[Senate Prints 118-15]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress    }                                     {     S. Prt.  
 1st Session      }          COMMITTEE PRINT            {     118-15        
                                      

______________________________________________________________________


 
                          STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT:

                      THE IMPERATIVE OF RESOURCING

                       THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

                               __________

                        A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

                      PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                           February 16, 2023

                                     
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      Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
      
      
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                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-148 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023  



                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

            ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman          
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

Executive Summary................................................     1

Key Recommendations..............................................     1


Background.......................................................     4


Realizing the Indo-Pacific Strategy..............................     6


    Adequately Resource the Indo-Pacific Strategy................     6

    Advance U.S. Leadership on Trade and Economic Integration....    10

    Promote Democracy and Human Rights...........................    13

    Bolster Deterrence through Security and Non-Security Efforts.    14

    Invest in Public Diplomacy Efforts and Expand People-to-
      People Ties................................................    18

    Deepen Engagements with Allies and Partners..................    20


Conclusion.......................................................    24


Figures and Tables...............................................    25



                             (iii)        


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

    In 2014, I released a Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Majority staff report titled ``Rebalancing the Rebalance: 
Resourcing U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,'' which examined the Obama administration's progress in 
reorienting the United States' national security strategy 
towards the Asia-Pacific. In that report, I argued that the 
rebalance was the right decision for the United States and our 
national security interests, but in order to be successful, the 
Administration must be willing to expend political capital to 
ensure that the strategy is fully and adequately resourced.
    Nine years, two administrations, and numerous strategies 
later, the recommendations made in this report are regrettably 
very similar.
    The U.S. government needs to approach the Indo-Pacific 
region with a well-resourced, whole-of-government approach that 
synchronizes the military-security elements with diplomatic, 
economic, and civil society elements so that all move in 
concert with one another to ensure the greatest chance of 
success.
    I believe that President Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy, 
released one year ago, adopts this whole-of-government 
approach. If fully equipped with the tools that it needs to be 
successful, this strategy will underpin the United States' 
leadership in the most consequential and dynamic region of the 
world in the 21st century.
    In order to achieve this, we must be willing to make tough 
decisions. First, the Administration must make tradeoffs to 
ensure that funding aligns with its strategy. Reallocating 
funding within the international affairs Function 150 account 
will be necessary, but will not be sufficient. The 
Administration must expend the political capital necessary to 
end decades of underfunding diplomacy and development agencies 
and to ensure that they are equipped both to advance U.S. 
interests in Asia and to compete with the People's Republic of 
China globally. Second, the Administration must actively 
cultivate Congress as a full partner in modernizing U.S. 
diplomatic and development tools and to shore up bipartisan 
support investment in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the 
Administration needs to advance an ambitious, substantive 
economic agenda that expands opportunities for U.S. businesses 
and leverages the United States' unique advantages in working 
with and through our allies and partners.



                              (v)        

    In the 117th Congress, the Administration and Congress 
worked together to pass landmark legislation to invest in our 
domestic competitiveness. In the 118th Congress, I stand ready 
to work with the Executive Branch and my colleagues on the Hill 
to ensure that we do the same for American leadership abroad. 
Strategically aligning our resources and improving the 
institutional capacity of our diplomatic and development 
agencies are essential to realizing the promise of the Indo-
Pacific Strategy and ensuring that the United States is 
prepared to tackle the challenges ahead.
            Sincerely,
                                  Robert Menendez, Chairman
                                 Senate Foreign Relations Committee


                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


    In February 2022, President Biden released his Indo-Pacific 
Strategy (IPS) ``to strengthen our long-term position in and 
commitment to the Indo-Pacific'' in response to the region's 
increasing importance to the U.S. and to China's growing 
influence and aggressive behavior.\1\ The IPS builds on similar 
efforts of the previous three administrations and offers a 
long-term vision for a ``free and open, connected, prosperous, 
secure and resilient'' Indo-Pacific based on ``unprecedented 
cooperation'' between the U.S. and its allies and partners both 
within and outside the region.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 
Feb. 11, 2022.
    \2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The strategy presents five broad goals to achieve its 
vision: advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific; building 
connections within and beyond the region; driving regional 
prosperity; bolstering regional security; and developing 
resilience to transnational threats. It also lists ten core 
``lines of effort'' to be implemented within 24 months to help 
realize these goals.
    The IPS's vision is commendable, and President Biden and 
others at the highest levels of his Administration are deeply 
engaged in implementing the strategy. In the year leading up to 
the release of the IPS and in the months after, the 
Administration made significant progress in a number of areas. 
This report offers recommendations as to how the Administration 
should sharpen the strategy's aims and better ensure adequate 
resourcing of its efforts.



                          KEY RECOMMENDATIONS


   Adequately Resource the Strategy: The Biden administration 
        must ensure the IPS has the funds it needs for success. 
        Despite four successive administrations identifying 
        Asia as a priority region for U.S. attention and 
        assistance, none have made the necessary tradeoffs to 
        ensure that resources are allocated in a manner 
        commensurate with such prioritization. The 
        Administration must significantly increase funding for 
        diplomatic and development agencies across the U.S. 
        government, and dedicate a larger portion of the 
        Department of State operating budget and U.S. foreign 
        assistance to advance priorities in the Indo-Pacific. 
        To further IPS goals, it must also incentivize other 
        U.S. agencies like the U.S. Agency for International 
        Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge 
        Corporation (MCC), the U.S. International Development 
        Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. Trade and 
        Development Agency (USTDA), and the Export-Import Bank 
        to increase grants, loans, and other financing programs 
        in the Indo-Pacific while leveraging International 
        Financial Institutions (IFIs).


   Cultivate Congress as a Key Partner: Congress should be 
        made an active partner to ensure sufficient allocation 
        of resources to the Indo-Pacific, to provide new 
        authorities if and when needed, and to engage in 
        effective oversight. The Administration should provide 
        Congress with a full, detailed, and prioritized list of 
        its plans for implementing the IPS, updated as 
        necessary. The plan should include associated 
        resourcing requirements as well as data that can be 
        used to set benchmark resource allocations to the Indo-
        Pacific. Finally, the Administration should provide 
        Congress with a list of designated officials in each 
        department who are responsible for implementing the 
        IPS.


   Advance Economic Integration: The IPS must include a 
        substantive and action-oriented economic agenda that is 
        responsive to our allies' and partners' calls for 
        increased U.S. economic engagement. This includes: (1) 
        pressing for concrete deliverables from the Indo-
        Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) that 
        offer meaningful benefits for IPEF members; (2) taking 
        full advantage of the U.S.' hosting this year's Asia-
        Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leader's Meeting by 
        showcasing what the U.S. private sector can deliver, 
        particularly in energy infrastructure and digital 
        technology; (3) stepping up consultations with like-
        minded partners on sensitive export control issues; and 
        (4) prioritizing a meaningful trade program with Taiwan 
        under the U.S. Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade 
        while not precluding Taiwan's future inclusion in IPEF.


   Democracy and Human Rights: At the center of the IPS lies 
        the promotion of democracy and human rights. By 
        advancing these universal values, which are vital to 
        long-term stability and prosperity, the Administration 
        will underscore its commitment. Such efforts will also 
        demonstrate that the U.S. envisions a future for the 
        region that embraces democracy and human rights across 
        the diverse political and social context in the Indo-
        Pacific.


   Bolster Deterrence through Security and Non-Security 
        Efforts: While the IPS was right to focus on non-
        military tools of national power, the roles that non-
        military agencies play on security issues need to be 
        clearly defined. This will be important in reassuring 
        U.S. partners of the strategy's broader trade, 
        economic, and diplomatic aims and to avoid the 
        perception that it contributes to an unnecessary 
        intensification of great power rivalry. This includes: 
        (1) clarifying what ``integrated deterrence'' in the 
        Indo-Pacific means and explaining how the Department of 
        State, USAID, and economic agencies' unique roles, 
        resources, and authorities contribute to integrated 
        deterrence; (2) pursuing coordinated efforts to deter 
        coercive PRC actions against Taiwan and other regional 
        partners, including through the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Quadrilateral 
        Security Dialogue (``the Quad''), combined planning 
        activities with partners such as Japan, Korea, 
        Australia, the Philippines, and India; and (3) 
        establishing communications channels with Beijing to 
        reduce the risk of miscalculation and to provide 
        openings for engagement on opportunities for conflict 
        de-escalation and cooperation on issues like climate 
        change, illegal drugs, and nonproliferation.


