[Senate Prints 118-15]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
118th Congress } { S. Prt.
1st Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { 118-15
______________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT:
THE IMPERATIVE OF RESOURCING
THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
__________
A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
February 16, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-148 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Key Recommendations.............................................. 1
Background....................................................... 4
Realizing the Indo-Pacific Strategy.............................. 6
Adequately Resource the Indo-Pacific Strategy................ 6
Advance U.S. Leadership on Trade and Economic Integration.... 10
Promote Democracy and Human Rights........................... 13
Bolster Deterrence through Security and Non-Security Efforts. 14
Invest in Public Diplomacy Efforts and Expand People-to-
People Ties................................................ 18
Deepen Engagements with Allies and Partners.................. 20
Conclusion....................................................... 24
Figures and Tables............................................... 25
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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In 2014, I released a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Majority staff report titled ``Rebalancing the Rebalance:
Resourcing U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific
Region,'' which examined the Obama administration's progress in
reorienting the United States' national security strategy
towards the Asia-Pacific. In that report, I argued that the
rebalance was the right decision for the United States and our
national security interests, but in order to be successful, the
Administration must be willing to expend political capital to
ensure that the strategy is fully and adequately resourced.
Nine years, two administrations, and numerous strategies
later, the recommendations made in this report are regrettably
very similar.
The U.S. government needs to approach the Indo-Pacific
region with a well-resourced, whole-of-government approach that
synchronizes the military-security elements with diplomatic,
economic, and civil society elements so that all move in
concert with one another to ensure the greatest chance of
success.
I believe that President Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy,
released one year ago, adopts this whole-of-government
approach. If fully equipped with the tools that it needs to be
successful, this strategy will underpin the United States'
leadership in the most consequential and dynamic region of the
world in the 21st century.
In order to achieve this, we must be willing to make tough
decisions. First, the Administration must make tradeoffs to
ensure that funding aligns with its strategy. Reallocating
funding within the international affairs Function 150 account
will be necessary, but will not be sufficient. The
Administration must expend the political capital necessary to
end decades of underfunding diplomacy and development agencies
and to ensure that they are equipped both to advance U.S.
interests in Asia and to compete with the People's Republic of
China globally. Second, the Administration must actively
cultivate Congress as a full partner in modernizing U.S.
diplomatic and development tools and to shore up bipartisan
support investment in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the
Administration needs to advance an ambitious, substantive
economic agenda that expands opportunities for U.S. businesses
and leverages the United States' unique advantages in working
with and through our allies and partners.
(v)
In the 117th Congress, the Administration and Congress
worked together to pass landmark legislation to invest in our
domestic competitiveness. In the 118th Congress, I stand ready
to work with the Executive Branch and my colleagues on the Hill
to ensure that we do the same for American leadership abroad.
Strategically aligning our resources and improving the
institutional capacity of our diplomatic and development
agencies are essential to realizing the promise of the Indo-
Pacific Strategy and ensuring that the United States is
prepared to tackle the challenges ahead.
Sincerely,
Robert Menendez, Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In February 2022, President Biden released his Indo-Pacific
Strategy (IPS) ``to strengthen our long-term position in and
commitment to the Indo-Pacific'' in response to the region's
increasing importance to the U.S. and to China's growing
influence and aggressive behavior.\1\ The IPS builds on similar
efforts of the previous three administrations and offers a
long-term vision for a ``free and open, connected, prosperous,
secure and resilient'' Indo-Pacific based on ``unprecedented
cooperation'' between the U.S. and its allies and partners both
within and outside the region.\2\
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\1\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,
Feb. 11, 2022.
\2\ Id.
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The strategy presents five broad goals to achieve its
vision: advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific; building
connections within and beyond the region; driving regional
prosperity; bolstering regional security; and developing
resilience to transnational threats. It also lists ten core
``lines of effort'' to be implemented within 24 months to help
realize these goals.
The IPS's vision is commendable, and President Biden and
others at the highest levels of his Administration are deeply
engaged in implementing the strategy. In the year leading up to
the release of the IPS and in the months after, the
Administration made significant progress in a number of areas.
This report offers recommendations as to how the Administration
should sharpen the strategy's aims and better ensure adequate
resourcing of its efforts.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Adequately Resource the Strategy: The Biden administration
must ensure the IPS has the funds it needs for success.
Despite four successive administrations identifying
Asia as a priority region for U.S. attention and
assistance, none have made the necessary tradeoffs to
ensure that resources are allocated in a manner
commensurate with such prioritization. The
Administration must significantly increase funding for
diplomatic and development agencies across the U.S.
government, and dedicate a larger portion of the
Department of State operating budget and U.S. foreign
assistance to advance priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
To further IPS goals, it must also incentivize other
U.S. agencies like the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. Trade and
Development Agency (USTDA), and the Export-Import Bank
to increase grants, loans, and other financing programs
in the Indo-Pacific while leveraging International
Financial Institutions (IFIs).
Cultivate Congress as a Key Partner: Congress should be
made an active partner to ensure sufficient allocation
of resources to the Indo-Pacific, to provide new
authorities if and when needed, and to engage in
effective oversight. The Administration should provide
Congress with a full, detailed, and prioritized list of
its plans for implementing the IPS, updated as
necessary. The plan should include associated
resourcing requirements as well as data that can be
used to set benchmark resource allocations to the Indo-
Pacific. Finally, the Administration should provide
Congress with a list of designated officials in each
department who are responsible for implementing the
IPS.
