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ONE YEAR LATER: THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE'S FAILURES SURROUNDING THE JULY 13, 2024 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

FINAL REPORT

PREPARED BY THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

JULY 13, 2025

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Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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61–162 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025

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ONE YEAR LATER: THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE'S FAILURES SURROUNDING THE JULY 13, 2024 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, U.S. Senator Rand Paul, Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) released the Committee's final report regarding what can only be described as stunning failures by the United States Secret Service (USSS) that allowed then-former President Donald J. Trump to be shot on July 13, 2024, in an attempted assassination in Butler, Pennsylvania. One year later, the facts remain as chilling as ever: a former President of the United States and major party candidate was shot in the head at a public rally by an individual who was reported as suspicious and carrying a rangefinder to the Secret Service at least 25 minutes prior. It is a miracle that President Trump survived. This attempt on the life of President Trump cost one innocent life and could have resulted in far more bloodshed. The truth is, President Trump, and the Nation, was fortunate. The once-again President survived despite being shot in the head. Since that day, there has been another attempt on his life and further threats to do him harm, including most recently a renewed threat from Iran. This report reveals a disturbing pattern of communication failures and negligence that culminated in a preventable tragedy. What happened was inexcusable and the consequences imposed for the failures so far do not reflect the severity of the situation.

THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION

On July 13, 2024, at approximately 6:11 p.m., Thomas Crooks, a 20-year-old man from Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, managed to climb on to the roof of the American Glass Research (AGR) building, unimpeded, during a campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show. From that rooftop, Crooks fired eight shots from a rifle at President Trump. Crooks struck four individuals, killing Corey Comperatore and injuring three others, including President Trump.

THE INVESTIGATION

Following the attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (the Committee) and the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) launched a joint-bipartisan investigation. Over the past year, the Committee has conducted 17 transcribed interviews with USSS personnel and reviewed over 75,000 pages of documents produced from Federal,

State, and local law enforcement entities. A preliminary report was issued in September 2024. This final report issued by the Chairman builds on those findings and includes new evidence.

THE FAILURES BY SECRET SERVICE

There were multiple, unacceptable failures in the planning and execution of the July 13 Butler rally. A 20-year-old gunman was able to evade detection by the country's top protective agency for nearly 45 minutes. Agents and officers chose not to retrieve radios from local and State law enforcement, limiting coordination at a critical time. Known line-of-sight vulnerabilities were identified in advance but not addressed. An inexperienced operator was tasked with managing counter-unmanned aerial systems. Personnel who were vital to mission success were not requested. In addition to the consequential failures on the ground in Butler, Pennsylvania, there were also numerous failures in Washington, DC, at USSS Headquarters. USSS executives told the Committee that prior to July 13, 2024, there was no formal process to request or deny assets. USSS advance agents told the Committee that when their requests went unanswered, they had no way of knowing whether they would receive the support needed to protect the former President. Some did not even bother submitting requests at all, convinced they would be denied by headquarters.

INSUFFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY

Not a single person has been fired. USSS has conducted internal reviews, but only six individuals have faced disciplinary action. Two of those individuals received lighter punishments than initially recommended. The Committee believes more than six individuals should have received disciplinary action as a result of their action (or inaction) on July 13, 2024. Those who were disciplined received penalties far too weak to match the severity the failures. Details on these disciplinary actions were withheld from the Committee until Chairman Paul issued a subpoena for them on July 1, 2025. The American people deserve better.

FINDINGS

Based on the evidence gathered, the Committee found the following:

1. USSS denied multiple requests for additional staff, assets, and resources to protect President Trump during the campaign.
2. USSS did not fire a single person involved in the planning and execution of the Butler rally. USSS formally disciplined only six personnel, some of whom received their disciplinary decision as recently as July 2025. In two instances, the final disciplinary decision was a reduced punishment from what was originally recommended.
3. Former Director Kimberly Cheatle falsely testified to Congress that no USSS asset requests were denied for the Butler rally.
4. Despite USSS leadership receiving an intelligence briefing regarding the protectee and authorizing counter snipers at all of President Trump's outdoor rallies a day prior, counter snipers were not present at the July 9, Doral campaign rally.

5. There were ill-defined responsibilities for USSS agents serving in advance roles.

6. USSS agents failed to communicate crucial information regarding the suspicious individual to President Trump's shift detail, which had the ability to prevent him from taking the stage.

7. Pertinent threat intelligence related to the protectee was not shared with USSS agents in charge of security at the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally.

8. There was a severe lack of coordination and communication between USSS and State and local law enforcement from the advance process through the event.

This was not a single error. It was a cascade of preventable failures that nearly cost President Trump his life. In the interest of transparency, the Committee is releasing a number of subpoenaed records and additional transcripts in the addendum. The addendum also includes a summary of changes USSS made to its policies and procedures as a result of the events of July 13 and the Committee's interim report.

II. HISTORY OF DENIED STAFFING, ASSETS, AND RESOURCE REQUESTS FROM SECRET SERVICE HEADQUARTERS

According to USSS documents provided to the Committee, USSS Headquarters denied or left unfulfilled at least 10 requests by the Donald Trump Division (DTD) for additional resources during the 2024 campaign including enhanced counter-unmanned aerial system (C–UAS) assets, counter assault team (CAT) personnel, and counter sniper personnel.[1] The documents revealed a pattern of certain categories of requests being either blatantly denied, unfulfilled, or required to be supplemented by local law enforcement or other Federal agencies, such as the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).[2] These documents further contradict statements made by former Director of USSS, Kimberly Cheatle's testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.[3]

COUNTER SNIPERS

On July 1, 2023, President Trump visited Pickens, South Carolina, for a campaign rally.[4] Prior to the visit, on June 28, 2023, DTD requested the Office of Protective Operations (OPO) provide counter sniper assets in support of this event due to "line-of-sight

[1] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

[2] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).; Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

[3] House of Representatives Oversight Committee: *Hearing on the Oversight of the U.S. Secret Service and the Attempted Assassination of President Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. At min. 52:00* (July 22, 2024) (Statement of Director Kimberly Cheatle).

[4] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 58 (Dec. 4, 2024).

vulnerabilities."[5] This request for USSS counter snipers included a full justification from DTD, noting the expectancy of over 20,000 attendees, a statement that TSD relayed to DTD that the use of ballistic glass would not be an option for this visit, and a notification that then-Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of DTD would be speaking to the OPO Deputy Assistant Director about the request.[6] The OPO responded to DTD, only three hours later, stating that following a review of the justification and manpower availability, USSS counter snipers were not available.[7] Furthermore, despite the justification sent to OPO and a conversation between the DTD SAIC and OPO Deputy Assistant Director, the Committee was provided with internal DTD communications stating that Uniformed Division (UD) counter snipers in full or LNO (liaison) role would not be authorized for the visit, primarily due to manpower constraints.[8]

Notwithstanding the history of denials from USSS Headquarters, the current Chief Counsel of USSS, appointed by President Trump, told the Committee that there was no discernable evidence of political animus related to the reason for these denials.[9]

In a briefing with the Committee, USSS explained the lack of Uniformed Division counter sniper personnel is a limiting factor when determining approval for specific events.[10] Similar to using HSI Special Agents to supplement post standers, USSS explained that following July 13, 2024, USSS entered into a request for assistance agreement with CBP to use their Tactical Unit Snipers known as BORTAC from the Eagle Pass, Texas, post to supplement USSS counter snipers.[11]

COUNTER ASSAULT TEAM (CAT)

From January 5, 2024, to February 29, 2024, DTD was denied CAT assets for various roles six times.[12] When asked about the denial of CAT assets, the ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee in a transcribed interview that sometimes they did get [CAT assets] and sometimes they did not. One notable example was for a January 6, 2024, visit to Iowa. DTD requested CAT advance support over email, CAT responded that they were unable to fulfill the request due to lack of available assets. Documents reviewed by the Committee indicated that the request was fulfilled by local tactical assets. However, the itinerary for the event stated that there would

[5] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS—023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[6] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS—023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[7] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS—023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[8] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Donald Trump Division Official, U.S. Secret Service to multiple Donald Trump Division Officials, U.S. Secret Service* (June 28, 2023) at USSS—023619 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[9] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

[10] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

[11] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

[12] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

be "No traditional police meeting scheduled."[13] A police meeting is a planning meeting between USSS and local law enforcement to go over operational plans for securing the event. The Technical Security Division (TSD) advance agent for the Butler rally stated that a police meeting is "where all the assets that I need to talk to, from the fire chief, the respective bomb squad sergeant or captain—or commander. and so on and so forth, they are at this meeting."[14]

A similar instance occurred for a visit to Las Vegas, Nevada from January 26, 2024, to January 28, 2024, President Trump's detail requested CAT advance support one week prior to the event, on January 19, 2024. Internal communications between CAT Operations Center and DTD provided to the Committee revealed that the denial of the request took CAT Operations Center fewer than 20 minutes to relay the denial to DTD. However, unlike other denials, CAT Operations Center stated the reason for denial was due to the lack of available personnel in this district.[15] In a letter from USSS to the Committee, USSS explained that because of the unavailability of CAT advance support, local law enforcement who usually supplement USSS CAT personnel were not provided because there was no liaison from the USSS available.[16]

The ATSAIC of DTD stated CAT denials were not uncommon. In a transcribed interview with the Committee, the ATSAIC of DTD stated there were probably more than five times where CAT assets were denied following a request from DTD.[17] While the Committee could not verify the exact number of denials for CAT assets and personnel, USSS told the Committee that on April 7, 2024, a CAT team was assigned to travel with DTD on an ongoing basis.[18]

ENHANCED COUNTER-UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS ASSETS

Between November 15, 2022, the date President Trump announced his candidacy for a second term, and July 13, 2024, the date of the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, USSS denied or left unfulfilled enhanced C–UAS asset requests on four separate occasions.[19] All of the requests were unfulfilled due to lack of man-

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[13] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Donald Trump Division Official, U.S. Secret Service to multiple U.S. Secret Service Officials (Dec. 27, 2023) at USSS—023547* (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[14] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance Agent, at 20 (Aug. 13, 2024).

[15] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Special Operations Official, U.S. Secret Service to Donald Trump Detail Official* (Jan. 19, 2024) at USSS—023551 and USSS—023552 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[16] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

[17] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 61 (Dec. 4, 2024).

[18] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

[19] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).; Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations , at USSS—023570–023575, USSS—023632 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

power.[20] In a briefing to the Committee, USSS senior agency officials told the Committee that all requests submitted by the DTD for enhanced C–UAS assets were denied prior to the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.[21]

For President Trump's June 9, 2024, visit to Las Vegas, Nevada, DTD requested enhanced C–UAS assets. Internal communications from DTD to the Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) of the Technical Security Division (TSD) stated that President Trump would be speaking outdoors, fully exposed, and vulnerable to UAS threats. TSD replied that they would be unable to support the request but would assist with setting up a ground response plan.[22] TSD did not indicate a reason for the denial.

While TSD did not provide justification for the denial of enhanced C–UAS assets in Las Vegas, two weeks later DTD once again requested these capabilities for President Trump's visit to Chesapeake, Virginia, on June 28, 2024.[23] Similar to the Las Vegas rally, DTD told TSD in the request that President Trump would be speaking outdoors, exposed, and vulnerable to UAS threats.[24] The next denial of enhanced C–UAS assets by TSD occurred ahead of the July 9, 2024, campaign event in Doral, Florida, which was expected to have an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 attendees.[25] In preparation for this event, on July 1, 2024, DTD operations staff emailed the ATSAIC of TSD requesting "enhanced C–UAS coverage to include, detection and enhanced mitigation capabilities. as well as an operator for the day of the visit."[26] TSD responded to DTD the following day, stating: "Due to POTUS travel and the NATO NSSE during this timeframe, C–UAS is unable to accommodate this request."[27] This specific denial of assets is notable, as the campaign event took place on July 9, the same day which threat information was shared with DTD and USSS agents preparing for the upcoming Butler rally on July 13.[28]

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[20] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025); Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at USSS—023570–023575, USSS—023632 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[21] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

[22] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 5, 2024), at USSS—023570 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[23] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at USSS—023573. (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[24] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (June 22, 2024) at USSS—023573 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[25] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (July 2, 2024) at USSS—023574 to USSS—023575* (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[26] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (July 2, 2024) at USSS—023574 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[27] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (July 2, 2024) at USSS—023574 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[28] U.S. Secret Service, *Email from Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service to U.S. Secret Service Official to (July 2, 2024) at USSS—023575* (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service, *Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service* (July 3, 2024) at USSS—023718 (received Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with Committee).

The final denial for C–UAS assets by USSS Headquarters came days prior to the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania rally. In a transcribed interview with the Committee, the C–UAS advance agent stated that he requested enhanced C–UAS assets on July 10, 2024, which were denied.[29] In a document production to the Committee, USSS provided internal communications related to the denial of enhanced C–UAS assets to the DTD.[30] In the Committee's review of this production, Committee staff did not locate an explicit denial of enhanced C–UAS to DTD for the July 13 campaign rally. However, in a transcribed interview, the C–UAS Advance Agent told the Committee the request was denied telephonically from the TSD Advance Agent, which was corroborated by documentation from USSS.[31] When the Committee asked whether it was common for asset denials to be issued without providing a reason, USSS told the Committee that prior to July 13, 2024, there was no formal procedure to submit a request and justification to the Office of Staffing and Logistics and therefore, there was no standard response concerning approvals or denials of such requests from USSS Headquarters.[32]

III. ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE SECRET SERVICE

In the 17 transcribed interviews the Committee has conducted, the USSS personnel interviewed have continued to shift blame and point fingers, not only within the agency, but also with PSP and Butler ESU. Following months of requests for records relating to the disciplinary actions taken against USSS personnel involved in the planning and execution of the Butler rally, the Chairman issued a subpoena on behalf of the Committee to USSS for such records on July 1, 2025.

On July 3, 2025, USSS produced to the Committee a table of administrative and disciplinary actions taken against officers related to their performance at the July 13, 2024, campaign rally.[33] According to the document, six individuals received disciplinary action from the USSS Office of Integrity following the attempted assassination of President Trump.[34] Four of these individuals were assigned to the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office, one individual was assigned to DTD, and one individual is assigned to UD. The disciplinary actions taken by the USSS Office of Integrity span from a 10-day to forty-two-day suspension without pay.[35] Additionally, two individuals were placed on management directed reassign-

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[29] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C–UAS Advance Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).

[30] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

[31] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C–UAS Advance Agent, at 53 (Aug. 20, 2024).

[32] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

[33] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS—023839 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[34] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS—023839 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[35] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS—023839 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

ments.[36] No USSS personnel were fired for their role in the planning or execution of the Butler rally.[37]

While these six individuals played a role in the failures that occurred on July 13, 2024, the Committee would like to note the lack of disciplinary action for other individuals involved, most notably the USSS Security Room Agent, who, according to testimony and documents received by the Committee, failed to relay critical information he obtained from the PSP Security Room Officer regarding a suspicious individual with a range finder to the DTD agents who could have removed or prevented President Trump from taking the stage.[38] In a document provided to the Committee detailing administrative actions taken against agents or officers of USSS by the agency, the USSS states "After the Mission Assurance Inquiry review was completed, as part of the determination of which employees might face discipline, [the USSS Security Room Agent] was found not to be in violation of Secret Service policy. [The USSS Security Room Agent] retired on June 28, 2025."[39] Further discussions of the USSS Security Room Agent's actions on July 13 are included below.

It is also concerning to the Committee that nearly one year has passed since an assassination attempt of the current President of the United States and the USSS has only days ago issued final disposition of disciplinary action to individuals who were determined to be complicit in the failures of USSS on July 13. Furthermore, USSS completed the disciplinary process for two personnel only after the Chairman issued the subpoena.

PITTSBURGH FIELD OFFICE SAIC

On August 14, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, was informed that pending the ongoing investigation into the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, he was placed on telework status by his direct supervisor, the Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) in the Office of Investigations. The DAD in the Office of Investigations informed the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC that this decision came directly from Acting Director Rowe and the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was instructed to place the USSS Site Counterpart, USSS Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, the Protective Intelligence Advance Lead, and the USSS Advance Lead on the same telework status.[40] According to the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's written response to his Notice of Proposed Suspension, no reason, justification, or instructions for this action by Acting Director Rowe were given to the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC or any of the individuals the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was instructed to place on

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[36] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[37] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS—023839 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[38] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 71 (Oct. 9, 2024).

[39] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[40] Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Grievance Form 3112 Dated 5/6/25: Final Decision for Discipline for [Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC] by the USSS Office of Integrity, Attach. 1,* on May 6, 2025, at USSS—024029 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee)

telework status.[41] However, in the USSS Site Counterpart's written response to her Notice of Proposed Suspension, she states "[USSS Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC] specifically informed me that I would not receive any documentation because there were concerns the information would leak."[42]

On November 26, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was informed by the DAD in the Office of Investigations that the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC would be permanently reassigned as the Director of USSS Personnel National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA) and the DSAIC in the Criminal Investigative Division (CID).[43] Despite this reassignment, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC remained on restricted duty until December 29, 2024.[44] This same day, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC received a total of $9,000 in performance-based awards for his exceptional hard work . . . during a manpower intensive Presidential Campaign.[45] In a written response to the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's Notice of Proposed Suspension, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's attorney stated these awards are contingent on not receiving disciplinary action from the agency.[46] While the Committee is aware the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC did receive disciplinary action, it is unclear if he ever received the $9,000 in performance-based awards.

On January 18, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC received a Notice of Proposed Suspension stating the USSS Office of Integrity recommending he be suspended for 14 days without pay.[47] On April 24, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC received a final suspension decision from the USSS Office of Integrity which stated that the USSS' decision is that the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC will receive a fourteen-day suspension.[48]

As per Secret Service policy, if an individual disagrees with a final decision of the USSS Office of Integrity, they have the ability to request an administrative review of the decision by filing an administrative grievance with the USSS Discipline Review Board

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[41] Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Grievance Form 3112 Dated 5/6/25: Final Decision for Discipline for [Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC] by the USSS Office of Integrity, Attach. 1,* on May 6, 2025, at USSS—024029 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[42] Atty. for Site Counterpart to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension, Ex.1,* on May 12, 2025, at USSS—024269 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[43] Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension,* on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS—024119 (received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee); Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, 1U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS—024108 (received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[44] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[45] Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS—024119 (received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).*

[46] Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS—024119 (received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[47] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Jan. 18, 2025, at USSS—024091 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[48] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, Director of USSS Personnel, National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance, *Suspension Decision*, on Apr. 24, 2025, at USSS—024100 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

(DRB).[49] The DRB will then meet to determine if the disciplinary action taken by the USSS Office of Integrity is adequate and will issue a response to the complainant. On May 6, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC requested DRB review. On June 2, 2025, the DRB met and upheld the USSS Office of Integrity's decision regarding the proposed suspension for the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC.[50] The Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was issued a 14-day suspension without pay.[51]

PITTSBURGH FIELD OFFICE ATSAIC

On August 14, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was placed on telework status on the orders of former Acting Director Rowe by the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC. On January 17, 2025, the USSS Deputy Chief Integrity Officer issued a Notice recommending the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC be suspended for 10 days without pay.[52] On April 24, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was issued a final suspension decision which confirmed the USSS's decision to suspend him for 10 days without pay.[53] On May 1, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC resumed full operational duty in his leadership position in the Pittsburgh Field Office.[54] On May 9, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC requested DRB review. On June 2, 2025, the DRB met and upheld the USSS Office of Integrity's decision regarding the proposed suspension for the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC.[55] The Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was issued a 10-day suspension without pay.[56]

As part of the disciplinary process, agents are afforded the opportunity for their direct supervisor to comment on the findings of the Office of Integrity and list any mitigating or aggravated factors related to their proposed disciplinary action. The USSS Office of In-

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[49] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed. Suspension* , on Nov. 5, 2024, at USSS—024953 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[50] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Grievance Decision*, on June 2, 2025, at USSS—024458 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, Director of USSS Personnel, National Cyber and Forensic Training Alliance, *Grievance Decision*, on June 2, 2025, at USSS—024022 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[51] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS—023839 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[52] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Jan. 17, 2025, at USSS—024534 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[53] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision*, on Apr. 24, 2025, at USSS—024540 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[54] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[55] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Grievance Decision*, on June 2, 2025, at USSS—024458 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, Director of USSS Personnel, National Cyber and Forensic Training Alliance, *Grievance Decision*, on June 2, 2025, at USSS—024022 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[56] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS—023839 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

tegrity relied on the comments of the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC for at least two personnel on proposed disciplinary action, even though the ATSAIC himself was under investigation and later received disciplinary action for the same incident.[57]

USSS Site Agent

On August 16, 2024, the USSS Site Agent was placed on an unofficial restricted duty status by former Acting Director Rowe.[58]

On November 5, 2024, the USSS Site Agent received a Notice of Proposed Suspension for 3 days in connection with an incident involving unauthorized contact with the media.[59] The USSS Site Agent appealed this proposed suspension and filed a written response via her attorney on December 19, 2024.[60]

On December 15, 2024, the USSS Site Agent was reassigned from DTD to the Miami Field Office.[61] Despite this management directed reassignment, the USSS Site Agent remained on restricted duty until April 4, 2025.[62]

On April 3, 2025, the USSS Site Agent was issued a suspension decision by the Chief Integrity Officer of the USSS for her unauthorized contact with the media.[63] The Office of Integrity considered several factors in her case and decreased her disposition from a three-day suspension without pay to a one-day suspension without pay.[64] The next day, April 4, 2025, the USSS Site Agent received a separate Notice of Proposed Suspension for forty-two days without pay as a result of her performance at the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign event.[65] This same day, the USSS Site Agent returned from restricted duty to a fully operational status at the USSS Miami Field Office.[66]

On July 3, 2025, the Site Agent was issued the final suspension for her involvement in planning and securing the July 13, 2024,

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[57] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity, *Email from Supervisory General Investigator to Site Counterpart* (Apr. 29, 2025), at USSS—024910 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision,* on April 24, 2025, USSS—024540 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[58] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[59] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Nov. 5, 2024, at USSS—024592 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[60] *See generally* Atty. for Site Agent to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Dec. 19, 2024, at USSS—024600 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[61] Standard Form 50, Notification of Personnel Action—Reassignment (Site Agent), U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (Dec. 15, 2025) at USSS—025059 (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[62] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[63] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision*, on Apr. 3, 2025, at USSS—024597 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[64] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, 1U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision*, on Apr. 3, 2025, at USSS—024597 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[65] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, 1U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Apr. 4, 2025, at USSS—024757 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[66] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally. The Site Agent's final disposition was forty-two days without pay.[67]

USSS Site Counterpart

On August 14, 2024, the USSS Site Counterpart was placed on telework status by the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC following the orders of former Acting Director Rowe. In mid-December 2024, the Site Counterpart was directed to report back to work but has since been prohibited in participating in her typical day-to-day responsibilities.[68] On April 4, 2025, the Site Counterpart received a notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a fourteen-day suspension without pay.[69]

USSS Lead Advance Agent

On August 14, 2024, the USSS Lead Advance Agent was placed on telework status by former Acting Director Rowe.[70]

In January 2025, the Lead Advance Agent returned from the situational telework but was restricted from performing her standard duties until April 8, 2025.[71]

On April 4, 2025, the USSS Lead Advance Agent received a Notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a twenty-one-day suspension without pay.[72]

On July 1, 2025, the Lead Advance Agent received her final disciplinary decision from the USSS Office of Integrity. The USSS concluded the charges of negligence in the performance of official duties were substantiated, but mitigated the proposed suspension of twenty-one days to 14 days without pay.[73]

USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader

On December 20, 2024, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader was placed on restricted duty by former Acting Director Rowe. On April 23, 2025, the Counter Sniper Team Leader received a Notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a fifty-two-day suspension for negligence in the performance of official duties and specific

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[67] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision*, on July 3, 2025, at USSS—024781 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[68] Atty. for Site Counterpart to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension*, Ex.1, on May 12, 2025, at USSS—024269 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[69] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Site Counterpart, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Apr. 4, 2025, at USSS—024884 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[70] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[71] Atty. for Lead Advance Agent to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Written Response to Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on May 12, 2025, at USSS—023989 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[72] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity Lead Advance Agent, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Apr. 4, 2025, at USSS—024791 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[73] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to Lead Advance Agent, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision*, on July 1, 2025, at USSS—023972 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

operational failures during the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.[74]

On July 3, 2025, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead received his official suspension decision. While he was found negligent, and although aggravating factors initially supported a fifty-two-day suspension, mitigating factors considered by the USSS Office of Integrity decreased his suspension without pay to thirty-five days.[75] As of July 9, 2025, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead remains on official restricted duty status.[76]

IV. TIMELINE OF INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT INFORMATION LEADING UP TO JULY 13, 2024

BACKGROUND OF THREAT INTELLIGENCE

On January 14, 2022, a video was posted on Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei's website depicting an animated drone strike targeting then-former President Donald Trump playing golf at his Mar-a-Lago estate in West Palm Beach, Florida.[77] President Trump and others in his first administration's national security apparatus have long been targets of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) for the U.S. role in a January 3, 2020 drone strike which killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General, Qasem Soleimani.[78] The threats from Iran continued even after President Trump left office on January 20, 2021.[79]

On July 12, 2024, one day before the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Asif Raza Merchant, a Pakistani national with ties to Iran and the IRGC.[80] According to the Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal complaint, after spending approximately two weeks in Iran, Merchant arrived in the U.S. in April 2024 to recruit an individual to assassinate U.S. political officials.[81] The now-unsealed DOJ proffer agreement States that Merchant was charged with murder-for-hire.[82] While discussing the assassination plot with undercover Federal law enforcement officers, Merchant alluded to that he was "the 'representative' in the United States, indicating that there

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[74] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead, Special Operations Branch, Uniformed Division, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Notice of Proposed Suspension*, on Apr. 23, 2025, at USSS—024421 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[75] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Integrity to USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead, Special Operations Branch, Uniformed Division, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, *Suspension Decision*, on July 3, 2025, at USSS—024449 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[76] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[77] Diana Glebova & Caitlin Doombos, Secret Service was warned of possible Iran 'drone attack' on Trump last year, agent told Senate, N.Y. Post (Sept. 26, 2024) https://nypost.com/2024/09/26/us-news/secret-service-was-warned-of-possible-iran-drone-attack-on-trump-last-year-agent-told-senate/.

[78] Press Release, Justice Department Announces Murder-For-Hire and Related Charges Against IRGC Asset and Two Local Operatives, Dep't of Justice, Nov. 8, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-murder-hire-and-related-charges-against-irgc-asset-and-two.

[79] Proff., USA v. Asif Merchant, No.24-mj–467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/17/2024).; Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., No. 24-mag–3904, (S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).

[80] Compl., USA v. Asif Merchant, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/14/2024).

[81] Compl., USA v. Asif Merchant., 5 No. 24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/14/2024).

[82] Proff., USA v. Asif Merchant, 1, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/17/2024).

were other people he worked for outside the U.S."[83] After making an agreement with and paying $5,000 to undercover Federal law enforcement officers to commit the murder, Merchant attempted to leave the United States on July 12, 2024, when he was subsequently arrested by the FBI.[84]

On November 8, 2024, the DOJ released a criminal complaint from the Southern District of New York stating Farhad Shakeri, an Afghan national living in Iran, conspired with two United States citizens to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, to commit murder-for-hire, money laundering, and to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.[85]

The complaint alleges that Shakeri, working on behalf of the IRGC, recruited two United States citizens in order to assassinate enemies of Iran. The complaint lists a total of four victims residing in the United States and one planned mass casualty attack overseas.[86] Among the four listed U.S. based targets, "Victim Four" was identified as President Trump. Shakeri told the FBI that the IRGC has long been targeting President Trump for assassination attempts:

[A]ccording to Shakeri, in approximately mid-to-late September 2024, IRGC Official-1 asked Shakeri to put aside his other efforts on behalf of the IRGC and focus on surveilling, and, ultimately, assassinating, former President of the United States, Donald J. Trump. Shakeri indicated to IRGC Official-1 that this would cost a "huge" amount of money. In response, IRGC Official-1 said that "we have already spent a lot of money . . . [s]o the money's not an issue," which Shakeri understood to mean that the IRGC previously had spent a significant sum of money on efforts to murder [President Trump] and was willing to continue spending a lot of money in its attempt to procure [President Trump]'s assassination.

[D]uring his meeting with IRGC Official-1 on or about October 7, 2024, IRGC Official-1 directed Shakeri to provide a plan within seven days to kill [President Trump]. If Shakeri was unable to put forth a plan within that timeframe, IRGC Official-1 continued, the IRGC would pause its plan to kill [President Trump] until after the U.S. Presidential elections, because IRGC Official-1 assessed [President Trump] would lose the election and, afterward, it would be easier to assassinate [President Trump].[87]

PRE-JULY 13

During the first week of July, several Deputy Assistant Directors met at Secret Service Headquarters to discuss intelligence they had received regarding President Trump.[88] The Director of the Office of Protective Operations told the Committee that the outcome of that meeting was that "if there is actionable intelligence of specific intelligence toward a specific event, that might be an opportunity to

[83] Proff., USA v. Asif Merchant, 2, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/17/2024).
[84] Compl., USA v. Asif Merchant., 13, No. 24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/14/2024).
[85] Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., 1–4, No. 24-mag-3904, (S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
[86] Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., No. 24-mag-3904, (S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
[87] Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., 25, No. 24-mag-3904, (S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
[88] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 80–81 (Sept. 13, 2024).

leverage different resources if required.one of which could be counter sniper[s]."[89] The result of the conversation was that going forward counter sniper assets would be deployed at all of President Trump's outdoor rallies.[90] This directive was then communicated to the SAIC of the Special Operations Division,

On July 3, 2024, an agent from the USSS Protective Intelligence Division (PID) sent an email to the SAIC and DSAIC of DTD, informing them that PID had received approval for a one-time-read-in of classified reports related to their assignment.[91] According to the communications reviewed by the Committee, the SAIC and DSAIC of DTD needed to travel to a local FBI office to receive the brief in the FBI's secure compartmented information facility (SCIF).[92] The SAIC of DTD responded to the PID agent requesting to attend the briefing at 1:30 p.m. on July 8, 2024, the day before the Doral, Florida, campaign rally.[93] Following the briefing, the DSAIC of DTD sent a text message to an undisclosed number of DTD personnel stating, "It is imperative that 2nd Supervisors focus heavily on line-of-sight mitigation. Exposure time, and line-of-sight mitigation of critical areas of concern. Finally, interact with your site agents early in the advance as we should mandate that [protective asset] is available for ALL DTD outside rallies."[94]

The timeline of documents provided to the Committee from USSS coincide with what was publicly reported by The New York Times regarding threats to President Trump.[95] The New York Times published that it was FBI leadership, including then Director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, who was personally involved in ensuring the USSS was aware of the threat to President Trump. Moreover, The New York Times claimed that it was in response to the threat posed by Asif Merchant that the USSS made the decision to send counter snipers to the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally on July 13.[96]

President Trump held a campaign rally in Doral, Florida, on July 9, 2024, the same day USSS decided it would supply counter sniper assets for the former President's July 13, 2024, rally in Butler, Pennsylvania due to threat intelligence. In his interview with the Committee, the ATSAIC of the DTD, told the Committee he received a phone call from SAIC of DTD on July 8, 2024, informing him that counter sniper assets had already been approved and directed him to complete the request paperwork.[97] The ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee that he believed the decision by USSS

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[89] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 80 (Sept. 13, 2024).

[90] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 82 (Sept. 13, 2024).

[91] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email Communication on July 3, 2024, at USSS—023718 (received Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[92] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email Communication on July 3, 2024, at USSS—023718 (received Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[93] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email Communication on July 7, 2024, at USSS—023726 (received Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[94] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text Message Communication on July 3, 2024, at USSS—023758 (received Apr. 24, 2025) (On file with Committee).

[95] Peter Baker, Adam Goldman, and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Detected Potential Iranian Plot to Kill Trump Separate From Saturday's Shooting, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2024.

[96] Peter Baker, Adam Goldman, and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Detected Potential Iranian Plot to Kill Trump Separate From Saturday's Shooting, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2024.

[97] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 31 (Dec. 4, 2024).

Headquarters to add counter sniper assets was intelligence driven.[98]

When asked who conveyed the specific intelligence, the ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee that it was the DSAIC of DTD who told him "The information I received was we have a credible, long-range threat to [President Trump] and it's by the typical actors."[99]

Despite the claim from the Deputy Assistant Director of OPO asserting that USSS Headquarters had decided to provide DTD with counter sniper assets at all outdoor rallies following the July 8, 2024, PID briefing, counter snipers were not present at the July 9, 2024, Doral rally.[100] While USSS counter sniper assets were assigned to the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally three days later, of those who were asked in transcribed interviews with the Committee, none of the USSS counter snipers were informed of the threat intelligence regarding the protectee. In addition to the USSS counter snipers who were not briefed on the threat intelligence regarding President Trump, the ATSAIC of DTD confirmed in his transcribed interview that he never received a verbal briefing from PID indicating the existence of an elevated threat environment.[101]

Despite the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally being the first time a former President and candidate has received counter sniper assets from the Secret Service, it was not the first time these assets had been requested by DTD as discussed previously.[102]

V. CONCLUSIVE FAILURES OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

In a briefing with the Committee, USSS officials stated that the unprecedented nature of having a protectee as both a former President and a candidate for office simultaneously was not appreciated to the degree it should have been.[103] This unique circumstance led to confusion and assumptions made by USSS staff in charge of planning security for the rally. The lack of communication both within USSS and between local law enforcement regarding a suspicious individual, USSS not requesting assets because they believed the assets would be denied, and placing individuals in roles with ill-defined responsibilities culminated in a breakdown of accountability among those individuals the Committee interviewed.

While the Committee discussed the communication failures at length in the interim findings report, additional information became evident in transcribed interviews and documents produced by the USSS following the Committee's initial assessment.

USSS Security Room Agent

The lack of structured communication was likely the greatest contributor to the failures of the USSS on July 13, 2024. At a USSS protected event, the individual in charge of communications

[98] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 31 (Dec. 4, 2024).
[99] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 32 (Dec. 4, 2024).
[100] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 56 (Sept. 13, 2024).
[101] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 61 (Dec. 4, 2024).
[102] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, at USSS—023621 (June 28, 2023) (received Mar. 12, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[103] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).

is the security room agent. The security room agent's duties include conducting appropriate radio checks, passing all pertinent protectee movement to the post standers, and in the event of an emergency, communicate situational information to the shift and post standers accordingly."[104]

At the Butler rally, the security room agent was the SAIC of the USSS Buffalo, New York, Field Office.[105] He was assigned the role on July 11, 2024. Although he had originally submitted himself to work the First Lady's trip to Pittsburgh, he was asked by the SAIC of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office to work the security room at the Butler rally instead.[106] Despite telling the Committee that he had been a security room agent "5 or 6 times" prior to arriving in Butler, he was not cognizant of numerous issues which hindered his ability to perform his duty.[107]

While the USSS Security Room Agent told the Committee "[T]he role of the command post is to ingest information from different sources and then put that information back out", he was simultaneously unaware that Butler County had a separate command post until the afternoon of July 13.[108] He only discovered the existence of another command post after overhearing conversations between the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Officer stationed in the USSS Security Room and other law enforcement.[109] By his own admission, he never had direct contact with local law enforcement throughout the day, and that his only method of communication with them was through the PSP officer in the USSS Security Room.[110] Moreover, when asked by the Committee if he had viewed the PSP or Butler Emergency Services Unit (ESU) operations plan prior to the event, he stated that his first time seeing either of the operations plans was the day prior to his transcribed interview with the Committee.[111]

The USSS Security Room Agent first learned of the suspicious individual, later identified as Thomas Crooks, at 5:45 p.m., 25 minutes before the shooting, when his PSP counterpart in the security room received a call from the Butler County command post reporting that a local tactical team was looking for a suspicious individual.[112] During the conversation between the USSS Security Room Agent and the PSP Security Room Officer, the PSP Security Room Officer relayed that the suspicious individual was outside the perimeter and had a rangefinder.[113] In a joint interview with the PSP and FBI, the PSP Security Room Officer stated the following regarding the USSS Security Room Agent's reaction to learning of the suspicious individual:

Question: When you made that—when you relayed the information to him, was this in person?

PSP Officer: Yes. Yes.

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[104] U.S. Secret Service, Site Post Instructions (July 13, 2024) at USSS—0002220 (received Aug. 9, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[105] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 12 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[106] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 19 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[107] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 15 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[108] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 27 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[109] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 29 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[110] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 43 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[111] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 124 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[112] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[113] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 47 (Oct. 9, 2024).

Question: Did you see if he communicated that over his radio?
PSP Officer: I don't know, but I know he appeared to, like, it wasn't—there was, like, after I said outside the perimeter, I got a distinct impression that there's, like, a lack of urgency.
Question: Like, you know, could you go on about, like,——could you explain more?
PSP Officer: About, like, it was like. Oh, like, OK. Like, it wasn't like he rushed around or did anything. I just told him about this and everything.[114]

The USSS Security Room agent told the Committee that after learning of the suspicious person, he relayed the information to the USSS C–UAS Advance Agent embedded in the Security Room.[115] In this conversation, the USSS Security Room Agent told the C–UAS Advance Agent to pass the information along to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Agent and have him start looking.[116] When asked about whether the information was passed to Protective Intelligence (PI) Response Agent, the USSS Security Room Agent stated, "Yeah. I believe that they were notified at the same time as CS Response, but through [the C–UAS Advance Agent]."[117] According to the PI Response Agent, she heard the information from her PSP Counterpart, not the C–UAS Advance Agent, and stated no one had dispatched her.[118] The C–UAS Advance agent corroborates what the PI Response Agent told to the Committee stating, "PI also went out to try to locate the individual. I did not speak to her, but possibly it could've been the [USSS] Security Room Agent that did."[119]

Regarding a suspicious individual on the outer perimeter, the USSS Security Room Agent told the Committee, "For someone on the outer perimeter, there's really only two assets available to us from a USSS perspective to dispatch. the [protective intelligence] response and the [counter sniper] response because they're the only people who are capable of leaving the interior secure perimeter to go on the outside to look for somebody."[120] Furthermore, because the information regarding a suspicious individual with a rangefinder was passed verbally from the PSP Security Room Officer to the USSS Security Room Agent, and the USSS Security Room Agent made the decision for the USSS C–UAS Agent to relay the information over the phone to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Agent, rather than radio, the message did not go out to USSS post standers, counter snipers, and DTD shift detail.[121] The ATSAIC of DTD stated in his transcribed interview that the information should have been elevated to someone at his level.[122] Had the ATSAIC on the DTD shift been aware of the information, he could

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[114] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 20, 2024) at 8 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[115] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 47–48 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[116] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 48–49 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[117] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 49 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[118] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 56 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[119] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C–UAS Advance Agent, at 107–108 (Aug. 20, 2024).
[120] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 68 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[121] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 71 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[122] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 103 (Dec. 4, 2024).

have potentially prevented the President from taking the stage while the suspicious individual was being tracked down. When asked which USSS individual was responsible for tracking down the suspicious person, he stated, "In this specific instance, a protective intelligence advance agent or a site protective intelligence agent, site agent would be primary."[123]

The job of a Security Room Agent is to be the conduit of communications between all entities involved in a protective site in order to ensure situational awareness of all parties involved in securing the event. The PSP Security Room Officer, when asked during a joint interview with FBI and PSP whether he was aware of a suspicious person being on the roof of the AGR building prior to the shooting responded, "at 1809, I received another call from [Butler ESU Commander] saying that the guy was discovered on top of a roof."[124] The PSP Security Room Officer continues by stating he relayed that information to the USSS Security Room Agent but did not notice if the USSS Security Room Agent did anything with that information.[125] In the USSS Security Room Agent's transcribed interview with the Committee the USSS Security Room Agent claims he never heard about the individual on the roof, only that that local police were working a problem at 3 o'clock.[126] The USSS Security Room Agent States in his transcribed interview with the Committee, "what I recall is that the local police were working [a] problem at 3 o'clock. And when I heard that on the radio, that's what I put back out over the Secret Service Radio".[127] However, in the USSS Security Room Agent's joint interview with PSP and FBI he states:

Question: OK. Were you ever made aware of Mr. Crooks being on the roof prior to the shooting?

USSS Agent: No.

Question: OK, so if [PSP Security Room Officer] were to say that he did inform you guys that he was on the roof, that wouldn't be an accurate statement.

USSS AGENT: Yeah, I don't recall being told that he was on the roof until we heard the radio traffic come across that the local police were working the problem at [3 o'clock].[128]

There are conflicting accounts between the PSP Security Room Officer and the USSS Security Room Agent regarding whether or not the USSS Security Room Agent heard that the suspicious individual was on the roof of the AGR building. The PSP Security Room Officer testifies in his joint interview with PSP and FBI:

Question: And then prior to calling [PSP Corporal], you gave that information to the Secret Service about him being on the rooftop?

PSP Officer: Yes.

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[123] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 103 (Dec. 4, 2024).
[124] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 20, 2024) at 17 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[125] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 20, 2024) at 18 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[126] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 51 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[127] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 63 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[128] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 22, 2024) at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

Question: And who was that you communicated that to?

PSP Officer: It would be [USSS Security Room Agent]. Like, I was like, you know, it was like, we're in the room and I'm like, moving fast.

Question: He could hear all your communications?

PSP Officer: Yes, yes. Like, 'cause I'm—Yeah. 'Cause I'm like, trying to get-it's like, hey, like-basically, almost like, hey, he's on the roof. And then I need to get our people there because obviously, you know, they're the ones that can get there fastest.[129]

USSS Protective Intelligence Response Agent

The Protective Intelligence (PI) Response Agent at the Butler rally was a Special Agent out of the Phoenix, Arizona Field Office.[130] In a transcribed interview with the Committee, the PI Response Agent asserted that the job of a PI Response Agent is to respond to any unusual or threatening individuals in the site, including any individual with an unusual interest in the protectee.[131] According to documents reviewed by Committee staff, the PI response agent is paired up with a local law enforcement agent, in this case, a Pennsylvania State Trooper, to ensure fluid channels of communication between State and local law enforcement with USSS.

The PI Response Agent told the Committee that her PSP Counterpart had been issued a radio for communication with PSP, who had a presence in the Security Room.[132] However, in the Pennsylvania State Trooper's interview with PSP and the FBI, he stated that he did not have his radio and was using his cell phone to communicate with the command post.[133]

Between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., the PI Response Agent was told by her PSP Counterpart there was a suspicious individual seen outside the venue with a rangefinder.[134] After arriving at the location where the suspicious individual was last seen, the PI Response Agent spoke with the local tactical team and a Pennsylvania State Trooper posted in the vicinity. She was able to gather a vague description of the individual and was told the individual was no longer in the area.[135] The PI Response Agent told the Committee that even if a suspicious person is no longer in the area continuing the behavior, they are still a concern since they could return.[136] Furthermore, she added that a PI Response Agent should not stop searching for the individual until after the visit.[137]

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[129] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 20, 2024) at 18–19 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

[130] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 12 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[131] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 14 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[132] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 26 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[133] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 23, 2024) at 3 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

[134] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 28–29, at 55 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[135] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 50 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[136] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 111 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[137] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 111 (Nov. 14, 2024).

The PI Response Agent then called the Counter Sniper Response Agent asking if either of the USSS counter sniper teams had seen the suspicious individual.[138] After the PI Response Agent ended the phone call with the Counter Sniper Response Agent, she, along with her PSP Counterpart began to drive back to the stage left area to resume crowd control.[139] On the way to resuming crowd control, her PSP Counterpart separated from the PI Response Agent and offered to drive his vehicle in order to continue searching for the suspicious individual.[140] When asked by the Committee whether she informed the command post that she stopped looking for the suspicious individual, the PI Response Agent stated, "I did not, my team, meaning that [the PSP Counterpart], was still looking. I was not in a position to leave the venue to keep looking."[141] She asserted that her primary responsibility and duties would be within the site itself, but that's not to say that [she] could not respond to something outside the site.[142] When asked about the difference between a protective intelligence response agent and a counter sniper response agent, the PI Response Agent stated that the counter sniper response agent addresses individuals specifically flagged by the counter sniper team and the protective intelligence response agent responds to anything reported as suspicious.[143]

The PI Response Agent told the Committee it was not her job to search for a suspicious individual.[144] Despite this claim by the PI Response Agent, the Counter Sniper Response Agent told the Committee that it was the PI Response Agent's job to look for suspicious people, and the counter sniper [response agent's] job is to look for threats.[145] When confronted with this contradiction, the PI Response Agent stated "He's not incorrect. I think it depends on your personal definition of suspicious and threat."[146] Furthermore, the PI Response Agent stated that an individual with a rangefinder is what she would consider unusual or suspicious.[147]

While the PI Response Agent asserted that her PSP Counterpart was still searching for the suspicious individual, in the PSP Counterpart's PSP and FBI interview, he stated that as he was leaving the outer perimeter he was stopped by the Secret Service and told that if he exits, he would not be allowed back into the event.[148] This interaction prompted the PSP Counterpart to return to the

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[138] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 33 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[139] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 37 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[140] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 37 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[141] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 37–38 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[142] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 22 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[143] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 20–21 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[144] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 99 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[145] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 124 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[146] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 124–125 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[147] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 29 (Nov. 14, 2024).
[148] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 23, 2024) at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

Command Post.[149] Since the PSP Counterpart did not have a radio and the PI Response Agent only had a USSS post-stander radio, the two could only communicate directly by cell phone after they separated.

The PI Response Agent returned to the stage left to assist with crowd control at approximately 6 o'clock p.m., despite the ongoing concern of a suspicious individual with a rangefinder.[150] Although the PI Response Agent left the area where the individual was last seen, she asserts that she never stopped searching.[151] She did not inform the Security Room or USSS personnel responsible for protectee movements because she believed the Security Room was already aware of the suspicious individual and had no additional intelligence.[152] When asked if a Counter Surveillance Unit (CSU) would have been helpful in searching for the suspicious individual, the PI Response Agent stated that it would have been beneficial because they would have been moving outside the venue and would have been better positioned to look for this person.[153]

USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper

The USSS Counter Sniper partnered with the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader in the Hercules 1 position on the southern barn was the counter sniper who neutralized Thomas Crooks moments after he opened fire injuring President Trump, David Dutch and James Copenhaver, and killing Corey Comperatore. The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper's quick and decisive action to neutralize the threat on July 13 undoubtedly saved countless lives of numerous innocent rallygoers.

The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper learned on the Tuesday prior to the event that he would be covering the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally on July 13.[154] Despite the unusual nature of being tasked with protecting a former President, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee he was unaware of the underlying intelligence which led to the deployment of counter sniper assets.[155] While the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper was not the counter sniper team lead advance, he was the highest ranking counter sniper at the event making him the supervisor of the other USSS counter snipers.[156] On July 11, 2024, prior to arriving at the Butler Farm Show site, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader sent a document to all USSS counter snipers titled the Counter Sniper Team Tactical Survey.[157] This document listed primary areas of concern, one of which

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[149] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 23, 2024) at 8 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

[150] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 42 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[151] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 43 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[152] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 45 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[153] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 103 (Nov. 14, 2024).

[154] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 13 (Dec. 5. 2024).

[155] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 69 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[156] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 16 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[157] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Counter Sniper Tactical Survey at USSS—001490 (on file with Committee).

was the AGR building described as "buildings at three o'clock, approximately."[158]

On the morning of July 13, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper arrived at the Butler Farm Show site and participated in a walkthrough with other USSS counter snipers.[159] In the walkthrough, the Counter Sniper Team Leader pointed out the AGR building stating that there would be a local counter sniper team positioned on the second floor.[160] When asked about line-of-sight concerns and mitigation practices, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee, "So we're looking at not just [the AGR] rooftop but all areas within the 360-degree circle. That's our area of responsibility."[161] Despite the USSS counter snipers having a 360-degree area of responsibility, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified to the Committee that at the time, he was unaware of Hercules 2's partially obstructed view of the AGR building's roof.[162] This fact was particularly troubling to the Committee. When asked which USSS counter sniper team had the AGR building in their particular area of responsibility, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper stated the counter sniper team responsible for securing the roof of the AGR building was Hercules 2, the team which had an obstructed view.[163]

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[158] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Counter Sniper Tactical Survey at USSS—001490 (on file with Committee).

[159] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 18 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[160] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 19 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[161] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 20 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[162] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 22 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[163] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 26–27 (Dec. 5, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 42 (Aug. 16, 2024).

VIEW FROM THE ROOF OF AGR LOOKING TOWARD THE POSITION OF HERCULES 1 (RIGHT) AND HERCULES 2 (LEFT)[164]



The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper first learned of the suspicious individual at 5:53 p.m. after receiving an email from the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead co-positioned with him at Hercules 1.[165] The email was forwarded to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead from the local Butler County ESU counter snipers and stated "If spotted, please notify PI at [redacted] or go direct with the Security Room. Kid [lurking] around building we are in, AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking toward stage, FYI, if you want to notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him."[166] The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee that an individual with a rangefinder is not inherently suspicious.[167] After that information was received by the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, he made the decision to not utilize the counter sniper response agent. When asked by the Committee why he made that decision, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper responded, "I do not know why he was not sent."[168]

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[164] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, Exhibit 2, at 39 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[165] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 39 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[166] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 39–40 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[167] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 40 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[168] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 43 (Dec. 5, 2024).

However, the Counter Sniper Response Agent was sent to search for the suspicious individual, not by the USSS counter sniper team, but rather the C–UAS agent embedded in the USSS Command Post.[169] Furthermore, as the information regarding the suspicious person was passed to USSS counter snipers via email, the DTD shift detail was not aware of the suspicious individual.[170] Between 6:06 p.m. and 6:09 p.m., a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position transmitted on the radio channel shared by the DTD, USSS counter snipers and the USSS Security Room that locals are working a problem at the 3 o'clock.[171] Since the USSS Security Room Agent did not use the radio to transmit the information about a suspicious individual with a rangefinder, DTD was still unaware. When asked why the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper did not put the BOLO out on the radio, he said that he wanted to keep observing the [3 o'clock] and keep the radio air clear.[172]

Prior to when shots were fired, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified that he had heard that someone was on the roof of the AGR building.[173] He was unaware if it came over his USSS radio or whether it came from the crowd.[174] Furthermore, he was unsure if his co-located partner, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead had heard the same.[175] Again, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper decided to not radio that information to the Security Room or DTD. Instead, he "was trying to do [his] job and observe the rooftops."[176] While observing the vicinity of the AGR building, he noticed local police running around the building with their weapons drawn.[177] While he stated that this raised his suspicion, he was focusing on the building and made the decision to not use his radio in order to notify DTD, the Security Room, or other USSS counter snipers. Former Acting Director Rowe stated in his testimony to a joint committee hearing with the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the reason why President Trump was not removed was that USSS did not have any other information aside from the locals working an issue at the 3 o'clock.[178]

When asked by the Committee why he did not relay information regarding the suspicious individual with a rangefinder, hearing there was an individual on the roof, or local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their weapons drawn, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper stated:

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[169] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Response Agent, at 39–40 (Oct. 30, 2024).
[170] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second Supervisor, at 103 (Dec. 4, 2024).
[171] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 13 (Aug. 16, 2024).
[172] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 49 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[173] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[174] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[175] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[176] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[177] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 53 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[178] U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security Committee: Hearing on Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump at Pg. 20, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118–379).

"I'm not the only one that's observing that area. Someone else could've also put out the radio call. I'm not just going to go ahead and, you know, just put it on, just myself. There were other individuals."[179]

VI. CONTRADICTORY, FALSE, OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

KIMBERLY CHEATLE

On July 22, 2024, nine days after the attempted assassination of President Trump, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a committee hearing with the then-Director of the USSS, Kimberly Cheatle. In that hearing, Director Cheatle testified under oath in response to questions from multiple Members of Congress that "for the event in Butler, there were no requests that were denied."[180] The Committee is aware, by the USSS' own admission that this claim is false. In fact, the USSS has provided the Committee with a list of all assets requested by DTD and denied by USSS headquarters. The Committee is aware of at least two instances of assets being denied by USSS headquarters as they relate to the July 13, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.[181]

The first example of assets which were requested by DTD and denied by USSS Headquarters is the request for enhanced C–UAS assets. While it is true that the DTD did have C–UAS assets in place at the July 13, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, enhanced C–UAS assets were also requested.[182] The USSS told the Committee that the request for enhanced C–UAS assets went unfulfilled due to the lack of manpower to support the request.[183] Additionally, DTD also requested a USSS CAT LNO or liaison. A CAT LNO is a USSS position within the CAT which the agency uses to coordinate between USSS CAT and local CAT. While this particular asset was not listed in the assets denied by the USSS Headquarters, the Lead Advance Agent testified in her transcribed interview that while the asset was requested by DTD, CAT LNO assets were not "approved or provided" for "manpower reasons."[184]

RONALD ROWE

Former Acting Director Rowe testified before a joint committee hearing between the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and

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[179] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 54 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[180] House of Representatives Oversight Committee: *Hearing on the Oversight of the U.S. Secret Service and the Attempted Assassination of President Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. At min. 52:00* (July 22, 2024) (statement of Director Kimberly Cheatle).

[181] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

[182] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C–UAS Advance Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).

[183] Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at USSS—023632 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[184] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).

the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on July 30, 2024.[185] Former Acting Director Rowe's testimony, when cross-referenced with USSS transcribed interviews, was misleading and contradicted by other USSS officials. When asked if the USSS Counter Sniper Advance Lead gave explicit instructions to local counter snipers regarding a plan to cover the roof of the AGR Building, the former Acting Director responded that it was his understanding the locals "had a plan" because they had been there before.[186] However, in interviews with the USSS counter sniper team, specifically the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead confirmed that he did not instruct the local counter snipers in the AGR building about any role they should [play] in covering the AGR roof specifically.[187]

USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead was the individual responsible for completing advance paperwork, ensuring the USSS counter sniper team and local counter sniper teams knew their assignments, acting as the conduit between local counter snipers and USSS counter snipers, and determining placement for counter snipers.[188] While the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead stated that it was his responsibility to determine positions, when asked whether he either went inside the AGR building or on top of the AGR roof at any point in the planning for the rally the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead replied, "I did not, no."[189]

When asked by the Committee whether he was comfortable in terms of the ability to accomplish his mission that day from his position, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead stated, "Yes. They were good positions."[190] During the USSS Hercules 2 Counter Sniper's transcribed interview, he stated that when he went on post with his partner, they noted several trees which blocked the three o'clock to four o'clock view of the AGR building.[191] When the Committee asked the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead about the obstruction from the Hercules 2 position, he replied, "But Hercules 1, you had a clear line-of-sight, so I was OK with it."[192] Notwithstanding the alleged clear line-of-sight from Hercules 1's position, USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead's partner,

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[185] *See generally* U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security Committee: *Hearing on Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump,* 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118–379).

[186] U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security Committee: Hearing on Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump at Pg. 68, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118–379).

[187] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Lead, Hercules 1, at 39 (Aug. 28, 2024).

[188] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO–03(01), at USSS—006320 (Mar. 11, 2024), (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[189] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 39 (Aug. 28, 2024).

[190] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1 at 27 (Aug. 28, 2024).

[191] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper, Hercules 2 at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).

[192] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).

USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee that Hercules 2 was the USSS counter sniper team who held responsibility for "the three o'clock side", which included the AGR building.[193] Furthermore, despite claiming that Hercules 1 had a clear line-of-sight, when the USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead was asked by the Committee if he had a clear line-of-sight to the AGR roof he responded, "Not full line-of-sight. I could not see the actual roof itself."[194]

The USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified that his and the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead's area of responsibility was primarily covering the 6 o'clock to 9 o'clock to 12 o'clock, while Hercules 2 would be covering from the 12 o'clock to 3 o'clock to 6 o'clock.[195] This presents a host of issues which greatly concern the Committee. The first of which is Hercules 2 was responsible for covering the 12 o'clock to 6 o'clock despite the 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock positions being obstructed by foliage.[196] Furthermore, while the USSS counter sniper team had overlapping area of responsibilities, Hercules 1's primary area of responsibility was that facing away from the AGR building despite being the primary reason the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead was OK with the obstructed line-of-sight of Hercules 2.

Question: And you mentioned that the line-of-sight concern was mitigated with AGR because there were always Secret Service counter sniper eyes on the rooftop?

USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead: Mitigated as in between Secret Service was looking at them but as well as other local CS had eyes on from the horse stadium, as well.

Question: And so were they just looking at the AGR Roof?

USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead: No. Basically, the Hercules teams CS with the Secret Service, we were looking at everything 180 from the stage. I assumed the local counterparts, as well, as long as it's in their line of sight and it's not being obstructed, and there's no reason you can't see it, between the horse stadium teams and AGR building itself, if you can see it, you can act on said threats.[197]

The issue with USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead's assessment was his reliance on the local counter snipers which the USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead guessed was between 400 yards and 500 yards away from the AGR building to cover the roof.[198] In comparison, the USSS Hercules 1 counter snipers were approximately 200 yards away.[199]

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[193] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 28 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[194] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 43–44 (Aug. 28, 2024).

[195] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 73 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[196] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).

[197] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 79–80 (Aug. 28, 2024).

[198] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 81 (Aug. 28, 2024).

[199] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 78 (Dec. 5, 2024).

USSS Site Agent and Site Counterpart

Throughout the Committee's investigation, the Committee has continuously been told by USSS agents in charge of planning the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally that they did not request CSU personnel because this asset is typically not provided for a former President. However, in the Committee's review of USSS documents, it was discovered that CSU assets had twice been previously requested by DTD and approved by USSS Headquarters.[200]

VII. CHANGES IN SECRET SERVICE POLICY PURSUANT TO THE COMMITTEE'S INTERIM REPORT

An addendum to the USSS' March 12, 2025, document production to the Committee, USSS stated that changes were made to internal policy as a reflection of recommendations provided to the agency in the Committee's interim report. These changes to USSS internal policy largely reflect the Committee's findings regarding the lack of coordination and communication between Federal, State, and local law enforcement entities; clarification of protective advance procedures; and the sharing of pertinent intelligence to USSS agents assigned to a protectee or protective event. Further information regarding the changes to USSS policy pursuant to the Committee's interim report recommendations will be released as an addendum to the final report.

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VIII. OUTSTANDING REQUESTS AND OBSTRUCTION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES

The Committee has made numerous requests to components of the Department of Justice (DOJ) which remain outstanding at the close of the investigation. The Committee's request to the FBI was originally transmitted on July 24, 2024. Beginning on October 3, 2024, the Committee went to the Department of Justice four times for the purpose of viewing FBI interview summaries, lab reports, firearms and explosives examinations in-camera. When the Committee arrived, the documents were produced in-camera, redacted. DOJ producing redacted documents in-camera greatly rendered the purpose for the Committee's visit moot. Furthermore, in February

[200] *See generally* Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).

2025, the Committee travelled to FBI Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia to receive an in-person briefing from subject matter experts involved in the case.[201] Despite a glimpse of cooperation from the FBI, the Committee's follow-up requests for information remain unanswered. On July 25, 2024, the Committee made a request to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) asking to interview a specific individual involved in the July 13 campaign rally. To date, the Committee has only received a one overly redacted production from the ATF and has not had the opportunity to interview the individual referred to in the Committee's initial letter and a general briefing stating the ATF had no official involvement in the rally.

[201] Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 21, 2025).

COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF POLICY CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY U.S. SECRET SERVICE

SOD–03 & SOD–03(1)

The Special Operations Division–03 (SOD–03) policy has been updated twice since the July 13, 2024, campaign rally. The policy was first updated on August 16, 2024, and again on February 5, 2025.[1] The first update adds specific teams and units not previously included in SOD–03 and removes others which are no longer applicable under the SOD.[2] Specifically, the policy provides guidance on advance procedures for the Hazardous Agent Mitigation and Medical Emergency Response (HAMMER), Airspace Security Branch (ASB), Emergency Response Team (ERT), Specialized Rifle Unit (SRU) and Tactical Operations Branch (TOB). These SOD advance elements provide security assessments, safeguard communications, develop countermeasures, and implement a tactically oriented security plan.[3]

Further, the August 16, 2024, policy states that the SOD advance, composed of CAT, counter sniper (CS), ERT, SRU, ASB, and TOB personnel will advise the lead agent from the protective detail on the number of HAMMER, CAT, CS, ERT, SRU, ASB, and TOB personnel needed to conduct to tactical security plan.[4] The policy also explicitly stated that advance work conducted by SOD EDT [Explosive Detection Team] is done in conjunction with TSD [Technical Security Division].[5]

The August 2024 update removed mention of CSU as they were placed under the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information and removed references to magnetometers which were moved under the Uniformed Division (UD).[6] The most recent update of SOD–03 from February 5, 2025, removed the Airspace Security Branch (ASB) from the SOD Advance Procedures all together. Pursuant to the updated policy, ASB no longer provides security assessments, secures communications, or develops a security plan with other SOD elements during the advance.[7]

On December 6, 2024, the Secret Service implemented Special Operations Division policy SOD–03(01) regarding advance proce-

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[1] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS—006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—006391 (on file with Committee).

[2] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS—006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[3] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—006391 pg. 5 (on file with Committee).

[4] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS—006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[5] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS—006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[6] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for August 2024, at USSS—006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[7] *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—023648–023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).

dure for the USSS CS team.[8] SOD–03(01) supplements SOD–03, updated on February 5, 2025, by further delineating the responsibilities of the CS team lead during the advance planning of a protective[9] event.[10] SOD–03(01) States the CS team lead assigned to an advance team is responsible for creating a plan of protection for a protectee or venue.[11] Specifically, the CS team lead will conduct a sniper threat assessment to identify long range threats and line-of sight-concerns.[12] In the assessment, the CS team lead will give a detailed explanation for how CS will cover the site including the number and placement of CS teams and their counterparts (if applicable), areas of concern, and recommendations for mitigation.[13]

SOD–03 requires the SOD Advance Team, including the CS team lead, to attend and brief Secret Service personnel at the visit manpower briefing.[14] SOD–03(1) provides further detail, stating the CS team lead is required to attend relevant meetings and all manpower briefings.[15] Furthermore, SOD–03(01) outlines the CS Survey, which the CS team lead is required to conduct as part of the advance procedure.[16] The policy underscores that the survey should be done in a way that any CS personnel or non-Secret Service unit supplementing the CS team can understand and implement.[17] The survey will include, among other items, maps and photographs of areas of concern.[18]

SOD–03(01) also creates a section on events management requirements, stipulating the CS team lead will request necessary resources in consultation with the lead advance agent and CS Operations, complete all information under the "Personnel, Equipment, and Actions" tab and all statistical data slots, including why a particular site was recommended "no CS coverage", when applicable.[19]

SOD–03(01) further outlines the CS Advance Checklist in Appendix A as a master document for all CS protective advances.[20] The policy gives the CS team lead discretion, stating the CS team lead may use their judgment to address items not on the list or decide if certain items on the list are not applicable for a specific event.[21]

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[8] *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669–023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[9] *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669–023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[10] *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—023648–023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[11] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669–023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[12] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669–023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[13] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669–023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[14] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[15] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[16] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023670 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[17] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023670 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[18] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023670–023671 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[19] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023671 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[20] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[21] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023669 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives

Furthermore, the CS team lead may prioritize items on the checklist during a shortened advance timeline or late notification of a protective location.[22]

SOD–08

The Special Operations Division Policy 08 (SOD–08) in place on July 13, 2024, provided an overview, responsibilities, and qualification for the USSS counter sniper team. On December 9, 2024, the USSS released an updated version of this policy. While many of the updated policies were inconsequential to the events of July 13, there were specific substantial changes in response to the issues identified in the Committee's interim findings report. The most notable change is the addition to a section called "CS Communications."[23] This section expands upon the previously updated SOD–08 to list specific acceptable forms of communication to facilitate the quick and smooth transmission of information between USSS counter snipers and State and local counter sniper teams.[24]

In an effort to ensure intra-agency communications and increase accountability, the revised policy updated on December 9, 2024, States that USSS counter sniper personnel are responsible for directing counter sniper response teams to areas identified by counter sniper personnel requiring further investigation. Moreover, any additional taskings to CS response teams shall be coordinated through counter sniper personnel.[25] This policy change will help to alleviate confusion from counter sniper response agents and keep USSS counter snipers informed of the activities of their dedicated response agents. On July 13, members of the USSS counter sniper team were unaware that the counter sniper response agent was deployed by the C–UAS agent embedded in the USSS Command Post.[26]

Another issue identified by the Committee was the denial of USSS counter sniper personnel to campaign events due to lack of staffing. To address staffing and logistical challenges with the USSS counter sniper teams, the updated policy authorizes at least eight more slots for USSS counter snipers within the Special Operations Division (SOD). However, the policy clarifies the number of authorized personnel is subject to change.[27]

OPO–08

Office of Protective Operations Policy–08 (OPO–08) issues regulations related to communications within the USSS. In addition to

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System, Counter Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD–03(01), at USSS—023672–023673 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[22] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—0023699 (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—02372–023673 (on file with Committee).

[23] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—023652 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[24] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures—General, SOD–03, at USSS—023652 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[25] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, SOD–08, at USSS—023651 (Dec. 9, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[26] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer Technician, at 207 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 42 (Dec. 5, 2024).

[27] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, SOD–08, at USSS—023656 (Dec. 9, 2024), (on file with Committee).

general communications the policy also includes guidance on administration of the Command Post and Security Room. Following the July 13, campaign rally, communications were at the forefront of failures by the USSS. On September 11, 2024, USSS issued an updated policy of OPO–8, which provides in greater detail the roles and responsibilities of USSS agents in regard to communications.

The most notable update from the policy in place on July 13, is the updated policy requiring a "supervisory-level special agent to be assigned as the command post supervisor for specific classes of protectees.[28] Moreover, the policy stipulates that no less than a GS–13 level special agent will be assigned as the command post supervisor for all other sites and events.[29] Under previous guidance, there was no specificity as to what events or sites a special agent could be assigned as the command post supervisor and ambiguously stated that an "experienced" agent should serve in this role. In addition to grade-level requirements, the policy promulgates the Lead Advance agent of the site or event is now responsible for providing the command post with paper copies of documents and forms including "all security and/or tactical plans from partner law enforcement and public safety agencies providing support to the protective visit."[30]

The policy also places further responsibility on the Lead Advance Agent and field office SAIC to determine command post staffing by State and local partners.[31] The purpose of the updated policy is to facilitate communications between all partner agencies to the greatest extent possible.[32] As the Committee previously discussed, as there was no dedicated command post at the Butler, PA rally, the command post supervisor served as both the command post supervisor and the security room agent simultaneously.[33]

In regard to the security room, the updated policymakes a technical and conforming change from ". and should be provided with communications equipment and the same pertinent Secret Service forms and surveys that are also provided to the command post" to ". and *will* be provided with the same pertinent Secret Service forms and surveys that are also provided to the command post."[34] Further contained in the updated policy, the field office SAIC or their designee will make the decision as to who shall staff the security room.[35] According to the new policy this decision should be made taking into account numerous factors such as the level of the protectee, the assessment of the site, and the number of expected

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[28] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[29] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[30] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[31] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[32] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[33] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room Agent, at 10 (Oct. 9, 2024).
[34] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—006255 (Apr. 6, 2021), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[35] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).

attendees.[36] Similar to the command post, staffing by State and local partners should be determined by both the field office SAIC as well as the Lead Advance Agent, and Site Agent.[37]

On July 13, 2024, numerous agents of USSS, communicated using their cell phones rather than their USSS-issued radios. The updated policy also stipulates that USSS personnel assigned to work at protected sites or events are expected to communicate with each other over their Secret Service-issued radios.[38]

OPO–24

Prior to the Butler rally on July 13, 2024, requests from USSS protective divisions to the Office of Protective Operations (OPO) Staffing and Logistics, were often denied without explanation.[39] OPO–24, implemented on November 7, 2024, provides guidance to OPO Staffing and Logistics on coordinating with protective divisions, the Office of Investigations (INV), the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC), the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (SII), and other directorates as needed to provide the appropriate number of personnel and assets for each protective event.[40]

OPO Staffing and Logistics is managed by the Deputy Assistant Director of OPO with the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) and Assistant SAIC providing day-to-day oversight of the office's mission.[41] The purpose of OPO Staffing and Logistics is to help coordinate the temporary assignment of personnel and other resources used to supplement the protective divisions of USSS for protective operations.[42] The office is staffed by a combination of special agents and a Uniformed Division (UD) official.[43]

It is the responsibility of OPO Staffing and Logistics to evaluate personnel and asset requests submitted by protective divisions. OPO–24 states decisions regarding the use of assets for protective operations, "are informed by previous protective events."[44] The lead advance agent for a visit or event will work with a field office supervisor to determine the number of post standers needed for a protective visit.[45] The lead advance agent will then submit a Manpower Request Form to describe post stander needs. The lead advance agent will also submit a more thorough Manpower Justification Form detailing post stander needs and may provide the site

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[36] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[37] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[38] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Communications, OPO–08, at USSS—023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[39] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Email Communication on June 28, 2023*, at USSS—023585 (received Mar. 13, 2025) (on file with Committee).

[40] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[41] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[42] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[43] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[44] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[45] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

post log to justify the staffing request.[46] However, OPO–24 permits flexibility in the resource request process.[47] If an event occurs on short notice, OPO may work directly with the operations section of the protective detail to process staffing requests permitting an omission of the Manpower Justification Form.[48]

OPO–24 stipulates the Manpower Justification Form, created by the lead advance agent, shall include: "adverse intelligence specific to the protectee, event, or site that can be mitigated through the requested asset; a description or map of how assets will be deployed; a list of local assets which were requested; if applicable, a description of local assets which are unavailable and why; and alternative solutions providing mitigation of a concern if the requested personnel or assets are not available.[49] Once completed, the Manpower Request Form is sent to the operations team of the protective detail for review. The operations team will then send the Manpower Justification Form to OPO Staffing and Logistics.[50] OPO Staffing and Logistics and the respective protective division operations team will work together if OPO believes efficiencies can be found in the request. The protective division's operations team will then communicate with both the lead advance agent and OPO Staffing and Logistics if changes to staffing levels are made.[51] Concurrently, the local field office operations team or supervisor will submit the number of post standers needed to Office of Investigations (INV) Staffing and Logistics.[52] OPO Staffing and Logistics and INV Staffing and Logistics will coordinate to ensure the number of local post standers requested by the protective division are available in the district.[53] If the number of local post standers falls below the agreed upon request, INV Staffing and Logistics will provide additional post standers from out of district.[54]

Magnetometer support consists of various forms for search and detection of prohibited items. Decisions regarding the number or magnetometers provided are based solely on the amount of time it takes to screen and not on the level of screening attendees will receive.[55] The policy States the Magnetometer Operations Unit will then decide the number of personnel needed to operate the requested magnetometers, taking into consideration whether USSS is requesting additional magnetometer support from other DHS components such as the Transportation Security Agency (TSA).[56] The

[46] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[47] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[48] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[49] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[50] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[51] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[52] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[53] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[54] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[55] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
[56] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

lead advance agent then submits the request for magnetometer support where the detail's operation team will review it prior to sending the request to OPO Staffing and Logistics.[57]

For protective events without a magnetometer advance coordinator, these responsibilities are handled by the lead advance agent.[58] The policy further states that OPO Staffing and Logistics and Magnetometer Operations Unit will work through any discrepancies with what the protective division is requesting and what the Magnetometer Operations Divisions deems is available and appropriate for the protective event.[59]

If Counter Surveillance Division (CSD) or PID assets are requested by the protective division, OPO Staffing and Logistics will pass the request to SII.[60] The OPO Office of Staffing and Logistics will also send an email to the requesting protective division confirming receipt, copying the respective operations team of the respective division to notify them of the request.[61] The specific operations team will then respond to the message, including the protective division, with a response including the amount of support that will be provided and an explanation for any requests the respective Ops cannot meet.[62] Moreover, If CSD or PID are unable to provide the resources requested by the protective division, it is the responsibility of the lead advance agent, who originally made the request, to find alternatives to mitigate the concerns the requested assets would have addressed.[63]

OPO–25

In order to increase accountability specifically among USSS protective operations leadership, on April 4, 2025, the USSS published OPO–25. OPO–25, Protective Operations Accountability, ensures a clear hierarchy of specific protective operations personnel as it relates to their overall responsibilities when planning an event. The policy states that "the lines of accountability established in this policy supersede any lines of accountability defined elsewhere in the Protective Operations Manual or other sections of the Secret Service Manual.[64] The lines of accountability contained within this policy concern the Assistant Director (AD) of the Office of Protective Operations (OPO), the protective division SAIC, the field office SAIC, lead advance agent, and site agent.[65]

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[57] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[58] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[59] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[60] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023666 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[61] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023668 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[62] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023668 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[63] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO–24, at USSS—023666 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).

[64] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[65] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).

OPO–25 prescribes the AD of OPO will have final decision authority over all USSS personnel supporting protective operations.[66] The protective division SAIC will have authority over all USSS personnel of a specific visit, regardless of the office to which they are normally assigned.[67] Prior to the protective division SAIC arriving at the event, the field office SAIC will have responsibility for the protective advance.[68] Once the protective division SAIC arrives at the event, the field office SAIC will then report to the protective division SAIC and continue their duties in a supporting role.[69] OPO–25 also States that the lead advance agent is responsible for the protective advance and works in coordination with the field office SAIC, but under the supervision of the protective division SAIC.[70] Furthermore, the lead advance agent is also responsible for the coordination of advance team members and maintains a line of communication with all protective operations staff, including partner agencies.[71]

Working under the supervision of the lead advance agent is the site agent.[72] The site agent is responsible for designating the site perimeters, identifying line-of-sight concerns and communicating those designations to the USSS advance team, including the lead advance agent.[73] In regard to advance paperwork, the lead advance agent is responsible for the accuracy of advance paperwork associated with a protective visit. Once the advance paperwork is submitted, the final review and approval of the advance paperwork rests with the field office SAIC.[74]

OPO–03(01)–03(04)

OPO–03, the policy document prescribing guidance for USSS advance planning was most recently updated on April 10, 2025. In the most recent update, the policy was further broken down into four separate OPO policy documents: OPO–03(1) Protective Advance Overview; OPO–03(2), Advance Team Components; OPO–03(3), Protective Advance Meetings and Briefings; and OPO–03(4), situation reports. The majority of OPO–03, prior to the update was under the subheading "Advance Team Components." This section was expanded upon and reissued as a separate policy.[75] The most significant change in the updated OPO–03(01) policy are additions related to coordination with "Partner Law Enforcement Agen-

[66] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[67] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023674 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[68] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023675 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[69] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023675 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[70] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[71] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[72] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[73] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023676 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[74] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO–25, at USSS—023677 (Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[75] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—023692 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

cies."[76] Specifically, OPO–03(01) now ensures that members of the USSS advance team working with other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies will request and review the partners' operations plans.[77] Prior to July 13, there was no requirement for USSS agents to request partner law enforcement agency's operational plans, much less review them.

OPO–03(02) was released on April 10, 2025, as a more separate version of the OPO–03 updated in March 2024, which lists the duties and responsibilities of certain advance jobs related to protective visits. Previously, the duties listed in the policy updated in March 2024, the responsibilities were superficial and ill-defined. In the April 2025 update, changes were made to extensively cover all responsibilities of an agent's job and further solidify a chain of command to ensure accountability for specific duties. Most notably, changes were made to the duties of the field office SAIC, the lead advance agent, the site agent, and the protective intelligence agent.

In the April release of OPO–03(02), the responsibility of coordinating a meeting with Federal, State, and local law enforcement entities were removed from the field office SAIC and replaced with the responsibility to review and approve advance paperwork, including the preliminary survey.[78] Furthermore, pursuant to the updated policy, the Lead Advance Agent is now specifically responsible for: ensuring other members of the USSS advance team have established plans for communications between USSS and all other law enforcement entities involved in the protective operation, reviewing the plans to ensure they are sufficient, the overall security plan for the visit, and ensuing the command post staffing is consistent with the policy prescribed in OPO–08.[79]

In addition to the previously prescribed duties listed in the March 2024 policy, the Site Agent is now responsible for designating perimeters and communicating those perimeters to the USSS advance team, requesting copies of other law enforcement agency's operations plans, conducting site walk-throughs with partner agencies to review responsibilities, and providing the applicable paperwork to the security room and command post.[80] Regarding the PI agent the only further duty assigned is that the PI agent will now work with the detail SAIC, field office SAIC, and lead advance agent to ensure all agents assigned to the visit are informed of relevant intelligence and threats against the visit and protectees.[81]

OPO–03(03) was released as a supplemental extension of certain policies in the previously updated OPO–03 policy documents. OPO–

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[76] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO–03(01), at USSS—023682 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[77] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO–03(01), at USSS—023682 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[78] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—023692 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[79] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—023693 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[80] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—023695 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[81] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—023695 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO–03(02), at USSS—023696 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

03(03) concentrates on protective advance meetings and briefings.[82] The purpose of these updates is chiefly to maintain open lines of communication between the USSS and partner entities, whether they be Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies.[83] Notable changes include additional guidance on administering police meetings and manpower briefings as well as creating a requirement that each member of the advance team to conduct daily check-ins with their partner agency counterparts leading up to protective events.[84]

In regard to police meetings, changes were made to require the USSS to include all partners involved in the police meeting to also be invited to the final briefing.[85] This change is in response to reports from PSP officers who were asked to leave the final manpower briefing on July 13.[86] Furthermore, in a change from previous policy, police meetings are now mandatory for all events involving specific classes of protectees.[87] Formally known as the manpower briefing, final briefings take place in order to provide all pertinent information related to a visit or event to increase awareness of threats or address certain issues which arose during the advance process.[88]

Similar to police meetings, changes were made to the organization of "final briefings." Per the April 10, 2025, dissemination of OPO–03(03), members of partner agencies are now required to be invited to the final briefing, and the meeting is now mandatory for all USSS agents to attend.[89] Exceptions can be made for a pre-approved absence from the final briefing under extenuating circumstances and only with approval from the field office SAIC.[90] This change in policy echoes the importance of communication between the USSS and other Federal, State, and local entities.

OPO–03(04) was also released on April 10, 2024, and provides instructions on providing situation reports.[91] Unlike other policy documents related to OPO–03, while this guidance is an extension of

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[82] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023703 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[83] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[84] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[85] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[86] Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re PA—2024–924893 (July 23, 2024) at 2–3 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

[87] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[88] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[89] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[90] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO–03(03), at USSS—023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

[91] *See generally* U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO–03(04), at USSS—023711 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).

OPO–03, the issuance of this document was as a result of specific USSS failures on July 13. The most relevant portion of this document is titled Situation Reports—Examples of Critical Information to be Passed. In this section of OPO–03(04), many examples given are of specific instances which occurred on July 13. For example, the USSS includes: "Changes to protective countermeasures—e.g., availability of counter-unmanned aircraft systems. due to inoperability.[92] As the Committee unveiled in the September 2024 report, the USSS C–UAS system was inoperable until over 30 minutes after Crooks flew a drone over the event.[93] This information was never passed to the USSS Site Counterpart.[94]

Other examples of critical information to be passed included in OPO–03(04) include "any suspicious person observed in proximity to the site, to include identification and photographs of the suspicious person(s), if available"; "results of efforts to locate/interview suspicious persons" and "security sweeps which reveal explosives or other hazardous materials."[95] The Committee is aware of instances where the PI Response Agent did not alert the security room when she split up from her PSP counterpart and returned to crowd control duties. Furthermore, the PI Response Agent did not send the photo of Crooks to the security room agent until after the event had concluded.[96]

[92] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO–03(04), at USSS—023711 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[93] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C–UAS Advance Agent, at 19 (Aug. 20, 2024).
[94] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Senior Special Agent, at 109 (Aug. 21, 2024).
[95] U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO–03(04), at USSS—023712 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
[96] Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective Intelligence Response Agent, at 43 (Nov. 14, 2024).

APPENDIX

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Employee Number	Last Name	First Name	Office	Position	Charged Misconduct	Decision	Other Non-Disciplinary Actions	USSS Employment Status	Previous Employment Validation
1	Lead Agent	Lead Agent	PIT	SA	Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties	14 days suspension	Placement on Restricted Duty	Currently Employed by USSS	No
2	SAIC Pittsburgh	SAIC Pittsburgh	PIT	SA	Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility	14 days suspension	Reassigned from Division leader of 713 to a non-operational position	Currently Employed by USSS	No
3	Site Planner	Site Planner	PIT	SA	Failure to Follow Instructions	14 day suspension	Placement on Restricted Duty	Currently Employed by USSS	No
4	CIS Team Lead	CIS Team Lead	UD	Officer	Negligence in Performance of Official Duties	35 days suspension	Placement on Restricted Duty	Currently Employed by USSS	No
5	ATSAIC Pittsburgh	ATSAIC Pittsburgh	PIT	SA	Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties	10 days suspension	Placement on Restricted Duty	Currently Employed by USSS	No
6	Site Agent	Site Agent	DTD	SA	Failure to Follow Supervisor's Orders	1 day suspension	N/A	Currently Employed by USSS	No
6	Site Agent	Site Agent	DTD	SA	Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties	42 days suspension	Removal from protective position held on 713 division; non-supervisory position	Currently Employed by USSS	No

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Cases as of 6/25/25

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U.S. Secret Service Enclosure

- Lead Agent: On August 14, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed Lead Agent in an unofficial restricted duty status. She remained in this status until May 1, 2025.
- SAIC Pittsburgh: On August 14, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed SAIC Pittsburgh in an unofficial restricted duty status. He remained in this status until he received a Management Directed Reassignment (MDR) to a non-operational assignment in another office on December 29, 2024. See Bates 025051-025053.
- Site Counterpart: On August 14, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed Site Counterpart in an unofficial restricted duty status. She remained in this status until May 1, 2025.
- ATSAIC Pittsburgh: On August 14, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed ATSAIC Pittsburgh in an unofficial restricted duty status. He remained in this status until May 1, 2025.
- C/S Team Lead: On December 20, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed [redacted] C/S Team Lead in an unofficial restricted duty status. He currently remains in this status.
- Site Agent: On August 16, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed Site Agent in an unofficial restricted duty status. During this timeframe, Site Agent received a MDR from a protective office to an investigative office on December 15, 2024. Although she was reassigned, she remained in the restricted duty status until April 4, 2025. See Bates 025059-025060.

- Intel Advance Lead: On August 14, 2024, the former Acting Director of the Secret Service placed Intel Advance Lead in an unofficial restricted duty status. He remained in that status until he resigned from the agency on September 13, 2024.
- Hercules 1 C/S: Please note that on July 14, 2024, Sergeant Technician Hercules 1 C/S was put on administrative leave pursuant to RES 07(05), which states that immediately following a shooting or deadly force incident, the affected employee will immediately be placed on administrative leave, pending the local and/or federal law enforcement investigation. Following administrative leave, Hercules 1 C/S was placed in a desk duty status on July 25, 2024. He returned on November 26, 2024, upon clearance by the agency's Shooting or Deadly Incident Review Committee (SIRC). See Bates 025054-025058.
- SAIC Buffalo: After the Mission Assurance Inquiry review was completed, as part of the determination of which employees might face discipline, SAIC Buffalo was found not to be in violation of Secret Service policy. SAIC Buffalo retired on June 28, 2025.

**Note: There are no official records associated with "unofficial restricted duty" status.*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: January 18, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Special Agent in Charge [SAIC Pittsburgh]
Pittsburg Field Office

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

On July 13, 2024, and at all times during the planning of the Butler Farm Show visit, you were the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT). You assigned PIT Senior Special Agent (SSA) [Lead Agent] as the Lead Advance Agent and PIT SSA [Site Counterpart] as the Site Counterpart Agent. The Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD) assigned Special Agent (SA) [Site Agent] as the Site Agent. For a protective advance involving a former president, the applicable field office maintains the overall responsibility for the site.

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As the SAIC of the responsible field office, you had, among other duties, the following responsibilities: 1) oversight of the planning and execution of security arrangements; 2) coordinating decisions relating to the operational security environment with the Lead Advance Agent; and 3) oversight/collaboration with the Lead Advance Agent to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners.

2. Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility, Offense Code 5.6

On July 30, 2024, you were interviewed by Inspector Inspections Office and Assistant Inspector Inspections Office. In that interview, you stated that, prior to the July 8, 2024 police meeting, you received information that local partners and the Advance Team had a number of protective concerns with the Butler Farm Show site. One concern was the amount of active construction in the area. Another was that the roads came up right onto the property, which was unsecured, despite being closed to the public. Because these issues made the site difficult to secure, the Advance Team tried to get DTD staff to change the venue, without success.

You also stated that, at the July 8, 2024 police meeting, you overheard Butler law enforcement officers discussing staffing issues and saying that they were concerned over whether they would have enough officers to cover the rally. You told inspectors that when no one brought this issue to you directly, you assumed it was not going to be a problem going forward.

You informed inspectors that, on July 10, 2024, you conducted a manpower walkthrough for the rally. You stated that this was the first time you had visited the Butler Farm Show site. You further said that you immediately recognized the dangers posed by the exposed site. However, you told inspectors that the Advance Team members informed you that large farm equipment and bleachers would be placed between the AGR building and the stage that was set up for FPOTUS Trump, to mitigate the line-of-sight concerns. They also told you that local police would be roving the area and that the AGR building complex would be locked down, so no one would be allowed in or around the building on the day of the rally.

Additionally, you told inspectors that, towards the end of your July 10, 2024 walkthrough, the Counter Sniper Advance arrived in Butler. You informed inspectors that, although it is extremely rare to have counter snipers assist with a former president's event, you did not ask SSA Site Counterpa why the asset was deployed to Butler. You assumed that the Counter Sniper Advance would contact their local counterparts to coordinate the deployment of their assets.

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You further informed inspectors that, on July 11, 2024, the Advance Team conducted a walkthrough of the site with local law enforcement partners. Although you did not attend, you told inspectors that, typically, the local and state partners would agree among themselves how to divide their protective responsibilities. You stated that it was likely that the local and state partners told the Advance Team that they had everything covered.

You also explained to inspectors that, on July 12, 2024, you received a call from SSA Lead Advance early in the morning, saying that she was in the emergency room suffering from heat exhaustion and would not be able to conduct the final walkthrough with DTD supervisors that day. Because of a conflict, you also did not attend the final walkthrough. You told inspectors that it was typically a job for the "second sups," but that your team was aware you were available if they needed you.

On August 30, 2024, you were interviewed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs about the events of July 13, 2024. During that interview, you admitted that you could not recall reviewing the site plans for the Butler Farm Show visit. You did, however, admit to receiving and reviewing a Preliminary Survey on July 12, 2024. The Survey had conflicting information about where a local counter sniper team would be located. One picture showed the local team inside a building, and another showed them on a roof. You admitted that you were aware of this and that you did not notify anyone about this inconsistency.

You told the Senate Committee that you were not responsible for approving any documents associated with the visit. You admitted that you did not review any of the local partners' operational plans and deferred any questions about the plans to the Site Agent. You stated that the DTD and Office of Protective Operations had the final say over any issue that arose during the visit, and you eschewed responsibility for these decisions. You acknowledged that it was uncommon to have a separate local security room, like the mobile Command Center, but you did not take responsibility for the communications strategy.

The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, ITG-03(01), "Standards of Conduct – General," says that "Secret Service employees are responsible for conducting themselves in a manner that reflects the highest standards of the United States Government and must maintain an appropriate state of awareness and mission preparedness." This policy requires supervisors to "[u]understand and adhere to the standards of conduct applicable to themselves and to the employees under their supervision."

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The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, "Protective Advance – Overview," states the following:

> The mission of the Secret Service advance team, with oversight from the appropriate field office [SAICs] and protective division SAICs, is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

OPO-03 further states that the appropriate field office SAIC must:

- work with the Lead Advance Agent in "coordinating decisions relating to the operational security environment." The Lead Advance Agent should "routinely" be contacting the SAIC over "schedule changes, police meetings, intelligence concerns, support requests, and any other pertinent information regarding the visit or event . . .;"
- ". . . review any verbal and written agreements made with local partners prior to conducting the advance to determine their relevance as security planning continues for the protective visit or event;" and
- " . . . determine if it is necessary to conduct a final police meeting . . . to summarize and confirm all security procedures agreed to during the advance process."

In addition, the Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, "Protective Advance – Guidelines," states that the Lead Advance Agent must schedule a "security briefing and supervisory final walk through" with the SAIC or his or her designee before a visit or event.

Finally, the Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, "Communications," states:

> The Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and responsible field office SAIC will collaborate to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners. Staffing determinations will be designed to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible. Staff representatives from partner agencies/entities should be at

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> the supervisory or otherwise most senior level available.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP), Offense Code 5.6, Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility, states that a supervisor can be disciplined for the following:

> failing to exercise reasonable care in the execution of his/her duties or responsibilities [or] disregarding his/her duties or responsibilities; [or] significantly deviating from appropriate methods of supervision . . .

I find that you failed to appropriately exercise oversight of the security arrangements fo the protectee, to appropriately supervise security room staffing by state and local partners as required to ensure that communication was optimally facilitated, and to effectively coordinate with the Lead Advance Agent regarding decisions about the operational security environment. You also admitted to taking a passive stance during the planning of the July 13, 2024 visit, assuming that issues would be brought to your attention, instead of exercising the active ov rsight and supervision required by Agency policy. Further, you admitted to recognizing a discrepancy with where the location of the local counter sniper team would be located, but you did not alert your team to the discrepancy.

2. There is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 1 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to carry out your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the Agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and the mission of the Secret Service. As a SAIC in the Secret Service, you were, or should have been aware of your duty to oversee and if necessary, take charge of any situation that needed your expertise and oversight. You also knew, or should have known, that you were a vital and required part f the team responsible for the protectee's safety on July 13, 2024. Even so, you continually failed to take any ownership of the decisions relating to the operational and security decisions for the visit.

3. In proposing this a tion, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

Th TOP sta es that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lesser penalty.

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The offense of "Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility," Offense Code 5.6, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a fourteen-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.6 apply to this situation. The applicable aggravating factors of "[j]eopardizes safety of others," "injury/harm to persons/property," and "impact on agency/mission" all appear to apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities. I have further considered the clarity with which you were on notice of the rul s you violated in committing this offense. I have also considered that, as a supervisory law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than o her Federal employees.

I find that you did not carry out your supervisory duties and responsibilities with reasonable care when it came to preparing for FPOTUS Trump's visit to Butler on July 13, 2024. You failed to confirm that the Lead Advance Agent had established a plan to ensure Secret Service personnel could effectively communicate with their local counterparts, despite your awareness of the possibility of local law enforcement being understaffed. You were aware of the dangers posed by the Butler Farm Show site, yet this information seemed to have no effect on how you approached the site's security. For example, you failed to follow up with the Advance Team to ensure the line-of-sight danger had been mitigated, and you did not review any agreements between the Advance Team and local partners about securing the site. Finally, after you received a Preliminary Survey with obvious errors and omissions, you did nothing about it. In sum, it was your responsibility to be more proactive and involved in overseeing the planning for this visit.

While I have considered your laim that ensuring effective communications, mitigating line-of-sight concerns, and reviewing local partners' operational plans, was not your responsibility, I find this assertion to be incorrect and a failure to take responsibility for your actions.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-four (24) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023 and 2022 rating periods and an Ex eeds Exp ctations for the 2024 rating period. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

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In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

4. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

   a. Your Official Transcripts from the July 30, 2024, and August 16, 2024, Inspection Division Interviews;

   b. Your Official Transcript from the August 30, 2024, interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs;

   c. Cited portions of the Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, "Protective Advance – Overview;"

   d. Cited portions of the Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, "Protective Advance – Guidelines;"

   e. The Office of the Director Manual, ITG-03(01) "Standards of Conduct – General;"

   f. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, "United States Secret Service Table of Penalties;" and

   g. Cited portions of the Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, "Communications."

5. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer LES [redacted] Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

6. You have fifteen-calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD PII [redacted]. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII [redacted] 245 Murray Drive, SW, Bldg. T-5, Washington, D.C. 20223. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at Integrity Office [redacted] prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD LES after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless otherwise specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via

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Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD LES after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

7. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

8. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

9. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be c unseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

   Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complain s System.

10. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at (LES [redacted]

11. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD LES medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of

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actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment and responses to treatment;

c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD LES within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

12. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

13. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office.

LES

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SAIC Pittsburgh

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE

DATE: April 24, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer 203.110

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Director - SAIC Pittsburgh
National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance

1. This is in reference to notice to you dated January 18, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for fourteen (14) calendar days based on the information cited in that notice.

2. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submit ed by your representative, , dated February 19, 2025. I have also considered your March 4, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by Counsel and Counsel . A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Counsel and Counsel on March 18, 2025. Additionally, I have considered your addendum that was submitted by your representative Counsel , on March 18 2025. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by then .

In your replies, you stated that you have fully cooperated with all of the inquiries into the events and planning of the assassination attempt on July 13, 2024. You asserted that you have been punished already as you were asked to refrain from in-person work at the Pittsburgh Field Office and were eventually reassigned to the position of Director of the National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA). Given this, you argued that a fourteen (14) day suspension was not warranted.

You explained that you lacked critical intelligence that suggested that there was a known threat against now President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump prior to the visit. Yo said that, had you been aware of this adverse intelligence, you would have recommended either that the event be held indoors, or that additional resources be deployed at the Butler Farm site (e.g., a counter assault team, a HAMMER team, or a

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counter-surveillance team). You also claimed that members of the Donald Trump Protective Detail (DTD), the Office of Protective Operations (OPO), and the Protective Intelligence Division (PID) had received this intelligence. This, in your view, was proof that they, not you, were responsible for overall security at the event.

You also noted that both the former First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS) Jill Biden and POTUS Trump visited the Pittsburgh district on July 13, 2024. You said having the two visits happening at the same time required you to divide your atten ion between the two sites. You further mentioned that the visits were taking place during a critical staffing period (i.e., between the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, and the RNC in Milwaukee, WI). When ISP asked you about the su ervisor walk-throu h on Jul 12 2024 ou stated ou did not require
do a "walk-through" because ". . . both of the second sups (from DTD) were going to be on the ground for their final walkthrough on Friday when everything was built out." You also advised that you attended a monthly meeting, called the LEAD meeting, with the heads of federal and local LE agencies.

You argued that neither Secret Service policy nor current practices support the proposal suspension's statement that "the applicable field office maintains the overall responsibility for the site." Instead, you claimed that, over the ast several years, the protective detail supervisors for Presidential Protective Division (PPD), Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD), and DTD, had been responsible for overall security, not the field offices.

You then listed ten reasons why you were not responsible for security at Butler: (1) you were never made aware of the intelligence of a known threat against POTUS Trump, but members of DTD were; (2) you were not required to complete an Unusual Event Preliminary Information Form, whi h is only filled out by the person with overall responsibility of the site; (3) DTD and CNOS supervisors completed the second supervisor walkthrough, not you; (4) on two previous visits by then former POTUS Trump, DTD supervisors were responsible for overall security planning; (5) the Counter-Sniper (CS) Advance Team never communicated with you; (6) you were not invited to the Emergency Action Briefing; (7) DTD Operations emailed the Lead Advance, telling her that it would review the Preliminary Survey; (8) the Lead Advance submitted all paperwork to DTD supervisors for approval; (9) the Lead Advance had been trained to submit all paperwork to DTD Operations; and (10) you were not invited to the final DTD supervisor Briefing held the night before the rally. Type text here

You further explained that, after the walkthrough you participated in on July 10, 2024, you were briefed that state and local law enforcement would secure the AGR building, and that all line-of-sight issues would be mitigated by large farm equipment, banners, jumbotrons,

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bleachers, or the CS Team. You stated that you had no reason to believe that after the July 10, 2024 walkthrough that these items would not be in place on the day of the rally.

You argued that you did not take a "passive stance" during the visit as asserted in the proposal. You stated that on July 10, 2024, that you pointed out that the AGR building was a vulnerability. You said that you requested additional assets from the then-named Office of Investigations (INV), and that you placed an experienced SAIC in the security room. You also stated that you had been in contact with leadership from the state and loc l law enforcement entities supporting the visit and that you were not informed of any staffing issues.

You claimed that state and local law enforcement failed to secure the AGR Building as expected. You also stated that the protectee's staff overruled the Secret Service's request to block the line of sight from the AGR building with farm equipment.

You admitted that you never reviewed the Pennsylvania State Police's operational plan but claimed that they were not required to give you copy of it. You admitted that you were informed by the Emergency Medical Services Director that a local Mobile Command Post would be on site but said that you thought it would be used for medical issues, not as a second command post. You claimed that all law enforcement agencies were briefed on the Secret Service's security room and its functions.

In the addendum that you submitted on March 18, 2025, you stated that then Acting Director Ronald Rowe said in a press conference that the CS Advance failed to pass any security issues to supervisors. You said that in the USSS Mission Assurance Investigation it was stated, "Agency supervisors reported that the line-of-sight mitigation they had expected to be in place for the vent to eliminate the line-of-sight issues were not present at the time the former President arrived." You explained that the investigation also concluded that the Advance Team did not make supervisors aware that the line-of-sight issues were not mitigated. You stated that, when you arrived at the site on the day of the visit, you were not made aware of any security concerns by the state and local law enforcement officials. Specifically, you asserted you were not informed that they were searching for a suspicious individual. You added that you were not informed of any security issues or concerns when you entered the security room. Finally, you reiterated that you were not responsible for overall security of the site and should not be held responsible for what was not within your scope of responsibility.

I find that the charge of Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility, Offense Code 5.6, is fully supported by the evidence.

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I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, your misconduct adversely affects the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility," Offense Code 5.6, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven day to a fourteen-day suspension. The mitigating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.6 do not apply to this situation. The aggravating factors of "[j]eopardizes safety of others," "injury/harm to persons property," and "impact on agency/mission" apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. As a law enforcement officer and supervisor, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I find your actions, or lack thereof, to be a disregard of Secret Service policy.

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, PA, which fell under the Pittsburgh Field Office's jurisdiction. The assassination attempt resulted with the death of Corey Comperatore, and injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention which negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

This is not a case where critical information was withheld or obscured from you. On the contrary, you were well aware of a number of security concerns that had been raised in the days leading up to the Butler rally, yet you failed to take any affirmative action to correct them. As the SAIC of the Pittsburgh District, you were responsible for overseeing the

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Advance Teams, coordinating decisions with the Lead Advance Agent, and mitigating security vulnerabilities. However, even though you were well aware of a number of security concerns leading up to the day of the rally, you failed to take any affirmative action to correct them

First, our local partners reached out to you, pushing for a change of venue because of ongoing construction around Butler, yet you did nothing with this information. During your oral reply, you explained that Butler County Butler Co. Sherriff and Congressman Mike Kelly called you a week before the Butler visit, saying that they "were very worried" about using the Butler site because "of all the construction [around the site] and getting people in and out." Despite them raising these concerns, you made no effort to correct the issue with the advance team, nor did you notify anyone in either OPO or DTD about the matter.

Second, you were aware that our local partners were concerned about having enough assets to secure the Butler site, but you sat on this information. During your interview with Inspector Inspections Office and Assistant Inspector Inspections Office, you explained that securing the Butler site was a "nightmare" because it was a heavily trafficked, wide open space with multiple entrances. You also told them that you "overheard . . . Sheriff Butler Co. Sherri just talking about staffing issues and just being able to supply enough manpower for [the visit] and that being a concern." You did not, however, vigorously follow up on this issue because no one had "directly" raised a concern with you.

Third, despite recognizing that the "entire [Butler] site was a line-of-sight disaster," you took little to no interest in whether any line-of-sight threats were properly mitigated before the event. For example, you told inspectors that you were briefed that the line-of-sight concerns would be mitigated with farm equipment, bleachers, and roving police posts. However, because you never followed up on the matter, all you could tell inspectors about whether these mitigation measures were deployed was that you didn't "think [they] came to fruition." Likewise, during your interview with the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, when asked whether "farm equipment [was] used to block the line-of-sight [threat]" from the AGR building, you said that you did not "know if it was positioned where it was requested to be [because] that wasn't determined through [you]." Similarly, during your oral reply, you blamed your lack of awareness about the CS Advance's plan for the site on his failure to communicate with you, instead of your failure to take the initiative and contact him.

Fourth, even though you claimed to be the liaison between our local partners and DTD, you told inspectors that you had no idea how our local partners' assets would be posted. Nor did you know if anyone on the Advance Team would be privy to that information.

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Instead, you thought the local postings "probably would've been for [our local and state partners] to hash out themselves."

Fifth, you did not ensure that the Advance Team was properly supervised. When it came to second supervisor walkthroughs, you told inspectors "sometimes [you] go . . . [s]ometimes [you] don't . . . . It just depend[ed] on [the] schedule." You also might send one of your "other supervisors along if they're free." However, because "the detail [supervisors were] the ones . . . basically signing off on the final plan," you felt that you did not need to be there. Nor did your opinion change after you learned that the Lead Advance Agent was hospitalized and would miss the walk through. At the same time, you must have known that you, or another supervisor, should have attended that walkthrough because you explicitly told inspectors that you did not want to say that you failed to attend simply because you thought DTD was responsible for the overall security of the site. Finally, as a highly experienced, supervisory special agent, you knew how critical communications are during protective operations, yet you could not say which of our local partners were represented in the security room, nor could you confidently say whether any of them could communicate with each other.

In your replies, you generally argued that you were not responsible for the overall security of the site. However, as the SAIC of the local field office, you knew, or should have known, that you needed to be more engaged during this visit given the high profile of the protectee and the operational concerns that you were aware of prior to the visit. At a minimum, you should have communicated directly with DTD supervisors and/or OPO leadership about these matters. Instead, if you were not told there was an issue or invited to a meeting, you felt no need to follow up on a matter. Moreover, I find your statements asserting that you did not attend meetings due to a lack of invitation or that you did not address concerns because they were not raised to you, to be troubling. No SAIC must wait for an invite to attend a meeting or a walkthrough about a protective visit to his or her district. What is more, I find that your lack of knowledge of the security plan, postings, and police functions, left you ineffective. Additionally, I find your argument that things would have been different if you had been told about the credible threat intelligence to be wanting. Whether you knew about the threat or not, your actions should have been the same—to mitigate all line-of-sight threats and ensure the safety of our protectee.

I find that you abdicated your responsibilities as the SAIC of the district. As the SAIC, you are responsible for providing oversight to the advance team, the coordination of decisions relating to the security environment with the lead advance special agent, planning and executing security arrangements with the goal of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to the protectee. I find that you failed to meet your supervisory responsibilities. In my decision, I must consider that as an agency, we

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failed to meet our primary objective, the zero fail mission, which ultimately resulted in injuries and the loss of life.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-four (24) years of service with this agency, and your lack of prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance ratings of Outstanding for the 2023, 2022, and 2021 ratin c cles. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis provided by then PII . said that you have held many positions within the Secret Service that require trust and confidence and that your performance is exemplary. He also stated that you are well respected within the law enforcement community at the Federal, State, and local levels. He mentioned too that the Office of Field Operations management team is confident in your abilities to continue to perform your duties.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed fourteen (14) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on he attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at Integrity Office . The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

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5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Mana ement may be contacted by calling or emailing .

6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notic , you may contact Integrity Office [redacted], Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office .

[redacted] [redacted] Digitally signed b[redacted] Date: 2025.04.24 15:04:48 -04'00'

cc: Counsel [redacted]

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: June 2, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Discipline Review Board

SUBJECT: Grievance Decision

TO: SAIC Pittsburgh
Director, National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance

1. This is in reference to your grievance dated May 6, 2025. Through your grievance, you requested a review of Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Chief Integrity Officer PII decision of a fourteen (14) calendar day suspension for Dereliction of Supervisory Responsibility.

2. The Discipline Review Board (DRB) met on June 2, 2025, and reviewed your written grievance and the case file. The DRB also considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties as guidance.