   Expand Investment in Public Diplomacy Efforts and People-
        to-People Ties: To advance our values in the Indo-
        Pacific region, the U.S. must leverage its comparative 
        advantage through expanding people-to-people ties. The 
        U.S. must also improve our ability to counter 
        disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. The 
        Administration should: (1) reassess the funding, 
        impact, and policy coordination among entities involved 
        in public diplomacy, information sharing, and 
        countering disinformation; (2) strengthen collaboration 
        between American and regional students by shortening 
        visa-processing times and addressing barriers to 
        working in the U.S. after graduation; (3) provide 
        additional scholarships and administrative support to 
        increase the scope and scale of professional education 
        programs such as the U.S.-ASEAN and U.S.-Pacific 
        Institutes for Rising Leaders; and (4) cultivate 
        regional expertise at home by expanding funding for 
        U.S. students, academics, and experts to develop 
        expertise on the Indo-Pacific, including through 
        public-private partnerships.


   Prioritize Strategic Investments: The PRC's Belt and Road 
        Initiative and Digital Silk Road have expanded 
        worldwide with the aim of growing PRC investments and 
        resource acquisition abroad. This has increased the 
        number of countries indebted to China and expanded the 
        PRC's sphere of influence. To compete globally, the 
        U.S. and our partners must strive to provide 
        alternative financing and economic development 
        projects. The U.S. should not seek to challenge every 
        investment, but should prioritize based on our 
        strategic interests, taking into account strategic 
        locations and strategic sectors such as clean energy, 
        transportation and shipping infrastructure, and digital 
        infrastructure.


   Deepen Engagements with Allies and Partners: Many of the 
        most important IPS efforts will require deepening 
        engagement with our network of allies and partners 
        across the region. The Administration should: (1) 
        leverage opportunities to make U.S.-Japan-Republic of 
        Korea (ROK) trilateral cooperation more meaningful and 
        resilient; (2) follow through on the Pacific 
        Partnership Strategy by prioritizing and resourcing its 
        commitments related to climate change resilience; (3) 
        continue efforts to routinize the Quad through a 
        consistent tempo of meetings and preparatory 
        consultations and deepen cooperation among working 
        groups; (4) bolster U.S.-ASEAN ties by prioritizing 
        bilateral engagement with ASEAN members and the 
        institution itself; (5) advance the Australia-United 
        Kingdom-United States trilateral security partnership 
        (AUKUS) and renewal of the Compacts of Free Association 
        (COFA) by working closely with Congress to facilitate 
        congressional consideration of any agreements; and (6) 
        encourage a stronger democratic India as our two 
        nations deepen cooperation on issues such as defense, 
        emerging technology, and maritime security.



                               BACKGROUND


    The global economic and strategic center of gravity has 
shifted decisively to the Indo-Pacific, and its importance to 
the U.S. has grown commensurately. The region is home to more 
than half of the world's population, accounts for 60 percent of 
its GDP, and is expected to contribute to two-thirds of global 
economic growth in coming years.\3\ Two-way trade between the 
U.S. and countries in the Indo-Pacific amounted to $1.75 
trillion in 2020, and three million American jobs are directly 
dependent on U.S. economic ties to the region.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the same time, the rise of the PRC as an economic and 
military power is reshaping the ways in which the U.S. 
perceives and pursues its interests in the region. With an 
economy already roughly equal in size to that of the U.S. by 
some measures, levels of trade that make it the top economic 
partner of many countries in the region, an increasingly 
powerful military, growing technological prowess, expansive 
investments in regional infrastructure--including coal-fired 
power plants--and a clear willingness to use economic and 
military coercion to achieve its ambitions, the PRC has been 
asserting itself in the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage. 
The PRC's efforts constitute a significant challenge to 
American interests, regional stability, and global greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions.
    Across four administrations, the U.S. has sought to 
effectively respond to China's rise and to the increasing 
importance of the Indo-Pacific. While U.S. approaches have 
evolved over time, they have all shared several essential 
elements. As early as 2001, the George W. Bush administration 
identified the rise of China as the most serious threat to U.S. 
long-term interests.\5\ In 2004, it issued a Global Posture 
Review, which called for an enhanced American force posture in 
the Asia-Pacific to counter the PRC's growing ambitions.\6\ 
That same year, the Bush administration completed an 
interagency Asia strategy that sought to shape Beijing's 
decision-making by working with allies and partners to dissuade 
the PRC from achieving regional hegemony.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Nina Silove, ``The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to 
Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,'' International Security, Vol. 
40(4), Apr. 1, 2016, at 57.
    \6\ Robert Critchlow, U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New 
Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, Oct. 31, 2005.
    \7\ Nina Silove, ``The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to 
Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,'' International Security, Vol. 
40(4), Apr. 1, 2016, at 61-66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Obama administration followed with its 2011 strategy to 
``rebalance'' to Asia.\8\ Composed of integrated economic, 
military, and diplomatic programs and policies, the strategy 
was designed to address the negative aspects of the PRC's rise 
and to ensure our regional partners' resilience. Dr. Kurt 
Campbell, one of the strategy's foremost architects, 
characterized the rebalance as ``bolstering traditional 
alliances, forging new partnerships, engaging regional 
institutions, diversifying military forces, defending 
democratic values, embracing economic statecraft, and 
developing a truly multifaceted and comprehensive approach to 
an increasingly assertive and capable China.'' \9\ Importantly, 
this strategy was also informed by the 2009 National 
Intelligence Council report released on the Indo-Pacific 
region's vulnerability to climate change. The report found that 
``[t]here is overwhelming evidence that climate change will 
impact a variety of sectors in Southeast Asia and Pacific 
Islands through 2030.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Mark Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama 
Administration's ``Rebalancing'' Toward Asia, Congressional Research 
Service, Mar. 28, 2012.
    \9\ Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in 
Asia, at 7 (June 7, 2016).
    \10\ ``Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands: The Impacts of Climate 
Change to 2030: A Commissioned Research Report''. NIC 2009-06D, 
National Intelligence Council, Aug. 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the Obama administration's strategy included modest 
changes to military posture and increased high-level diplomatic 
engagement, the centerpiece of the strategy was the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement among 12 countries 
in the Indo-Pacific (not including the PRC), which together 
constituted 40 percent of the global economy. The TPP aimed to 
set the rules for expanded regional trade and investment.\11\ 
In 2016, the Obama administration completed TPP negotiations, 
but the agreement did not have sufficient congressional support 
for passage and it was not ratified.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives,'' Oct. 4, 2015.
    \12\ Mike DeBonis et al., ``The Trans-Pacific Partnership is Dead, 
Schumer Tells Labor Leaders,'' The Washington Post, Nov. 10, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Trump administration characterized Beijing as a 
strategic competitor across economic, political, and military 
domains. The Administration's 2017 National Security Strategy 
called the PRC a challenge to ``American power, influence, and 
interests, attempting to erode American security and 
prosperity.'' The 2018 National Defense Strategy stated: 
``China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to 
intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the 
South China Sea.'' \13\ The Trump administration's declassified 
2018 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific called for 
the U.S. to maintain ``strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific 
region and promote a liberal economic order while preventing 
China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence, 
and cultivating areas of cooperation to promote regional peace 
and prosperity.''\14\ In 2019, the Department of State issued a 
report entitled ``A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a 
Shared Vision,'' which outlined a strategy for enhancing U.S. 
engagement with regional allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific, increasing U.S. support for infrastructure development 
in the region, championing good governance, and upgrading 
military ties to deter adversaries.\15\ However, these 
strategies were undermined by President Trump's attempts to 
dramatically reduce federal resources to non-military agencies 
and his unpredictable and damaging behavior toward U.S. allies 
and partners. An account of the Trump administration's assault 
of American diplomacy can be found in a Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Democratic staff report ``Diplomacy in 
Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the State 
Department,'' published in July 2020.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, Dec. 18, 2017; U.S. Department of Defense, National 
Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Jan. 19 2018.
    \14\ U.S. National Security Council, U.S. Strategic Framework for 
the Indo-Pacific, Jan. 5, 2021.
    \15\ U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: 
Advancing a Shared Vision, Nov. 4, 2019.
    \16\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democratic Staff Report, 
Diplomacy in Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the State 
Department, July 28, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, released 
in February 2022, is premised on views similar to those of 
prior administrations from both political parties. It 
recognizes the Indo-Pacific's increasing importance as well as 
the PRC's growing influence, aggressive behavior, and 
intentions. The IPS's goal is to achieve ``an Indo-Pacific that 
is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and 
resilient'' and in order to ``realize that future, the U.S. 
will strengthen our own role while reinforcing the region 
itself.'' \17\ To that end, the IPS also recommends diplomatic, 
economic, and military efforts for the Indo-Pacific that are 
broadly similar to those of its predecessors.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 
Feb. 11, 2022.
    \18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The IPS recognizes that cooperation with allies and 
partners is critical to the strategy's success. It states: 
``the essential feature of this approach is that it cannot be 
accomplished alone: changing strategic circumstances and 
historic challenges require unprecedented cooperation with 
those who share in this vision.''\19\ Indeed, U.S. partners 
both within the Indo-Pacific and beyond have offered their own 
approaches that complement the IPS. These include Japan's Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific concept; India's Act East policy; South 
Korea's New Southern Policy, ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific, Taiwan's New Southbound Policy, the United Kingdom's 
Indo-Pacific Tilt; France's Indo-Pacific Strategy; Germany's 
policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific; Canada's Indo-Pacific 
Strategy; and the European Union's Strategy for Cooperation in 
the Indo-Pacific.\20\ All of these strategies recognize that 
the Indo-Pacific's changing strategic and economic landscape 
poses risks to regional peace and stability as well as to the 
existing rules-based international order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ``Japan's 
Effort for a `Free and Open Indo-Pacific,' '' Mar. 2021, https://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf; Dhruva Jaishankar, ``Acting East: 
India in the Indo-Pacific,'' Brookings Institutions, Oct. 24, 2019; 
John Nilsson-Wright & Yu Jie, ``South Korean Foreign Policy Innovation 
Amid Sino-U.S. Rivalry,'' Chatham House, July 22, 2021; Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, June 23, 
2019; Hunter Marston & Richard Bush, ``Taiwan's Engagement with 
Southeast Asia is Making Progress Under the New Southbound Policy,'' 
Brookings Institute, July 30, 2018; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, 
``Understanding the UK's `tilt' towards the Indo-Pacific,'' 
International Institute for International Studies, Apr. 15, 2021; 
French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France's Indo-Pacific 
Strategy, Feb. 2022; Frederic Grare, ``Germany's New Approach to the 
Indo-Pacific,'' Carnegie Endowment, Oct. 15, 2020; Global Affairs 
Canada, Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy, Nov. 2022; European Union, EU 
Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Feb. 21, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



