[Senate Prints 118-29]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
118th Congress} { S. PRT.
SENATE
2nd Session } { 118-29
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EXAMINATION OF U.S. SECRET SERVICE
PLANNING AND SECURITY FAILURES
RELATED TO THE JULY 13, 2024
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
__________
INTERIM JOINT REPORT
PREPARED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
AND THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SEPTEMBER 25, 2024
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-824 WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
LAPHONZA R. BUTLER, California ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Alan S. Kahn, Chief Counsel/Chief Investigative Counsel
Claudine J. Brenner, Deputy Chief Counsel
Megan Petry Edgette, Senior Investigative Counsel
Kevin G. McAloon, Senior Investigator
Naomi S. Rosen, Special Assistant
Victoria J. Kasonde, Investigations Assistant and Editor
William E. Henderson III, Minority Staff Director
Christina N. Salazar, Minority Chief Counsel
James P. Stephens, Minority Investigator
Megan M. Krynen, Minority Professional Staff Member
Kendal B. Tigner, Minority Professional Staff Member
J. Ryan Arient, Minority Professional Staff Member
Madeleine R. Fleenor, Minority Research Assistant
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin+
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RICK SCOTT, Florida
JON OSSOFF, Georgia, JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
LAPHONZA BUTLER, California ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
Jennifer N. Gaspar, Staff Director
Caitlin A. Warner, Chief Council
John M. Geise, Senior Counsel
John Micah D. Heinemann, Senior Counsel
Lorenzo P. D'Aubert, Counsel
Brian Downey, Minority Staff Director
Patrick D. Hartobey, Minority Chief Counsel
Scott D. Wittmann, Minority Deputy Staff Director
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................1
Committee Actions to Date.................................. 3
Key Failures............................................... 5
II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................6
III. USSS PLANNING AND SECURITY FAILURES FOR JULY 13, 2024, RALLY.....9
A. Overview of USSS Planning and Security Assignments for
the July 13 Rally........................................ 11
B. Planning Failures....................................... 12
USSS Advance Personnel Roles and Responsibilities Were
Unclear and Lacked Accountability........................ 13
USSS Failed to Sufficiently Coordinate With State and
Local Law Enforcement.................................... 14
USSS Did Not Adequately Cover the AGR Building........... 17
USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader Identified the AGR Roof
as a Vulnerability, but Did Not Ensure Local Snipers
Could Mitigate It........................................ 19
Multiple Law Enforcement Line-of-Sight Concerns Were Not
Sufficiently Mitigated in Advance of July 13............. 30
Resource Requests for Additional Assets Were Denied and
Others Were Not Made..................................... 31
Errors in security planning documents.................... 33
C. Communications Failures................................. 34
Key USSS personnel were never informed that local law
enforcement was searching for a suspicious person with a
rangefinder prior to shots being fired................... 36
USSS officials expected the USSS Security Room would
relay relevant information from all law enforcement
agencies................................................. 37
Siloed communications hindered information sharing at the
July 13 rally............................................ 38
Responsibilities for the USSS Security Room were not well
defined or clearly understood............................ 44
D. ``I got him''--USSS Counter Snipers and Local Snipers
Describe Line-of-Sight and Communication Limitations..... 45
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader saw local law
enforcement running toward the AGR building with their
guns drawn, but did not radio the Trump detail to remove
Trump from the stage..................................... 48
Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper's sights for ``mere
seconds'' before he fired at Crooks...................... 52
E. Intelligence Concerns................................... 53
A USSS official was made aware that ``credible
intelligence'' existed of a threat, but still wrote in a
security planning document that there was ``no adverse
intelligence'' concerning the visit to Butler, PA........ 54
Other USSS officials involved in the planning of the
rally told the Committee they had no knowledge of any
threats and the FBI did not respond to USSS' intelligence
request.................................................. 56
F. Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Failures............... 59
Requests for additional counter drone equipment and drone
flight restrictions were denied.......................... 59
The USSS official responsible for overseeing C-UAS at the
July 13 rally lacked experience and knowledge about the
equipment................................................ 61
IV. TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS AT THE JULY 13, 2024, RALLY..............64
Known Actions of the Assailant Prior to the July 13 Rally 64
Identification and Search for the Suspicious Individual
on July 13, 2024......................................... 65
Local Law Enforcement Fired at Crooks.................... 74
V. FEDERAL AGENCIES' LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMITTEE'S
BIPARTISAN INQUIRY..............................................76
DHS and USSS incomplete response to the Committee's
requests................................................. 76
FBI's responsiveness to the Committee's requests......... 77
ATF's responsiveness to the Committee's requests......... 77
Outstanding Requests Regarding the July 13, 2024 Rally
and Assassination Attempt................................ 78
APPENDIX
Appendix......................................................... 79
Letters.......................................................... 83
Transcripts of Interviews
USSS Counter Sniper Team Lead................................ 121
USSS Special Agent in Charge, Pittsburgh Field Office........ 345
USSS Counter Unmanned Aerial System Advance Lead............. 556
USSS Counter Hercules 2 Counter Sniper....................... 718
USSS Assistant Director for the Office of Protective
Operations................................................. 885
USSS Site Counterpart........................................ 1027
USSS Lead Advance Agent...................................... 1214
USSS Intelligence Advance Agent.............................. 1396
USSS Site Agent.............................................. 1569
USSS CAT Advance Agent....................................... 1763
USSS CAT Operator............................................ 1905
USSS TSD Advance Agent....................................... 2063
EXAMINATION OF U.S. SECRET SERVICE
PLANNING AND SECURITY FAILURES
RELATED TO THE JULY 13, 2024 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 13, 2024, Thomas Matthew Crooks bought 50 rounds of
ammunition on his way to Butler, Pennsylvania, drove to former
President Donald Trump's campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show
grounds, and climbed onto the roof of the American Glass
Research (AGR) building less than 200 yards away from where the
former President was speaking, where at 6:11 pm, he fired eight
rounds from an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle, killing one person
and injuring three others including the former president.\1\
That day, he was able to fly a drone 200 yards from the site,
use a rangefinder capable of gauging the distance to the former
president less than an hour before he began speaking, and bring
two explosive devices within proximity of the site of the
rally.\2\ The United States Secret Service's (USSS') planning,
communications, intelligence sharing, and related security
failures in advance of and during July 13 directly contributed
to Crooks' ability to carry out the assassination attempt and
kill and injure people in Butler, PA that day.
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\1\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigative Updates on the
Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt (July 29, 2024) (https://
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-
pennsylvania-assassination-attempt).
\2\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigative Updates on the
Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt (July 29, 2024) (https://
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-
pennsylvania-assassination-attempt).
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On July 30, 2024, Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., the Acting Director
of the USSS, testified in a joint hearing before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC)
and Judiciary Committee that the attempted assassination ``was
a failure on multiple levels.''\3\ Acting Director Rowe
testified before the Committees that he has since initiated
several reforms to address clear deficiencies in how USSS
provides security for its protectees.\4\ During the July 30
hearing, Acting Director Rowe acknowledged USSS responsibility
for protecting former President Trump.\5\ In a series of
transcribed interviews conducted by HSGAC and the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, key USSS personnel responsible
for planning, coordinating, communicating, and securing the
Butler, PA rally on July 13, declined to acknowledge individual
areas of responsibility for planning or security as having
contributed to the failure to prevent the shooting that day,
even when as an agency, the USSS has acknowledged ultimate
responsibility for the failure to prevent the former president
of the United States from being shot.\6\
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\3\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\4\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\5\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service
Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security Failures
Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th
Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\6\ U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interviews with Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (on file with Committee).
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At the direction of U.S. Senators Gary Peters and Rand
Paul, Chairman and Ranking Member of HSGAC and Senators Richard
Blumenthal and Ron Johnson, Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the Committee),
Majority and Minority Committee staff are conducting a
bipartisan investigation of planning and security failures that
contributed to the attempted assassination on July 13, 2024.
This interim report details the information the Committee
has learned to date, as well as the Committee's preliminary
findings. The Committee finds that USSS failures in planning,
communications, security, and allocation of resources for the
July 13, 2024 Butler rally were foreseeable, preventable, and
directly related to the events resulting in the assassination
attempt that day. The Committee also finds that siloed
communications and coordination problems between federal,
state, and local law enforcement officials remain unaddressed
and were a contributing factor to the failures at the July 13
Butler rally.
On September 15, 2024, a suspect was taken into custody in
West Palm Beach, Florida after being identified by USSS hiding
in a tree line with a semiautomatic rifle and a scope
approximately 300 to 500 yards from where former President
Trump was playing golf at Trump International Golf Club.\7\ On
September 16, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), USSS, and Palm Beach County Sheriff's
Office held a press conference to provide an update on the
investigation.\8\ On September 16, the suspect was charged with
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon,
among other charges.\9\ According to the complaint, the
suspect's mobile phone was in the vicinity of the area along
the tree line for approximately 12 hours prior to the
incident.\10\ The FBI has said it is investigating the incident
as an apparent assassination attempt.\11\ The Committee has
requested briefings from the USSS and the FBI. The Committee
will be pursuing additional information from the USSS, FBI, and
other relevant federal agencies as the Committee continues its
investigation.
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\7\ See News Conference on Apparent Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump in Florida with Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw
(Sept. 15, 2024); United States of America vs. Ryan Wesley Routh, S.D.
Fla., Criminal Complaint (Case No. 24-mj-8441-RMM) (Sept. 16, 2024).
\8\ U.S. Secret Service, Media Advisory: Justice Department, FBI,
U.S. Secret Service, and Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office to Provide
Investigation Update (Sept. 16, 2024) (https://www.secretservice.gov/
newsroom/releases/2024/09/media-advisory-justice-department-fbi-us-
secret-service-and-palm-beach).
\9\ United States of America vs. Ryan Wesley Routh, S.D. Fla.,
Criminal Complaint (Case No. 24-mj-8441-RMM) (Sept. 16, 2024).
\10\ United States of America vs. Ryan Wesley Routh, S.D. Fla.,
Criminal Complaint (Case No. 24-mj-8441-RMM) (Sept. 16, 2024).
\11\ FBI Special Agent in Charge update to the West Palm Beach,
Florida Assassination Attempt Investigation (Sept. 16, 2024).
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Committee Actions to Date
On July 15, 2024, Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul
announced their investigation into the assassination attempt on
former President Trump and called for a briefing and public
hearing within 15 days.\12\ On July 24 and 25, 2024, Chairmen
Peters and Blumenthal and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson sent
ten letters requesting documents and information to the USSS,
FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF), Beaver County District Attorney, Butler
County District Attorney, Butler County Sheriff, Butler
Township Police Department, Pennsylvania State Police (PSP),
and Clairton Sportsmen's Club as well as a letter requesting
voluntary transcribed interviews with USSS individuals
responsible for planning and security on July 13.\13\
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\12\ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable
Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and
Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).
\13\ Letters from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand
Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald
Rowe, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 24,
2024), Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice (July 24, 2024), Undersecretary Kenneth
Wainstein, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland
Security (July 24, 2024), District Attorney Nathan Bible, Beaver County
District Attorney's Office (July 24, 2024), District Attorney Richard
Goldinger, Butler County District Attorney's Office (July 24, 2024),
Sheriff Michael Slupe, Butler County Sheriff's Office (July 24, 2024),
Acting Chief of Police Lt. Matthew Pearson, Butler Township Police
Department (July 24, 2024), Commissioner Colonel Christopher Paris,
Pennsylvania State Police (July 24, 2024), Acting Director Ronald Rowe,
U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 25, 2024);
Clairton Sportsmen's Club (July 25, 2024); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (July 25, 2024).
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On July 25, 2024, Acting USSS Director Rowe and FBI
National Security Branch Executive Assistant Director Wells
provided a closed-door unclassified briefing for HSGAC and
Judiciary Committee Members.\14\ And on July 30, 2024, Acting
Director Rowe and FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate testified at
a joint public hearing before the Senate HSGAC and Judiciary
Committees.\15\
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\14\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, and
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Briefing with
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 25, 2024).
\15\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
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On August 14, 2024, the Committee wrote DHS Secretary
Mayorkas and FBI Director Wray seeking additional information
about the July 12, 2024 arrest of Asif Merchant for allegedly
orchestrating a plot to assassinate U.S. government officials
and politicians, and any information related to security
decisions made by the USSS in advance of July 13.\16\
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\16\ Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul,
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and
Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Secretary Alejandro
Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and Director Christopher
Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (Aug. 14,
2024).
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As part of its bipartisan investigation, Committee staff
traveled to Butler, PA on July 26 to conduct a site visit walk-
through of the Butler Farm Show and AGR building and receive
briefings from local law enforcement officials. Specifically,
Committee staff spoke with law enforcement officials from
Butler and Beaver Counties' Emergency Services Units (ESUs)
that provided support to USSS on July 13, including the local
snipers posted in the AGR building that day. During the visit,
Committee staff examined the roof and interior of the AGR
building with those officials. The Committee has also
interviewed four local law enforcement officers who provided
support on July 13 (three local snipers and one Quick Response
Force operator), the President of the Clairton Sportsmen's
Club, and two rally attendees.
The Committee has also examined state and local operational
plans and other related information provided by PSP, Butler
County ESU, and Beaver County ESU; reviewed local radio
communications on July 13 provided by Butler County Emergency
Services; and reviewed body worn camera footage provided by
Butler Township Police Department. The Committee has also
reviewed transcripts and audio recordings of several PSP
interviews of state and local law enforcement officials who
helped provide support on July 13.
On August 13, 2024, the Committee began a series of
transcribed interviews with USSS personnel. To date, Committee
staff have examined over 2,800 pages of documents provided by
USSS and conducted 12 transcribed interviews with USSS
personnel responsible for the planning and security in Butler,
PA on July 13, 2024.
As discussed at the conclusion of this interim report, key
requests to FBI, DHS, ATF and USSS remain outstanding. The
majority of documents provided by the USSS and DHS are heavily
redacted. This has unnecessarily hindered the Committee's
ability to carry out its constitutional authority to
investigate and acquire information necessary to identify
needed reforms. These overly burdensome redactions, including
of communications related to the same individuals who the
Committee interviewed, only served to delay the Committee's
ability to conduct these interviews and carry out its
investigation efficiently and effectively. Despite these
impediments, the Committee recognized the need to conduct
transcribed interviews with USSS personnel as soon as possible
before memories faded.
In addition, as detailed in the report below, several USSS
individuals responsible for planning and security for the July
13 rally provided contradictory or incomplete information, some
of which ran counter to responses from state and local law
enforcement officials and even other USSS personnel. This
interim report highlights preliminary findings based on the
Committee's transcribed interviews and the limited document
productions it has received to date. These preliminary failures
and findings consider the actions of the USSS in the period
leading up to the July 13 assassination attempt. They do not
consider the extent to which other agencies or individuals may
have contributed to these events, if at all. The Committee is
choosing to present these preliminary findings while its
investigation remains ongoing to ensure that the public has the
most accurate and up-to-date information.
The Committee will continue to pursue all information it
deems necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities and
will, if necessary, take steps to ensure that it obtains the
information it is seeking.
KEY FAILURES
1. LUSSS failed to clearly define responsibilities for
planning and security at the July 13 rally.
LUSSS personnel responsible for planning in
advance of the July 13 rally denied that they were individually
responsible for planning or security failures and deflected
blame.
LUSSS Advance Agents told the Committee that
planning and security decisions were made jointly, with no
specific individual responsible for approval.\17\
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\17\ Prior to events requiring USSS Protection, USSS assigns
personnel to serve as ``Advance Agents'' responsible for planning
security, coordinating with state and local law entities, and
requesting needed assets to secure the upcoming event, among other
tasks. USSS assigned seven Advance Agents for the July 13 Rally in
Butler, PA.
2. LUSSS failed to ensure the AGR Building was effectively
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covered.
LUSSS identified the AGR building as a concern due
to the line-of-sight from the roof to the stage, but did not
take steps to ensure sufficient security measures were in
place.
LUSSS knew that local snipers planned to set up
inside the AGR building and USSS did not express objections or
concerns about that placement.
LUSSS personnel, including the USSS Counter Sniper
Team Leader, did not enter the AGR building or go on the roof
prior to the shooting.
LOne USSS Counter Sniper team, whose
responsibility included scanning the area around the AGR
building for threats, had an obstructed view of the AGR roof.
3. LUSSS failed to effectively coordinate with state and
local law enforcement.
LUSSS did not give state or local partners
specific instructions for covering the AGR building, including
the positioning of local snipers.
LUSSS did not adequately consider state and local
law enforcement operational plans.
LCommunications at the July 13 rally were siloed
and USSS did not ensure it could share information with local
law enforcement partners in real time.
4. LUSSS failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally
that could have enhanced security.
LUSSS denied specific requests for additional
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capabilities and a
Counter Assault Team liaison.
LA USSS Counter Surveillance Unit--which could
have helped patrol the outer perimeter that included the AGR
building--was not requested by USSS Advance Agents.
5. LUSSS failed to communicate information about the
suspicious person to key personnel, and failed to take action
to ensure the safety of former President Trump.
LAt approximately 5:45 pm, USSS personnel were
notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious
person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at
least eight USSS personnel had been informed.
LApproximately two minutes before shots were
fired, the USSS Security Room, located on the rally grounds,
was told that there was an individual on the roof of the AGR
building.
LShortly before shots were fired, a USSS Counter
Sniper observed local officers running towards the AGR building
with guns drawn.
II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FINDINGS
As detailed below and throughout this report, the Committee
has identified several key findings as part of its ongoing
investigation.
1. USSS personnel were notified of a suspicious person
with a rangefinder around the AGR building approximately 27
minutes before the shooting. The report of a suspicious person
with a rangefinder near the AGR building was relayed to the
USSS Security Room at approximately 5:44 pm and to the USSS
Counter Sniper Team Leader at 5:45 pm. Shortly after, USSS
personnel, including a Counter Sniper Response agent, engaged
in an on-the-ground effort to locate the individual. However,
the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart
all told the Committee they did not receive this information
and therefore did not know local law enforcement had identified
a suspicious person with a rangefinder--and that those local
officers later lost track of this individual--until after shots
were fired.
2. USSS was notified about an individual on the AGR roof
approximately two minutes before Crooks fired from the AGR
roof. Three minutes before shots were fired, a local law
enforcement officer sent out a radio alert that there was an
individual on the AGR roof. This information was passed to the
USSS Security Room approximately two minutes before Crooks
fired. Approximately 22 seconds before Crooks fired, a local
officer sent out a radio alert that the individual on the AGR
roof was armed, but that was not relayed to key USSS personnel
that the Committee spoke with.
3. Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper
saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with
their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump's
protective detail to remove him from the stage. The USSS
counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers
with their guns drawn ``elevated'' the threat level, the
thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage ``did not
cross [his] mind.''
4. USSS counter snipers--including the one who shot and
killed Crooks--were sent to the rally in response to ``credible
intelligence'' of a threat. The July 13 rally was the first
time a USSS counter sniper team was assigned to a protectee
other than the President, Vice President, or a presidential
candidate who had been formally nominated by his or her party.
USSS provided the counter snipers in response to ``credible
intelligence'' of a threat. However, FBI has said that Crooks
``was not known to the FBI prior to'' the assassination
attempt. According to the USSS Assistant Director of the Office
of Protective Operations, a decision to assign counter snipers
to former President Trump's events occurred sometime in the
first week of July. Of the USSS personnel interviewed by the
Committee, nearly all--including the Intelligence Advance Agent
and the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh Field
Office--said they were unaware of any credible intelligence of
a threat.
