisted	All personnel		Officers	Enlisted	All personnel
RATES OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES							
1865	$1,912	$427	$510	43	$4,447	$993	$1,186
1898	2,489	444	528	32	7,778	1,388	1,650
1918	2,698	870	968	64	4,216	1,359	1,513
1945	3,777	1,587	1,811	76.9	4,911	2,063	2,355
1952	6,234	2,584	2,940	113.5	5,492	2,277	2,590
1955	6,787	2,742	3,222	114.5	5,928	2,395	2,814
INDEX OF PAY AND ALLOWANCE RATES (1918=100)							
1865	71	49	53	67	105	73	78
1898	92	51	55	50	185	102	109
1918	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1945	140	182	187	120	116	152	156
1952	231	297	304	177	130	168	171
1955	252	315	333	179	141	176	186

NOTE.—The above figures cover the value of quarters, food, and clothing, both in the form of cash allowances to officers and "in kind" to enlisted men. However, they do not include the value of medical care, income-tax exemptions, recreational facilities, flight, combat, and other hazardous-duty pays, transportation, Government insurance benefits, etc. The omission of these latter items results in an understatement of the level of military compensation; also, to the extent that these subsidiary items have been introduced in recent years or been improved in quality and extent, the upward trend in military compensation is not fully reflected.

The figures in tables 24 and 25 are given in both the dollars of each period cited (i. e., "current dollars") and in dollars of 1947–49 purchasing power. Translation of the figures in current dollars to dollars of constant (i. e., 1947–49) purchasing power was made by means of the Labor Department's Consumer Price Index carried back from 1913 to 1865 by a series calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Consumption habits and consumer prices have changed materially since the Civil War period. The figures for the 19th century in 1947–49 dollars must therefore be used with reservation, and a recognition that they are at best approximations.

	1947–49=100	1918=100
1865	43	67
1898	32	50
1918	64	100
1945	76.9	120
1952	113.5	177
1955	114.5	179

Even allowing for the decline in value of the purchasing power of the dollar according to the above index, it can readily be seen that basic pay has risen substantially through the years. For example, in 1918 the average basic pay of all military personnel in 1947–49 dollars would be equal to about $797 as compared to $1,805 in 1955, an increase of 126 percent. For enlisted men alone, on the same basis, the average in 1918 would be equal to $652, and would be $1,460 in 1955, a rise of 124 percent. The figures are admittedly rough, but the trend is clear.

Table 25 gives the figures on basic pay plus allowances. As is shown, average pay plus allowances and maintenance for all personnel in current dollars in 1865 was $510 as compared with an average of $3,222 in 1955; figures reflecting a sixfold increase. Since the average for all personnel in 1918 was only $968, there has been more than a threefold increase in the value of cash pay plus allowances between 1918 and 1955. For enlisted men alone the average of $870 in 1918 compares with $2,742 in 1955, over a threefold increase. For officers the increase during this period was only about 2½ times.

The quoted figures are in current dollars in each period. However, if they are deflated by the cost-of-living index in previous reference, the increase in real compensation from 1918 to 1955 for all personnel was 86 percent. For enlisted men alone it was 76 percent.

The third element which must be taken into account in appraising the total compensation of military personnel consists of incentive pays and special items. These include such pay items as flight or combat pay, overseas or sea-duty pay, bonuses for reenlistment, mustering-out pay or terminal-leave pay given upon separation. Data from the Department of Defense indicate that the average cost per man of the various special pay items in the various services was as follows:

Fiscal year and category	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marines	All services
1945:					
All personnel	$186	(1)	$205	$188	$191
Officers	394	(1)	379	580	396
Enlisted	163	(1)	186	157	168
1952:					
All personnel	199	$227	229	233	215
Officers	239	901	533	660	544
Enlisted	194	122	196	128	177
1955:					
All personnel	356	774	401	246	485
Officers	386	1,105	792	812	766
Enlisted	353	720	353	193	449

[1] Included in Army.

The special pays in reference are not evenly distributed among military personnel, since some get much more than others. Flight pay, of course, is almost exclusively limited to aircrews, the bulk going to personnel of the Air Force. For the most part, aircrews are composed of trained technicians with considerable service experience, hence the average draftee or 2-year man seldom qualifies in this respect.

A substantial share of the extra-hazardous-duty pay goes to submariners, underwater demolitionists, paratroopers, and men who test risky gear. Again, these servicemen are specialists, expert technicians made adept through many months of training. The average serviceman (and, of course, the draftee) would not be in line for pays in this category.

"Combat pay," as the term implies, does not go to peacetime servicemen. They may draw sea-duty pay or overseas pay, depending on service and terms of enlistment.

Nevertheless, special pays and fringe benefits constitute a substantial part of military compensation, particularly for the career serviceman. Table 26 shows the average monthly rate of various pay categories for the 19 grades in the pay structure of the Armed Forces, as of June 30, 1953. As is indicated, hazardous-duty pay goes largely to the servicemen in the higher grades while newly enlisted personnel receive only a small fraction of the disbursement. Pay for overseas service also constitutes a relatively small portion of the serviceman's gross compensation, but it is more widely distributed. Mustering-out pay is paid with a lag, but tends to be widely spread. Those who reenlist receive substantial bonuses.

TABLE 26

Average monthly rate of pay for military personnel on active duty, June 30, 1953 [1]

Grade	Base pay	Shelter [2]	Subsistence	Overseas pay and allowances	Hazardous duty	Clothing	Medical costs [3]	Reenlistment bonus	Total
O–8	$968.30	$170.28	$47.88	$2.67	$57.76	--------	$19.20	--------	$1,266.09
O–7	841.73	170.28	47.88	2.53	57.63	--------	19.28	--------	1,139.33
O–6	652.34	136.46	47.88	3.34	56.55	--------	19.27	--------	915.84
O–5	515.46	135.80	47.88	3.17	39.39	--------	19.28	--------	760.98
O–4	452.47	118.66	47.88	3.94	46.00	--------	19.24	--------	688.19
O–3	390.51	101.16	47.88	3.64	41.28	--------	19.21	--------	603.68
O–2	310.13	90.14	47.88	3.18	28.94	--------	19.27	--------	499.54
O–1	236.47	75.77	47.88	.86	17.58	--------	19.27	--------	397.83
W–4	453.63	118.60	47.88	3.15	2.19	--------	19.59	--------	645.04
W–3	362.43	100.69	47.88	2.30	1.52	--------	19.08	--------	533.90
W–2	301.20	93.07	47.88	2.76	1.58	--------	19.16	--------	465.65
W–1	250.59	84.43	47.88	2.02	2.02	--------	19.48	--------	406.42
E–7	247.45	85.12	33.46	10.15	5.42	$6.22	19.08	$3.04	409.94
E–6	200.69	78.04	33.46	10.32	4.55	5.71	19.20	2.97	354.94
E–5	165.86	69.84	33.46	8.71	2.91	5.50	19.31	2.96	308.55
E–4	131.84	62.17	33.46	8.13	1.99	4.82	19.15	2.98	264.54
E–3	103.57	54.29	33.46	5 97	1.20	6.16	19.18	2.95	226.78
E–2	87.75	53.38	33.46	3.28	.49	10.92	19.27	2.84	211.39
E–1	81.88	53.67	33.46	.66	.08	14.85	19.66	2.60	206.86
All	147.83	64.22	35.00	5.58	4.91	7.06	19.26	2.59	286.45

[1] From Retirement Policy for Federal Personnel Proposal No. 1, the Uniformed Service Retirement System: Doc. No. 89, Pt. 2, 83d Cong. 2d sess; May 1954.
[2] Includes estimated cost of shelter where furnished, plus cash "quarters" (family) allowances.
[3] Includes pay and allowances of medical military personnel.

NOTE—Personal money allowances for generals and admirals have been omitted.

As shown in the foregoing table, an item of major importance in the special category is the medical care which is provided by the Government for all military personnel and for their families where family facilities are available. Figures are not obtainable for all the services on the cost of medical care, but Army data show that in the 3 years 1945, 1952, and 1955 the cost per serviceman averaged from $334 to $434. Of course, some of the expenditure in the postwar years was for men hospitalized by battle wounds or otherwise disabled in service. And many of the younger men in uniform need little if any doctoring. Even by the standard of civilian's spending for medical care, which is about 5 percent of income on the average, the medical care in military service would appear to have a value of about $200 per year for the average serviceman.

Finally, military personnel are entitled to various tax exemptions which, in effect, mean an increase in real compensation. During World War II, military pay up to $2,400 per year was tax exempt. Similar exemptions were provided during the Korean conflict, but they were limited to servicemen who saw duty in the combat area. In addition, the maintenance provided military personnel "in kind" and all the quarters, subsistence, and family allowances are not subject to taxes. The value of these exemptions can be measured by comparing the taxes which a civilian and a military man, each with a wife and one child, would pay if they had no other income (tabulation p. 83.).

Year	Assumed total income	Federal income tax	
		Serviceman	Civilian
1945	$2,400	(1)	$184
	4,000	[2] $184	509
1955	3,800	[1] 11	329
	5,700	[2] 347	669

[1] Enlisted man.
[2] Officer.

Comparison with civilian pay

A precise comparison between the total compensation of military personnel and that of civilians is difficult to draw. Military personnel must make a number of unique expenditures incident to military life. Travel allowances seldom cover the cost of moving a household from one base or station to another. Frequent separations from families increase traveling expenses and incur other costs not covered by "total compensation." Officers' dress uniforms are expensive. So are some of the obligatory social aspects of military life. While military jobs are becoming more and more like those in the civilian realm, military occupations have many special elements. Military personnel are also selected on the basis of standards which eliminate the physically unfit and the subnormal—a process which tends to lower the civilian average which includes this segment of the population. However, evidence indicates that the levels of military compensation have been raised, and in recent years there has not been a major disparity between the pay of military personnel and that of people in the civilian economy.

The improvement in military compensation can be indicated in two ways. First, a comparison of the average pay and allowances in the Armed Forces in 1955 of $3,222, plus the additional items of special compensation (fringe pays, medical care, and tax allowances) which probably have an average value of around $800, indicates that the weighted average compensation of military personnel is about $4,000 per year. This figure—the average gross compensation of military personnel in fiscal 1955—may be compared with two sets of figures on the compensation of civilian employees.

Table 27 shows the average wages and salaries of all paid, full-time, nonagricultural workers in the United States and is adjusted for unemployment. The amount, as estimated by the Department of Labor for calendar 1954, was $3,805. The second set of figures (table 28) are Bureau of the Census statistics on the median income of all males in the calendar year of 1954. Note the median income of $3,199. Note also that the figure is for all males, including some military personnel, and individuals who receive income but are not employed. Data on the average income of employed male civilians showed a median income of $3,562 which, on a weighted average basis (precise figures are not available), would probably be in the neighborhood of $3,700. This comparison is admittedly rough. The Census figure is understated, because it includes a number of male workers who are only in the labor force part-time. On the other hand, the Armed Forces include a much larger proportion of young men below the age of 24, at ages when Census figures show earnings in civilian life are low. In terms of broad averages military personnel thus compare favorably pay-wise.

TABLE 27.—*Average compensation of civilian nonfarm workers, for selected years 1865–1954*

Year	Average annual compensation in current dollars				Average annual compensation in constant 1947–49 dollars, adjusted for unemployment	
	Full-time employee	Percent of time lost by unemployment	Adjusted for unemployment [6]			
			Amount	Index 1918=100	Amount	Index 1918=100
1865	[1] $500	[2] 6.0	$470	44	$1,093	66
1898	[3] 542	[3] 14.8	462	44	1,444	87
1918	[3] 1,107	[3] 4.3	1,059	100	1,655	100
1945	[4] 2,424	[5] 2.5	2,364	223	3,074	186
1952	[4] 3,747	[5] 3.3	3,634	342	3,193	193
1954	[4] 4,056	[5] 6.2	3,805	359	3,323	201

[1] Estimated from Lebergott's 1890 figure (see note 3) extrapolated by 1865–90 percent change in average daily wage rates given in Aldrich Committee Report, S. Rept. No. 1394, 52d Cong. 1893), vol. I, p. 176.
[2] Estimated by President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions. Figure could range up to 10 percent or more.
[3] Source: Stanley Lebergott, Earnings of Nonfarm Employees in the United States 1890–1946, Journal of the American Statistical Association, March 1948, p. 76.
[4] Calculated from Survey of Current Business, July 1955 and 1954 National Income Supplement.
[5] Estimated from Monthly Report on the Labor Force, U. S. Bureau of Census, Series P–57.
[6] Full-time compensation reduced by percent of time lost by unemployment.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor.

Trends

The pay relationship may also be considered in terms of trends. Since the typical veteran was an enlisted man and the traditional argument that military personnel are underpaid applies with greatest force to the enlisted ranks, this becomes an important focal point for investigation. Because most enlisted men are provided food, clothing, shelter and medical care "in kind," and these are essential needs, it is useful to measure the trend in their basic pay—what might be called their cash spending money.

Table 27 indicates the trend in civilian wages and salaries by showing estimated annual average civilian compensation from 1865 to 1954. As shown, since 1865 there has been a ninefold increase in the average annual compensation (adjusted for unemployment) of nonfarm employees, the index rising from 44 to 359.

TABLE 28.—*Estimated percentage distribution of males with income and male military personnel on active duty, for selected dates*

Age group	Males with income, 1954 [1]		Military males	
	Median income	Percent	June 30, 1952	Dec. 31, 1954
			Percent	*Percent*
All ages	$3,199			
Under 20	448	6.2	13.2	16.0
20 to 24	2,042	7.2	57.0	52.0
25 to 34	3,664	22.4	22.0	22.0
35 to 44	4,051	21.5	7.8	10.0
45 to 54	3,811	17.9		
55 to 64	3,195	13.3		
65 and over	1,268	11.5		

[1] Includes members of the Armed Forces living off post or with their families on military reservations; excludes servicemen living in barracks on reservations.

Source: General data from U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports (series P–60, No. 19), October 1955, table 3. Military data from U. S. Department of Defense.

The accompanying chart compares the trend in average basic pay of enlisted personnel in current prices from 1865 to the present to the trend in the average compensation of full-time employed workers


(excluding agricultural laborers) in the United States. In this chart, 1918 is arbitrarily taken as 100 for both series, regardless of the difference in levels of pay. Basic pay, of course, covers only that part of the stipend usually paid in cash to enlisted personnel; it excludes all the allowances in cash or "in kind" and the fringe pay. In 1918, which was taken as 100, the average basic pay was $417 per year (see table 24). On the other hand, the compensation of civilian workers is their entire current pay, including overtime. In 1918 the average was $1,059 and this was set at 100.

As can be seen, the two indexes parallel each other closely. The "cash spending money" position of enlisted men since 1918 has improved somewhat, compared to the total earnings by civilians. The improvement has been most pronounced since the Career Compensation Act was passed in 1949. Both sets of figures on which these trends have been computed are in terms of current dollars. On this basis, average basic pay of enlisted men between 1918 and 1955 has increased 301 percent. During the same period the increase in total civilian compensation of all full-time paid workers (excluding agricultural employees) has been 259 percent.

CHART

COMPARISON OF TRENDS IN AVERAGE BASIC PAY FOR ENLISTED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND AVERAGE PAY OF CIVILIAN NON-FARM WORKERS

Index of Weighted Averages, Selected Years 1865-1955



Source: Department of Defense and Department of Labor

76907—56——7

CONCLUSION

As with nearly all other features of military service, military pay has greatly improved since 1865. In this respect, it has kept step with civilian wages and salaries. Today the two are pretty well abreast, the average serviceman's gross compensation pacing the average civilian's earnings. The great disparity between the average enlisted man's stipend and the wage of the civilian worker engaged in a comparable occupation no longer exists.

Admittedly intangibles enter the pay equation. Many military officers hold positions of high responsibility—management and executive positions—which are comparable to top-rung offices in civilian life. At this level, civilian salaries may be considerably higher than the military. And the gross compensation of the business executive may include valuable insurance coverage, shares of stock in the firm or corporation (or opportunity to buy stocks at reduced rates), and a promise of ultimate partnership or directorship of the enterprise. Although the promise in mention is an intangible, it constitutes an extremely valuable asset in the ledger of the civilian businessman. Even for the small-business man—the realtor, the broker, the small manufacturer or dealer—the sky of income opportunity remains limitless for the capable, the energetic and the ambitious. While the military man may entertain similar chances for financial investment, the average service officer's opportunities for advancement are comparatively restricted. That is, the career officer must "climb the ladder" rung by rung, admittedly with little chance for rapid promotion from "junior executive" to top echelons with large increase in pay compensations.

On the enlisted man end of the scale there are similar intangibles, especially in the technician rates. The civilian machinist, working overtime, may earn twice as much as his Army counterpart. The merchant radioman under certain circumstances may earn twice as much as the Navy radioman, even when "gross compensation" for the bluejacket is computed. Opportunities for individual advancement and higher pay are perhaps not so disparate between military enlisted specialist and civilian technician. But even so the enlisted man faces a standardized "ladder climb," whereas the civilian worker may jump a dozen rungs by means of genius or capability or sheer luck.