                  REALIZING THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

Adequately Resource the Indo-Pacific Strategy
    Driving new resources to the Indo-Pacific will be critical 
to the IPS's success. Though the Biden administration has not 
yet produced a public list of specific programs and policies 
within the strategy's ``core lines of effort,'' its budget 
allocations for foreign assistance and non-foreign assistance 
program operations to the Indo-Pacific compared to previous 
years, as well as the percentage of assistance allocations to 
the region could indicate if the resources the Administration 
seeks for the Indo-Pacific region are commensurate with the 
ambitions of the IPS.
    The Administration's FY 2023 request for foreign assistance 
for the Indo-Pacific constituted only a marginal increase (3.8 
percent) over FY 2022 allocations and the share of assistance 
directed to the region remains under eight percent of overall 
foreign aid spending (see Figures 1 and 2). Since FY 2014, the 
Department of State's allocations for the Indo-Pacific for non-
foreign assistance program operations (e.g., diplomatic 
programs and public diplomacy) have never amounted to more than 
one-fifth of total spending globally (see Figure 4). The 
information available on the activities of the MCC (see Figure 
7), Ex-Im Bank (see Figure 8), DFC (see Figure 5), and USTDA 
(see Figure 6) aimed at the Indo-Pacific predate the launch of 
the IPS.
    Given the importance of the Indo-Pacific to the U.S., the 
Administration should direct more substantial funding to the 
region, including by raising the percentage of overall foreign 
assistance provided. While the Administration appears to be 
hard at work developing activities across many of the IPS's 
``core lines of effort,'' it has failed to adequately consult 
with Congress. Assessing the IPS's full resourcing needs will 
continue to be challenging without more detailed, programmatic 
information on the Administration's efforts.

Recommendations on Resourcing
    The IPS's success depends on adequate resourcing. While 
four successive administrations have identified Asia as a 
priority region, they have not expended the political capital 
necessary to meaningfully expand and modernize U.S. diplomatic 
and development agencies, or to make the necessary tradeoffs to 
ensure that resources are allocated in a manner commensurate 
with the region's strategic importance. To achieve this goal, 
the Administration should cultivate Congress as a key partner 
in the effort. Congress should receive information to inform 
effective oversight, justify new authorities, and understand 
the strategic case for allocating additional resources to the 
Indo-Pacific.


   Seek additional resources and allocate a larger portion of 
        foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific. While the Indo-
        Pacific represents 60 percent of global GDP and more 
        than half of the world's population, the 
        Administration's FY 2023 assistance request for the 
        region amounts to $1.7 billion. This is only 
        incrementally more than requested in the previous year 
        and represents only 7.7 percent of the overall foreign 
        assistance budget (see Figures 1 and 2). Even 
        accounting for the value of longstanding assistance to 
        key partners in the Middle East and Europe, this 
        foreign assistance allocation to the Indo-Pacific is 
        incommensurate with its strategic and economic 
        importance (see Figure 2).


   Invest a higher percentage of the Department of State's 
        operating budget in the Indo-Pacific. The Department of 
        State's operations budget, which supports overseas 
        posts and domestic operations, is similarly 
        underweighted in the Indo-Pacific. The FY 2023 request 
        for the region was less than 20 percent of the overall 
        request (see Figure 4). Those allocations have remained 
        relatively flat since FY 2014 (see Figures 3 and 4). If 
        the Administration is serious about elevating the 
        importance of the Indo-Pacific and is committed to the 
        breadth of efforts outlined in the IPS, this proportion 
        must increase.


   Incentivize other U.S. agencies to increase their grants, 
        loans, and other financing programs in the Indo-
        Pacific. While the USTDA, DFC, and Export-Import Bank 
        are generally demand-driven in terms of the funds they 
        offer, they can seek to attract applications through 
        outreach in priority sectors or regions. In recent 
        years, these agencies' funds for activities in the 
        Indo-Pacific represent a far smaller portion of their 
        overall funding than is suggested by the economic 
        importance of the region, and in some cases, the monies 
        mobilized in the Indo-Pacific have declined in relative 
        or absolute terms (see Figure 5 for DFC and Figure 6 
        for USTDA). For example, the MCC has worked in only 
        seven Indo-Pacific nations since its inception in FY 
        2003 and currently has active compacts only with 
        Mongolia, Nepal, and Timor-Leste. As part of its IPS 
        implementation guidance for the Indo-Pacific Strategy, 
        the White House should require each of these agencies 
        to report how they intend, over the next 24 months, to 
        expand their Indo-Pacific portfolios. As MCC's program 
        constraints limit its operations to low and lower-
        middle income countries (LICs and LMICs), MCC should 
        continue to work with Congress to expand its country 
        candidate pool.


   Address impediments to increasing the number of Peace Corps 
        Volunteers in the Indo-Pacific and expanding to 
        additional countries in the region. Peace Corps 
        Volunteers offer an important means of demonstrating 
        U.S. commitment to countries in the Indo-Pacific and 
        strengthening people-to-people ties. As shown in Figure 
        9, while Volunteer levels in the Pacific Islands peaked 
        in 2017 and have since declined, the number of 
        Volunteers in the Indo-Pacific has remained somewhat 
        steady over the past decade. While the Administration 
        has announced that the Peace Corps will return to Fiji, 
        Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu, it is unclear how many 
        Volunteers will be sent when Peace Corps returns to 
        historic Volunteer levels.\21\ The Administration has 
        also said that it will explore expanding the Peace 
        Corps to additional Pacific Island countries, though no 
        timeline has been given.\22\ That exploration should be 
        expedited and coupled with an interagency strategy and 
        appropriate resources to address fiscal and security 
        concerns so that Volunteers can be sent to new 
        countries as soon as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The White House, ``Fact Sheet: President Biden Unveils First-
Ever Pacific Partnership Strategy,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
    \22\ Id.


   Continue to work closely with allies and partners to 
        provide infrastructure investment and development 
        options to Indo-Pacific countries. Beyond its 
        individual efforts, the U.S. is working with other 
        countries to drive resources to the Indo-Pacific. For 
        example, as an alternative to the PRC's Belt and Road 
        Initiative (BRI), in June 2022, the G7 announced the 
        launch of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
        Investment (PGII), to mobilize $600 billion in private 
        capital by 2027.\23\ PGII has the potential to offer 
        values-driven, transparent infrastructure opportunities 
        as opposed to those of the BRI, which have often been 
        plagued by poor governance, non-transparency, and 
        corruption.\24\ The Administration should continue to 
        partner with countries such as Japan to provide high-
        quality infrastructure options in the region. The U.S. 
        should redouble efforts to work with partners to 
        provide alternatives on the digital infrastructure side 
        as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ The White House, ``U.S.-Indonesia-EU Joint Statement on 
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,'' Nov. 15, 2022.
    \24\ Jonathan Hillman, ``Corruption Flows Along China's Belt and 
Road,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jan. 18, 2019.


   Ensure that the U.S. leverages International Financial 
        Institutions to further its IPS goals. The 
        Administration should use its leadership positions at 
        the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
        Multilateral Development Banks, and the G7 to showcase 
        the benefits of the U.S.-led international order. This 
        includes fostering economic development, ensuring 
        global economic stability, combatting climate change, 
        and reducing poverty around the world. The U.S. should 
        align its voice and vote at these institutions with the 
        goals of the Indo-Pacific Strategy to ensure that we 
        are able to effectively communicate the tangible 
        benefits of our global economic leadership versus the 
        strategic and economic risks that can result from 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        becoming heavily indebted to the PRC.