5. USSS Advance Agents for the July 13 rally denied
individual responsibility for planning or security failures,
deflected blame, and could not identify who had final decision
authority for the rally. USSS planning and execution of
security measures for the July 13 rally appears to have lacked
a clear chain of command. USSS Advance Agents told the
Committee that planning and security decisions were
collaborative and could not agree on who at USSS was
responsible for final approval or decisions. USSS Advance
Agents interviewed by the Committee could not identify who was
responsible for determining the security perimeter for the July
13 rally.
6. Local law enforcement raised concern about the security
coverage of the AGR building. A member of Butler ESU told the
Committee that he notified USSS Advance Agents during a
walkthrough on Thursday, July 11 that local law enforcement did
not have the ``manpower'' to lock down the AGR building. USSS
Advance Agents interviewed by the Committee gave conflicting
accounts and told the Committee that state and local law
enforcement were responsible for covering the AGR building
because it was in the outer perimeter. Prior to the July 13
rally, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Counter Sniper Team Leader,
and Site Counterpart did not go into the AGR building. None of
the USSS Advance Agents shared planning documents with state or
local law enforcement, or requested state or local operational
plans--and those plans reveal no post-standers or patrol
assigned to cover the AGR building or roof.
7. USSS advance personnel identified multiple line-of-
sight concerns at the Butler Farm Show grounds, including the
AGR building. USSS advance personnel proposed positioning large
trucks or heavy equipment in the area between the stage and
nearby buildings to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. USSS told
the Committee they relied on multiple measures, including USSS
counter sniper teams and bleachers, to mitigate lines-of-sight.
USSS ultimately did not use the trucks or heavy equipment to
mitigate line-of-sight concerns from the AGR building. A USSS
counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position told the Committee he
believed the mitigations were sufficient and the USSS Site
Counterpart told the Committee she believed they had a ``good
security plan'' for the July 13 rally.
8. There were two separate communications centers at the
July 13 rally--one run by USSS and one by local law
enforcement. The posts were anywhere from 120 to 300 yards
apart from each other and the primary means of communication
between the posts was by cell phone. Local law enforcement and
USSS operated on separate radio channels. All of the local
channels were recorded on July 13, but USSS radio transmissions
were not.
9. Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper's sights for
``mere seconds'' before he fired at Crooks. The USSS partner of
the USSS counter sniper who shot Crooks told the Committee he
observed that ``mere seconds'' after his partner identified
Crooks in his sights, the USSS counter sniper fired at Crooks.
USSS counter snipers confirmed to the Committee that they did
not require permission before they fired.
10. USSS Advance Agents requested additional resources
that would have been helpful, but those assets were denied. The
USSS C-UAS operator told the Committee he requested additional
C-UAS equipment and personnel in the days before the rally.
However, these requests were denied, at times without
explanation. The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee
former President Trump's USSS detail requested Counter Assault
Team liaisons to help coordinate tactical assets in advance of
the July 13 rally, but USSS denied this request. The USSS Site
Agent and the Site Counterpart told the Committee that a
Counter Surveillance Unit would have been helpful, but this
asset is typically not provided for a former President and USSS
Advance Agents did not request a Counter Surveillance Unit for
the July 13 rally.
11. USSS' C-UAS system experienced technical problems and
was inoperable until 4:33 pm, after Crooks flew his drone near
the rally site. With no backup system, the USSS agent
responsible for overseeing the C-UAS capabilities at the July
13 rally called a toll-free 888 tech support hotline ``to start
troubleshooting with the company,'' which took several hours.
That agent had only three months of experience working with
that equipment and lacked knowledge about it.
12. Several USSS officials reported experiencing technical
problems with their radios at the rally, and told the Committee
such problems are common for USSS. A USSS Hercules 1 counter
sniper was offered a local radio on July 13 but said he did not
have time to pick it up because he was occupied fixing
technical problems with his USSS radio. In addition, at the
Pittsburgh airport before the motorcade left for the rally, the
USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office gave the Lead Advance
Agent his radio because the Lead Advance Agent's radio was not
working. As a result, the SAIC did not have a working radio on
him during his entire time at the July 13 rally. While he did
not ``hold a post or a sector'' and was ``not part of any
protective formation,'' he did claim that he was there to ``act
more in a liaison capacity.'' However, he did not have any
means to communicate on the radio with his USSS counterparts.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Planning and Coordination: Congress should require USSS
to identify defined roles and responsibilities for USSS
personnel responsible for advance planning of any protective
event.
LFor all protective events, USSS should improve
coordination and specify roles and responsibilities between and
among federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.
LUSSS policies and protocols should require
advance planning leads to request and review state and local
operational plans in advance of any protective event to ensure
a shared understanding of security responsibilities and
vulnerabilities as well as other critical planning and security
components.
2. Responsibility: In advance of each protective event,
USSS should designate a single individual responsible for
approving all plans, including the responsibility for approving
security perimeters.
3. Communications: DHS and USSS should ensure
communications plans between federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies and first responders are properly executed
and should ensure records retention capabilities.
LCongress should require that USSS record its
radio transmissions at all protective events.
LCongress should require DHS and USSS to evaluate
the steps it needs to take to ensure communications plans with
state and local partners are fully executed when conducting law
enforcement and/or first response activities at a given
location. Congress should require that DHS and USSS report to
Congress any steps taken to remedy past failures to execute
communications plans and to ensure compliance with those plans
in the future.
4. Intelligence: USSS should consider sending additional
assets, including counter snipers, to all future outdoor
protective events as it evaluates intelligence and threats
against protectees. USSS should also ensure that the
appropriate agents working protective events are informed of
relevant intelligence and threats against protectees.
5. Resources: Congress should evaluate USSS budget and
resources. Security requirements should be determined depending
on various threat levels, ranging from less severe threat
environments to the highest level of security at National
Special Security Events.
LCongress should require that USSS allocate assets
and resources based on the threat level, not the position or
title of the protectee.
III. USSS PLANNING AND SECURITY FAILURES FOR
JULY 13, 2024, RALLY
On July 3, 2024, USSS began assigning key personnel
responsible for planning and coordinating security for former
President Trump's travel to Pittsburgh and campaign rally on
July 13 in Butler, PA.\18\ In interviews with the Committee,
USSS agents responsible for leading and coordinating the
advance planning for the July 13 rally provided contradictory,
opaque, or nonresponsive information about who was responsible
for key components of the planning and security.\19\ In
response to questions by the Committee regarding responsibility
for key planning decisions, the Senior Special Agent who served
as the Lead Advance Agent for the July 13 rally stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email
Communication on July 5, 2024, USSS--1033-USSS--1035 (received Aug. 23,
2024) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Secret Service, Timeline of Advance, USSS--1367 (received Aug. 23,
2024) (on file with Committee).
\19\ See generally Senate Committee on Homeland Security. and
Governmental Affairs and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent (Aug.
26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office (Aug. 30, 2024).
I don't approve anything. I clearly just take the
information that they [the USSS Site Agent and USSS
Site Counterpart] have recommended and put together
with the other information that's put together from the
other advance entities, and those are all submitted to
the field office and then submitted to the Trump
detail, the candidate nominations operations, and then
they go further to headquarters.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 23 (Aug. 26, 2024).
In response to questions by the Committee regarding
responsibility for determining the site perimeter, USSS agents
stated that these were joint decisions and no singular
individual was responsible.\21\ In response to questions by the
Committee regarding responsibility for security coverage of the
AGR building, certain USSS advance agents pointed to state and
local law enforcement, but could not say with any specificity
how the AGR building would be covered.\22\ The SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office told the Committee that measures for
securing the AGR building were briefed through the Donald Trump
Detail (Trump Detail) and not through the SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, and the Trump Detail and the USSS
Office of Protective Operations (OPO) were responsible for
reviewing the plans. According to the USSS Assistant Director
of OPO, the preliminary survey, which ``encapsulates the
security plan,'' ``should get reviewed and approved by the
local field office management'' in addition to the Trump
Detail's operations section.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 141 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Counterpart, at 37-38 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 18 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\22\ See, e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead
Advance Agent, at 35-38 (Aug. 26, 2024) (The USSS Lead Advance Agent
told the Committee, ``[m]y understanding was that there would be police
posts in the area and they would deter and enforce and mitigate anyone
that tried to access the building or the area around it.'' Id. at 37.
However, there was a fence located between these PSP ``police posts''
and the AGR building. When the Committee asked if the Lead Advance
Agent was aware of the fence at the time she stated, ``I wasn't aware--
I didn't recall the fence going all the way with no openings on that
side.''). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 45-46, 48-50 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 31-33. 35 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\23\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 49 (Sept. 13,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed throughout this section, multiple foreseeable
and preventable planning and operational failures by USSS
contributed to Crooks' ability to carry out the assassination
attempt of former President Trump on July 13. These included
unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination
with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective
communications, and inoperable C-UAS systems, among many
others.
A. Overview of USSS Planning and Security Assignments for the July 13
Rally
Prior to any event requiring USSS protection, USSS assigns
an ``advance team'' to plan security and obtain needed assets
to secure the event.\24\ USSS' advance team for the Butler
Rally consisted of a Lead Advance Agent, a Site Agent, a Site
Counterpart, an Intelligence Advance Agent, and in some cases,
a C-UAS Advance Agent, among other potential asset advance
agents, depending on a variety of factors, including threat
assessments.\25\ USSS ``advance agents'' conduct a series of
assessments and prepare documents as part of their planning and
security.\26\ These documents, collectively known as a ``site
security plan'' include a preliminary survey, Technical
Security Division (TSD) outdoor site survey, site security
diagrams, hospital surveys, transportation documents, and
counter sniper documents (if such assets are applicable).\27\
USSS assigned the following roles to lead the advance planning
for the July 13 rally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Congressional Research Service, Legislative Evolution of U.S.
Secret Service, at 3 (R48138) (July 25, 2024); U.S. Secret Service, Our
Protective Mission (https://www.secretservice.gov/protection) (last
accessed Sept. 2024).
\25\ See Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Preliminary Survey (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\26\ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead
Advance Agent, at 15-16, 24-26 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 16-18, 21 (Aug. 23, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 21,
114-115 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\27\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 21-22 (Aug. 26, 2024).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T78242.177
According to the USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office,
USSS received preapproval for 18 posts, which were broken down
into ``jump teams.''\28\ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field
Office explained that for campaigns, a ``jump team'' includes
USSS and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents, per a
USSS memorandum of understanding.\29\ ATF told the Committee
that there was an ATF agent present in his personal capacity at
the Butler rally on July 13 but that ATF as an agency had no
official presence at the rally and did not provide any security
assistance before shots were fired.\30\ The committee has yet
to speak with the ATF agent who was at the rally. Due to the
size of the Butler venue, the USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field
Office requested and received additional USSS agents to staff
the site.\31\ The USSS Site Diagram depicted below provides an
aerial overview of the planning and security posts for the July
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13 rally, which are discussed throughout this section.
\28\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 44 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\29\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 44 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\30\ Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Sept. 5, 2024).
\31\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 44 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Site Diagram for the July 13 Rally\32\
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.017
B. Planning Failures
Throughout the week of July 8, USSS advance personnel spoke
or met with federal, state and local law enforcement on
multiple occasions to identify available assets, plan security
for the July 13 rally, and conduct site visits to identify
areas of concern, needed mitigation, fence lines, and post
positions.\33\ Most of the interactions between USSS, federal,
state, and local law enforcement were informal, and there
appeared to be only two ``official'' or planned meetings, which
included an initial police briefing for state and local law
enforcement on Monday, July 8, and site walk-through with state
and local law enforcement on Thursday, July 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Site
Diagram, at 2 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\33\ See generally Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP
Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 11 (received Aug.
26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services
Unit (ESU), Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (July 26, 2024) (hereinafter ``Butler County ESU
Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024)''); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, Aug.
21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent
(Aug. 23, 2024).
The USSS Advance Agents did not document responsibility for
securing the outer perimeter--the area outside the fence lines
where individuals would be screened by magnetometers, which
included the AGR building.\34\ They also did not share planning
documents with state or local law enforcement, or request state
or local operational plans.\35\ According to state and local
law enforcement officials, USSS received more resources than
USSS Advance Agents requested from state and local law
enforcement for the July 13 rally.\36\ Multiple USSS Advance
Agents told the Committee that they received fewer assets than
they had requested from other USSS components.\37\ The
Committee also found that USSS agents involved in the planning
process did not have a clear understanding of who was
responsible for approving certain documents and requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart (Aug. 21, 2024).
\35\ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart (Aug. 21, 2024).
\36\ See generally Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP
Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024)
(on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee
(July 26, 2024).
\37\ See, e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead
Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024) (stating the Trump Detail
requested but did not receive Counter Assault Team liaison assets);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 35-
36 (Aug. 21, 2024) (stating the Lead Advance Agent requested 13
magnetometers, but only received 10); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Site Agent, at 55 (Aug. 23, 2024) (stating the Lead
Advance Agent requested 13 magnetometers, but only received 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Advance Personnel Roles and Responsibilities Were Unclear and
Lacked Accountability.
USSS planning leads identified three security perimeters
for the July 13 rally: the inner perimeter (which included the
stage and ``wherever [the protectee] is moving''\38\), the
middle perimeter (which included a double fence line and
magnetometers), and the outer perimeter (which included
anything outside of the fence line and was not secured or off-
limits to spectators).\39\ The Lead Advance Agent explained,
``[w]hen we consider a perimeter for Secret Service, the
perimeter that we secure is what we are able to secure with
(sic) our laws and regulations that we operate under. The
perimeter on the outside, although it could be secured in other
ways, it's not necessarily as hard and as fast as having
complete access shut off.''\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 31-33 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\39\ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent, at 24-33; 62-64 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 36-46 (Aug. 21,
2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
26-31 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\40\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 64 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Lead Advance planning agents could not answer
questions about who--specifically--was responsible for
determining the perimeter and who approved the designation of
the perimeter. For example, when asked who was in charge of
determining the perimeter for the Butler Farm Show site, the
USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart each
individually explained that it was a joint effort based on
available assets.\41\ The USSS Site Agent explained to the
Committee it was a ``consensus decision,'' noting ``we work
together as a team, and we submit [the required information] to
the [USSS Lead Advance Agent],'' who then sends to OPO and
Headquarters.\42\ The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the
Committee the advance agents put together a draft that is then
``raised to the [the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office] and
then to the Trump detail CNOS operations, and then come back
down.''\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead
Advance Agent, at 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 36-40 (Aug. 21, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 20; 22-23
(Aug. 23, 2024).
\42\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
20-21 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\43\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office told the Committee
he was not responsible for reviewing or approving perimeter
decisions, as he was not present (or expected to be present)
for the walk-through of the site on the day prior to the
rally.\44\ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office told the
Committee that the reporting, operational planning, and overall
approval goes through the Trump Detail and OPO, not the SAIC of
the local field office.\45\ However, the USSS Assistant
Director of OPO told the Committee that, in addition to the
Trump Detail, the Pittsburgh Field Office supervisor and the
Lead Advance Agent ``are responsible for the security plan on
the ground.''\46\ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office also
told the Committee that if issues were brought to his
attention, he would be there to address them, but otherwise it
is the detail supervisors who are responsible.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Agent, at 24 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 55-56, 144
(Aug. 30, 2024).
\45\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 15, 55 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\46\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 49-50 (Sept. 13,
2024).
\47\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 26 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Failed to Sufficiently Coordinate With State and Local Law
Enforcement.
On July 5, USSS informed PSP and Butler County local law
enforcement of former President Trump's planned visit to the
Butler County Farm Show.\48\ USSS did not share materials
outlining their expectations and according to state and local
law enforcement, planning meetings were disorganized and lacked
direction.\49\ A PSP Lieutenant involved in the July 8 planning
meeting noted USSS did not have answers to certain questions
from PSP (e.g. where the stage would be).\50\ A Butler ESU
Commander involved in the advance planning described the July
11 site walk-through as ``incredibly disorganized'' with ``no
coordination . . . really just people milling about . . . I
felt like there was no plan.''\51\ Some USSS leads participated
in briefings by telephone or not at all.\52\ While some key
USSS personnel did not request state and local operational
plans in advance of the July 13 rally, the USSS Site Agent was
provided a copy of the PSP operational plan.\53\ The SAIC of
the Pittsburgh Field Office did not receive the operational
plan. Both the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office and the USSS
Site Agent told the Committee that state and local partners do
not always send operational plans prior to an event.\54\
Furthermore, the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office said he
was not aware of any USSS policy or procedure to request any
state or local operational plans.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Pennsylvania State Police, Email from PSP Lieutenant (Officer
in Charge) to PSP Law Enforcement Officials (July 5, 2024), at PSP--
0002 (received Aug. 14, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\49\ See, e.g. Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP
Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024)
(on file with Committee); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of
Butler ESU Assistant Commander 1 on July 23, 2024 (received Sept. 4,
2024) (on file with Committee); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)
Interview of PSP Lieutenant on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024)
(on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee
(July 26, 2024).
\50\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\51\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\52\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault
Team Advance, at 20-25, 30 106, 115 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance Agent, at 21-22, 65
(Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 19-20, 27, 36 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\53\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 113 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\54\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 54 (Aug. 30, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 113 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\55\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 54 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Monday, July 8, USSS held a ``police meeting,'' led by
the Lead Advance Agent.\56\ Attendees included USSS, FBI, and
state and local law enforcement.\57\ During that meeting, USSS
explained ``what [assets/resources] they wanted each agency to
provide.''\58\ According to local law enforcement, USSS also
did not discuss the site perimeter at this meeting.\59\ The
Butler County ESU Commander told the Committee that after the
Police Brief, a Butler ESU Deputy Commander contacted the
Beaver County Emergency Service Unit to request additional
assistance for the Trump rally ``knowing the [event] was going
to be manpower intensive.''\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 101-102 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\57\ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead
Advance Agent, at 101-102 (Aug. 26, 2024). In correspondence to the
Committee, the FBI stated that it attended the July 8 briefing. Letter
from Assistant Director Patrick N. Findlay, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice, to Chairman Gary Peters and
Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking
Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
(Sept. 13, 2024).
\58\ Pennsylvania State Police, Email from PSP Official to PSP Law
Enforcement Officials (July 19, 2024), at PSP--0037-PSP--0038 (received
Aug. 14, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\59\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\60\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Tuesday, July 9, agents from USSS, PSP, and Butler
County conducted separate site visits at the Butler Farm Show
and following their visits, joined together at the ``Butler
Barracks,'' a local PSP office, to review the site on Google
Earth.\61\ A PSP Lieutenant explained, ``we . . . started just
pre planning the map. . . We were able to draw like, the fence
line and then show like, around like, areas that would be of
any concern and where we needed to make some. Set some posts
up, which we discussed at a later date.''\62\ Below is the
initial map created during that meeting. A PSP Lieutenant sent
this map out to ``the group,'' including the USSS Lead Advance
Agent and USSS Site Agent.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
\62\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
\63\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee); Email correspondence to Committee staff from PSP
(Sept. 22, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Map from July 9 Meeting\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T78242.178
USSS Did Not Adequately Cover the AGR Building.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS' Protective Operations policy documents provide
guidance on how to conduct advance planning and secure
protective events for former President Trump.\65\ Specifically,
USSS' Protective Operations Manual states, ``[a]ll large events
should be closely scrutinized by both the Site Agent and the
Lead Advance Agent. Attention should be paid to how attendees
may gain access to the protectee(s).''\66\ Despite this
guidance, in interviews with the Committee, USSS agents in
charge of the advance planning could not say with any
specificity how the AGR building would be covered and who was
ultimately responsible for ensuring the AGR building was
sufficiently covered.\67\ For example, the USSS Site Agent told
the Committee that other than the local snipers inside the
building, she did not know how the AGR building would be
covered, but understood Butler ESU ``would have coverage of
[the] building.''\68\ Butler ESU told the Committee that they
informed USSS they did not have the manpower to lock down the
AGR building, but USSS Advance Agents told the Committee Butler
local law enforcement never raised these concerns.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ U.S. Secret Service Directives Systems, Protective Operations
Manual, Donald Trump Protective Division General Information (USSS--
000226- 000249).