For such career people, then, as the officer executive and the enlisted technician, rectifications in the military-pay structure may be in order. From the standpoint of the general veteran's problem the fact is that the average serviceman's gross compensation is at present not below that of the average civilian's. It may also be noted that the military seniority system—the "long, slow climb"—has its compensatory advantages in job or position security. The officer or enlisted man automatically goes up if he consistently performs in a satisfactory manner. The average civilian businessman or worker has no such guaranty of advancement. The element of risk (or lack of risk) is a factor to be considered in the promotion picture.

There is still another factor to be considered in relation to the pay problem. Neither combat pay nor insurance nor survivor benefits can compensate the soldier, airman, sailor, or marine who loses his life in battle. In the showdown of combat he is expected to risk his life and sacrifice himself if need be. This is mandatory of the man in uniform. It is the one feature of military service that has indelibly

distinguished it from the average civilian occupation. It is the factor beyond monetary compensation.

But, again, the old-time disparity no longer exists. For in any future major war massed armies will not fight on some remote battle-front far from noncombatant lines. The air fleets of World War II and the holocaustal blast of the atom bomb forever abolished the old-time conception of battle lines and fronts, rear areas and noncombatant cities. In an all-out atomic war every industrial city will constitute a target. Every noncombatant civilian will be on a potential front. And many civilians will be as exposed to danger as uniformed servicemen.

In consequence, civilians may be called upon to serve. The old noncombatant distinctions were obliterated in World War II. In London, under the blitz, civilians manned the AA defenses, fought the city's fires, guarded the streets. On the Continent thousands of civilians served with Red Cross units, emergency corps, or fought in combat as underground partisans in resistance movements. Total war in the atomic age will place the entire nation in uniform, if no more than a helmet or armband. And for most of these fighting civilians there will be no pay.

Chapter XII. Conditions of Military Service

Overall Summary

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

Viewed from the standpoint of one's own day and time, the practices and mores of a society may seem fixed in grooves of permanence and stability. A generation may be aware of changes, but those affecting the ways of life of a people are often so gradual as to be imperceptible.

Seen in historical perspective, such changes follow an axiom of inevitability (even rocks are impermanent). Often the changes are drastic. Some, from the historian's point of view, occur overnight.

The overnight change, which is termed a revolution, may do slow or immediate violence to many of the conventions, beliefs, customs, methods, practices and techniques accepted as standards in the past. Such a revolution may alter the industrial or economic structure of a nation. It may alter political systems or educational doctrines or the manners and so-called moral standards of a society. Usually such changes are resisted. Progress must overcome inertia.

For centuries nearly every progressive change caused a social convulsion. Mankind tends to cling to traditions. Progress means leaving the past behind, and for many the past evokes a mystical nostalgia. Progress means a departure from the "good old days" and from the "good old ways." So progressive change is resisted by the man who finds his convictions or means or his livelihood routines outmoded or rendered obsolescent. Accordingly, the ways of yesterday are not easily abandoned, and progress is often hampered by a drag of outworn traditions or popular misconceptions.

In the long record of ancient and medieval history drastic revolutions were infrequent, occurring at intervals spaced by centuries. But within the brackets of modern history revolutionary changes have occurred with increasing acceleration. In historically rapid suc-

cession some of the world's most drastic revolutions have taken place since the American Civil War.

Prior to the Civil War conditions of life in America were not greatly dissimilar to those which prevailed in Colonial times. Manufacturing had entered the scene with the machine age and steam had made its debut, but the Nation's economy was largely based on agriculture. The great majority of the population enjoyed a pastoral existence—Currier & Ives farmsteads; provincial villages and backwoods hamlets; clearings on the Western frontier. Even the city man chopped his own firewood, raised chickens at the back of his yard, perhaps kept a cow. In the few manufacturing centers factory workers lived in slums of incredible squalor—little, if any better than some of the slave quarters in the South. But manufacturing remained largely handicraft—the cobbler, the cooper, the tinker, the smith. In general the pace was as slow and plodding as it had been in 1812.

Among other things, the Civil War exploded in America an industrial revolution. (Or was touched off by an industrial revolution, as the economist might put it.) At any rate, since that time "cultural change," as anthropologists and sociologists employ the term, has occurred in America with unprecedented rapidity. During the latter part of the Victorian era and the first half of the 20th century every civilized nation in the world has experienced phenomenal cultural change. Growth in human control over physical environment has perhaps been greater during this epoch than in all recorded preceding history.

The revolutionary change (or series of changes) within the past century produced tremendous alterations in the social and economic structure of America. Concomitant with changes in American civilian life were alterations in the character of national military service. In part the latter reflected the changes in the civilian-life picture. In part they resulted from revolutions which altered the nature of warfare itself.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

From 15th century to mid-19th there was relatively little change in the fundamentals of warfare. Strategy and tactics, the handling of armies and battle fleets, the essential weapons and their employment—these underwent little alteration. The carbine was replacing the old-time musket, but this change in gunnery was not drastic.

The cannon of 1861 were basically similar to those forged in Elizabethan days. Aside from a few minor refinements, Civil War fire-control was similar to that of Elizabethan times; a gun crew on Drake's flagship could have manned the smoothbores on Farragut's *Hartford.* Cromwell could have understood the field tactics of Stonewall Jackson, even as Jackson modeled his army after Cromwell's. By an exchange of boots, Napoleon's cavalrymen could have ridden with Sheridan—the same sabre work, the same vedette detail. Drill and discipline under McClellan were much as they were under Clive. In respect to food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, Sherman's infantrymen were little better off than Marlborough's.

Innovations which came during the Civil War wrought massive changes in the tools and techniques of warfare. A revolution in naval strategy was caused by the introduction of ironclad combat vessels and turret guns. Electrical torpedo-mines and semisubmarines drastically

altered the harbor-defense picture. Rifled cannon and explosive projectiles altered the character of Army artillery. Telegraphy accelerated communication, and railroading shortened the military mile. Even aerial warfare appeared on the horizon with the advent of the observation balloon. The men of Drake or Cromwell, Marlborough or Napoleon might have handled the basic war gear of 1861. They would have been utterly baffled by some of the devices on the front in 1865.

The revolution which exploded during the Civil War featured the rise of mechanistic technology. A new type of military man took the stage—the fighting technician. He was most needed in the Union Navy, just converting from sail to steam when the war began. But good mechanics were needed in the Army Engineers and in the Artillery. Men who could handle steam winches and drive locomotives, who could build dams and trestles or repair increasingly complex machinery. A shortage of mechanics and "engine drivers" in the Armed Forces compelled the United States Government to hire civilian technicians for those tasks. Lack of trained mechanics and engineers in the Southern States may well have cost the South the war. The Confederates built 21 formidable naval ironclads. Nearly all were immobilized in port or disabled in action by engine trouble. The Confederacy was paralyzed for want of competent machinery men.

In the succeeding 3 decades the Navy took long technological strides. The Army's march was somewhat slower. A Civil War infantryman might have fallen in step with the boys on the way to Cuba—indeed, a number of Civil War veterans did. Rifle work had changed little, and bayonet assaults were much as before. So was camp life. But Farragut's sailors could not have manned the breach loaders on battleship *Maine* or cruiser *Olympia*. No Civil War engine crew possessed the skills demanded by the "triple expansions" in the new *Iowa*.

Truly seismic changes occurred during the conflict that raged from 1914 to 1919. Gas warfare, tank warefare, camouflage warfare, scientific intelligence warfare, submarine and antisubmarine warfare—above all, aerial warfare—these altered the nature of military service more than anything which had occurred since the first cannon spoke at Crecy. But through a curious tour de force the immense increase in the fire power and destructiveness of weapons resulted in some decrease in the percentage of battle deaths as great barrages drove the troops underground. Trench warfare, in effect, cut losses. In the age-old contest between penetration and protection, the latter was countering the former by the time American troops reached the western front.

Prior to the Civil War almost any leather-lunged individual, given a modicum of brains, ambition, and luck, could qualify as an Army officer. There were field generals—Zachary Taylor, for example—who had little, if any, formal schooling. But most of the officers who held commissions in World War I had better than high-school educations. Modern artillery demanded a knowledge of higher mathematics. Tank warfare demanded a knowledge of mechanics. No uneducated man, however leather-lunged, could have gained a commission in the Air Corps.

So it was with the enlisted personnel. The old-time soldier had been trained "monkey see, monkey do." The rule: discipline and target practice. But intellectual caliber was an added requisite by

1917. The doughboy of the AEF had to operate and maintain weapons which would have confounded the Civil War infantryman.

Manual skills were not enough. The World War I soldier had to do some thinking for himself; had to use his head. Perhaps the demand for intelligent initiative on the part of the private was the most revolutionary feature of the war. It might be demonstrated that the Germans lost the war because the Kaiser's foot soldiers were trained in the ironbound old-school system—"yours not to reason why." Manned by crack Potsdam officers, the German armies were the world's best equipped. Behind them were outstanding scientists in the realm of warmaking. But the Prussian-trained enlisted man was an automatic robot, goosestepping to order, but incapable of initiative. Some authorities aver that this "automaton" training, operating throughout the German military structure, caused Von Kluk's steamroller to stall at the gates of Paris when the general in the driver's seat lost his head. A fluke that wrecked the German war plan.

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's the technological revolution continued: Advent of the mechanized division; of long-range bombers and blockbuster bombs; of radio and complex electronic devices. Entering World War II, the nations were armed with "Buck Rogers" weapons that would have seemed fantastic in World War I. Warfare had entered a scientific fourth dimension beyond anything conceivable to a 19th century military man.

Perhaps infantrymen remained the backbone of the Army and seamen the backbone of the Navy, but the guns and gear used by these fighting men were complicated mechanisms compared to the Civil War variety and, for every combatant on the firing line scores of adept hands were needed in rear areas of maintenance and supply. In the ranks were thousands of highly skilled aviators, electronics men, machinists, mechanics, aerologists, fire-control men, pharmacists, photographers, metal workers, electricians. Almost every major profession and vocational pursuit were represented in some vital branch of the Armed Forces. In uniform were architects, doctors, lawyers, teachers, chemists, accountants, construction engineers.

Here was the vast difference between the Civil War serviceman and the serviceman of World War II. The average Union soldier was a farm boy or unskilled laborer—a provincial semi-illiterate. In uniform he performed simple tasks with simple tools. In contrast, the average GI of World War II had an urban or metropolitan background, better-than-grade-school education, and the capacity to handle complex machines. Many GI's were (or became) high-grade technicians.

THE IMPROVED SERVICE PICTURE

Needless to say, the revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare during the past century were accompanied by drastic alterations in conditions of military service. Progress marched along many lines.

The science and invention that created complex weapons also created sanitary field kitchens, water purifyers, weatherproof garments, and similar items for military use. As war gear changed, so did the methods for training and handling men. (The demand for brains as well as brawn brought into uniform the enlisted man who was an intelligent individual—a man to be led rather than coerced or driven.) Perhaps of greatest benefit to all in the Armed Forces were the ad-

vances in military medicine. Suppressive drugs, front-line surgery, plasma, and antibiotics came as lifesaving boons to the present generation of servicemen.

A survey of conditions of military service, Civil War to present, shows a trend of decided progress and improvement in nearly all aspects of military life and endeavor. Of course, the survey would lack significance unless the trend were subjected to certain measures. How rapid the progress? How great the improvement?

As is usual with progress, some of the advances encountered inertia—the drag of tradition or convention. For reasons perhaps inherent in organizational structure and regimentation, the military may become peculiarly convention-bound. Many of the weapon and technique innovations previously mentioned were adopted only through force of dire necessity. Lags were even greater in the areas of personnel leadership and employment—areas having to do with officer-enlisted-man relationships, with military law, with service ranks and rates, and with "promotion and pay."

Tradition has fixed a drag on other matters relating to the military. This is particularly true of rules and regulations involving veterans' benefits. The pension system in force today is a ramshackle of laws and policies based on doctrines, presumptions and assumptions dating back to the General Grant period. Much of the basic pension legislation was designed to suit the veteran of the Union Army. Under pressure of politics (and sometimes of urgent necessity) new laws were tacked on to the old, or old ones were embellished and extended, until the structure became a labyrinth—in architectural terms a Victorian mansion of gingerbread, gables, and mansards, with balconies added everywhere, the cupola replaced by a dome, and modern wings attached at random.

Equally grotesque in some of its aspects is the system of statutory awards for injury or illness incurred by servicemen in line of duty. A study of the rating system indicates that much is to be desired by way of equable compensation for disabled veterans. Another matter inviting attention is the rehabilitation program.

Devoted to conditions of military service, the present monograph does not include a discussion of veterans' benefits and the pension system, per se. But service conditions are obviously forerunner to the veteran's postservice situation. Every GI benefit is linked to some aspect or condition of military service. The very justification for pension or privilege derives from the veteran's having been in uniform, a national serviceman as distinguished from the noncombatant civilian.

It follows that if service conditions change, the need or justification for certain veterans' benefits may increase or lessen. Some may become doubly imperative. Others may be entirely obviated. Even the status of the veteran as a man apart may change. For example, non-service-connected pensions were originally intended as recompense for the extreme risks, hardships and deprivations that made Civil War soldiering a gruelling ordeal. For the volunteer who marched and fought through months and years of that agonizing war, such compensation was doubtless justifiable. Was similar compensation justifiable for the soldier who spent a few weeks in Cuba? Or for the trooper who was in a minor skirmish in Puerto Rico, serving with an expedition humorously reported as "General Miles' grand picnic and moonlight excursion."

The foregoing is an oversimplification, but the point is clear: circumstances alter cases.

In summary review, one sees that the conditions of military service (in effect, the circumstances) have altered greatly since 1865. On the whole, the trend has been one of improvement—conditions changing favorably for the serviceman.

FAVORABLE TRENDS

Changes in the nature of warfare and the conditions of military service have generally paralleled contemporary change in the character of civilian life. Innovations in the military realm were often generated by civilian innovations. Analysis discloses that such important military factors as diet, education, and medical care are dependent variables changing in time with broad advances currently underway elsewhere in the society.

Accordingly, a true measure of the advances in the military realm can only be made by comparing them with advances in the civilian. If life today is easier for the soldier than it was in 1865, so is it easier for the civilian. If the bluejacket under Nimitz drew more pay than his grandfather under Dewey, so did the shipyard worker. Significance can only lie in the comparisons of contemporary serviceman and civilian, contemporary civilian life and military service conditions. However, military-civilian life comparisons, designed to indicate the advantages or disadvantages inherent in one or the other, must always be taken as relative to the fact that the fighting man must deliberately risk his life in combat. Warfare is played for keeps, and in the crucible of battle men are maimed or killed. Even in this respect the old distinction between military man and civilian no longer exists (that is, modern warfare may turn an entire country into a battleground of death and destruction).

Modern fighting men are not compelled to bear the burdens borne by their forebears. The load is now distributed by selective service with relative impartiality.

Selective service equalizes the burden

The inauguration of selective service democratized the methods of manpower procurement. Prior to the Civil War the Government had relied on volunteers to man the Nation's war-going forces. Enlistments were uncertain and haphazard. The burden was shouldered by those who answered the call to the colors, while the "sunshine patriot" and the "summer soldier" stayed home.

Reverses in the field inevitably meant slack recruiting at the hour when men were needed most. In desperation the Government might resort to wild (and unsubstantial) propaganda appeals, or to taking any comer, or to makeshift pay and privilege incentives. All of those contingencies eventuated during the Civil War. In the South the Confederate Government was compelled to set up a draft in 1862. The North initiated a similar draft in 1863.

The draft laws, North and South, were highly discriminatory. The wealthy could buy themselves out or furnish substitutes. The indifferent could easily dodge the summons. Actually, the Northern draft was designed as a dragnet to catch deserters, and the Southern draft, hastily improvised, was a measure of desperation. Neither

JUL 17 1956
STATE COLLEGE
MANHATTAN
KANSAS

was intended to equalize the burden of war duty by distributing the service obligation among the male populace. Both were a form of class legislation that made of the conflict a rich man's war and a poor man's fight.

Discriminatory privilege was largely ruled out of the draft laws of World War I. With the exception of dependency, job priority and health exemptions, there were few deferments granted. All able-bodied eligibles were subject to call. Commutation could not be purchased, nor could substitutes be furnished. Needless to say, the draft levies that built up the AEF (and sent a few men into the Navy and the Marine Corps) were a great improvement over the Civil War variety.

Yet a form of class legislation persisted in the selective service system of World War I. It was an open secret that political influence engineered a number of deferments and was covertly employed to obtain commissions for "socialites" about to be drafted. But the "class legislation" took another turn in the mass exempting of highly skilled labor groups—for example, munitions machinists and shipyard workers. These mass exemptions aroused the resentment of other workers who were subject to the draft because their jobs were not vital to the war effort.