   Provide Congress with a full, detailed, and prioritized 
        list of the Administration's plans for implementing the 
        IPS and its associated resourcing requirements. If 
        Congress is to appropriate funds for ambitious IPS 
        activities, it needs significantly greater detail about 
        the Administration's priorities, plans, and intentions 
        to increase operational spending, program spending, and 
        financing to the Indo-Pacific.


   Provide Congress with data for resource allocation 
        benchmarks. Resourcing the Indo-Pacific Strategy will 
        require that the agencies administering funds and 
        programs are matched by an adequate number of 
        personnel. While Congress and the Congressional 
        Research Service made a concerted attempt to obtain 
        data on personnel allocations to the Indo-Pacific from 
        all the key agencies involved in the IPS, little 
        information was obtained. Figure 10 and Table 1 show 
        the information provided by USAID. If Congress is going 
        to authorize funds commensurate with the region's 
        importance, it will require more detailed information 
        from which to benchmark current Administration efforts. 
        To the extent that there are internal impediments to 
        collecting and analyzing this data, the Administration 
        should prioritize efforts to overcome these challenges, 
        and inform Congress of those efforts.


   Identify designated officials at each department and agency 
        responsible for the implementation of the IPS and 
        ensure that they have a meaningful voice in determining 
        relevant staffing and resource allocations. Almost 20 
        federal departments and agencies are involved in an 
        ongoing Interagency Policy Committee process led by the 
        National Security Council to carry out the IPS. 
        However, only the Department of State and USAID have 
        designated officials to coordinate IPS efforts in which 
        these agencies are engaged. Given the scope of efforts 
        under their jurisdiction, it is particularly important 
        that the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
        Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Trade 
        Representative, the International Development Finance 
        Corporation, the Department of Defense, and the Joint 
        Chiefs of Staff designate IPS coordinators 
        expeditiously.

Advance U.S. Leadership on Trade and Economic Integration
    When President Trump formally withdrew from the TPP in 
2017, doubts about America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific 
grew precipitously, to the PRC's benefit.\25\ The remaining 
members of the TPP forged ahead to create the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 
with the hope that the U.S. might eventually join.\26\ The PRC 
formally applied to join the CPTPP in 2021.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Yuka Hayashi, ``U.S. on Sidelines as China and Other Asia-
Pacific Nations Launch Trade Pact,'' Wall Street Journal, Jan. 1, 2022.
    \26\ James McBride et al., ``What's Next for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP),'' Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 20, 2021.
    \27\ Joanna Shelton, ``Look Skeptically at China's CPTPP 
Application,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nov. 18, 
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rather than pursue joining the CPTPP, the Biden 
administration has offered a new economic initiative that 
signals the U.S.' intention to enhance its economic engagement 
in the Indo-Pacific. During his May 2022 visit to Japan, 
President Biden announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) with 12 countries from 
the Indo-Pacific, not including the PRC.\28\ Shortly 
thereafter, Fiji joined as well.\29\ IPEF will cover a broad 
range of other issues under four pillars: trade; supply chains; 
clean economy; and fair economy, with member countries given 
the choice of which pillars to join.\30\ The Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative leads the first pillar, while the 
Department of Commerce facilitates the latter three.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a 
Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 
for Prosperity,'' May 23, 2022.
    \29\ The White House, ``Statement by National Security Advisor Jake 
Sullivan on Fiji Joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for 
Prosperity,'' May 26, 2022.
    \30\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a 
Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 
for Prosperity,'' May 23, 2022.
    \31\ The White House, ``On-the-Record Press Call on the Launch of 
the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,'' May 23, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The aims of the four IPEF pillars were defined in September 
2022 at IPEF's first in-person ministerial meeting.\32\ 
Notably, within the trade pillar, member countries committed to 
promoting trade facilitation and digital trade, advancing food 
security and good regulatory practices, and ensuring that labor 
and environmental issues remained at the core of 
discussions.\33\ On supply chains, the focus is to identify and 
increase investment in critical sectors and goods, establish an 
information-sharing and crisis response mechanism, and 
strengthen supply chain logistics.\34\ The clean economy pillar 
states that countries will seek ``to advance cooperation on 
clean energy and climate-friendly technologies, as well as 
mobilize investment and promote usage of low- and zero-
emissions goods and services.'' \35\ The fair economy pillar 
will focus on ``preventing and combatting corruption, curbing 
tax evasion, and enhancing transparency.'' \36\ The first 
negotiating round of IPEF was held in Brisbane, Australia in 
December 2022.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Aidan Arasasingham et al., ``IPEF Comes into Focus at LA 
Ministerial,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sept. 
12, 2022.
    \33\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``U.S. and Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework Partners Announce Negotiation Objectives,'' 
Sept. 9, 2022.
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Id.
    \37\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Joint USTR and 
Department of Commerce Readout of the First Indo-Pacific Economic 
Framework Negotiating Round.'' Dec. 15, 2022.

Recommendations to Advance Economic Integration
    If the IPS is to succeed, it must include a substantive and 
action-oriented economic agenda. This engagement should be 
responsive to the demand signals of our regional allies and 
partners for increasing U.S. economic engagement in the region.


   Ensure IPEF's longevity. IPEF, the main economic element of 
        the IPS, is the U.S.' first major foray into shaping 
        the Indo-Pacific's economic architecture since the U.S. 
        withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017. 
        Regional support expressed for IPEF at this early stage 
        indicates that, over time, IPEF has the potential to 
        meaningfully contribute to regional economic 
        integration. However, the Administration must ensure 
        that IPEF is developed in a manner that demonstrates 
        the U.S.' long-term commitment to regional economic 
        integration and provides stability and dependability to 
        the U.S. private sector and IPEF partner countries. To 
        ensure the longevity of IPEF, the Administration must 
        work with Congress to arrive at a common understanding 
        of its scope, approval, and implementation. Absent such 
        a process, it will not be possible to build an 
        agreement that is as meaningful and durable as U.S. 
        interests require.


   Prioritize a meaningful trade program with Taiwan. Taiwan's 
        exclusion from IPEF sent an unfortunate signal, 
        particularly in light of the fact that half the Members 
        of the House and Senate expressed support for Taipei's 
        participation.\38\ The Administration should prioritize 
        negotiating a meaningful agreement under the U.S.-
        Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, which was 
        launched alongside IPEF, while not precluding the 
        possibility of Taiwan's future inclusion in IPEF.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ See, e.g., ``Menendez, Risch Lead 50 Colleagues in Letter to 
POTUS Championing Taiwan's Inclusion in Proposed Indo-Pacific Economic 
Framework (IPEF),'' U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Press 
Release, May 18, 2022; Steven Chabot, ``Chabot and Taiwan Caucus Urge 
Commerce, USTR to Include Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic 
Framework,'' Office of Congressman Steve Chabot Press Release, Mar. 31, 
2022.
    \39\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``U.S. and Taiwan 
Announce the Launch of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century 
Trade,'' USTR Press Release, June 1, 2022.


   Take advantage of the U.S. hosting the APEC Leaders Meeting 
        in 2023. The U.S. APEC host year is an opportunity to 
        showcase what the U.S. private sector can deliver and 
        to drive value for U.S. companies that want to increase 
        their exports to the region. The Administration should 
        use these meetings over the course of the year to 
        highlight U.S. capacity in energy transformation 
        necessary to address the climate crisis and digital 
        technology and to reduce barriers for small and medium-
        sized businesses. The U.S. host year is also an 
        opportunity for the Administration to press IPEF 
        members to complete IPEF negotiations in time for the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        leaders' summit in late 2023.


   Promote secure supply chains in ways that are respectful of 
        allies' and partners' concerns. The COVID-19 pandemic 
        and Russia's war against Ukraine have underscored the 
        fragility of global supply chains. The Biden 
        administration has worked bilaterally with partners and 
        through multilateral fora, such as the G7 and the Quad, 
        to address these fragilities. At the same time, the 
        Administration has undertaken unprecedented and far-
        reaching policies to sustain U.S. competitiveness in 
        advanced technologies and prevent the PRC's malign use 
        of those technologies.\40\ These actions, combined with 
        other ``re-shoring'' and ``near shoring'' efforts, may 
        have a compelling strategic logic but have often been 
        unsettling to U.S. allies and partners who have felt 
        under-consulted.\41\ While the Biden administration has 
        rightly prioritized securing supply chains, it has also 
        invested in revitalizing its relationships with like-
        minded partners. Therefore, it should work to step up 
        its consultations with partners on these sensitive 
        issues. In addition to economic and security interests, 
        it should explain how the policies that grow and secure 
        U.S. supply chains, including in semiconductors, 
        critical minerals, and clean energy, and also grow 
        cooperation that benefits our partners and allies in 
        the long-term.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced 
Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and 
Semiconductor End Use; List Modification, 87 Fed. Reg. 62186, Oct. 13, 
2022.
    \41\ See, e.g., Cagan Koc & Debby Wu, ``Dutch Foreign Minister Says 
U.S. Can't Dictate Approach to China Exports,'' Bloomberg, Nov. 18, 
2022.
    \42\ Harput, Halit, ``What Policy Initiatives Advance Friend-
Shoring,'' St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity Through Trade, Aug. 24, 
2022.