\66\ U.S. Secret Service Directives Systems, Protective Operations
Manual, Donald Trump Protective Division General Information (USSS--
000240).
\67\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 35-38 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Counterpart, at 48, 50, 122-124 (Aug. 21, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 39 (Aug.
23, 2024).
\68\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
49 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\69\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at
39 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 123 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Site Agent, at 148 (Aug. 23, 2024) (noting PSP raised
concerns they did not have the ``manpower to secure'' the AGR building,
but Butler ESU did not raise these concerns).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Butler ESU police officer told the Committee that during
a July 11 police walk through of the Butler rally site on July
11 led by USSS, he introduced himself to the USSS Site Agent
and USSS Site Counterpart:
[I] explained where our teams were going to be . . . I
told them that the area along the AGR fence line was a
concern... the closeness to the stage . . . it wasn't a
good vantage point for anybody to see even from the
venue inside... I explained to them there would be cars
parking alongside the road because it was close and
people walking up.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
The Butler ESU officer stated that they ``did not have the
manpower to lock down this area and the area [referring to the
AGR building] needed to be locked down.''\71\ The Butler ESU
officer told the Committee that in response to these concerns,
USSS--specifically the Site Agent, Site Counterpart, and
Counter Sniper Team Leader--said they ``copied'' and ``they
would take care of it.''\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\72\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Committee interviewed the USSS Site Agent and
asked about this interaction, she stated ``it was brought up to
our attention that the local Pennsylvania State Police won't
have the manpower to secure the building'' and ``at that point
our response was the Butler County ESU would have coverage of
the AGR building.''\73\ Specifically, the Site Agent told the
Committee Butler ESU did not inform her they did not have the
manpower to lockdown the building. When the Committee asked
what steps USSS took to ensure the AGR building was covered--
knowing PSP could not secure the building--the Site Agent told
the Committee, ``since it was on the outer perimeter, we did
not discuss or plan for having a post-stander or having any
other asset other than the local counter sniper, once they
decided to have a local counter sniper inside the building for
the day.''\74\ When the Committee asked the USSS Site
Counterpart about local law enforcement raising concerns, she
stated, ``that was not a conversation I took part in.''\75\ The
Lead Advance Agent also told the Committee she was not aware of
local law enforcement raising these concerns.\76\ When asked
how the AGR building would be covered, the Lead Advance Agent
stated, ``my understanding was that there would be police posts
in the area and they would deter and enforce and mitigate
anyone that tried to access the building or the area around
it.''\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
40 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\74\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
37 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\75\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 123 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\76\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 39-40 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\77\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 36 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the July 13 rally, the USSS Lead Advance Agent,
Counter Sniper Team Leader, and Site Counterpart did not go
into the AGR building as part of their advance planning.\78\ On
the day of the rally, USSS did not sweep the AGR building prior
to the rally.\79\ When asked by the Committee ``who ultimately
was responsible'' for ensuring there was no unauthorized access
of the AGR roof, the Lead Advance Agent stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 98 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 167 (Aug. 21, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at
59-60 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\79\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at
90, 110-111 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Agent, at 115 (Aug. 23, 2024).
There's no specific. There were several different plans
in place, different pieces of the puzzle from the
advance that all had their own stake in making sure
that that building was not accessible.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 38 (Aug. 26, 2024).
The Site Agent told the Committee, ``[t]he AGR building was
not part of our site. The AGR building was not considered part
of our perimeter . . . that building was not part of our
perimeter, our secure perimeter. When we say, when we identify
buildings and surroundings that [are outside] of perimeter,
that's more local law enforcement responsibilities.''\81\ When
the Committee asked what specific steps USSS took to ensure the
AGR building was covered, the Site Agent stated, ``[s]ince it
was on the outer perimeter, we did not discuss or plan for
having a post-stander or having any other asset other than the
local counter sniper[s]''\82\ However, the USSS Counter Sniper
Team Leader told the Committee that part of the USSS counter
snipers' responsibility included scanning for threats
regardless of the location, including beyond the perimeter.\83\
The Committee has interviewed two USSS counter snipers and has
requested interviews for the other two USSS counter snipers
that were assigned to the July 13 Butler rally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
147 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\82\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
37 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\83\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 27-28, 46-47 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader Identified the AGR Roof as a
Vulnerability, but Did Not Ensure Local Snipers Could Mitigate It.
The four USSS counter snipers positioned on two barn roofs
behind the stage played a key role in scanning for threats,
including on and around the AGR building. In interviews with
the Committee, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader stated that
part of his job in the advance planning for the event was to
identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities or threats and
that he identified the AGR building, with its line-of-sight
from the roof to the stage, as one such vulnerability.\84\ He
further stated in his interview that a key component of his
plan to mitigate the AGR building vulnerability was himself and
his partner in the Hercules 1 position on the southern
barn.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 29 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\85\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 30-31 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The image below shows the positions of the USSS counter
sniper Hercules 1 and Hercules 2 positions during the rally,
the local snipers in the AGR building, and the likely route
Crooks took across the roofs to get into position and
ultimately shoot.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024);
Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS and Local Sniper Positions at July 13 rally\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ The likely route Crooks took across the roofs is based on the
following information received by the Committee as part of its
investigation: the position of the air conditioning unit where Crooks
climbed up on the roof, dash cam footage and PSP interview with a
Butler Township Police Officer, and Committee staff examination of the
AGR roof on July 26, 2024 (Butler Investigation Evidence Photos,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 28, 2024, https://www.fbi.gov/
news/press-releases/butler-investigation-photos; Dashboard Camera
Footage, Butler Township Police Department, Unit 5-1, July 13, 2024, at
18:08:34-18:08:46 (footage appears to show Thomas Crooks traversing the
roof of the AGR building); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of
Butler Township Police Detective on July 16, 2024 (received Sept. 4,
2024) (on file with Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T78242.179
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader created a planning
document as part of his advance work for the Butler event that
he and the other USSS counter snipers would use for planning
purposes as well as for communicating about specific locations
during the event.\88\ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told
the Committee that when he went to the Butler Farm Show site on
July 10 before the event, he identified where the USSS counter
snipers would be posted and took pictures of the approximate
views the sniper teams would have from their postings.\89\
These pictures were incorporated in planning documents, like
the image below, to be used by the USSS counter sniper teams
during the event and included potential areas of
vulnerabilities such as the AGR building.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 16-19, 75-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\89\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 75-76 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\90\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 16-19, 75-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This image below does not show the exact view that Hercules
2 had of the AGR building because it was not taken from the
same part of the barn roof where Hercules 2 was positioned. The
Counter Sniper Team Leader explained to the Committee that he
took this picture while standing on the roof of the barn that
was in the middle of the Hercules 1 and Hercules 2
positions.\91\ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the
Committee that when he went to the roof of the barn where
Hercules 1 and 2 would be positioned and took the photograph
contained in the image below, ``I actually wasn't looking
independently at all the threat areas. It was more to make sure
that the roof was secure for us to stand on. . . . Up there it
was really just officer safety.''\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 75-76 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\92\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 76 (Aug. 28, 2024).
This image below does show the trees that partially blocked
the line-of-sight from the Hercules 2 position on the northern
barn (to the right of the photographer's position) to the right
side of the AGR roof from which Crooks fired.
USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader Planning Document\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ USSS Counter Sniper Team, Site 2: Butler Farm Outdoor Rally,
at 4 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.002
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that
when he initially went on the barn roof to take the photograph
contained in the above image, ``I looked over at the AGR
building, but I didn't really make a mental note of, hey, this
is actually being blocked. It wasn't until later that I was
actually doing the grids and doing a 360 that I went, I don't
know if you can see that [the AGR building] from Hercules 2, so
I made note of that at the time. But Hercules 1, you had a
clear line-of-sight, so I was okay with it.''\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 76-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Committee asked the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader if he ever notified the Hercules 2 counter snipers about
the tree line obstruction of the AGR building, he said, ``I did
not mention [to] them that hey, part of the [AGR] building is
going to be obscured from you.''\95\ When the Committee asked
why the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader did not mention the
obstruction to the Hercules 2 team, he responded:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
Honestly, I just didn't think about it. This is one of
the many threat areas that looked it [sic]. I wouldn't
have mentioned that hey, we can actually see the
buildings on the left side, the private residences and
the wood line, and you guys can't see that. It's kind
of, between each posting, when we're working together
we have full coverage, but there are certain things a
certain post would see better than another post.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77-78 (Aug. 28, 2024).
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that
if another USSS counter sniper had an issue with their post,
``they could reach out if they had any concerns. But I believe
they would understand I did the advance work, this is this line
of we can't see a certain threat area, I assume that the
advance did his job diligently, which I did, and Hercules 1
could see the threat area.''\97\ After noticing the obstruction
of the trees in front of the AGR building, one of the USSS
counter snipers on Hercules 2 told the Committee that he and
his partner did not notify the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader
``because it was assumed that he took the post during his
advance procedures and chose that one, regardless of a line of
sight issue with the trees, because the AGR building was to be
secured by locals.''\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 78 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\98\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper at 80 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local snipers explained to the Committee they understood
their primary areas of responsibility to be the rally
crowd.\99\ The local snipers also explained that they were
positioned behind windows and behind their weapons, which were
approximately 6-7 feet away from the windows.\100\ The image
below, created by local law enforcement, identifies seven
sectors of coverage responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024);
Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\100\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sector Map of Butler Rally Site\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024)
(Sector map taken from Butler County ESU briefing documents presented
at Rally on July 13, 2024).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.003
According to one of the local snipers the Committee
interviewed, the snipers in the AGR building were responsible
for covering part of Sector 2 (identified by the dark green box
in the above map); Sector 1 (the yellow box in the in the above
map); and the upper portion of Sector 5 (the purple box in the
above map).\102\ These sectors cover the approximate locations
of the rally crowd.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Interview with AGR Sniper 1, Beaver County ESU (Aug. 5, 2024)
(on file with Committee)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No USSS personnel involved with planning who the Committee
interviewed questioned the local snipers' decisions regarding
these positions nor their understanding of their areas of
responsibility.\103\ As discussed above, the USSS Lead Advance
Agent, Counter Sniper Team Leader, and Site Counterpart did not
go into the AGR building as part of their advance
planning.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ See e.g Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 36-38 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\104\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 98 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 167 (Aug. 21, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at
59-60 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee staff visited the Butler Farm Show rally site,
toured the AGR building, and examined the rooms and views where
each local sniper was posted.\105\ During the tour, Committee
staff took photographs from the approximate position of the
local snipers in the AGR building on July 13, 2024.\106\ As
shown in the photographs below, the local snipers had a limited
view of the AGR roof based on their positions on July 13.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\106\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\107\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
View from local sniper post in AGR building\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on
July 26, 2024.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.004
The photograph above shows the approximate field of view
from one of the positions occupied by local snipers positioned
in AGR building on July 13, 2024.\109\ As can be seen in the
photograph, from this position the local sniper would not have
been able to see Crooks either during his transit of the roof
or when he took his final firing position.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\110\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although local snipers would not have been able to see
Crooks from their positions, they had access to a break room on
the same floor of the AGR building.\111\ This breakroom
contained a south-facing window, and was closest to the
location from which Crooks fired.\112\ The photograph below,
taken by Committee staff, shows the southward view from that
AGR window looking out toward the rally site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\112\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
View from AGR building breakroom\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on
July 26, 2024.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.005
The roof visible in the foreground of the above photograph
is the AGR roof from which Crooks fired. However, this view
does not show the actual spot from which Crooks fired, which
was on the eastern side of that roof (i.e., to the left from
the perspective of this photograph).\114\ In addition, as the
above photograph shows, a local sniper positioned in this
location would not have been able to provide coverage of the
rally crowd, which was their primary area of
responsibility.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\115\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on staff's tour of the AGR building, it was possible
for a local sniper in the breakroom to position themselves so
as to be able to see Crooks' location on the roof while
remaining concealed inside the building. In order to obtain a
visual of that spot, a sniper would have had to go to the
breakroom, press up against the window, and look eastward
(i.e., to the left). The photograph below was taken by
Committee staff and shows that view of Crooks' approximate
position (indicated with the black arrow) from that window.
View looking left from AGR building breakroom\116\
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.006
As can be seen in the above photograph, a sniper who
assumed this position would have obstructed their view of what
was understood to be their primary area of responsibility--the
rally crowd.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on
July 26, 2024.
\117\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, local snipers told the Committee that their
understanding was their role was to act as ``snipers,''
concealed within the AGR building and looking into the crowd
within the rally site for threats--as opposed to ``counter
snipers'' primarily responsible for looking outside the site
for threats from snipers on structures such as the AGR
building.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in the Timeline (Section IV) below, a local
sniper in the AGR building was the first to spot the suspicious
person with a rangefinder, which was relayed to USSS. According
to the Beaver County ESU Commander, ``if [the Beaver County
sniper in the AGR building] doesn't give that first warning,
however long it was, nobody would be looking for that guy''--
and the two officers who fired at Crooks (the Butler ESU
officer and the USSS counter sniper) may not have been able to
determine where the shots were coming from and to shoot at
Crooks as quickly as they did, thereby preventing him from
inflicting further harm on former President Trump and rally
attendees.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the Committee's July 30, 2024 hearing, Acting
Director Rowe presented the below photograph taken from the AGR
building to show local snipers could have seen Crooks on the
roof from their positions.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS Acting Director Rowe Exhibit Presented at July 30, 2024
Hearing\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.007
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to this image, Acting Director Rowe stated:
This is from the second floor of the AGR building. This
point of view is the point of view where the counter-
sniper team locally was posted. The gold arrow
indicates where the shooter fired from. Looking left,
why was the assailant not seen? When we were told that
building was going to be covered, that there had been a
face to face that afternoon, that our team leads met.
This was the view.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
Local law enforcement snipers stationed in the AGR building
who spoke with the Committee said that the Acting Director's
assessment did not align with their point of view.\123\ When
asked about the picture presented by Acting Director Rowe, one
local law enforcement sniper stationed in the AGR building told
the Committee ``I'm not exactly sure where they took those
pictures from, but like if they were taken from where I was,
they would have been, they would have literally had to been
hanging out the window.''\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Interview with AGR Sniper 1, Beaver County ESU (Aug. 5, 2024)
(on file with Committee); Interview with Local Law Enforcement Sniper
positioned in AGR Building (Aug. 6, 2024).
\124\ Interview with AGR Sniper 1, Beaver County ESU (Aug. 5, 2024)
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple Law Enforcement Line-of-Sight Concerns Were Not Sufficiently
Mitigated in Advance of July 13.
The USSS site agent told the Committee that the Butler
County Farm Show site had ``many vulnerabilities,'' which
included an airport hangar, multiple buildings, a residential
area, rooftops, and empty buildings near the airport, noting
``so everything pretty much surrounding the venue, the site,
was pretty much considered a line-of-sight [concern] or a
vulnerability.''\125\ USSS and PSP discussed placing farm
equipment, bleachers, and other large trucks in certain
areas.\126\ In an interview with Committee staff, the USSS Site
Counterpart said that by Wednesday, July 10, there were still
line-of-sight concerns that needed to be mitigated.\127\ The
USSS Site Counterpart ``tried to put [trucks] in those
positions that I wanted to block, you know, those AGR
building.''\128\ A PSP Lieutenant involved in coordinating the
planning and security for the rally stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
51-52 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\126\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 33 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent, at 55 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 174 (Aug. 21, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 87 (Aug.
23, 2024).
\127\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 175 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\128\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 175 (Aug. 21, 2024).
But in the end, like, to me, I thought from the way it
sounded, like there was going to be a lot more
[tractors/vehicles] than was actually there. I mean, I
think there was only a handful of tractors on this side
and one combine right here.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 33 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee she
discussed AGR line-of-sight concerns throughout the week,
including the day before the rally.\130\ The USSS Lead Advance
Agent noted that the rally site ``had still not been built out
as of the time I left on Friday'' and the second supervisors
from the Trump Detail ``were continuing to walk through the
site and discussed line-of-sight and other issues.''\131\ The
USSS Site Agent told the Committee she was not prevented or
overruled in using heavy equipment or trucks to mitigate ground
line-of-sight issues.\132\ Ultimately, however, large trucks
were not used.\133\ The USSS Lead Advance Agent said, ``the
Penske trucks were in the area at the time, helping with the
buildout. Those trucks were not used. They continued to speak
about some farm equipment that they had. The counter sniper
teams that we had in place, the police posting we had in place,
the screens that were going to be in place, and the bleachers
that would be in place, that would all mitigate being able to
obstruct line-of-sight from that area.''\134\ A USSS counter
sniper in the Hercules 2 position told the Committee he
believed the mitigations were sufficient and the USSS Site
Counterpart told the Committee she believed they had a ``good
security plan'' for the July 13 rally.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 117 (Aug. 26, 2024). The USSS Lead Advance Agent left the
Butler Farm Show grounds at approximately 3:00 pm on July 12. Id., at
137.
\131\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 117 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\132\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
53 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\133\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 56 (Aug. 26, 2024). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Counterpart, at 175 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\134\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 56 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\135\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 163 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 61 (Aug. 21, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resource Requests for Additional Assets Were Denied and Others Were Not
Made.
PSP initially told USSS they would be able to provide 10-15
troopers but ultimately provided a total of 30 troopers,
including 22 troopers on site.\136\ The Butler County ESU sent
three sniper teams and approximately 20-25 officers.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant,
Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 20 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
\137\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Trump Detail requested specific assets for the
July 13 rally that were not approved.\138\ These included C-UAS
and UAS resources, which are discussed below, and a Counter
Assault Team liaison.\139\ President Trump's USSS detail
requested Counter Assault Team liaisons to help coordinate
tactical assets in advance of the July 13 rally, but other USSS
components denied this request.\140\ The Lead Advance Agent
also told the Committee she requested 13 magnetometers from
USSS, but only received 10.\141\ In addition, the USSS Site
Counterpart told the Committee that having a Counter
Surveillance Unit (CSU) would have been helpful and she was
``surprised'' USSS did not have a CSU for an outdoor
event.\142\ A CSU team is used to ``identify and observe outer
perimeter areas from which significant threats could
originate.''\143\ The USSS Assistant Director of OPO also told
the Committee that ``a large outdoor venue would lend itself
for requesting a CSU-type asset,'' and that a CSU may have
helped because ``an area of focus for CSU is to look for that
pre-attack behavior.''\144\ The USSS Site Agent also told the
Committee having a CSU asset would have been helpful for the
July 13 rally.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 26 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Agent, at 159 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 28 (Aug. 21, 2024) (stating
``I don't know who makes the final decision on whether a request gets
granted or not.'').