In the draft machinery set up for World War II, meshes in the system were tightened and deferment defects practically eliminated. Political commissions were virtually abolished. There was no mass exemption of labor groups. Dependency exemptions were put on a basis more equable than formerly. Medical standards for selection were improved, and inductees were given scientific I. Q. and aptitude tests designed to expedite their assignment to suitable service occupations.

Thus the draft of World War I—which went far to distribute the burden of military service—was improved upon by that of World War II, designed to embrace all classes of society and to rate the selectee according to his individual capacities and capabilities.

Aside from exceptions imposed by contingency, the Korean war draft operated more or less as an extension of the World War II selective service system. Necessitated by unsettled world conditions, the present peacetime draft maintains the system in low-gear operation.

There were flaws in the great wartime selective service machines—doctors occasionally disagreed on the criteria for physicals, and in any event it is virtually impossible to standardize to the last degree anything involving millions of men. Critics aver that peacetime selective service contains a form of class legislation in student deferment—the boy who can afford college may win exemption as a potential science graduate, or gain a "campus commission," whereas the less-favored youth faces compulsory service when he leaves high school. One way to rectify such a situation might be universal military training (UMT), putting every eligible American boy in uniform.

Meantime, selective service has brought into the Armed Forces a much broader representation of society than formerly. Its wartime operation remains the nearest thing to a compulsory military draft devisable on an "equal justice for all" basis.

Military living conditions have bettered

The Nation cannot afford, and dare not risk, a slipshod policy with respect to the welfare of its uniformed personnel. Those who enter the service must not only be fit, they must be kept at the peak of physical and mental trim. Much depends on the quality of such basic necessities as food and clothing and on environmental factors. These have undergone vast improvement since the Civil War.

Probably the best-dressed army of the Civil War was McClellan's. The men were issued one uniform only. With some modifications, all arms of the service, Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, wore it summer and winter, rain or shine, in camp or on battlefield, parade dress or fatigue. Other armies, notably Sherman's, campaigned in a patchwork of anything to hand. Nothing was so fantastically impractical as the Zouave uniform of the period, gaudy as a circus costume—a perfect target.

During the Spanish-American War a foolish error sent the Army to tropical Cuba in heavy woolens. General Shafter himself collapsed from exhaustion. Khaki was finally introduced—after troop morale almost expired in the jungle.

Of course, civilian clothing in this period was little better. The average citizen owned a woolen "Sunday-go-to-meetin' " perhaps a white duck suit for July. A famous murder case of the period featured a prominent banker clad in black wool with satin vest on a broiling summer morning—and breakfasting on hot mutton soup. Comfortable fabrics and comfortable tailoring did not enhance American efficiency (and cool frayed tempers) until the 20th century.

Functional clothing is now the rule for military dress as well as civilian. All service arms are well supplied with appropriate uniforms to meet various work and weather conditions. Combat uniforms, of course, are designed to afford protective coloration—a camouflage feature unknown to the Civil War trooper. For routine duty, comfort and durability are order of the day.

The improved conditions of daily life in the Armed Forces are, perhaps, nowhere better illustrated than in modern messhall or field kitchen. Military diets and food preparation more than meet the old Napoleonic maxim that "an army marches on its stomach."

Trends in the provision of rations have been from pork, dried vegetables, and fruits once cooked in squads by untrained personnel, to packaged frozen foods, mobile kitchens, scientific menus, and expertly trained cooks and bakers.

Most of the military's dietary improvements marched in step with civilian advances. The Nation's eating habits have bettered since the gaslight era (no modern businessman in his right mind would breakfast on mutton soup in mid-July). Refrigeration and canning processes were civilian inventions adopted by the military. Pure-food laws which protect the public also protect the serviceman. During the Spanish-American War hundreds of American soldiers were poisoned, many to the point of death, by rancid "embalmed beef." Food poisoning (botulism) is as rare in the service today as it is in civilian life. Trichinosis (from bad pork) is equally uncommon.

"In port, in tropical climates, give the men a little coffee before they go to work in the morning," said a Navy handbook of the Civil War period. Today's Navy coffee pot is available around the clock, and few seagoing Navy ships are without an ice-cream machine. Once

a target for grumbling throughout the service, Armed Forces "chow" is now on a par with that served in the best civilian cafeterias—and probably better than some. Even the World War II K ration—emergency fare—has been improved upon. In Korea the field kitchens moved up front and tried to serve the men in advanced positions at least two hot meals a day.

Military shelter remains another problem. Progressive improvement in peacetime housing is evident on most posts, stations, and bases. In some areas, however, officers' quarters are not up to civilian standards and enlisted men's barracks could be better equipped and furnished. Many posts are unable to accommodate the bulk of the personnel on locale, and these servicemen and their families are compelled to compete with each other for substandard or limited rental housing in the area. But the average post with its modern or modernized buildings, its heating plant, its laundry, its recreational facilities, is a far cry from the tent city of the Civil War.

Of course, standards in wartime must frequently be lowered to a makeshift level. Under emergency conditions military housing tends to deteriorate. Temporary buildings are usually substandard. Campaigning in the field, combat troops have to shift for themselves. So long as war is waged men must, at times, sleep under shelter halves in foxholes, and in the open. In this respect, there can be no comparison with a civilian standard; the military "has the worst of it." Even so, today's serviceman has it better than his Civil War ancestor. Rainproof tentcloth, sleeping bags, "canned heat," and a dozen modern devices come to his aid. During the Civil War a Boston profiteer swindled the Army with thousands of half-rotted blankets that soaked up dampness like blotting paper. Modern procurement standards and scientific inspection procedures have all but eliminated such impositions on the serviceman.

Modern military occupations have "transfer value"

The average Civil War serviceman learned little (if anything) that could be adapted to a job in civilian life or enhance a civilian career. Close-order drill—the manual of arms—rifle marksmanship—for the most part, Army training stopped there. A few schools were set up for Signal Corps men, engineers, and hospital personnel. But there were no organized training programs, no educational facilities for the rank-and-file soldiery.

By contrast, the modern serviceman learns much that has transfer value. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps train thousands of men in those specialties previously enumerated as innovations of technological warfare. Every modern military post and station maintains schools for the instruction of personnel. Courses range from aerodynamics to roentgenology, from motor-repair work to deep-sea diving. The Civil War illiterate went home as educationally handicapped as when he entered the service. Today, inducted illiterates are taught the "three R's" as rigorously as they are trained in the manual of arms; for these underprivileged, the service opens the door to opportunity and productive endeavor.

Armed Forces training is not primarily designed for the purpose of endowing servicemen with capabilities that will make them more productive and better citizens when they return to civilian life. But education and better citizenship go hand in hand. And vocational

training is manifestly valuable to the serviceman. Skills learned in the Armed Forces have increasing civilian utility. The veteran who trained in some military specialty has a good chance of obtaining a counterpart civilian job, or transferring some of his acquired know-how to a civilian occupation.

The trend in transferable job skills, military to civilian, climbed rapidly in the serviceman's favor after the Spanish-American War. Military-type occupations with little or no correspondence to civilian (e. g., rifleman or naval gunner) were assigned to more than nine-tenths of the Civil War servicemen. Only one-fourth of today's servicemen are now engaged in purely military occupations. Of the technical and scientific, administrative and clerical, mehanical and repair, craft, service, operative, and labor types of occupations to which the remaining three-fourths are assigned, the majority are regarded by the Department of Labor as closely similar to civilian occupations. Those without some degree of similarity appear to be negilgible.

It is true (especially in wartime) that a man may be trained in some specialty—for example, radio operation—which has a close civilian counterpart but offers little by way of job opportunity in civilian life. Relative to opportunity, there remains another question: How far could the man have advanced in a chosen endeavor had he followed it, uninterrupted, as a civilian? The compulsory aspect of service training may, in some cases, work to the disadvantage of the individual. But, occupationwise, it is evident that the majority of servicemen are benefited by specialist training. Even for the ordinary rifleman, the experience of military service may be turned to future advantage. If nothing else, he learns teamwork with his fellows—a valuable lesson in the art of human relations.

The Civil War rifleman learned teamwork, too, but of the mechanical robot variety. In fact, he was told not to use his head. The modern rifleman is trained to do some thinking for himself. Initiative is encouraged in today's Armed Forces personnel. That has a great deal of transfer value.

Military pay has improved

The way to promotion and pay in the Armed Forces has never been easy. "You're in the Army now" went the song in World War I. "You'll never get rich * * *." Today's serviceman can sing it with equal certitude. But his GI pay is better than the 1917 doughboy's. With food, clothing, housing (or pay in kind) and certain fringe benefits counted in, the pay for the career serviceman approximates in many cases the pay of civilians at similar occupational levels.

The productivity of the American worker has grown at a fairly steady rate since 1865. Pacing this growth have been notable gains in real wages and levels of living. Although available data are insufficient to permit exact comparisons, it appears probable that the compensation of men in the Armed Forces, apart from the higher officer ranks, has increased at about the same rate as for men of corresponding ages in the civilian labor force.

Certain imponderables make comparisons difficult, even for recent years. The estimated average annual compensation for all full time employees in civilian life more than trebled between 1918 and 1954 ($1,059 to $3,805). But this does not necessarily prove that military personnel are seriously disadvantaged in respect to pay.

For one thing, the civilian figures include payments to employees of middle age or older—men who would normally earn more than the average serviceman (who is younger). This is indicated by income figures collected by the Bureau of the Census for 1954. The median average income of men of ages 20 to 24, inclusive, was only $2,042 as compared with $3,664 for the next age group, 25 to 34. The average base pay plus allowances for enlisted men only, in 1955, was $2,742.

However, allowances in this case take no account of a number of perquisites such as free medical services and partial income-tax exemption from which civilian employees would not benefit. Again, the allowances that were taken into account (food, quarters, etc.) have been valued at cost to the Federal Government, rather that at the higher figures which they would represent in the personal budget of any civilian who was required to procure them at his own expense.

If more refined data should indicated that the comparable rise in civilian compensation has been greater than for men in the Armed Forces, there would still be an offsetting factor—the higher earning capacity of veterans as compared with nonveterans. The 1954 census data show an average difference in annual earnings in favor of the former of $905 in the 20 to 24 age group, and $409 in the 35 to 44 year age group. Those differences, although certainly not exclusively a resultant, speak something for the value of military training and experience—assets which cannot be discounted as dividends in the serviceman's total outlook.

For the average serviceman, then, the compensation approximates or exceeds what he might earn in civilian life. But existing pay rates for officers and enlisted specialists are lower than those on the civilian scale. Technicians are continually leaving the Armed Forces because civilian wages and salaries for specialist workers exceed the military. Similarly, many business executives and professional men earn incomes much higher than the compensation of military officers in positions of comparable capacity or responsibility.

Medical care has improved for the miltary

Certainly the medical attention given today's servicemen stands on the "gains" side of the ledger. The trend of improvement in both military and civilian medicine since the Civil War has been nothing short of phenomenal. In respect to combat wounds alone the modern recovery rate is miraculous. Gangrene—one of the deadliest Civil War killer—has been almost written off the books. So has tetanus. So has death as a result of amputation.

In the fields of disease suppression and control, military medicine has scored a series of remarkable victories. Needless to point to the conquest of deadly Yellow Jack. The defeats dealt VD and typhus. The vanquishment of typhoid fever.

Of course, the serviceman may be more exposed to injury or contagion than the civilian. But the health of the serviceman receives constant attention and checkup. He is given medical, dental, and nursing services which equal the best available in civilian life. By contrast his civilian counterpart may (and often does) go unattended. However, in no area of civilian life has progress been more pronounced than in public health, medical science, and medical care facilities. If the civilian suffers it is often through personal neglect or refusal to take precautionary measures. Such negligence is not permitted the serviceman.

Care for the serviceman's health has been matched by care for his moral and spiritual welfare. The Chaplain's Corps, greatly expanded since 1865, stands ready to lend a guiding hand to today's servicemen. "Sky pilots" stood with the men in the foxholes of World War II and of Korea. As psychological supports, such ministrations are a form of medicine not to be discounted.

The mortality rate has been reduced to a percentage figure far below the ghastly battle tolls of the Civil War. Several engagements of the Spanish-American War cost painful losses. They were excruciating at Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood; at Omaha Beach, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa; and on the Pusan perimeter. But in the great world wars and the Korean conflict, the heavy losses were mainly borne by shock troops, or units spearheading a landing or leading an assault. A relatively small percentage of the forces in the area were directly engaged in combat. By contrast, Civil War battles frequently engaged or engulfed all of the forces in the area. In sustained frontal assaults, regiment after regiment might be decimated (as at Cold Harbor). Infantrymen were often thrown wholesale against artillery positions, and in one slaughter (Fort Fisher) a naval brigade armed only with pistols and cutlasses was ordered to storm beach fortifications. Such reckless expenditures of men are not countenanced by modern tacticians.

The death rate among battle casualties in the Civil War was 40.1 per 1,000 man-years; in the Korean war, 3.4. Corresponding figures for deaths from other causes are 68.69 and 1.48. As has been noted, factors other than medical contributed to the reduction in combat fatalities. But frontline surgery, plasma, and wonder drugs were major lifesavers for American forces on the European and Pacific fronts.

CONCLUSION

The trend is clear. Conditions of military service have improved immeasurably since the Civil War, keeping pace with or outpacing corresponding improvements in civilian life.

Selective service has equalized the burden of war duty.

Modern military medicine maintains the Armed Forces in a state of health as good as that of the civilian populace, if not better.

Military pay is not the pittance it once was.

Military living conditions and occupational pursuits are no longer widely disparate from those in civilian life. Today the average American serviceman is a civilian in uniform—a citizen soldier—who lives and works in a post or camp that is a miniature city containing shops, post office, stores, church, library, recreation center. Even the ladies are present—in uniform of WAC, WAVE, or USMC (WR). What could be more revolutionary than this last feature of modern military life? Another trend in the civilian counterpart direction.

Finally, the distinction between wartime serviceman and civilian noncombatant is no longer sharply defined. In the 19th century the differences in status were held to be absolute. The civilian noncombatant was entitled to a form of sanctuary. The introduction of total war and mass bombing, the V-bombs of World War II, reduced the distinction to name only. In World War I and World War II

thousands of civilians were slain, and millions died from disease or starvation caused by the warfare.

The A-bomb is no respecter of persons. Its deadly fallout may travel for miles, raining atomic dust on homes, churches, hospitals, schools, reservoirs. The Defense Department report does not discuss atomic warfare, but civilian casualty assumptions published by Civil Defense leave little doubt as to the death-dealing potential of atomic weapons.

Even more devastating is the recently tested H-bomb. In the event of an all-out thermonuclear war every city, every industrial center, may become a target. Battlegrounds will then have no valid geographical connotation. All occupations will be military; every citizen will be on a potential battleline. That is the ultimate change, and the trend is inescapable. Atomic warfare may be fought on every civilian's doorstep. It could make of every citizen a combat veteran.

PART II

COMPARATIVE SITUATION: VETERANS AND NONVETERANS

(A Survey of the Veteran's Status in Contemporary Society)

Introductory

For the purposes of part II, the staff of the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions assembled and analyzed the data presented herewith on the current status of the average veteran in American society as compared with that of the nonveteran. A controlled appraisal is effected by dividing the veterans into two groups—those who served in World War I (or prior to World War II), who did not benefit by the GI and contemporary bills, and who are now 55 and over; and the younger GI veterans of World War II and Korea, aged 25 to 40 in the main.

Relative to male veterans in both groups, and to nonveterans in the corresponding age brackets, the assembled data includes material on the current social, occupational, financial, marital, health, and general economic standings of ex-servicemen and exemptee civilians for various periods between 1947 and 1955. The data in this section come largely from special tabulations prepared by the Bureau of the Census from information already in its files. This information was gathered by use of comprehensive sampling techniques. Area coverage was nationwide. Racial backgrounds were proportionately represented, and the veterans' groups included the percentage of those with disabilities.

The first 11 tables relate to veterans and nonveterans of World War II. Tables 12 and 13 relate to the older groups of World War I. The tables were designed to present a comparative statistical picture of the veteran and nonveteran groups of each major war period. This picture may to some degree suggest answers to two major questions under the Commission's inquiry. . Namely: (1) What is the veteran's current social and economic status, relative to the nonveteran's?; and (2) to what extent do veterans constitute a handicapped group in need of special privilege and continuous assistance?

Chapter I. Veterans and Nonveterans, World War II

COMPARISON OF INCOME

Table 1 deals with a comparison of total money income for male veterans and nonveterans of World War II in the years 1951 and 1954.