   Continue to promote public-private partnerships through the 
        Indo-Pacific Business Forum. In January 2023, the Biden 
        administration co-hosted the fifth Indo-Pacific 
        Business Forum in Japan. Focused on economic recovery 
        and sustainable and inclusive growth, the Forum 
        provided an opportunity for the private sector to 
        synchronize its efforts with U.S. government and 
        partner governments to maximize results and accelerate 
        investments in U.S. government-funded projects.\43\ The 
        private sector plays a critical role in addressing 
        today's most pressing challenges--from the climate 
        crisis, to food and energy insecurity, to the effects 
        of the COVID-19 pandemic--and the Administration should 
        seek to fully realize opportunities for public-private 
        partnerships in these and other areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Department of State Factsheet, 2023 Indo-Pacific Business 
Forum Promotes Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in the Indo-Pacific, 
Jan. 12. 2023.

Promote Democracy and Human Rights
    The IPS' core line of effort on supporting good governance 
and accountability in the Indo-Pacific reflects the new 
national security focus on corruption. While corruption is a 
regional problem, including in the PRC, PRC regional economic 
engagement often exacerbates corruption challenges.
    PRC investment through the Belt and Road and Digital Silk 
Road Initiatives ``abets corruption and democratic backsliding 
in host countries,'' according to a 2021 Council on Foreign 
Relations study.\44\ The report notes that ``major 
infrastructure projects provide ample opportunities for 
corruption, and PRC government practices magnify these 
opportunities. Opaque lending terms and contracts and closed 
bidding processes typify these projects. This secrecy and lack 
of accountability enable corrupt political elites to award 
contracts to their allies and divert funds toward their 
supporters.'' \45\ Such corruption can work in Beijing's favor 
by linking officials' personal financial interests to specific 
PRC projects rather than a system that awards contracts on the 
basis of merit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Jennifer Hillman & David Sacks ``China's Belt and Road: 
Implications for the U.S.,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Mar. 2021.
    \45\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Though good governance and accountability support 
democracy, the IPS is less focused on promoting democracy 
directly. To be sure, the IPS report mentions support for 
democratic institutions and democratic governance as part of 
its objective to ``advance a free and open Indo-Pacific.'' \46\ 
But there are only two references to democracy within the IPS 
``core lines of effort'', and both are in reference to Burma.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 
Feb. 11, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Human rights, meanwhile, are mentioned in the IPS in 
reference to North Korea and the PRC as well as in an 
introductory paragraph covering America's history in the 
region, but the core lines of effort are silent on how to 
advance human rights elsewhere across the Indo-Pacific.
    ASEAN is particularly sensitive to a U.S. strategy that 
places too much weight on democracy and human rights when many 
ASEAN countries have problematic records on these issues. Yet, 
by downplaying human rights and democracy in the IPS, the 
Administration undercuts its claims about the centrality of 
these issues to U.S. foreign policy and it also opens itself up 
to questions about the strength of its commitments to them.

Recommendations to Promote Democracy and Human Rights
    If the IPS is to succeed, U.S. values, including democracy 
and human rights, must be a core tenant of the strategy.


   Make human rights and democracy promotion a fundamental 
        line of effort of the IPS. The focus on good governance 
        and accountability rather than democracy and human 
        rights in the IPS likely reflects the Administration's 
        concern that several Indo-Pacific countries may be less 
        open to U.S. overtures if they are pressed too hard on 
        these issues. However, including human rights and 
        democracy directly would underscore the U.S.' 
        commitment to universal rights and focus the 
        Administration's efforts to advance those priorities 
        within a diverse set of political and social contexts 
        across the Indo-Pacific. It would also demonstrate to 
        countries in the region that the U.S. and its partners 
        envision a future for the Indo-Pacific in which human 
        rights and democracy are central elements.

Bolster Deterrence through Security and Non-Security Efforts
    The U.S. and its allies and partners must respond robustly 
to the security challenges posed by the PRC. Deterring its 
military adventurism is critical to maintaining peace and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific. The PRC's aggressive actions in 
response to Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022 
have brought the threats posed by China's military into sharp 
focus. However, if the U.S. concentrates on defense measures at 
the expense of broader trade, economic, diplomatic, and other 
initiatives, many in the region may perceive that the strategy 
amounts to little more than an intensification of great power 
rivalry. States may also feel that this undermines their 
interests and increases the risk of conflict. Maintaining an 
appropriate balance of security and non-security efforts in the 
region will require leadership at the highest levels of the 
Biden administration, and close consultation with Congress, as 
China's rapid military build-up will continue to demand 
attention.
    Indeed, China now has the world's largest navy, Asia's 
largest air force, and missile capabilities that are aimed at 
deterring and denying the U.S. from projecting its military to 
the western Pacific in a military contingency.\47\ Beijing is 
also engaged in the largest nuclear force expansion in its 
history.\48\ Moreover, unlike the U.S., which has its military 
dispersed around the globe with only a fraction of its naval 
and air assets in the western Pacific, China's armed forces are 
focused geographically in the region, giving Beijing an 
advantage should a conflict arise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Mallory Shelbourne, ``China Has World's Largest Navy With 355 
Ships and Counting, Says Pentagon,'' U.S. Naval Institute News, Nov. 3, 
2021; John Xie, ``China Is Increasing Taiwan Airspace Incursions,'' 
VOA, Jan. 6, 2021.
    \48\ Shannon Bugos, ``Pentagon Sees Faster Chinese Nuclear 
Expansion,'' Arms Control Association, Dec. 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beijing's actions indicate that risk of a conflict over 
Taiwan may be increasing. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made 
Taiwan's ``reunification'' with mainland China a principal 
component China's ``national rejuvenation.'' \49\ Greater PRC 
military capabilities, growing Chinese nationalism, and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership's more ominous tone 
regarding Taiwan during the 20th Party Congress contribute to 
expectations that Xi will intensify efforts toward 
unification.\50\ In Taipei and in Washington, attention is 
increasingly focused on the aggressive military, economic, and 
cyber actions against Taiwan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ David Sacks, ``What Xi Jinping's Major Speech Means For 
Taiwan,'' Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021.
    \50\ Emily Feng, ``China's Communist Party moves to solidify Xi 
Jinping's power in leadership shuffle,'' NPR, Oct. 22, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even before Beijing launched military drills after Speaker 
Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PRC military was 
making almost daily incursions into Taiwan's air defense 
identification zone and engaging in dangerous maneuvers near 
Taiwanese vessels.\51\ Additionally, in June 2022, China 
declared sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait, despite the 
Strait's long-established legal status as an international 
waterway.\52\ China has also taken increasingly coercive steps 
against companies and countries that do not fall in line with 
its view of PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan, including imposing a 
trade embargo in 2021 on Lithuania for welcoming a Taiwan 
representative office to Vilnius.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ ``Chinese Incursions Highest Since 1996,'' Taipei Times, Jan. 
4, 2020.
    \52\ ``U.S. Rebuffs China by Calling Taiwan Strait an International 
Waterway,'' Reuters, June 14, 2022.
    \53\ Andrew Higgins, ``In an Uneven Fight With China, a Tiny 
Country's Brand Becomes Toxic,'' The New York Times, Feb. 21, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the face of the PRC's reckless and coercive behavior, 
the U.S. must continue to stand with Taiwan for moral, 
economic, and strategic reasons. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy 
that shares American interests and values. The U.S. has an 
important stake in ensuring that Beijing does not force the 
island into unification with China. Taiwan also accounts for 
more than half of global semiconductor production and almost 
all of the world's most advanced chips.\54\ A disruption in 
this supply would have significant implications for the global 
economy.\55\ Meanwhile, nearly half of the world's container 
ships pass through the Taiwan Strait, and as of August 2022, 88 
percent of the largest of those vessels transited the 
waterway.\56\ Strategically, if the U.S. were to abandon 
Taiwan, Washington would lose credibility with our allies and 
partners throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This would 
undermine regional peace and stability and the PRC would feel 
emboldened to impose its will on the Indo-Pacific.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Chris Miller, ``The Chips that Make Taiwan the Center of the 
World,'' Time, Oct. 5, 2022.
    \55\ Yimou Lee et al., ``T-DAY: The Battle for Taiwan,'' Reuters, 
Dec. 27, 2021.
    \56\ Kevin Varley, ``Taiwan Tensions Raise Risks in One of Busiest 
Shipping Lanes,'' Bloomberg, Aug. 2, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In May 2022, the PRC signed a security agreement with the 
Solomon Islands. In a November 2019 interview, Robson Tana 
Djokovic, the Chief of Staff to the Solomon Islands' Prime 
Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, cited the country's vulnerability 
to the effects of climate change and the need to build 
resilience capacities as motivation for their pivot to China 
for assistance.\57\ The perception that the U.S. and our allies 
were not offering alternatives also contributed to the Solomon 
Islands decision to cut ties with Taiwan and allow closer 
security cooperation with the PRC.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Ashley Westerman, ``Some Pacific Island Nations Are Turning to 
China, Climate Change is a Factor,'' NPR News, Nov. 23, 2019.
    \58\ Zoe Liu, ``What the China-Solomon Islands Pact Means for the 
U.S. and South Pacific,'' Council on Foreign Relations, May 4, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The IPS describes integrated deterrence as ``more tightly 
integrat[ing] our efforts across warfighting domains and the 
spectrum of conflict to ensure that the U.S., alongside our 
allies and partners, can dissuade or defeat aggression in any 
form or domain.'' \59\ If ``integrated deterrence'' of all the 
levers of U.S. power, diplomacy, and influence will be the U.S. 
response to growing security challenges prompted by the PRC, 
then it is imperative that the U.S. modernize and fully-fund 
the non-military elements of its national power. The U.S. must 
also ensure that our partners are doing the same, in league and 
in concert with the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 
Feb. 11, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Biden administration's emphasis on cooperation with 
allies and partners is a recognition that the U.S. needs 
greater support from them in order to maintain a balance of 
power with the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. has for years 
relied on a ``hub and spoke'' system of bilateral alliances 
with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand as 
fundamental to regional security. However, the threat demands a 
more networked and cross-sectoral approach among allies and 
partners, one that leverages respective strengths, allocates 
resources more efficiently, and allows for more effective 
coordination, including in domains not directly associated with 
warfighting.
    Growth in U.S. security assistance to the Indo-Pacific has 
come almost entirely from the short-term legal and funding 
authorities exercised by the Department of Defense, instead of 
the longer-term, more strategic programs undertaken by the 
Department of State. The Department of Defense has, since 2001, 
attempted to duplicate a number of Department of State security 
assistance authorities and roles, expending a global security 
assistance budget that has significantly exceeded that of the 
Department of State without sufficient foreign policy oversight 
and expertise from the Department of State itself. Meanwhile, 
the Department of State's budget for global security assistance 
has not appreciably increased and was almost entirely earmarked 
to three countries outside the Indo-Pacific over the same 
period. The Department of State's influence over security 
assistance and security cooperation has diminished, with real 
consequences for U.S. power and influence abroad.
    With the enactment of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act 
(TERA) in 2022, the State Department now has the authority, for 
the first time, to provide Foreign Military Financing to 
Taiwan. If fully funded, such support, when combined with 
Taiwan's own investments, could catalyze timely and important 
near-term acquisitions that will increase Taiwan's ability to 
deter PRC aggression in the Taiwan Strait.