After reviewing this matter, the DRB finds that the evidence in this case supports DAD PII decision. The DRB determined that the charges were sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The DRB also determined that DAD PII appropriately balanced the Douglas Factors in determining an appropriate penalty for the charges. Therefore, the DRB has decided to uphold DAD PII decision in this matter, and you will be suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

PII

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Deputy Assistant Director PII
Office of Field Operations

SAIC Pittsburgh

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: January 17, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge [ATSAIC Pittsburgh]
Pittsburg Field Office

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for ten (10) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

On July 13, 2024, you were assigned as the Site Supervisor/Field Office Supervisor from the Pittsburg Field Office (PIT) for the Butler Farm Show visit. For this event, PIT Senior Special Agent (SSA) [Lead Agent] was the assigned Lead Advance Agent and PIT SSA [Site Counterpart] was the assigned Site Counterpart Agent. In addition, Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD) Special Agent (SA) [Site Agent] was the assigned Site Agent. Your duties included facilitating the resolution of any matter(s) that occurred at the site and to managing any issues that arose between local law enforcement and Secret Service personnel.

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2. Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

On October 16, 2024, you were interviewed by the House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump. During that interview, you stated that your duties as "site supervisor" were to "respond to any critical incident and then also to mediate if there's a disagreement between our personnel and campaign staff or local or state law enforcement." You stated that you became aware that you would be the site supervisor on July 2, 2024, or July 3, 2024.

However, during a July 30, 2024, interview with Inspector [Inspections Office] and Assistant Inspector [Inspections Office], Office of Inspections, you admitted that you did not prepare for your role as site supervisor and had little to no understanding of the security plan for the Butler Farm Show site prior to the July 13, 2024 visit. You admitted that you did not meet with SSAs [Lead Agent] or [Site Counterpart] to discuss the visit prior to July 13, 2024. You stated that during the week leading up to the visit, you were working on numerous manpower requests, to include the First Lady's visit and dealing with your other supervisory duties. You stated that you did not participate in the site briefing that was scheduled at 1000 hours on the day of the event and that you did not request a briefing from SSAs [Lead Agent] or [Site Counterpart]. You stated that you did not review the site diagram for the event. Additionally, you admitted that you did not participate in any of the site walkthroughs with the other Advance Team members, so you were unaware of where local assets were posted.

The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, ITG-03(01), "Standards of Conduct – General," says that "Secret Service employees are responsible for conducting themselves in a manner that reflects the highest standards of the United States Government and must maintain an appropriate state of awareness and mission preparedness."

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

> [n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . . .

You admitted that you were aware that you would be acting as site supervisor for approximately ten days prior to the July 13, 2024 visit, yet you failed to familiarize yourself with the Butler site, security plans, local law enforcement assets, and post-stander locations prior to visit. As a result, you lacked the necessary background information to effectively deal with critical incidents or mediate matters with local law enforcement.

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2. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 1 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your misconduct adversely affects the Agency's trust and confidence in your job performance, and the misconduct adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

3. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

   The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lesser penalty.

   With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a 5-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a Letter of Reprimand to a 3-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a 7-21 day suspension. The applicable aggravating factor is "disruption of the mission." It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors listed under this offense code are applicable.

   With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this offense. As a supervisory law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees.

   I find that you failed to ensure that you were fully committed to performing the full range of your duties in support of a protectee visit. I have considered that you were engaged in managing the visit of the First Lady of the United States to a nearby venue and were otherwise unavailable to attend the pre-event meetings leading up to the July 13th rally. However, I find that you failed to adequately prepare for your duties on the day of the rally. To be effective in your duties, you needed to have prior awareness of the site and the security planning. As you have admitted, you failed to review any planning materials before the Butler visit. I have taken into great consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, and that there was one civilian death and two more critically injured with gunshot wounds. Your failure to properly prepare led to your lack of awareness of multiple significant factors to include the line-of-sight and communication issues.

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In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-four (24) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023, 2022, and 2021 rating periods. Additionally, I have considered the manpower constraints that PIT was facing, which may have contributed to your failure to appropriately prepare for the visit. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for ten (10) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

4. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

   a. Your Official Transcripts from the July 30, 2024, interview with the Inspection Division;

   b. Your Official Transcript from the October 16, 2024, interview with the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force;

   c. The Office of the Director Manual, ITG-03(01), "Standards of Conduct – General;" and

   d. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, "United States Secret Service Table of Penalties."

5. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer PII , Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

6. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD PII . Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at PII PII prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after expiration of the fifteen-day

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response period. Unless otherwise specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

7. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

8. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

9. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

   Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

10. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at PII

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11. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD PII medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

    a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

    b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment and responses to treatment;

    c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

    d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

    The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

12. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

13. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at PII

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ATSAIC Pittsburgh
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 24, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge ATSAIC Pittsburgh
Pittsburg Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer PII notice to you dated January 17, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for ten (10) calendar days based on the information cited in that notice.

2. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submitted by your representative, Counsel dated February 21, 2025. I have also considered your February 25, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by Mr. Counsel A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Mr. Counsel on March 20, 2025. I have further considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by then Acting/Assistant Director (A/AD) PII PII .

   In your replies, you discussed the negligence charge and your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of a Site Supervisor. You disagreed with the Deputy Chief Integrity Officer's overall assessment that you were not fully committed to performing the full range of your duties as a Site Supervisor in support of now President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's visit to the Butler Farm site on July 13, 2024.

   You argued that the proposal was logically inconsistent because it acknowledged that you were busy preparing for then First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS) Jill Biden's visit to the Pittsburgh district on July 13, 2024, while simultaneously faulting you for being unavailable to attend meetings and walkthroughs for POTUS Trump's visit to the Pittsburgh district that day.

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Although you admitted that you did not attend the post-stander briefing at 1000 hours on July 13, 2024, you claimed that attending the meeting was unnecessary because site supervisors do not always attend post-stander briefings. You also suggested that the record as a whole did not make any reference to specific instructions that describe what is expected of a Site Supervisor, other than to respond to critical incidents and resolve disputes regarding on scene operations on the day of the event. You stated that local field office Site Supervisors never attended countdown meetings or walkthroughs, other than the manpower walkthroughs, when you were a site agent in the past.

You also asserted that the Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD), stated that at the discretion of the DTD Special Agent in Charge (SAIC), DTD would send a second supervisor in advance of a trip to assess the security plan and provide additional support to the working shift. It was your understanding that the DTD supervisory chain sent Assistant Special Agent in Charge DTD 2nd Sup. and Inspector DTD Campaign Sup. to conduct the second supervisor walkthrough on July 12, 2024, which you said was in accordance with Secret Service policy and past practice. You also explained that you did not attend the second walkthrough on July 12, 2024, because the DTD manual did not instruct or require you to do so, and you were thoroughly engaged in preparation for the FLOTUS visit. You further stated that notwithstanding the lack of clear evidence of training, knowledge, customary practices, or the existence of site supervisor procedures, you diligently completed your duties based on your personal knowledge, customary practice over your years of service, and the standards as you understood them in fulfilling those duties.

Furthermore, as proof that you were prepared for your role as site supervisor, you stated that you were fully aware of the number of Secret Service and local law enforcement personnel assigned to the site. However, you admitted that you did not know where these assets were placed until you arrived at the site on the day of the rally, which you admitted was too late to make any changes if they were needed. You also admitted that you never knew how the assets were instructed to respond in case of an emergency. You admitted that you did not meet with Senior Special Agent (SSA) Lead Agent and Site Counterpart; however, you stated that it was not common practice to do so.

With regard to your failure to review the site diagram for the event, you stated that, when you reported to the security room after you arrived at the site, you requested a copy of the site diagram and the post stander instructions. You stated that there were no copies available; however, the Pennsylvania State Police had a picture of the site on the wall, so you reviewed that instead.

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You stated that the circumstances described in the proposed suspension were misleading. You acknowledged that you did not specifically review the documents prior to arriving to the site; however, you thought that the proposal did not consider your prior conversations with SAIC SAIC Pittsburgh or that Lead Advance Agent Lead Agent and Site Counterpart Agent Site Counterpart did not come to you with any issues about the site.

Finally, you noted your twenty-five (25) years of service, outstanding performance, awards, and lack of prior discipline as significant mitigating factors. You therefore requested that the penalty be rescinded.

I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence.

I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a 5-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a Letter of Reprimand to a 3-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a 7-21 day suspension.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. As a law enforcement officer and supervisor, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees.

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On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, PA. This attempt tragically resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump.

I find that as the Site Supervisor for the July 13, 2024 event, you were responsible for supporting the visit, which included assisting and guiding the Advance Team both on the day of the visit and during the advance. Based on the following, I conclude that you negligently performed your duties as the Site Supervisor for the Butler rally.

It is self-evident that, before you could effectively perform your duties as the Site Supervisor for the Butler rally, you first had to familiarize yourself with the site's security plan. Yet, you failed to do so. During your interview with Inspector Inspections Office and Assistant Inspector Inspections Office, you said that you "knew it was going to be hectic" and that "there were going to be a lot of people and that a lot of them weren't going to be prepared for the heat," but "as far as, like, the actual site" was concerned, you "did not receive the brief or ask for a brief or [see] any of the site diagrams or anything like that" prior to the rally. You explained that "if [the Lead and Site Advance Agents] didn't have an . . . issue, then [you] didn't request that they . . . give [you] a briefing." This was because you thought that "as supervisors," you were only there "to back them up and answer any questions they have."

During your oral reply, you admitted that you did not attend the second supervisor walkthrough the day before the visit. When asked by your attorney why this was, you said that you were "not invited." Moreover, you admitted to inspectors that you did not arrive on site until after the post-stander briefing, again missing an opportunity to possibly learn vital information about the site, to include the local law enforcement postings and the emergency action (EA) plan. Because of this, when asked by inspectors what the security plan was for the area around the AGR building you responded, "I don't know," which I find to be an unacceptable response given that the AGR building was the closest line-of-sight threat to POTUS Trump.

You also admitted to inspectors that, instead of focusing your experience and knowledge on ensuring the site was secure, you spent a large amount of time assisting local emergency medical services with victims of heat exhaustion and screening those individuals with a handheld magnetometer before they were allowed to re-enter the secure area. Although commendable, I find that this activity distracted from your role as the site supervisor, effectively delaying your response to any EA or providing resolution to possible conflicts.

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In your replies, you claimed that you were busy during the lead up to the Butler rally. You said that you were busy ordering "supplies and things that the office needs," reviewing special agents' casework, approving EPS timecards, approving leave, scheduling overtime, and fielding requests from INV to fill assignments outside of the Pittsburgh District. I find this argument meritless. The Secret Service has a zero-fail protective mission, and nothing, especially administrative duties, should interfere with the execution of that mission.

Furthermore, you claimed that neither the Lead Advance Agent nor the Site Counterpart Agent came to you with any issues about the site. However, as a supervisor, you knew, or should have known, that it is your responsibility to be proactive. Under no circumstances should you simply wait until problems or concerns are raised before addressing a matter.

In summary, your lack of knowledge of the Butler Farm Show site's security plan, prevented you from effectively carrying out your site supervisor responsibilities and demonstrated a blatant disregard for Secret Service policies and procedures. Furthermore, I cannot ignore that, as an agency, we fell short of our zero-fail mission. This incident, which resulted in death and injury, received extensive media attention and negatively impacted this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

Your career history is impressive and reflects the necessary skills to perform these duties successfully. In making my decision, I must consider that more engagement from you during the advance phase of this event may have resulted in a more positive outcome. As the site supervisor you are mandated to coordinate with the lead and site advance for the duration of the visit. You are responsible for supporting the visit, to include facilitating resolution of matters specific to the local jurisdiction. It is my opinion that your actions failed to meet this very basic mandate.

In mitigation I have considered your twenty-five (25) years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have further considered your performance ratings of Outstanding for the 2023 and 2021 rating periods and an Exceeds Expectations for the 2024 rating period. Finally, I acknowledge that you have had an impressive career with the Secret Service.

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In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed ten (10) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for ten (10) calendar days on dates to be determined by your office. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at Integrity Office The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling PII or emailing ContactEEO@usss.dhs.gov.

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6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office [redacted] Office of Integrity, at PII [redacted]

PII [redacted]
Digitally signed PII
Date: 2025.04.24 15:02:56 -04'00'
PII [redacted]

ATSAIC Pittsburgh [redacted]
Digitally signed by ATSAIC Pittsburgh
Date: 2025.04.25 13:36:41 -04'00'

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: June 2, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Discipline Review Board

SUBJECT: Grievance Decision

TO: Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge ATSAIC Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh Field Office

1. This is in reference to your grievance dated May 9, 2025. Through your grievance, you requested a review of Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Chief Integrity Officer PII decision of a ten (10) calendar day suspension for Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties.

2. The Discipline Review Board (DRB) met on June 2, 2025, and reviewed your written grievance and the case file. The DRB also considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties as guidance.

After reviewing this matter, the DRB finds that the evidence in this case supports DAD PII decision. The DRB determined that the charges were sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The DRB also determined that DAD PII appropriately balanced the Douglas Factors in determining an appropriate penalty for the charges. Therefore, the DRB has decided to uphold DAD PII decision in this matter, and you will be suspended for ten (10) calendar days. This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

PII

Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.06.04 10:42:50 -04'00'

Deputy Assistant Director PII
Office of Field Operations

ATSAIC Pittsburgh

Digitally signed by ATSAIC Pittsburgh
Date: 2025.06.05 13:34:51 -04'00'

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Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 23, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Officer-Technician CS Team Lead
Uniformed Division – Special Operations Branch

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for fifty-two (52) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

From July 10-13, 2024, you were the Uniformed Division Counter Sniper (CS) Advance for the Butler Farm Show site. In your role as the CS Advance, you were expected to evaluate areas of vulnerability; work with the Lead Advance Agent to determine the location and number of CS teams required for the visit; conduct building surveys; participate in briefings and provide site familiarization to the CS teams; and inform and confirm arrangements with the Pittsburg Field Office Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) SAIC Pittsburgh and the Lead Advance Agent, Senior Special Agent (SSA) Lead Agent .

2. Charge and Specifications

a. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

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Specification 1 – Failure to Mitigate Line-of-Sight Threats

On July 13, 2024, Crooks utilized the roof of the AGR building in his attempted assassination. Crooks was able to position himself on the roof of the building and to take several shots before he was stopped by a Secret Service counter sniper. You were aware of the security vulnerabilities posed by the AGR building roof, but you failed to mitigate line-of-sight vulnerabilities.

You told the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs on August 28, 2024, that you considered the AGR building "a threat." Specifically, you flagged that the AGR building's roof had a direct line of sight to where FPOTUS Trump would be giving his speech. Despite this, you never took the time to either enter the building or get on its roof. However, when asked by the House Task Force if it would have been prudent to walk over and inspect the AGR building, given that it was an elevated position only 150 yards from where FPOTUS Trump would be standing, you candidly admitted that, in retrospect, "absolutely" it made "total sense" to do so.

During your interview with the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump on October 22, 2024, you admitted that you conducted only a cursory walkthrough of the site after you arrived on July 10th. You explained that, once the Site Agent told you where the stage would be set up on the day of the rally, you took 360-degree photographs of the site and determined that the best place to position the Secret Service CS teams, Hercules 1 & 2, would be on the roofs of two barns located behind the stage. You then admitted that "you did not walk any of the other parts of the site at that point." Instead, you relied on "modern technology, like Google and stuff, [to] look at the overhead" of the site. Because of this, you "did not feel that [you] had to further walk the site[.]"

You also told the Senate during your August 28, 2024, interview that you were relying on the local sniper team to assist in covering the AGR building's roof, yet you failed to develop an effective operational plan and coordinate tactical assets with the local team to ensure this threat was properly mitigated. For example, you admitted that you did not "know what [the local sniper team] could see or could not see" because you were "never in the [AGR] building and [you] never looked out the window" where the local sniper team was posted. Likewise, you never communicated nor met with the team to discuss these matters. In other words, you were relying on the local sniper team to cover line-of-sight threats, like the AGR building's roof, but you admittedly knew nothing about how the team intended to work or what threats it could cover from its position.

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You further told the Senate that, when you saw the AGR building, you thought that the best place for the local sniper team was on its roof and that you were surprised when you learned that the local team would be located inside the building. Still, you said nothing about moving them to the roof because their position in the AGR building was set before you arrived at the site, and you did not want to risk engendering any bad feelings by moving them to the roof.

You further admitted that Hercules 2's view of the AGR building's roof was partially "covered by trees or foliage." You explained that you knew that Hercules 2 could only see one side of the roof because of this obstruction. Even so, you did not tell Hercules 2 about its limited view of the roof. During your interview with the House Task Force, however, you admitted that you "should have [told Hercules 2 about the tree], absolutely."

Finally, you suggested that, between Hercules 1 & 2 the AGR building's roof was covered, so it did not matter that Hercules 2's view was obstructed because Hercules 1 could cover that part of the roof. However, you admitted to the Senate that a person in the prone position behind the AGR building's roof was hidden from the view of both Hercules 1 & 2. This is why you did not see Crooks run up to the slope of the roof or take a prone position behind it. Rather, as you acknowledged, the first time you saw Crooks was after he was shot.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-03, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures, states further that:

- SOD advance personnel will make contact with local law enforcement counterparts, develop an operational plan, and coordinate tactical assets.

- The SOD advance team will conduct vulnerability assessments of the protected sites and . . . identify and establish appropriate countermeasures. . . . The SOD advance team will make recommendations to the site agents regarding tactical enhancements to the site security plan.

The Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, states that the CS Team Advance:

- Evaluates area of vulnerability from a long-range single threat (e.g., lone sniper) and/or coordinated assault;

- Conducts building surveys with the local field office;

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- Participates in police/agent briefings and provides site familiarization to the CS team(s)[.]

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-08, CS Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, states the following:

. . .

At least one hour prior to the arrival of the protectee, . . . the CS team leader will provide the CS response team(s) with the appropriate portions of the tactical survey and an extensive briefing suggesting pre-positioning locations and areas of concern. . . .

Specification 2 – Failure to Establish Effective Communications with Local Snipers

You knew that communications between Hercules 1 & 2 and the local sniper teams was critical, yet you did not pick up the radios that the local sniper teams offered you. During your Senate interview, you stated that the Secret Service CS teams typically co-locate with the local law enforcement sniper teams during a President of the United States (POTUS) visit. However, you stated that the local snipers declined to co-locate with your teams. You said that since this was not a POTUS event, it did not raise an immediate "red flag" for you that the teams were not co-located. You did not raise concerns regarding that decision, even though co-locating with the local sniper teams would have provided quicker and more efficient communication between the teams. You noted too, however, that the communication issue could have been mitigated if you had picked up the extra set of radios that the local sniper team had offered you. You admitted that the local sniper teams not only offered you the use of these radios but also told you where to find them. You thought using the local radios was a great idea, but you did not pick them up because you became busy with other matters. You acknowledged, however, that you could have, and should have, delegated picking up the radios to another member of the Secret Service CS team.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-03, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures, states the following:

- SOD advance personnel will make contact with local law enforcement counterparts, develop an operational plan, and coordinate tactical assets.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-08, CS Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, states the following:

- CS will also maintain communications with any local and federal tactical units that are participating in the visitor event.

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Specification 3 – Failure to Disseminate Critical Information

You acknowledged that you received a text message containing information and photos of a suspicious person and that you only disseminated that information via e-mail to Hercules 1 & 2. You failed to immediately notify the security room, Lead Advance Agent, or the Site Agent. Furthermore, you acknowledged that you did not notify the CS Response Special Agent because you were unsure of the location of the individual.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

> [n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . . .

During your CS Advance planning, you failed to adequately address obvious line-of-sight issues, which ultimately provided the shooter with ample coverage from your CS teams. You knew that these concerns existed, yet you did not take action to remedy those concerns. You further failed to ensure that communication between local law enforcement and USSS was effective by utilizing the shared radio communications offered to you. That decision left the Secret Service at a disadvantage during a security event.

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 1 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and the Secret Service's mission.

4. In proposing this action, I have considered as guidance the TOP and the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors).

The TOP provides that the Proposing Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lower penalty. The TOP further provides that, where an employee has committed "more than one offense," the Proposing Official may add the penalties together.

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With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply in this situation. It appears that the aggravating factor of "disruption of the mission" applies in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. Furthermore, as the CS Advance, it was your responsibility in ensuring that both the Secret Service and local sniper teams were positioned for maximum and unobstructed coverage. I have considered that you allowed the local CS teams to select and post their CS teams where they determined necessary, to include posting a team inside of the AGR building where their visibility was limited. Furthermore, I have considered that you declined to co-locate the CS teams as well as utilize their offer of radios, which would have served as an additional means of communication that day. As an aggravating factor, I have also considered the conflicting testimony you provided during your interviews with the Senate and House committees as well as your interview with the Inspection Division, which suggests to me that your security and communication plans for the day of the event were unclear. Your actions reflected negatively on the Secret Service and call into question your honesty, integrity, and judgment.

As a significant aggravating factor, I have taken into consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, that a civilian was killed, and that two civilians were critically wounded. Furthermore, I have also considered the notoriety of the offense, and its impact on the mission of the Secret Service and negatively impacted public trust in the Agency.

In mitigation, I have considered your ten (10) years of service and that you have no prior discipline. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Exceeds Expectations for the last three rating periods. Additionally, I have considered that it was the negligence of several individuals that led to the security failure on July 13, 2024. I have also considered that you were given a shorter time to conduct your advance than was otherwise usual. Based upon these mitigating factors, I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

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In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for fifty-two (52) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

   a. Your Official Transcript from the August 28, 2024, interview with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;

   b. Your Official Transcript from the October 22, 2024, interview with the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump;

   c. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview;

   d. The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, SOD-03, Special Operations Division Advance Procedures;

   e. The Protective Operations Manual, SOD-08, Counter Sniper (CS) Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications; and

   f. The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.

6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer PII Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

7. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD Wynn. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII PII. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at PII prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless other specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

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8. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at PII .

9. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, you will have the right to appeal that decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Specific details for filing, including filing addresses and time limitations, will be included in the final decision. For more information, you may visit www.mspb.gov. Alternatively, once you receive the decision in this matter, you may elect to waive your MSPB appeal rights and request administrative review of the decision by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB).

   If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to file a grievance with the DRB. Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

10. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity. Please note that if you seek corrective action from OSC prior to filing an appeal to MSPB, you will have elected corrective action and any appeal to the MSPB would be an IRA appeal and limited as such, regardless of the nature of the decision.

11. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

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12. However, allegations that the decision on this proposal, if the decision is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought either in an appeal to the MSPB or an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System, but not in both forums. Otherwise, the allegation regarding the decision can be brought as an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

13. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD PII medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

    a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

    b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;

    c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

    d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

    The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

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14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at PII.

PII
PII
Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.04.23 09:20:27 -04'00'

Jeffrey J. Lowe

CS Team Lead

04/25/25
Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

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DATE: July 3, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Officer-Technician CS Team Lead
Uniformed Division – Special Operations Branch

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer PII notice to you dated April 23, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for fifty-two (52) calendar days based on the information cited in tha notice.

2. I find that the charge and specifications of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, are fully supported by the evidence. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submitted by your representative, Counsel , dated June 6, 2025. I have also considered your June 23, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by Mr. Counsel . A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Mr. Counsel on July 2, 2025.

   In your replies you argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8. You explained your duties as the Counter Sniper (CS) Advance for the Butler rally, noting that you were a late addi ion to the advance team and arrived on site on July 10, 2024.

   As to the specification of Failure to Mitigate Line-of-Sight Threats, you claimed that you selected the placement of the Secret Service's CS Team's (i.e., Hercules 1 and 2) post locations to ensure the team could adequately view all threat areas. However, you admitted that Hercules 2's view of the AGR building's roof was partially obscured by a crop of trees. Additionally, while Hercules 1 had a full view of the AGR building's roof, you conceded that a person could remain obscured behind the roof's arch.

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You further noted that the local police sniper team declined your offer to "co-locate" with either Hercules 1 or 2, and you informed your supervisor of its decision. You explained that standard protocol required local sniper and counter sniper teams to co-locate with Secret Service CS Teams on Presidential Protective Division (PPD) advances to facilitate communication between the teams. However, you stated that you did not press the issue because this was not a typical PPD advance, and you were concerned about upsetting our local law enforcement partners.

Although you expressed confidence in the local sniper team's capability and its contribution to the overall protective mission and thought that it could cover the portion of the AGR building's roof behind the arch, you admitted that your primary concern was having Hercules 1 or 2 identify the local snipers as a threat and accidently firing on them. So, while you thought that they could, or would, cover the portion of the AGR building's roof that sat behind the roof's arch, you never verified that this was the case.

Regarding the specification of Failure to Establish Effective Communications with Local Snipers, you acknowledged that the local snipers offered you radios for the Hercules Teams, and you agreed to retrieve them. However, as you were heading to do so, you received a radio transmission indicating that then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump was already en route to the site. Although you admitted that you could have assigned getting the radios to another Secret Service employee, you did not do so. Rather, you chose to take up your position with Hercules 1. Thus, you noted that the radios were never collected, and you used your cell phone to communicate with the local snipers.

You stated that the shortened advance notice and your inability to attend the initial police briefings impacted your ability to convince the local police to co-locate with your teams. You argued that you are not at fault for the lack of response from the local police partners posted in or around the AGR building. You further alleged that it was reasonable for you to believe that those officers would appropriately address any issues that arose during the event.

Based on the above, you claimed that you were not negligent in performing your duties. However, you also admitted that you could have performed your role in a more effective manner. Specifically, you admitted that, in hindsight, it would have been simple for you to have another employee pick up the radios from the local counter sniper team, that you

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should have raised the co-location discussion up your chain of command, and that you should have communicated to others when you learned of a suspicious individual. You took responsibility for your actions and apologized for your role in the events of July 13, 2024.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at POTUS Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and a tempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore, and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump were injured. You were the CS Advance for the rally and ultimately responsible for, among other things, evaluating areas of vulnerability and working with the local snipers to ensure all long-distance threats were addressed and quick, efficient communications were established between the teams. You failed to do this. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as the CS Advance.

3. I find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. Your negligence adversely affects the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

4. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

   The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

   The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

   With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. I have

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considered that you did not fully address line-of-sight threats, which the shooter ultimately took advantage of in carrying out this heinous act. I have further considered that you could have easily assigned the duty of picking up radios that would have facilitated communications with the local snipers to another Secret Service employee, but that you did not. I have considered too that you did not pass relevant information to the security room, CS Response, Lead Advance, and Site Advance because you assumed someone else would do so. I have considered as well that this incident, which resulted in death and injury, received world-wide media coverage that negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have also considered that, as a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees; your ten (10) years of service with this agency, including the approximately two (2) years you served in the Uniformed Division's White House Branch; and the eight (8) years you have been assigned to the Counter Sniper Program, during which you have completed approximately ten (10) to fifteen (15) CS advances. This level of experience indicates to me that you knew, or should have known, how to successfully carry out your duties as the CS advance.

In mitigation I have considered your ten (10) years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance ratings of Exceeds Expectations for the previous three rating cycles. I have further taken into consideration it was not the negligence of just one employee that led to this unwanted outcome. In addition, I have strongly considered that it was your CS position that ultimately neutralized the threat, ending all hostile actions. I have also strongly considered that you have taken responsibility for your actions and identified key steps that you could have taken that may have prevented this unwanted outcome.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to mitigate the proposed fifty-two (52) calendar day suspension to a thirty-five (35) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for thirty-five (35) calendar days on dates to be determined by your office. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

5. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. You may file an appeal by sending it to the MSPB, Washington DC Regional Office, 1901 S. Bell Street, Suite 950, Arlington, VA 22202, or by electronic filing by using "e-Appeal," an interactive application available on the MSPB website at

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https://e-appeal.mspb.gov/. If you wish to appeal this decision, you may file such an appeal no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of this action, or no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision, whichever is later. If you do not submit an appeal within this time period, your appeal will be dismissed as untimely filed unless a good reason for the delay is shown; the judge will provide you an opportunity to show why your appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Appeals submitted by traditional means must be in writing and contain all the information specified in the MSPB regulations (the MSPB's Appeal Form and regulations are available on the MSPB website at https://www.mspb.gov/appeals/appeals.htm). You must follow the instructions on e-Appeal for electronic appeals.

6. Under Secret Service policy, you may elect to waive your rights to file a MSPB appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 and request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). In your grievance, you must specifically state that you are waiving your MSPB appeal rights. You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may email your grievance to the Office of Integrity at Integrity Office. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

7. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to either: 1) to file an appeal of this decision to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 as referenced above and include such a claim in your appeal, or 2) seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov, but not both. However, a complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or protected activity. If you file a complaint with OSC prior to filing an appeal to the MSPB, you have elected corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12, and as such, any appeal to the MSPB would be limited to an IRA appeal, resolving only claims of reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities.

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8. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling (202) 406-5540 or emailing ContactEEO@usss.dhs.gov.

9. The Secret Service will generally be notified of any appeal filed with the MSPB via e-Appeal. However, to the extent required, the MSPB should forward a copy of the appeal and Acknowledgement Order to the Communications Center (LEG), Attn: Associate Chief Counsel Agency Counsel, PII; email: PII, phone: PII, fax: PII.

10. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at PII.

PII

Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.07.03 09:51:28 -04'00'

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 4, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Senior Special Agent [Lead Agent]
Pittsburg Field Office

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for twenty-one (21) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reasons for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate then Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

From July 3–13, 2024, you were the Lead Advance Agent assigned to the Butler Farm Show site from the Pittsburgh Field Office. Other members of the Advance Team included, Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] as the Site Counterpart Agent assigned from the Pittsburgh Field Office, and SA [Site Agent] as the Site Agent assigned from the Donald Trump Protection Detail. In your role as a Lead Advance Agent, you were expected to, among other things, implement security arrangements, serve as a conduit between the field office and the detail, coordinate the advance team, and maintain communication with the protectee's staff and our local law enforcement partners.

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2. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

Specification 1 – Failure to Mitigate Line-of-Sight Issues

On July 13, 2024, Crooks utilized the roof of the AGR building in his attempted assassination of FPOTUS Trump. Crooks was able to position himself on the roof of the building and to take several shots before a Secret Service counter sniper stopped him. You were aware of the line-of sight concerns that the AGR building presented. However, you did not engage in the coordination necessary to ensure that the concerns were mitigated.

On October 18, 2024, you were interviewed by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump. In your interview with the House Task Force, you stated that, as the Lead Advance Agent, you were responsible for coordinating and putting the plans in place for the visit. You explained that you were, "supposed to know everything that's going on so that I can help make a coordinated effort and a coordinated decision in order to make it a successful trip."

However, you also implied to the House Task Force that you did not have awareness of the security plans for the AGR building:

- When asked if you communicated with the Secret Service Counter Sniper (CS) Advance about where the local snipers would be located, you told the Task Force that you "didn't question as to exactly what his placement [of the local sniper team] was. There [were] a lot of vulnerabilities, a lot of buildings, a lot of people . . . ." Instead, all you asked the CS Advance was if he "had a plan," and if he was "comfortable with his plan."

- You also informed the Task Force that you did not speak to any local law enforcement regarding the plans for the AGR building, stating that you "did not talk to anyone about the building specifically."

Likewise, in your interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs on August 26, 2024, you repeatedly eschewed responsibility for any security vulnerabilities, citing your lack of knowledge of the details of the security plans or issues with the security build.

- When asked if you were aware that the three local snipers were inside the AGR building without a visual of the AGR building's roof, you

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responded that you "did not know any of that. All [you] knew was that we were supposed to have police assets in the area of the AGR building."

- When asked if all equipment to mitigate line-of-sight was properly in place, or if there were security concerns leading up to the event, you stated that, on July 12, 2024, and July 13, 2024, "the site agents were at the site, walking around . . . to make sure that . . . whatever holes needed to be filled, were filled," and that you "did not receive information . . . that [the site] wasn't built properly and things were not filled and mitigated." You maintained that "because those issues weren't raised to [you], [your] understanding was that whatever mitigation needed to happen, had happened."

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview, states the following:

> The mission of the Secret Service advance team . . . is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

OPO-03 also states that the Lead Advance Agent's responsibilities include:

- [P]lan[ing] and implement[ing] the security arrangements;
- Serve[ing] as a conduit between the protective division/detail and the field office; [and]
- Coordinate[ing] the activities of advance team members[.]

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, Protective Advance – Guidelines, states that the Lead Advance Agent must:

- Discuss the itinerary and walk through the site(s) with the protectee's staff advance . . . [and] attend all walk-throughs and countdown meetings.
- Conduct police meeting(s) and ensure assignments of counterparts.

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- Coordinate all physical security needs such as:
  - Ropes and stanchions;
  - Barricades, sawhorses, barrels;
  - Pipe and drapes;
  - Tents/awnings; and
  - Lighting.
- Determine police and Secret Service staffing needs for the site(s) . . . .
- Brief all post-standers and support entities on responsibilities, scheduled site movements, site identification, press movements, intelligence information, homicide bomber policy, and emergency evacuation procedures (medical, fire, tactical); be cognizant that post-standers and support entities have different experience levels.
- Ensure all protective equipment is properly positioned, complete, and in proper working condition.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

> [n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . . .

Under Agency policy, you had the responsibility to take part in planning *and implementing* security arrangements. You were also to coordinate the activities of advance team members, to include the site agents and the CS Advance. However, you admitted to a lack of knowledge regarding the security plans around the AGR building. You implied that, if an issue was not brought to your attention, it was not your responsibility. However, to plan and implement security arrangements, you needed to have knowledge of the security plans, including those of local law enforcement and the CS Advance. Thus, you failed to effectively implement security arrangements and coordinate the activities of advance team members.

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Specification 2 – Failure to Mitigate Communication Issues

On July 13, 2024, local law enforcement discovered that Crooks was on the roof of the AGR building before the Secret Service became aware. The lack of direct communication between local law enforcement and Secret Service—due to the lack of local presence in the security room and the lack of Secret Service presence in the local command post—led to a time lag between the discovery of Crooks position and the Secret Service response.

During your August 26, 2024, interview with the Senate, you stated that, on July 8, 2024, during the first meeting with all of the entities supporting the visit, you invited a member from each law enforcement agency to be in the Secret Service security room. However, this is where your involvement in ensuring the appropriate staffing of the security room ended. You did not do anything further to ensure that local law enforcement entities staffed the security room. Additionally, on July 13, 2024, you did not enter the security room to determine if there were representatives from our local law enforcement partners in the security room, and, as you told the House Task Force, you were "not aware of who was in there besides Secret Service personnel."

Likewise, you did not ensure that any Secret Service personnel were in the mobile command post staffed by local law enforcement.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, Communications, states the following:

> The Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and responsible field office SAIC will collaborate to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners. Staffing determinations will be designed to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible. Staff representatives from partner agencies/entities should be at the supervisory or otherwise most senior level available.
>
> . . .
>
> For any protective visit or site where state and/or local law enforcement partners have established a complementary command post or coordination center, the Secret Service will staff that complementary command post/coordination center . . . .

The Secret Service TOP Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official

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Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

> [n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . . .

You held at least partial responsibility for ensuring that representatives from our local law enforcement partners were in the Secret Service security room and that Secret Service personnel were present at the local command post. You failed to fulfill this responsibility.

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph two (2) of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and the Secret Service's mission.

4. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

   The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lesser penalty.

   With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" appears to apply in this situation. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply.

   With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. With regard to the line of sight, you were well aware of the concerns of the AGR building, and yet you failed to ensure that the concern was mitigated. You claimed that you were not aware that the three local snipers were inside the AGR building. Additionally, you admitted that there were a lot of line-of-

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sight vulnerabilities and yet you were not aware of the specifics of the CS Advance's plan. You had an affirmative duty to ensure that security plans were planned and implemented effectively. Instead, you acted in a passive manner, assuming that any issues would be brought to your attention. In regard to the failure to mitigate communication issues, I find that you did not ensure that our local law enforcement partners were physically inside the security room with the Secret Service agents. You did admit that you were aware of the local law enforcements mobile command post, however, you did not ensure that the Secret Service had a representative in the local command post. This resulted in a serious lack of communication on the day of the rally. If this were not the case, it is possible that the Secret Service would have been alerted when our local partners radioed that there was a man with a weapon on the AGR building's roof prior to the shots being fired, which may have resulted in a different outcome that day. I have taken into consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, that a civilian was killed, and that two civilians were critically wounded. I have also considered the notoriety of the offense, and its impact on the mission of the Secret Service and the negative impact to public trust in the agency.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty-one (21) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for 2023, 2022, and 2021. I have also taken into account that it was not the negligence of any one employee that led to the failure to mitigate security vulnerabilities. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for twenty-one (21) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

   a. Your Official Transcript from the August 26, 2024, interview with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;

   b. Your Official Transcript from October 18, 2024, interview with the House Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;

   c. The Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-03;

   d. The Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-04;

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e. The Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-08; and

f. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.

6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer PII Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

7. You have fifteen (15) calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD PII Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII 245 Murray Drive, SW, Bldg. T-5, Washington, D.C. 20223. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at Integrity Office prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

8. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at LES

9. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, you will have the right to appeal that decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Specific details for filing, including filing addresses and time limitations, will be included in the final decision. For more information, you may visit www.mspb.gov. Alternatively, once you receive the decision in this matter, you may elect to waive your MSPB appeal rights and request administrative review of the decision by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB).

10. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a

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complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity. Please note that if you seek corrective action from OSC prior to filing an appeal to MSPB, you will have elected corrective action and any appeal to the MSPB would be an IRA appeal and limited as such, regardless of the nature of the decision.

11. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

    However, allegations that the decision on this proposal, if the decision is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought either in an appeal to the MSPB or an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System, but not in both forums. Otherwise, the allegation regarding the decision can be brought as an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

12. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD PII [redacted] medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

    a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

    b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;

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c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office.

PII

Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.04.04 12:58:58 -04'00'

PII

Lead Agent

Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

USSS - Standard Sensitive Info
DATE: July 1, 2025

REPLY TO:
ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Senior Special Agent [Lead Agent]
Pittsburg Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer [PII] notice to you dated April 4, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for twenty-one (21) calendar days under the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8.

2. I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence. I have considered the written reply submitted by your representative, [PII] dated May 12, 2025. I also considered your May 19, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by [Counsel] and [Counsel]. A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to [Counsel] and [Counsel] on June 2, 2025. I further considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) [PII] a copy was provided to you on April 29, 2025.

   In your replies, you explained that you were the Lead Advance Agent and part of the advance team that was responsible for planning the security and logistics for the Butler rally. You explained that each team member served a unique role with a focus on their particular expertise. You stated as the Lead Advance Agent you coordinated the functions of the advance team members and ensured that the team had the resources needed to complete their responsibilities. You stated that you led the initial police meeting, introduced the Service advance team members to the local law enforcement counterparts, completed site walkthroughs, submitted the documentation for manpower and documented the security plan, and coordinated travel logistics.

   You explained that you were also the Transportation Advance Agent for the visit, which

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required you to plan for then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's arrival and departure from the airport, LES [redacted] LES and manage vehicle logistics. You added that you also coordinated with the now former First Lady's detail on security planning as the First Lady was also scheduled to visit Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that same day.

You explained that you should not have been expected to micromanage every decision made by members of the advance team that were responsible for performing their duties in their areas of expertise. You stated that in your role you were to assist the advance team members to resolve problems that arose. You added that you secured a local counter sniper team after you received a request from the second supervisor on the Donald Trump Detail (DTD).

You stated that you were aware of line-of-sight concerns and that you participated in discussions all week to mitigate the concerns. You explained that, by July12th, that the Site Agents, DTD campaign staff, and local law enforcement, had a plan to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. You explained that the plan included bleachers, large screens, and farm equipment that would all be in place to obstruct the line-of-sight from the AGR building to the stage. You further said that the AGR building would be closed, local law enforcement would have posts around the AGR, and Secret Service counter snipers (CS) would cover the AGR's roofline.

You explained that no one informed you that the bleachers were not angled properly or that the screens were smaller than you were originally told. Nor had anyone told you that local law enforcement did not secure the AGR building as you had previously been informed. You also said that you were not aware that the local snipers and Secret Service CS, did not have a clear view of the AGR roof. You explained that the Site Agents, who were to oversee the buildout of the line-of-sight mitigations, did not ensure that the mitigation plans were fully implemented as you had been informed they would be.

You explained that you did fulfill your responsibilities as the Lead Advance Agent as you were informed that the AGR building would be closed, secured, and posted with law enforcement officers. You added that it was the Site Agent's responsibility to coordinate with local law enforcement as to the exact position of the post standers. You stated that you were not informed by local law enforcement partners or the Site Agents of any concerns regarding securing the AGR building. You stated that you could not "solve problems" that you were not made aware of.

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In regard to you being charged with failing to mitigate communication issues, you stated that the cited policy, OPO-08, did not go into effect until September 11, 2024. You pointed out that the CNOS-03 policy, which was in effect, stated that the Site Agent was responsible for the setup and staffing of the Security Room. You added that based on the policies in place on July 13th, you fulfilled your responsibilities. You also said that at the July 8th meeting, you invited all law enforcement entities into the Security Room, although it was not required as stated in the manual section at that time. Additionally, you stated that in both your roles, as Lead Advance Agent and Transportation Advance Agent, you would not have been physically able to enter the Security Room to determine if all law enforcement partners were represented, as you were required to remain with the protectee, and that this was in fact the role of the Site Agents.

You stated that you are wrongfully being held to a standard of duty that was not in effect on July 13th and that was later incorporated into Secret Service policy. You requested that the proposed discipline be reconsidered.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore, and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump were injured. You were the Lead Advance Agent on the advance for the rally and ultimately responsible for, among other things, planning and implementing security arrangements and coordinating the activities of the advance team members. Despite your argument to the contrary, this meant that you had a responsibility to ensure that the advance team actually implemented the mitigation measures that they had planned to place, including those developed to mitigate the threat posed by the AGR building. You failed to ensure this was the case. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as the Lead Advance Agent.

I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

3. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

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The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. The attempted assassination of POTUS Trump by Thomas Crooks at the Rally in Butler, PA, resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and in injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention which negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have further considered that, as a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I have also considered your twenty-one (21) years of service with this agency, including the approximately six (6) years that you were assigned to the Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD). While on VPD you conducted multiple site advances, you were assigned to the Second Lady's Detail, and you were assigned to the Operations Section. I have further considered that you attended Lead School and conducted multiple lead advances and you were eventually selected to be a "whip" on an operational shift. In other words, I have factored in that, at the time of this incident, you were arguably the most senior and experienced special agent on the advance team.

In the Secret Service, the GS-13, special agents, who are given the title and responsibility of "lead" and/or "whips" hold great authority, respect, and influence amongst their peers. These positions are bestowed upon deserving individuals because of their experience and leadership potential. In the absence of a formal supervisor or manager, leads and whips are expected to fill that void. With regards to the events of July 13th, your responsibility was defined in the very title of the position which you held; an individual in a leadership role responsible for guiding their advance team to mission success.

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I will also add that you are expected to mentor, set priorities and standards, as well as oversee the quality of work of your advance team. However, you appeared to have downplayed your role during your testimony to the Senate, the House, in your written reply, and during your oral reply. For instance, during your testimony with the Senate, you claimed that the Lead Advance Agent is more a coordinating role, stating, "I coordinate and submit." You further stated "I don't approve anything. I clearly just take the information that they have recommended and put together with the other information from the other advance entities, and those are all submitted to the field office and then submitted to the Trump detail, the candidate nominations operations, and then they go further to headquarters." I find that this statement is misleading and an abdication of your role and responsibilities.

Throughout your testimony given to the various institutions you clearly state that the line of sight remained a major concern throughout the advance. For instance, during your interview with the Senate you listed multiple line-of-sight concerns, to include the AGR building complex, buildings within the perimeter, residential areas that "butted up" to the Farm Show Site, and airplane hangars on the attached airport. Yet, when asked about the police posts around the AGR building you repeatedly stated you did not know any of the those details, or "I was not a part of that conversation."

You appear to have expressed concerns with the positioning of the local snipers located inside of the AGR Building, looking out of a window. However, never did you raise your concerns with the subject matter experts. When asked about the CS advance you stated, "I deferred to the counter-sniper as to his expertise and where he wanted those assets placed." I agree that during an advance the opinion and advise of subject matter experts must be given serious consideration. However, as the Lead Advance Agent, you must have a basic understanding of their plan and methods of operation to adequately incorporate said plan into your Emergency Action (EA) blueprint and provide clear explanations to supervisors.

Furthermore, I see no evidence that these issues were adequately addressed, nor where the line-of-sight concerns raised to PIT supervisors after the initial manpower walk-through or prior to the second supervisor walk-through. I see no efforts made by you to have mechanisms in plaice, such as countdown meetings, to ensure that the concerns of the advance team where addressed, or to make you aware of everyone's individual progress.

Protective advances are a team sport, rather than an individual effort. We often brief post standers, "if you see a hole, then fill it," or to bring their concerns immediately to the site agent. There were ongoing concerns, and it is my opinion that you failed to address them appropriately. You were responsible for devising a robust security plan to ensure the

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safety of our protectee. It is my opinion that your actions failed to meet this basic mandate.

In making my decision, and in mitigation, I have considered your dual role, as the Lead Advance Agent, as well as the Transportation Advance Agent. Both assignments are demanding and time consuming. As the Transportation Advance Agent you were required to not only [redacted] LES LES [redacted] I recognize there is a general practice to allow advance team members to handle multiple assignments for certain protectees. It is my opinion that this practice may be suitable and practical for low-level protectees with little to no adverse intelligence; however, I believe your leadership should have taken into account POTUS Trump's popularity, political standing, and the knowledge that the Republican National Convention was to begin only two days after the July 13th rally before assigning you the roles of Lead and Transportation Advance Agent.

I have also taken into consideration that the Office of Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-08, dated September 11, 2024, was used as part of the documents relied upon in the proposal.

In further mitigation, I have considered your twenty-one years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance ratings of Outstanding for the 2023, 2022, and 2021 rating cycles. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis provided by ATSAIC [redacted] PII ATSAIC [redacted] PII said that you have held many positions within the Secret Service that require trust and confidence and that your performance is exemplary. ATSAIC [redacted] PII also stated that leadership has confidence in your ability to continue to perform at a high level.

Finally, I have taken into consideration that it was not the negligence of just one employee that led to this unwanted outcome. I have also taken into consideration that your chain of command, in my opinion, abdicated their responsibility and authorities during the advance. I have strongly considered your quick reaction responding to the dais after hearing the first shots fired, with no consideration to your own peril, and the exemplary manner in which you performed your duties thereafter.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to mitigate the proposed twenty-one (21) calendar day suspension to a fourteen (14) day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they

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are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at [redacted] Integrity Office The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling [redacted] PII or emailing [redacted] PII @usss.dhs.gov.

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6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office [redacted] Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office.

PII
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Date: 2025.07.01 13:31:18 -04'00'

cc: Counsel

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DATE: April 4, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart]
Pittsburg Field Office

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

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This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate then former President (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, FPOTUS Trump was injured, a civilian was killed, and several others at the event were injured. In response to the July 13th incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conduct a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt.

From July 6 – 13, 2024, Special Agent (SA) [Site Agent] from the Donald Trump Detail (DTD), was the assigned Site Agent for the Butler Rally advance. You were the assigned local Site Counterpart from the Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT).

2. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

On August 6, 2024, and August 13, 2024, you were interviewed by Inspectors [Inspections Office] [redacted] and [Inspections Office] about the incident on July 13, 2024. In your interviews with Inspectors, you explained that you volunteered for the Site Counterpart role because you felt that your level of experience and your time on the presidential detail would be valuable in filling the role. Regarding SA [Site Agent], you stated that, while you were not sure how many times that she had been a Site Agent in the past, you "could tell that she wasn't kind of sure of … she didn't have a lot of experience." You further stated that SA [Site Agent] did not have

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knowledge of certain "basic things," you would expect her to know. You noted that, during the days leading up to the event, SA [Site Agent] did not have the correct "mentality," and that "she didn't seem like she was worried at all." You also said that you had no idea of what she expected of you as the Site Counterpart. Despite this, you said that you did not have discussions with SA [Site Agent] about your roles and responsibilities. Finally, you did not elevate your concerns about SA [Site Agent] lack of experience or understanding of her assignment to your chain of command.

Despite acknowledging that you knew SA [Site Agent] lacked the experience and knowledge necessary to ensure site security, you admitted to Inspectors during your interviews that:

- you were not present when the site build occurred, despite your insistence to SA [Site Agent] that the Site Agent needed to attend the build and despite your assertion that SA [Site Agent] did not seem to have the appropriate understanding of the importance of her role/ presence at the site build;
- local law enforcement emailed you and SA [Site Agent] an operational plan showing where their resources would be placed, but you neither read it nor knew if it had been provided to the Counter Sniper (CS) Advance Team or Counter Assault Team (CAT); and
- you did not ensure that Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) radios could communicate with the Butler County Police Department or Butler Township or that Secret Service radios could communicate with PSP or Butler County.

You also articulated to Inspectors that you knew that line of site concerns existed but stated that mitigating the line of site was not your responsibility and that ". . . not once did I think that my job as a Site Counterpart [was] to mitigate line of sight concerns." Nor did you escalate your line-of-sight concerns to DTD staff or your chain of command.

On October 17, 2024, you were interviewed by the House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump. During that interview, you again eschewed any responsibility for the security of the site, stating that your job was limited to acting as liaison with local law enforcement and that, when you acted as Site Agent in the past, you never "rel[ied] on my site counterpart to do anything for me." You further noted that the "site agent is in charge of the site, period." However, you did tell the Task Force that on the day of the event, the Site Counterpart would "deal[] with any issues that are going to arise," as the Site Agent was responsible for the protectee once he arrived at the site.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview,

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states the following:

> The mission of the Secret Service advance team . . . is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

> [n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . . .

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 2 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charges and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner.

4. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

   The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lesser penalty.

   With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply in this situation.

   With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this

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offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I find that despite your experience and knowledge, you did not perform your duties in assisting SA [Site Agent]. You stated that you were aware that SA [Site Agent] had trouble in performing her advance duties and lacked the experience to be fully effective. You abdicated responsibility when you failed to proactively assist and ensure that the site was secure. The manual section, OPO-03, notes that the goal of the protective advance is to mitigate vulnerabilities, which I find you failed to do when you did not rely on your experience to help SA [Site Agent] more assertively or to elevate your concerns up your chain of command. Furthermore, you admitted that you were responsible for liaising with local law enforcement yet failed to read the PSP operational plan. You also admitted that you did not ensure that our local law enforcement partners had direct communication each other and with the Secret Service, and the lack of communication that day led to a delay in the response to Crook's presence. You admitted to Inspectors that you were responsible for overseeing "issues that arose" on the day of the event, and therefore, you had a responsibility to be aware of the site security plans and vulnerabilities.

I have also considered the notoriety of the offense and its impact on the reputation of the Secret Service. The notoriety of this incident negatively impacts the reputation of the Secret Service and has resulted in negative public attention.

In mitigation, I have considered your twenty (20) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for 2023 and 2022 and Exceeds Expectations for 2021. I have considered as a mitigating factor that you were assigned as the Site Counterpart and not the Site Agent. I have also taken into account that it was not the negligence of any one employee that led the failure to mitigate security vulnerabilities. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

a. Your Official Transcript from your Inspection Division Interview on August 6, 2024;

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b. Audio recording of your interview on August 6, 2024. (To listen to the recording contact Integrity Office ITG);

c. Your Official Transcript from your Inspection Division Interview on August 13, 2024;

d. Audio recording of your interview on August 13, 2024. (To listen to the recording contact Integrity Office ITG);

e. Your Official Transcript from the October 17, 2024, interview with the U.S. House of Representatives;

f. Your Official Transcript from the August 21, 2024, interview with the U.S. Senate;

g. The Office of Protection Operations Manual, section OPO-03; and

h. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.

6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer PII Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

7. You have fifteen (15) calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD Wynn. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII . If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at Integrity Office prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

8. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's

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Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

9. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

10. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

    Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

11. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at [redacted].

12. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD [redacted] medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licensed physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

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a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;

c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen (15) calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Angel Rizzuto, Office of Integrity, at LES

PII
Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.04.04 13:09:56 -04'00'
PII

Site Counterpart
Receipt Acknowledgment

Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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memorandum

DATE: June 30, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Senior Special Agent Site Counterpart
Pittsburg Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer PII notice to you dated April 4, 2025, proposing that you be suspended from duty for fourteen (14) calendar days under the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8. I have decided to uphold this charge and the proposed penalty.

2. I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I considered your written reply submitted by your representative, Counsel dated May 12, 2025. I also considered your May 15, 2025, oral reply, at which you were represented by Counsel A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Counsel on May 30, 2025. I also considered the Douglas Factors analysis submitted by Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) PII

In your replies, you argued that the proposed discipline should be rescinded or mitigated because you were being blamed for negligently carrying out duties that were assigned to the Site Agent, Special Agent (SA) Site Agent You admitted that you had more experience than SA PII because, among other things, you had been the Site Agent on site advances while assigned to the Presidential Protective Division (PPD) and you had done over two years on the agency's Counter Surveillance Unit (CSU). You also admitted that you felt SA Site Agent was not as engaged as she should have been when it came to asking questions and providing feedback and that her lack of engagement left you "having to address issues that should have been addressed by the Site Agent, not the Site Counterpart."

You claimed that you brought this concern to Site Lead Agent, Senior Special Agent

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Lead Agent who you claimed had similar concerns. You also suggested that Assistant Special Agent in Charge DTD 2nd Sup. was concerned too. Yet they decided to keep SA Site Agent as the Site Agent, so every indicator was that "SA Site Agent was meeting the expectations of her own supervisors from the DTD who were present during the advance and on the day of the Rally."

You then went on to address individual concerns raised in the proposal. First, you argued that, regardless of whether you ensured SA Site Agent stayed to ensure the site build was completed properly the night before the rally, you showed up at 8 a.m. the day of the Rally and made sure that the site build had been properly completed. Second, although you admitted that you did not review the local law enforcement operational plan that had been emailed to you prior to the Rally, you claimed that missing it had "absolutely no impact on anything as all strategy and planning operational activities . . . were in place." Third, you said that you were not responsible for ensuring communication between local law enforcement and the Secret Service, which was a long-standing agency issue unrelated to SA Site Agent experience as a Site Agent. Fourth, you argued that the proposal inaccurately claimed that you failed to address or escalate line of sight concerns, but you said that you testified that line of sight issues were frequently discussed and communicated to ASAIC DTD 2nd Sup. and Inspector DTD Campaign Sup. during the final walkthrough of the site. Finally, you claim that the cited policy in the proposal fails to detail any specific responsibilities that you failed to perform or even reference "Site Counterpart Agent" at all.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination left Corey Comperatore dead and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump injured. You were the assigned Site Counterpart Agent on the advance for the campaign rally in Butler, PA. As the Site Counterpart, you were part of the team responsible for planning and executing security arrangements for POTUS Trump at the rally. Despite your suggestions otherwise, this meant that you were responsible for coordinating and cooperating with POTUS Trump's staff along with state and local agencies. You were also responsible for identifying and mitigating any vulnerabilities to reduce the risk of harm to POTUS Trump. What is more, you were a Senior Special Agent with experience on PPD and CSU, which gave you a unique insight into the weaknesses of the security plan. You recognized this and took responsibility for executing many of the Site Agent's responsibilities. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as Site Counterpart and uphold the charge.

I further find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed

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suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. These circumstances were egregious, and the misconduct interfered with and adversely affected the mission of the Secret Service.

3. I have decided to uphold the fourteen (14) calendar day suspension. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. The attempted assassination of POTUS Trump by Thomas Crooks at the Rally in Butler, PA, resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and in injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention which negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

I have further considered that, as a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. Likewise, I have taken into account your years of service with this agency, including the experience you gained from being assigned to PPD and CSU. Similarly, I have factored in that you were a Senior Special Agent in the Pittsburgh Field Office and, arguably, one of the most experienced agents on the advance team.

Although I recognize that the protective detail site advance agent is sometimes more experienced than the field office site counterpart, that was not the case here. Yet, instead

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of mentoring SA [Site Agent] through this process, you told inspectors during your second interview with the Inspection Division (ISP) that it was not your responsibility to "coach her." Moreover, throughout your testimony you repeatedly abdicated your responsibility by making it clear that you were "only" the site counterpart, while SA [Site Agent] was the site agent. You stated, "Had I been a site agent, I would've handled things differently. I would've ensured I knew what my responsibilities were and assigned those around me to facilitate those to completion."

During your interview with ISP, and throughout testimony given to other bodies, when asked if you had an immediate concern with the site, you stated that line of sight was a major concern. You stated, "Okay, well the main thing was the line of sight. Obviously, that was the main thing, it was discussed almost every day." You further stated that you had multiple conversations with the staff lead about possible objects being strategically placed to mitigate line of sight issues, but he refused claiming it would mess up the press sight. Though line of sight and the refusal of staff to cooperate in addressing these concerns seemed to remain a common theme throughout the advance, I see no evidence that you attempted to raise your concerns with either Special Agent in Charge [SAIC Pittsburgh] or more appropriately Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge [PII], who was assigned as the Site Supervisor for the Pittsburgh Field Office. When inspectors asked if you escalated your concerns to your supervisors you stated, "I don't know if the site agent talked to her supervisors, but no, I didn't escalate any of the staff problems to anybody." I do recognize that you made a passive attempt to address the issue during the second supervisor walk-through by having the staff lead present, but it is my opinion that you should have taken a more aggressive posture in raising your concerns.

You also expressed concerns with the positioning of local Counter Snipers inside of the American Glass Research (AGR) building, looking out a window and facing the stage, as well as the positioning of local tactical assets positioned between buildings and not being used as a visible deterrent. However, never did you raise your concerns up your chain of command. When you were asked about the Counter Sniper advance you stated, "I didn't go into his plan, I didn't -- he's the expertise, it's his expertise, and I let him take care of it. When he said that he was good, I didn't question it further." I agree that during the course of an advance the opinion and advise of the subject matter experts must be given serious consideration. However, as the site agent you must have a basic understanding of their plan and methods of operation in order to adequately incorporate said plan into your Emergency Action blueprint.

When asked about the communications plan you advised that all law enforcement entities were invited, but only the Pennsylvania State Police and the Butler Emergency Medical

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Service (EMS) showed up to the security room. You further stated that all other entities reported to the mobile command bus. During your interview with ISP, you advised that you were aware that Butler EMS was going to use their mobile command bus, stating you knew, ". . . right at the beginning." When asked about its use, you stated, ". . . it's, like a dispatch. It's, like their communication center. And I'm guessing that their -- some of their, you know, command is going to be in there." It is my opinion that your communication plan was based on assumptions and that expectations were not adequately explained to our local counterparts. Nor were the necessary adjustment made, such as having the site supervisor relocate to the mobile command bus.

I also find that you were on notice of your responsibility to raise your security concerns up the chain. While I have considered that the Site Agent Counterpart responsibilities could have been better defined in agency policy, you know, or should know, that protective advances are a team sport, rather than an individual effort. Post standers are often briefed that, "if you see a hole, then fill it," or to bring their concerns immediately to the site agent. You had concerns and failed to address them appropriately. You were responsible for devising a robust security plan to ensure not only the safety of the protectee, but also the safety of the general public attending the event. It is my opinion that your actions failed to meet this basic mandate. Furthermore, in making my decision, I must consider that as an agency, we failed to meet our primary objective.

In mitigation, I have considered your eighteen (18) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for 2023 and 2022 and Exceeds Expectations for 2021. I have also considered the Douglas Factors analysis provided by ATSAIC PII. ATSAIC PII said that you have held many positions within the Secret Service that require trust and confidence and that your performance is exemplary. ATSAIC PII also stated that leadership has confidence in your ability to continue to perform at a high level.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed fourteen (14) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for fourteen (14) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

4. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected

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activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

5. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at [redacted] Integrity Offce The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

6. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling [redacted] LES or emailing ContactEEO@usss.dhs.gov.

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7. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office [redacted] Office of Integrity, at Integrity Office

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cc: Counsel

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024592

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: November 5, 2024

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Special Agent [Site Agent]
Donald Trump Protective Division

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for three (3) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

a. Failure to Follow Secret Service Policy, Offense Code 5.12

On August 28, 2024, [Reporter], a reporter from [Publication], contacted you via your personal cell phone regarding the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania. During your conversation, Ms. [Reporter] explained to you that she was gathering information regarding the events that occurred that day. Ms. [Reporter] asked you for details regarding that incident and you notified Ms. [Reporter] that you were not permitted to speak to her, and you provided Ms. [Reporter] with the contact information for the Office of Communication and Media Relations (CMR). Ms. [Reporter] stated that you had been identified as the individual responsible for the events that occurred that day and proceeded to ask you additional questions. In response, you stated to Ms. [Reporter] that some of the information being reported in the media was inaccurate. Furthermore, when Ms. [Reporter] continued to ask questions, specifically about the site advance procedures, you again responded to her inquiry by discussing elements of the planning and coordination process. You did not have authorization from CMR to speak to the reporter regarding this matter.

In your Official Memorandum dated September 3, 2024, you stated:

> On 08/28/2024, at approximately 10:50 hours, I . . . received a phone call on my personal electronic device . . . [s]he identified herself as [Reporter], an investigative reporter who works for [Publication] . . . stat[ing] that she was attempting to gather information regarding the events on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania. . . . Mrs. [Reporter] started asking questions about the events on July 13. I stated that I was not allowed to speak on the matter and that she will have to contact the USSS Communication[] and Media Relations (CMR) if needed. Mrs. [Reporter] continued asking more questions and stated that she had been told by an unidentified individual that I was the

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agent to blame for the events that unfolded that day. At that time, I stated that some of the information that has been circulating on the news and that has been reported to other media outlets lacks accuracy and actual facts. . . . Mrs. Reporter continued to ask more questions as to the procedures during the site advance work, to include interaction with local law enforcement counterparts, to which I responded that an essential part of the process is to plan and coordinate with local entities for site security. . . .

The Official United States Secret Service E-Mail from DSAIC PII labeled "Inquiries," dated July 21, 2024, states:

If any personnel receive external (outside USSS) unsolicited requests for information or interviews, please advise and consult with your Supervisor.

. . .

If any media outlets contact individuals privately, all personnel are reminded of USSS policies and communications with external entities. All media inquiries should be referred to the USSS Office of Communication[] and Media Relations. . . .

Furthermore, the Secret Service Office of Government and Public Affairs Manual, section CMR-03(01), states:

. . . Under no circumstances should any non-designated employee comment to the media on behalf of the Secret Service and/or regarding Secret Service activities without the prior approval of CMR, their AD/EC, DAD, SAIC, or Division Chief. . . .

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 5.12 states that it is a disciplinable offense to:

Fail[] to follow a…policy, procedure, practice, protocol or rule.

2. In proposing this action, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP states that the Proposing Official should also consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lesser penalty.

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The offense of "Failure to Follow Instructions," Offense Code 5.12, provides for a standard penalty of a three-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a one-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a five-day to a seven-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.12 apply to this situation. The applicable aggravating factor of "willful" appears to apply in this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and their relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of the rules you violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. You participated in an unauthorized conversation with Ms. Reporter regarding the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of a protectee. You should be well aware that speaking to a member of the national media without authorization is in violation of Secret Service policy. Additionally, this conversation involved a matter that was still under active investigation. Furthermore, you admitted that you spoke to Ms. Reporter even after she informed you that she was inquiring about the events that occurred on July 13, 2024. Your actions violated Secret Service policy and cannot be condoned.

In mitigation, I have considered your five (5) years of service and that you have no prior discipline record. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023 rating period. I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for three (3) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

3. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

   a. Your Official Memorandum to SAIC PII, dated September 3, 2024;

   b. E-Mail from DSAIC PII, Subject: Inquiries, dated July 21, 2024;

   c. Cited portions of the Office of Government and Public Affairs Manual, section CMR03(01); and

   d. The Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.

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4. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer PII Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

5. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD PII Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at PII prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless otherwise specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

6. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to request administrative review of the action by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB). Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

7. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

8. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

   Allegations that the decision on this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought in an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

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9. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at PII

10. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD PII medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

    a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

    b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment and responses to treatment;

    c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

    d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

    The medical documentation must be provided to DAD PII within the fifteen calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

11. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

12. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at PII

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024597

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 3, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Special Agent [Site Agent]
Miami Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer [PII] notice to you dated November 5, 2024, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for three (3) calendar days based on the information cited in section one of that notice.

2. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply, submitted via e-mail by your representative, [Counsel] on December 20, 2024. I have also considered your oral reply held on January 30, 2025, where you were also represented by Mr. [Counsel] A copy of the transcript was provided via e-mail to Mr. [Counsel] on February 18, 2025. I find that the charge of "Failure to Follow Secret Service Policy," Offense Code 5.12, is fully supported by the evidence.

   In your replies, you described your current and former work history with the Secret Service, the United States Army, and your position with the Transportation Security Administration. You stated that shortly after the July 13, 2024, incident, you began to receive numerous calls and e-mails to your personal electronic devices and to your work cell phone. You explained that you answered the call from the [Publication] reporter, [Reporter], because it was from a 202-area code, and you had assumed that it was a co-worker trying to reach you. You stated that you were not expecting the call, but that when Ms. [Reporter] began to make a provocative accusation that you were to blame for the events that unfolded during the July 13th incident, you began to defend yourself.

   You stated that your response was an effort to defend yourself from what you perceived as a defamatory and inaccurate attack on your character, work ethic, and performance. You also asserted that merely stating that the accusations against you were inaccurate does not contradict current Secret Service policy nor is it equivalent to commenting on behalf of the Secret Service. You stated that it was not your intent to circumvent Secret Service policy and asserted that your actions showed that you intended on adhering to established policy as you only mentioned facts that were readily available through open sources. You further stated that you immediately reported your conversation to your supervisor who instructed you to notify the Office of Communication and Media Relations (CMR).

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You denied revealing any information that would be considered and disclosed on a "need to know" basis only. Given that, you stated that a suspension is not justified, and the charge should not be sustained.

You stated that you have fully cooperated in all the investigative efforts conducted by multiple entities. You apologized and took full responsibility for your actions and noted that you have learned from this incident. You stated that you have not been the subject of prior discipline and that you are proud to serve. You made assurances that in the future you will refer any reporter or media representative directly to CMR without further comment from you.

In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

The offense of "Failure to Follow Instructions," Offense Code 5.12, provides for a standard penalty of a three-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a one-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a five-day to a seven-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating or aggravating factors under the Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 5.12 apply to this situation.

With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard than other Federal employees. On August 28, 2024, you were contacted directly by a member of the press inquiring about your involvement in the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt of Former President Donald J. Trump. It is my opinion that the reporter used dishonorable tactics and goaded you into providing information by making statements blaming you for the events of July 13, 2024. I recognize the information you provided was minimal. However, in your efforts to defend yourself you did provide elements of the planning and coordination process. Your actions demonstrated a disregard not only for Secret Service policy, but also for a directive given to you by your chain of command.

However, in mitigation, I have considered that you have no prior disciplinary action. I have considered the Outstanding performance rating you received for the 2023 rating cycle. I have strongly considered that you immediately reported your contact with the media to your chain of command and CMR.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to mitigate the proposed three (3) day suspension to a one (1) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for one (1) calendar day on a date to be determined by your office. You are also reminded that employees are

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not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

3. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel actions and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity.

4. You may request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(04). You should present your grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may e-mail this grievance to the Office of Integrity at PII. The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

5. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling PII or emailing ContactEEO@usss.dhs.gov.

6. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office Office of Integrity, at PII.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

DATE: April 4, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Proposed Suspension

TO: Special Agent [Site Agent]
Miami Field Office

This is to inform you that I propose that you be suspended from duty without pay for forty-two (42) calendar days. This suspension, if effected, will take place no sooner than thirty (30) calendar days from the date you receive this notice. The reason(s) for this proposed action are outlined below.

1. Background

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks attempted to assassinate then Former President of the United States (FPOTUS) Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. During the attack, one person was killed, and three were injured, including FPOTUS Trump. In response to the incident, the Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted a Mission Assurance Inquiry into the factors that contributed to the assassination attempt. In addition, an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, as well as by the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump.

From July 7-13, 2024, you were the Donald Trump Detail (DTD) assigned Site Agent for the Butler Farm Show site. Other members of the Advance Team included, Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT) Senior Special Agent (SSA) [Lead Agent] as the assigned Lead Advance Agent and PIT SSA [Site Counterpart] as the Site Counterpart Agent. In your role as a Site Agent, you were expected to create a site security plan for the event that optimized the resources at your disposal and mitigated any site vulnerabilities to ensure a secure environment for FPOTUS Trump.

2. Charge and Specifications

a. Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8

Specification 1 – Failure to Properly Secure AGR Building

On July 13, 2024, Crooks utilized the roof of the AGR building in his attempted assassination. Crooks was able to position himself on the roof of the building and to take several shots before he was stopped by a Secret Service counter sniper.

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You were aware of the security vulnerabilities posed by the AGR building, but failed to mitigate those vulnerabilities, as detailed below.

On August 13, 2024, you were interviewed by Secret Service Inspector [redacted] and Assistant Inspector [redacted]. During this interview you acknowledged that line-of-sight issues, specifically the AGR building, were vulnerabilities you were aware of before the Butler Rally. You stated that the line-of-sight threats for outdoor events were always a "number one concern." You further stated that you recognized the difficulty in mitigating the danger from the AGR building's roof because of its elevated position and "direct line of sight to where the former president was standing." You described a line-of-sight threat as "any point of view that could be approached by the enemy or [that] someone [could] utilize as a target to conduct an attack [at] the event." When asked who was responsible for mitigating line-of-sight threats, you admitted that "[w]e are, the Secret Service."

During your interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs on August 23, 2024, you told the Committee that there was a "designated inner perimeter and an outer perimeter," and that any issue that arose concerning the outer perimeter was delegated to local law enforcement, unless local law enforcement raised a concern to the site or lead agent.

On July 11, 2024, local law enforcement did voice concerns to you regarding the AGR building. Specifically, you were told that local law enforcement did not have the resources to secure the AGR building. At that time, you were also aware that local counter snipers would not be on the roof of the AGR building and would only be inside the building. During your August 23, 2024 interview with the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, you told the Committee that you were aware, before July 13, 2024, "that local Pennsylvania State Police [would not] have the manpower to secure the building." When the Committee asked you what steps you took to secure the AGR once you were told that local law enforcement would be unable to secure it, you stated, "it was on the outer perimeter. We did not discuss or plan for having . . . any other asset other than the local counter sniper once they decided to have a local counter sniper inside the building for that day." Instead—as you admitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on The Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump during your October 30, 2024 interview—you told our local partners that there "should be enough . . . police presence . . . outside of the fence line and covering from the water tower," and that presence "should be good."

You also failed to elevate the concerns regarding the AGR building to your supervisor. On November 12, 2024, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAIC) [redacted] was interviewed by the House Task Force. ASAIC [redacted] told the

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Task Force that, during the July 12, 2024 Butler Farm Show site walkthrough he attended with you, the AGR building was specifically discussed. ASAIC [redacted] was briefed that there would be a local counter sniper presence as well as a local uniformed presence to cover the AGR. In other words, you informed him that there was a plan for a uniformed presence to secure the AGR building. You stated this despite the fact that, as you admitted to the Senate Committee, you did not know how the AGR building would be covered prior the July 13, 2024 event. You also did not inform ASAIC [redacted] that local law enforcement had voiced specific concerns about the ability to secure the AGR building.

The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-02, states the following:

> CNOS Site Agents are responsible for establishing a secure environment for CNOS protectees as detailed in OPO-06, Site Security.

The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-03, states the following:

> The Site Agent is responsible for an in-depth physical survey/study of the site, in order to address all security concerns . . . .

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview, states the following:

> The mission of the Secret Service advance team . . . is to plan and execute security arrangements for the protectee. A successful advance requires effective coordination and cooperation with the protectee's staff, as well as with other federal, state, and local agencies. The goal of the Secret Service advance is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to reduce the risk of harm to protectees.

OPO-03 further states that the Site Agent:

- Plans and implements the procedures necessary to create a secure environment at their assigned site;
- Is thoroughly familiar with the physical layout of their site;
- Plans for any contingency that could arise during the visit;

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- Coordinates site security concerns with local law enforcement and support agencies, press advance personnel, members of the protectee's and host committee's staff, and venue security staff; and

- Coordinates placement of post standers and the requisite paperwork for the post stander assignments.

You failed to mitigate the security vulnerabilities posed by the AGR building. Also, despite your awareness of the line-of-sight issues posed by the building and the concerns of local law enforcement that they would be unable to secure it, you did not raise concerns up your chain of command.

Specification 2 – Communication Failures

On July 13, 2024, local law enforcement discovered that Crooks was on the roof of the AGR building before the Secret Service became aware. The lack of direct communication between local law enforcement and Secret Service—due to the lack of local presence in the Security room and the lack of Secret Service presence at the local command post—led to a time lag between the discovery of Crooks position and the Secret Service response.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, Communications, states the following:

> The Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and responsible field office SAIC will collaborate to determine requisite security room staffing by state and local partners. Staffing determinations will be designed to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible. Staff representatives from partner agencies/entities should be at the supervisory or otherwise most senior level available.
>
> . . .
>
> For any protective visit or site where state and/or local law enforcement partners have established a complementary command post or coordination center, the Secret Service will staff that complementary command post/coordination center . . . .

The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-03, states the following:

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> When a security room has been designated, the Site Agent is responsible for coordinating its physical setup and staffing, as well as for ensuring that administrative requirements are met.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, Site Security, states the following:

> The Site Agent is responsible for conducting and/or ensuring that all personnel associated with the security of the site have been properly briefed.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-08, Communications, states that security rooms must be staffed to:

> facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible.

The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-04, Protective Advance Guidelines, states the following:

> Ensure survey reports, hospital routes/surveys, Site Post Assignment Logs, site diagrams, access lists, and phone numbers are available in the command post and/or security rooms.

In your July 30, 2024 interview with Inspectors Inspections Office and Inspections Office you discussed the role that the Secret Service Security Room and Butler County's mobile Command Post played at the Butler Farm Show site on July 13, 2024. You acknowledged that you were aware of the local Command Post at the Butler Farm Show site. You also knew that our local partners planned on using it as a communication center for the various local agencies involved in securing the site. However, you admitted to Inspectors that, instead of placing a post stander at the command post, you determined that you would communicate with the Command Post by phone.

During your interview with the House Task Force on October 30, 2024, you admitted that, even though you knew it was your responsibility, you did not set up the Security Room. Instead, and in contradiction to your admission that you were responsible for setting up the Security Room, you stated that you expected that the field office would be coordinating the Security Room set up. You further admitted that you did not draft the Security Room Book, which would have included local points of contact and other information. Finally, although you told the House Task Force that "it is always

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common sense" to have a representative from each local law enforcement agency in the Security Room, you did nothing to confirm that any of the ten people you saw in the Security Room on the day of the rally were representatives from each local law enforcement agency participating in site security that day.

***

The Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) Offense Code 1.8, "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," states it is a disciplinable offense to:

> [n]egligently perform[] your official duties. . . . Examples of negligent performance include, but are not limited to, . . . inattention to duty . . . .

You failed to appropriately mitigate security concerns regarding the line-of-sight threat created by the AGR building. You knew that these concerns existed, yet you did not take action to ensure a secure environment when you were told that local law enforcement did not have the personnel to lock down the building. You further failed to ensure that communication between local law enforcement and USSS was effective, leaving Secret Service unaware and unprepared for security contingencies.

3. I find that there is a nexus between your conduct described in paragraph 2 of this notice and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your duties in a satisfactory manner. Your actions adversely affected the Agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and the Secret Service's mission.

4. In proposing this action, I have considered as guidance the TOP and the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors).

The TOP provides that the Proposing Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factor(s) exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factor(s) exist will yield a lower penalty. The TOP further provides that, where an employee has committed "more than one offense," the Proposing Official may add the penalties together.

With regard to the TOP, the offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. It does not appear that any of the mitigating listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 apply in this situation. It appears that the aggravating factor of "disruption of the mission" applies in this situation.

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With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing this offense. As a law enforcement officer, you are held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees. I have also considered that you were, or should have been, on notice that it was your responsibility to mitigate security concerns at the site and to collaborate with other advance staff to ensure to facilitate communications between all partner agencies/entities to the greatest extent possible.

I have considered that, after a local law enforcement counterpart told you that he lacked sufficient personnel to secure the AGR building on July 11, 2024, you did not communicate this concern to your advance team counterparts or otherwise mitigate the security concern. Instead, when you were given a specific opportunity to discuss the AGR building line-of-sight threat with a supervisor during the July 12, 2024, walkthrough, you glossed over the security threat, instead informing him that there was a plan for that area with a police uniform presence. Furthermore, your failure to post a Secret Service representative in the local Command Post and ensure local representatives were posted in the Security Room hampered communications the day of the rally. If this were not the case, it is possible that the Secret Service would have been alerted when our local partners radioed that there was a man with a weapon on the AGR building's roof thirty (30) seconds prior to the shots being fired, which may have resulted in a different outcome that day. I have taken into consideration the fact that a protectee was shot, that a civilian was killed, and that two civilians were critically wounded. I have also considered the notoriety of the offense, and its impact on the mission of the Secret Service and negatively impacted public trust in the Agency.

In mitigation, I have considered your five (5) years of service and that you have no prior discipline. I have also considered your performance record wherein your performance was rated as Outstanding for the 2023 rating period. Additionally, I have considered that it was the negligence of several individuals that led to the security failure on July 13, 2024. Based upon these mitigating factors, I believe that you have the potential for rehabilitation and that a suspension will serve as an adequate sanction.

In light of the above and consistent with the Secret Service's TOP, I propose that you be suspended for forty-two (42) calendar days. This action, if effected, will promote the efficiency of the service.

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5. The documentation on which this proposal is based is attached. The documentation consists of:

   a. Your Official Transcripts from the July 30, 2024, and August 13, 2024, interviews with the Inspection Division;

   b. Your Official Transcript from the October 30, 2024, interview with the House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump;

   c. Your Official Transcript from the August 23, 2024, interview with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;

   d. Cited Portions of the Official Transcripts from ASAIC [redacted] DTD 2nd Sup. [redacted]s August 22, 2024, interview with the Inspection Division, and the November 12, 2024, interview with the House Task Force;

   e. Department of Homeland Security Independent Review Panel Report on the July 13, 2024, Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, dated October 15, 2024;

   f. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-03, Protective Advance – Overview;

   g. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-04, Protective Advance Guidelines;

   h. The Secret Service Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, Site Security;

   i. The Secret Service 2024 Campaign Operational Guide, CNOS-03;

   j. The Protective Operations Manual, section OPO-08, Communications; and

   k. The Secret Service Office of the Director Manual, section ITG-04, United States Secret Service Table of Penalties.

6. The deciding official in this matter is Deputy Assistant Director (DAD)/Chief Integrity Officer [redacted] PII [redacted], Office of Integrity. You have the right to reply to this notice orally and/or in writing and to submit affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of your reply. You may also be represented by an attorney or other representative at your own expense.

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7. You have fifteen calendar days from the day you receive this notice to reply to DAD Wynn. Your written reply should be sent to Communications Center (ITG), Attn.: PII, PII, or e-mailed to PII. If you elect to reply orally, you should contact Integrity Office of the Office of Integrity at PII prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day response period. Unless other specified, your oral reply will be held virtually via Microsoft Office Teams. You will receive a written decision regarding this proposal from DAD PII after the expiration of the fifteen-day response period.

8. If you feel that you have an emotional, personal, and/or family problem which may have contributed to, or caused, your conduct as described above, I encourage you to contact the Secret Service Employee Assistance Program. Program counselors may be reached at PII.

9. If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, you will have the right to appeal that decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Specific details for filing, including filing addresses and time limitations, will be included in the final decision. For more information, you may visit www.mspb.gov. Alternatively, once you receive the decision in this matter, you may elect to waive your MSPB appeal rights and request administrative review of the decision by filing a grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB).

   If the decision regarding this proposal is that you be suspended for fourteen (14) days or less, or issued a letter of reprimand, you will have the right to file a grievance with the DRB. Specific details for filing a grievance will be included in the final decision.

10. If you believe that this proposal or any subsequent action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov. A complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or other protected activity. Please note that if you seek corrective action from OSC prior to filing an appeal to MSPB, you will have elected corrective action and any appeal to the MSPB would be an IRA appeal and limited as such, regardless of the nature of the decision.

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11. Allegations that this proposal is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be raised as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. Please note that while EEO complaints regarding proposals will be counseled during the informal EEO process, formal EEO complaints generally must be dismissed except under certain circumstances where reprisal for prior protected EEO related activity is being alleged or the proposal itself is alleged to be part of a pattern of harassment or a hostile work environment.

    However, allegations that the decision on this proposal, if the decision is that you be removed, reduced in grade or pay, or suspended for more than fourteen (14) days, is based on discrimination due to a protected status may be brought either in an appeal to the MSPB or an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System, but not in both forums. Otherwise, the allegation regarding the decision can be brought as an EEO complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System.

12. If you wish the deciding official to consider any medical condition(s), which you believe may have contributed to your conduct as described above, please submit to DAD [redacted] medical documentation (i.e., a copy of a dated, written, and signed statement, and/or a dated copy of actual medical office or hospital records, from a licenses physician or other health practitioner) which provides, in detail, the following information:

    a. Diagnosis, including the current clinical status;

    b. The history of the medical condition(s), including references to findings from previous examinations, treatment, and responses to treatment;

    c. Prognosis, including an estimate of the expected date of full or partial recovery; and

    d. An explanation of the impact of the medical condition(s) on overall health and activities, including the basis for any conclusion as to whether restrictions or accommodations are necessary.

    The medical documentation must be provided to DAD [redacted] within the fifteen-calendar day reply time limited described above whenever possible. The documentation, if timely submitted, will be considered in reaching a decision on the proposed action along with any written and/or oral reply to the notice of proposal which you may make.

13. No decision to effect this proposed action has been made or will be made until the time allowed for your reply. If you submit a reply, it will be given full and impartial consideration before a final decision is made.

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14. If you have questions concerning this proposed action, please contact Integrity Office, Office of Integrity, at PII.

PII Digitally signed by PII
Date: 2025.04.04 13:55:46 -04'00'

PII

Site Agent

4/8/2025
Date

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
203.110

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DATE: July 3, 2025

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Deputy Assistant Director/Chief Integrity Officer

SUBJECT: Suspension Decision

TO: Special Agent [redacted] Site Agent
Miami Field Office

1. This is in reference to Deputy Chief Integrity Officer [redacted] PII notice to you dated April 4, 2025, which informed you that he proposed that you be suspended from duty for forty-two (42) calendar days based on the information cited in that notice.

2. I find that the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8, is fully supported by the evidence. I have carefully reviewed the proposal and the documentation upon which the proposal was based. I have considered your written reply submitted by your representative, [redacted] Counsel, dated May 9, 2025. I have also considered your May 29, 2025 oral reply, at which you were represented by Mr. [redacted] Counsel. A copy of the transcript from the oral reply was sent to Mr. [redacted] Counsel on June 27, 2025.

   In your replies, you contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of Negligence in Performance of Official Duties, Offense Code 1.8. You affirmed your familiarity with Secret Service policies OPO-06, Site Security, and OPO-03, Protective Advance Overview, and argued that your actions complied with these policies.

   Regarding the specification for failing to mitigate line-of-sight issues, you argued the proposal did not recognize the actions you took to mitigate these concerns. You said that you identified vulnerabilities and relied on the expertise of local sniper and Secret Service counter sniper teams. You argued it was reasonable to assume local law enforcement would understand their responsibilities, and any failure was not your fault.

   You stated that you recognized the threat posed by the AGR building from the first day you arrived on site. You also said that, although you were informed that the AGR building would be closed on the day of the rally, you were not aware of the specific plans, if any,

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for securing it by local law enforcement. You clarified that the primary role of local law enforcement was to prevent bystanders from approaching the secure area near the stage, not to control access to the AGR building itself. Despite this, you stated that you believed that bystanders were not supposed to be in the vicinity of the AGR building. Furthermore, you admitted that you were not briefed on the snipers' role in the AGR building but understood that their responsibilities did not include access control.

You emphasized your reliance on personnel tasked with protecting then former President of the United States (POTUS) Donald J. Trump during the event, arguing that you reasonably relied on them to highlight line-of-sight issues and should not be blamed for their deficiencies. You stated that you briefed the detail leader and other personnel on site diagrams, post standers, and local law enforcement placement, and that no concerns were raised afterward.

Regarding the specification for failing to mitigate communication issues, you stated that you informed local counterparts about the Security Room location and the need for one individual to be assigned there. You also said that the only communication that you had with our local law enforcement counterparts about their mobile Command Center was that it was supposed to be used to mitigate line-of-sight concerns from the 9 o' clock position and as a down room for local law enforcement personnel. You claimed that you never discussed it being used as a secondary communication center with anyone.

You also asserted that it was Senior Special Agent Site Counterpart 's responsibility to set up the Security Room. Although you stated that you did not spend much time in the Security Room due to other concerns, you noted that you periodically entered and observed local law enforcement and Secret Service personnel present. You further claimed that no one raised any communication issues with you on the day of the rally.

In conclusion, you argued your actions were reasonable and that you exercised appropriate care. You requested a rescission of the proposed suspension or mitigation of the proposed penalty.

The evidence shows that Thomas Matthew Crooks circumnavigated site security at POTUS Trump's campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024, and attempted to assassinate POTUS Trump. The attempted assassination resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore, and David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump were injured. You were the Site Agent on the advance for the rally and ultimately responsible for site security. Despite your arguments to the contrary, this meant that you were responsible for establishing a secure environment for POTUS Trump in accordance with the Secret

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Service policies referenced in the proposal. You failed to ensure this was the case. Thus, I find that the evidence sufficiently shows that you negligently performed your duties as the Site Agent and uphold both specifications of Negligence in the Performance of Official Duties, as described in the proposed suspension.

3. I find that there was a nexus between your actions referenced in the proposed suspension and the efficiency of the service. There is a clear and direct relationship between the grounds for the charge and your ability to accomplish your law enforcement duties in a satisfactory manner. Your negligence adversely affected the agency's trust and confidence in your job performance and negatively impacted the mission of the Secret Service.

4. In reaching my decision, I have considered the factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313; 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (April 10, 1981) (Douglas Factors) and the Secret Service Table of Penalties (TOP) as guidance.

   The TOP provides that the Deciding Official will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors. A finding that aggravating factors exist will yield a higher penalty; a finding that mitigating factors exist will yield a lower penalty.

   The offense of "Negligence in Performance of Official Duties," Offense Code 1.8, provides for a standard penalty of a five-day suspension, a mitigated penalty of a letter of reprimand to a three-day suspension, and an aggravated penalty of a seven-day to a twenty-one-day suspension. The aggravating factor for Offense Code 1.8 of "disruption to the mission" is applicable in this situation. The mitigating factors listed under the TOP Penalty Guidelines for Offense Code 1.8 do not apply in this situation.

   With regard to the Douglas Factors, I have considered the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to your duties, position, and responsibilities, and the clarity with which you were on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense. The attempted assassination of POTUS Trump by Thomas Crooks at the Rally in Butler, PA, resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and in injuries to David Dutch, James Copenhaver, and POTUS Trump. This incident received world-wide media attention that negatively affected this agency's reputation and eroded confidence in our ability to execute our core mission.

   I have also considered your five (5) years of service with this agency, including the approximate four (4) years assigned to the Miami Field Office working investigations and various protection assignments. I have also taken into account that, at the time of this incident, you had been assigned to the Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD) for one

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(1) year and completed several protective advances. This level of experience indicates to me that you knew, or should have known, how to successfully carry out your duties as Site Agent and the appropriate level of attention to give those duties.

While I have considered your argument that you believe you fulfilled your responsibly to mitigate line-of-site concerns, I do not find it convincing. During your replies and interviews with the Inspection Division, the House, and the Senate, you have made several contradictions regarding the plan for the AGR building. For example, during your oral reply, you said that no one told you that the AGR building would be "locked and secured by local law enforcement," or that the area around the AGR building would be secured. However, only moments later, you said that the general public was not allowed to be in the area around the AGR building. While I am not accusing you of lacking candor, this lack of clarity on the issue shows how little you understood the steps taken to ensure the site was secure, a failure that is extremely concerning considering that you were the Site Agent, and the security of the site was your responsibility.

Similarly, you stated in your replies that no one told you that the local Mobile Command Center would be used as a secondary communication center for our local counterparts. However, you testified previously that local law enforcement specifically told you that it would be used as such, which again shows that you lacked clarity on the significance of this issue. You knew, or should have known, that unified communications were an absolute necessity for site security.

Moreover, your interview with ISP, made it clear that you were not familiar with which local law enforcement agency would have representation in the security room. It also made clear that you were aware, as just mentioned, that the Mobile Command Center would be used as a command post for our local counterparts. You, unfortunately, had no strategy to properly implement this asset into your security plan. You should have known that allowing two communication hubs or platforms to operate simultaneously at the same protective site without proper forethought would result with confusion and communication failures. The evidence, therefore, shows, that your communication plan was based on assumptions and a misunderstanding of standard protocol.

Additionally, you took little, if any, responsibility for failures in site security leading up to, and on the day of, the rally. For example, you put the full responsibility of establishing a Security Room on SSA [redacted] Site Counterpart, your Site Agent Counterpart. Likewise, during your interview with ISP, you often described your role as a "liaison," suggesting at times that you were not fully responsible for site security. In other words, you frequently blamed

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others for security failures that led to what occurred on July 13th, even though you were ultimately responsible for site security, which causes me to question whether you have learned from the circumstances.

In mitigation I have considered your six (6) years of service with this agency, with no prior disciplinary actions. I have also considered your performance rating of Outstanding for the 2023 rating cycle. I have further taken into consideration it was not the negligence of just one employee that led to this unwanted outcome.

In balancing the above factors against the nature and seriousness of the offense, I find it appropriate to uphold the proposed forty-two (42) calendar day suspension. Therefore, you will be suspended from duty without pay for forty-two (42) calendar days on dates to be determined by your supervisor. You are also reminded that employees are not eligible to work overtime in the pay period in which they are suspended in accordance with the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). This action promotes the efficiency of the Federal service.

5. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. You may file an appeal by sending it to the MSPB, Atlanta Regional Office, 401 W. Peachtree Street, NW, 10th Floor, Atlanta, GA 30308-3519, or by electronic filing by using "e-Appeal," an interactive application available on the MSPB website at https://e-appeal.mspb.gov/. If you wish to appeal this decision, you may file such an appeal no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of this action, or no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision, whichever is later. If you do not submit an appeal within this time period, your appeal will be dismissed as untimely filed unless a good reason for the delay is shown; the judge will provide you an opportunity to show why your appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Appeals submitted by traditional means must be in writing and contain all the information specified in the MSPB regulations (the MSPB's Appeal Form and regulations are available on the MSPB website at https://www.mspb.gov/appeals/appeals.htm). You must follow the instructions on e-Appeal for electronic appeals.

6. Under Secret Service policy, you may elect to waive your rights to file a MSPB appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 and request administrative review of this decision by filing an administrative grievance with the Secret Service's Discipline Review Board (DRB) as specified in the Office of the Director Manual, ITG-06(05). In your grievance, you must specifically state that you are waiving your MSPB appeal rights. You should present your

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grievance in writing on the attached Secret Service Administrative Grievance Form, SSF 3112. You may email your grievance to the Office of Integrity at [redacted] The Office of Integrity will refer your grievance to the DRB. If you wish to file a grievance, it must be submitted to the Office of Integrity no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of your receipt of this decision.

7. If you feel this action is being taken based on reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities, you have the right to either: 1) to file an appeal of this decision to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 as referenced above and include such a claim in your appeal, or 2) seek corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12 by filing a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) at www.osc.gov, but not both. However, a complaint filed with OSC can be followed by an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal to the MSPB. In an IRA appeal, the MSPB will be limited to considering the issues outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), i.e., whether you have demonstrated that whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action and, if so, whether the agency has demonstrated that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing or protected activity. If you file a complaint with OSC prior to filing an appeal to the MSPB, you have elected corrective action under subchapters II and III of 5 U.S.C. chapter 12, and as such, any appeal to the MSPB would be limited to an IRA appeal, resolving only claims of reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activities.

8. If you feel this action is being taken based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, genetic information, age (40 or older), parental status, or reprisal for prior protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) related activity, you may file a complaint you may file a complaint through the Secret Service Discrimination Complaints System. To initiate an EEO complaint, you must contact EEO Case Management within forty-five (45) calendar days of the effective date of this action. EEO Case Management may be contacted by calling [redacted] or emailing ContactEEO@usss.dhs.gov.

9. The Secret Service will generally be notified of any appeal filed with the MSPB via e-Appeal. However, to the extent required, the MSPB should forward a copy of the appeal and Acknowledgement Order to the Communications Center (LEG), Attn: Associate Chief Counsel [redacted], email: [redacted], phone: [redacted], fax: [redacted].

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10. If you have any questions about the contents of this notice, you may contact Integrity Office Office of Integrity, at PII.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AND THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW OF

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ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,

DONALD TRUMP PROTECTIVE DIVISION, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Room SD-342

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, December 4, 2024

1:07 p.m.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Witness:

[redacted], Bracewell LLP

[redacted] Bracewell LLP

[redacted], Chief Counsel's Office, U.S. Secret Service

[redacted], Office of General Counsel, DHS Oversight Counsel

On Behalf of Chairman Peters:

[redacted], Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Deputy Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul:

HSGAC Minority, Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

APPEARANCES (continued):

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul (continued):

HSGAC Minority, Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of PSI Chairman Blumenthal:

PSI Majority, Senior Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

On Behalf of PSI Ranking Member Johnson:

PSI Minority, Deputy Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Chief Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

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P R O C E E D I N G S

HSGAC M j ity: Good morning. This is the transcribed interview of Witness, being conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

This interview was requested by Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, as well as Subcommittee Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, as part of the Committee's investigation of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on former President Trump, and the U.S. Secret Service planning and security in advance of and during the events in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, Chairmen Peters and Blumenthal, and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson requested voluntary transcribed interviews with Secret Service agents, and on September 11, 2024, as well, with additional U.S. Secret Service individuals involved in the event, including Mr. Witness

We are going to provide introductions of the offices who will be conducting this interview today as well as instructions on how we will proceed, and as we do that, [redacted] Witness, I would like to start with you and just ask that you introduce yourself and your title, for the record, and

then if counsels could introduce themselves, as well.

Witness: Witness Witness.

Witness Counsel: Witness Counsel.

Witness Counsel: Witness Counsel, as well, for Witness.

HSGAC Majority: HSGAC Majority for the Chief Counsel's Office of the Secret Service.

HSGAC Majority: There are four offices conducting this interview today. I will start with our office. For Chairman Peters, my name again, HSGAC Majority. I am the Chief Counsel and Chief Investigative Counsel for the Committee. I am joined by my colleague, HSGAC Majority, Deputy Chief Counsel; HSGAC Majority, Senior Investigator; and HSGAC Majority, Senior Counsel.

HSGAC Minority: Good afternoon. My name is HSGAC Minority HSGAC Minority. I am with Ranking Member Paul, and I am here with my colleague, HSGAC Minority.

PSI Majority: And I am here today with PSI Chairman Richard Blumenthal, PSI Majority, Senior Counsel.

PSI Minority: Good afternoon, PSI Minority. My name is PSI Minority. I am with Ranking Member Ron Johnson's office. I am joined here today with PSI Minority, Chief Counsel, and the Staff Director, PSI Minority. Thank you.

HSGAC Minority: So our plan for today is to try and go in hour-long blocks. We will try and limit the number of people asking questions so you do not have to shoot back and forth. If we have follow-up we will try and introduce that, as well. And we will plan, generally, to take a break after an hour, but at any time should you need a break we are happy to do so. If you need water, anything like that, just let us know.

If our follow-up questions, if we ask a question that is compound or confusing, please ask us to clarify and we will be happy to do so.

The reporter is going to create a verbatim record of what we discuss today, and with that in mind, as I am sure you are familiar, please respond verbally because the reporter cannot properly record a nonverbal response. Does that make sense?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Majority: During today's interview you are required to provide truthful answers to responses to questions. This includes questions in this interview by this Committee's staff. And as you may be aware, pursuant to U.S. Code 18 USC 1001, it is a crime to provide false, misleading, or incomplete answers to questions, including questions from staff. Are you familiar with this?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And is there any reason you would not be able to provide truthful answers today?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Today's interview is being conducted without prejudice. Should the Committee have follow-up information, if we do need to follow up we will contact counsel and arrange to do so. But we would ask, to preserve the integrity of this investigation, that you not relay to anybody outside of today's meeting the questions we ask and the responses to those questions, to preserve the integrity of our investigation. Does that make sense?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Finally, today's investigation is being conducted in an open setting. We expect to be able to ask questions that will elicit information that does not implicate classified information. However, to the extent that our questions do implicate information you know to be classified, please just indicate that, and to the extent possible, provide as complete an answer as you can with publicly available information. Should the need arise, we have the capability, and we can set up a classified setting in which we can address those questions. Any questions about that?

Witness: No questions.

HSGAC Majority: Do you have a statement?

Agency Counsel: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Agency Counsel: Thank you. The Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security have made available to the Committee, consistent with requests from the Chairman, information and records that would not be publicly released. This information and records covered under the Privacy Act, personnel and other personal privacy information, for official use only, law enforcement sensitive records, and raw intelligence information.

While the Secret Service and the Department have made this information and records available to the Committee, we continue to assert that such information and any discussion of such information is not intended for public disclosure. The Secret Service and the Department are not waiving any protections, and for the purpose of administrative efficiency and to promote constructive dialogue during the transcribed interview, we are making this assertion at the outset of the transcribed interview, to preserve all assertions of protection for public release or disclosure over information or records used or discussed during the transcribed interview.

The transcript and any other attachments are protected from dissemination to the same extent as the documents and information they are based on. Please consult with the

Secret Service and the Department prior to any public release or disclosure. The Secret Service and the Department have not consented to and were assured that there would not be any audio or video recordings of this interview. The agency understands that the interview will be transcribed by the court reporter, and that the court reporter is recording for the purpose of assisting with transcription.

HSGAC Majority: That is our understanding, as well. As per past interviews, the only recording will be for the purposes of creating the transcript. The Committee will retain custody of the transcript. Counsels will be provided access to that transcript, to make any actual corrections afterwards.

With respect to the information we received today, it is the Committee's intent to make public information it learns as part of future hearings or reports, as the Committee has done in an interim report released publicly in September of this year, based on information we learned in this investigation, and we will do so moving forward, including based on information we learn today.

However, it is the Committee's practice, and the Committee engaged in this practice with respect to its first interim report, and I would expect that we would do so moving forward, in advance of making any non-public

information public, the Committee will provide you and your counsel with any information we relied on, based on today's interview, and provide you an opportunity in advance of making any information public, to make any factual corrections.

Do you have any questions about that?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Do you have any other questions before we begin today?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Majority: We will, again, as I said, proceed for the next hour, and we will start with Chairman Peters' staff asking a first round of questions, and I will turn it over to my colleague now, HSGAC Majority, to begin.

HSGAC Majority: Good afternoon, Witness.

Witness: Good morning.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you for being here today. We appreciate it.

I would like to star by asking if you have taken any notes, either before the rally, during the rally, or after the rally.

Witness: I don't recall taking any notes before or after, or before or during, but personal notes after.

HSGAC Majority: What do you mean by personal notes?

Witness: I just want to document my experience.

I prepared the notes to assist my counsel with the recollections of events that happened that day.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. How long have you been with Secret Service and in what positions?

Witness: I have been with the Secret Service since January of 2009. I started off as a special agent in the Miami Field Office. I transferred to the Fort Myers Resident Office shortly after being in Miami for approximately 1 year. I transferred to Washington, D.C., to the President's detail in August of 2017. I finished my time on the President's detail in July of 2021, and took a position with Mr. Trump's former detail beginning in July of 2021 through current.

HSGAC Majority: What was your role with the Donald Trump Detail?

Witness: I started off as a special agent. I was a shift leader. And then in June of last year I was promoted to ASAC.

HSGAC Majority: And does second supervisor, a role that you perform, based on protective events as ASAC?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Just a quick question going back to your notes. Did you provide those notes to Secret Service, or were those notes taken, or did you create those notes at the direction of your counsel?

Witness: The notes taken after the event was for my counsel.

HSGAC Majority: And you mentioned you were with the Donald Trump Detail beginning July 2021. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: How many events have you led, you know, planned, before, either with the Donald Trump Detail or prior, during your tenure with Secret Service?

Witness: You want to know how many sites I have been involved with since my career started?

HSGAC Majority: Roughly, in general, if you could just walk us through approximately how many events you have secured before and in what roles, roughly how many times working advance as the lead agent or site agent or with the detail.

Witness: It would be hard for me to approximate each role and how many times I have done those roles. But I can tell you that I have been a site agent, I have been a lead advance agent, I have been a second supervisor many times. I don't know the exact number.

HSGAC Majority: Over 30?

Witness: Over 30 as a site agent, for sure. As a lead, probably less than 30. As a second supervisor, probably 30 or more.

HSGAC Majority: The Preliminary Survey for the July 13th

rally lists three Protective Division supervisors -- SAC PII, yourself, as well as Inspector Campaign Supervisor. And we understand that Inspector Campaign Supervisor was shadowing you for the purposes of training. What were your respective roles and responsibilities among the three of you for the July 13th rally?

Witness: I served as the second supervisor for that specific event. Part of my role is to be there to support the lead advance team, whether that is the lead agent herself or himself, the site agent, assistant site agents. Any questions they can't resolve on their own they can call me on and I can provide direction to them, to help, you know, whether it may be a problem with staff or with the local police department, which is typically handled by the local field office, but they may ask me my opinion on something.

You know, another responsibility of the second supervisor would be just as a -- you're a liaison to that field office from the detail.

HSGAC Majority: In your role supporting the advance team, is your role to support the lead advance agent as well as the site agent and other advance agents, or are you there to support the Donald Trump Detail agents?

Witness: It can be everybody on the advance team.

HSGAC Majority: And what did that role look like in the

days leading up to the July 13th rally? What support did you provide?

Witness: Well, one specific example is the site agent called me about access control. She had a question about who could be backstage and that was unclear. And I provided her guidance on, you know, having those people name checked and where they needed to be.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any involvement in the planning for the July 13th rally?

Witness: Not specifically. Our operations team would have notified the field office of the trip, and I would have shared any information that I have, or had received prior to the event, with the advance team, for them to incorporate into their security plans.

HSGAC Majority: Did SAC PII have any involvement in the planning for the July 13th rally?

Witness: What do you mean by planning, I guess, specifically?

HSGAC Majority: Sure. So involvement in reviewing, approving, provide guidance or support on the security perimeter, identifying vulnerabilities, figuring out staffing, those types of things.

Witness: I wasn't too heavily involved in those things up until, you know, the day I had a briefing from the site agent, the lead, and the assistant site agent on

the 12th. So leading up to that my involvement in their planning is minimal.

HSGAC Majority: Assistant Detail Leader Assistant Detail Lead also traveled to Butler for the July 13th rally. Did he have any role in planning for the Butler rally?

Witness: Not that I can recall.

HSGAC Majority: And how does the assistant detail leader's role and responsibility differ from yours as the second supervisor?

Witness: I mean, if I can't resolve something I can go to him, to have him liaison with staff at a higher level, and he can provide, you know, hopefully, resolution to something like that.

HSGAC Majority: I am not sure I caught the answer to your question about planning. Was SAC PII involved in planning at all for the July 13th rally?

Witness: Not in like -- no. Not really. LES [redacted] .

HSGAC Majority: That day.

Witness: That day. LES [redacted] but as far as the items that you told me, he doesn't have much to do with that.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned that if you needed guidance on something you might go to the Assistant Detail Leader DSAC. What is your general chain of command within the Donald Trump Detail?

Witness: I report directly to DSAC DSAC.

HSGAC Majority: And he reports to SAC PII?

Witness: Yes, ma'am.

HSGAC Majority: And who does Campaign Supervisor report to?

Witness: Campaign Supervisor is -- at the time was assigned as part of a supplemental GS-15, because it was during a campaign season so he was part of the campaign supplement supervisor team. He is not assigned to the Donald Trump Division permanently.

Witness: How long had he been training to become a second supervisor?

Witness: You know, I don't -- it is not something you -- he has probably been a second supervisor before, so it is not like you are training to become a second supervisor.