TABLE 1.—*Income—Comparison of total money income for male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, 25 years old and over and median income by age groups: 1951 and 1954*

Income and age groups	1951 [1]		1954	
	Veteran	Non-veteran	Veteran	Non-veteran
Number of persons (thousands)	13,854	28,672	13,712	31,125
Percent of those with income	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Loss	1.0	4.5	0.7	1.3
$1 to $499	1.0	7.0	2.0	7.3
$500 to $999	2.7	8.5	2.9	9.9
$1,000 to $1,499	4.0	6.4	3.5	7.8
$1,500 to $1,999	5.1	6.0	3.2	7.3
$2,000 to $2,499	8.8	8.6	4.9	7.3
$2,500 to $2,999	11.2	7.7	7.6	7.5
$3,000 to $3,499	15.6	9.5	11.1	9.2
$3,500 to $3,999	13.4	8.1	12.7	8.5
$4,000 to $5,999	23.4	16.5	36.2	26.0
$6,000 and over	7.0	7.8	15.2	8.0
Not reporting	6.8	9.3	----	----
Median income:				
Ages 25 years and over	$3,411	$2,780	$4,039	$3,087
25 to 34 years	3,349	2,813	3,978	3,073
35 to 44 years	3,632	3,564	4,231	3,813
45 to 54 years	3,169	3,257	3,841	2,827
55 years and over	(2)	1,723		

[1] A small proportion of persons reporting no income is included in the "loss" income class.
[2] Median income not shown for less than 250,000 persons.

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

The income characteristic is of major importance in that it embraces a number of significant factors. Aside from an indication of financial competence, it reflects the general occupational level of the veteran, the steadiness of his employment and the amount of compensation for the disabled veteran. It is an indicant of his ability to maintain himself successfully in a highly competitive society.

In table 1 two types of analyses are presented. The upper half of the table gives the income distribution in various income classes for veterans and nonveterans in 1951 and 1954. The lower half shows the median incomes for all persons over 25 and then for 3 distinct age groups in which veterans constitute a significant number.

The income distribution statistics show that relatively few veterans in the designated age group are in the extremely low income brackets for both years of the comparison. As indicated, a substantially large proportion of veterans earned incomes higher than those earned by nonveterans in 1951 and 1954.

The median income statistics present the same general picture. It would appear that the 25-to-34 age group, which includes about two-thirds of the World War II veterans, earned about $900 more in 1954 than nonveterans of similar age. For the 35-to-44 age group the differential still favors the veteran. The 1951 data for the 45-to-54 age group show the veterans' median income slightly below that of

STATE COLL JUL 17 MANHATTAN KANSAS SCIENCE

the nonveterans'. But the small number of World War II veterans in this age group, and the slim differential makes generalization impossible, particularly as the 1954 median for men 45 and over shows the veterans' median income much above the nonveterans'.

In general, the statistics suggest that the average veteran today is earning a consistently better income than the nonveteran of comparable age.

ANNUAL INCOMES, 1947–54

Table 1 (a) shows the median total money incomes of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, aged 25 to 44, in the period 1947–54. Incomes for veterans and nonveterans are presented for two significant age groups. The two right hand columns give the ratios in which the income of veterans in each age group is expressed as a percentage of the income of nonveterans.

TABLE 1 (a).—*Incomes of veterans and nonveterans—Median total money incomes of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, 25 to 44 years old, 1947–54, annual income*

Years	Ages 25 to 34		Ages 35 to 44		Ratio of incomes: Veterans to nonveterans	
	Veteran	Non-veteran	Veteran	Non-veteran	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years
1954	$3,978	$3,073	$4,227	$3,818	129.5	110.7
1953	3,948	3,183	4,118	3,867	124.0	106.5
1952	3,631	3,065	3,834	3,602	118.5	106.4
1951	3,359	2,875	3,647	3,595	116.8	101.4
1950	3,058	2,626	3.291	3,234	116.5	101.8
1949	2,828	2.562	2,984	2.935	110.4	101.7
1948	2,734	2,692	3,045	3.046	101.6	100.0
1947	2,401	2,585	2,689	2,900	92.9	92.7

Source: Consumers Income Current Population Survey Bureau of the Census, P60 Series.

As shown by the table, in 1947 the veteran's income was less than the nonveteran's. In 1948 the veteran and nonveteran incomes were approximately even in both age groups. In 1949 there appears a differential in the veteran's favor. From 1950 to 1954 the income gap widens appreciably in the veteran's favor with the largest differential appearing in the 25-to-34 age group. Clearly the figures substantiate those of table 1, and support the inference previously drawn—that the average World War II veteran earns a higher income than the contemporary nonveteran.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Table 2 presents a comparative statistical picture of the work experience of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, aged 25 to 59, by age and occupation, in the year 1952. The upper half of the table gives an age-group and working-time analysis. The lower half shows the occupational distribution of veterans and nonveterans.

76907—56——8

TABLE 2.—*Weeks worked—Comparison of work experience of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, 25 to 59 years old, by age and occupation: 1952*

[Persons in thousands]

Age and occupation groups	Veteran of World War II				Not a veteran of World War II			
	Total worked, 1952		Worked 48–52 weeks		Total worked, 1952		Worked 48–52 weeks	
	Number	Percent distribution	Number	Percent of total worked during 1952	Number	Percent distribution	Number	Percent of total worked during 1952
AGE								
Ages 25 to 59 years	13,506	100.0	11,120	82.3	19,218	100.0	15,420	80.2
25 to 29 years	4,080	30.2	3,280	80.4	1,178	6.1	840	71.3
30 to 34 years	4,152	30.7	3,512	84.5	1,342	7.0	1,076	80.3
35 to 39 years	2,666	19.7	2,262	84.9	2,508	13.1	2,104	83.9
40 to 44 years	1,554	11.5	1,242	79.9	3,472	18.1	2,882	83.1
45 to 54 years	974	7.2	760	78.0	7,502	39.0	6,038	80.5
55 years and over	80	0.6	64	91.2	3,216	16.7	2,480	77.1
MAJOR OCCUPATION								
Total	13,506	100.0	11,120	82.3	19,218	100.0	15,420	80.2
Professional, technical and kindred workers	1,370	10.1	1,152	84.1	1,324	6.9	1,148	86.7
Farmers and farm managers	524	3.9	452	86.2	2,076	10.8	1,808	87.1
Managers, officials, proprietors	1,746	12.9	1,580	90.5	2,938	15.3	2,590	88.1
Clerical and kindred workers	1,150	8.5	1,030	89.6	968	5.0	852	88.0
Sales workers	942	7.0	826	87.6	846	4.4	730	86.3
Craftsmen and foremen	2,882	21.3	2,296	79.7	3,912	20.4	3,070	78.5
Operatives	3,130	23.2	2,484	79.4	3,874	20.2	2,950	76.2
Service workers	708	5.2	612	86.5	1,244	6.5	1,048	84.2
Farm laborers and foremen	140	1.0	84	60.0	410	2.1	238	58.0
Laborers, except farm and mine	844	6.3	554	65.6	1,520	7.9	922	60.7
Not reported	70	0.5	50	71.4	106	0.6	64	60.4

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

As indicated in the second column of each half of the table, about 10 percent of the veterans were in professional and technical work, whereas about 7 percent of the nonveterans were engaged in such work. About 4 percent of the veterans and 11 percent of the nonveterans were farmers and farm managers (figures doubtless reflecting the wartime deferment of agricultural workers). Veterans predominated in clerical and sales occupations. As craftsmen, foremen, factory operatives, and service workers they more or less maintained an even balance with nonveterans similarly employed. In the farmhand and general laborer categories, there were significantly fewer veterans than nonveterans.

The upper half of the table compares the steadiness or regularity of employment of veterans and nonveterans. The fourth, or last, column in each half of this upper section points the story with figures showing the percentages of all persons who worked 11 months or more of the year. As shown in the 25-to-29 age group, about 80 percent of the veterans worked 48 weeks or more, whereas about 71 percent of the nonveterans worked 48 weeks. The differential remains in the veteran's favor except for age groups 40–44 and 45–54.

Altogether, the statistical picture shows the veteran leading the nonveteran with a higher percentage of full-time employment and a some-

what greater representation in the more remunerative occupations and professions.

JOB STATUS

Dealing with job status, table 3 may be described as a rough measure of mobility between jobs for veterans and nonveterans of World War II. Shown are the total number who were working in January 1953 in agricultural activities or in general industry. For each veteran and nonveteran age-group there is a four-way breakdown as to job stability.

TABLE 3.—*Job status—Comparison of major industry groups of employed male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, 25 to 59 years old, in January 1953 with longest period of employment in 1952*

Age groups and period of employment	Total employed civilians	Agriculture			Nonagricultural industries		
		Total	Veteran	Non-veteran	Total	Veteran	Non-veteran
All ages 25 to 59 years:	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Current job same as longest job	93.1	93.5	89.3	94.9	93.0	92.8	93.2
Current job different from longest job	2.3	2.1	4.0	1.5	2.3	2.4	2.2
Current job in different industry	4.3	4.0	6.5	3.2	4.3	4.2	4.5
No work experience	.3	.3	.2	.4	.4	.6	.2
25 to 34 years:							
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Current job same as longest job	91.0	90.4	90.5	92.4	91.0	91.6	88.7
Current job different than longest job	3.1	5.2	4.9	3.3	2.9	2.8	3.2
Current job in different industry	5.2	4.2	4.3	4.3	5.3	4.7	7.7
No work experience	.7	.2	.3	----	.8	.9	.4
35 to 44 years:							
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Current job same as longest job	93.2	92.9	84.3	95.3	93.3	94.4	92.4
Current job different than longest job	2.3	1.9	2.5	1.8	2.3	2.0	2.6
Current job in different industry	4.4	5.1	13.2	2.9	4.3	3.6	4.9
No work experience	.1	----	----	----	.1	.1	0
45 to 59 years:							
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Current job same as longest job	94.8	95.4	(1)	95.3	94.7	95.0	94.7
Current job different than longest set	1.6	.9	(1)	.9	1.7	1.5	1.7
Current job in different industry	3.4	3.1	(1)	3.1	3.5	3.1	3.5
No work experience	.2	.6	(1)	.7	.2	.4	.2

[1] Rates not computed for less than 250,000 persons.

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

In agriculture, a slightly greater proportion of nonveterans than veterans were in the job in January 1953 which had accounted for their longest period of employment during 1952. In nonagricultural industries, the proportion of veterans and nonveterans holding the same job in January 1953 which they had held longest in 1952 was approximately equal.

The actual movers between jobs are indicated by the second and third percentage figures in each column. "Current job different from longest job" means that the individual worked the previous

year in different occupation, but same industry as in 1952. "Current job in different industry" refers to a shift in industry but not necessarily in occupation.

The extent of mobility between industries appears to be more extensive among the veteran population. Of those persons employed in agriculture, the veterans between the ages 35 to 44 were the most mobile. Thirteen percent of the veterans and 3 percent of the nonveterans currently employed in agriculture were employed in some other industry in the preceding year.

The age-group breakdown, however, shows that nonveterans in the 25 to 34 group changed jobs more frequently than did veterans. In the 35 to 44 age group and the 45-plus group, the veterans were somewhat the more mobile.

The second part of table 3 presents the job status picture in absolute figures by thousands.

TABLE 3.—*Job status*—Continued

[Thousands of persons]

Age groups and period of employment	Total employed civilians	Agriculture			Nonagricultural industries		
		Total	Veteran	Non-veteran	Total	Veteran	Non-veteran
All ages, 25 to 59 years:							
Total	31,616	3,736	896	2,840	27,880	12,224	15,656
Current job same as longest job	29,426	3,494	800	2,694	25,932	11,338	14,594
Current job different than longest job	718	80	36	44	638	298	340
Current job in different industry	1,362	150	58	92	1,212	514	698
No work experience	110	12	2	10	98	74	24
25 to 34 years:							
Total	10,456	1,032	610	422	9,424	7,438	1,986
Current job same as longest job	9,520	942	552	390	8,578	6,816	1,762
Current job different than longest job	316	44	30	14	272	208	64
Current job in different industry	544	44	26	18	500	348	152
No work experience	76	2	2	----	74	66	8
35 to 44 years:							
Total	9,862	1,134	242	892	8,728	3,830	4,898
Current job same as longest job	9,196	1,054	204	850	8,142	3,614	4,528
Current job different than longest job	226	22	6	16	204	76	128
Current job in different industry	434	58	32	26	376	136	240
No work experience	6	----	----	----	6	4	2
45 to 59 years:							
Total	11,298	1,570	44	1,526	9,728	956	8,772
Current job same as longest job	10,710	1,498	44	1,454	9,212	908	8,304
Current job different than longest job	176	14	----	14	162	14	148
Current job in different industry	384	48	----	48	336	30	306
No work experience	28	10	----	10	18	4	14

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

Seen as a broad view, the statistics indicate no large differences in the job mobility of veterans and nonveterans either in agriculture or in general industry.

EDUCATIONAL PICTURE

Table 4 presents statistics on the years of school completed by veterans and nonveterans, aged 25 to 59, as of October 1952. The table is arranged to show percentages and absolute figures for veteran and nonveteran attendance at elementary school, high school, and college.

TABLE 4.—*Education–Age—Comparison of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, 25 to 59 years old, by years school completed and age, October 1952*

Veterans status and age group	Total		Elementary school				High school			College			Median
	Number [1]	Percent	Total	Less than 5 years	5 to 7 years	8 years	Total	1 to 3 years	4 years	Total	1 to 3 years	4 years	Years Completed
VETERAN	*Thousands*												
25 to 59 years	13,700	100.0	22.9	2.1	7.9	12.9	52.4	20.8	31.6	23.6	11.2	12.4	12.2
25 to 34 years	8,428	100.0	19.4	1.8	6.4	11.2	56.0	21.7	34.3	23.8	11.4	12.4	12.2
35 to 44 years	4,130	100.0	27.1	2.2	9.6	15.3	48.8	19.8	29.0	23.0	11.2	11.8	12.1
45 to 59 years	1,142	100.0	34.1	4.0	13.3	16.8	38.5	17.7	20.8	25.3	10.2	15.1	11.5
NONVETERAN													
25 to 59 years	19,766	100.0	49.5	11.0	15.7	22.8	35.3	17.0	18.3	13.3	6.5	6.8	9.0
25 to 34 years	2,508	100.0	43.0	14.0	13.8	15.2	39.9	17.5	22.4	15.3	6.4	8.9	10.1
35 to 44 years	6,070	100.0	40.7	8.2	13.2	19.3	44.0	20.1	23.9	14.3	7.5	6.8	10.3
45 to 59 years	11,188	100.0	55.8	11.9	17.5	26.4	29.7	15.3	14.4	12.2	5.9	6.3	8.7
MALES 25 TO 59 YEARS	Thousands of persons												
Number persons	33,466	------	12,936	2,470	4,166	6,370	14,170	6,218	7,952	5,862	2,820	3,042	------
Veterans World War II	13,700	-----	3,138	288	1,056	1,764	7,176	2,848	4,328	3,242	1,538	1,704	------
Nonveterans World War II	19,766	------	9,798	2,182	3,110	4,506	6,994	3,370	3,624	2,620	1,282	1,338	------

[1] Includes persons not reporting on years school completed. Percents will not add to 100.

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

Of the total who had attended only elementary school, veterans figured at less than 23 percent while nonveterans came close to 50 percent—a differential decidedly in the veteran's favor. About twice as many veterans than nonveterans in the 25–34 age group were grade-school graduates. In this respect, veterans continued to lead in the older age groups. The situation is reflected by the figures pertaining to high-school attendance. And at the college end of the scale, one finds nearly a quarter of the veterans attended college, whereas about 13 percent of the nonveterans attained a college education.

The final column, under "Median," summarizes the situation. These figures indicate that the average veteran had 3 more years of education than the average nonveteran. This striking differential reflects, of course, the educational opportunities afforded the veteran by the GI bills. It may also reflect the capacity of the average veteran—a more or less select individual—who had attained higher education before service.

Education relative to occupation

Presenting an education-by-occupation picture, table 5 (accompanying) tells a story similar to that told by table 4. By and large the veterans in the various categories have had more education than their nonveteran counterparts.

