[Senate Prints 119-19]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
119th Congress} { S. Prt.
1st Session } SENATE { 119-19
======================================================================
ONE YEAR LATER:
THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE'S FAILURES
SURROUNDING THE JULY 13, 2024
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
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FINAL REPORT
PREPARED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
JULY 13, 2025
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-162 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RAND PAUL, Kentucky, Chairman
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
RICK SCOTT, Florida RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio ANDY KIM, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
William E. Henderson III, Staff Director
Christina N. Salazar, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
James P. Stephens, Special Investigator
Megan M. Krynen, Senior Professional Staff Member
J. Ryan Arient, Professional Staff Member
Adam Hinz, Research Assistant
Joseph A. Martin, Research Assistant
Sibley A. Powell, Research Assistant
David M. Weinberg, Minority Staff Director
Alan S. Kahn, Minority General Counsel
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Ashley A. Gonzalez, Records Clerk
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................1
The Attempted Assassination................................ 1
The Investigation.......................................... 1
The Failures by the Secret Service......................... 2
Insufficient Accountability................................ 2
Findings................................................... 2
II. HISTORY OF DENIED STAFFING, ASSETS, AND RESOURCE
REQUESTS FROM SECRET SERVICE HEADQUARTERS.........................3
Counter Snipers............................................ 3
Counter Assault Team (CAT)................................. 4
Enhanced Counter-unmanned Aerial System Assets............. 5
III.ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE SECRET SERVICE..........................7
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC............................... 8
Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC............................. 10
USSS Site Agent............................................ 11
USSS Site Counterpart...................................... 12
USSS Lead Advance Agent.................................... 12
USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader............................ 12
IV. TIMELINE OF INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT INFORMATION LEADING UP TO JULY
13, 2024.........................................................13
Background of Threat Intelligence.......................... 13
Pre-July 13................................................ 14
V. CONCLUSIVE FAILURES OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET
SERVICE..........................................................16
USSS Security Room Agent................................... 16
USSS Protective Intelligence Response Agent................ 20
USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper............................. 22
View from the Roof of AGR Looking Towards the Positition of
Hercules 1 (right) and Hercules 2 (left.................. 24
VI. CONTRADICTORY, FALSE, OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY SPECIFIC
INDIVIDUALS OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE..................26
Kimberly Cheatle........................................... 26
Ronald Rowe................................................ 26
USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead...................... 27
USSS Site Agent and Site Counterpart....................... 29
VII. CHANGES IN SECRET SERVICE POLICY PURSUANT TO THE COMMITTEE'S
INTERIM REPORT..................................................29
VIII.OUTSTANDING REQUESTS AND OBSTRUCTION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES......29
COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF POLICY CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY U.S SECRET
SERVICE
SOD-03 & SOD-03(1)......................................... 31
SOD-08..................................................... 33
OPO-08..................................................... 33
OPO-24..................................................... 35
OPO-25..................................................... 37
OPO-03(1)-03(04)........................................... 38
APPENDIX
USSS Records
USSS Disciplinary Chart...................................... 43
USSS Summary of Administrative Actions....................... 44
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC Disciplinary Documents.......... 45
Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC Disciplinary Documents........ 63
Counter Sniper Team Lead Disciplinary Documents.............. 77
Lead Advance Agent Disciplinary Documents.................... 93
Site Counterpart Disciplinary Documents...................... 111
Site Agent Disciplinary Documents............................ 125
Transcripts of Interviews
DTD 2nd Supervisor........................................... 151
PI Response Agent............................................ 291
Counter Sniper............................................... 436
CS Response Agent............................................ 593
USSS Security Room Agent..................................... 752
ONE YEAR LATER:
THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE'S FAILURES
SURROUNDING THE JULY 13, 2024 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Today, U.S. Senator Rand Paul, Chairman of the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC)
released the Committee's final report regarding what can only
be described as stunning failures by the United States Secret
Service (USSS) that allowed then-former President Donald J.
Trump to be shot on July 13, 2024, in an attempted
assassination in Butler, Pennsylvania. One year later, the
facts remain as chilling as ever: a former President of the
United States and major party candidate was shot in the head at
a public rally by an individual who was reported as suspicious
and carrying a rangefinder to the Secret Service at least 25
minutes prior. It is a miracle that President Trump survived.
This attempt on the life of President Trump cost one innocent
life and could have resulted in far more bloodshed. The truth
is, President Trump, and the Nation, was fortunate. The once-
again President survived despite being shot in the head. Since
that day, there has been another attempt on his life and
further threats to do him harm, including most recently a
renewed threat from Iran. This report reveals a disturbing
pattern of communication failures and negligence that
culminated in a preventable tragedy. What happened was
inexcusable and the consequences imposed for the failures so
far do not reflect the severity of the situation.
The Attempted Assassination
On July 13, 2024, at approximately 6:11 p.m., Thomas
Crooks, a 20-year-old man from Bethel Park, Pennsylvania,
managed to climb on to the roof of the American Glass Research
(AGR) building, unimpeded, during a campaign rally at the
Butler Farm Show. From that rooftop, Crooks fired eight shots
from a rifle at President Trump. Crooks struck four
individuals, killing Corey Comperatore and injuring three
others, including President Trump.
The Investigation
Following the attack, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs (the Committee) and the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) launched
a joint-bipartisan investigation. Over the past year, the
Committee has conducted 17 transcribed interviews with USSS
personnel and reviewed over 75,000 pages of documents produced
from Federal, State, and local law enforcement entities. A
preliminary report was issued in September 2024. This final
report issued by the Chairman builds on those findings and
includes new evidence.
The Failures By Secret Service
There were multiple, unacceptable failures in the planning
and execution of the July 13 Butler rally. A 20-year-old gunman
was able to evade detection by the country's top protective
agency for nearly 45 minutes. Agents and officers chose not to
retrieve radios from local and State law enforcement, limiting
coordination at a critical time. Known line-of-sight
vulnerabilities were identified in advance but not addressed.
An inexperienced operator was tasked with managing counter-
unmanned aerial systems. Personnel who were vital to mission
success were not requested. In addition to the consequential
failures on the ground in Butler, Pennsylvania, there were also
numerous failures in Washington, DC, at USSS Headquarters. USSS
executives told the Committee that prior to July 13, 2024,
there was no formal process to request or deny assets. USSS
advance agents told the Committee that when their requests went
unanswered, they had no way of knowing whether they would
receive the support needed to protect the former President.
Some did not even bother submitting requests at all, convinced
they would be denied by headquarters.
Insufficient Accountability
Not a single person has been fired. USSS has conducted
internal reviews, but only six individuals have faced
disciplinary action. Two of those individuals received lighter
punishments than initially recommended. The Committee believes
more than six individuals should have received disciplinary
action as a result of their action (or inaction) on July 13,
2024. Those who were disciplined received penalties far too
weak to match the severity the failures. Details on these
disciplinary actions were withheld from the Committee until
Chairman Paul issued a subpoena for them on July 1, 2025. The
American people deserve better.
Findings
Based on the evidence gathered, the Committee found the
following:
1. USSS denied multiple requests for additional staff,
assets, and resources to protect President Trump during the
campaign.
2. USSS did not fire a single person involved in the
planning and execution of the Butler rally. USSS formally
disciplined only six personnel, some of whom received their
disciplinary decision as recently as July 2025. In two
instances, the final disciplinary decision was a reduced
punishment from what was originally recommended.
3. Former Director Kimberly Cheatle falsely testified to
Congress that no USSS asset requests were denied for the Butler
rally.
4. Despite USSS leadership receiving an intelligence
briefing regarding the protectee and authorizing counter
snipers at all of President Trump's outdoor rallies a day
prior, counter snipers were not present at the July 9, Doral
campaign rally.
5. There were ill-defined responsibilities for USSS agents
serving in advance roles.
6. USSS agents failed to communicate crucial information
regarding the suspicious individual to President Trump's shift
detail, which had the ability to prevent him from taking the
stage.
7. Pertinent threat intelligence related to the protectee
was not shared with USSS agents in charge of security at the
Butler, Pennsylvania, rally.
8. There was a severe lack of coordination and
communication between USSS and State and local law enforcement
from the advance process through the event.
This was not a single error. It was a cascade of
preventable failures that nearly cost President Trump his life.
In the interest of transparency, the Committee is releasing a
number of subpoenaed records and additional transcripts in the
addendum. The addendum also includes a summary of changes USSS
made to its policies and procedures as a result of the events
of July 13 and the Committee's interim report.
II. HISTORY OF DENIED STAFFING, ASSETS, AND
RESOURCE REQUESTS FROM SECRET SERVICE HEADQUARTERS
According to USSS documents provided to the Committee, USSS
Headquarters denied or left unfulfilled at least 10 requests by
the Donald Trump Division (DTD) for additional resources during
the 2024 campaign including enhanced counter-unmanned aerial
system (C-UAS) assets, counter assault team (CAT) personnel,
and counter sniper personnel.\1\ The documents revealed a
pattern of certain categories of requests being either
blatantly denied, unfulfilled, or required to be supplemented
by local law enforcement or other Federal agencies, such as the
Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), or Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI).\2\ These documents further contradict statements made by
former Director of USSS, Kimberly Cheatle's testimony to the
U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.\3\
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\1\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
\2\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).; Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy
Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman
Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
\3\ House of Representatives Oversight Committee: Hearing on the
Oversight of the U.S. Secret Service and the Attempted Assassination of
President Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. At min. 52:00 (July 22, 2024)
(Statement of Director Kimberly Cheatle).
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Counter Snipers
On July 1, 2023, President Trump visited Pickens, South
Carolina, for a campaign rally.\4\ Prior to the visit, on June
28, 2023, DTD requested the Office of Protective Operations
(OPO) provide counter sniper assets in support of this event
due to ``line-of-sight vulnerabilities.''\5\ This request for
USSS counter snipers included a full justification from DTD,
noting the expectancy of over 20,000 attendees, a statement
that TSD relayed to DTD that the use of ballistic glass would
not be an option for this visit, and a notification that then-
Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of DTD would be speaking to the
OPO Deputy Assistant Director about the request.\6\ The OPO
responded to DTD, only three hours later, stating that
following a review of the justification and manpower
availability, USSS counter snipers were not available.\7\
Furthermore, despite the justification sent to OPO and a
conversation between the DTD SAIC and OPO Deputy Assistant
Director, the Committee was provided with internal DTD
communications stating that Uniformed Division (UD) counter
snipers in full or LNO (liaison) role would not be authorized
for the visit, primarily due to manpower constraints.\8\
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\4\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 58 (Dec. 4, 2024).
\5\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Office of Protective
Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (June 28, 2023) at USSS--
023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\6\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Office of Protective
Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (June 28, 2023) at USSS--
023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\7\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Office of Protective
Operations, U.S. Secret Service to Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (June 28, 2023) at USSS--
023585 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\8\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Donald Trump Division Official,
U.S. Secret Service to multiple Donald Trump Division Officials, U.S.
Secret Service (June 28, 2023) at USSS--023619 (received Mar. 12, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
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Notwithstanding the history of denials from USSS
Headquarters, the current Chief Counsel of USSS, appointed by
President Trump, told the Committee that there was no
discernable evidence of political animus related to the reason
for these denials.\9\
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\9\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).
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In a briefing with the Committee, USSS explained the lack
of Uniformed Division counter sniper personnel is a limiting
factor when determining approval for specific events.\10\
Similar to using HSI Special Agents to supplement post
standers, USSS explained that following July 13, 2024, USSS
entered into a request for assistance agreement with CBP to use
their Tactical Unit Snipers known as BORTAC from the Eagle
Pass, Texas, post to supplement USSS counter snipers.\11\
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\10\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).
\11\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).