\139\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Lead Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\140\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\141\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 26-27 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\142\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 30 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\143\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, USSS
Manpower Briefing, at 3 (USSS--000155-158) (received Aug. 2, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
\144\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 122-123 (Sept. 13,
2024).
\145\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 30 (Aug. 21, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While former President Trump did not have a CSU for the
outdoor rally that was expected to have 15,000 attendees on
July 13, the First Lady did have a CSU assigned for her indoor
event in the same area had 410 expected attendees.\146\
According to the USSS Site Counterpart, the First Lady
regularly receives CSU.\147\ The Lead Advance Agent told the
Committee she was not aware of any discussions to request a CSU
for the July 13 rally, noting ``it's not a typical asset for an
advance for a former President that I had worked at that
time.''\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler event at 5, U.S.
Secret Service (on file with Committee); Preliminary Survey for July
13, 2024 FLOTUS event, U.S. Secret Service (on file with Committee).
\147\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 67-68 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\148\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 26 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Site Counterpart for the July 13 rally noted that
Advance Agents often already know what assets will be provided
before putting in a request: ``a lot of times I think it is
like . . . you can make the request, but you know what you're
going to get,'' explaining, ``we have limited, you know,
manpower, limited resources. Especially during a campaign, is
[sic] it's always an issue: resources and manpower.''\149\ The
fact that USSS was responsible for providing security for two
protectees in the Pittsburgh area on July 13--former President
Trump's event in Butler and the First Lady's event in the city
of Pittsburgh--resulted in shared USSS assets at the Pittsburgh
airport.\150\ Although the Site Counterpart for the Butler
rally acknowledged that resources could be strained by asset
sharing between protectees, she told the Committee that she was
confident that there was not going to be any resource issues
during this specific arrangement because she had previously
worked with the local law enforcement entity providing the
shared coverage.\151\ She said that if any issues did arise,
``I think it would've been an easy and quick adjustment if
needed.''\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 31 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\150\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 171 (Aug. 21, 2024); Department of Homeland Security,
U.S. Secret Service, USSS Manpower Briefing, at 3 (USSS--000155-158)
(received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\151\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 173 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\152\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 173 (Aug. 21, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked if protective glass had been discussed for the
July 13 event, the Site Agent told the Committee that on
protective events she had worked, former presidents typically
did not have this asset. The Agent added that, in her opinion,
``definitely would be beneficial to have protective
glass.''\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
121-122 (Aug. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Errors in Security Planning Documents.
At least two documents that USSS officials created
detailing security specifications and asset postings for the
July 13 rally contained errors regarding the positions of the
local counter snipers at the event.
One document, the Preliminary Survey, which contains
information about the positions of assets, radio frequencies,
and many other items, contained inaccurate information
regarding the positions of the local counter snipers at the
July 13 rally.\154\ In an interview with the Committee, the
USSS Site Agent for the July 13 rally who contributed to the
Preliminary Survey acknowledged that the accuracy of the
document is important.\155\ In the document, it stated ``Local
CS [Counter Sniper] Team (elevated 4 o'clock & 8 o'clock) Barn
Roof.''\156\ When asked about the accuracy of that information,
the Site Agent acknowledged that this was not the actual
position of the local counter sniper teams.\157\ The agent
continued:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
92 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\155\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
93 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\156\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler event at 5, (received July
26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\157\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
98 (Aug. 23, 2024).
[O]nce the paperwork is submitted, we normally brief
during the post-stander briefing to make sure that
everybody is aware of tactical assets or special
tacticals from local law enforcement. And that was
briefed as part of--if there's any corrections or
anything that needs to be addressed prior to the visit,
or even during the post-stander briefing, which is what
we did once we noticed that there was some
misinformation, or not, something that was not correct,
we make sure that we brief that during the day of the
visit to ensure that everybody is aware of tactical
elements or positioning of local assets.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
98 (Aug. 23, 2024).
Another document, the Site Diagram, which contains overhead
images of site venues and lists assets for those venues, also
contained similar, inaccurate information listing ``Local CS
[Counter Sniper] Team (elevated 4 o'clock & 8 o'clock) Barn
Roof.''\159\ The Site Agent, who also contributed to this
document, confirmed that the location of the local counter
sniper teams presented in this Site Diagram was also not
accurate.\160\ The Site Agent submitted this paperwork with the
errors to the Lead Advance Agent for the July 13 rally.\161\
The Lead Advance Agent's supervisor did not review the
preliminary survey until ``after it had already been approved
and submitted.''\162\ The Lead Advance Agent did not catch the
error before she submitted the document to the Trump
detail.\163\ The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee,
however, ``I put those [papers] together with the best of my
ability, I observed them, and those errors that were found were
addressed when they were found.''\164\ The Lead Advance Agent
stated, ``I did review. There was information that I missed on
the page, and that was corrected in a briefing that happened
later that evening,'' and that ``[t]he counter sniper advance
sent an email with his documents, that had in the body of the
email the correct locations of the counter sniper teams and the
[local] sniper teams, and that was what was briefed[.]''\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ The USSS Site Diagram for the July 13, 2024 rally contained a
diagram for the Pittsburgh airport, the Butler Farm Show site, and the
stage and bleacher set-up. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret
Service, USSS Site Diagram, at 2 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\160\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
103 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\161\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
104 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\162\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Special Agent
in Charge (SAIC) of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office, at 188 (Aug. 30,
2024).
\163\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 171-172 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\164\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 174 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\165\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 171, 173 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Communications Failures
Multiple USSS officials, including Acting Director Rowe,
have acknowledged communications failures on July 13.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ See, e.g., Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent, at 163 (Aug. 26, 2024) (``I think we can agree that
communication failed.''); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Counterpart, at 137 (Aug. 21, 2024) (``I think there was
also like a big communication breakdown. It appears that, you know, the
word wasn't getting out to the right entities.''); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of
Protective Operations, at 90 (Sept. 13, 2024); Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald
Rowe, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several USSS personnel at the rally have told the Committee
that they were not notified about the suspicious person with a
rangefinder--and that if they had been, there may have been
time to take action prior to shots being fired.\167\ The Site
Counterpart explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 92-94 (Aug. 26, 2024). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 112-114 (Aug. 14, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 134 (Aug.
23, 2024).
There's a lot of things that could have been done, but
it has to be relayed. It has to be communicated in
order for those to be put in place. . . . I didn't know
anything was going on. I can't put out fires that I
don't know exist[].\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 145 (Aug. 21, 2024).
The USSS Site Agent told the Committee that if she had
known law enforcement was trying to locate a suspicious person,
she would have passed that information along to the supervisors
of former President Trump's detail, who could make the decision
whether to remove him from the stage.\169\ The USSS Lead
Advance agents the Committee has interviewed stated that they
were not aware of any discussions that day about potentially
removing former President Trump from the stage.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
134-135 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\170\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 93-94 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Agent, at 132-135 (Aug. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an interview with the Committee, the Assistant Director
of the USSS OPO said, ``clearly, there were communication gaps
that day that led to this failure. And if those communication
gaps had been mitigated, information could have been passed in
a more timely fashion that would've avoided that
failure.''\171\ When asked by the Committee to provide
additional detail on what specific communication gaps he was
referring to, the Assistant Director stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 90 (Sept. 13,
2024).
Well, I did not conduct the advance. I don't have
firsthand knowledge, but based on information I've
learned after the fact and even one could almost
observe from a third-party perspective. The
communications plan was, in my opinion, siloed. We had
a security room with a Secret Service supervisor, a
member of the Pennsylvania State Police, and then
approximately 120 yards to 300 yards away. You had a
mobile command post with the various law enforcement
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agencies represented.
So, I will speak in generalities to answer your
question. In law enforcement, one of the most basic
tenants is one has to be able to communicate. What
frustrates me, and maybe I'm dating myself, but I keep
hearing about technology, and this, and that, and the
other thing, and/or some panacea radio-type system
where, again, if you just had a well-staffed, unified
command post with law enforcement appropriately co-
located for command and control, and the ability to
contemporaneously communicate and pass information, we
wouldn't have had--or I'll say, I don't have all the
facts to the investigation, but you won't have
stovepipe communications that can cause failures that
we saw up at Butler as a result of communication being
delayed. This individual was walking around for an
hour, but somehow information seemed to be getting
stove piped. Sometimes in law enforcement, there isn't
a script for every play or every scenario you may
encounter, but just by sitting in that unified command
post, ``Oh, what did you hear? There's a guy, so and
so.'' And oftentimes that's how information in reality
is going to get passed.
Even if you had one radio communication frequency and
everyone could speak on, it would be worthless because
everyone would be stepping on each other. And
oftentimes in exigent situations, you can take their,
you can't even talk on the radio, but it's that lead up
prior to something becoming kinetic, which is essential
in that command and control.
So, if the information is correct, which I don't have
firsthand knowledge of, but there was a Secret Service
security room with only a Secret Service supervisor and
a member of the Pennsylvania State Police. Why would
you not embed them in that unified mobile command post
to have that command and control? If there was an
incident or something percolating, establish that
jurisdictional deconfliction and address the issue.
I mean, if I was to use an analogy; if there's any
football fans, if we have the coach calling in the
plays to the quarterback, and we have the defensive
coordinator on the same radio frequency, it's not going
to work. So, I don't really put much stock in the
whole--there's been this whole notion of radios and
radio. You establish a unified command so people can
communicate and collaborate and reach out to their
respective entities.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 91-92 (Sept. 13,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key USSS personnel were never informed that local law enforcement was
searching for a suspicious person with a rangefinder prior to shots
being fired.
After a local sniper first observed Crooks with a
rangefinder at 5:32 pm, local and state law enforcement
officials acted promptly to notify others, including USSS.\173\
As detailed below, by 5:52 pm at least eight USSS personnel had
been notified of the suspicious person. The PSP Sergeant in the
USSS Security Room notified the USSS Security Room Agent
verbally at approximately 5:44 pm, and shared photos of Crooks
with the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent at approximately 5:48
pm.\174\ The C-UAS Advance Agent passed the photos and
description of Crooks along to the USSS Counter Sniper Response
Team agent by text message at 5:52 pm.\175\ The Butler ESU
Sniper Team Leader notified the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader
at 5:45 pm via text message-- and that USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader told the Committee he found the report of a rangefinder
``extremely suspicious''--who then notified the other three
USSS Counter Snipers by email at 5:52 pm.\176\ Additionally, a
USSS Protective Intelligence Agent at the rally site was also
looking into the suspicious person report around this
time.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ See Section IV below.
\174\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\175\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
Messages from C-UAS Advance Agent to Counter Sniper Response Team
Agent, USSS--1919, USSS--1922 (received Aug. 30, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\176\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local
Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm, at USSS--001412-001415 (on
file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 116 (Aug. 28, 2024);
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email between
USSS counter snipers on July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm, at USSS--001417-
001419 (on file with Committee).
\177\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 116 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The C-UAS and Intelligence Advance Agents told the
Committee that after learning of the suspicious person, the
USSS Counter Sniper Response Team Agent and USSS Protective
Intelligence Agent engaged in the on-the-ground effort to
locate the individual. Several USSS personnel told the
Committee they were not aware that these agents had been
deployed in a search of any kind.\178\ Additionally, the Site
Agent and Counter Sniper Team Leader stated that they would
typically be made aware if the Counter Sniper Response Team is
deployed in a search, and that they should have been told on
July 13.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ See, e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-
UAS Advance Agent at 107-108 (Aug. 20, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Advance Agent, at 107-109 (Aug.
29, 2024).
\179\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 207 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 182 (Aug. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the fact that multiple USSS personnel were aware
that local law enforcement identified a suspicious person with
a rangefinder--and some USSS personnel were actively engaged in
the search--others including the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site
Agent, Site Counterpart, and Counter Assault Team Leader, did
not receive this information until after shots were fired.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 92 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Site Agent, at 47-48 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 53 (Aug. 21, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team
Advance, at 127 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS officials expected the USSS Security Room would relay relevant
information from all law enforcement agencies.
Several of the USSS personnel who did not learn of the
suspicious person with a rangefinder until after the shooting
told the Committee that they expected the USSS Security Room
would relay relevant information from all law enforcement
agencies working at the rally site.\181\ According to the PSP
Sergeant who was stationed in the USSS Security Room, he
initially told the Security Room Agent about the suspicious
person with a rangefinder approximately 27 minutes prior to the
shooting, and that the suspicious individual was on the AGR
building roof approximately 2 minutes before the shooting.\182\
The PSP Sergeant stated that he was not aware of what, if
anything, the Security Room Agent did with the
information.\183\ The Committee has not yet interviewed the
Security Room Agent to determine what he did with that
information. Additionally, the Committee was not able to review
radio communications made from the USSS Security Room because,
as Acting USSS Director Rowe stated in his testimony to the
Committee on July 30, the USSS did not record its radio
transmissions on July 13.\184\ USSS officials told the
Committee that radio communications are often recorded at
protective events, but that the recording capability was not
available at the rally.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ See, e.g., Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent, at 92-93, 96-97 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 181 (Aug. 23, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team
Advance, at 69 (Aug. 14, 2024).
\182\ See, e.g. Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July
26, 2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant
and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\183\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\184\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\185\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 143 (Aug. 20, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 91-92 (Aug. 14, 2024); Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting
Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to
the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July
30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Siloed communications hindered information sharing at the July 13
rally.
USSS, state, and local law enforcement operated on multiple, separate
radio channels.
At the July 13 rally, the USSS operated at least three
radio channels, each designated for different categories of
personnel.\186\ PSP operated on two radio channels--a primary
channel that all PSP officers were instructed to monitor, and a
secondary channel.\187\ Local law enforcement operated on three
radio channels on July 13--a tactical channel for local snipers
and members of the quick response force and counter assault
teams, a patrol channel for local post-standers and patrol
officers, and a third channel for members of the Butler County
Sheriff's Department.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ See USSS Site Post Instructions for July 13, 2024, USSS--
000219 (listing two radio frequencies: one for ``shift and motorcade''
and another for ``post standers, TSD, UD.'' A third channel was also
used for tactical personnel. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 105 (Aug. 16, 2024). Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 34
(Aug. 14, 2024).
\187\ Pennsylvania State Police, Former President Donald J. Trump
Visit to the Butler County on July 13, 2024, at 3 (received Aug. 26,
2024) (on file with Committee).
\188\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024). In addition to the local law enforcement channels, there was a
separate radio channel used for medical/emergency personnel. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS uses encrypted radio frequencies, which are not
accessible without a USSS-issued radio.\189\ According to
Butler County ESU police officers, no local law enforcement
officials were given a USSS radio on July 13, and no one from
USSS had a Butler County-issued radio.\190\ Similarly, all of
the USSS personnel the Committee interviewed stated that they
did not personally have a local radio or access to local radio
channels.\191\ Based on its interviews with USSS personnel and
local law enforcement, the Committee could not confirm anyone
in USSS had a local radio nor any local law enforcement had a
USSS radio.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 108 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\190\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\191\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 134, 136 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 105-106 (Aug. 16, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 176 (Aug.
23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance,
at 173 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Counter Assault Team Operator, at 35 (Aug. 14, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules
1, at 196 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 118 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\192\ The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that she
believed she saw the USSS Counter Assault Team Advance exchange a radio
with a Butler ESU officer. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Lead Advance Agent, at 105-106 (Aug. 26, 2024). However, the
Counter Assault Team Advance told the Committee that he did not
exchange radios with any local Butler ESU personnel. Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 37
(Aug. 20, 2024). He said he did exchange radios with someone from
Pennsylvania State Police. Id., at 27. Similarly, Butler ESU told the
Committee none of their personnel exchanged radios with USSS personnel
on July 13. Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several USSS personnel told the Committee that it is a
common practice to exchange radios with local partners to
facilitate communications during protective events.\193\
However, they noted that it is not a required practice, and it
is more common when tactical officers conduct on-site advance
work for several days prior to a protective event, which was
not the case for the July 13 rally.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Assault Team Advance, at 39 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 151-153 (Aug. 14,
2024).
\194\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Assault Team Advance, at 39 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 153-154 (Aug. 14,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One USSS officer--the Counter Sniper Team Leader--was
offered a local radio on July 13, but he did not pick it
up.\195\ The Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that
when he met with local snipers at the rally they offered him a
local radio.\196\ According to the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader and Butler County ESU officials, he did not pick up a
local radio that day.\197\ The Counter Sniper Team Leader told
the Committee that he intended to pick up a local radio, but
did not have time due to technical issues with his USSS radio
he needed to resolve first.\198\ He explained that by the time
those problems were addressed, he needed to get into his
assigned position on the barn roof.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ Butler ESU briefing; Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28,
2024).
\196\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\197\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024); Butler County ESU
Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\198\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-53 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\199\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to radio exchanges, USSS officials noted that
another common practice for facilitating communications is for
USSS and local law enforcement to co-locate, or embed, tactical
personnel.\200\ On July 13 a Butler ESU tactical officer was
embedded with the USSS Counter Assault team, meaning he was
stationed in close proximity to them throughout the day.\201\
Both USSS Counter Assault team members told the Committee that
a primary purpose of having the local officer embedded with
them was to ensure they had a direct line of communication with
local tactical assets.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Assault Team Advance, at 34-35, 38 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\201\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Assault Team Advance, at 34 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\202\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Assault Team Operator, at 64 (Aug. 14, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS and local law enforcement operated separate communications
centers.
Several USSS personnel the Committee spoke to explained
that a command post or ``security room,'' is used at protectee
events to facilitate communications among USSS as well as
between the USSS and its state and local partners.\203\ USSS
operated a Security Room at the July 13 rally, and Butler
County law enforcement ran a separate Command Post for local
law enforcement agencies. The posts were at least 120 to 300
yards distance from each other.\204\ The USSS Security Room and
the local Command Post's primary means of communication with
each other was by cell phone, not radio.\205\ The graphic below
depicts the multi-step process for information to travel from
local law enforcement to the USSS Security Room, as described
by Butler ESU.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ According to a USSS policy manual, ``A security room is the
Secret Service communications center at a site, when the command post
is located elsewhere.'' U.S. Secret Service Directives System,
Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, at 5 (on file with Committee).
USSS officials explained that a command post is generally used for an
entire visit, while a Security Room is used for a specific location.
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at
132 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Counter Assault Team Advance, at 40 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 56 (Aug. 23, 2024).
However, the terms are often used interchangeably to refer to the USSS
communications hub for an event. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Lead Advance Agent, at 132 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at 117 (Aug. 13, 2024).
USSS instructions to post-standers on July 13 also describe the
security room as ``the command post for the overall visit.'' Department
of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Site Post Instructions for
Site #2, Candidate Donald J. Trump--Rally, Butler, PA, at USSS--000220
(received August 9, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\204\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 91 (Sept. 13,
2024).
\205\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024, at 13 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local Command Post and USSS Security Room Communications\206\
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.008
The Butler ESU Commander maintained radio contact with the
local law enforcement officers working the rally.\207\ If he
wanted to relay information he heard from local radio channels
to USSS, the Butler ESU Commander would use his cell phone to
call the PSP Sergeant in the USSS Security Room.\208\ The PSP
Sergeant stated that he would then relay information verbally
to the USSS Security Room Agent, who had the ability to contact
USSS agents in the field over the USSS radio.\209\ The
Committee has not yet interviewed the USSS Security Room Agent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ Graphic created by the Committee.