Advance Economic Integration: The IPS must include a
substantive and action-oriented economic agenda that is
responsive to our allies' and partners' calls for
increased U.S. economic engagement. This includes: (1)
pressing for concrete deliverables from the Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) that
offer meaningful benefits for IPEF members; (2) taking
full advantage of the U.S.' hosting this year's Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leader's Meeting by
showcasing what the U.S. private sector can deliver,
particularly in energy infrastructure and digital
technology; (3) stepping up consultations with like-
minded partners on sensitive export control issues; and
(4) prioritizing a meaningful trade program with Taiwan
under the U.S. Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade
while not precluding Taiwan's future inclusion in IPEF.
Democracy and Human Rights: At the center of the IPS lies
the promotion of democracy and human rights. By
advancing these universal values, which are vital to
long-term stability and prosperity, the Administration
will underscore its commitment. Such efforts will also
demonstrate that the U.S. envisions a future for the
region that embraces democracy and human rights across
the diverse political and social context in the Indo-
Pacific.
Bolster Deterrence through Security and Non-Security
Efforts: While the IPS was right to focus on non-
military tools of national power, the roles that non-
military agencies play on security issues need to be
clearly defined. This will be important in reassuring
U.S. partners of the strategy's broader trade,
economic, and diplomatic aims and to avoid the
perception that it contributes to an unnecessary
intensification of great power rivalry. This includes:
(1) clarifying what ``integrated deterrence'' in the
Indo-Pacific means and explaining how the Department of
State, USAID, and economic agencies' unique roles,
resources, and authorities contribute to integrated
deterrence; (2) pursuing coordinated efforts to deter
coercive PRC actions against Taiwan and other regional
partners, including through the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (``the Quad''), combined planning
activities with partners such as Japan, Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, and India; and (3)
establishing communications channels with Beijing to
reduce the risk of miscalculation and to provide
openings for engagement on opportunities for conflict
de-escalation and cooperation on issues like climate
change, illegal drugs, and nonproliferation.
Expand Investment in Public Diplomacy Efforts and People-
to-People Ties: To advance our values in the Indo-
Pacific region, the U.S. must leverage its comparative
advantage through expanding people-to-people ties. The
U.S. must also improve our ability to counter
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. The
Administration should: (1) reassess the funding,
impact, and policy coordination among entities involved
in public diplomacy, information sharing, and
countering disinformation; (2) strengthen collaboration
between American and regional students by shortening
visa-processing times and addressing barriers to
working in the U.S. after graduation; (3) provide
additional scholarships and administrative support to
increase the scope and scale of professional education
programs such as the U.S.-ASEAN and U.S.-Pacific
Institutes for Rising Leaders; and (4) cultivate
regional expertise at home by expanding funding for
U.S. students, academics, and experts to develop
expertise on the Indo-Pacific, including through
public-private partnerships.
Prioritize Strategic Investments: The PRC's Belt and Road
Initiative and Digital Silk Road have expanded
worldwide with the aim of growing PRC investments and
resource acquisition abroad. This has increased the
number of countries indebted to China and expanded the
PRC's sphere of influence. To compete globally, the
U.S. and our partners must strive to provide
alternative financing and economic development
projects. The U.S. should not seek to challenge every
investment, but should prioritize based on our
strategic interests, taking into account strategic
locations and strategic sectors such as clean energy,
transportation and shipping infrastructure, and digital
infrastructure.
Deepen Engagements with Allies and Partners: Many of the
most important IPS efforts will require deepening
engagement with our network of allies and partners
across the region. The Administration should: (1)
leverage opportunities to make U.S.-Japan-Republic of
Korea (ROK) trilateral cooperation more meaningful and
resilient; (2) follow through on the Pacific
Partnership Strategy by prioritizing and resourcing its
commitments related to climate change resilience; (3)
continue efforts to routinize the Quad through a
consistent tempo of meetings and preparatory
consultations and deepen cooperation among working
groups; (4) bolster U.S.-ASEAN ties by prioritizing
bilateral engagement with ASEAN members and the
institution itself; (5) advance the Australia-United
Kingdom-United States trilateral security partnership
(AUKUS) and renewal of the Compacts of Free Association
(COFA) by working closely with Congress to facilitate
congressional consideration of any agreements; and (6)
encourage a stronger democratic India as our two
nations deepen cooperation on issues such as defense,
emerging technology, and maritime security.
BACKGROUND
The global economic and strategic center of gravity has
shifted decisively to the Indo-Pacific, and its importance to
the U.S. has grown commensurately. The region is home to more
than half of the world's population, accounts for 60 percent of
its GDP, and is expected to contribute to two-thirds of global
economic growth in coming years.\3\ Two-way trade between the
U.S. and countries in the Indo-Pacific amounted to $1.75
trillion in 2020, and three million American jobs are directly
dependent on U.S. economic ties to the region.\4\
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\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
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At the same time, the rise of the PRC as an economic and
military power is reshaping the ways in which the U.S.
perceives and pursues its interests in the region. With an
economy already roughly equal in size to that of the U.S. by
some measures, levels of trade that make it the top economic
partner of many countries in the region, an increasingly
powerful military, growing technological prowess, expansive
investments in regional infrastructure--including coal-fired
power plants--and a clear willingness to use economic and
military coercion to achieve its ambitions, the PRC has been
asserting itself in the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage.
The PRC's efforts constitute a significant challenge to
American interests, regional stability, and global greenhouse
gas emissions reductions.
Across four administrations, the U.S. has sought to
effectively respond to China's rise and to the increasing
importance of the Indo-Pacific. While U.S. approaches have
evolved over time, they have all shared several essential
elements. As early as 2001, the George W. Bush administration
identified the rise of China as the most serious threat to U.S.
long-term interests.\5\ In 2004, it issued a Global Posture
Review, which called for an enhanced American force posture in
the Asia-Pacific to counter the PRC's growing ambitions.\6\
That same year, the Bush administration completed an
interagency Asia strategy that sought to shape Beijing's
decision-making by working with allies and partners to dissuade
the PRC from achieving regional hegemony.\7\
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\5\ Nina Silove, ``The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to
Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,'' International Security, Vol.