TABLE 5.—*Education—Occupation—Comparison of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II by years of school completed and occupation, October 1952*

Major occupation group	Veteran of World War II						
	Total [1]	Elementary school	High school		College		Median years completed
			1 to 3 years	4 years	1 to 3 years	4 years	
Number employed.....thousands..	13,164	2,980	2,750	4,214	1,450	1,638	12.2
Percent of employed.....	100.0	22.6	20.9	32.0	11.0	12.4	.....
Total employed (percent).....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....
Professional, technical, and kindred.....	11.7	0.2	1.9	5.6	20.4	57.0	16.0
Farmers and farm managers.....	4.3	7.2	3.0	4.7	2.9	2.0	11.6
Managers, officials, and proprietors.....	11.9	6.0	8.4	15.5	17.1	15.1	12.6
Clerical and kindred workers.....	8.1	3.0	6.2	9.6	16.8	9.4	12.7
Sales workers.....	6.5	1.9	4.8	8.4	11.6	8.4	12.7
Craftsmen and foremen.....	23.6	25.8	31.1	27.0	17.9	3.3	11.7
Operatives.....	21.3	31.7	31.8	18.8	8.1	2.1	10.5
Service workers.....	5.0	6.9	5.4	5.1	3.9	1.6	11.4
Farm laborers and foremen.....	1.0	2.6	.7	.8	.3	-----	8.6
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	6.4	14.4	6.8	4.5	1.0	1.1	9.0
Not reported.....	.3	.3	.1	.1	-----	-----	-----

Major occupation group	Not a veteran of World War II						
	Total [1]	Elementary school	High school		College		Median years completed
			1 to 3 years	4 years	1 to 3 years	4 years	
Number employed.....thousands..	18,778	9,160	3,250	3,520	1,236	1,266	9.1
Percent of employed.....	100.0	47.8	17.3	18.7	6.6	6.7	.....
Total employed (percent).....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....
Professional, technical, and kindred.....	7.0	0.9	2.3	4.8	18.9	58.3	16.0
Farmers and farm managers.....	10.7	14.5	7.8	8.7	7.1	1.7	8.5
Managers, officials, and proprietors.....	14.9	8.3	16.2	24.1	26.7	22.6	12.1
Clerical and kindred workers.....	5.0	2.7	5.4	8.6	12.3	4.6	12.1
Sales workers.....	4.3	1.9	4.2	8.5	9.9	5.5	12.3
Craftsmen and foremen.....	21.9	21.8	30.0	23.9	14.6	3.2	9.1
Operatives.....	19.5	25.4	22.0	13.5	6.5	1.9	8.5
Service workers.....	5.7	6.4	5.8	4.7	2.8	1.1	8.6
Farm laborers and foremen.....	3.3	5.6	1.5	0.7	.5	.2	5.6
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	7.6	12.4	4.4	2.6	.6	.9	7.3
Not reported.....	.2	.1	.2	.1	.2	-----	-----

[1] Includes persons not reporting on years school completed.

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

As shown in the last columns ("Median years completed") for veterans and nonveterans, the percentage is consistently in the veteran's favor, with the exception of the professionally employed. In the professional category, both veterans and nonveterans have a 16.0 median.

Veteran farmers have had more education than nonveteran farmers. The figures even off for working managers, clerks, and sales workers. Veteran craftsmen and foremen, service workers, farm workers, and general laborers have had more education than nonveterans in those categories.

The educational picture seems clear. In general, more veterans than nonveterans completed high school or college and were occupationally fitted accordingly.

MARITAL STATUS

An indication of the veteran's capacity to readjust is the marital status of veterans as a class: Were ex-servicemen, as a rule, inclined to marry and settle down? In this regard, a comparison of veterans with nonveterans is made in table 6 (accompanying). The figures apply to veterans and nonveterans of World War II, who are household heads as of April 1952. Four age groups are presented—the first, a comprehensive 25-to-59, followed by 3 intermediate groupings. Urban and rural classifications reflect possible area influences. Marital status is simply confined to married and single, and does not show possible widower or divorce percentages.

TABLE 6.—*Marital status—Comparison of male household heads who are veterans and nonveterans of World War II, by marital status and residence, April 1952*

Marital status and residence	25 to 59 years			25 to 34 years		35 to 44 years		45 to 59 years	
	Total	Veteran	Nonvet	Veteran	Nonvet	Veteran	Nonvet	Veteran	Nonvet
Total United States:									
Number persons----------thousands--	28,620	10,146	18,474	6,592	2,144	2,882	6,172	672	10,158
Single----------percent--	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.1	3.0	2.5	2.1	12.2	2.7
Married----------do----	94.3	96.0	94.8	97.3	96.8	95.9	96.5	84.2	93.2
Urban:									
Number persons----------thousands--	18,908	7,308	11,600	4,666	1,202	2,146	3,854	496	6,544
Single----------percent--	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.0	3.8	2.1	2.2	10.5	2.9
Married----------do----	95.4	96.6	94.7	97.6	95.8	96.8	96.4	86.7	93.4
Rural:									
Number persons----------thousands--	9,712	2,838	6,874	1,926	942	736	2,318	176	3,614
Single----------percent--	2.7	3.6	2.4	2.3	1.9	3.8	2.1	17.0	2.7
Married----------do----	94.8	94.5	94.9	96.5	98.1	93.5	96.6	77.2	93.0

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

Although differentials are slight, a somewhat lower proportion of the veterans are married in the over-45 age group. In the earlier age groups (under 44 years) the proportion of married and single persons is about the same for both groups. The general balance is about even. Table 6–a reveals a similar relationship in the marital status of all veterans and nonveterans. However, the problem of the postwar marital situation of veterans is extremely complex. The figures available in this survey are merely suggestive, and are not presented as definitive in any way.

TABLE 6-a.—*Comparison of male veterans of World War II by marital status and age: April 1952*

	All persons 25 years and over	Age groups				
		25 to 29 years	30 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 years and over
VETERANS OF WORLD WAR II						
Number of persons.....thousands..	13,854	4,636	4,140	4,024	922	132
Percent distribution: Marital Status:						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Married	83.1	78.7	87.2	85.9	75.3	86.4
Wife present	80.9	77.0	85.4	83.2	70.5	86.4
Wife absent	2.2	1.7	1.8	2.7	4.8	----
Single	14.8	19.9	11.1	11.6	20.4	6.1
Other [1]	2.1	1.4	1.8	2.5	4.3	7.6
NONVETERANS OF WORLD WAR II						
Number of persons.....thousands..	28,672	1,028	1,364	6,262	7,734	12,284
Percent distribution: Marital Status:						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Married	82.8	68.3	82.8	89.8	88.3	77.0
Wife present	80.3	64.8	80.6	87.3	85.6	74.6
Wife absent	2.5	3.5	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.4
Single	8.6	29.2	16.6	7.8	6.9	7.6
Other [1]	8.6	2.5	0.6	2.5	4.7	15.5

[1] Includes persons who were either widowed or divorced.

Source: Bureau of Census, special tabulation from current population survey of April 1952.

FAMILY STATUS (CHILDREN)

Table 7 presents a comparative statistical picture of the parental status of married veterans and nonveterans of World War II, as of April 1952. Here a marked difference between veteran and nonveteran families is indicated by figures for the various age groups. As is shown, young veteran families were relatively small; young nonveterans, as a rule, fathered a greater number of children per household.

TABLE 7.—*Children—Comparison of households by number of related children under 18 years of age for male veterans and nonveterans of World War II—by age of head: April 1952*

Households and Number of Related Children	All Ages, 25–59		25 to 34 Years		35 to 44 Years		45 to 59 Years	
	Veteran	Non-veteran	Veteran	Non-veteran	Veteran	Non-veteran	Veteran	Non-veteran
Number of households (thousands)...	10,146	18,474	6,592	2,144	2,882	6,172	672	10,158
Total percent, all households...	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No children under 18	27.6	38.5	22.3	18.7	30.9	18.3	65.5	54.9
1 child under 18	26.9	21.4	29.5	20.9	23.7	20.6	15.8	22.1
2 children under 18	27.4	18.1	29.9	28.7	25.0	25.8	12.8	11.2
3 children under 18	11.7	11.0	12.5	17.4	11.9	17.8	3.3	5.5
4 or more children under 18	6.3	11.0	5.8	14.4	8.5	17.5	2.7	6.3

Source: Current Pouplation Survey, Bureau of the Census.

The proportion of younger veterans (22 percent) and nonveterans (14 percent) who were heads of households without children are about the same. However, in the same age group, the nonveteran population (31.8 percent) had more households with 3 or more children under 18. In the older age groups (45 to 59) nonveterans tend to have had more children.

It appears, then, that the average veteran has fewer children than the average nonveteran. Sociologists and other authorities point to a number of contributory factors. One, of course, has to do with opportunity—military service may have delayed servicemen in getting married or in starting or building families. Another set of factors, however, has to do with the characteristics of the veteran population. A larger proportion of veterans than of nonveterans live in metropolitan areas, and census figures indicate that urban families are, as a rule, smaller than farm families. Likewise, more veterans are in the higher educational and income categories, and it is well known that people with higher educations and higher incomes tend to have smaller families than those in the low education and low income groups.

RESIDENTIAL PICTURE

Table 8 deals with the pattern of residence for veterans and nonveterans of World War II, as of April 1952. The urban section is divided into subsections indicating metropolitan (large cities of 1 million or more), smaller cities and townships, and communities which are not in urbanized areas. The rural section is divided into nonfarm and farm areas.

TABLE 8.—*Residence—Comparison of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II, 25 to 59 years old, by age and residence, urban (by size of place), rural nonfarm, and rural farm: April 1952*

Veteran status and age	Total		Urban								Rural nonfarm	Rural farm
	Number	Percent	Total	Places in urbanized areas				Not in urbanized areas				
				Total	1,000,000 or more	250,000–999,999	Under 250,000	Total	250,000 and over	Under 250,000		
Veteran, World War II:												
All ages 25 to 59	13,816	100.0	73.0	49.8	25.3	15.4	9.1	23.2	9.2	14.0	18.6	8.4
25 to 34 years	8,776	100.0	72.0	48.6	24.2	15.5	9.0	23.4	9.3	14.1	19.3	8.7
35 to 44 years	4,024	100.0	74.9	51.4	27.4	15.2	8.8	23.5	9.4	14.1	16.6	8.4
45 to 54 years	922	100.0	74.1	53.1	29.1	14.5	9.5	21.0	8.0	13.0	19.7	6.1
55 to 59 years	94	100.0	65.8	44.6	10.6	17.0	17.0	21.2	10.6	10.6	27.7	6.4
Nonveteran:												
All ages 25 to 59	19,958	100.0	63.9	45.3	22.9	14.4	8.0	18.6	6.5	12.1	18.5	17.6
25 to 34 years	2,392	100.0	58.4	41.2	20.0	14.6	6.6	17.2	5.3	11.9	17.3	24.3
35 to 44 years	6,262	100.0	62.9	44.6	21.4	15.0	8.2	18.3	7.0	11.3	20.0	17.2
45 to 54 years	7,734	100.0	65.8	46.7	23.8	14.8	8.1	19.1	6.3	12.8	18.0	16.3
55 to 59 years	3,570	100.0	65.4	46.2	25.6	12.3	8.3	19.2	6.9	12.3	17.8	16.8
	[In thousands]											
Males 25 to 59 years:												
Number of persons	33,774	----	22,830	15,910	8,070	4,996	2,844	6,920	2,566	4,354	6,264	4,680
Veteran World War II	13,816	----	10,080	6,874	3,498	2,124	1,252	3,206	1,274	1,932	2,570	1,166
Nonveteran World War II	19,958	----	12,750	9,036	4,572	2,872	1,592	3,714	1,292	2,422	3,694	3,514

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

The statistical pattern shows that of the younger veteran groups (25–34 and 35–44) about half were residing in urbanized areas—large or medium cities or their immediate suburbs. The percentage of nonveterans of comparable age residing in urbanized areas is shown to be considerably lower.

About the same percentage of veterans and nonveterans were residing in rural nonfarm areas. A wide differential appears in the rural farm area section where the percentage of nonveterans is much higher than the veteran figure.

The pattern undoubtedly reflects the wartime deferment policy which exempted many men engaged in vital agricultural pursuits. It may also reflect educational factors—the military training of many farm boys who emerged from the service as technicians and mechanics. Another factor is suggested by the popular song (of World War I vintage): "How you gonna keep 'em down on a farm after they've seen Paree?"

Altogether it appears from the table that the majority of veterans took up residence in large metropolitan communities or cities, or suburban areas. About 1 out of 4 took up rural residence.

Mobility (change in residence)

The residential picture is, of course, affected by "mobility"—the shifting of residence from one locality to another. The pattern is developed in table 9—a tabulation of the number of veterans and nonveterans who moved from one home to another during the year ending April 1952.

STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
MANHATTAN
KANSAS

TABLE 9.—*Mobility—Mobility of male veterans and nonveterans of World War II by age: May 1951–April 1952*

[Persons in thousands]

Age groups	Total		Did not move		Moved in same county	
	Veteran	Nonveteran	Veteran	Nonveteran	Veteran	Nonveteran
All ages 25 years and over	13,854	28,672	10,016	24,788	2,446	2,706
25 to 34 years	8,776	2,392	6,000	1,678	1,778	402
35 to 44 years	4,024	6,262	3,158	5,158	546	786
45 years and over	1,054	20,018	858	17,952	122	1,518
	Percent					
All ages	100.0	100.0	72.3	86.5	17.7	9.4
25 to 34 years	100.0	100.0	68.4	20.3	20.3	16.8
35 to 44 years	100.0	100.0	78.5	82.4	13.6	12.6
45 years and over	100.0	100.0	81.4	89.7	11.6	7.6

Age groups	To different county in same State		Moved to different State		Resided abroad	
	Veteran	Nonveteran	Veteran	Nonveteran	Veteran	Nonveteran
All ages 25 years and over	556	528	702	564	134	86
25 to 34 years	386	140	510	138	102	34
35 to 44 years	140	136	156	152	24	30
45 years and over	30	252	36	274	8	22
	Percent					
All ages	4.0	1.8	5.1	2.0	1.0	0.3
25 to 34 years	4.4	5.9	5.8	5.8	1.2	1.4
35 to 44 years	3.5	2.2	3.9	2.4	0.6	0.5
45 years and over	2.8	1.3	3.4	1.4	0.8	0.1

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

As is shown by percentage figures in the lower half of the table, only 72 percent of the veterans were living in the same home wherein they had resided a year earlier. Some 28 percent had moved. Of the nonveterans, 86 percent maintained the same residence they had previously held; only 14 percent had moved.

One notes, however, that 18 percent of the veterans merely moved from one domicile to another in the same county. Only 9 percent of the nonveterans made similar local moves. About 4 percent of the veterans moved to a different county in the same State, whereas some 2 percent of the nonveterans made such moves. And 5 percent of the veterans moved from one State to another, whereas 2 percent of the nonveterans made insterstate moves.

As is shown, only a very small percentage of the veterans took up residence abroad. The figure for nonveterans is also small.

The statistical pattern reflects a number of contributory factors. Education and experience doubtless influenced the veteran's mobility. Increasing income may have entered the situation in some of the moves. Urban employers may have transferred a number of the movers from one locality to another. Business opportunities could be still another motivation.

But it would be a manifest error to interpret all moves as reflecting the economic betterment of the individual involved. A move could as readily be incurred by economic maladjustment or job instability. One might also note that the figures apply only to the year, May 1951–April 1952. In respect to rural moves, current reports indicate that some 600,000 small farmers abandoned their farmsteads in the past 2 years (1954–55). The abandonments were failures caused by a declining agricultural economy and adverse conditions. Undoubtedly the number of movers included a sizable percentage of veterans.

COMPARATIVE ASSETS

A tabulation of liquid asset holdings, by age group, for veterans and nonveterans, table 10 comes from the Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances. Because of the relatively small size of the sampling, the variables may be greater than in the previous comparisons. However, the sample is sufficient to suggest the asset position of veterans and nonveterans by age group.

TABLE 10.—*Assets*

A. MEDIAN LIQUID ASSET HOLDINGS, BY AGE, FOR VETERANS AND NONVETERANS, 1948 AND 1955

Age	Veterans		Nonveterans	
	1948	1955	1948	1955
18–24 years	$195	$166	$16	$83
25–34 years	399	279	174	166
35–44 years	710	412	433	424

B. PERCENT OF VETERANS AND NONVETERANS OWNING HOME, BY AGE, 1948 AND 1955

Age	Veterans		Nonveterans	
	1948	1955	1948	1955
18–24 years	18	11	7	8
25–34 years	32	45	32	34
35–44 years	40	61	47	61

C. MEDIUM AMOUNT OF EQUITY IN HOME FOR VETERANS AND NONVETERANS, BY AGE, 1955

Age	Veterans	Nonveterans
18–24 years	$3,928	$3,602
25–34 years	4,945	4,957
35–44 years	6,517	8,915

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances.

As shown in section A, the veteran in all age groups possessed larger assets than the nonveteran, in the years 1948 and 1955, with one minor exception (in the 35–44 group for 1955). One notes, however, a marked decline in the veteran's assets for the years designated—in the 35–44 age group a drop from $710 in 1948 to $412 in 1955,

whereas the nonveteran's assets remained more or less constant in this older age group.

Section B of the table gives the extent of homeownership among veterans and nonveterans. The differential favors the younger veterans. The gap closes in the 25–34 age group, and evens off in the 34–44 group—61 percent of both veterans and nonveterans in the older group owning homes in 1955. The picture, of course, reflects governmental assistance to veterans and nonveterans—GI loans for the ex-serviceman and FHA for nonveteran civilians.

Section C shows a comparison of the amount of equity in homes. In the two younger age groups, veterans and nonveterans own equities in relatively similar amounts. In the 35–44 age group, the veterans do not do so well, in that their median equity is $2,000 below that of the nonveteran.

Aside from the differences in mention, it would appear that in terms of homeownership the veterans came out as well as, if not somewhat better than, the nonveterans of World War II.