\207\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\208\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\209\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law enforcement officers routinely communicated by cell phone.
Several law enforcement personnel at the July 13 rally also
used cell phones to communicate. All of the local snipers at
the rally were on a group text chain, in addition to being on
the same radio channel.\210\ USSS and local law enforcement
officials told the Committee that one reason text messages or
email will be used is to send images or photographs.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\211\ See generally Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee
(July 26, 2024); Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July
26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In some instances, such as between the PSP Sergeant in the
USSS Security Room and the Butler ESU Commander in the Local
Command Post, cell phones were the primary or only direct
method of communication between certain entities.\212\ As
depicted in the graphic below, cell phones were also the
primary method of communication between the local snipers, via
the Butler ESU Sniper Team Leader, and USSS counter snipers
during the July 13 rally.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024, at 6-7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\213\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 184 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Text and Email Communication between Local Snipers and USSS Counter
Snipers\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ Graphic created by the Committee.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.009
As described in more detail in the Timeline in Section IV
below, the local sniper in the AGR building who first observed
Crooks with a rangefinder sent a text message on the local
sniper chain with pictures and a description of Crooks.\215\
The Butler ESU Sniper Team Leader, who was on the text chain,
passed that information along to the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader by text message, who then emailed the information and
photos to the other USSS Counter Snipers.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ See Timeline, Section IV.
\216\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local
Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm, at USSS--001412-001415 (on
file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret
Service, Email correspondence between USSS Counter Snipers on July 13,
2024 at 5:52 pm, at USSS--001417-001419 (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that
relying on cell phones was ``not great but better than
nothing.''\217\ He also explained: ``Radios are preferred.
They're instantaneous. But they didn't have our radios. We
didn't have their radios.''\218\ However, the USSS Counter
Sniper Team Leader also noted that, ``if radios are being
difficult and/or there's just a lot of traffic, the cellphone
is always an option too.''\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 118 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\218\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 153 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\219\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 131 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radio problems added to communications challenges at the July 13 rally.
The Committee has been made aware of multiple instances of
USSS dealing with faulty radio equipment on the day of the July
13 rally. USSS personnel told the Committee that it is standard
practice at protective events to scan multiple USSS radio
channels to maintain awareness of relevant USSS
communications.\220\ However, the Committee has asked for and
not been provided all unredacted standard operating procedures
related to communications. On July 13, the Site Counterpart's
regular USSS-issued radio was unable to scan, and it could only
connect to one channel at a time.\221\ On the day of the rally,
the USSS Site Counterpart sent a text message to the Site Agent
and Lead Advance Agent: ``So I think my radio is screwed up of
course. I've had problems ever since I got the new radio. Been
on the phone with the radio folks and they think there is a
problem as well.''\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 111-112 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 80 (Aug. 14,
2024).
\221\ USSS Texts (on file with Committee); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 124 (Aug. 26, 2024);
Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 112
(Aug. 21, 2024).
\222\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
Message from USSS Site Counter Part to USSS Site Agent and USSS Lead
Advance Agent at 9:34 am, at USSS--000822 (received Aug. 23, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In another USSS text message on July 13 at 5:13 pm, a USSS
employee--whose name is redacted--wrote: ``I'm not getting good
comms on either my phone or radio I'll try to stay on[.]''\223\
On the day of the rally, USSS changed the post-standers' radio
frequency due to bleed over from other radio traffic--meaning
that USSS radios at the Butler rally site were picking up
transmissions they believed to be coming from the First Lady's
USSS detail nearby.\224\ USSS personnel told the Committee that
this type of issue is common when multiple protectee details
are in the same area.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
Message on July 13, 2024 at 5:13 am, at USSS-- 000912 (on file with
Committee).
\224\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
125-126 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent, at 123 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\225\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 123-124 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The two USSS counter snipers that have been interviewed by
the Committee both reported experiencing issues with their
radios at the rally. One said that the orientation of his USSS-
issued radio antenna can affect the signal and it ``can become
spotty'' if angled towards the ground.\226\ He also recalled
problems caused by his radio being in close proximity to his
partner's radio while they were in position on the barn roof,
saying the radio frequencies will ``sometimes cancel out'' and
one of them will receive a transmission but the other will
not.\227\ The Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee
that he experienced interference on his radio channels and had
to spend time troubleshooting, resulting in him being unable to
pick up a local radio on July 13.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 13, 50 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\227\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 50 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\228\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office did not have a working
radio on his person during his entire time at the July 13 rally.
The Lead Advance Agent said that while at the Pittsburgh
airport waiting for former President Trump to arrive, her radio
``dropped code,'' meaning she ``could hear some radio traffic''
but ``wouldn't be able to communicate back.''\229\ Since the
Lead Advance Agent would be travelling to the rally in the
motorcade and giving vehicle directions along the way, her
supervisor, the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, made the
decision to give her his own radio. The SAIC told the Committee
``[i]t was more important for [the Lead Advance Agent] to have
communications with everybody than for myself at that
point.''\230\ The SAIC also told the Committee that upon
arriving at the Butler Farm Show grounds, he intended to code
the Lead Advance Agent's radio in the Security Room, but
learned at the Security Room that the coder was back at the
motorcade.\231\ The SAIC was walking back from the Security
Room to the motorcade in order to obtain the coder, when shots
were fired.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 125 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\230\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, 108-109 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\231\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 109 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\232\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 110-112 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SAIC told the Committee that, while he was in the Trump
motorcade heading to the rally, he was riding with another USSS
official who had a working radio and that ``on the day of the
visit and during the visit, I act more in a liaison capacity. I
don't hold a post or a sector. I'm not part of any protective
formation.''\233\ Instead, the SAIC said, ``I'm there just if
something comes up and somebody needs help or if there's
something with our local or state partners or something else
comes up, I'm there to help assist with that.''\234\ Having
given the Lead Advance Agent his working radio and unable to
code the Lead Advance Agent's radio, the SAIC did not have
direct access to any radio communications with other USSS
agents while he was at the rally.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 109 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\234\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 109 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\235\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 108-110, 113 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responsibilities for the USSS Security Room were not well defined or
clearly understood.
In addition to a lack of clarity regarding how information
should be shared between the USSS and its state and local
partners, some of the protocols and expectations for
communications within USSS were also unclear. While USSS
personnel the Committee spoke to agreed that the Security Room
was a critical component of the overall communications plan for
the July 13 rally, they did not agree about who was responsible
for ensuring the Security Room was functioning as
intended.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
176-174 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
Lead Advance Agent, at 132-136 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to USSS policy, the ``Site Agent is responsible
for coordinating [the security room's] physical setup and
staffing.''\237\ However, the site agent for the July 13 rally
told the Committee that she was not the primary person
responsible for the security room's physical setup and
staffing.\238\ She said that she was involved in the setup
``working in coordination with [the Site Counterpart],'' but
that the Site Counterpart coordinated equipment and ensured the
security room was adequately staffed.\239\ In her view,
Security Room equipment and staffing is a responsibility of the
local field office, in this case, Pittsburgh.\240\ When asked
about responsibility for the Security Room set up and staffing,
the Site Counterpart told the Committee that ``the Site Agent's
really responsible for making sure that the security room's set
up and that there's communications.''\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Donald
Trump Protective Division Functions, at USSS--000243 (received Aug. 9,
2024) (on file with Committee).
\238\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
172-173 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\239\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
172 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\240\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
173 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\241\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 112 (Aug. 21, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that both the
Site Agent and Site Counterpart were ``responsible for making
sure that the site has adequate resources and everything that
was part of the plan is in place.''\242\ She explained that
during the July 8 Police Meeting she had invited all state and
local agencies participating in rally security to have someone
present in the USSS Security Room.\243\ However, she stated
that there was no specific follow up regarding which state and
local entities would actually be present in the Security
Room.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 103 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\243\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 101-102; 129-130 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\244\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 129-130 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some USSS officials told the Committee they expected that
local law enforcement entities working at the rally would have
a representative in the USSS Security Room, but many were not
certain about which local agencies, if any, were present in the
Security Room on July 13.\245\ When asked how the USSS was
supposed to communicate with local law enforcement at the July
13 rally, the Site Agent told the Committee: ``that's the
reason why there should be a local counterpart from each
department inside the Security Room, to ensure that everyone
has some communications and everyone is clear, on the same
page.''\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead
Advance Agent, at 101-102 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with
U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 70 (Aug. 14,
2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 156 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S.
Secret Service TSD Advance, at 118-119 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 49-50, 124-125 (Aug.
23, 2024).
\246\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
176 (Aug. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. ``I got him''--USSS Counter Snipers and Local Snipers Describe Line-
of-Sight and Communication Limitations
Radio logs obtained by the Committee show that the local
snipers positioned in the AGR building did not receive any
notification on their ESU radio channel about an individual on
the roof before Crooks fired, and the Beaver County sniper that
was posted in the AGR building told the Committee that neither
he nor his partner in the AGR building were aware of anyone on
the roof before shots were fired.\247\ The Committee learned
that a Butler Township Police Officer responded to the AGR
building to look for the suspicious person and saw a person
with a book bag ``running'' on the roof of the AGR building,
from the north end ``south across the building towards the
stage''--but he did not send out a radio alert about the
individual on the roof at that point.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Interview with AGR 1
Sniper (Beaver County ESU) (Aug. 5, 2024).
\248\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township
Police Detective on July 16, 2024, at 6-12 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 13, the four USSS counter snipers assigned to the
Butler rally were split into two 2-man teams identified by USSS
as ``Hercules 1'' and ``Hercules 2.'' The image below depicts
the positions of law enforcement at the Butler rally with two
arrows pointing at the locations of the USSS counter sniper
``Hercules'' teams:
Butler County ESU Site Map\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\249\ Butler County ESU, Site Map for July 13, 2024 Rally (received
July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee) (two red arrows added by
Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.010
As depicted in the above image, Hercules 1 was positioned
on the rooftop of the southern barn and Hercules 2 was
positioned on the rooftop of the northern barn. The Hercules 2
counter sniper team's responsibility included scanning the area
around the AGR building for threats (though their view of the
AGR building was partially obstructed by trees).\250\ The USSS
Counter Sniper Team Leader, along with his partner, were co-
located at the Hercules 1 post.\251\ Although Hercules 1 did
have a ``clear line-of-sight'' of the AGR building, the USSS
Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that the majority
of his time he was facing ``basically the same direction as the
stage.''\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper at 12, 55 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\251\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 22, 25, 69, 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\252\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 28, 76-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At approximately 5:45 pm, the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader received text messages from a local sniper regarding an
individual near the AGR building with a rangefinder looking
toward the stage.\253\ The text messages included two pictures
of Crooks.\254\ Within a minute, the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader responded, ``Roger. I'll notify teams on AGR
side.''\255\ Then, at 5:52 pm, the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader emailed the USSS counter snipers the information he
received from the local sniper, regarding an individual with a
rangefinder near the AGR building:\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 127-128 (Aug. 28, 2024); Department of
Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text between U.S. Secret
Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local Officer Sniper, July 13,
2024 at 5:45 pm, at USSS--001412-001415 (on file with Committee).
\254\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local
Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm, at USSS--001412-001415 (on
file with Committee).
\255\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local
Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm, at USSS--001416 (on file with
Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 128 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\256\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 114-116, 128-130. In the July 25 Member
briefing, USSS Acting Director Rowe told senators that former President
Trump's protective detail probably should have held the former
President off-stage until law enforcement tracked down and resolved the
suspicious person with the rangefinder. USSS and FBI Briefing with the
Committee (July 25, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Image of 5:52 pm USSS email notifying counter snipers of individual
near AGR building (white redactions applied by USSS)\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ 257 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Email between USSS counter snipers on July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm, at
USSS--001417-001419 (on file with Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.011
The 5:52 pm email above included two images of Crooks
(although his identity was unknown at the time):
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.012
In reference to this email, one of the Hercules 2 USSS
counter sniper team members told the Committee that this
``BOLO'' or ``be on the lookout'' email was ``worded
vaguely.''\258\ But, he and his partner, ``continued to search
and observe the site.''\259\ The Hercules 2 counter sniper
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\259\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).
After we were searching for several minutes I saw two
white vehicles pull into the AGR parking lot, but they
were obscured by that tree line that I previously
mentioned. And from those two vehicles I saw one
individual emerge from the tree line, identified him as
a police officer, and I couldn't tell why he was moving
urgently, but I went over the radio with the following
transmission: ``Security Room from Hercules, locals are
working something at the three o'clock, approximately
200 yards out.''\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper at 12-13 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader saw local law enforcement running
toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but did not radio the
Trump Detail to remove Trump from the stage.
According to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, as soon
as he and his partner (both at the Hercules 1 post) heard this
radio transmission, they repositioned themselves to face the
AGR building. The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the
Committee:
[W]e repositioned ourselves so that our tripod was on
the center of the [roof], the peak, and then we were
standing on the, I guess, the farthest edge that away
from the AGR building. So we were facing the AGR
building.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 109 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * *
[W]e had all focus on that building, around that
building, trying to figure out what was happening.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 181 (Aug. 28, 2024).
* * * *
[W]e placed our rifles in the tripods and started
searching through the rifle scopes themselves.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 182 (Aug. 28, 2024).
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader could not recall the
exact time that he and his partner repositioned themselves to
face toward the AGR building.\264\ He estimated that it was
``close to minutes'' between the time he received the Hercules
2 USSS counter sniper's radio transmission and when shots were
fired.\265\ The Hercules 2 USSS counter sniper told the
Committee that it could have been ``a minute or two'' between
his radio transmission and the first shots.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 181 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\265\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 135 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\266\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 109 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in that short amount of time, the Counter Sniper
Team Leader told the Committee what he witnessed unfolding in
front of the AGR building when he and his partner turned to
face the AGR building:
[W]hen we looked, just plain eyes, no optics or
anything, you could see police running towards the
building with their hands on their pistols. I think one
actually had a pistol facing towards the ground, out of
a holster. That's a pretty big deal for us, so
immediately we turned and faced our guns towards the
threat area. We didn't know what was happening, but it
seemed pretty serious, especially with the locals'
response.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 138 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * *
There were police running, guns out, and there were a
couple of people just running away from the AGR
building, that looks like citizens, I guess you would
say, just normal people. So something was wrong. We
didn't know what. But there was a lot going on in that
moment. The police were the main identifier that
something bad was happening.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 139 (Aug. 28, 2024).
Despite this, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader did not
relay this information to anyone on the radio. The USSS Counter
Sniper Team Leader explained this decision to the Committee
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
below:
Question: So why not, in that moment, send a signal or a
radio call, saying, ``Do not let the protectee on the stage,''
or if the protectee was already on the stage, take him off?
Answer: At that time we didn't know what we were working
with. Obviously, police are running towards a situation. That
could be anything from a medical situation to potentially a man
with a gun or some sort of violent situation. We didn't know
what we were having, and I didn't have enough to go over the
radio with the same exact communication of ``the police are
working a situation at the three o'clock.'' We know they're
working. What are they working on? We don't know. We're trying
not to clog the radio.
Question: Understood. You mentioned you saw someone with
their gun drawn.
Answer: Mm-hmm.
Question: That seems like an extremely serious situation,
more than just looking for a suspicious person.
Answer: Yes.
Question: It seems like a major elevation of a threat
level. Correct?
Answer: That's why we placed our rifles in the tripods and
started searching through the rifle scopes themselves.
Question: But beyond that, is that not enough to say we
have something imminent happening here, if their guns are drawn
and we need to ensure the safety of the protectee?
Answer: Potentially. It definitely is elevated. We're
trying to figure out what's happening. It's happening very
quickly. It's a very dynamic situation. But--
Question: Did the thought even cross your mind that you
should inform someone to keep the protectee from going on
stage, or, if he was already on stage, take him back? Did that
thought even cross your mind?
Answer: The thought did not cross my mind. It was more find
out what's happening, figure out what's happening. Can we help?
Can we take action? \269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 181-183 (Aug. 28, 2024).
The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that
if he did go on the radio to notify USSS to remove the
protectee from a potentially dangerous situation, ``there will
be no questions asked and that'll happen.''\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 137-138 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the estimated likely route Crooks took across the
roofs of the AGR buildings starting at 6:05 pm on July 13, the
USSS counter snipers in the Hercules 1 position could have had
a direct line-of-sight to him for at least part of his
movements across the roofs.\271\ The photograph below was taken
by Committee staff from an AGR roof looking southward toward
the USSS Hercules 1 position on the southern barn behind the
stage (i.e., the red barn on the right in this photograph
below). The AGR property is a complex of buildings with a
series of connected roofs.\272\ Crooks fired from the AGR roof
peak closest to the stage, and there are two additional roof
peaks beyond (i.e., to the north of) that roof, all of which
are connected and able to be traversed on foot.\273\ The
photograph below was taken from the third (i.e., northernmost)
of those three roofs, looking back past Crooks' shooting
position and on to the Hercules 1 position. As the photograph
below shows, the Hercules 1 position had a direct line-of-sight
to portions of these three roofs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ The likely route Crooks took across the roofs is based on the
position of the air conditioning unit where Crooks climbed up on the
roof, dash cam footage and PSP interview with a Butler Township Police
Officer, and Committee staff examination of the AGR roof on July 26,
2024 (Butler Investigation Evidence Photos, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Aug. 28, 2024, https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/
butler-investigation-photos; Dashboard Camera Footage, Butler Township
Police Department, Unit 5-1, July 13, 2024, at 18:08:34-18:08:46
(footage appears to show Thomas Crooks traversing the roof of the AGR
building); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township
Police Detective on July 16, 2024 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file
with Committee). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 43-45 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\272\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
\273\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
View from AGR Building Roof\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on
July 26, 2024 (arrow added by Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.013
When shown the photograph above of these three roof peaks
during the Committee's interview, the USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader who was in the Hercules 1 position (i.e., on the roof of
the red barn on the right in the photograph above) acknowledged
that with the view he had of the AGR building, if someone were
standing on those three roofs or walking across them, he could
have been able to see them: ``From our position you should have
line-of-sight, yes.''\275\ However, the USSS Counter Sniper
Team Leader and the Hercules 2 USSS counter sniper said they
never saw Crooks on the roof prior to shots being fired.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 43-45 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\276\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 190 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 43 (Aug. 16,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although FBI ``confirmed the subject's movement across
multiple AGR building roofs between 6:05 and 6:08 p.m.,'' the
Committee cannot know for certain that the Hercules 1 USSS
counter snipers would have spotted him if they were facing that
direction at that time.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper's sights for ``mere seconds''
before he fired at Crooks.
The two USSS counter snipers interviewed by the Committee
both confirmed that the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader's
partner on Hercules 1 fired his weapon at Crooks.\278\ The
Committee has requested to interview the USSS counter sniper
who shot Crooks, but has not yet interviewed him. The USSS
Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that prior to his
team member firing his weapon, he ``distinctly heard three
shots.''\279\ He then heard his USSS counter sniper partner
tell him, ``I got him.''\280\ The USSS Counter Sniper Team
Leader stated, ``I immediately gave him a wind call--when
you're doing a shooter/spotter, a wind call is basically any
adjustments you'd have to make to the wind. ... But at 200
yards it's minimal.''\281\ The Counter Sniper Team Leader
continued, ``[f]rom there I heard his round go off... I still
couldn't find what he was shooting at, so I got off my gun and
looked to see what angle he was looking at. I figure out he was
looking at the roof, got on, and then I saw the target that he
had shot at.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81-82 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 57, 59
(Aug. 16, 2024).