HSGAC Minority: I see. And what was the reason then for him shadowing you on that day?

Witness: Because it was his first week assigned to the Donald Trump Detail, in the role that he was fulfilling, so we were just kind of getting him acclimated to what our former detail looks like because it is quite a

bit different than other former details.

HSGAC Majority: I see. So it is his first week within the Donald Trump Detail, serving as a second supervisor. So before he actually started in that role he first shadowed you.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And I would like to get a better sense of the typical career progression to working a Secret Service protective event. Could you walk us through generally what is required? Is law enforcement experience necessary? How long does one generally remain in the field and investigations before being promoted to working protective events?

Witness: Those timelines can shift based on the needs of the Service. And I can tell you my career track. I did 8 years in investigations in our Phase 1, where you, you know, you are going to work white-collar crime cases and do protection, where you get experience as a site agent, working on a shift, doing lead advances. You may be a transportation agent one day. You may work as a protective intelligence agent another day.

That is all Phase 1 time, and like I said, I spent 8 years in that Phase 1 time, before moving to D.C., where I started my Phase 2 assignment, which is full protection. There are no more investigations in that time. During that

time it is more of the same. You are going to now do full-time protection, which would be sites, leads, shift work, et cetera. And that is a 6-year commitment.

What was the rest of your question?

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned that timelines can shift based on the needs of the Service. Have you seen those timelines shift over the years that you have been in the Service?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Have they been compressed? Can you talk more about that?

Witness: I am not sure why they get compressed. But like I said, I did 8 years, and I think the current time frame is agents are spending 3 to 4 years in their Phase 1 time, which I believe historically was usually around 4 years before moving on.

HSGAC Majority: Have you heard of any Secret Service agents assigned to either POTUS or FPOSTUS shortly after graduating from the Academy?

Witness: What do you mean by shortly? Do you mean like --

HSGAC Majority: A year or 2 years, 3 years?

Witness: It is not uncommon currently for a 3-year agent to be assigned to a protection detail.

HSGAC Majority: Does that compressed timeline concern

you at all?

Witness: I think it just depends on how good, you know, the agent is, how the experiences they may or may not have had will help shape them.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned you did 8 years in Phase 1 and then another 6 years in Phase 2. Compressing that timeline into 3 years, in your view, and based on your experience, does that compromise the ability of the agent to be able to have the experience necessary to adequately provide security for protectees?

Witness: I don't think so, and with a caveat. It just depends on where you are coming from. Like I came from the Fort Myers office. It is a very small office with four agents. We don't do a lot of protection. But like our Miami office or our Chicago office or New York office, basically all they do is protection. So the 3 years, they have a lot of meaningful repetitions in those assignments.

So if they are coming from a larger office it is possible that they are more prepared. If they are coming from a smaller office, it may mean it could affect them. But, you know, I don't know their background or their skill set.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. So there are a number of variables that are taken into account. Recognizing that, is part of the compressed time frame due to staffing

shortages?

Witness: I can only assume that it is. I don't work in the human resources.

HSGAC Majority: So specifically, I would like to talk about the staffing for the July 13th rally. Who is in charge of making the decisions within the Donald Trump Detail to determine work schedules and assignments?

Witness: Our Operations Division works with each shift leader on Mr. Trump's shift and Mrs. Trump and their son.

HSGAC Majority: And who is that?

Witness: Barron Trump.

HSGAC Majority: No. Your operations shift leader.

Witness: PII [ph] is my operations whip.

HSGAC Majority: And he is the one who makes the decisions about work schedules and assignments?

Witness: He liaisons with each shift leader, and he each week he will put out a, like a needs to fill. This is the upcoming trips we need to fill, and then he will work with the shift leaders until a predetermined date. Usually it is Wednesday or Thursday that they need to have their draft schedules in to him. And then he will, you know, basically massage the schedule to make sure everything is covered, and any last-minute changes he can just handle himself, before it is published on Friday

before midnight.

HSGAC Majority: And approximately how many shift leaders are there?

Witness: LES [redacted]. So there is the -- Mr. Trump's detail has an LES [redacted] shift. Each one of those shifts has one shift leader and two whips.

HSGAC Majority: Who was the shift leader for the July 13th rally?

Witness: RAC CNOS Supplemnt [ph]. He was a CNOS supplement, I believe, from -- I'm not sure what RAC office he is in charge of, but he is a GS-14.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any concerns about the assignments for the July 13th rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: To your knowledge, how was the July 13th protective team selected from the Donald Trump Detail? Was it based on experience? Availability? Something else?

Witness: You want to know about the advance team? Is that what you said?

HSGAC Majority: Correct. Correct.

Witness Counsel: So the Donald Trump Detail only provides a site agent. The rest of the advance team, in our notification to the field we request what we need, and part of that is the rest of the advance team. So it would have

been on the Pittsburgh office for that specific event, for them to fulfill the lead site assistant agent, you know, all the other protective intelligence. All the member of the advance team would have to come from outside of our detail.

HSGAC Majority: In the Independent Review Panel's recent report they pointed out the significant lack of experience of the site agent appointed to, assigned to the July 13th rally. Were you aware of the assigned site agent's lack of experience?

Witness: I knew she came from the Miami Field Office. I know she had done prior sites for us successfully. That is all I was aware of.

HSGAC Majority: Because of her lack of experience did you make any modifications in how you conducted your supervisory work?

Witness: I don't think I said she had a lack of experience. I just knew she came from the Miami office, which is a high-tempo protection office, and she had been with us, I believe, for a year, and had experienced many shift movements, many rallies as a shift agent, and had also successfully worked sites by herself.

HSGAC Majority: So you didn't have any concerns.

Witness: Not at the moment, no.

[Pause.]

Witness : So something that the Donald Trump Detail had done to further educate and help agents be successful in the field. One thing that we have done is we have created our own -- the operations team created a PowerPoint that went over some administrative things that they would experience on the road, how to deal with staff, how to complete correct diagrams, things to look for when you are doing a site, liaisoning with local police, et cetera. More of just like a refresher on things that they should have learned in the Academy and then through their Phase 1 time.

So we provided that training to as many agents as we could. I don't know if it was everyone, as I sit here today. But it was a substantial amount of agents that went through that. And that was something that we did, like I said, to help them be more successful when they were out. I know SAC PII and DSAC PII also brought in a rally training center, people from our Academy, to help provide training on shift movements, on emergency action situations, first aid, et cetera. And those were things that they went above and beyond to provide our agents.

HSGAC Majority : Is it accurate to say the Donald Trump Detail provided additional training on top of what Secret Service provides its agents?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And the PowerPoint training that the operations team within the Donald Trump Division provided, was that provided before the July 13th rally?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: PII, I don't believe we have received a copy of that, so I would ask that we receive a copy of the PowerPoint and any other documents regarding the training.

Witness Counsel: Understood.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you.

Our understanding is the Donald Trump Detail also provided a C-UAS advance agent, or a C-UAS agent, for the rally. Were you aware of that, as well?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: We you aware of the C-UAS agent's lack of experience?

Witness: He was provided experience before that assignment.

HSGAC Majority: Could you say more about his experience?

Witness: Our Technical Security Division came down to Mar-a-Lago. I don't know the date and time. But they are the experts, if you want to say that, on the equipment that Agent C-UAS Advance Lead was operating that day. They showed us how to set it up. And this was just open to everyone. It just wasn't specific to the few guys that run

that program for us.

So we all had a basic understanding of that equipment from them, from the Technical Security Division. And then we also did like a, almost like a ride-along, like a police officer would, for a new trainee, who would send out someone getting ready to go out on their own with somebody that has already -- knows how to operate the equipment. And I believe that C/UAS Advance Lead had that opportunity before the Butler event.

HSGAC Majority: Was that training you just mentioned provided by the Donald Trump Detail at Mar-a-Lago, was that a 1-hour training, do you recall?

Witness: That sounds correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So other than that training, the C-UAS agent had not received any other specific training related to C-UAS and related to the technical capabilities of the system.

Witness: I believe he also had the ride-along, if you want to call it that.

HSGAC Majority: Oh right, okay. Can you explain how the Donald Trump -- you have touched on this a little bit, but if you could explain how the Donald Trump Detail operations, CNOS operations, and then Secret Service OPO, how do you coordinate among those offices for planning, responsibility, resource allocation for a protective event?

Or I guess to put a finer point on it, is there a hierarchy among those three? You know, is it ultimately up to OPO? Are there instances where DTD requests something but it is not received? How do you coordinate with CNOS? If you could speak to that.

Witness: Sure. So typically the advance team would identify a need for something, and then they would submit that request with a brief justification on why they are requesting it. And then the Donald Trump Detail operations section -- so the CNOS operations was kind of, I don't recall how long they had kind of been in the scene. But typically we would put that request straight to OPO and cc the Campaign Ops, the CNOS Ops section.

This campaign was a bit different because there had not been another protectee with an existing detail running for President. So CNOS Operations' function is set up to provide an operations team for someone that has never had protection, or doesn't have protection. So we were just kind of working together. So that is why we would cc everyone. But DTD would typically go straight to OPO for a request.

HSGAC Majority: For campaign events, would DTD Operations coordinate with Trump campaign staff, as well, on how to secure events?

Witness: We work with staff closely.

HSGAC Majority: And which staff from the Trump campaign?

Witness: For this specific event?

HSGAC Majority: Correct.

Witness: I believe the lead advance for the staff was Campaign Staff Lead Advance, I believe is his name.

HSGAC Majority: It appears that for some decisions, a senior, more experienced agent from the local Pittsburgh Field Office deferred to the site agent because she was a member of the Donald Trump protective detail. Is this standard protocol for experienced field office agents to give deference to the detail operations? Is there a hierarchy there? What I am trying to get at is are the roles and responsibilities within the Donald Trump Detail operations and the field offices, are they clear in terms of who has responsibility for what?

Witness: I think they are clear. I mean, I guess, could you just give me a specific example?

HSGAC Majority: Does it make sense to give deference to someone that is less experienced within the Donald Trump Detail operations if you are a senior agent within the Pittsburgh Field Office?

Witness: I think if it is -- if it is maybe like an administrative question, possibly. But if it goes to the heart of securing the venue, then no, it should be like a group, this is what we think we need.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. And you mentioned your involvement in the July 13th rally substantively started on July 12th, aside from responding to specific inquiries. Is that right?

Witness: I didn't hear the whole question.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned that your involvement in the July 13th rally, and the planning for the July 13th rally, aside from responding to specific requests from the site agent or an advance agent, that it really substantively started on July 12th. Is that correct?

Witness: The advance started on July -- we notified the Pittsburgh Field Office on July 3rd. I arrived on July 11th. My walk-through was July 13th, or July 12th, and the event was July 13th.

HSGAC Majority: And was the July 12th walk-through kind of your initial involvement in the planning?

Witness: It was the first time I saw the site.

HSGAC Majority: And before we get to that July 12th walk-through, I would like to first understand one thing we touched on, which is the organizational kind of roles and responsibilities among the advance agents. So for the July 13th rally, who was in charge of determining the amount of support needed from state and local law enforcement?

Witness: State and local relationships are established by the field office. They work not just our

visit but every visit that is going to come through their district. So we lean, as the detail, we defer to the field office to establish and come up with what they need to secure, you know, how many police we would need for that venue or that event. Because we don't have those relationships, and we definitely don't want to burn those relationships and then leave town, leave Pittsburgh with sort of a mess.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Would that be the lead advance agent?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And who was responsible for determining the amount of support needed from Secret Service?

Witness: There would have been a manpower walk-through with one of the supervisors from the Pittsburgh office.

HSGAC Majority: Would that be the responsibility of the lead agent or the site agent to determine the amount of support needed from Secret Service?

Witness: I believe it is a joint effort to go through how many post-standers you need, specific. I think we might be mixing two things as far as how many police we need and how my agents we need. Those are different conversations, I think. Because we only request agents from OPO. We don't request local officers from OPO.

HSGAC Majority: Who made the decision to send counter snipers for the July 13th rally?

Witness: I received a phone call from SAC PII to request our counter sniper team, and then it would be approved.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know what prompted this decision?

Witness: I received a -- not just me. It was more of a, I think it was a group text message that just said, you know, when you are out working your sites, if you think you need our counter sniper assets please say something. It was kind of a broad, nonspecific information.

HSGAC Majority: And that --

Witness: And so that was like the night before, and then SAC PII called me the next day and said, "Hey, request counter sniper. It's already been approved. I just need you to submit the paperwork."

HSGAC Majority: So the request for the counter sniper, our understanding was submitted on July 9th, or approved on July 9th. Can you talk more about the text messages? What prompted the decision to send counter snipers? Was it intelligence? Was it something else?

Witness: I believe it was intelligence driven. It was --

HSGAC Majority: Why do you --

Witness: The information I received was we have a credible, long-range threat to Mogul, and it's by the typical actors, is how it was kind of relayed to me, in those broad terms. I kind of knew what people were talking about, but this was not in a classified setting.

HSGAC Majority: Who did you receive that information from?

Witness: I believe I received it from DSAC PII.

HSGAC Majority: And is there a -- I don't want to get into anything that is classified, and we can set up a separate setting, but is there any additional information that is classified related to the credible threat, that you are aware of?

Witness: I have never received a classified briefing on that information.

HSGAC Majority: To your knowledge, did Secret Service or any of the advance team change any of its planning after adding two counter snipers to its operations for the July 13th rally, based on this credible intelligence you mentioned?

Witness: So when I received the information, as I have described, I immediately called the lead agent, PII, and relayed to her in the same terms that I received them. And I also called the site agent, Site Agent Site Agent, shortly after I had talked to Lead Agent. But

before I hung up with Lead Agent she made mention that she was going to request a local counter sniper, because at the time of that phone call with her, Secret Service counter sniper had not been approved yet.

HSGAC Majority: It was pending approval?

Witness: It was either pending or I was about to submit it, you know, within the next -- it all happened like within hours.

HSGAC Majority: Going back to roles and responsibilities, who is in charge of determining the perimeter of an event, the security perimeter, if an event is outdoors? The lead agent? The site agent? Who is in charge?

Witness: The site agent is ultimately responsible for their site. They can reach that conclusion on what those perimeters need to be within the lead agent and their site counterpart and the local field office. But ultimately the site agents are responsible for their site.

HSGAC Majority: And that would include determining the security perimeter?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any involvement in reviewing or approving any of the resource requests that the advance team submitted, so the Preliminary Survey, the Manpower Request, the Site Diagram?

Witness : So all that information is submitted to my operations team. It is not something I personally review until it is final. I think the manpower numbers and what the lead advance team is requesting is my general Ops agents will liaison and call them and ask specifically what they need. My agents are there to help get them all the assets that they are requesting. So, you know, I may call them and just ask for clarity on something so it can be either written better or give us the best, you know, opportunity for approval.

HSGAC Majority : Are there any supervisors that review the Preliminary Survey, Manpower Request, Site Diagram, any of those documents before they are finalized?

Witness : It is possible that the Pittsburgh office reviewed those documents before they were submitted to DTD Operations.

HSGAC Majority : And did DTD Operations review before everything is submitted to OPO?

Witness : We do. We are reviewing for more administrative, just things are in the same format, misspellings, itineraries match the latest itinerary being published by staff, things of that nature.

HSGAC Majority : Not a substantive review in terms of --

Witness : We are not questioning why they have an agent here and not there, because LES

LES [redacted]

HSGAC Majority: Right. But should there be a more substantive review before the request is submitted to OPO?

Witness: Like I said earlier, there is a supervisor manpower walk-through before that is submitted, to make sure that they have the numbers that they want for their site. So when it reaches my operations team, a supervisor from the local office has physically walked that site and seen where things are going to be.

HSGAC Majority: So let's talk about the LES walk-through. I guess before we get there, what training did you receive on how to conduct walk-throughs and approve site plans?

Witness: My training has been just my experiences.

HSGAC Majority: And before that walk-through -- what time did it start? Was it in the early evening?

Witness: LES .

HSGAC Majority: LES

Witness: Approximately.

HSGAC Majority: Before you began that walk-through, what information did you receive, either from the site agent or other advance members? What did you receive before, just to prepare for the walk-through? Did you review any documents?

Witness : I received a draft, LES
LES .
HSGAC Majority : A draft of the Site Diagram?
Witness : Yes, Site Diagram, Preliminary Survey. I don't recall if the Counter Sniper Report was in there or not yet, but I eventually saw it.
HSGAC Majority : Did you review or receive the Pennsylvania State Operations Plan or the Butler ESU Operation Plan?
Witness : No. That is not something typically that we include in our paperwork.
HSGAC Majority : Have you since seen those documents?
Witness : No.
HSGAC Majority : Could you walk us through -- so the walk-through started LES -- just walk us through it. Who was there? How did you conduct it? I understand it started at the airport, but let's fast forward.
Witness : It actually did not start at the airport. LES .
HSGAC Majority : Okay.
Witness : But Lead Agent , had not been feeling well on the 11th, going into the 12th, that midnight. When I woke up I had saw that she had sent me an email that said she was feeling unwell, had spent the night in the ER. So I replied all to the email and just said,

"Take care of yourself. Let's not worry about the airport." We can see it either later that evening or the next day, prior to Mr. Trump's arrival. And that I would go direct with [redacted] on setting up the walk-through at her site.

[redacted]: And so who was present at the walk-through? Was it you, [redacted], and [redacted]?

[redacted]: And [redacted].

[redacted]: And [redacted]. How did you evacuate the security perimeter during the [redacted]

[redacted]: So my walk-throughs I want to start at the arrival/departure area. As a second supervisor, my [redacted]. So I want to see how we are arriving. In this case it was a tented arrival. And then I want to see the stage, assets around the stage, emergency action from the stage, sequence of events, where our assets are going to be positioned in relation to each walking path movement. That is where I am focused.

[redacted]: And could you walk us through after that. So you are focused on the inner perimeter. Where do you then go from there to evaluate, you know, other threats and vulnerabilities to the site?

Witness: So when the walk-through started, Site Agent Site Agent initially was telling me about some of the LES LES et cetera. Initially I stopped her and refocused her and told her that those are important things but I wanted to start at the arrival/departure area. So she took me there. We looked at the tent, a large, LES LES

She showed me where LES would be, and that after arriving LES for an undetermined amount of time and then proceed to a photo op area. I had asked her what the push-pull scene was going to look like inside the photo area, meaning where the guests were going to be coming from or where are they going to exit. She wasn't completely sure, so I offered my advice on where the lines should stack and how they should exit.

And then I talked about how I wanted LES LES LES

So those are some of the finer details that I am looking for and that I coached her on. And then we started on basically the walking path to the stage. When I got to the stage I noticed the first two-foot riser he took up on to the walking path, you know, LES LES, we just kind of stopped there and observed what

was around us. And I asked her what her plans were for mitigation at the five o'clock. So we call our clock directions off of the front of the dais, and we work in a clockwise position.

So I asked her what the plans were for mitigation at the five o'clock, and I believe she provided some information. The other agents were with her, as well, during this walk-through, so it was either her or one of the senior special agents that said there was a plan to mitigate that with a large crane. There was a large crane with the American flag draped behind it, and that was the plan, to mitigate that area, which seemed satisfactory to me.

HSGAC Majority: The five o'clock area?

Witness: Yes, ma'am.

HSGAC Majority: Would that be near where the water tower was?

Witness: Yes. In that direction.

HSGAC Majority: So that was to mitigation the water tower vulnerability?

Witness: Just threats at the five o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And what about threats at the three o'clock, which was the AGR building?

Witness: So as we continued I noticed the buffer area, because again, I am concerned with the innermost

circle. So as we are taking this walk-through I can see that the bike rack that she had positioned was LES LES . I ended up walking it off, and it was around LES . So I explained to her that the LES LES , because after you start putting press and speakers in that area it can get tight on space. So we pushed that right side bike rack LES . That was the maximum we could go with where the bleachers were pre-positioned.

And then I worked my way around basically counterclockwise from that position, and ended up she had a set of stairs at the LES , which was not in line with the dais. So part of my responsibility as the second supervisor is I am looking at emergency actions specifically, and to save any amount of time that I can save on if we have to LES the stage. And when I say LES I mean just go up on the stage and remove the protectee, like we did.

HSGAC Majority: I'm sorry to interrupt you. I'd like to focus on the discussions as it relates to the security perimeter and how the AGR building was covered. Did you have discussions about scoping the security perimeter? Did you talk about how that security perimeter, the middle perimeter, the one outside the inner perimeter, would be defined?

Witness: Yes. We had those discussions after the -- what I'm there for -- I'm concerned with everything, right. I wanted to know the whole security plan. [redacted] LES [redacted] LES [redacted] LES [redacted]. To the cars, should we need to go there, LES [redacted] LES [redacted], things of that nature.

So I'll just finish what I told her to do there and then I'll address what you're asking.

So I moved the set of stairs that was initially at basically the back left of the stage, and I had them moved to the front left of the stage, or the LES [redacted] LES [redacted], which would have made SAC PII [redacted] stairs directly in line with the podium, LES [redacted] LES [redacted].

But as far as the bike rack and things that we made those changes, as far as the middle perimeter and the concerns at the three o'clock, I addressed -- I asked what the plans were at the three o'clock, and in that kind of deer run area, I kind of called it. The initial site was cordoned off by bike rack and then there was a deer run, which is like 50 or so yards of green area, at the three o'clock there.

HSGAC Majority: I'll just show you. I'll mark it as

Exhibit Number 1. This is the Butler ESU Operations Plan, but it's an aerial of the site.

[Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

Witness: Okay. So I was told that -- there was a fence by the AGR building and those other buildings there. That was a chain-link fence, and there was a secondary chain-link fence, I believe it was outside of the bike rack that staff had placed to define the site from that other property. I was briefed that there was going to be uniformed police presence in that deer run area to help secure those buildings and that green space area, and that the police officers would be positioned on both sides of the fence, meaning on the AGR side of the fence and in the deer run area between the AGR side and the site.

HSGAC Majority: Can you mark with an X where your understanding was that the police presence would be positioned, where those post-standers would be?

Witness: I didn't ask specifically where they would be standing. I just referred -- they told me that there was going to be police officers there, and as a second supervisor, it tells me that they've thought about it and that they had a plan. And additionally, they said that they had spoken to our counter sniper team and that they felt that they were very confident they could cover

those buildings, you know, from where they were and in addition to where they were positioning the local counter sniper team.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say "those buildings," are you referring to the AGR building, which is essentially three buildings?

Witness: Yes, ma'am.

HSGAC Majority: What was your understanding, based on the site walk-through, of how the AGR building would be covered?

Witness: That area of the site, my understanding was there would be a local counter sniper team at the AGR area, right, as depicted on the diagram.

HSGAC Majority: Did you know whether the local sniper team would be on the roof or in the building?

Witness: It's been my experience, since 2009, that counter sniper teams are on roofs, so I didn't ask that specific question.

HSGAC Majority: But when you learned there would be a local sniper team, your understanding was that they would be positioned on the roof of the AGR building. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And did you discuss line-of-sight concerns at the Butler Farm Show ground?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And could you specifically -- so our understanding is it's common to use physical barriers, like large equipment, trucks, in this case farm equipment potentially. What were the line-of-sight concerns that you discussed and what potential mitigation tactics did you consider using?

Witness: So at the five o'clock was the crane, and then there was a John Deere tractor used at the nine o'clock, and then specifically at the three o'clock there was a red combine tractor that we utilized for that area.

HSGAC Majority: Could you mark where that red tractor was?

Witness: It's in the pictures somewhere. Do you have pictures from the day? I can circle it.

HSGAC Majority: So I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit 2.

[Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: And these are redacted, but it's our understanding that these are text messages either to or from you. Do these look familiar to you?

Witness: They look familiar.

HSGAC Majority: And was this something that you sent?

Witness: It looks like somebody sent it to me.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know who that would be?

Witness: Possibly Site Agent. Hard to say with the redactions.

HSGAC Majority: And are these the -- is this the equipment you're talking about, or is this something different? It's difficult to tell with the redactions.

Witness: I don't see a picture from the three o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So let's talk about the three o'clock line-of-sight concerns. Our understanding is that Penske trucks were in the area and there was an offer to use farm equipment to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. Is that correct?

Witness: I was only aware of the farm equipment.

HSGAC Majority: Of the farm equipment. And what ended up happening? Was the farm equipment used?

Witness: Yes, the farm equipment was used at the three o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: And using Exhibit 1, could you put an X on where the farm equipment was used, roughly, understanding this is an approximation?

Witness Counsel: We don't have an overhead of the day of, that would actually show it. I mean, I'm sure he can do his best, but --

HSGAC Majority: This is, unfortunately, the only aerial

that we have of the site.

Witness: So the stage would've been approximately like here. I would say it's in this area.

HSGAC Majority: And just for the record, ASAC PII is marking the area to the, like in the rabbit run, the deer run that you talked about, in front of the AGR building but forward the crowd and not the stage. Is that accurate?

Witness: Roughly.

Witness Counsel: The exhibit will speak for itself.

HSGAC Majority: So when you talked about farm equipment and using physical barriers, was there any objection to using farm equipment?

Witness: No. I thought it was a good idea.

HSGAC Majority: So to your knowledge, no one objected to using any farm equipment.

Witness: Not at the three o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: Did anyone object to using Penske trucks?

Witness: I wasn't aware there was Penske trucks available.

HSGAC Majority: We've learned that the Trump campaign staff denied the use of physical barriers, such as trucks and farm equipment, because the barriers would, quote, "block a press shot." Is this something that you've heard?

Witness: After the events I have heard that, but

not during the event. Had that been brought to my knowledge it would've been good information to have.

HSGAC Majority: So were you present for any of those conversations on the day of the walk-through?

Witness: I recall staff having hesitation at the nine o'clock. I wanted to use some line-of-sight mitigation at the nine o'clock. There was a pond in that area. And after some talking we just decided -- I felt comfortable with an increased police presence in that area. There were some outbuildings behind the fence line, and I was assured that there would be police officers in those alleyways to mitigate that concern.

HSGAC Majority: Specifically with regard to the three o'clock, the AGR building vulnerability, and considering what ended up happening on July 13th, is it fair to say the line-of-sight vulnerabilities from the AGR building were not fully mitigated?

Witness: Yeah, I guess that's a fair statement.

HSGAC Majority: So to your knowledge, direct knowledge, did the Trump campaign staff deny any requests to use equipment or any type of physical barrier to mitigate line-of-sight vulnerabilities?

Witness: I was not aware of staff denying line-of-sight mitigation assets at the three o'clock. It was never elevated to my decision-making authority.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. And how about not specific to the three o'clock, but any line-of-sight issue within the venue?

Witness: Like I just testified to the nine o'clock, that was it.

HSGAC Majority: That's it.

HSGAC Majority: Who ultimately has the authority to grant or deny a request as it relates to security decisions? Can a staff for a former President or current President protectee make that decision, or is that ultimately up to the Secret Service?

Witness: If it's a security issue it's up to us. We may go back and forth with them, but if it's something that we need, and it's not getting done at the current level, that it needs to be elevated.

HSGAC Majority: Have you ever been involved in a discussion where staff for a protectee you were responsible for disagreed about a security-related decision?

Witness: I believe so. Yeah, I think so.

HSGAC Majority: With respect to this event, is that the case, or no?

Witness: Did staff approach me about a security issue -- is that your question?

HSGAC Majority: Yes, that's my question.

Witness: I don't recall them coming to me with a

security issue.

HSGAC Majority: And can you provide any details -- you said to your recollection you may have in the past been involved. To your recollection, can you provide any detail there?

Witness: I can't provide a specific site, but things that will come up are where do we put the magnetometers for a walk-through, can we have them here, or we want them as close to the, you know, seating area so our guests don't have to walk as far, as an example. Whereas, you know, from a security standpoint that's not a good idea. LES [redacted], if we can control it.

So that would be a typical conversation I may have with staff, or, "Hey, we're arriving on this side of the building because we like the way it looks," whereas I may push to have, if there's an option to arrive inside, I'm going to push for that.

HSGAC Majority: You just shared that ultimately the decision is up to the Secret Service when it relates to security. Within, then, the Secret Service, what is the hierarchy? For this event, for example, who was the senior official involved, either on-site or off, who ultimately had authority to make decisions about security, and can you delineate the line of authority on down?

[redacted]: I don't know that I can, who has ultimate authority. I guess it's just who has the facts, who has the problem that we're trying to solve.

[redacted]: There are several individuals, including involved in this event, with the "Special Agent in Charge" title in their title. For example, you, ASAC, SAC of the Pittsburgh office, SAC in the detail. To an outside person that's confusing. Can you delineate the authority as it relates to Special Agents in Charge among various Special Agents in Charge with that title, and who is above and below them?

[redacted]: Certainly a Special Agent in Charge can make final decisions. It's their district. It's their detail. They can certainly make those decisions. I can also make a decision on security measures.

[redacted]: Is the Special Agent in Charge of field office in a geography where an event is being held higher, in terms of whether there's a disagreement, than a Special Agent in Charge on a detail?

[redacted]: I don't know if there's --

[redacted]: It's not set out anywhere?

[redacted]: Not that I'm familiar with.

[redacted]: And just understanding the make-up of the Secret Service itself, in general, you are part of the, and were at this time, part of the Donald Trump Detail. But

for protectees, in general, each protectee has a detail. Correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Be it the President or former President. The details themselves are part of the Secret Service. Correct?

Witness: They are.

HSGAC Majority: Can you just explain, when you rotate to the detail, is there any distinction in operationally how you staff? Are you, in essence, kind of separate, if not physically, from, say, a particular field office or the rest of the Secret Service? What are the differences, to the extent there are any, being on a detail as opposed to the other rotations you may do within the Secret Service?

Witness: When you're assigned to the Office of Investigation, where is where you are in Phase 1, I mean, you could be in a supportive role for any protectee, at any one time. Outside of a few exceptions, when you're in a Phase 2 assignment, assigned to a protectee, such as the President or former President, you are, the majority of the time with maybe a few exceptions here and there, only supporting that protectee. Does that answer your question?

HSGAC Majority: Yes. In addition to that, what you've just explained, that your sole responsibility becomes the protection for the protectee themselves, are there other

differences -- your duration, your geographic location, the way in which you communicate with the other aspects of Secret Service?

Witness: I don't completely follow your question.

HSGAC Majority: If you're on a detail and, therefore, your responsibility for protection means you're going to be staying with that protectee, so not in your field office, in your instance in Florida, not at Headquarters, are there distinctions in your job? So other than the responsibility you just identified, the primary responsibility of protection, are there differences in how you would receive training information, change in policy information, how you would understand your next rotation, or anything distinguishing what you do on a detail, as opposed to what you do when you rotate to field offices or other parts of the Secret Service?

Witness: Policy changes are, you know, published from our administrative officers, just like in the field. That's been my experience. As far as rotating assignments, on a protective detail -- we'll take Donald Trump Detail for example -- you may come to the detail on Shift [redacted] for the former President, and at any time, it could be three months, it could be longer, it could be shorter, you may be on the family section. I guess I'm trying to do my best here. Is that what you mean?

HSGAC Majority: Yes. Just trying to understand, if at all, the distinctions between various responsibilities an agent may have within the Service.

On the detail, is there typically a set duration of time you would serve in that position, and if so, what is it?

Witness: You mean how long would you serve on your Phase 2 time?

HSGAC Majority: Yeah.

Witness: Typically it's six years.

HSGAC Majority: How long have you served?

Witness: I was assigned to the President's detail in August of 2017, and I'm still doing protection.

HSGAC Majority: Are you rotating to any new position or staying in your current?

Witness: When I was promoted to ASAC, I run our operations team now, and I have not rotated -- I guess, what do you mean by like rotated out?

HSGAC Majority: Maybe I'm using the wrong terminology. But do you have any plans to leave the detail for another position within the Secret Service?

Witness: Not currently.

HSGAC Majority: We're going to break shortly. I just have one more question, and we'll pick up with other lines of questions. I'll want to return to questions related to the

day of. You mentioned on the day of that you eventually had to LES the stage and remove the President, the former President, in a situation that involved a security threat.

I guess, question one, is the definition of LES the stage," meaning you're not just removing him; you're moving him because of a security threat?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Is that something you've ever done before?

Witness: No, outside of a training scenario.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Let's take a break. We'll go back on in a couple of minutes. Thanks.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Minority: HSGAC Minority, again with Ranking Member Paul. I'm going to start -- we'll jump around a little, so bear with me. And then HSGAC Mino will ask some questions.

So I just want to go back to the group text. You said you received the information about the threat or the counter snipers through a group text. Can you repeat that for me?

Witness: It was a text about if you need -- if you think you need counter sniper assets to be aware of them, like to not hesitate to, you know, request them.

HSGAC Minority: And do you recall the day of that text?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Just for the record, we don't have that text message. That has not been produced to us. I don't even think we have anything that looks relatively like it in redacted form. So we would just make that request again for all records to Secret Service.

So you're not quite sure. Do you recall if it was the day before the event? A week before the event?

Witness: I don't recall. It was around the time of the --

HSGAC Minority: And do you recall who else was in the group text?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Was it folks from the DTD?

Witness: It would've been DTD, yeah.

HSGAC Minority: So we've been trying to get this timeline straight from communicating and doing TIs with other folks. So my understanding, and I'd like to hear if you were aware of this at the time so I'll just kind of give you what I've collected as my outline of this timeline of counter sniper assets going forward for Trump, and then you let me know -- I'll ask some specific questions after.

Based on testimony that we've received, sometime in the first week of July there was a discussion and some kind of determination that I guess was made by the Deputy Assistant Directors of the Headquarters level, that going

forward the Donald Trump Detail would have counter sniper support at outdoor rallies, going forward. So that was, you know, testified to us that that happened sometime in the first week of July, and it appears it was before July 5th, because that's when SOD was made aware of this decision to implement it.

Is that something that you were aware of?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And there was a rally in Doral on July 9th. Is that right?

Witness: I recall that.

HSGAC Minority: Were you there that day? Were you working that event?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: No. Okay. There have been reports that, at that event, right before, that's when the Trump campaign found out about certain credible threats to Trump. Are you aware of that?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And then on that same day, July 9th, the Secret Service counter sniper was approved for Butler. Is that right?

Witness: Sounds correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So when you became aware of the Secret Service counter sniper being approved for Butler,

was your understanding that this was going forward all events would have a Secret Service counter sniper?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So your understanding was that still individual events, you had to request it if you felt a need.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: And that text message, do you feel like that was communicating to you that this decision had been made, that these assets were now available in the different way that they were not available necessarily going previously, if that makes sense?

Witness: No. I think it was just, the heart of the information was if you think you need this, if our agents need this at their sites, that they should now request it, because previously it was not something that we would get.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So it was kind of like now you can request it and it'll be approved?

Witness: Considered, maybe.

HSGAC Minority: Considered. So were there previous requests that were made for counter sniper support that were not approved?

Witness: I can recall one specifically.

HSGAC Minority: Can you tell me a little bit more about

that?

Witness: Pickens, South Carolina. I don't know the date. It was an outdoor rally Mr. Trump had, like in a downtown setting. Buildings, you know, left and right on the street there. A lot of line-of-sight concerns, being a city setting, urban, or suburban, whatever, you know, a city setting rather.

And we had sent out, on our own, the SAC and the DSAC, you know, advocated for this asset by sending out someone experienced to make a, you know, justifiable PowerPoint to present to the folks at Headquarters that can make these decisions. So they did that, and we submitted it, and it was ultimately not approved.

HSGAC Minority: I'll ask a couple of questions about that, but when you say "ultimately not approved," are things like explicitly denied, or is it just it's never answered or never approved in a formal way? Like how does that work in how it's communicated back down?

Witness: That specific incident, I don't know if it was a verbal denial or an email, or if it was just left untouched. I don't know.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And so you said there was a PowerPoint. Do you recall like what kind of justification was included in there? We don't have that document either, just for the record.

Witness: I don't know if I've seen it specifically. I don't recall exactly what was on it. But historically it would've been like pictures and distances to concerns, and why we need the counter sniper asset and why it would be effective.

HSGAC Minority: And that was specific to that particular event in South Carolina?

Witness: Pickens.

HSGAC Minority: Yeah, okay. And do you know who that PowerPoint was presented to within Headquarters?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Are there other requests, non-counter sniper requests, that you are aware of that the DTD team made to Headquarters that weren't approved or were explicitly denied?

Witness: We've made requests for counter assault team that were denied.

HSGAC Minority: How many times? Was this a one-time denial?

Witness: No. It's more than one.

HSGAC Minority: More than five? We're just trying to get a better understanding --

Witness: Probably.

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

Witness: You know, my operations team, I would

just have them request it. And if it was available sometimes we did get it, and then sometimes we didn't. I don't know exact number.

HSGAC Minority: And any of those, were they explicit denials rather than just not fulfilled requests?

Witness: I believe so.

HSGAC Minority: Do you recall if all of the ones that were not fulfilled were explicit denials, or if --

Witness: I don't recall.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And then so CAT requests. Any other requests for assets that were denied or not fulfilled?

Witness: We would request Uniformed Division advance agents sometimes, and those were not granted. They would still help us. They would still send Uniformed Division personnel for screening, but they would put it basically on the lead and the site agent to kind of figure out what a Uniformed Division lead advance agent would typically do, where to set up, power sources, you know, kind of the normal check boxes. And they would be available for, you know, phone calls if those people had questions on if this was a good idea to put them here versus there. But those were things that were kind of put back on the detail to figure out.

HSGAC Majority: And what was the general feeling among

the agents on the detail about, I guess, what seems to be some kind of recurring theme of not getting all the assets that were requested?

Witness: We wanted the assets, so, I mean. I understand there are other variables in a plan, why things are not given. I don't know. I don't have the entire picture of, you know, the needs of every detail. But certainly we always wanted the assets. Mr. Trump's events were typically very large, and we felt like it would've helped our posture.

HSGAC Minority: Did former President Trump at the time have an elevated threat environment compared to other formers, in your opinion?

Witness: You'd have to ask the Protective Intelligence Division, but he certainly had threats against him.

HSGAC Minority: Is that something that the Protective Intelligence Division would share with you all, as the Donald Trump Detail?

Witness: I don't recall ever getting like a verbal briefing from them, but they do put out some work products. So I don't want to say never, but they do put out work products. I don't know off the top of my head exactly if it's comparing Mr. Trump's threat level to another protectee.

HSGAC Minority: But, I mean, I think it's generally acknowledged that there was a heightened threat environment, I mean, especially given the decision in the first week of July, at the Headquarters level, to provide counter sniper support going forward.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Do you have a security clearance?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: What level?

Witness: Top Secret.

HSGAC Minority: SCI?

Witness: I believe so.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Can you run me through, so you were the second supervisor at the time. You're the ASAC now. Can you run me through the leadership level of the Donald Trump Detail team with the names and the titles, just because I'm getting confused. So just for my clarification.

Witness: No problem. So ASAC is my title. Second supervisor, think of it as like a position. Like the site agent or the lead advance agent, second supervisor is just my role for that trip.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So there's the SAC. Can you run me through the DTD leadership structure?

Witness: Sure. So you have a SAC, DSAC --

HSGAC Minority: And the names, please.

Witness: Sure. SAC PII, DSAC DSAC. ASACs at the time would've been DSAC ASAC, ASAC, ASAC, ASAC, and ASAC ASAC. And that's the supervisor structure, and then from there it goes to Special Agent.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And so the Independent, I think HSGAC Mino will correct me, but the Independent Review Panel report, page 7. I'm not going to pass it around. I'm just going to read it for you. It talks about the intelligence and what was shared prior to the event. And it says, "Both the leader and the assistant leader of former President Trump's personal detail had been read in on this intelligence," and it's referring to whatever the counter sniper -- whatever intel was behind the decision to send the counter sniper support for the Butler event. Not specific to Butler, but just in general.

So you were not read in on any specific intelligence?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So who were the two people on DTD that were read in?

Witness: I can assume. I don't know those specific, how they refer to them. I don't know. We don't use that language.

HSGAC Minority: Yeah.

Witness: But I would assume it's SAC PII and DSAC.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Have you ever been read in on intelligence related to your protective detail duties?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: When was the last time?

Witness: 2017.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So a long time ago.

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Minority: Is it helpful to have details about the nature of the threat, classified details, if they exist, do you think, in order to help you do your protective job?

Witness: I operate as if there is already -- having the intelligence, I guess confirms what you area already planning for anyways. It doesn't change how I approach a site.

HSGAC Minority: Do you think that the group text, do you feel like you had enough information about the nature of that threat from that group text?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So you don't think that you would've done anything different had you known any more detailed information?

Witness: I don't believe so.

[Pause.]

Witness: Okay. Just for clarity, regarding the text, I don't know exactly what it said. But I recall the text or the phone call or both said that this was, you know, be watch line-of-sight issues for a long-range threat. So that's what I remember.

HSGAC Minority: So, I guess, what does that mean to you?

Witness: A long-range threat, really it could be anything. But, I mean, certainly a shooter comes to mind.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Had you ever worked an event where C/S Team Lead, C/S Team Lead, was the counter sniper advance?

Witness: I don't believe I've met him.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. What about Officer Technician ?

Witness: I have not met him.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. We interviewed C/S Team Lead, and we asked him a lot about his role as counter sniper advance. And we asked him if he got on the roofs of the barns where they were going to be located, and he said he did. But he said he only got on them to see if the agents that were place there would fall through, not to look for all line-of-sight concerns from their positions. Does that concern you?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Is that something you knew before right

now?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Has there been any after-action report or anything that has been given to you all as the DTD, going forward, for events going forward, based on the situations that have occurred?

Witness: I don't know if they were -- I believe there was something put out. I don't recall exactly who published it. But, you know, I've tried not to read a lot about exactly what happened, but I believe there was some literature published.

HSGAC Minority: Knowing what I just told you, would you feel comfortable having C/S Team Lead as the counter sniper advance at another event?

HSGAC Minority: I have full confidence in our Counter Sniper Division. They undoubtedly saved my life on July 13th.

HSGAC Minority: Would you want them to go and look around for long-range threats, full 360 and line-of-sight concerns from the positions of the counter snipers? Because, I mean, someone died.

Witness: I understand. It's certainly a learning point to take. But as far as their ability, they have my confidence.

HSGAC Minority: Just one last question from me on the

denial of requests or unfulfilled requests. Was there a feeling among DTD that any of that was politically motivated?

Witness: Can you repeat that?

HSGAC Minority: On the denial of requests or the requests that went unfulfilled, was there any feeling that the reason why those assets were not provided was politically motivated?

Witness: I have nothing to suggest that.

HSGAC Minority: Were there any conversations among any DTD individuals, that you participated in or you aware of, about it potentially being politically motivated?

Witness: Not that I recall.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. I'll pass it to HSGAC Minori.

HSGAC Minority: HSGAC Minority with Senator Paul's office. What time did you arrive on July 13th, the day of the rally?

Witness: Arrive where?

HSGAC Minority: At the site, Butler fairgrounds.

Witness: The motorcade arrived sometime in the evening, around, I think it was around 5. So I was at the airport waiting for him to land.

HSGAC Minority: And you came in on the motorcade?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. When you arrived, I understand a

lot of moving parts, taking care of your protectee and the bubble around him. Did you take a look around the site as you're bringing him in and notice anything, specifically the line-of-sight mitigation things that you were told were going to be in place for you? Because I think it your testimony you've already confirmed that there were some concerns of the three o'clock, five o'clock area.

When you're there, did any of that catch your attention?

Witness: So when I arrive, you know, I'm working the former President very closely, along with the SAC. LES [redacted] So when we arrived I relieved SAC PII to go look at the stage area with Site Agent, so I was inside a tent until he basically took the stage. So I didn't really have the opportunity to walk the site to make sure things were implemented as I was briefed.

HSGAC Minority: What was SAC PII going to the stage with Site Agent to specifically look at? Were there some things that they were looking for?

Witness: So I brief SAC PII the night before. I suggested that he LES [redacted], LES [redacted] LES [redacted] So part of that is him going to check out how he's going to

get to his position.

And then the rest is just the site agent giving him a real quick -- you've got LES whatever it is, LES LES LES You know, LES , if it already hasn't been. And that's it.

HSGAC Minority: So he was advancing the steps of the former President before he took the stage, and they were going over the emergency egress.

Witness: That's my -- I wasn't there when they briefed him, but typically, yes.

HSGAC Minority: That's typically what they would do. Correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Going back to your testimony on meeting with Special Agent PII , you pointed out multiple things that you had to correct there.

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Minority: Is that typical that you would have to make that many corrections for, as you said, an experienced agent, when you arrived, to make that many corrections?

Witness: I don't believe I called her experienced. I just said she came from a high-trafficked, you know, protection office with a lot of repetitions, and that she'd been in our detail for approximately a year, I

think.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So is that normal to go to a site and have that many issues, which sound to me like quite a few just right there, at the stage area, that you had to immediately deal with.

Witness: Mm-hmm. There's usually some adjustment at each site that I want to see. But things like the bike rack and the stairs should have been caught, in my opinion.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Thank you. When you worked as a lead or a site agent in your career, did you review the local operations plans, ops plans?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Can you explain why?

Witness: That's how I was trained. I just wasn't -- that's not to say I didn't meet with the local law enforcement and go over exactly where they were going to be and what they were going to do. But as far as reviewing their paperwork, that's not something I would do.

HSGAC Minority: After July 13th, would you do that now?

Witness: I think it could be helpful.

HSGAC Minority: Because you've testified, and we've heard a lot of people testify that they assumed where the local -- and you even used the term "counter snipers" were going to be. But yet in their ops plan it's very clear that they were operating in a sniper role, which you, as an

experience agent, understand the difference between a sniper and counter sniper, that their operations were different.

So my point is, why are so many people just not looking at the plan that locals were putting in place, which would eliminate the ambiguity of who is doing what?

Witness: Like I said, I'm just not familiar with doing it that way. That's not to say it's something we shouldn't consider.

HSGAC Minority: Thank you. You mentioned your notes afterwards. Did you note anything in there of what failures you identified and how those could be corrected?

Witness: I think he testified that the notes were prepared at the direction of counsel. We'd like to protect that privilege, if that's okay with you.

HSGAC Minority: Absolutely.

Moving to the Donald Trump Detail training that you said that you all had, for Site Agent and others, that you all went above and beyond, giving them a refresher course, and you even talked about the C-UAS team getting the training they did, do you believe the one-hour training is sufficient to operate the equipment that C/UAS Advance Lead operated?

Witness: So that program was not -- it was something that DTD saw a need for. It wasn't something

Headquarters, you know, gave to us. We developed that from within our ranks to help secure our sites. And we provided the training that we thought was needed for someone to successfully operate that equipment. And, you know, C/UAS A e Less C/UAS Advance did successfully operate that equipment that day. It worked when former President Trump was on the stage. He troubleshooted, you know, the problems he had earlier in the day. But before we arrived it was working, and it was being used, to my knowledge.

HSGAC Minority: Except during the time that Crooks was flying his drone.

Witness: I've learned that after the fact. I'm not sure that it would've been operational had it been working anyways, because, you know, the -- what is it, the FAA kind of sets the TFR times on when it will be operational. So I'm not completely confident it would've been operating anyways if there weren't issues.

HSGAC Minority: Were there any concerns raised by the advance team that were not addressed?

Witness: Could you be more specific?

HSGAC Minority: Any concern at all. When you do an advance you're looking for threats, you're looking for vulnerabilities, and you're creating mitigation procedures. Was there anything that was brought up that was not addressed, to your knowledge? I know you mentioned that

you didn't have time to see the, I guess, three o'clock position because of your proximity to the protectee, which is understandable.

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Minority: But to your knowledge, was there anything there that was discussed in the advance process that was not implemented on July 13th?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of. I recall one thing when we arrived. I had sent out Campaign Supervisor to inspect the LES, that we ended up using. I asked him to make sure it was clear, because I believe it was bike-racked off prior to our arrival, just LES LES

And so I sent him out there before former President Trump took the stage, and it was, in fact, not open. So Inspector LES made that open and clear, which ended up being pretty critical.

HSGAC Minority: I only have a couple more questions and I'll pass it over to my colleague.

You mentioned that you reviewed the Security Plan before it went final, or did you review it after it went final?

Witness: It wasn't a review. It was just here's our paperwork, and I looked it over prior to getting to the

site so Agent PII could give me her briefing.

HSGAC Minority: That's the last question I have, and I'll pass it to my colleagues.

PSI Minority: Witness, thank you for your time today. My name is PSI Minority. I'm with Ranking Member Ron Johnson's office.

I just want to go back to something that you discussed earlier regarding the request denials or requests that were made that were never approved, regarding the counter sniper. You mentioned that you didn't know the date, but do you recall the year?

Witness: I don't. I can only guess.

PSI Minority: Was it this year?

Witness: I want to say it was 2023, but I'm not sure.

PSI Minority: And when a request is made and then never approved or denied, is there a reason given for that?

Witness: It's usually like a vague, just can't support it at this time. Nothing specific.

PSI Minority: And is that usually shared verbally or via email, text?

Witness: It can be both. It's usually verbally or preferably email.

PSI Minority: In this specific situation, do you know who would've sent or received that type of communication?

Witness: No. Specific to Pickens? Are we still talking about --

PSI Minority: To, I think it was the South Carolina event?

Witness: Yeah, okay. I wasn't in Operations -- I don't believe I was in Operations at that time. So it could've been the second supervisor on that trip. It could've been the SAC. It could've been the DSAC. It could have been all three of them.

PSI Minority: Do you know their names in this specific situation?

Witness: The SAC is PII, the DSAC is DSAC.

Witness: Okay. I want to just quickly go back to your description of the counter drone equipment on the day of the rally. I think you mentioned that it was your understanding that it was working early in the day and then it wasn't. Is that correct?

Witness: The opposite.

PSI Minority: Oh, okay.

Witness: It wasn't working early in the day and then it was working when the former President was at the site.

PSI Minority: Okay. I appreciate the clarification. Now I want to touch on the text that you received regarding

the use of counter snipers. You mentioned that you didn't recall the date of when that was sent. Do you know who sent that text?

[Witness]: I believe it was the [DSAC] [redacted], but it could've been SAC [PII] [redacted], as well.

[PSI Minority]: And earlier you talked about how it was communicated that there was a credible, long-range threat to [LES] [redacted].

[Witness]: Yes.

[PSI Minority]: And [LES] [redacted] being Mr. Trump?

[Witness]: Yes.

[PSI Minority]: And that was communicated to you separate from this text?

[Witness]: Well, I think that text would have captured --

[PSI Minority]: Okay.

[Witness]: -- that.

[PSI Minority]: And you do not recall who else would've received that text message. Is that correct?

[Witness]: I believe it was the Donald Trump Detail supervisors. Just the supervisors.

[PSI Minority]: Did you reply to that text?

[Witness]: I may have just indicated like a received, but that's it.

[PSI Minority]: Did anyone else reply to the text?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: Was this type of text typical?

Witness: No. I mean, like getting information like that. I mean, it's -- not specifically, but the way in which it was phrased was good.

PSI Minority: Is it your understanding that a credible, long-range threat would be based on adverse intelligence?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: I want to share with you an exhibit that we'll mark as, I think, Exhibit Number 3.

[Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: It's coming your way. This is the Preliminary Survey for the July 13th rally. So I'll give you a moment to take a look at that.

Are you familiar with this document?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Could you turn to the last page, page 10. Under the Intelligence section, do you see that, on page 10 of 10?

Witness: I see it.

PSI Minority: It notes, "At this time no adverse intelligence has been developed concerning this event. Any adverse intelligence that may arise will be passed to all

working supervisors." If there was a credible, long-range threat that you believe was based on adverse intelligence --

Witness: Mm-hmm.

PSI Minority: -- would it be your expectation that that would be mentioned in this section of the Preliminary Survey?

Witness: I guess if it could be written in a way that was not classified.

PSI Minority: When you learned that there was a credible, long-range threat, was it given to you in a classified setting?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Do you think --

Witness Counsel: Sorry.

Witness: The information I was given for clarify was not specific to Butler. It was just specific to any visit in which you may think you need counter sniper assets, that you should request them.

PSI Minority: Do you think that if someone read this intel section they would be aware about a credible, long-range threat to the protectee at this event?

Witness: Not this specific section.

PSI Minority: Is there any section in this Preliminary Survey where anyone who was reading this

document to prepare to protect, to provide security at the rally, that they would've been made aware of a credible, long-range threat?

Witness: As I testified earlier, once I received that I briefed the lead agent personally, and she runs, or he runs, the advance team. How they disseminate that information is, you know, outside of my capabilities. But as far as what I'm looking at in front of me on the Preliminary Survey, I don't see anything. I mean, there is a counter sniper team depicted on the Preliminary Survey, and if you are familiar with working with a former detail that may pique your interest on why we're receiving them. But I don't see anything specific to your question.

PSI Minority: You brought up something that I want to get to regarding the actions that you took after receiving this information. I think you mentioned earlier that sometime after you received this text you took a phone call from SAC PII about the counter snipers.

Witness: I believe I did, yes.

PSI Minority: Do you recall when that occurred?

Witness: I believe the text was later in the evening, and I don't know if I didn't receive it and read it until that next morning. I don't recall exactly when. But I believe I received the phone call from SAC PII, you know, the next day from the text message.

PSI Minority: And could you tell us any content of that conversation?

Witness: It was just please request a counter sniper team. It will be approved. That's it.

PSI Minority: Did you discuss any more than that?

Witness: No. I don't think we did.

PSI Minority: So then after you had that call you mentioned earlier that you eventually called Ms. PII. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: How soon after?

Witness: Immediately.

PSI Minority: And why did you call her?

Witness: Because she's the lead advance agent for the trip.

PSI Minority: In testimony to the Committee, Lead Agent told us -- this is a quote -- "I received another phone call from the second supervisor from Trump Detail stating that we would be getting a Secret Service counter sniper advance and that I would be receiving the names from SOD or Special Operations Division. In his phone call he discussed that there was credible intel that he could not tell me as to why we were getting a sniper asset." Then the question is, "Did you ask any more questions?" Lead Ag Lead Agent replied, "I told him he needed to call my supervisor

about whether whatever credible intel he had, and I knew enough that when he would say 'You're not going to tell me over the phone,' because that's something classified."

So just to take a step back from that, did Lead Agent tell you that you need to call her supervisor about this information?

Witness: I don't recall that.

PSI Minority: Would that be something that you would've felt the need to do, that in addition to calling Lead Agent, and I think later you mentioned that you called Site Agent, that you would also need to call Lead Agent supervisor?

Witness: How I understand it and how I've worked it as a lead myself, I never have received something quite this, well, on this scale. But I work for my SAC, and if get something that needs to be briefed to him, specifically if I'm the lead advance on a large visit like this, it's my responsibility to brief my direct supervisor on what I've learned, because I report to them. It's our district. So it was my opinion that she should have briefed her direct supervisor.

PSI Minority: Lead Agent told us that you told her that there was credible intel and that you could not tell her as to why counter snipers were being assigned to the event. Is that accurate?

Witness: Sounds accurate.

PSI Minority: Did she ask you why they are receiving counter snipers?

Witness: I don't recall she asked me specifically, but I think it's possible.

PSI Minority: And did you tell her that you can't tell her why they're receiving counter snipers, outside of just there was credible intel?

Witness: If I did it's because I didn't receive -- I mean, I just showed you how I received the information, so I just didn't have it. I relayed to her basically what was relayed to me in the same kind of terms.

PSI Minority: Did you ever relay to her that there's classified information regarding the reasoning behind the receipt of counter snipers for the event?

Witness: I don't believe I did.

PSI Minority: Did she ever ask if any information regarding the use of counter snipers is classified?

Witness: The use of counter snipers?

PSI Minority: Did she ever ask whether the fact that counter snipers were going to be assigned to the even was based on classified information?

Witness: I don't think so.

PSI Minority: Do you know whether Lead Agent communicated to her supervisor any information about the

conversation you had with her?

Witness: I don't know.

PSI Minority: Do you know who Lead Agent supervisor is?

Witness: I know the SAC of the district is [redacted] SAIC Pittsburgh.

PSI Minority: Okay. Did you ever have any conversations prior to the July 13th rally about the use of counter snipers for the rally?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: You mentioned that you also called --

Witness Counsel: I'm sorry to interrupt. Conversations with anyone?

PSI Minority: With SAIC Pittsburgh

Witness Counsel: Oh, SAIC Pittsburgh Okay.

Witness: Specific to SAIC Pittsburgh, no.

PSI Minority: Okay. You mentioned that you also called Site Agent. Is that correct?

Witness: I did call her.

PSI Minority: And how soon did you call her?

Witness: I called her -- well, before I knew we were going to -- let me think of the timeline here. I don't know the exact timeline, but I know I called Site Agent Site Agent because at the time I called her I was unsure if we were getting the counter sniper asset. So I sent her -- I

used to work in the President's Operations Division, the sitting President's Operations Division, when Mr. Trump was the sitting President. And I was assigned to the First Lady's detail, all of her operations and logistics. And so I had an old template on how to request counter sniper, which was a Word document -- take a picture of what you're looking at, get a distance, and a brief description on why this would be an effective, kind of like we did for Pickens but this was in a Word document format. In an attempt to set [Site Agent] up for a successful, you know, submission of that.

And this is like before I knew we were getting the counter sniper asset, I sent that to her and kind of walked her through, hey, I need you to do this. I asked her to ask the local field office for a rangefinder so she could get distances from where the stage would be. And I sent her that document.

Now very shortly after I sent that document, maybe within the hour, I learned we were going to get counter sniper assets, and then I had my operations team reach out to [Site Agent] and say, "Don't worry about the Word document that [Witness] just sent you, because we're getting Secret Service counter sniper. That's part of their advance. They'll do this for you."

So I forget the original question, but --

PSI Minority: Yeah, no, I appreciate the background. So to clarify, did you personally call Site Agent?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: And when was that? Was that after the call with Lead Agent?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Shortly after?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: And what did you communicate to [redacted] Site Agent?

Witness: Same general, pay attention to your line-of-sights, long-range threat. That's basically it.

PSI Minority: And did she ask any questions to you about any specifics? Did she ask you if you could share any specifics as to why counter sniper assets are being assigned?

Witness: I don't recall her asking any follow-up questions. I just remember acknowledging that she understood what I was saying.

PSI Minority: And in addition to calling Lead Agent, why did you feel it was necessary to call Site Agent?

Witness: Because it's her site. She's building it out, right, something she needs to take into consideration.

Witness: Did you make any other calls to any

other agents working the event that day regarding the assignment of counter snipers to the event?

Witness: I contacted our operations team. They're not assigned to the advance but I did let them -- I believe it was CNOS Supplement. He was a CNOS supplement to our operations team, and I asked him to submit the paperwork for that asset. That's all I can recall.

PSI Minority: And CNOS Supplement is in Operations, you said?

CNOS Supplement: He's assigned to a field office. He was on a temporary assignment to our detail during the campaign. LES [redacted] LES [redacted]. That's pretty standard.

PSI Minority: Okay. And when did you contact [redacted] CNOS Supplement?

Witness: I don't know the exact date or time but it was basically as soon as I got the information that we needed to request it. I didn't wait.

PSI Minority: And maybe if you could just help us understand the type of information you asked CNOS Supplement to put together. Is it a document? Is it an email request?

Witness: It's an email. It would've been sent to Counter Snipers Operations Team, requesting a lead advance agent for this rally. It was just an email.

PSI Minority: Does CNOS Supplement -- would someone need to specify how many counter snipers would be assigned to the event?

Witness: That's the function of the advance counter sniper. So he's going to go out there, she's going to go out there and determine we need X amount of teams to cover the site.

PSI Minority: Did you make these calls on your personal phone or was this your work phone?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: Would it be typical for you to make these types of calls on a personal phone as opposed to a work phone?

Witness: It's whatever's close by, you know. It's usually my work phone, but if I have a personal phone near me it could be that. I just don't know. Typically I would try and use my work phone.

PSI Minority: Okay. I do not believe that we have received any call logs related to these communications. We would like those.

Witness Counsel: I don't have access, obviously, to his personal phone, but I will coordinate with his attorney.

PSI Minority: Understood. I'm going to turn to the next exhibit, that I'll mark as Exhibit 4.

[Exhibit No. 4 was

marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: Witness, I'll give you a moment to take a look at this. Are you familiar with this email?

[Pause.]

Witness: This is July 12th. I don't know if I was on this email or not. It doesn't refresh my memory at all.

PSI Minority: And what is the reason why you can't tell whether or not you were on this email?

Witness: Well, it's redacted, and the FROM is from the Protective Intelligence Division to someone on DTD.

PSI Minority: And you can't recall if this was sent to you?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: For the record, this Committee did not apply the redactions to this email. This email was redacted by Secret Service or DHS. And just to give context, the subject line of this email is "The arrest was made," and it's sent from a redacted individual at Secret Service to another redacted individual on the DTD. And that person wrote, on July 12th, "Don't have many other details right now, but the subject is in custody. Not expecting any press. Still sealed as far as I am aware."

Witness: Yeah.

PSI Minority: And then it goes on.

Witness: I would just say that, you know, Mar-a-Lago is a dynamic place to protect. It's possible that -- I don't know what this email is just talking about. I mean, it's dated July 12th and 13th, around and on the day of Butler events, but I don't know that it's related. I'm just putting that out there.

PSI Minority: Are you aware of an individual named Asif Merchant.

Witness: It doesn't sound familiar.

PSI Minority: Okay. So just to be clear, you are not aware of any arrest of an individual relating to the protectee, or as a threat to the protectee, on July 12th?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: Okay. Has anyone from DHS or Secret Service instructed you not to speak with Congress?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: I'm going to turn it over to my colleague, PSI Minority.

PSI Minority: Hey, good afternoon. Thank you for being here. So could we walk through, in more detail, once you arrive at the Butler scene, what you did, what was your role, and walk us through up to shots fired.

Witness: You want to know on July 13th from when I arrived in the motorcade to shots fired.

PSI Minority: Yes, sir.

Witness: When we arrived and pulled into LES, as expected, everything seemed good. I recall my radio had LES LES so I had phone ahead to Site Agent Site Agent to get the LES for me, which is usually kept in the LES And she told me she would have that for me at the arrival/departure area. So when I initially arrived, Mr. Trump LES, and I went and she had the LES in that area. LES, did a LES, LES loud and clear, and I did the same. So I knew the radio was operational now, as it should be.

After that I walked into LES where SAC PII is, and I relieved him so he could go and see the stage area with Site Agent. I recall taking Mr. Trump to the photo line area LES, and just kind of watching the public come in to take their photo with him and exit. And during that time I recall SAC PII coming back, and LES LES, and he was just kind of letting me work it as he was waiting for it to finish up.

As it finished, because Mr. Trump was running behind that day, there was supposed to be an interview also after the photos, but they decided to do it after the event, just

to speed up the timeline. I recall after the photos, the person that was going to be doing that interview came in. He wanted just to greet her and say thank you. So she came in, and when she came in I pushed [redacted], because typical that's where I should be, [redacted], and then SAC [redacted] [redacted].

So that happened. I went out and [redacted], [redacted] That's when I told [redacted] to go check on the [redacted], and he did. We cleared that up. And then, you know, his music queued up. "Proud to Be An American" [redacted], [redacted] And he did. He walked out. There was a set of American flags in front of the tent door to lead out to the stage, and he walked out, [redacted] And, you know, he walked out as we planned. SAC [redacted] went right. I stayed to the [redacted].

We walked him out to the stage. It was incredibly loud, a very enthusiastic crowd that day. Nothing abnormal at that time that would've caused us to do anything different at that moment. To me it looked like the shift and myself and the SAC were in good position for anything.

And then we eventually worked him to our final positions.

LES [redacted]

LES [redacted]

LES [redacted]

And then President Trump began his speech. For about four or five minutes he was giving remarks. The crowd was, again, just very, very loud. And I recall that the Hercules team, which is our counter snipers, came over the radio and said, "The locals are working something at the nine o'clock," and then they corrected themselves, basically within the same breath, and said, "No, it's the three o'clock."

And so I kind of had eye contact with SAC PII [redacted]. We've worked many events together. And I noticed we both kind of waited for an update on what that was, and we didn't receive that update. And between the time we got that information and, you know, a few seconds later, really, I saw SAC PII [redacted] tell Site Agent [redacted] to go figure out what was going on. I saw him like kind of motion her offstage, and I knew what that meant. It's too loud for her to hear anything, so she's going to go offstage and figure out what's going on.

And by the time she left, you know, she was maybe gone 20 seconds or so, I heard the first -- no more radio updates. The only radio traffic I heard that day was, that

I can be for certain on, was what I just testified to, about what our counter snipers put out over the radio. I recall that pretty vividly.

When I heard the first crack of the -- I didn't know what it was at the time. What I'm about to explain is my brain kind of processing three separate things in a matter of a second or under. But when I heard the crack, July 4th was not too long before that, and the first crack sounded like -- I've got a nine-year-old and a five-year-old, and they were throwing those little poppers in our driveway. And that's what it sounded like to me. I was like, that memory was triggered immediately.

And then within that same kind of thought I was thinking maybe there's a heckler behind us with caps, and you know, almost like one of those poppers that you'd shoot off at, you know, New Year's Eve or something. That's what it sounded like. And so I'm waiting for someone to tell me what's going on behind me. And kind of during that last thought there I heard the second crack, and just instinctively just didn't really think about much else after that and went on and LES the stage. And as I was running up I yelled, to the former President, "Get down. Get down. Get down," and kind of caught him as he moved to the ground. And I recall just kind of holding him and pushing him up towards the front of the stage LES

LES as I could.

And then I went to the ground with him. I didn't lay on top of him, because I needed him to still be able to breathe. So I just kind of just covered his head, neck, and vital organs above his chest as best I could with my entire body. You know, as I kind of caught him and moved to the grown, PII, SAC, was also kind of zippering in on his midsection and lower half, almost at the same time. I recall, you know, being over Mr. Trump, and I asked him if he was okay. I said, "Sir, are you okay?" and he said, "I think so."

And then I noticed a pool of blood forming in front of him as I was looking down on him. And Campaign Supervisor, I believe, gave me the white towel that you see in all the photos. He dropped it down onto me, and I recognized it as Mr. Trump's sweat, you know, the thing he cleans his face with at rallies. So I was familiar with what it was, and I immediately grabbed it and applied pressure to the wound.

And I initially had put it on his left ear, and then he corrected me and said, "No, it's my right ear." Almost his humor in that moment kind of reassured me that he wasn't really badly injured. He was alert. He was very calm, honestly. He was speaking clearly. So from a medical triage standpoint I felt like we were in good

shape.

And by then every agent was on the stage, and he was completely covered. And then at some point while we're on the stage, it was either [Special Agent] or what I heard through my radio, or both -- I believe it was both -- "Shooter down. Shooter down." And when we heard those words, collectively, we pulled him to his feet and escorted him off the stage, stage left, [LES] and evacuated.

[PSI Minority]: Thank you. So going back to when you arrived [LES], did the motorcade come down Meridian Road into Brady Paul Lane?

[Witness]: I don't remember the names of the roads. It was to the rear of the stage. [LES] [LES] If you're in the driver's seat, driving towards the arrival/departure, to the left are some like residential homes, and then to the right is kind of an open, grassy area. And, you know, we had talked about that area during the walk-through.

[PSI Minority]: As part of the motorcade, [LES] [LES] [LES] [LES]

[Witness]: You're talking about [LES] [LES]

PSI Minority: Yeah, like the main arteries into the rally that day. Were there local cops enforcing, you know, you can't park your car on the side of the road?

Witness: I recall the local police having signage up that said that there was no parking allowed on the street. Now, there were residential homes also on that street, so there were people in their front yards having parties, excited for his arrival. But I do recall there being like a DOT, you know, sign, specific for that event.

PSI Minority: And that would've been on Meridian Road, which is the route that goes behind the Farm Show?

Witness: Yes, sir.

PSI Minority: Do you know the exact time that you arrived with the protectee on July 13th, what time that was?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Was it around 5:30?

Witness: Sounds correct.

PSI Minority: Outside of the radio transmission from Hercules about the locals who were working something at the 9 a.m., and then they immediately correct to the 3 p.m., I just want to be clear. You working that day, you did not see any other type of commotion or any type of law enforcement working something, either inside the rally or outside the rally, from your vantage point?

Witness: I did not.

PSI Minority: Did you hear anyone say, quote, "On the roof" before shots were fired?

Witness: I don't recall that.

PSI Minority: After the assassination attempt, and when you had time to maybe review your phones, text messages, was there any messages or phone calls you received in the lead-up of shots being fired at 6:11 p.m. on that day?

Witness: No. I was in communication with Site Site Agent all day, asking her how things were going, wanting status updates on, you know -- medical conditions were one of the big threats that day. It was hot, large crowd. Dehydration was an issue. So I like to pass that information along to SAC PII and the staff coming in, just to let them know, hey, you've got, you know, X amount of people here, and we've had this many transports. Just so they kind of know what's going on, on the ground. But I didn't receive anything outside of that. And C/UAS Advance also let me know about his problems with the software.

PSI Minority: So reviewing your phones and text messages, emails, you did not receive any images of Thomas Crooks, be on the lookout, to any of your devices?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Did you at all receive images of the assassin after the event?

Witness: I've seen images of him after the event.

PSI Minority: Do you know if Thomas Crooks was on any federal, state, or local radar before July 13th?

Witness: I do not.

PSI Minority: Did you interact with any other federal agencies before, during, and after the event -- FBI, ATF?

Witness: So Homeland Security Investigations supplemented us that trip, as post-standers. As far as before, that would be my only -- and outside of Pennsylvania State Police, you know, they helped us with motorcade things. I wasn't directly in communication with them, but I recall them being there. Those are local assets for that. That's kind of like before. You know, afterwards, obviously I've been interviewed by other agencies.

PSI Minority: Okay. It's 3:43, and I think we're going to take a break.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Majority: We'll go back on the record and divide the remaining time that we have left.

So I'd like to go back and ask a couple of follow-up questions about the line-of-sight issues we spoke about the day prior to the rally. We've been told by members of the advance team that the campaign staff denied requests to use physical barriers such as farm equipment and Penske trucks

to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. Should this information have been elevated to you?

Witness: I recall using farm equipment for some line-of-sight. The Penske trucks, I did not have any awareness of. If those were denied I certainly would've like to have known about it.

HSGAC Majority: And does campaign staff have the ability to overrule security decisions that the Donald Trump Detail believes are appropriate?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And what specifically were you told about how the AGR building would be covered, on July 12th?

Witness: I was briefed that there would be police officers on the AGR side of the fence and additional police officers on the area in between the site and the AGR, as well as overwatch from Secret Service counter sniper and local counter sniper.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any concerns with regard to the coverage of the AGR building as a vulnerability to the protectee?

Witness: No. The best counter snipers in the world told me they had it covered, and I was good with that.

HSGAC Majority: So for the walk-through, you were responsible for reviewing the in-person site security

setup. Is that correct?

Witness: Say that again.

HSGAC Majority: During the July 12th walk-through, you were responsible for reviewing in-person the site security setup, to make sure that everything is adequate and appropriate.

Witness: I'm briefed on what it will look like on game day, on the 13th. LES

LES

HSGAC Majority: Understood. According to the Independent Review Panel, they issued a report in September, and in the report they wrote, "A senior agent from the Trump detail tasked with reviewing in-person the site security setup in the run-up to the rally did not engage in appropriate follow-up after a, quote, 'more junior detail member'" -- improvising here -- "relayed generic information regarding how the AGR building would supposedly be secured. That was not consistent with the diagrammatic depiction of security resources in the site layout diagram."

Are you familiar with this critique?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know who this critique is in reference to?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Are there any other senior agents from the Trump detail tasked with reviewing in-person the site security setup in the run-up to the rally, aside from you?

Witness: It was me and Campaign Supervisor. That's it from the Donald Trump Detail.

HSGAC Majority: And during the site walk-through, did you discuss which buildings would be swept?

Witness: Every building inside the site would be swept.

HSGAC Majority: Based on the unique layout of the Butler Farm Show and the number of vulnerabilities on the exterior of the security perimeter, should the AGR building have been swept?

Witness: Like I said, I was briefed that it was being covered. Think of a second supervisor walk-through. You want to make sure that things have been thought of, and if they haven't been thought of then how are we going to fix that. The AGR buildings had been thought of, and their plan was to have a uniformed presence there and counter sniper overwatch. So from my perspective, it's okay. Like I said, I'm concerned about the innermost circle, the President's movements, and all the assets onstage, where the cars are, posted capabilities, where can we go if we have to LES

So when I'm briefed that those things have been

thought of and that there's police not just on one side of the fence but on both sides of the fence, and that we have overwatch from extremely capable people with advanced training on counter sniper, I feel okay with that.

HSGAC Majority: Moving forward to the day of the rally, you mentioned you LES LES And during that whole time were you positioned in the tents behind the stage?

Witness: So when we arrived I was in the tents, and then when Mr. Trump took the stage LES LES

HSGAC Majority: Prior to your arrival at the rally site, were you aware there would be two Command Posts, so one Secret Service Security Room and then a state/local Command Post?

Witness: I was briefed on the 12th that it would be a joint Command Post, or joint Security Room, which to me means everybody that's going to be there has a seat at the table, which would be what I'm accustomed to. So I would have no reason to ask LES

HSGAC Majority: Who briefed you on that?

Witness: I believe it was PII .

HSGAC Majority: And so your understanding, it was a joint Security Room, that kind of LES LES

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Full integration between local, state, and Secret Service.

Witness: That was my understanding.

HSGAC Majority: Were you in direct communication with any local law enforcement or state law enforcement that day?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: In the event a suspicious person is identified at a large rally site such as the Butler Farm Show, whose responsibility is it to track down and confront the suspicious person?

Witness: It depends on what we have available to us. In this specific instance, a protective intelligence advance agent or a site protective intelligence site agent would be primary.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware that the counter sniper response agent as well as the protective intelligence agent were both looking for an individual, a suspicious individual, with a rangefinder?

Witness: I was not aware of that information.

HSGAC Majority: Is that information that should have been elevated to someone of your level?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And I just want to confirm. I know you

testified to this before, but I want to confirm. You did not receive any text messages, emails, or any other communications, whether it was verbal, a phone call, in person, informing you about a suspicious individual with a rangefinder, gauging the stage at the rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And you were not informed about the suspicious individual on the roof for three minutes, between 6:08 and 6:11 p.m.

Witness: I had no knowledge.

HSGAC Majority: And you did not receive the BOLO that was sent out by the Secret Service counter sniper team at 5:52 p.m. Is that correct?

Witness: I don't recall receiving that.

HSGAC Majority: LES [redacted] LES [redacted] LES [redacted] I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards stage. FYI. If you want to notify Secret Service counter snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with a backpack sitting next to it in the rear of the building was not seen earlier."

Is that information that you should have been made aware of?

Witness: Absolutely.

HSGAC Majority: Is that information that the site agent should have been made aware of?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know why the site agent was not made aware of that information?

Witness: Are you saying that it's a fact that she was not? I'm not aware if she was or was not.

HSGAC Majority: Our understanding is that this information was not relayed to the Secret Service advance individuals on the day of the rally. Is that information that should have been relayed to the site agent, and if so, to your knowledge where is the breakdown?

Witness: Everybody should have been aware of that. It's critical information.

HSGAC Majority: And so the only radio traffic you heard was the counter snipers over the radio that the locals were working a three o'clock, a situation at the three o'clock.

Witness: Correct. They said the locals were working something at the nine o'clock, and they corrected themselves and said three o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to go back in time and then go forward in time. So going back in time, before you arrived at the rally site, our understanding is the C-UAS advance agents with the Donald Trump Detail testified that he told you around 2 p.m. that the C-UAS system was down. Do you

recall that?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What steps did you take to help him get the system back up and running?

Witness: Well, he told me what he was doing. He told me that he was in communication with the manufacturer and TSD, which is -- that's the correct advice. He already knew what to do.

HSGAC Majority: So from 2 p.m. until 4:33 p.m., the C-UAS system is down, which allowed Crooks to fly a drone undetected for 11 minutes, beginning at 3:51 p.m. Did that concern you at all, that the system was down for two-plus hours?

Witness: That was the first time I had experienced that it wasn't working. But it wasn't overly concerning because Mr. Trump wasn't there yet.

HSGAC Majority: But at the same time, this would have been an opportunity to have a potential interaction with a potential suspicious individual, someone flying a drone around the site of a political rally prior to a former President speaking. Correct?

Witness: Had it been on, we're assuming that it would've been on and operational, yes, it would've been. If all those assumptions happen, that he's there and everything's working and the LES

LES [redacted],

LES [redacted] that would've been great information. It just simply didn't happen, though, you know, unfortunately.

HSGAC Majority: And so the C-UAS system being down is entirely separate from the temporary flight restriction zone. Correct? Those two things operate independently. You can have a C-UAS system that can detect drones independent of having a TFR zone. Correct?

Witness: Sure. The TFR is just a note that FAA puts out. It's not Secret Service, you know --

HSGAC Majority: And our understanding is the C-UAS agent testified that he requested an extension for the TFR zone. He was concerned that the President might be speaking longer than 6:15, and wanted to make sure that the TFR covered the time in which he was on the stage. And he raised those concerns to you. Do you recall this?

Witness: I don't recall that.

HSGAC Majority: We've learned that the TFR, the request for a TFR extension, was denied without explanation. Were you aware of this?

Witness: He wanted to extent it beyond -- so not before the rally but after.

HSGAC Majority: Correct.

Witness: I was not aware of the denial, and I

don't know who did that.

[HSGAC Majority]: And you weren't aware of the denial. Do you know where the denial came from? Did it come from Secret Service? Did it come from FAA?

[Witness]: I can only speculate.

[HSGAC Majority]: Only if you know.

[Witness]: I don't know.

[HSGAC Majority]: Okay. I'll turn it over to my colleague for a couple of drone questions, and then we'll move forward in time.

[PSI Majority]: Just to go over the issues with the drones again, because you had mentioned previously that you're not certain but you believe that [C/UAS Advance Lead] [redacted] was part of, am I understanding this correctly, a group briefing, where the TSD went over how the equipment worked?

[Witness]: That's how I remember it.

[PSI Majority]: And then that there was also sort of a ride-along that he potentially went on. Correct?

In general, in your role, making sure the protectee is covered, how do you see the role of C-UAS as, I guess, complementing your role?

[Witness]: I think it's an excellent program. It helps us complete our 360-degree protection of site by having that capability. So I think it's important.

PSI Majority: And so how often do you put thought into whether all the pieces of a site are operational or functioning the way they're supposed to, or is that outside of the purview of your responsibilities?

Witness: As it relates to a drone?

PSI Majority: Sure. I mean, as part of making sure that the security plan is complete and that everything is working the way it's supposed to, how much thought do you put into the C-UAS function?

Witness: One, I want to make sure that we actually have it because, like I said earlier, this wasn't an asset that we always got. It's if our own division could supply it. It wasn't like it came from TSD, which we get now. We had TSD come down and train a couple of guys that were willing to do it, and when we could we deployed them. So it's an important asset, LES LES.

PSI Majority: Sure. And you don't run the D.C. office. I guess in retrospect, have you had a chance to read the Interim Report we put out?

Witness: No.

PSI Majority: It suggested that C/UAS Advance fundamentally, from what we were hearing, fundamentally didn't understand how the equipment worked or how to really be on how to plug the pieces together. Does that seem

concerning to you?

Witness: The equipment worked.

PSI Majority: I mean, yes, but that's a technical distinction that kind of -- it didn't work until after the assailant had used a drone to surveil the site. It didn't work until four hours after it was supposed to work. So saying that it worked is an incomplete statement.

Witness: Okay. I mean, he got it to work. He did everything, I think, correctly to troubleshoot what he was experiencing. He called the right people. And ultimately it worked. As I've said earlier, we can only guess if it would've been operational when the drone was up in the air. We don't know that we would've been operational with the C-UAS system.

PSI Majority: So, I mean, because I understand. It seems like one that -- again, this is not fully within your purview, and I get that. But I guess just from the perspective of your comfort in feeling that you have all the assets you need in place, there is one aspect of the training of Mr. PII, but then also there's the aspect of when he called tech support that it took multiple hours for them to locate the experts necessary to actually figure out what was going wrong. Does that raise any concerns, that it took so long for tech support to -- and that might be a contracting issue, that might obviously go up the chain.

But just as a base level, does that concern you that it took that long for tech support, whatever contract they had with tech support, to work through those issues?

Witness: It would certainly be nice to have immediate access to the experts.

PSI Majority: Thanks. That's all I've got.

HSGAC Majority: Excuse me. HSGAC Majority with Senator Peters. I've got a couple of quick follow-up questions on what you were discussing earlier. One thing I want to make sure I heard correctly. When you were speaking about your understanding of how the AGR building would be covered, did you say that you were briefed that there would be a uniformed police presence on both sides of the fence in that area?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And that was Site Agent?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: When you say both sides of the fence, you mean that area in between the two fence lines as well as the side where the AGR building was present?

Witness: Yes. There was like a chain-link fence and --

HSGAC Majority: And do you recall anything more specific about, you know, what she said in terms of, you know, which state or local agencies would be providing that presence

and if there would be vehicles or uniformed patrol walking around, or anything along those lines?

Witness: No. It was just there's going to be uniformed presence on both sides of the fence.

HSGAC Majority: And that was a verbal briefing?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And did you ever see any, you know, diagrams or other paper depicting where the uniformed presence would be?

Witness: So I recall her diagram. It's pretty standard LES [redacted] LES [redacted] LES [redacted]. It's just to acknowledge that there is a presence there, I've thought about this, and it's going to be covered.

HSGAC Majority: And was your expectation that Agent PII would've received more detail from your state and local partners about, you know, even if your diagram only showed something high level, would you have expected Agent PII to have had a conversation with state or local partners saying, you know, we're going to have X number of uniformed officers on foot, X number of, you know, vehicles, and here's specifically where they're going to be?

Witness: For the second supervisor walk-through it probably would not get that granular.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. But when she was briefing you, saying, you know, there's going to be a uniformed presence on both sides, would you have expected her to be aware of a greater level of detail than what she conveyed to you, or you would have expected her to just, you know, hear from state and locals, we'll have some presence?

Witness: She told me that she actually walked that area with the locals. So it was my understanding that, you know, she had that rapport with whomever was going to be there and where they were going to be positioned and how many.

HSGAC Majority: And then did you become aware at any point, that day or after the fact, that there -- your understanding is that while there were patrol cars in between the two fences, there were not any uniformed officers patrolling the area on the AGR side of that second fence. Did you come to learn that at any point?

Witness: Not before the event.

HSGAC Majority: And is that unusual that, you know, what actually happened on the ground is different than what you were told and what the expectation would have been?

Witness: I'm sorry. Say that again.

HSGAC Majority: You know, is that unusual -- I guess the question is you would expect, in your experience, have you had other instances where you were told this is where state

and locals are going to be and then come to find out later that that was not, in fact, the case?

Witness: I don't recall a specific instance.

HSGAC Majority: Thanks. And one separate question. I want to talk specifically about the time period right before the former President took the stage. So you were, at that point, with President Trump backstage before he went on to speak?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And at events like this, or protectee events, is there any kind of, you know, standard, LES [redacted]

Witness: LES [redacted]

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So you would expect, LES [redacted]

Witness: LES

HSGAC Majority: You rely on your colleagues in the Secret Service to raise any issues if there were.

Witness: Correct. Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And we've talked about how, you know, at the time or later, around 6:00,1 give or take a couple of

minutes, we know now that both the protective intelligence agents and the counter sniper response team were actively engaged in looking for this suspicious individual and had not made contact or, you know, interviewed him, detained him. Is that something that you would expect any number of agents with that knowledge to raise prior to a protectee taking the stage?

Witness: I would've liked to have known all the information before we took the stage.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And with all the other agents working the event, were they aware -- would they have known that -- would they have received any notice prior to the President taking the stage where, you know -- LES LES so that agents could raise something if they had a concern that was outstanding?

Witness: LES LES LES So that does happen. It did happen. I can't say for certain. It's just so automatic that it's something that I'm just --

HSGAC Majority: LES LES LES

Witness: LES

LES

Now if they were scanning on their radio, LES LES , they would've heard it. If they were not scanning, then they wouldn't hear it.

HSGAC Majority: And is there a standard practice or expectation that they should be scanning to follow those movements?

Witness: They should be scanning -- we didn't have Secret Service agents that day, though, so I can't completely fault them. We had Homeland Security Investigation agents, who are fine people, but they're not Secret Service agents. And so that may not be something they're totally familiar with.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Got it. That's all that I have. I'll turn it over to my colleagues. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: Just a couple additional questions on the day of the July 13th rally. One thing I wanted to clarify is you initially, the day before, were briefed that there would be a joint Security Room with all the key players involved. Is that what you thought was happening on July 13th?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So you did not know that there were actually two Command Posts?

Witness: I was under the impression it was one

joint Security Room.

HSGAC Majority: And moving forward to when shots were fired, I know you spoke about, in detail, your movements and how you responded to protect the President. I want to ask a couple of specific questions about protocol. When you moved to cover the President to make sure he was protected, what is the protocol to move the protectee off the stage? Do you have to wait until you hear "shooter down"? Do you hold for a specific period of time? Could you walk us through the protocol?

Witness: Sure. I'm not sure there's a specific set of rules. It's a very dynamic situation where multiple rounds are being shot. You've got counter assault team guys coming on the stage to set up a perimeter. For that specific day, once we heard "shooter down" we felt pretty good that it was an appropriate time to move.

HSGAC Majority: And in the event where you experience something like this but do not have counter snipers and may not hear "shooter down," would the protocol be -- maybe it's not a protocol, as you mentioned; it's dynamic, depending on the situation -- to hold with the CAT team, creating that barrier?

Witness: The question is in a hypothetical situation, if I didn't have counter sniper and the same events unfolded, the same thing happened but we just don't

have counter snipers. Is that your question?

HSGAC Majority: Yes.

Witness: I don't know if any of us would be alive if we didn't have counter sniper.

HSGAC Majority: And I guess one other question. So why not move him off the stage immediately, considering he was shot?

Witness: One, I didn't know he was shot. I didn't know it was confirmed that he had been hit. I did see blood but I didn't know how he was bleeding. And we're behind cover. LES [redacted] LES [redacted] agents on top of him. Although we're exposed, we're still safe. So it's instinct.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. So moving forward, why, as you moved him off the stage, why -- I think there were a couple of critiques of why waiting to let the President get his shoes, and why it let him expose himself to raise his fist.

Witness: I believe he left in his socks. We moved him off the stage as fast as we could. To me it seemed textbook, to be quite honest with you.

HSGAC Majority: So you have no -- I know this probably all was a blur, but looking back there wasn't anything in your view where you waited to let him get his shoes or

allow him to expose himself by, you know, raising his fist up.

Witness: He didn't get his shoes. He left in his socks. And we moved him off the stage, shielding him with our entire bodies as we moved LES It was pretty textbook.

HSGAC Majority: And I'd like to ask a couple follow-up questions. The Independent Review Panel report noted that it is LES LES LES The panel found that while the process enhancement by the Trump detail, and this is their words, quote, "appears to have been well intentioned and sensible to improve the quality of site planning, it may have inadvertently also contributed to the ambiguity regarding overall site security ownership and leadership responsibilities on the 13th."

Do you agree with this assessment?

Witness: I think the integration of our agents has been extremely well received by the field offices, from its inception up until recently, LES LES We're being given agents from the current President's detail for site advance work.

HSGAC Majority: I'm sorry. Could you say that again?

LES

Witness: Not right now. Like I'm talking within the last few days, LES [redacted] LES [redacted] LES [redacted] We could still send one, but honestly, the travel has been minimal since the election.

HSGAC Majority: Another critique from the panel was that multiple experienced senior personnel from local field offices tasked with advance work, quote, "failed to properly develop the Site Security Plan in a way that was responsive to basic security planning principles." Do you agree with this assessment, and if so, what needs to change to ensure security planning is aligned with basic security planning principles? Examples they included were, you know, effective mitigation of high-angle line-of-sight risks, effective flow of communication, integrating state and local roles. Those are just a few examples.

Witness: I think how we've responded after this event, it would have been helpful then, just, you know, the full complement of assets.

HSGAC Majority: I'm sorry. Could you clarify that? What do you mean?

Witness: Like the counter sniper, counter assault, a larger counter assault team, all the advance personnel that go with those assets. LES [redacted] LES [redacted]

LES Those LES pieces, you know, are there to help the site agent, as well, on what they see from their training and experience on what needs to be helped to secure that site. So having those things, having those kinds of assets for our detail would've been helpful prior to Butler.

HSGAC Majority: Would have a counter surveillance unit have been helpful?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know why one was not requested? Did you recommend that one be requested?

Witness: We did not request one. That never came in from the advance team. I don't know if we ever got a Counter Surveillance Division team prior to Butler, Pennsylvania. It was not a standard practice.

HSGAC Majority: But given the unique nature of this site and the threat that had recently come in against President Trump, should a counter surveillance unit have been requested?

Witness: It would've been helpful. Mr. Trump had a lot of outdoor rallies. I mean, just because we were outside at Butler was not really unusual.

HSGAC Majority: Are there certain, whether it's cultural, institutional norms or customs within the Secret Service that, you know, should be reevaluated as it relates

to whether it's giving deference to inexperienced protective detail agent or the campaign staff, who do not specialize in security, or something else, based on your decade-plus of experience with the agency?

Witness: I think if we, you know, we should definitely look at what's happening with a protectee that might be running for office versus, you know, a traditional former President who may not be holding the types of events that Mr. Trump was holding. They're very different, in my experience. So maybe some kind of evaluation on what could be provided to those situations. Granted, this is the first of its kind, so --

HSGAC Majority: Did you contribute to the final Site Survey after the event?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Was there a final Site Survey, to your knowledge?

Witness: It's standard practice to submit a final survey. There should've been.

HSGAC Majority: I don't believe we've received a copy of the final Site Survey, so I'll just add that to our request list.

To your knowledge, have any Secret Service personnel involved in the July 13th event been removed from duty, reassigned, place on leave, or terminated?

Witness: On DTD?

HSGAC Majority: Or anyone in a field office, anyone to your knowledge, whether it's within the detail or within a field office.

Witness: I know Agent PII has been put on, I don't know what the exact classification of it is, but she does not operate at work anymore.

HSGAC Majority: Have you received any disciplinary actions or administrative leave from Secret Service after the event?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: What happened at the July 13th rally was a near miss or what Secret Service refers to as an unusual protective event or incident. Are you aware, have you been involved in any event like this in the past, or are you aware of any events like this in the past?

Witness: No. I mean, 43 years ago was the last time something basically like this happened.

HSGAC Majority: To your knowledge, did anyone complete LES which is the LES LES after this event?

Witness: I believe one was completed.

HSGAC Majority: And I also don't believe we have received a copy of this. I would ask for that, as well.

To your knowledge, were there any Secret Service

protocols or policies that day that were deviated from or not followed on July 13th?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: Is setting up two command posts contrary to Secret Service protocol?

Witness: I've come to learn that it is not unusual.

HSGAC Majority: The former and acting Director of the Secret Service have both testified before Congress that operational failures occurred that day. Do you agree that there were operational failures, and if so, please opine.

Witness: I believe communication was the biggest learning point from this day. I think if we had the communications with the appropriate people, information flow, I think this gets avoided.

HSGAC Majority: To your point on communications, the SAC of the Buffalo Field Office, who ran the Security Room on July 13th, suggested that a second supervisor who had done the walk-through run the security post in the Security Room. Do you agree with that suggestion?

Witness: Absolutely not. I'm sorry. Basically he wanted me to run the radios?

HSGAC Majority: I'm not saying you specifically. Moreso a recommendation forward looking and how to improve communications. I'm curious whether you --

Witness: I guess just be careful. Second supervisors would not perform that function. So if he wants a suggestion is to have additional people in the security room --

HSGAC Majority: It should be someone else. It is not within the role of the second supervisor, is what I'm hearing you say. Is that correct?

Witness: That's correct. LES

HSGAC Majority: And last question before I turn it over to my colleague. What changes, to your knowledge, has Secret Service, including the Donald Trump Detail, implemented since July 13th?

Witness: Say it again.

HSGAC Majority: What changes or reforms has Secret Service, including the Donald Trump Detail, implemented since July 13th?

Witness: Well, they've increased our -- we basically have a similar style posture to the sitting President, which is, you know, LES LES Some of the larger -- when it was possible they would send a LES agent to conduct the lead, instead of just the field office. I'm not saying that, you know, Agent PII was from a big detail so she had big detail time as far as doing advance work, but a change that happened after that was

agents that were on the sitting President's detail supplemented our trips, and when they could, they would run those trips if manpower allowed. So that was a positive change, I thought.

HSGAC Majority: Just a few questions and I'll turn it over to our colleagues. Who has the authority to remove a protectee from the stage?

Witness: It's the Secret Service.

HSGAC Majority: Who, within the Secret Service, physically in proximity to any protectee, is only going to be the detail. Correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So wouldn't it be only the detail that has the actual capability to remove a protectee?

Witness: From the stage, yes.

HSGAC Majority: So is there any communication prior to an event about responsibilities with respect to flow of information to details that is unique to information that needs to go to a detail?

Witness: I'm not sure I follow.

HSGAC Majority: You indicated in response to questions from my colleague, in at least three different instances, that there was information you would've liked to have known about in this event -- LES, the individual with the rangefinder, the individual lurking around.

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: Among all of these pieces of information, why would that have been relevant for you, as someone with direct proximity to the President, to have?

Witness: Because in those instances that happened, that information is critical to, one, maybe we hold at the airport until this person is found. It just gives us opportunities to make better decisions. That information flow, you know, ideally would've went either to the lead agent or to the field office supervisor, you know, to me in some form, whether it was through the lead or whether it was through SAC PII. It could've happened in any one of those information flows.

HSGAC Majority: So our Interim Report identified as one of the major failures, communications breakdowns themselves. And among the changes you identified as having happened since this event, I've not heard anything specific to communications. So have there been any changes, or in your opinion, should there be any changes specific to communications that are relayed to individuals in direct proximity to a protectee?

Witness: I change on how I receive the information. I mean, I think the plan is there. It just wasn't executed on the 13th.

HSGAC Majority: You stated earlier that on the 13th the

former President arrived in LES , and that, in your view, was a good thing. Is that accurate?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC M j ity : And why is that good, in your view?

Witness : Because it covers where the protectee is exactly at.

HSGAC Majority : And is it accurate to say that that's preferable, specifically for an outdoor event, because the more coverage you have, the more he is blocked from public view until he is ready to be in public view, the safer it is.

Witness : It's not specific to an outdoor. I've worked plenty of indoor rallies where the LES LES . That's not uncommon. LES LES LES .

HSGAC M j ity : Let me ask you a different question then. Is an outdoor venue, in your view, as opposed to an indoor venue, something that presents specific and, to some degree, greater risks than an indoor event?

Witness : Indoor events, in my opinion, are preferred. They are easier to secure. There is less -- what's the word I'm looking for? -- there's less things we have to consider on mitigation, or they're defined by the interior of the building.

HSGAC Majority : Is one of the risks of an outdoor event

related to the ability, depending on line-of-sight concerns, or rather than ability, I should say, the threat of some firearm-related risk, unique to an indoor event, where there is greater certainty that all attendees will pass through a magnetometer?

Witness: I think that's true. There is a greater certainty that all the attendees will pass through, for an indoor venue, whereas an outdoor venue, long-range threats LES you know. There could be long-range threats at an outdoor rally that are outside of any perimeter.

HSGAC Majority: And in your experience, and since you began up until today, has the risks of firearms and high-capacity magazines and firearms capable of longer range threats, has that risk increased for outdoor protectee events?

Witness: Rephrase the question, please.

HSGAC Majority: In the time in which you've been an agent, is it in your view a greater threat with respect to long-range capabilities of certain weapons than when you began?

Witness: I don't think so.

HSGAC Majority: Why is that?

Witness: From my training and experience, from when I came onto the job, there's always been weapons capable of shooting at a long range.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned an assassination attempt

hasn't happened in 43 years. In your time on the job, have you personally been involved in any event in which a firearm has been discharged?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'm going to turn it over to our colleagues.

HSGAC Minority: HSGAC Minority with Senator Paul's office. I've got a few more questions for you. One is do you know of any requests made by the Donald Trump Detail for LES LES that was ever denied? I know you use it now, but was there ever a time that you remember you requested it and it was denied?

Witness: I don't recall.

HSGAC Minority: I think you mentioned it a little bit, but are you satisfied with the changes implemented since July 13th? And the reason I ask you, you know, unfortunately experience is the greatest teacher in security, and you have a lot of it. And it appears you have a lot more left in you. So that's the question I wanted to really put forward. Are these the changes that you believe needed to happen, and what other -- I want to reiterate -- changes do you feel need to be implemented so we don't repeat July 13th of 2024?

Witness: Okay. I do like the changes that

happened afterwards. I think they were beneficial. I think there should be, you know -- I don't know what exactly it looks like, but some kind of assessment of just because they're a former President doesn't exclude why they should or should not get something. That should not be a factor. It should be based on other things. Their status as a former President should not have any bearing on if we get campaign glass or don't get campaign glass, or things that are normally associated with a sitting President.

HSGAC Minority: In our testimonies, and we've heard from C/S Team Lead, he had information at 1745 hours of the issue that was going on in the three o'clock. Did he have a means of communication to you or the other people on the shift? Could he contact you by radio or any other means to let you know that?

Witness: If I was at the site, my radio was operational. I'm not sure. Were we at the site yet when he would be contacting me?

HSGAC Minority: 1745 you said you were on-site. You said you arrived LES

Witness: Okay. Then yes, he would've had the means.

HSGAC Minority: And I'm just going to ask you this again. That is information you think should've been shared with you.

Witness: Absolutely.

HSGAC Minority: Because you made the statement, the best counter sniper in the world was there, the counter sniper team.

Witness: Yeah, their team.

HSGAC Minority: But that best counter sniper team in the world didn't ensure that the AGR roof was covered. But let me finish. Site advance, Donald Trump Detail advance, counter sniper advance, and lead advance. My question to you is, is that the responsibility of each of those individuals to ensure that that line-of-sight or vulnerability threat was mitigated, because it takes a team.

Witness: You know, the way it was briefed to me it was mitigated. The execution of that did not work.

HSGAC Minority: I think that you're explaining what I think we've heard from a lot of people. The process was in place but people failed. Because you're in a position to where you're relying totally upon the advance team for their diligence to provide that layered protection for when you arrive. Because you mentioned that PII, you told them to pay attention to line-of-sight issues due to the long-range threat that was brought to your attention. Should this have raised their security posture and attention to detail to a higher degree?

Witness: I think so. I think it's part of the reason why I shared it.

HSGAC Minority: So you're probably familiar with the Cooper's Code of Mindset Readiness, the Color Code, Cooper's Mindset Readiness Color Code. Does security posture change from time to time, and does that mindset change based on intel or information that's being passed on to you?

Witness: Certainly our readiness changes when certain information is passed to us, or not passed to us.

HSGAC Minority: And the last question I have. I guess this is the downfall of being considered an Agent in Charge in a supervisory role. I'm going to ask you this. Knowing what you know now, and knowing that the roof of the AGR specifically was compromised by Thomas Crooks, and ultimately exploited by him, who -- and I'll just make it easier for you so you don't have to -- what role is responsible to ensure that that does not happen?

Witness: I believe candid and detailed conversations have to happen during the advance on these types of problems that were identified, because they were, because I was briefed on how they were mitigated. It's communication. It's liaisoning with your local counterparts. It's walking the site. It's being at the site.

HSGAC Minority: But what role, whether it's the site lead, who is responsible to ensure that that actually happens? It's great to have a plan, but someone has to ensure that that plan is enacted. What role -- because you've done it --

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Minority: -- who is responsible for that, to ensure that it is taken care of?

Witness: So ultimately the site agent is responsible for their site, and how they brief me, they need to make sure it's implemented that way. Now there are things we can do to make sure that happens. If I'm made aware of it, I can help do that. But if I'm in the blind, or if any other agents there don't know about it, then we can't help get them to how we know they thought things were going to be. If something's off, they need to raise that issue.

HSGAC Minority: And I'll finish with that because that's the last thing I wrote -- intelligence is only good if disseminated properly for action. Would you agree with that assessment?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: Thank you for your time.

PSI Minority: PSI Minority. Did Thomas Crooks attempt to enter the Butler rally?

Witness: I was never briefed on that.

PSI Minority: What time did local law enforcement in the AGR building spot an individual with a rangefinder?

Witness: Like I said, I was never given that information. I don't know.

PSI Minority: We understand, through text messages, that local law enforcement communicated with each other that at about 5:16 p.m. Thomas Crooks was spotted with a rangefinder, so nearly an hour before shots were fired. Do you know how Thomas Crooks arrived in Butler, Pennsylvania?

Witness: No. No. I wasn't briefed on Thomas Crooks at all until, you know, there's the media. But I don't know.

PSI Minority: What do you know about Thomas Crooks?

Witness: White male, from the area.

PSI Minority: Were you briefed about where Thomas Crooks' vehicle was ultimately parked, and that there was IEDs in the trunk of the vehicle?

Witness: I don't recall a specific briefing, but I had heard that information, you know, sometime after the events, between then and now.

PSI Minority: What information specifically?

Witness: I recall somebody, I don't know who, said he had like a clicker device on him. And I think just from, you know, news outlets, that there were things in his

vehicle consistent with what you described.

PSI Minority: So Thomas Crooks ultimately parked his Hyundai Elantra right outside the AGR building. Is that news to you?

Witness: News to me.

PSI Minority: He couldn't park any closer. He was right across from the driveway into the AGR building.

Did Thomas Crooks act alone?

Witness: I don't know.

PSI Minority: We understand Secret Service radio communications were not recorded on July 13th. Is that correct?

Witness: I've come to learn that.

PSI Minority: Are they recorded now?

Witness: Yes. It's my understanding they are.

PSI Minority: How does that work?

Witness: You'd have to ask the CIO. I'm not much for that.

PSI Minority: You mentioned earlier that there was going to be local uniformed presence at or around the AGR building. Do you know what specific local law enforcement was supposed to be there?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Do you know if Pennsylvania State Police were supposed to cover the AGR grounds?

Witness: I do not.

PSI Minority: Did you know that Pennsylvania State Police had undercover vice unit officers at the Sheetz and were deployed around 5:49 p.m. to go locate Thomas Crooks?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Do you know if any Secret Service personnel ended up on the AGR grounds before shots were fired?

Witness: Say that again.

PSI Minority: Do you know of any Secret Service personnel that was at the AGR grounds, seeking to find Thomas Crooks, before shots were fired?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Do you know that a local law enforcement officer, Butler ESU, took a shot at Crooks on top of the AGR building that day?

Witness: I've heard it after.

PSI Minority: What did you hear?

Witness: I heard -- I didn't know his name -- that the local counter sniper team had shot. This is obviously during the unfolding, after we LES the stage, is my understanding, and that his round struck the weapon. That's what I heard.

PSI Minority: Were you interviewed by the Pennsylvania State Police and the FBI?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: When did that occur?

Witness: I don't know the exact date.

PSI Minority: We can check the date and get back to you.

PSI Minority: Was that interview recorded?

Witness: I believe it was.

PSI Minority: Is there anything that we haven't asked that you'd like to tell us?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Thank you.

Witness: Thank you very much for your time today. This is going to conclude our interview. As I mentioned at the beginning, while we've tried to be comprehensive, we reserve the right, should we need to, to revisit any questions, and we would ask that you not relay any information we discussed today.

Before we conclude the interview, and I'll follow up with the Secret Service, but in today's interview a number of documents that I believe are responsive to our original July requests for documents and information, which is not specific to individual interviewees, I believe a number of documents that are responsive to that request exist within the custody and control of the Secret Service but have not been provided to the Committee. I'd ask that you follow up

and ensure that those documents have been received. You should have a notation of all of those. That includes, without limitation, the PowerPoint training by the DTD, the text messages that were discussed today, [redacted] cellphone log, the final Site Survey, the Unusual Protective Event document, and if there are others I'd ask you to follow up with us and get back to us.

Of note, I do want to make reference to one document that has been produced to us, that I believe is not exclusive to other relevant information. We received, as a part of the ongoing productions, document with the Bates Number 012892. And as our colleagues relayed during the interview, this document is an email, and the subject title of the email is "The Arrest Was Made," and the email date is July 12, 2024, the day before the rally.