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Counter Assault Team (CAT)
From January 5, 2024, to February 29, 2024, DTD was denied
CAT assets for various roles six times.\12\ When asked about
the denial of CAT assets, the ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee
in a transcribed interview that sometimes they did get [CAT
assets] and sometimes they did not. One notable example was for
a January 6, 2024, visit to Iowa. DTD requested CAT advance
support over email, CAT responded that they were unable to
fulfill the request due to lack of available assets. Documents
reviewed by the Committee indicated that the request was
fulfilled by local tactical assets. However, the itinerary for
the event stated that there would be ``No traditional police
meeting scheduled.''\13\ A police meeting is a planning meeting
between USSS and local law enforcement to go over operational
plans for securing the event. The Technical Security Division
(TSD) advance agent for the Butler rally stated that a police
meeting is ``where all the assets that I need to talk to, from
the fire chief, the respective bomb squad sergeant or captain--
or commander. and so on and so forth, they are at this
meeting.''\14\
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\12\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).
\13\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Donald Trump Division
Official, U.S. Secret Service to multiple U.S. Secret Service Officials
(Dec. 27, 2023) at USSS--023547 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
\14\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance
Agent, at 20 (Aug. 13, 2024).
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A similar instance occurred for a visit to Las Vegas,
Nevada from January 26, 2024, to January 28, 2024, President
Trump's detail requested CAT advance support one week prior to
the event, on January 19, 2024. Internal communications between
CAT Operations Center and DTD provided to the Committee
revealed that the denial of the request took CAT Operations
Center fewer than 20 minutes to relay the denial to DTD.
However, unlike other denials, CAT Operations Center stated the
reason for denial was due to the lack of available personnel in
this district.\15\ In a letter from USSS to the Committee, USSS
explained that because of the unavailability of CAT advance
support, local law enforcement who usually supplement USSS CAT
personnel were not provided because there was no liaison from
the USSS available.\16\
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\15\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Special Operations Official,
U.S. Secret Service to Donald Trump Detail Official (Jan. 19, 2024) at
USSS--023551 and USSS--023552 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
\16\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
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The ATSAIC of DTD stated CAT denials were not uncommon. In
a transcribed interview with the Committee, the ATSAIC of DTD
stated there were probably more than five times where CAT
assets were denied following a request from DTD.\17\ While the
Committee could not verify the exact number of denials for CAT
assets and personnel, USSS told the Committee that on April 7,
2024, a CAT team was assigned to travel with DTD on an ongoing
basis.\18\
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\17\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 61 (Dec. 4, 2024).
\18\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
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Enhanced Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Assets
Between November 15, 2022, the date President Trump
announced his candidacy for a second term, and July 13, 2024,
the date of the Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally, USSS
denied or left unfulfilled enhanced C-UAS asset requests on
four separate occasions.\19\ All of the requests were
unfulfilled due to lack of manpower.\20\ In a briefing to the
Committee, USSS senior agency officials told the Committee that
all requests submitted by the DTD for enhanced C-UAS assets
were denied prior to the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania,
campaign rally.\21\
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\19\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).; Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy
Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman
Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations , at USSS--023570-023575, USSS--023632
(received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\20\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025); Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy
Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman
Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations at USSS--023570-023575, USSS--023632
(received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\21\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).
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For President Trump's June 9, 2024, visit to Las Vegas,
Nevada, DTD requested enhanced C-UAS assets. Internal
communications from DTD to the Assistant to the Special Agent
in Charge (ATSAIC) of the Technical Security Division (TSD)
stated that President Trump would be speaking outdoors, fully
exposed, and vulnerable to UAS threats. TSD replied that they
would be unable to support the request but would assist with
setting up a ground response plan.\22\ TSD did not indicate a
reason for the denial.
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\22\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from U.S. Secret Service Official
to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (June 5, 2024), at USSS--
023570 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
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While TSD did not provide justification for the denial of
enhanced C-UAS assets in Las Vegas, two weeks later DTD once
again requested these capabilities for President Trump's visit
to Chesapeake, Virginia, on June 28, 2024.\23\ Similar to the
Las Vegas rally, DTD told TSD in the request that President
Trump would be speaking outdoors, exposed, and vulnerable to
UAS threats.\24\ The next denial of enhanced C-UAS assets by
TSD occurred ahead of the July 9, 2024, campaign event in
Doral, Florida, which was expected to have an estimated 10,000
to 15,000 attendees.\25\ In preparation for this event, on July
1, 2024, DTD operations staff emailed the ATSAIC of TSD
requesting ``enhanced C-UAS coverage to include, detection and
enhanced mitigation capabilities. as well as an operator for
the day of the visit.''\26\ TSD responded to DTD the following
day, stating: ``Due to POTUS travel and the NATO NSSE during
this timeframe, C-UAS is unable to accommodate this
request.''\27\ This specific denial of assets is notable, as
the campaign event took place on July 9, the same day which
threat information was shared with DTD and USSS agents
preparing for the upcoming Butler rally on July 13.\28\
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\23\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations at USSS--023573. (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
\24\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from U.S. Secret Service Official
to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (June 22, 2024) at USSS--
023573 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\25\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from U.S. Secret Service Official
to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (July 2, 2024) at USSS--
023574 to USSS--023575 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
\26\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from U.S. Secret Service Official
to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (July 2, 2024) at USSS--
023574 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\27\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from U.S. Secret Service Official
to Donald Trump Division, U.S. Secret Service (July 2, 2024) at USSS--
023574 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\28\ U.S. Secret Service, Email from Donald Trump Division, U.S.
Secret Service to U.S. Secret Service Official to (July 2, 2024) at
USSS--023575 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee); U.S.
Secret Service, Email from U.S. Secret Service Official to Donald Trump
Division, U.S. Secret Service (July 3, 2024) at USSS--023718 (received
Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with Committee).
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The final denial for C-UAS assets by USSS Headquarters came
days prior to the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania rally. In
a transcribed interview with the Committee, the C-UAS advance
agent stated that he requested enhanced C-UAS assets on July
10, 2024, which were denied.\29\ In a document production to
the Committee, USSS provided internal communications related to
the denial of enhanced C-UAS assets to the DTD.\30\ In the
Committee's review of this production, Committee staff did not
locate an explicit denial of enhanced C-UAS to DTD for the July
13 campaign rally. However, in a transcribed interview, the C-
UAS Advance Agent told the Committee the request was denied
telephonically from the TSD Advance Agent, which was
corroborated by documentation from USSS.\31\ When the Committee
asked whether it was common for asset denials to be issued
without providing a reason, USSS told the Committee that prior
to July 13, 2024, there was no formal procedure to submit a
request and justification to the Office of Staffing and
Logistics and therefore, there was no standard response
concerning approvals or denials of such requests from USSS
Headquarters.\32\
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\29\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\30\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
\31\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 53 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\32\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Briefing
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 14, 2025).
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III. ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE SECRET SERVICE
In the 17 transcribed interviews the Committee has
conducted, the USSS personnel interviewed have continued to
shift blame and point fingers, not only within the agency, but
also with PSP and Butler ESU. Following months of requests for
records relating to the disciplinary actions taken against USSS
personnel involved in the planning and execution of the Butler
rally, the Chairman issued a subpoena on behalf of the
Committee to USSS for such records on July 1, 2025.
On July 3, 2025, USSS produced to the Committee a table of
administrative and disciplinary actions taken against officers
related to their performance at the July 13, 2024, campaign
rally.\33\ According to the document, six individuals received
disciplinary action from the USSS Office of Integrity following
the attempted assassination of President Trump.\34\ Four of
these individuals were assigned to the USSS Pittsburgh Field
Office, one individual was assigned to DTD, and one individual
is assigned to UD. The disciplinary actions taken by the USSS
Office of Integrity span from a 10-day to forty-two-day
suspension without pay.\35\ Additionally, two individuals were
placed on management directed reassignments.\36\ No USSS
personnel were fired for their role in the planning or
execution of the Butler rally.\37\
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\33\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS--023839
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\34\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS--023839
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\35\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS--023839
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\36\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
\37\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS--023839
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
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While these six individuals played a role in the failures
that occurred on July 13, 2024, the Committee would like to
note the lack of disciplinary action for other individuals
involved, most notably the USSS Security Room Agent, who,
according to testimony and documents received by the Committee,
failed to relay critical information he obtained from the PSP
Security Room Officer regarding a suspicious individual with a
range finder to the DTD agents who could have removed or
prevented President Trump from taking the stage.\38\ In a
document provided to the Committee detailing administrative
actions taken against agents or officers of USSS by the agency,
the USSS states ``After the Mission Assurance Inquiry review
was completed, as part of the determination of which employees
might face discipline, [the USSS Security Room Agent] was found
not to be in violation of Secret Service policy. [The USSS
Security Room Agent] retired on June 28, 2025.''\39\ Further
discussions of the USSS Security Room Agent's actions on July
13 are included below.
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\38\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 71 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\39\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also concerning to the Committee that nearly one year
has passed since an assassination attempt of the current
President of the United States and the USSS has only days ago
issued final disposition of disciplinary action to individuals
who were determined to be complicit in the failures of USSS on
July 13. Furthermore, USSS completed the disciplinary process
for two personnel only after the Chairman issued the subpoena.
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC
On August 14, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, was
informed that pending the ongoing investigation into the July
13, 2024, assassination attempt, he was placed on telework
status by his direct supervisor, the Deputy Assistant Director
(DAD) in the Office of Investigations. The DAD in the Office of
Investigations informed the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC that
this decision came directly from Acting Director Rowe and the
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was instructed to place the USSS
Site Counterpart, USSS Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, the
Protective Intelligence Advance Lead, and the USSS Advance Lead
on the same telework status.\40\ According to the USSS
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's written response to his Notice
of Proposed Suspension, no reason, justification, or
instructions for this action by Acting Director Rowe were given
to the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC or any of the individuals
the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was instructed to place on
telework status.\41\ However, in the USSS Site Counterpart's
written response to her Notice of Proposed Suspension, she
states ``[USSS Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC] specifically
informed me that I would not receive any documentation because
there were concerns the information would leak.''\42\
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\40\ Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Grievance Form
3112 Dated 5/6/25: Final Decision for Discipline for [Pittsburgh Field
Office SAIC] by the USSS Office of Integrity, Attach. 1, on May 6,
2025, at USSS--024029 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee)
\41\ Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Grievance Form
3112 Dated 5/6/25: Final Decision for Discipline for [Pittsburgh Field
Office SAIC] by the USSS Office of Integrity, Attach. 1, on May 6,
2025, at USSS--024029 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\42\ Atty. for Site Counterpart to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response to Notice of
Proposed Suspension, Ex.1, on May 12, 2025, at USSS--024269 (received
July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 26, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was
informed by the DAD in the Office of Investigations that the
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC would be permanently reassigned as
the Director of USSS Personnel National Cyber and Forensics
Training Alliance (NCFTA) and the DSAIC in the Criminal
Investigative Division (CID).\43\ Despite this reassignment,
the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC remained on restricted duty
until December 29, 2024.\44\ This same day, the Pittsburgh
Field Office SAIC received a total of $9,000 in performance-
based awards for his exceptional hard work . . . during a
manpower intensive Presidential Campaign.\45\ In a written
response to the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's Notice of
Proposed Suspension, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC's
attorney stated these awards are contingent on not receiving
disciplinary action from the agency.\46\ While the Committee is
aware the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC did receive disciplinary
action, it is unclear if he ever received the $9,000 in
performance-based awards.