\279\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 144 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\280\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81-82, 144 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\281\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\282\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81-82 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee asked the Counter Sniper Team Leader how long
his partner on Hercules 1 had Crooks in his sights before
firing, and he responded, ``mere seconds.''\283\ The Counter
Sniper Team Leader confirmed to the Committee that, to his
knowledge, USSS counter snipers fired only one shot at
Crooks.\284\ Further, the USSS counter snipers the Committee
spoke with confirmed that USSS counter snipers do not need
permission to fire at a shooter. They also said that no
permission was requested or required during the July 13
rally.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 178-179 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\284\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 178 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\285\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 178 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 114 (Aug. 16,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the counter snipers on the Hercules 2 team told the
Committee that after hearing shots fired, he ``thought that
[his] partner was hit, due to the proximity of these whip-like
cracks[.]''\286\ The USSS Counter Sniper added that after the
shooting he told the Committee that he ``asked my partner how
close he thought the rounds were to our left, and he looked at
me and said, `I heard them on my right.' And the[re] were
approximately six feet between him and I when we were on the
rooftop at the main site.''\287\ The Committee cannot confirm
whether any bullets passed by any of the USSS counter snipers.
The Committee has not yet spoken to the other USSS Counter
Sniper on the Hercules 2 team about these statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 13 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\287\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 14-15 (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Intelligence Concerns
The July 13 rally was the first time USSS sent counter
snipers for a protectee other than the President, Vice
President, or a presidential candidate who had been formally
nominated by his or her party.\288\ According to the USSS
Assistant Director of OPO, prior to July 5, the then-Deputy
Assistant Director and the SAIC of the Special Operations
Division agreed that USSS headquarters would send USSS counter
snipers to all outdoor events for former President Trump going
forward.\289\ In his interview with the Committee, the USSS
Assistant Director of OPO said this decision was based on
several factors including the size and scale of the former
President's outdoor events, his being on the cusp of becoming
the nominee, and threat information, at least some of which is
classified.\290\ To date, the Committee has not been provided
any additional detail related to the USSS' decision in early
July to send counter snipers to outdoor events going forward,
aside from Assistant Director of OPO's testimony provided
during his transcribed interview. It appears that the addition
of the USSS counter snipers to the security detail at the rally
was a direct result of ``credible intelligence.''\291\ However,
only two of the USSS personnel the Committee has interviewed
were made aware that there was a credible threat related to
former President Trump prior to July 13, only one of whom was
made aware of the classified information underlying the
threat.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 19 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview
with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 74-75 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\289\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 44, 54-55, 81-82
(Sept. 13, 2024).
\290\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 31, 34, 62, 63, 67
(Sept. 13, 2024).
\291\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\292\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant
Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 67-68 (Sept. 13,
2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 44-45 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A USSS official was made aware that ``credible intelligence'' existed
of a threat, but still wrote in a security planning document that there
was ``no adverse intelligence'' concerning the visit to Butler, PA.
The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that on July
9, 2024, she received a call from the second supervisor of the
Trump detail, telling her that USSS counter snipers would be
assigned to the rally.\293\ The Lead Advance Agent told the
Committee that the second supervisor of the Trump detail
informed her that the reason USSS was assigning counter snipers
was because of ``credible intel'' that he could not discuss
further with her.\294\ The Lead Advance Agent told the
Committee that she instructed the second supervisor to call her
supervisor, the SAIC of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office, to
discuss the ``credible intel,'' and stated:\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\294\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\295\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).
Lead Advance Agent: He said that there was credible
intelligence that he could not speak about, and that we
were going to get Secret Service counter sniper advance
for that reason.
Question: And did he say why he couldn't speak about
it?
Lead Advance Agent: Because it was information that he
wasn't able to pass.
Question: Did he say it was classified?
Lead Advance Agent: He did not use the word
``classified'' on the phone, but from my general
knowledge when you say that you cannot pass something
on the phone, the understanding is that it's classified
and he can't speak about it on the phone.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 72-73 (Aug. 26, 2024).
When the Lead Advance Agent told the Pittsburgh SAIC that
USSS counter snipers were being assigned to the rally ``because
the second supervisor expressed that there was credible
intelligence,'' she said the SAIC did not have any awareness of
this information prior to their discussion.\297\ The Pittsburgh
SAIC, however, told the Committee that the Lead Advance Agent
did not relay this information to him.\298\ He said that he
first became aware that USSS counter snipers were coming to the
event through an e-mail requesting housing for them.\299\ In an
interview with the Committee, the Pittsburgh SAIC said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 166 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\298\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 86-87 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\299\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 84 (Aug. 30, 2024).
Question: Do you know why--so I guess stepping back,
was that the first time you had heard about even a
request for counter snipers?
Pittsburgh SAIC: I did not even know a request was
made.
Question: Okay. Do you know why they were sent?
Pittsburgh SAIC: I don't.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 85 (Aug. 30, 2024).
The SAIC said if he had been made aware of intelligence
regarding a potential threat, he would have requested more
specific information about the threat and might have pushed for
the event to be moved indoors if it was deemed too risky for an
outdoor venue.\301\ Additionally, the SAIC told the Committee
that he would have requested more assets if he had received
this information.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\301\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 103 (Aug. 30, 2024).
\302\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 103-105 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite learning on July 9 that based on ``credible
intelligence'' of a threat, USSS counter sniper assets would be
provided for the July 13 rally, the Lead Advance Agent wrote in
the intelligence section of the Preliminary survey document
that, ``[a]t this time, no adverse intelligence has been
developed concerning this visit. Any adverse intelligence that
may arise will be passed on to all working supervisors.''\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler Event, at 10 (on file with
Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 168 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Snapshot from Preliminary Survey, Intelligence Section\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler Event, at 10 (on file with
Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.014
In response to questions from the Committee regarding why
she specifically wrote that ``no adverse intelligence has been
developed concerning this visit'' despite the information
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided on July 9, the Lead Advance Agent said:
At the time I filled out this document my understanding
was that there was no adverse intelligence to pass on
to the group as a whole. This is not all-encompassing
as to intelligence, whether or not it can be passed. If
it's something classified, such as something that was
not passed to me to begin with, then that would not be
put in writing, as well. It would've been passed to
those that needed to know in this situation.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 168 (Aug. 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unclear who else involved in the planning for the
July 13 rally, besides the Lead Advance Agent, had knowledge of
the ``credible intelligence.'' The Pittsburgh SAIC told the
Committee that it would be his expectation that any credible
threat or intelligence would appear in the ``intelligence''
section in the Preliminary Survey.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 183 (Aug. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other USSS officials involved in the planning of the rally told the
Committee they had no knowledge of any threats and the FBI did not
respond to USSS' intelligence request.
The FBI has stated that Crooks ``was not known to the FBI
prior to'' the assassination attempt.\307\ The FBI also
communicated to the Committee, and publicly stated, that the
arrest on July 12, 2024, of Asif Merchant, ``a Pakistan
national with ties to Iran, [for] plotting to commit murder-
for-hire'' of U.S. government officials, was not connected to
the attempted assassination of former President Trump.\308\ The
Committee has requested additional documents and information
about this matter and has yet to receive a response.\309\ In
public updates on August 28, 2024 regarding its ongoing
investigation, FBI Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells
also stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Update on the FBI
Investigation of the Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald
Trump (Jul. 14, 2024) (https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/update-
on-the-fbi-investigation-of-the-attempted-assassination-of-former-
president-donald-trump).
\308\ Email communication from Federal Bureau of Investigation to
Committee staff (received Aug. 6, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\309\ Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand
Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Secretary Alejandro
Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and Director Christopher
Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (Aug. 14,
2024).
[T]he FBI has not identified a motive nor any co-
conspirators or associates of Crooks with advance
knowledge of the attack. And I want to be clear: we
have not seen any indication to suggest Crooks was
directed by a foreign entity to conduct the
attack.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Opening Statement to Media
on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt
Investigation (Aug. 28, 2024) (https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
opening-statement-to-media-on-updates-to-the-butler-pennsylvania-
assassination-attempt-investigation-08282024).
Additionally, the FBI Deputy Director testified on July 30,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024, to the Committee that there is:
[a]n integrated relationship between FBI and Secret
Service and every other federal, state, local agency
you can imagine. We have constructs like the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces and Violent Crime Task Forces
where we're cross embedded with each other. And when it
comes to this event and others like it, we're always
talking in advance. In fact, with respect to this
event, we did have a meeting between US Secret Service
and FBI in the days leading up to the event to
determine, assess whether there was any information or
intelligence pertaining to a threat against the rally
or to former President Trump or anyone else there.
There was an absence of that in the lead up
specifically. And again, none of us had any information
in our holdings with regard to the--to the ultimate
shooter.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of Federal
Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, the decision to send counter snipers to the
July 13 rally, which was based on credible intelligence of a
threat, potentially saved lives.\312\ The July 13 rally was the
first time USSS sent counter snipers for a protectee other than
the President, Vice President, or a presidential candidate who
had been formally nominated by his or her party.\313\ On July
9, the Lead USSS Agent received a phone call from a supervisor
in the Trump Detail who stated, ``there was credible
intelligence that he could not speak about, and that we were
going to get Secret Service counter sniper advance [for the
July 13 rally].''\314\ The Lead Advance Agent asked that this
information be relayed to the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field
Office, but it never was.\315\ USSS has not provided the
Committee with any information confirming that this information
was ever shared with any other USSS personnel responsible for
planning the July 13 rally, including the USSS Site Agent, USSS
Counter Assault Team, Site Counterpart, Intelligence Advance
Agent, Technical Security Division (TSD) Advance, or the C-UAS
Advance Agent, or any state or local law enforcement officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\313\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 19 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\314\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 71-73 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\315\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the
Pittsburgh Field Office, at 86-87 (Aug. 30, 2024); Transcribed
Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 169 (Aug. 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to questions regarding whether advance planning
leads would have expected to be made aware of any credible
intelligence or threats, USSS agents told the Committee that
information is something they ``absolutely'' should have been
aware of prior to the July 13 rally.\316\ The Site Agent told
the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ See, e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Agent, at 69, 71 (Aug. 23, 2024).
As a Site Agent or Lead [Advance] Agent assigned, you
should have any intelligence or any information
pertaining to an active threat to a particular
protectee, absolutely, in case that we need to take,
you know, take additional measures, or maybe plan for
additional assets or additional resources for that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
particular matter.
* * * *
So it shocked me, like just being out there. They're
planning to have a protectee with 15-, 20,000 people,
in an outdoor event, when there's an active threat for
the drone attack. That was definitely one thing that
obviously raised my concerns, and I know everyone's
concerns.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
69-71 (Aug. 23, 2024).
The Site Agent also clarified that the information about a
possible drone attack threat was relayed to her in 2023.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
68 (Aug. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS Intelligence Advance Agent also did not receive
information about a threat in advance of the July 13 rally. The
USSS Intelligence Advance Agent told the Committee he did not
know why counter snipers were being sent and he did not receive
any intelligence on threats related to the July 13 rally, nor
about the arrest of Mr. Merchant on July 12, the day before the
rally.\319\ On July 10, 2024, the Intelligence Advance Agent
sent a letter to FBI, requesting any intelligence related to
former President Trump and the July 13 rally in Butler,
PA.\320\ The FBI did not respond to this intelligence
request.\321\ A document from the USSS Protective Intelligence
& Assessment Division dated July 8 described ``Open Source
Findings for Candidate Donald Trump's Visit to Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania.''\322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence
Advance Agent, at 30-31, 158 (Aug. 29, 2024).
\320\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence
Advance Agent, at 18-19, 66-68 (Aug. 29, 2024); Email communication
from U.S. Secret Service to Committee staff (received Sept. 23, 2024)
(on file with Committee).
\321\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence
Advance Agent, at 18-19, 66-68 (Aug. 29, 2024).
\322\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service,
Protective Intelligence & Assessment Division, Open source findings for
Candidate Donald Trump's visit to Pittsburgh, PA (July 8, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to interviews the Committee conducted with the
USSS Intelligence Advance Agent for the Butler rally, having
received no intelligence from headquarters, the Intelligence
Advance Agent called the USSS Protective Intelligence Division,
asked if there were any updates, and was told there were
not.\323\ The Site Agent explained to the Committee,
``normally, we receive a bulletin with any information or any
advisory information in regards to a specific visit, but not
for this one [referring to the July 13 rally],'' noting ``it
came back with negative results, as no threats or no other
issues or concerns prior to the visit.''\324\ The Site Agent
Counterpart explained that she was never made aware there was
any type of threat to former President Trump in advance of the
rally.\325\ Without being briefed on any specific intelligence
threats, the Site Counterpart assumed USSS sent counter snipers
because of the size of the rally and venue.\326\ In notes taken
after the assassination attempt, the Site Counterpart wrote,
``why am I hearing that there were threats to the site on TV.
How can the SAIC of our [field office] not know about any
threats and why did they feel that only one part of [Special
Operations Divisions] was sufficient to cover it instead of the
entire package.''\327\ The USSS Site Counterpart explained that
by ``entire package'' she meant, not sending Counter Assault
Team liaisons, CSU, and other assets.\328\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence
Advance Agent, at 30 (Aug. 29, 2024).
\324\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at
63 (Aug. 23, 2024).
\325\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 51-52 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\326\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 150 (Aug. 21, 2024).
\327\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 51 (Aug. 21, 2024); Department of Homeland Security,
U.S. Secret Service, Site Counterpart Hand Written Notes, at USSS--
000791 (received Aug. 21, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\328\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site
Counterpart, at 115 (Aug. 21, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Excerpt of Site Agent Counterpart Notes Taken After the July 13
Rally\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Site
Counterpart Hand Written Notes, at USSS--000791 (received Aug. 21,
2024) (on file with Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.015
F. Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Failures
At 3:51 pm on July 13, 2024, Crooks flew a drone near the
site of the Butler rally for about 11 minutes.\330\ USSS Acting
Director Ronald Rowe testified at a Senate hearing that on July
13, the USSS counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) ``had
technical difficulties and did not go operational until after
5:00'' and that had it been working properly, ``[w]e could have
maybe stopped him [Crooks].''\331\ The Committee learned that
in addition to the C-UAS ``technical difficulties,'' requests
for additional C-UAS equipment and longer drone flight
restrictions were denied.\332\ Further, the USSS agent tasked
with C-UAS responsibilities at the rally had very little
experience with the equipment he was operating.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\331\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\332\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 34-38 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\333\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent at 11 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests for additional counter drone equipment and drone flight
restrictions were denied.
USSS TSD's Outdoor Site Survey of threats and
vulnerabilities flagged that the ``open farm area'' rally site
``is vulnerable to possible drone attacks with the limited
amount [of] C-UAS equipment on site'' as well as vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices, both of which are items the
shooter brought near the rally site undetected.\334\ The Site
Agent told the Committee that she was briefed on possible drone
attacks in June 2023, but did not receive any briefings prior
to the July 13 rally.\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, TSD
Outdoor Site Survey, USSS-- 000310-000316 (received Aug. 12, 2024) (on
file with Committee).
\335\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent,
at 67-73 (Aug. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS used C-UAS equipment intended to counter the
unauthorized use of drones the day of the rally.\336\ USSS has
several forms of drone mitigation equipment available.\337\ An
additional mitigation tool for protective events is a Temporary
Flight Restriction (TFR), issued by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), which bans all unauthorized aircrafts,
including drones, from operating in a certain area for a
limited period of time.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\336\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance,
at 49-52 (Aug. 13, 2024).
\337\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 25-26, 140 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\338\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 35-36 (Aug. 20, 2024). Federal Aviation Administration,
Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) (last accessed Sept. 22, 2024)
(https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting--started/temporary--flight--
restrictions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSS assigned the C-UAS Advance Agent to operate the C-UAS
unit the day of the Butler Farm Show rally.\339\ USSS also
assigned other equipment that can assist in mitigation
efforts.\340\ On July 10, during a phone call with the USSS
Lead Technician for the event as part of pre-planning for the
security of the rally, the C-UAS Advance Agent requested an
additional mitigation capability as well as a more advanced
mitigation system with a technician to operate it as a backup
to the C-UAS system.\341\ Both requests were denied.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
C-UAS Advance Agent (Aug. 20, 2024).
\340\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 25-26 (Aug. 20, 2024). The C-UAS Advance Agent stated that
the Trump detail has operated drones at other events for overwatch,
search warrants, etc., and the Pennsylvania State Police offered USSS
the use of drones on July 13 for similar purposes. The C-UAS Advance
Agent told the Committee that such use cases were beyond his job
description, and he did not want to second guess the security plan that
had been approved. See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service
C-UAS Advance Agent, at 99-100 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\341\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 34, 38 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\342\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 12, the day before the rally, the C-UAS Advance
Agent visited the Butler Farm Show to determine the best
location to place the C-UAS unit.\343\ He initially placed it a
few hundred yards from the stage.\344\ During this site visit,
the C-UAS Advance Agent spoke to another USSS agent in person
to request extending the time for the TFR for the event.\345\
Specifically, the C-UAS Advance Agent was concerned that former
President Trump sometimes operates outside of the expected
timeframe for his events, and a longer TFR would provide more
certainty that the TFR would cover the entire time former
President Trump was on the stage.\346\ The request for
extending the TFR was denied without explanation.\347\ FAA
approved the TFR at the Butler Farm Show rally site from 4:20
pm to 6:15 pm on July 13.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 15 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\344\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 15-16 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\345\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 95-97 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\346\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 35-36 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\347\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 35-36 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\348\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 23 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USSS official responsible for overseeing C-UAS at the July 13 rally
lacked experience and knowledge about the equipment.
In an interview with the Committee, the USSS C-UAS Advance
Agent said that, following a 10:00 am post-stander briefing at
the rally site on July 13, he tried to activate the C-UAS
equipment that can detect drones and immediately began having
issues with it.\349\ Because the equipment was located near
satellite trucks, he decided to change locations for the C-UAS
to avoid potential interference.\350\ However, even after he
moved the equipment to a different location and ``reconnected
everything,'' it was still inactive.\351\ The C-UAS Advance
Agent determined that the equipment was not active, and at
approximately 11:30 am, he began to call others within the USSS
asking for help.\352\ He contacted a member of his detail and
also spoke to the USSS official he believed was in charge of
the C-UAS program.\353\ In his interview with the Committee,
the C-UAS Advance Agent said this official gave him the number
for tech support at the company that produces the C-UAS
equipment.\354\ The C-UAS Advance Agent was unable to reach
someone immediately when he called the 888 tech support
hotline.\355\ He also undertook basic steps to troubleshoot the
problem, such as reconnecting wires and moving the location of
the equipment.\356\ When the C-UAS unit's Tech Support called
the C-UAS Advance Agent back, he worked with them for several
hours over several phone calls, where they took steps to fix
the problem such as restarting the system remotely and pushing
software updates to the system, to no avail.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 17, 37 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\350\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 117-118 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\351\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 19 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\352\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 18 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\353\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 20 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\354\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 20 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\355\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 121 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\356\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 16, 18 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\357\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 20 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after 4:00 pm, the C-UAS Advance Agent received a
call from the C-UAS unit's tech support, who told him that the
components of the system were not communicating with each
other.\358\ They recommended he replace an ethernet cable
between two components of the equipment.\359\ He did not see an
ethernet cable in the Security Room so he approached the audio-
visual personnel for the Trump campaign and used one of their
ethernet cables.\360\ Shortly afterwards, the system became
operational, and at 4:33 pm, he called the Second Supervisor
for the Trump Detail to let him know the system was
active.\361\ Once the system was operational, the only drones
the C-UAS Advance Agent detected were drones operated by local
police.\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 20-21 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\359\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024). The Committee notes that this recounting
of events contrasts with Acting Director Rowe's testimony before the
Committee that the inoperability of the C-UAS system came from cellular
connectivity issue. See Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony
of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\360\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024). The C-UAS Advance Agent noted that it is
not common to use equipment that is not USSS property, but given the
delay in troubleshooting the device, he stated ``I just wanted to get
the system up.''