Based on information we have, including subsequent requests from this Committee to the Department of Homeland Security, this does not appear like it would be the only document related to the arrest being referenced here. So we'd ask that Secret Service and Department of Homeland Security review records within their custody and control and ensure that we receive all responsive documents and information, and would thank you for your additional efforts there. And [redacted], thank you, as well, for your time today and your counsel's time.

Thank you, and that concludes this interview.

[Whereas, at 5:02 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

INTERVIEW OF

Site Protective Intelligence Agent

SENIOR SPECIAL AGENT, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Thursday, November 14, 2024

Washington, D.C.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AND THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW OF

Witness [redacted]

SENIOR SPECIAL AGENT, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Room SD-342

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, November 14, 2024

2:07 p.m.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Witness:

[redacted], Counsel

[redacted], Deputy Chief Counsel, Secret Service

On Behalf of Chairman Peters:

[redacted], Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul:

[redacted], Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of PSI Chairman Blumenthal:

[redacted], Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

APPEARANCES (continued):

On Behalf of PSI Ranking Member Johnson:

PSI Minority, Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Chief Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations [Virtual]

PSI Minority, Deputy Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

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P R O C E E D I N G S

HSGAC Majority: Good afternoon. This is the transcribed interview of Witness, being conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

This interview was requested by Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, as well as Subcommittee Chair Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, as part of the Committee's investigation of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on President Trump, and the U.S. Secret Service planning and security in advance of and during the Butler, Pennsylvania, July 13, 2024, rally.

On July 25, 2024, Chairmen Peters and Blumenthal, and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson requested voluntary transcribed interviews with U.S. Secret Service personnel, and again, on September 11, 2024, renewed those requests, including for Secret Service Agent Witness

We will introduce ourselves for the record so you can understand the offices who will be asking questions today, and then we'll ask for introductions for counsel, as well. And with that, I will pause and actually ask if you would start and introduce yourself with your name and your current title.

Witness : My name is Witness , [redacted] . I'm a Senior Special Agent with the United States Secret Service in the LES Office.

HSGAC Majority : And I'll ask if your counsels will now introduce themselves.

Witness Counsel : Yes. Witness Counsel , and I represent Special Agent Witness .

HSGAC Majority : This interview is being conducted, as I mentioned, by four offices, and we'll introduce ourselves so you can understand the staff reach of the offices who will be asking questions.

My name is HSGAC Majority . I'm the Chief Counsel and Investigative Counsel for Chairman Peters. I'm joined by my colleague, HSGAC Majority , Senior Investigative Counsel, and HSGAC Majority , Senior Investigator.

And I'll turn it over to Senator Blumenthal's staff.

PSI Majority : PSI Majority , Counsel for Majority Staff, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

HSGAC Minority : HSGAC Minority with the Office of Senator Rand Paul. HSGAC Minority will be in shortly.

PSI Minority : Good afternoon, PSI Minority . My name is PSI Minority . I'm Staff Director for Ranking Member Johnson. I have PSI Minority here, who is our Deputy Staff Director, and virtually we have PSI Minority from our officer, who is our Chief Counsel. Thank you for being

here.

HSGAC Majority: And apologies. We are also joined by HSGAC Majority for Chairman Peters' office, who is the Deputy Chief Counsel for the majority.

The reporter is going to create a verbatim record of what we discuss here today, and with that in mind, as I'm sure you are familiar, please respond to the questions we ask verbally because the reporter will not be able to properly record a nonverbal response. Do you understand?

Witness: I do.

HSGAC Majority: The interview is being conducted in an unclassified setting, and so if the questions call for any information that you know to implicate classified information, please state that for the record, as well as the reason you understand the question to implicate classified -- a response that will require providing classified information. Once you have clarified, to the extent possible, please respond with as much unclassified information as you are able to do so, to respond to the question, and if need be, we are able to adjourn and can address any information in a classified setting should that need arise. Do you understand?

Witness: I do.

HSGAC Majority: It's the Committee's practice to honor valid common law privilege and claims as an accommodation

to a witness when those claims are made in good faith and accompanied by a sufficient explanation, so that the Committees can evaluate the claim. When deciding whether to honor these privileges, the Committee will weigh its need for the information against any legitimate basis for withholding it. The interview today is occurring without prejudice to any future discussions the Committee may request, and we reserve the right to do so in the future should we need to.

If you need to take a break during today's interview, we will be happy to accommodate you, but our plan is to generally ask questions for an hour, break on the hour, and provide an opportunity for a break. Should you need any in advance please just let us know.

If you have any questions about what we are asking, or if the question we have asked is confusing, please just ask us to clarify and we'll be happy to do so.

You are required to answer questions before Congress truthfully. Do you understand?

Witness [redacted]: I do.

HSGAC Majority: This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview, and specifically 18 USC Section 1001 makes it a crime to make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations in the course of a congressional

investigation, and this statute applies to your statements in today's interview. Do you understand?

Witness [redacted]: I do.

HSGAC Majority: Is there any reason that you would be unable to provide us today with truthful answers to our questions?

Witness [redacted]: No.

HSGAC Majority: We would also ask that you not speak about what we discuss in this interview with anyone outside of the room, in order to preserve the integrity of our investigation. And we also ask that you not remove or make any copies or photographs of the exhibits.

Do you have any questions?

Witness [redacted]: None at this time.

Agency Counsel: Agency Counsel [redacted], Deputy Chief Counsel, Secret Service. We just want to go on record that the Secret Service and DHS made available to the Committee, consistent with the Chairman, information and records that would not ordinarily be released publicly. This information and records fall under the Privacy Act, personnel and other personal privacy information, for official use only, and law enforcement sensitive records, and related statutes.

While the Secret Service and the Department have made this information and records available to the Committee, we

continue to assert that such information and any discussion is not intended for public disclosure. Additionally, we are not waiving any protections under these statutes. And just for purposes of the constructive dialogue, we are making this assertion at the outset of this interview.

And finally, the transcript and any other attachments are protected, we feel, from dissemination to the same extent as the documents. And also the Secret Service and the Department were assured that there would be no video recordings or audio recordings of today's interview, of course with the exception for purposes for the court reporter.

We appreciate it. Thank you, HSGAC Majority

HSGAC Majority: And per our prior interviews I will reiterate the Committee is bound by Senate and Committee rules, and we will be bound by those rules here. We intend, as we did with our interim report, to have a public report at some point in the future, and we will rely on nonpublic information we learn, including in today's interview, as part of any future report.

And as is the Committee's practice, and as was the practice in the first interim review, in advance of making any nonpublic information public it is our practice and our intent here to provide any individuals who provided that

information with the opportunity to review such information for factual accuracy in advance of any effort to make that information public.

With respect to any recordings, it is our understanding there will only be a recording made of the interview today for the purposes of transcribing the interview itself, and I just the other offices, and it is their understanding, seeing their affirmation, all of the offices have agreed. And with that, if there are no other questions, we will begin.

[redacted]: We appreciate it.

[redacted]: We will begin the first hour [inaudible]. I'm with Chair Peters' office. As [redacted] mentioned, we will begin the first hour by us asking questions, and then I'll turn it over to my colleague, [redacted] [sic].

I'd like to start by asking a few background questions. How long have you been with the Secret Service, and in what positions?

[redacted]: Twenty-one years, as a special agent.

[redacted]: Can you describe what roles you fulfilled during those 21 years, whether it be advance roles, other types of protection details?

[redacted]: I was hired in 2003, the Fresno Resident Office, as a criminal investigator Special Agent.

I was in the Fresno office for approximately 10 years, doing criminal investigations and protection work. I was then transferred to the Carter Protective Division, where I worked as a shift agent, shift leader, and when I left the Carter Division in 2019, I was an acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge. Primarily I was Mrs. Carter's detail leader.

I then transferred to the Phoenix Field Office in 2019, and I became a Senior Special Agent. Then I resumed criminal investigations. In 2020, I took over the protective intelligence investigations for the Phoenix Field Office, as what we would call a backup, which is a non-supervisory GS-13 position.

In 2022, I was assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force at the FBI in the Domestic Terrorism Squad. I left the Phoenix Field Office in August of 2024, and transferred LES [redacted] LES [redacted] office, where I'm currently stationed.

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: Why were you assigned to a rally in Pennsylvania when you're based out of Phoenix, or when you were based out of Phoenix at the time?

Witness [redacted]: So for the 2024 campaign, approximately a year in advance all field agents are given a solicitation to list a number of preferences for campaign assignments. My number one preference was as a jump team leader. A jump team leader for the campaign is a post-

stander who is assigned a team of post-standers. In this instance, HSI special agents were used to supplement Secret Service for post-standing assignments. So my role for the campaign would be for a three-week rotation. Myself and a team of other agents would travel from site to site and stand post for whatever event we were assigned to. And that was how I became assigned to the rally in Butler on the 13th.

HSGAC Majority: And you mentioned you transferred to the LES office in August 2024. Why did you LES LES after Phoenix?

Witness: My husband was hired to coach at LES, so I volunteered for a transfer.

HSGAC Majority: What was your assignment for the July 13th Butler rally, and when did you learn of that assignment?

Witness: On approximately July 10th I received an email notification that I had been activated in my role as a jump team leader. I believe ta that time I was told -- and I would have to go back and look at the records to be certain -- I believe at that time I was told I would be traveling to Pittsburgh for President Trump's rally. I also received logistics for travel, a list of names of HSI agents that would be assigned to me for that particular assignment. And then I traveled on the 12th, I believe, to

Butler, where I met my team.

HSGAC Majority: Our understanding is that in addition to serving as jump team leader you also served as the site protective intelligence agent for the July 13th rally. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: First, I'd like to understand the roles and responsibilities of the respective positions. What were your roles and responsibilities as a protective intelligence agent?

Witness: So as site protective intelligence agent is one of the standard posts that are assigned at a protected venue. There are a certain number of posts that are common among all sites. This is one of them. A site protective intelligence agent would be a roving post, not a fixed post, and they would be responsible for responding to any unusual or threatening individuals that would be encountered in the site. For example, if someone were to approach the main magnetometer screening area and make an unusual or a threatening statement, in theory that person would be detained and a site PI team would be called to do an interview.

HSGAC Majority: And was there only one site protective intelligence agent for the Butler rally?

Witness: There was.

HSGAC Majority: And our understanding is that there were three jump teams for the Butler rally. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Actually, let me first introduce as an exhibit, this is the Manpower Request. I'll mark it as Exhibit 1.

[Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: And if you turn to page 2, the top page of the Manpower Request -- are you familiar with this document?

Witness: Not this document, no.

HSGAC Majority: Oh. Take a moment and review it. I'm just going to ask, on the second page, about the post-standers in the top section. Is this a document you're familiar with? Not this specific one but Manpower Requests.

Witness: In general, yes.

HSGAC Majority: And at the top of page 2, under the section that says Post-Standers, it lists total USSS, LES other federal agencies, LES so total post-standers LES I'm wondering if you can help us understand the distribution here. So our understanding is there were three post-standers, or excuse me, three jump teams, each with one

post-stander from Secret Service, so that's three, and then five HSI agents on two of the jump teams, and six HSI agents on one of the other jump teams. Where are the other three Secret Service positions?

Witness [redacted]: The other three post-standers were from the Secret Service post-standing pool of investigative field agents. So for example, had this been a presidential rally or a non-campaign event, post-standers would come from all over the United States, from Secret Service offices, from their INV roles as criminal investigators. So three of these post-standers were from the field, and also were Secret Service agents.

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: And are jump team leaders and jump team agents always post-standers?

Witness [redacted]: Yes.

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: Who determined how many jump teams were needed for the July 13th rally?

Witness [redacted]: I don't know. The jump teams would be -- the post-standers would be requested. A number would be submitted, this is how many we're requesting. And then someone else would make a determination on where those bodies would come from, if they would be jump teams or if there were bodies within district, where it says out of district, non-district, or in-district. If there were people available from the Pittsburgh area, they would be

selected first to stand post, due to proximity. So it really could come from whoever was available.

HSGAC Majority: And aside from your particular role as jump team leader for Jump Team 3 as well as the site protective intelligence agent, which was a roving position, were all of the other jump team positions post-standers or were they roving?

Witness: They were all post-standers.

HSGAC Majority: I'm showing you what I'll mark as Exhibit 2, which is the Secret Service Site Map Diagram.

[Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: Is this the document you saw in advance of the July 13th rally?

Witness: Yes. This would've been included in the site post briefing.

HSGAC Majority: Does this document indicate where the post-standers, where the jump teams were positions?

Witness: No. It doesn't have post-stander positions. The positions for PD, that's local law enforcement. It doesn't have the individual Secret Service and HSI post-standers.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know where those three jump teams were stationed throughout, for the rally?

Witness: To a degree.

HSGAC Majority: Are you able to just mark to give us --

Witness: There were some that I was not familiar with, the exterior vehicle checkpoints. I never encountered those agents, or I didn't post them up. I can tell you approximately where people were that I encountered, but I --

HSGAC Majority: Sure. If you could just walk us through approximately.

Witness: So there would've been one agent at the arrival/departure area --

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: -- which is another standard post at every site. That would've been in the area of where the motorcade had staged. There would've been an agent at the Hold Room, which is another standard post. That would've probably been at this other orange X, just beyond the motorcade. There were LES agents, what we call "dais agents." They would have been staged right and left. The dais is another general post that you would see at any venue.

There were, I believe, LES agents at the press riser, which was in the crowd area. There was an agent in a vehicle post, by a pedestrian gate.

HSGAC Majority: And so for each jump team, these agents

are located throughout, not all in a singular area.

Witness : No.

HSGAC Majority : Or in a concentrated area.

Witness : All three jump teams were at this venue with the exception of one jump team leader who was at the airport. Everybody else was here at this site.

HSGAC Majority : And were any jump teams located or positioned near the AGR building?

Witness : Not that I'm aware of, no.

HSGAC Majority : Is it common to serve as both the protective intelligence agent and a jump team leader?

Witness : For the campaign -- the Protective Intelligence site PI assignment is a post-standing assignment, so it would be a post-stander, and it's common at every site. For the campaign, those assignments Protective Intelligence site PI, is typically given to a Secret Service agent rather than an HSI agent, because of the nature of our threat investigations. That's not an investigation that they conduct. They wouldn't have the experience for conducting those interviews, so that typically goes to a Secret Service agent, which is a jump team leader.

HSGAC Majority : What I'm trying to get at is, is it a resource issue why you fulfilled both roles, or is it a common practice?

Witness : No. I would be standing post regardless, and being a jump team leader. So I could've been in the Security Room. I could've been at a fixed post. I could've been the CS Response. For this particular event I happened to be site PI. But it was common for the jump team leader to do any manner of those posts.

HSGAC Majority : And did your responsibilities as a site PI, were they at all hindered by also serving as a jump team lead?

Witness : I wouldn't say hindered, no. But I was operating in both capacities at the same time.

HSGAC Majority : And I think you answered this but just to make sure, were there any other site PIs there that day?

Witness : No. Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority : And so, you know, for the 15,000-plus people that were there, and the vast area that needed to be covered, you were the only one tasked with responding to a report of a suspicious individual. Is that correct?

Witness : Myself and then there was a CS Response Agent, a Counter Sniper Response Agent. He would --

HSGAC Majority : What's the difference?

Witness : Yeah, he would have a similar role. However, he would be addressing individuals specifically

called out by the Counter Sniper Team, whereas I would respond to anything reported suspicious, be it by local law enforcement, post-stander, attendee, Security Room, uniformed division officer. The counter sniper response agent would be primarily coordinating with the Counter Sniper Team to respond to things that they saw.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any involvement in the planning for the rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: What documents did you review in advance of and in preparation for the rally?

Witness: The documents that I received via email from the advance team, logistics and site post instructions, site post log, and then there would've been the diagram.

HSGAC Majority: Did you review the post-stander map from the Pennsylvania State Police Department?

Witness: No. I didn't receive that.

HSGAC Majority: Did you review any of the local operational plans from Butler ESU?

Witness: No. I didn't receive any of those.

HSGAC Majority: Did you go to the Butler Farm Show grounds prior to July 13th?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Who was in charge of advance planning

for the Butler rally?

Witness : The site agent from the Trump detail.

HSGAC Majority : And I apologize if I asked this and I forgot your answer, but who was responsible for determining where the Secret Service post-standers would be positioned? Is that the site agent?

Witness : That would've been the site agent, yes.

HSGAC Majority : How does the security perimeter generally affect your responsibilities and duties as a site protective intelligence agent?

Witness : So my primarily responsibility and duties would be within the site itself. That's not to say that I could not respond to something outside the site. I have done that in the past, and that does happen. However, it is typically, for example, an exterior police post, let's say, would encounter someone outside the site that would be suspicious or unusual to the degree that they felt the Secret Service needed to respond. Then they would call for a site PI or someone within the Secret Service to respond to that. That's not something that I would initiate myself outside the site. I would have to be called by someone outside of the site to respond to something. My primary responsibility is within the site, the crowd, the attendees, and the immediate stage and area.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any concerns about the perimeter on July 13th?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: With an area as large as the Butler Farm Show grounds, with an event that garnered so many individuals, in your view is it, you know, realistic to cover that wide, that vast amount of area? Is that reasonable? Is it effective? Do you think there should be more site PIs?

Witness: I felt confident that I could respond to anything that needed my attention. It would have been beneficial to have more, but I didn't feel like I could not do my job effectively with what I had.

HSGAC Majority: And given the security perimeter -- and we'll get to this in more detail -- but in this particular instance, on July 13th, you were called to respond to a suspicious individual outside of the perimeter. Is that correct?

Witness: I was.

HSGAC Majority: And did the fencing and any other obstacles that might have been present, did that impede at all in your ability to respond to find the suspicious individual?

Witness: It did. The immediate perimeter was encased. We were surrounded by a chain-link fence. When

we attempted to go to the area where the individual was reported to be, we were stopped at the chain-link fence and there was a locked gate. Had I been able to go further at that time I would have. There was about a 20-yard grassy area and then a second chain-link fence, and the individual was reported to be on the other side of that second fence, in an industrial area.

I went as far as I could go physically, and I visually inspected the area, and I didn't see the person. The reporting parties didn't have a visual on them at that time. I didn't feel comfortable, given that the program had begun and that President Trump was en route, I didn't feel comfortable leaving the venue to go look for somebody. I was relying on other means to locate and detain this person before responding.

[redacted]: And we'll go through in detail the search for the suspicious person. But did you ever leave the security perimeter?

[redacted]: I did not leave the venue itself, no.

[redacted]: And when you say "the venue," you're talking about the security perimeter where attendees had to go through the magnetometers, correct, and the fenced-in area.

[redacted]: When I went to look for this person was behind the stage, behind the barns, through the parking

lot, all the way to the chain-link fence, as far as I could go in the golf cart that I had. To go any further to look for this person I would've had to get in a vehicle and leave the venue and drive on a public road outside the Farm Show property to look for this person. So I went as far as I could, within the fencing of the Farm Show.

HSGAC Majority: Going to the morning of July 13th, did you attend the 10 a.m. briefing that day?

Witness: I did.

HSGAC Majority: How did you learn of your state PI counterpart?

Witness: I had received an email prior to the 13th from the Protective Intelligence advance, providing me a name and contact information for the State Trooper that would be assigned to assist me.

HSGAC Majority: And who was that State Trooper?

Witness: PSP Counterpart

HSGAC Majority: And when did you meet with Trooper PSP Counterpart

Witness: The morning of the 13th, after the 10 a.m. briefing.

HSGAC Majority: Did Trooper PSP Counterpart have a radio for state and/or local communications?

Witness: He did.

HSGAC Majority: For which ones? For state? For local?

Witness : He had his issued radio for communications with Pennsylvania State Police, who had a presence in the Security Room.

HSGAC Majority : And one other thing that happened the morning of the 13th. I'm happy to pull the document if you don't recall. But I'm curious if you recall getting an auto message of one of the jump team members being out of the country. Do you recall that?

Witness : Yes. The original list of names that I was given included an individual who had been replaced. His replacement hadn't been included in that first email distribution list. I got into contact with him prior to the event, and used his contact information, and we resolved the issue.

HSGAC Majority : So you were not down a jump team member.

Witness : No. He had been replaced. I just wasn't given the name of his replacement, and his replacement had been left off the email distribution list.

HSGAC Majority : Understood.

Witness : He was there, though.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. Turning to the search for the suspicious individual, when did you first learn about the suspicious individual with a rangefinder? Or when did you first learn about the suspicious individual?

Witness : Myself and Trooper PSP Counterpart at the same

time. We were together. We received information that a suspicious person, a person had been observed outside the venue, along the fence line, with a rangefinder.

HSGAC Majority: Where were you when you learned this information?

Witness: We were in the stage left area.

HSGAC Majority: So I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit 3.

[Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: And this is an overview of the site diagram from the Butler ESU. I have copies. One moment.

[Pause.]

HSGAC Majority: Here we go. Have you seen this document before?

Witness: I have not.

HSGAC Majority: So looking at this document, is this an accurate depiction of an aerial depiction of the Butler Farm Show grounds and the event venue on July 13th?

Witness: It is.

HSGAC Majority: Could you mark with pen where you and Trooper PSP Counterpart were when you first learned of the suspicious individual?

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: If you can just put an X.

Witness : Okay.

HSGAC Majority : So it looks like you are directly in front of the barn that is furthest away from the AGR building.

Witness : The stage was here, and we were in the stage left area.

HSGAC Majority : Stage left. And who did you learn this information from?

Witness : Trooper PSP Counterpart and I received the information at the same time. I can't recall if it was via radio or cellphone. There were also uniformed Pennsylvania State Patrol officers in the area. We learned at that time a local tactical team, Pennsylvania State Patrol, reported somebody outside the fence line for the event with a rangefinder. Myself, Trooper PSP Counterpart and one of the uniformed troopers then decided to respond to that tactical team's position.

HSGAC Majority : So a Pennsylvania State Police officer informed you and Trooper PSP Counterpart

Witness : There were a number of us standing around in the same area talking, working on crowd control in that immediate area. We were having some issues with crowds spilling outside of the bike rack area. So we were lined up along that area to contain the crowd.

It was passed to me through Trooper PSP Counterpart, and it

could've been through the radio, as well. I don't recall exactly how I heard. I have an earpiece in one ear where I'm getting radio traffic, and I'm communicating face-to-face and hearing things through my other ear at the same time. We both received the information at the same time and decided to respond.

HSGAC Majority: And approximately what time did you first learn about the suspicious individual?

Witness: At approximately 5:40.

HSGAC Majority: 5:40?

Witness: It could've been a little earlier. I would say between 5:30 and 5:40, in that area.

HSGAC Majority: And what exactly did you learn about the suspicious individual?

Witness: That was it. There was a suspicious individual outside the venue, along the fence line, with a rangefinder.

HSGAC Majority: Did that raise, the fact that the suspicious individual had a rangefinder, did that raise the level of suspicion or threat, in your view?

Witness: It's what I would consider unusual or suspicious. There were a number of pedestrians or onlookers along that fence line, I would say approximately 10 to 12. They were not visible from the stage left are. Until we responded to that area where the tactical team

reported seeing this person, I had no idea there were any people along that fence line. When we went over there, there were a number, as I said, a number of public lined up along the fence line.

HSGAC Majority: And in terms of the location of the suspicious individual, was it communicated to you where approximately he was seen?

Witness: Initially it was communicated along the fence line, outside the venue. Until we responded to where that tactical team was positioned, who was reporting the information, I did not know where that area was.

HSGAC Majority: Why not? Was it because you didn't have a map, or was it because --

Witness: It was described as the fence line outside the venue.

HSGAC Majority: Not --

Witness: It could've been anywhere.

Witness: Not with sufficient specificity.

HSGAC Majority: Yes. It could've been anywhere. We first needed to get to where the reporting party was to then determine where this fence line was where this person was seen.

HSGAC Majority: And during this time did you receive a photo of the suspicious individual?

Witness: Not at this time, no.

HSGAC Majority: And when you first learned about the suspicious individual, our understanding is that, or what did you do with this information when you first learned about it?

Witness: As far as with the information, or what did I do?

HSGAC Majority: What did you do when you learned that there was a suspicious individual with a rangefinder outside the fence line?

Witness: Trooper PSP Counterpart and myself and a uniformed Pennsylvania State Trooper, we got on the golf cart that we were using and we drove over to the area where the tactical team was positioned, that reported the information, and looked for the individual.

HSGAC Majority: And was that a Post-Stander 5?

Witness: It wasn't a Secret Service fixed post. It was a Pennsylvania State Patrol post.

HSGAC Majority: So I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 4, which is the Pennsylvania State Police Operations Manual.

[Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: Have you seen this document before?

Witness: Not on that day, no.

HSGAC Majority: Not on that day. But since then?

Witness : I would've in previous interviews.

HSGAC Majority : Would that document --

Witness : I --

HSGAC Majority : Would that document have been helpful to have in advance, specifically referring to the map of where the post-standers were, on page 4?

Witness : It would have been helpful to know where the local law enforcement posts were, yes.

HSGAC Majority : And was it Posts 4 and 5 on the Pennsylvania State Police Operational Plan Page 4 where you went with Trooper PSP Counterpart

Witness : Yes. There was a local tactical team there, and there was also a uniformed trooper with a marked unit parked just outside of the chain-link fence and chain-link gate that was locked.

HSGAC Majority : And what did you learn, if anything, when you were at this post?

Witness : Nothing actionable. They repeated the information, there was a suspicious individual with a rangefinder. There was limited physical description. I believe he was described as a white male with long hair.

HSGAC Majority : Who relayed this information?

Witness : The tactical team and the uniformed trooper at Post 4.

HSGAC Majority : The State Police.

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Majority : Not local police.

Witness : No. The local tactical team that was staged in that area. So Posts 4 and 5, we spoke with the officers there.

HSGAC Majority : And that's the State Police posts.

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Majority : And so you learned this information at approximately 5:30 or 5:40 --

Witness : In that area.

HSGAC Majority : -- in that range. But our understanding is you did not call Special Agent Intel Advance Lead until 6:05. Why wait that amount of time to inform him?

Witness : At that time we had a limited physical description. The individual was not in the area. No one knew where this person had gone or where they were. It was vague, at best. At that time, while we were looking for them, I noticed a couple of uniformed police cars with markings in that industrial area. I asked Trooper PSP Counterpart to reach out to those officers, find out who was over there, see if they had seen this person, look for this person.

I also noticed the counter sniper teams on the roof. I called the Counter Sniper advance, asked if any of his counter sniper teams had seen this person. They did not

know where this person was. I instructed him if they saw him to call me and that I would respond and interview this person. There was no more information to pass at that time other than what was already known by the Security Room and had already been passed. I had no additional intel.

HSGAC Majority: How did you know -- did you hear at all this information being relayed on the Secret Service radio?

Witness: Trooper PSP Counterpart had communication with the Pennsylvania State Patrol representative in the Security Room. I don't remember specifically communicating with the Security Room. I know that from his end he was getting information from the Security Room. The understanding was they were aware of the situation. I had no further intelligence than what was passed to me.

HSGAC Majority: Given how big the Butler Farm Show grounds were, did it ever occur to you to call this information in to the Security Room so that others could be made aware of the suspicious individual and keep an eye out for him?

Witness: Again, at the time I was under the understanding that the Security Room had the information, being that it was being relayed to my partner and to me. None of the other posts in the area, that I was aware of, had a visual to the fence line. There were interior posts, but there were risers that would've blocked line of sight

from the stage posts. Same for the people on the press riser. There weren't any other posts that would've had a visual of this area. It was that far removed.

HSGAC Majority: Were you at all privy to the local radio communications that day?

Witness: I was not. It was being relayed to me through my partner, my counterpart.

HSGAC Majority: So at 5:42 p.m., a Butler ESU commander radios out, and this is on their radio channel, PD Ops 4, and he says, I quote, "Just an FYI. We had a younger white male, long hair, lurking around the AGR building. He was viewed with a rangefinder, sighting the stage. He was up against the building. I believe he was looking up at us and he walked around the side of the building. We lost sight of him. There was a bike with a large backpack sitting beside it. It's parked in the rear of the building. That wasn't there earlier."

Would this information have been helpful for you to hear?

Witness: It would have. I did not hear it. I did not know Butler ESU was out there that day. The only local law enforcement agency I was aware of was the Pennsylvania State Police.

HSGAC Majority: You were not aware that Butler ESU was -- could you say that one more time?

Witness : I was not aware Butler ESU was out there supporting the visit.

HSGAC Majority : What was your understanding of how the AGR building was covered?

Witness : I had no understanding of where the AGR building was, what it was, or how it was covered. That was not briefed to me.

HSGAC Majority : When you learned that the suspicious individual with the rangefinder was near the AGR building, did you go to the AGR building?

HSGAC Majority : It was never reported to me that this person was near the AGR building. I was never briefed on the AGR building or where it was located. All I was briefed on was the site itself, and the only intelligence I received was a suspicious person along a fence line with a rangefinder. The AGR building was never mentioned specifically.

[Pause.]

Witness : And so I'd like to go through just where we left off. Initially you learned of the suspicious individual with a rangefinder when you were stage left. You then traveled on the golf cart with Trooper PSP Counterpart to Pennsylvania State Police post-standers 4 and 5. You then learned, at that time, a little bit more information, a description of the individual. At that time did you

receive a photo or any other information?

Witness : Not at that time.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. so what did you do from there?

Witness : Once I concluded my phone call with the Counter Sniper Advance agent, and Trooper PSP Counterpart finished his phone call asking for local support in looking for this person, we got back on the golf cart and we were in the process of returning back to the stage left area to resume crowd control. When we got to the parking lot behind the barn, Trooper PSP Counterpart advised that his vehicle was parked in that lot and volunteered to get in his truck and drive the fence line outside the venue, looking for this person. I agreed that that was a good use of our manpower. The uniformed trooper and I then continued back to the stage left area, and Trooper PSP Counterpart broke away, got in his vehicle, and was driving the exterior fence line, looking for the individual that had been reported.

HSGAC Majority : And what did you then do?

Witness : I went back to the stage left area to resume crowd control.

HSGAC Majority : Did you inform either the Command Post or the Security Room at any point that you then stopped looking for the suspicious individual?

Witness : I did not, my team, meaning that Trooper PSP Counterpart was still looking. There was no one visible

at that time. I wouldn't say that we stopped looking. There was nothing further to be done in that area for me, unless this person had been located and detained for questioning. I was not in a position to leave the venue to go look for this person.

HSGAC Majority: And can you estimate around what time this was when you returned back to, you mentioned stage left, to do crowd control?

Witness: I'd say approximately 5:45, a few minutes after. We were in that area with the Posts 4 and 5 for I would say 10 to 15 minutes.

HSGAC Majority: I think it might be helpful, let me show you some text messages which might be helpful in terms of putting times --

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: -- on these things, because I know it's been a while. So I'm showing you two sets of text messages. One is Exhibit 5 and then the other will be Exhibit 6. And the redactions you will see on these messages were not applied by us but Secret Service.

[Exhibits No. 5 and 6 were marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: So if we could first look at the text message that has, I believe it's Exhibit 5.

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Majority: Who is this text message between?

Witness: The first message?

HSGAC Majority: Yes.

Witness: I believe that was from me to Special Agent Intel Advance Lead

HSGAC Majority: And it says here 3:07 p.m. Is that just because of the time change, it really should be 6:07 p.m.?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So at 6:07 p.m., you text a photo to Special Agent Intel Advance Lead Do you recall where you got this photo?

Witness: I believe I got it from Special Agent C/S Response who was the counter sniper response agent.

HSGAC Majority: And when did you run into Special Agent C/S Response

Witness: After I had returned to the stage left area from looking for the person outside the venue.

HSGAC Majority: And was this an intentional connection? Did you write to Special Agent C/S Response and ask to consult with him?

Witness: No. He was in that area, assisting with the crowd control.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware that Special Agent C/S Response was also looking for this individual?

Witness: Not until I spoke to him.

HSGAC Majority: And talk about that communication.

Witness: When I responded back to the stage left area I encountered him. We shared information. We basically had the same information, a vague physical description of a person outside the venue, along a fence line, with a rangefinder. He then advised he had received a photo of this person, and he shared it with me via text message, and then I passed that to Trooper PSP Counterpart and to Special Agent Intel Advance Lead

HSGAC Majority: And so this was at 5:52. At 5:52, Special Agent C/S Response said he texted you a photo of the suspicious individual. Why wait so long to share it with Special Agent Intel Advance Lead

Witness: I don't believe it was that long. I don't know how long the picture would have taken to go out once it was being sent. Once I received it I sent it. There was no intentional delay.

HSGAC Majority: But it was 15 minutes from the time you received the photo from Special Agent C/S Response And just for the record, I don't know that we've received this text message where Special Agent C/S Response sent a text to Special Agent Witness I could be wrong, but I think that's probably from Special Agent C/S Response TI.

Witness: I don't recall it being 15 minutes. That seems long to me. I believe it was a shorter time

frame.

HSGAC Majority: And in this text message, Intel Advance Lead responds, "Command Post PSP Trooper said he may be walking toward the Sheetz." Why didn't you go toward the Sheetz at that time?"

Witness: At that time I didn't know what the Sheetz was. I'm not from Pennsylvania. I was unaware that was a gas station. I learned that after the fact. I didn't know where it was, well outside the venue I later found out. The assumption among those of us that had been looking was that this person was probably leaving the area.

HSGAC Majority: And turning to Exhibit 6, you then shared that information, "Command Post PSP Trooper said he may be walking toward the Sheetz." Is this with your Pennsylvania State Police counterpart, Trooper PSP Counterpart

Witness: No. What happened here was Special Agent Intel Advance Lead and I were texting each other at the exact same time. That's actually information he's passing to me. My text is in the green, and that was from him to me. They came in --

HSGAC Majority: At the same time.

Witness: -- at the same time, I think within seconds, so his appeared first.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. But going to Exhibit 6 --

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: -- this is text messages. It's redacted, but our understanding is it's with Pennsylvania State Trooper PSP Counterpart Correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And you then relayed the information that Intel Advance Lead shared with you about going toward the Sheetz with Trooper PSP Counterpart Correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So when you go back to -- it was likely -- I wanted to show you those just to get a better understanding of timing. So can you estimate when approximately you then went back to stage left? It must've been around 6:00 and not 5:40?

Witness: Possibly. I think maybe 5:40 was when we were initially looking for them. I got the pictures shortly after we returned to the stage left area.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: I can't give you an exact time. Again, it's been four months. But it sounds right. It was minutes, I would say less than five minutes after we got there we had the photo.

HSGAC Majority: And at this time did you hear at all that the individual was near the AGR building?

Witness: Again, I was never told where the AGR building was or what it was. All I had was a fence line,

which I observed to be near an industrial area. I did not know that was the AGR building or what any of those buildings were.

HSGAC Majority: And at that time, when you decided to go back to crowd control, knowing that you're the only protective intelligence agent who is tasked with looking for suspicious individuals, and that there is a suspicious individual somewhere on-site, that local police officers lost sight of for over 20 minutes, why did you not inform anyone that you stopped your search?

Witness: So the person was not inside the site. They were outside the site, in a public area where people were gathered. I never stopped searching. I had no additional intelligence. I had no additional information on where to look or how to encounter this person. The stage left area was a large section of the crowd that was being contained with bike rack. The people in this crowd were taking apart the bike rack and spilling into a walkway with direct access to the motorcade. Had that crowd broken through that bike rack completely, they could have overwhelmed the motorcade. They were also within throwing distance of the stage.

Based on the information I had, which was a suspicious individual with a rangefinder looking at the stage outside the venue, I had no more information. The person was not

detained. They were not visible in the area. Other people had the information and had a better vantage point than I did.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say other people, who?

Witness: The counter snipers on top of the buildings had a better vantage point of that area than I did. I was on foot, at a fence line, approximately 25 yards away from where the person was spotted, and they were no longer in the area. They were no longer visible. Had they been detained, had they been stopped, I would have left and interviewed them. I was not in a position to leave the venue and to conduct a search for this person at that time.

HSGAC Majority: Did you inform Special Agent Intel Advance Lead that you stopped your search?

Witness: Again, I wasn't stopping a search. I needed more information. I needed a location. This person had to be detained for me to be able to respond to them. My job is not to leave the venue and search for people. My job is to interview people with a suspicious interest, with an unusual interest, or someone that's making a threat. Yes, this person's behavior was suspicious. I'm not in a position to leave the venue and to go look for this person. My responsibility is a post-stander within the protected site.

HSGAC Majority: So what did you do to make sure that the Secret Service Security Room and the Secret Service personnel who were tasked with making decisions about keeping the President on and/or off stage, made sure that this individual was actively being looked for and others were aware that there was a suspicious individual?

Witness: The Security Room, it was my understanding at that time the Security Room was aware of this person, being that they had passed information to people who had shared that information with me. I was among the people who had responded to look. I was not initiating any of this. I was responding to information I was being given, along with other people. I was not in a position to provide any additional intelligence. I had nothing else to contribute to the search. I was waiting for more information. Had anything else come, I would have responded in kind.

HSGAC Majority: And is there any protocol for protective intelligence agents when you're in this type of position, where, based on what you're saying, you are unable to leave the security perimeter but know that there is a potentially dangerous individual that needs to be confronted? What are you supposed to do?

Witness: At this point it was never communicated that this person was dangerous. Yes, it was

unusual that someone would be using a rangefinder to look at the stage. The information that Butler ESU put on the radio, that wasn't known until after the fact. That was never passed to me. I never received it. There were a number of people on that fence line doing any manner of things that could be considered unusual. I observed a woman on horseback with a flag, riding up and down the fence line.

Yes, this was unusual. Yes, it was concerning. But again, had this person been detained or stopped, had someone who had seen this person asked them to stand by and then called for specifically Secret Service to interview them, I would have gone and interviewed them.

HSGAC Majority: But your role was to confront and interview individuals. Correct?

Witness: Within the site. Outside of the site, I am not roving outside the security perimeter looking for people. I had 15,000 people inside. Any manner of threat can develop inside these events. That's my primary responsibility.

HSGAC Majority: Would you characterize your search for the suspicious individual with the rangefinder as urgent?

Witness: At that time, based on the information I knew, it was not urgent. I was concerned. There was never any mention of a weapon or any direct threat. The

only concerning information was the rangefinder at that time.

HSGAC Majority: And to your knowledge, who else was involved in searching for the suspicious individual?

Witness: Pennsylvania State Police.

HSGAC Majority: And in your view, was Secret Service's search for the suspicious individual sufficiently coordinated?

Witness: There were no Secret Service personnel outside the venue looking for this person that I was aware of. Myself and Special Agent C/S Response would have been tasked to respond to somebody had they been located or detained. Being that the person was in an unknown location, not visible, there was nothing to respond to.

HSGAC Majority: Did you hear the Secret Service radio alerts about the locals addressing a 3 o'clock issue 200 yards out?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Why not?

Witness: They were passed on a different channel. The post-standers were operating on one channel, and the detail operates on a different channel. So that was communicated on a radio that I was not privy to.

HSGAC Majority: And before shots were fired, were you ever made aware that there was someone on the roof?

Witness : Prior to the shots being fired, there was information passed, I believe it was verbally, among those of us in that area, that someone was spotted on the roof of the AGR building. This was the first time I heard the AGR building addressed by name. Prior to that statement, I had no idea what the AGR building was or where it was located, and at that time I did not know what it was or where it was located.

HSGAC Majority : Did you consider putting that information out on the radio, that there was someone on the roof of the AGR building?

Witness : That information was being communicated through my counterpart, Trooper PSP Counterpart and the Pennsylvania State Police. It had been passed to them through their coms. It was my understanding that that was originating in the Security Room, through the Pennsylvania State rep in the Security Room. So my understanding was they were aware.

HSGAC Majority : But there's someone on the roof of a building that's 200 yards from where the President is speaking. It did not occur to you to put that out on the radio, since you had not heard it out on the radio?

Witness : Again, I didn't know where the building was or what the building was. So I have no idea what the AGR building is or where it's located. I had no

more information. I was asking State Police at that time what is the AGR building and where is the AGR building. I had no other information. It was my understanding this was being communicated through the local police rep in the Security Room. I did not put any additional information on the radio because I didn't have any additional information. While we were trying to determine this location and what this building was, that's when the shots rang out.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. I'll turn it over to my colleague.

Witness: Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: Special Agent Witness my name is HSGAC Majority. I'm on Senator Peters' team with the Committee.

Just following up on my colleague's questions about the perimeter and your role, have you ever been instructed that you're not allowed to leave the security perimeter other than you as a PI agent?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Is there any policy, that you are aware of, prohibiting you as a PI agent from leaving the security perimeter at an event?

Witness: No. There is not.

HSGAC Majority: So what gives you the understanding that you should not be leaving the security perimeter?

Witness : There was not an understanding that I should not be leaving. The issue was there was nothing specific I am responding to. There was nobody to be interviewed. There was nobody to contact. If I had stepped up to that fence line when I had first gotten the information and seen that person, I would have gone to that person and tried to make contact with them. They were not visible, and I had no other information other than a vague physical description.

HSGAC Majority : But forgive my confusion. Wasn't that your job? In other words, wasn't it on you to go find that person?

Witness : Not necessarily, no. My primary responsibility is the site itself and the crowd in the site. If the person had been visible, if I had seen them or if they had been detained and they were calling for someone to come interview them, this is something the Secret Service needs to respond to, this is something they need to question, I would have responded. There was nothing to respond to at that time other than a description of a person that was no longer in the area.

HSGAC Majority : What gave you the impression that they were no longer in the area?

Witness : They were not visible, to anyone.

HSGAC Majority : So you didn't know where they were.

Witness : No.

HSGAC Majority : So you didn't know positively that they were no longer in the area.

Witness : I knew they were no longer anywhere visible that I could respond to. I did not feel at the time I was in a position to leave the venue, go to an industrial area that I was unfamiliar with, and to conduct a search for this person.

HSGAC Majority : So just to clarify, not knowing where someone was gave you confidence that they were not in a certain area?

Witness : Not knowing where they were gave me confidence in I needed to wait for more information before I left the venue to contact them.

HSGAC Majority : Understood.

Witness : If there's no one to see or interview, I did not feel comfortable leaving the venue to wander this area looking for someone.

HSGAC Majority : Have you ever left the security perimeter at a previous event?

Witness : I have.

HSGAC Majority : For what reasons?

Witness : There were a number of times, and one specific time there were a group of protesters, a crowd, gathered outside of a venue, and we had intelligence from

local police one of the protesters was armed legally, under their clothing. And I walked across the street from the venue to get a better visual on the post-stander, a better physical description. They were visible from the venue. I walked across the street, got a good visible description and a look at the person, should something happen.

HSGAC Majority: But in this case, as you've said, you felt that it wouldn't have been appropriate for you to leave the security perimeter to look for this suspicious person.

Witness: No. Being that I would have had to get into a vehicle, drive completely off property, onto a public road, into an area I was unfamiliar with, and look for a person I had a vague physical description of, the crowd itself was a bigger threat at that time, I felt. I needed more information. I needed a picture. I needed a physical person to talk to.

HSGAC Majority: Well, when my colleague was first asking you about the search for the suspicious person, you said that initially you encountered the fence and it was locked, and that if it hadn't been locked you would've gone out further to look for the suspicious person.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So explain the difference now why you

initially said you would've gone further outside the security perimeter if the gate hadn't been locked, but now you're saying that you were prohibited, or at least it was your understanding that you shouldn't have left the perimeter.

Witness : If the gate hadn't been locked I would've crossed that 20 yards of grass right up to the fence line, face-to-face with those people, and I would've engaged them, "Hey, did you see somebody over here? What did they do? Where did they go?" I would've continued along. Being that I had to go and get in a vehicle and then drive outside a fence line to the other fence line to conduct those interviews while the program was beginning, when the protectee was en route, staying inside the site felt like the bigger priority to me at the time.

HSGAC Majority : Understood. I appreciate it. I'm going to turn it to my PSI majority colleague for some brief follow-up.

PSI Majority : Hi there. Just a couple of questions, Special Agent Witness In radio communications referring to the AGR building, do you recall was it primarily local, like Pennsylvania State Police making these references, or were there Secret Service personnel also using the term "AGR building"?

Witness : The first time I heard the term "AGR

building" was when someone was reported to be on the roof of the building. I had never heard that term, the name of the building, prior to that. The Pennsylvania State Police in the immediate area that I was communicating with did not know where the building was located. We were trying to determine that as we got the information.

PSI Majority: And are you aware, or do you recall if any briefing materials that you received ahead of this event labeled or identified the AGR building?

Witness: The first time I heard the term "AGR" was the report that someone was on the roof.

PSI Majority: Okay. Thank you very much.

Witness: You're welcome.

HSGAC Majority: Just one follow-up question, or a couple of follow-up questions. Our understanding from an interview of Trooper PSP Counterpart is that he did not have a Department radio on him at the time. Was that something that you were made aware of?

Witness: I do not recall. I believed he did have a radio. I knew he had communication with his agency. I assumed it was via radio.

HSGAC Majority: You did not know that he may have not had a radio on him.

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And did you experience difficulties with

cellphone service that day?

[redacted]: I did not.

[redacted]: And I believe we are nearing the hour, so we will take a five-minute break and then resume with our colleagues from Ranking Member Paul's office.

[redacted]: Okay.

[Recess.]

[redacted]: Thank you. I'm [redacted] of Senator Rand Paul's office. I've just got some questions that we've come in with and then multiple follow-ups, just on what we've heard, from what you've already testified on.

First of all, can you go back and just kind of clarify when you first got a notification of that suspicious individual, later known as Thomas Crooks. Give me a kind of a timeline when you first heard that, that there was a suspicious person in that area.

[redacted]: The specific times obviously are a little foggy being that it's been four months. Between 5:20, 5:45, in that area, it was communicated to me there was a suspicious person seen outside the venue, on a fence line, with a rangefinder. That was all the information I had. I responded to the area of where the reporting party was, to follow up with them, and try and establish a visual of where this person was, who this person was.

[redacted]: Where was that area that you responded

to? I think you've told us it was in the area of post, I think she showed you --

Witness : 4 and 5.

HSGAC Minority : -- 4 and 5.

Witness : To the stage right area there were bleachers, tall bleachers. It was behind those bleachers, right up along the interior fence line where it cordoned off the property of where we were in the venue.

HSGAC Minority : Did you get to speak with the person who made the report?

Witness : I spoke with the local tactical team that was stationed there, and I also spoke to the uniformed State Trooper that was posted right outside, on Post 4. I spoke to both of them, and they said the same thing, a person on the fence line with a rangefinder. There was a vague description, and I believe it was white male, long hair, younger. And they were no longer visible. They were no longer in a position where we could make contact with them.

HSGAC Minority : Who sent you there? Who dispatched you there?

Witness : I wasn't dispatched by anyone. I was given information that this was being reported, through --

HSGAC Minority : From who?

Witness : My counterpart, PSP Counterpart , through

the uniformed trooper, "Hey, we've got a report of a suspicious person outside the venue with a rangefinder." And I said, "Okay. Let's go check it out." Where are we going, who is reporting this. The tactical team in this area. So we responded to that area and spoke to the tactical team.

HSGAC Minority: And can we clarify what your role was. You had, it looked like, two roles. But primarily what was your primary role that day, as a PI or as a post-stander, jump team leader? What was your primary role?

Witness: So the site PI, Protective Intelligence Team, is a post-stander. It's not a fixed post. So it's a roving post throughout the venue. My primary role was to engage and counter anybody with an unusual interest in the protectee, anybody making a threat. For example, if somebody in the crowd were to make a concerning statement and another attendee were to report that to a post-stander, they would call for a site PI team. I would respond, who made the concerning statement. I would go talk to that person, "Hey, what did you say? What's going on? What is the intention behind this statement?" Anything within the venue and outside of the venue, if there is a person or issue to respond to.

For example, on a previous site, in Phoenix, Arizona, for the First Lady, we had someone attempt to gain access

to a site by producing a fake credential. I was the site PI team for that venue. The person was spotted outside the venue with a group of protesters. I cross the street to the corner where they were standing, made contact with them, identified them, questioned them regarding their intention, what they did, and I later generated a report regarding that contact.

If this person had been visible outside the venue and I had been able to make contact with them and do a field interview, I would have. They were not in a position where I could see them to do that, locate them to do that.

HSGAC Minority: Have you ever been sent to a suspicious person at any event and you had to go look for them?

Witness: No. Any time that I would be sent to respond to somebody it would be somebody that was in a known location or that was being detained for interview.

HSGAC Minority: So you've never found someone suspicious on your own that was not detained. You've only interviewed people under the PI role after they've been detained.

Witness: No. I have contacted and interviewed people in venues that I deemed to be suspicious or unusual. For example, after this incident I was the site protective intelligence agent at a JD Vance site, and an individual wandered up to different areas within the stage location.

He appeared to be checking out security perimeters, trying to determine a way to gain access, get closer to the stage. I followed this individual. I questioned the individual, "Why are you here? Where do you live? What is your intention to be here today?" He was just curious. That's something I determined on my own, within the venue, to be suspicious.

So that's something you can develop through observing the crowd. At this venue it was a very large crowd. It would be difficult to navigate the crowd should somebody make a threat or an overt action towards the stage. So I was very concerned about the crowd itself and how I would navigate that crowd should something happen with someone inside of it.

HSGAC Minority : So when you talk about suspicious people, and that is one of the roles that you had, to either, if you observed them yourself to go to them and question them, or if you were sent under the device of someone else then you would interview them, we've heard from other people that the person was suspicious but they weren't threatening. What do you look for, for a suspicious person? What are you looking for? Because we've talked about the rangefinder. With the information you were given for Mr. Crooks, does that rise to the level of suspicion?

Witness : The rangefinder is unusual. That's not something you would see very often. Is it threatening in itself, alone? No. I think it's important to understand here, at no time was there ever a mention of any weapon, in any intelligence that I received. The only unusual bit of information that was ever passed was the rangefinder itself.

HSGAC Minority : So how many suspicious person calls did you respond to, that you were sent to that day?

Witness : This was the only suspicious call that I responded to. The first call for a site PI response was at the main mag checkpoint earlier in the day. There was an attendee and a volunteer who were waiting to be screened that got into a verbal altercation. Trooper PSP Counterpart and I responded. We spoke to both parties involved, determined that it was nothing that we needed to be concerned with, with regard to a threat to the protectee, and we allowed the uniformed State Police to handle it.

There was another report of a mother in a crowd who had a child. She believed someone in the crowd had inappropriately touched her child and was calling for a response. We responded to assist with that, determined that was also something uniformed State Police needed to address on a local level.

There were several missing children, several medical

callouts. As far as an unusual activity or suspicious, this was the first that I responded to.

HSGAC Minority: And if I understand you correctly, that is your priority, as your assignment --

Witness: It is.

HSGAC Minority: -- that day. Correct. Because we've heard reports from other people within the Secret Service, and maybe even the Acting Director, that you all responded to multiple calls of suspicious persons. And I just wanted to clarify that you had not. That was not things you had responded to. Correct?

Witness: I personally did not respond. This was the first suspicious person that I responded to.

HSGAC Minority: So did you have direct contact with people within the HSI that were there on the scene? Were they on a channel that you could communicate with them?

Witness: The HSI post-standers were on the post-stander radio channel, and I was able to communicate with them through the radio.

HSGAC Minority: Did you broadcast anything during the day on the radio?

Witness: I don't recall. I don't recall anything specific. I know there were several calls for relief at posts. That could've been communicated through the radio. I believe the response up to the main mag

checkpoint for the verbal altercation with the attendees was communicated via the radio. I don't recall initiating any traffic with intelligence I had to pass.

HSGAC Minority: And you mentioned that you didn't specifically know anything about the AGR building or where it was at. But there was talking of a suspicious person, and as you just said, was taken to the general area of where that report was at. Correct?

Witness: Yes. What was passed to me was it was a person on the fence line, outside the venue.

HSGAC Minority: The general area of where that building ended up being.

Witness: There were a number of general public gathered along that fence line, and they were reported to be with those people, along that fence line. That's what was reported to me.

HSGAC Minority: So at some point during the day you had worked and met up with, on a couple of occasions, with Special Agent C/S Response who was working as the counter sniper response agent. And at one point, as we were told, and I think you even mentioned it too, that you all were both actively looking for this suspicious person. Am I correct?

Witness: Yes. We had both received a report of the person. We had similar descriptions and intelligence

to share. And we had both responded and looked for this person, yes.

HSGAC Minority: And Sergeant C/S Response told us that at some point he was told to go back to the dais stage area and stop looking. Do you know who would've told him that?

Witness: I don't know. I know he was in the dais area with me, helping with crowd control.

HSGAC Minority: As you were standing, or meeting with the person who had reported that out to the fence line area, you never heard him told to go back to the crowd control position?

Witness: When I was with the tactical team in the stage right fence line area, Special Agent C/S Response was not in that area with me. I didn't encounter him until I returned over to the stage left side.

HSGAC Minority: And you testified earlier that you never went outside the, I guess for better, to quote/unquote, "inner perimeter" at any time during that day. Am I correct? While the rally was going on, because I know you had to come and traverse in and out.

Witness: The farthest I got was that fence line and locked gate.

HSGAC Minority: Let's go back to when you first got the cellphone picture of Mr. Crooks. What time was that? Because you first heard about him at around 5:20 to 5:45,

and I'm not going to hold you to specific times.

Witness : Yeah.

HSGAC Minority : I understand. But what time did you receive the photo of Mr. Crooks?

Witness : I sent the photo at, the timestamp on this is 3:07, so it would've been prior to that, maybe a minute or two before that.

HSGAC Minority : So was that 6:07?

Witness : Yes. I would've received it a minute or two before that.

HSGAC Minority : So 6:00, 6:07?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority : Okay.

Witness : I received it, and then I forwarded it.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. Did your counterpart receive, or do you know that he received a photograph before you did?

Witness : Trooper PSP Counterpart

HSGAC Minority : Trooper PSP Counterpart

Witness : I sent him a photograph, the one that I received. I don't know if he received one before that.

HSGAC Minority : But you had not seen any photograph until that time that it came across your --

Witness : Yes. That was the first I saw.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. I think that our colleague asked

a few questions a while ago about your decision to stay within the inner perimeter or leaving, and it is my understanding that you are the one that makes that decision. Am I correct? You specifically, no one. There's not a policy that says you have to stay here. You didn't have a supervisor to coordinate your movements. But you, individually, are able to make that decision. Correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: And you made a decision based upon what you called vague description of the individual, and you felt like that it was not enough information to leave the inner perimeter because of a, I think you used the term "crowd control issue" that was taking place close to the bike rack.

Witness: Had there been somebody detained to interview, I would've left to do that. That would've been my primary function is to contact and interview this individual. Absent them in custody or in sight, where I could contact them, that's my primary function as protective intelligence is to gather intelligence from that person. If there's not a person to gather intelligence from, my function is not to go look for people.

HSGAC Minority: Were you aware of any U.S. Secret Service assets that were leaving or left the inner

perimeter to search for Mr. Crooks?

Witness : I was not aware, no.

HSGAC Minority : Did you think that -- let me rephrase that. Knowing that your agency is the lead over all security, did you make a conscious decision not to ask someone from your agency or to make sure? I know we talk about, I think you mentioned assumptions that the radio room or the Security Room was broadcasting things out. But since your role is to follow up on suspicious persons, I'm trying to understand why you, specifically, did not ask for someone within the Secret Service to go outside the fence to search for that individual in partnership with the local and/or state agencies.

Witness : That's not something I would ask for. That's not something in my role that I would be tasked with asking. My job, as a site PI person, assigned to stand post at the site, is the site itself. The only time I would leave the site would be to contact somebody that has been stopped, had been detained, that I had stopped and detained because I determined this was someone who needed to be interviewed. Absent a physical body to gather intelligence from, there was no reason for me to leave.

HSGAC Minority : So if they would've found him you would've went.

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority : So which I guess leads me to the next thing. Did you hear anything over the radio that day, on whatever channel you were monitoring, that you said the other HSI and post-standers were listening to, did you hear anyone, including the Security Room, give a dispatch of this BOLO, Be on the Lookout, or ATL of this individual?

Witness : No. Nothing specific regarding this individual over the radio.

HSGAC Minority : Are you allowed to get on the radio and relay that information? Since your job is to interview the individual, help me understand why I wouldn't use the resources out there to help locate the individual so I could then henceforth interview the individual, is my question.

Witness : I understand your question. What I'm trying to think of is how to explain this. The posts inside the venue that I had contact with, none of them, absent myself or Special Agent C/S Response were in a position to see this area or to respond to this area. Myself and Agent C/S Response we were roving posts. If anyone were to leave the venue or to contact this person, had they been available for contact and interview, it would've been myself or Agent C/S Response We were in contact with each other. I was receiving information that was coming from the Security Room via the State Police. My

understanding was that the Security Room was up to date on the information. I had nothing additional to pass, to put this description out to the post-standers. Yes, that would've been an option, but they would not have been in a position to assist in locating this person. They were at fixed posts with fixed responsibilities.

HSGAC Minority : I must be missing something, because if I'm at Point A, and you said that you couldn't see in the area they are, but I've got other people that are spread out.

Witness : They were not in a position to see it. The two gentlemen on the stage could not see the AGR building from where they were standing.

HSGAC Minority : So how many people were on that channel?

Witness : All of the post-standers assigned to the --

HSGAC Minority : How many?

Witness : Let's see. How many did we have out there. Approximately LES

HSGAC Minority : Then again, I think that question I have is LES eyes are better than one person. If I can't see it but yet I need to locate this person to interview, I'm having a hard time understanding why if you didn't personally hear it on the radio why we would assume that

the other people heard it on the radio, why you, in your role, would not ask the other individuals, "This is the information we have. If you locate this individual please let me know so I can come and interview them." Because as you've testified, you did not know where he was at, so that's the benefit of a radio is to broadcast that out for other people, other standers. So maybe you can help me clarify that, on why that would not be helpful.

Witness [redacted]: Again, the other posts inside the venue did not have a vantage point to see where this person had been reported.

HSGAC Minority: But you testified earlier you did not know where he was at, at this point now.

Witness [redacted]: I knew he was outside the venue. I knew that he was not inside the venue.

HSGAC Minority: How did we know that?

Witness [redacted]: Because he was seen outside the venue, in that area. To get into the venue he would've had to hop fences. He would've had to traverse the parking lot, the backstage area, where there were police posts. He would've had to go through the magnetometers to get into the venue. And again, I had a vague physical description of a white male with long hair. There were 15,000 people there. I didn't have a photo at this time. I had no intelligence other than a white male with long hair, outside the venue,

with a rangefinder. I could have broadcast that, yes. I did not feel anybody else was in a position to respond or to assist in locating this person at that time, other than myself and Agent [C/S Response]

[HSGAC Minority]: Did your counterpart, as I think you said, got in his own work vehicle and left and went outside the fence. Am I correct?

[Witness]: Yes.

[HSGAC Minority]: Did you overhear or know of anyone that told him if he leaves outside the fence that he cannot get back in?

[Witness]: I did not hear that, no.

[HSGAC Minority]: If he was told that if you leave you can't get back in because that's where the motorcade is going to be at, you never overheard that conversation at all?

[Witness]: No.

[HSGAC Minority]: Would you understand why a uniformed trooper would be told that?

[Witness]: My counterpart was no in uniform. He was in a business suit. I don't know who told him what. When he got in his vehicle he broke away from me, so I don't know who he spoke to after that.

[HSGAC Minority]: And you made a decision not to go with him.

Witness : I did.

HSGAC Minority : And go back to the stage, based upon what you said was a crowd control concern?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority : Which goes back to your primary issues was the suspicious person. Could you have got in the vehicle and rode with him?

Witness : I could have. At that time, based on the information we had, I felt we were better served to split up. If he saw the person, if he encountered them, he could detain them and I could respond to his area. The crowd that we had breaking through the bike rack, who would've had direct access to the motorcade at that time, I felt was the bigger threat. If that crowd had broken through the bike rack they could've overwhelmed the road and approached the motorcade area.

HSGAC Minority : So when you went back to protect the bike rack area, did the presence of your one person prevent them from overtaking that route?

Witness : I was there. We had uniformed Pennsylvania State Patrol there. We'd even called over the EOD, the explosive -- it was basically an all-hands-on-deck area. We needed people along this bike rack line to control the crowd and keep them back from the bike rack. My intention was if this person was located and that it was

passed to me, I would immediately respond and conduct an interview. At the time that I split from Trooper PSP Counterpart I did not feel there was any more I could do to locate and assist with this person. He volunteered to go look. I thought that was the best use of our resources. He would continue looking. I would go back over to this area and keep an eye on the crowd. Should he make contact, we would reconvene and I would conduct an interview.

HSGAC Minority : When you were notified at 5:20, somewhere 5:20, 5:25, 5:30, of the suspicious person, I think you've told us that you received multiple, I guess, recurring accounts of the individual and updates, other people asking. Is it normal to, once you have a, quote/unquote, "suspicious person" for, I don't know, the reports just keep coming in a little quicker, a little more often, with a little more detail? And I guess my question to you is, was there a growing sense of urgency in all the things that you heard. They're focusing so much on one individual out of 15,000 people. Did an alarm bell not go off and say we may need to ratchet up our search pretty quick for this guy?

Witness : When I got the initial report that there was someone outside the venue with a rangefinder, I was concerned. I responded immediately. There was no more information for me at that time. In observing the area I

saw two marked units, police cars. One of them was Butler County. At that time I asked Trooper PSP Counterpart "Do we have uniformed officers in this area?" I didn't know. I asked him. He said, "I don't know. Let me check." He gets on the phone and he's making contacts.

So at that time my action is let's get some people over here looking for this guy. I asked my counterpart to reach out to local police. Let's get people mobilized to look and find and contact this guy. I also thought how else can we look to see where this person is. That's when I reached out to the counter sniper advance agent, "Hey, have your guys seen anybody?"

This is the first I'm hearing of this. I don't know this person has been in the area for all this time prior. All I know is, as far as I know this is the first we've heard of him. I don't know that he's been seen before this. I'm doing everything I can to get as many eyes on this area as I can.

Once I have exhausted those options, and I now know people are looking for this person, I'm going to go back to my original area of concern, which I was working on prior to this coming up. Trooper PSP Counterpart offered to join the search. I thought that was a great idea. Again, I was already concerned with the crowd control prior to this. I've got as many assets as I could possibly drum up,

looking for this person. Someone find this person and detain them so I can interview them. Everybody's working on this.

So I go back to the problem I was working prior. That was all I knew at the time. There was no other intelligence other than what I've told you -- someone on the fence line, with a rangefinder, limited physical description. I later get a photo, which I passed. And then I get into that someone is on a roof of a building that I've never heard of, in an area I don't know, trying to mobilize to go figure out where this building is. And then the shooting starts.

So I did as much as I could with what I had at the time.

HSGAC Minority : And the radio, you never, on your channel, heard anything about a person on a roof. That never came across.

Witness : I heard that someone was on the roof. I can't tell you if I heard it through my radio, which was in one ear, or if I heard it verbally through the other area. But the information was passed to me that someone was on the roof.

HSGAC Minority : And that was when you all were standing next to the stage, stage left --

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority: -- with that conglomerate of individuals that you were talking about?

Witness: There were a number of us in that area, watching the crowd. It was passed to me either via radio or verbally. I can't tell you which one. And we were in the process of determining where this building was, what this building was, and how can we get there when the shooting started.

HSGAC Minority: I think that's all I have at this point, and I'll pass it to my colleagues.

PSI Minority: PSI Minority, my name is PSI Minority. I work for Ranking Member Ron Johnson. Thank you for your time today. I'm going to go ahead and hand you, or my colleague will hand you Exhibit 7, and to save on time, Exhibit 8.

[Exhibits No. 7 and 8 were marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: Exhibit No. 7 is an image of three individuals on a golf cart during the July 13, 2024, rally in Butler. The image is a snapshot of a video posted on YouTube that was recorded by a rallygoer at Butler on July 13th. And I know that it is not a clear image, but if you are able to, could you please first answer whether or not that is you in this photo?

Witness: It appears to be.

PSI Minority : There appears to be three individuals. Two are seated inside of the golf cart, and one individual is standing, I guess, on the back of the golf cart. And it looks like the individual that is driving, is that you?

Witness : It would have been. I was driving the golf cart that day.

PSI Minority : Could you identify the other two people?

Witness : The person in the back, that would've been Trooper PSP Counterpart my counterpart, and then the person to the right appears to be in uniform, so that would've been the uniformed trooper that we grabbed to come assist us with the search.

PSI Minority : Do you know his name?

Witness : I don't.

PSI Minority : Is it Corporal PSP CPL

Witness : That sounds right. It was told to me in another interview. I didn't recall on my own his name, no.

PSI Minority : Okay. Earlier today you mentioned that Trooper PSP Counterpart was in business attire.

Witness : Yes. I would say business attire but I remember now I was in a buttoned-down shirt. Our dress for the day was neat casual. So typically it would be a

business suit, but he didn't have a coat on.

PSI Minority: Thank you for the clarification. Actually, before I turn to the next exhibit, just generally speaking about golf cart use that day, besides the golf cart that you were using, did you see other golf carts in the area?

Witness: It was passed to me through the site assist agent that she had secured three golf carts for our use. So I was using a golf cart, I was also sharing that golf cart with Agent C/S Response and then the site assist agent had a golf cart. I believe one of the Trump staff personnel had a golf cart. So we were sharing the golf carts throughout the day.

PSI Minority: Did you ever see a golf cart go outside of the immediate secured perimeter, specifically near the AGR area?

Witness: Did I?

PSI Minority: Yes.

Witness: No. No.

PSI Minority: Were you ever made aware of a golf cart in that area?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Okay. I'm going to go ahead and move on to Exhibit No. 8. That was the transcript that was handed to you a moment ago.

Witness : Okay.

PSI Minority : This is Trooper PSP Counterpart July 23, 2024, interview transcript with Pennsylvania State Police and FBI. It's a 14-page transcript, and I'm not going to make you go through every single page. But I want to begin, if you wouldn't mind flipping to page 3 of the transcript.

Witness : Okay.

PSI Minority : On page 3 of the transcript, at the bottom, Trooper PSP Counterpart states, "I had my cellphone and I was with Witness She had the radio for the Command Post." Then the questioner asks, or states, "Okay. So the Secret Service agent you're with would've been able to be in touch with Command Post," and on the next page Trooper PSP Counterpart responds, "Correct."

You mentioned that you had a radio that day. Is that correct?

Witness : Yes.

PSI Minority : Was that radio connected to the Command Post?

Witness : We were operating on the same channel. The Security Room agent for Secret Service has the ability to communicate with the post-standers on their dedicated channel, as well as the detail on their dedicated channel, and special teams.

HSGAC Majority : PSI Minority I apologize for interrupting, but can you clarify, when you mentioned Command Post, are you speaking about the Butler ESU Command Post or the Security Room?

PSI Minority : Thank you for the clarification. I am quoting directly from this transcript, which describes Command Post as written. So I'm not sure what Trooper PSP Counterpart may be implying here.

HSGAC Majority : But I just want to make sure it's clear for the record. The next two lines, the question is, "Was she able to be in touch with the County Command Post or just the Secret Service Command Post?" PSP Counterpart "I believe Secret Service Command Post."

PSI Minority : Okay.

HSGAC Majority : I just want to clarify because it's always confusing.

PSI Minority : I appreciate that, HSGAC Majority Thank you.

So this is the Secret Service Command Post that you had your radio --

Witness : Yeah. We refer to it as the Security Room, but there can be confusion between the two.

PSI Minority : Okay. Okay. And did Trooper PSP Counterpart ever ask you specifically who you would be in contact with on the radio? How did he know what Command Post you were in contact with?

Witness : We were in and out of the Security Room, so I believe -- and I'm speaking on my belief here -- that he knew I was in contact with the Secret Service Security Room. I'm assuming that's what he knew.

PSI Minority : And you might have addressed this earlier, but did you contact anyone on the radio?

Witness : Throughout the day, in general?

PSI Minority : Yes.

Witness : There was radio traffic passed. As I said before, there would be a call for us to respond to an area. We would put on the radio, "Yes, we're responding, en route." I was in and out of the Security Room so I would've communicated from the Security Room via radio if I was in response to a call for response.

PSI Minority : I want to turn to page 5 of the transcript.

Witness : Okay.

PSI Minority : On page 5, Trooper PSP Counterpart states, "Corporate PSP CPL Trooper PSP Trooper and then the Secret Service agent" -- that's the quote in there -- that those people were with Trooper PSP Counterpart when he was made aware of a suspicious person, later identified as Mr. Crooks. Can you tell us again how you were made aware of Mr. Crooks?

Witness : I received word, along with Trooper PSP Counterpart that there was someone reported to be along the

fence line, outside of the venue, with a rangefinder. I cannot tell you specifically who told me that or how it was communicated. It was communicated to both of us. And we decided, as a team, this is something we need to respond to.

PSI Minority: You mentioned you can't recall who or how, but is it your recollection that you received this information at exactly the same moment as Trooper PSP Counterpart

Witness: I do believe that I received the information from my local counterpart, with the understanding this is being passed through the Pennsylvania State Police to the Secret Service.

PSI Minority: And we've been through this several times, but your best approximation is sometime between 5:30 and 5:40. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Also on page 5, a little further down, Trooper PSP Counterpart describes the actions he took when learning about the suspicious person, later identified as Crooks. He stated, quote, "There were two undercover vice members that were outside of the event. They were staged at the Sheetz. I contacted them immediately by phone and told them to head over to the AGR building."

Were you aware of vice unit members at the Butler rally on July 13th?

Witness : I am aware now. I don't recall at the time that I was aware there were undercover units outside the venue. I've since learned that, but at the time I don't recall knowing that.

PSI Minority : Did you see Trooper PSP Counterpart contacting anyone shortly after learning about the suspect?

Witness : I asked him to reach out and find out if we had any assets with local police in that area, to go look for this person.

PSI Minority : Did you see him do that?

Witness : I saw him on the phone, yes. I assumed he was calling for that assistance. I didn't monitor his conversation. We didn't debrief afterwards.

PSI Minority : And he never mentioned to you the substance of that conversation?

Witness : I don't recall what his response was. I am assuming if he had people responding to look that he would've communicated that, and I would've said, "Okay, great." I don't recall the specific conversation whether or not he told me that.

PSI Minority : At what point did you learn, after the fact, that there were these vice units?

Witness : It could've been in one of my first interviews. And again, at the time that he was one the phone, I was also on the phone with the counter sniper

advance agent, asking the same thing. We were both contacting our separate agencies, asking for resources to locate this person. So I don't know that we -- we both asked for resources to look. I don't know that we debriefed and compared notes afterwards. This is my fifth interview. At some point in one of the previous interviews it was communicated to me that these teams were out there. I don't recall knowing that at the time.

PSI Minority: Were you ever made aware of whether the people that he contacted, whether any additional support went to the area where this suspicious person was?

Witness: At the time, I was under the impression we had Secret Service and local people looking in the area. Nothing more specific than that. And by Secret Service people I mean the counter snipers were aware, from their elevated position, that they could see the area, not that we had dispatched anyone to the area.

PSI Minority: Trooper PSP Counterpart in this transcript, says that he told these vice unit members to head toward the AGR building. Had you and Trooper PSP Counterpart discussed any specific location where additional personnel would need to be deployed?

Witness: Nothing specific, no.

PSI Minority: And again, and I know that you mentioned this a few times during our discussion today, you

did not hear anything about the AGR building until around the time shots were fired. Is that correct?

Witness: That was the first time I heard "AGR" --

PSI Minority: Okay.

Witness: -- that day.

PSI Minority: I want to go to page 6 of the transcript. At the very bottom, Trooper PSP Counterpart states, "So the Secret Service officer was with me. She knew that I was sending my two UCs over. I was also going to go over. I had her and Corporal PSP CPL drove me to my undercover truck, which was parked in the Farm Show grounds."

You mentioned earlier that you did not know at that time that he was sending undercovers over. Do you know why Trooper PSP Counterpart had the impression that you did?

Witness: I don't recall. He could've told me that. I don't remember the conversation. As I said, I was on the phone at the same time, having another conversation. He could've told me and I could've forgot. I don't recall the specific conversation.

PSI Minority: And you did mention earlier about driving Trooper PSP Counterpart to his truck. Did that occur?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: What time was that?

Witness: After the initial report and the phone

conversations. So it was anywhere between 5:45 and 6, somewhere in there. It took a few minutes to drive from where we were located over to the parking lot, and then offload him and then drive back over to the other side of the stage.

PSI Minority: What did Trooper PSP Counterpart convey to you that he would do once he got to his car?

Witness: He was going to drive the fence line and look for the person.

PSI Minority: Did he offer you to join him?

Witness: I don't remember him offering, no.

PSI Minority: Would it have been appropriate for you to join him?

Witness: No. I think I started earlier that at that time I felt it was a better use of our resources for him to do that and for me to go back and work the problem that I was concerned about initially with the crowd control. Also, the fact he was getting ready to take the stage, at that time, based on what I knew, the biggest is that that's in closest proximity, which was the crowd. I needed to be in a position where if something came up from the crowd, be it a threat or a physical attack, that I could respond. I would not have been able to respond from a vehicle on a fence line.

PSI Minority: At the point that you dropped off

Trooper PSP Counterpart at his truck, had you already contacted Mr. C/S Response

Witness: Not yet. I didn't contact him until after I resumed my position at stage left.

PSI Minority: At approximately what time?

Witness: It would've been right before he sent me the photo, so around 6.

PSI Minority: And did he tell you where he was located, Mr. C/S Response

Witness: I don't know where he was located. I don't recall. I don't recall where he was located prior to that. I know when I got back to that area he was there, and we had a conversation.

PSI Minority: He was where, exactly?

Witness: In the stage left area.

PSI Minority: So did you call him or did you just talk to him face-to-face?

Witness: I spoke to him face-to-face. He was there, in that area. We were together when the shooting started.

PSI Minority: Okay. And was that the first time that you had an interaction with Mr. C/S Response about the suspicious person?

Witness: That I recall, yes.

PSI Minority: Okay.

Witness : I don't remember talking to him before that about it.

PSI Minority : Okay. Then just to clarify something, you mentioned earlier that you had called counter sniper. Was it counter sniper advance?

Witness : The advance agent, yes.

PSI Minority : And who was that?

Witness : His name has been told to me, but for whatever reason I cannot remember it.

PSI Minority : Is it Mr. C/S Team Lead

Witness : That sounds right, yes. It's been told to me several times. It's not sticking.

PSI Minority : Okay.

Witness : I got my paperwork on my phone. I pulled up the site advance information that had been passed out to the post-standers. I believe his name and number was on the site post log. So I opened that document, looking for his contact information, so I could reach out.

PSI Minority : what time did you contact him?

Witness : This would've been when we were over in the stage right area, near the ESU team, looking for the individual. So when Trooper PSP Counterpart was on the phone, trying to find local support, I called him for the elevated support, for eyes on that area.

MR. PSI Minority And if you wouldn't mind stating again,

what did he convey to you?

Witness: The did not know where he was. I believe at that time -- and this is my recollection -- I believe at the time they were aware that someone had been in the area with a rangefinder, but they had lost sight or they didn't know where he was. He may have told me that there was a photo. I don't know for sure. I don't recall for sure. But we communicated, if they saw this person again, if they had a location they would call me and I would respond to that location to make contact and interview the person.

PSI Minority: So you did not learn any more information than what you had already known, that there was a suspicious person outside the venue.

Witness: Yeah. At that time I had no additional intelligence.

PSI Minority: Along the fence line, outside the venue along the fence line.

Witness: That was all I knew at that time.

PSI Minority: Did Mr. C/S Team Lead confirm that information?

Witness: I recall that he was aware that a person had been sighted in the area with a rangefinder. I believe he communicated that he was no longer visible to them, that they had lost him or they didn't know where he

was. And my communication was if you see him, call me and I'll respond.

PSI Minority: So was it your understanding that they had, themselves, seen him, as well?

Witness: I believe so, and this was a telephone conversation I had four months ago. I believe that was communicated. I can't tell you verbatim what was said.

PSI Minority: I want to go to Exhibit 5, that was handed out earlier. It's the text messages between you and Intel Advance Lead.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: It begins with, let's see, the first one, Bates 7851, 7852, and so on. I just wanted to follow up on a comment you made earlier about cell service. You mentioned earlier, I believe, that you didn't have any problems with cell service. Is that correct?

Witness: No. After the shooting I had a couple of text messages that I had tried to share that photo with a couple of individuals and it didn't go through. I believe there was a lot of cell usage at that time on the towers. But during the event I didn't have any issues with my phone.

PSI Minority: Okay. so Bates number 7853 and 7854, just for the record, show an image of Crooks being sent, and if you take into account the time difference it would

probably be around 8:14 p.m. and 8:15 p.m. on July 13th.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: And both these messages are not delivered.

Witness: Which is interesting, because these messages were sent to the Security Room agent and the special agent in charge of the FBI. I was in a face-to-face conversation with the two of them after the event. The Security Room agent and I were briefing the SAIC for the FBI, and I shared the photo with both of them. They received the photo. But on my phone it showed that it hadn't gone through. I may have tapped on it and resent. But they did receive the photo from me.

PSI Minority: And what were the names of those individuals?

Witness: I don't know the name of the Pittsburgh FBI SAIC. SAIC Buffalo was the Security Room agent. I don't recall his last name at this moment.

PSI Minority: SAIC Buffalo?

Witness: That sounds right, yes.

PSI Minority: In Exhibit 5, the top left corner image, with Bates number 7851, it appears that Intel Advance Lead wrote to you, "Command Post PSP trooper said he may be walking towards Sheetz." Did you ask anyone where the Sheetz is located?

Witness : That message came in concurrently with the other message. I don't recall at that time asking anybody where or what Sheetz was. I know I passed that information to Trooper PSP Counterpart At this point, with the photo, there was more concern, so it was more just getting information out as quick as possible and not necessarily trying for myself to define where this was.

PSI Minority : Wouldn't it be important for you to know where the suspicious person was going?

Witness : It would. Being that I was not in a position, I was now in the stage left area, I wasn't anywhere near anything. I mean, this is something that I'm putting out to people that are in a different location than me, looking, specifically Trooper PSP Counterpart I guess it could've been important, but as far as I knew it wasn't part of the venue. It wasn't in my immediate area. It's not like he's in the stage right area, where I could've responded.

PSI Minority : But you didn't know where the Sheetz was located.

Witness : I didn't know what the Sheetz was. I didn't know it was a gas station. I found that out after the fact.

PSI Minority : I want to go to Exhibit 6, that was handed out earlier. You mentioned before that these are

text messages between you and Trooper [PSP Counterpart]. Is that correct?

[Witness]: Yes.

[PSI Minority]: On Bates 7885, you wrote, "I wish I had more time." I'm sorry. Oh, "I wish we had more time." Do you see that on there?

[Witness]: Yes.

[PSI Minority]: What did you mean by that?

[Witness]: I was apprised of the fact that from the time we got the photo and we actually now knew who we were looking for -- and again, prior to this very vague physical description -- now we have a photo, so that ratchets things up a notch. From the time we got the photo to the information someone was on the roof of the AGR building to the time of the first shot was fewer than 10 minutes. There was not enough time for us to respond to this area. We were actively trying to find out where the AGR building is.

I have since learned that this person was spotted earlier in the day, and I wasn't even notified. If I had had a chance to talk to this person prior to then, if we'd had this information earlier in the day, I could have made contact. I could have interviewed this person and perhaps disrupted this. And by the time we got the information to the shooting there was not enough time for us to find and

locate and interview this person.

PSI Minority: What was the earliest time that you now know that Mr. Crooks was identified?

Witness: I believe it was said earlier in our discussion today that it was around 4:20, 4:26, that he was first observed by Butler County. Is that accurate? I think that was what was said today.

PSI Minority: I don't recall anyone saying that.

Witness: Ma'am, you said the Butler County ESU reported, very first reported lurking, Crooks was lurking. It was like 4:20 was the time you said, or 4:26.

HSGAC Majority: That PD Ops 4 radioed out at 5:42 p.m.

Witness: 5:42 p.m. Okay. So then I believe it was news reports then it would have been earlier in the day when he was first seen. I guess what I learned was a local police officer was being relieved and was going home, and was on his way to his car, and he first saw who we later learned was Crooks, in the area, acting strangely.

PSI Minority: So based on what you heard through public reporting is what made you think that law enforcement was actually aware of him much earlier than when you were made aware.

Witness: Now. At the time of this text --

PSI Minority: Is that correct?

Witness: Yes, that's correct. Now that's what

I know to be true. At the time of this text message I was referring to the fact that by the time we had a photo and got reports of someone on the roof, to the shots, it was fewer than 10 minutes. And we would have done more if we'd had more time.

PSI Minority: And this text message was sent on July 14th?

Witness: Um --

PSI Minority: I'm just basing that on Bates 7884.

Witness: Yes, it appears to be. Well, I don't have a date on 7885.

PSI Minority: 7884?

Witness: 7884 is a different message.

PSI Minority: Okay.

Witness: I don't see that text in that message. Are they --

PSI Minority: It appears the way that this was produced --

Witness: Okay. I see now, from the time on the -- yeah, that would've been the following night, following the conclusion of my interview with the FBI.

PSI Minority: So it's your understanding that the following day there were already public reports --

Witness: No. That's my understanding now. At that time I was only referring to that time window. I had

not seen any news reports at that time.

PSI Minority: Okay.

Witness: I was referring to the 10 minutes that we had from the photo to the shots.

PSI Minority: Okay. Then let's go to the next text message, which it appears to be Trooper PSP Counterpart's response to you --

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: -- which is, quote, "Yes, I've played that whole thing back so many times. Why did we not know that this guy was rangefinding the stage until 30 minutes after the fact? My guys were on him when he shot, and they would've got him if we knew that. I truly believe and now that."

So Trooper PSP Counterpart is saying that you did not know about Crooks rangefinding until 30 minutes after the fact. So based on what you said is that you learned about him rangefinding sometime between 5:30 and 5:40. It appears that Trooper PSP Counterpart is saying that people knew about that 30 minutes prior to that, which would've been approximately 5:00, 5:10.

Witness: Mm-hmm.

PSI Minority: Is that your understanding?

Witness: No, and this was the day after the fact, so he could've gotten that information from any

number of sources I wasn't privy to. I personally was not following news coverage or any other information at that time. I was off all social media and news coverage. I wasn't following anything. So I don't know where he got that information from.

PSI Minority: Do you have any understanding today where he got that information from?

Witness: No. I have not spoken to him about it.

PSI Minority: When did you receive information about someone on the AGR roof?

Witness: Shortly after I got the photo text messaged to me.

PSI Minority: And how did you receive that information?

Witness: I can't remember if it was via radio or verbal. It was communicated to me and other individuals in my immediate area that we were getting reports from local police of someone on the AGR building roof.

PSI Minority: Was there any mention that that individual on the AGR roof had a gun?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Has anyone from DHS or Secret Service instructed you not to speak with Congress?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: And final question. You mentioned earlier about exterior vehicle checkpoints. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: What are those?

Witness: It's my understanding -- and again, I was not present when these posts were up, so to speak, when they were posted -- it was my understanding there were four exterior posts with agents paired up with a vehicle, in a raid vest, in a vehicle checkpoint exterior area.

PSI Minority: What time did you --

Witness: A vehicle checkpoint is to stop vehicle traffic from coming through a road or whatever access point has been identified.

PSI Minority: Understood. What time did you leave the venue following the shooting?

Witness: It was around midnight.

PSI Minority: Did you receive any reports about a vehicle containing explosives?

Witness: At some point I did. It was passed to me. I can't tell you exactly through -- I know I was in contact with the Tactical Security Division advance agent in and throughout the night after the shooting, and he communicated that there were some devices. At one point it was communicated to everybody that there was going to be a

controlled detonation of some device, but I didn't have specific information.

PSI Minority: And what time?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: Did you receive this information verbally or via email, text?

Witness: I believe it was verbally.

PSI Minority: And who told you this?

Witness: It could've been anyone in the Security Room or the TSD advance agent. I'm not sure. There were a number of people around at this point.

PSI Minority: Okay. I think we're at the end of our hour, so we'll go ahead and take a five-minute break.

Witness: Okay.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Majority: We're back on the record at 4:38. So thank you again for taking the time today. In the remaining time we'll split our time in half, so Senator Peters' office and Senator Blumenthal's office will ask questions first, the next 30 to 40 minutes, and turn it over to our colleagues, Ranking Member Paul and Ranking Member Johnson.

I'd like to follow up on a few things my colleagues asked. You mentioned that your primary function as protective intelligence agent is to interview individuals

to figure out what they're going to do and potentially divert a threat. If that is the case, then whose job, whose role within Secret Service, is it to actually look for the suspicious individuals, once they are identified, to search for them?

Witness : The best way I can answer this is the counter sniper advance agent and the counter sniper team, they have a response agent. In my past experience in working as a counter sniper response agent if they see something that is concerning to them they would call that agent, reach out for them direct to respond and check that out and report back. That would be one function of that agent's job, to respond to anything that they call out, for further investigation.

The protective intelligence agent doesn't have that responsibility to that specific degree, in that there's no one other than local law enforcement, outside or within the venue, other post-standers, attendees, that would see something and call for a response. So there's not an overwatch dispatching us so much as people saying, "Hey, there's something here with me. Come respond." Does that answer your question?

HSGAC Majority : So it seems like there's still a gap, given that we know Special Agent C/S Response the counter sniper response agent, was actively looking for the

suspicious individual. You mentioned you did everything you could within the security perimeter but also felt that you had to get back to crowd control. And your state counterpart was also actively looking for this individual.

So during this whole time, whose responsibility is it to assess the evolving situation and determine whether there is a threat, whether it is safe to put President Trump on stage? Who is responsible for that? Where is the gap? Where is the breakdown?

Witness [redacted]: I understand your question, and I think given what we knew at the time, that there was never any intelligence about a weapon of any kind, the only concerning piece of intelligence was the rangefinder, at that time. As a physical body to interview, it would not have been my responsibility. Had I contacted this person, had this person been available for interview, had I developed further intelligence that suggested the presence of a weapon or an immediate threat, that's something I would have passed to the PI advance agent, to the Security Room, and I would have relied on them to pass it to the detail or to anyone else that needed to know.

Absent that information, there's not really a specific person that would make that determination, absent of a physical person to assess. Does that make sense?

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: Yes.

Witness : Okay.

HSGAC Majority : And you did not relay to the Security Room or advance protective intelligence agent that you had essentially stopped your search and went back to crowd control. Correct?

Witness : No, I didn't pass that to anyone.

HSGAC Majority : And so to your point that there really isn't anyone that's tasked with this responsibility of tracking and ensuring that threats of suspicious individuals are sufficiently followed up on, should there be a dedicated role for a protective intelligence agent that is not dual hatted as a jump team lead?

Witness : That's a difficult question to respond to. I can tell you that every city, every site, every location you go to is different and unique in what assets are available from a state and local level, in addition to what assets are available from Secret Service. It depends on the size of the venue, you know, a number of things.

The presence of that undercover vice team that was there that day, that Trooper PSP Counterpart contacted, you know, that would have been an asset. And again, I don't know, in these minutes when we're all -- we're discussing after the fact, I don't know where Crooks was at that time. He could've been in the building. He could've been on the building. It's all speculation on my part. But had that

team been able to encounter him, located him and detain or question him, that would've certainly raised all of the information straight up the chain, I believe, in speaking after the fact.

I think we've established I didn't know that asset was deployed that day and that they were actively looking. I'm glad they were. And I believe Trooper [PSP Counterpart] -- you know, of course I'm going to delegate, reach out to local people, get someone looking. I'm not going to follow up on that and verbatim question, who did you speak to, who's looking. We're all making phone calls in this moment, trying to get someone to find this person. That's certain an asset, having that team looking, those eyes on.

For the protective intelligence agent to do that, I think it takes away from their primary responsibility, is to gather intelligence from people at the site, determine what level of threat. Yes, I did look, but again, it wasn't my function to leave the venue to go search this person out.

[HSGAC Majority]: Let me ask you this. Would having a countersurveillance unit have been beneficial in this particular situation?

[Witness]: Yes, I believe it would've been beneficial.

[HSGAC Majority]: Why?

Witness : For that same function. And this is my understanding. I'm not trained in countersurveillance. I don't operate those units. My understanding of countersurveillance it would've been similar to that vice team that was described. They would've been in plain clothes. They would've been moving outside the venue. They would've been in a better position to look for this person. They don't typically operate within the venue. They typically operate outside of the venue, is my understanding.

HSGAC Majority : And what training do you receive as a protective intelligence agent?

Witness : So the training that I received was part of the criminal investigative training, the Secret Service training at the John J. Rowley Training Center. We have a protective intelligence section of training which covers the investigations, threat investigations as a whole. That was my initial training.

HSGAC Majority : When was that?

Witness : When I went through training in 2003.

HSGAC Majority : And do you receive any continuing training or, you know, any other training since then on protective intelligence?

Witness : As far as the role of a site PI person as a post-stander or as --

HSGAC Majority: I mean, that's 20-plus years. Technology has evolved.

Witness: But I was also running, at that time, in Phoenix, I was running all of our protective intelligence investigations. I was also on the JTTF. I have extensive experience with protective intelligence.

HSGAC Majority: So my question more generally is do you think there is sufficient training as it relates to protective intelligence and sufficient ongoing training for agents like yourself that commit to service with Secret Service?

Witness: With regard to the functions that I was fulfilling that day and what I was doing, I think there was adequate training for that. I don't think any additional training could have been provided to avoid this situation with regard to what I was tasked with that day. Does that make sense?

HSGAC Majority: Yes. And in addition to the gap in communication, which I know we've discussed, and Trooper PSP Counterpart did not have a local radio and there were issues with Secret Service communications, as well, it sounds like, in this particular instance -- correct me if I'm wrong -- there is a gap in a role really here. Is that also accurate?

Witness: I can say that, in retrospect, looking

at that day, I would have liked to have known all of the local assets that were available that day. I would like to have known that there was a team inside that building. Had I known that and had I known Trooper [PSP Counterpart] or someone in the Security Room had communication with them, I would've requested that that team look for this person. Perhaps intelligence could've been shared sooner. I didn't know that at the time, and I wasn't in charge of setting that up. I could only respond to what was told to me.

[HSGAC Majority]: I just have another question about that day, because it sounds like there were a number of things going on, and you mentioned the crowd control that you felt like you really needed to be present for. Did you respond to any medical emergencies, as well? Our understanding is it was a very hot day and there were a number of medical emergencies.

[Witness]: I personally responded to several.

[HSGAC Majority]: When you say several, over 10? Under 10? Over 15?

[Witness]: Between 5 and 10.

[HSGAC Majority]: Between 5 and 10. And is that part of your role either as a jump team lead and/or protective intelligence agent?

[Witness]: It is not.

[HSGAC Majority]: And did responding to those medical

emergencies interfere with your primary duties as a protective intelligence agent?

Witness: I do not believe they did. I would not have diverted from my duties had I been called to respond to a protective intelligence call. I would not have stopped responding in order to render aid to somebody in the crowd. At the time that I rendered aid I was not tasked with anything else in that moment, and I observed someone in a medical emergency situation and was in a position to assist.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to ask a couple of questions on intelligence, both before the event as well as at the event. Do you usually receive intelligence in advance of an event, as a site protective intelligence agent and/or a jump team lead?

Witness: Typically, as a site PI agent, there is some sort of intelligence briefing provided by the PI advance agent.

HSGAC Majority: And did you receive that in advance of the July 13th rally?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know why not?

Witness: I don't.

HSGAC Majority: Did you ask Special Agent Intel Advance Lead about it?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: For the July 13th rally, did you receive any intelligence in advance relating to President Trump or the event itself?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: For the July 13th rally, did you receive any intelligence in advance related to Iran?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware of any intelligence or threat information that led to Secret Service counter snipers being sent to the July 13th rally?

Witness: I was not aware, no.

HSGAC Majority: I just want to follow up on a few prior questions. When you answered earlier about staffing questions you mentioned that certain roles, you believe, the Secret Service is better positioned to fill among the protective intelligence role. When you returned to the stage left and thereby left the local law enforcement officials to continue to search for the individual, is there a Secret Service role, you believe, that should have been fulfilled, or some asset, some training that Secret Service possesses that local law enforcement do not, that should have been in place to continue that search?

Witness: No. At that time, the primary objective was to locate and detain this individual. That

could be effected by anyone in law enforcement.

HSGAC Majority: With respect to the search that continued when you returned to stage left, did it ever get communicated to you that this individual was seen running?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And when you were at stage left, returned to stage left, up until the time that you heard shots fired, did you reach out to any of your communications to get an update, an assessment, on whereabouts location, detention of the individual?

Witness: When I returned to the stage left area I had a verbal conversation with Special Agent C/S Response I received the text message photo. I passed the text message photo. That was when the information about the moving towards the Sheetz was communicated. The next piece of information that I received was that someone was on the roof of the AGR building. When I received that information I was unaware it was the same person. It wasn't communicated the same person with the rangefinder was on the roof. When I received the information about the person on the roof I processed that as a new problem. I did not follow up on the search for the individual. I was now trying to locate and address the individual on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: So prior to the information you received about the individual on the roof, when you're still aware

of the fact that the individual you were trying to identify had not been identified, does that piece of information, the duration of time in which you are looking for somebody, not able to find that person, factor into the assessment you make about the threat level?

Witness [redacted]: The fact that we couldn't find them, does that factor in? I believe, and I recall at the time, with the information the person is moving towards Sheetz, I recall now that I believed Sheetz was a street. I didn't know it was a gas station. I thought it was a street. At the time, I was operating under the assumption that that person was leaving the venue, or was leaving the area, rather. The fact that we couldn't find them I actually thought was a mitigating factor. I think the hope at that point is that this person has moved on. And then with someone on the roof, okay, now we've got a new issue to address. That's not to say that I was more concerned or less concerned. The level of concerned maintains. And again, we're talking minutes in processing time here.

HSGAC Majority: So correct me then if I'm wrong, but based on what you said, the duration in time in which somebody that you're trying to identify and look for, the duration of that time when you have not found somebody, does factor into your assessment of the threat level, and in this case that duration, coupled with the information you received

about where you believed he was heading, away from the event, the way in which that assessment went was threat level down, not up.

Witness [redacted]: Not threat level down. Threat level remains the same. We continue what we're doing. We continue looking. And also, at the same time, I know there's some concern about my presence in the stage left area doing crowd control. The way site PI operates, in my understanding, training, and experience, you need to be in relatively close proximity to the protectee. For example, if a threat emerges from the crowd you need to be able to immediately respond to that. A threat from outside the venue, from an elevated position, is not something I'm able to respond to on foot, in the venue, as an intelligence response agent.

So at that time the threat level doesn't go down. It still remains the same. But there are additional areas of concern, mainly the crowd, access to the motorcade, and now someone on the roof.

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: And just to fully understand --

Witness [redacted]: I just want to say that she never testified that there was a, quote, "threat level," end quote. She never said that, and I don't believe that she believed that there was.

HSGAC Majority [redacted] So to further --

Witness: Let's just use the right phrasing.

HSGAC Majority: So to further probe this line of questioning then, during that time the duration does go into your assessment of the individual you are searching for. Is that correct? I will set aside the question of the level, and whether that level rises to the position of threat versus suspicion. But that is one of the factors, the duration of time.

Witness: If they're not seen in the area continuing the behavior, they're still a concern because they could return. They could be anywhere in the area. So, of course, you're still looking for them, and you wouldn't stop until after the visit, I suppose, when everything is done. I'm not really understanding what you're trying to get at here. It's still a concern the entire time. That doesn't ever change. The fact that they're not seen, to me it doesn't affect the level of concern at all, in one way or the other. I mean, you're still concerned, but the fact that they're not in the immediate area, is certainly better because they're not visibly attempting to access the site of the protectee.

HSGAC Majority: That's what I'm trying to get at --

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: -- assessing whether the situation you're addressing is better or worse. Your answer is it was

better, based on the information you had.

Witness [redacted]: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: The number of years of experience you've had, for the events you have worked during that experience, have you ever been at an event where there was an individual who had been identified as a threat and not suspicious?

Witness [redacted]: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And can you describe that?

Witness [redacted]: I was a protective intelligence advance agent for the visit of the Vice President to Phoenix, Arizona. Months prior there was a protester along the motorcade route who threw an unknown liquid substance at the motorcade. She struck several Phoenix police officers on motorcycles. She then fled the area. I was in the motorcade so I continued with the motorcade to the next site and assisted with hazmat and decon. The site protective intelligence advance agent, or site agent, post-stander, the PI person at that site, with local police, after we left, was able to locate and contact that person. That person was arrested and then taken to a local precinct, and I later interviewed them.

HSGAC Majority: My follow-up question was whether that person was detained. You said she was.

Witness [redacted]: She was detained, arrested, and

interviewed by Secret Service and Phoenix PD.

HSGAC Majority: And in your experience have you ever been a part of an event where an individual was determined to be a threat but was not detained, to your knowledge?

Witness: Not to my knowledge, no.

HSGAC Majority: Prior to July 13th, have you ever been at an event, working at an event, where shots were fired?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Prior to July 13th, have you ever been at an event where the threat level didn't rise to the occasion where shots were actually fired but there was a dangerous weapon identified?

Witness: At a previous Trump rally, again, this is in Mesa, Arizona, we had a person go through a magnetometer screening with a weapon in her purse. She had a firearm in her purse that she claimed to have forgotten about. She had forgotten it was there. She was denied entry and asked to leave the venue, and she left the venue with the weapon in her purse. And legally owned and stored. And she cooperated and left the venue. She was identified. We ran checks.

There are certain states where open carry is allowed. I was working shifts with President Carter in downtown Plains, Georgia, and we had an individual walking around the event we were attending with a weapon in plain sight,

holstered on his belt.

So yes, I've encountered dangerous weapons. I forget what the question was.

HSGAC Majority: You've answered it --

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: -- whether or not you've ever been involved --

Witness Counsel: You're good.

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: Last question from me and I'll turn it over to my colleague, HSGAC Majority. Have you ever learned after the fact that you were at an event where a weapon was present that was not identified during the event?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: Going back to the issue of the medical emergencies, you responded to 5 to 10, you said?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Did any of those medical emergencies come up after you learned of the suspicious person?

Witness: They did not.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. At any point that day, whether it was before the event started, you know, during planning briefings or walkthroughs, or during the event, informally, did you ever communicate or convey to other Secret Service personnel or any state and local law enforcement the

importance of communicating via radio?

[redacted]: Did I? No.

[redacted]: You didn't, either in a briefing or informally, talk about the importance of communicating via radio?

[redacted]: Not that I recall, no.

[redacted]: Okay. You said when shots were fired you were at stage left. Is that right/

[redacted]: Yes.

[redacted]: Did you observe local law enforcement fire their weapon?

[redacted]: I did not.

[redacted]: Have you since learned that local law enforcement did fire their weapon, at Crooks, that is?

[redacted]: I read in media and like general reports that Secret Service did. I don't remember hearing or reading specifically local law enforcement did, no.

[redacted]: Okay. That's all I had. I'll turn it over to my colleague from PSI majority.

[redacted]: Nothing from me. Thank you.

[redacted]: I just have a few more follow-up questions. You've been with Secret Service for over 20 years at this point. Can you describe your general schedule, hours, and travel, and if that has changed at all in the past, since you've joined, for better or for worse?

Witness : So when I joined the Secret Service George W. Bush was in office. Social media did not exist. So most of the protective intelligence and the threat investigations we conducted were letter writing in nature, not a lot of online or posted threats. So from that aspect, with the evolution of the internet and social media, the amount of threats that we investigate, the number of threats towards our protectees, in my experience, has increased significantly. The number of protectees since that time have increased significantly, which affects our travel, which affects the number of people that we use to secure venues.

So I would say there's been a steady increase in the amount of travel, in the size, prior to the election of President Trump. I do not recall any time prior to that doing outdoor rallies of this nature with this amount of frequency. It is my personal opinion, my experience, that he's the first protectee to hold rallies of this nature on a regular basis. And it's been my experience they are very difficult to secure, due to the sheer size and number of attendees.

With the presidential campaigns evolving as they have since 2003, even this campaign compared to the last has been a much more stringent pace. This previous rotation I was on I traveled for four weeks straight. Prior to that I

was at the U.N. for 11 days. Prior to that I was traveling for three weeks. Prior to that was the Butler incident. There's very little down time during campaign year.

In a non-campaign year, as I said the number of protectees have increased, so the protective travel increases. The protective intelligence cases increases. To give you an example, after the July 13th rally I was home with my family for approximately a week. During that time, because I was a protective intelligence person for Phoenix, I believe we got half a dozen threat cases in those seven days, just in our district alone, directed at former President Trump.

HSGAC Majority: What do you mean by received half a dozen threat cases? You mean --

Witness: Notifications from our headquarters, Protective Intelligence Division, that persons in our district had threated to kill President Trump, and that we needed to conduct a preliminary investigation, six in seven days.

HSGAC Majority: And that is also part of your job responsibilities.

Witness: That was part of my responsibility in addition to traveling for the campaign.

So that changed. It's constantly evolving, the pace.

As I said, the number of protectees, the evolution of the internet, it's certain made things more challenging than they were 21 years ago.

HSGAC Majority: To your knowledge, have any Secret Service personnel involved in the July 13th event been removed from duty, reassigned, placed on leave, or terminated?

Witness: To my knowledge, some agents were, and I don't know the terminology, but were working from home, that were removed from travel and campaign duties.

HSGAC Majority: Have you received any disciplinary actions, either telework duties, administrative leave, anything else, from Secret Service after the event?

Witness: I have not.

HSGAC Majority: What happened at the July 13th rally was a, quote/unquote, "near miss" or what Secret Service refers to as a, quote, "unusual protective event and incident." Are you familiar with that terminology?

Witness: I've heard it before.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of any other such events in the past?

Witness: That I personally was involved in? No.

HSGAC Majority: Any that you were not --

Witness: Historically, I'm aware. The

assassination attempt on President Reagan.

HSGAC Majority: But during your tenure?

Witness: During my tenure, I believe there was the shoe-throwing event with George Bush. Someone removed a shoe and threw it at him. So, for example, the protester throwing the unknown substance at the VP, that would be also an unusual incident or protective -- the terminology they used, forgive me. I'm getting tired.

HSGAC Majority: That's okay. Were there any, to your knowledge, Secret Service protocols or policies on July 13th that were either not followed or deviated from?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: I know it's been a few months, and you've had time to reflect on what has happened. And the former and acting Director of the Secret Service have both testified before Congress that operational failures did occur that day and there has been our investigation and our report, and I know a House report as well as the independent review panel report. Based on your experience, you know, from the past, since 2003, with the Service, and the expertise that you've garnered since then, what is your assessment of what failures occurred on July 13th?

Witness: I think, as I've spoken to earlier, for me personally, with my role that day, I wish I had more knowledge of the number of local and state assets that were

there. I wish I had known all of the teams that were in place and what their roles were. I understand why I wasn't briefed on that at the time.

Knowing now what we know now, I think it's more important, and I think it's worth noting, going forward after that day, I have found myself in a position, as a Security Room agent. I have been assigned that role as a post-stander. And I have taken it upon myself to speak to any local assets that are in that room with me and ask who is here. I want all of the assets, everyone that is here, do you have communication with all of them. I think that was something that could have been better that day, knowing the number of assets we had and being able to communicate with all of them. If we had gotten information when Crooks was first spotted, I feel like we could have disrupted the event, either through an interview or removal or detention of him. Again, hindsight is 20/20, but I think that certainly would have helped.

HSGAC Majority: And based on your experience, both that day but also your over 20 years of service, there have been a number of reforms proposed and also Secret Service has announced reforms itself. In your review, are those reforms that Secret Service has announced so far sufficient to address the problems that occurred on July 13th?

Witness: I think they're ongoing, and I think

they're evolving. I have seen some adjustments with regard to radio communication and support for cellphone communication that I think are important. I think it's going to continue to evolve and change, now that the campaign is, for the most part, over, and we go forward with new protective strategies.

HSGAC Majority: Is there anything else you'd like to share specifically with regard to reforms or challenges in implementing them that you think we should be aware of?