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\43\ Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response
to Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS--024119
(received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee); Atty. for
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity, 1U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response to Notice of
Proposed Suspension, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS--024108 (received on
July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\44\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
\45\ Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response
to Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS--024119
(received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\46\ Atty. for Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC to Office of Integrity,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response
to Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Feb. 19, 2025, at USSS--024119
(received on July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 18, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC
received a Notice of Proposed Suspension stating the USSS
Office of Integrity recommending he be suspended for 14 days
without pay.\47\ On April 24, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office
SAIC received a final suspension decision from the USSS Office
of Integrity which stated that the USSS' decision is that the
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC will receive a fourteen-day
suspension.\48\
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\47\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, Pittsburgh Field Office,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Notice of
Proposed Suspension, on Jan. 18, 2025, at USSS--024091 (received July
3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\48\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC, Director of USSS
Personnel, National Cyber and Forensics Training Alliance, Suspension
Decision, on Apr. 24, 2025, at USSS--024100 (received July 3, 2025) (on
file with Committee).
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As per Secret Service policy, if an individual disagrees
with a final decision of the USSS Office of Integrity, they
have the ability to request an administrative review of the
decision by filing an administrative grievance with the USSS
Discipline Review Board (DRB).\49\ The DRB will then meet to
determine if the disciplinary action taken by the USSS Office
of Integrity is adequate and will issue a response to the
complainant. On May 6, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC
requested DRB review. On June 2, 2025, the DRB met and upheld
the USSS Office of Integrity's decision regarding the proposed
suspension for the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC.\50\ The
Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC was issued a 14-day suspension
without pay.\51\
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\49\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S.
Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed.
Suspension , on Nov. 5, 2024, at USSS--024953 (received July 3, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
\50\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh
Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security,
Grievance Decision, on June 2, 2025, at USSS--024458 (received July 3,
2025) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Secret Service, Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office
SAIC, Director of USSS Personnel, National Cyber and Forensic Training
Alliance, Grievance Decision, on June 2, 2025, at USSS--024022
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\51\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS--023839
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC
On August 14, 2024, the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was
placed on telework status on the orders of former Acting
Director Rowe by the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC. On January
17, 2025, the USSS Deputy Chief Integrity Officer issued a
Notice recommending the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC be
suspended for 10 days without pay.\52\ On April 24, the
Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC was issued a final suspension
decision which confirmed the USSS's decision to suspend him for
10 days without pay.\53\ On May 1, 2025, the Pittsburgh Field
Office ATSAIC resumed full operational duty in his leadership
position in the Pittsburgh Field Office.\54\ On May 9, 2025,
the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC requested DRB review. On
June 2, 2025, the DRB met and upheld the USSS Office of
Integrity's decision regarding the proposed suspension for the
Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC.\55\ The Pittsburgh Field Office
ATSAIC was issued a 10-day suspension without pay.\56\
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\52\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field
Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Notice of
Proposed Suspension, on Jan. 17, 2025, at USSS--024534 (received July
3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\53\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh Field
Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security,
Suspension Decision, on Apr. 24, 2025, at USSS--024540 (received July
3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\54\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
\55\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC, Pittsburgh
Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security,
Grievance Decision, on June 2, 2025, at USSS--024458 (received July 3,
2025) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Secret Service, Discipline Review Board to Pittsburgh Field Office
SAIC, Director of USSS Personnel, National Cyber and Forensic Training
Alliance, Grievance Decision, on June 2, 2025, at USSS--024022
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\56\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Disciplinary Actions Taken by USSS Office of Integrity at USSS--023839
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the disciplinary process, agents are afforded
the opportunity for their direct supervisor to comment on the
findings of the Office of Integrity and list any mitigating or
aggravated factors related to their proposed disciplinary
action. The USSS Office of Integrity relied on the comments of
the Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC for at least two personnel
on proposed disciplinary action, even though the ATSAIC himself
was under investigation and later received disciplinary action
for the same incident.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity, Email from Supervisory General Investigator to Site
Counterpart (Apr. 29, 2025), at USSS--024910 (received July 3, 2025)
(on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret
Service, Office of Integrity to Pittsburgh Field Office ATSAIC,
Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, Suspension Decision, on April 24, 2025, USSS--024540
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Site Agent
On August 16, 2024, the USSS Site Agent was placed on an
unofficial restricted duty status by former Acting Director
Rowe.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 5, 2024, the USSS Site Agent received a Notice
of Proposed Suspension for 3 days in connection with an
incident involving unauthorized contact with the media.\59\ The
USSS Site Agent appealed this proposed suspension and filed a
written response via her attorney on December 19, 2024.\60\
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\59\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S.
Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed
Suspension, on Nov. 5, 2024, at USSS--024592 (received July 3, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
\60\ See generally Atty. for Site Agent to Office of Integrity,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response
to Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Dec. 19, 2024, at USSS--024600
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 15, 2024, the USSS Site Agent was reassigned
from DTD to the Miami Field Office.\61\ Despite this management
directed reassignment, the USSS Site Agent remained on
restricted duty until April 4, 2025.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Standard Form 50, Notification of Personnel Action--
Reassignment (Site Agent), U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security (Dec. 15, 2025) at USSS--025059 (received July 9, 2025) (on
file with Committee).
\62\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 3, 2025, the USSS Site Agent was issued a
suspension decision by the Chief Integrity Officer of the USSS
for her unauthorized contact with the media.\63\ The Office of
Integrity considered several factors in her case and decreased
her disposition from a three-day suspension without pay to a
one-day suspension without pay.\64\ The next day, April 4,
2025, the USSS Site Agent received a separate Notice of
Proposed Suspension for forty-two days without pay as a result
of her performance at the July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania,
campaign event.\65\ This same day, the USSS Site Agent returned
from restricted duty to a fully operational status at the USSS
Miami Field Office.\66\
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\63\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, U.S. Secret Service,
Department of Homeland Security, Suspension Decision, on Apr. 3, 2025,
at USSS--024597 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\64\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, 1U.S. Secret Service,
Department of Homeland Security, Suspension Decision, on Apr. 3, 2025,
at USSS--024597 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\65\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, 1U.S. Secret Service,
Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Apr.
4, 2025, at USSS--024757 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
\66\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 3, 2025, the Site Agent was issued the final
suspension for her involvement in planning and securing the
July 13, 2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally. The Site
Agent's final disposition was forty-two days without pay.\67\
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\67\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Agent, Miami Field Office, U.S. Secret Service,
Department of Homeland Security, Suspension Decision, on July 3, 2025,
at USSS--024781 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Site Counterpart
On August 14, 2024, the USSS Site Counterpart was placed on
telework status by the Pittsburgh Field Office SAIC following
the orders of former Acting Director Rowe. In mid-December
2024, the Site Counterpart was directed to report back to work
but has since been prohibited in participating in her typical
day-to-day responsibilities.\68\ On April 4, 2025, the Site
Counterpart received a notice from the USSS Office of Integrity
proposing a fourteen-day suspension without pay.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Atty. for Site Counterpart to Office of Integrity, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response to Notice of
Proposed Suspension, Ex.1, on May 12, 2025, at USSS--024269 (received
July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\69\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Site Counterpart, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed
Suspension, on Apr. 4, 2025, at USSS--024884 (received July 3, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Lead Advance Agent
On August 14, 2024, the USSS Lead Advance Agent was placed
on telework status by former Acting Director Rowe.\70\
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\70\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2025, the Lead Advance Agent returned from the
situational telework but was restricted from performing her
standard duties until April 8, 2025.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Atty. for Lead Advance Agent to Office of Integrity, U.S.
Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Written Response to
Notice of Proposed Suspension, on May 12, 2025, at USSS--023989
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 4, 2025, the USSS Lead Advance Agent received a
Notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a twenty-
one-day suspension without pay.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity Lead Advance Agent, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed
Suspension, on Apr. 4, 2025, at USSS--024791 (received July 3, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 1, 2025, the Lead Advance Agent received her final
disciplinary decision from the USSS Office of Integrity. The
USSS concluded the charges of negligence in the performance of
official duties were substantiated, but mitigated the proposed
suspension of twenty-one days to 14 days without pay.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to Lead Advance Agent, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S.
Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Suspension Decision,
on July 1, 2025, at USSS--023972 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader
On December 20, 2024, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader
was placed on restricted duty by former Acting Director Rowe.
On April 23, 2025, the Counter Sniper Team Leader received a
Notice from the USSS Office of Integrity proposing a fifty-two-
day suspension for negligence in the performance of official
duties and specific operational failures during the July 13,
2024, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally.\74\
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\74\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead, Special Operations
Branch, Uniformed Division, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, Notice of Proposed Suspension, on Apr. 23, 2025, at USSS--
024421 (received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 3, 2025, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead received
his official suspension decision. While he was found negligent,
and although aggravating factors initially supported a fifty-
two-day suspension, mitigating factors considered by the USSS
Office of Integrity decreased his suspension without pay to
thirty-five days.\75\ As of July 9, 2025, the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Lead remains on official restricted duty
status.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Office
of Integrity to USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead, Special Operations
Branch, Uniformed Division, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, Suspension Decision, on July 3, 2025, at USSS--024449
(received July 3, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\76\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Administrative Actions Taken by U.S. Secret Service (received July 9,
2025) (on file with Committee).
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IV. TIMELINE OF INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT INFORMATION LEADING UP TO JULY
13, 2024
Background of Threat Intelligence
On January 14, 2022, a video was posted on Grand Ayatollah
Sayyid Ali Khamenei's website depicting an animated drone
strike targeting then-former President Donald Trump playing
golf at his Mar-a-Lago estate in West Palm Beach, Florida.\77\
President Trump and others in his first administration's
national security apparatus have long been targets of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) for the U.S. role in a January
3, 2020 drone strike which killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) General, Qasem Soleimani.\78\ The threats from
Iran continued even after President Trump left office on
January 20, 2021.\79\
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\77\ Diana Glebova & Caitlin Doombos, Secret Service was warned of
possible Iran `drone attack' on Trump last year, agent told Senate,
N.Y. Post (Sept. 26, 2024) https://nypost.com/2024/09/26/us-news/
secret-service-was-warned-of-possible-iran-drone-attack-on-trump-last-
year-agent-told-senate/.
\78\ Press Release, Justice Department Announces Murder-For-Hire
and Related Charges Against IRGC Asset and Two Local Operatives, Dep't
of Justice, Nov. 8, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/
justice-department-announces-murder-hire-and-related-charges-against-
irgc-asset-and-two.
\79\ Proff., USA v. Asif Merchant, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/17/
2024).; Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., No. 24-mag-3904,
(S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 12, 2024, one day before the Butler, Pennsylvania,
campaign rally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
arrested Asif Raza Merchant, a Pakistani national with ties to
Iran and the IRGC.\80\ According to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) criminal complaint, after spending approximately two
weeks in Iran, Merchant arrived in the U.S. in April 2024 to
recruit an individual to assassinate U.S. political
officials.\81\ The now-unsealed DOJ proffer agreement States
that Merchant was charged with murder-for-hire.\82\ While
discussing the assassination plot with undercover Federal law
enforcement officers, Merchant alluded to that he was ``the
`representative' in the United States, indicating that there
were other people he worked for outside the U.S.''\83\ After
making an agreement with and paying $5,000 to undercover
Federal law enforcement officers to commit the murder, Merchant
attempted to leave the United States on July 12, 2024, when he
was subsequently arrested by the FBI.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Compl., USA v. Asif Merchant, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/14/
2024).
\81\ Compl., USA v. Asif Merchant., 5 No. 24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/
14/2024).
\82\ Proff., USA v. Asif Merchant, 1, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/
17/2024).
\83\ Proff., USA v. Asif Merchant, 2, No.24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y., 7/
17/2024).
\84\ Compl., USA v. Asif Merchant., 13, No. 24-mj-467, (E.D.N.Y.,
7/14/2024).
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On November 8, 2024, the DOJ released a criminal complaint
from the Southern District of New York stating Farhad Shakeri,
an Afghan national living in Iran, conspired with two United
States citizens to provide material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization, to commit murder-for-hire,
money laundering, and to violate the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., 1-4, No. 24-mag-3904,
(S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The complaint alleges that Shakeri, working on behalf of
the IRGC, recruited two United States citizens in order to
assassinate enemies of Iran. The complaint lists a total of
four victims residing in the United States and one planned mass
casualty attack overseas.\86\ Among the four listed U.S. based
targets, ``Victim Four'' was identified as President Trump.