\361\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\362\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 33, 42-43 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With no backup C-UAS system while the C-UAS unit was down,
USSS did not have any drone detection capabilities.\363\ When
the Committee asked the C-UAS Advance Agent if he had received
specialized training in the use of the C-UAS unit, which
consists of two boxes and four antenna nodes, he replied that
another USSS employee walked him through the C-UAS unit's
operation, stating his total training consisted of this hands-
on training and ``wasn't very long, less than an hour.''\364\
In describing the steps he took to troubleshoot the C-UAS unit
while he was waiting for tech support to return his call, the
C-UAS Advance Agent told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 27 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\364\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 115 (Aug. 20, 2024). In total, the C-UAS Advance Agent for
July 13 had approximately three months of experience working with that
equipment. See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS
Advance Agent, at 11 (Aug. 20, 2024).
I continued to troubleshoot it myself, just to the best
of my abilities, turning it on and off, reconnecting
stuff. At some time after 4 p.m., I get a call back
from Tech Support and says that another person from
[the C-UAS unit's] Tech Support had looked at it, had
looked at my system that was connected, and it looked
like two boxes--please don't ask me what these boxes
are; it's beyond me--but two boxes were not talking to
each other, and to try to change out an ethernet cable
between those two boxes, that connected the two of
them.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\365\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 20-21 (Aug. 20, 2024).
In setting up the security plan for the rally, the Lead
Advance Agent told the Committee that her role was to
coordinate the various entities involved and ``make sure that
they have the equipment and knowledge and personnel that they
need.''\366\ The C-UAS Advance Agent's unfamiliarly with C-UAS
equipment was evident in his testimony to the Committee. As
described above, he struggled to describe the functions of
certain pieces of technical equipment that were not working
properly.\367\ In another instance, the C-UAS Advance Agent
seemed unsure whether C-UAS connects to a cellular network:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance
Agent, at 15 (Aug. 26, 2024).
\367\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question: What is your understanding of how the C-UAS
system interacts with the mobile cell networks?
Answer: I don't know how it interacts with it. I
believe that it does. The technical aspect of how it
communicates to it I don't know.
Question: Okay. But is it your understanding that the
equipment has to be connected to a mobile network in
order for it to be functioning?
Answer: To like a--I think it needs cell signal,
cellular signal, to my knowledge. So if that's what you
mean by mobile network, yes.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent at 118-119 (Aug. 20, 2024).
The C-UAS Advance Agent also admitted that he did not
follow standard USSS protocol when he replaced the Ethernet
cable with another Ethernet cable he found with the Trump
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
campaign equipment.
Question: The cable that you replaced to connect the
systems again, was that cable Secret Service property?
Answer: No. It was a Trump campaign radio and video,
audio and video personnel.
Question: Is that standard protocol to use a cable that
isn't Secret Service property in this case?
Answer: No. I just wanted to get the system up.\369\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 156 (Aug. 20, 2024).
The C-UAS system was inoperable until 4:33 pm on July
13.\370\ It was during that time that Crooks flew his drone in
the vicinity of the Butler Farm Show at approximately 3:51 pm
for 11 minutes while streaming footage to his controller.\371\
Even though this was not within the window of the TFR, had the
C-UAS system been active and detected Mr. Crooks' drone, the C-
UAS Advance Agent stated he would have sent USSS personnel to
conduct a voluntary interview with Mr. Crooks to determine the
purpose of his flight.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024).
\371\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\372\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance
Agent, at 98 (Aug. 20, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acting Director Rowe testified before the joint HSGAC and
Judiciary Committee hearing on July 30, 2024, that the outage
of the C-UAS system had cost him ``a lot of sleep because of
the eventual outcome of the assailant.''\373\ Acting Director
Rowe testified that perhaps had the C-UAS system been
operational at 3:51 pm, USSS agents would have spoken with
Crooks and he could have decided not to go through with his
assassination attempt.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\373\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\374\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret
Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security
Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President
Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS AT THE JULY 13, 2024, RALLY
Known Actions of the Assailant Prior to the July 13 Rally.
At the Committee's July 30th hearing, FBI Deputy Director
Paul Abbate testified about what the Bureau had learned to date
as part of its investigation of the attempted assassination.
According to the FBI, Thomas Crooks registered for the Butler
rally on July 6, 2024, three days after it had been
announced.\375\ The next day, he visited the site for
``advanced planning and reconnaissance.''\376\ FBI said that on
July 8, Crooks searched ``AGR International.''\377\ On July 12,
the day before the rally, Crooks signed in at 2:45 pm to shoot
at the rifle range at the Clairton Sportsmen's Club.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\376\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\377\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent
in Charge's Remarks to Media on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania,
Assassination Attempt Investigation (August 28, 2024) (https://
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fbi-pittsburgh-special-agent-in-charge-s-
remarks-to-media-on-updates-to-the-butler-pennsyvlania-assassination-
attempt-investigation).
\378\ Clairton Sportsmen's Club, Range Off Hours Sign in Log, July
12, 2024 (received Aug. 2, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to PSP, on July 13, Crooks' cell phone data
showed he was at the Butler Farm Show grounds between 10:58 am
and 11:50 am.\379\ He returned with a weapon and
ammunition.\380\ At approximately 3:51 pm, he flew a drone
approximately 200 yards from the Farm Show grounds for about 11
minutes and was able to view the footage from the drone live on
his controller.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\ Pennsylvania State Police, Thomas Crooks Timeline, at PSP--
0054 (received Aug. 14, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\380\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\381\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service
Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the Security Failures
Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th
Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As detailed further below, at 5:32 pm, local law
enforcement observed Crooks using a rangefinder, a device used
to determine the distance of objects, frequently used at golf
courses and gun ranges.\382\ At 6:05 pm, he climbed to the roof
of the AGR building, where he remained for approximately 6
minutes, before firing eight shots at the former president at
6:11 pm.\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, FPOTUS After Action,
Beaver County ESU/SWAT, at 18 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with
Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening
Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\383\ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within hours of the assassination attempt, the FBI assumed
the lead role as the federal law enforcement agency
investigating the incident.\384\ The FBI identified the weapon
used by Crooks as an AR style rifle, and announced that his
phone as well as explosive devices found in his car had been
shipped to Quantico for forensic analysis.\385\ The FBI also
reported that Crooks' social media history going back to 2019
espoused political violence.\386\ Crooks also prepared for July
13, searching online for details on how to build an explosive
and researching how the rally would be set up.\387\ As of the
publication of this interim report, the FBI's investigation is
ongoing.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\ FBI National Press Office: FBI Statement on Incident in
Butler, Pennsylvania (July 14, 2024).
\385\ Assistant Director Cath Milhoan, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Attorney General Merrick Garland, Department of Justice,
Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Deputy
Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Agent in
Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Executive
Assistant Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Remarks as Prepared for the Media (July 14, 2024).
\386\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\387\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigative Updates on the
Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt (July 29, 2024) (https://
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-
pennsylvania-assassination-attempt); Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination
Attempt (July 29, 2024) (https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
investigative-updates-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-
attempt).
\388\ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the Butler rally, Crooks had researched multiple
political targets including President Biden, former President
Trump, the DNC Convention, and the RNC Convention.\389\ On July
6, the same day Crooks registered for the Butler rally, he
searched online with the following entry: ``how far away was
Oswald from Kennedy.''\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).
\390\ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is a detailed timeline of events between the
first confirmed sighting of Crooks by law enforcement and when
Crooks was killed.
Identification and Search for the Suspicious Individual on July 13,
2024.
4:26 pm
An AGR Sniper from Beaver County who had been positioned
inside the AGR building earlier that day exited the building at
the end of his shift and noticed a suspicious person sitting
near the AGR building.\391\ The sniper texted the other two
local snipers remaining in the AGR building: ``Someone followed
our lead and snuck in and parked by our cars just so you know.
I'm just letting you know because you see me go out with my
rifle and put it in my car so he knows you guys are up there
he's sitting to the direct right on a picnic table about 50
yards from the exit.''\392\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024); Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, Text Messages between AGR
Snipers (IMG--0549), at 49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\392\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024;
Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, Text Messages between AGR
Snipers (IMG--0549), at 49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FBI initially testified that ``The first reported sighting
of the shooter by local law enforcement was at approximately
4:26 p.m.''\393\ However, FBI later stated that while witness
interviews indicated that Crooks was in the AGR area at 4:26
pm, ``Subsequent digital evidence review shows the subject was
in fact near the farm show air strip, walking past a row of
vendors outside the secure perimeter approximately a half mile
away from the AGR grounds at 4:26 p.m.''\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\394\ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).
5:10 pm
AGR Sniper 1 (Beaver County) posted in a window inside the
AGR building observed an individual outside walk by the window,
who the sniper later determined was Crooks.\395\ This was the
first confirmed sighting of Crooks by law enforcement, 1 hour
and 1 minute before the shooting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ The local Beaver County sniper referred to here, who was
stationed on the second floor of the AGR building on July 13, is
identified by the Committee as AGR Sniper 1. See Beaver County
Emergency Services Unit, Text Messages Between AGR Snipers (IMG--0534
and IMG--0535), Slideshow, at 47-49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file
with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
5:14 pm
AGR Sniper 1 (Beaver County) took a photograph of Crooks
using his cell phone.\396\ That sniper later told the Committee
that he was not sure at the time why he took the photograph,
but that something seemed off about the individual.\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ Beaver County ESU, Text Messages Between AGR Snipers (IMG--
0534 and IMG--0535), Slideshow, at 47-49 (received July 29, 2024) (on
file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony
Submitted for the Record of Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\397\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
5:32 pm
AGR Sniper 1 (Beaver County) observed Crooks ``looking at
[his] phone, news feeds, and rangefinder confirmed through
monoculars.''\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, FPOTUS After Action,
Beaver County ESU/SWAT, at 18 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with
Committee); see Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5:38 pm
AGR Sniper 1 texted all local snipers (AGR Building and
Grandstands): ``Kid learning [sic] around building we are in.
AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking
toward stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out.
I lost sight of him. Also a bike with backpack sitting next to
it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.'' The text
included two photographs of Crooks.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, FPOTUS After Action,
Beaver County ESU/SWAT, at 47-48 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with
Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Text Message from AGR Sniper 1 to All Local Snipers\400\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\ Beaver County ESU, FPOTUS After Action, Beaver County ESU/
SWAT, at 47-48 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7824.016
Shortly after 5:38 pm
An AGR Sniper went downstairs to the exit of the AGR
building in attempt to keep track of Crooks.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
5:42 pm
AGR Sniper 1 radioed on the local ESU channel, ``Just an
FYI, we had a younger white male long hair lurking around the
AGR building. He was viewed with a rangefinder sighting the
stage. He was up against the building; believe he was looking
up at us and he walked around the side of the building. We lost
sight of him. Also there's a bike with a large backpack sitting
beside it, it's parked in the rear of the building that wasn't
there earlier.''\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
5:43 pm
The Butler ESU Commander responded to the 5:42 radio call,
``Copy. We will send somebody to check it.''\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
5:44 pm
The Butler ESU Commander called a PSP Sergeant, stationed
in the USSS Security Room, who was his primary point-of-contact
and liaison to USSS. In a subsequent interview, the PSP
Sergeant stated he received information about a suspicious
person near the AGR building, specifically, ``a young white
male, long hair, with a rangefinder, like, had been seen by the
counter snipers. . . . And then he also said a bike and a
backpack had appeared that they weren't sure was related, but
wasn't there, obviously, at the start of the rally.''\404\ This
was the first confirmed communication to USSS about Crooks,
approximately 27 minutes before the shooting.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\405\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around that same time, the PSP Sergeant called a PSP
Trooper (who was assigned as the intelligence officer working
with the USSS Protective Intelligence agent) and a PSP Corporal
(who was assigned as a site roving supervisor) and informed
them about the suspicious person and was told they would start
to look for him.\406\ Also at 5:44 pm, the Butler ESU Commander
told a Butler County Sheriff's Deputy about the suspicious
person.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024, at 9 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\407\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log Timeline
with C1 Phone Calls (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
5:45 pm
The Butler ESU Commander radioed on the local ESU channel,
``PSP and Sheriffs should be en route. If you [get] a visual
let me know.''\408\ The Butler County Sheriff's Deputy then
radioed on the Sheriff's Office radio channel, ``[b]e on the
lookout for a white male, young white male, blonde hair with a
backpack, might be on the AGR side fence line.''\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\409\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for
Sheriff's Channel (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also at 5:45 pm, the Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead
texted the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader in the Hercules 1
position on top of the southern barn behind the stage: ``At
AGR...Sending a uniformed office[r] to check him out. Kid
learning [sic] around building we are in. AGR I believe it is.
I did see him with a rangefinder looking toward stage. FYI. If
you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him.
Also a bike with backpack sitting next to it in rear of
building that was not seen earlier.''\410\ The text included
the same two photographs of Crooks.\411\ The USSS Counter
Sniper Team Leader responded, ``Roger. I'll notify teams on AGR
side.''\412\ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader later told the
Committee that he meant he would notify the two USSS counter
snipers in the Hercules 2 position on top of the northern barn
behind the stage.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), Text Message
from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader,
Hercules 1 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee);
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text Message from
Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader,
Hercules 1, USSS--1411-1415 (received Aug. 27, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\411\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), Text Message
from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader,
Hercules 1 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee);
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text Message from
Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader,
Hercules 1, USSS--1411-1415 (received Aug. 27, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\412\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), Text Message
from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader,
Hercules 1 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee);
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text Message from
Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader,
Hercules 1, USSS--1411-1415 (received Aug. 27, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\413\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 128 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This was the first communication to the USSS counter
snipers about Crooks, approximately 26 minutes before the
shooting. The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the
Committee that immediately after receiving the text, a USSS
Protective Intelligence agent called him and told him she was
looking into the suspicious person report.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 116 (Aug. 28, 2024).
5:47 pm
The PSP Trooper who had been told about the suspicious
person around 5:44 pm then called two undercover PSP Troopers
stationed at the Sheetz gas station and gave them a description
of the suspicious person and told them to go to the AGR
building to look for him.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Trooper on
July 23, 2024, at 11 (received August 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
Approx. 5:48 pm
The Butler ESU Commander texted the PSP Sergeant stationed
in the USSS Security Room, and again provided a description of
the suspicious individual and attached the photographs of
Crooks.\416\ The PSP Sergeant shared this information with the
USSS C-UAS Advance Agent who was co-located with him in the
USSS Security Room.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\417\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
5:52 pm
After receiving the photographs of Crooks from the PSP
Sergeant, the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent sent the photographs to
the USSS Counter Sniper Response Team agent.\418\ At that same
time, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader who had received the
description and photographs of Crooks at 5:45 then sent a ``be
on the lookout'' or ``BOLO'' email to all three other USSS
counter snipers positioned on the two barn roofs behind the
stage. The BOLO included a description of Crooks and the
photographs, and stated: ``From local police near the AGR Glass
Building. If spotted please notify [USSS Protective
Intelligence] at [redacted] or go direct with [USSS Security
Room]. `Kid learning [sic] around building we are in. AGR I
believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards
stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost
sight of him. Also a bike with backpack sitting next to it in
rear of building that was not seen earlier.' ''\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Text
Messages from C-UAS Advance Agent to Counter Sniper Response Team
Agent, at USSS--1919, USSS--1922 (received Aug. 30, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\419\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Email
between USSS counter snipers, July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm, at USSS--
001417-001419 (on file with Committee).
5:54--5:55 pm
The Butler ESU Commander sent a radio transmission on the
local officers' radio channel (including Butler Township PD)
with a description of Crooks and noted that he ``was near the
AGR building on foot, with believed to be a rangefinder, headed
towards the stage. Our [local sniper] units lost visual of him.
I believe you guys are outside of that fence if you come upon
him.'' At 5:55 a local officer replied, ``Copy there is a PSP
unit by the water tower, and I sent [a local officer] over
there and he didn't [?] see him.''\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
Approx. 6:00 pm
Former President Trump took the stage at the rally.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
6:02 pm
The Beaver County ESU sniper who took the photograph of
Crooks radioed on the local ESU channel, ``Alright subject is
in between the AGR buildings. He's got a backpack now. He just
went towards Sheetz.''\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County
Emergency Services Department, Audio File for PD Ops 4 (received Aug.
19, 2024) (on file with Committee).
Approx. 6:03--6:04 pm
The Butler ESU Commander relayed this information via phone
call to the PSP Sergeant.\423\ In a subsequent interview, the
PSP Sergeant stated that he was unable to radio the PSP Trooper
at Post 5 so he called the PSP Trooper, relayed the
information, and told him, ``[t]hat guy's back. He's walking
between buildings. He's headed towards the Sheetz.''\424\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\424\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
6:04 pm
The PSP Trooper (who had previously directed the two
undercover Troopers to look for the suspicious person at 5:47
pm) then sent the two undercover Troopers the photograph of
Crooks.\425\ The Butler County Sheriff's Deputy then radioed on
the Sheriff's Office radio channel that the suspicious person
``is headed towards Sheetz.''\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Trooper on
July 23, 2024 (received August 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\426\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for
Sheriff's Channel (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
6:05--6:08 pm
According to FBI, at approximately 6:05 pm, Crooks climbed
up an air conditioning unit onto a roof on the north end of the
AGR complex.\427\ He then moved southward across the connected
AGR buildings' roofs with the backpack.\428\ FBI later stated
that ``video obtained from a local business showed the subject
climbed to the roof of the AGR complex at approximately 6:05
p.m. Video from local business, police dash cam, and police
body cameras confirmed the subject's movement across multiple
AGR building roofs between 6:05 p.m. and 6:08 p.m. [...] Our
overall assessment is the subject was only on the roof for
approximately 6-minutes prior to the shooting between 6:05 p.m.
and 6:11 p.m.''\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\ Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Email
from Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Committee (Aug. 28, 2024)
(on file with Committee); Press Conference with Assistant Director
Cathy Milhoan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive Assistant
Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Special
Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek (Aug. 28, 2024).
\428\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\429\ See Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Email from Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Committee (Aug. 28,
2024) (on file with Committee); Press Conference with Assistant
Director Cathy Milhoan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive
Assistant Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek (Aug. 28, 2024). A video taken by
James Copenhaver (who would later sustain gunshot wounds at the rally)
appears to show Crooks moving across the roof of the AGR building.