Witness: I think it's clear through the number of conversations we've had today regarding my concern with crowd control in that stage left area, and I said this to another group, and I'll be brief. When you have a crowd the size of 15,000 people, I would compare that day to an outdoor concert. If anyone has been to an outdoor concert in a large field with several thousand people, there's generally some kind of asset that is there for crowd control, as far as getting people into their seats, out of their seats, making sure they don't go to restricted areas. I think that would have been an asset that day, if we had had someone dedicated specifically to that. For example, medical callouts, verbal altercations at the checkpoint.

And I think personally that it's incumbent on the host committee, campaign staff, or the venue to provide that, to ask Secret Service to essentially do crowd control in

addition to responding to threats, which I'm not saying we were asked to do that that day. But that's the biggest threat is the human factor. When you have 15,000 people in a venue, it's a concern. And I think going forward if we're going to be hosting rallies of that size we need some sort of assistance with that, so we can focus on the protectee.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. And so you just talked about crowd control. You talked about the changing threat landscape and also the changing technological landscape that has increased the number of threats, and the roles of Secret Service agents and what they're expected to do and how they're expected to respond.

Is there anything else that we haven't asked about that you think should be addressed or you want to bring to our attention today?

Witness: Not at this time, no.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. I'll turn it over to my colleague, Mr. HSGAC Minori [sic].

HSGAC Minority: Thank you. This is HSGAC Minority, Senator Paul's office, back again, and I've just got a few questions. You talked about hindsight is 20/20, but isn't that the purpose of security and advance, to plan for the unforeseen?

Witness: It is. However, you can't anticipate

every threat. No one is omnipresent, is all-knowing. You can plan for everything that you can, and some things are out of your control.

HSGAC Minority: Were you given the opportunity to review the local ops plans?

Witness: I was not.

HSGAC Minority: Are you allowed to look at those?

Witness: I can't imagine I wouldn't be. It's not something that's typically provided to the post-standers.

HSGAC Minority: The only reason I ask that is because you've repeated multiple times you wished you would've known. You wished you would've known. There was an opportunity to know, and it was within those operations plans. And that's a question I just can't understand, because we've even heard testimony from the lead counter sniper that didn't review the local operations plans. Is that normal?

Witness: I don't know what their protocol is. I know they're not typically provided to the post-standers.

HSGAC Minority: Do you think that's something that would be nice, moving forward, that we offer to them, to look at? Because it would've helped you, I think. Am I correct?

Witness: It would've helped me, I think. That

would be helpful going forward.

HSGAC Minority: I just want to clarify a couple of things and I'll it along to them. I think we've covered almost everything that I'm looking for today.

We had a little discrepancy because I think you said that the counter snipers were looking for suspicious people too. Am I correct, is that's what they were looking for?

Witness: And again, I'm not a counter sniper. I can't speak to what their directive is. I've worked in the counter sniper response position, and I have responded to things like, "There's someone along the fence line in this area that's supposed to be restricted. I want you to respond and find out who that is." I have done that as a counter sniper response agent. It's been my experience that's part of their function.

HSGAC Minority: The only reason I ask is because under the testimony from Special Agent C/S Response he said that the PI's job was to look for suspicious people, and the counter sniper's job is to look for threats. And I know it sounds like minutiae, but there is a difference between suspicion and a threat. And I just wanted to clarify for the record, is that correct in what he is assessing there, that that's the roles?

Witness: He's not incorrect. I think it depends on your personal definition of suspicious and

threat. Again, I've worked in both roles, and I've been asked to respond to everything from a fuel truck moving on a runway that was supposed to a ramp freeze and to someone standing on a fence line. They overlap to a degree with the distinction that counter sniper would respond specifically to directions from the counter sniper advance and counter sniper team. Protective intelligence not necessarily.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. You mentioned a while ago that you were at an event where people carried open carry. I just want to make sure. Someone with a gun, does that necessarily make them a threat, the possession of the weapon?

Witness: It does not, but I believe the question was have you been at an event where a weapon was present.

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

Witness: And I have. You know, and it doesn't necessarily make that person a threat, but when you're standing next to a protectee, responsible for them, you certainly want to know where that weapon is at all times.

HSGAC Minority: And their hands.

Witness: Exactly.

HSGAC Minority: Last thing I have, because you talked about actionable intelligence and timeliness of

intelligence. Would it have been beneficial -- because you said even in your text to your counterparts that if you had more time, and that's one thing we're just not able to make. But would it have helped you if you'd have seen the photo of Mr. Crooks at 5:45 p.m.?

Witness: I think it would've been helpful from the aspect of sharing intelligence and knowing who we were looking for. I certainly would've wanted to know as soon as possible exactly who we were looking for.

HSGAC Minority: If you had received it at 5:45, would you have passed that along to other individuals so that they could create that actionable intelligence? Because I think that's where you're trying to get from.

Witness: Yeah. Yeah.

HSGAC Minority: Just general intel, actionable.

Witness: I would've passed it as soon as I received it.

HSGAC Minority: The reason I asked that specifically is because under testimony from other individuals, the counter sniper lead had that photo at 5:45 p.m.

Witness: Okay. I didn't know that.

HSGAC Minority: And a lot of other people did not know that either.

Witness: Okay. Yeah, I would've passed it along.

HSGAC Minority: Thank you. And the last thing that I wanted to ask, did you ever assume the role, transition -- I know you're on the JTTF FBI. Was there any time during that day that you had to assume the role to assist them as an FBI JTTF or anything like that? Was there ever a crossover in your role?

Witness: No. There was not a crossover. I did brief the FBI as they arrived at the site to take over on what I knew. And we haven't really touched on this, and I'll be brief. But after the shooting, after President Trump was evacuated, part of my post responsibilities was crime scene response. So at that point I'm then assisting with removing the public, securing evidence, turning the scene over to the FBI. So I briefed them to that degree, but I didn't do any investigations.

HSGAC Minority: But you were acting under the role of the U.S. Secret Service at that point.

Witness: Yes. Never in my role as a task force officer.

HSGAC Minority: And the last thing I want to clarify is you did not hear anyone say anything about a man on the roof with a gun.

Witness: I never heard any mention of a weapon at any time.

HSGAC Minority: And the reason I mention that is

because in in our last interview with Mr. C/S Response he specifically stated, on page 150 of his transcript, that he shouted out -- well, he said he spoke out loud. I don't think he said he shouted -- that there was a man on the roof with a gun. He specifically said that, and he mentioned that you were in the proximity. Not that you could hear everything, but I just wanted to confirm, you did not hear anything about the gun. Correct?

Witness : I did not hear him shout that, that I recall, no.

HSGAC Minority : That's all the questions I have, and thank you for your time, and I'll pass it to my colleagues.

HSGAC Majority : I'd just like to correct the record briefly. I know a few hours ago we asked about the text message that Special Agent C/S Response sent to you. So I'm showing you what, I believe we're on Exhibit 9, what's been marked as Exhibit 9.

[Exhibit No. 9 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority : Is this the text message communication? The names are redacted, so I want to make sure it's accurate, and if so, the time is stamped as not 5:52 p.m. but 6:04 p.m.

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Majority : And who sent this message?

Witness : This would've been from C/S Response to me.

HSGAC Majority : That's all. I just wanted to make sure the record is accurate.

PSI Minority : Agent Witness PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office. So 5 p.m. on July 13th the shots fired. Discuss your communications with Agent C/S Response

Witness : With regard to the shots, or --

PSI Minority : All of it. From 5 p.m. on.

Witness : On. Okay. I don't recall conversations or specific, anything specific prior to getting the initial report of the person on the fence line. We worked together throughout the day, so from 5 p.m. to the point where I went to the fence line to initially look for this person I don't recall anything specific with him.

After the fence line I encountered him in the stage left area, as I said before. I remember speaking to him, telling him the information I had, suspicious person on the fence line with a rangefinder. I believe that he had the same information. The photo was shared. After the photo was shared there was the intelligence that someone was on the roof. I recall speaking with him and that we were both trying to determine where the AGR building was and how to get over there.

Then the shots rang out. Special Agent C/S Response and

I were right next to the pneumatic lift that was holding the speakers in the air, and it's my belief that the first shot hit that lift and it punctured the tube, sending gas and shrapnel onto Agent C/S Response and myself, and it dropped the speakers to the bottom of the lift. And then I remember hearing shots fired, and I believe I looked at C/S Response and at that time we thought the lift had failed. At that time we weren't aware that it was gunshots, that we thought something had malfunctioned with the lift and dropped the speakers, creating the noise. And then I remember hearing additional shots after that.

We took cover behind the lift, behind the tires, and then I lost track of him after that point. I then encountered him later on, and we worked together throughout the evening. But after the shots I don't recall seeing or speaking to him until later that evening.

PSI Minority: Okay. When you get the report of the suspicious person and you go over to the fence line, who specifically was there?

Witness: With me?

PSI Minority: Yes.

Witness: Trooper PSP Counterpart and then Trooper, I think it was PSP CPL or Corporal PSP CPL We were on the golf cart together, and I think you can see it in the photo. When we got over to the fence line there was a local

tactical team, and then there was a uniformed trooper at, I think it was Post 4, outside the gate. I remember that group of us in that area.

PSI Minority: Do you remember any of their names?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Was the Butler sheriff -

Witness: The Butler sheriff?

PSI Minority: Was a member of the Butler Sheriff's Department in that group?

Witness: I don't recall, no.

PSI Minority: Okay. Did those individual you spoke to along the fence line, there was no discussion of any of those people leaving their posts to go out and look for the suspicious person?

Witness: I don't recall, no. The tactical team that was there, their spot where they were holding in support of Secret Service tactical team, it was my understanding. And then the trooper was in a fixed post at that gate. So there was no discussion, or no direction from me for them to do anything, that I remember.

PSI Minority: So no one in that group, at that time, thought one of us should go outside the perimeter.

Witness: No. Not that I recall.

PSI Minority: Do you remember a Pennsylvania State Trooper named PSP Trooper?

Witness : Not off the top of my head, no.

PSI Minority : I believe he's the one who was partnered with Agent C/S Response

Witness : I wasn't aware Agent C/S Response had a partner.

PSI Minority : Had you ever worked at an event with Agent C/S Response before? Do you know Agent C/S Response

Witness : I had not. I met him that day.

PSI Minority : So after shots are fired at 6:11 p.m. on July 13th, what did you do?

Witness : After the shots were fired, and then President Trump was on stage, he was covered by his detail, I remember shouting at people in the crowd to get down. They had stood and started cheering when President Trump stood. He was evacuated, and then I moved into a position on the bleachers and started giving the crowd direction to evacuate and leave the venue. I went around to a number of the post-standers in my immediate area that I could contact, and I gave them direction with regard to holding their post, maintaining evidence.

I worked my way back up to the Security Room, clearing out general public and securing the crime scene. And then I went into the Security Room, and I believe I spoke with the Security Room agent, SAIC Buffalo and it was SAIC Buffalo I spoke with local law enforcement, the FBI, the site assist agent,

a number of people, as far as getting the FBI in and turning the scene over to them and then accounting for post-standers. I provided SAC of Buffalo a list of all the post-stander names and contact information to be turned over to the FBI, assisted in getting them off post, things like that.

PSI Minority: Did you ever go over to the AGR property?

Witness: I drove the FBI over to that area. I didn't enter the building or go on top of the roof at any time. I gave them a ride in the golf cart to that area. They didn't know how to get over there, so I drove them around, dropped them off, and came back.

PSI Minority: You drove who specifically from the FBI?

Witness: I believe it was the special agent in charge and one of his agents.

PSI Minority: The SAIC of Pittsburgh FBI?

Witness: I think so, yeah. I had sent him the photo earlier. They were going over there in an attempt to identify the shooter.

PSI Minority: What time was that at?

Witness: That was, I think it was one of those text messages that didn't go through. One of those was to the special agent in charge of the Pittsburgh. So that would've been either at, I believe it was at 8:15 p.m.

PSI Minority: Okay. Can you describe the AGR property

when you get over, when you drive over the FBI SAIC at 8:15?

Witness: It was as it had looked earlier. It was like an industrial property, a number of buildings, nondescript.

PSI Minority: What was happening when you went over there?

Witness: There were a number of uniformed police in and around the area. I didn't really spend any time there or interact with anybody. I dropped them off and drove back over to the Security Room.

PSI Minority: So you had some interactions with the FBI. Any interactions with the ATF?

Witness: We don't want to go into any details about their investigation or conversations about ATF or FBI. We've been very careful not to divulge any of those discussions. We have no authority from the FBI or ATF to talk about --

PSI Minority: My question was did she interact with ATF on July 13th.

Witness: Not that I was aware of, no.

PSI Minority: Do you know if Crooks was on any local, state, or federal law enforcement radar before July 13th?

Witness: I do not.

PSI Minority: On July 13th, did you receive any

communications regarding someone along the fence line of concern with a red shirt or a neon, high visibility shirt?

Witness : I recall a report of an unattended bicycle and a bag.

PSI Minority : He's asking you about a red shirt. Just answer the question.

Witness : And I believe there was someone in that area with a red shirt, but nothing specific, no.

PSI Minority : So you heard about the red shirt on July 13th?

Witness : There was someone in a red shirt in that area. I remember hearing that at some point, but nothing specific.

PSI Minority : Where did you hear that from?

Witness : I believe it was afterwards. A person had been detained to be interviewed. And I remember someone saying this was the guy in the red shirt, by the bike. I had nothing to do with it. It was information that had been passed to me. I think one of the post-standers was bringing him in for an interview.

PSI Minority : Okay. Do you know who Officer Butler ESU [ph] is?

Witness : Not off the top of my head, no.

PSI Minority : Who were the people right around you, right before shots were fired? What are their names?

Witness : The only names that I'm aware of were PSP Counterpart and then Special Agent C/S Response I didn't know everyone's individual names of the uniformed troopers or the EOD technicians that were in the area.

PSI Minority : But there were more people around you at that moment.

Witness : There were more people in that area, yes.

PSI Minority Did you at any time receive information that a suspicious person was inside the security perimeter?

Witness : No.

PSI Minority : Do you have any idea why potentially someone on the Secret Service believed the suspicious person was inside the security perimeter?

Witness : No. That was not communicated to me.

PSI Minority : Did you use your Secret Service device to communicate that day?

Witness : The cellphone?

PSI Minority : Yes.

Witness : Yes.

PSI Minority : Do you use your personal cellphone on July 13th?

Witness : No. I didn't know anyone personally. I didn't have their personal cellphones.

PSI Minority : No. Did you use your personal cellphone

that day.

Witness: Not to talk to anybody in the venue, no. I used it to call my family to let them know I was safe.

PSI Minority: Right. Since July 13th, do you know anything about how Crooks arrived in Butler that day?

Witness: Only what's been reported in the news.

PSI Minority: And what's that?

Witness: That he drove a vehicle, his own vehicle, or a parent's vehicle. I'm not sure which.

PSI Minority: Do you know where he ended up leaving the vehicle?

Witness: I don't.

PSI Minority: [redacted] Witness just a few follow-up questions. Were you aware of other federal law enforcement agents at the rally prior to shots fired?

Witness: I was not.

PSI Minority: You were not at the time. Have you been made aware since, or you're not aware altogether?

Witness: The FBI was there after the fact, but prior to the shooting, no, I wasn't aware of any other federal presence.

PSI Minority: Understood. Were you ever made aware of a suspicious backpack or bike being identified at the rally, or not at the rally but near the rally?

Witness : No. Along that fence line I remember a report that there was an unattended, like there was a bike and a backpack that were unattended. Nothing suspicious. There's a difference between unattended and suspicious. Suspicious would indicate that smoke or wires or fluid. Unattended means no one is around their property.

PSI Minority : When were you made aware of that?

Witness : In and around the time that we were made aware of the person on the fence line with the rangefinder.

PSI Minority : Who made you -- sorry, go ahead.

Witness : When I was over there on the fence line, looking at the fence line, there was a number of people. I believe there was the bike. There was the woman on the horse. I think it was passed to me at that time.

PSI Minority : Who shared that information with you?

Witness : It would've been one of the officers that was there, posted on that fence line area. I don't know exactly who.

PSI Minority : And the purpose of you finding out about that information, was the intention for you to go and investigate that, as well?

Witness : I think at that time they were reporting anything that they could to help locate or pass

intelligence regarding this person. I'm not sure if they thought it was relevant or not. I do recall someone telling me that.

PSI Minority: So you found this out after hearing about a suspicious individual?

Witness: In that same time frame, when we were looking along the fence line at everyone and everything.

PSI Minority: Did you see the backpack and bike yourself?

Witness: I don't recall specifically, no. I remember there were several people on bicycles and on foot, and a horse, and there were a number of things over there. I don't recall the specific bicycle or backpack being mentioned.

PSI Minority: Did you and Trooper PSP Counterpart discuss the bike and backpack?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: You mentioned the individual on the horse a few times. When did you see that person?

Witness: At the same time that we were looking for Crooks. There were people with cellphones and cameras. There were a number of people on that fence line.

PSI Minority: And when you saw the individual on the horse, where were you located?

Witness: In that area along the chain-link

fence, was Posts 4 and 5.

PSI Minority: Were you ever made aware of any individuals associated with that property, which you later found out was AGR, dealing with people who had congregated in and around that property?

Witness: Not specifically, no.

PSI Minority: When you post the individuals at Posts 4 and 5, did they mention to you about dealing with people in that area outside of the fence line?

Witness: I don't recall. I recall they were just reporting to me what they were observing.

PSI Minority: And what was that?

Witness: The gentleman with the rangefinder, that we had the physical description of. I remember them pointing out a bike that was unattended, and the fact that a crowd, a small crowd of approximately 10, 12 people, had gathered in that area. Nothing more.

PSI Minority: Just to be clear, did they tell you that they had observed the individual with the rangefinder?

Witness: Yeah, I believe it was the tactical team in that area that I was speaking to that was reporting it.

PSI Minority: So again, for clarity, you first received the information about a suspicious individual outside the fence line with a rangefinder, and then you

went to talk to those individuals, Post 4 and Post 5. And they confirmed to you that they saw this individual using the rangefinder. Is that right?

Witness: It was my understanding they were the reporting party. At that time I didn't know anyone else had seen them. At this time I believed this was the first anyone is reporting any of this. I don't know anything that happened prior to this one call that I responded to. So to me, this is the first time anyone has seen this person. This is the first I'm learning of it.

PSI Minority: But you heard from these people about the suspicious person? I thought you said earlier that you heard from someone else about the suspicious person.

Witness: Trooper PSP Counterpart who was with me, with the State Police, told me, "Hey, someone's reporting a suspicious person on the fence line with a rangefinder." We responded. It was my understanding at that time that was the reporting party --

PSI Minority: Oh, okay.

Witness: -- that had informed him. So we were responding to people reporting it and getting the information from them directly.

PSI Minority: Okay. So did you confirm with them that they were indeed the people that had reported it prior?

Witness: I asked them what they had seen, and they told me. I didn't ask if they had heard this from anybody else.

PSI Minority: So you still do not know today if they were the reporting party.

Witness: I don't know if they were the first people to see him, no. I don't know that. I don't know who the first people were to see him. I didn't speak to them. I didn't hear from them.

PSI Minority: And did they identify where this individual was when they saw him?

Witness: They said he was on the fence line. That was the only information I had.

PSI Minority: They didn't describe what he looked like to you?

Witness: They said he was a white male, he was younger, and had long hair.

PSI Minority: Did they say where he went?

Witness: No. They didn't know where he was.

PSI Minority: Well, they saw him, right. So at some point they did see him. And then where did they --

Witness: They told me what he looked like and where he was, and he was no longer there. That was all they told me. At that point I was trying to find him.

PSI Minority: And these were local law enforcement?

Witness : It was a tactical team posted in that 4, 5 area.

PSI Minority : How many individuals?

Witness : Approximately four, maybe five.

PSI Minority : Did you ask them if they had communicated to anyone what they had seen on either radio or text?

Witness : It was my understanding that they had communicated it to Trooper PSP Counterpart, and that's why we were there.

PSI Minority : Did Trooper PSP Counterpart ever tell you that they were indeed the reporting party?

Witness : Not specifically, no.

PSI Minority : Okay. I'll turn it back over to my colleagues in the majority.

HSGAC Majority : Well, thank you very much for your time today, Senior Special Agent Witness . We have tried to cover every topic area. However, we are still in the process of receiving productions from DHS and the Department of Homeland Security and Secret Service. This has limited our ability to be efficient and thorough, But we hope that we have been here today. So we may have further questions, and we'll follow up if that is the case.

But as we mentioned at the beginning, we ask that you not speak about what we discussed in this interview here

today with anyone outside of who was in the room, to preserve the integrity of our investigation.

With that, and with no other questions, we will go off the record. Thank you again.

[redacted]: Thank you.

[Whereas, at 5:44 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AND THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW OF

Witness

SERGEANT-TECHNICIAN, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Room SD-342

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, December 5, 2024

1:06 p.m.

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APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Witness:

[redacted], Counsel

Agency Counsel, Deputy Chief Counsel, U.S. Secret Service

Agency Counsel, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Office of the Chief Counsel, U.S. Secret Service

On Behalf of Chairman Peters:

HSGAC Majority, Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

HSGAC Majority, Senior Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

HSGAC Majority, Senior Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

HSGAC Majority, Deputy Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul:

HSGAC Minority, Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

APPEARANCES (continued):

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul (continued):

[redacted], Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of PSI Chairman Blumenthal:

[redacted], Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

On Behalf of PSI Ranking Member Johnson:

[redacted], Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

[redacted], Chief Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

[redacted], Deputy Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

P R O C E E D I N G S

HSGAC Majority: Good morning. This is the transcribed interview of Sergeant-Technician Witness, being conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

This interview was requested by Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, as well as Subcommittee Chair Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, as part of the Committee's investigation of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on former President Trump, and the U.S. Secret Service planning and advance and response related to the events in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, Chairmen Peters and Blumenthal, and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson requested voluntary transcribed interviews with individuals within the Secret Service related to this event, including of Witness.

We will proceed to make introductions today of the four different offices who have combined and are conducting this interview, and then we'll explain how we intend to proceed. And with that first I'd ask if you, for the record, would introduce yourself, and if counsel could then introduce themselves.

Witness: Sergeant-Technician Witness, U.S. Secret

Service Counter Sniper Team.

Witness Counsel: Witness Counsel, attorney for Witness.

Agency Counsel: Agency Counsel, Deputy Chief Counsel, U.S. Secret Service.

Agency Counsel: Agency Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security.

HSGAC Minority: HSGAC Minority, Investigator for U.S. Senator Rand Paul, and I'll be joined shortly with our counsel, HSGAC Majority.

PSI Majority: PSI Majority, Senior Counsel with PSI Chairman Richard Blumenthal. With me I have [redacted] PSI Majority, Counsel for PSI Blumenthal.

PSI Minority: Good afternoon, Witness. I'm [redacted] PSI Minority. I'm Staff Director for Senator Johnson on PSI, and along with me is PSI Minority, Chief Counsel for Senator Johnson, and PSI Minority, Deputy Staff Director for Senator Johnson. Thank you for being here.

HSGAC Majority: We are going to plan to conduct our long sessions of questions by office, to be as efficient as possible, and then to break after an hour, or as needed. So should you need a break during our questioning we are happy to take one. Just let us know.

We will do our best not to have more than one person speaking at once. Should somebody have a follow-up question we will try to do so orderly so you're not

confused about who is asking the question. If, for whatever reason, the question is unintelligible or hard to understand or confusing, just please ask us to restate it and we will be happy to do so.

The reporter is going to create a verbatim record of what we discuss here today, and with that in mind, as I'm sure you are aware, please respond verbally because the reporter can't properly record any nonverbal response. Do you understand?

[redacted]: Yes, I do.

[redacted]: This interview is being conducted in an unclassified setting, and to the extent practicable we intend to ask for information that should not implicate classified information. However, should any question raise information you know to be classified, please indicate that the question has implicated classified information and you cannot answer it in this setting, and answer as best to your ability any information you can provide that is not classified, that can be responsive to the question.

If necessary, and as needed, once you have clarified, should the Committee have a need for additional information that implicates classified information, we have the capability to do so, and can arrange to receive that information in a classified setting. Do you understand that?

Witness Yes, I do. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority It's the Committee's practice to honor valid common law privilege and claims as an accommodation to a witness when those claims are made in good faith and accompanied by a sufficient explanation, so that the Committee can evaluate the claim. When deciding whether to honor these privileges, the Committee will weigh its need for the information against any legitimate basis for withholding it. This interview today is being conducted without prejudice to any future discussions the Committee may require, and we reserve the right to request your participation in a future interview should we need to.

If you need to take a break, as I've mentioned, please just let us know. In addition, we have water available, and if you have a need just let us know and we'll try to accommodate you.

You are required to answer questions before Congress truthfully. Do you understand that?

Witness Yes.

HSGAC Majority This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in interviews, including today's interview. Specifically 18 USC Section 1001 makes it a crime to make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations in the course of a congressional investigation. Do you understand?

Witness Yes.

HSGAC Majority Is there any reason that you would be unable to provide us today with truthful answers to our questions?

Witness No reason.

HSGAC Majority Finally, we would ask that you not speak about what we discuss in today's interview outside of the room, to help us maintain the integrity of our investigation. And we also ask that you not remove or make any copies or photographs of any materials or exhibits. Do you understand?

Witness Yes.

Agency Counsel Just for the record, the Secret Service and DHS have made available to the Committee, consistent with the Chairman's request, info and records that we would not ordinarily release publicly. We feel these records fall under the Privacy Act, personnel and other privacy information, FOUO, intelligence law, and sensitive records information.

While we have made these records available, and the information available, any discussions is not intended for public disclosure. The Secret Service aren't waiving any protections under these laws. The transcript and attachments are protected from dissemination, we feel, based on these authorities.

And lastly, we just want to confirm that there is no audio or video recordings of today's proceedings except, of course, for the court reporter.

We appreciate that. Thank you, HSGAC Ma.

HSGAC Majority: Consistent with our prior interviews and this investigation, our understanding as well is that the only recording being made today is for the purposes of making the transcript of this interview, and that's our understanding of this, as well.

With respect to the transcript of this interview itself, that will remain the property of this Committee. We will provide all counsel opportunity to review the transcript and to provide any factual corrections to that transcript.

As is the case, and has been explained in our other interviews, but for your information, the Committee does intend to rely on the information we learn today in future, including public hearings or reports. And as has been the Committee's practice and was the case with respect to the Committee's Interim Report, released in September of this year, in advance of making any non-public information, including information we learn today, public, our practice has been, and our intent is, to provide counsel and witnesses with an opportunity to review that information in advance of it becoming public, and to provide any factual

corrections to any errors that may exist.

Are there any questions about that?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Majority: With that we will begin the first hour of our questioning with Chairman Peters' staff starting. So before we begin with our questioning, if you have any other questions we are happy to entertain them now.

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'll turn it over to my colleague, [redacted] HSGAC Majority.

HSGAC Majority: Sergeant-Technician Witness, my name is HSGAC Majority. I'm a Senior Investigator for Senator Peters on the Committee here. Thank you for being here.

Could you start with telling us how long you've been with the Secret Service?

Witness: I've been with the Secret Service for almost 24 years.

HSGAC Majority: How long have you been a counter sniper for the Secret Service?

Witness: Over 21 years.

HSGAC Majority: So in those roughly two or three years before you were a counter sniper, what was your role with the Secret Service?

Witness: I was assigned as a Uniformed Division Officer down at the White House branch.

[HSGAC Majority]: Did you have counter sniper experience before joining the Secret Service?

[Witness]: No, I did not.

[HSGAC Majority]: Did you have law enforcement experience before joining the Secret Service?

[Witness]: No, sir.

[HSGAC Majority]: Could you walk us through if there is a typical career progression for a counter sniper, what that typical career progression is. Was yours typical? In other words, you start with the Uniformed Division?

[Witness]: So before you join the counter sniper team you will have to be part of the Uniformed Division for approximately two years, or for two years, before you can apply and start the process.

[HSGAC Majority]: Do Secret Service counter snipers generally spend any time in the field in Investigations Division?

[Witness]: No.

[HSGAC Majority]: Has that typical progression changed in all of the years that you've been with the Secret Service?

[Witness]: No, it has not.

[HSGAC Majority]: Regarding Secret Service agents, so not counter snipers, to the extent that you're familiar with their typical career progression, are you aware of that progression changing in recent years? In other words,

shortening the amount of time the agents spend either in the field or in investigations before they're assigned to high-level protectees such as the former President?

Witness: I don't understand anything with the special agent side, only the Uniformed Division side.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of any special agents being assigned to either POTUS, VPOTUS, or FPOTUS with minimal experience, such as one or two years out of the Academy, or less?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And you are a counter sniper as opposed to a sniper. Is that right?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And you were a counter sniper at the July 13th rally?

Witness: Yes, I was.

HSGAC Majority: What's your understanding of the difference between sniper and counter sniper.

Witness: So as a counter sniper my responsibility is to look for that long-range threat, the lone gunman in most terms. In some cases you're also looking for the organized attack onto a protectee or to a site.

HSGAC Majority: At outdoor events is there ever any use for snipers looking into the site or is it only counter snipers looking outside of the site, as you said, for long-

range threats.

Witness: So as a sniper and a counter sniper, one of your responsibilities or one of your duties is to provide observation, your real-time intelligence for that location. You're watching people. You're seeing what's going on. So regardless of a sniper or counter sniper role, your one duty is to provide real-time knowledge and observe.

HSGAC Majority: Have you worked Secret Service protective events before where there were snipers looking into the site?

Witness: Yes, I have.

HSGAC Majority: And that were state or local snipers. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: And then shifting towards preparations for this July 13th rally, it's our understanding this was the first time that Secret Service sent counter snipers to any protectee other than POTUS, VPOTUS, or an official candidate. Is that your understanding?

Witness: As far as I know, this was the first time we've ever covered for this year.

HSGAC Majority: When did you become aware that Secret Service counter snipers would be sent to this event?

Witness: I learned the Tuesday before the event.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know who decided that?

Witness: My operations section that's responsible for our schedule assigned me to that detail.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know why it was decided to send counter snipers?

Witness: No. I get my assignment and I move forward.

HSGAC Majority: So in your 23 years with the Secret Service, this was the first time you or any other counter sniper had been sent to a former President. Is that right?

Witness: As a former President, yes, but we've also covered candidates in the past.

HSGAC Majority: Candidates, right, but not a former President.

Witness: This was the first time we've ever had a former President.

HSGAC Majority: So what was your reaction to that decision?

Witness: Get my orders and move forward.

HSGAC Majority: Did it strike you as significant?

Witness: No. It's just another assignment.

HSGAC Majority: Was it at all concerning to you to be assigned to a protectee that you hadn't before, not the individual but the role as a former President?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did that cause you to plan differently

at all for this event?

Witness: No, it did not.

HSGAC Majority: And to clarify, this was the first time counter snipers were sent to former President Trump since he left office. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: So you said you learned the Tuesday before the event that counter snipers would be sent. Did that include yourself, that you learned that Tuesday that you personally would be sent? Is that right?

Witness: I knew that my assignment for the upcoming week would be to provide coverage in Pennsylvania for former President Trump. I didn't look at the schedule to see who else I would be working with.

HSGAC Majority: You ended up working with three other counter snipers, two 2-man teams. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: And your partner was C/S Team Lead. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: Were you and C/S Team Lead both shooters or riflemen? In other words, you both had weapons that you were able to shoot and you weren't exclusively a spotter or observer?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: And so there's no functional difference between your two responsibilities?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Regarding planning for the rally, did you have any planning responsibilities ahead of the rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: As sergeant-technician, you were the supervisor for all of the counter snipers at that event. Is that right?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What was your role and responsibilities as supervisor?

Witness: So as a supervisor for the event, depending on what were to happen, I would have to do an administrative role. But my role primarily for that detail was to be what we call a second team member. I am coming in before the event to work a protective assignment and take the command, so to speak, from the team leader.

HSGAC Majority: Team leader being C/S Team Lead?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: I'm sorry. When would you take the command from him?

Witness: So I'm just a working team member. So if I'm assigned to that detail, which I was, I came in on that Friday, and I'm taking all directions from the team leader

because he's responsible for that detail --

HSGAC Majority: All right. So --

Witness: -- for the counter sniper role.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. Say that again.

Witness: He's the team leader for the counter snipers.

HSGAC Majority: So you may have answered my next question, but does your role as sergeant and supervisor differ at all from the team lead, C/S Team Lead?

Witness: So the team lead would be responsible for the overall counter sniper mission for that detail. Regardless of rank, whether it's a sergeant-technician, lieutenant, or captain, the team leader was responsible for that detail. He understands what's going on.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any role or responsibility to review or approve any of C/S Team Lead planning?

Witness: No. Not at all.

HSGAC Majority: Did you overrule any of his decisions in the planning and leading up to the rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Could you have?

Witness: It would have to be an extreme case, but I didn't.

HSGAC Majority: You did not, you said.

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: What information did you rely on ahead of the rally to prepare? Any documents?

Witness: So the team leader provided us with logistics reports and photos that he developed for that site.

HSGAC Majority: Did you attend or give any briefings ahead of the rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And when did you say you first arrived at the site?

Witness: To the site?

HSGAC Majority: Yes.

Witness: That would be on July 13th, the day of the detail.

HSGAC Majority: What did you do when you got there?

Witness: We went ahead and parked our vehicle, government vehicle, and then attended a site walk-through with C/S Team Lead.

HSGAC Majority: And what was discussed on the walk-through?

Witness: The walk-through, we basically started at the arrival/departure point where former President Trump would arrive. We went to the tents that he was going to do some photo ops, and then we walked up onto the actual stage, the runway that led up to the stage where the podium

was, and was able to get an idea of what was looking in on the site.

HSGAC Majority: Did you conduct any kind of threat assessment?

Witness: C/S Team L was the one that would be conducting the threat assessment. That's what he does during his advance.

HSGAC Majority: Did he make you aware of that on that walk-through.

Witness: Yes. He pointed out locations.

HSGAC Majority: Was the AGR building one such location that was pointed out as a potential threat or vulnerability?

Witness: He pointed out the AGR building, explaining that on the second floor of the AGR building there was going to be a local team positioned on that floor.

HSGAC Majority: So in terms of the local positioning. But was AGR noted in any way as a potential threat or vulnerability?

Witness: It was in clear sight, so it would be understood that it was a line-of-sight concern.

HSGAC Majority: How were those line-of-sight concerns mitigated?

Witness: So the line-of-sight concerns that I could see, I mean, they had the stands on either side of the

podium. They had the big Jumbotrons on either side of the stage. I remember a combine to the right of the stage, that was on the fence line, flags.

HSGAC Majority: Were you and the other Secret Service counter snipers part of a plan to mitigate the line-of-sight concern from the AGR building?

Witness: We are. We're placed in locations to mitigate any line-of-sight concerns.

HSGAC Majority: And how does that work? In other words, you had visibility of that roof, so therefore part of your job was to monitor that roof, to mitigate the line-of-sight. Is that what you mean?

Witness: So we're looking at not just that rooftop but all the areas within the 360-degree circle, out to LES That's our area of responsibility.

HSGAC Majority: I think you mentioned a combine. Is that right? That was part of the line-of-sight mitigation?

Witness: It was on a fence line on the interior.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of whether trucks were used, or discussed to be used, to mitigate line-of-sigh1)1t concerns?

Witness: I wasn't during that planning process, no.

HSGAC Majority: Did you later become aware of that?

Witness: I don't remember seeing any trucks on fence lines or anything.

HSGAC Majority: Do you remember any discussions about whether trucks were considered?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: We're handing you a document that's been marked Exhibit 1.

[Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: This is Bates 3009 through 3010. This is a July 11, 2024, email with an attachment, called the "Counter Sniper Team Tactical Survey."

Did you send or receive this email?

Witness: I did not send it but I did receive it.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know who sent it?

Witness: C/S Team Lead.

HSGAC Majority: Was he the one who completed this tactical survey?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: On that document, the second page, it says, "Primary areas of concern," about halfway down, and it includes, the third bullet there, that says "buildings at three o'clock, approximately," and it's redacted "yards away." Does that refer to AGR?

Witness: Yes. If it was for the three -- yes.

HSGAC Majority: So do you take that to mean that ahead of the rally, one of the three primary areas of concern

that were identified was the AGR building?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What did you do with that information, if anything? Did it affect your planning or actions in any way?

Witness: No, it does not. It just gives me like a mental note of what to expect once I arrive on-site, because I received this prior to arriving into Pennsylvania.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware of the line-of-sight issues that the Hercules 2 team had in terms of the blocked view of the AGR building, with the trees in between them and the AGR?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Have you since become aware of that?

Witness: From everything that's gone on now I'm starting to understand it, yes.

HSGAC Majority: But you weren't made aware before the event or during that Hercules 2 team on the northern barn had a limited view of the AGR building?

Witness: Not that I recall.

HSGAC Majority: In the lead-up to the event, did you have any discussions with the local snipers who were going to be positioned in that AGR building?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you know where they would be positioned? Before the event, did you know?

Witness: No, I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Can you turn back to that Exhibit 1. On that second page, the box about halfway down, below the one we were just discussing, this box says, "Local tactical counter sniper support, Butler ESU sniper team," and it says "located in the AGR glass building." Is that signifying that the local snipers would be positioned inside the AGR building?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So you received this before the event. You just don't recall seeing that. Is that right?

Witness: It's been a while so I'm just trying to remember everything that I received for that day.

HSGAC Majority: Sure. Fair enough. But you don't recall the time, in the lead-up to the event and during that day, you don't recall being aware that those officers were positioned inside AGR?

Witness: No. So when we arrived to the site and we did the site walk-through, C/S Team Lead identified the team that was going to be on the second floor of the AGR building. And he also identified the team that was going to be at the horse stands.

HSGAC Majority: Oh, I see. Okay. So it was your

understanding that those snipers would be inside the AGR building.

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: As opposed to on the roof.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Did you have any concerns with them being positioned inside the AGR building as opposed to on the roof?

Witness: No, because C/S Team L went ahead and explained -- C/S Team Lead explained to me, and to the three of us, that that team has used that location for prior events.

HSGAC Majority: Did you suggest that they be positioned elsewhere, including the roof or elsewhere?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Was there any discussion of them possibly being placed on the roof?

Witness: During that time when it was the four of us together, no. Prior to that, I don't know.

HSGAC Majority: It's been explained to us by other counter snipers that the local snipers are often co-located with you all at other events. Is that right?

Witness: In my experience, yes.

HSGAC Majority: Were you fine with the fact that they would not be co-located with you at this event? Did that raise any concerns?

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Witness: No, it did not.

HSGAC Majority: And why is that, if they usually are?

Witness: Because it was only two counter sniper teams that were going to be provided for that site. Having the two local teams away from us, neither being co-located, they could provide more eyes on the large area that was going to be for the detail for the site.

HSGAC Majority: And what was their responsibility? Did they have a particular area of responsibility? What was your understanding of what their role would be?

Witness: From what I can understand from their positioning on the roof, inside the AGR, they would be looking towards the south, and basically everything outside their building and out to the south, and then the team in the horse stands would be providing the line-of-sight coverage for the opposite side of the venue.

HSGAC Majority: Was it your understanding that those local snipers inside AGR were part of the plan to mitigate those line-of-sight concerns you described earlier, that came from AGR?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: How would they do that?

Witness: By observing out of the windows of their post, they should be able to see anything that's in front of their post location and out through the entire site.

HSGAC Majority: So it was your understanding that they would be able to see out their window onto the roof of the AGR building that they were positioned in?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Did you ever go inside the AGR building before the event?

Witness: No, I did not.

HSGAC Majority: And can you clarify. So if they were inside the building, how would that give them a view of the roof? Was it your understanding that they had line-of-sight to the roof in front of the AGR building?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: Is there anything else, in terms of the mitigation plan for the AGR building that we haven't covered? So who else would've been responsible for covering AGR? Not just line-of-sight but securing it from a law enforcement perspective.

Witness: Just local ground law enforcement.

HSGAC Majority: What was your understanding of their footprint or role?

Witness: I don't know exactly where they were going to be positioned, but normally around a site you would have local law enforcement covering the area outside.

HSGAC Majority: Did any of the four of you, meaning the Secret Service counter snipers, have the AGR building in

your particular area of responsibility?

Witness: That would be Hercules 2.

HSGAC Majority: Throughout that day, leaving aside shots fired, but leading up to that moment when the former President took the stage, throughout that day did you ever see any law enforcement around the AGR building?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What did you see?

Witness: Just regular uniformed local officers on the ground.

HSGAC Majority: Roughly how many?

Witness: I don't recall. I don't know.

HSGAC Majority: Were they posted there or were they roving in and out?

Witness: They were just around the building.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say around the building, this is on that side of the fence. Our understanding is that there were two fences. One was the security perimeter, and then there was a no-man's land or rabbit run, and then another fence. So you're saying the officers you saw were beyond that second fence?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And I know you said that Hercules 2 had AGR in their area of responsibility, but you, being on Hercules 1, did you have any responsibilities for AGR in

any way?

Witness: So both teams, basically both teams are responsible for an aera of 360 degrees and out to LES yards. Because there were two teams you basically split the responsibility up the middle. You still have some kind of overlapping coverage, so you're not just focused on one side, one team is focused on one side, one team on the other. So you are doing some kind of overlapping coverage, checking to make sure your teammates are okay behind you. But basically I was responsible for the nine o'clock side, and Hercules 2 was primarily responsible for the three o'clock side. You don't want all four individuals looking in the same direction, because then you're taking your line-of-sight off of something else.

HSGAC Majority: Did anyone raise any concerns about the AGR building, including potential threats, vulnerabilities, line-of-sight concerns, that you haven't discussed?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to talk a little bit about the security perimeter, and when I say -- I understand that there are different levels of security perimeters that the Secret Service refers to. I'm referring to the magnetometers, so the secure area. Just broadly speaking, first, how does the security perimeter affect your responsibilities or duties, if at all, as a counter sniper?

Witness: We're responsible for everything from our exact location out to LES yards.

HSGAC Majority: Regardless of the location of the perimeters? In other words, you scan beyond the security perimeter?

Witness: Correct. Everything from us out to LES yards is in our perimeter.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware of the location of other security perimeter that day, at the site?

Witness: I knew of the immediate site security and the fence lines and where the mag point was.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any concerns about the perimeter, including the location of any threats or vulnerabilities, either inside or outside the perimeter?

Witness: No, because -- no, no.

HSGAC Majority: Did anyone else have any concerns, that you're aware of, about the perimeter?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: And you said you were on Hercules 1. That's the southern barn of those two barns. Is that right?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: What was your rough estimate of the clock position you were positioned in?

Witness: So I was positioned, from the stage I was

positioned at the seven o'clock position.

HSGAC Majority: Is that the position you had initially planned to be in, or that C/S Team Lead planned for you to be in?

Witness: C/S Team Lead planned for us to be at that location.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any concerns about that position?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you consider any other positions?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And regarding your responsibility once you're up in position, you said your primary area of responsibility was the nine o'clock side. Is that right?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Were you primarily scanning the crowd for threats or looking out beyond the security perimeter?

Witness: Well, I'm looking at everything inside the venue to include everything outside.

HSGAC Majority: And I know you said even though each team had an area of responsibility, you're also all responsible for 360 degrees, generally speaking. So can you walk us through how an area of responsibility works? So in other words, if something comes up in one team's AOR, how does that affect your actions? Like are you supposed

to let them handle that and not abandon your AOR, or how does that work?

Witness: So you want to go ahead and you want to assist them in what they're looking at, but you also want to make sure that it's not a diversion for something else that could be coming from behind you.

HSGAC Majority: But you're certainly not prohibited from looking in another counter sniper's AOR.

Witness: Absolutely not, no.

HSGAC Majority: Was there a direction that you were facing for most of the day?

Witness: To the nine o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: Is it common to change the direction you're facing at these events?

Witness: Meaning?

HSGAC Majority: Are you generally facing one direction the entire day at these kinds of events, or are you often changing the position you're facing, including the position or direction you're facing with your weapon? Does that change throughout the day at these events?

Witness: So I was primarily focused on the nine o'clock side. So basically the twelve to six, out to the nine o'clock. And I'm doing a scan from the six o'clock to the twelve, all the way on the nine o'clock side, doing an overlap coverage, you know, check on my teammates behind me

at Hercules 2.

HSGAC Majority: And did that change throughout the day, or were you primarily facing that direction from the twelve to six, at the nine o'clock?

Witness: I was primarily twelve to six, at the nine o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: Can you describe for us the view you had of the AGR building from your position?

Witness: I mean, it seemed unobstructed from what I could tell. I could see the rooftops. I could see where the local team was positioned, on the second floor.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any visibility of the far slope of the AGR roofs, in other words, the slope of the roof on the north side of that building?

Witness: Not from what I can remember. Well --

HSGAC Majority: Is it clear what I'm describing? So the slope of the roof facing you was facing down towards the south, towards you.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And you had clear visibility of that slope, right?

Witness: Right.

HSGAC Majority: And then the opposite slope of that roof, sloping away from you towards the north.

Witness: No, I couldn't see that side.

HSGAC Majority: You couldn't see that?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. How about the width of the roof, so going west to east, could you see the entirety of that roof from the west to the east edge of that roof, so left to right?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: What could you not see?

Witness: There's just a small portion on the right side.

HSGAC Majority: Why were you not able to see that small portion?

Witness: There was a tree obstructing the view.

HSGAC Majority: So can you describe any more about what was obstructed?

Witness: Just a small portion of the rooftop.

HSGAC Majority: Did that concern you at all, when you got into position and saw that you didn't have a full, unobstructed view of that roof?

Witness: No, it did not.

HSGAC Majority: Why is that?

Witness: You had the team on the second floor of the AGR building that was covering that line-of-sight.

HSGAC Majority: We'll get into all the events that happened when Mr. Crooks got into position and fired, but

before that happened, when he got into position, did you ever see him on the roof moving into position?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'm going to hand you another document. This is marked Exhibit 2.

[Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: So this is two photographs. The first photograph was taken from the AGR roof, looking towards the barns behind the stage where you were positioned. You probably are aware, the AGR building is actually a series, a complex of multiple roofs. This is three successive roof peaks. So where the photographer is standing here is the northern of the three roofs, looking south towards the barns where you were positioned. The second page on this exhibit is the same picture, just zoomed in.

Does that look like your position on that barn on the right? It's easier to see in the second picture.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So from your position, looking back towards where this photographer was standing, what was your view beyond that first roof peak where Mr. Crooks ended up? So were you able to see these other two roofs beyond that first roof?

Witness: I could see that there were other rooftops.

HSGAC Majority: And again, the question of the two slopes of the roof. Were you able to see the near slopes, the roof sloping down towards you, towards the south of each of those successive roofs?

Witness: No. The only roof that I really had a clear line-of-sight was the first roof that was closest to the site.

HSGAC Majority: But you said you were able to see the other roofs beyond that, to the north.

Witness: You could see like the ridge line.

HSGAC Majority: The ridge line. I see. But not the far slope, sloping away from you to the north?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'm sorry. Can you give a verbal answer?

Witness: Oh, no. Sorry.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. I appreciate it. So you were able to see the ridge line of those other roofs. If someone had been running across those roofs, would you have expected to be able to see them?

Witness: If I was looking that direction, probably. It depends.

HSGAC Majority: What would it depend on?

Witness: It depends on if, were they in a full, stand-up sprint across the rooftops or were they using way

the rooftops were built, you know, using that as cover, crawling along it.

HSGAC Majority: And again, leaving aside the events of when shots were fired, throughout that day do you recall how much time roughly you spent scanning those roofs?

Witness: Minimal, because I was focused to the other side of the site.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall observing anything on those roofs before the events of shots fired?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Was there a CS response team at the rally?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What are they responsible for? What's their role?

Witness: Their role is to provide the non-lethal mitigation of something. If we see something, they go out and investigate it. So they're [redacted]

HSGAC Majority: And what kind of things do they get sent out to investigate?

Witness: Suspicious individuals, vehicles, suspicious packages. Just anything that doesn't look clear from our point of view.

HSGAC Majority: Does anyone in particular have authority or responsibility for sending them out to investigate

something?

Witness: Normally, once we get on the site and we brief them, they belong to us, and we're the ones that control them.

HSGAC Majority: Is it common for anyone else in the Secret Service to send them out to investigate, anyone besides the counter snipers?

Witness: Not in my experience.

HSGAC Majority: It's our understanding that Agent C/S Response was the CS response agent that day. Is that your understanding?

Witness: I do not remember who the agent was.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall being aware at the time what his experience level was?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Have you since become aware?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Apologies if you said this. What time did you arrive at the Butler rally site that day, Saturday the 13th?

Witness: 1330, I think. I don't remember.

HSGAC Majority: Where did you come from?

Witness: I came from -- that morning, you mean?

HSGAC Majority: Yes.

Witness: So after having breakfast, we responded up

to Butler.

[redacted]: Breakfast at the hotel?

[redacted]: No. First Watch.

[redacted]: But you stayed in the Pittsburgh area, at a hotel, on Friday night. Is that right?

[redacted]: Right. That's correct.

[redacted]: What did you do that night, Friday night?

[redacted]: Stayed in my room.

[redacted]: Do you know what the other three counter snipers did that night?

[redacted]: Stayed in their room.

[redacted]: Did you have any concerns ahead of the rally that we haven't discussed?

[redacted]: None.

[redacted]: I'd like to talk about suspicious persons. So just generally speaking, what is your responsibility as a counter sniper when there is a suspicious person that's been flagged for you or other Secret Service personnel at an event like this?

[redacted]: So once an individual has been identified as suspicious we will try to locate that individual to help provide ground units to investigate to, for lack of a better term, capture, to catch.

[redacted]: And before shots were fired at this

event, were you aware of a suspicious person in the general area of the three o'clock, which is the north around the AGR building?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: When were you made aware of that?

Witness: It was at approximately 1753 I received an email that had his photos and identified him as being suspicious.

HSGAC Majority: Who sent you that email?

Witness: C/S Team Lead, through the local Butlers.

HSGAC Majority: I just handed you a document marked Exhibit 3. This is Bates 2965 through 2968.

[Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: Is this the email that you just referred to?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So this is from Officer-Technician C/S Team Lead to you as well as the other two counter snipers. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: So this email was sent at 5:53 on July 13th from local police near the AGR glass building. "If spotted, please notify PI at [redacted] or go direct with the Security Room. Kid learning" -- and I think that's

supposed to be lurking -- "around building we are in, AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards stage, FYI, if you want to notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him."

So this said that the suspicious person had a rangefinder. What did that piece of information tell you? Did that raise the level of suspicion or concern in your mind?

Witness: No. A rangefinder is an observation device with just an added feature. So it's been my experience with being with multiple campaigns that I've worked, he just wants to see, just like everybody wants to see, the candidate speak. So they're just using that to get a closer look.

HSGAC Majority: Have you seen rally attendees at other events with a rangefinder before?

Witness: I've seen binoculars. I've seen rangefinders. I've seen rifle scope not attached to the rifle. Or even just a naked eye.

HSGAC Majority: So a rifle scope is not concerning either, if you see a rally attendee with that?

Witness: As long as it's not attached to a rifle it's not concerning.

HSGAC Majority: Is it not concerning seeing that but not knowing whether that person has a weapon somewhere else?

Witness: You'll keep an eye on it to make sure that nothing else presents itself.

HSGAC Majority: And the other pages of that exhibit, those are the photos of Mr. Crooks, which we know is Mr. Crooks, but that was the suspicious person that they flagged. Is that right?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: So what did you do in response to receiving this information?

Witness: So I turned around, based off the image that I received in that email, and see if I could locate him.

HSGAC Majority: And where did you look?

Witness: I looked at the base of the AGR, looking from the west to the east, around the grounds of the AGR building.

HSGAC Majority: So again, even though AGR was not in your AOR, that didn't prohibit you from looking in that direction for this suspicious person. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct. But once my search became negative, then I turned back around to my area of responsibility.

HSGAC Majority: Roughly how long did you search and determine it was a negative search? Do you recall?

Witness: I don't know.

HSGAC Majority: What was your understanding of how that suspicious person was being handled, and by whom, beyond your search?

Witness: Can you explain again please? Sorry.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of whether any law enforcement officials, whether with Secret Service or state and local, were performing any kind of tasks to try to find the suspicious person?

Witness: I wasn't aware.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if the CS Response Agent C/S Response was deployed or sent out to look for the suspicious person?

Witness: I do not recall that.

HSGAC Majority: So we spoke with Special Agent C/S Response and he told us that he was sent out by other Secret Service agents, not counter snipers, to look for the suspicious person. Does that surprise or concern you to learn that someone besides a counter sniper sent him out to look?

Witness Counsel: Wait, wait, wait, wait. He wasn't aware.

HSGAC Majority: Right. And I'm asking him --

Witness Counsel: And you're asking him now.

HSGAC Majority: Right. We've been told by Special Agent C/S Response that he was indeed sent out to look for the suspicious person.

Witness Counsel: So you're asking him to speculate as to

whether he would be surprised?

HSGAC Majority: No. I'm asking whether he's surprised now, to learn that --

Witness Counsel: All right. You're asking are you surprised now --

HSGAC Majority: Yes.

Witness Counsel: -- that you've just learned that C/S Response was sent out.

HSGAC Majority: Surprised or concerned.

Witness Counsel: Surprise to you.

HSGAC Majority: Because you said earlier that he, the CS response agent, belongs to you, meaning the CS team. So is it surprising or concerning to learn that he was sent by someone else to look for the suspicious person?

Witness: I wouldn't say concerning. You know, they're normally ours once we get to a site. But knowing now that they were directed to go to a location, no, they were just trying to help out with the search.

HSGAC Majority: And why didn't you send out, you or the other three Secret Service counter snipers, why didn't you send out C/S Response as the CS response agent to look for this particular suspicious person?

Witness: I don't know.

HSGAC Majority: I'm sorry?

Witness: I do not know why he was not sent.

[HSGAC Majority]: In hindsight --

[Witness Counsel]: Can you just repeat the question?

[HSGAC Majority]: Why did you or any of the other three counter snipers not send out CS response agent --

[Witness Counsel]: His question is why -- you're asking why he didn't send anybody out, not why you weren't sent out.

[HSGAC Majority]: Correct.

[Witness Counsel]: Do you understand the question?

[Witness]: Yeah. Why he didn't get sent out --

[Witness Counsel]: Did you have any authority to send him out, or why you didn't send him out. That's the question. Is that relevant to you in any way, in terms of your role there?

[Witness]: No. We would've just continued doing our search, whether he was sent out or not.

[HSGAC Majority]: Should you have known that he was sent out? Because like you said earlier, he, quote/unquote, "belongs to the CS team" --

[Witness]: Right.

[HSGAC Majority]: -- as an asset. Should you have known that he was being deployed by someone else in the Secret Service?

[Witness]: If he's going to be used for something else we need to know, because if he gets tied up with something, then they're basically preventing him from working with us.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Do you know what ended up happening with the search for the suspicious person? Do you know if local law enforcement addressed it or found the person?

Witness: No. I don't know what happened.

HSGAC Majority: At any other point that day did you receive word about any other suspicious persons?

Witness: No. He was the only one.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall hearing Secret Service counter sniper say over the radio that locals were addressing an issue at the three o'clock, about 200 yards out?

Witness: I do.

HSGAC Majority: What was communicated?

Witness: That the locals were working an issue at the three o'clock position.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall who said that?

Witness Hercules 2 C/S.

HSGAC Majority: And roughly when was that?

Witness: I don't know.

HSGAC Majority: Can you put it in terms of a frame of reference to the shooting? Was it a few minutes before shooting?

Witness: I wasn't looking at my watch to know how many minutes prior to that call being put out.

HSGAC Majority: What, if anything, did you do with that information?

Witness: Basically turned back around to observe the three o'clock position.

HSGAC Majority: And you had received the BOLO email at, I think we said, 5:53, about a suspicious person around AGR, which is the same area as the three o'clock. Did you associate Hercules 2 C/S radio alert about the three o'clock with this BOLO about the three o'clock?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And why not?

Witness: Because he stated that there was an issue. It's just a blanket statement. He wasn't saying that the suspicious individual was being worked at the three o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: But this was the only BOLO that was sent out that day, that you're aware of, right?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And you said that this was the only suspicious person report sent out that day.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And they were both in the same area, the three o'clock. But you didn't associate the two in your mind?

Witness: No. They were working an issue, so you

don't know what they're working.

[redacted]: Did you relay over the radio any information about the suspicious person or the area around the three o'clock?

[redacted]: No.

[redacted]: You knew that the suspicious person was seen with a rangefinder. I know you said that that isn't totally unheard of. Why not relay that on the radio, the fact that the suspicious person had a rangefinder and there's also an issue being worked at the three o'clock, in the same area?

[Pause.]

[redacted]: Could you just repeat the question?

[redacted]: So you were told that there was a suspicious person at the three o'clock, and then you heard this -- and this suspicious person, you were told, had a rangefinder. And then you heard [redacted] alert, over the radio, that the locals are working something at the three o'clock. Why not send out a radio alert that the suspicious person in that same area had a rangefinder?

[redacted]: It already had been out.

[redacted]: It's already been something --

[redacted]: Yeah.

[redacted]: I don't know if they're one in the same. So you're working each individual call as something

separate. You have the suspicious individual, you know, the guy with the rangefinder, the local police are working an issue at the three o'clock. You don't know if it's all the same thing or separate. So you basically take all the pieces and work them individually.

HSGAC Majority: But the BOLO was sent via email to you and the other Secret Service counter sniper team, not over the radio. Is that right?

Witness: Correct. Yeah, I received that by email.

[redacted]: So the shift agents around the former President would've heard Hercules 2 C/S alert about the locals working something at the three o'clock, but they would not have heard anything about the fact that a suspicious person in that same area had a rangefinder. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct, because he did put it over the radio channel that the shift would've heard.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. Say that again.

Witness: So the radio call that Hercules 2 C/S put out would've been heard by the detail or the shift of former President Trump.

HSGAC Majority: But you're not aware of anyone saying over the radio that the suspicious person had a rangefinder.

Witness: No, not over the radio.

HSGAC Majority: But that wasn't worth communicating at that point, once Hercules 2 C/S alerted everyone about the issue at the three o'clock, to also alert them that the suspicious person in that area had a rangefinder?

Witness Counsel: All right. Can we take a moment?

HSGAC Majority: Sure.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Majority: Go ahead, Witness.

Witness: All right. So the information was already disseminated via radio that the local PD was working an issue at the three o'clock. You know, I need to observe that area, you know, and keep the air clear.

HSGAC Majority: Keep the radio air clear -- is that what you mean?

Witness: Right. If something pertinent needs to go out, I don't want to be stepping on somebody else. The information has already been put out. I need to stand by and wait for further information that comes out.

HSGAC Majority: Were you ever told that someone was on the roof of the AGR building?

Witness: I heard somehow that someone was on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: So walk us through that. What did you hear?

Witness: Someone was on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: When was this that you heard that?

Witness: Prior to the shots being fired.

HSGAC Majority: Roughly how long before shots fired?

Witness: I don't know. Just -- it was prior to the shots being fired.

HSGAC Majority: Who said it?

Witness: I don't know. I don't know if it was from the crowd that was close by. I don't know if it came over my radio earpiece. But all I kept hearing was "someone's on the roof."

HSGAC Majority: So you heard it more than once.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if Officer-Technician C/S Team Lead heard that?

Witness: I don't know if he heard it or not. I can only speak for myself.

HSGAC Majority: What did you do in response to hearing that?

Witness: I went ahead and place my rifle into the tripod, facing in that direction.

HSGAC Majority: And again, did it occur to you to send out a radio alert about that?

Witness: I was trying to do my job and observe the rooftops.

HSGAC Majority: Before shots fired, did you see anyone

on the roof?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: So roughly when did you turn your attention and put your weapon into the tripod facing the AGR building?

Witness: So when I heard that local police was working an issue at the three o'clock I turned around and stopped facing at the nine o'clock, grabbed my rifle, spun it around, and started facing the three o'clock. When I started hearing that there was an individual or "someone's on the roof," that's when I grabbed my rifle and put it into the tripod, and continued observing.

HSGAC Majority: So roughly how long were you directing your attention towards the AGR building before shots were fired?

Witness: I don't know. It was before the shots were fired.

HSGAC Majority: So after that point, when you started looking in that direction and put your weapon in the tripod, did you ever turn your attention away from AGR?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: But you said earlier that you shifted your attention away from AGR when you initially looked for the suspicious person but your search came up negative. Is that right?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. But not after this moment where you heard someone's on the roof. After that you continued to look towards AGR.

Witness: Because of the severity of everybody, you know, someone's saying, or everybody's saying "someone's on the roof," I need to keep my eyes in that direction.

HSGAC Majority: So at that point, when you're looking towards AGR, were you using your eyes, your naked eyes, your scope, your binoculars, or a combination thereof?

Witness: I was using my binoculars and the naked eye.

HSGAC Majority: Were you ever at your scope before you fired your weapon?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And why is that? Can you just walk us through how that works, how you choose which tool to use?

Witness: [redacted] You use your naked eye and also your observation devices, whether it's binoculars or spying scope, to observe an area.

HSGAC Majority: So in those moments when you're looking towards AGR, you didn't observe anyone on the roof before shots fired, you said?

Witness: No one on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: What did you observe around AGR, so on the ground around the building?

Witness: I did notice local police moving around the building. You know, it looked like they were looking for something or someone.

HSGAC Majority: Roughly how many was it?

Witness: I saw at least a couple.

HSGAC Majority: Did they have their weapons drawn?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Were they running?

Witness: Jogging. Running.

HSGAC Majority: Did that fact, at least a couple of law enforcement officers, weapons drawn, jogging or running, did that raise concerns for you?

Witness: Yes, because of their movement. They were looking for something. Something was raising their suspicion.

HSGAC Majority: But you didn't relay any information over the radio at that point either?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: And why is that?

Witness: I was trying to continue focusing on the building.

HSGAC Majority: When Hercules 2 C/S sent out his alert about the three o'clock, locals working something, his

radio alert did not mention weapons drawn. Is that right?

Witness: No, it did not. It just said that they were working something at the three o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: But you said the fact that the local officers had their weapons drawn did raise concerns for you. Is that not worth relaying over the radio, to let other Secret Service personnel become aware of that?

Witness: I'm not the only one that's observing that area. Someone else could've also put out the radio call. I'm not just going to go ahead and, you know, just put it on, just myself. There were other individuals.

HSGAC Majority: But why is it up to them and not you? Can you explain that?

Witness: I know what I was doing, and I was maintaining focus on the building, looking for something that someone was raising suspicion about. So that's what I kept on doing. The radio call went out about a suspicious individual being, or something being worked at the three o'clock, and then it's up to whoever else is receiving that to take action.

HSGAC Majority: One of the reasons is because the shift agents around the former President did not have the same information that everyone else did, so they were not aware of the suspicious person. You became aware of it through a BOLO email from C/S Team Lead, who became

aware of it through a text message. So the shift agents were not aware of the suspicious person. They also did not have the bird's-eye view that you had. And some of the shift agents that we have spoken to said that they would've taken different action if they had received more information, potentially including taking the former President off the stage.

So is that not something that you can relay down to them, to let them know, "Hey, the officers at the three o'clock have weapons drawn at this point"?

Witness: I can't speak for what they would've done, receiving any radio call.

HSGAC Majority: Leaving aside what they would do with the information you give them, you didn't feel that it was your responsibility to relay to them what you were observing?

Witness Counsel: I'm sorry, but again, I think you're asking questions in hindsight. I would think that you'd want to address his state of mind at the time of the incident, into a rapidly evolving, volatile situation. He's assessing a threat, and he has seconds to decide what to do. So can you explain exactly your state of mind and what you understood your mission was at that moment?

Witness: I had to be able to react for whatever came next, which I did not know. Going ahead and being able to

speak about this, in this forum, and also in other forums, that I've spoken about July 13th, by talking about it makes it look like I had all the time in the world, my teammates had all the time in the world to take action.

Within seconds of going ahead and identifying what was going on, the shots were fired. You're already in one state of thought of trying to figure out what's going on, where is this individual that people keep talking about, and then next thing you know a shot's ringing out.

So to go ahead and say, in this manner, in a peaceful situation, that I had all the time in the world, I did not. I don't know how much time I had. I wasn't staring at my watch. I don't know how many seconds went by. But I know when I was on that rooftop and I'm looking for a suspicious individual, for whatever it may have been someone's on the roof, seeing police moving around, I don't know what's coming next and I don't know where it's coming from. Is there someone on the roof or is there someone on the ground? And all our attention is being directed in one location. [redacted]

HSGAC Majority: Understood, and I appreciate it. Before shots were fired, were you made aware of anyone who was armed?

Witness: Civilian or law enforcement?

[HSGAC Majority]: Civilian.

[Witness]: No.

[HSGAC Majority]: At any point before shots were fired were you aware of any discussions or deliberations about potentially taking former President Trump off the stage?

[Witness]: Sorry. Say it again.

[HSGAC Majority]: Before shots were fired, were you made aware of any discussions or deliberations among Secret Service about potentially taking the former President off the stage?

[Witness]: No.

[HSGAC Majority]: I'm going to hand you another document. This is marked Exhibit 4. These pages are Bates 14820 through 14823. They're handwritten notes.

[Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification.]

[HSGAC Majority]: Did you take these notes?

[Witness]: I did.

[HSGAC Majority]: When exactly did you write these notes down?

[Witness]: When?

[HSGAC Majority]: Yes.

[Witness]: It was after everything.

[HSGAC Majority]: Do you recall what day?

[Witness]: It was July 13th.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So after the shooting but on that day.

Witness: Right.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to just first walk through the notes, just so I understand what we're reading. Some of the words have been redacted by the Secret Service and some of them I'm having trouble reading. So if you don't mind I'll just walk through what it says, and then we can ask about the substance.

So first, on that first page, Bates 14820, about a third of the way down it says, "At approximately" -- it's hard to read that time. Is that 1815?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: -- "I noticed people running at the three o'clock position of the site." And by the way, please correct me if I'm getting any of this wrong. "I noticed that there were," and then that was redacted. Do you know what that word or word is?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: "I noticed that there were [blank] the site and outside the site, moving to the buildings at the three o'clock." Does that jog your memory about what's under that redaction?

Witness: Yeah. They were focused on the area to the three o'clock, the building.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. Who was?

Witness: They was just talking about law enforcement moving around there.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So under that redaction is some kind of reference to law enforcement, is your understanding?

Witness: I guess. I don't remember.

HSGAC Majority: So you wrote, "Moving to the buildings at the three o'clock." You had said earlier that you saw local law enforcement moving in that area, right?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Right. Okay. The next page, Bates 14821 -- and again, please correct me if I get any of this wrong -- "I and my teammates positioned ourselves to observe that area that everyone was moving to. I noticed" -- does that say noticed?

Witness: Noticed.

HSGAC Majority: -- "an individual, white male, white or gray shirt" -- is that right?

Witness: Yeah.

HSGAC Majority: -- "low crawling" -- is that what that says?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: -- "low crawling on the roof. I noticed an AR-style weapon in his hands. As I moved to observe

through my rifle scope I leaned" -- is that what that says at the end?

Witness: Heard.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry?

Witness: "Observed through my rifle scope I heard."

HSGAC Majority: Oh, I heard. And then the next page, I think it starts with "weapon."

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And what's the next word?

Witness: Weapon fire.

HSGAC Majority: Oh, I see. Okay. So "As I moved to observe through my rifle scope I heard weapon fire. I immediately got a laser-rangefinder distance from my weapon-mounted laser rangefinder." Is that right so far?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: "I looked up to see my engagement scope, looked back through the scope, observed the individual" -- what's that next word?

Witness: Shooting.

HSGAC Majority: -- "shooting, and engaged. At that time" -- is that what that says?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: -- "the shooter" -- and what's the next word?

Witness: Dropped out.

HSGAC Majority: -- "dropped out of my sight." Sorry?

Witness: Sight.

HSGAC Majority: -- sight in the scope."

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: "I confirmed" -- and then what does that say?

Witness: Continued.

HSGAC Majority: "I continued to" --

Witness: Observe.

HSGAC Majority: And what's the rest of that note say?

Witness: Observe the area as there were reports.

HSGAC Majority: And then Bates 14823, "of another individual on another" -- what does that say there?

Witness: The water tower at the four o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: "On the water tower at the four o'clock." I appreciate that. I know my handwriting is worse than yours, so I appreciate that.

So in terms of the substance of these notes, you had said, on Bates 14820, the first page, you saw people running. So again, that's the local law enforcement officers, you said maybe a couple of them with their weapons drawn. Is that what that's referring to?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And then on the next page, 14821, you said you saw the individual, who we now know is Mr. Crooks,

crawling. Does that mean you saw him crawling with a weapon? Did you see him with a weapon at that point?

Witness: No. What I was trying to get at is when I saw him he was on the peak of the roof, in his firing position, and as soon as he was identified the shots went out. I didn't have time to do any radio call or any other action except to get on my gun and take action on my own.

HSGAC Majority: So you didn't see him until he was in his position.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: In his position and basically at the moment of firing. It sounds like an eternity, but basically as soon as I saw him -- I don't know how long he was there. But once I identified, then the shots went out.

HSGAC Majority: I see. So when you wrote "crawling," you didn't mean that in terms of he was actively transporting anywhere. He was in position, static.

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Majority: I see. Thank you. And what was the situation with the individual at the four o'clock?

Witness: Once everything semi-quieted down with everything that happened with Mr. Crooks, we started getting reports of someone on the water tower. So immediately I went ahead and started to observe the water

tower to see if there was anybody on the water tower. And I did not see anyone, so I went back to looking at the AGR.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. This is after you fired and neutralized Mr. Crooks?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So after you fired and neutralized Mr. Crooks, then you looked towards the water tower.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: I see.

Witness: I continued to observe Mr. Crooks after I took the shot to see if, you know, he may have came back up. Once I noticed that he was down and wasn't coming back into view of anywhere on the rooftop, we heard the reports of someone being on the water tower. And that's when I went ahead and looked at the water tower, saw there was no one there, and went back to the AGR roof.

HSGAC Majority: Did you take any other notes that day or since regarding this event?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So I'd like to ask more about the events, you know, leading up and after shots were fired.

Agency Counsel: Excuse me, HSGAC Majority. I'm sorry. We're past an hour. The ground rule is we get an hour.

HSGAC Majority: Oh, sure.

Agency Counsel: That's how you started off, and it's past that. So this may be a good time. Like if you have another, this line. But we're exceeding, and it's not fair.

HSGAC Majority: Yeah, no, I appreciate it, Agency Counsel. I think we can take a break.

PSI Minority: HSGAC Majority, no, real quick, stay on the record. Bates 14820, does counsel from Secret Service know what that redaction is?

Agency Counsel: I don't know. I don't have the information right here.

PSI Minority: Could you please find that out for us?

Agency Counsel: It's redacted.

PSI Minority: Well, go back to Secret Service and figure out what it is and unredact it.

Agency Counsel: We'll consider it.

PSI Minority: What's the justification for the redaction? There's no justification on there. You guys have not provided any justifications for any of the redactions. You've just provided redactions. So if you're going to consider it, and there is a legal justification for the redaction, provide --

Agency Counsel: It's law enforcement sensitive information at this point.

PSI Minority: We've gotten lots of law enforcement

sensitive information.

Agency Counsel: I don't know what you want me to do at this point. I don't have it right now.

PSI Minority: If you're going to go back to it, right, and you're not going to redact it, provide a reason why it is redacted.

Agency Counsel: Okay.

PSI Minority: A legal reason why it is redacted.

HSGAC Majority: All right. We'll go off the record and take a five-minute break. Thank you.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Minority: HSGAC Minority with Senator Rand Paul's office. I think we can definitely agree that the actions that were taken on July 13th, once he was identified as an imminent threat, saved a lot of people's lives, so I personally want to thank you for that.

Witness: Thank you, sir.

HSGAC Minority: And what I want to do is I want to focus more on what led up to the shooting. So everything I'm going to talk to is prior to 1811 hours of that day. Could you kind of explain to us what the purpose and role of the Secret Service Counter Sniper Team is?

Witness: So our mission is to provide long-range protection, to LES yards. We observe an area, we identify a threat, and then we communicate it. And then if

needed we use lethal force.

HSGAC Minority: So can you explain the counter sniper advance process and what the purpose of that is?

Witness: So as a counter sniper advance technician, their responsibility is to go out to a site or sites, basically walk the footsteps of the protectee. So they start from the LES point of the protectee and identify any line-of-sight concerns. So if you want to start with an LES LES LES everything that looks at them, 360 degrees LES, we will identify that, a Threat Survey, a comprehensive survey, LES LES so LES LES we'll do the same thing. If a protectee is in a building, like if he would've come into this room LES, we would do whatever we can to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. So that's either LES LES LES.

HSGAC Minority: So either creating cover concealment.

Witness: Correct.

[HSGAC Minority]: Either/or.

[Witness]: Yes, sir.

[HSGAC Minority]: In your experience, what's the main cause in the failure of a Threat Survey security plan?

[Witness]: By people, I would say, basically for us, if we're taken as a subject matter expert, so people come to us to mitigate those line-of-sights. Anything that could be a failure would basically be the non-mitigating of those line-of-sight concerns.

[HSGAC Minority]: Human error?

[Witness]: Yes, sir.

[HSGAC Minority]: What's implemented to minimize the human error in your process in advancing, whether it's supervision or oversight scrutiny?

[Witness]: So we'll make recommendations to a site agent, telling them what we --

[HSGAC Minority]: Specifically the counter sniper's advance report, Threat Survey. What is there to, as oversight or supervision, or do you put 100 percent trust in the advance agent with no oversight?

[Witness]: So they will go ahead and create their paperwork, the Logistics Report, the TAC Survey, and then they'll forward it out back to D.C. And it's hard to look at a piece of paper or read a piece of paper and identify what are our concerns, because you don't have eyes on. So

it's difficult to really know what you're looking at.

HSGAC Minority: And I apologize if there's some duplicity in my questioning of what our colleague did, but please bear with me. Who selected the Counter Sniper Team for July 13th event? Were you involved in the selection of the team?

Witness: No. That was our Counter Sniper Operations Section, the Scheduling Section.

HSGAC Minority: Who selected Officer-Technician [redacted] C/S Team Lead to be the counter sniper advance?

Witness: It would also be the Counter Sniper Operations Scheduling Section.

HSGAC Minority: And how vital is the advance to the execution of your operation plan?

Witness: Very vital.

HSGAC Minority: How much do you, and did you specifically rely on that operation advance for the July 13th event?

Witness: I relied on it a lot.

HSGAC Minority: Have you ever worked other events where Officer-Technician C/S Team Lead was the counter sniper advance?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Did you ever identify or observe any gaps in his ops plan or any issues to mitigate long-range

threats in any previous events that you worked with him?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Minority: Am I understanding that you also provide his performance reviews yearly?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: Did you know about the long-range threat that was reported to being the reason why the counter sniper team was sent on July 13th?

Witness: What long-range threat?

HSGAC Minority: The one that we were told yesterday at testimony that the DTD 2nd Sup. had received and disseminated to the site agents and the advance team.

Witness: I never received any intelligence prior to arriving to Butler.

HSGAC Minority: If you had known that would that have raised your, I guess, elevation of concern or, for lack of a better term, threat posture, moving into your positions and maybe taking a closer look at all the areas of vulnerability, to ensure that all those are mitigated properly?

Witness: I would've continued to do my mission as I was trained.

HSGAC Minority: But if you were -- the reason I'm asking is your experience is vast, so you've performed multiple advances, I'm quite certain. Am I correct?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Minority: So would that be something that you, as an advance agent, would have took into consideration to maybe give an extra layer of scrutiny to my operations plan, to make sure that there are no gaps in that plan?

Witness: I would've conducted my Threat Survey as I was trained, identifying the line-of-sight concerns, how to mitigate them, and also relay that to my team.

HSGAC Minority: So you did not review the ops plan or the security survey, the threat assessments. You've got them to look over, but you're not looking as a supervisor trying to find issues that may be wrong with that. Because as you've testified, you're not on the scene. You don't do the advance. You're relying on his work to operate the day of the event. Correct?

Witness: Correct. Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Did you review or look at the local Operations Plan?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: In your experience as an advance agent, have you done that in the past?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Can you explain why not?

Witness: It wasn't ever provided by the locals.

HSGAC Minority: In your experience, in the past, you

have never been provided an Operations Plan in 21 years --

Witness: By a local --

HSGAC Minority: -- by a local team?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: So that's not something you would want to know in advance.

Witness: They relay to us where they're going to be working, what's their area of responsibility, but as far as they're actually written Operations Plan, no.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Officer-Technician [redacted] C/S Team Lead testified that when, quote/unquote, "his team arrived on July 13th they did a walk-through," and you walked us through that there. He stated that they "mitigated the AGR building by having the CS team" -- this is his quote -- "being able to look at it. We would see that there's potentially a human on top of it or a potential sniper that could be harm to our protectee."

So my question is, was his statement accurate? Were you, as Hercules 1 and Hercules 2, able to mitigate the threat of a long-range sniper from the AGR roof?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: So my question is, can you define mitigation? And again, I understand at 1811 we eliminated the threat. But mitigation is preventing or reducing the threat. So you eliminated the threat at 1811. My question

is this. Was the Herc 1, Herc 2 properly positioned to eliminate that line-of-sight issue?

Witness: So Hercules 1 and 2, we try to get as close as we can to the protectee. Basically we would try to stand on their shoulders. Of course, that is not going to happen. So we try to get as close as we possibly can, looking at everything that looks in on them. And then by identifying any line-of-sight concerns, we will also work with the locals and, you know, have them placed in locations to help mitigate it. One of the teams that was positioned was inside the AGR that would help mitigate the rooftop in that area of the protective site.

HSGAC Minority: If they could've seen it. And we've heard their testimony that they could not see the roof where the individual was at. Understanding that's information you have now, not that day.

Witness: Right.

HSGAC Minority: And I guess the questions I'm trying to get to, because you said in your testimony just earlier that Herc 2 was the primary responsibility of observing the AGR building. Am I correct? And you were 12 to 6, 12 to 9?

Witness: Right. So we're all responsible for that 360-degree circle.

HSGAC Minority: Correct.

Witness: So because it's just a vast area, you don't want all four technicians looking in one area at the same time. So you split up the area of responsibility. So myself and C/S Team Lead were positioned basically at the nine o'clock position of the site, so we're covering 6 to 9 to 12, with an overlapping coverage to the other team, which is on the right side or the three o'clock of the site, covering from 12 to 3 to the 6, with overlapping coverage.

HSGAC Minority: And in your testimony you said you spent minimal time overlapping observation of the AGR building because of Herc 2 being that primary --

Witness: Correct. That is in their primary area of responsibility. I hate say area of responsibility. The whole area is ours. However, they were primarily focused, you know, situated, positioned on that side, and we were positioned on the opposite side.

HSGAC Minority: You had to have a 360-degree awareness. Correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: And then you also stated that Herc 2 had limited visibility to the AGR building, that you weren't aware of until you were up there. Am I correct on that?

Witness: I didn't see -- I didn't go to their post

so I didn't know exactly what they could see or not see.

HSGAC Minority: As a lead advance, is that something that you would, in your past, make sure that your team is aware of those limitations before they take their post?

Witness: You will identify those. If there's a line-of-sight concern you will let them know. But then, in turn, you will also find something to mitigate that line-of-sight, whether it's blocking vehicles, the curtains, whatever it may be, additional local law enforcement to cover a blind spot.

HSGAC Minority: So if you were one of those on Herc 2, the last time you'll want to know that, or you would not want to realize you have a line-of-sight issue when you get on the roof. You would prefer that the lead advance give you that information. Am I correct?

Witness: As a lead advance you should be giving us information, but you're trying to get all the information that you've been given, that you've obtained in the short amount of time, you're trying to pass out as much as you possibly can.

HSGAC Minority: Under testimony, Hercules 2 C/S said that Hercules 2 never were made aware of any line-of-sight issues until they actually took their post. Is that surprising to you?

Witness: I --

Witness Counsel: The question is does it surprise you.

Witness: That they weren't told?

HSGAC Minority: Correct.

Witness Counsel: Assuming that they were not told.

Witness: No, because as a team leader, you're working on that one site or multiple sites, and you're trying to gather as much information as you possibly can and disseminate that out to the site agent, to your teams, and also to the lead, to help provide that long-range protection. So if something was not communicated, it's just a lot of information that he's trying to get out, and remember that he's trying --

Witness Counsel: Okay. The question --

Witness: I'm trying to figure out how to say that.

Witness Counsel: No, you're good. The question is not whether you are aware whether it was communicated or not. The question is just assuming that they were not informed, are you surprised. That's what the question is.

HSGAC Minority: Is that something that you, as a lead advance agent, will let your team members know?

Witness: Yes, you try to let them know everything that you possibly can.

HSGAC Minority: Just a quick question, to jump in. Did you review C/S Team Lead transcript of his interview with this Committee?

Witness: No. I haven't reviewed any of them.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Were you briefed at all by any individual on that transcript, or what he testified to this Committee about?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: No?

Witness: No. Sorry.

HSGAC Minority: And what about the other two counter snipers that testified before this Committee?

Witness: No, ma'am.

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

HSGAC Minority: You spoke that the line-of-sight with Herc 2 was going to be complemented by the oversight of Hercules 1, and if I'm not mistaken, the LES which was located within the horse barn area, around the pond, to your nine o'clock --

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: -- ten o'clock. Is that a correct statement? Is that correct, who was going to cover the AGR roof area? Since Hercules 2 could not see it, the responsibility would come upon Hercules 1 --

Witness Counsel: Hold on. You're good, but he's not aware what Hercules 2 could see or not. That's an assumption. You know, you're bringing facts into the case that he's not aware of at the time. As I understand it, he doesn't know

what Hercules 2 is seeing or not.

[redacted]: Yeah.

[redacted]: If you're asking him whether he understood that there were locals posted in the AGR building, that's a good question.

[redacted]: No, let me rephrase it then. I don't want any confusion.

[redacted]: You should know the answer to that. I mean, he should be able to give you an answer to that.

[redacted]: Hercules 2 was primarily focused 12 to 3, 12 to 6.

[redacted]: Correct.

[redacted]: Primarily, understanding 360-degree totality.

[redacted]: Right.

[redacted]: You were 12 to 9 --

[redacted]: Correct.

[redacted]: -- 12 to 6. You said that you spent minimal time there, looking at the AGR building.

[redacted]: Correct.

[redacted]: So you were working under the -- and I hate to use this word -- assumption that Hercules 2 could accurately, I mean, equitably cover, or correctly cover the AGR roof.

[redacted]: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: You had no reason to believe that they could not.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Great. Sorry I stumbled through that.

Witness Counsel: No, you're good.

HSGAC Minority: Glad we got that. You did know the locations of local sniper teams. You did testify that you knew where they were at. Correct?

Witness: Yes, I did.

HSGAC Minority: Do you know how far LES on the horse barn, was to the AGR building, what was their range distance? Do you know what that was, or can you take an accurate or a close guess?

Witness: I never took a distance to find out how far one team was from the other, no.

HSGAC Minority: What was your range distance?

Witness: From my post to the AGR?

HSGAC Minority: Mm-hmm.

Witness: At the time when I used my rangefinder it was approximately 200 yards.

HSGAC Minority: So let's jump over to some communications. Did you have prior experience in the military --

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: -- before you came on. What was your role in the military?

Witness: I was a radio operator.

HSGAC Minority: So moving into that, what's the inherent risk or issues by not co-locating with local law enforcement? What communications issues does that create?

Witness: You don't have that seamless communication.

HSGAC Minority: How do you mitigate that or eliminate that issue?

Witness: If you don't co-locate then you could just, by cellphone or email you could communicate with each other.

HSGAC Minority: So I think you testified earlier that one of the primary roles of counter snipers is to observe threats and provide timely, quick information out to the other people. Am I correct on that?

Witness: That's correct.

HSGAC Minority: What's the quickest way to get information out?

Witness: If everything is working in a perfect world maybe a radio.

HSGAC Minority: Was your radio working properly that day?

Witness: They were.

HSGAC Minority: Do you know if C/S Response stated

anything about his radio being not operational that day?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Are you aware of anyone's radios not being operational that day?

Witness: I'm unaware of any.

HSGAC Minority: So the ones that you were working on, whatever channel or radio system you were working on with the counter sniper team was working correctly.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Are you aware that C/S Team Lead did not pick up local radios that were provided to him by local police?

Witness: I'm aware.

HSGAC Minority: Did you have an issue with that?

Witness: No, because we could've gone to secondary communications, which is a phone or email. And in all my years of being with the Counter Sniper Team and with the Secret Service I've never been given a local's handheld radio.

HSGAC Minority: And did you testify that this is the first time you have not co-located, as well?

Witness: Yeah. I've not co-located with other local agencies also.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So this isn't the first time you've not co-located, and in your practices you don't use

local police radios.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Can you see the benefit of that, if you would have used those police radios that day?

Witness: I mean, if I had them it would've been nice, but we had to move through the issue without having them, or work the day without having the secondary radio or their radios.

HSGAC Minority: I just want to introduce, I think it's Exhibit 5, or 4.

[Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Minority: Have you seen this email before?

Witness: Not that I remember. No, sir.

HSGAC Minority: So you don't know who this is to or where it's from?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Because the part that I have highlighted here says it came in July 12th, and it says "the majority [blank] assets are local. I will organize to grab one of the radios for the coms."

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Minority: And it came from someone from the Counter Sniper Team, but you're not on that distribution list. Correct?

Witness: I don't remember the context of this email. No, I don't remember getting it.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Again, it's redacted so we don't know really who it came from, so we'll move on from that.

Witness: On that same email, while we're looking at it, above, on the highlighted portion, it says, I think "Star, no," and then there's what I think is a whited-out redaction, "asset for this visit." Do you know what that's related to?

Witness: No, ma'am.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Are you aware of any particular asset that was not available on this visit? I would assume this would be relevant to the counter snipers, given it's an email thread with the counter snipers.

Witness: No, I'm not aware of any other asset that would've been provided since I wasn't on the advance of the detail. So I'm not sure what was provided and not provided.

HSGAC Minority: Could it potentially be the countersurveillance unit? Is that something that might be relevant?

Witness: I don't want to assume what it could have been. I don't know.

HSGAC Minority: Are there any assets that are typical to former President protective events that were not there?

Witness: Well, when you're talking a former protectee, former President, to a sitting President, the assets provided are -- you know, it's totally different, like night and day. You know, you're getting LES [redacted] countersurveillance. You're getting the LES [redacted]. As a former, or even as a candidate, you're not getting -- normally candidates will not receive a LES [redacted] which is LES [redacted].

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

HSGAC Minority: Thank you. This is the first time, as you testified, that you've done a former President of the United States.

Witness: Correct. I've never had to work a former President ever.

HSGAC Minority: And I think you've testified, but you didn't have any radio communication with the local police. It was all text, email being sent back and forth. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Has that process changed any since July 13th? Have you all changed your protocol on communication on-site?

Witness: I can't say because I just started working back the full duty, so I missed the entire campaign. I

don't know.

HSGAC Minority: Would you like to see things changed in communication then?

Witness: Oh, absolutely.

HSGAC Minority: You've got 20-some years' experience. I think that's valuable.

So I'll just jump to my last questions here. What changes do you think need specifically implemented to ensure that July 13, 2024, 1811, does not ever happen again?

Witness: Two things -- communications and no more outdoor rallies.

HSGAC Minority: Good luck with one.

Witness: Yeah.

HSGAC Minority: I just have a couple quick questions. Are you still C/S Team Lead or in his chain of command?

Witness: Yes, ma'am.

HSGAC Minority: Have you given him a performance review since the July 13th event?

Witness: Yes, I have.

HSGAC Minority: And can you tell me a little bit about that performance review?

Witness: Just based off his performance for the last year, you know, you're just talking about his performance

for the whole evaluation year, what he's done or, you know, guidance on what to do later on, and trying to make him a better advance technician or a counter sniper technician.

HSGAC Minority: Did that performance review include feedback or critiques based on his advance work from July 13th?

Witness: I don't know if it did or not. I'd have to look. I don't know.

HSGAC Minority: Do you recall about when -- I won't hold you to a date --

Witness Counsel: Can I just intervene? Do you know what the performance rating period was when you gave the rating? Approximately when did you give the rating, do you know?

Witness: It was supposed to be at the end of July, but then everything was extended to September/October.

Witness Counsel: Of this --

Witness: Of the year, because of the campaign.

Witness Counsel: Do you know when the annual performance rating period started and ended, off the top of your head?

Witness: July to July.

Witness Counsel: Okay. And July 30th or July 1st?

Witness: Yeah, the 30th.

Witness Counsel: Or June 30th.

Witness: June 30th?

Witness Counsel: Yeah, so just so you understand, if the

performance rating period ended on June 30th it wouldn't include any events of July 13th.

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

Witness Counsel: I mean, so let's get that straight. That's all.

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

Witness Counsel: All right.

HSGAC Minority: Okay.

Witness Counsel: He was rated on his performance prior to July 13th. Okay?

HSGAC Minority: For this last performance review.

Witness Counsel: All right?

HSGAC Minority: For his next performance review, which I guess would cover July 13th, do you plan to review the transcript which is publicly available of Officer C/S Team Lead's testimony to this Committee?

Witness: Once everything is done I will probably review everything and just see what everybody else said versus, you know, what I thought.

HSGAC Minority: I guess why when it's done? Why not now? It's probably available.

Witness: I know. But I just want to go into this with what I know and not go based off of what someone else said. I have to testify based off of what I did, not someone else.

HSGAC Minority: Well, I'm saying for his next performance review, as his supervisor, because he testified to this Committee about the advance work that he conducted.

Witness Counsel: That's September of 2025. I mean, that's a long time from now.

HSGAC Minority: Sure. I don't know when it is, but I --

Witness Counsel: He's got to complete this testimony, and there is more testimony perhaps before the Office of Inspector General.

HSGAC Minority: But you plan --

Witness Counsel: There's testimony before his Internal Affairs --

HSGAC Minority: -- you plan to read his transcript and what he testified to this Committee too, about his actions and his advance work prior to giving him his next --

Witness Counsel: Sometime next year.

HSGAC Minority: -- review.

Witness: Yeah. At some point I may read it, yes.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. I would encourage you to review it, as his supervisor.

Witness: Yes, ma'am.

Witness Counsel: Thank you.

PSI Minority: Witness, my name is PSI Minority. I work for PSI Minority. I want to begin by echoing what my colleague said at the start of this round,

which is thanking you for what you did on July 13th, for neutralizing the threat that day.

Witness: Thank you, sir.

PSI Minority: You mentioned earlier, I believe, that you were aware that C/S Team Lead did not pick up the local radios. Is that correct?

Witness: I am aware.

PSI Minority: How did you become aware of that?

Witness: If he had then he would've gave them out early so he would've had one with him. When we arrived at the site I did -- after we conducted the team walk-through he said that he was going to meet with the locals, and I went with him. And at no time was any local radio ever discussed or provided to us.

PSI Minority: I'm going to turn to Exhibit 6, which we will distribute to you in a moment.

[Exhibit No. 6 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: This is the Pennsylvania State Police report regarding the July 13th shooting. It's an 87-page report, but I'm not going to ask you to read the whole thing right now. Have you seen a copy of this report?

Witness: No. Any paperwork regarding this entire, I have not reviewed.

PSI Minority: Okay. I'd just like to have you turn

to page 21.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: And page 21 discusses the moments in which you saw Crooks and the actions that you took. And again, I'm not going to ask you to read it, but in case you need to reference it to help you with your memory for my next few questions, it's right in front of you.

But I just want to get an understanding of the moment-by-moment actions that you took as you spotted Crooks on the roof. Specifically, I'm trying to understand how much time occurred between you seeing Mr. Crooks and then you firing at Mr. Crooks. And you mentioned earlier that you weren't looking at your watch during this. So I just want to have you tell us and help us understand how instant, to the extent that it was instant, you had to act after you first saw him.

Witness: So once --

Witness Counsel: This is from the time you first observed him.

Witness: Correct.

Witness Counsel: Okay.

Witness: So from when I first saw him, he fired, and then I immediately, you know, pulled my binoculars down, looked in my rifle scope, chambered a round, hit the button on my rangefinder that's mounted to my rifle, got my

elevation adjustment, and sent the round, and then chambered another live round just in case. Then it was at that time, after firing, I noticed that Crooks was out of line-of-sight, and I stayed there just in case he came back up or he moved. I wanted to make sure that it was a successful shot.

PSI Minority: And again, because obviously when you tell us right now it sounds, you know, methodical that you went through different steps. But can you just help us understand how quickly all of that occurred.

Witness: I don't even know how to explain it. It's one of those that you have to actually be on the gun and ready to go. You know, we trained for, you know, target identification, observing a target, identifying it as a threat, not threat, and then, you know, taking the necessary action that you need. So in all my years of being on this team, just training constantly, and seeing this event unfold in front of you for the first time, there is no hesitation. You have got to take immediate action, you know, not just to go ahead and neutralize a threat, but you know, you're also, in the split seconds, you're identifying that it is a threat, and then you also want to make sure of, you know, what is behind that, you know, what is behind your target, because you don't want anybody, an innocent, getting shot. So what's beyond your target, is

it a threat, get your wind call, your distance, and then send your shot.

PSI Minority: Would you testify today that you acted within split seconds to neutralize the threat?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Did you communicate anything to [redacted] C/S Team Lead at the moment that you identified the threat?

Witness: I think I said something that "I've got him" or "I see him."

PSI Minority: And what did C/S Team Lead say to you, if anything?

Witness: "Center. Send it." Gave my wind call.

PSI Minority: And that's typical?

Witness: In a perfect world, a center shot is, yeah, no wind, you know, but normally, you know, as soon as you get your distance, he's giving you your wind call for the time that he sees for the way the wind is blowing, so you don't want any delay. So as soon as you get your wind call you want to the shot to go out, because that's what he's seeing at that time. If I would've hesitated and the wind would've shifted, that could cause a round to come off my target.

PSI Minority: And I think you mentioned earlier that, please correct me if I'm wrong, but did you at first see Crooks with your naked eye and then you saw him in your

scope?

Witness Counsel: It was with the binoculars first.

PSI Minority: The binoculars and then to the scope.

Witness: Correct. Because once I identified, you know, what was occurring in front of me, and then he started taking shots, I had to drop my binos and get in the rifle scope, and then get into position. So it took, you know, I was in a kneeling position on the tripod, on a pitched roof, to take my shot. So I had to get into position and make sure I was stable to make sure I took an accurate shot.

PSI Minority: By the time you put down the binoculars and you began looking into your scope to see Mr. Crooks, had Mr. Crooks already begun shooting, or was it so shortly after the moment that you scoped him, essentially?

Witness: No. I remember the first shot, and then it was the rapid succession of the next two shots, where I was getting into position to get on him. And then that's when I fired.

PSI Minority: Did you speak to the other counter snipers in the Hercules 2 position following the events at the July 13th rally?

Witness: When? Sorry. I mean --

PSI Minority: Sure. I'll clarify. Do you know who the individuals were in the Hercules 2 position?

Witness : Oh yes, very well.

PSI Minority : Yeah. Who are they?

Witness : It's Hercules 2 C/S 2 and Hercules 2 C/S .

PSI Minority : -- I'm sorry. Hercules 2 C/S 2 ?

Witness : Excuse me. Hercules 2 C/S 2 . Sorry.

PSI Minority : That's okay.

Witness : Hercules 2 C/S 2 and Hercules 2 C/S .

PSI Minority : And following the events of July 13th, did you speak to either one of them regarding what they experienced that day?

Witness : No. Basically the only thing we've been doing since July 13th is just kind of checking on each other, morale checks, and making sure we're okay. Just get them back to our families.

PSI Minority : And to follow up on what my colleague was asking earlier, you have not read any of the transcripts that have been made public from this --

Witness : No. I have not read any of them.

PSI Minority : Okay. Hercules 2 C/S told us that during the -- as soon as Crooks opened fire he believed that he and his partners had bullets that were being fired directly towards them. Had you ever heard Hercules 2 C/S or Hercules 2 C/S 2 mention that to you?

Witness : Yeah, now that you -- I'm sorry. Just trying to recall. They did say something about rounds, you

know, snapping by them, and I remember Hercules 2 C/S 2 saying that he heard a distinct round off his left side, which was mine.

PSI Minority: Oh. So from your understanding, what Hercules 2 C/S 2 told you regarding rounds near him, it was your understanding that that was actually your round that you fired toward --

Witness: Well, it was multiple rounds, and unfortunately it was, you know, rounds from Crooks and then mine.

PSI Minority: What was your reaction to hearing that they felt that in addition to your round that other rounds fired by Crooks came towards them?

Witness: It hit home. I mean, you had someone trying to take the life of two, you know, teammates that you're very close to, you know very well, you've worked with on multiple details, you know, for years, and their life would've been ended right there.

PSI Minority: Do you have any doubts that rounds were fired directly toward the snipers in the Hercules 2 position?

Witness: For anything that happened that, it wouldn't have surprised me. I mean, I don't know exactly which way Crooks was pointing so I can't confirm whether he was or not. But just to hear from my teammates that, you

know, the ballistic crack by their post, by their head, you know, is believable.

PSI Minority: And as you recall the events of that moment, did you ever feel that bullets were being fired directly at you?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: I want to go back to Exhibit 3. This was the email that was shared earlier that contained pictures of Mr. Crooks. It's Bates number 2965 through 2968. Do you have that in front of you?

Witness: Yes, sir.

PSI Minority: You testified earlier that you received this email. Is that correct?

Witness: That's correct.

PSI Minority: When you received this email did you discuss the contents of this email with C/S Team Lead?

Witness: No. Being up on post and I was trying to observe, prior to the protectee's arrival, I looked at what the email was about, saw the photos, gained a mental picture of who the individual was, and then went back to work, put my phone away. I can't remember if C/S Team Lead and I actually did talk about anything pertaining to it, you know, so it's just a matter of just trying to get back on problem, start looking around.

PSI Minority: In addition to this email, did you

receive any other emails or texts while you were in position on July 13th?

Witness: No. This is the only one.

PSI Minority: And what about radio communications.

Witness: And --

PSI Minority: Sorry.

Witness: Correct. There was a First Lady detail in the area, and we had to switch radio channels, so there was an email that did go out.

PSI Minority: And why did you have to switch radio channels?

Witness: Because the First Lady was in district, so the channel that we were using for the former President's detail or assignment was basically overlapping. So we had to switch to another channel so we weren't taking up the same channel.

PSI Minority: What time did that email occur?

Witness: I don't remember.

PSI Minority: Were you already in position?

Witness: I was already on post.

PSI Minority: And that was an email, you said?

Witness: Correct. If I remember correctly, I do remember getting told, email or by voice, by C/S Team Lead, that we had to switch channels due to the fact that the First Lady was in district and we had to find something else to talk

on. And it was for everybody. It wasn't just for us. It was overall.

PSI Minority: Do you remember who sent that email?

Witness No, sir. Not off the top of my head.

PSI Minority: Has anyone from DHS or Secret Service instructed you not to speak with Congress?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: I'm going to turn it over to my colleague, PSI Minority.

PSI Minority: Witness, I'm PSI Minority again, with PSI Minority. What time did you take up your post on the barn on July 13th?

Witness: I can't remember the exact time. I know we were delayed because the former President was supposed to be at the site hours prior, and he was delayed getting into Pittsburgh Airport, so we delayed our post. It may have been -- I don't know off the top of my head, sir. I don't remember.

PSI Minority: What time did former President Trump arrive at the Butler rally?

Witness: I don't recall. I didn't look at my watch when he arrived. I just know when we heard that he was departing Pittsburgh Airport that it was going to be just over an hour of travel time. So that's when we got up on post.

PSI Minority: Did you observe a local law enforcement officer take a shot at Crooks on the roof of the AGR building?

Witness: No, sir.

PSI Minority: Did you hear a shot go off before you fired your weapon?

Witness: No, sir.

PSI Minority: Did you speak with Butler ESU ph 1:52:12], Beaver ESU, or Beaver ESU before, during, or after the assassination attempt?

Witness: I don't know if it was them. I did speak to a local officer, but I don't know if it was them. I don't recall who it was. The officer I spoke to was at the horse arena.

PSI Minority: Were you able to communicate with these officers positioned inside the AGR building on July 13th?

Witness: Only by phone or email.

PSI Minority: And at your post on the barn, can you describe to us what other buildings or structures that may have been of a concern that day?

Witness: There was AGR. There were two other smaller buildings on the immediate grounds of the site. There were some buildings at the 12 o'clock that appeared to be across the streets. And then at the 9 to the 11 o'clock there were other barns. There was the horse stable

that the other local team was positioned in, and then buildings beyond them. I don't know if it was barns or sheds, but it was other structures. And then to the south, even though it was not in the immediate vicinity or line-of-sight of the stage, there were private residences in which the motorcade was going to be passing, so we were also watching that too.

PSI Minority: And on July 13th, did you observe any other citizens on the rooftops of any structures outside the security perimeter on that day?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: I'm going to hand out two exhibits. This will be Exhibits 7 and 8.

[Exhibits No. 7 and 8 were marked for identification.]

[Pause.]

PSI Minority: So Exhibit 7 is a one-page with a larger initial narrative that was authored by the Pennsylvania State Police relating to the July 13th assassination attempt. The case number is 2024-9248-98. If you could please turn your attention to the highlighted section, which I'll read now.

"Crooks' vehicle is captured on a mobile license plate reader parked along Whitestown Road near the front of the AGR office buildings. Crooks then enters the event grounds

and is seen near the vendor areas at approximately 1626 hours. Crooks was then observed at approximately 1645 hours, on the AGR grounds, outside of the event confines. Both of these sightings were established through cellular telephone camera footage attained from attendees of the event. At approximately 1710 hours, Beaver ESU first observes Crooks watching the event from just below his observation window, and visually scanning the AGR building and windows.

"Crooks then traverses the AGR grounds on foot but returns to the area directly from the BC ESU counter sniper position, sits on the concrete wall, and begins utilizing his cellphone. At approximately 1715 hours, Beaver ESU takes several photographs of Crooks as he is stationary below his observation window, and distributes the photographs to the BC ESU command post and the other counter snipers on-site. At approximately 1730 hours, Beaver ESU observes Crooks to begin utilizing a laser rangefinder towards the venue area, also relating this information to the BC ESU command post."

If we can turn to the next exhibit, Exhibit 8, this is a text message from Butler ESU [ph] to Butler ESU, who is a local officer who is stationed inside of the security perimeter on July 13th. In that text message from July 13th, at 1715 hours, says, "Are you watching this guy up against our building, long hair, gray t-shirt, white shorts?" And then at 1716 hours, there is an edited text

message from [redacted] that says, "he has a rangefolder" which he changes to "he has a rangefinder."

[redacted], are you aware of the fact that at 5:16 p.m., [redacted], who was stationed in the AGR building, saw Crooks with a rangefinder?

[redacted]: I don't know who was positioned in the AGR building.

[redacted]: But is this news to you that at 5:16 p.m. on July 13th, local law enforcement inside the AGR building know Crooks has a rangefinder?

[redacted]: Just one second.

[Pause.]

[redacted]: It is new to me that at 1716 hours they had him with a rangefinder, and I didn't receive any information until maybe a half hour later.

[redacted]: So this information is not in the Pennsylvania State Police narrative that I read from in Exhibit 7. Is that significant that at 5:16, local law enforcement knew Crooks had a rangefinder?

[redacted]: Well, like I stated earlier, as a rangefinder, it's just a magnified device, observation device, that you can see something closer. The addition to the capabilities of that device, you know, whether he was using it or not, you know, I don't want to say this is what he was doing. But, you know, a person could use this just

so they can see the protectee, you know, closer, you know, especially with former President Trump speaking at the Butler rally. To me it's just a device. Now if he had a long gun at his feet with the rangefinder, yeah, that would definitely raise a lot more suspicion at the time.

PSI Minority: Okay. So at 5:16 p.m., Butler ESU texts a local officer inside the security perimeter that this individual has a rangefinder. I think we've established that former President Trump arrives at the Butler rally right around 5:30-ish, approximately that time. Would it have been helpful if local law enforcement immediately reported this information in the 5:16 hours, and spread it out to all their personnel, as well, and get it up the chain of command?