Recommendations to Improve Deterrence
    The IPS was right to focus on non-military tools of 
national power, but the roles that non-military agencies play 
on security issues in the region need to be better explained 
and translated into reality.


   Reinforce that U.S. strategy toward the region is not 
        principally military in nature. The IPS wisely leads 
        with non-military tools of U.S. influence in the 
        region. While the U.S. faces a deteriorating security 
        environment in the Indo-Pacific, it is important that 
        the Administration not focus too narrowly on defense at 
        the expense of broader trade, economic, diplomatic, and 
        other initiatives, lest partners in the region view the 
        strategy as contributing to an unnecessary 
        intensification of great power rivalry that undermines 
        their interests.


   Bolster deterrence through security and non-security 
        efforts. While the IPS was right to focus on non-
        military tools of national power, the roles that non-
        military agencies play on security issues need to be 
        clearly delineated so that they can be better explained 
        and translated into reality. This will be particularly 
        important in reassuring partners of the strategy's 
        broader trade, economic, and diplomatic aims and avoid 
        the perception that it contributes to an unnecessary 
        intensification of great power rivalry. First and 
        foremost, the Administration should clarify what 
        ``integrated deterrence'' in the Indo-Pacific means. 
        The Administration should also explain how the 
        Department of State, USAID, and economic agencies' 
        unique roles, resources, and authorities contribute to 
        integrated deterrence, and how the programs and 
        activities of the Department of Defense should be 
        coordinated with and integrated into these efforts.


   Prioritize climate funding for the Indo-Pacific. With 
        significant vulnerability to climate change--
        particularly in the Pacific Islands--the PRC has seized 
        the opportunity to provide climate-related support to 
        these countries. The USAID-led President's Emergency 
        Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) provides a 
        formidable alternative to PRC investments for countries 
        in dire need of foreign assistance to combat the 
        effects of climate change. It should be fully resourced 
        and deployed strategically in the Indo-Pacific 
        region.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ U.S. Agency for International Development, ``Action Plan 
Released for the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and 
Resilience (PREPARE),'' Sept. 15, 2022.


   Restore State's leadership role in providing security 
        assistance in the Indo-Pacific. To realize longer-term, 
        strategic partnerships on security assistance in the 
        Indo-Pacific, the Department of State needs a 
        significant increase in security assistance funding 
        that can be directed to partners in the region. Nowhere 
        is this more urgent than in the case of Taiwan. The 
        Administration should prioritize bolstering financial 
        and political support to Taiwan through the TERA and 
        obtain full funding of these authorities. The 
        Administration should also continue to engage candidly 
        with Taiwan to ensure that it invests wisely in its 
        self-defense capabilities and consult closely with 
        Congress about threats to Taiwan and capability gaps 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        that the U.S. and our partners could help to fill.


   Pursue coordinated efforts to deter coercive PRC actions 
        against Taiwan. The Biden administration has taken 
        steps to reassure Taiwan about U.S. commitments as 
        defined by the Three Joint Communiques, the Taiwan 
        Relations Act, and the Six Assurances-- although mixed 
        messages from administration officials have undermined 
        some of these efforts.\61\ The Administration should 
        pursue coordinated efforts to deter coercive PRC 
        actions against Taiwan and other regional partners, 
        including through ASEAN and the Quad, and it should 
        strengthen its consultations and combined planning 
        activities with partners, including Japan, Korea, 
        Australia, the Philippines, and India.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Phelim Kine, ``Biden Leaves No Doubt: `Strategic Ambiguity' 
Toward Taiwan is Dead,'' Politico, Sept. 19, 2022.


   Seek to sustain communication channels with Beijing. The 
        Administration should continue to press for more direct 
        lines of communication between key military and 
        civilian officials of the U.S. and China. Such channels 
        of communication between Washington and Beijing have 
        atrophied since 2016.\62\ Sustaining these channels has 
        important benefits. First, it reduces the risk of 
        miscalculations over Taiwan or other potential 
        flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific. [S]econd, it provides 
        openings to engage with Beijing on opportunities for 
        deconfliction or cooperation on issues such as climate 
        change, combatting illegal drugs, nonproliferation, and 
        counterterrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Barbara Usher, ``Why U.S.-China Relations are at Their Lowest 
Point in Decades,'' BBC, July 24, 2022.