BENEFIT OR HANDICAP?

The following table (No. 11) summarizes a Bureau of the Census survey made for the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions in the autumn of 1955. As quoted in the table's caption, the survey asked of the veteran: "Looking back, how has the time you spent in the Armed Forces and the training, skills, and experience you acquired there, affected your employment and progress in civilian life?"

TABLE 11.—*Census survey*

In the census survey for the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions, all veterans were asked the following question:

"Looking back, how has the time you spent in the Armed Forces and the training, skills, and experience you acquired there, affected your employment and progress in civilian life?"

Answers were distributed as follows for the veteran population, including veterans of all wars:

	Number (thousands)	Percent
1. Helped me considerably	3,098	14.7
2. Has been of some benefit	5,503	26.2
3. Not much effect	10,465	50.1
4. Was a temporary handicap, etc	576	2.7
5. Has been a handicap or disadvantage	1,325	6.3
Total	20,967	100.0

By count of cards in the sample, the answers were as tabulated by number and by percentage. Some 15 percent said that Army experience had helped them considerably. About 26 percent felt the experience was of "some benefit." Some 50 percent declared the

experience had little effect either way. Only 2.7 percent considered military service a temporary handicap, and 6.3 percent considered it a decided handicap or disadvantage.

Lumping figures, one notes that roughly 41 percent of the veterans considered Army experience beneficial; about 50 percent thought it neither particularly beneficial nor disadvantageous; 9 percent considered it a detriment.

For the World War II generation, this view was doubtless influenced by the tangible benefits of the GI program. However, the views of World War I veterans appear not to diverge markedly. If the 2.9 million veterans in the age 55 and over group—mostly World War I veterans—30 percent considered their military experience helpful, 59 percent regarded it as neither helpful nor harmful, and only 11 percent believed it temporarily or permanently detrimental.

Chapter II. Veterans and Nonveterans, World War I

PRESENT SITUATION, WORLD WAR VETERANS

Today's veteran population contains a sizable percentage of oldsters who were "doughboys" in the First World War. Most of these veterans are now in their 50's and 60's. Is this veteran generation on an economic and social level with nonveterans of comparable age? Are these veterans better off than their contemporaries? Or were the majority handicapped to some degree by military service and, accordingly, unable to attain the social and economic status of contemporary nonveterans?

Data from surveys by the Bureau of the Census went into the following tables, which present comparative statistical pictures of the World War veteran's present situation. The evidence is somewhat blurred because data on the older veterans cover both "peacetime" and wartime servicemen. However, the preponderance of World War servicemen in these age groups is so great that the general picture remains unaffected.

MONEY INCOME, WORLD WAR I VETERANS

Table 12 deals with the money income in 1954 of World War I veterans and the remainder of the male population aged 55 to 64, and 65 and over. The veteran column includes all men with military service other than in World War II; these are predominantly veterans of World War I. The nonveteran columns pertain to men who are predominantly nonveterans, but includes a small number of older World War II veterans.

TABLE 12.—*Income—Comparison of money income of World War I veterans [1] and nonveterans, [2] by age group and income class, 1954*

Income class	55–64 years		65 years and over	
	Veterans of World War I	Nonveterans	Veterans of World War I	Nonveterans
Percent with income	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under $500	4.4	9.5	8.7	17.9
$500 to $999	9.2	8.3	20.7	25.9
$1,000 to $1,499	8.8	5.9	15.8	14.0
$1,500 to $1,999	6.7	6.1	11.4	9.5
$2,000 to $2,499	6.1	7.8	10.2	7.7
$2,500 to $2,999	7.0	9.9	7.3	5.5
$3,000 to $3,499	11.4	10.2	4.4	4.2
$3,500 to $3,999	9.9	10.2	7.0	3.8
$4,000 to $4,499	9.4	7.4	2.4	3.4
$4,500 to $4,999	4.3	6.0	.5	1.9
$5,000 to $5,999	6.6	7.3	3.4	1.8
$6,000 to $6,999	5.9	3.3	.5	1.2
$7,000 to $9,999	5.6	4.7	3.6	1.5
$10,000 and over	4.7	3.4	4.1	1.7
Median income	$3,342	$3,123	$1,715	$1,221

[1] Includes all males in the civilian noninstitutional population with military service, other than in World War II, who have money income. These are predominantly World War I veterans.
[2] Includes all males with money income in the civilian noninstitutional population who are not World War I veterans; a small number of World War II veterans are included.

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

The median total money income of World War I veterans with income in the 55–64 age group was $3,342 as compared with $3,123 for all other men in the same age group. As shown, in the 65-and-over age group, the veterans with income had a significantly greater margin in their favor—$1,715 median annual income as compared with $1,221 for nonveterans.

The most striking thing about the income distribution shown is the smaller proportion of veterans than nonveterans with very low incomes, and the comparatively large numbers of veterans at higher income levels. About twice the proportion of nonveterans than veterans in both age groups had incomes under $500. At the high end of the income scale, 22.8 percent of the veterans and 18.7 percent of nonveterans in the age group 55–64 had income of $5,000 or more. In the 65-and-over age group, 11.6 percent of the veterans and 6.2 percent of nonveterans had money income of at least $5,000.

Approximately the same proportion of World War I veterans than nonveterans in these groups had incomes. In the 55–64 age group, 97.2 percent of the veterans had incomes as compared with 96.2 percent of those predominantly nonveterans. In the 65-and-over brackets, 95.4 percent of the veterans had incomes as compared with 91.9 percent of the nonveterans.

The higher income figures, as shown, appear to favor the veterans. It thus appears that ex-servicemen of World War I are generally better off incomewise than their contemporaries.

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS, WORLD WAR I VETERANS

Table 13 presents a comparative statistical picture of World War I veterans and other men in the 55-64 and 65-and-over age groups by their labor force, industry and occupational status as of April 1955.

TABLE 13.—*Labor force, industry, and occupation—Comparison of World War I veterans [1] and nonveterans [2] in age groups 55–64 and 65 and over, by labor force, industry and occupational attachment, April 1955*

Category	55–64 years		65 years and over	
	Veterans of World War I	Nonveterans	Veterans of World War I	Nonveterans
Labor force status: Total persons (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
In labor force	86.6	88.0	44.8	38.7
Employed	81.9	83.7	43.1	37.3
Agriculture industry	10.9	12.6	7.2	10.7
Nonagricultural industries	71.0	71.1	35.5	26.7
Unemployed	4.6	4.3	1.7	1.4
Not in labor force	13.4	12.0	55.2	61.3
Major industry groups: Total employed (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agricultural industry	13.3	15.1	16.9	28.6
Nonagricultural industries	86.7	84.7	83.1	71.4
Construction	8.2	8.8	9.8	7.0
Manufacturing	24.9	26.2	15.7	17.9
Transportation, communications, and other public utilities	11.3	9.7	4.3	5.5
Trade	12.5	17.7	14.9	15.0
Service industries	19.7	17.8	27.5	22.3
Other industries	10.1	4.8	11.0	3.7
Major occupation groups: Total employed (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional, technical and kindred	10.4	6.5	6.6	4.9
Farmers and farm managers	9.0	13.0	15.1	24.8
Proprietors, managers and officials	14.9	14.7	8.5	15.7
Clerical and kindred workers	6.8	4.8	11.6	4.4
Sales workers	5.9	5.0	8.1	4.2
Craftsmen and foremen	19.7	20.7	18.2	14.4
Operatives and kindred workers	14.1	16.7	12.8	9.7
Service workers, including private household	9.4	9.1	11.2	11.1
Farm laborers and foremen	3.8	1.3	1.2	3.3
Laborers, except farm and mine	6.0	8.0	6.6	7.6

[1] Includes all males in the civilian noninstitutional population with military service other than in World War II.

[2] Includes all males in the civilian noninstitutional population who are not World War I veterans; a small number of World War II veterans are included.

NOTE.—Percentages do not always total 100 due to rounding of figures.

Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census.

As shown by the table, differentials generally favor the World War I veteran. The principal exception is in the 55–64 age group where the veterans show slightly lower labor force participation and employment rates than their contemporaries. In the 65-and-over category, the figures favor the older ex-serviceman—43.1 percent of the veterans employed compared with 37.3 percent of the nonveterans.

Among those employed in the 55–64 age group, there were few notable differences in the occupational distribution. Of some significance is the fact that 10.4 percent of the veterans were in the professional and technical category, whereas only 6.5 percent of their contemporaries were in this group.

In the 65-and-over group 7 percent of the veterans and 5 percent of the nonveterans were in the high-paying professional and technical category. On the other hand, a smaller proportion of the veterans were proprietors, managers or officials. Only 1 out of every 6 veterans was engaged in agriculture in some capacity, while the proportion for nonveterans was nearly 3 out of 10.

The picture presented by table 13 substantiates the one reflected by the money-income table. Altogether, it would seem that the

World War I veterans as a group suffered little, if any, social or economic handicap in comparison with other men of the same age.

Chapter III

CONCLUSION

THEY SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

Seen in broad perspective, the comparative statistical picture shows veterans of all age groups—the oldsters of World War I and the younger men of World War II and later—in relatively favorable social and economic positions. In respect to incomes, occupational status, job mobility, marital status, homeownership and liquid assets, the veterans of World War II were generally as well off as contemporary nonveterans, and in many cases better off. In money income and occupation categories, the veterans of World War I held a similar lead over nonveterans of the world war period.

Admittedly a number of possibly negative factors failed to show in the statistical delineation. Samples are never entirely definitive, and interpretations cannot be drawn in absolute terms from generalities. Some of the tabulated categories were relatively broad. As was noted in regard to "mobility," the individual's move from one job to another, or from one residence to another, in itself proves little in respect to occupational stability or economic position. He may change jobs (or residence) for the better or worse. Conversely, he may remain in job (or residence) through satisfaction or through unambitious inertia.

As such an item as "mobility" may be hard to evaluate, so is the matter of children—one feature of life in which the veteran seems to have come out in a secondary position. If he was, indeed, placed in this position by events, it would seem a handicap. Yet the trend in America has not been in a "large family" direction, and it might be difficult to prove that military service was in a large degree responsible for relatively small veteran families.

Finally, an impartial assessment of the veteran's situation must take a basic factor into account. Factually, veterans were by and large the physical and perhaps mental superiors of the contemporary male population. Through the exacting processes of military requirement and selection they were, so to speak, the "Nation's best." Given this edge over 4–F exemptees and deferred (and generally disadvantaged) civilians, they took the lead in the subsequent competitions of civilian life. The question remains: how much further could they have gone, how much more in life could they have gained if they had not been compelled to devote several years to military service?

The question defies an arbitrary answer. It was, however, in part implicit in the query which captions table 11. In broad terms that table summarizes the situation. The veterans—and the figures—speak for themselves. Most veterans do not feel they were disadvantaged by military service and the census figures show that economically and socially veterans as a group are better off than nonveterans.

PART III

VETERANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD VETERANS' BENEFITS

(A Survey of Veteran Opinion)[1]

Introductory (the Roper Study)

Much has been recorded on public attitudes toward veterans' benefits. But relatively little information has been obtained heretofore on the opinions held by veterans themselves in regard to veterans' benefits. The veteran consensus is not necessarily voiced by the "spokesmen" for veterans' organizations or by the professional publicity agents and representatives of those organizations. The present survey represents an attempt to measure the thinking of the rank and file—the organization member and the veteran who belongs to no organization—the "G. I." ex-serviceman and the older veteran of World War I—the man who served overseas and the man who did not—the man who was disabled in service, and the man who suffered no service-connected disability.

Pioneering a comprehensive study of across-the-board veteran opinion, the firm of Elmo Roper in October 1954 assembled and assessed pertinent data for the National Civil Service League. The project embraced a broad inquiry on veterans' benefits in general. Analysis was concentrated on the veteran's attitude toward civil-service job preferences for ex-servicemen. But his attitude toward this benefit (one provided by existing law) could be taken as an indicant of his thinking on veterans as a group or special class. It also reflected his position in regard to other benefits enumerated in the survey.

The method of survey involved the polling of veterans in all parts of the country to obtain a nationally representative sample. Altogether 2,922 male veteran respondents composed the sample—a typical one for this type of survey.

In analysis, respondent attitudes were measured in various degrees ranging through "least favorable," "moderately favorable," "strongly favorable." General characteristics of attitude and opinion were thus reduced to statistics by the relatively scientific yardstick of "scale analysis."

For the purposes of group subdivision, veterans were given two broadly classifying labels—"proveterans benefits" and "veterans are just people" (an adjective term more or less indicative of an attitude that veterans do not constitute a special class). As will be noted in more detail, the "probenefits" (special class) advocates and the "just people" veterans constituted antithetical minorities at opposite ends of an axis. Some 85 percent of the veteran respondents could be placed in brackets lying in between, with about 29 percent in the middle or "neutral" segment.

Drawn from the Roper study were the general findings herewith enumerated.

---

[1] Based on a study of veterans' attitudes toward veterans' benefits prepared for the National Civil Service League by Elmo Roper; Survey Director Robert A. Peattie, Jr. (October 1954).

Chapter I. General Findings

WHAT VETERANS THINK

The principal findings of the Roper study appear to be as follows:

1. Most veterans think of ex-servicemen as a group, and are inclined to favor some benefits for fellow veterans and themselves (e. g., medical care for service-connected disability; reemployment rights; and low-cost housing loans).

2. Most veterans favor civil-service job preferences for fellow veterans, but——

3. A sizable percentage of veterans feel that a nonveteran should have equal or preferential treatment as a Federal employee if (*a*) he has a better job rating or more seniority than a veteran, or (*b*) he has dependent children and the veteran is childless.

4. Although expressing the opinion that Government service is not hampered by current law, most veterans aver they would like to see the law changed so that qualified nonveterans would receive more equable treatment.

5. Relatively few veterans approve such gratuitous benefits as free medical care for non-service-connected disabilities and first choice for low-rent apartments. Only a small percentage of those polled approved "pensions for life" for all veterans.

6. Organization veterans are usually more "pro-veterans' benefits" than are nonorganization veterans, but not drastically more so.

7. World War I veterans are more inclined to favor across-the-board benefits than are younger veterans, but not greatly more so.

8. While most veterans are partial to veterans as a group and are inclined to favor special consideration for the veteran, a vigorous minority register impartiality and take a conservative view of veterans' "rights" and of subsidies for ex-servicemen.

9. Veterans who are active in veterans' organizations generally belong to the "pro-benefits" group. But their viewpoint is not the majority one. Among organization members there are considerable divergences of opinion.

10. As shown by respondent opinion, about 8 percent of the veterans are hard-core "pro-benefitters"; about 7 percent reflect the "veterans are just people" attitude; some 85 percent are in the "in between" category.

11. Speaking for himself in the survey, the average veteran seems to be "fairminded" on the subject of benefits. He feels entitled to some aid in getting started in civilian life. He approves generous compensation for the veteran disabled in service. But he is averse to pensions for all veterans. And he would probably vote conservatively on some of the more controversial benefit issues.

The following offers a brief discussion of the data which produced the foregoing findings.

BASIC ATTITUDES

As a starting point for investigation of veteran opinion, the ex-serviceman's attitude toward veterans as a group was subjected to inquiry and analysis.

Veteran respondents were given a "battery" of five questions. Each question was calculated to elicit opinion which would bear on a

particular facet of the subject under inquiry—the "group consciousness" of the average veteran.

Table 1 enumerates the five questions and shows the percentage of veterans (by total and by age group) who agreed or disagreed with the propositions in the questionnaire. Intensity of opinion is measured, as shown, by "agree strongly," "agree a little," "disagree a little," "disagree strongly."

TABLE 1

"People say a good many things about veterans of the Armed Forces. I am going to read some of them to you, and I'd like to know which of the statements on this card [card shown veteran] comes closest to how you feel about each one."

	Total veterans	Analyzed by veterans whose ages are—			
		21–29	30–34	35–49	50 and over
Number of veterans	2,922	708	742	931	541
Percent	100	100	100	100	100
(*a*) Veterans of the armed services have done more for their country than most other people:					
Agree strongly	39	42	34	34	50
Agree a little	33	34	35	35	24
Disagree a little	16	14	19	18	15
Disagree strongly	6	4	6	7	5
Don't know or no answer	6	6	6	6	6
(*b*) No matter how much veterans get from the Government, veterans' groups are always asking for more:					
Agree strongly	18	15	15	19	25
Agree a little	25	23	27	27	23
Disagree a little	22	23	22	23	19
Disagree strongly	22	25	23	21	19
Don't know or no answer	13	14	13	10	14
(*c*) Wherever possible, veterans deserve favored treatment:					
Agree strongly	36	34	31	35	46
Agree a little	27	28	29	27	27
Disagree a little	18	19	19	19	12
Disagree strongly	15	15	17	16	10
Don't know or no answer	4	4	4	3	5
(*d*) While veterans' groups do a lot of good, they often get involved in things that are none of their business:					
Agree strongly	24	19	26	26	24
Agree a little	26	26	23	26	29
Disagree a little	17	19	15	17	16
Disagree strongly	19	21	21	18	17
Don't know or no answer	14	15	15	13	14
(*e*) Veterans' groups are doing a fine job in keeping the country well prepared:					
Agree strongly	40	41	36	37	51
Agree a little	28	27	29	30	24
Disagree a little	12	13	15	12	9
Disagree strongly	7	7	8	8	4
Don't know or no answer	13	12	12	13	12

Summarization of the Roper tabulation gives the following picture of veteran opinion on veterans as a group:

72 percent agree that veterans have done more for their country than most other people.