Witness: Yes. As soon as they had something that they were deeming suspicious it would've been nice to have it then versus waiting.

PSI Minority: Did Thomas Crooks attempt to enter the security perimeter of the July 13th rally?

Witness: I don't know.

PSI Minority: Did Thomas Crooks act alone?

Witness: I do not know.

PSI Minority: Did you speak with the Pennsylvania State Police on July 13th?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Were you aware that the Pennsylvania State Police had vice units or plain-clothes officers at and around the Butler rally on July 13th?

Witness: I mean, I would assume that they would be there, just because it's a protective site.

PSI Minority: And what we're aware of, at least two Pennsylvania State Police plain-clothes officers, Trooper PSP Trooper and Trooper PSP Trooper, PSP Trooper. Witness, were you aware that Pennsylvania state plain-clothes officers were dispatched from their position at the Sheetz gas station on Meridian Road to go find Mr. Crooks?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: I'm going to mark the next two exhibits, Exhibits 9 and 10.

[Exhibits No. 9 and 10 were marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: So Exhibit 9 is an image from security footage from the Sheetz gas station that the Committee obtained, and the two individuals in the image are the two undercover Pennsylvania State Police plain-clothes officers that were stationed at the Sheetz gas station on July 13th. This image is from 5:49 p.m. on July 13th, and they are looking out across Meridian towards the AGR buildings. Do you recognize these individuals?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Exhibit 10 is another still shot from those security cameras at the Sheetz gas station, and this one is at 5:51, and this is where PSP Trooper and PSP Trooper leave the Sheetz position and end up walking to the AGR building. We haven't spoken to PSP Trooper or PSP Trooper, why they decided to walk from that position to the AGR building on that day. They had vehicles. Their vehicles are in that line of vehicles in the parking lot there.

So once again, you don't recognize these two individuals

Witness: No, sir.

PSI Minority: So they end up going from the Sheetz down Meridian Road to the AGR buildings in an attempt to find Crooks. Would it have been helpful to you and your teammates and other members of the Secret Service if you could've directly communicated with these individuals outside the perimeter on the day of July 13th?

Witness: We normally don't go ahead and communicate to all the entities. We have our Command Post, which is a central location for coms, where one person or representative from each entity will be positioned in there. If we see something, then we pass it off to the Security Room. The Security Room would then pass it off to all their counterparts that are in there, and then it would

get disseminated on their own radio channels. So to actually directly communicate with these individuals, we'd have to end up having a bunch of radios in our hand, and it gets cumbersome. So just by communicating to the Security Room, or if someone in the Security Room were to know about this they could disseminate that information.

PSI Minority: And I know you've testified that you weren't aware that Pennsylvania State Police had plain-clothes officers at the Sheetz on Meridian Road on July 13th. But being a law enforcement official, can you speak to us about why they would position undercovers at that location? You know, now, being a Monday morning quarterback, being at the AGR grounds obviously would've been maybe more helpful.

Witness: Correct. Yeah. I don't know why they would be at the Sheetz. You know, to be actually at the site, roaming and blending in with the rest of the crowd would be better. But I don't know why they would be at the Sheetz.

PSI Minority: So these two individuals with the Pennsylvania State Police end up on the AGR grounds. It's unknown whether they had an ability to stop Thomas Crooks before he climbs up onto the AGR building. As I've said, we haven't spoken to these two individuals. But it's pretty close. We believe they ended up on the side of the

AGR building where the alcove is, where he jumps up from the A/C unit onto the building, right near when shots are fired. But they are sent out to find Crooks.

Do you know if there were any Secret Service employees that were on the AGR grounds before shots were fired?

[redacted]: I am unaware of any Secret Service employees.

[redacted]: Today Acting Director Rowe testified to the Task Force, and he continued to take responsibility for what occurred on July 13th. Did the Pennsylvania State Police fail on July 13th?

[redacted]: Could you just repeat the question? I didn't hear that.

[redacted]: Did the Pennsylvania State Police fail on July 13th?

[redacted]: Could we take a short break? How's that. And we'll be right back.

[redacted]: Off the record.

[Recess.]

[redacted]: All right. It's 3:38 and we'll go back on the record. [redacted], I have a couple more questions before I turn it over to my colleagues.

We left off with the question, did the Pennsylvania State Police fail on July 13th.

[redacted]: I don't know what their mission was, to say

they succeeded or failed. I can't be the interpreter of that.

PSI Minority: Did local law enforcement, Butler ESU, fail on July 13th?

Witness: Yeah. Yes.

PSI Minority: How?

Witness: From my understanding, they were going to be positioned at the second floor of the AGR building and providing an overwatch of the rooftops and area that was outside the venue. If someone was able to get on the roof, such as Mr. Crooks did, and they were able to be in that position and overwatch that rooftop, they should have been able to call it out, mitigate it, and stop it before anything happened, to include me taking a shot.

And I'd like to add, you know, we've been around for 53 years, the Counter Sniper Team. For 53 years we have conducted these protective advances, whether it's POTUS, VPOTUS, foreign dignitaries, whoever it may be, to include NSSEs, like when we do the State of the Union here, on the grounds. You know, we build a comprehensive plan, and we work with our local partners, federal, state, and local, to go ahead and make this plan for everybody to be safe.

If one of the chains in that protective circle fails, the entire thing fails. So Pennsylvania State, Butler, everybody was part of that protective circle on that day.

We knew, and everybody knew, what our mission was, what to do, and if someone fails to do it, it's going to end up having, you know, the consequence of what I had to do. None of us on the Counter Sniper Team want to actually have to pull a trigger. We know it could happen one day. And unfortunately, on July 13th, it ended up me actually taking that shot, something I never thought I would have to do, nor anybody else on this team.

So for me to turn around and say did Butler actually fail, yes. You were supposed to watch an area of concern. Whether you though it was a concern or not, you were supposed to watch an area, to help provide protection to the protectee, and not just to the protectee but to all the people who are attending that venue on that day.

PSI Minority: Who told you that local CS would cover the AGR roof?

Witness: So when we receive the walk-through by [redacted] C/S Team Lead we knew that the local Butler teams would be in the horse arena and also in the AGR building, second floor.

PSI Minority: One more question and then I'll turn it over to my colleagues. What time did you leave the Butler rally site on July 13th?

Witness: I don't know. Once we got our next marching orders to head to Pittsburgh Airport for the departure, that's when we left.

PSI Minority: So you never went over to the AGR property.

Witness: No. I stayed on grounds, just in case someone needed to talk to me. I let C/S Team Lead do his job as the TL, to find out what was next, and then we went to the Pittsburgh Airport for departure.

HSGAC Majority: I want to follow up on one of my colleagues' questions, in response to a question about what, in your experience, you felt needed to change. One of the two responses you gave was communications. Can you elaborate on your view of what about the communications aspect with Secret Service needs to change.

Witness: The biggest thing would just be the co-located communications or command center, with every entity being in there, whether it's fire or law enforcement. Everybody is in there at one time, receiving information as it comes through, not, you know, going to one communications center and then going to another one.

HSGAC Majority: Current practice is radios are the primary source of communication. Secondary sources could be phone, text, et cetera. Anything related to that, that you believe should change?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Currently with respect to the Counter Sniper Team, as you described it, it's generally, and it

was on July 13th, four individuals, working in teams, each individual with the same areas of responsibility, whether that be visual, identifying threats, addressing threats. With respect to that, anything about that structure that you believe should change?

Witness: No. So each site is particular as far as it could be one team, two teams, three teams. It's all based on, you know, the team availability and how many teams it would take to work that site.

HSGAC Majority: With respect to counter snipers having identical responsibilities, obviously ideal and actual world circumstances don't always overlap. But in your view would it improve operations to have an individual, whether that's an additional individual on the CS team, or one of the CS team members whose primary responsibility is communications?

Witness: No, because we know that, in our training, that we also do the communications also.

HSGAC Majority: With respect to the second recommendation you made, outdoor events, can you elaborate on what prompted that recommendation, in your view?

Witness: To put it bluntly, outdoor rallies are a nightmare. You know, you have vast amount of space, out to LES yards and well beyond. You know, you look at an area such as New York City. When a protectee steps out of the

motorcade, out of the limo, you have hundreds, if not thousands, of windows looking at you, to include rooftops. You know, that's a nightmare. And you may only have two teams, or even if you had a lot more teams than that, just to cover all these windows and rooftops, you know, it's crazy. It's a lot of work.

But to have a protectee arrive underground, no line-of-sight concerns, to speak inside a venue where there's no line-of-sight concerns, that's a lot better. You know, your lone gunman or even your assault, your attack, coordinated attack, it would be harder. You would be able to harden the individual inside that building without being exposed to anything outside, before whatever was mitigated was taken down, and then extract or evac the protectee.

HSGAC Majority: In your experience, multiple decades now, is your job harder with the technology and availability of firearms in the public over the last two decades, both the type of firearm that's available and the number of firearms?

Witness: It makes it challenging.

HSGAC Majority: More challenging, in your view, today than when you started?

Witness: No. It was even challenging when I first came on, you know.

HSGAC Majority: Why, with respect to your answer just now,

does that challenge not differ, in your view, with the advance and the number and availability of guns that I described?

Witness: Because of the vast amount of weapon systems that are out there, you know, especially the long guns, the rifles, it's not just the weapon system. The weapon system by itself is one thing, but it's actually taking the motivation of the individual that owns that weapon, the intent, you know, the two things that they need to do that harm. So they need the motivation and the intent to actually do the harm.

Mr. Crooks that day, and I don't want to speak for him, but he could've been at home and just enjoying his day. Instead, he had the motivation and intent to take a weapon system and utilize it for violence. And if I'm understanding correctly, from what I have heard, he was at the range on Friday. Well, that is perfectly okay, to go to the range and just shoot targets and not harm anybody. But to do what he did the next day, there's your motivation and intent.

HSGAC Majority: Bringing you back to that day -- last question and then I'll turn it over to my colleague -- as you're scanning and looking at the 12 o'clock to the 9 o'clock, primarily that area would cover the crowd in front of the protectee. Correct?

Witness: No. The actual area in front of the protectee for the crowd would be basically the 12 o'clock position in front of the podium.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Focusing just then on that 12 o'clock, looking out at the crowd that day, did you observe any other concerning activity?

Witness: None. Not that I remember.

HSGAC Majority: Getting more specific now, perhaps "concerning" is the wrong word, did you observe any medical emergencies that day?

Witness: I heard medical emergencies on the radio.

HSGAC Majority: Did you observe any fights in the crowd?

Witness: No, sir. No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you observe any running or crowd dispersement or anything, again, prior to 6:11?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Majority: Sergeant-Technician, thank you again for your patience and bearing with us. I just have some follow-up questions. Apologize as I'm going to kind of bounce around a little bit. I just want to make sure we wrap up and understand and we're clear on all the topics we've covered.

Going back to, so the moments of shots fired and the immediate moments preceding that, you said -- these were in your handwritten notes -- you had said that when you looked

toward the AGR you saw the person who was a white male wearing a gray shirt. And I know you said earlier that everything happened incredibly fast. Did it at all cross your mind that that description matched the person who was in the BOLO, or did it not matter at that point because you're focusing on an immediate threat on a roof.

Witness: It wasn't until much later that I realized that that was the individual that matched --

Witness Counsel: Answer his question. Repeat the question one more time, if you don't mind.

HSGAC Majority: Sure.

Witness Counsel: Just listen to the question, and you're fine.

HSGAC Majority: When you saw the person on the roof who was a white male, white or gray shirt, did it cross your mind at that point that that matched the description of the person who was in the BOLO, or were you just focusing on what was apparently a potential threat in that moment.

Witness: I was focused on what was going on at that time.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And you said -- again, apologies if I recover some ground here. I just want to make sure I'm clear. You said you saw Mr. Crooks before he started firing, right?

Witness: He was on the roof. As soon as I -- I

don't know.

Witness Counsel: I don't believe that was his testimony.

HSGAC Majority: Oh, okay. Okay. Then let's clarify. So can you give us the timeline of what you saw and when, versus when he started firing? So did you see him, either through your binoculars or your scope, before he started firing, or not?

Witness: No. I did not see him through naked eye or binos prior to him shooting.

HSGAC Majority: So I'm just looking back at Exhibit 4, I believe it's Exhibit 4, your handwritten notes. And correct me if I'm wrong. Let's make sure I understand what you were saying in these notes. In Bates 14821, which should be the second page, you noticed an individual, white male, white or gray shirt, low crawling on the roof. "I noticed an AR-style weapon in his hands. As I moved to observe through my rifle scope I heard weapon fire."

So when you say that's when you heard the weapon fire, was that not the first shot that he took off? Because my reading, and please correct me if I'm wrong, my reading of this is that you saw an individual on the roof with an AR-style weapon, and as you moved to observe through your rifle scope, that's when he started firing. Is that not right?

Witness: I didn't observe the individual -- and I

apologize if my notes were off -- I observed the individual after he started shooting. Because I was looking on the rooftop, trying to find an individual, on whatever rooftop. It wasn't until he began to fire that it actually directed me to where he was, on his position, and that's when I saw where he was.

HSGAC Majority: I see. Okay. Thank you for that.

Witness: And when I wrote those notes it was, I don't want to say shortly after but it was after I got off the roof and I was trying to hurry up, and, you know, in the heat of everything. Sorry.

HSGAC Majority: That's fine. Yeah, no, totally understood, and I appreciate that. So at the top of 14822, when you say you heard weapon fire, that must not have been the first shot that he took off. If you wrote this sequentially, in other words, "I saw an individual, white male, white or gray shirt, on the roof, I noticed an AR-style weapon in his hands. As I moved to observe through my rifle scope I heard him fire." That must not have been the first shot he took, because you're saying that he --

Witness: I was just trying to get all my thoughts on paper.

HSGAC Majority: Understood.

Witness: As far as being in chronological order, I was probably way off. I was just trying to get it on paper

for recollection later on. I just know that I didn't know his exact pinpoint location on the rooftop until he began to fire.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. I appreciate it. Do you recall how many shots he got off before you saw him?

Witness: As soon as I heard the first shot I was getting into position to do what I needed to.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And again, walk us through the thought process and how radioing works. This might be more of a technical question about how the radios work. So similar to my question earlier about whether you could've radioed when you saw local law enforcement running, in that moment, again, knowing, like you said, it was an incredibly tense and fast situation and obviously an imminent threat, did you have the technical capability to radio at that moment, when you see him firing, or were your hands occupied on your weapon and therefore you couldn't operate your radio?

Witness: I was holding my binoculars when I was trying to observe and trying to find the individual, or an individual.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. After shots had started firing.

Witness: No. After he started firing I dropped my binos and got into my scope.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And then everything happened

fast, and that's why you didn't radio at that point. Once you'd seen him on the roof it wouldn't have made sense to radio at that point. You were just focused on neutralizing the threat. Is that right?

Witness: If I went ahead and got on my radio to put the call out it's just going to delay my action more. So my immediate reaction was to get on the weapon to neutralize a threat that was shooting.

HSGAC Majority: Yeah, understood. Would a hands-free radio have been a help there? If you're at your weapon with both hands, able to communicate hands-free, would that have been something that you could've utilized, to notify, you know, what's happening, what you're seeing?

Witness: I mean, being the shooter, my job is to neutralize a threat.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Do you recall the timeline in terms of the shots? So Mr. Crooks fired a total of eight shots. If you went to your scope, I think you said a couple of shots went off and then you went to your scope. Is that right?

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: Does that sound right?

Witness: I know I reacted on the first shot. But then there was -- go ahead.

HSGAC Majority: So do you know what happened in the

remaining time? So it would be six shots, six additional shots. If he got off two shots and you started going to your scope, the additional six shots he took off, that's when you were going to your weapon, going to your scope, getting the rangefinder reading, and getting your wind read from your partner. Is that right?

Witness: Correct. So I was putting my binos, you know, dropping my binos, getting into position, look through the scope, get my distance, you know, adjust for the elevation, get my wind call, which was immediate, and then sent the round.

HSGAC Majority: And can you put in the timeline, if you can, put in the timeline of the eight shots when you said to C/S Team Lead, "I got him." Do you recall, you know, after how many shots first went off that you were able to say that?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Do you recall how many shots, if any, Crooks got off after you had him in your scope?

Witness: I know of at least one.

HSGAC Majority: At least one. Okay.

Witness: And then it was just me focusing on what I needed to do.

HSGAC Majority: So you are the only Secret Service counter sniper that we have spoken to so far who ever saw

Mr. Crooks before you neutralized him. Without speculating, if you know, do you know why that is? I mean, why did you know to look there? How were you able to find him when the other three -- I understand that Hercules 2 had an obstructed view, but did you just happen to know whether C/S Team Lead was looking somewhere else at the time, or any insight you can provide on that?

Witness: I don't know why I was the only one.

HSGAC Majority: What did you see after you fired?

Witness: So after I took the shot I continued to observe where Mr. Crooks was located, see if I needed to do a follow-up shot, see if he would've popped back up. And then that's when we started getting calls about someone on the water tower. I got off my rifle, put it on safe -- put it on safe, got off my rifle, started looking at the water tower to see if I could see anybody. I didn't see anybody. When I got back onto my rifle I noticed local law enforcement, what appeared to be local law enforcement, a TAC team, was on the rooftop.

HSGAC Majority: And sorry. Backing up, right after you fired, did you see the reaction? In other words, was it your understanding that you hit him?

Witness: It was my understanding that I hit him and he slid out of view.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. Say that again.

Witness : He slid -- slid away.

HSGAC Majority : C/S Team Lead told us that around this time, at some point after Mr. Crooks started firing, he was sprayed with what he later determined was a hydraulic liquid. The hydraulic lift had been hit by bullets from Mr. Crooks and sprayed him and his weapon. Do you recall that happening to you? Were you affected by that?

Witness : I didn't -- we noticed well after the shooting that the left side of my rifle was covered with some kind of droplets, and that it wasn't identified until much later when I was meeting with Pennsylvania State Police forensics and FBI forensics that it was actually hydraulic fluid from a round that impacted the hydraulic line.

HSGAC Majority : So you noticed it on your rifle afterwards. Do you recall it happening in the moment?

Witness : No.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. So you don't think that affected your ability to either see Crooks or take an accurate shot?

Witness : No.

HSGAC Majority : You told our colleague earlier that you didn't observe a local law enforcement officer fire at Crooks. Is that right?

Witness : That's correct.

HSGAC Majority: Did you observe Crooks have any kind of reactions, such as a flinch or slump over before you fired?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did he duck down at all before you fired?

Witness: Not from what I saw.

HSGAC Majority: So do you have any insights -- so it's understanding that a local officer did fire at Crooks from the ground. This local officer was on the ground, near the stage, and fired at Mr. Crooks. Do you have any insight on whether that had any effect on your ability to neutralize Mr. Crooks?

Witness: No. I mean, I know what I had to do, seeing the threat.

HSGAC Majority: Did a call go out over the radio regarding "shooter down"?

Witness: Not that I remember.

HSGAC Majority: Who would call that? Could anyone call that if they can possibly identify that the shooter is down, or was that something that only a Hercules team member would usually call?

Witness: I know in training if you hit the target, the target goes down, and you'll say "target down." But, you know, I don't remember anybody saying anything on the radio regarding, you know, threat's down, threat's

neutralized.

HSGAC Majority: Regarding communications, our understanding is that Secret Service that day used a couple different radio frequencies, LES and LES Did you have access to both?

Witness: Yes, I did.

HSGAC Majority: You also said that you didn't exchange radios with locals, that that's just not something that you do as your normal course of business, right?

Witness: In all my years I've never exchanged with a local law enforcement.

HSGAC Majority: Is there a protocol for getting in touch with the locals? So in this case, for example, the snipers in AGR, if you needed to get in touch with them was there a protocol in place?

Witness: Just by the means that has been talked about, just cellphone or emails or text messages.

HSGAC Majority: Yeah. And we had entered into evidence the text between the locals, and then the locals texted C/S Team Lead, and then C/S Team Lead emailed you and the other two counter snipers. Have you ever been at an event where there's a more coordinated communication, whether it's an email chain or a text chain, with the locals altogether, as opposed to that kind of game of telephone?

Witness: Not that I remember, no.

HSGAC Majority: Do you think that would be helpful?

Witness: I mean, any kind of communications at any level would be great.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of anyone else in Secret Service that day who had a direct line of communication with state or local law enforcement?

Witness: No. Maybe just the Command Post, but other than that, no.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any other difficulties or challenges that day communicating?

Witness: I did not have any difficulty.

HSGAC Majority: We've heard from some of the other counter snipers that they sometimes had difficulties with their radios in terms of which direction they're oriented and pointing. Like if they're pointing towards the ground they might not have as good service or effectiveness. Have you ever had that problem?

Witness: On other details I have, but not that day.

HSGAC Majority: What's the issue there?

[Laughter.]

Witness: I have no clue.

HSGAC Majority: Well, how much does it impede your ability to communicate?

Witness: Well, if you're not able to communicate

when you key up the radio you can't get out your, you know, your necessary communications, whether it's, you know, like an immediate threat or, you know, whatever else.

HSGAC Majority: Does it happen often?

Witness: It can. It just depends. Maybe bigger details. But I have experienced where you key up your radio and it fails to transmit.

HSGAC Majority: We've also heard that there's sometimes difficulties with the radios transmitting if you're in too close proximity to your partner. Have you had that problem?

Witness: I have.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have that problem that day?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And same question about the orientation. Does that other problem happen often?

Witness: Some days, you know, it depends on the day, I guess you could say. I mean, sometimes it happens. Sometimes it doesn't.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned that rangefinders are not unheard of in your experience at these events, and you even mentioned rifle scopes, that attendees can bring them, and they use them to sight -- you know, they have better view of the speaker, et cetera, and as long as they're not attached to a weapon they're not an immediate -- yeah, go

ahead.

Witness: Well, outside of the venue. So I don't want to say inside the venue, totally different. When you're inside a venue you're screened, you're cleared, you're not bringing anything in that's crazy. Outside of the venue, where the bystanders were well outside the secondary fence, outside the AGR, the people that were there, you know, if they want to get a closer look, they're not in the secure area, so to speak. They're not in that cleared area where everybody clean, gone through the magnetometer. So having a pair of binoculars or a rangefinder, it's not unheard of.

HSGAC Majority: Do you think that should change? In other words, do you think Secret Service should have almost like they have a heckler policy, do you think they should have a policy about confronting people who have those devices, even if it's outside the secure area?

Witness: I mean, if it looks suspicious, you know, someone from whether it's local law enforcement or Secret Service, if there's anybody there, you know, to go up, check it, and see if there's anything that's leading on, and if not, carry on.

HSGAC Majority: So you said earlier, in response to our colleague, about the failures that, in your opinion and experience, you think the locals, Butler ESU, exhibited.

Former Director Cheatle testified before Congress that Secret Service failed on July 13th. Acting Director Rowe testified repeatedly that Secret Service failed on July 13th. I mean, clearly the former President was shot at a Secret Service protectee event.

Do you agree with those two leaders, that Secret Service had failures that day?

Witness: I don't think we should take full accountability of what happened that day. There were multiple players involved in that -- Secret Service, Butler, Beaver, Pennsylvania State. You know, those are the only ones that I know of. You can't have just one person or one unit take accountability for a failure.

HSGAC Majority: Totally fair and understood. But does Secret Service share any of that accountability for what happened that day?

Witness: You know, the Secret Service can go ahead and tell, you know, whoever it may be, medical, law enforcement, you know, where they need to be, and it's up to them. You know, we're putting our faith into another department to clear, to secure an area, you know, that we've deemed an issue. If that's the case, if we can't count on someone to go ahead and do their job, then we might as well just be there ourselves. And if we can't, we have them go ahead and provide that action. We shouldn't

have to babysit them. If they come forward to say they want to be part of it, then they need to be part of it. They need to do the responsibility and take care of their area.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. And I hope it's clear. We're talking to everyone involved, including the state and locals. So that's helpful for us as we continue to talk to them. But you have 23 years of experience with Secret Service. Leaving aside the culpability or responsibility of other agencies involved, I'm curious, in your 23 years of experience, including now as a supervisor sergeant, do you think that, from what you experienced that day, there were any failures in the Secret Service, either planning or execution of the security of that event that day, that at least contributed to what ended up happening?

Witness: I mean, the communication plan may have been an issue, but there were a lot more things that were going on.

HSGAC Majority: It's understanding you were removed from active duty while there was an ongoing investigation. Is that right?

Witness: Right. Yeah. I was not full duty while the investigation was going on.

HSGAC Majority: That was the officer-involved shooting, because you were involved in that, right?

Witness : Correct.

HSGAC Majority : What's your status now?

Witness : I'm back to full duty.

HSGAC Majority : When did you return to full duty?

Witness : If I'm correct it was last Tuesday. I don't know the exact date, but last Tuesday.

HSGAC Majority : It's also understanding that your weapon was handed over to FBI for their investigation. Has that weapon been returned to you?

Witness : No.

HSGAC Majority : Do you know why not?

Witness : Waiting for clearance from the FBI, for them to release it back to us.

HSGAC Majority : But you're able to operate regular duty now with another weapon?

Witness : Yes, I am.

HSGAC Majority : And to clarify, you're acting as a counter sniper now. Is that right?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And regarding after the shooting, apologies, did you say you evacuated with the former President to the hospital? Is that right?

Witness : No. Myself and C/S Team Lead stayed at the site, and then the other two technicians went to the hospital.

HSGAC Majority: Where did you go that night, after leaving the site?

Witness: Myself and C/S Team Lead went down to the Pittsburgh Airport for the former President's departure.

HSGAC Majority: So you left with him on the plane to Bedminster. Is that right?

Witness: No. He left on the plane. I stayed on the ground.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: And then other teams in Bedminster were picking him up.

HSGAC Majority: I see. Can you give us a sense of your work schedule? I suppose it might be helpful to talk, you know, before and post this event. So before this event, what was your work schedule like? Did you have regular days off?

Witness: I did. I did have regular days off.

HSGAC Majority: How often were they?

Witness: It varied because we were traveling a lot with the current President. So, you know, we were covering other assignments, you know, other details. If I was not in Wilmington or Rehoboth I was on other details in town, working the White House roof or other assignments outside the D.C. area.

HSGAC Majority: Did you work nights frequently?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: What was your schedule like and your travel like in the week leading up to the July 13th event?

Witness: I was working primarily day work, and I was assigned to the White House roof or in the office, doing my supervisory duties.

HSGAC Majority: You didn't travel for any particular assignments in that week or so before the July 13th event?

Witness: I don't know exactly what trips I was on, if I can I recall where I was.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry if you said this. When you went to the Pittsburgh area that Friday night before the event, was that from the D.C. area?

Witness: Correct. I departed from the D.C. area and went to Pittsburgh.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. You mentioned the locals, how you need to trust them, and they played a key role here obviously. And as you say, you shouldn't have to babysit them. With that lesson learned, does that say anything about changes moving forward about coordination with the locals? You know, the leadership of Secret Service has made very clear that you all can't do your work without cooperation from locals at these kinds of events. So I don't imagine that's changing. I don't imagine these events will be entire Secret Service protected. You're

going to still have to rely on your local and start partners.

But does this experience speak to how the coordination needs to change or improve or whether more explicit direction needs to be given to the state and locals, or any other lessons learned there, you think, that might be helpful?

Witness: I mean, yeah, the coordination needs to be, you know, converse back and forth. You need to really explain to the local teams what you want. We just need to make sure that if someone says that you're going to do something then they need to follow through with it and they need to be accountable for whatever happens.

HSGAC Majority: Is there anything that we haven't asked about today that you think we should be asking about, or anything that we haven't covered today that you think we should know about?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Majority: All right. I appreciate you being patient with us, and I'm going to turn it over to my colleague from PSI. But I just want to say thank you for your long years of service.

Witness: Thank you.

PSI Majority: Good afternoon. PSI Majority with PSI Majority office. First of all, thanks so much

for your service and thank you for what you were able to do that day.

Witness: Thank you.

PSI Majority: I want to talk a little bit about the walk-through and discussion that you had ahead of the rally. Were there any local law enforcement, either ESU or State Police, present there?

Witness: Not for our walk-through, no.

PSI Majority: Is that common that walk-throughs do not include local law enforcement for this sort of event?

Witness: It is. It is.

PSI Majority: Okay. Have you ever worked a counter sniper detail in which you were positioned inside a building, as opposed to on a rooftop?

Witness: In arenas. Convention centers, arenas like football stadiums.

PSI Majority: But never in an outdoor setting, or never in a situation akin to the outdoor rally at Butler, in which there were sort of multiple buildings?

Witness: I'm probably not following you, sir.

PSI Majority: I guess, have you ever worked, prior to Butler, an event in which you were positioned inside a structure -- have you ever worked an outdoor event in which you were positioned --

Witness: Yes.

PSI Majority: Yeah.

Witness: Okay, thank you. Yes, I have.

PSI Majority: You have.

Witness: I have.

PSI Majority: And did you feel, during that event, that you were able to both perform your duties as a counter sniper, sort of looking out and in the 360-degree field for which you were responsible, and also maintain an awareness of what was happening on the roof above you?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Majority: Okay. So you said normally you brief the Counter Sniper Response Teams. Was that the case at the Butler rally?

Witness: Correct. C/S Team Lead was going to be briefing them.

PSI Majority: Okay. And about how much time do you recall was spent on this briefing with the Counter Sniper Response Team.

Witness: I did not go with him to brief the Counter Sniper Response.

PSI Majority: Are you aware of whether there were any significant issues or concerns about the day that were highlighted in the discussion with Counter Sniper Response?

Witness: No.

PSI Majority: No, you're not aware, or no, there were

no significant issues communicated?

[redacted]: No, I'm not aware.

[redacted]: Okay. Have you ever, in the past, been part -- have you ever worked an event in which the protective detail prevented the protectee from coming out and speaking?

[redacted]: None that I've ever been on.

[redacted]: So you've never been at an event where the protectee was prevented from coming out as planned?

[redacted]: Correct.

[redacted]: Is there a standard Secret Service protocol for how such a decision is made?

[redacted]: So basically if we were to see something or if anybody were to see something we put it on the radio, and then the shift, the immediate shift, will make the decision of whether to allow the protectee to go on the stage or not go out.

[redacted]: So I just want to clarify. You said if "we," and then you said "others." So theoretically any one, not just a counter sniper, could potentially provide the information that, you know, would indicate some threat, and it would be the detailee team that would make the call about whether or not the protectee would come out and speak as planned?

[redacted]: Correct.

PSI Majority: Okay. And then just the last thing I wanted to clarify. So during the walk-through, was it specifically C/S Team Lead who told you that there would be local law enforcement inside the AGR building?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Majority: Okay. That's all my questions. I believe my colleague from PSI Majority office has a few more.

PSI Majority: Thank you again, Sergeant, and thank you again for your actions that day. We just spoke to one of your colleagues who said you saved his life. So we understand that this was a very acute situation, and you mentioned, did I remember this correctly, you said the entire moment from seeing Crooks to taking your shot, was a matter of seconds. Am I remembering that correctly?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Majority: And do you recall how many shots Crooks was able to get off in that time frame?

Witness: I just remember his one and then me just going, getting on my rifle and paying attention to what I had to do.

PSI Majority: My understanding from the other interviews we've conducted is he fired off approximately 7 to 8 shots. Can you tell me again what kind of rifle you use?

Witness : So we use a LES .
It's a LES .
PSI Majority : And what capacity does a LES use? Is it magazine fed?
Witness : It is a LES
PSI Majority : And how many rounds are in that magazine?
Witness : LES
PSI Majority : So I guess the question is, you talked about intent and ability of a would-be assassin, and the intent part, like you said, Crooks could be at home watching TV on his couch, but instead he chose to pursue violence. But the ability, it seems like in a very short amount of time he was able to get seven or eight shots off. With your magazine, as I understand it, it's bolt action, so it's one shot at a time, and then you have to chamber a new round. Would you have been able to get off seven to eight rounds in the same amount of time that Crooks was able to get that many shots off?
Witness : Get rounds off or just get rounds off accurately?
PSI Majority : Get rounds off, with relative accuracy.
Witness : Yes.
PSI Majority : In a matter of just a few seconds.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Majority: Even though you only have LES in a magazine.

Witness: Well, given the nature of that if I had a LES magazine, then I could go ahead and, you know, get the rounds off. You know, with me only having LES, I would be hesitating a little bit to go ahead and remove the mag, get another magazine in.

PSI Majority: So you're saying that a semi-auto rifle like an AR-15 can't shoot faster than a LES bolt action.

Witness: I've seen some competitive shooters out there that can shoot just as fast on a bolt-action as a gas gun.

PSI Majority: I wouldn't be surprised. But I think what you said about the capacity and the magazine is also worth mentioning. Because earlier my colleague asked about the proliferation of high-capacity magazines and more advanced weaponry. And I guess the question is, would a more advanced weapon -- because, you know, Crooks, and again, from our understanding he didn't participate -- he was at the ranch but he didn't appear to be an expert marksman, from what we were able to glean. So he wasn't a competitive shooter. He certainly wasn't at the level that you are. Do you think that having a semi-auto rifle would

allow a relative amateur like Crooks to get more rounds off in a shorter amount of time?

Witness: Anybody can grab a semi-automatic weapon and start pulling the trigger, and as fast as they could pull the trigger they could put rounds down. Whether it's accurate or not, that's another question. Go ahead.

PSI Majority: I guess what I'm getting at is, you know, he didn't hit his mark, but there was Mr. Comperatore, there was one casualty, and there were others injured, based off of how many rounds he's able to get off in such a short amount of time. And when it comes to capability, just as a civilian it seems like having access to these advanced weapons would, if somebody has the intent it would give them a greater ability to cause harm. Would that seem accurate?

Witness: I mean, I think the motivation of the shooter, the individual himself, would be more of a problem than the actual weapon system themselves. You know, if you have a high-capacity magazine, whether it's 30 rounds or just one that's at 5 rounds, just to go ahead and be able to shoot that weapon system, just for fun, you know, you just want to go out and shoot targets. But to go ahead and then use it for violence, that takes a whole different set of motivation.

PSI Majority: I guess so would the same person with

the same intent be able to cause more harm with a more advanced weapon?

Witness: Well, I would say, if I gave you my weapon system LES would you be able to do the same thing that I did? You know, it goes down to you may have a very advanced weapon system, but what's the capabilities of the shooter? What's the knowledge of the shooter?

PSI Majority: But I'm saying the same shooter, with the same intent, the same ability, if you've got two weapons and one is more advanced, and I understand advance is relative because there are different purposes, but one where an amateur would be able to get shots off faster. The same shooter, the same knowledge level. Isn't it reasonable to say that the more advanced weapon would be able to cause more damage?

Witness: It depends on the round. I mean, there are just a lot of factors when it comes to the shooting, you know, to a shooting. You know, the caliber of the round, the grains of the round. Are you using a rifle or are you using a shotgun? Are you using a high-powered rifle? There are just a lot of factors. And then again, it goes back to the shooter. What's the knowledge of the shooter?

If I gave you a high-powered rifle, could you be able to accurately shoot a one-mile target? That's another

thing, because then you have to worry about the effects of the environment, the wind, the barometric pressure, the humidity, you know, the temperatures. There are a lot of factors. Instead of the typical call-of-duty shooting, I just point and shoot, there are a lot of factors when it comes into shooting. You may have an advanced weapon system with the greatest round in the world, but do you know the factors of the environment on that round? Do you know the capabilities of that round? Do you know the capabilities of the shooter?

PSI Majority: And the fact that you understand all that is why I'm grateful you're on our side and one of the good guys.

I guess the question is somebody who has been to a range a couple of times just goes into a Walmart. It just seems to me that a high-capacity magazine and a semi-auto could do more damage to a crowd than a simpler weapon.

But let me go to the second part really quick, and then I'll wrap up. There is the ability but then there's also the intent. And again, what we've seen from the FBI investigation, based off of Crooks' search history, he would've been just as happy to shoot Joe Biden on that stage. He was looking to assassinate somebody, which suggests this was a severely mentally ill person. And we also know that mental illness has been rising dramatically.

Would you say that that adds a risk factor to the work that you do? Because again, we're talking about intent. Do you see a risk in rising mental illness rates that there would be more people -- I mean, we just heard about the United Healthcare CEO -- that there might be more people with more extreme tendencies, that might threaten protectees.

Witness: I mean, yeah, I would say yes, a mental condition could cause the individual to do more harm. But, you know, a person in their normal state of mind could do just as much. You just don't know the mindset of the shooter, of the individual.

PSI Majority: So you don't consider there to be a risking risk commensurate with more mental illness.

Witness: I mean, mental illness would be a definite factor behind a weapon system, yes, or obtaining one.

PSI Majority: Or not just obtaining one but having the willingness to look to try to hurt a protectee. As you said, you can use a lot of different weapons to hurt somebody, but even a willingness to search for a weapon to hurt somebody. Do you feel like that's going to be a growing risk to keeping protectees safe at these events?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Majority: All right. That's all. Thank you.

Witness: Thank you.

HSGAC Minority : HSGAC Minority , HSGAC Minority office again. I didn't think we were going to go into a ballistic education today, but your ballistic knowledge is commendable.

Witness : Thank you.

HSGAC Minority : So I will ask a few questions for the record, as well, then. Which is more ballistically capable, a .30 caliber or a 556?

Witness : .30 cal.

HSGAC Minority : Thank you. What's the most common hunting weapon in America, caliber?

Witness : .30 cal.

HSGAC Minority : Thank you. How long have they been in existence? You don't have to answer that.

Have you ever seen someone outside the perimeter, outside perimeter, with a weapon, that did not pose an imminent threat to you and/or the protectee? In an open carry state, have you ever seen someone carrying a weapon that did not pose an imminent threat just by them possessing the firearm, to the protectee and/or you?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority : So it follows up what you testified earlier, that the motive is the issue. Have you ever heard the term "Means, motive, and opportunity, all three have to come together for an act of violence to take place"?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: When you're doing an advance work, you're doing your counter sniper work for deterrence, what is one of the three issues that you're trying to mitigate -- the means, the motive, or the opportunity?

Witness: All three.

HSGAC Minority: Primarily which one?

Witness: Opportunity.

HSGAC Minority: Correct. Because it's very hard, am I correct in assuming, for you to personally intervene in someone's motive?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Thank you. You probably also heard the statement, "The person is the weapon. Everything else is a tool."

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: So that individual chose the tool that day. Correct?

Witness: Yes, he did.

HSGAC Minority: And I've got a few questions now to move away from that, but I wanted to get that on the record.

Were you ever shown any cone of fire diagrams from the local police, what they provided to C/S Team Lead, to clearly identify what they felt like their cone of fire

would be within the AGR building?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Minority: What are we on now? 11?

[Exhibit No. 11 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Minority: This is a diagram that was provided from the local Beaver ESU team that had a diagram. It's hard to see, so bear with me if you can. What you're looking at is from the positions inside the AGR building. Can you see what I'm looking at there, the green cone, blue cone, yellow cone?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: From your experience from July 13th, are any of those areas within the location that Thomas Crooks was ultimately located and neutralized?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Minority: In C/S Team Lead testimony he stated that he's speaking with them and their mission was to have "overwatch of the area" -- and I'm specifically reading from his transcript -- "of the area, and the crowd, on both sides, as well as the magnetometers, the x-ray, the metal detectors, before the time of the event. They wanted to have a good sight of those areas. From my location where the Hercules teams were, we did not have good line-of-sight toward the magnetometers or any of those areas, so

I would not, again, send people up on the roof to get a good line-of-sight of those areas."

So his understanding was, and I think he relayed to you, maybe something different. But he was given information. He was told by the local police that they could not see that area. But you were working under the assumption that they could, in fact, see that area. Am I correct?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And then further he stated that -- and bear with me because I've got a lot of notes here -- but he stated in here that Hercules 2 was, quote/unquote, "out of the game" because their line-of-sight was eliminated by the trees, where Crooks location was, and that LES which LES is the team within the AGR building, had a very limited view and could not see that location. He testified further that his mitigation of the AGR building was Hercules 2, Hercules 1, and Sierra 1, which was on the horse barns.

So my question to you is, were you provided the information that I just gave you, that he's testified to, that that team in the AGR building could not see that roof where Thomas Crooks was at?

Witness: I've never seen this, first of all, and without actually having to go to the AGR building,

witnessed that myself, see that myself, I wouldn't know what they're able to --

HSGAC Minority: Correct.

Witness: And both the understand that that team has worked that location before, then they would know whether it would for the event or not.

HSGAC Minority: Has anything changed in the counter sniper advance since July 13th?

Witness: No, sir.

HSGAC Minority: The process.

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Any reason why that hasn't changed, or do you personally feel like something needs to change in the counter sniper advance?

Witness: I don't believe something should change. I mean, we conduct our advances the same. We look at everything, walk in the footsteps, looking at line-of-sight concerns, identifying them, you know, passing that information off to site agents and leads, you know, and local teams. You know, we have a thorough checklist that we have to go by to ensure everything is covered.

HSGAC Minority: So how did C/S Team Lead fail then in not ensuring -- well, no, let me rephrase that.

Witness Counsel: He can't answer that.

HSGAC Minority: In the advance, you said he has to

ensure that all areas were covered. I think we all agreed that the AGR building was not covered. It was exploited by a shooter. So my question to you is, and you don't have to name names or anything, what role failed within the Secret Service, to ensure that that did not happen? Because we had, and I said yesterday, site advance, lead advance, counter sniper advance. I'm just having a hard time understanding how many people looked at this, and Thomas Crooks was the only person to exploit that.

So in your 20-plus years of experience, you're the most experienced person we've interviewed, and I value your feedback. What failed that day? Because if we can't identify what role failed, it's going to repeat itself. So that's my question to you.

Witness Counsel: All right. Let's just stop for a moment. And just want to go and talk to him outside.

HSGAC Minority: Thank you.

Witness Counsel: Okay. Thanks.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Minority: Back on the record. Do you need me to restate the question, or are you understanding just what I'm, a simple --

Witness: I'll let you go ahead and restate it, sir. Yes, sir.

Witness Counsel: Can you do that, or no?

HSGAC Minority: Yes, I can. I may have to rephrase it a little bit.

Witness Counsel: That's okay. That's not a problem.

HSGAC Minority: But based on your experience, and taking aside the locals' failures, because we certainly don't believe that, or I personally don't believe just one person failed, what do you believed failed specific to the United States Secret Service to allow Thomas Crooks to exploit the roof of the AGR building and ultimately take the life of another human being? So I guess that's a way of restating it.

Witness Counsel: Yeah, that's fine.

Witness: Just not being able to cover that rooftop properly is, you know, as intended. You're putting your faith in someone, so to watch part of the site, watch an area. And you know, if someone could have watched something as it was intended then they should, you know, let you know that they're going to change their plan. I don't -- hopefully that answers kind of what you're asking.

HSGAC Minority: Not completely, but I'll accept that.

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Minority: The last question I have is, have you provided all of your emails, texts, encrypted messages, or any data or documents to the United States Secret Service for them to provide to us?

Witness : Yes, sir.

HSGAC Minority : That's all I have, and again, thank you for your service.

Witness : Thank you, sir.

PSI Minority : Witness , this is PSI Minority from PSI Minority office again. I'm going to go to Exhibit 6, which I shared with you earlier. It's the 87-page Pennsylvania State Police report regarding the July 13th shooting. And I want to go back to the same page that I referenced earlier, which was page 21 of that report.

Witness , what I'm going to do is I'm going to read part of this page. It's a little on the long side. And I just want you to listen and then let me know whether or not you disagree or if there are what you believe are inaccuracies in what is written in this, once I finish. So I'll go ahead and start reading it.

"Witness then overheard attendees from the crowd yelling that someone was on the roof. Witness and C/S Team Lead then repositioned themselves toward the AGR building and began searching the rooftops of the complex with both their naked eyes and binoculars. As Witness begins to pan his sight line back toward the crowd, he observes Crooks appear atop the roof of Building 4 and advises C/S Team Lead . Witness assumes a shooting position with his rifle locked into a tripod.

"While observing through his rifle optic, Witness sees

Crooks in a prone shooting position and armed with a rifle. Witness explained Crooks' position was at the peak line of a slightly pitched roof, and his sight picture was of his head and the tops of his shoulders. C/S Team Lead provides Witness with direction that he does not need to adjust his point of aim, as no cross wind was present. Witness activates a laser rangefinder system affixed to his rifle, receiving a distance to the target of approximately 200 yards. Moments later, Witness could hear the sonic disturbances of gunfire emanating from Crooks' location. Witness then discharged one round from his rifle into Crooks, at which time Crooks 'slumped away' and did not appear to reengage."

Witness, any inaccuracies in what I read or anything that needs to be clarified?

Witness: So basically when you're reading it, it makes it look like I have all the time in the world from when I identified his location to me shooting. If there was a way to recreate the exact thing that happened that day, that would be the only way for anybody to understand what I did and what I saw.

Witness Counsel: He's already testified it was over a period of seconds. I mean, that's what happened.

Witness: Yeah.

Witness Counsel: That's a linear sequence of events compressed into a few seconds. That's what happened.

PSI Minority: Understood. And all I'm trying to just get from you is --

Witness Counsel: Those are the -- that's the sequence --

PSI Minority: -- whether or not you feel that what I just read is accurate.

Witness Counsel: Was that the sequence of your behavior?

Witness: I mean, from what I can recall, I mean, you know, I like to say I relive that moment every day, but I try not to.

PSI Minority: Understood. Thank you.

PSI Minority: PSI Minority. Just a couple of quick questions for you. I know you said you didn't connect that the individual on the roof was the individual in the BOLO at the time of the shooting. When did you connect that the individual on the roof was the individual in the BOLO?

Witness: It was later in the evening, that finally I put 2 and 2 together.

PSI Minority: How did you make that connection?

Witness: Well, just recalling what the individual looked like on the roof to the photo on the email. It just, you know, they resembled -- there was a resemblance.

PSI Minority: Understood. I know you said you weren't aware of any PSP plain-clothes or vice officers on at the rally site. Were you aware of any other plain-

clothes officers who were working the rally that day?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Does that present any concern to you? And let me give you a little bit more context for that. If a plain-clothes officer were to have drawn a weapon, either in the crowd of the rally or in the area that you were responsible for, would you have engaged that individual with that weapon?

Witness: If they did not identify themselves as law enforcement, they could have been a blue-on-blue.

PSI Minority: So not knowing that there were plain-clothes officers on the ground at the rally creates a potential for a blue-on-blue violent situation.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Okay.

Witness: And not just for me but any Secret Service or local law enforcement. If you don't work with that individual on a daily basis and know their face, that could be a blue-on-blue.

PSI Minority: Understood. I appreciate that. I want to just quickly go over a little bit the line-of-sight concerns and your obstructed view from the barns. If you can go back to Exhibit 2, that's those images. So that tree in the image, that was the tree that obstructed your view of the roofs of the AGR building?

Witness : With that lower portion of the roof, yes, that tree obstructed the lower portion, or I guess it would be the northern portion of that roof.

PSI Minority : Okay. And the Hercules 2 team, would they have been positioned on that second barn that you can sort of make out through the tree?

Witness : Correct.

PSI Minority : So that tree would've also been in their viewpoint then, if they were looking towards the AGR building, at least the same amount that it was in your viewpoint.

Witness : Right. I mean, for the angle that this photo was taken, that tree clearly blocks out just that portion of the roof. But in the location that Crooks was located, as we're looking at the photo it would be to the right.

PSI Minority : Understood, yes, and I understand that you don't know the exact extent of Hercules 2's obstruction. But that tree would've at least obstructed some of their view of the AGR building from wherever they were positioned, on the AGR roof.

Witness : Yes, sir.

PSI Minority : And they never mentioned to you that they had an obstructed view. They never radioed out over, saying, "We have an obstructed view."

Witness : I don't remember any kind of radio call or anything that went out about that.

PSI Minority : And you never mentioned, or Agent C/S Team Lead never mentioned -- sorry, Officer C/S Team Lead never mentioned to Hercules 2 that you also had a partially obstructed view of that roof.

Witness : Yeah. I don't remember.

PSI Minority : So you said something earlier regarding the individuals in the AGR building, that if someone's not able to cover the area that they were supposed to cover, that individuals should be made aware of that and that should be communicated that, hey, we have to change our plan.

Witness : Right.

PSI Minority : So at least as I understand it with the obstructed view, Hercules 2 was not able to cover all of the AGR roof, which was its primary area of responsibility, and that whole 12 to, I guess, 6, is that where they were, 12 to 6 was their end, on the other side of 12 to 3?

Witness : Well, so when the team is positioned on a roof they're not just primarily focused on the AGR building. They're looking at all the area, from the 12 to the 6 o'clock, that's primarily on the 3 o'clock side. So they're looking at everything. If you were to go ahead and start moving teams to basically cover a blind spot, so to

speak, now you're opening up something else. So if you're having this team on the second floor of the AGR building, you move Hercules 2 to another spot, you're opening something else up and now no one can see.

PSI Minority: I completely understand that there are complexities into how the assets have to be placed, right. But their primary area of responsibility was the area over towards the AGR, which had previously been identified as an area of concern, right?

Witness: Right.

PSI Minority: So they were unable to cover part of their primary area of responsibility due to the line-of-sight obstruction.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: And they did not communicate that.

Witness: Not that I remember, no.

PSI Minority: But your expectation is that if an individual is unable to cover their area of responsibility, that should be communicated so that plans can be adjusted.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Okay. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. This is going to conclude our interview for today. We have tried to cover everything we believe was necessary to address in the interview, and appreciate your thorough and detailed account. Should we,

as I mentioned at the beginning, find that there are areas we failed to cover that we need to address, we'll contact Secret Service. We reserve the right to revisit it, and we'll reach out if we need to do so.

As we mentioned at the beginning, we would ask that you not speak with others about what we discussed today, to preserve the integrity of our investigation.

And with that we'll conclude the interview, and again, thank you very much for your time and for your service.

[redacted]: Thank you, sir.

[redacted]: Thank you.

[Whereas, at 4:49 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

INTERVIEW OF

C/S Response

SPECIAL AGENT, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Wednesday, October 30, 2024

Washington, D.C.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AND THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW OF

[redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Room SD-342

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, October 30, 2024

10:08 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Witness:

[redacted], General Counsel, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association [Virtual]

[redacted], Attorney-Advisor, Office of General Counsel, DHS Oversight Counsel [Virtual]

[redacted], Attorney-Advisor, Office of Chief Counsel, United States Secret Police

On Behalf of Chairman Peters:

[redacted], Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul:

[redacted], Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

APPEARANCES (continued):

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul (continued):

HSGAC Minority, Staff Director, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee [Virtual]

On Behalf of PSI Chairman Blumenthal:

PSI Majority, Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

On Behalf of PSI Ranking Member Johnson:

PSI Minority, Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Chief Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Deputy Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

EXHIBITS:

1) Email - Bates #3234 15

2) Email - Bates #3240-3241 30

3) July 13, 2024, Email - Bates #2234 32

4) Texts - Bates #2239-2244 40

5) 7/13/24 Texts from SA [redacted] - Bates #2247-2249 58

6) July 2024 Transcript PSP [redacted] 80

7) BOLO Email 7/13/24 5:52 p.m. - Bates #1417 126

8) Email 7/13/24 4:28 p.m. - Bates #2235 133

P R O C E E D I N G S

HSGAC Majority: Good morning. This is a transcribed interview of Witness, being conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

This interview was requested by Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, as well as Subcommittee Chair Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, as part of the Committee's investigation of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on former President Trump, and the U.S. Secret Service planning and security related to the Butler rally on July 13, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, Chairmen Peters and Blumenthal, and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson requested voluntary transcribed interviews with U.S. Secret Service personnel, and again, on September 11, 2024, requested additional transcribed interviews, including of Witness.

We will provide introductions today of our four offices who are conducting this interview and explain how we will proceed. And I will begin by introducing myself, HSGAC Majority. I am Chief Counsel and Chief Investigative Counsel for Chairman Gary Peters on the full committee. I am joined here today by my colleagues, HSGAC Majority, Senior Investigator, and HSGAC Majority, Senior Investigative

Counsel. And I will turn it over to our colleagues.

HSGAC Minority: Good morning. My name is HSGAC Minority HSGAC Minori for HSGAC minority. I'm joined by HSGAC Minority.

PSI Majority: And I'm PSI Majority, Counsel for PSI majority.

PSI Minority: Good morning. I'm PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office as Staff Director. I'm joined by my colleagues, PSI Minority, Chief Counsel, and PSI Minority PSI Minority, Deputy Staff Director for Senator Johnson.

HSGAC Majority: And Witness, I'd now ask you to introduce yourself and your title, and then your counsel.

Witness: I'm Witness, Special Agent, U.S. Secret Service. My personal attorney is Witness Counsel.

Witness Counsel: My name is Witness Counsel. I am the private counsel to the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association. I'm here in my representative capacity virtually.

Agency Counsel: I'm Agency Counsel. I'm from the Office of Chief Counsel, Secret Service.

Agency Counsel: I'm Agency Counsel from Department of Homeland Security Office of General Counsel.

HSGAC Majority: During today's interview we'll do our best to limit the number of people speaking at once and try and go in order, so you can understand the questions being asked and people asking the questions. That said, from

time to time there may be follow-up to a question we just asked you. If any of the questions we're asking or the follow-up are confusing, please ask us to clarify the question and we'll be happy to do so.

Today the reporter is going to create a verbatim record of what we discuss. With that in mind, as I'm sure you're familiar, please respond verbally, because the reporter cannot properly record any nonverbal responses. Do you understand?

[redacted]: I understand.

HSGAC Majority: This interview is being conducted in an unclassified setting, so if questions we ask call for information you know to be classified or to implicate classified information, we would ask that you state the reason you cannot answer. And once you have clarified, to the extent possible, please respond with as much unclassified information as you can to be responsive to the question, and if need be we can enter a classified session and can arrange for that at a later date. Do you understand?

[redacted]: I understand.

HSGAC Majority: It is the Committee's practice to honor valid common law privilege claims and to accommodate witnesses when those claims are made in good faith and accompanied by a sufficient explanation, so that the

Committees can evaluate the claim. When deciding whether to honor these privileges, the Committee will weigh its need for the information against any legitimate basis for withholding it. The interview today is occurring without prejudice to any future discussions the Committee may seek, and we reserve the right to request your participation at a future date if need be.

If you have to take a break, other than the breaks we plan to take -- we will break on the hour, or after an hour session each -- just let us know and we will be happy to do so, and we can accommodate you.

If you have any questions about what we are asking we are happy to clarify. Just ask us to do so. And when you respond you are required to answer questions truthfully. Do you understand?

[redacted]: I understand.

[redacted]: This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview, including today's interview. And specifically 18 USC Section 1001 makes it a crime to make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations in the course of a congressional investigation. This statute applies to your statements in this interview. Do you understand?

[redacted]: I understand.

[redacted]: Is there any reason that you would not be

able to provide truthful answers today?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: We would also ask that you not speak about what we discuss in this interview with anyone outside of who is in the room today, in order to preserve the integrity of our investigation. We will provide counsel with a copy of this transcript and an errata in order to make corrections, or access to the transcript.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

Witness: No, sir.

Agency Counsel: Just very quickly, the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security have made available to the Committee, consistent with requests from the Chairman, information and records that would not be publicly released. This includes information and records covered under the Privacy Act, personnel and other personal privacy information, for official use only, intelligence and law enforcement sensitive records, and raw intelligence information.

While the Secret Service and the Department have made this information and records available to the Committee, we continue to assert that such information and any discussion of such information is not intended for public disclosure.

The Secret Service and the Department are not waiving any protections, and for the purposes of administrative

efficiency and to promote constructive dialogue during the transcribed interview, are making these assertions at the outset of the transcribed interview to preserve all assertions of protection from the public release or disclosure of information or records used or discussed during the transcribed interview.

The transcript and any attachments are protected from dissemination to the same extent as the documents and information that they are based on. Please consult with the Secret Service and the Department prior to any public release or disclosure. The Secret Service and the Department have not consented to, and were assured that there would not be any audio recordings of this interview. The agencies understand that the interview will be transcribed by the court reporter, and that the court reporter may use a recording for the purpose of transcription.

HSGAC Majority: Just for the record, I am reiterating that [unclear] transcribed interviews that the Committee will be bound solely by Senate and Committee rules. We will adhere to them. And in addition, as is the Committee's practice, in advance of any publication of nonpublic information, including information we learn in today's interview, it is our practice to provide individuals who provided that information or agencies and their counsel excerpts in

advance of publication so that they may provide any factual corrections. That would be our intention here, as well. As you know, we have made one public interim report, and we intend to make additional publications, and we will adhere to best practice.

With respect to the transcript itself, the Committee retains the transcript as a record. It is the property of the Committee, and as discussed we will provide counsels with an opportunity to review and correct.

There will be an audio recording. That audio recording, to my understanding, is only to be used for the basis of creating the transcript itself. And I just ask that our offices all acknowledge we will rely on the transcript itself as the basis for the record for this interview. Thank you.

And just for the record, the offices have all agreed. And with that I would like to begin. We would just ask, [redacted], if you could begin by stating your background with the Secret Service, when you began, any training you've had, and lead us up to the status that you had as of July 13th and your responsibilities on that date.

[redacted]: Okay. So I started with the Secret Service October of 2022. And I went through the Academy and graduated in September 2023. So I've only been in the field now just over a year. Leading up to the event I was

at NATO, for the NATO Summit, and then [unclear] the July 13th event for Trump, and was assigned as a Counter Sniper Response Agent for that event.

HSGAC Majority: And when did you receive the call?

Witness: July 11th.

Agency Counsel: I'm sorry, [redacted]. I really hate to interrupt, but I cannot hear any sound from Special Agent Witness.

HSGAC Majority: I will repeat my question, and if you could just let us know if you hear Mr. Witness response. When did you receive the call that you would be working the July 13th event?

Witness: On July 11th.

HSGAC Majority: Did you hear that response?

Agency Counsel: Yes, [redacted], I did hear that. When he was giving his previous answer his mic worked intermittently. I don't know if others who are on the line are having the same issue.

Unidentified Voice: I am having the same issue. I'm only picking up every few words.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. I'm going to switch my microphone, and if you could just let us know if you hear Mr. Witness next response or if you are having the same problem. We will try and troubleshoot it. Right now we'll just move to the next question, and just please let us know

if you hear the full response.

[Pause.]

HSGAC Majority: HSGAC Majority. I'm a [inaudible]. You said you started with the Secret Service in October of '22 and graduated in [inaudible]. Did you start with the uniformed division?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: So you've been a special agent since you graduated the Academy in September of 2023?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And the folks who are virtual here [inaudible].

Agency Counsel: I believe you were addressing us, and your mic now seems to be cutting out. All I heard was "for the folks who are virtual."

HSGAC Majority: We're going to move to another location and pick it up, and that should solve the problem.

[Pause.]

HSGAC Majority: We're back on the record. Thank you, Special Agent Witness. So you were saying you were never in the uniformed division. You've been a special agent since September of '23. Is that right?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Are you assigned to a particular field office?

Witness: Oklahoma City Field Office.

HSGAC Majority: Regarding this rally in Butler on July 13th, did you take any notes, either handwritten or electronically, either before, during, or after, about that event?

Witness: I have just what I did online, I submitted it in our SharePoint.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. You had what?

Witness: Just a timeline of what the events went on, for the interview purpose.

HSGAC Majority: Did you make that available to the Secret Service?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. I would request Secret Service counsel, if we haven't received that already, that we would request that document. Do you know if that's been provided to the Committee?

Agency Counsel: I will have to double check. My understanding was that everything had been provided, but I will, as usual, double check.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. Regarding your assignment to this rally on July 13th, when were you told you'd be assigned? I think you said July 11th -- is that right?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Is that the same time you were told that

you would be assigned as the CS response agent?

Witness: I did not find out until July 12th.

HSGAC Majority: Who told you you'd be the CS response agent?

Witness: I believe it was a site agent that sent out the posting assignments. I don't remember her name offhand.

HSGAC Majority: Can you explain why you were selected to staff this event if you were in the Oklahoma City office?

Witness: So for any agent in Secret Service we get assigned to anywhere in the U.S. for any assignment. It's just what they need whatever particular event.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of any other agents who were assigned to this event from your field office?

Witness: Not my field office, no.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And do you know why you were selected to be a CS response agent for this event?

Witness: There's no particular region for being selected as CS Response. I guess they go down the list of positions that they need for that particular event and then they'll just put the names in there of agents that are selected.

HSGAC Majority: We're passing a document to you. It's been marked Exhibit 1.

Witness: Okay.

[Exhibit No. 1 was
marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: So this is a July 10th email. It's marked Bates 3234. Did you receive this email?

Witness: Sorry. I'm reading the email.

HSGAC Majority: Sure.

Witness: I'm familiar with the email.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. You said you're not familiar?

Witness: No. Yes, sorry. I am familiar.

HSGAC Majority: You said you believe it was a site agent who told you you'd be assigned as the CS response agent?

Witness: Yes, according to the Post Site Assignment Log.

HSGAC Majority: And who told you you'd be assigned, when you were told on July 11th that you'd be assigned to the rally generally?

Witness: That was my supervisor. I believe it was either A/ASAC or A/ASAC.

HSGAC Majority: How do you spell their last names?

Witness: A/ASAC, I believe.

HSGAC Majority: You said that it may have been another individual?

Witness: A/ASAC.

HSGAC Majority: How do you spell that last name?

Witness : USSS Agent .

HSGAC Majority : So this email on July 10, saying, "FYI, I will be submitting your name for this assignment. Sorry." You don't recall receiving that?

Witness : I'm reading further now. Yes, I do remember getting that.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. So this first email at the top, in response to that email about side note, "I need to make a correction to my LA voucher." Did you send that email in response to the one below it?

Witness : Yes. I was on an assignment prior to this assignment.

HSGAC Majority : Understood. Do you recall who sent you this email, where it says, "FYI, I will be submitting your name for this assignment"?

Witness : Like I said, it was either A/ASAC or A/ASAC . I want to say it was A/ASAC , our now acting ASAC.

HSGAC Majority : Do you know why he said, "Sorry?"

Witness : Because we'd been traveling back to back on trips, so he didn't want to -- he felt bad having to quick roll me to another trip.

HSGAC Majority : Understood. Can you walk us through how the CS response role works? So first, how many times had you worked as a CS response agent before the Butler rally?

Witness: That would be my first time.

HSGAC Majority: What's your understanding of what the purpose is of a CS response agent?

Witness: So my understanding is CS response is simply just you respond to any threat that the CS team may deem necessary for you to respond to.

HSGAC Majority: Is it to locate an individual who needs to be located, or is it to respond to a discreet individual or situation that the CS agents or officers already know the location of?

Witness: Generally it's someone that they know the location of.

HSGAC Majority: Is that distinction clear to other Secret Service personnel? In other words, is it your understanding that the role of the CS response agent is clear in that it's usually used to respond to something, the location of which is known, rather than to go out and look for something?

Witness: So I can't speak to anybody else other than myself. However, for me, that's my understanding of it.

HSGAC Majority: Have you encountered any confusion about that?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Is the CS response agent provided only

to events where counter snipers are provided?

Witness: Yes, from my understanding.

HSGAC Majority: Is it your understanding that the Butler rally on July 13th was the first time Secret Service sent counter snipers to former President Trump's events?

Witness: I'm unaware of that.

HSGAC Majority: When you were in the field, at an event as a CS response agent, is there a hierarchy of who you report to? Do you report to the CS lead?

Witness: So the CS lead is supposed to reach out to me if there's any type of event. So yes, to answer that question.

HSGAC Majority: So is it only the CS lead's authority to deploy you or to dispatch you to respond to something at an event, or can other Secret Service personnel direct you?

Witness: Other Secret Service personnel, so like the Security Room or Command Post, whichever term you want to use for it. They can reach out to you, as well.

HSGAC Majority: But it is it generally supposed to be an asset of the counter snipers? In other words, the counter sniper team, for lack of a better word, owns the asset of a CS response agent to be used for their purposes, or is it really Secret Service writ large can use this asset at these events?

Witness: So from my understanding, CS response

can have multiple duties at that event. However, like I said, this was my first time doing CS response, so I'm unaware of their normal protocol. However, it is my understanding that, yes, the Security Room personnel are able to deploy us as they see fit during the event.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Are you familiar with the Protective Intelligence, or PI, Agent role?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What's your understanding of that role?

Witness: Their purpose, from my understanding, is to respond to anyone that is deemed suspicious or otherwise showing suspicious behavior.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if a PI agent receives particular training?

Witness: Not as a post-stander. They do have Protective Intelligence Division. They go through something completely separate. But as a post-stander, not from my understanding, no.

HSGAC Majority: Have you worked as PI agent before?

Witness: I have not.

HSGAC Majority: In your understanding, do PI agents and CS response agents work closely together at events?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: How so. How do they work together?

Witness: So you're both filling a role that

you're looking for, well, PI looks for more of a suspicious individual, and you look for more of a threat. Generally a threat can, at times, become -- or, sorry, a suspicious person can, in certain scenarios, become a threat, as we saw in this event. However, that would be their connection there. They can help each other find said suspicious person or whatever it may be.

HSGAC Majority: Is it your understanding that a CS response agent and PI agent are in close proximity together during events?

Witness: It is not my understanding that that is a requirement, no.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Regarding the Butler rally on July 13th, did you have any involvement in planning for the rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you rely on any information ahead of the rally to prepare?

Witness: Just the Assignment Log I would get. That and a brief on the morning of.

HSGAC Majority: Did you receive any other documentation ahead of the rally?

Witness: I'd have to look at my email, but I'm pretty sure we received a good bit of documents via digital.

HSGAC Majority: Did you attend or give any briefings --

Witness: We attended -- oh --

HSGAC Majority: -- sorry, specific to the rally.

Witness: Yes. On the day of the event, July 13th, in the morning, we got a brief.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall what time that was?

Witness: Offhand I would say between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning.

HSGAC Majority: Was that just Secret Service personnel at that briefing?

Witness: Secret Service and HSI.

HSGAC Majority: Did you survey the site at all or do any kind of walkthrough before the event began?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What did you do?

Witness: So the site agent and lead, they would essentially do a roll call and make sure they have everybody on that list that were assigned to their particular post-standing positions. The site agent took half the group and the lead took the other half of the group to kind of show them where their positions were going to be and discuss further what the responsibilities are at each post.

HSGAC Majority: Did you conduct any kind of threat assessment of the grounds or buildings?

Witness : Personally I did, yes.
HSGAC Majority : What did you assess?
Witness : I just simply -- we got assigned a golf cart, CS response as well as PI, and then the site and the lead. I just drove around the park. At the time there was no one in the park, so I just drove around to kind of see the area, get familiar with it. Like I said, I'd never done this position before, so.
HSGAC Majority : So you got familiar with the area. But did you assess the site for any vulnerabilities or concerns?
Witness : Yes.
HSGAC Majorit : What did you determine?
Witness : From my understanding, at a point, I hadn't discussed with the CS lead so I was trying to figure out where the sniper teams would be located, which I later on found out, that there were a few vulnerabilities.
HSGAC Majority : And what were they?
Witness : The water tower was one that was voiced a few times.
HSGAC Majority : Is that all in terms of vulnerabilities identified?
Witness : Yes.
HSGAC Majority : Was that documented anywhere?
Witness : You talking about the packet that I

received?

HSGAC Majority: The identified vulnerabilities including the water tower.

Witness: Oh no, there was no document for that. That was just a visual on my own.

HSGAC Majority: Are there any other documents or information that would've been helpful to receive ahead of the rally, that you expected to receive?

Witness: No. I received a CS packet, but otherwise I was, for that particular position, that's usually what you would get.

HSGAC Majority: Had you been to Butler before this rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And in terms of your responsibility as a CS response agent, did you have a specific area of responsibility?

Witness: Just the event itself. I mean, can you specify?

HSGAC Majority: Did you have a post, or were you roving?

Witness: I was roving.

HSGAC Majority: In the golf cart, you said?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And is it typical, in your understanding, to have LES Secret Service CS response

LES at an event this large?

Witness: I'm unaware.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if there was any discussion of sending LES CS response agents to this rally?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Regarding the security perimeter of this rally, how, of at all, does a security perimeter at a rally affect your responsibilities as a CS response agent?

Witness: Simply put, the better secure the outer perimeter is, that helps relieve the concern of any potential threat from those positions. Yeah.

HSGAC Majority: Were you duties or responsibilities limited to within the security perimeter?

Witness: You're talking about inside where the magnetometers, the inner perimeter? Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Right. Your duties were indeed limited to that area. Is that what you're saying?

Witness: They're not limited to it, but that's where we were positioned up, as directed by the CS lead.

HSGAC Majority: But if you were directed to respond to something beyond the security perimeter you would have that capability? That's not outside of your authority or capability to respond outside the security perimeter?

Witness: From my understanding, no, it's not.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. What was your understanding

of the perimeter at the Butler rally?

Witness: Inner perimeter was anything where the immediate area was, like the stage up to the magnetometers. And then the middle perimeter was essentially the field between the crowd and the AGR building, and the outer perimeter would be beyond the AGR building, circling -- I apologize, I don't remember the street names, but front and back street of the event would be the outer perimeter, essentially border.

HSGAC Majority: And to clarify, the middle perimeter that you described, between the fence and AGR, that was outside the secure magnetometer area. Is that right?

Witness: You're discussing the one at 3 o'clock? So yes, that was outside the mags, blocked off by a fence.

HSGAC Majority: Right. Understood. Did you have any concerns about the perimeter?

Witness: Not at the time, no.

HSGAC Majority: Not at the time. Have you since raised concerns or had concerns about the perimeter?

Witness: I do now, yes.

HSGAC Majority: And what are they?

Witness: Lack of manning, personnel, in the area.

HSGAC Majority: Can you expound on that? So what did

you observe that raised those concerns for you?

Witness: It wasn't until shots fired did I realize there wasn't enough local -- so typically you'll have more locals on the outer and middle perimeter, more so the outer perimeter, to help deal with crowds and traffic. Now this is all from my perspective. I don't know if there were more individuals there or not prior to that. However, when I arrived at the building there was not the amount of people that I expected there to be, as far as law enforcement.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say when you arrived at the building, you mean after shots fired?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Did anyone else have any concerns, that you were aware of, before the rally about the perimeter?

Witness: Only the same thing as the water tower.

HSGAC Majority: And regarding the AGR building, same question. Did you have any concerns or identify any vulnerabilities about the AGR building before the rally?

Witness: No. It was my understanding that there was a sniper team on the roof of the AGR building, so that was concern was removed once I was told that.

HSGAC Majority: Who told you that?

Witness: The CS lead.

HSGAC Majority: The CS lead, you said?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Majority: And what was his name or her name?

Witness: His -- I have his name -- [redacted] C/S Team Lead.

HSGAC Majority: So what did he tell you exactly?

Witness: So I don't remember exactly, but I went over the packet with him, and on the CS response packet it shows where our CS teams will be located, our LES teams. And one was on top of the AGR building, so he's pointing it out to me, and one was at the horse track -- I don't remember what they called it specifically -- and then two on the barn behind the stage.

HSGAC Majority: So this map, was it your interpretation of that map that led you to believe that the local snipers would be on top of the roof of the AGR building, or did [redacted] C/S Team Lead explicitly tell you that they would be on the roof?

Witness: I'd have to say it's probably more my understanding of it.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So C/S Team Lead didn't say that those locals would be on the roof. It was just that was your impression of looking at the icons on the map that he gave you?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Were you aware of any concerns about line of sight from the AGR building to the stage?

Witness: I was not. I wasn't in a perspective from the AGR building to the view, any type of line-of-sight issues.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware of any efforts to mitigate any line-of-sight issues.

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: So you mentioned that after the fact you certainly had these concerns about a lack of manpower around the AGR building, but before the rally what was your understanding of who would be responsible for securing the AGR building?

Witness: It was my understanding, by our diagrams, was state and local personnel, as well as that LES team that was in that building, in that situation.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know who decided that?

Witness: I do not.

HSGAC Majority: Was that documented anywhere besides the map that you said C/S Team Lead showed you?

Witness: That they were -- that they had individuals around that building?

HSGAC Majority: Right.

Witness: I believe we had a site diagram that

was sent to us in that email. I can't remember what day it was. But there was a diagram that showed posts throughout the event.

HSGAC Majority: And can you talk more about the manpower that you saw around the AGR building during the event? So before shots fired, describe the presence of law enforcement you saw in the AGR area.

Witness: So during the event I wasn't necessarily looking at the AGR building, so I couldn't provide that information.

HSGAC Majority: Were you aware of anyone else reporting any concerns about the AGR building before the event?

Witness: Before the event started?

HSGAC Majority: Right.

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: So moving forward to the day of the event, what time did you arrive at the Butler site?

Witness: I believe it was around 9:00.

HSGAC Majority That's on Saturday the 13th?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Majority: And where did you come from? What was your previous assignment?

Witness: I was in D.C. for the NATO Summit.

HSGAC Majority: Did you drive out to Pittsburgh area that Saturday morning or the Friday night?

Witness: Driving would've made sense but I flew.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. You said you flew from D.C.?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Majority: Friday morning, or sorry, Saturday morning?

Witness: No. Friday.

HSGAC Majority: Friday. Okay.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: We're bringing you another document here. This is another email. This is a July 11th email. It's marked Bates stamped 3240 through 3241.

[Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: Do you recognize this email string?

Witness: I do, and I see I got my dates wrong.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. You said you had your dates wrong?

Witness: So I knew, I guess, the July 11th.

HSGAC Majority: You mean you were informed on July 11th about being assigned to the rally?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. So the July 11th email, it's the third email down on Bates 3240, where it says, "Good evening. I'm one of your post-standers for this."

Did you send that email?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So it looks like you wrote, "I have been rolled twice now." What does it mean to be rolled twice?

Witness: You're on a prior assignment, prior protection assignment. Like I mentioned, I was at NATO prior, and then prior to NATO I was in L.A. for another protection assignment.

HSGAC Majority: I see. So as opposed to doing your regular duties in the Oklahoma City Field Office, "rolled" means being assigned to a protective assignment.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. You also wrote in the email, "Unfortunately, our whole office has been getting it." Again, what does that mean, that the special agents in Oklahoma City had been assigned to protective events?

Witness: Correct. Agency-wide.

HSGAC Majority: You stated in the email that you didn't have a raid vest. Why did you not have a raid vest?

Witness: Because our first assignment was plain clothes, and the second assignment was a suit. It was my understanding that I was coming home after that second assignment, so we did not pack a raid vest. It was a mistake on my own.

HSGAC Majority: Why was it a mistake if you didn't need

the raid vest for the other assignments?

Witness: Because they tell you to plan for the worst, so I should've had it with me.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Did the lack of a raid vest at all affect your duties or responsibilities in terms of what you were assigned to do at Butler?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did the lack of a raid vest at all affect your ability to carry out your duties or responsibilities?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Where were you the night before the rally, so Friday the 12th?

Witness: At my hotel.

HSGAC Majority: When did you arrive? Do you recall?

Witness: I don't recall the time, no.

HSGAC Majority: What did you do that night?

Witness: I probably laid in my hotel bed and went to sleep. I don't remember.

HSGAC Majority: We're going to pass around this time another email marked Exhibit 3.

[Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: This email is from July 13th at 1:32 p.m. It's marked Bates 2234.

So in this email the sender says, "I got to brief you for CS response." Did you receive this email?

Witness: Yes, from C/S Team Lead.

HSGAC Majority: Understanding that this was your first event as a CS response agent, was it your understanding that it was typical for the CS response agent to meet with the CS lead at an event?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: When would you expect that to happen?

Witness: There's no expectation of time. Really, whenever they're available, I would assume.

HSGAC Majority: Were you not concerned at the timing of this briefing that the 1:32 p.m. notification to get you to brief with C/S Team Lead, that still left plenty of time for you to get into position and prepare for the rally?

Witness: Yes. As CS response you don't go on post until LES, so that was quite a few hours before.

HSGAC Majority: Did you end up having this briefing with C/S Team Lead?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And what did you discuss?

Witness: He handed me the CS response packet that I mentioned earlier, with the grid lines, and then he asked me the same question, "Is this your first time?" and

I said, "Yes." And he said, you know, "Just hang out and if we need you we'll call you on your cellphone."

HSGAC Majority: So it was protocol to call you on the cellphone as opposed to a radio?

Witness: I just assumed that was what was easiest for them since they were going to be back and forth with the other LES teams. It was less voices on that channel.

HSGAC Majority: On the Secret Service channel, you mean?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. You said earlier that you were roving. Were you in one particular area for the majority of the time, or more than others?

Witness: So by roving, as CS response and PI, during the lead-up to LES, you're relieving other posts that they need to use the bathroom or grab food, or whatever, grab water. So by roving I mean going around to each other's posts and helping them out.

HSGAC Majority: So did you end up just happening to be in any particular area more than any other areas?

Witness: It was either at a command post or by the stage.

HSGAC Majority: Or Secret Service Security Room? Is that what you mean by Command Post?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Were you paired with a local counterpart?

Witness: A State Trooper, yes.

HSGAC Majority: And who was that?

Witness: I believe his first name is PSP Trooper and his last name is PSP Trooper.

HSGAC Majority: When did you first learn that you would have that local counterpart?

Witness: It was, I want to say, around noonish that day. I mean, I knew I had a State Trooper counterpart. Not who specifically.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. So did you meet him physically face-to-face around noon?

Witness: Yes, on July 13th, yeah.

HSGAC Majority: Did you discus anything about how to handle the duties that day?

Witness: I did.

HSGAC Majority: What did you discuss?

Witness: Pretty much repeated what the CS lead explained to me, showed him the grid, how we would respond if there was a threat, and that leading up to, LES , we were kind of just roving to help out where needed.

HSGAC Majority: So what generally is the role of a local counterpart to a CS response agent?

Witness: So they have the local authority that

we would not have.

HSGAC Majority: Such as what?

Witness: Arrests, or if there's any type of, really I guess any local or state law that we can't enforce necessarily for that area.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any other concerns ahead of the rally that we haven't discussed?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to talk a bit about suspicious person. So generally speaking, what's your understanding of a CS response agent's responsibility when there's a suspicious person in the crowd or otherwise at an event?

Witness: So like I mentioned earlier, for CS response, from my understanding, we are not generally the one to respond to a suspicious person. We respond to a threat, which is someone who is obviously posing a direct threat to the event or our protectee. The ones that usually would report to a suspicious person would be PI or CSU.

HSGAC Majority: Before shots were fired, were you aware of a suspicious person in the general area of the 3 o'clock, which is north of the stage, around the AGR building?

Witness: About a minute prior to I knew that he was on the AGR building.

HSGAC Majority: But did you become aware of a suspicious person report earlier than that?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And when did you become aware of that?

Witness: I want to say it was 5:50-ish is when I was given a call.

HSGAC Majo: You were given a call, you said?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Who called you?

Witness: I don't remember his name right now offhand, but he was in the Security Room. He was part of Trump's detail. He was counter UAS individual.

HSGAC Majority: Special Agent [redacted] -- does that sound familiar?

Witness: Yes. Yep.

HSGAC Majority: That's who called you, you believe?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And what did he say?

Witness: He just explained that there was a suspicious person who had a rangefinder, and that he was trying to let me and PI and whoever else know that, pretty much everybody we can, know that they want to interview him, just to see why he had a rangefinder.

HSGAC Majority: What was your reaction to hearing that this suspicious person had a rangefinder?

Witness: I wasn't too alerted by it. I mean, it's not uncommon for people to have -- I mean, you don't see it every day, but a rangefinder isn't necessarily illegal. However, it is very suspicious, as we know. So I informed my State Trooper counterpart, and we started to look for the individual.

HSGAC Majority: Is it common, in your understanding, to see rally attendees with a rangefinder at these types of events?

Witness: I don't have prior experience with that, no.

HSGAC Majority: Did Special Agent C/UAS Advance give you any information about where the suspicious person was in terms of inside or outside the middle perimeter?

Witness: No, not to that effect, that I remember.

HSGAC Majority: So did Special Agent C/UAS Advance, for lack of a better word, direct you or deploy you to go look for the suspicious person?

Witness: He asked me to look for him, yes.

HSGAC Majority: So given what you said earlier about your understanding of the role of CS response usually to respond to a threat rather than to look for a suspicious person, were you surprised to be given that assignment or duty?

Witness: No. Like I said, we help each other out, so if there's someone that is suspicious we can, if we at the time have no potential threat, we'll look for suspicious individuals.

HSGAC Majority: When you had the briefing with [redacted] C/S Team Lead, did he speak to the role of CS response in terms of what he would expect you to respond to versus not respond to?

Witness: No. He just said what to respond to, not what not to respond to.

HSGAC Majority: And what did he say that you would be responding to.

Witness: Threats.

HSGAC Majority: Threats. He didn't mention looking for suspicious individuals?

Witness: Not that I recall.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. In terms of hearing from the CUAS agent, I understand you say you weren't terribly surprised to be asked, in general, to respond to a suspicious person, but were you surprised to hear from the lead CUAS agent asking you to do this? Did that seem out of the chain of command to you?

Witness: Not necessarily, because he was helping in the Security Room, so I kind of figure that he was passed down from the Security Room post-stander, which

was the SAC. I know that the radios get kind of busy so I figured he just passed it over to him, since he was sitting right next to him.

HSGAC Majority: So what was your understanding of what your task was to do, in terms of looking for the suspicious person?

Witness: Just interview him once we found him.

HSGAC Majority: Interview and to try to determine what he was doing?

Witness: Exactly.

HSGAC Majority: When you were, again for lack of a better word, dispatched or deployed to look for this person, did you notify Officer C/S Team Lead?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Why not?

Witness: I assumed it was coming from them to the Command Post.

HSGAC Majority: I'm going to hand you another document. This one, I believe, is a text. Marking this Exhibit 4.

[Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: So this marked Bates stamped 2239 through -44. This is from Saturday, July 13th. The first text is at 5:52 p.m. Did you receive this text? You can note on the next page, 2240, there's a photograph.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: You did receive it. Who sent it?

Witness: CUAS Advance Lead was the first one to send it to me.

HSGAC Majority: So it was your understanding that this was a picture of the suspicious person you were supposed to be looking for?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And what did you do in response to receiving this?

Witness: I gave it to my State Trooper counterpart, and I texted it to him, as well, and then I encountered PI, the PI agent, and I sent it to her, as well.

HSGAC Majority: What was her name?

Witness: I don't remember offhand, but I believe it was Site Protective Intelligence Agent [sic] something or another.

HSGAC Majority: Site Protective Intelligence Agent -- does that sound right?

Witness: Yes. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. And if you turn to page 2241, there's an additional text at 5:50 p.m., which appears to have the same photo attached on 2242. And then at 2243 there's another text at 6:04 p.m., and again on 2244 it appears to have the same photo. So did you receive this photo three different times? Is that what I'm seeing?

Witness: I don't believe I received it three times. I thought I sent it -- it looks like this one was sent to Site Protective Intelligence Agent

HSGAC Majority: I see. So 2241 is where you then sent the photos to others. Is that right?

Witness: Let me see here.

HSGAC Majority: 2241, the From field is redacted, but it says, "OK, C." So is it your understand that that's from you?

Witness: Yep. I believe the second one would be to my State Trooper counterpart, and a third one, because it's a few minutes later, yep, that was to Site Protective Intelligence Agent, out of Phoenix, I guess.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. Is that the PI agent?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Yeah, understood. Thank you. So can you walk us through what you did to try to locate the suspicious individual?

Witness: Yes. So once we got the text of actually what he looked like, my State Trooper counterpart and I got in the golf cart and we started to head up the road towards the Command Post to just try and circle the perimeter, of the inner and middle perimeter. When we got halfway up that road we encountered PI, and I stopped her and asked her if she had the same call as me, and she said

yes, she did. She said that her State Trooper counterpart was already over on the opposite side, so at 3 o'clock, that middle perimeter field, with a couple other local law enforcement and a truck, looking for the individual, and that we should spread out from there, she would go back up towards the Command Post and look up that way, and I would go back down towards the south end, or I don't know if it was the south end, the 6 o'clock of the stage, and look around there.

HSGAC Majority: So backing up, when you began to search for him, was this around 5:52 when you first got this text from Agent C/UAS Advance Lead?

Witness: Yes, it was immediately after.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall what time you ran into the PI agent?

Witness: It was whenever I sent that text, I believe. It was I guess after 6, I guess.

HSGAC Majority: And she told you that her counterpart was over by AGR?

Witness: He was in that middle field between AGR. AGR wasn't mentioned yet at all.

HSGAC Majority: So at that point did you stick together with Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent, or did you separate?

Witness: No, we separated. She went up towards the Command Post and around that way, heading back towards

where her counterpart was, and myself and my counterpart went the opposite way.

HSGAC Majority: And what was the opposite way?

Witness: Headed back towards the stage and around where the crowd was.

HSGAC Majority: At that point, when you separated from Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent, was it your understanding that she would continue to look for the suspicious person?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And I know you said you didn't notify Officer C/S Team Lead that you were being dispatched, but were you in contact with him or any other CS?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: No. Were you in contact or communication with any other Secret Service personnel at that point?

Witness: Just the PI and the Security Room. That would be the only other ones.

HSGAC Majority: Were you relaying any information back to the Security Room about your search?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And is that just because you didn't have any updates to give?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if your counterpart, Trooper

PSP Trooper, was in contact with any PSP or other local law enforcement about your search for the suspicious person?

Witness: He was. I sent him that picture and he distributed it out to his folks that were there, as well. So we had more eyes looking.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if he received any information from his PSP colleagues or other local colleagues about further information about the suspicious person?

Witness: I don't recall him ever mentioning that, no.

HSGAC Majority: Were you ever told to stop looking or go back to, you know, your post or roving duties at any point?

Witness: We were never told to stop looking, no.

HSGAC Majority: Did anything prevent you in any way from looking for him, whether it's the location of the securing perimeter, the fencing, being able to come in and out of secure areas, et cetera? Did anything prevent you or inhibit you from searching wherever you wanted to?

Witness: No. I mean, there were other things that happened throughout the event. Like I said, it was a suspicious person, so for me there were a couple of medical emergencies that happened right in front of me and people kind of grabbed us or asked us for assistance, and I would

have to call EMS real quick and then continue on with the search. There were a couple of fights that we had to break up by the stage. It was a little chaotic all in that last 15, 20 minutes, around the stage area and on the 9 o'clock side, while we were still looking, so that prolonged our search, as well.

HSGAC Majority: So let's break this down. You mentioned medical issues. So this is after 5:52, when you had started your search. Is that right?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So do you recall how many medical issues you encountered?

Witness: I do not recall. There was a lot that day.

HSGAC Majority: So you personally were involved in responding to medical issues?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Is that people overheating?

Witness: Overheating or passing out. We had a few people pass out. Actually, we had a lot of people pass out in the crowd.

HSGAC Majority: So at least one medical issue after 5:52. Is that right?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And you said breaking up fights near the

stage?

Witness: Yes. A lady got elbowed in the fact, and I guess they were trying to get the closest to the stage, and there was an altercation, and myself and the State Trooper counterpart, what he's there for is to handle this type of issue. So with it being that close to the stage with President Trump coming on, pretty relatively soon that took priority since it was right there. So we removed them from that situation and I guess had one go to one corner and the one go to the other corner, and then we continued on.

HSGAC Majority: And again, this was after 5:52. So it was during your search.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall how long that took?

Witness: I do not.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall how long it took to respond to the medical situations?

Witness: I do not, no.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. So what happened next with your search for the suspicious person?

Witness: So we hadn't had any news of any update whatsoever on him. The last I was told was that he was up towards the far 12 o'clock of the event, so pretty far away, and that was -- I don't remember a time exactly

but it was in between that time. So my focus at this point was to try and get in position for when Trump was coming on the stage, just to be readily available for the CS team in case they saw something while he was coming up on the stage I could respond accordingly. So that's what I started to head towards once the time came closer for him to come up on the stage.

HSGAC Majority: I want to address a couple of things you just said. First, did you say that you heard that a suspicious person was at the 12 o'clock?

Witness: Yeah. So at the front -- I don't have a map on me, sorry -- but up where the Security Room is I heard that he was pretty much essentially to the right of the Security Room, so your 2 o'clock area, which is why that State Trooper from the PI counterpart was over on that way looking, and that no one had seen him since essentially the first time they saw him. So that's when I started to move myself back to the stage area.

HSGAC Majority: And you said you moved yourself back towards the stage area in preparation for the former President to be on the stage?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: But were you still engaging in the search for the suspicious person at that point?

Witness: I was being aware. I was keeping my

eye out, looking for the individual, because he wasn't wearing what most of the other people were wearing, so I was hoping he would stand out a little bit better. So yeah, I mean, I was still looking, actively looking, as I'm also trying to get into position.

HSGAC Majority: So why didn't you go over to the 2 or 3 o'clock area if that was where he was reported to be?

Witness: We already had people there.

HSGAC Majority: So was it coordinated in terms of you were told to search a certain area and other people were told to search another area?

Witness: It was coordinated between myself and PI, as I mentioned.

HSGAC Majority: And you said the PI agent's local counterpart was over in the 2 or 3 o'clock area?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And you didn't want to duplicate those efforts. Is that why you didn't go over there?

Witness: I thought it unnecessary, yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Did you report back to the Security Room at any point about your status at that point?

Witness: I don't recall that I did, no.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of whether the locals in the 2 or 3 o'clock area found anything?

Witness: I'm unaware of it.

HSGAC Majority: Did you hear a radio alert over your Secret Service radio about the locals addressing something at the 3 o'clock?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Have you since become aware of that radio transmission?

Witness: I have been told, yes.

HSGAC Majority: What's your understanding for why you didn't receive it?

Witness: I was in a crowd of 20,000 people.

HSGAC Majority: So you mean you just couldn't hear?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have trouble hearing radio transmissions that day beyond that one?

Witness: Yes. That's why I had C/UAS Advance Lead call me rather than talk on the radio.

HSGAC Majority: Describe your radio setup. Is it an earpiece?

Witness: It's an earpiece.

HSGAC Majority: And you were routinely having trouble hearing?

Witness: When I'm around the crowd, yes. It's quite loud.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: Even with the radio turned all the way

up.

HSGAC Majority: And I know you said this was the first time you had worked as a CS response agent, but had you worked protective roles in large outdoor rallies like this before?

Witness: Not this large, no.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Was this the first time you'd experience that kind of difficulty hearing on the radio?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So it's your understanding that you should have received that transmission about the 3 o'clock, you just didn't hear it?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know what frequency it was submitted over, like LES

Witness: I don't recall the channel.

HSGAC Majority: Were you on the LES channel?

Witness: I was on whatever correct channel was for that day.

HSGAC Majority: You don't recall which one it was?

Witness: No, because we had been talking prior to that anyways.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall becoming aware of anyone on the roof before shots were fired?

Witness: Moments before, like probably 15, 20

seconds. C/UAS Advance Lead gave me a call and said, "There's someone on the building," and that's immediately when I turned around to find out what building.

HSGAC Majority: So what exactly did he tell you?

Witness: He just said, "There's someone on the AGR building," and I asked him who. He said it was suspected to be the individual. And then I said, "Okay. We're heading that way." I turned to my State Trooper counterpart, and at the time I was not aware of which building they meant exactly. AGR building, there was two of them over there. So I asked them which one's the AGR building. Since they're locals I figured they would understand more than someone who's from Oklahoma City. And eventually one of the local cops that was standing back there behind the stage pointed it out to us, and at that point that's when the first shot went off, about 10 feet above our head.

HSGAC Majority: So you were by the stage when Agent C/UAS Advance Lead called you?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And he called you, you said, moments before shots were fired?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And in response, did you say you started to move towards AGR?

Witness: Yes. I was at the 9 o'clock of the stage, behind the bike rack, trying to discuss with the locals there where the AGR building is, and that's when they pointed to it, and the moment they pointed to it I turned around to start heading that way, and that's when the shot went off.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any understanding from Special Agent C/UAS Advance Lead about how the situation was being handled beyond what he told you about what you should be doing?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: So what's your responsibility in that situation? We talked earlier about CS Response being responsible for suspicious individuals versus threats. Were you expected or not at all surprised that you'd be asked to respond to someone on a roof?

Witness: Yes. I was not at all surprised.

HSGAC Majority: And you said you associated this with the suspicious individual earlier. So in other words, you thought it was the person with the rangefinder?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And you didn't hear any radio alerts about someone on the roof? It was just the call from Special Agent C/UAS Advance Lead?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Did you consider radioing it, that information?

Witness: No. I was more concerned about finding the threat.

HSGAC Majority: Did you ever observe anyone on the roof before shots were fired?

Witness: Not before shots fired, no.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have a view -- I understand you were asking the locals where AGR was, but once you were told where it was did you have a view of the roof from there?

Witness: Not a clear view, no.

HSGAC Majority: Were you made aware of anyone who was armed? Did Special Agent C/UAS Advance Lead tell you that the individual on the roof was armed, or did anyone else tell you that?

Witness: I don't recall if he said he was armed or not. I believe he did.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. You said you believe he did tell you that?

Witness: Yes, on that phone call.

HSGAC Majority: So walks us through again why that wouldn't be radioed? It seems if it's the individual with a rangefinder on the roof and armed, did it not strike you that that should be sent out over the radio for more Secret

Service personnel to be notified beyond just a phone call from one person?

Witness: I agree. Usually that call would be put out over by Security Room, so I don't understand why it wouldn't have been.

HSGAC Majority: Why did it not occur to you to radio it at that point?

Witness: As I mentioned, I was trying to talk to the locals about finding where that building was. But yeah, in hindsight, sure, I probably should've radioed it.

HSGAC Majority: Were you ever aware of any discussion or deliberations about potentially preventing President Trump from taking the stage or from taking him off the stage?

Witness: I was unaware of any.

HSGAC Majority: Did it occur to you that that might be a proper course of action once you had heard about someone on the roof that was armed, with a rangefinder?

Witness: It didn't occur to me at the moment, no.

HSGAC Majority: Is it your understanding that the Secret Service has the capability or authority or ability to remove a protectee from a stage if there's a threat?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And what kind of threat do you think -- what level of a threat do you think would have to rise to

constitute a situation where a protectee should be removed from the stage?

[redacted]: One like this.

[redacted]: So then why do you think it was not radioed or why did it not occur to you to suggest that?

[redacted]: I can't speak to why they didn't do it either.

[redacted]: So just to be clear, you never saw the suspicious person you were looking for before shots fired?

[redacted]: No.

[redacted]: Which we now know to be Mr. Crooks. You never saw him before shots were fired?

[redacted]: Not before shots fired, no.

[redacted]: So when shots were fired you were still by the stage. Is that right?

[redacted]: Correct.

[redacted]: Can you describe what you observed or heard or saw?

[redacted]: So the first shot went off about 5, 10 feet above our head. The second shot was obviously immediately right after. I was winged by a piece of shrapnel in the hand, so I started bleeding pretty good. My partner thought that I was shot, but I was not shot. It was just a piece of shrapnel.

At that point we started running towards the fence,

hopped the fence, and ran over to the AGR building and responded accordingly, as fast as we could, to get to the threat.

HSGAC Majority: You said you got shrapnel in your hand?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What was the shrapnel from? Do you have an understanding of that?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Do you understand it was bullet shrapnel or debris from something a bullet hit?

Witness: We would assume bullet shrapnel, only because of where I was standing in their direct path, but it's unknown. There was no confirmation of what it was.

HSGAC Majority: Have you since gotten confirmation?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Could you tell the direction that the shots were coming from?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What was your understanding?

Witness: The AGR building. I mean, in that direction, yes, from the AGR building.

HSGAC Majority: And how many shots do you recall hearing?

Witness: Only two, but after that I was running towards the building, and I was just tunnel vision going to

the building. So outside that I wasn't necessarily hearing the shots fired. I was more so just running towards the building.

HSGAC Majority: And what happened next?

Witness: At the building? Is that what you're asking?

HSGAC Majority: Yes.

Witness: At the building my State Trooper counterpart and I lifted three TAC gentlemen up on the roof, and then we entered the building to clear the building.

HSGAC Majority: So you didn't get on the roof?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: When you were still back by the stage, and I suppose running towards the AGR, do you recall seeing or hearing any local law enforcement fire their weapon?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you observe, you know, hear or see the counter snipers, the Secret Service counter snipers fire their weapon?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Have you since learned that local law enforcement fired their weapon at Mr. Crooks?

Witness: I have heard that, yes.

HSGAC Majority: Have you received any kind of official

confirmation about that?

Witness: Only about our sniper, our personal sniper.

HSGAC Majority: But not the local?

Witness: Not the local.

HSGAC Majority: So you said you were injured in the hand. How bad was the injury?

Witness: Not bad.

HSGAC Majority: It didn't prevent you from responding over to the AGR building?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: I'm going to hand you a document about that. This is Exhibit 4 -- 5, thanks, Exhibit 5.

[Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: So I believe these are texts to and from you from July 13th. The first one is 8:05 p.m. and then 8:23 p.m. So this is Bates 2247 through -49.

This first text looks like it's from someone in Oklahoma City Field Office to you. I that right?

Witness: I believe that was to my supervisor, A/ASAC .

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. Was it from A/ASAC to you?

Witness: Sorry. From me to him, I believe. Let me read it.

HSGAC Majority: Sure.

Witness: Oh, so okay. I believe -- honestly, I don't remember who sent this. I want to say it was either SAIC OKC, our SAIC, or my -- yeah, that would make sense, probably my SAIC.

HSGAC Majority: So your Oklahoma City Field Office SAIC to you. That's your understanding?

Witness: I believe so, yes.

HSGAC Majority: So this is talking about the injury that you received to your hand. Is that what he's referring to there, about your injury?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Can you turn to page 2249? There are some redactions on this page. The Secret Service added these redactions.

Witness: Yep.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know what's under the redactions? So after it says "and it's really nothing" do you recall what you said there?

Witness: I do not.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say "where the shot hit above us," that's referring to the shooter's shots towards the stage where you were still near the stage?

Witness: The initial shots, yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Do you recall what time you left

the rally site?

Witness: After midnight, I believe.

HSGAC Majority: After midnight. What were you doing roughly between 6 and 12, you know, shots fired until when you left?

Witness: So searching that building took about an hour. After we were done at the building we went to the Command Post. I started helping out wherever they needed help, transported the mother and daughters to the police barracks. That's what that third or last text is about in your exhibit, or sorry, second one, arrived police barracks. I drove them to the police barracks, since they didn't have a vehicle large enough to take all of them in one vehicle, and then came back and gathered up other witnesses at the event. And at that point we really just stood by until -- we were told to stand by until the FBI decided whether they were going to interview us that night or the following morning.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall hearing any other reports of a suspicious person that day beside the one?

Witness: No. Just him.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall hearing any reports about an individual or individuals in a red shirt or yellow shirt?

Witness: Okay so yeah, sorry. I thought you

meant leading up to it. The reason we went into the building would be they said that there were two other individuals, but they didn't say necessarily what they were or whatnot, that were around the building or potentially in the building. We had no idea. Protocol either way would've been to clear that building, because that's where he was, the shooter. But at this point we had no clue whether or not there were multiples or not. There was no guarantee.

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. So can you take a step back? You said you were responding to AGR because of these individuals. Is that what you said?

Witness: No. I responded to AGR because shots were fired.

HSGAC Majority: Right.

Witness: I responded inside of the AGR building because we were informed that there were potentially two other individuals. We had no clue where they were, and from my understanding that's why we went in. But we were going to go in either way since that was the building that the shooter was on.

HSGAC Majority: So what were you told about these individuals?

Witness: Just that there were two other individuals. I don't recall if they said they were armed

or not. But they were two other individuals that they felt they were with the shooter.

HSGAC Majority: And I had mentioned red shirt and yellow shirt. Do you recall hearing that?

Witness: I remember red shirt. I don't remember yellow shirt. But I remember red shirt. I don't remember when I heard that, but I do remember a red shirt.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall what ended up happening? Were they located?

Witness: They were, but that was never communicated to us until after we came out of the building.

HSGAC Majority: What ended up happening? Were they detained and questioned by local law enforcement?

Witness: I'm unaware of what happened to them. I just know that they were detained.

HSGAC Majority: But it was no longer a concern to you? In other words, when did you stop looking for them?

Witness: I didn't until we came out of the building and heard that they were detained.

HSGAC Majority: I see.

Witness: So we searched the entire building. That's why it took an hour, because we had no clue that they were detained pretty much from the beginning of the search.

HSGAC Majority: So when you came out you saw these

individuals who were detained?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Can you describe them?

Witness: No. I mean, they were -- I just saw two individuals on the ground. I didn't remember a yellow shirt. I remember a red shirt, for whatever reason. But they mentioned that they were both detained.

HSGAC Majority: Do you have any understanding of what ended up happening? Were they released at that point?

Witness: I don't recall. I was never informed of that.

HSGAC Majority: And you haven't been made aware since then if they had been detained or arrested?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: I've got three short follow-ups. You mentioned earlier that the Secret Service did have authority to remove a protectee from a public event. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What is your understanding of how that is supposed to work, in practice?

Witness: From my understanding it's the detail that would be informed of any type of threat, whether it be from the CS lead or the Security Room. They'll mention,

"Hey, you know, we have a potential threat. Probably not a good idea to bring the prior President up onto the stage at this time."

HSGAC Majority: And how did that come to be your understanding? Was there training where you learned this? Was it communicated to you just on the job, showing how it works?

Witness: In training they mention to you that, you know, the detail lead will -- from my understanding they'll do like a threat assessment prior to, or something along the lines. If there's nothing vocalized or communicated then I guess they carry on with the event.

HSGAC Majority: Who, to your knowledge, within the Secret Service, has the authority to remove the protectee?

Witness: Really any agent there can.

HSGAC Majority: And in practice, is there only, among the various types of agents, the specialists, the line agents, you mentioned in your response the detail, who, in practice, is going to physically be in close proximity to the President, and does that ever change?

Witness: It's the detail, the direct detail. So there's detail lead and his shift, and that never changes. They're always with him.

HSGAC Majority: So in any instance in which any protectee, in this case the former President, is potentially going to

be removed, is it correct to say that the sole group within the Secret Service that would be the ones to do that removal would be agents in the detail?

Witness: Yes, from my understanding.

HSGAC Majority: Have you ever been part of an event where that has happened, where a protectee has either been removed from the public at an event or been held from going out to an event?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: You also mentioned being injured this day, on the 13th. Have you ever been inured before in your work with the Secret Service?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: In any of your work prior to July 13th, have you ever, at the NATO event, the California event, or anything when you're in practice in the field, have you ever been a part of an event where threats to the protectee were raised to a level higher than just suspicious activity?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Any questions before we break?

PSI Majority: Sure. Just a few things. This won't take long. You mentioned sort of discussing the process of assignments. I think you said they go down the list of agents they need. Is that a list of sort of -- does that

include all field offices, do you know?

Witness : Yeah, so generally how it works, to give you a better understanding, they put out a solicitation to all field offices that if they need in that area for whatever event, and they'll put a requirement of bodies that they need from that field office. So for example, my office, we're usually so small it's usually one or two agents that they ask for from our office, and then our supervisors submit our name for that event, and then all those names go to a separate database for the site agent or lead who is in charge of that event, so in this case the rally, and then they'll have all their post-standers listed at that point. And then they just plug and play at that point. There's no rhyme or reason, per se. If people have prior experience in that field and they acknowledge then maybe they'll put them in that field. But even then that's not a guarantee.

PSI Majority : Okay. And then you'd mentioned that sort of based off the briefing materials that you got ahead of the event that it was your understanding that there would be local snipers positioned on the AGR building.

Witness : Correct.

PSI Majority : How, in these briefing materials or in your conversations with Counter Sniper C/S Team Lead, were these buildings labeled?

Witness: As in like --

PSI Majority: I'm asking because you said later you were unsure which the AGR building was when you were alerted that there was a threat there. In the briefing materials that you received, how was the AGR building and other buildings identified?

Witness: So there is an AGR building which is that one there, and to the left of it there's another AGR building. So I just didn't know if it was the left one or the right one.

PSI Majority: And then regarding sort of the sequence with which you had concerns about the setup and the perimeter that day, earlier you said that you didn't have any concerns until sort of the moment of shots fired. You said, though, that when you arrived there weren't the amount of people that you had expected to be there, sort of for that middle perimeter. Did I get that right?