Invest in Public Diplomacy Efforts and Expand People-to-People Ties
    The U.S. is the global leader in higher education, and U.S. 
colleges and universities attract some of the world's most 
talented and resourceful international students, approximately 
70 percent of whom are from Asia.\63\ Education has 
historically been a significant U.S. export and source of soft 
power. In the 2019-2020 academic year, before the full effects 
of COVID-19 were felt, international students contributed 
almost $40 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 
400,000 jobs.\64\ International students attending schools in 
the U.S. are often exposed to American democracy and the free 
expression of ideas which can be life-changing, especially for 
those from countries with authoritarian governments. 
International students who rise to positions of influence 
within their home countries or remain in the U.S. after their 
studies create important links between the U.S. and the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Karin Fischer, ``The U.S. Attracts Fewer International 
Students, Loses Billions in Revenue,'' NPR, Aug. 9, 2021.
    \64\ ``New NAFSA Data Show First Ever Drop in International Student 
Economic Value to the U.S.,'' National Association of Foreign Student 
Advisers, Nov. 16, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The number of Indo-Pacific students studying in the United 
States remains much lower than pre-pandemic levels (see Figure 
13). Since taking office, President Biden has eased travel 
restrictions and expanded the degrees that allow international 
students to qualify for a three-year work permit after 
graduation.\65\ In July 2022, Secretary Blinken said that 
``continuing to nurture a vibrant community of international 
students is a foreign policy imperative.'' \66\ His remarks 
were accompanied by a joint statement by the Departments of 
State, Education, Commerce, and Homeland Security, which laid 
out principles for encouraging international students, 
researchers, and scholars to study in the U.S. as well as 
Americans to study abroad.\67\
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    \65\ Suzanne Monyak, ``U.S. Expands Work Program to Retain More 
Foreign STEM Students,'' Roll Call, Jan. 24, 2022.
    \66\ U.S. Department of State, ``Joint Statement of Principles in 
Support of International Education,'' accessed Nov. 22, 2022.
    \67\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. must use all public diplomacy tools at its 
disposal to further its IPS goals. To promote U.S. values, the 
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) broadcasts news and information 
``to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in 
support of freedom and democracy.'' \68\ In Asia, USAGM 
oversees the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and 
the Open Technology Fund (OTF).\69\ VOA focuses on explaining 
U.S. perspectives in a global context, while RFA broadcasters 
offer news and information in places where local media is 
repressed or in a nascent stage, and OTF supports global 
internet freedom technologies. VOA allocates the largest 
proportion of its budget to the Indo-Pacific region, while 
Radio Free Asia has consistently received less funding than the 
other regional broadcasters (see Figures 11 and 12 and Tables 2 
and 3).\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ U.S. Agency for Global Media, ``Who We Are,'' accessed Nov. 
22, 2022.
    \69\ Id.
    \70\ ``U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM),'' USASpending.gov, 
accessed Nov. 22, 2022, https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/us-agency-
for-global-media?fy=2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To counter PRC disinformation campaigns, the IPS should use 
the Department of State's Global Engagement Center, whose 
mission is to ``recognize, understand, expose, and counter 
foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation 
efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, 
security, or stability of the U.S., its allies, and partner 
nations.'' \71\ The IPS should enhance interagency coordination 
with U.S. Combatant Commands working in this space, including: 
the U.S. Southern Command that undertakes internet-based 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) efforts to 
counter global threats\72\ and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
that undertakes MISO ``to support a diversity of voices in the 
information space, to deter aggression and malign actions, to 
build partner-nation capacity, and to assist partner-nation 
counter-terror operations, counter-recruitment efforts, and 
counter-radicalization programs.''\73\
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    \71\ U.S. Department of State, ``Global Engagement Center: Core 
Mission and Vision,'' accessed Nov. 22, 2022.
    \72\ U.S. Southern Command, ``Military Information Support 
Operations,'' accessed Nov. 21, 2022.
    \73\ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, ``Useful Theater Information,'' 
accessed Nov. 21, 2022.

Recommendations to Expand Public Diplomacy Efforts
    If the IPS is going to be successful, the U.S. must 
capitalize and expand upon the success that people-to-people 
programs offer in creating positive perceptions of the U.S. 
around the world. Furthermore, the U.S. must improve our 
ability to project information and awareness campaigns about 
positive U.S. policies and relationships in the region and 
develop and execute a more coordinated effort to counter 
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda.


   Assess funding, impact, and policy coordination among U.S. 
        government entities involved in public diplomacy, 
        including countering disinformation. The U.S. has a 
        number of entities engaged in different aspects of the 
        information space, including USAGM, the Global 
        Engagement Center, and Military Information Support 
        Operations (MISO). The Administration should use the 
        IPS to enhance effectiveness and coordination among 
        these entities to increase their coherence and 
        messaging impact as well as assess how agencies overlap 
        with USAGM.


   Reinforce welcoming students from the Indo-Pacific to the 
        U.S. as a core IPS line of effort. The Administration 
        should take further steps to encourage educational 
        exchanges as a core line of effort under the IPS: 
        shortening visa processing times for international 
        students; addressing barriers to working in the U.S. 
        after graduation; offering scholarships; and increasing 
        the scope and scale of professional education programs 
        like the U.S.-ASEAN and U.S.-Pacific Institutes for 
        Rising Leaders.\74\
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    \74\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in 
Washington, DC,'' May 12, 2022; The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Roadmap 
for a 21st-Century U.S.-Pacific Island Partnership,'' Sept. 29, 2022.


   Cultivate regional expertise at home. Expanding funding for 
        U.S. students, academics, and experts to research and 
        study in the Indo-Pacific will be important to building 
        and sustaining regional expertise. Expanding funding, 
        including through public-private partnerships, to 
        organizations like the Council of American Overseas 
        Research Centers, the Boren Fellowship, and Fulbright 
        for the Indo-Pacific will be important for achieving 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        this goal.

Deepen Engagements with Allies and Partners
    The U.S. alliances that were built in Asia after World War 
II are critical components of U.S. security posture in the 
Indo-Pacific--as are security relationships with India, New 
Zealand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Mongolia, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the 
Marshall Islands. These arrangements have supported regional 
stability and helped facilitate the Indo-Pacific's peace and 
prosperity.
    The Biden administration has been careful in its messaging 
to avoid presenting the IPS as forcing countries to pick sides 
between the U.S. and the PRC. As Secretary Blinken said in his 
speech on U.S. policy toward China in May 2022, ``This is not 
about forcing countries to choose. It's about giving them a 
choice.'' \75\ That message should be reinforced and clarified. 
The U.S. offers the rule of law rather than coercion; support 
for civil society, human rights, and democracy rather than 
authoritarianism; and good governance, transparency, and 
accountability rather than corruption. Prioritizing host 
country-led development activities that provide high-quality 
outcomes without transactional caveats sets the U.S. apart from 
the PRC. It also increases resilience and prosperity among 
nations in the Indo-Pacific region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ U.S. Department of State, ``The Administration's Approach to 
the People's Republic of China,'' May 26, 2022.
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    The frequency and quality of the Administration's 
engagement with allies and partners have demonstrated the 
strength of President Biden's commitment to them and to the 
IPS. For example, in September 2021, President Biden hosted the 
first-ever in-person Quad Leaders' Summit, which focused on 
increasing production and access to vaccines to end the COVID-
19 pandemic; promoting high-standards infrastructure; 
addressing climate change; working jointly on emerging 
technologies, space, and cybersecurity; and enhancing people-
to-people exchange.\76\ On a visit to Korea and Japan in May 
2022, largely in pursuit of the IPS, Biden participated in a 
second in-person Quad Leaders' Summit in Tokyo, which expanded 
on many of the same themes as the first, and included the 
launch of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain 
Awareness.\77\ Before that trip, the President hosted the U.S.-
ASEAN Special Summit, held for the first time in Washington 
D.C., and recently attended the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia.\78\ 
Furthermore, in September, the Administration hosted the first-
ever U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit at the White House, 
where it unveiled the ``Pacific Partnership Strategy.'' \79\
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    \76\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders' Summit,'' Sept. 
24, 2021.
    \77\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders' Tokyo Summit 
2022,'' May 23, 2022.
    \78\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in 
Washington, DC,'' May 12, 2022; Joshua Kurlantzick, ``Reflections on 
the ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN-U.S. Summit in Cambodia,'' Council on 
Foreign Relations, Nov. 15, 2022.
    \79\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: President Biden Unveils First-
Ever Pacific Partnership Strategy,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IPS programs and policies have and should be developed in 
close consultation with countries in the region. The U.S. 
should therefore continue to engage governments and populations 
of the Indo-Pacific on an ongoing basis to gain an 
understanding of how to meet their needs. By fully considering 
the interests and aspirations of Indo-Pacific partners in 
adapting and implementing the IPS going forward, the U.S. will 
increase the chance that the strategy gains the necessary buy-
in to succeed.

Recommendations to Deepen Ties
    The Indo-Pacific Strategy rightly recognizes that the U.S.' 
rich network of allies and partners across the region is a 
source of strength. Many of the most important IPS efforts, 
therefore, will require continuous work to deepen engagement 
with these allies and partners.


   Explore ways to make U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation 
        more meaningful and resilient. Even as the U.S. is 
        working closely with Japan and Korea to modernize each 
        bilateral alliance, it is also working trilaterally 
        with the two countries to improve coordination in the 
        face of threats posed by North Korea. But the potential 
        for greater U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation extends beyond 
        North Korea to the broader Indo-Pacific. Efforts in 
        that respect may offer something of a proof-of-concept 
        for networking the current alliance system. In July 
        2022, Washington and Tokyo launched the U.S.-Japan 
        Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC)--a 
        ``2+2'' economic meeting including the Secretaries of 
        State and Commerce and their counterparts, the Japanese 
        Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Economy, Trade and 
        Industry--aimed at ``countering threats to economic 
        security and to the rules-based international economic 
        order.'' \80\ Given Korea's shared interest in the 
        EPCC's aims, as well as the country's leadership in key 
        technologies central to economic and technological 
        security, the U.S. and Japan should consider inviting 
        Korea to join the EPCC or meet in the ``2+2+2'' format 
        to address specific economic security issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ U.S. Department of State, ``Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan 
Economic Policy Consultative Committee: Strengthening Economic Security 
and the Rules-Based Order,'' July 29, 2022.