69 percent agree that veterans' groups are doing a fine job in keeping the country well prepared.


63 percent agree that wherever possible veterans deserve favored treatment.

44 percent disagree with the proposition "no matter how much veterans get from the Government, veterans groups are always asking for more."

36 percent disagree with the statement "while veterans' groups do a lot of good, they often get involved with things that are none of their business."

As measured by the scaling technique employed in the Roper survey, veterans' attitudes toward veterans as a body can be graduated in seven groupings. These range from "least favorable" to "most favorable" along a basic underlying continuum (or fundamental characteristic) having to do with attitude toward veterans. The Roper study pictures this opinion-range with the diagram below.

BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARD VETERANS



As indicated, 75 percent of the veterans took a "moderately favorable" view of veterans as a group and of veterans' organizations. But this "moderate" grouping, subdivided, shows 20 percent of the "moderates" inclined toward the "veterans are just people" view, and 26 percent more or less "proveterans' benefits."

ATTITUDINAL DIVISIONS

Having measured veteran sentiment concerning veterans as a group, the Roper study went on to identify the veterans in the "probenefits" and "just people" categories by age, educational status, economic status and so on. Which veterans were most likely to be confirmed "proveteran benefits"? Which were most likely to think of veterans as "just people" entitled to some degree of recognition and recompense for service, but not to be endowed with gratuities as a special class?

The Roper study produced the following data:

Types most likely to be "proveteran benefits"

1. World War I veterans.
2. American Legion members (and to lesser extent, members of other veterans' organizations).
3. "Very active" in their veterans' organizations.
4. Veterans drawing a disability pension.
5. Grade school only graduates.
6. Negroes.
7. Lower economic level veterans (today's status).

"Veterans are just people" types

1. Not members of a veterans' organization.
2. Not too active (if belonging to an organization).
3. Veterans who have talked or written to public officials about public issues.
4. College men.
5. Ex-officers.
6. Higher economic level veterans (today's status).

In assessing the foregoing, the Roper analysts noted that service overseas (or the contrary) had little or no effect on the attitude of the average veteran. It was also noted that the "probenefits" and "just people" groups represented extremes; most veteran opinion was "in between."

STATE COLLEGE JUL 195 MANHATTAN KANSAS

Chapter II. Veterans' Opinion of Specific Benefits

RE BENEFITS ALL VETERANS SHOULD RECEIVE

In an effort to measure the "overall veteran attitude," the Roper experts selected 11 benefits for use in a standard test. A battery of questions was applied to the 11 benefits. Opinions thus invited produced data for tabulations recording percentages of "pro" and "con" opinion, attitudinal divisions, degrees of conviction, and attitude by age-group, disability status and service experience.

The veteran respondents were asked which of the 11 enumerated benefits all veterans should be entitled to.

Of the 11, the average number selected was 5½. Among the "hard core" extremes, the "just people" veterans felt all ex-servicemen should receive an average of 4 benefits; the "probenefits" group voted for 6½ on the average.

Table 2 offers a percentagewise breakdown of veteran opinion in respect to benefits for all veterans.

Table 2

"Which of the benefits on this list do you think all veterans should receive?"

Total number of veterans	2, 922
	Percent
Total percent	100
Free medical care for illness or injury connected with the service	86
Getting back the jobs they held before going into service	84
Low-cost loans for home building or buying	69
Schooling at Government expense	66
Low-cost Government insurance	60
On-the-job training paid for by the Government	52
Advantages over nonveterans in getting Government jobs	39
First choice for low-rent apartments	26
Free medical care for any illness or injury whatsoever	22
Holding Government jobs while other people are being laid off from theirs	18
Pensions for life	13
None of them or no answer	1

As indicated by the table, the respondents felt that all veterans should receive some of the listed benefits—evidence that ex-servicemen do regard veterans as deserving a number of benefits and privileges.

As shown, 86 percent of the veteran respondents favored free medical care for all veterans with service-connected disabilities.

Next in line of popularity was the benefit labeled "getting back jobs held before going into service." Some 84 percent of the respondents favored this reemployment right for all veterans.

Low-cost housing loans (building or buying) were approved for all veterans by 69 percent of the respondents.

Some 66 percent felt all veterans should be given schooling at Government expense; 60 percent favored low-cost Government insurance for all veterans; and 52 percent approved of on-the-job training at Government expense.

The figures register a considerable drop in respect to civil-service reemployment privilege and "first choice for low-rent apartments"—39 percent and 26 percent respectively in favor. Only 18 percent of the respondents thought veterans should hold Government jobs while nonveterans were being laid off.

And, as shown at the bottom, a mere 13 percent were in favor of "lifetime pensions" for all veterans.

The statistics add up to eloquent testimony that nearly all veterans believe ex-servicemen are entitled to aid and recompense from the Federal Government. But the figures also indicate moderation on the part of the veteran majority. Veterans place service-connected medical care and readjustment benefits at the top. They place non-service-connected pension and medical benefits at the bottom of the list.

VETERAN OPINION ON BENEFITS (BY WAR AND OVERSEAS SERVICE)

As analyzed with respect to particular war and stateside or overseas service, veteran opinion regarding benefits is presented in table 3 (accompanying). The war category serves as an indicant of opinion by age group, the World War I veterans, of course, being oldest, and the Korean veterans representing the youngest. The overseas category measures to some extent the opinion of veterans who saw the hardest war duty (those who were longest away from home and those who were in combat).

76907—58——10

TABLE 3

"Which of the benefits on this list do you think all veterans should get right now regardless of whether or not you think they get them?" [Card shown veteran]

	Total veterans	Veterans who served in—										
		World War I			World War II			Korea only			World War II and Korea	Other campaigns
		Total	Overseas	Not overseas	Total	Overseas	Not overseas	Total	Overseas	Not overseas		
Number of veterans (100 percent)	2,922	436	271	162	1,897	1,428	455	405	299	101	[1] 85	[1] 96
Should get now—	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
Free medical care for illness or injury connected with the service	86	88	88	88	85	85	87	86	90	75	84	93
Getting back the jobs they held before going into the service	84	83	82	85	84	85	82	83	83	84	92	81
Low-cost loans for home building or buying	69	64	64	63	69	69	70	75	78	66	76	59
Schooling at Government expense	66	63	62	65	64	63	67	80	81	74	74	59
On-the-job training paid for by the Government	52	46	44	51	51	51	49	62	63	59	60	49
Advantages over nonveterans in getting Government jobs	39	41	39	44	38	38	36	44	47	35	47	45
First choice for low-rent apartments	26	33	30	38	23	22	25	33	35	28	21	28
Free medical care for any illness or injury whatsoever	22	30	32	28	20	19	19	23	22	27	22	28
Holding Government jobs while other people are being laid off	18	24	22	27	16	17	15	23	25	18	19	20
Pensions for life	13	25	28	20	10	10	10	14	15	11	6	11
None of them or no answer	1	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	2

[1] Percentages based on less than 100 cases are often unreliable.

NOTE.—Percentages add to more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than 1 answer.
Distribution of veterans does not add to totals because some failed to respond to the particular question.

Perhaps the most notable feature of this statistical picture is the higher percentage of World War I veterans in the overseas category who favored pensions for life for all veterans. Only 10 percent of the younger World War II veterans who saw overseas duty voted in favor of this benefit.

Again, a relatively high percentage of all World War I veterans voted for free medical care for non-service-connected disabilities—30 percent as against an average 22 percent vote by younger veterans.

The table 3 statistics indicate that the older veteran of World War I is more inclined to favor pensioning than are the younger veterans of World War II and Korea. It would seem that of the two, the younger generation is more inclined to favor educational benefits (schooling at Government expense; on-the-job training), reemployment privileges and homebuilding aids. The younger veteran's point of view suggests a desire to get started and then make his own way. Perhaps unfamiliar with the GI benefits in reference, the World War I veteran inclines toward cash subsidies and such paternalistic benefits as life pensions and civil service job-preference.

In respect to those who served overseas and those who did not, the table shows Korean war overseas veterans voting consistently in favor of benefits—particularly in the readjustment category—with some of the highest percentages recorded.

One may note several instances wherein stateside veterans of each of the designated wars registered the strongest approval of certain benefits. But in most cases the overseas veterans demanded more by way of compensation.

The pattern of benefit selection seems consistent throughout, whatever the war (or age group) of the veteran and whatever his service experience. Almost all of the veteran respondents expressed the opinion that veterans deserved benefits for service-connected disability. At the other extreme, only small percentages favored non-service-connected pensions or related benefits.

VETERAN OPINION ON BENEFITS (BY ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP)

As analyzed with respect to respondents who belonged or did not belong to veterans' organizations, veteran opinion regarding benefits for all veterans is presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4

"Which of the benefits on this list do you think all veterans should get right now regardless of whether or not you think they get them?" [Card shown veteran.]

	Total veterans	Veterans who now belong to—		
		American Legion	Other veterans' organizations	No veterans' organizations
Number of veterans	2,922	536	243	2,130
	Percent	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
Total percent	100	100	100	100
Should get now:				
Free medical care for illness or injury connected with the service	86	89	85	85
Getting back the jobs they held before going into service	84	88	85	83
Low-cost loans for home building or buying	69	70	72	68
Schooling at Government expense	66	65	62	67
Low-cost Government insurance	60	65	63	59
On-the-job training paid for by the Government	52	48	52	53
Advantages over nonveterans in getting Government jobs	39	49	42	37
First choice for low-rent apartments	26	27	28	26
Free medical care for any illness or injury whatsoever	22	23	20	22
Holding Government jobs while other people are being laid off from theirs	18	24	17	17
Pensions for life	13	15	14	12
None of them or no answer	1	1	1	2
Average number of benefits mentioned	5.4	5.6	5.4	5.3

NOTE.—Percentages add to more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than 1 answer. Distribution of veterans does not add to 2,922 because some failed to respond to the particular question.

As is shown, the opinions of organization members and nonmembers are relatively uniform in the matter of selection. That is, in each group the highest percentage voted for free medical care for service-connected disabilities. Reemployment rights received the next highest vote. And so on down the line, with "pensions for life" coming in last in each case.

In examining the table, one notes that the greatest divergences of opinion were registered by American Legion members and those veterans who belonged to no organization. In general, the members of the VFW, the AVC, the AMVETS and smaller organizations took an "in between" or "moderate" position.

It would seem that the American Legionnaires were more inclined to favor what might be called "paternalistic" benefits (Civil Service job privileges and "life pensions"), whereas the nonorganization respondents cast the higher vote for schooling at Government expense and for on-the-job training—educational benefits. Perhaps these views reflect the preponderance of older men (World War I veterans) in the American Legion. The oldsters, of course, would be less interested in vocational training and other educational opportunities.

VETERANS' OPINION OF SPECIFIC BENEFITS (CON.)

As a check on the "pro" attitude toward benefits, the Roper survey asked of the respondents a "con" opinion: Which of the 11 enumerated benefits did the respondent feel veterans ought not to have?

Again the responses were tabulated to record opinionwise percentages, attitudinal divisions, degrees of conviction, and status of respondent. Table 5 shows the response as registered by members and nonmembers of veterans' organizations.

TABLE 5

"Could you go down the list once more and tell me whether there are any that you think veterans ought not to have?"

	Total veterans	Veterans who now belong to—		
		American Legion	Other veterans' organizations	No veterans' organizations
Number of veterans	2,922	536	243	2,130
	Percent	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
Total percent	100	100	100	100
Free medical care for any illness or injury whatsoever	32	30	34	33
Holding Government jobs while other people are being laid off from theirs	32	26	33	33
First choice for low-rent apartments	25	24	26	25
Advantages over nonveterans in getting Government jobs	19	15	20	19
Pensions for life	18	18	19	18
Schooling at Government expense	6	5	7	6
On-the-job training paid for by the Government	6	5	7	6
Low-cost Government insurance	6	5	5	6
Low-cost loans for home building or buying	5	5	5	5
Getting back the jobs they held before going into service	1	1	2	1
Free medical care for illness or injury connected with the service	(1)	(1)	----	1
None	31	35	32	30
No answer	3	3	1	3

[1] Less than 0.5 percent.

NOTE.—Percentages add to more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than 1 answer. Distribution of veterans does not add to 2,922 because some failed to respond to the particular question.

One notes that 32 percent of the veteran respondents disapproved of free medical care for non-service-connected disabilities. A similarly high percentage disapproved of civil-service job preference for veterans over nonveterans in event of employee layoffs. In the middle of the range 18 percent disapproved of "pensions for life." At the other end of the scale, less than one-half of 1 percent disapproved of free medical care for veterans disabled in military service.

The figures in table 5 substantiate the divergences of opinion between organization and nonorganization veterans shown in table 4. The American Legion veterans seem less inclined to dispense with the more "paternalistic" benefits than do the non-Legion members. Only 30 percent of the American Legion respondents disapproved of free medical care for nonservice disabilities—a benefit disapproved by 34 percent of the other organization members. Whereas 33 percent of the nonorganization veterans disapproved of veterans holding Government jobs while nonveterans were being laid off, only 26 percent of the American Legion members voted against this "superseniority" privilege.

Again the respondents expressed an interesting unanimity of opinion in favor of low-cost housing loans, reemployment rights, and free medical care for service-connected disabilities. However, some inconsistency appears in the opinion expressed on educational benefits. In the previous poll, relatively few American Legion members voted in favor of on-the-job training and schooling at Government expense. In voting on benefits veterans ought not to have, only 5 percent of the American Legion members expressed disapproval of schooling at Government expense and on-the-job training.

OPINION ON BENEFITS FOR DISABLED VETERANS ONLY

The Roper survey asked the respondents what benefits they thought only disabled veterans should receive. Because the question contains a double negative (i. e., a vote for the disabled exclusively implies that the nondisabled should not receive the benefit), some of the answers are ambiguous. Again, redundancy confuses the issue, for the veteran is asked his opinion on free medical care for service-connected disability for only disabled veterans. Obviously the nondisabled could not receive care (or otherwise) for a service-connected disability.

With this ambiguity in mind, one may nevertheless discern the trend of veteran opinion as shown by the accompanying tabulation (table 6). Most veteran respondents approved of "pensions for life" for disabled veterans only. Relatively few approved of "free medical care for any illness or injury whatsoever" (non-service-connected disabilities).

TABLE 6

"Are there any benefits that only disabled veterans should get?"

Total number of veterans	2, 922
	Percent
Percent	100
Pensions for life	73
Free medical care for any illness or injury whatsoever	27
Advantages over nonveterans in getting Government jobs	20
On-the-job training paid for by the Government	20
Holding Government jobs while other people are being laid off from theirs	18
First choice for low-rent apartments	16
Free medical care for illness or injury connected with the service	15
Schooling at Government expense	13
Low-cost Government insurance	13
Low-cost loans for home building or buying	11
Getting back the jobs they held before going back into the service	6
All veterans should get or no answer	7

If one admits the double negative in the question, it would seem that most of the respondents thought nondisabled veterans should also be entitled to the other enumerated benefits. However, this inference is confused by the 7 percent response labeled "all veterans should get or no answer."

As used in the Roper survey the term "pensions for life" is ambiguous. In the official usage, a "pension" is a gratuity paid as an award for military service to veterans who have no service-incurred disability. In reference: the "service pensions." Embraced by the same general term were "old-age pensions" for needy veterans, and payments to veterans with non-service-connected disabilities. (Payments for service-connected disabilities are called compensation.) However, one may assume that the respondents did not clearly differentiate between non-service-connected pensions and service-connected disability compensation. In common usage both are called "pensions." This would explain 73 percent of the respondents favoring "pensions" for disabled veterans, as compared to the 13 percent cited earlier as favoring pensions for all veterans.

Chapter III. Civil Service Job Preference

VETERANS IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Focal point of the Roper study is the veteran's attitude toward special privileges for veterans in Federal Government employment. As the law stands, all veterans seeking such employment are entitled to a "five-point bonus" in their civil-service examination score. Disabled veterans are entitled to a "ten-point bonus." In addition to this advantage over nonveteran competitors, veterans are entilted to the reemployment right and to "super seniority" in event of reductions in force. In short, the veterans are given first chance for the job, and at time of layoff they are last to go.

Since the average veteran is not a Federal Government employee, an opinion poll on these particular benefits might reflect a more or less disinterested attitude toward benefits per se. Here the average respondent had no personal ax to grind.