Audrey Conklin, Video from Trump assassination attempt victim's POV
shows figure moving on roof moments before gunfire, Fox News (July 31,
2024) (https://www.foxnews.com/us/video-from-trump-assassination-
attempt-victims-pov-shows-figure-moving-roof-moments-before-gunfire);
Alex Oliveira, Chilling new video shows Thomas Crooks moving across
roof before Trump assassination attempt, N.Y. Post (July 31, 2024)
(https://nypost.com/2024/07/31/us-news/chilling-new-video-shows-thomas-
crooks-moving-across-roof-before-trump-assassination-attempt/).
Approx. 6:06--6:10 pm
The Beaver County ESU sniper positioned in the AGR building
who took the photograph of Crooks went downstairs to the AGR
exit to meet the law enforcement officers responding to the
suspicious person ``to let them know suspect is around building
on side of fairgrounds. One marked vehicle and one unmarked
vehicle pull[ed] in together.''\430\ PSP testimony later
confirmed that a Butler Township PD car and a PSP car came into
the parking lot on the east side of AGR, and officers were seen
surrounding the building.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, FPOTUS After Action
Beaver County ESU/SWAT, Timeline at 6 (received July 29, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\431\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant on
July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around the same time, a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules
2 position (on top of the northern barn behind the stage) ``saw
two white vehicles pull into the AGR parking lot'' and saw a
police officer emerge from one of the vehicles and begin
``moving urgently.''\432\ The USSS counter sniper then radioed
on a USSS channel, ``locals are working something at the three
o'clock, approximately 200 yards out,'' which indicated the
area of the AGR building.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 12-13 (Aug. 16, 2024).
\433\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper, at 13 (Aug. 16, 2024).
6:08:32 pm
A Butler Township PD officer radioed on the local officers'
radio channel, ``[s]omeone's on the roof. [...] I have someone
on the roof with white shorts.''\434\ The Butler ESU Commander
replied on the radio and confirmed the individual on the roof
was not local law enforcement.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County
Emergency Services Department, Audio File for PD Ops 3 (received Aug.
19, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the
Committee (July 26, 2024); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening
Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\435\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee). Butler County ESU
Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
6:09 pm
The same Butler Township PD officer then radioed, ``[w]e
got him, we don't have him in custody yet, but he's right
straight in front of me by the pine tree standing upwards. He
has a backpack.''\436\ That officer then radioed that they
``Lost sight of him. [PSP] Trooper was chasing him, trying to
follow him around the building.''\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County
Emergency Services Department, Audio File for PD Ops 3 (received Aug.
19, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the
Committee (July 26, 2024); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening
Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\437\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Butler ESU Commander called the PSP Sergeant to notify
him that the suspicious person they had been looking for was on
the AGR roof.\438\ The PSP Sergeant later stated that he then
relayed that information to USSS.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
\439\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and
Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with
Committee).
6:10 pm
Between 6:10:08 and 6:10:17, body camera footage from
Butler Township Police show USSS counter snipers positioned on
the roof of the southern barn behind the stage reposition
themselves to face toward the direction of the AGR
building.\440\ Around the same time, a Butler County Sheriff's
Deputy radioed on the Sheriff's Office radio channel, ``State
Police and [Butler Township PD] units have AGR surrounded. They
are looking for him.''\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ Butler Township, Body Camera Footage from July 13, 2024 at
6:10:08 pm--6:10:17 pm (on file with Committee).
\441\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for
Sheriff's Channel (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
6:11:03--6:11:25 pm
At approximately 6:11 pm, a Butler Township PD officer was
lifted up to the roof by another officer, and he stated that he
saw Crooks approximately 5 to 6 feet away with ``his gun
pointed directly at me.''\442\ The officer further stated, ``I
thought I was fucked because all he had to do was pull the
trigger. [...] So, my hands came off and I went back down onto
the concrete.''\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township
Police Detective on July 16, 2024, at 14-16 (received Sept. 4, 2024)
(on file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony
Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy
Director Paul Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to
the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July
30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\443\ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township
Police Detective on July 16, 2024, at 14-16 (received Sept. 4, 2024)
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 6:11:03 pm, that officer then radioed on the local
officers' radio channel, ``[h]e's armed! I saw him, he's laying
down! [...] He's got a long gun!''\444\ A Sheriff's Deputy
confirmed the individual is armed and relayed on the Sheriff's
radio channel that other law enforcement had indicated he ``has
a long gun.''\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\445\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio
Log for PD Ops 3 (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee);
Butler County Emergency Services Department, Audio File for PD Ops 3
(received Aug. 19, 2024) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around this time, according to USSS Acting Director Rowe's
testimony before the Committee, ``[a] member of former
President Trump's [USSS] protective detail contacted their
Pittsburgh Field Office counterpart to inquire about the radio
update that there was an issue local law enforcement was
looking into near the perimeter.''\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul
Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the
Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30,
2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uniformed officers were seen running with their hands on
their weapons, and rally attendees were seen running away from
the AGR building.\447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1 (Aug. 28, 2024); Beaver County ESU Briefing
with the Committee (July 26, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6:11:25--6:11:40 pm
At approximately 6:11:25, Crooks fired an initial volley of
three shots, one of which struck former President Trump in the
ear.\448\ At 6:11:33, a local law enforcement officer reported
over the radio that shots had been fired from the AGR building
roof.\449\ The USSS Acting Director testified before the
Committee that ``[w]ithin three seconds, the former President's
detail rushed the stage and covered former President Trump,
shielding him with their bodies.''\450\ Crooks fired an
additional five shots over the next several seconds, for a
total of eight shots.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\ Butler ESU, Butler Township PD, and the Butler County
Sheriff's Office all radioed alerts about shots being fired between
6:11:25 and 6:11:34 (Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log
for PD Ops 3 (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler
County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4 (received July
27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services
Unit, Radio Log for Sheriff's Channel (received July 27, 2024) (on file
with Committee)); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony
Submitted for the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald
Rowe, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigative Updates on the
Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt (July 29, 2024) (https://
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-
pennsylvania-assassination-attempt).
\449\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\450\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX).
\451\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of
U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX);
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Email from
Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Committee (Aug. 28, 2024) (on
file with Committee); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks to Media
on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt (Aug. 28, 2024)
(https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/remarks-to-media-on-the-butler-
pennsylvania-assassination-attempt-08282024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local Law Enforcement Fired at Crooks.
In a briefing with Butler County ESU, the Committee learned
that after Crooks fired, a Butler ESU officer between the
stands and the AGR building looked in the direction of the
shots that had been fired, and saw Crooks' head and part of his
shoulders.\452\ That Butler ESU officer relayed to the
Committee that as he shouldered his weapon, he saw Crooks fire
his eighth round and ``saw the gas come from the muzzle, I
heard the snap, and then immediately I returned fire'' and shot
at Crooks.\453\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\453\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other law enforcement officers who were in the vicinity
also confirmed that they saw or heard an officer fire from the
area where the Butler ESU officer stated he fired from,
including a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position on
top of the northern barn behind the stage, a USSS counter
assault officer, and a PSP Trooper who stated that he ``saw
[the Butler ESU officer] fire a round and I remember asking if
he shot him or shot at him. He said yes.''\454\ The Committee
has requested a copy of the autopsy report.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2
Counter Sniper (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret
Service Counter Assault Team Advance (Aug. 16, 2024); Pennsylvania
State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Trooper on July 22, 2024 (received
Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\455\ Email communication from Committee staff to Solicitor for the
County of Butler, Butler County Commissioners' Office (Sept. 18, 2024)
(on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI reported, ``we have no forensic evidence indicating
that [ ] [the round fired by the local officer] either struck
our subject or the subject's rifle.''\456\ The Butler ESU
officer who told the Committee that he fired a round said that
Crooks ``did not get another shot off after I engaged.''\457\
The Butler ESU officer said that he believed that he shot
Crooks in the right shoulder or right side of his neck.\458\
After the officer shot at Crooks, the Butler ESU officer told
the Committee,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\ Press Conference with Assistant Director Cathy Milhoan,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive Assistant Director Robert
Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Special Agent in Charge
Kevin Rojek (Aug. 28, 2024).
\457\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
\458\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
[Crooks] went down and slowly came back up. As he was
coming back up, I was ready to press the second one,
and that's when [USSS counter sniper] Hercules took him
out. [...] He went down. He wasn't, like, getting down
like a reaction--he slowly slumped over, my left, his
right--and then slowly came back up and then got taken
out [by the USSS counter sniper].\459\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26,
2024).
According to the USSS Counter Sniper Advance Agent, after
Crooks fired and the Butler ESU officer fired back, a USSS
counter sniper in the Hercules 1 position on top of the
southern barn behind the stage said to his partner ``I got
him,'' meaning he had Crooks in his sights as he pointed his
weapon toward Crooks.\460\ At approximately 6:11:40, that USSS
counter sniper fired a single shot that killed Crooks.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1 (Aug. 28, 2024).
\461\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for
the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe,
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination
Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg.
118-XX); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper
Team Leader, Hercules 1 (Aug. 28, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 6:12 pm, a Butler ESU sniper in the AGR building radioed
on the local ESU channel, ``Shooter is down, [local sniper call
sign,] shooter is down.''\462\ Several seconds after that, a
Butler County Sheriff's Deputy radioed on the Sheriff's Office
radio channel, ``[s]hooter is down, shooter is down.''\463\ A
USSS counterassault agent also told the Committee that he heard
a USSS agent on former President Trump's protective detail say
``[t]he shooter's down.''\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4
(received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\463\ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for
Sheriff's Channel (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).
\464\ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter
Assault Team Advance (Aug. 16, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * *
USSS agents from former President Trump's protective detail
then evacuated the former President. A medic from Beaver County
ESU pronounced Crooks dead at 6:25 pm.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\465\ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, FPOTUS After Action,
Beaver County ESU/SWAT, Timeline at 6 (received July 29, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. FEDERAL AGENCIES' LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMITTEE'S BIPARTISAN
INQUIRY
Federal departments and agencies including DOJ and DHS have
failed to provide complete responses to the Committee.
DHS and USSS Incomplete Response to the Committee's Requests
DHS and the USSS continue to provide heavily redacted or
incomplete documents and productions in response to the
Committee's bipartisan inquiry. On July 24 and 25, 2024, the
Committee requested information on planning, resources,
intelligence, and related communications for each, as well as
transcribed interviews with 13 USSS individuals and teams
connected to the Butler rally.\466\ To date, the USSS has
produced approximately 2,800 pages of documents to the
Committee. Despite not obtaining all records related to these
individuals the Committee believes it was necessary to move
forward and interview these individuals close in time to the
assassination attempt. The Committee has conducted 12
transcribed interviews with USSS personnel who were involved
with the Butler rally. These interviews were with the following
individuals:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\466\ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letters to Ronald L. Rowe,
Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service. (July 24 and 25, 2024).
LThe USSS Lead Technical Security Division Advance
Lead;
LThe USSS Counter Assault Team Advance Lead;
LThe USSS Counter Assault Team Operator;
LThe USSS Officer Technician serving as a Hercules
2 Counter Sniper;
LThe USSS Counter Unmanned Aerial System Advance
Lead (from the Donald Trump Protective Division);
LThe USSS Senior Special Agent serving as the Site
Counterpart for the July 13 Butler rally (from the Pittsburgh
Field Office);
LThe USSS Special Agent serving as the Site Agent
for the July 13 Butler rally (from the Donald Trump Protective
Division);
LThe USSS Senior Special Agent serving as the Lead
Advance Agent for the July 13 Butler rally;
LThe USSS Officer Technician serving as the Team
Leader for the USSS Counter Sniper Team at the July 13 Butler
rally;
LThe USSS Special Agent serving as the
Intelligence Advance Agent for the July 13 Butler rally;
LThe USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office; and
LThe USSS Assistant Director of the Office of
Protective Operations.
The Committee will continue its review and ensure all
necessary personnel are made available for interviews. The
Committee is releasing with this interim report the transcripts
of interviews conducted to date, with redactions, where
appropriate, to protect individual privacy and law enforcement
sensitive information.
On September 11, 2024, the Committee sent a letter to the
USSS Acting Director raising concerns about the timing of
document production and the number of redactions applied to the
records.\467\ A response received from the Assistant Secretary
for Legislation for DHS the same day did not adequately address
the Committee's concerns.\468\ The Committee will continue to
pursue full and complete responses to its requests, and all
records necessary to complete its investigation.
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\467\ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letters to Ronald L. Rowe,
Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service. (Sept. 11, 2024).
\468\ Letter from Zephranie Buetow, Assistant Sec. for Leg.
Affairs, Department of Homeland Security to Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. (Sept. 11, 2024).
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FBI's Responsiveness to the Committee's Requests
On July 24, 2024, the Committee sent a request to FBI
Director Wray seeking records and information connected to the
July 13 assassination attempt.\469\ To date, the FBI has
produced 27 pages of documents.
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\469\ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letter to Christopher A.
Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (July 24, 2024).
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At the July 30, 2024 hearing, and in follow up after the
hearing, Ranking Member Johnson requested all 302s for all USSS
personnel interviewed by the FBI in connection with the July
13, 2024 assassination attempt and the Butler rally.\470\
Deputy Director Abbate testified, ``Senator, I'll take that
back and we'll get those to you as soon as possible.''\471\ The
SAIC of the FBI Pittsburgh Field Office has stated publicly
that, as of August 28, 2024, the FBI has conducted ``nearly
1,000 interviews.''\472\ On September 20, 2024, the FBI
notified the Committee that it will begin to make 302s
available for the Committee to review in camera on a rolling
basis with the first set consisting of 15 interview records
(approximately 64 pages of classified and unclassified
documents).\473\ The Committee will continue to seek all 302s
and related information from the FBI.
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\470\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Email
from Committee staff to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 2, 2024
(on file with Committee). ``302s'' or ``FD-302s'' are the FBI' official
interview summaries.
\471\ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examination of the
Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former
President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).
\472\ Statement by Kevin Rojek, Special Agent in Charge, FBI
Pittsburgh Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 28,
2024, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fbi-pittsburgh-special-agent-
in-charge-s-remarks-to-media-on-updates-to-the-butler-pennsyvlania-
assassination-attempt-investigation.
\473\ Letter from Assistant Director Patrick N. Findlay, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, to Chairman Gary Peters
and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking
Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
(Sept. 13, 2024).
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ATF's Responsiveness to the Committee's Requests
On July 25, 2024, the Committee sent a request to ATF
Director Dettelbach seeking to interview an ATF Agent who was
reported to be present at the July 13 rally.\474\ To date, the
Committee has received an informal briefing regarding the
agent's presence at the rally, but continues to seek a
transcribed interview.
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\474\ Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand
Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Steven Dettelbach,
Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (July 25,
2024).
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Outstanding Requests Regarding the July 13, 2024 Rally and
Assassination Attempt
The Committee's investigation into the events surrounding
the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on former President
Trump remains ongoing. The following represent additional and
outstanding lines of inquiry that the Committee plans to pursue
as a part of its ongoing investigation:
1. Information related to federal law enforcement agencies'
preparations for and participation in the July 13 rally,
including but not limited to:
La. Information regarding USSS' decision not to
participate in the July 13, 2024, 9:00 am briefing for local
SWAT and sniper units;
Lb. The time at which USSS first arrived at the AGR
building on July 13, 2024, and total number of USSS personnel
present; and
Lc. The total number of FBI personnel involved in the
security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including
the total number on-site during the rally.
2. Information related to coordination between federal,
state, and local law enforcement in preparation for the rally,
including but not limited to:
La. Information regarding the creation and implementation
of the security plan presented at the July 13, 2024 briefing
between Butler ESU and USSS; and
Lb. All official or unofficial unredacted electronic
communications, including but not limited to text messages,
between and among USSS, FBI, and other state or local law
enforcement agents from July 11, 2024, to July 14, 2024,
referring or relating to the July 13, 2024 rally.
3. Information related to Thomas Crooks and the FBI's
investigation into the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt,
including but not limited to:
La. All FD-302 FBI interview reports;
Lb. All security footage from the Clairton Sportsmen's
Club in possession of the FBI;
Lc. Information regarding all encrypted messaging
applications used by Crooks, including when he used them, who
he communicated with, and the content of his communications;
Ld. Information regarding all social media platforms used
by Crooks, including when he used them, who he communicated
with, and the content of any posts or communications; and
Le. Copies of Crooks' other online activity, including,
search history, any communications, online posts, handwritten
notes, or other statements by Crooks related to mass shooting
or assassination events, including but not limited to the
possible assassination of former President Trump.
4. Information related to the investigation of the crime
scene on or after July 13, 2024, including but not limited to:
La. Protocols for responding to and documenting a crime
scene involving an assassination attempt;
Lb. Information related to any ATF facial recognition
searches of Crooks' body;
Lc. Information related to the discovery, location, and
subsequent search of Crooks' car identified after the July 13
assassination attempt, including but not limited to information
about the length of time the car was present prior to the
rally;
Ld. Crooks' autopsy and toxicology report;
Le. Time sequence and trajectory analysis of all rounds
fired at the July 13 rally;
Lf. Crime scene photos from the AGR building roof and
other points at the Butler rally site;
Lg. The weapons, including firearms or explosives devices,
bullets recovered, all firearm tracing requests connected to
the assassination attempt, and all ATF Form 4473 associated
with the gunman's weapon(s); and
Lh. Information from subject matter experts regarding the
handling of crime scenes, including crime scene expert analysis
of the processing of the crime scene at the Butler grounds and
AGR building.
5. Information related to intelligence regarding threats to
presidential candidates and other high-ranking officials,
including former President Trump, in advance of or during the
July 13, 2024 rally.
6. Information related to requests from former President
Trump's campaign, his protective detail, or anyone else within
USSS for additional protective resources.
7. Information regarding the incident involving USSS that
occurred on September 15, 2024 in West Palm Beach, FL,
including information related to threats to former President
Trump between July 13, 2024 to September 15, 2024, and
information related to the suspect who was arrested and
subsequently charged.
8. Additional transcribed interviews of federal, state, and
local personnel, including without limitation, USSS, DHS, FBI,
and ATF officials with knowledge of the planning and securing
of the Butler rally.
APPENDIX I
To date, the Committee has sent the below correspondence as
part of its ongoing investigation. These letters are included
as attachments.
1. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul,
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Department of Homeland
Security, and Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024)
2. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 24, 2024)
3. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice (July 24, 2024)
4. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Undersecretary Kenneth Wainstein, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
(July 24, 2024)
5. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to District Attorney Nathan Bible, Beaver
County District Attorney's Office (July 24, 2024)
6. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to District Attorney Richard Goldinger, Butler
County District Attorney's Office (July 24, 2024)
7. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Sheriff Michael Slupe, Butler County
Sheriff's Office (July 24, 2024)
8. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Acting Chief of Police Lt. Matthew Pearson,
Butler Township Police Department (July 24, 2024)
9. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Commissioner Colonel Christopher Paris,
Pennsylvania State Police (July 24, 2024)
10. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 25, 2024)
11. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul,
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to President
Bill Sellitto, Clairton Sportsmen's Club (July 25, 2024)
12. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul,
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Director
Steven M. Dettelbach, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (July 25, 2024)
13. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul,
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Secretary
Alejandro Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and
Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice (August 14, 2024)
14. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul,
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to
Commissioner Colonel Christopher Paris, Pennsylvania State
Police (Aug. 21, 2024)
15. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member
Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret
Service, Department of Homeland Security (September 11, 2024)
A P P E N D I X
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