40(4), Apr. 1, 2016, at 57.
\6\ Robert Critchlow, U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New
Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress, Congressional Research
Service, Oct. 31, 2005.
\7\ Nina Silove, ``The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to
Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,'' International Security, Vol.
40(4), Apr. 1, 2016, at 61-66.
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The Obama administration followed with its 2011 strategy to
``rebalance'' to Asia.\8\ Composed of integrated economic,
military, and diplomatic programs and policies, the strategy
was designed to address the negative aspects of the PRC's rise
and to ensure our regional partners' resilience. Dr. Kurt
Campbell, one of the strategy's foremost architects,
characterized the rebalance as ``bolstering traditional
alliances, forging new partnerships, engaging regional
institutions, diversifying military forces, defending
democratic values, embracing economic statecraft, and
developing a truly multifaceted and comprehensive approach to
an increasingly assertive and capable China.'' \9\ Importantly,
this strategy was also informed by the 2009 National
Intelligence Council report released on the Indo-Pacific
region's vulnerability to climate change. The report found that
``[t]here is overwhelming evidence that climate change will
impact a variety of sectors in Southeast Asia and Pacific
Islands through 2030.'' \10\
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\8\ Mark Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administration's ``Rebalancing'' Toward Asia, Congressional Research
Service, Mar. 28, 2012.
\9\ Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in
Asia, at 7 (June 7, 2016).
\10\ ``Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands: The Impacts of Climate
Change to 2030: A Commissioned Research Report''. NIC 2009-06D,
National Intelligence Council, Aug. 2009.
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While the Obama administration's strategy included modest
changes to military posture and increased high-level diplomatic
engagement, the centerpiece of the strategy was the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement among 12 countries
in the Indo-Pacific (not including the PRC), which together
constituted 40 percent of the global economy. The TPP aimed to
set the rules for expanded regional trade and investment.\11\
In 2016, the Obama administration completed TPP negotiations,
but the agreement did not have sufficient congressional support
for passage and it was not ratified.\12\
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\11\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Trans-Pacific
Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives,'' Oct. 4, 2015.
\12\ Mike DeBonis et al., ``The Trans-Pacific Partnership is Dead,
Schumer Tells Labor Leaders,'' The Washington Post, Nov. 10, 2016.
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The Trump administration characterized Beijing as a
strategic competitor across economic, political, and military
domains. The Administration's 2017 National Security Strategy
called the PRC a challenge to ``American power, influence, and
interests, attempting to erode American security and
prosperity.'' The 2018 National Defense Strategy stated:
``China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to
intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the
South China Sea.'' \13\ The Trump administration's declassified
2018 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific called for
the U.S. to maintain ``strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific
region and promote a liberal economic order while preventing
China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence,
and cultivating areas of cooperation to promote regional peace
and prosperity.''\14\ In 2019, the Department of State issued a
report entitled ``A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a
Shared Vision,'' which outlined a strategy for enhancing U.S.
engagement with regional allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific, increasing U.S. support for infrastructure development
in the region, championing good governance, and upgrading
military ties to deter adversaries.\15\ However, these
strategies were undermined by President Trump's attempts to
dramatically reduce federal resources to non-military agencies
and his unpredictable and damaging behavior toward U.S. allies
and partners. An account of the Trump administration's assault
of American diplomacy can be found in a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Democratic staff report ``Diplomacy in
Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the State
Department,'' published in July 2020.\16\
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\13\ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, Dec. 18, 2017; U.S. Department of Defense, National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Jan. 19 2018.
\14\ U.S. National Security Council, U.S. Strategic Framework for
the Indo-Pacific, Jan. 5, 2021.
\15\ U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Advancing a Shared Vision, Nov. 4, 2019.
\16\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democratic Staff Report,
Diplomacy in Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the State
Department, July 28, 2020.
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The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, released
in February 2022, is premised on views similar to those of
prior administrations from both political parties. It
recognizes the Indo-Pacific's increasing importance as well as
the PRC's growing influence, aggressive behavior, and
intentions. The IPS's goal is to achieve ``an Indo-Pacific that
is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and
resilient'' and in order to ``realize that future, the U.S.
will strengthen our own role while reinforcing the region
itself.'' \17\ To that end, the IPS also recommends diplomatic,
economic, and military efforts for the Indo-Pacific that are
broadly similar to those of its predecessors.\18\
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\17\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,
Feb. 11, 2022.
\18\ Id.
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The IPS recognizes that cooperation with allies and
partners is critical to the strategy's success. It states:
``the essential feature of this approach is that it cannot be
accomplished alone: changing strategic circumstances and
historic challenges require unprecedented cooperation with
those who share in this vision.''\19\ Indeed, U.S. partners
both within the Indo-Pacific and beyond have offered their own
approaches that complement the IPS. These include Japan's Free
and Open Indo-Pacific concept; India's Act East policy; South
Korea's New Southern Policy, ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific, Taiwan's New Southbound Policy, the United Kingdom's
Indo-Pacific Tilt; France's Indo-Pacific Strategy; Germany's
policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific; Canada's Indo-Pacific
Strategy; and the European Union's Strategy for Cooperation in
the Indo-Pacific.\20\ All of these strategies recognize that
the Indo-Pacific's changing strategic and economic landscape
poses risks to regional peace and stability as well as to the
existing rules-based international order.
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\19\ Id.