Shakeri told the FBI that the IRGC has long been targeting
President Trump for assassination attempts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., No. 24-mag-3904,
(S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
[A]ccording to Shakeri, in approximately mid-to-late
September 2024, IRGC Official-1 asked Shakeri to put aside his
other efforts on behalf of the IRGC and focus on surveilling,
and, ultimately, assassinating, former President of the United
States, Donald J. Trump. Shakeri indicated to IRGC Official-1
that this would cost a ``huge'' amount of money. In response,
IRGC Official-1 said that ``we have already spent a lot of
money . . . [s]o the money's not an issue,'' which Shakeri
understood to mean that the IRGC previously had spent a
significant sum of money on efforts to murder [President Trump]
and was willing to continue spending a lot of money in its
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
attempt to procure [President Trump]'s assassination.
[D]uring his meeting with IRGC Official-1 on or about
October 7, 2024, IRGC Official-1 directed Shakeri to provide a
plan within seven days to kill [President Trump]. If Shakeri
was unable to put forth a plan within that timeframe, IRGC
Official-1 continued, the IRGC would pause its plan to kill
[President Trump] until after the U.S. Presidential elections,
because IRGC Official-1 assessed [President Trump] would lose
the election and, afterward, it would be easier to assassinate
[President Trump].\87\
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\87\ Compl., USA v. Farhad Shakeri, et al., 25, No. 24-mag-3904,
(S.D.N.Y., 11/8/2024).
Pre-July 13
During the first week of July, several Deputy Assistant
Directors met at Secret Service Headquarters to discuss
intelligence they had received regarding President Trump.\88\
The Director of the Office of Protective Operations told the
Committee that the outcome of that meeting was that ``if there
is actionable intelligence of specific intelligence toward a
specific event, that might be an opportunity to leverage
different resources if required.one of which could be counter
sniper[s].''\89\ The result of the conversation was that going
forward counter sniper assets would be deployed at all of
President Trump's outdoor rallies.\90\ This directive was then
communicated to the SAIC of the Special Operations Division,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 80-81 (Sept. 13,
2024).
\89\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 80 (Sept. 13,
2024).
\90\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 82 (Sept. 13,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 3, 2024, an agent from the USSS Protective
Intelligence Division (PID) sent an email to the SAIC and DSAIC
of DTD, informing them that PID had received approval for a
one-time-read-in of classified reports related to their
assignment.\91\ According to the communications reviewed by the
Committee, the SAIC and DSAIC of DTD needed to travel to a
local FBI office to receive the brief in the FBI's secure
compartmented information facility (SCIF).\92\ The SAIC of DTD
responded to the PID agent requesting to attend the briefing at
1:30 p.m. on July 8, 2024, the day before the Doral, Florida,
campaign rally.\93\ Following the briefing, the DSAIC of DTD
sent a text message to an undisclosed number of DTD personnel
stating, ``It is imperative that 2nd Supervisors focus heavily
on line-of-sight mitigation. Exposure time, and line-of-sight
mitigation of critical areas of concern. Finally, interact with
your site agents early in the advance as we should mandate that
[protective asset] is available for ALL DTD outside
rallies.''\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email
Communication on July 3, 2024, at USSS--023718 (received Apr. 24, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
\92\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email
Communication on July 3, 2024, at USSS--023718 (received Apr. 24, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
\93\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email
Communication on July 7, 2024, at USSS--023726 (received Apr. 24, 2025)
(on file with Committee).
\94\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
Message Communication on July 3, 2024, at USSS--023758 (received Apr.
24, 2025) (On file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The timeline of documents provided to the Committee from
USSS coincide with what was publicly reported by The New York
Times regarding threats to President Trump.\95\ The New York
Times published that it was FBI leadership, including then
Director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, who was personally
involved in ensuring the USSS was aware of the threat to
President Trump. Moreover, The New York Times claimed that it
was in response to the threat posed by Asif Merchant that the
USSS made the decision to send counter snipers to the Butler,
Pennsylvania, rally on July 13.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Peter Baker, Adam Goldman, and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Detected
Potential Iranian Plot to Kill Trump Separate From Saturday's Shooting,
N.Y. Times, July 16, 2024.
\96\ Peter Baker, Adam Goldman, and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Detected
Potential Iranian Plot to Kill Trump Separate From Saturday's Shooting,
N.Y. Times, July 16, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Trump held a campaign rally in Doral, Florida, on
July 9, 2024, the same day USSS decided it would supply counter
sniper assets for the former President's July 13, 2024, rally
in Butler, Pennsylvania due to threat intelligence. In his
interview with the Committee, the ATSAIC of the DTD, told the
Committee he received a phone call from SAIC of DTD on July 8,
2024, informing him that counter sniper assets had already been
approved and directed him to complete the request
paperwork.\97\ The ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee that he
believed the decision by USSS Headquarters to add counter
sniper assets was intelligence driven.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 31 (Dec. 4, 2024).
\98\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 31 (Dec. 4, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked who conveyed the specific intelligence, the
ATSAIC of DTD told the Committee that it was the DSAIC of DTD
who told him ``The information I received was we have a
credible, long-range threat to [President Trump] and it's by
the typical actors.''\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 32 (Dec. 4, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the claim from the Deputy Assistant Director of OPO
asserting that USSS Headquarters had decided to provide DTD
with counter sniper assets at all outdoor rallies following the
July 8, 2024, PID briefing, counter snipers were not present at
the July 9, 2024, Doral rally.\100\ While USSS counter sniper
assets were assigned to the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally three
days later, of those who were asked in transcribed interviews
with the Committee, none of the USSS counter snipers were
informed of the threat intelligence regarding the protectee. In
addition to the USSS counter snipers who were not briefed on
the threat intelligence regarding President Trump, the ATSAIC
of DTD confirmed in his transcribed interview that he never
received a verbal briefing from PID indicating the existence of
an elevated threat environment.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 56 (Sept. 13,
2024).
\101\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 61 (Dec. 4, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the Butler, Pennsylvania, rally being the first
time a former President and candidate has received counter
sniper assets from the Secret Service, it was not the first
time these assets had been requested by DTD as discussed
previously.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, at
USSS--023621 (June 28, 2023) (received Mar. 12, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. CONCLUSIVE FAILURES OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
In a briefing with the Committee, USSS officials stated
that the unprecedented nature of having a protectee as both a
former President and a candidate for office simultaneously was
not appreciated to the degree it should have been.\103\ This
unique circumstance led to confusion and assumptions made by
USSS staff in charge of planning security for the rally. The
lack of communication both within USSS and between local law
enforcement regarding a suspicious individual, USSS not
requesting assets because they believed the assets would be
denied, and placing individuals in roles with ill-defined
responsibilities culminated in a breakdown of accountability
among those individuals the Committee interviewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Briefing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (Mar. 14, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Committee discussed the communication failures at
length in the interim findings report, additional information
became evident in transcribed interviews and documents produced
by the USSS following the Committee's initial assessment.
USSS Security Room Agent
The lack of structured communication was likely the
greatest contributor to the failures of the USSS on July 13,
2024. At a USSS protected event, the individual in charge of
communications is the security room agent. The security room
agent's duties include conducting appropriate radio checks,
passing all pertinent protectee movement to the post standers,
and in the event of an emergency, communicate situational
information to the shift and post standers accordingly.''\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ U.S. Secret Service, Site Post Instructions (July 13, 2024)
at USSS--0002220 (received Aug. 9, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the Butler rally, the security room agent was the SAIC
of the USSS Buffalo, New York, Field Office.\105\ He was
assigned the role on July 11, 2024. Although he had originally
submitted himself to work the First Lady's trip to Pittsburgh,
he was asked by the SAIC of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office to
work the security room at the Butler rally instead.\106\
Despite telling the Committee that he had been a security room
agent ``5 or 6 times'' prior to arriving in Butler, he was not
cognizant of numerous issues which hindered his ability to
perform his duty.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 12 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\106\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 19 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\107\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 15 (Oct. 9, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the USSS Security Room Agent told the Committee
``[T]he role of the command post is to ingest information from
different sources and then put that information back out'', he
was simultaneously unaware that Butler County had a separate
command post until the afternoon of July 13.\108\ He only
discovered the existence of another command post after
overhearing conversations between the Pennsylvania State Police
(PSP) Officer stationed in the USSS Security Room and other law
enforcement.\109\ By his own admission, he never had direct
contact with local law enforcement throughout the day, and that
his only method of communication with them was through the PSP
officer in the USSS Security Room.\110\ Moreover, when asked by
the Committee if he had viewed the PSP or Butler Emergency
Services Unit (ESU) operations plan prior to the event, he
stated that his first time seeing either of the operations
plans was the day prior to his transcribed interview with the
Committee.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 27 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\109\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 29 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\110\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 43 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\111\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 124 (Oct. 9, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Security Room Agent first learned of the
suspicious individual, later identified as Thomas Crooks, at
5:45 p.m., 25 minutes before the shooting, when his PSP
counterpart in the security room received a call from the
Butler County command post reporting that a local tactical team
was looking for a suspicious individual.\112\ During the
conversation between the USSS Security Room Agent and the PSP
Security Room Officer, the PSP Security Room Officer relayed
that the suspicious individual was outside the perimeter and
had a rangefinder.\113\ In a joint interview with the PSP and
FBI, the PSP Security Room Officer stated the following
regarding the USSS Security Room Agent's reaction to learning
of the suspicious individual:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\113\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 47 (Oct. 9, 2024).
Question: When you made that--when you relayed the
information to him, was this in person?
PSP Officer: Yes. Yes.
Question: Did you see if he communicated that over his
radio?
PSP Officer: I don't know, but I know he appeared to, like,
it wasn't--there was, like, after I said outside the perimeter,
I got a distinct impression that there's, like, a lack of
urgency.
Question: Like, you know, could you go on about, like,----
could you explain more?
PSP Officer: About, like, it was like. Oh, like, OK. Like,
it wasn't like he rushed around or did anything. I just told
him about this and everything.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 20, 2024) at 8 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
The USSS Security Room agent told the Committee that after
learning of the suspicious person, he relayed the information
to the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent embedded in the Security
Room.\115\ In this conversation, the USSS Security Room Agent
told the C-UAS Advance Agent to pass the information along to
the USSS Counter Sniper Response Agent and have him start
looking.\116\ When asked about whether the information was
passed to Protective Intelligence (PI) Response Agent, the USSS
Security Room Agent stated, ``Yeah. I believe that they were
notified at the same time as CS Response, but through [the C-
UAS Advance Agent].''\117\ According to the PI Response Agent,
she heard the information from her PSP Counterpart, not the C-
UAS Advance Agent, and stated no one had dispatched her.\118\
The C-UAS Advance agent corroborates what the PI Response Agent
told to the Committee stating, ``PI also went out to try to
locate the individual. I did not speak to her, but possibly it
could've been the [USSS] Security Room Agent that did.''\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 47-48 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\116\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 48-49 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\117\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 49 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\118\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 56 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\119\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 107-108 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding a suspicious individual on the outer perimeter,
the USSS Security Room Agent told the Committee, ``For someone
on the outer perimeter, there's really only two assets
available to us from a USSS perspective to dispatch. the
[protective intelligence] response and the [counter sniper]
response because they're the only people who are capable of
leaving the interior secure perimeter to go on the outside to
look for somebody.''\120\ Furthermore, because the information
regarding a suspicious individual with a rangefinder was passed
verbally from the PSP Security Room Officer to the USSS
Security Room Agent, and the USSS Security Room Agent made the
decision for the USSS C-UAS Agent to relay the information over
the phone to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Agent, rather
than radio, the message did not go out to USSS post standers,
counter snipers, and DTD shift detail.\121\ The ATSAIC of DTD
stated in his transcribed interview that the information should
have been elevated to someone at his level.\122\ Had the ATSAIC
on the DTD shift been aware of the information, he could have
potentially prevented the President from taking the stage while
the suspicious individual was being tracked down. When asked
which USSS individual was responsible for tracking down the
suspicious person, he stated, ``In this specific instance, a
protective intelligence advance agent or a site protective
intelligence agent, site agent would be primary.''\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 68 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\121\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 71 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\122\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 103 (Dec. 4, 2024).