   Follow through on the U.S.' extensive commitments outlined 
        in the Pacific Partnership Strategy. In September 2022, 
        President Biden hosted the U.S.-Pacific Islands Country 
        Summit, at which assembled leaders signed the 
        Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership.\81\ The White 
        House also released a Pacific Partnership Strategy with 
        ten accompanying lines of effort.\82\ This document 
        rightly prioritizes many of the issues of greatest 
        concern to Pacific Island countries, such as investment 
        in climate change resilience efforts, support for 
        marine conservation, bolstered health architecture, and 
        promotion of economic opportunity.\83\ As some Pacific 
        Island leaders have criticized U.S. administrations for 
        failing to follow through on commitments to the region, 
        it is important that the Biden administration, in 
        consultation with Congress, adequately prioritize and 
        resource these efforts. The U.S. should finalize 
        negotiations and enhance consultations with Congress 
        regarding the Compacts of Free Association for the 
        Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
        and Palau, which are set to expire in 2023 with the 
        Marshall Islands and Micronesia and in 2024 with 
        Palau.\84\ Successful conclusion of these agreements is 
        a prerequisite for continued U.S. credibility in the 
        Pacific Islands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ The White House, ``Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership,'' 
Sept. 29, 2022.
    \82\ The White House, Pacific Partnership Strategy, Sept. 2022.
    \83\ Id.
    \84\ U.S. Department of the Interior, ``Compacts of Free 
Association,'' Office of Insular Affairs, accessed Nov. 21, 2022.


   Expand the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) initiative. 
        In June 2022, the Biden administration announced PBP, 
        which brings together the U.S., Australia, Japan, New 
        Zealand, and the United Kingdom to ameliorate the 
        existential threat climate change poses to the Pacific 
        Island Countries.\85\ Focusing on six pillars, the PBP 
        takes a collaborative, multi-sectoral approach to 
        building resilience in Pacific Island countries.\86\ 
        Initiatives like the PBP are critical to these 
        countries' survival as sea levels rise. Climate change 
        devastates economic well-being and eliminates physical 
        land, infrastructure, and cultural heritage sites. 
        President Biden must continue to build support among 
        new partners--like Canada, Germany, France, the 
        European Union, the Republic of Korea, and India--who 
        are newly-engaged.\87\ The Administration should 
        leverage new USG-led programs such as the ``Resilient 
        Pacific Blue Economy Program'' to crowd in new public-
        private investment in our Pacific Island partner 
        countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Roadmap for a 21st-Centuary 
U.S.-Pacific Island Partnership,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
    \86\ The six pillars are as follows: ``climate change resilience, 
adaptation, and disasters; secure and resilient technology and 
connectivity; protection of the ocean and environment; people centered 
development; resources and economic development; and political 
leadership and regionalism.''
    \87\ Id.


   Routinize the Quad. The Biden administration has invested 
        heavily in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which 
        has become a versatile and important new element of the 
        Indo-Pacific diplomatic and security architecture, 
        engaged in issues from vaccine provision to critical 
        and emerging technologies. New initiatives within the 
        Quad can take years to mature, and the Administration 
        should continue to invest patiently in the dialogue. 
        The Quad is an informal body without a secretariat, 
        budget, or binding commitments by its members.\88\ This 
        informality has allowed for flexibility and appeals to 
        its members--particularly India. The Quad does not need 
        a formal secretariat, but as its ambitions and agenda 
        continue to grow, the Administration should continue to 
        take steps to institutionalize a more routine tempo of 
        meetings, preparatory consultations, and structured 
        working groups. Moreover, there have been proposals for 
        ``Quad-Plus'' arrangements that go beyond the dialogues 
        to date on health security; the Quad may be 
        sufficiently mature that countries such as South Korea 
        or France could be invited to Quad-Plus dialogues on 
        certain issues.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Patrick Gerard and Benjamin Rimland, ``Defining the Diamond: 
The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,'' 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mar. 16, 2020.
    \89\ Jyotsna Mehra, ``An Evolving Agenda for the Quad,'' The 
Stimson Center, June 7, 2022.


   Deepen U.S.-ASEAN ties. The Joint Vision Statement from the 
        2022 ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit outlined a wide range of 
        areas in which the U.S., ASEAN, and its member states 
        will partner. These include health security, economic 
        ties, maritime cooperation, technology, climate change, 
        security, and people-to-people connectivity.\90\ Even 
        though engagements with ASEAN often move at a slow 
        pace, it is important that senior administration 
        leaders continue to participate in ASEAN's major 
        gatherings and that the U.S. government remains 
        attentive to the diverse array of interests and 
        concerns expressed by member countries. The 
        Administration should prioritize building up ASEAN as 
        an institution and bilateral engagement with ASEAN 
        member states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ The White House, ``ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit 2022, Joint 
Vision Statement,'' May 13, 2022.


   Advancing AUKUS in the near term. The Administration's 
        September 2021 announcement of the ambitious Australia-
        United Kingdom-U.S. Partnership has been followed by 
        interagency efforts to determine a path to realize this 
        goal.\91\ The Administration should work closely with 
        Congress throughout this process and ensure that 
        thorough consultations, including on safeguards, are 
        prioritized to facilitate congressional consideration 
        of any agreement. Because capabilities will likely not 
        be delivered for some time, it will also be important 
        to identify areas where the AUKUS partnership can 
        deepen trilateral cooperation on security issues in the 
        near-to-medium term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Implementation of the 
Australia--United Kingdom--U.S. Partnership (AUKUS),'' Apr. 5, 2022.


   Support a strong and democratic India. The U.S. and the PRC 
        vie for the position of India's largest trading 
        partner, with India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
        reporting in June 2022 that trade with the U.S. 
        exceeded that of China, an important marker in the 
        increasingly close ties between Washington and New 
        Delhi.\92\ Indeed, the relationship between the world's 
        two largest democracies has been on an upward 
        trajectory for more than two decades, overcoming Cold 
        War antagonism and division over India's nuclear 
        program and the country's testing of a nuclear device 
        in 1998. Security ties have deepened dramatically in 
        recent years as both countries are increasingly 
        concerned about the implications of a more assertive 
        China. The U.S. and India are now Major Defense 
        Partners and the two countries have launched a new 
        Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies to 
        enhance cooperation on quantum computing, 5G and 6G 
        networks, space, semiconductors, biotech, and 
        artificial intelligence.\93\ Even as the Administration 
        rightly treats India as an important security partner, 
        it will need to address the very real complications of 
        India's continued ties with, and dependence on, Russia 
        for defense equipment and its recent downward trend of 
        democratic values and institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ ``U.S. Becomes India's Largest Trade Partner, is China Trade 
Decoupling?,'' The Economic Times, updated June 21, 2022.
    \93\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``Joint India-U.S. Statement on 
the Visit of Secretary of Defense Carter to India,'' U.S. Department of 
Defense, Dec. 8, 2016; The White House, ``Readout of President Biden's 
Meeting with Prime Minister Modi of India,'' May 24, 2022. The White 
House, ``FACT SHEET: United States and India Elevate Strategic 
Partnership with the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology 
(iCET),'' Jan. 31, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



                               CONCLUSION


    The IPS reflects the U.S.' growing reliance on the Indo-
Pacific for U.S. prosperity and security and on ``the fact that 
the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from 
the People's Republic of China (PRC).'' The Biden 
administration was correct not to make its Indo-Pacific 
strategy solely about competition with the PRC, but if it is to 
succeed, it has to grapple with the realities of this 
competition for the U.S. and the challenges it poses for our 
regional allies and partners.
    The IPS states, ``We will also seek to manage competition 
with the PRC responsibly. We will cooperate with our allies and 
partners while seeking to work with the PRC in areas like 
climate change and nonproliferation.'' \94\ Responsible 
management of the China challenge and working with allies and 
partners to address coercive PRC activities are key 
distinctions of the Biden administration's IPS and are critical 
to the policy's long-term success. This can and should include 
deeper dialogues with allies and partners on the full spectrum 
of challenges from enhancing supply chain security, to 
providing quality infrastructure alternatives, to growing their 
support for bolstering Taiwan's military and economic 
resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 
Feb. 11, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Responsible management of this challenge also means working 
with the PRC where we can. Unfortunately, after Speaker 
Pelosi's trip to Taiwan, the PRC unilaterally suspended 
discussions with the U.S. on climate change, illegal drugs, and 
other transnational issues.\95\ Reviving those discussions, and 
ensuring they achieve tangible results, would demonstrate that 
the U.S. and China can address critical matters of mutual 
interest even amid heightened tensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ Johnson Lai, ``China Halts Climate and Military Dialogue with 
the U.S. over Pelosi's Taiwan Visit,'' Politico, Aug. 5, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bipartisan support for the main objectives of the IPS and 
its underlying premise regarding the growing importance of the 
Indo-Pacific remains strong, given the close parallels to Indo-
Pacific strategies offered by previous administrations of both 
parties over the past two decades, but should not be taken for 
granted. Maintaining bipartisan support for the IPS will 
require the Administration to engage more closely with 
Congress, as well as with the U.S. public, to explain the 
rationale behind the strategy, and the benefits to the American 
people of prioritizing U.S. funding and engagement in this 
dynamic region.



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