\20\ See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ``Japan's
Effort for a `Free and Open Indo-Pacific,' '' Mar. 2021, https://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf; Dhruva Jaishankar, ``Acting East:
India in the Indo-Pacific,'' Brookings Institutions, Oct. 24, 2019;
John Nilsson-Wright & Yu Jie, ``South Korean Foreign Policy Innovation
Amid Sino-U.S. Rivalry,'' Chatham House, July 22, 2021; Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, June 23,
2019; Hunter Marston & Richard Bush, ``Taiwan's Engagement with
Southeast Asia is Making Progress Under the New Southbound Policy,''
Brookings Institute, July 30, 2018; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury,
``Understanding the UK's `tilt' towards the Indo-Pacific,''
International Institute for International Studies, Apr. 15, 2021;
French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France's Indo-Pacific
Strategy, Feb. 2022; Frederic Grare, ``Germany's New Approach to the
Indo-Pacific,'' Carnegie Endowment, Oct. 15, 2020; Global Affairs
Canada, Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy, Nov. 2022; European Union, EU
Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Feb. 21, 2022.
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REALIZING THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
Adequately Resource the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Driving new resources to the Indo-Pacific will be critical
to the IPS's success. Though the Biden administration has not
yet produced a public list of specific programs and policies
within the strategy's ``core lines of effort,'' its budget
allocations for foreign assistance and non-foreign assistance
program operations to the Indo-Pacific compared to previous
years, as well as the percentage of assistance allocations to
the region could indicate if the resources the Administration
seeks for the Indo-Pacific region are commensurate with the
ambitions of the IPS.
The Administration's FY 2023 request for foreign assistance
for the Indo-Pacific constituted only a marginal increase (3.8
percent) over FY 2022 allocations and the share of assistance
directed to the region remains under eight percent of overall
foreign aid spending (see Figures 1 and 2). Since FY 2014, the
Department of State's allocations for the Indo-Pacific for non-
foreign assistance program operations (e.g., diplomatic
programs and public diplomacy) have never amounted to more than
one-fifth of total spending globally (see Figure 4). The
information available on the activities of the MCC (see Figure
7), Ex-Im Bank (see Figure 8), DFC (see Figure 5), and USTDA
(see Figure 6) aimed at the Indo-Pacific predate the launch of
the IPS.
Given the importance of the Indo-Pacific to the U.S., the
Administration should direct more substantial funding to the
region, including by raising the percentage of overall foreign
assistance provided. While the Administration appears to be
hard at work developing activities across many of the IPS's
``core lines of effort,'' it has failed to adequately consult
with Congress. Assessing the IPS's full resourcing needs will
continue to be challenging without more detailed, programmatic
information on the Administration's efforts.
Recommendations on Resourcing
The IPS's success depends on adequate resourcing. While
four successive administrations have identified Asia as a
priority region, they have not expended the political capital
necessary to meaningfully expand and modernize U.S. diplomatic
and development agencies, or to make the necessary tradeoffs to
ensure that resources are allocated in a manner commensurate
with the region's strategic importance. To achieve this goal,
the Administration should cultivate Congress as a key partner
in the effort. Congress should receive information to inform
effective oversight, justify new authorities, and understand
the strategic case for allocating additional resources to the
Indo-Pacific.
Seek additional resources and allocate a larger portion of
foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific. While the Indo-
Pacific represents 60 percent of global GDP and more
than half of the world's population, the
Administration's FY 2023 assistance request for the
region amounts to $1.7 billion. This is only
incrementally more than requested in the previous year
and represents only 7.7 percent of the overall foreign
assistance budget (see Figures 1 and 2). Even
accounting for the value of longstanding assistance to
key partners in the Middle East and Europe, this
foreign assistance allocation to the Indo-Pacific is
incommensurate with its strategic and economic
importance (see Figure 2).
Invest a higher percentage of the Department of State's
operating budget in the Indo-Pacific. The Department of
State's operations budget, which supports overseas
posts and domestic operations, is similarly
underweighted in the Indo-Pacific. The FY 2023 request
for the region was less than 20 percent of the overall
request (see Figure 4). Those allocations have remained
relatively flat since FY 2014 (see Figures 3 and 4). If
the Administration is serious about elevating the
importance of the Indo-Pacific and is committed to the
breadth of efforts outlined in the IPS, this proportion
must increase.
Incentivize other U.S. agencies to increase their grants,
loans, and other financing programs in the Indo-
Pacific. While the USTDA, DFC, and Export-Import Bank
are generally demand-driven in terms of the funds they
offer, they can seek to attract applications through
outreach in priority sectors or regions. In recent
years, these agencies' funds for activities in the
Indo-Pacific represent a far smaller portion of their
overall funding than is suggested by the economic
importance of the region, and in some cases, the monies
mobilized in the Indo-Pacific have declined in relative
or absolute terms (see Figure 5 for DFC and Figure 6
for USTDA). For example, the MCC has worked in only
seven Indo-Pacific nations since its inception in FY
2003 and currently has active compacts only with
Mongolia, Nepal, and Timor-Leste. As part of its IPS
implementation guidance for the Indo-Pacific Strategy,
the White House should require each of these agencies
to report how they intend, over the next 24 months, to
expand their Indo-Pacific portfolios. As MCC's program
constraints limit its operations to low and lower-
middle income countries (LICs and LMICs), MCC should
continue to work with Congress to expand its country
candidate pool.