Witness: So near the AGR building. Like I mentioned earlier, I expected the sniper team at that moment to be on the roof. So for there to be an individual on the roof, my concern was how did this individual get there if we had a team on the roof.

PSI Majority: Okay.

Witness: And I voiced that when I got to the building, to the locals that I did see, not necessarily

nicely. So I just didn't think there was enough presence there that you would expect, I guess, if there was that potential threat.

PSI Majority: And you had that thought that there wasn't enough presence. When did that thought occur to you?

Witness: As I was running over towards the building.

PSI Majority: Okay.

Witness: Yeah.

PSI Majority: And then the last thing, you said typically CS Response do not go on post until LES before arrival. That's the arrival of the protectee?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Majority: Okay. Yeah, that's it for me.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. We'll go off the record. We'll take a short break and come back in 5-ish minutes.

Witness: Okay.

[Recess.]

Witness Counsel: -- hour or so. We'll ask some questions over on this side here.

My name is HSGAC Majority. I'm with Senator Rand Paul's office. And first of all, thank you for your service. Appreciate what you do.

You were in a pretty tough position, limited time as

an agent, first time as a Counter Sniper Response. It was a tough position to be in to begin with. And when you were there, I want to hit on a little bit about your discussions with the counter sniper lead, C/S Team Lead. You were given your role at that point, correct? I mean, he told you what he expected from you since, I guess, and you were working for him. Correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Did you feel comfortable with what he had told you, and were you clear on your role and your responsibilities after speaking with him?

Witness: Yes, sir.

HSGAC Majority: Did you feel comfortable at any point if you saw something maybe that was an alarm to you that you would feel comfortable raising that to someone, if you were given information that may be contrary to what you thought was correct. Being newer in the field, would you feel comfortable pushing back against a seasoned agent?

Witness: Regarding a potential threat -- is that what you're asking?

HSGAC Majority: Yes, sir.

Witness: Yes, I have no problem with that.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Thank you. How many people were at that rally that day? You said it was very large. What's your estimate?

Witness: I believe the number was upwards of 15,000.

HSGAC Majority: How many calls of service did you respond to personally?

Witness: I lost track after about 20.

HSGAC Majority: Who was dispatching you?

Witness: So for medical emergencies it was more so, I guess, visual. As far as suspicious individuals that was from the Security Room. That's the only communication I got from them. And as far as conflict, that was both the Security Room and other agents, because I had that State Trooper counterpart.

HSGAC Majority: And with the briefing with the counter sniper lead, did he tell you that that would be part of your role, as well?

Witness: No. That was only what I did up to the LES. Then I assumed strictly just the role of CS response.

HSGAC Majority: So all that took place before LES out. And once that took place you just strictly assumed the role of counter sniper response.

Witness: Yes and no. As I mentioned earlier, medical emergencies and conflict near the stage are still a concern and can pose a potential threat, especially the fights. So you still respond within that LES as long as,

you know, it looks within reason.

HSGAC Majority: How many suspicious person calls did you specifically respond to?

Witness: That was just the only one for that day that I recall.

HSGAC Majority: How many suspicious person calls did you hear on the radio?

Witness: I don't remember hearing really anything on the radio. The radio for that day, for me at least, was very intermittent. That's why we relied heavily on the cellphone.

HSGAC Majority: But you personally never responded to another suspicious person call, and you're not aware of any others during that day?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Did you --

Witness: Other than -- sorry, not to cut you off, sorry -- other than the ones that we mentioned after the AGR, the shooter, and all that. The two other individuals, that was post. But prior to no, no other ones.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Did you do anything for CUAS Advance Lead? Was part of your role anything to do with the counter surveillance system at all? Were you put in a position to where if they had to take one down you were to

secure it? Anything to do with the counter drone systems?

Witness : So, again, PI and CS, from my understanding, and from the email that we were both sent, you act kind of as a dual hat, multi hat during that time frame. So yes, if there was a UAV issue or drone, we could respond to either the pilot or the drone itself, whoever was called upon.

HSGAC Majority : So within LES of the event that role of working, I guess we call it bifurcated role, would that cease LES in and then you would strictly go, or what would happen if, let's say, 30 minutes before the protectee took the stage you had a CAUS issue with a threat? How do you choose which one to respond to?

Witness : Clarification, I guess, on what the threat is. But I personally would have responded to the threat, and the PI, I would assume, would respond to the UAS.

HSGAC Majority : I guess this is a good time to ask this, because I keep hearing you say suspicious activity and threats.

Witness : Correct.

HSGAC Majority : Will you define those for us? What is a suspicious activity, what is a threat, and what differentiates the two, from your training?

Witness : From my training and my understanding,

a suspicious individual is more so someone displaying suspicious -- like, for example, a recent event I went to, from the protection assignment we had, everybody was there for Trump. They were in red, white, and blue, the whole nine yards. But if you have individual show up in all black, a hoodie, it's 95 degrees outside, it's a little suspicious. They still want us to interview them.

And the situation with our shooter, the rangefinder is considered suspicious. It's not a threat. As I mentioned, people will use rangefinders for a variety of reasons. Granted at an event like this it is a little concerning, but it's still suspicious. It's not a threat.

A threat is more so someone who is aggressive in nature or they're carrying a weapon, they're climbing to the top of a building to get a better vantage point, that would be considered to us as a threat.

HSGAC Majority: Correct me if I'm wrong but did you testify earlier that Counter Sniper Lead C/S Team Lead said your specific role was to respond to threats?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And that is LES in. Correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: That's when you assume your responsibilities, yes.

HSGAC Majority: At what point did the individual now known as Mr. Crooks move from suspicious to a threat?

Witness: So for me, he was not a threat until I got the phone call that he was on the AGR building, on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: Did you begin looking for him as a suspicious person within an hour of the event?

Witness: No --

HSGAC Majority: Within an hour of Donald Trump taking the stage?

Witness: I didn't know about him until I think it was 5:50, 5:51, so it was well within --

HSGAC Majority: So it was within the hour.

Witness: Yes, sorry. Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So your role at that point was, if I'm not mistaken from your own testimony, was specifically dealing with threats. But you were sent to look for a suspicious person.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: So let's talk about whenever you were sent to look for the suspicious person. You mentioned that while you were doing your search with the counterpart on the golf cart you encountered the PI, and you all made a decision to separate. Am I correct?

Witness: To cover more ground, yes.

HSGAC Majority: What was the rationale in that decision, knowing that everything was focused on one area, and there was nothing that we have heard -- maybe you know -- intelligence-wise or radio-wise or any information to suggest that that individual was anywhere else other than the area of the AGR building.

Witness: That information was not given to me that he was near the AGR building when we initiated our search. So at the time of our search we had no clue necessarily to where exactly he was. We knew he was in the area of the 12 to 3 o'clock, but not near the AGR building. There's that big gap between those.

HSGAC Majority: Well, yeah, I see what you're talking about. When you're saying 12 to 3 from the dais over 3 o'clock, that was the area --

Witness: Yes, from all that to the Security Room over, that's where we had his last known. That's why I was heading that way, and that's when I encountered the PI. People walk. People move. So he could've easily went from the 12 to 3 to the 6 to the 9, or wherever it may be. So putting all of our efforts into one localized area, when he's moving, doesn't make sense.

In the regard of you have an entire area of 15,000 people, if you're looking in one small area and the guy's moving, he's walking, he could easily blend be moving down

the side of the fence, or whatever the case may be.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if anyone radioed out to look for the suspicious person? Because if I'm correct, you all had agents, post-standers all over that area that would've been able to be on the lookout for that individual, which would have alleviated the fear or issue of concern that you're speaking of, not being able to cover the entire area. But do you know if anyone put that on the radio, all agents, we're looking for fill-in-the-blank. Then you could've, as I said, you would've covered that entire area with one radio call. Did you make that call or do you know of anyone that made that call?

Witness: I did not make that call, and like I said, my radio for the duration was very intermittent, so if I missed it I don't know. But I never heard that call.

HSGAC Majority: Would you be in a position to, once you got that information from C/UAS Advance Lead, to get on your radio and broadcast that so everyone would know that information?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Did you make that call on the radio?

Witness: As I stated, no.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. I'm just trying to figure out, because we have agents all over the area, where they're not saturated in one area. And that's what we're trying to figure out if there was a call made to notify everyone

collectively so they could all be looking for this individual.

You said that you couldn't hear anything about the 3 o'clock, what was going on there, because your radio was intermittent. Was it you just couldn't hear, or was the radio cutting in and out?

Witness: I would go with I just couldn't hear it.

HSGAC Majority: Just couldn't hear it. And you said this was the first large event that you have done. Am I correct?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Are these earpieces designed and created for environments just like the one you were in ?

Witness: I can't answer that.

HSGAC Majority: My question is just simply because the other agents, the shift agents, use the same equipment that you were using. Am I correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. When you were injured did they do an injury report on you?

Witness: We did a, I believe it's a CA-1 form. It's like a Workers Comp form, I guess. You have to fill it out if you get injured on the job. That was following the event.

HSGAC Majority: Sort of like an OSHA 300 form?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Did they photograph your injuries?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: What was your understanding of the roles -- again, I want to hit back on the local snipers. You said that you were given the general diagram with the labels of who is where. And just so we're clear, were you told that the snipers were going to be on the roof, or I think you used the word you "assumed"?

Witness: I assumed that they would be on the roof, because they were displayed by a dot on the map, and generally speaking, the best vantage point for that area would be on the roof, just like we had the individuals behind, on the barn. But I don't recall if C/S Team Lead specifically said they would be on the roof, so I can't say he did or did not say that.

HSGAC Majority: But you do remember that for some reason when you saw that roof that was something that you questioned.

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. I had one more question that I was going to ask you, if I could find it here. I'm bad with sticky notes. I apologize.

Do you know of anyone else there, besides yourself,

that was working in the same role or capacity? I believe you stated that you were LES there that was the Counter Sniper Response. Am I correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And I know this was the first time you've worked one, but is that normal when you have a crowd of 15,000 people?

Witness: I don't know if it's normal or not. I couldn't attest to that.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

Witness: As far as CS Response. For an event that size.

HSGAC Majority: And I have about two more questions, but what type of specific training did you get to perform your duties as a Counter Sniper Response?

Witness: There's no specific course that you go through for it. It's just essentially a topic that you cover in training at the Academy.

HSGAC Majority: So that way everyone could be prepared to fill that role --

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: -- as you said earlier.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay.

PSI Minority: Witness, my name is PSI Minority

PSI Minority. I work for Ranking Member Ron Johnson.

Before I begin my line of questioning I just want to make a note to Secret Service of a request for all of Witness Witness call logs. I do not believe we have received that.

Agency Counsel: Understood.

PSI Minority: Witness, you mentioned earlier about golf carts that were assigned to individuals or groups of individuals that day. Do you know how many golf carts were assigned?

Witness: At least two.

PSI Minority: At least two?

Witness: At least two.

PSI Minority: Okay. And who were those golf carts assigned to?

Witness: They weren't necessarily assigned. They were there to be available to CS, PI, site, lead, predominantly those four. And if anybody else from the Security Room needed it, for whatever reason, yeah.

PSI Minority: Did you see any other golf carts that day besides those two?

Witness: There were a lot of golf carts there. I mean, particularly ours, but someone else was using them, so yeah, there were a few.

PSI Minority: From your understanding, when you saw

the other golf carts, was it your understanding that they were in use by law enforcement somewhere?

Witness: Law enforcement, they were using them to transport, so like EMS was using them to transport individuals that passed out, to take them to the medical tent, stuff like that.

PSI Minority: I want to go back to the time of when you received calls from C/UAS Advance Lead You mentioned that you received two calls from C/UAS Advance Lead that day. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: When did you receive the first call?

Witness: I believe it was 5:50, 5:51, in that time frame. It was in the 5:50's.

PSI Minority: And did he send you the picture of Mr. Crooks?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Around that same time?

Witness: Correct, after we got off the phone.

PSI Minority: Okay. I want to introduce Exhibit No. 6, and my colleague will pass that to you, and I'll give you a moment to take a look at it.

[Exhibit No. 6 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: It is a transcript with PSP Trooper

PSP Trooper dated July 23, 2024.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: This is a transcript that PSP Trooper conducted with PSP and FBI, as well.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: It's a short transcript, so I'll just flag the page I want to bring your attention to. It's on page 5. And on page 5, towards the top, it appears that PSP Trooper begins to describe the actions that the both of you took that day, shortly after receiving the call from PSP Trooper. PSP Trooper says, in his testimony, "He said, 'Hey, we've got to go. We've got to go look for this guy,' shows me a picture, and he said, 'He tried to come through the gate with a rangefinder.'"

So at the moment that C/UAS Advance Lead called you, where were you and PSP Trooper located?

Witness: We were by the stage.

PSI Minority: And were you with PSP Trooper at this point?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: In the golf cart?

Witness: I don't know where we were specifically at that moment.

PSI Minority: Okay. Did you show PSP Trooper the picture of Mr. Crooks?

Witness: I did, and I texted it to him, as well.

PSI Minority: And in PSP Trooper's testimony here it says that, it appears that he's saying that you told him that Mr. Crooks tried to come through the gate with a rangefinder. Did you say that to PSP Trooper?

Witness: That was my understanding at the time, yes.

PSI Minority: How did you come to that understanding?

Witness: Because when C/UAS Advance Lead called he said we had a guy -- I don't remember exactly what he said. My recollection of the conversation on the phone was that we had a guy trying to get to the event with a rangefinder, and my understanding was that he tried to come through the mags with it. I later found out that that's not what he meant by that. He just meant there was a guy with a rangefinder. He didn't necessarily mean inside the event, which would've been good information to know.

PSI Minority: So C/UAS Advance Lead never told you specifically that Mr. Crooks tried to enter the event with a rangefinder.

Witness: No. The wording was more so like we had a guy at the event with a rangefinder. So that, to me, essentially what I thought that meant was he tried to come through the mag. So it was my own interpretation of what

he said.

PSI Minority: Did C/UAS Advance Lead mention the mags or magnetometers at all to you?

Witness: Not that I recall.

PSI Minority: Okay. Further down on that page -- again, we're on page 5 -- PSP Trooper goes on to say, "He said somebody took a picture of him because he was looking suspicious, and he said that he tried to come through the gate with a rangefinder, but it was seized."

Was it your understanding that a rangefinder was seized?

Witness: It was, because he also mentioned that they had -- he said, I believe, that they encountered him or something along those lines. So again, my interpretation of it was that they encountered him as he was trying to come through the mags, and they take those type of things. And usually they want us to interview them as a protocol, hey, you know, this is weird. People don't typically bring that kind of thing. Let's interview the guy.

So yeah, that was again my interpretation of what I was told.

PSI Minority: But to be clear, C/UAS Advance Lead never told you that a rangefinder was seized. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: On that same page, towards the top again, it's the last sentence of that larger paragraph, [redacted] PSP Trooper describes, "So we got in the golf cart and started going up. There is a private lane. And then we go up around that, and we end up meeting with another Secret Service agent. I believe she was from Intel, and she said that her, and there were other units already looking for him. And then we can go back to our posts. We went back to where we were, by the bleachers."

Is it your understanding that in PSP Trooper's testimony here that he's describing your interaction with Site Protective Intelligence Agent?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: And when you and PSP Trooper met with PII, can you describe where that meeting occurred?

Witness: So like he said, there was a private road that was essentially just for law enforcement and Secret Service transit between the front and the back of the event. It happened maybe 50 to 100 yards from the Security Room, on that road. I mean, I don't know whether, landmark --

PSI Minority: Was she in a golf cart at that point?

Witness: Yes. Yep, sorry, yeah.

PSI Minority: And was she accompanied by anyone?

Witness: No. Her counterpart, like I mentioned

earlier, she said he was in a pickup truck on the opposite side of the event, looking for him.

PSI Minority: And how did you learn that?

Witness: Through her.

PSI Minority: Okay. So she told you the location of her counterpart.

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: And it was your understanding that he was located where again?

Witness: On the upper 3 o'clock. So I guess if you're looking at it it's like 1, 2 o'clock of the event, where we all suspected he was last seen.

PSI Minority: Okay. How did you come to the understanding of where he was located, Mr. Crooks?

Witness: From -- you talking about initially or at that moment?

PSI Minority: Let's start initially and then we'll go to that moment.

Witness: So initially, from CI/UAS Advance Lead, he said he was at the event, so I didn't know specifically, so I ended up calling him back to get more specifics because I needed a little bit more than just "at the event," with a crowd of 15,000 people. So he said he got the information from one of the locals, and I asked him for one of the locals' numbers. I ended up calling that local. I don't remember

his name offhand. And he also mentioned that he was in that area, as well.

PSI Minority: And what was the area?

Witness: The right side. So at 12 o'clock, the right side of the event.

PSI Minority: And you got a number for a local law enforcement. You don't know who that person was affiliated with or the name of that individual?

Witness: I don't offhand, no. I can get it, I'm sure.

PSI Minority: Yeah. We would appreciate that. We are hoping to receive your call logs, which will help us understanding the timing of all this.

Witness: Yeah.

PSI Minority: So you made that phone call approximately what time?

Witness: It was shortly after the second phone call with C/UAS Advance Lead, so 5:54, 5:55. I'd have to look at the call log. It wasn't long after, maybe a couple of minutes, because, like I said, I didn't have much information so I wanted more information on the individual that we were supposed to be looking for.

PSI Minority: Right. So before you got in the golf cart to drive you received that information of what direction you should go.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Okay. And now we can move on to the moment where you're talking to Site Protective Intelligence Agent and your understanding of where Mr. Crooks might be at this point in time.

Witness: Correct. Oh, so okay. So I talked to her, and I asked her if she's on the lookout for this individual, as well. She said yes. I said, "Were you given the picture?" She said, "Can you send it to me?" so I sent it to her. And then I said, "Where's your counterpart?" She explained that her counterpart and her were already looking up in that area, that we want we can go down and look down where we were, and look around there to see if they can find him in the crowd or along the fence, or whatever the case was. So that area was already being, I guess, searched.

PSI Minority: The area --

Witness: Sorry. The initial area up by the top of the event, the 1 to 3 o'clock.

PSI Minority: And what is your understanding of how Site Protective Intelligence Agent knew where Mr. Crooks may be?

Witness: I guess I hadn't -- I guess she just was informed, as well. I didn't ask her how she knew that. At least I don't recall asking her why she knew that or how she knew that.

PSI Minority: Did you show her a picture of Mr. Crooks?

Witness: I did, yeah.

PSI Minority: And what was her reaction to that?

Witness: She told me to send it to her, which I did, and I sent it to her in a text.

PSI Minority: And do you know if she received the picture?

Witness: She did, yeah.

PSI Minority: And when she received it, did she mention to you that she had already received a similar picture before?

Witness: I don't recall if she did or not.

PSI Minority: Okay. And then so you felt confident, based on your conversation with her, that the area approximately 1 to 3 o'clock was sufficiently being covered.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: And can you tell me what you and [redacted] PSP Trooper ?

Witness: So as I said, PI, she told me and him to go back down. She's a senior agent, so I was kind of gauging my response. She said, "Hey, we got up here. We're looking in this area. You and him go back down toward that area and start searching that area." So we

turned around, headed back towards the staging area. On the way down towards the staging area I believe that's when we encountered another medical emergency, a lady or someone passed out, and they called us over. A bunch of people were freaking out. So we ended up getting an EMS over to them, and then a State Trooper who was in the area, as well, we sent him over there to handle that so PSP Trooper and I could move on back down towards the stage and handle the situation down there as far as trying to expand our search in that area.

PSI Minority: Are you aware of whether Site Protective Inteligence Agent went to AGR, directly to the building?

Witness: At what time?

PSI Minority: Either prior to or after your interaction with her.

Witness: Not my understanding, no. I never knew -- she did go to the AGR, is that what you're asking?

PSI Minority: I'm asking if you're aware of whether she did or not.

Witness: No. My understanding is I'm the only one that went to the AGR, and that was after the shooting, for Secret Service-wise.

PSI Minority: On the exhibit that we were discussing earlier, the transcript, I want to go to page 7 of 9. Towards the top of that page PSP Trooper says, "right before

shots. This is what I started to get into, right before shots were fired, Witness came up to me, where we were post. He hits me on the back and he says, 'He's on the roof of the AGR.'"

Could you describe what time you were made aware that Mr. Crooks was on the roof of AGR?

Witness: It was within less than a minute prior to the shooting.

PSI Minority: And you were made aware of this through C/UAS Advance Lead?

Witness: Yes, through cellphone.

PSI Minority: And can you just describe again what specifically C/UAS Advance Lead told you?

Witness: It was pretty short. Like I said, he called and he said, "Hey, our guy is on the roof," or he said, "Guy on the roof," whatever it was, and that "he's armed." So that's when I turned to PSP Trooper and essentially said we needed to go over there. But I didn't know exactly where "over there" was, which building, because there were two AGR buildings.

PSI Minority: And when C/UAS Advance Lead relayed this information to you, did he ask you where you were located at that time?

Witness: No. Not that I recall.

PSI Minority: Did you say anything to C/UAS Advance Lead

after he relayed this information to you?

Witness: I don't remember verbatim, but I know that I told him that we were headed that way.

PSI Minority: Did you mention anything to C/UAS Advance Lead about your interaction with [redacted]?

Witness: Not that I recall.

PSI Minority: Did you ask any further questions to get further clarity from C/UAS Advance Lead what the individual may be armed with?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Going back to PSP Trooper testimony, he mentions "right before shots," do you agree with [redacted] PSP Trooper testimony that it was right before shots that you told PSP Trooper about an individual on the roof of AGR?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Did you say specifically "the roof of AGR"?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: So in the time that you received that information from C/UAS Advance Lead, the only person that you relayed that information to was PSP Trooper?

Witness: And the other State Troopers that were behind us, to the right. There was top brass there, standing behind us.

PSI Minority: Do you know those individuals' names?

Witness : I do not. They were waiting for a photo line, so I don't know their names. Again, this was all in a matter of seconds, so I didn't really have much time to address everybody that was in there, in that particular area.

PSI Minority : Are you aware of how C/UAS Advance Lead was informed of Mr. Crooks' location?

Witness : No.

PSI Minority : Subsequent to July 13th, do you have any awareness?

Witness : Of what?

PSI Minority : Of how C/UAS Advance Lead knew where Mr. Crooks was located?

Witness : Can you restate your question?

PSI Minority : Following the event, do you have any awareness now of how C/UAS Advance Lead knew where Mr. Crooks was located and was able to inform you that he's armed and on the roof?

Witness : I mean, I would assume the sniper team informed him. That would be the logical explanation. But I don't know for sure, no.

PSI Minority : Okay. So I want to move forward to -- one moment, please.

I'm going to quickly turn it over to my colleague, [redacted] PSI Minority .

Witness : Okay.

PSI Minority : Hi, Witness . PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office. Can you please turn to the current exhibit on page 6. So at the top of this page -- this is the interview with Trooper PSP Trooper that was conducted by Pennsylvania State Police, and the FBI was there, as well -- PSP says, "Who told you that he tried to enter the event and was turned away?" PSP Trooper PSP Trooper says, "That was through Witness and whoever he talked to on the phone." PSP trooper says, "Okay. Do you know who Agent Witness would've spoke to on the phone?" and Trooper PSP Trooper said, "I'm not sure. I don't think it was another Secret Service. I think he was directly talking to a local, but I can't know that for sure."

You mentioned that you got a phone number of a local law enforcement officer. When did you call that number?

Witness : As I mentioned earlier, I don't remember the exact time. It was after the initial two phone calls with C/UAS Lead Advance, and he gave me that number to the local individual.

PSI Minority : And what was discussed? So did the phone call with the local occur?

Witness : Did it occur?

PSI Minority : Yes.

PSI Minority : Yes.

PSI Minority: And what was discussed?

Witness: The description of the individual, which I already had the picture, but the description, a verbal description. And he just stated that the last time he saw him was in the area I described already, up in the 1 to 2 to 3 o'clock area of the event, and that was the extent of it. It was a very short phone call.

PSI Minority: Did this local tell you where he was positioned at that time of the phone call?

Witness: Not that I recall, no.

PSI Minority: Do you know if he was inside the perimeter or outside the perimeter?

Witness: I do not.

PSI Minority: What actions, if any, did you take after speaking with this local officer?

Witness: The actions I did take, after talking to the local officer, was, as I discussed, getting in the golf cart and heading up towards the front of the area where he described, last seen of the individual, when I encountered PI.

PSI Minority: Was this local officer seeking to confront Crooks as well, at this time?

Witness: I'm unaware if he was or not.

PSI Minority: Do you have any idea why this local officer was aware of the suspicious person who apparently

ended up being Crooks?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Approximately how long was this phone call?

Witness: I can't recall. I know it was short. That's all.

PSI Minority: Before shots are fired, did Trooper PSP Trooper discuss Pennsylvania State Police having a vice unit, plainclothes officers outside the security perimeter on that day of July 13th?

Witness: Not that I recall.

PSI Minority: Are you now aware of that?

Witness: I knew there was when I arrived at the AGR building, I saw guys in civilian clothes, but I didn't know who they were. I just assumed they were other law enforcement.

PSI Minority: Do you know if [redacted] PSP T r spoke to any of his counterparts during this 5:50 to 6:11 time frame on July 13th, and was he able to provide you with any additional details of what Pennsylvania State Police was doing to find Crooks?

Witness: No. He just mentioned that they would be on the lookout for him. He sent out the picture that I sent to him to all of his, I guess their group chat, or whatever it may be. But otherwise I had no further

information, any further details, I guess.

PSI Minority: Do you know if any local law enforcement was utilizing golf carts on July 13th?

Witness: I want to say they were, but I don't know who specifically was. I remember seeing some uniforms in a golf cart, but --

PSI Minority: Did you see any golf carts outside the security perimeter on July 13th?

Witness: I wasn't even -- no.

PSI Minority: Did you see any golf carts on the west side of AGR right before shots were fired?

Witness: No. From my perspective I couldn't see that.

PSI Minority: Okay. PII

PSI Minority: Witness, I want to talk to you about the moment that you, as you're going to AGR, you're on foot at this point?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: And you're accompanied by PSP Trooper?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: How did you enter AGR?

Witness: There are double doors. My directions are all messed up so I can't tell you exactly if it was north, south, whatever. But there's double doors that we entered, and we immediately started just breaking it down

into a puzzle, at that point.

PSI Minority: Were the doors open when you arrived there?

Witness: No. There were two gentlemen ahead of us, maybe three. I think it was five of us total that went into the building. I could be off by a couple, one or two. But I believe one of them opened the doors.

PSI Minority: Was it your understanding that it was locked and then someone opened it with a key, or they just pulled the door open?

Witness: I was unaware if it was locked or not.

PSI Minority: Did you see the other individual open the door?

Witness: I don't recall him opening the door. Not offhand, no.

PSI Minority: Okay.

Witness: This all was happening very, very quick, so no, I can't remember.

PSI Minority: And as you're in the building, we discussed this a little earlier, but again, what were you searching for?

Witness: So in any situation, well, particularly this situation, the last word was that there were two other individuals, but even if there weren't two other individuals you still want to clear the building for

any potential other threats. Since he was on top of the roof we don't know whether or not there are other threats inside the building, how he got to the roof. A lot of factors. So you're just looking for any other threat.

PSI Minority: When were you made aware of other individuals that you may need to be on the lookout for?

Witness: I can't say specifically. It was within that short time frame.

PSI Minority: Were you already inside of the building when you were made aware of this?

Witness: I don't recall.

PSI Minority: Were you made aware of it prior to running toward the building?

Witness: No. No. It was once we were at the building then I had already lifted people up onto the roof. I think it was between that time and the front door, or somewhere in between, that I was told.

PSI Minority: And who made you aware?

Witness: You said who?

PSI Minority: Who made you aware of the suspicious individuals?

Witness: Someone yelling. That's all. I really don't remember.

PSI Minority: Was it PSP Trooper?

Witness: I could not tell you.

PSI Minority: You mentioned earlier, I believe, that you searched the building for an hour. Is that correct?

Witness: About an hour, yeah, I believe, 45 minutes to an hour.

PSI Minority: And did you personally search the entire building?

Witness: I would say probably about 80 percent of it. We did break up into teams of two or three, so that we could cover more ground faster, which is not uncommon to do, as long as you do it in unison, so you're not having crossfire. So I would say probably about 80 percent, because there were some parts that overlapped, because the building -- I'm not sure if you know the building or not, but it's multi levels, multi sections, and there's like cubicle spaces, so a lot of potential hiding spots.

PSI Minority: And approximately how many people conducted this search with you?

Witness: I would say anywhere between 5 and 7. No more than that.

PSI Minority: And were you always with at least one other individual --

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: -- during your search?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Was it the same individual?

Witness: So it was me and two local TAC guys. I don't know their names. And then later on PSP Trooper and I met back up, throughout the search. He broke off from me at one point and went with the other group, and then we ended up meeting back up again. I don't know the exact time frame of all that.

PSI Minority: In response to my colleague's question a few moments ago you mentioned noticing plainclothes officers. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: Did any of those officers conduct the search with you?

Witness: I don't know. I don't remember. They might have been part of the group that went to the other side.

PSI Minority: How many plainclothes officers did you see?

Witness: I saw at least two. I can't remember if there was more, but I know I saw at least two running up to the building.

PSI Minority: While you were in the building, were you made aware of additional threats?

Witness: As far as individuals?

PSI Minority: Any threats.

Witness: It wasn't until after we got out of

the building and back to the Command Post that we were told that there was a potential for IEDs.

PSI Minority: At approximately what time?

Witness: That timeline I don't remember. It was maybe 15 to 20 minutes after we had finished our search and we were back at the Command Post or Security Room.

PSI Minority: So it's your recollection that you were not informed of any IEDs or potential IEDs inside the building until after you left the building?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: And how did you learn about that?

Witness: I do not remember. I mean, there were a lot of people in the Security Room, a lot of people Special Agent saying every which thing. So someone in there mentioned it, and then they said that they found something, I think, under the stage or near the stage or in a van. There were all kinds of things being thrown out at that time. I don't know which one was actually true. I still don't know. I think the van one was legitimate, or vehicle, but that's all I remember from that.

PSI Minority: And this information that's being shared or discussed, is this through word of mouth? Are you receiving messages communicating these additional threats? Or are there phone calls? Text?

Witness: No. From what I heard it was in the

Security Room. I believe they said it over the radio, the radios in the Security Room, and then other people were there saying it as well, that they were investigating the IED. And at one point they said stand by for potential explosion or detonation of a round. But that in the disarmament.

PSI Minority: And what time is that?

Witness: That wasn't long after. I mean, like I said, it was right after, maybe 15, 20 minutes after we were done searching the building.

PSI Minority: Any additional information regarding what may be disarmed and how it's going to be disarmed and who is going to disarm?

Witness: No. I still don't know.

PSI Minority: And where it's going to be disarmed?

Witness: No. That was my understanding, was that it was in the event area, but again, everybody was saying everything so I have no idea personally where it was or what they were talking about.

PSI Minority: Would it be your expectation, as a law enforcement agent on the ground, to be made aware of certain information regarding locations of potential IEDs or location of potential disarming of an IED.

Witness: It would, yes.

PSI Minority: And were you ever made aware of any of

that information?

Witness: Not intentionally to me, no. The only reason I was aware was because I overheard it.

PSI Minority: Were you made aware of a remote control device found near the shooter's body?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: How were you made aware of that?

Witness: Again, overhearing it.

PSI Minority: Do you recall what time?

Witness: I do not.

PSI Minority: Or how you heard about that information?

Witness: Again, in the Security Room, there were 50-plus people in the Security Room at that point. Every bit of detail was getting thrown out left and right. So I guess I overheard it. I don't know who specifically. There were a lot of bodies in there that I hadn't seen up until that point.

PSI Minority: I want to go back for a moment. Obviously, you were injured that day. Did you seek treatment for your injury.

Witness: I did.

PSI Minority: When?

Witness: Immediately after the building. One of the other agents saw that I was bleeding and told me to go

to the medical tent.

PSI Minority: Do you know if you were bleeding inside of the building, during your search?

Witness: I was.

PSI Minority: How did you come to that awareness?

Witness: Someone -- again, I don't know who it was. It was chaos. Someone came in and said, "Is anybody bleeding?" because they wanted to clarify whether or not it was another threat, someone got shot, and whatever case it was. And both myself and PSP Trooper were bleeding, so it could've been either one of our blood.

PSI Minority: And what was your understanding of why PSP Trooper was bleeding?

Witness: He cut his hand jumping the fence with me.

PSI Minority: Did you or PSP Trooper attempt to address your injuries while you were inside of AGR?

Witness: Not necessarily, no. We weren't really focused on the injuries.

PSI Minority: I want to go to, you mentioned vehicle and potential IEDs. What is your understanding of a vehicle being associated with an IED?

Witness: My understanding is it's not good.

PSI Minority: I'll be more specific. What was your understanding of a vehicle that day being associated with

an IED?

Witness: I mean, it's very concerning. Like I said, I had no clue about any type of potential explosives or anything regarding even that nature. The concern is he meant for that attack to be a heck of a lot bigger than it was. Just by hearing that he had that in his possession, it sounded to me that he wanted something more to happen than what happened.

PSI Minority: When were you made aware that there was a vehicle with IEDs?

Witness: Again, I don't know the exact time frame. It was within that 15, 20 minutes or so after I got done clearing the building that we were told that there was potential IEDs either in the event or nearby.

PSI Minority: At that moment, were you made aware that those IEDs were associated with a vehicle or that there could be IEDs, generally?

Witness: They suspected that there were some with a vehicle and that there were some that they said they found in the AGR building. I don't know if that ever proved true or not. I was never -- again, I was not given that information personally.

PSI Minority: You mentioned that you left the site around midnight. Is that correct?

Witness: I want to say it was a little after

midnight.

PSI Minority: And in the time between you clearing the building, learning about the potential for IEDs, and then you eventually leaving the site, did you receive any additional updates regarding the location of a vehicle that may be associated with IEDs?

Witness: No. I was in no position to get that information. Usually that's going to be handled by well above my pay grade.

PSI Minority: Sure. I guess in the way that you were hearing about all this other information just by proximity to other people, did you hear any other information regarding a vehicle associated with the shooter and IEDs found in or near the vehicle?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Were you aware of any other federal entities, law enforcement entities, at the event on July 13th?

Witness: Other than HSI, that was all I was aware of that were there during that time.

PSI Minority: After shots fired were you made aware of any other additional federal law enforcement entities?

Witness: ATF and FBI showed up later on, yes.

PSI Minority: When did those officials appear?

Witness: I can't give you an exact time. That

whole 4- or 5-hour block afterwards really blurred together.

PSI Minority: Did you meet any individuals from ATF or FBI?

Witness: ATF I did, yep.

PSI Minority: Who did you meet?

Witness: I don't know his name. It was a very short encounter. He said he had somebody in the vehicle, and that he wanted to talk to whoever was in charge. And I was just one person walking by at that time, so I went into the Security Room and they said they'll go and address him. And that was the end of that.

PSI Minority: And did this person show you any identification?

Witness: I don't recall. He had an ATF jacket on and his partner had an ATF jacket. There was another guy in the vehicle.

PSI Minority: So there were at least two?

Witness: Two. Oh, there was a third person they had apparently in the vehicle. So that's why I said I'd go grab the supervisor, because that was the only thing I really thought was the right choice at that moment. I don't know where it went from that.

PSI Minority: Did they give you any indication regarding what they needed to talk about?

Witness: I don't recall. I feel like he might've explained something but I really don't remember what he said. I was tasked with three other things at the time, and then they made me a Jump Team Leader of the other group, so it was a lot of tasks all at once. So I don't remember exactly what he said but I did tell him I would go get the supervisor, so he can explain to him what he has going on.

PSI Minority: Who was tasking you with things to do at this point?

Witness: The SAIC in the Security Room as well as the PI, [redacted], however you say her last name.

PSI Minority: [redacted].

Witness: [redacted]. They wanted me to move the witnesses to a separate location. That way they were removed from the event. And then after that I had to transport the mother and daughters to the police barracks.

PSI Minority: Did you speak with Secret Service counter snipers after shots were fired?

Witness: No. I didn't hear from them at all, no.

PSI Minority: Did you ever speak to C/S Team Lead again?

Witness: No. Not since the brief at 11:00 or 1:00, whenever it was.

PSI Minority : Has anyone from Secret Service or DHS instructed you not to speak with Congress?

Witness : No.

PSI Minority : I'm going to turn it over to my colleague, PSI Minority .

PSI Minority : So going back to when you and Trooper PSP Trooper were on the golf cart, or heading up, and you run into Agent Site PI Agent , this is around 5:55 p.m. on July 13th?

Witness : It was somewhere within that time frame. I mean, 5 minutes or so, yeah.

PSI Minority : What was the plan if you did locate the suspicious person and they were outside the security perimeter? What were you going to do?

Witness : Interview him. That's it.

PSI Minority : So you were going to leave the perimeter, the security perimeter. You were going to go outside of it.

Witness : Not me particularly. I mean, whoever found him, if they would encounter him, they were told to interview the individual. Not arrest him or anything like that because he wasn't, like I said, a threat. He was a suspicious individual. So the protocol was simply just to interview him.

PSI Minority : So did you ever plan to leave the

security perimeter to find the suspicious person?

Witness: I did not plan to, no.

PSI Minority: Why not?

Witness: I can't answer that question.

PSI Minority: But at that time you didn't know if he was inside the perimeter or outside the perimeter. Correct?

Witness: It was my understanding that he was within our perimeter, yes, at least the middle or inner perimeter is where I thought he was.

PSI Minority: So who was searching for him outside the security perimeter?

Witness: I can't answer that.

PSI Minority: So you and Trooper PSP Trooper had no discussion about leaving the security perimeter to search for the suspicious person before 6 p.m.

Witness: Not that I recall. I know we were heading over towards the last time or last position we knew he was, but I don't remember specifically stating we were to go outside the perimeter or not.

PSI Minority: Was [redacted] Site Protective Intelligence Agent going to leave the security perimeter to search for this suspicious person after you spoke to her?

Witness: I'm unaware of her actions or what she wanted to do.

PSI Minority: Site Protective Intelligence Agent didn't tell you what she planned to do when you guys split off from each other?

Witness: She didn't specifically say she was going to out of perimeter. What she said was that her partner was already over on that area that we discussed.

PSI Minority: And who was her partner?

Witness: The State Trooper counterpart.

PSI Minority: Do you know that person's name?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: And that State Trooper was already outside the perimeter?

Witness: I'm unaware of what exact location he was. I don't know if he was on the outside of the perimeter, middle perimeter. She said that he was in the area where the individual was last seen.

PSI Minority: Okay. So you and Trooper PSP Trooper go back towards the stage area after speaking with Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent, right?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: You didn't traverse anywhere else inside the perimeter to search for this suspicious person?

Witness: We did. So like I said, we were still actively searching as we were driving back, looking through the crowd, looking around the outskirts of the crowd. Again, like I said, my understanding was that he was within

the perimeter or by that gate on the 3 o'clock side. And at that time frame we also had the medical emergency and then the conflicts. We had two conflicts in that time frame, as well.

PSI Minority: What time did you speak with the local officer you phoned?

Witness: I don't remember the time. It was again after the second phone call with C/UAS Advance Lead, so I would say 5:55-ish, 5:56.

PSI Minority: Did that local officer tell you that the suspicious person was inside the security perimeter?

Witness: No. He didn't specify what perimeter he was last seen. Not to me, at least.

PSI Minority: So all that local officer told you was a description of Crooks.

Witness: A description of Crooks and where he was last seen, as far as he was at the front of the event, on the right-hand side.

PSI Minority: So he was outside the perimeter.

Witness: If that's your interpretation of it. My interpretation was that he was within the perimeter. I'm saying he was at the front of the event, which is within the perimeter. We had middle, inner, and outer, which is a pretty big difference between all three of those. My understanding was that he was somewhere in

between one of those perimeters, not specifically one individual. If you're talking about outside the perimeter, that would be outside our outer perimeter, which is beyond the AGR building.

PSI Minority: So that phone call with the local officer, was it your belief that this local officer had personally seen Crooks in that position that you just described?

Witness: Yes. Because C/UAS Advance Lead explained to me that he was the one that sent C/UAS Advance Lead, or called C/UAS Advance Lead, or whatever the case was, that he was the one that saw him.

PSI Minority: But to be clear, you and PSP Trooper did not go up to that position.

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: And why not?

Witness: As I stated earlier, we did not go that route because our senior agent described that she and many other, and her counterpart, were already in that area searching, for us to go down and look in the area of where we were prior to. So I took those orders and carried them out. I went back down towards the staging area and looked around the back side and on the 3 o'clock side.

PSI Minority: So that phone call with the local law enforcement officer that you had, was there any other description that was provided to you? Did he have anything

in his hands at the time? Was he carrying anything? Was there any other description besides -- well, what was the description you were given?

Witness: He was saying he had a gray shirt, blonde hair, tan pants, and that was pretty much the extent of it. There was nothing about anything in his hands, other than the rangefinder, but there was nothing else other than the rangefinder, and I was told that by C/UAS Advance Lead.

PSI Minority: But the local phone call, did they talk about the rangefinder with you?

Witness: No, because the purpose of that phone call was to get a description of the individual.

PSI Minority: But you already had the photo.

Witness: Yeah, but I wanted him to explain to me the description and where he last saw him.

PSI Minority: And which direction was Crooks headed at this point, that the local officer told you?

Witness: I don't remember him telling me what direction he was headed in, just where he last saw him.

PSI Minority: After the phone call with the local officer, did you relay any of that information to the counter sniper teams on the barns?

Witness: No. Like I stated, I have not talked to counter sniper teams at all, during the event, and they did not reach out to me about any potential threat or

suspicious individual. It was just the Security Room.

PSI Minority: So was there any plan to leave the security perimeter to look for the suspicious person?

Witness: There was no specific plan to do that, no.

PSI Minority: I'm just having trouble understanding how that's possible.

Witness: I mean, in hindsight, if we're talking about hindsight, yeah, I would've done a lot of things differently, as would anybody else that was there. But looking back at it, we have an outer perimeter for a reason. We have an inner perimeter for a reason. We have a middle perimeter for a reason. Everybody is there to do their job. My understanding was that that area was entirely covered, and then more so once we sent PI and her counterpart there. So at the time I carried out my duties as I was directed.

PSI Minority: So at the time, on July 13th, at that 5:50, 6:00 hour, you meet with Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent, at that time your thought is that she is going to handle going over to that direction where you were told by a local law enforcement officer that Crooks was over in that direction, the 1 to 3 o'clock position.

Witness: Yes, and I relayed that to her and she had told me she had already known that.

PSI Minority: Did you relay on the radio, email, text anything to the rest of your colleagues in the Secret Service that "I had spoken to Site Protective Intelligence Agent and she's going to go out that direction to see if they can find the suspicious person"?

Witness: No, I did not.

PSI Minority: Why not?

Witness: Again, hindsight, sure, I could've, but so could she. So could Security Room. They already knew the information. I mean, it was not exactly clear. I probably should've, yes.

PSI Minority: Do you know if anyone else within the Secret Service, that was outside the perimeter on July 13th, who was actually stationed to do security outside the security perimeter, are you aware of --

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: -- any Secret Service people positioned?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Is that unusual, from your experience working these events?

Witness: No. Out of perimeter and beyond is usually handled by state and local.

PSI Minority: And outside of the phone call you had with that local law enforcement officer, did you speak with any local law enforcement during the day?

Witness: I mean, other than my State Trooper counterpart? No. Up until shots fired is when I asked the individuals behind me, as well as Trooper PSP Trooper, "Hey, which AGR building is what?" That was the only interaction I had with other local law enforcement. There was nothing prior to or anything like that.

PSI Minority: And going back to after shots are fired, you go over to the AGR building, you sweep the building, and you're at the Butler Fairgrounds until about midnight. Before you left that night were you aware of how Crooks arrived at the rally?

Witness: I was not.

PSI Minority: Did you hear anything about his vehicle being located and discovered and searched?

Witness: The only thing I heard about the vehicle was that he had potential IED in it. I mean, I assume that meant they searched it. But no, I did not hear anything specifically at all about that.

PSI Minority: Right. So we have Tom Crooks' vehicle. I think you mentioned the white van, as well.

Witness: I don't know what color the van was.

PSI Minority: Okay. But there was a van I think you mentioned.

Witness: From what I understood there was a van, yes.

PSI Minority: So can you talk to me about what the van was, when it was discovered?

Witness: I cannot. As I said, I only overheard it in the crowd of individuals all speaking about every type of thing that was going on at that event. It was very chaotic. So there wasn't any particular thing that I heard other than that there was a vehicle, a van, that they suspected had IED.

PSI Minority: Did you utilize just your Secret Service-issued cellphone that day?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Did you send any messages on your personal phone?

Witness: In what regard?

PSI Minority: Work-related messages on your personal phone?

Witness: No. Only to tell my family that I'm okay. Everything was handled on my work phone.

PSI Minority: Understood.

PSI Minority: Sir, just one additional question and then we'll take another five-minute break.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: Are you aware of any face sheets being made or created prior to this event?

Witness: Face sheets?

PSI Minority: Have you heard of that phrase before, face sheet?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: Or just photos with names or faces of individuals to either be on the lookout for.

Witness: We have lookouts, or they're called lookouts, or Be On the Lookout, a BOLO.

PSI Minority: And these BOLOs are created for each event, or are they specific to just be on the lookout generally?

Witness: A little bit of both. Depending on the area and whatnot they'll put out potentials that we've encountered before, PI, Protective Intelligence, cases. So if someone previously made a threat online and they're in that area of, say, in this case a rally, we'll put that lookout, a state lookout or nationwide lookout, whatever it may be, in that email that they'll put out, what whatever the individual's face is or demographics, and then an explanation of what exactly their case is.

PSI Minority: So you will sometimes, prior to events or any situation involving a protectee, you will sometimes receive this type of information in an email?

Witness: Correct. Protective Intelligence Division will put it out.

PSI Minority: Did you receive any such information

prior to the July 13th Butler rally?

Witness: No. They said there was no adverse -- there's a verbiage they use, but essentially there was, from my understanding, no threat.

PSI Minority: And if there was some sort of threat then you would expect to receive this additional piece of information that you just described?

Witness: Yeah. It doesn't necessarily have to be a threat either. Like I said, it could be somebody who was on the radar for us just for sitting in front of the motorcade on a motorcade route. We'll put that out there because there's still a concern that they might do it again. So it doesn't necessarily have to be a threat, as well.

PSI Minority: So just so I understand, information regarding intelligence, adverse intelligence let's just say, it could be the case where there is no adverse intelligence, but you still may receive this information regarding an individual to be on the lookout for?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: And again, in the case of the July 13th rally in Butler, you did not receive any information, any be on the lookout information?

Witness: Off the top of my head I can't recall. I may or may not have. But I don't recall there being

anything.

PSI Minority: Okay. At this point we'll take another five-minute break and we'll go off the record. Thank you.

Witness: Thank you.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Majority: Witness Counsel, are you on the line?

Witness Counsel: Yes, I am. Thank you again for checking.

HSGAC Majority: All right. We'll go back on the record. Special Agent Witness, thank you very much for your time. My name is HSGAC Majority and I work for Chair Peters. I have a few follow-up questions. Thank you again for being here today.

COURT REPORTER: Excuse me. Can you please move your microphone closer?

HSGAC Majority: Can you hear me now? Okay.

I'd like to ask a few follow-up questions on your training. You mentioned you graduated from the Academy in September 2023. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes, ma'am.

HSGAC Majority: How was counter sniper response agent covered in your training?

Witness: It's a simple PowerPoint presentation. They go over it with you. There's no like shooting requirement or nothing like that. It's just a simple academic training.

HSGAC Majority: How many days or hours did you receive on training as a counter sniper response agent?

Witness: It was a class, I believe, so maybe two hours.

HSGAC Majority: Did you participate in any mock events or simulations as either a counter sniper response agent or a protective intelligence agent?

Witness: We would do PI, but I don't remember us ever doing a CS response in the Academy, as like a hands-on training.

HSGAC Majority: You're currently in Phase 1 of your training. Correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Through the Field Office?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: How many protective assignments have you done since you graduated training?

Witness: At least 20, if not more.

HSGAC Majority: In what roles?

Witness: So our roles vary every single time. I've done CS response --

HSGAC Majority: But July 13th was your first time doing CS response. Correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: What other roles have you --

Witness: There's a lot, sorry. There's an arrival/departure agent, which is where the motorcade pulls in. There's a stairwell agent, which is as it sounds. You stand in a stairwell. There's CSU, which is like a counter surveillance agent.

HSGAC Majority All those you were previously assigned as a protective agent?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Have you worked as a protective intelligence agent before?

Witness: I don't recall ever working as a PI, no.

HSGAC Majority: Have you worked as a post-stander before?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And is it typical for special agent like yourself, who recently graduated, new to the position, be assigned to work a protective assignment for the former President?

Witness: It is very likely, and it happens almost the day you graduate. Some people it happens the day after they graduated.

HSGAC Majority: Specifically with regard to July 13th, you mentioned a counter sniper response agent has a number of duties. Aside from responding to any direction from the

counter snipers in response to a potential threat, what are your other duties?

Witness: So up to that time prior to the arrival of the protectee you're simply just helping out all the other post-standers. You're what we call as a relief agent. You go to all the variety of posts that are throughout the event, ask them if they need a relief to use the head or the bathroom, or grab food or snack real quick. So that's generally what you're doing. The same thing with PI, unless there is something that pops off for PI as far as someone trying to get into the event or whatever cases that it. But for CS response you're simply a relief agent until[LES] out.

HSGAC Majority: From your perspective, both performing the role of protective intelligence agent and a counter sniper response agent, are the roles and responsibilities clear to you --

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: -- at each position?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Whose job is it to respond to medical emergencies? You mentioned on July 13th you responded to a number of medical emergencies. Is that because Secret Service and/or state and locals were short staffed, or is it because that is part of your job as a relief agent?

Witness: So it's kind of an unwritten ordeal. If there is a medical emergency and you're able to assist in that moment, you're able to assist and carry it out, that's fine as long as it's not keeping you from your other duties. There was no one on either relief at the many medical emergencies I responded to that day. And simply what we're doing, we're not necessarily getting in the crowd and doing CPR on somebody or whatever. We're more so trying to contact EMS and giving them a route in to those individuals by separating the crowd and getting them out of the way so that way it's handled efficiently.

HSGAC Majority: And on the morning of July 13th, at the 10 a.m. brief, the Secret Service brief you attended, did you receive any documents, any maps? I know the site diagram you received in advance. But did you receive anything on that day so you had a thorough understanding of the lay of the land at the Butler Farm Show?

Witness: We had the, I can't remember if it was the night before or the day of, they gave you a packet. It covers all that. It covers how many EOD teams we're going to have, canines, it shows an aerial view of the event area, where certain posts will be positioned at. And that depends on the site agent and how detailed they want to get with that exactly, because you can get very detailed if you want to and break it down to where each local officer is

going to be standing or uniformed vehicle, whatever the case may be. But we received one of those as well as the CS packet I got from the CS lead.

HSGAC Majority: Did you feel prepared in advance of the rally that day?

Witness: I did. I had all the documents that we typically get for a protection assignment.

HSGAC Majority: Did you feel that you had an adequate understanding of the Butler Farm Show grounds and surrounding area?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority Had you worked with Special Agent C/UAS Advance Lead before?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Had you worked with Special Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent before?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you meet either of them at the brief in advance?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to ask a couple of questions related to communications. You mentioned that you first received information about the suspicious individual with a rangefinder around 5:50 from a call from Special Agent C/UAS Advance Lead, but -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- he did not

provide any context regarding the suspicious individual with the rangefinder other than there was an individual at the rally who had a rangefinder. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And at 5:42 p.m., and I'm reading from a printout of the Butler ESU PD Ops 4 radio, a Butler ESU commander radios out to the Butler ESU radio, quote, "Jut an FYI. We had a younger white male, long hair, lurking around the AGR building. He was viewed with a rangefinder, siting the stage. He was up against the building. I believe he was looking up at us, and he walked around the side of the building. We lost sight of him. There was a bike with a large backpack sitting beside it. It's parked in the rear of the building. That wasn't there earlier."

Did you receive any of that information?

Witness: No, ma'am.

HSGAC Majority: Would that have been helpful to you?

Witness: Extremely helpful.

HSGAC Majority: Why?

Witness: It gave the exact description of where he was last seen, what he was potentially on a bike, and that he was not just using the rangefinder but looking at law enforcement with the rangefinder. All that brings to light a heck of a lot more concern rather than just somebody that we saw with a rangefinder.

HSGAC Majority: Would that have changed your view as something from suspicious to a threat?

Witness: I wouldn't say it was exactly a threat, but it's definitely a higher concern for me at that point to find him and immediately go to the AGR building, if that's where he was last seen. I didn't get that information, like I said, until it was unfortunately too late.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. And I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit 7, Bates stamped 1417.

[Exhibit No. 7 was marked for identification.]

Witness: This is a BOLO email my colleagues referred to. These redactions were applied by Secret Service and DHS. But this is the BOLO email from the counter sniper lead. Let me know when you've had a chance to review the email.

[Pause.]

HSGAC Majority: And just for the record, this email was sent at 5:52 p.m., so 10 minutes after the local PD Ops radio that I just read from. Is this an email you received?

Witness: No. It's my first time seeing it.

HSGAC Majority: And it reads, quote -- this is an excerpt of it -- "kid learning," which our understanding is

that's an autocorrect from "lurking," "around building. We are in AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking toward the stage. FYI, if you want to notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also bike with a backpack sitting next to it in the rear of the building that was not seen earlier."

So you did not receive this. Correct?

Witness: No, ma'am.

HSGAC Majority: Would this have been helpful information for you to have received?

Witness: Yes, it would.

HSGAC Majority: Would that have changed the way that you conducted your search for the individual?

Witness: Yes, it would, because we would know the building that he was at and that he was actually near the building, not on the side of where the building, that direction, I guess.

HSGAC Majority: I'll turn it over to my colleagues.

Witness: I would just like to follow up on a couple of questions my colleague asked, in terms of the training process. Can you tell us if you had any law enforcement experience before you joined the Academy?

HSGAC Majority: I did not. I was military for 13 years.

Witness: Military. Generally what did you do for

the military?

Witness: Air crewman and water survival instructor.

HSGAC Majority: You said water survival?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What branch was that?

Witness: Navy.

HSGAC Majority: When you joined the Secret Service Academy, what was your understanding of how the development process would play out? In other words, was there a rough number of years you'd have to serve in a Field Office, whether you'd have to serve in the Uniformed Division, before you would be assigned a high-profile protectee event?

Witness: So there was no requirement as far as getting a high protectee. I mean, like I said, there are agents that the day after training were a site agent for POTUS. So, I mean, it doesn't necessarily matter as long as you're qualified, you've got your creds. At that point you are free to use where they see fit. So yeah.

HSGAC Majority: When you say POTUS, you mean the current sitting President?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say site agent, my understanding is that "site agent" is a specific term that

one individual is assigned. Do mean that or do you mean just an agent assigned to a particular site?

Witness: That's one individual assigned to that. So for example, I was a site agent for JD Vance, so I was in charge of that site that he would visit. You carry out an advance on that site as a site agent, and you have a list of things you need to look for and discuss with whoever is the host of that event. And then you cover all your bases -- fire, police, TAC teams, EOD, canine, the whole list.

HSGAC Majority: When did you serve as the site agent for Senator Vance?

Witness: It was in, about two weeks after July 13th. It was in August, I believe.

HSGAC Majority: So you were coming up on a year out of the Academy at that point.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: So I guess my understanding is incorrect in that recent graduates have to spend at least some time in a field office doing like financial crime investigations, and then some time at lower level protectee events before they can be even considered being assigned to a high-level protectee event. That's not a correct understanding? It can happen right out of the Academy?

Witness: Correct. You can get assigned a

protection assignment for any of them or potential a site or a lead as a new agent out of the Academy, yes.

HSGAC Majority: And understanding that you're relatively new to the Service, is it your understanding that's a new practice at the Secret Service?

Witness: No. I believe it's been a practice for a while.

HSGAC Majority: You touched on this earlier, but regarding intelligence I just want to make sure I'm clear. In terms of intelligence, about any adverse intelligence before the event or any kind of threats you were made aware of, you weren't made aware of any threats specific to the Butler event or any adverse intelligence before the event. Is that right?

Witness: Correct. I had nothing.

HSGAC Majority: And the same question regarding to the protectee. So you weren't aware of any adverse intelligence or threats to former President Trump before the event?

Witness: Not to my knowledge, no.

HSGAC Majority: Were you made aware of any intelligence or threats related to the government of country of Iran?

Witness: Just from like social media and everything. Not particularly with the job, no. Sorry.

HSGAC Majority: Not through the Service or through DHS?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And going back to communications, I just want to make sure again we're clear, do you routinely use your work cellphone at events like this. That's not unusual?

Witness: That's not unusual at all.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have any issues with cellphone service that day?

Witness: I did not, no.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of others who did?

Witness: I am not.

HSGAC Majority: And I think you said earlier you couldn't recall which Secret Service frequency you were on, whether it was LES or LES

Witness: No. So to clarify on that, every event that we have in protection, like I said, I've done over 20 in the last year, we use a different channel most of the times, and generally it's LES as post-standers, it's on LES But each event sometimes they change it up, so that way you don't have too many people on one channel, or whatever the case may be.

HSGAC Majority: If you don't recall the specific frequencies, can you recall generally who you were in contact with? In other words, was it specific types of agents that you were on the same frequency as but others

were on a different frequency?

Witness: Just Secret Service, and so -- sorry. Secret Service and HSI that were at the event were on one channel. CS and the detail, they were on a different channel than what we would be on.

HSGAC Majority: So you were on a different channel from CS, including Officer C/S Team Lead?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Did you have a capability to get in touch with them if you needed to?

Witness: I did.

HSGAC Majority: What was that?

Witness: I mean, cellphone. That's what he told me to contact him was via cellphone.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. How about radio contact with state or locals. Did you have any direct contact with them via radio?

Witness: No. Only through my counterpart. That was it.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. You may have just answered my next question, but if you needed to get in contact with state or locals, either to give them information or to request information, what would be the mechanism? Would it be through that trooper that you were partnered with?

Witness: For me, yes, but other post-standers,

they wouldn't necessarily have that available to them. They are not paired with a State Trooper counterpart, if that makes sense.

HSGAC Majority: Are you aware of anyone else having direct line of communications with state or locals?

Witness: Security Room, and as well, the PI. We all have direct interaction with state and local.

HSGAC Majority: Were there any other difficulties communicating that day?

Witness: Just the radio that we discussed earlier, not being able to hear, and then going through the cellphone as a secondary.

HSGAC Majority: I'm handing you another document. It's marked Exhibit 8.

[Exhibit No. 8 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority: So this is Bates 2235. It's an email from July 13th, at 4:28 p.m. So the email at the top says, "All post-standers and Site 2 advance switch radio traffic from [redacted] to [redacted]."

Do you recall receiving this email?

Witness: Yes. So as I mentioned, multiple channels were used, so if we're stepping on somebody else's motorcade, I believe Mr. Trump's spouse was there as well -- not at the event but in close enough range we were

catching some of her detail's radio traffic. So they kept trying to switch radio channels to put us on our own, that wouldn't be stepped on, I guess.

HSGAC Majority: So interference or bleed-over from another Secret Service detail in the approximate geographical area was causing that problem, is your understanding?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: So did you switch your radio as requested here?

Witness: I did, and I was tasked by Security Room to make sure others did, as well.

HSGAC Majority: I know you said earlier you had trouble hearing, but do you remember experiencing that bleed-over or that interference?

Witness: I do not remember offhand. Sorry.

HSGAC Majority: So again, regarding your experience with the Academy and training, you know, you're kind of in a unique position in that you're a relatively recent graduate of the Academy but also have this incredibly relevant experience with this event. Considering that, what you through in the Academy, the training you received, and then your experience less than a year later at the July 13th event, in your opinion does any of the Secret Service training need to change, that you received at the Academy?

Witness: I would say yes. Communication, obviously, is an important factor, a very important factor. And knowing these positions that we stand, like I mentioned earlier, we can potential stand at any position, at any given time. You can be in control of an event that is now for POTUS or the next day it's for a relative or a son or daughter of an individual. That footprint varies dramatically between those, as I'm sure you all know, as far as what logistics you need for each of those.

So having that kind of training and understanding would better prepare people, as well, when they get out to the field, to handle a situation such as this, I guess.

HSGAC Majority: To that point, did you feel prepared, as the site agent for Senator Vance?

Witness: I did. I'm a bit OCD when it comes to that stuff, so I was a little overkill, I think, with my event, as I was told from our SAIC.

HSGAC Majority: Well, beyond your personal preparations, do you feel you received the necessary training from the Service before you were put in that position?

Witness: I did. So for me, specifically, at my office, and some other offices may, as well -- I can't attest to those -- they do have prior work-ups for those sites. A lot of sites we reuse, and they've already been advanced prior to, so all you have to do is essentially go

back and revisit it, make sure that things are the same, or if they have changed you update the go-bys, and then you discuss with the local law enforcement, fire department, EMS, and everybody. So my office was very good with assisting me with that.

And then sometimes you do have a site assist, which comes from like POTUS or in this case Donald Trump, which will be LES people that will carry out that site advance. I think we moved to LES at this point.

But I personally, to answer your question, I felt like I was pretty well prepared for mine.

HSGAC Majority: And regarding your injury, are you fully healed, back to work?

Witness: I am. I never was out of work.

HSGAC Majority: Other than the medical care, did the Service or DHS perform any evaluation before you were cleared to go back to work?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Did you, at any point, get placed on any kind of telework status or administrative status or any kind of adverse personnel action after the Butler event?

Witness: No. personal [redacted] So they let me stay home with her for two days and then I started advancing that site for Vance.

HSGAC Majority: At any point that day did you see any drones being flown, whether it was law enforcement or civilian?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Have you participated in any after-action reviews with the Secret Service or DHS?

Witness: As in like interviews like this? Is that what you're asking?

HSGAC Majority: Yes, whether it's the mission assurance investigation or the DHS Independent Panel?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: When were those interviews?

Witness: The ISP interview was, I don't remember the dates offhand. It was very shortly after the event. And then the Independent Review Panel, that was -- I can't remember when that was. I don't remember. It was after that one. So it was the FBI and then the ISP and then the DHS, and the Independent Review Panel. I think it was in August, yeah, for that one.

HSGAC Majority: Is there anything else you think that the Committee should be aware of as we investigate this incident and moving forward, in terms of reforms that we haven't discussed today?

Witness: I mean, as I said, communication. If we can all get ourselves on the same channel, and maybe not

necessarily on the same channel, because obviously that would be too many voices in one spot. But it would be very helpful, as I'm learning today, to have emails that are sent to everybody regarding a potential individual like this, because a father would still be alive and this kid would've been, you know, handled well before he was.

But having a universal communication for state, local, and us, whoever the federal entity is there, HSI and Secret Service, a joint email like that would be helpful or some type of unified communication, you know, to relay this kind of information. There's no reason -- this is the first time I'm seeing this stuff, and I was CS Response. That, to me, is very frustrating.

And to be clear, as well, in my case, for the CS folks in that building, clarifying that it was not secure, as we thought it was secure, and to have local and state that are assigned to those positions to relay if they move or if they take a break, or stuff like that, to all of us, as well, would be ideal, so that way we know their movements, as well.

Obviously, further training never hurts, as well.

HSGAC Majority: I appreciate you answering our questions. I will turn it over to my colleagues.

HSGAC Minority: Again, this is HSGAC Minority with Senator Paul's office. I would just thank you for your

candor in your last answer. It's the first time we've heard that, so I appreciate that.

Let's go back to a little bit of what my colleague, PSI Minority, was hitting on. Back to the moment when you started hearing about this suspicious person, and you received multiple calls, you started looking for this individual, did you sense a growing sense of urgency to find this individual as the minutes went by?

Witness: So yes and no, and what I mean by that is many of these events we get suspicious individual calls. At almost every single one I've been to we've had a suspicious individual. We interview them and we carry on. That doesn't mean that you get complacent with it, by any means. However, this individual was seen with a rangefinder. He was outside of our immediate area by the stage, which doesn't necessarily mean to stop a search at any means. However, yeah, so I'm --

HSGAC Minority: I guess my point is that when someone continues to be brought up on radio or cellphones or texts, that would probably indicate a sense of, okay, this person really needs to be found. And as time went on, I guess that's what I'm asking you. Did you feel that urgency that we need to prioritize and find this person?

Witness: I did. The closer it got to Mr. Trump getting up on the stage, again though, we had no

description that he was armed or that he was a threat. You know, at the time, like I said, I was also dealing with the medical emergency and then people fighting. There was a lot going on. It was very much chaos. But yeah.

HSGAC Minority: So when you have multiple issues, as you say, chaos, in your training experience are you instructed or trained how to prioritize or triage threats or ongoing situations to deal with the most serious issue before moving to the next?

Witness: Yes. So in this situation, a suspicious individual that was last seen at the back of the rally was definitely a concern. Yes, I agree. However, with the information that I had at the time, a fight breaking out and individuals having a conflict right next to the stage, directly in the path of where former President Trump was, that took priority at that moment. But immediately once that was resolved, we went back to our search.

HSGAC Minority: So you mentioned a while ago that you wanted to know, when you reached out to the local person, a little bit better description of that individual, hear it from them. And one thing you wanted to know was where were they last seen. Why would you want to know where they were last seen?

Witness: Just so we can direct our efforts in

that general aera, at least.

HSGAC Minority: Which leads me to the next question, because you also testified that, you know, you only knew of one or two people going to that area, and that's why yourself -- and we didn't get on the radio to send other people there. Am I correct in that?

Witness: No. So only the two people that were our individuals. There was already state and local that were stationed along that area, so I guess I should clarify. They went over there with those individuals and were already searching. So it was more than just two people. There was also state and local in that area, as well, within that perimeter. As I mentioned before, middle and outer perimeters are all state and local.

HSGAC Minority: Are you considering the middle perimeter, between the two fences, where the PSP had their cars parked, before you get to the other fence that was the fence to the AGR building?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So inner was within that fence line, middle is the portion between the two fences --

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Minority: -- and then outer perimeter was out of that fence line, including the AGR perimeter grounds. Am I correct on that?

Witness: Yes. Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. What's the purpose of an "attempt to locate" on the radio, or a BOLO?

Witness: The purpose of it? To find an individual and interview them and remove them as being a potential threat or suspicious individual, get clarification on their purpose of being there.

HSGAC Minority: Do you know of an "attempt to locate" that was broadcast out to everyone to look for this suspicious person?

Witness: I'm unaware of it, no.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. I've got a couple more questions here. If you would, go back to the Exhibit 6, I think, is the transcribed interview with your counterpart, Trooper PSP Trooper, and got to page 7.

I'll start with a question. Okay. At any point prior to the shooting were you made aware of a suspicious person being on the roof of the AGR building?

Let's focus on the statement next, from Trooper PSP Trooper. "Right before the shots, this is what I started to get into, right before the shots were fired, Witness came up to me, where we were post, he hits me on the back and says, 'He's on the roof of the AGR.' And then we're like, 'Excuse me, he's on the effing roof.' Excuse me, turn, came back around, tell their counterparts that some lady

that they talked to, I will pull out a personal phone. He pulled out a map from the Ops plan, and I said, 'This is where the AGR -- this is the AGR building there.'"

Is that the discussion you were telling me that you had right before the shots were fired? You didn't know where the AGR building was, what they were talking about?

[redacted]: Yes.

[redacted]: How long did that conversation take?

[redacted]: Seconds.

[redacted]: Estimate. I mean, 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 15 seconds?

[redacted]: I mean, from the time I got the phone call to the shots fired, in between there it was probably 15 seconds maybe. I don't know.

[redacted]: Do you know how long it took the shift team to cover former President Trump once the shots were fired?

[redacted]: I do not.

[redacted]: According to the Independent Review, two seconds. So if they can cover him in two seconds when shots were fired, if someone would've got on the radio within 15 seconds, and said, "Shooter on the roof," could we assume that the shift detail would've got him covered within 15 seconds?

[redacted]: I will reiterate, I was on a different

channel than the detail, so therefore that would require me to have to look at my radio and, as well, change the channel. The Security Room that gave me that information could've very well as easily done that --

HSGAC Minority: Agree.

Witness: -- and it would've been done way sooner, and he would've been removed from the stage. So I thought in the moment for me to change my radio and waste time on doing that, we can assess and get on over to the building. Yes, unfortunately, he took his shots when he did. But in a moment's notice I acted the way I felt best.

HSGAC Minority: And I don't want you to think that that's pointed only to you, because it seems to be like an issue that, as you said in your providing information, better communications --

Witness: Mm-hmm.

HSGAC Minority: -- would certainly be beneficial moving forward.

Witness: Absolutely.

HSGAC Minority: And that was the purpose of bringing up that, is that we see a time there that, yes, we keep hearing within seconds, but yet Acting Director Rowe was very proud of the fact that they got him covered within two seconds, which is great. I agree. I don't want it to get lost that we're talking about information passed within

seconds, because that's all it really took was to cover the President, former President, at that time.

I'll finish with thank you for your military service, and I'm glad you came out well.

Witness: Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: That's all I have.

PSI Minority: Agent Witness, PSI Minority with Ranking Member Johnson. Let's stay on this quickly. So that line came back around to tell their counterparts "that same lady that we talked to." Is it your understanding that that would be referring to Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent, "that same lady that we talked to"?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Was Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent near you?

Witness: I didn't know she was until we turned around. She was near where the top brass were, the State Trooper PSP Trooper.

PSI Minority: So you alerted Agent Site Protective Intelligence Agent that there was an individual on the roof at the same time.

Witness: Yes. She was in that same exact area that I yelled it out to all of them.

PSI Minority: You yelled it out loud?

Witness: Well, not loud. I mean, it was loud enough for them to hear me. They were directly behind me.

PSI Minority: Okay. When you hear that information

you have enough time to turn around and yell to Agent [Site Protective Intelligence Agent]. Does it cross your mind to send a text message or call Agent [C/S Team Lead] and say, "Hey, we just got a report of a guy on the roof with a gun"?

[Witness]: No, it does not.

[PSI Minority]: Would that information have been helpful to them on the roof?

[Witness]: That information, from my understanding, would've only came from a sniper team, and they were all on the same channel. Taking my phone out and sending a text would've taken longer than changing the channel on my radio. So that would've been more time wasted.

[PSI Minority]: It was your understanding that all of the sniper units were operating on the same radio channel, so the Secret Service snipers and the local snipers.

[Witness]: Not on the same channel, but on the same communication chain.

[PSI Minority]: So that they all could share information.

[Witness]: Correct.

[PSI Minority]: But you didn't know that for certain.

[Witness]: No. No.

[PSI Minority]: So as the counter sniper response agent, if you were made aware of information of a threat,

because an individual with a gun is now elevated to a threat, was it your responsibility to make sure that the counter snipers were aware of that information?

Witness: When I received it from the Security Room, that's usually who it's coming from is the counter sniper team. So if they're reaching out to the Security Room and the Security Room is telling me, that's usually the chain of command on how it goes. They're getting that information from the sniper team to the Security Room to me.

PSI Minority: So help me understand that a little bit because I believe when we talked, or when you talked to my colleagues earlier your role was to respond to threats, or individuals identified by the counter snipers who were on that roof, right. So they would reach out to you directly and say, "Hey, can you go check this person out?" or would they relay that then to the Security Room and then to you?

Witness: Ideally they should have -- they could have done both. They never reached out to me. But yeah, they should've done both.

PSI Minority: So you assumed the counter snipers did relay that to the Security Room. You didn't have any reason to actually believe that that was the case at the time.

Witness: Other than -- no, I guess not, no.

PSI Minority: Okay. Again, you didn't think to check in with them, right, because we get this at 5:50, and I want to walk back a little bit. Because you get this at 5:50 from Agent C/UAS Advance ead, you get the pictures. You don't think at that point, maybe I should text these pictures over to Agent C/S Team Lead up on the roof.

Witness: Well no, because if I recall, and I don't know if I stated this earlier or not, they said that the picture was from the sniper team, through a scope.

PSI Minority: So your belief was that the Secret Service snipers had taken that picture through the scope.

Witness: I don't know which snipers. They just said it was through a sniper scope, so I don't know whose it was. And they didn't give coordinates, like they were supposed to give coordinates as far as where that individual is. That's why they gave me that chart.

PSI Minority: Okay. So you didn't know if it was the Secret Service counter snipers who had taken that picture. So again I ask, does it cross your mind at that point that, hey, maybe I should alert my counter snipers who are up on the barn roof that I'm receiving information that there's an individual being identified here.

Witness: In hindsight, yeah, that would've been a good idea.

PSI Minority: Okay. Let's go forward a little again.

You get that phone call. You get the description from the local, right, so you now know it's not one of your counter snipers who is up on the barn roof who has last seen this individual. At that point then does it cross your mind to say, hey, let me give my Secret Service counter snipers a call and give them this update that I just got from the local. Maybe they don't have it yet.

Witness: No. Again, the sniper teams are always on the same channel. I mean, that's what they were from my sight. They all communicate on a common ground, whether it be through text, phone call, or radio. So I guess from that understanding, yeah, I just assumed that they had already all known. So yeah, also again, in hindsight, sure, it would've been a good idea to send a text, I guess, of what we found out.

PSI Minority: Did you have the ability only to communicate with Counter Sniper C/S Team Lead, or did you have the ability to communicate with the other three Secret Service counter snipers?

Witness: Just C/S Team Lead. He told me he would contact me via cellphone.

PSI Minority: So I know you said your understanding is that the counter snipers are all going to be on their own communication channel, whether it's radio, text message, or some way to communicate with each other. How

does that come to be your understanding?

Witness: Because he's CS lead, so he handles both the state, local, whoever they're using, as well as his snipers. So he is the lead of the sniper teams. So he coordinates with them, they do the advance together, everything they do is together. So just like all the post-standers are all going to be on one channel, the detail is all on one channel, TAC teams are on one channel. Everybody has their own channel. It's not assumed; it's known, which I am now clarifying.

But back to why I kind of, in that case assumed, that they were on the same channel, because TAC teams as well as detail, all of us are on our own channels.

PSI Minority: I just want to clarify. When you're saying "channel," are you talking about radio channel?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Right. So I'm talking about the local counter snipers and Secret Service counter snipers.

Witness: So am I.

PSI Minority: Your understanding was they had a radio channel, or you assumed that they had a radio channel that they could communicate.

Witness: So like when, to give you an example, with our event I have four sniper teams at my advance or my site. They were given a Secret Service radio, as well.

That's common practice, to give the local TAC teams one of our radios too, to coordinate on the same channel, so that way they can hear both sides of it, their side and, as well, ours. And they can relay information to us, as we relay information to them.

PSI Minority: I just want to make sure. Is that the practice that was in place prior to July 13th or post July 13th?

Witness: My knowledge it's been a practice since I've been on, a very short time.

PSI Minority: Okay. So again, just so we're abundantly clear here, your understanding of that day, how the communications were supposed to work, was that the Secret Service was supposed to exchange radios with the local counter snipers so that they could communicate with the Secret Service counter snipers who were on the roof.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: Okay. I'm going to turn it over to my colleague.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: Hey, PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office. In the position you had in Butler on July 13th, was there any policy that prevented you from leaving the security perimeter?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of, no.

PSI Minority: So you could've left the perimeter at Butler to find this person.

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: But you didn't.

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: Do you know if Crooks was on any local, state, or federal law enforcement radar before July 13th?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority Since July 13th, are you aware of what type of vehicle Thomas Crooks used to get to Butler and where he parked that vehicle?

Witness: I am not.

PSI Minority: Is there anything else that this Committee needs to know about your time at Butler?

Witness: No. I think we covered it.

[Pause.]

HSGAC Majority: Thank you very much for your time here today. We've done our best to ask all the questions that we are able, although we are still in the process of obtaining documents and information. And if we have any follow-up questions we will reach out to you, Secret Service, and your counsel.

Witness: Okay.

HSGAC Majority: With that, as we mentioned in the beginning, we would ask that you not speak about what was

discussed in this interview with anyone outside of who is in the room today, to preserve the integrity of our investigation.

Again, thank you very much for your time, and with that we'll go off the record.

[Whereas, at 1:50 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AND THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW OF

[redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,

U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Room SD-342

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, October 9, 2024

10:19 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Witness:

[redacted], General Counsel, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association

[redacted], Personal Counsel to SAIC [redacted] [VIRTUAL]

[redacted], Deputy Chief Counsel, U.S. Secret Service

[redacted], General Attorney, Department of Homeland Security

On Behalf of Chairman Peters:

[redacted], Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Deputy Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigative Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

[redacted], Senior Investigator, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of Ranking Member Paul:

[redacted], Staff Director, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

APPEARANCES (continued):

HSGAC Minority, Chief Counsel, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

On Behalf of PSI Chairman Blumenthal:

PSI Majority, Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations [VIRTUAL]

On Behalf of PSI Ranking Member Johnson:

PSI Minority, Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Chief Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

PSI Minority, Deputy Staff Director, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

EXHIBITS:

1) Emails Bates Stamped 2614-2618 17

2) Email Bates Stamped 2953 37

3) Email Dated 7/1/24 Witness to Lead Agent 45

4) Sergeant PSP Site Liaison Testimony 95

5) Email Dated 7/13/24 at 7:33 p.m. 101

6) Email Dated 7/13/24 at 11:55 p.m. 104

7) Interview with Lieutenant PSP Officer in Charge 110

8) Email Dated 7/13/24 from Witness at 9:59 p.m. 133

P R O C E E D I N G S

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Good morning. This is a transcribed interview of U.S. Secret Service Special Agent In Charge Witness being conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

This interview was requested by Committee Chairman Gary Peters, Ranking Member Rand Paul, as well as Subcommittee Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson. This is a part of the Committee's investigation of the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on former President Trump, and the U.S. Secret Service planning in advance of and response related to the events in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13th, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, and again on September 11th, 2024, Chairmen Peters, Blumenthal, and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson requested a voluntary transcribed interview with U.S. Secret Service personnel, including Mr. Witness. We'll provide introductions and then explain how today's interview will proceed. And first, I'll ask you, Mr. Witness, to introduce yourself and your title, and then counsel to introduce themselves.

Witness: Hello, my name is Witness, Witness and I'm a Special Agent In Charge of the Buffalo Field Office.

Witness Counsel : Witness Counsel . I represent SAIC Witness , and also Witness Counsel . Witness Counsel also representing SAIC Witness . I have to leave at around 12:30 to 1:00, and Mr. Witness Counsel will pick up right after, so he's going to be listening in online.

Agency Counsel : Agency Counsel here for the Secret. Deputy Chief Counsel.

Agency Counsel : Agency Counsel , DHS Office of the General Counsel, Oversight Counsel.

HSGAC Majority : I'll now introduce my colleagues from Chairman Peter's office and then turn it over to my colleagues in the other offices. Today, we have HSGAC Majority , Deputy Chief Counsel for the majority on HSGAC, as well as HSGAC Majority , Senior Investigator, and HSGAC Majority , Senior Counsel.

HSGAC Minority : Good morning. My name is HSGAC Minority I'm Chief Counsel for the office of Ranking Member Paul, with HSGAC Minority , Staff Director.

PSI Minority : Good morning. I'm PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office. I'm Staff Director, and we have PSI Minority , Chief Counsel, right here. And PSI Minority , Deputy Staff Director. Thank you for being here.

PSI Majority : And this is PSI Majority , on virtual, Senior Counsel for PSI majority.

HSGAC Majority : During today's interview, our four offices

will be asking questions, and we will try and do so in orderly fashion so you don't have different people jumping in on questions. And we will plan to take breaks on the hour, but are happy to take breaks as needed. Just please let us know. The reporter is going to create a verbatim record of what we discussed today. And with that in mind as I'm sure you're familiar, please respond to questions verbally because the reporter cannot properly record nonverbal responses. Do you understand?

Witness: I do.

HSGAC Majority: This interview is unclassified. So, if the questions call for any information that you know to implicate classified information, please state for the record that classified information has been implicated with the question as well as the reason you understand this to be classified and the limits of your ability to respond. And once you have clarified, to the extent possible, please provide to the best of your ability information that is unclassified to fully respond to the question. And if needed, we will proceed to a classified setting and can make that happen if necessary.

You are required to provide truthful answers to the committee. And this interview is governed by U.S.C. Section 1001, which makes it a crime to provide false information to Congress, including to investigators. Do

you understand?

Witness: I do.

HSGAC Majority: Is there any reason you cannot provide truthful information in response to the questions today?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Do you have any questions before we begin?

Witness: I do not.

HSGAC Majority: Counsel?

Agency Counsel: Thank you. And for purposes of time here, I'll incorporate by reference other preference or preliminary remarks I've made with other witnesses before the committees that are consistent with requests of the Chairmen [Technical Issues.] at least that we are not at all attending any of the waiver of any Privacy Act or personnel law or law enforcement-sensitive information protocols be waived, also just understanding that only the audio recording except for, obviously, the purposes of the court reporter. And with those comments, sir, we appreciate the opportunity to make those statements. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: And our understanding as well is that the only recording is for the purposes of the transcription itself. With respect to the information received today, the committee intends to provide a public report on this, and in fact, has released to the public and interim report

of its findings to date. We will, as has been the committee's practice, and as was the committee's actions with respect to the interim report, prior to making any non-public information public, provide the agency, yourself, and counsel an opportunity to review information we intend to rely on, including information we learned from today's interview in advance of publication and with an opportunity to provide any factual corrections.

It is the committee's practice to honor valid common law privileges and claims, and accommodate a witness when those claims are made in good faith, and when a sufficient explanation been provided to the committee so that we can evaluate those claims. When deciding on whether to honor this privilege, the committee will weigh its need for the information against a legitimate basis to withhold it. This interview today is occurring without prejudice to discussions of the committee, and we reserve the right to request your participation in a future interview if necessary.

Finally, we would ask that you not speak about what we discussed today in this interview with anyone outside of the room today in order to preserve the integrity of our ongoing investigation. With that, before we begin, do you have any questions?

Witness: No questions.

HSGAC Majority: I'm now going to turn over to my colleague HSGAC Majority, who will begin our questions. We will spend again about an hour and then break. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. And, hi, Special Agent Witness. Is that the right title to -- or?

Witness: That's fine.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Like HSGAC Majority said, my name is HSGAC Majority HSGAC Majority, I also work for Chairman Peters. And just as a starting point if you could maybe give us a really brief high-level overview of your role and responsibilities with respect to the July 13th rally at Butler.

Witness: Sure. I was assigned as the command post/slash security room agent. And that function is typically one, if I were to make an analogy to something that's more common, would be to a dispatcher or a relayer of information. So, the role of the command post is to ingest information from different sources and then put that information back out.

HSGAC Majority: Okay, great. And we'll get into it to a lot more detail about that, but that's helpful at the start. As another preliminary matter, could you tell us if you have taken any notes either before the rally or afterwards with respect to the events on July 13th?

Witness: Notes? No. Like, handwritten notes? No.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. Thank you. And then a couple questions about your background. Could you tell us how long you've been with the Secret Service and in what roles?

Witness : Sure. I've been with the Service for a little over 24 years, almost 24 and a half years actually. I started in the New York Field office in 2000, was there for about 7 years, where I was assigned to several different squads to include counter-surveillance squad, the credit card fraud squad, and the protective intelligence squad, where I finished up doing 2 or 3 years on the JTTF.

From there I was transferred to the William Clinton Protective Division in Chappaqua when he was a former President with then Secretary or then Senator, Secretary Clinton. After about 5 years on their detail, I transferred up to the Portland, Maine resident office where I was there for about 2 years, a little over 2 years.

From there I had my first promotion. I was promoted to an assistant to the special agent in charge at the Raleigh Training Center, which is down here in Beltsville, Maryland. At the training center, I had led a couple of different sections. First one was the facility section, and then I had the judgment and tactic section. While I was assigned there, I had a temporary assignment as a shift leader, then Candidate Trump's 2016 detail. And while I was on that detail, I was selected to -- I had applied for,

and was selected for one of the in-residents master's degree programs here at the National Defense University.

So, I did that at the College of International Security Affairs, got my master's degree. Upon completing that I took an assignment in the Office of Protective Operations in the special project section at headquarters. After that assignment, I was promoted to the GS-15 rank as an assistant special agent charge at the Washington Field Office, where I led the criminal investigative section of that office. And from there I was assigned to the special agent in charge of the Buffalo Field Office, where I am now.

HSGAC Majority: Okay, thank you. And when was that last?

Witness: I transferred up to Buffalo in the Spring of '21.

HSGAC Majority: Okay, got it. Thank you. And can you describe your general responsibilities as the special agent in charge of the Buffalo Field Office?

Witness: Sure. So, as the special agent in charge of a district, I -- actually the district I'm responsible for covers all the way from Buffalo to Albany. Basically, everything in New York State, north and west of Ulster County. So, I have subordinate offices in Rochester, Syracuse, and Albany. And my responsibility is managing

all of the Secret Service activity across that district.

So, whether it's investigative, protective, intelligence-related, or protective operations-related. So that includes, you know, day-to-day personnel and administrative management, managing visits that may come into the district. You know, any sort of logistical concerns or assignments of my personnel. Really, anything that happens in the district.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And you said one of the other responsibilities is to oversee, you know, protectee events in the district. That's correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And since you've been the special agent in charge, can you give an approximation of how many protective events you've been involved in?

Witness: Sure. I mean, there have been at least 10, I would say, of varying levels from the President, the Vice-President to the Secretary of DHS, to grandchildren of the President. So, kind of the whole gamut of foreign dig or two. So the whole gamut of our protective, you know, types of visits we might have in a district.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And in your prior roles before becoming a special agent in charge, is it fair to say that you also had significant experience working on events for protectees?

Witness : I've done a fair amount of protection in my career, yes.

HSGAC Majority : Could you speak to, you know, what kind of specific roles you've held for protective events, whether you've, you know, worked advance teams as, you know, lead agents, or site agents, or?

Witness : Sure. I mean, I've done -- I've been a shift agent, I've been a shift leader. I have been an advance agent. I've done foreign advances for the Clinton detail, site advances. Pretty much any, you know -- the only thing I've never, I was never on the presidential detail or the vice-presidential detail, so I didn't do the lead advances for those, but I've been a counterpart on the field office level for those types of visits.

HSGAC Majority : Thank you. And then you said that you had a temporary assignment to then Candidate Trump's detail in 2016?

Witness : Correct.

HSGAC Majority : Could you talk about that a little bit more, what your role was?

Witness : It's every campaign season, there are a lot of temporary assignments for the candidates. So, I was assigned as a shift leader. I think I did two or three rotations at the beginning of that campaign before I went to NDU.

HSGAC Majority : And then so as the shift leader, did you ever have a role in the advanced process for his events?

Witness : No. The advance team is separate from the shift and the detail.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. Thank you. And amongst the roles you've had at various protective events, have you worked as a security room agent at previous events?

Witness : I have.

HSGAC Majority : Can you give an approximation of -- is it dozens of times, or five?

Witness : I would say a handful. The answer I gave yesterday was a handful. Five or six times.

HSGAC Majority : Do you recall the most recent time prior to July 13th?

Witness : Yes. The most recent time prior to that I believe, was in the spring. I believe it was Easter of 2022 on President Biden's trip to Northern Ireland in Ireland.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. All right, thank you. And jumping back to your current role now, could you describe briefly your current chain of command, who you report to directly and how many people you supervise?

Witness : Sure, sure. My supervisor, my direct supervisor is Deputy Assistant Director USSS DAD .

HSGAC Majority : And how many people do you supervise in

your role?

Witness: So, I have an assistant special agent in charge in the Buffalo office. And then an assistant to the special agent in charge in the Buffalo office. And then the office administrator. Those three people report to me directly. Then the resident agent in charge of the Syracuse office reports to me directly, and the now vacant resident agent in charge of the Albany office would report to me if the position was full.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. Thank you. And then talking about July 13th specifically, could you give us a sense of the chain of command on that day from your point of view, who, if anyone, you reported to on that day?

Witness: Sure. I reported to the site agent.

HSGAC Majority: To the site agent?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And did you have -- I guess we're going to get into some more detail about the security room itself. Was there anybody who formally reported to you on that day?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: Had you been to Butler, Pennsylvania, before?

Witness: Not that I recall, no.

HSGAC Majority: And could you talk about when and how

you first became aware that former President Trump was going to be holding a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania?

Witness: Sure. Typically, we find out about events from the Office of Investigations, the War Room, we call it the Manpower Section, where we get requests where we're going to have to provide personnel to fill assignments. I believe that's how I found out about this event initially.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And I'm going to show you a document. I don't know if about a sticker, but this will be Exhibit 1, a few pages of emails that were produced to us. It's more than -- I don't think it's all one contiguous chain, but it's Bates number 2614 through 2618.

[Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

Witness: Okay. Yes, these look familiar.

HSGAC Majority: And I wanted to draw your attention to an email on that first page, 2614. At the bottom half of the page. The email sent Wednesday, July 10th, at 12:39 p.m. Is that what you were referring to just now when you were talking about getting a notification of an event?

Yes.

And can you tell us what the -- you know, more specifically what the content of this email says?

Witness: It's essentially the War Room saying that they're going to need personnel for that visit for two --

well, the first request was for the FLOTUS visit to Pittsburgh. So it actually wasn't to the former President Trump visit. Our request was to fill spots for the FLOTUS visit, which I believe what I was initially assigned to.

HSGAC Majority: Okay, got it. And then, so this email on Wednesday, July 10th, was that the first notice you had that --

Witness: That we were going to be sending people to Pittsburgh for that weekend. Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And like you said, this email only talks about the FLOTUS visit. So, initially, you were not aware that that former President Trump was also holding an event the same day?

Witness: I don't remember exactly when I recall that there were going to be two simultaneous events. It may be in this email chain somewhere. I'm not sure.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall when or how you were specifically assigned to be the security room agent at the Trump event?

Witness: Sure. When we received the briefing materials, I believe it was the either -- probably Friday night, the night before the event, that's when I found out I would be working the command post the next day.

HSGAC Majority: And you just said that you didn't recall when the switch happened?

Witness : I recall, I think, when the switch happened, I believe it was on Thursday. I think I initially submitted myself to work the FLOTUS event. And then at some point, either on Wednesday or Thursday, I had a conversation with the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office and he suggested that he may want me to work the FLOTUS event -- I mean, the former President Trump event instead. Which I said, that's fine. It didn't matter. I was going to Pittsburgh either way.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And then you said that conversation was either Wednesday or Thursday. And could you tell us a little bit more about what you remember from that conversation?

Witness : No, it was a very pretty quick phone conversation. I think I actually called him to let him know that I was putting myself in to go to Pittsburgh just as a courtesy. You know, another SAIC going into another district. And said, hey, I'm coming in. I'm, you know, going to submit myself for the FLOTUS. We got asked for two people to work the FLOTUS event. And he said okay. Well, that actually may have been when I've learned about the Trump event because maybe on that call, he told me there was the Trump event. And he said I might switch you to that if you don't mind. And I said that was no problem.

HSGAC Majority : And do you recall if he said anything

else about why he wanted to switch you over to that event?

Witness : I don't remember any specific reasoning for switching me over. No.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And do you recall whether he mentioned anything specific about what role you would have or?

Witness : No. I don't think we talked about roles then, but going as another special agent in charge, I wouldn't -- I was not surprised that I was assigned to the command post.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And why would you say that?

Witness : Typically, you try to assign, you know, whoever is going to be one of the more senior folks on the trip to work the command post. So, I would probably have been the most senior person on that trip. So, it's pretty normal occurrence.

HSGAC Majority : And I guess two questions. Who would typically make that assignment of the security room agent and who --

Witness : The site agent makes the postings, the decisions, on who's going to do what post

HSGAC Majority : You said you spoke with the, the Pittsburgh SAIC, and that's --

Witness : SAIC Pittsburgh .

HSGAC Majority : SAIC Pittsburgh . And then did he -- I guess I

want to understand if he made that assignment, or was it the site agent that made the assignment?

Witness : I don't know what conversation he had with the site agent about who was going to do the assignment.

HSGAC Majority : But you didn't know what your assignment was going to be until the briefing materials on Friday?

Witness : That's my recollection, yes.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And then just to draw your attention back to Exhibit 1. On that last page on 2618, in the middle of that page looks like an email you sent on Thursday, July 11th at 10:53 a.m. saying, "Okay, great. There's a chance we might get switched to the --" and it's redacted, event. "They're occurring at roughly the same time." Is that the redacted word there referring to the Trump event?

Witness : I'm assuming it probably says the LES event. Yeah.

HSGAC Majority : And do you recall who you sent that email to?

Witness : This was the other agent that was going to Pittsburgh to work the FLOTUS event.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. Another agent under?

Witness : From the Buffalo office.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And just to clarify. I think we covered this, but the initial outreach requesting

personnel to work the FLOTUS event, did you ever get any specific assignments beyond just saying, yes, I can work?

Witness: No. The only thing is I put, you know, myself and the other agent in for the FLOTUS trip, and then through this chain of emails was eventually switched. The other agent stayed on the FLOTUS trip and I went to the LES trip.

HSGAC Majority: All right. Got it. And then after this initial email chain, could you talk about what other information you received about the rally prior to the 13th?

Witness: I received, you know, logistics information and briefing materials. I believe that all came -- well, the logistics probably came on the 11th. You know, like what hotel you're going to and that sort of thing. And then briefing materials, I believe came on the 12th, but I have to go back and look. But they were a standard briefing. You know, briefing material that you would get before any post standing assignment.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And I don't have the document in front of me, I think I know what you're talking about, but just to make sure we're clear. Did you separately see -- did that include the preliminary survey? Did you ever see that?

Witness: I believe the preliminary survey was included in that. Yes.

HSGAC Majority: In the post stander instructions?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall any other specific, you know, documents or materials that were included in what you received?

Witness: No. Just, again, the logistical information as well. But it was all via email, so I'm sure you have it all. Yeah.

HSGAC Majority: And was there anything specific to your role as the security room agent that you received in advance?

Witness: No. Just the site posting instruction. On the site post instructions, there's a brief paragraph about the command post in there.

HSGAC Majority: And prior to the 13th, did you receive any information or intelligence about potential threats related to the protectee or the event?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Majority: And then, so after you received those briefing materials and your assignment, what did you understand your main responsibilities were going to be on the 13th?

Witness: I would be working in the command post, you know, relaying information.

HSGAC Majority: And did you do anything before the 13th

to prepare? Was there anything that you had to -- that's a little bit vague. But were there any, I guess, more formal steps that -- you know, any paperwork you had to do, any, you know, boxes you had to check before showing up at Butler Farm Show?

Witness : No. Just making sure I had all my equipment and gear, and packing up and driving to Pittsburgh on the 12th.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And so, you said you drove to Pittsburgh on the, on the 12th?

Witness : I did.

HSGAC Majority : And on the 13th, that was the first time you arrived at the rally site?

Witness : Correct. The morning of the 13th.

HSGAC Majority : Do you recall approximately what time?

Witness : I believe the briefing was scheduled for 10:00 a.m.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And again, talking about before the rally began on the 13th, did you receive any information either formally or informally about the security room set up? Either where it was going to be, who was going to be there, or what equipment they would have?

Witness : No. I mean, other than what was in the briefing materials that I believe it did list the building that it was going to be in, and then the equipment that

would be there. It's a very standard setup that we have at that time for a command post or security room which, of course, for this event it was both. So, I knew that there would be what we call a LES radio which is just a larger version of a LES radio, and that I would have my work-issued cell phone and my LES radio. LES LES.

HSGAC Majority: And who do you know who was responsible for making the decisions about the location of the event and what equipment would be there?

Witness: Typically, that would be the site agent.

HSGAC Majority: And did you have any conversations with the site agent prior to the 13th about the setup in the room?

Witness: About the setup in the room? No. I think I only had one brief email exchange with the Trump division site person on the evening of the 12th, just about logistics, and if it was okay, if I drove myself to the event. Which she said it was.

HSGAC Majority: And that was you said from the Trump detail, Agent Site Agent?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And I assuming she's the site counterpart, correct?

Witness: No. My understanding is that Agent Site Agent

--

HSGAC Majority: Correct.

Witness: -- was the site agent. The site counterpart was an agent from the Pittsburgh office.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And so, Agent Site Agent, as far as your understanding was, would've been responsible for the setup of --

Witness: She was the site agent. Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And so, prior to showing up on the 13th, did you know who would be -- other than yourself, would be assigned to be present in the security room?

Witness: Well, typically, we only have, unfortunately, one person assigned in a security room or a command post.

HSGAC Majority: You mean one Secret Service?

Witness: Yeah. One Secret Service. Yeah. I didn't know what other entities may be in that command post until that morning.

HSGAC Majority: Is that typical to not know what other entities will be there until the day of --

Witness: Until the briefing. Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And so, on the briefing the morning of July 13th, did you get more information about who would be in the security room?

Witness: Yes. They mentioned that there'd be a

representative from the Pennsylvania State Police, and someone from the Butler County Emergency Services for medical and fire issues. And that there'd be representatives from the site itself, you know, if there were any facilities-type issues.

HSGAC Majority: And who gave that briefing on the morning of the 13th?

Witness: Both the site agent and the site counterpart conducted parts of that briefing.

HSGAC Majority: So, do you recall which one of them gave the information about the security room?

Witness: I don't.

HSGAC Majority: And before you got to the site on July 13th, were you aware that there was going to be a separate command post led by Butler County law enforcement?

Witness: I was not.

HSGAC Majority: When did you find out that that was the case?

Witness: Really, it only became apparent to me throughout the day in my conversations with the Pennsylvania State Police representative. It was never really talked about. It was more assumed that he was talking to other people somewhere else.

HSGAC Majority: And in your experience, is that a typical setup, a typical situation to have separate command

posts?

Witness : Typically, every site is a little bit different and every locality is a little bit different. But generally, it is preferred to have all the agencies that might be represented at a particular site together.

HSGAC Majority : And you said that you've worked as a security room agent at other events. In your experience, would you normally find out, you know, which state and local agencies would be represented earlier in the planning process?

Witness : No. The timing of finding out who was going to be in there was normal. When the post standers come in, we're not involved. None of the post standers are involved in any of the planning whatsoever.

HSGAC Majority : And what was your understanding of who would've been involved in ensuring that the appropriate representatives were in the security room?

Witness : The site agent.

HSGAC Majority : And then just to -- I know you've addressed this. To be completely clear, did you have any role in planning or going over the plan for communications in the security room before the 13th?

Witness : No.

HSGAC Majority : And so, you mentioned that you said it became apparent throughout the day that there was a second

command post through your discussions with the PSP representative. And that's Sergeant PSP Site Liaison. Is that correct?

Witness: That's what I remember his name to be, yeah.

HSGAC Majority: Could you talk a little bit more about how you came to realize that there was a separate post?

Witness: Just from him being on the phone with other people, that was clear. He was talking to other law enforcement. Again, it was never -- I don't explicitly remember a point in time where I was like, "Oh, there's definitely another command post." I just knew he was talking to other law enforcement somewhere else, in addition to other Pennsylvania State Police troopers on his radio. But most of the communication throughout the day revolved around communication with the Pennsylvania State Police.

HSGAC Majority: And when you say most of the communication that day, most of your communication, or?

Witness: Correct. Most of my communication. Because Pennsylvania State Police were all inside of the site, and that's where most of the activity was occurring throughout the day.

HSGAC Majority: And that communication, was that all through Sergeant PSP Site Liaison?

Witness : Yes. He was the only representative in there.

HSGAC Majority : And can you talk, I guess, maybe generally about what the radio traffic was like throughout the case before -- specific questions about Crooks, and all that. But just earlier in the day, what was the general flow of radio traffic?

Witness : So, it was a very, very busy site. I think in earlier testimony, I've said it was one of the busier sites I've ever worked from a command post perspective, the amount of traffic that was coming through it. You had 15,000 people who had been essentially standing out in the sun for five or six hours, maybe even longer than that. If you count the time before the gates even opened and people were lined up there was an inordinate number of medical calls that were coming in to the command post directly from our post standers.

So, all those calls would come into me, and then I would have to turn to the Butler County EMS representative and say, you know, post 210 has another medical main checkpoint, another medical. And there was a constant flow of dispatch of medical personnel to people who were, you know, having issues in the crowd.

Throughout the day, we had two or three lost children, one of whom actually spent some time in the command post

and security room until they were reunited with their family. We had lost property coming into the command post and security room. We had a call about a media truck that was going to set the ground on fire. So, we had to figure out how to get fire trucks to that.

We had you know -- and then, there's these standard calls about a package needing to be swept, or, you know, so calls for K9 EOD, or just the normal radio traffic that you would expect. But there was a lot of traffic that day.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. Can you talk a little bit about just the physical setup of the room, how big it was?

Witness: Sure. It was a relatively large room, kind of in a standalone building. And there were essentially card tables or tables of about this size. You know, the six-foot, eight-foot tables set up in a big ring configuration. That was pretty much it. There was one door out the front, and then there were two small windows to my right. And there was a little kitchen in the back and a restroom.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. But small enough that you could talk across the room --

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: -- verbally to others who were there. And you said you were the only Secret Service person assigned to the room. Were there others who were in and

out of the room during the day that you recall?

Witness: Yes, there were. The security room also functioned as the -- what we would call the down room. So, when the agents were getting relief from their post, it's where they would come. The site agents were in and out of the room throughout the day. The PI response and the counter sniper, CS Response Teams, were in and out of the room all day.

Other Pennsylvania State Troopers who were doing the same thing, who were being pushed, were in and out of the room all day. Our Uniformed Division personnel who were working the magnetometers who were on break, in and out of the room all day. And then at one point the agent assigned to work the UAS detection system, ended up taking up residence and setting up his station in the security room.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And is there a log of who came and went from the room all day?

Witness: We don't keep -- I've never seen a log of who comes and goes. That's not a standard practice of ours

HSGAC Majority: And we've heard from others that there's a security room book. Is that something different?

Witness: That's the command post -- well, the security room book would've had all of those same briefing materials in it; the preliminary survey, the site diagrams. And then there's also what we call a command post log,

which is simply just a record of the protectee movements.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. But not a log of --

Witness: Not a log of people coming and going. It's just the protectee movements.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And then, sorry to jump around a little bit. Going back to the morning of the 13th, you said the initial briefing happened at 10:00 a.m. Could you talk about what you did after that briefing?

Witness: Sure. After we concluded the briefing, pretty much everybody went up to the security room to drop off their gear and get ready to start going out on post. While they were doing that, I was configuring the radios and getting my materials set up.

Initially, they had set up the radio in a place where my back would've been to the door, which I didn't want. So, I moved the radio. I had to enlist the help of the Butler Farm Show personnel there to find me an extension cord and a power strip. So, I set up my radio so I could at least look out the door of the command post. Got my radio set to the right channels. Got my paperwork out and ready, and waited for everyone to get on post so I could start radio checks.

HSGAC Majority: And then what time was it, approximately, if you remember, that you started the radio checks?

Witness : Sometime around 11:00, 11:15, maybe.

HSGAC Majority : And could you describe briefly what that entails, who you were checking with?

Witness : Sure. So, the radio check process is, once you know that everybody is on post -- you know, you wait for the site agents to come back and tell you, all right, everybody's on post. And then the way that I do it, I have my site post log there in front of me, and I just go down post by post. You know, "Post 202, radio check."

First, I tell everybody. I go out on the channel, "Hey, I'm about to begin radio checks." Then, "Post 202 from security room, radio check," and I wait for them to get back to me. If they don't get back right away, you give it, you know, 15, 20 seconds, you move on to the next one. But the way I do it is I put a check mark next to everybody who answers up.

There were a couple people on that initial go through that didn't, and I had to go back around. And a couple more got it the second time around. And then there were one or two where either the CS Response Team or the PI response team, I don't remember which one, actually went out to the post to make sure that they were all set. So, a couple of the HSI agents were having some issues with getting the code properly loaded on their radio. So, we had to make some -- you know, troubleshoot that. But we

eventually got it straightened out.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And talking about the radios. So when you did the checks, was that just for the post standers or were you also checking with the shift agents and the tactical folks?