\123\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 103 (Dec. 4, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The job of a Security Room Agent is to be the conduit of
communications between all entities involved in a protective
site in order to ensure situational awareness of all parties
involved in securing the event. The PSP Security Room Officer,
when asked during a joint interview with FBI and PSP whether he
was aware of a suspicious person being on the roof of the AGR
building prior to the shooting responded, ``at 1809, I received
another call from [Butler ESU Commander] saying that the guy
was discovered on top of a roof.''\124\ The PSP Security Room
Officer continues by stating he relayed that information to the
USSS Security Room Agent but did not notice if the USSS
Security Room Agent did anything with that information.\125\ In
the USSS Security Room Agent's transcribed interview with the
Committee the USSS Security Room Agent claims he never heard
about the individual on the roof, only that that local police
were working a problem at 3 o'clock.\126\ The USSS Security
Room Agent States in his transcribed interview with the
Committee, ``what I recall is that the local police were
working [a] problem at 3 o'clock. And when I heard that on the
radio, that's what I put back out over the Secret Service
Radio''.\127\ However, in the USSS Security Room Agent's joint
interview with PSP and FBI he states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 20, 2024) at 17 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\125\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 20, 2024) at 18 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\126\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 51 (Oct. 9, 2024).
\127\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 63 (Oct. 9, 2024).
Question: OK. Were you ever made aware of Mr. Crooks being
on the roof prior to the shooting?
USSS Agent: No.
Question: OK, so if [PSP Security Room Officer] were to say
that he did inform you guys that he was on the roof, that
wouldn't be an accurate statement.
USSS Agent: Yeah, I don't recall being told that he was on
the roof until we heard the radio traffic come across that the
local police were working the problem at [3 o'clock].\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 22, 2024) at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
There are conflicting accounts between the PSP Security
Room Officer and the USSS Security Room Agent regarding whether
or not the USSS Security Room Agent heard that the suspicious
individual was on the roof of the AGR building. The PSP
Security Room Officer testifies in his joint interview with PSP
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and FBI:
Question: And then prior to calling [PSP Corporal], you
gave that information to the Secret Service about him being on
the rooftop?
PSP Officer: Yes.
Question: And who was that you communicated that to?
PSP Officer: It would be [USSS Security Room Agent]. Like,
I was like, you know, it was like, we're in the room and I'm
like, moving fast.
Question: He could hear all your communications?
PSP Officer: Yes, yes. Like, `cause I'm--Yeah. `Cause I'm
like, trying to get-it's like, hey, like-basically, almost
like, hey, he's on the roof. And then I need to get our people
there because obviously, you know, they're the ones that can
get there fastest.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 20, 2024) at 18-19 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
USSS Protective Intelligence Response Agent
The Protective Intelligence (PI) Response Agent at the
Butler rally was a Special Agent out of the Phoenix, Arizona
Field Office.\130\ In a transcribed interview with the
Committee, the PI Response Agent asserted that the job of a PI
Response Agent is to respond to any unusual or threatening
individuals in the site, including any individual with an
unusual interest in the protectee.\131\ According to documents
reviewed by Committee staff, the PI response agent is paired up
with a local law enforcement agent, in this case, a
Pennsylvania State Trooper, to ensure fluid channels of
communication between State and local law enforcement with
USSS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 12 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\131\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 14 (Nov. 14, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PI Response Agent told the Committee that her PSP
Counterpart had been issued a radio for communication with PSP,
who had a presence in the Security Room.\132\ However, in the
Pennsylvania State Trooper's interview with PSP and the FBI, he
stated that he did not have his radio and was using his cell
phone to communicate with the command post.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 26 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\133\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 23, 2024) at 3 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., the PI Response Agent was
told by her PSP Counterpart there was a suspicious individual
seen outside the venue with a rangefinder.\134\ After arriving
at the location where the suspicious individual was last seen,
the PI Response Agent spoke with the local tactical team and a
Pennsylvania State Trooper posted in the vicinity. She was able
to gather a vague description of the individual and was told
the individual was no longer in the area.\135\ The PI Response
Agent told the Committee that even if a suspicious person is no
longer in the area continuing the behavior, they are still a
concern since they could return.\136\ Furthermore, she added
that a PI Response Agent should not stop searching for the
individual until after the visit.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 28-29, at 55 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\135\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 50 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\136\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 111 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\137\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 111 (Nov. 14, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PI Response Agent then called the Counter Sniper
Response Agent asking if either of the USSS counter sniper
teams had seen the suspicious individual.\138\ After the PI
Response Agent ended the phone call with the Counter Sniper
Response Agent, she, along with her PSP Counterpart began to
drive back to the stage left area to resume crowd control.\139\
On the way to resuming crowd control, her PSP Counterpart
separated from the PI Response Agent and offered to drive his
vehicle in order to continue searching for the suspicious
individual.\140\ When asked by the Committee whether she
informed the command post that she stopped looking for the
suspicious individual, the PI Response Agent stated, ``I did
not, my team, meaning that [the PSP Counterpart], was still
looking. I was not in a position to leave the venue to keep
looking.''\141\ She asserted that her primary responsibility
and duties would be within the site itself, but that's not to
say that [she] could not respond to something outside the
site.\142\ When asked about the difference between a protective
intelligence response agent and a counter sniper response
agent, the PI Response Agent stated that the counter sniper
response agent addresses individuals specifically flagged by
the counter sniper team and the protective intelligence
response agent responds to anything reported as
suspicious.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 33 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\139\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 37 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\140\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 37 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\141\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 37-38 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\142\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 22 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\143\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 20-21 (Nov. 14, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PI Response Agent told the Committee it was not her job
to search for a suspicious individual.\144\ Despite this claim
by the PI Response Agent, the Counter Sniper Response Agent
told the Committee that it was the PI Response Agent's job to
look for suspicious people, and the counter sniper [response
agent's] job is to look for threats.\145\ When confronted with
this contradiction, the PI Response Agent stated ``He's not
incorrect. I think it depends on your personal definition of
suspicious and threat.''\146\ Furthermore, the PI Response
Agent stated that an individual with a rangefinder is what she
would consider unusual or suspicious.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 99 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\145\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 124 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\146\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 124-125 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\147\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 29 (Nov. 14, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the PI Response Agent asserted that her PSP
Counterpart was still searching for the suspicious individual,
in the PSP Counterpart's PSP and FBI interview, he stated that
as he was leaving the outer perimeter he was stopped by the
Secret Service and told that if he exits, he would not be
allowed back into the event.\148\ This interaction prompted the
PSP Counterpart to return to the Command Post.\149\ Since the
PSP Counterpart did not have a radio and the PI Response Agent
only had a USSS post-stander radio, the two could only
communicate directly by cell phone after they separated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 23, 2024) at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\149\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 23, 2024) at 8 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PI Response Agent returned to the stage left to assist
with crowd control at approximately 6 o'clock p.m., despite the
ongoing concern of a suspicious individual with a
rangefinder.\150\ Although the PI Response Agent left the area
where the individual was last seen, she asserts that she never
stopped searching.\151\ She did not inform the Security Room or
USSS personnel responsible for protectee movements because she
believed the Security Room was already aware of the suspicious
individual and had no additional intelligence.\152\ When asked
if a Counter Surveillance Unit (CSU) would have been helpful in
searching for the suspicious individual, the PI Response Agent
stated that it would have been beneficial because they would
have been moving outside the venue and would have been better
positioned to look for this person.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 42 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\151\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 43 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\152\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 45 (Nov. 14, 2024).
\153\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 103 (Nov. 14, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper
The USSS Counter Sniper partnered with the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Leader in the Hercules 1 position on the southern
barn was the counter sniper who neutralized Thomas Crooks
moments after he opened fire injuring President Trump, David
Dutch and James Copenhaver, and killing Corey Comperatore. The
Hercules 1 Counter Sniper's quick and decisive action to
neutralize the threat on July 13 undoubtedly saved countless
lives of numerous innocent rallygoers.
The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper learned on the Tuesday prior
to the event that he would be covering the Butler,
Pennsylvania, rally on July 13.\154\ Despite the unusual nature
of being tasked with protecting a former President, the
Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee he was unaware of
the underlying intelligence which led to the deployment of
counter sniper assets.\155\ While the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper
was not the counter sniper team lead advance, he was the
highest ranking counter sniper at the event making him the
supervisor of the other USSS counter snipers.\156\ On July 11,
2024, prior to arriving at the Butler Farm Show site, the USSS
Counter Sniper Team Leader sent a document to all USSS counter
snipers titled the Counter Sniper Team Tactical Survey.\157\
This document listed primary areas of concern, one of which was
the AGR building described as ``buildings at three o'clock,
approximately.''\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 13 (Dec. 5. 2024).
\155\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 69 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\156\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 16 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\157\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Counter
Sniper Tactical Survey at USSS--001490 (on file with Committee).
\158\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Counter
Sniper Tactical Survey at USSS--001490 (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the morning of July 13, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper
arrived at the Butler Farm Show site and participated in a
walkthrough with other USSS counter snipers.\159\ In the
walkthrough, the Counter Sniper Team Leader pointed out the AGR
building stating that there would be a local counter sniper
team positioned on the second floor.\160\ When asked about
line-of-sight concerns and mitigation practices, the Hercules 1
Counter Sniper told the Committee, ``So we're looking at not
just [the AGR] rooftop but all areas within the 360-degree
circle. That's our area of responsibility.''\161\ Despite the
USSS counter snipers having a 360-degree area of
responsibility, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified to the
Committee that at the time, he was unaware of Hercules 2's
partially obstructed view of the AGR building's roof.\162\ This
fact was particularly troubling to the Committee. When asked
which USSS counter sniper team had the AGR building in their
particular area of responsibility, the Hercules 1 Counter
Sniper stated the counter sniper team responsible for securing
the roof of the AGR building was Hercules 2, the team which had
an obstructed view.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 18 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\160\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 19 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\161\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 20 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\162\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 22 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\163\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 26-27 (Dec. 5, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 42 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
View from the Roof of AGR Looking Toward the Position of Hercules 1
(right) and Hercules 2 (left)\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer
Technician, Exhibit 2, at 39 (Dec. 5, 2024).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1162.001
The Hercules 1 Counter Sniper first learned of the
suspicious individual at 5:53 p.m. after receiving an email
from the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead co-positioned with him
at Hercules 1.\165\ The email was forwarded to the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Lead from the local Butler County ESU counter
snipers and stated ``If spotted, please notify PI at [redacted]
or go direct with the Security Room. Kid [lurking] around
building we are in, AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a
rangefinder looking toward stage, FYI, if you want to notify SS
snipers to look out. I lost sight of him.''\166\ The Hercules 1
Counter Sniper told the Committee that an individual with a
rangefinder is not inherently suspicious.\167\ After that
information was received by the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, he
made the decision to not utilize the counter sniper response
agent. When asked by the Committee why he made that decision,
the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper responded, ``I do not know why he
was not sent.''\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 39 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\166\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 39-40 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\167\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 40 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\168\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 43 (Dec. 5, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Counter Sniper Response Agent was sent to
search for the suspicious individual, not by the USSS counter
sniper team, but rather the C-UAS agent embedded in the USSS
Command Post.\169\ Furthermore, as the information regarding
the suspicious person was passed to USSS counter snipers via
email, the DTD shift detail was not aware of the suspicious
individual.\170\ Between 6:06 p.m. and 6:09 p.m., a USSS
counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position transmitted on the
radio channel shared by the DTD, USSS counter snipers and the
USSS Security Room that locals are working a problem at the 3
o'clock.\171\ Since the USSS Security Room Agent did not use
the radio to transmit the information about a suspicious
individual with a rangefinder, DTD was still unaware. When
asked why the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper did not put the BOLO
out on the radio, he said that he wanted to keep observing the
[3 o'clock] and keep the radio air clear.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Response Agent, at 39-40 (Oct. 30, 2024).