Address impediments to increasing the number of Peace Corps
Volunteers in the Indo-Pacific and expanding to
additional countries in the region. Peace Corps
Volunteers offer an important means of demonstrating
U.S. commitment to countries in the Indo-Pacific and
strengthening people-to-people ties. As shown in Figure
9, while Volunteer levels in the Pacific Islands peaked
in 2017 and have since declined, the number of
Volunteers in the Indo-Pacific has remained somewhat
steady over the past decade. While the Administration
has announced that the Peace Corps will return to Fiji,
Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu, it is unclear how many
Volunteers will be sent when Peace Corps returns to
historic Volunteer levels.\21\ The Administration has
also said that it will explore expanding the Peace
Corps to additional Pacific Island countries, though no
timeline has been given.\22\ That exploration should be
expedited and coupled with an interagency strategy and
appropriate resources to address fiscal and security
concerns so that Volunteers can be sent to new
countries as soon as possible.
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\21\ The White House, ``Fact Sheet: President Biden Unveils First-
Ever Pacific Partnership Strategy,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
\22\ Id.
Continue to work closely with allies and partners to
provide infrastructure investment and development
options to Indo-Pacific countries. Beyond its
individual efforts, the U.S. is working with other
countries to drive resources to the Indo-Pacific. For
example, as an alternative to the PRC's Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), in June 2022, the G7 announced the
launch of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment (PGII), to mobilize $600 billion in private
capital by 2027.\23\ PGII has the potential to offer
values-driven, transparent infrastructure opportunities
as opposed to those of the BRI, which have often been
plagued by poor governance, non-transparency, and
corruption.\24\ The Administration should continue to
partner with countries such as Japan to provide high-
quality infrastructure options in the region. The U.S.
should redouble efforts to work with partners to
provide alternatives on the digital infrastructure side
as well.
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\23\ The White House, ``U.S.-Indonesia-EU Joint Statement on
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,'' Nov. 15, 2022.
\24\ Jonathan Hillman, ``Corruption Flows Along China's Belt and
Road,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jan. 18, 2019.
Ensure that the U.S. leverages International Financial
Institutions to further its IPS goals. The
Administration should use its leadership positions at
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
Multilateral Development Banks, and the G7 to showcase
the benefits of the U.S.-led international order. This
includes fostering economic development, ensuring
global economic stability, combatting climate change,
and reducing poverty around the world. The U.S. should
align its voice and vote at these institutions with the
goals of the Indo-Pacific Strategy to ensure that we
are able to effectively communicate the tangible
benefits of our global economic leadership versus the
strategic and economic risks that can result from
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becoming heavily indebted to the PRC.
Provide Congress with a full, detailed, and prioritized
list of the Administration's plans for implementing the
IPS and its associated resourcing requirements. If
Congress is to appropriate funds for ambitious IPS
activities, it needs significantly greater detail about
the Administration's priorities, plans, and intentions
to increase operational spending, program spending, and
financing to the Indo-Pacific.
Provide Congress with data for resource allocation
benchmarks. Resourcing the Indo-Pacific Strategy will
require that the agencies administering funds and
programs are matched by an adequate number of
personnel. While Congress and the Congressional
Research Service made a concerted attempt to obtain
data on personnel allocations to the Indo-Pacific from
all the key agencies involved in the IPS, little
information was obtained. Figure 10 and Table 1 show
the information provided by USAID. If Congress is going
to authorize funds commensurate with the region's
importance, it will require more detailed information
from which to benchmark current Administration efforts.
To the extent that there are internal impediments to
collecting and analyzing this data, the Administration
should prioritize efforts to overcome these challenges,
and inform Congress of those efforts.
Identify designated officials at each department and agency
responsible for the implementation of the IPS and
ensure that they have a meaningful voice in determining
relevant staffing and resource allocations. Almost 20
federal departments and agencies are involved in an
ongoing Interagency Policy Committee process led by the
National Security Council to carry out the IPS.
However, only the Department of State and USAID have
designated officials to coordinate IPS efforts in which
these agencies are engaged. Given the scope of efforts
under their jurisdiction, it is particularly important
that the Department of Commerce, the Department of
Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Trade
Representative, the International Development Finance
Corporation, the Department of Defense, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff designate IPS coordinators
expeditiously.
Advance U.S. Leadership on Trade and Economic Integration
When President Trump formally withdrew from the TPP in
2017, doubts about America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific
grew precipitously, to the PRC's benefit.\25\ The remaining
members of the TPP forged ahead to create the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),
with the hope that the U.S. might eventually join.\26\ The PRC
formally applied to join the CPTPP in 2021.\27\
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\25\ Yuka Hayashi, ``U.S. on Sidelines as China and Other Asia-
Pacific Nations Launch Trade Pact,'' Wall Street Journal, Jan. 1, 2022.
\26\ James McBride et al., ``What's Next for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP),'' Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 20, 2021.
\27\ Joanna Shelton, ``Look Skeptically at China's CPTPP
Application,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nov. 18,
2021.
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Rather than pursue joining the CPTPP, the Biden
administration has offered a new economic initiative that
signals the U.S.' intention to enhance its economic engagement
in the Indo-Pacific. During his May 2022 visit to Japan,
President Biden announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) with 12 countries from
the Indo-Pacific, not including the PRC.\28\ Shortly
thereafter, Fiji joined as well.\29\ IPEF will cover a broad
range of other issues under four pillars: trade; supply chains;
clean economy; and fair economy, with member countries given
the choice of which pillars to join.\30\ The Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative leads the first pillar, while the
Department of Commerce facilitates the latter three.\31\
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\28\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a
Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
for Prosperity,'' May 23, 2022.
\29\ The White House, ``Statement by National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan on Fiji Joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
Prosperity,'' May 26, 2022.
\30\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a
Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
for Prosperity,'' May 23, 2022.
\31\ The White House, ``On-the-Record Press Call on the Launch of
the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,'' May 23, 2022.