Witness: So, at that point the shift agents aren't -- I mean, we're setting up at 11:00. I don't know where they're at. They're in a different state. So can't do anything with them. The tactical, same thing with the CAT team. They're traveling with the protectee. Did the radio check with the TSD lead, for sure. And the site agents were in the room, so they were on the radio. So, they were up and running.

And this was a question I was asked yesterday, specifically, about if I did a radio check with the counter sniper team. And I answered yesterday, no. I thought about it last night. It's because I didn't do the radio check. They don't go up on post until much later in the day. And when they went up on post, they radioed into us to say that they were on post, so. But that was later in the day. And that initial round of radio checks, I was able to contact all of the posts by the time we were done. And once that's done, that allows TSD to begin their sweeps.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And at that point, were the

other state and local officials also in the security room while you were doing the radio checks?

Witness: Yes, I believe they were there.

HSGAC Majority: And did you have any communication with Sergeant PSP Site Liaison, or with anybody else to make sure that their communications were working well?

Witness: I mean, I didn't have a specific conversation, but he was on the radio with his folks. And I mean, before we were even set up, we were getting medical calls. So, I knew that the EMS guy was able to talk to his folks.

HSGAC Majority: But there's no -- I guess my question is, is there any kind of like standard operating procedure where as the Secret Service security agent, you would check in with the other agencies and make sure that they're operational?

Witness: I don't remember specifically asking him if his radio was working, no. But that wouldn't be necessarily something that I've ever done before.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And then could you speak to the different channels or frequencies that the Secret Service was using that day?

Witness: Yes. And I'm going to pull out just one piece of paper here because I keep forgetting what we switched to and from, and I don't want to say it wrong. We

started out that the shift was going to be on LES [redacted]. So, when we do these initial radio checks you know, the shift is not included in that at all. So they were on LES [redacted], and initially everybody that was on the site was going to be on LES [redacted]. And we stayed on LES [redacted] for quite a while throughout the day.

So, we operated on LES [redacted] most of the day. But it wasn't until much later in the day where we -- when both visits were occurring at once that we started getting bleed-over from the First Lady's visit on LES [redacted], and we had to make a switch to LES [redacted] at that time, LES [redacted].

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: Got it. And I'm going to introduce -- we'll mark Exhibit 2. I think it's an email. I'll give you a second to take a look.

[Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: Sorry. And while we do, just one clarifying question. What were you referring to to refresh your recollection?

Witness [redacted]: Oh, this is a printout of the site post instructions that I made prior to coming down here to DC so that I could remember this.

HSGAC Majority [redacted]: And one other clarifying question. You mentioned several times now testimony you gave yesterday. Who was the testimony to?

Witness : The House version of this -- these committees.

HSGAC Majority : Have you testified with respect to the events of July 13th to anybody else besides the House?

Witness : Yes. This is about my sixth interview.

HSGAC Majority : Can you just list those?

Witness : Sure. The day after I had an interview with the FBI. A couple of days after that was a joint interview with the FBI and Pennsylvania State Police. Then I had the Mission Assurance, Secret Service. Internal Mission Assurance interview. And then, I had the independent review panel or board interview, and then yesterday the House.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And so, the email or the document I just introduced, that's marked Bates Number 2953. There's a couple emails on that page. Do you recall receiving these emails?

Witness : Yes. This, I believe, at least the one here that says it's from Phoenix, that was the site PI person sending out that we had switched channels because I was putting it out. I also put it out over the radio, but she did this as a backup to email everybody as well.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. You answered my next question. Just to make sure that this was what you were referring to with the bleed-over from the FLOTUS visit. And there's the

first email is at 4:28 p.m., and you said that was sent by the protective intelligence agent?

Witness : The PI site team Agent. Yes.

HSGAC Majority : Saying all post standers, and site, to advance, switch radio traffic. And that would've been from LES ?

Witness : Yes. I think we briefly tried LES , but very briefly. We didn't really spend any time on LES . There was also bleed over on that. So, the final switch was from LES .

HSGAC Majority : And so, that's the second. There's an email about 15 minutes later at 4:42?

Witness : Yes, that would've been it.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And who makes the call to switch the radio frequency?

Witness : So, in this instance, I called SAIC Pittsburgh, the SAIC of Pittsburgh and asked him, I said, hey SAIC P , we're having some trouble on the radio here with bleed-over from the First Lady's visit. Who would you like me to switch? And he said, well, let's switch the posts standers at the LES rally. And then left it up to us to find the channel that worked. But we made that decision, you know, talking on the phone, he, and I.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And then you said when that change was made, you put it out over the radio prior to

this email being sent?

Witness : Yes. Both switches went out over the radio, and I redid radio checks as well.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And then, so when you redid the radio checks after this email came out at 4:42 you were able to confirm?

Witness : Yes. So eventually, we were able to confirm with everybody again. It did take -- I think we had to go out to one post to make sure that they had heard the messages or got the messages. But we did get everybody on the same page.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And were there any other radio problems you were aware of that day?

Witness : Just the coding issue. It's always an issue for us. It seems like getting everybody with the proper code, with the amount of times that we switch code. We switch code LES , which I understand from a security perspective. But you know, other than that, things seemed to be working okay. I mean, the bleed-over, that was a significant issue that we had to troubleshoot. I'm not aware if any individual person was having individual problems with their radio, but none that were necessarily brought to my attention.

HSGAC Majority : And as the security room agent, it wouldn't have been your role to, I guess, troubleshoot

aside from doing the radio checks that --

Witness: Yeah, I mean, I have no special technical expertise. If the radio was completely broken, I wouldn't know how to fix it.

HSGAC Majority: And is that something that should be conveyed to you as a security room agent if someone is having a problem with their radio?

Witness: Yes, I think so.

HSGAC Majority: And we had heard in prior interviews that Special Agent Lead Agent had trouble with her radio, and that SAIC Pittsburgh had given her his radio, so that she'd had it working with that the day. Was that something that you were aware of at the time?

Witness: I wasn't aware of that until Special Agent SAIC urgh actually arrived and came into the command post. That jogs my memory. He came into the command post and was actually looking for the key loader so that he could try to put the code into her radio, because again, both of them were not at the site. They arrived with the motorcade.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And you said a little while ago that that coding is often an issue. Could you talk a little bit more about that and how that impacts events?

Witness: It's just oftentimes hard to -- you know, we sometimes have this, what LES [redacted]. Some cities, it works, some

cities it doesn't. I know I've had some difficulty with it in my own district, and I've tried to work to find solutions with our CIO's office to make that happen. It's just a reality of the technology. I can't speak to why it is. I don't have that technical background.

HSGAC Majority: And for technical issues during events, who would be the person that folks would go to to troubleshoot?

Witness: LES [redacted] At this time, you know, at the time of the event, I should say, for candidates or other protectees that aren't the President or Vice-President, those capabilities were never available to us.

HSGAC Majority: And do you know if that's still the case or if that's changed?

Witness: I haven't worked a campaign event since the 13th, so I am not 100 percent sure what the footprint looks like from that perspective. I will say I've had, for example, a DHS Secretary visit, and we're still on our own for that.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. So, jumping back to the

security room on July 13th, and you've talked about this, but just to confirm. In the security room, did you personally have any direct access to radio transmissions on the Pennsylvania State Police or Butler County radio channels?

Witness: No. I mean, I could occasionally hear traffic on the Pennsylvania State Police Radio just because he was, you know, sitting six feet or so away from me, but not that I was like listening to or hearing the traffic. And that was all to my knowledge, Pennsylvania State Police to Pennsylvania State police traffic. There was no other local radio traffic in the command post that I would've gotten. And I was also occasionally hearing the Butler EMS radio traffic. Kind of similar to the Pennsylvania State Police.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And as far as you were aware, did any of the other state or local officials in the security room have direct access to the Butler County ESU radio channels?

Witness: I'm not aware if they did or didn't.

HSGAC Majority: And throughout the day, and I apologize, I think you might have touched on this, but just to remind me, your primary contact was through Sergeant PSP Site Liaison, and you said you learned throughout the day from his phone calls that he was in touch with the other command post.

Did you have an understanding of his access to whether he had a Butler County Radio or whether Butler County had a Pennsylvania State Police radio?

Witness : I did not have knowledge of exactly who he was communicating with or by what means.

HSGAC Majority : And again, based on your experience working with state and locals at other events, did you have any expectation? You know, would you have assumed that they would've exchanged radios or just kind of leave it up to them to figure out their plan?

Witness : So, from my experience, I would say that you would hope that all of the state and locals that were working together had communications with each other. But again, you would've also wanted that communication all in one place.

HSGAC Majority : Got it. And so, jumping forward in the day a little bit, I want to ask you about a few specific communications with Sergeant PSP Site Liaison from the local command post. But actually, before that, I want to show you one additional email.

Witness : Is there any chance we can take a quick bathroom break?

HSGAC Majority : Yeah. Let's take a five-minute break.

HSGAC Majority : Got it.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Majority: All right. Back on the record. I think where we left off, I was just about to hand you this email. I think this is Exhibit 3, and this is an email that you sent on July 13th at 5:38 p.m. The recipient is redacted, but our understanding is that that's Lead Agent that this email was sent to?

[Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

Witness: I believe that's correct.

HSGAC Majority: The email says, "Please give me a shout in the CP when you're able." Could you explain the context of this email, please?

Witness: Yes. I had gotten a question from the Pennsylvania State Police about where the motorcade was going to exit and how they were going to coordinate the motorcades exit with the exit of all the people. And they just wanted some clarification on what the plan was for that. So that's why I reached out to Lead Agent to have her call so that I could get the proper answer.

HSGAC Majority: And why did you send an email rather than calling or using the radio?

Witness: I don't know. I may have actually tried calling the cell phone. And as far as the radio, this would not be something that you'd discuss on the radio because her answer would've been much longer than what you

would want for radio traffic.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And did you ever get a response from her?

Witness: I never got a response from her, but I was able to get the answer. And I forget if it was from one of the site agents who came into the room at the time, but we were able to get the answer. So, this issue resolved itself, so I never revisited it.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. Got it. Thanks. And to jump a few minutes ahead on the 13th to around after the time that local law enforcement, as we now know, you know, first identified a suspicious person who turned out to be Crooks, could you tell us when you first learned that local law enforcement had identified a suspicious individual?

Witness: Sure. It was around 5:45, 5:50 timeframe, when Sergeant PSP Site Liaison mentioned that a local tactical team was looking for a suspicious person.

HSGAC Majority: And that's something he told you verbally in the command, in the security room?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: And our understanding is that Sergeant PSP Site Liaison received a phone call from the Butler County command post that started at 5:44 p.m. Were you speaking to him while he was on the phone or after he had finished his call?

Witness : No. I think it was after he finished his call. He told me the substance of the call.

HSGAC Majority : And do you recall specifically what he said or anything that he said?

Witness : My recollection in summary of it was that there was a potentially suspicious person that the local police or local tactical unit had observed and was looking for.

HSGAC Majority : Do you recall if he told you the location of that person?

Witness : I believe there was some conversation. I don't remember if he told me, or if I asked if it was inside or outside the perimeter of the event.

HSGAC Majority : And so, he then told you that it was --

Witness : It was outside.

HSGAC Majority : And do you recall if he said that the suspicious person was using a rangefinder?

Witness I do remember a mention of a rangefinder. Yes.

HSGAC Majority : And what did you do after you received that information from him?

Witness : So, at that time, Agent CI/UAS Advance ead was fully embedded in the command post. He was working from the command post at that point. So, I had a brief discussion with him about getting the particulars from Sergeant PSP Site Liaison

so that he could push it out to our CS Response Team and PI Response Team.

HSGAC Majority: He being Agent C/UAS Advance Lead

Witness: Agent C/UAS Advance Lead, yeah.

HSGAC Majority: And can you elaborate that, about that discussion for send -- you said sending out the CS Response and Protective Intelligence?

Witness: Yeah. Basically, the discussion was essentially, you know, get whatever information that is available and contact starting with the CS Response Team so that they could go out and start looking for the individual.

HSGAC Majority: And that was an instruction that you gave to Agent C/UAS Advance Lead?

Witness: Yeah. We had a discussion about it.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And your understanding was that Agent C/UAS Advance Lead then contacted CS Response?

Witness: Yeah. My understanding is that he contacted CS Response, and I believe he forwarded it a picture that he was able to get from Sergeant PSP Site Liaison.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. And was that picture forwarded to you as well?

Witness: Not at that time. I got it much later in the evening.

HSGAC Majority: Did you or Agent C/UAS Advance Lead notify the

counters snipers that CS Response was being sent out?

Witness: I did not.

HSGAC Majority: Do you know if Agent C/UAS Advance Lead did?

Witness: I don't believe that we notified them at that time.

HSGAC Majority: Is that standard practice to send out CS Response without informing the counters snipers?

Witness: So, the CS Response Team, you know, could be dispatched either from us or by them directly. So, it's not unusual to have CS Response respond to things that may have been picked up by somebody other than CS, which in this case it was picked up by somebody else.

HSGAC Majority: And you said you also discussed sending out Protective Intelligence?

Witness: Yeah. I believe that they were notified at the same time as CS Response, but through Agent C/UAS Advance Lead. That was my understanding.

HSGAC Majority: And did Agent C/UAS Advance Lead communicate anything to you after he had reached out to CS Response and Protective Intelligence?

Witness: No. Just that they were, you know, on their way to respond, to start looking.

HSGAC Majority: And other than Agent C/UAS Advance Lead, did you share the information with anybody else at that point?

Witness: No. We were the only two people in there,

or only two Secret Service that were in there. At that point, I believe there could have been people coming and going.

HSGAC Majority: So, did you consider sending the information out over the radio at that point?

Witness: I did not. Because at that point it's a, you know, just a suspicious person that is outside of the perimeter. So that's part of why asking if they were inside or outside the perimeter was important for me because if it was inside the perimeter maybe there was a particular post that could have responded as well.

But at events of this size and with everything that was going on, having a report of a suspicious person on the outside perimeter was not unusual. I would've been surprised if I didn't get one of those calls that day.

HSGAC Majority: Got it. And then at that point, do you recall the next time that you received information about the suspicious person?

Witness: I don't specifically recall receiving information about the suspicious person again, but I do recall hearing over the Secret Service radio that the local police were working a problem at the 3 o'clock.

HSGAC Majority: Do you remember around what time that came through?

Witness: In my recollection, it was pretty much

moments before the shooting.

HSGAC Majority: So, moments rather than minutes. Is that fair?

Witness: Yeah. I mean, to me the time was very compressed in real time.

HSGAC Majority: Do you recall Sergeant PSP Site Liaison having any other phone calls about the suspicious person between, you know, 5:45, 5:50 and when shots were fired that he told you about?

Witness: I don't recall any.

HSGAC Majority: Our understanding is that he received a phone call from the Butler County command post around 6:08 relaying that there was an individual on the roof of the AGR building. Is that something that --

Witness: I never heard that about the individual on the roof of the building. Again, what I heard was local police are working a problem at 3 o'clock. And so, unfortunately, the radios aren't recorded, so I don't know what time that came across the radio. But once I heard that, I was clicked onto our radios at that point.

HSGAC Majority: And, you know, during this 15-, 20-minute period from when CS Response and PI were sent out and when shots were fired, did you have any follow-up at all with Agent PSP Site Liaison or anybody else about, you know, like did they find him like, what's going on with --

Witness : No, I did not. At that time, I was just back to working the radios for the event, the arrest of the regular traffic. So, I was just waiting to hear an update if there was going to be one, if they were able to find the person.

HSGAC Majority : And when shots were fired, did you hear them from the security room or did you find out otherwise?

Witness : No, I did not hear the shots in the security room. What I heard was, "Shots fired, shots fired."

HSGAC Majority : Over the Secret Service radio?

Witness : Over the Secret Service radio.

HSGAC Majority : And do you recall any other conversations with Sergeant PSP Site Liaison at any point before shots were fired about what local or state law enforcement were doing to locate this person?

Witness : No. I don't recall anything specific, no.

HSGAC Majority : I think I'm going to turn it over to my colleagues for a couple of quick follow-ups. Thank you.

HSGAC Majority : You testified earlier about preparations for the week that your communications were largely with the site agent, that's Agent Site Agent. Is that correct?

Witness : During the week --

HSGAC Majority : In advance of July 13th, who did you speak with in preparation for the event?

Witness : Before July 13th, I only had one email with Site Agent Site Agent about logistics for that morning, and I spoke with SAIC SAIC burgh just letting him know that I was coming.

HSGAC Majority : When was the first time you spoke with Special Agent Lead Agent?

Witness : I don't recall. I don't think I ever spoke to her that day. It may have been the next day.

HSGAC Majority : That day being the 13th?

Witness : The 13th. I think I had some email. She sent an email or two with some of the paperwork on the 12th, but I'm not sure that I ever had a conversation with her until the following day.

HSGAC Majority : What did you understand Agent Lead Agent role to be?

Witness : So, she was the lead advance agent. So, in our protective model, the lead advance has overall responsibility for coordinating all the different aspects of the visit.

HSGAC Majority : And what's the distinction between that role and the site agent's role?

Witness : So the lead advance kind of has overall purview of the entire visit. So that's the site's airport, the motorcade routes, and having function of liaison with whatever local counterparts are being involved. The site

agents are responsible for the security plan for their individual site. So it's a little bit more narrow of a scope.

HSGAC Majority: If changes needed to be made to the communications responsibilities, who would be the most likely person to make those changes? The site agent, the lead advance, or the person in charge of the security post.

Witness: So when you say communication changes, what do you mean?

HSGAC Majority: If you didn't like the setup, if you felt the communications capabilities, the radios weren't as they should be, if you felt like the people who were going to be in the tent weren't sufficient, who would be the person to make those changes? You, the site agent, or the advanced agent?

Witness: So if there were an issue that I had identified earlier in the day, but again, I just want to reiterate everything, when I walked in that day, other than me moving the physical location of the radio was a very typical setup for us at that point. But if I felt like something was missing, that I had known was missing, I would've started with the site agent.

HSGAC Majority: Would you have had the authority to make any changes if something was missing, or wrong, or not how you wanted it?

Witness : So, typically, no. A post stander would not have that authority. Again, we're showing up there the day of the event. Everybody else has been involved in the planning for probably a week or so. So, I would be deferring to the advance team or continue the problem up the chain until we got to some, you know, whoever either field office supervisor or the detail supervisor, depending on the issue.

HSGAC Majority : But the first person on the chain would've been the site agent?

Witness : Correct.

HSGAC Majority : You mentioned in preparation the written materials were the only mention you saw of the setup that day. And correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe you said it, reference command post or security room, but in this case, both?

Witness : Correct. So for this particular visit, the command post and the site security room for the Butler Farm Show were one and the same.

HSGAC Majority : What is the difference?

Witness : So in the context of, say, a presidential visit, the command post is a separate entity, sometimes combined with like the airport security room where there's not a lot going on at the airport other than the arrival of the air of the airplane and departure of the motorcade. So

that is where the command post is, and where you would have, hopefully, command-level staff from all the agencies involved in the visit at a command post for, say, on a presidential visit.

And then the site security room would be just that the security room at a particular site to handle whatever issues or to relay the traffic of that day for that site security room. In this instance, they were one and the same.

HSGAC Majority: What would be a reason for making them one and the same?

Witness: In this instance, a reason could be distance between the sites. It could be personnel, you know, not having enough personnel. It could be logistics where it may make sense that you have your command post at the largest site because that's where most of the activity is going to happen for the visit. Really depends on each particular visit.

HSGAC Majority: When you saw that the command post and security room would be one and the same for this visit, did it raise any concerns for you?

Witness [redacted] LES

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned earlier that it was anticipated there would be 15,000 people there, and it was a hot day, and there were plenty of problems the day of.

Did the Secret Service ever verify the number of people in advance and in anticipation of the heat that day in preparations, et cetera? Did you anticipate there being problems or a large volume of work coming through this post based on the anticipated numbers and the heat?

Witness: Again, I wasn't involved in any of the planning, so I don't know what discussions were had about that leading up to that day.

HSGAC Majority: You also mentioned earlier that typically there's only one U.S. Secret Service personnel in the command post or security room. And correct me if I'm wrong, but you said, "unfortunately that's the case." Why is that unfortunate?

Witness: Well, I think this is a perfect example of what happened that day. Sometimes when things are going well, it works fine. But the volume of traffic that was going through the room that day and in the aftermath, particularly having another person. Again, the other thing too is you're one person working a cell phone in [redacted] different radio channels. So it's when you're trying to focus on three different things at once, it may be possible to miss something else.

HSGAC Majority: Have you recommended to anybody the need to change that practice?

Witness: I think I've mentioned it in every

interview so far.

HSGAC Majo: With respect to your learning about there being a separate command post, local command post that day, you mentioned that you only learned as events were occurring, and you heard PSP PSP Site Liaison talking to others. Approximately what time did you learn this separate command post to exist that day?

Witness: I can't give an estimate on that. We were in there -- we were in that room from, you know, 11 o'clock till the event started. So, it would be hard to guess.

HSGAC Majority: At any time prior to 5:45 or 5:50 when you learned of the suspicious person, did you determine that separate command post to be problematic in your view to dealing with events?

Witness: No. I didn't consider it an issue at that point.

HSGAC Majority: At 5:45 or 5:50 when you first learned, did you determine that it was problematic that you were getting this information secondhand?

Witness: I didn't determine it was problematic. It was obvious it was probably third-hand information at that point, but we got the information so it worked in that instance.

HSGAC Majority: Did you learn at that time that the suspicious person had a rangefinder?

Witness : I believe there was mention of the rangefinder. Yes.

HSGAC Majority : Well, you mentioned that you asked whether the person was inside or outside the perimeter. Correct?

Witness : Well, yeah, what their last known location was.

HSGAC Majority : Did you ask any other questions?

Witness : I had gotten the information that they were looking for a person that he was -- you know, I asked if he was outside the perimeter and they had mentioned the rangefinder. So, I think that was all the information I got.

HSGAC Majority : Had C/UAS Advance Lead not been there, what would you have done?

Witness : I would've done what he ended up doing, which was notifying the PI response and CS Response and trying to get them the same information that we got to them.

HSGAC Majority : And what would've been required in your mind for you to put that out over the radio?

Witness : Well, to put that we were looking for suspicious personnel over the radio, I would wait till there was like a threat or something specific to report rather than a person that we're just looking for.

HSGAC Majority : When was the first time you heard he was

near the AGR building?

Witness : I think that was in the initial report. I believe that was like his last known location.

HSGAC Majority : Had you seen the AGR building prior to going into the security room that day?

Witness : I had not.

HSGAC Majority : My name is HSGAC Majority . Just a couple of follow-up questions on that line of questioning about the separate command posts. I understand you said you learned later in the day that there was a separate command post for the locals, but you learned at the 10:00 a.m. briefing you said, which units would be represented in the Secret Service security and that did not include all local law enforcement. Was that your understanding?

Witness : Correct. But I also didn't know the full scope of what other local, there wasn't really a mention of what other local law enforcement other than PSP was going to be involved.

HSGAC Majority : But did you know at that 10:00 a.m. briefing when you learned who was going to be in the security room, did you, did you put it together that not all local units would be represented in the security room?

Witness : I didn't really put that together at that point, no.

HSGAC Majority : Okay. And you just became aware, you

became aware throughout the day as you were hearing Sergeant [PSP Site Liaison] receive information present at the rally?

[Witness]: Correct.

[HSGAC Majority]: So then you didn't have any different understanding about how you were expecting to receive local radio information. Your understanding before the 10:00 a.m. briefing and after was that Sergeant [PSP Site Liaison] would relay anything?

[Witness]: Correct.

[HSGAC Majority]: Okay. And you had said earlier about what the general role about the security room agent is, you said it was for relaying information. Can you say more about that? So was your job as the security room agent to relay everything you hear out to Secret Service radio?

[Witness]: Well, anything pertinent or, you know, there's certain traffic that's very standard that we're going to put out over the radio. But yes, it's not a -- you are relaying whatever information you get. Yes.

[HSGAC Majority]: But anything pertinent. So in other words, you have to make some decisions about not to relay some information?

[Witness]: Well, of course.

[HSGAC Majority]: Okay. And regarding the person on the roof, you had said earlier that you never became aware of someone on the roof before shots were fired. Is that

right?

Witness: No. My recollection is I heard the radio traffic about the local police working a problem at 3 o'clock,

HSGAC Majority: But nothing about a man on the roof?

Witness: I don't recall ever hearing anything about a man on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: So, I understand that the 3 o'clock radio was over Secret Service radio transmission, but you didn't receive any information from Sergeant PSP Site Liaison verbally about a man on the roof?

Witness: Again, I don't recall hearing that specifically. What I recall hearing at the time when everything started happening was over our radio, which is the radio that I'm focused on listening to.

HSGAC Majority: So, Sergeant PSP Site Liaison says that he was told at 6:08 that there was someone on the roof and that he relayed that to you shortly after that. So around 6:09, which would be two minutes before shots.

Witness Counsel: I don't think that's an accurate rendition of his testimony that he, did he say exactly it was SAIC SAIC Pittsburgh or if he would've, or he may have sent it to somebody else? I don't think that's a precise -- that's what he said.

HSGAC Majority: Well, let me ask you this way. That

doesn't ring a bell. Sergeant PSP Site Liaison telling you shortly before shots fired that there was someone on the roof?

Witness: No. Again, what I heard at the time in the room was that the local police are working a problem at 3 o'clock. Now, if he's claiming that he said that at,

Witness Counsel: I don't think he's claiming he said that. I think he's claiming he actually told C/UAS Advance Lead.

HSGAC Majority: But you did not hear from Sergeant PSP Site Liaison before shots were fired from you. From what you can recall that there was a man on the roof?

Witness: No. What I recall is that the local police were working at problem at 3 o'clock. And when I heard that on the radio, that's what I put back out over the Secret Service radio.

HSGAC Majority: What did you put back out?

Witness: I parroted back exactly what I heard so that whatever unit called it Security Room radio is a little bit stronger. I wanted to make sure everybody else could hear the same thing. So when that traffic comes in, I'm not only listening to it, I am then repeating back and waiting to hear what else comes back if anybody responds to it.

HSGAC Majority: Understood. Thank you. I think we'll turn it over to our minority colleagues

HSGAC Minority: And my name is HSGAC Minority, I'm

going to follow-up on a few things that our majority colleagues touched on. So I'm going to start with the man on the roof since we just ended there. So, my understanding as well is that PSP Site Liaison says that he relayed that to you at 6:09. That's our understanding. You say that you don't recall hearing that. Were you listening for that kind of update?

Witness Counsel: I'm sorry, but I'm going to have to interject again. I don't believe that's an accurate statement of his statement. I think he said something to the effect that maybe he would have said something simply because he was there

HSGAC Minority: Could someone could pull that up for me?

Witness Counsel: Why don't we just double-check and just to make sure. That's all.

HSGAC Minority: Oh, we will. I mean, what was your level of urgency here? Because, you know, in your response to the majority's question about the suspicious individual, you did initially say that they notified you of the range finder. Were you notified in the same conversation the suspicious individual had a rangefinder?

Witness: Yes, that was all the same conversation, I believe.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. I mean, is that something that happens often and protective events?

Witness : So the individual having a rangefinder was part of what made him suspicious and what we wanted to go talk to him about.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. And then you were waiting for some kind of update after?

Witness : Well, we dispatched a team to go look for him and they were looking for him for several minutes.

HSGAC Minority : And then what were you doing in that time? I mean, were you listening?

Witness : Yes, I was listening to the radios and doing the rest of the traffic, the rest of the movements, the rest of everything else that was going on.

HSGAC Minority : Did you feel any sense of urgency

Witness : At the time where we were just -- where we were looking for the suspicious person?

HSGAC Minority : I guess, let's start first with the man on the roof. Well, I mean at that time you didn't know about it, so.

Witness : So the Man on the roof thing, again, I never heard the man on the roof thing because I believe if the claim is that that was said out loud into the room, that that was probably occurring as I'm getting the same traffic of the local police are working a problem at 3 o'clock, which I'm listening to my Secret Service radio intently at that point.

HSGAC Minority : And are you only listening to your Secret?

Witness : Well, I'm trying to listen to as much as I can, but I typically can only listen to one thing at a time.

HSGAC Minority : Do you recall, I guess, the level of activity that was going on around that time, around 6:09

Witness : Precisely at 6:09, no. But I will say that at the time that the call came across that the local police were working a problem at the 3 o'clock, that the entire -- everybody who was in the security room definitely peaked up and was very much turned on.

HSGAC Minority : So, is it that the locals were working something at the 3 o'clock that raised it to enough of a threat level that you felt like you needed to communicate that out on the radio?

Witness : Yeah. I reported back what I heard on the radio that came across on the Secret Service radio from another Secret Service personnel. And to this day, I'm still not sure exactly who that was, who called that into the security room. But I'm listening for traffic on my Secret Service radio.

Witness Counsel : Can I just say that when you used the phrase "enough of a threat," there were between a suspicion and a threat, those are mutually exclusive categories and

they have completely different meanings. If you wanted to expound on your understanding of the difference between a suspicion and a threat?

Witness : Sure. A threat is somebody who has the capability to do immediate harm to somebody. So even in this instance, even if I had heard that there was a man on a roof, a man on a roof solely that is not necessarily a threat.

Witness Counsel : But that's a hypothetical that --

Witness : It's 100 percent hypothetical.

Witness Counsel : Describe the difference in your mind between a suspicious suspicion and an actual threat. The difference.

Witness So, suspicion is someone who is suspicious, is someone who needs to be talked to, investigated to determine what their intent is, if they have any, to do any sort of ill will. A threat is someone who is actively displaying the capability to do harm.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. And you mentioned before the fact that it was relayed to you, you I guess asked where because of that? I think, you know, you weren't as concerned as if inside the perimeter.

Witness : I never said I wouldn't be as concerned. I said it would differentiate potentially who we might dispatch to investigate that individual.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. So how would that have been?

Witness : Because if the person was inside the perimeter and he was in the vicinity of a particular post, we could have enlisted the assistance of that post to potentially, you know, find that person quicker. Someone on the outer perimeter, there's really only two assets available to us from a Secret Service perspective to dispatch. And those would've been the PI response and the CS Response because they're really the only people who are capable of leaving the interior secure perimeter to go on the outside to look for somebody. Everybody else has to maintain and hold their particular post.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. Because, I mean, we're having this conversation, but at the end of the day, it's not a hypothetical. The suspect was on the outer perimeter. He got up on the AGR building, he shot, he hit the protectee, and he killed someone, and hurt other people. So, I mean, the threat, you know, whether or not you recognized it at that time, it seems like there was some urgency. So that's what we're trying to understand is what folks were doing and why information was or wasn't relayed. So what did you relay out of the security that day?

Witness : Just in general all day long?

HSGAC Minority : I mean, how many transmissions did you put out from the security room then?

Witness : I have no idea how many, but it had to be -- oh, I don't even want to guess. I mean, I was on the radio a lot during that day.

HSGAC Minority : And were they all related to medical? Were there any other suspicious individuals?

Witness : I don't recall any other particular suspicious individual call. There were a lot of medical calls. There were a lot of calls for -- again, you know, we had the fire incident, somebody trying to report a domestic assault to one of our posts. We had, you know, the typical calls for requests for site agents to come to post to deal with an issue or, you know, staff had a question or a guest had a question. I mean, there was -- you know, like any other typical site, it was a lot of traffic. A site that big is always going to have a lot of radio traffic.

HSGAC Minority : And then were you relaying some of that information out?

Witness : All of it.

HSGAC Minority : So, I guess that's what I don't understand is why then you didn't relay out a suspicious individual if you were relaying all these other things out that day?

Witness : So, for a common practice for us is if there is a suspicious individual, you dispatch the two

teams to go look for and find out if the individual is in fact suspicious.

HSGAC Minority: So is the communication standard less for suspicious individual than it is for medical or for other things you may have to communicate out of the radio?

Witness: No. In this instance, the appropriate people who could deal with a suspicious person outside of the secure perimeter were dispatched.

HSGAC Minority: What time did former President Trump get on the stage?

Witness: I'd have to -- I don't know exactly the time he went on stage.

HSGAC Minority: Do you know if it was after you received the initial reports at 5:45 of the suspicious individual?

Witness: I believe it was after. Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Our understanding, I think is, it was around 6 o'clock. So you know, there was time to potentially not have him go on stage. I mean, none of this was something that was discussed in the security room?

Witness: So as we've discussed this timeframe here, we were looking for this person for it sounds like 15 minutes or so. If you're saying he went on stage at 6 o'clock, I highly doubt that they would've held him off stage for 15 minutes while we were trying to look for somebody who could have been anywhere.

HSGAC Minority: But they didn't have the information about the suspicious individual from the security room?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: So they wouldn't have been able to even make that determination?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. You mentioned earlier, I'm going to back earlier in the day that the CS or PI Response Team you actually went out to help them out with their radio at one point earlier that day?

Witness: I did not. They went out to help other posts. This was well before arrival when they're, you know, kind of, you know, just down waiting. I think, in fact, it may have even been before the CS teams were even up. So the CS Response agent at that point is really just a relief agent.

HSGAC Minority: And you also mentioned that they were both, I think, the CS Response and the PI Team were in and out of the security room that day?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: How many times were they in and out?

Witness: A dozen or more.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. You also mentioned that the PI agent she sent that out secondary backup to what you'd put out on the radio transmission. How did send that out? Was

she in the security room?

Witness: Yeah. She was in the room at the time. And since all those email addresses would've had to be hand typed in, because a lot of them were HSI and they wouldn't just pre-populate on her phone. She volunteered to do that.

HSGAC Minority: So she was in the security room around 8 28 and probably for a little before that if that's when the email was sent -- or 4:28?

Witness: Yes, yes.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And do you recall how long she in security room? I'm just trying to get a sense of whether or not she was patrolling the area kind of in the 5 o'clock, you know, when you started getting these reports about a suspicious individual.

Witness: I do not believe that she was in the security room when that report came into us at 5:45, 5:50.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And so you don't recall about how long after four twenty eight it was that she left?

Witness: She could have been in or out two or three times in that timeframe.

HSGAC Minority: And is the protective intelligence team roaming the site or they were kind of fixed in one location and waiting?

Witness: Really depends on the site and what's going

on. At this site, they were definitely out and about a lot. So I would say that the majority of the day they were roaming coming in and out back to the security room, you know, at times.

HSGAC Minority: Were you, you were on site during the soft opening for vendors and volunteers around, I think it was around 1:00-ish?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Do you recall hearing anything about or hearing something that sounded like shots or fireworks?

Witness: It doesn't ring a -- I don't really recall, no.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And you didn't hear anything like that after the fact agents hearing something earlier?

Witness: Not that I recall, no.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Who was the main protective intelligence agent for the Butler rally?

Witness: I believe he was from the Pittsburgh Field office. I believe his first name is Intel Advance Lead

HSGAC Minority: Okay. The woman -- is it Site Protective Intelligence Agent?

Witness: Site Protective Intelligence Agent was the post stander PI team agent?

HSGAC Minority: And she was the one that was actually

dispatched?

Witness : Correct, because Intel Advance Lead would've been with the motorcade.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. And she works for Secret Service?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority : Does she have any affiliation with FBI?

Witness : Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Minority : What is a task force officer, FBI task force officer?

Witness : Oh, I mean, at one point I was an FBI task force officer as well when I was in the New York Field office and I was on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. So that was my experience. I don't know if in her field office she's at some other task force. I have no idea.

HSGAC Minority : So it's just you're part of an FBI task force, not some title that you're dual?

Witness : I can only speak from my experience. Like for example, I have an individual in the Buffalo Field office who's our representative to the JTTF. So technically, he's a JTTF task force member, but that's all that that is.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. And so, were you aware that she was an FBI Task Force officer on July 13th?

Witness : No.

HSGAC Minority : And so how often did you interact with

her on the day of the event, radio traffic?

Witness: Pretty frequently. Again, she was in and out of the command post a lot. We've gone over some of the emails that I was included on or that she sent. I believe there was probably a couple of phone calls, but, you know, a normal amount for the PI response team for an event that size.

HSGAC Minority: Did you ever communicate with her about the suspicious individual or did she communicate to you anything?

Witness: Leading up to the event, leading up to the shooting or after?

HSGAC Minority: Leading up. We can start with leading up.

Witness: I believe that the communication she got came through, you know, the picture and the other information I believe came either directly from Agent C/UAS Advance Lead or the CS Response agent gave it to her. I don't know exactly.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And then did she relay that information to you after the fact?

Witness: At some point, I do believe she sent me the picture of the individual, but well, after the event.

HSGAC Minority: And that was the first time that you saw the picture?

Witness: That was the first time I saw the picture. Yes.

HSGAC Minority: So, no one showed it to you in the security room?

Witness: No, I never saw it.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. When did you first become aware that the counter UAS system was not operational that day?

Witness: Sometime after sweeps had begun or, I don't know exactly what time he tried to start setting it up. But Agent C/UAS Advance Lead did come into the security room and say that he was having difficulty getting it set up and that he was trying to find a new location to set it up to see if that would help him get it working.

HSGAC Minority: And did it?

Witness: Yes. He was eventually able to get it working. He spent a considerable amount of time on the phone, I believe, with the technical support for the vendor for the equipment.

HSGAC Minority: Do you recall around what time it became operation?

Witness: The only thing I remember is that he mentioned that he had to -- he waited until 4 o'clock, until there was a new person on the other end of the technical support for the vendor. And so, it had to be after 4 o'clock because that was when he was able to

resolve the problem.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And I mean, did that concern you at all, that counter UAS system wasn't operational for the better part of the day?

Witness: Well, frankly, when I arrived there I was very surprised that there even was a counter UAS system. That was not typical at all at that point for a candidate to be receiving that.

HSGAC Minority: And you found out when you arrived at the event?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Are you aware that former President Trump has specific and credible threats against him from a former country related to drones?

Witness: I am not. Other than what I've heard in the news.

HSGAC Minority: You weren't aware of that prior?

Witness: No.

HSGAC Minority: So you weren't aware of the CAS system in advance. TSD outdoor site survey did talk about how there was going to be a CAS system. Do you recall that? Did you receive the TSD outdoor site survey?

Witness: It may have been in the initial paperwork, but I may not have caught the fact that there was a CAS in that survey, but we learned about it at the briefing the

next morning.

HSGAC Minority: Because the outdoor site survey specifically said that the site was vulnerable to drone threats and then I think IEDs, but specifically vulnerable to drone threats. So the site was vulnerable. The TSD put that in their survey. The drones, the counter drone system was inoperable for part of the day. So you did not communicate that out on the radio

Witness: That what the counter drone system was inoperable? I did not. I assume that Agent C/UAS Advance Lead would've notified whoever he needed to notify to get that system working. And it was working well in advance of arrival.

HSGAC Minority: But it was supposed to be operational earlier in the day, and it wasn't.

Witness: I'm not exactly sure what time would've been their details protocol for getting that operational before arrival. But much like counter snipers, not everything goes operational as soon as we start the site.

HSGAC Minority: Were there any reports of drones that day?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. If law enforcement that was working and securing the event thought that there was a drone detection system operable, I mean, is it, and they

weren't aware that it wasn't, maybe they weren't looking for drones and that could be an issue, is that not something that you guys thought?

Witness Counsel: Speculative, but I don't want you to speculate.

Witness: I'm not going to speculate. So why you don't just leave it at that.

HSGAC Minority: But you did know that the drone system wasn't operational, the counter drone system?

Witness: For a period of time, well before arrival, I knew that the agent responsible for setting up the system was working on getting it set up.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. When did you first find out that there were going to be counter snipers, is it the day of?

Witness: It may have been in the survey as well. So, either the night before or the day of, they mentioned them at the briefing for sure. That morning at 10 o'clock.

HSGAC Minority: SAIC SAIC Pittsburgh didn't mention that when he spoke with you?

Witness: I don't think so, no.

HSGAC Minority: Is it typical for candidates to get counters sniper support or at the time? Was it typical?

Witness: Absolutely not. I was actually surprised and very happy to see that they were going to be there that day given the nature of the event.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. Were you briefed or informed of any threats against either the protectee or the site?

Witness : No. Nothing specific, no.

HSGAC Minority : In your position as SAIC the Buffalo Office, you're familiar with threats, right? That's something that you guys investigate. I think I saw on June 26th, so 20 days before, there was an announcement that you guys had arrested or DOJ had arrested in coordination with your office someone for threatening President Biden?

Witness : Oh, yes, yes. Absolutely.

HSGAC Minority : And so, I mean, the nature of threats in the preliminary survey said there was no threat information.

Witness : Correct.

HSGAC Minority : In your experience, if there were threat information, would it be in the preliminary survey?

Witness : One would hope, yes.

HSGAC Minority : Is it a problem that that information was not in there?

Witness : Again, I don't know what the specific threat information is or if it would be capable of being disseminated in that way.

HSGAC Minority : How would information be disseminated if it's classified?

Witness : That would require, you know, trips to

SCIFs, and that sort of thing would typically -- I mean, it certainly depends on the level of classification. So again, not knowing what the level of classification is for whatever it is you're referring to it, I can't really say how they would've done it.

HSGAC Minority: If you had credible information of a threat, would that potentially change what you'd be listening for as the security room supervisor?

Witness: As the security --

HSGAC Minority: The person who's monitoring the radio traffic?

Witness: Sure. As the person who's monitoring the traffic. I would be listening the same way no matter what. You're always going to be listening to make -- you know if there's a threat. You're not going to just because there's a threat or no threat, you're not going to be any less diligent.

HSGAC Minority: But are there levels of -- are certain individuals have a heightened threat environment or certain sites, certain protectees, or does everyone have the same general threat?

Witness: Well, I --

Witness Counsel: You can answer that.

Witness: Yeah. I mean, I think it's pretty obvious that the President receives a certain level of protection.

The Vice-President receives a certain level of protection, LES [redacted] LES [redacted]. And then there are other protectees, you know, say, LES [redacted] LES [redacted].

HSGAC Minority: And so, in your role as SAIC, when you have a protective visit in your responsibility area, in your jurisdiction, do you send a letter typically to the FBI asking for threat information about the protectee?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Minority: Typically, do you get at least an acknowledgement from the FBI that they received that letter

Witness: Most of the time, yes.

HSGAC Minority: And have you ever actually received threat information from FBI in response?

Witness: Not during my time as SAIC at Buffalo, no.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. So, when DHS Secretary Mayorkas -- I think he said it was after July 13th?

Witness: Oh yes, it was recently. It was in September.

HSGAC Minority: You sent the letter FBI didn't share any --

Witness: I got a response back that there was nothing to share.

HSGAC Minority: You got a response back. Was there any

threat information that was shared with you.

Witness : On that visit, no.

HSGAC Minority : Or protectee?

Witness : Say that again?

HSGAC Minority : Or protectee, because I know there's also -- you may receive stuff from headquarters, Intelligence Headquarters, from anyone. Did you have any intelligence threat information related to --

Witness : Relating to July 13th?

HSGAC Minority : No. Related to Mayorkas's visit?

Witness : For particular threat information for the visit that we had in September?

HSGAC Minority : Yes.

Witness : No. The PI advance for that visit did this check. LES [redacted]

HSGAC Minority : Okay. And was there a counter surveillance unit for that visit, the Mayorca visit?

Witness : LES [redacted]

HSGAC Minority : And did he have CAT assets or any of that?

Witness : No.

Witness Counsel : We're starting to get well beyond Butler.

HSGAC Minority : I'm just trying to understand what's typical and what's not. I mean, LES LES LES, so I'm just trying to understand even though it's recent. That's fine.

HSGAC Minority : You said you asked Special agent C/UAS Advance L ad to Make context to the counter response and protective intelligence response when those calls came in. Why did you have him do that rather than you do it yourself?

Witness : Well, because of the nature of the information and getting the picture and all of that would've taken a -- it took some effort for him to do that to get the picture. It's not that easy to get a picture on our work phones from an outside source. And because he was there and was another pair of hands, it was just the most expeditious way of doing it and required the least amount of my attention being diverted from listening to the radios to have him do it.

HSGAC Minority : Forgive me if it sounds like a dumb question, but this issue has come up in a lot of different conversations we've had during this investigation. Can you receive a picture on your Secret Service radio?

Witness : On our radio? No.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. Earlier you said that you

wouldn't have been surprised if there had not a suspicious person call at this event. Why is that?

Witness : Just due to the nature of the size of the event, and given the weather that day, and the fact that people were out in the sun for so long. Really any event of that size, I've never really -- can't remember one big large outdoor event like that where there's not some sort of suspicious person at some point.

HSGAC Minority : Is there ever in any of those that you've been a part of where the suspicious person had a rangefinder?

Witness : Not that I recall.

HSGAC Minority : What is your current duty status?

Witness : My current duty status? I'm in full-duty status.

HSGAC Minority : Has it been the case since July 13th?

Witness : Yes.

HSGAC Minority : Have you ever been put on telework, administrative, or anything like that?

Witness No. We're going to go ahead and reserve the rest of our time for after.

PSI Minority : Hey, Mr. Witness. I'm PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office. on July 13th, how many suspicious individual calls did you receive?

Witness : The one that I remember is the one we've

been discussing.

PSI Minority: So the only one you remember is the one of Thomas Crooks?

Witness: Correct. There was in the aftermath a suspicious bicycle that was discussed, but that was kind of in the aftermath.

PSI Minority: In your role in the security room, would you receive all suspicious person reports, meaning did you receive information from Pennsylvania State Police, Butler, other local law enforcement?

Witness: All the information I was getting that would've been coming from the state police or local law enforcement would've come through the state police. I received no direct communication from any other police agency outside of the Pennsylvania State Police.

PSI Minority: So on July 13th, did the Pennsylvania State Police ever tell you about reports of suspicious individuals near the AGR property?

Witness: Yes. The person we discussed that we sent the people out to look for.

PSI Minority: So just Thomas Crooks?

Witness: Well, now we know to be Thomas Crooks, but at the time we did not know.

PSI Minority: So there was no other communications for the Pennsylvania State Police before the suspicious person

call of, you know, 5:45 p.m. on July 13th?

Witness : I'm not recalling one, but I'm not sure what you're referencing.

PSI Minority : So we understand from Pennsylvania State Police on July 13th sent out vice units looking for someone in a red shirt and a neon shirt by the AGR fence line. Does that ring a bell?

Witness : It does not really ring a bell. No.

PSI Minority : Do you know that Pennsylvania State Police had vice units at Butler on July 13th?

Witness : I'm not sure exactly what you mean by a vice unit, but I do know that the Pennsylvania State Police had postings all within the secure perimeter.

PSI Minority : Do you know if Pennsylvania State Police had plain closed officer officers at the Butler rally on July 13th?

Witness : Yes. There was at least one that I know of who was paired with our PI response agent.

PSI Minority : Do you know the name of that person

Witness : Of the Pennsylvania State Police person paired with the PI response yet? I do not know his name.

PSI Minority : And that individual that was paired with CST --

Witness : No PI response.

PSI Minority : PI response, that individual go out at

around 5:45 to look for Crooks?

Witness : I believe he was paired with the Secret Service PI agent, so they were worked as a team.

PSI Minority : Do you know if PSP had any other plain clothes officers at the Butler site embedded with Secret Service personnel?

Witness : Embedded with Secret Service personnel? The only one that I'm aware of is the trooper who was with the PI response agent.

PSI Minority : Do you know that trooper's name?

Witness : That's the name you just asked me. It's the same person.

PSI Minority : What other federal entities were you aware of that were outside of that were on the grounds on July 13th?

Witness : Other than the Secret Service and HIS, none.

PSI Minority : So, moving to after shots were fired at 6:11 p.m. on July 13th, what did you do?

Witness : Sure. So, I heard the call that shots were fired. I repeated that back over the radio. Very shortly thereafter that there was more transmission on the radio that the shooter was down. I, again, relayed that information back on the radio, and at that point, I told or instructed all posts to hold their posts.

In that time, the shift and counter assault team were obviously making their way to a departure. Once they cleared, I put back out on the radio for all posts to remain at their posts. And I was still getting -- you know, there were calls in for medical even at that point, obviously. And so I was working on dispatching those and telling all posts to hold and maintain their posts so that we could figure out the aftermath.

PSI Minority : You received information of a potential explosive devices found at the AGR property?

Witness : Yes. That came in all around that same time. It was all part of the same activity that there was a report. This was the bicycle that I mentioned earlier. So there were, you know, calls for TSD, and what they were going to do, and who they were going to contact to examine that "suspicious package".

PSI Minority : Do you know how many Secret Service personnel were sent to the AGR property after shots were fired at 6:11 p.m.?

Witness : After shots were fired?

PSI Minority : Yes.

Witness : I don't know specifically who responded other than I know that the PI response and the counter sniper response teams were in that vicinity, are headed to that vicinity. Other than that, all the other posts were

told to maintain their posts, which is, to my knowledge, they all did.

PSI Minority: When you were receiving calls about potential explosive devices found on the AGR property, were other law enforcement assets sent to the AGR property, meaning Allegheny County Bomb Squad, Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosive, ATF?

Witness: So, yes, in the aftermath there were people started responding to the scene and TSD coordinated that response of who was going to go and check out that bicycle. But I do believe there were local assets that did the render safe or that did the investigation of that bicycle.

PSI Minority: So the night of July 13th, were you still in the security room when devices were found in Crook's vehicle?

Witness: Yes, I believe so. I was there until about 12:30 that night.

PSI Minority: Can you describe to us how that was radioed in and what was told about the devices in Crook's vehicle?

Witness: I just remember there being discussion that the bomb teams were out and were looking at some other devices. And at that point, they were nowhere near any of our Secret Service posts, to my knowledge. So there was just the information that they were going to go examine

those other devices that was coming into the security room. At that point, there were a lot of different law enforcement personnel in and around the security room, so I'm only catching bits and pieces of that.

PSI Minority : Do you know what time the devices were found in Crook's vehicle?

Witness I do not.

PSI Minority : Can you guess?

Witness : I don't want to guess. No.

PSI Minority : But that information was sent into the security room on the night of July 13th?

Witness : I wouldn't say it was sent in. It was just something that was being discussed in the room.

PSI Minority : Where was Crook's vehicle discovered?

Witness : I don't know.

PSI Minority : You don't know that night of July 13th, or you still don't know?

Witness : I still don't know exactly where it was discovered. I know it was outside of the perimeter somewhere close to the Butler Farm Show, but I don't know exactly where.

PSI Minority : Was it near the AGR building?

Witness : I don't know exactly where it was found.

PSI Minority : Do you know the make and model and color of Crook's vehicle?

Witness : I do not.

PSI Minority : None of that information was talked about in the security room the night of July 13th?

Witness : It may have been talked about in the security room, but at that point, frankly, I was dealing with the aftermath of the potential assassination and was focused on that. I was not focused on the investigation that was starting by the FBI.

PSI Minority : Was there discussion in the security room the night of July 13th when devices were found in Crook's vehicle of clearing the area because of that threat?

Witness : I'm not specifically recalling how that all played out. I was honestly at that point, so much focused on dealing with the post standers that I still had there, the multiple calls I was getting, you know, about the event from Secret Service. I was not focused on what was going on with the ongoing investigation really at all at that point in the aftermath.

PSI Minority : Do you know if anyone in Secret Service was dealing with the discovery of devices in Crook's vehicle at that time?

Witness : If it would've been anybody, it would've been the TSD lead at that point.

PSI Minority : Who is that?

Witness : I believe his last name is TSD Advance Agent [redacted]

[redacted], maybe.

PSI Minority: Agent Witness, I just want to go back to something that was discussed earlier. I believe in response to one of my colleagues, you had said you'd never received a call of a suspicious individual with a rangefinder before that day?

Witness: I don't recall one.

PSI Minority: Okay. So fair to say, based on that hearing that somebody has a rangefinder in the proximity of a protectee is unusual, not something a Secret Service expects to hear at an event?

Witness: Yeah. Again, that's part of the reason why we determined that it was a suspicious individual.

PSI Minority: When you were classifying someone as suspicious or a threat, is that something that is a Secret Service policy that they say, hey, this is level that would meet suspicion, this is level that would meet a threat, or is this something it's a gut call on your part?

Witness: No, I mean, I think I discussed what would determine a threat prior, and that is somebody with the immediate capability of doing harm.

PSI Minority: Would there ever be an instance where you would relay out a suspicious individual to say a site agent or a lead agent at an event?

Witness: I mean, hypothetically speaking? Sure.

PSI Minority: What would cause you to relay that information to them?

Witness: Again, it would really have to be specific to the exact particulars of what were going on at that time in this hypothetical situation.

PSI Minority: But in this case, an individual who had a rangefinder near where the protectee was going to be approximately 15 minutes before a protectee takes stage, didn't rise to that level in your mind?

Witness: Again, we dispatched the teams that were available to investigate what was determined to be a suspicious person.

PSI Minority: And forgive me, I believe you said this earlier. Did you continue to check in with those teams?

Witness: Again, we dispatched the teams that were available to investigate a suspicious person, and I was awaiting information back from them, if they were to even have any information back.

PSI Minority: You didn't proactively reach out to them to check to see if they --

Witness: I, myself, did not.

PSI Minority: Did Agent C/UAS Advance Lead, to your knowledge?

Witness: I don't know if he did or did not.

PSI Minority: When they were dispatched, were they dispatched to the AGR building, specifically?

Witness : Agent C/UAS Advance ead was the one speaking with them on the phone, so I believe that they were told that that was their last known location. So I'm sure that that would've been the direction that they were heading in to go look.

PSI Minority : You said you worked PI, right, Protective Intelligence in the past?

Witness : Yes. I've had PI cases in the past.

PSI Minority : So if you were a PI agent at a thing and you heard an individual that was their last location, that would be where you would head his last known location?

Witness : Can you repeat the question?

PSI Minority : When he was a PI agent and if he worked PI, he would've headed to the individual's last known location to look for them.

Witness : I mean, sure. Unless there was some other information that I got to look somewhere else.

PSI Minority : Because I know we talked about this a little bit, I'm going to introduce Sergeant PSP Site Liaison testimony to the PSP and this will be Exhibit 4.

[Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority : Go ahead and turn to page 17. I know it's a large document, but we're only going to focus on pages 17 and 18.

Witness : Okay.

PSI Minority : The bottom half of page 17 saying -- and it's that last thing. "At 18:09, I received another call from Officer Butler ESU Commander saying the guy was discovered on the roof, and they had officers below," meaning municipals, not troopers, "that they couldn't like figure out how he got up there." So this seems to be talking about the same suspicious individual that we already talked about, that guy.

Then if you flip over on the back, now to page 18, he says, "At 18:10, I related this to the Secret Service that, hey, the guy is that, you know, is back and everything. And at 18:10, I called Corporal PSP CPL," and a little bit further down near the bottom, it asked, "And who was that communicated to?" And it says it, Witness, I was like, you know, we were in the room and like I'm moving fast." So, Witness would be you, right?

Witness : I believe that's who he's referring to, but, yes.

PSI Minority : And you don't recall any communication about an individual on the roof.

Witness : So, I think this is probably the seventh time I've answered this now, but no, because at that time, again, we were getting reports on the Secret Service radio of the local police working a problem at 3 o'clock. So

that's what I heard and responded to.

Witness Counsel: I just want to, again, point out the quote is, "It would be Witness." What I said earlier. He's speculating. He doesn't say he actually spoke to Witness. "It would be." So he's speculating that it was Witness. "It was like, we're in the room, and I'm like, moving fast." But this is not a distinct recollection that he said anything to Witness.

PSI Minority: I'm going to just challenge that that's speculation. I think that's your interpretation of what he's saying there.

Witness Counsel: I do.

PSI Minority: But, yeah, as far as I know, it's an answer to a question of who was that communicated to? It would be Witness.

Witness Counsel: It would be Witness, not it was Witness. Witness is proximate to the guy. I don't know whether he's confounding his recollection, but is by saying it would be, it's showing a bit of equivocation. That's it.

Witness: I'll say this. If I had heard that there was a man on the roof, I would've put that out on the radio instead of the local police are working a problem at 3 o'clock.

PSI Minority: Were you aware on that day that Secret Service counters snipers had also been alerted to the

suspicious individual?

Witness: I was not aware that day that they knew.

PSI Minority: When did you find out that they knew?

Witness: I believe it was during my testimony yesterday when I saw the Secret Service timeline for the first time.

PSI Minority: You didn't have any discussions with the Secret Service counter snipers that day after the shots have been fired?

Witness: No. I never talked to them after shots were fired.

PSI Minority: I turn it over to my colleague.

PSI Minority: Mr. Witness, my name is PSI Minority. I work for Ranking Member Johnson. Thank you for your time.

PSI Minority: You mentioned earlier that you had called SAIC SAIC Pittsburgh about switching your radio channels.

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: Why not call the site Agent Site Agent?

Witness: Well, because it involved the possibility of impacting both visits. So he needed to make a decision at which visit he wanted to impact as far as making that switch because we were either going to have to switch the FLOTUS visit channel or the Trump visit channel. So you know, I think it was most appropriate to reach out to him since there are two visits happening in his district.

PSI Minority: Did you ever subsequently inform Site Agent Site Agent about the conversation you had with SAIC SAIC Pittsburgh?

Witness: Yes. I mean, that was put out over the radios, and I believe she was probably included on those emails as well.

PSI Minority: You did not inform Site Agent Site Agent regarding the information you received about a suspicious individual after you received that?

Witness: Yeah. Again, the people who were notified were the [redacted] that could go out and respond and determine, you know, what the suspicious person was or wasn't.

PSI Minority: You mentioned earlier that you directly reported to Site Agent Site Agent on the day of the July 13th event?

Witness: Yeah. So the way that post standers works is on that day, whoever's standing post the site agent is in charge of that site.

PSI Minority: Why did you not relay the information about the suspicious individual to your direct report?

Witness: Because at the time, I believe that we had relayed the information to the teams that were best suited to go out and make a determination on what that information was.

PSI Minority: I understand that you relay to those

individuals, but why not also relay it to your direct report?

Witness: At that time, I thought that was the best course of action.

PSI Minority: Were you ever directly told that there would be a separate command post?

Witness: No. I don't ever recall being told that there'd be a separate command post.

PSI Minority: Is that a problem?

Witness: Again, it wasn't until partway through the day that I even made -- you know, fully figured out that there was a second command post. And I think I've already stated that it would've been advantageous to have everybody in the same room.

PSI Minority: Given your professional experience, have you ever worked an event where during the event you discover that there is a separate command post?

Witness: I can't say that during the event discovered, but I've worked several events where there have been multiple command posts.

PSI Minority: So, in this particular case, at the July 13th rally, it was unique that at this event you were not informed initially that there would be a separate command post?

Witness: I'm not sure unique is the right word. But

again, I wasn't taken aback by the fact once I learned that there were more than one command post.

PSI Minority: You mentioned earlier that you had a LES radio.

Witness: Yes. Just our common parlance for essentially a LES radio.

PSI Minority: But even on that LES radio, that only could that only receive Secret Service communications?

Witness: Yes.

PSI Minority: It could not access local law enforcement communications?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: Could it be, and forgive me if I misused this term, could it be coded to access local law enforcement communications?

Witness: I don't have the technical knowledge to answer that question, but I know that our LES radios and our LES radios only have our Secret Service channels, and some DHS, and our operability channels.

PSI Minority: I'm going to show you an email and mark it as Exhibit 5.

[Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: And I'll give you a moment to take a

look at it. You can just let me know when you're ready.

Witness: I'm ready.

PSI Minority: Mr. Witness, are you familiar with this email?

Witness: Yes. This came in, obviously, after the event, and it's coming from our LES, which is here in Washington, DC. This is a good example of one of the many questions and requests I was getting in the aftermath.

PSI Minority: The email is dated July 13th, 2024, at 7:33 p.m. And do you know what individual sent this email to you?

Witness: It would've been somebody who was working in the LES. I have no idea who was working in there that night.

PSI Minority: This individual writes, "Sir, do you have a status update on suspicious package or any other updates from the site?" What is the suspicious package in reference to in this email, that's

Witness: That's the bicycle that we've discussed earlier.

PSI Minority: Okay. And at the time of this email, what was the status regarding that suspicious package or the bicycle?

Witness: I don't remember exactly if the bicycle had

been cleared at that point or not. But I want to say that the bicycle probably had been cleared by that point.

PSI Minority: And how did you come to the understanding that it had been cleared?

Witness: I believe that TSD lead advance came back into the security room and let us know.

PSI Minority: Did you receive any similar communications related to the discovery of the explosive devices found in Crook's car?

Witness: Yeah, again, I think that was much later, and I don't specifically remember the particulars of that, just because it was not something at that point that I was focusing on. I was focusing on dealing with the aftermath and our personnel primarily at that point.

PSI Minority: Who discovered the bicycle

Witness: The bicycle who discovered it? I'm not sure which agency or which team initially identified it as a suspicious package

PSI Minority: At the time shots were fired, did you hear any radio communications regarding the location of the shooter?

Witness: Just the 3 o'clock.

PSI Minority: Anything more specific than that?

Witness: On our radio is what I heard was it's 3 o'clock and that was a suspicious person, but the shots

fired, didn't -- wasn't accompanied with a clock position.

PSI Minority: Besides a clock position, were any other specific locations identified as relating to where the shooter is?

Witness: No. What I remember hearing was shots fired.

PSI Minority: I'm going to go to the next exhibit, which I'll mark as Exhibit 6.

[Exhibit No. 6 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: I'll give you a moment to take a look at it. You can let me know when you're ready.

Witness: I'm good.

PSI Minority: Okay. Who did you send this email to?

Witness: This was sent to the lieutenant who was the supervisor for all of the Uniformed Division assets that were running the magnetometer detail.

PSI Minority: Who was that individual?

Witness: Her name is escaping me right now.

PSI Minority: Okay. And this is a July 13th, 2024, email sent at 11:55 p.m. You write, "Lieutenant, thank you again. Whenever you have the list of names, please send it my way. EAP will definitely be here tomorrow, and I will be coordinating with them as the POC on the ground here. As I get more, I will be sure to pass it along." What was

the list? What list of names did you request?

Witness: It was the list of names of all the Uniformed Division officers who were on the magnetometer detail.

PSI Minority: And why did you make that request?

Witness: Because I had been requested to make sure that all of the Uniformed Division officers on the magnetometer detail and all of the post standers stayed on Sunday rather than getting on their scheduled flights.

PSI Minority: Who told you to make that request?

Witness: It happened during one of my many conversations with headquarters personnel in the aftermath.

PSI Minority: So someone from headquarters?

Witness: Correct.

PSI Minority: And what is EAP?

Witness: EAP is the Employee Assistance Program.

PSI Minority: And how many people from EAP did you understand would be on the site the next day?

Witness: At that time, I don't remember if I had the number or not, but it was three that ended up coming.

PSI Minority: Okay. And in what way did you coordinate with them as the POC, point of contact on the ground?

Witness: Sure. I had some phone conversations with our EAP director or chief that evening. And then there was

some email conversation or traffic as well with the person who was going to be the leader of the folks that was coming the next day.

PSI Minority: And why were you going to be the point of contact on the ground?

Witness: I was asked by headquarters to do that, and I was available. I was still here. I was going to be here. And you know, it was kind of an extracurricular duty that I don't think that the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Office would've had the capacity at that time with everything else he was dealing with to take on.

PSI Minority: And in what way did you serve as the point of contact on the ground?

Witness: Sure. I worked with the administrative officer, I believe of the Pittsburgh office to make sure they got hotel rooms. I coordinated conference rooms at the -- at the hotel. All the post standers were staying at so that they could hold their counseling session. And I coordinated with the post standers and the magnetometer officers, you know, telling them what time these resources would be available to them if they wanted to attend.

PSI Minority: You may have addressed this earlier, but I just wanted to make sure that it's clear. Who made the radio communication that the locals are working a situation at the 3 o'clock?

Witness That's still not clear to me. When it came across the radio, I don't believe that the unit identified themselves or I didn't hear them identifying themselves. But it was definitely on the Secret Service radio.

PSI Minority: Have you learned after the fact who made that communication?

Witness: I believe I discovered that yesterday when, again, at my House testimony that it was one of the CS team personnel that made that communication.

PSI Minority: If now that you know that it was CS, does that refresh your memory in terms of hearing that radio communication and your response to addressing that situation?

Witness: Well, I know what my response to addressing that situation, it was, it was to repeat that radio traffic.

PSI Minority: It didn't make a difference to you that it would've come from one of the counters snipers versus another post stander or anyone else securing the rally?

Witness: No. I would've repeated the same information no matter who had said it.

PSI Minority: Has anyone from DHS or Secret Service instructed you not to speak with Congress?

Witness: No.

PSI Minority: I'm going to turn it over to my

colleague.

Witness Counsel: I may have to leave.

Witness: Can we do like five minutes? It's been --

Witness Counsel: Can we take five minutes and my able colleague, we'll continue to monitor the interview. But for the record, I just want to make a comment about this suspicious person on the roof. I'm looking at Sergeant PSP Site Liaison testimony during the course of what appears to be an Internal Affairs investigation, his own agency.

He's being interviewed by a Corporal PSP CPL, and PSP CPL asks him, this is on page 10, "Were you ever made aware of this suspicious person being on the roof of the AGR building prior to the shooting?" PSP Site Liaison; "No. Well, just moments before it." PSP CPL right. As it was trans -- and it's cut. PSP Site Liaison; "Yeah, yeah. As I was, yeah, like, yeah. The only time I was aware of it is the shooting occurred right after it. Yeah." It doesn't appear that he ever communicated to anybody that there was a suspicious person on the roof.

HSGAC Majority: We'll ask questions related to this, and if you want to, specifically as you've just done, read into the record from Exhibit 4, that's fine. But just as you have asked others not to characterize, we would ask that you not characterize.

HSGAC Minority: But I would like to know what -- can you

repeat what document you're referring to?

Witness Counsel: I'm referring to Exhibit Number 4, the interview with Sergeant PSP Site Liaison.

HSGAC Majority Okay. And page numbers?

Witness Counsel: July 20th, 2024

HSGAC Majority: Page numbers you read from?

Witness Counsel: Page number 10, and right in the middle from --

HSGAC Majority: This is Exhibit 4, page 10. If we have follow-up questions on that, we'll ask them before we break. Did you have a few more questions?

PSI Minority: I just want to make sure I'm understanding that. That's on page 10. It does say on page 17, "At 18:09, I received another call from Officer Butler ESU ander saying that the guy was discovered on top of the roof." So he is saying, I've received a call from Officer Butler ESU c nder saying there was a guy on the roof at 18:09. You got reconcile those.

HSGAC Majority: So if you only have one or two more questions, I think we should just go ahead and ask those and have your colleague -- and then, then we'll break.

PSI Minority: So this is PSI Minority, again with Senator Johnson's office. I think real quick, I'm going to go back to the issue about suspicious individuals on July 13th. This will be Exhibit 7, I believe.

[Exhibit No. 7 was marked for identification.]

PSI Minority: This exhibit is an interview with Lieutenant PSP Officer in Charge, that was conducted on July 22nd, 2024, with the Pennsylvania State Police. And this Exhibit is pages 26, 27, 28 of that interview.

Witness: Okay.

PSI Minority: So I want to turn your attention to the middle of page 26, where, where PSP Officer in Charge mentions Now the vice guys were somewhere around outside the perimeter. Did you know on July 13th at Butler that Pennsylvania State Police had vice guys outside the perimeter?

Witness: I was not explicitly aware of that fact, no.

PSI Minority: Who was the Pennsylvania State police counterpart in the security room on July 13th?

Witness: Sergeant PSP Site Liaison.

PSI Minority: So going back to my questions earlier about suspicious individuals at the Butler Rally. Go to the bottom of page 26. It says, just to clarify, PSP Trooper calls you about two suspicious people over on the AGR property in yellow and red. They send you a text of photographs of them. PSP Officer in Charge responds, "No phone, just a text of what he saw." PSP Trooper says what he saw, PSP Officer in Charge says, "Yeah, no pictures." PSP Trooper says you relayed that

information to Sergeant [PSP Site Liaison] and the command post and asked him to send some assets over to Trooper [PSP Trooper]. [PSP Officer in Charge] responds, "and I took it upon myself to send that text to [Butler PD] because I knew they were on the outside."

Once again, did Sergeant [PSP Site Liaison] ever mention to you about two suspicious people over on the AGR property on July 13th?

[Witness]: Yeah. Once again, I don't specific specifically remember any of these details.

[PSI Minority]: If you turn to page 27 of the same exhibit, about three-fourths of the way down the page, it says, [PSP Officer in Charge]. Yep. The first I received a call from [PSP Trooper] at 17:21. [Washington SWAT] says, you said that the phone call in response to was in reference to the two suspicious. [PSP Officer in Charge] says, "Yes, the kid in the red shirt and then the yellow shirt." [Washington SWAT] says, "After receiving that information, what did you do immediately?" [PSP Officer in Charge] said, I put in a quick text and I text the vice guys, the three vice guys that were assigned in this detail to contact post 5 for suspicious people on the fence line. Do you know where post 5 was on the Butler Rally?

[Witness]: I don't believe that was a Secret Service post, so, no, I do not.

[PSI Minority]: So to be clear, all this information about suspicious people over at the AGR property on July

13th, this is news to you?

Witness: Yes. I don't recall any two other suspicious people. The suspicious person I remember from that day is the one we've been discussing.

PSI Minority: And it appears according to this interview with Lieutenant PSP Officer in Charge, this report of suspicious people on the AGR property happened approximately 5:21 on July 13th. So, this is before the suspicious call comes in on Crooks at 5:45.

Witness: I mean, I'm reading the same thing you're reading, so, yes.

PSI Minority: Okay. Thank you.

HSGAC Minority: Just to clarify on the layout of the security room, Sergeant PSP Site Liaison was about six feet away from you?

Witness: Yeah, five to six feet-ish off to my right.

HSGAC Minority: Where was, particularly during the time we're talking about dispatching the counter sniper response and protective intelligence response, where was Special Agent C/UAS Advance Lead?

Witness: He was basically right behind me at a different table.

HSGAC Minority: So, like two feet behind you?

Witness: Yeah. Two feet behind me.

HSGAC Majority: Okay. We're going to break for 10 minutes

and then go on for the last hour. Thank you.

[Recess.]

HSGAC Majority: Going back to the timeline and the communications that have been discussed around 6:08 p.m., is it possible that Pennsylvania State Police Sergeant PSP Site Liaison relay the information of man on the roof and you did not hear it?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Was the communication in that room at that time, to your recollection, frantic, for lack of a better word?

Witness: Yes. Particularly after and around the time we got the call of that the local police were working a problem at three o'clock, everybody in the room was then very much turned on because in the Secret Service parlance, working a problem means that's an issue that you are going to want to pay attention to. In fact, in our training, we say "on problem" when we're starting a scenario. So as soon as I heard those words, I knew that I needed to get that back out on the radio.

HSGAC Majority: Is it common practice for the Secret Service to have co-location for communications with state and locals?

Witness: By co-location, you mean like two different --

HSGAC Majority: Sorry. For local law enforcement or whatever, law enforcement are going to be at a particular event to be located with Secret Service officials?

Witness: Yes. That typically in the command post or security room, there are typically local or state law enforcement officials there depending on which entities are working the visit.

HSGAC Majority: And is one of the reasons for doing that so that a Secret Service official can be aware of state and local communications by the fact that those communications can be relayed by the state and local officials who are located in that security room?

Witness: Yes, that would be the purpose.

HSGAC Majority: And is that because those communications channels are not communications channels that the Secret Service monitors

Witness: Correct. I don't believe we have the capability to monitor them currently.

HSGAC Majority: Is it then problematic, in your view, given what we just discussed on July 13th, that the current practice to have Secret Service officials located with state and local officials for the purposes of being able to hear their communications, given the communications limitations that the Secret Service has, is that problematic given that when an event rises to the level of

significance beyond a medical emergency, such that there is frantic communication going on, one of the risks of this current setup is that information may be missed or not heard?

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: What needs to change, in your view, to remedy that risk?

Witness: I think that for particular sites, particularly large events, where there's a lot more potential for things to be going on as far as just the day-to-day business of the site I think those site security rooms need to be you know, manned by at least two people. And it would be great if one of those people was a professionally trained dispatcher or something like that.

HSGAC Majority: Is there any training within the Secret Service right now about best practices for managing a security room at an event?

Witness: Not that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: Is there any training within the Secret Service right now that you're aware of with respect to the communications themselves, the actual physical radios and capabilities and options that a security room has for those working in event?

Witness: The only the radio training that we get is either in our basic training course that we all go through

at the beginning of our careers. I believe there's probably some interspersed in protective detail training that you would go through. And maybe our C and S training has some, but nothing particular to working a security room or command post that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: Should, in your view, communications capabilities themselves be one of the things under consideration for change in light of what happened in Butler, meaning, should the ability of the Secret Service and vice versa, state, and local officials to have access to each other's communications be something the Secret Service considers?

Witness: Absolutely. Interoperability and the ability for the different agencies to talk to each other, I think has been a problem across law enforcement for quite some time. I've had discussions about this locally with, you know, departments in my district and constantly trying find better ways to be on the same page when it comes to radio communications. But to my understanding, technically it's a very complicated problem.

HSGAC Majority: Who within Secret Service, in your view, is best positioned to make those recommended changes?

Witness: It would have to fall to somebody who has the technical expertise in those about radios. And right now, our radio communications are based out of our Chief

Information Officer's Office.

HSGAC Majority: And who is the Chief Information Officer at the Secret Service?

Witness: I believe right now it's USSS CIO.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned earlier in your testimony that you were not aware on July 13th at the time, that the counter sniper team for the Secret Service knew of a suspicious person on the roof. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct. I learned about that yesterday when I saw the timeline for the first time.

HSGAC Majority: Should you, as the Security room agent, have been made aware of that?

Witness: It wouldn't have been a bad piece of information to have, but it wouldn't have changed anything.

HSGAC Majority: How would that have information have come to you?

Witness: They could have called my cell Phone or radioed it.

HSGAC Majority: With respect to the proliferation of firearms in the U.S. and the events the Secret Service has had to engage in for protectees over the years, since in recent events, Sandy Hook, since Las Vegas, since the Pulse Nightclub, since these shootings with high caliber rifles, has Secret Service engaged in any additional training for its agents on how to deal with the access to and

availability of guns in the U.S.?

Witness: I'm not sure what you mean, like, training on how to detect them in our sites, or?

HSGAC Majority: Training on how sites need to be protected, how Secret Service needs to set up and engage in differently than it may have in the past, outdoor open events.

Witness: For as long as I've been with the Secret Service, we've always been concerned about firearms and their capability. So as long as I've been in the Secret Service, those are always things that we've taken into account.

HSGAC Majority: In the last 10 years, has the training or the practices of how you take into account the concerns you've just mentioned changed at all?

Witness: No. Line of sight concerns are always something that we've -- you know, are taught when it comes to building out a site or whatever to be considered.

HSGAC Majority: And after any of the events I've mentioned that involved high caliber rifles, large magazines of weapons that are capable of shooting multiple rounds rapidly, in the wake of any of those events, has a Secret Service engaged internally in any discussions that you're aware of about the need to change how it protects events?

Witness: None that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Majority: Should they?

Witness: Our goal is to keep these sites safe. So the fact that there are people who may have weapons available to them is something we always consider. And we do our best to make sure that those weapons don't enter our sites.

HSGAC Majority: Is it harder to keep these sites safe in the current environment today and the way in which these weapons can be used than it was in years past?

Witness: I mean, the weapons have existed the entire time I've been with the Secret Service. So the threat is still the same.

HSGAC Majority: Is the existence of a weapon that can shoot 50 rounds and be folded into a backpack like the weapon that was used at Butler, a greater risk than a handgun that can shoot 10 rounds.

Witness: For us, one bullet is enough to be a problem.

HSGAC Majority: And you don't distinguish between the two types of guns I've just mentioned.

Witness: Again, any firearm for us is an issue.

HSGAC Majority: Good afternoon, SAIC Witness. Thank you for being here. My name is HSGAC Majority, and I'm also with Chairman Peter's staff. I have a few questions, follow-up questions from what we discussed earlier. The first I'd

like to go back to when my colleague asked about the staffing for the Butler event. I'll reference Bate stamps 2615 and 2675, and happy to share them if you'd like.

But you mentioned two things. One is how you won't have anyone in the Syracuse office on specific days because everyone is out on assignment. And then, you know, discussing on Bates 2675 about how all of the assignments, and it wasn't until July 12th, the day before the Butler rally were now filled. Are there and were there at the time, staff challenges and staffing protective events.

Witness: Yes.

HSGAC Majority: Can you talk more about that?

Witness: I would say that since the NATO Summit, at any given time, at least one, if not two of my subordinate offices has essentially been closed. Due to not having any agents in that district, there have been multiple occasions where either myself or my ASAC are the only people left in the district at all from the Secret Service perspective to cover, you know the majority of the State of New York.

HSGAC Majority: What impact does that have?

Witness: I'll put it this way. On the Thursday or Friday before coming down here, I actually had to respond to a call since Buffalo is a border district, CBP had stopped somebody with a Secret Service warrant, and I was the only person available to go and affect that arrest and

do the initial appearance. I had no other agents that had to rely on the U.S. Marshal Service to help me.

HSGAC Majority: Why did you, from Buffalo, as the SAIC of Buffalo with a number of duties, have to staff an event in Pittsburgh? Did the Pittsburgh Office not have sufficient staffing to provide a security room agent that day?

Witness: So, everybody -- the situation I just described is not particular to Buffalo. It's every office is facing that exact same staffing challenge currently. You know, we are running at a pace that in my 24 years is unprecedented. And there are oftentimes more assignments than there are people.

HSGAC Majority: We understand the staffing has since picked up, and when I say picked up in terms of additional staffing for former Presidents and candidates, as well as the current presidential election environment. But was it this way prior to that as well?

Witness: I would say that for the last couple of years, staffing has been growing into a larger and larger problem. For example, when I first came into the Buffalo District, I was essentially fully staffed. I'm probably about half staffed now.

HSGAC Majority: What do you attribute that to?

Witness: The greater protective needs attrition and

difficulty, you know, finding candidates to fill these spots.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to also ask about resourcing. I'm referencing Bates stamp 2609. Happy to share it with you, but it's an email that you received from, I believe a colleague in Buffalo. We don't know the name because the name's redacted. And he or she writes, "Site agent reached out to see if I could bring our," blank "radio down to use for the security room." I guess the blank event is using theirs, and they're currently without one. Again, we did not release the redactions here. Do you recall this?

Witness: Yeah, I know exactly what that is.

HSGAC Majority: Talk about that.

Witness: Sure. That was, again, the other agent in my office who was going to staff the FLOTUS event. The site agent from that event reached out to him and asked him if he could bring the Buffalo Field Office's LES radio for them to use at their event so that the Pittsburgh Office could use their LES radio for the LES event.

HSGAC Majority: Is that common?

Witness: When there's two events happening at the same time, it's not uncommon for districts to have to share equipment.

HSGAC Majority: Who is your colleague who staffed the FLOTUS event?

Witness : His name was USSS Agent . He's an agent in my office.

HSGAC Majority : I'd like to ask a couple questions about the security room setup, which you've spoke to a bit earlier. So I hope I'm not asking the same questions. If so, I apologize. But you mentioned there were two command posts on that day. When you learned about that in the afternoon did you -- or actually let, let me take a step back. Did you know when you learned about that in the afternoon that there would not be any local law enforcement in the security room?

Witness : Well, so yeah, that morning when we had the briefing, I learned that my police counterpart was going to be the Pennsylvania State Police and that he would have communication with the local counterparts if necessary.

HSGAC Majority : Did that concern you?

Witness : Again, at the time, it's not completely unusual for that to happen. So, at the time it was not concerning to me.

HSGAC Majority : Did you ask why you would not have any access to the local tactical channel?

Witness : No. I mean, it wouldn't be common for me to have the command post agent to have any other radios other than the Secret Service radios.

HSGAC Majority : Understood. You also mentioned that you

did not know where other security posts were. For example, Pennsylvania State wasn't a Secret Service security post. Did you receive a copy of the Pennsylvania State Police operations plan in advance?

Witness: So, the police posts that I would've had knowledge of where they were are the ones that are indicated on our Secret Service diagrams. There are some state and local police posts on those diagrams, but no, I did not see that Pennsylvania State Police Ops plan until yesterday at my House testimony.

HSGAC Majority: Did you see the Butler ESU operational plan?

Witness: The first time I saw that was yesterday as well?

HSGAC Majority: Would those documents be helpful for you?

Witness: They would be helpful, but in an emergency situation, sifting through them without the proper context of someone who knows what those documents are would be challenging.

HSGAC Majority: Do you have the capability to radio directly to a single Secret Service agent?

Witness: Yes. Oh, no. So do you mean I could call out to a single service agent, Secret Service agent, but it's not like dialing a phone --

HSGAC Majority: Everybody would hear it.

Witness: Everybody would hear it. Correct.

HSGAC Majority: Can you send photos via text message on your Secret Service device, your cell phone?

Witness: I believe it is possible, but it is often challenging.

HSGAC Majority: Why is that?

Witness: Just the way that our texting is set up on our phones. I believe it's for preservation purposes. Texting on our phones is not the easiest thing. It's much easier to just send an email, which is what I typically do.

HSGAC Majority: Based on your experience, staffing, both the security room as well as other post, should the security room agent be part of an advance as opposed to --

Witness: Not necessarily. I think that would be in an already resource-constrained environment. I think that would be difficult. I do think, and it's another suggestion I at least made in one other interview, for details that are sending a second supervisor, and that's someone who comes in the day before and reviews the whole security plan and the whole security site. That it may be advantageous to have that second supervisor man the command post because he's familiar with the detail, how the detail operates, and what would have had time to do full walkthroughs of all the sites the day before.

HSGAC Majority: Going back to July 13th, on the day of, you went through a number of different calls you received that day, a large number of medical calls coming in, lost children, lost property, children actually in the security room, about a media truck, mine sweeping, as well as the room being used as downtime. And you're the singular person from Secret Service to streamline all of this. That's a lot of information to be able to synthesize, digest, and then relay. What recommendations about this, briefly, to my colleague do you have for better ingesting and relaying this information?

Witness: I think definitely it's a two-person job, particularly when something goes awry. But even if nothing were to have gone wrong that day, it would've -- you have one person manning a phone and [redacted] radio channels. So even when something goes poorly, you have to put that out on two channels. One of them has to come first, one of them has to come second. That takes time. Right?

So having two people or one person who's dedicated just to the communications and another person that's there taking in the information, and maybe you could keep a log, then maybe you could, you know. So, I think and not every single site might necessarily require that, but there are certain sites that looking at it at the face of it, you could imagine would need two people.

And I do think that either a local or detailed person assigned to the command post itself is also helpful. You know, in a perfect world, I would man a command post with a [redacted] and the detail's [redacted], that would be the command post. And then the site security rooms would be, you know, at a major site would manned by [redacted] and [redacted] if I had all the manpower in the world.

HSGAC Majority: I'd like to draw your attention into the local tactical radio on that day. I know you did not have access to it, but I'd like to read you something that was announced over that radio at 5:4:54 seconds. And the -- This is from Commander [redacted].

He says, "Just FYI, we had a younger white male, long hair, lurking around the AGR building. He was viewed with a rangefinder citing the stage. He was up against the building, believe he was looking up at us, and he walked around the side of the building. We lost sight of him. There is a bike with a large backpack sitting beside it. It's parked in the rear of the building that was not there earlier." Is this information that would've been helpful to you?

Witness: So that's a complete picture of the truncated information I got in the game of telephone that was that day. Right? So that's the complete information

as opposed to what we got was that there was a suspicious person using a rangefinder in that area.

HSGAC Majority: But had you known the information that I just read to you, would that have changed your calculus?

Witness: Probably not dramatically, however, because we still would've dispatched the same [redacted] teams to go and look and try to find that person.

HSGAC Majority: You mentioned you dispatched the counters sniper response team and the protective intelligent agent. Why didn't you relay this information to counter snipers on top of the barns?

Witness: At the time, I thought that I had, you know, made the best decision by dispatching the [redacted] teams that were available to go and try to evaluate if the person was actually a suspicious or what his intentions were.

HSGAC Majority: So the local tactical radio I just read to you was at 5:42 p.m. At 5:52 p.m., one of the counter sniper team leads sent out a BOLO email at 5:52 p.m. with pretty much the same information I described. Is that something that should have gone to the security room?

Witness: Sure. It's pretty much the same information. We just at -- I'm only finding out that they knew that same information beginning yesterday. So I wasn't on that chain that they sent. So sure, it would've been great to know. But again, at that time, the same

teams would've been dispatched to go and look for the individual. That's who we had available to go look for.

HSGAC Majority: And I'd like to go through -- so these are just a couple examples. 5:42 p.m. which is shortly before you learned of the information. Again, 5:52 p.m. with the counter snipers, and then you received calls or you received kind of the game of telephone from Sergeant PSP Site Liaison where you first received the information at 5:44. And there were four calls. I'd like to just go through them to the best of your recollection, if you can recall exactly what PSP Site Liaison told you. So, he first received a call from Commander Butler ESU Commander at 5:44 p.m., and I believe this is when he first informed you of the suspicious person in the AGR building. Do you recall this?

Witness: Yeah. That's the notification we've been referencing.

HSGAC Majority: And that's when you learned about the suspicious person with the rangefinder, correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Majority: And then at 5:48 p.m., PSP Site Liaison received a second call. To the best of your recollection, do you remember PSP Site Liaison relaying additional information to you?

Witness: At 5:48? No.

HSGAC Majority: And at 6:03 p.m., PSP Site Liaison received another call. And this indicated that the individual was

spotted, again, walking toward the sheets. Do you recall that information being relayed to you?

Witness: I did not receive that particular information.

HSGAC Majority: Would having updates on a suspicious individual with a rangefinder have been helpful?

Witness: So, if I myself had received that information about the sheets, it would've been relayed to the teams that were out looking for him. That's what I would've done with it.

HSGAC Majority: And at 6:09 p.m., this is the call that we discussed ad nauseam. This is when PSP Site Liaison learns that the same suspicious individual with the rangefinder on the roof. And you mentioned that you did not hear, it's possible, you did not hear this. Correct?

Witness: Right. Because that is in close conjunction with the time where I'm getting our own radio traffic, about the same thing, essentially.

HSGAC Majority: And so you never learned that there was a suspicious individual on the roof that was armed then?

Witness: No. There was never any mention of anybody being armed at any time until I heard, "Shots fired."

HSGAC Majority: And did you learn at all that local law enforcement fired shots?

Witness: I believe there was -- after the incident

in the command post, I believe there was some discussion amongst the local law enforcement and the Pennsylvania State Police that I was not necessarily part of that conversation, but I overheard that one of them said that he had fired his weapon, but I don't know who or from what agency he was from.

HSGAC Majority: And just going back to the setup on that day, Special Agent [CUAS Advance Lead] was the advance lead for CUAS, is it common for CUAS to set up in the security room?

Witness: No. And he initially did not try to set up in the security room. He was initially trying to set up, I believe, closer to the stage, but he was having a technical difficulty and he was trying to find a solution to get his equipment working. And he settled on the security room as an alternate location.

HSGAC Majority: And you've secured a number of protective events before. Compared to those events, was the advance for this event, in your view, well organized?

Witness: So, I wasn't present for any of the advance, so I'm not sure how the advance went. I wasn't a part of it.

HSGAC Majority: But in terms of the information you received as a security agent, working as a security agent for many events prior did the information you received, was it similar to other events? Was it relayed in, you know, a

different manner?

Witness: No. So, the paperwork we received the night before and the briefing we had that morning were all very typical and standard for other briefings and paperwork I had gotten many times.

HSGAC Majority: And you've touched on a couple different things that need to change moving forward. Are there other specific protocols or gaps that you think we should be aware of in terms of improving security for future protective events that we have not already discussed?

Witness: I mean, I've been focusing on, you know, the communications, and my role that day, and the things that related to that that could be bettered. I'd have to think about that question and come back with a better answer than -- I don't have anything specific to add.

HSGAC Minority: HSGAC Minority. The recommendations that you had talked about and the suggestions, who have you relayed those to?

Witness: Some of them have come up in different -- these interview sessions. I believe the independent review panel they came up in. I believe there was a brief discussion of them in my Mission Assurance interview. So, in those forms.

HSGAC Minority: Is there a standard channel within which to provide that kind of feedback?

Witness : I wouldn't say that there's a standard channel, no.

HSGAC Minority : So, if you hadn't had these interviews, what would be the means to take thoughts to? I mean, would you just run them up the chain, so to speak, go to your supervisor and express your thoughts. That would be LES for yourself?

Witness : For me it would be LES, but if it was someone in my office, they would bring it to me.

HSGAC Minority : So, I'm just going to jump around a little bit. Is SAIC Pittsburgh still on situational telework?

Witness : I'm not at -- I don't know the personnel decisions of the agency.

HSGAC Minority : You guys are personal friends though. Is that right?

Witness : I've known SAIC Pittsburgh for 24 years, yes.

HSGAC Minority : Okay.

Witness : I know the answer personally, but I'm not going to answer for professionally.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. Personally, do you know if he's still in situational?

Witness : I'm not going to answer personally.

HSGAC Minority : Why?

Witness : Because it's a personnel matter that I'm not authorized to speak about.

HSGAC Minority: Have you been instructed that you're not authorized to speak about personnel matters in this setting?

Witness: Not in the setting, but generally we don't speak about personnel matters.

HSGAC Minority: I mean, I don't hear Counsel objecting.

Agency Counsel: If SAIC Witness is not comfortable answering, he is not comfortable answering the question.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. I mean, so you're refusing to provide this information to the committee for -- I mean, it's not classified information. SAIC SAIC sburgh gave us that information. I mean, he told us that himself when we interviewed him, so.

Witness: I just don't want to speak for him.

HSGAC Minority: Are you aware of whether he is on?

Witness: I am aware.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. But again, for the record, you're refusing to answer?

Witness: I'm not refusing to answer. It's a personnel matter that I am not authorized to speak about.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Who would have to give that authorization for you to speak about it?

Witness: Legal. Secret Service Legal.

Agency Counsel: Well, you have SAIC SAIC Pittsburgh testimony. His testimony is his testimony.

HSGAC Minority: Right. And that was also over a month ago. So, I'm asking for an update again. I guess, can you take that back to answer that? Again, this is a topic that we've discussed and we've discussed other people's status. So, I guess --

Agency Counsel: Sure. I'll take that back and discuss with my colleagues at Department of Homeland Security.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. I'm going to introduce exhibit -- what exhibit are we on, 8? It's an email from you dated July 13th, 9:59 p.m. Do you recognize this email?

[Exhibit No. 8 was marked for identification.]

Witness: I do.

HSGAC Minority: Right. The who it is sent to is redacted. Who did this go to?

Witness: So this went to the UD Sergeant, who was one of the UD officials running the magnetometer detail.

HSGAC Minority: What's that person's name?

Witness: I don't recall his name.

HSGAC Minority: And then it says, "Please call me ASAP." What was this related to?

Witness: So, this was again, concerning the having people remain and not take their flights the next morning. So, I wanted to make sure that I was able to convey that information to his team through him, and I was asking him

to reach out so I could explain the situation to him.

HSGAC Minority: And you don't recall -- how did you get that person's name?

Witness: It's in the paperwork. I just don't remember his name three months later, the UD Sergeant.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Do you know where he was based?

Witness: He's based here in DC. He's a Uniformed Division officer. All our Uniformed Division officers are based in DC.

HSGAC Minority: You'd never met him before?

Witness: I believe that was the first time I'd ever worked with him.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And that was your only conversation with him?

Witness: No. I talked to him on the -- I eventually got him on the phone, and then I eventually -- that when he brought the officers back, I talked to him. I talked to him the next day on Sunday as well.

HSGAC Minority: And what did you talk to him about on Sunday?

Witness: Again, it was just about organizing his personnel, making sure that they didn't leave, and making sure that they were lined up for the FBI interviews that had been requested.

HSGAC Minority: And so, were you responsible for

coordinating that?

Witness: I wasn't necessarily responsible, but I did it. There was no one else to do it, so I just took that on.

HSGAC Minority: And who directed you to coordinate, I guess, to make sure people were around for the interviews?

Witness: That came from one of many conversations that I've had with her headquarters personnel the night after everything had happened.

HSGAC Minority: Do you recall who from headquarters?

Witness: I believe at the time I had -- most of the conversations I was having with headquarters personnel were that at that time going through the then SAIC of Philadelphia who was on his way to become a DAD in the Office of Investigations, SAIC HQ.

HSGAC Minority: And then were you in contact with the DCC at any point, the director's crisis?

Witness: I never called into the DCC. No.

HSGAC Minority: Were you aware that the FBI had arrested Asif Raza Merchant the day before for plotting to assassinate US government officials or politicians?

Witness: I was not aware.

HSGAC Minority: Is this the first time that you're becoming aware of that?

Witness: Yeah. Of that name, and I'm sure I've seen

news stories about the FBI arresting people, but that name did not ring a bell to me.

HSGAC Minority: He was a Pakistani national with ties to Iran that was meeting with FBI undercover agents in New York, and they had been monitoring him for months. He, in his proffer, discussed assassinating by sniper outside at a rally, potentially Trump, Nikki Haley, Biden. You've never heard of that?

Witness: No. Now that you're saying all those details, I have read news articles, and I believe there -- we may have even had a bulletin post the 13th that came out regarding that individual, but the name was not ringing a bell. But those particulars, yes.

HSGAC Minority: The 13th, as in July 13th?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And that information was not included in any kind of threat briefing or materials for the rally. Is that correct?

Witness: Correct.

HSGAC Minority: So what was that bulletin?

Witness: I think it pretty much just said what you said. I think it was like a recap of the news, like different news stories. It was an unclassified document, so.

HSGAC Minority: On July 13th?

Witness : No, no, no, no. It came out well after.

HSGAC Minority : Okay. Right, because that,

HSGAC Majority : Just to clarify, you're saying there was some information that came out post, after July 13th?

Witness : Yes, yes, yes. Well, after. I have no idea what date, but it was not anywhere around that day.

HSGAC Minority : I mean, you're the SAIC of the Buffalo Office which is in New York. You discussed how most field offices running low, everyone is kind of pitching in, had to serve search warrants. You were not aware that in New York, the FBI was monitoring someone who was trying to hire people to assassinate two protectees. I don't recall if Nikki Haley was at that time a protectee or not, but Biden was and Trump was. So, you had no information about that prior to the arrest?

Witness : Prior to the arrest? No.

HSGAC Minority : Prior to it becoming public?

Witness : Prior to it becoming public? No.

HSGAC Minority : Is that surprising? I don't know if that's typical, but.

Witness : I don't know if anybody else in the Secret Service knew about it, but it's not surprising that every arrest that the FBI makes isn't pushed out to every office.

Witness : Does FBI share that? I mean, someone who's trying to hire people to assassinate protectees,

that's not something that's shared with the Secret Service?

Witness: Again, I can't comment if it was or wasn't shared. I'm telling you when I remember hearing or learning about it, and that would've been through the news stories and/or this bulletin that eventually was sent out to everybody. But I don't know what the date was, but it was definitely post-July 13th.

HSGAC Minority: Because, again, incident that we discussed earlier, that was your field office was involved in investigating less than 20 days before the Butler event. That was an arrest of an individual for making threats against President Biden, complaint that they posted. It was a response to Biden's post on X saying he was going to put a bullet in your head.

Witness: Yes. It was a PI case we had in my district.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. You mentioned earlier that radio transmissions in the security room were not recorded. Is that correct?

Witness: Not to my knowledge, yeah, they were not.

HSGAC Minority: Were there any other recordings of the security room? Are there any cameras in security rooms or anything like that?

Witness: None that I'm aware of.

HSGAC Minority: So just going back to a discussion with

HSGAC Majority a little bit earlier, but knowing what you know now, if you were working an event today, would you relay on the radio information about suspicious individual with a rangefinder?

Witness : With the benefit of hindsight, there's probably things that I would do differently. Sure.

HSGAC Minority : Is that one of the things?

Witness : The only thing that I would've done differently is I would've probably looped in the site agent. That's it.

HSGAC Minority : You wouldn't have relayed that over the radio even today, knowing everything that we know now?

Witness : I can't say.

PSI Minority : This is PSI Minority with Senator Johnson's office. When were you interviewed by the FBI in Pennsylvania State Police?

Witness : So, my first interview with the FBI was the day after. So, Sunday, and then the FBI/Pennsylvania State Police Interview I believe was the Tuesday or Wednesday after. Pretty shortly thereafter. I'd have to go back and look at my calendar, but a few days after.

PSI Minority : And that one with Pennsylvania State Police and FBI, was that recorded?

Witness : I believe it may have been, yes.

PSI Minority : Going back to after shots are fired at

6:11 p.m., on July 13th, do you know who discovered Crook's vehicle, know what entity or what individual?

Witness: I do not.

PSI Minority: Do you know what law enforcement entity responded when devices were found in Crook's vehicle on the night of July 13th?

Witness: I know that there were local and state assets that were all responding. And again, I believe that the TSD lead would know that answer definitively.

PSI Minority: So, you do not know if ATF responded that night?

Witness: No. ATF definitely came. There was ATF that responded to the command post after the shooting, absolutely.

PSI Minority: And what information did ATF provide to the command post?

Witness: They were working with the FBI and the Pennsylvania State Police, and I believe that they were working on trying to figure out the serial number from the weapon or something like that, is what I recall their involvement being.

PSI Minority: Did the ATF discuss anything more on the night of July 13th in the command post?

Witness: From what I remember, they were mostly working on trying to identify the suspect, what his

identity was before it was known.

PSI Minority: ATF was trying to identify the suspect, not the suspect's weapon, or both?

Witness: Well, both.

PSI Minority: At that time, were they working to identify the devices that were found in the trunk of Crook's vehicle.

Witness: Again, I really have no knowledge about what was going on with the vehicle.

PSI Minority: Okay. Thank you.

PSI Minority: Witness, this is PSI Minority, again, Ranking Member John. Just follow-ups just trying to get an understanding of what's in the security room at Butler. Are there televisions in --

Witness: There was not.

PSI Minority: Would it be typical that there would be televisions in the security room?

Witness: It really depends. You know, whenever we go to a site, we kind of have to find a room that's available, but it's not something that we bring or provide ourselves.

PSI Minority: Would Secret Service set up their own security cameras for events?

Witness: LES [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PSI Minority: So at this event, as far as you understand July 13th Butler event there were no Secret Service security cameras set up?

Witness: None that I'm aware of.

PSI Minority: Do the Secret Service drones deployed, do they have camera capabilities?

Witness: I don't know all of our drones and all of our drone capability, but I do believe that most of our drones would have camera capability. Yes.

PSI Minority: And would those drones be relaying video in real time to wherever the CUAS location is established?

Witness: LES [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PSI Minority: Are you aware of any footage from Secret Service drones being relayed to the security room or any other location on the July 13th event?

Witness: I don't believe we had a drone operating that day.

PSI Minority: And if local law enforcement had drones with the same type of capability, would that be relayed to the security room?

Witness: If they were being utilized, but I'm not aware of any drones that were being utilized by anybody.

HSGAC Minority: I have just two more. Who became the incident commander after shots were fired?

Witness: After shots were fired?

HSGAC Minority: Or, yeah, who took the --

Witness: I don't think there was any official designation of an incident commander from the Secret Service side. We hold an interim federal presence to preserve the crime scene until the FBI is on scene and capable of maintaining the crime scene. And so that turnover to the FBI happened at 10:30, and the FBI upon their arrival were constantly communicating with the Pennsylvania State Police about who was going to do what parts of the investigation.

HSGAC Minority: Who, I guess, held the scene on for Secret Service prior to the handover?

Witness: We did. I held the security room and all of the post standers held their posts. So, the post standers were on posts from about 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. that day.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. And so, there was no one in

charge for Secret Service?

Witness: I mean, I'm in the command post, so people are coming and asking me questions. I, again, was the highest-ranking person on scene that day. But I was in constant contact with SAIC [SAIC urgh] since it was his district.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. Did you interview any eyewitnesses?

Witness: I did not interview anybody.

HSGAC Minority: Did you discuss any eyewitness accounts with anyone and people were coming to you asking questions?

Witness: No. Again, there was so much going on and so many phone calls. All I was doing was focusing on managing, keeping everybody on post, trying to secure that crime scene and dealing with the inquiries and the information on scene. So, I didn't do anything that would, was part of an investigation, at that point. I'm just trying to manage the scene.

HSGAC Minority: By managing the scene, were you still located in the security room, or?

Witness: Yes. I was in that security room. I left once or twice to go out and talk, for example, to the Uniformed Division personnel as a group. And one other time to talk to the post standers as a group once they were taken off post to explain to them what the next day was going to look like, that they weren't going to be able to

take their flights in the morning and that sort of thing.

HSGAC Minority: Okay. But you did not discuss any eyewitness accounts or anything like that?

Witness: No. The only person I talked to is the CS response person because he had a small injury to his hand, and we talked about that.

HSGAC Minority: And did you pass over your communications responsibilities to Special Agent CAUAS Advance Lead because you needed to be --

Witness: At some point he was still in there. Yes. So at some point while everyone was still up on post, I didn't want to abandon the radios completely to talk, be having all those phone calls. So I did have him listen to the radio in case the post would call out while I was on the phone and not able to respond.

HSGAC Minority: Do you recall around what time that happened?

Witness: I do not. I mean, there was probably multiple times from post shooting till we -- I believe the post standers and everybody else got out of there around 11:00 or so, 11:30. So, there were probably several instances in that timeframe where he would've been listening for the radios while I was on the phone.

HSGAC Minority: You said the CS response person had an injury. How did that happen?

Witness: I frankly don't know. It was something he said about a fence that he was trying to negotiate, and it was a very minor injury. The Pennsylvania State Police counterpart that he with was with had a larger injury to his hand.

HSGAC Minority: So it wasn't a gunshot injury?

Witness: Oh, no, no. It was -- the Secret Service post stander's was like a scratch.

HSGAC Minority: So this was not the individual that caught shrapnel, the Secret Service person who --

Witness: Oh, I don't know if that's what the final cause of what it was, that I don't know.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you again for your time today. I think just to wrap up. Our four offices have been conducting an investigation since immediately after the incident. We recently released a report, an interim report on this, and really with the goal toward identifying and assessing potential reform. But in order to do so, we first need to look at the failures that occurred during that day. And looking back on the 13th, the former President was shot. Others were injured and lost a life. Former Director Cheatle and Acting Director Rowe both testified that there were failures by the Secret Service. So, our question for you is do you agree that there were failures, and if so, what were those failures that day?

Witness: So in my limited role that day, what I would say is that everybody did the best that they could. And obviously, it was the worst day for anybody who was working that day that we could imagine. As the Secret Service, it's our worst nightmare. And, you know, I tried to execute my duties to the best that I could. I don't have enough of the full information about everything that went into the planning of where some of the breakdowns may have been. Obviously, some of the things that we've talked about today with improving our ability to communicate in a better real time with our state and local partners is obviously something that could be improved.

HSGAC Majority: And specifically, to follow-up on what you mentioned related to the security room and communication, is there anything else you'd like to raise? I think one thing we haven't talked about are interoperability of communications and how to assess and divide who is responsible for which communications since there's so many and of great scope.

Witness: I think you just hit on an important point there. There are so many, and that is the greatest problem I see with interoperability. If there was a magic radio channel that we could give to everybody, and that was the only channel we used for our events, and every single law enforcement agency in the country had it and they could

only access it when they were doing our events and we could use it, that would be wonderful. But I'm not sure that that's technically possible.

HSGAC Majority: And looking forward, do you have any lessons learned from that day, either for yourself, your team, or Secret Service in general?

Witness: Yes. For myself and my team there are a couple things that we've already started doing differently in my district. Now, when we have a protective visit, we provide written post instructions to whatever police posts we're going to have. If we are doing a visit, again, I'll go back to the recent DHS Secretary visit, we had that happened post this event where we did have support from the New York State Police attack team that we requested and they granted. And we don't have the ability to embed somebody with them, but we modified one of our radios and gave it to them so that they would have that direct communication on our radio so that we could have real time communication should we need it. So those are two things that I'm doing now that I wasn't doing before.

HSGAC Majority: Thank you. So, I think with that, thank you very much for your testimony here today. We will follow-up if there is any additional pieces where we have questions, but really appreciate time. And I think with that, we will go off the record.

Witness : Thank you.

[Whereas, at 2:01 p.m., the interview was concluded.]