\170\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Second
Supervisor, at 103 (Dec. 4, 2024).
\171\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper at 13 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\172\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 49 (Dec. 5, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to when shots were fired, the Hercules 1 Counter
Sniper testified that he had heard that someone was on the roof
of the AGR building.\173\ He was unaware if it came over his
USSS radio or whether it came from the crowd.\174\ Furthermore,
he was unsure if his co-located partner, the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Lead had heard the same.\175\ Again, the Hercules 1
Counter Sniper decided to not radio that information to the
Security Room or DTD. Instead, he ``was trying to do [his] job
and observe the rooftops.''\176\ While observing the vicinity
of the AGR building, he noticed local police running around the
building with their weapons drawn.\177\ While he stated that
this raised his suspicion, he was focusing on the building and
made the decision to not use his radio in order to notify DTD,
the Security Room, or other USSS counter snipers. Former Acting
Director Rowe stated in his testimony to a joint committee
hearing with the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs that the reason why President Trump was not removed was
that USSS did not have any other information aside from the
locals working an issue at the 3 o'clock.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\174\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\175\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\176\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 50 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\177\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 53 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\178\ U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and
the Senate Homeland Security Committee: Hearing on Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump at Pg. 20, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-
379).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked by the Committee why he did not relay
information regarding the suspicious individual with a
rangefinder, hearing there was an individual on the roof, or
local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with
their weapons drawn, the Hercules 1 Counter Sniper stated:
``I'm not the only one that's observing that area. Someone
else could've also put out the radio call. I'm not just going
to go ahead and, you know, just put it on, just myself. There
were other individuals.''\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 54 (Dec. 5, 2024).
VI. CONTRADICTORY, FALSE, OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY
SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
Kimberly Cheatle
On July 22, 2024, nine days after the attempted
assassination of President Trump, the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform held a committee hearing with
the then-Director of the USSS, Kimberly Cheatle. In that
hearing, Director Cheatle testified under oath in response to
questions from multiple Members of Congress that ``for the
event in Butler, there were no requests that were
denied.''\180\ The Committee is aware, by the USSS' own
admission that this claim is false. In fact, the USSS has
provided the Committee with a list of all assets requested by
DTD and denied by USSS headquarters. The Committee is aware of
at least two instances of assets being denied by USSS
headquarters as they relate to the July 13, Butler,
Pennsylvania, campaign rally.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ House of Representatives Oversight Committee: Hearing on the
Oversight of the U.S. Secret Service and the Attempted Assassination of
President Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. At min. 52:00 (July 22, 2024)
(statement of Director Kimberly Cheatle).
\181\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first example of assets which were requested by DTD and
denied by USSS Headquarters is the request for enhanced C-UAS
assets. While it is true that the DTD did have C-UAS assets in
place at the July 13, Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally,
enhanced C-UAS assets were also requested.\182\ The USSS told
the Committee that the request for enhanced C-UAS assets went
unfulfilled due to the lack of manpower to support the
request.\183\ Additionally, DTD also requested a USSS CAT LNO
or liaison. A CAT LNO is a USSS position within the CAT which
the agency uses to coordinate between USSS CAT and local CAT.
While this particular asset was not listed in the assets denied
by the USSS Headquarters, the Lead Advance Agent testified in
her transcribed interview that while the asset was requested by
DTD, CAT LNO assets were not ``approved or provided'' for
``manpower reasons.''\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\183\ Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy Director,
United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, to
Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Ron Johnson
and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, at USSS--023632 (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with
Committee).
\184\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ronald Rowe
Former Acting Director Rowe testified before a joint
committee hearing between the U.S. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs on July 30, 2024.\185\ Former Acting
Director Rowe's testimony, when cross-referenced with USSS
transcribed interviews, was misleading and contradicted by
other USSS officials. When asked if the USSS Counter Sniper
Advance Lead gave explicit instructions to local counter
snipers regarding a plan to cover the roof of the AGR Building,
the former Acting Director responded that it was his
understanding the locals ``had a plan'' because they had been
there before.\186\ However, in interviews with the USSS counter
sniper team, specifically the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance
Lead, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead confirmed that
he did not instruct the local counter snipers in the AGR
building about any role they should [play] in covering the AGR
roof specifically.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ See generally U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary
Committee and the Senate Homeland Security Committee: Hearing on
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-379).
\186\ U.S. Senate Joint Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee and
the Senate Homeland Security Committee: Hearing on Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump at Pg. 68, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-
379).
\187\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Lead, Hercules 1, at 39 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead was the
individual responsible for completing advance paperwork,
ensuring the USSS counter sniper team and local counter sniper
teams knew their assignments, acting as the conduit between
local counter snipers and USSS counter snipers, and determining
placement for counter snipers.\188\ While the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Advance Lead stated that it was his responsibility
to determine positions, when asked whether he either went
inside the AGR building or on top of the AGR roof at any point
in the planning for the rally the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Advance Lead replied, ``I did not, no.''\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO-03(01), at USSS--006320 (Mar.
11, 2024), (received Mar. 12, 2025) (on file with Committee).
\189\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 39 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked by the Committee whether he was comfortable in
terms of the ability to accomplish his mission that day from
his position, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead stated,
``Yes. They were good positions.''\190\ During the USSS
Hercules 2 Counter Sniper's transcribed interview, he stated
that when he went on post with his partner, they noted several
trees which blocked the three o'clock to four o'clock view of
the AGR building.\191\ When the Committee asked the USSS
Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead about the obstruction from the
Hercules 2 position, he replied, ``But Hercules 1, you had a
clear line-of-sight, so I was OK with it.''\192\
Notwithstanding the alleged clear line-of-sight from Hercules
1's position, USSS Counter Sniper Team Advance Lead's partner,
USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper told the Committee that Hercules
2 was the USSS counter sniper team who held responsibility for
``the three o'clock side'', which included the AGR
building.\193\ Furthermore, despite claiming that Hercules 1
had a clear line-of-sight, when the USSS Hercules 1 Counter
Sniper Team Lead was asked by the Committee if he had a clear
line-of-sight to the AGR roof he responded, ``Not full line-of-
sight. I could not see the actual roof itself.''\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1 at 27 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\191\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Sniper, Hercules 2 at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\192\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\193\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service U.S. Secret
Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 28 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\194\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer
Technician, at 43-44 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper testified that his and
the USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead's area of responsibility was
primarily covering the 6 o'clock to 9 o'clock to 12 o'clock,
while Hercules 2 would be covering from the 12 o'clock to 3
o'clock to 6 o'clock.\195\ This presents a host of issues which
greatly concern the Committee. The first of which is Hercules 2
was responsible for covering the 12 o'clock to 6 o'clock
despite the 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock positions being obstructed
by foliage.\196\ Furthermore, while the USSS counter sniper
team had overlapping area of responsibilities, Hercules 1's
primary area of responsibility was that facing away from the
AGR building despite being the primary reason the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Advance Lead was OK with the obstructed line-of-
sight of Hercules 2.
\195\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 73 (Dec. 5, 2024).
\196\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer
Technician, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question: And you mentioned that the line-of-sight concern
was mitigated with AGR because there were always Secret Service
counter sniper eyes on the rooftop?
USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead: Mitigated as in between
Secret Service was looking at them but as well as other local
CS had eyes on from the horse stadium, as well.
Question: And so were they just looking at the AGR Roof?
USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead: No. Basically, the Hercules
teams CS with the Secret Service, we were looking at everything
180 from the stage. I assumed the local counterparts, as well,
as long as it's in their line of sight and it's not being
obstructed, and there's no reason you can't see it, between the
horse stadium teams and AGR building itself, if you can see it,
you can act on said threats.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer
Technician, at 79-80 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The issue with USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead's
assessment was his reliance on the local counter snipers which
the USSS Hercules 1 Counter Sniper Team Lead guessed was
between 400 yards and 500 yards away from the AGR building to
cover the roof.\198\ In comparison, the USSS Hercules 1 counter
snipers were approximately 200 yards away.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer
Technician, at 81 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\199\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 1
Counter Sniper, at 78 (Dec. 5, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Site Agent and Site Counterpart
Throughout the Committee's investigation, the Committee has
continuously been told by USSS agents in charge of planning the
Butler, Pennsylvania, campaign rally that they did not request
CSU personnel because this asset is typically not provided for
a former President. However, in the Committee's review of USSS
documents, it was discovered that CSU assets had twice been
previously requested by DTD and approved by USSS
Headquarters.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ See generally Letter from Darryl S. Volpicelli, Acting Deputy
Director, United States Secret Service, Department of Homeland
Security, to Chairman Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman
Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (Mar. 12, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. CHANGES IN SECRET SERVICE POLICY PURSUANT TO THE COMMITTEE'S
INTERIM REPORT
An addendum to the USSS' March 12, 2025, document
production to the Committee, USSS stated that changes were made
to internal policy as a reflection of recommendations provided
to the agency in the Committee's interim report. These changes
to USSS internal policy largely reflect the Committee's
findings regarding the lack of coordination and communication
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement entities;
clarification of protective advance procedures; and the sharing
of pertinent intelligence to USSS agents assigned to a
protectee or protective event. Further information regarding
the changes to USSS policy pursuant to the Committee's interim
report recommendations will be released as an addendum to the
final report.
An addendum to the USSS' March 12, 2025, document
production to the Committee, USSS stated that changes were made
to internal policy as a reflection of recommendations provided
to the agency in the Committee's interim report. These changes
to USSS internal policy largely reflect the Committee's
findings regarding the lack of coordination and communication
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement entities;
clarification of protective advance procedures; and the sharing
of pertinent intelligence to USSS agents assigned to a
protectee or protective event. Further information regarding
the changes to USSS policy pursuant to the Committee's interim
report recommendations will be released as an addendum to the
final report.
VIII. OUTSTANDING REQUESTS AND OBSTRUCTION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES
The Committee has made numerous requests to components of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) which remain outstanding at the
close of the investigation. The Committee's request to the FBI
was originally transmitted on July 24, 2024. Beginning on
October 3, 2024, the Committee went to the Department of
Justice four times for the purpose of viewing FBI interview
summaries, lab reports, firearms and explosives examinations
in-camera. When the Committee arrived, the documents were
produced in-camera, redacted. DOJ producing redacted documents
in-camera greatly rendered the purpose for the Committee's
visit moot. Furthermore, in February 2025, the Committee
travelled to FBI Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia to receive
an in-person briefing from subject matter experts involved in
the case.\201\ Despite a glimpse of cooperation from the FBI,
the Committee's follow-up requests for information remain
unanswered. On July 25, 2024, the Committee made a request to
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)
asking to interview a specific individual involved in the July
13 campaign rally. To date, the Committee has only received a
one overly redacted production from the ATF and has not had the
opportunity to interview the individual referred to in the
Committee's initial letter and a general briefing stating the
ATF had no official involvement in the rally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs (Mar. 21, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF POLICY CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY U.S. SECRET
SERVICE
SOD-03 & SOD-03(1)
The Special Operations Division-03 (SOD-03) policy has been
updated twice since the July 13, 2024, campaign rally. The
policy was first updated on August 16, 2024, and again on
February 5, 2025.\1\ The first update adds specific teams and
units not previously included in SOD-03 and removes others
which are no longer applicable under the SOD.\2\ Specifically,
the policy provides guidance on advance procedures for the
Hazardous Agent Mitigation and Medical Emergency Response
(HAMMER), Airspace Security Branch (ASB), Emergency Response
Team (ERT), Specialized Rifle Unit (SRU) and Tactical
Operations Branch (TOB). These SOD advance elements provide
security assessments, safeguard communications, develop
countermeasures, and implement a tactically oriented security
plan.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S.
Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for
August 2024, at USSS--006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee);
U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations Division
Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--006391 (on file with
Committee).
\2\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S.
Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for
August 2024, at USSS--006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\3\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations
Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--006391 pg. 5 (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the August 16, 2024, policy states that the SOD
advance, composed of CAT, counter sniper (CS), ERT, SRU, ASB,
and TOB personnel will advise the lead agent from the
protective detail on the number of HAMMER, CAT, CS, ERT, SRU,
ASB, and TOB personnel needed to conduct to tactical security
plan.\4\ The policy also explicitly stated that advance work
conducted by SOD EDT [Explosive Detection Team] is done in
conjunction with TSD [Technical Security Division].\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S.
Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for
August 2024, at USSS--006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\5\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S.
Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for
August 2024, at USSS--006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The August 2024 update removed mention of CSU as they were
placed under the Office of Strategic Intelligence and
Information and removed references to magnetometers which were
moved under the Uniformed Division (UD).\6\ The most recent
update of SOD-03 from February 5, 2025, removed the Airspace
Security Branch (ASB) from the SOD Advance Procedures all
together. Pursuant to the updated policy, ASB no longer
provides security assessments, secures communications, or
develops a security plan with other SOD elements during the
advance.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, U.S.
Secret Service Monthly Summary of Secret Service Policy Changes for
August 2024, at USSS--006351 (Sept. 4, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\7\ See generally U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special
Operations Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--
023648-023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 6, 2024, the Secret Service implemented Special
Operations Division policy SOD-03(01) regarding advance
procedure for the USSS CS team.\8\ SOD-03(01) supplements SOD-
03, updated on February 5, 2025, by further delineating the
responsibilities of the CS team lead during the advance
planning of a protective\9\ event.\10\ SOD-03(01) States the CS
team lead assigned to an advance team is responsible for
creating a plan of protection for a protectee or venue.\11\
Specifically, the CS team lead will conduct a sniper threat
assessment to identify long range threats and line-of sight-
concerns.\12\ In the assessment, the CS team lead will give a
detailed explanation for how CS will cover the site including
the number and placement of CS teams and their counterparts (if
applicable), areas of concern, and recommendations for
mitigation.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See generally U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter
Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669-023673
(Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\9\ See generally U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter
Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669-023673
(Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\10\ See generally U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special
Operations Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--
023648-023649 (Feb. 5, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\11\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024),
(on file with Committee).
\12\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024),
(on file with Committee).
\13\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669-023673 (Dec. 6, 2024),
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOD-03 requires the SOD Advance Team, including the CS team
lead, to attend and brief Secret Service personnel at the visit
manpower briefing.\14\ SOD-03(1) provides further detail,
stating the CS team lead is required to attend relevant
meetings and all manpower briefings.\15\ Furthermore, SOD-
03(01) outlines the CS Survey, which the CS team lead is
required to conduct as part of the advance procedure.\16\ The
policy underscores that the survey should be done in a way that
any CS personnel or non-Secret Service unit supplementing the
CS team can understand and implement.\17\ The survey will
include, among other items, maps and photographs of areas of
concern.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations
Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--023649 (Feb. 5,
2025), (on file with Committee).
\15\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations
Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--023649 (Feb. 5,
2025), (on file with Committee).
\16\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023670 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\17\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023670 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\18\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023670-023671 (Dec. 6, 2024),
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOD-03(01) also creates a section on events management
requirements, stipulating the CS team lead will request
necessary resources in consultation with the lead advance agent
and CS Operations, complete all information under the
``Personnel, Equipment, and Actions'' tab and all statistical
data slots, including why a particular site was recommended
``no CS coverage'', when applicable.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023671 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOD-03(01) further outlines the CS Advance Checklist in
Appendix A as a master document for all CS protective
advances.\20\ The policy gives the CS team lead discretion,
stating the CS team lead may use their judgment to address
items not on the list or decide if certain items on the list
are not applicable for a specific event.\21\ Furthermore, the
CS team lead may prioritize items on the checklist during a
shortened advance timeline or late notification of a protective
location.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\21\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023669 (Dec. 6, 2024), (on
file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter
Sniper Team Advance Procedures, SOD-03(01), at USSS--023672-023673
(Dec. 6, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\22\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--0023699 (on file
with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective
Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--02372-
023673 (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOD-08
The Special Operations Division Policy 08 (SOD-08) in place
on July 13, 2024, provided an overview, responsibilities, and
qualification for the USSS counter sniper team. On December 9,
2024, the USSS released an updated version of this policy.
While many of the updated policies were inconsequential to the
events of July 13, there were specific substantial changes in
response to the issues identified in the Committee's interim
findings report. The most notable change is the addition to a
section called ``CS Communications.''\23\ This section expands
upon the previously updated SOD-08 to list specific acceptable
forms of communication to facilitate the quick and smooth
transmission of information between USSS counter snipers and
State and local counter sniper teams.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations
Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--023652 (Feb. 5,
2025), (on file with Committee).
\24\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Special Operations
Division Advance Procedures--General, SOD-03, at USSS--023652 (Feb. 5,
2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to ensure intra-agency communications and
increase accountability, the revised policy updated on December
9, 2024, States that USSS counter sniper personnel are
responsible for directing counter sniper response teams to
areas identified by counter sniper personnel requiring further
investigation. Moreover, any additional taskings to CS response
teams shall be coordinated through counter sniper
personnel.\25\ This policy change will help to alleviate
confusion from counter sniper response agents and keep USSS
counter snipers informed of the activities of their dedicated
response agents. On July 13, members of the USSS counter sniper
team were unaware that the counter sniper response agent was
deployed by the C-UAS agent embedded in the USSS Command
Post.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, SOD-08, at USSS--023651
(Dec. 9, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\26\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Officer
Technician, at 207 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Hercules 1 Counter Sniper, at 42 (Dec. 5, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another issue identified by the Committee was the denial of
USSS counter sniper personnel to campaign events due to lack of
staffing. To address staffing and logistical challenges with
the USSS counter sniper teams, the updated policy authorizes at
least eight more slots for USSS counter snipers within the
Special Operations Division (SOD). However, the policy
clarifies the number of authorized personnel is subject to
change.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Counter Sniper Team
Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, SOD-08, at USSS--023656
(Dec. 9, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-08
Office of Protective Operations Policy-08 (OPO-08) issues
regulations related to communications within the USSS. In
addition to general communications the policy also includes
guidance on administration of the Command Post and Security
Room. Following the July 13, campaign rally, communications
were at the forefront of failures by the USSS. On September 11,
2024, USSS issued an updated policy of OPO-8, which provides in
greater detail the roles and responsibilities of USSS agents in
regard to communications.
The most notable update from the policy in place on July
13, is the updated policy requiring a ``supervisory-level
special agent to be assigned as the command post supervisor for
specific classes of protectees.\28\ Moreover, the policy
stipulates that no less than a GS-13 level special agent will
be assigned as the command post supervisor for all other sites
and events.\29\ Under previous guidance, there was no
specificity as to what events or sites a special agent could be
assigned as the command post supervisor and ambiguously stated
that an ``experienced'' agent should serve in this role. In
addition to grade-level requirements, the policy promulgates
the Lead Advance agent of the site or event is now responsible
for providing the command post with paper copies of documents
and forms including ``all security and/or tactical plans from
partner law enforcement and public safety agencies providing
support to the protective visit.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\29\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\30\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The policy also places further responsibility on the Lead
Advance Agent and field office SAIC to determine command post
staffing by State and local partners.\31\ The purpose of the
updated policy is to facilitate communications between all
partner agencies to the greatest extent possible.\32\ As the
Committee previously discussed, as there was no dedicated
command post at the Butler, PA rally, the command post
supervisor served as both the command post supervisor and the
security room agent simultaneously.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\32\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023659 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\33\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Security Room
Agent, at 10 (Oct. 9, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to the security room, the updated policymakes a
technical and conforming change from ``. and should be provided
with communications equipment and the same pertinent Secret
Service forms and surveys that are also provided to the command
post'' to ``. and will be provided with the same pertinent
Secret Service forms and surveys that are also provided to the
command post.''\34\ Further contained in the updated policy,
the field office SAIC or their designee will make the decision
as to who shall staff the security room.\35\ According to the
new policy this decision should be made taking into account
numerous factors such as the level of the protectee, the
assessment of the site, and the number of expected
attendees.\36\ Similar to the command post, staffing by State
and local partners should be determined by both the field
office SAIC as well as the Lead Advance Agent, and Site
Agent.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--006255 (Apr. 6, 2021), (on
file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective
Operations Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023659 (Sept. 11,
2024), (on file with Committee).
\35\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\36\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
\37\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 13, 2024, numerous agents of USSS, communicated
using their cell phones rather than their USSS-issued radios.
The updated policy also stipulates that USSS personnel assigned
to work at protected sites or events are expected to
communicate with each other over their Secret Service-issued
radios.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Communications, OPO-08, at USSS--023660 (Sept. 11, 2024), (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-24
Prior to the Butler rally on July 13, 2024, requests from
USSS protective divisions to the Office of Protective
Operations (OPO) Staffing and Logistics, were often denied
without explanation.\39\ OPO-24, implemented on November 7,
2024, provides guidance to OPO Staffing and Logistics on
coordinating with protective divisions, the Office of
Investigations (INV), the Office of Technical Development and
Mission Support (TEC), the Office of Strategic Intelligence and
Information (SII), and other directorates as needed to provide
the appropriate number of personnel and assets for each
protective event.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email
Communication on June 28, 2023, at USSS--023585 (received Mar. 13,
2025) (on file with Committee).