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The aims of the four IPEF pillars were defined in September
2022 at IPEF's first in-person ministerial meeting.\32\
Notably, within the trade pillar, member countries committed to
promoting trade facilitation and digital trade, advancing food
security and good regulatory practices, and ensuring that labor
and environmental issues remained at the core of
discussions.\33\ On supply chains, the focus is to identify and
increase investment in critical sectors and goods, establish an
information-sharing and crisis response mechanism, and
strengthen supply chain logistics.\34\ The clean economy pillar
states that countries will seek ``to advance cooperation on
clean energy and climate-friendly technologies, as well as
mobilize investment and promote usage of low- and zero-
emissions goods and services.'' \35\ The fair economy pillar
will focus on ``preventing and combatting corruption, curbing
tax evasion, and enhancing transparency.'' \36\ The first
negotiating round of IPEF was held in Brisbane, Australia in
December 2022.\37\
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\32\ Aidan Arasasingham et al., ``IPEF Comes into Focus at LA
Ministerial,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sept.
12, 2022.
\33\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``U.S. and Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework Partners Announce Negotiation Objectives,''
Sept. 9, 2022.
\34\ Id.
\35\ Id.
\36\ Id.
\37\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Joint USTR and
Department of Commerce Readout of the First Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework Negotiating Round.'' Dec. 15, 2022.
Recommendations to Advance Economic Integration
If the IPS is to succeed, it must include a substantive and
action-oriented economic agenda. This engagement should be
responsive to the demand signals of our regional allies and
partners for increasing U.S. economic engagement in the region.
Ensure IPEF's longevity. IPEF, the main economic element of
the IPS, is the U.S.' first major foray into shaping
the Indo-Pacific's economic architecture since the U.S.
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017.
Regional support expressed for IPEF at this early stage
indicates that, over time, IPEF has the potential to
meaningfully contribute to regional economic
integration. However, the Administration must ensure
that IPEF is developed in a manner that demonstrates
the U.S.' long-term commitment to regional economic
integration and provides stability and dependability to
the U.S. private sector and IPEF partner countries. To
ensure the longevity of IPEF, the Administration must
work with Congress to arrive at a common understanding
of its scope, approval, and implementation. Absent such
a process, it will not be possible to build an
agreement that is as meaningful and durable as U.S.
interests require.
Prioritize a meaningful trade program with Taiwan. Taiwan's
exclusion from IPEF sent an unfortunate signal,
particularly in light of the fact that half the Members
of the House and Senate expressed support for Taipei's
participation.\38\ The Administration should prioritize
negotiating a meaningful agreement under the U.S.-
Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, which was
launched alongside IPEF, while not precluding the
possibility of Taiwan's future inclusion in IPEF.\39\
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\38\ See, e.g., ``Menendez, Risch Lead 50 Colleagues in Letter to
POTUS Championing Taiwan's Inclusion in Proposed Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF),'' U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Press
Release, May 18, 2022; Steven Chabot, ``Chabot and Taiwan Caucus Urge
Commerce, USTR to Include Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework,'' Office of Congressman Steve Chabot Press Release, Mar. 31,
2022.
\39\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``U.S. and Taiwan
Announce the Launch of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century
Trade,'' USTR Press Release, June 1, 2022.
Take advantage of the U.S. hosting the APEC Leaders Meeting
in 2023. The U.S. APEC host year is an opportunity to
showcase what the U.S. private sector can deliver and
to drive value for U.S. companies that want to increase
their exports to the region. The Administration should
use these meetings over the course of the year to
highlight U.S. capacity in energy transformation
necessary to address the climate crisis and digital
technology and to reduce barriers for small and medium-
sized businesses. The U.S. host year is also an
opportunity for the Administration to press IPEF
members to complete IPEF negotiations in time for the
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leaders' summit in late 2023.
Promote secure supply chains in ways that are respectful of
allies' and partners' concerns. The COVID-19 pandemic
and Russia's war against Ukraine have underscored the
fragility of global supply chains. The Biden
administration has worked bilaterally with partners and
through multilateral fora, such as the G7 and the Quad,
to address these fragilities. At the same time, the
Administration has undertaken unprecedented and far-
reaching policies to sustain U.S. competitiveness in
advanced technologies and prevent the PRC's malign use
of those technologies.\40\ These actions, combined with
other ``re-shoring'' and ``near shoring'' efforts, may
have a compelling strategic logic but have often been
unsettling to U.S. allies and partners who have felt
under-consulted.\41\ While the Biden administration has
rightly prioritized securing supply chains, it has also
invested in revitalizing its relationships with like-
minded partners. Therefore, it should work to step up
its consultations with partners on these sensitive
issues. In addition to economic and security interests,
it should explain how the policies that grow and secure
U.S. supply chains, including in semiconductors,
critical minerals, and clean energy, and also grow
cooperation that benefits our partners and allies in
the long-term.\42\
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\40\ Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced
Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and
Semiconductor End Use; List Modification, 87 Fed. Reg. 62186, Oct. 13,
2022.
\41\ See, e.g., Cagan Koc & Debby Wu, ``Dutch Foreign Minister Says
U.S. Can't Dictate Approach to China Exports,'' Bloomberg, Nov. 18,
2022.
\42\ Harput, Halit, ``What Policy Initiatives Advance Friend-
Shoring,'' St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity Through Trade, Aug. 24,
2022.