The Roper survey termed the reemployment right and the examination-score bonus "advantages over nonveterans in getting Government jobs." The veterans were asked if they approved of these advantages. As shown in table 2, 39 percent of the respondents thought all veterans should have the advantages stipulated. Conversely, 19 percent felt veterans should not have these advantages. (See table 5.)

CONCERNING "SUPER SENIORITY"

Queried on the veteran's right to "hold Government jobs while nonveterans are being laid off," only 18 percent of the respondents favored this benefit. On the other hand, 32 percent thought veterans should not have the retention privilege.

Concerning the veteran's "super seniority" advantage in the event of reductions in force, the Roper survey tested veteran opinion with a battery of "conditional" questions. Under what circumstances would the veteran respondent favor keeping the nonveteran on the job? Conditions were stipulated as follows: (*a*) All things being equal; (*b*) the nonveteran has two children; (*c*) the nonveteran has greater seniority; (*d*) the nonveteran has a better job rating; (*e*) "extreme" case wherein nonveteran is older, has greater seniority and better job rating.

Measuring the degrees or intensity of sentiment, the following table from the Roper study summarizes the vote for retaining the nonveteran employee:

Table 7

	Veterans' attitude score groups						
	Least favorable		Moderately favorable			Strongly favorable	
	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3	No. 4	No. 5	No. 6	No. 7
Number of veterans	189	180	579	860	756	122	236
Would keep nonveteran when—	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
All things equal (control group)	4	2	3	1	2	1	2
Nonveteran has 2 children	75	73	70	64	61	52	53
Nonveteran has greater seniority	82	80	71	64	56	52	45
Nonveteran has better job rating	88	73	74	61	57	54	46
"Extreme" nonveteran case	96	90	84	81	77	73	67

The Roper analysts call attention to the direct relationship between the attitudinal groups (Nos. 1 to 7) and the selection of the nonveteran, as shown in the table. In the "strongly favorable" group (col. 7) only 45 percent of the respondents favor the nonveteran employee who has seniority. And only 46 percent favor the nonveteran who has better job rating. However, most of the respondents expressed a "moderately favorable" attitude toward the nonveteran Government employee.

From the foregoing, the Roper study draws two conclusions. When circumstances are such that veteran and nonveteran are on equal footing, the veterans say "keep the veteran." However, if the nonveteran has marked seniority, superior merit, or dependents, the veteran consensus—by about 2 to 1—favors the nonveteran as the man best qualified, the employee who should be retained in event of reductions in force.

VETERANS' VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Queried concerning Government service and the legalized benefits involved, the veteran respondents expressed some interesting (and inconsistent) opinions.

Posed a question relating to the efficiency of Government departments compared with the efficiency of most business firms, about 1 out of 3 veteran respondents expressed the opinion that Government departments were "less efficient." Another 1 out of 3 thought Government and private business "about the same" in this respect. Only 14 percent of the respondents thought Government departments more efficient than firms in private business. Notably, both the "proveteran benefits" group and the veterans of the so-called lower economic level were inclined to regard Government departments as relatively efficient. Conversely, the "just people" veterans and the "higher economic level veterans" were inclined to downgrade governmental efficiency.

Did the veterans feel that employment advantages and super seniority for veterans reduced the efficiency of Government service? The respondents were asked: "Would you like to see Congress change the law so you could keep the nonveteran, or do you think the law ought to stay the way it is now?"

A majority of the respondents (54 percent) favored changing the law. But 31 percent favored keeping the law as it is. Yet a plurality of the veteran respondents stated they did not think employment privileges and super seniority for veteran employees had an adverse effect on the efficiency and morale of Government service. Thus it would seem that few respondents associated the existing handicap borne by the nonveteran employee with indifferent morale and lack of efficiency in Government service. But most veterans recognized the merits of individual cases and were sympathetic to a change of law to better the situation for the qualified nonveteran.

Parenthetically, it is well to note that the retention questions posed by the Roper survey were more or less hypothetical. Civil-service job ratings are not made on the precision basis implied by the wordage of the questionnaire. Nor does the age of the worker or his situation in respect to dependents affect his retention status as conditions actually exist. On these points a critic might find the survey unrealistic.

However, the Roper study contains commentary which suggests that the conditional questions concerning civil-service retention were not to be taken literally. Rather, they were designed to elicit answers indicative of an attitude, a general point of view—the veteran's attitude toward the nonveteran who is disadvantaged by a given set of circumstances. The circumstances themselves were fictionalized for the purposes of the inquiry. The device is made manifest by the wording with which the Roper analysts summarize their findings on this facet of veteran opinion. They conclude:

> At present, they [veterans] appear particularly concerned with the individual as an individual and less concerned with any broad philosophical feelings about Government employment in the abstract.

Chapter IV. Analysis of Veteran Types

INFLUENCE OF VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONS

In concluding their survey, the Roper examiners analyzed the respondents themselves in an effort to identify these veterans by type in relation to organization membership. This endeavor was in part aimed at determining the current influence of veterans' organizations on veteran opinion. An original survey in this field, the investigation covered pioneer territory as yet unexplored by political scientist or sociologist.

It had been realized, of course, that the source of much veterans' legislation was the professionally organized veterans' association, represented in the past by the historic Grand Army of the Republic and such minor groups as the Soldiers and Sailors National Union League and the Boys in Blue. Recent studies of these organizations (notably by William H. Glasson and by Mary R. Dearing) leave little doubt that they exerted powerful pressures to mold the pension legislation of the gaslight era. Of later date, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion sponsored and promoted numerous pension and benefit bills. (The activities of the American Legion have been definitively covered in volumes by Richard Seelye Jones and by William P. Dillingham.) The public was generally aware that the major veterans' organizations consistently campaigned for veterans' benefits. In fact, these organizations advertised themselves as the champions of such legislation.

But a question remained. Did the official positions taken by the veterans' organizations represent the thinking of the rank and file members? Corollary questions were: (1) If unanimous opinion was not represented, how divergent were the views of organization members? (2) Did nonorganization veterans generally echo organization views, and, if not, how divergent were their opinions?

The Roper survey entered inquiries relating to the numerical strength of the various organizations, membership by age group, attitudinal divisions by organization membership, and divisions within a particular organization according to active and not very active categories. From analysis of these and other facets of the organization survey, the Roper study produced the following findings:

SOME VETERAN TYPES

It has been felt by many people for some time that the most-favorable-to-veterans veterans are particular types—American Legion members, or overseas veterans, or disabled verterans, or active veterans, or World War I veterans. We investigated the attitudes of these different veteran types and, true enough, found evidence that American Legion veterans and disabled veterans and World War I veterans and organizationally active veterans are all likely to be more favorable to veterans' preferences. Conversely, veterans with no disability, World War II veterans, or those not active in veterans' organizations are likely to be less favorable. But the differences between the two groups were not of great magnitude as the (following) tables show—nor were these differences nearly so large as those obtained by dividing veterans into the seven basic attitude classes described earlier. This seems to us to say that a veteran's overall orientation toward veterans (or his underlying attitude toward them) is a much more sensitive measure of his answers to other survey questions relating to veterans' affairs than is the coincidence of his belonging to a particular veterans' group.

Specifically, the one type of veteran who seems to be the most enthusiastic veteran as a veteran is the one who is active in a veterans' organization. His attitudes on a number of the survey questions indicate that he comes closer to the pro-veterans benefits group than does any other veteran type we investigated. But his viewpoint is not the majority one.

ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP BREAKDOWN

Table 8 gives an organization membership breakdown of the veteran respondents polled by the Roper survey. The respondents were asked if they had ever belonged to a veterans' organization, and, if so, were they still on the membership rolls.

COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
MANHATTAN
KANSAS

TABLE 8

"Have you ever belonged to a veterans' organization, such as the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, etc.? (If 'yes') Which one? And do you still belong?"

	Total veterans	Analyzed by veterans whose ages are:			
		21-29	30-34	35-49	50 and over
Number of veterans	2,922	708	742	931	541
Percent	100	100	100	100	100
	Percent	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
American Legion	33	20	27	33	59
Still belong	18	12	14	19	32
No longer belong	15	8	13	14	27
No answer	(1)	----	----	(1)	----
Veterans of Foreign Wars	17	12	19	20	18
Still belong	9	8	9	11	9
No longer belong	8	4	10	9	9
No answer	(1)	----	----	(1)	----
AVC	1	(1)	1	1	----
Still belong	(1)	----	(1)	(1)	----
No longer belong	1	(1)	1	1	----
AMVETS	1	1	2	2	1
Still belong	(1)	(1)	1	1	----
No longer belong	1	(1)	1	1	1
No answer	(1)	----	----	(1)	----
Disabled American Veterans	3	2	2	3	4
Still belong	2	2	1	2	2
No longer belong	1	(1)	1	1	2
Catholic War Veterans	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	(1)
Still belong	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
No longer belong	----	----	(1)	(1)	----
Jewish War Veterans	1	(1)	1	1	1
Still belong	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	1
No longer belong	(1)	----	(1)	(1)	----
Other organizations	2	1	2	2	6
Still belong	2	1	1	1	4
No longer belong	(1)	(1)	1	1	1
No answer	(1)	----	(1)	(1)	(1)
Never belonged to any	53	69	56	51	31
Don't know or no answer	1	1	1	(1)	1

[1] Less than 0.5 percent.

NOTE.—Percentages add to more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than 1 answer.

As shown, the majority (53 percent) of the total comprising the sample had never belonged to any veterans' organization. Of the 47 percent who had been organization members at one time or another, more than two-thirds (33 percent) had been in the American Legion. And 17 percent had joined the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

However, only 18 percent had retained membership in the American Legion. And only 9 percent were still members of the VFW. Count-

ing these and the number retaining membership in other veterans' organizations (but adjusting for duplicate membership); one finds that only approximately 27 percent of the respondents currently belonged to a veterans' organization. Altogether, nearly three-fourths of the respondents were not organization members at the time of the survey.

Only 1 out of 7 veterans belonging to a veterans' organization is "very active"; only 2 out of 5 report they are at least "fairly active." Since only a fraction of all veterans belong to a veterans' organization, only 1 veteran in 26 veterans in the population is "very active" in a veterans' organization, and only 1 in 9 is as much as "fairly active."

The age-group analysis shows that most of the American Legion members were over 35. Among nonorganization veterans, the majority were in the 21-29 age group.

Endeavoring to measure the strength of membership and nonmembership opinion in regard to belonging to an organization, the Roper survey asked the respondents to vote on the matter. Results are shown in table 9.

TABLE 9

	Total veterans	Analyzed by questions in table 8—Veterans who now belong to—		
		American Legion	Other veterans' organizations	No veterans' organizations
Number of veterans	2,922	536	243	2,130
Percent	100	100	100	100
	Percent	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
Least favorable	13	8	8	14
Score No. 1	7	4	4	7
Score No. 2	6	4	4	7
Moderately favorable	75	74	76	76
Score No. 3	20	16	19	21
Score No. 4	29	28	30	30
Score No. 5	26	30	27	25
Strongly favorable	12	18	16	10
Score No. 6	4	4	5	4
Score No. 7	8	14	11	6

NOTE.—Distribution of veterans does not add to 2,922 because some failed to respond to the particular question.

As indicated, the response was "moderately favorable" across the board. Only 12 percent of the total (and 18 percent of the American Legion members) expressed opinions "strongly favorable."

It would seem that most of the respondents were not averse to membership in a veterans' organization. But relatively few were ardent advocates of belonging.

The next table presents a full summary of veterans' attitudes toward some of the major issues covered by the Roper survey. Breakdown is by organization membership or nonmembership, by "active" categories, by war service, and by pension status.

TABLE 10.—*Summary table of key responses to certain questions*

	Belong to American Legion	Belong to other veterans' organization	Don't belong to any	Very active in veterans' organization	Fairly active in veterans' organization	Not too active in veterans' organization	Served in World War I only	Served in World War II only	Drawing a disability pension	Not drawing one
Number of veterans	536	243	2,130	110	206	453	436	1,897	394	2,470
Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	109
	Percent	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
Pro veterans benefits (strongly favorable)	14	11	6	24	16	10	11	8	10	7
All veterans should have advantages over nonvets in getting Government jobs	49	42	37	(1)	(1)	(1)	41	38	45	38
All veterans should hold Government jobs while nonveterans are being laid off	24	17	17	(1)	(1)	(1)	24	16	22	18
Federeal Government is more efficient or about as efficient as most business firms	46	54	53	(1)	(1)	(1)	44	51	(1)	(1)
Would advise son or brother to work for Federal Government rather than private company	41	47	47	(1)	(1)	(1)	45	45	(1)	(1)
Think most Government workers are highly devoted to their jobs	21	30	23	(1)	(1)	(1)	24	22	(1)	(1)
Would keep vet when—										
All conditions are equal (control case)	84	80	77	81	89	80	79	78	76	79
Nonveteran has more dependents	30	32	25	36	37	27	29	25	31	25
Nonveteran has greater seniority	35	35	24	44	36	32	32	25	36	25
Nonveteran has higher rating	32	33	29	29	47	28	33	28	38	28
Nonveteran has higher rating and greater seniority (extreme case)	12	15	12	16	20	10	17	11	19	11
Think veteran's preference law should stay as is or prefer veteran in extreme case	32	35	30	41	40	28	33	29	(1)	(1)
Would hire veteran when—										
Nonveteran has higher score	64	66	56	71	74	59	61	57	65	57
Nonveteran has higher score and slightly higher rank	60	60	50	65	68	56	54	51	58	51
Nonveteran has higher score and appreciably higher rank	37	39	34	38	43	35	38	32	42	34
Veteran should get full 5-point advantage in civil-service examination	60	66	56	72	64	58	55	56	65	56
Veterans' preference law is not—										
Affecting quality of Government service	62	61	54	69	54	59	(1)	(1)	63	55
Making it unfair for nonveterans	51	56	46	58	58	49	(1)	(1)	60	45
Lowering morale	57	57	50	63	62	54	(1)	(1)	59	51
Keeping nonveterans out of Government jobs	51	55	43	61	50	50	(1)	(1)	52	45
Nonpartisan group would be trying to take away legitimate benefits from veterans	47	52	39	62	49	45	41	40	50	40

[1] These tabulations were not obtained.

Perhaps the most notable item in the table is the top line labeled "proveterans benefits" (strongly favorable). Only 14 percent of the American Legion respondents voted "strongly in favor." And only 24 percent in the "very active" membership category were strongly favorable "probenefiters."

Note also the majority percentages which show the veteran's fairminded attitude toward the nonveteran in Government service, given the conditions previously discussed in the Roper study.

Chapter V. The Consensus

The Roper survey discloses some interesting information concerning veterans' attitudes toward fellow veterans and veterans' benefits.

It would seem that most veterans are "fairminded" in their thinking about special privileges, compensations, and pensions for exservicemen. Nearly all of the survey respondents indicated group thinking in regard to some benefits—e. g., free medical care for service disablement, and reemployment rights for returnees. In these respects it seemed they identified veterans (and themselves) as a "special class."

Yet a large percentage inclined toward a "veterans are just people" attitude in respect to many benefits (e. g., low-rent privileges and life pensions for all veterans). The preponderance favored equable treatment of qualified nonveterans otherwise handicapped in Government employment by existing law.

The older (World War I) veterans generally favored the "paternalistic" type of benefit—service pensions, "super seniority" in Government service, free medical care for non-service-connected disabilities. By and large the younger veterans (particularly those who served in Korea) cast the higher votes for educational benefits—schooling at Government expense and on-the-job training at Government expense.

The survey indicates that organization veterans—in particular, members of the American Legion—express the strongest "probenefits" views. And members who are active in the various veterans' organizations are somewhat more "probenefits" than are inactive or pedestrian members. A measure of attitudinal intensity seemed to show that within the various organizations there were considerable divergencies of opinion. The American Legion does not speak with one voice for all its members, even as there are variances of opinion in any organization with nationwide (or even local) membership.

If the sample surveyed is an indicant of the whole, it would appear that the average veteran is self-interested and at the same time self-reliant and fair in his attitude toward special benefits. He feels entitled to recognition as a veteran. He demands some kind of recompense for military service, especially for the man disabled in line of duty. But he does not plump for benefits across the board, whole hog. He does not press his claim to special benefits to extremes. He favors constructive benefits over the backward-looking, non-service-connected pensions.

The average veteran asks for aid in getting started in civilian life—for readjustment benefits. He approves of the utmost in compensation, medical care, and rehabilitation for the veteran with a service-

connected disability. He considers mandatory reemployment a veteran's right. He approves of low-cost home building or housing loans (and exhibits every intent of repaying the contractural debt). And if the draft has interrupted his schooling, the young veteran believes he is entitled to educational aid at the Government's expense. At the same time he places the non-service-connected veterans' benefits—medical care and pensions—very low on the list.

Altogether, the Roper survey respondents seem to have expressed moderate and reasonable views.

○

KANSAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
MANHATTAN KANSAS

STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JUL 17 1956
MANHATTAN
KANSAS