\40\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO Staffing and Logistics is managed by the Deputy
Assistant Director of OPO with the Special Agent in Charge
(SAIC) and Assistant SAIC providing day-to-day oversight of the
office's mission.\41\ The purpose of OPO Staffing and Logistics
is to help coordinate the temporary assignment of personnel and
other resources used to supplement the protective divisions of
USSS for protective operations.\42\ The office is staffed by a
combination of special agents and a Uniformed Division (UD)
official.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\42\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\43\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is the responsibility of OPO Staffing and Logistics to
evaluate personnel and asset requests submitted by protective
divisions. OPO-24 states decisions regarding the use of assets
for protective operations, ``are informed by previous
protective events.''\44\ The lead advance agent for a visit or
event will work with a field office supervisor to determine the
number of post standers needed for a protective visit.\45\ The
lead advance agent will then submit a Manpower Request Form to
describe post stander needs. The lead advance agent will also
submit a more thorough Manpower Justification Form detailing
post stander needs and may provide the site post log to justify
the staffing request.\46\ However, OPO-24 permits flexibility
in the resource request process.\47\ If an event occurs on
short notice, OPO may work directly with the operations section
of the protective detail to process staffing requests
permitting an omission of the Manpower Justification Form.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023663 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\45\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\46\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\47\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\48\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-24 stipulates the Manpower Justification Form, created
by the lead advance agent, shall include: ``adverse
intelligence specific to the protectee, event, or site that can
be mitigated through the requested asset; a description or map
of how assets will be deployed; a list of local assets which
were requested; if applicable, a description of local assets
which are unavailable and why; and alternative solutions
providing mitigation of a concern if the requested personnel or
assets are not available.\49\ Once completed, the Manpower
Request Form is sent to the operations team of the protective
detail for review. The operations team will then send the
Manpower Justification Form to OPO Staffing and Logistics.\50\
OPO Staffing and Logistics and the respective protective
division operations team will work together if OPO believes
efficiencies can be found in the request. The protective
division's operations team will then communicate with both the
lead advance agent and OPO Staffing and Logistics if changes to
staffing levels are made.\51\ Concurrently, the local field
office operations team or supervisor will submit the number of
post standers needed to Office of Investigations (INV) Staffing
and Logistics.\52\ OPO Staffing and Logistics and INV Staffing
and Logistics will coordinate to ensure the number of local
post standers requested by the protective division are
available in the district.\53\ If the number of local post
standers falls below the agreed upon request, INV Staffing and
Logistics will provide additional post standers from out of
district.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\50\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\51\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\52\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\53\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023664 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\54\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnetometer support consists of various forms for search
and detection of prohibited items. Decisions regarding the
number or magnetometers provided are based solely on the amount
of time it takes to screen and not on the level of screening
attendees will receive.\55\ The policy States the Magnetometer
Operations Unit will then decide the number of personnel needed
to operate the requested magnetometers, taking into
consideration whether USSS is requesting additional
magnetometer support from other DHS components such as the
Transportation Security Agency (TSA).\56\ The lead advance
agent then submits the request for magnetometer support where
the detail's operation team will review it prior to sending the
request to OPO Staffing and Logistics.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\56\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\57\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For protective events without a magnetometer advance
coordinator, these responsibilities are handled by the lead
advance agent.\58\ The policy further states that OPO Staffing
and Logistics and Magnetometer Operations Unit will work
through any discrepancies with what the protective division is
requesting and what the Magnetometer Operations Divisions deems
is available and appropriate for the protective event.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\59\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023665 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Counter Surveillance Division (CSD) or PID assets are
requested by the protective division, OPO Staffing and
Logistics will pass the request to SII.\60\ The OPO Office of
Staffing and Logistics will also send an email to the
requesting protective division confirming receipt, copying the
respective operations team of the respective division to notify
them of the request.\61\ The specific operations team will then
respond to the message, including the protective division, with
a response including the amount of support that will be
provided and an explanation for any requests the respective Ops
cannot meet.\62\ Moreover, If CSD or PID are unable to provide
the resources requested by the protective division, it is the
responsibility of the lead advance agent, who originally made
the request, to find alternatives to mitigate the concerns the
requested assets would have addressed.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023666 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\61\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023668 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\62\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023668 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
\63\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Staffing and Logistics, OPO-24, at USSS--
023666 (Nov. 7, 2024), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-25
In order to increase accountability specifically among USSS
protective operations leadership, on April 4, 2025, the USSS
published OPO-25. OPO-25, Protective Operations Accountability,
ensures a clear hierarchy of specific protective operations
personnel as it relates to their overall responsibilities when
planning an event. The policy states that ``the lines of
accountability established in this policy supersede any lines
of accountability defined elsewhere in the Protective
Operations Manual or other sections of the Secret Service
Manual.\64\ The lines of accountability contained within this
policy concern the Assistant Director (AD) of the Office of
Protective Operations (OPO), the protective division SAIC, the
field office SAIC, lead advance agent, and site agent.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023674
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\65\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023674
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-25 prescribes the AD of OPO will have final decision
authority over all USSS personnel supporting protective
operations.\66\ The protective division SAIC will have
authority over all USSS personnel of a specific visit,
regardless of the office to which they are normally
assigned.\67\ Prior to the protective division SAIC arriving at
the event, the field office SAIC will have responsibility for
the protective advance.\68\ Once the protective division SAIC
arrives at the event, the field office SAIC will then report to
the protective division SAIC and continue their duties in a
supporting role.\69\ OPO-25 also States that the lead advance
agent is responsible for the protective advance and works in
coordination with the field office SAIC, but under the
supervision of the protective division SAIC.\70\ Furthermore,
the lead advance agent is also responsible for the coordination
of advance team members and maintains a line of communication
with all protective operations staff, including partner
agencies.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023674
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\67\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023674
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\68\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023675
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\69\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023675
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\70\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023676
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\71\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023676
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Working under the supervision of the lead advance agent is
the site agent.\72\ The site agent is responsible for
designating the site perimeters, identifying line-of-sight
concerns and communicating those designations to the USSS
advance team, including the lead advance agent.\73\ In regard
to advance paperwork, the lead advance agent is responsible for
the accuracy of advance paperwork associated with a protective
visit. Once the advance paperwork is submitted, the final
review and approval of the advance paperwork rests with the
field office SAIC.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023676
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\73\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023676
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\74\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Operations Accountability, OPO-25, at USSS--023677
(Apr. 4, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-03(01)-03(04)
OPO-03, the policy document prescribing guidance for USSS
advance planning was most recently updated on April 10, 2025.
In the most recent update, the policy was further broken down
into four separate OPO policy documents: OPO-03(1) Protective
Advance Overview; OPO-03(2), Advance Team Components; OPO-
03(3), Protective Advance Meetings and Briefings; and OPO-
03(4), situation reports. The majority of OPO-03, prior to the
update was under the subheading ``Advance Team Components.''
This section was expanded upon and reissued as a separate
policy.\75\ The most significant change in the updated OPO-
03(01) policy are additions related to coordination with
``Partner Law Enforcement Agencies.''\76\ Specifically, OPO-
03(01) now ensures that members of the USSS advance team
working with other Federal, State, or local law enforcement
agencies will request and review the partners' operations
plans.\77\ Prior to July 13, there was no requirement for USSS
agents to request partner law enforcement agency's operational
plans, much less review them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--023692 (Apr. 10,
2025), (on file with Committee).
\76\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO-03(01), at USSS--023682 (Apr.
10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\77\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Overview, OPO-03(01), at USSS--023682 (Apr.
10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-03(02) was released on April 10, 2025, as a more
separate version of the OPO-03 updated in March 2024, which
lists the duties and responsibilities of certain advance jobs
related to protective visits. Previously, the duties listed in
the policy updated in March 2024, the responsibilities were
superficial and ill-defined. In the April 2025 update, changes
were made to extensively cover all responsibilities of an
agent's job and further solidify a chain of command to ensure
accountability for specific duties. Most notably, changes were
made to the duties of the field office SAIC, the lead advance
agent, the site agent, and the protective intelligence agent.
In the April release of OPO-03(02), the responsibility of
coordinating a meeting with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement entities were removed from the field office SAIC
and replaced with the responsibility to review and approve
advance paperwork, including the preliminary survey.\78\
Furthermore, pursuant to the updated policy, the Lead Advance
Agent is now specifically responsible for: ensuring other
members of the USSS advance team have established plans for
communications between USSS and all other law enforcement
entities involved in the protective operation, reviewing the
plans to ensure they are sufficient, the overall security plan
for the visit, and ensuing the command post staffing is
consistent with the policy prescribed in OPO-08.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--023692 (Apr. 10,
2025), (on file with Committee).
\79\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--023693 (Apr. 10,
2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the previously prescribed duties listed in
the March 2024 policy, the Site Agent is now responsible for
designating perimeters and communicating those perimeters to
the USSS advance team, requesting copies of other law
enforcement agency's operations plans, conducting site walk-
throughs with partner agencies to review responsibilities, and
providing the applicable paperwork to the security room and
command post.\80\ Regarding the PI agent the only further duty
assigned is that the PI agent will now work with the detail
SAIC, field office SAIC, and lead advance agent to ensure all
agents assigned to the visit are informed of relevant
intelligence and threats against the visit and protectees.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--023695 (Apr. 10,
2025), (on file with Committee).
\81\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at USSS--023695 (Apr. 10,
2025), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret Service Directives System,
Protective Operations Manual, Advance Team Components, OPO-03(02), at
USSS--023696 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPO-03(03) was released as a supplemental extension of
certain policies in the previously updated OPO-03 policy
documents. OPO-03(03) concentrates on protective advance
meetings and briefings.\82\ The purpose of these updates is
chiefly to maintain open lines of communication between the
USSS and partner entities, whether they be Federal, State, or
local law enforcement agencies.\83\ Notable changes include
additional guidance on administering police meetings and
manpower briefings as well as creating a requirement that each
member of the advance team to conduct daily check-ins with
their partner agency counterparts leading up to protective
events.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023703 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\83\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\84\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee); U.S. Secret
Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, Protective
Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at USSS--023705 (Apr.
10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to police meetings, changes were made to require
the USSS to include all partners involved in the police meeting
to also be invited to the final briefing.\85\ This change is in
response to reports from PSP officers who were asked to leave
the final manpower briefing on July 13.\86\ Furthermore, in a
change from previous policy, police meetings are now mandatory
for all events involving specific classes of protectees.\87\
Formally known as the manpower briefing, final briefings take
place in order to provide all pertinent information related to
a visit or event to increase awareness of threats or address
certain issues which arose during the advance process.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\86\ Pennsylvania State Police, Interview with PSP Official, re
PA--2024-924893 (July 23, 2024) at 2-3 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
\87\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023704 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\88\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar to police meetings, changes were made to the
organization of ``final briefings.'' Per the April 10, 2025,
dissemination of OPO-03(03), members of partner agencies are
now required to be invited to the final briefing, and the
meeting is now mandatory for all USSS agents to attend.\89\
Exceptions can be made for a pre-approved absence from the
final briefing under extenuating circumstances and only with
approval from the field office SAIC.\90\ This change in policy
echoes the importance of communication between the USSS and
other Federal, State, and local entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\90\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Protective Advance Team Meetings and Briefings, OPO-03(03), at
USSS--023705 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
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OPO-03(04) was also released on April 10, 2024, and
provides instructions on providing situation reports.\91\
Unlike other policy documents related to OPO-03, while this
guidance is an extension of OPO-03, the issuance of this
document was as a result of specific USSS failures on July 13.
The most relevant portion of this document is titled Situation
Reports--Examples of Critical Information to be Passed. In this
section of OPO-03(04), many examples given are of specific
instances which occurred on July 13. For example, the USSS
includes: ``Changes to protective countermeasures--e.g.,
availability of counter-unmanned aircraft systems. due to
inoperability.\92\ As the Committee unveiled in the September
2024 report, the USSS C-UAS system was inoperable until over 30
minutes after Crooks flew a drone over the event.\93\ This
information was never passed to the USSS Site Counterpart.\94\
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\91\ See generally U.S. Secret Service Directives System,
Protective Operations Manual, Situation Reports, OPO-03(04), at USSS--
023711 (Apr. 10, 2025), (on file with Committee).
\92\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Situation Reports, OPO-03(04), at USSS--023711 (Apr. 10, 2025),
(on file with Committee).
\93\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 19 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\94\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Senior Special
Agent, at 109 (Aug. 21, 2024).
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Other examples of critical information to be passed
included in OPO-03(04) include ``any suspicious person observed
in proximity to the site, to include identification and
photographs of the suspicious person(s), if available'';
``results of efforts to locate/interview suspicious persons''
and ``security sweeps which reveal explosives or other
hazardous materials.''\95\ The Committee is aware of instances
where the PI Response Agent did not alert the security room
when she split up from her PSP counterpart and returned to
crowd control duties. Furthermore, the PI Response Agent did
not send the photo of Crooks to the security room agent until
after the event had concluded.\96\
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\95\ U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations
Manual, Situation Reports, OPO-03(04), at USSS--023712 (Apr. 10, 2025),
(on file with Committee).
\96\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Protective
Intelligence Response Agent, at 43 (Nov. 14, 2024).
A P P E N D I X
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