Continue to promote public-private partnerships through the
Indo-Pacific Business Forum. In January 2023, the Biden
administration co-hosted the fifth Indo-Pacific
Business Forum in Japan. Focused on economic recovery
and sustainable and inclusive growth, the Forum
provided an opportunity for the private sector to
synchronize its efforts with U.S. government and
partner governments to maximize results and accelerate
investments in U.S. government-funded projects.\43\ The
private sector plays a critical role in addressing
today's most pressing challenges--from the climate
crisis, to food and energy insecurity, to the effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic--and the Administration should
seek to fully realize opportunities for public-private
partnerships in these and other areas.
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\43\ Department of State Factsheet, 2023 Indo-Pacific Business
Forum Promotes Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in the Indo-Pacific,
Jan. 12. 2023.
Promote Democracy and Human Rights
The IPS' core line of effort on supporting good governance
and accountability in the Indo-Pacific reflects the new
national security focus on corruption. While corruption is a
regional problem, including in the PRC, PRC regional economic
engagement often exacerbates corruption challenges.
PRC investment through the Belt and Road and Digital Silk
Road Initiatives ``abets corruption and democratic backsliding
in host countries,'' according to a 2021 Council on Foreign
Relations study.\44\ The report notes that ``major
infrastructure projects provide ample opportunities for
corruption, and PRC government practices magnify these
opportunities. Opaque lending terms and contracts and closed
bidding processes typify these projects. This secrecy and lack
of accountability enable corrupt political elites to award
contracts to their allies and divert funds toward their
supporters.'' \45\ Such corruption can work in Beijing's favor
by linking officials' personal financial interests to specific
PRC projects rather than a system that awards contracts on the
basis of merit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Jennifer Hillman & David Sacks ``China's Belt and Road:
Implications for the U.S.,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Mar. 2021.
\45\ Id.
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Though good governance and accountability support
democracy, the IPS is less focused on promoting democracy
directly. To be sure, the IPS report mentions support for
democratic institutions and democratic governance as part of
its objective to ``advance a free and open Indo-Pacific.'' \46\
But there are only two references to democracy within the IPS
``core lines of effort'', and both are in reference to Burma.
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\46\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,
Feb. 11, 2022.
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Human rights, meanwhile, are mentioned in the IPS in
reference to North Korea and the PRC as well as in an
introductory paragraph covering America's history in the
region, but the core lines of effort are silent on how to
advance human rights elsewhere across the Indo-Pacific.
ASEAN is particularly sensitive to a U.S. strategy that
places too much weight on democracy and human rights when many
ASEAN countries have problematic records on these issues. Yet,
by downplaying human rights and democracy in the IPS, the
Administration undercuts its claims about the centrality of
these issues to U.S. foreign policy and it also opens itself up
to questions about the strength of its commitments to them.
Recommendations to Promote Democracy and Human Rights
If the IPS is to succeed, U.S. values, including democracy
and human rights, must be a core tenant of the strategy.
Make human rights and democracy promotion a fundamental
line of effort of the IPS. The focus on good governance
and accountability rather than democracy and human
rights in the IPS likely reflects the Administration's
concern that several Indo-Pacific countries may be less
open to U.S. overtures if they are pressed too hard on
these issues. However, including human rights and
democracy directly would underscore the U.S.'
commitment to universal rights and focus the
Administration's efforts to advance those priorities
within a diverse set of political and social contexts
across the Indo-Pacific. It would also demonstrate to
countries in the region that the U.S. and its partners
envision a future for the Indo-Pacific in which human
rights and democracy are central elements.
Bolster Deterrence through Security and Non-Security Efforts
The U.S. and its allies and partners must respond robustly
to the security challenges posed by the PRC. Deterring its
military adventurism is critical to maintaining peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific. The PRC's aggressive actions in
response to Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022
have brought the threats posed by China's military into sharp
focus. However, if the U.S. concentrates on defense measures at
the expense of broader trade, economic, diplomatic, and other
initiatives, many in the region may perceive that the strategy
amounts to little more than an intensification of great power
rivalry. States may also feel that this undermines their
interests and increases the risk of conflict. Maintaining an
appropriate balance of security and non-security efforts in the
region will require leadership at the highest levels of the
Biden administration, and close consultation with Congress, as
China's rapid military build-up will continue to demand
attention.
Indeed, China now has the world's largest navy, Asia's
largest air force, and missile capabilities that are aimed at
deterring and denying the U.S. from projecting its military to
the western Pacific in a military contingency.\47\ Beijing is
also engaged in the largest nuclear force expansion in its
history.\48\ Moreover, unlike the U.S., which has its military
dispersed around the globe with only a fraction of its naval
and air assets in the western Pacific, China's armed forces are
focused geographically in the region, giving Beijing an
advantage should a conflict arise.
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\47\ Mallory Shelbourne, ``China Has World's Largest Navy With 355
Ships and Counting, Says Pentagon,'' U.S. Naval Institute News, Nov. 3,
2021; John Xie, ``China Is Increasing Taiwan Airspace Incursions,''
VOA, Jan. 6, 2021.
\48\ Shannon Bugos, ``Pentagon Sees Faster Chinese Nuclear
Expansion,'' Arms Control Association, Dec. 2021.
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Beijing's actions indicate that risk of a conflict over
Taiwan may be increasing. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made
Taiwan's ``reunification'' with mainland China a principal
component China's ``national rejuvenation.'' \49\ Greater PRC
military capabilities, growing Chinese nationalism, and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership's more ominous tone
regarding Taiwan during the 20th Party Congress contribute to
expectations that Xi will intensify efforts toward
unification.\50\ In Taipei and in Washington, attention is
increasingly focused on the aggressive military, economic, and
cyber actions against Taiwan.
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\49\ David Sacks, ``What Xi Jinping's Major Speech Means For
Taiwan,'' Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021.
\50\ Emily Feng, ``China's Communist Party moves to solidify Xi
Jinping's power in leadership shuffle,'' NPR, Oct. 22, 2022.
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Even before Beijing launched military drills after Speaker
Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PRC military was
making almost daily incursions into Taiwan's air defense
identification zone and engaging in dangerous maneuvers near
Taiwanese vessels.\51\ Additionally, in June 2022, China
declared sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait, despite the
Strait's long-established legal status as an international
waterway.\52\ China has also taken increasingly coercive steps
against companies and countries that do not fall in line with
its view of PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan, including imposing a
trade embargo in 2021 on Lithuania for welcoming a Taiwan
representative office to Vilnius.\53\
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\51\ ``Chinese Incursions Highest Since 1996,'' Taipei Times, Jan.
4, 2020.
\52\ ``U.S. Rebuffs China by Calling Taiwan Strait an International
Waterway,'' Reuters, June 14, 2022.
\53\ Andrew Higgins, ``In an Uneven Fight With China, a Tiny
Country's Brand Becomes Toxic,'' The New York Times, Feb. 21, 2022.
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In the face of the PRC's reckless and coercive behavior,
the U.S. must continue to stand with Taiwan for moral,
economic, and strategic reasons. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy
that shares American interests and values. The U.S. has an
important stake in ensuring that Beijing does not force the
island into unification with China. Taiwan also accounts for
more than half of global semiconductor production and almost
all of the world's most advanced chips.\54\ A disruption in
this supply would have significant implications for the global
economy.\55\ Meanwhile, nearly half of the world's container
ships pass through the Taiwan Strait, and as of August 2022, 88
percent of the largest of those vessels transited the
waterway.\56\ Strategically, if the U.S. were to abandon
Taiwan, Washington would lose credibility with our allies and
partners throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This would
undermine regional peace and stability and the PRC would feel
emboldened to impose its will on the Indo-Pacific.
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\54\ Chris Miller, ``The Chips that Make Taiwan the Center of the
World,'' Time, Oct. 5, 2022.
\55\ Yimou Lee et al., ``T-DAY: The Battle for Taiwan,'' Reuters,
Dec. 27, 2021.
\56\ Kevin Varley, ``Taiwan Tensions Raise Risks in One of Busiest
Shipping Lanes,'' Bloomberg, Aug. 2, 2022.
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In May 2022, the PRC signed a security agreement with the
Solomon Islands. In a November 2019 interview, Robson Tana
Djokovic, the Chief of Staff to the Solomon Islands' Prime
Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, cited the country's vulnerability
to the effects of climate change and the need to build
resilience capacities as motivation for their pivot to China
for assistance.\57\ The perception that the U.S. and our allies
were not offering alternatives also contributed to the Solomon
Islands decision to cut ties with Taiwan and allow closer
security cooperation with the PRC.\58\
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\57\ Ashley Westerman, ``Some Pacific Island Nations Are Turning to
China, Climate Change is a Factor,'' NPR News, Nov. 23, 2019.
\58\ Zoe Liu, ``What the China-Solomon Islands Pact Means for the
U.S. and South Pacific,'' Council on Foreign Relations, May 4, 2022.
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The IPS describes integrated deterrence as ``more tightly
integrat[ing] our efforts across warfighting domains and the
spectrum of conflict to ensure that the U.S., alongside our
allies and partners, can dissuade or defeat aggression in any
form or domain.'' \59\ If ``integrated deterrence'' of all the
levers of U.S. power, diplomacy, and influence will be the U.S.
response to growing security challenges prompted by the PRC,
then it is imperative that the U.S. modernize and fully-fund
the non-military elements of its national power. The U.S. must
also ensure that our partners are doing the same, in league and
in concert with the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,
Feb. 11, 2022.
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The Biden administration's emphasis on cooperation with
allies and partners is a recognition that the U.S. needs
greater support from them in order to maintain a balance of
power with the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. has for years
relied on a ``hub and spoke'' system of bilateral alliances
with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand as
fundamental to regional security. However, the threat demands a
more networked and cross-sectoral approach among allies and
partners, one that leverages respective strengths, allocates
resources more efficiently, and allows for more effective
coordination, including in domains not directly associated with
warfighting.
Growth in U.S. security assistance to the Indo-Pacific has
come almost entirely from the short-term legal and funding
authorities exercised by the Department of Defense, instead of
the longer-term, more strategic programs undertaken by the
Department of State. The Department of Defense has, since 2001,
attempted to duplicate a number of Department of State security
assistance authorities and roles, expending a global security
assistance budget that has significantly exceeded that of the
Department of State without sufficient foreign policy oversight
and expertise from the Department of State itself. Meanwhile,
the Department of State's budget for global security assistance
has not appreciably increased and was almost entirely earmarked
to three countries outside the Indo-Pacific over the same
period. The Department of State's influence over security
assistance and security cooperation has diminished, with real
consequences for U.S. power and influence abroad.
With the enactment of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act
(TERA) in 2022, the State Department now has the authority, for
the first time, to provide Foreign Military Financing to
Taiwan. If fully funded, such support, when combined with
Taiwan's own investments, could catalyze timely and important
near-term acquisitions that will increase Taiwan's ability to
deter PRC aggression in the Taiwan Strait.
Recommendations to Improve Deterrence
The IPS was right to focus on non-military tools of
national power, but the roles that non-military agencies play
on security issues in the region need to be better explained
and translated into reality.
Reinforce that U.S. strategy toward the region is not
principally military in nature. The IPS wisely leads
with non-military tools of U.S. influence in the
region. While the U.S. faces a deteriorating security
environment in the Indo-Pacific, it is important that
the Administration not focus too narrowly on defense at
the expense of broader trade, economic, diplomatic, and
other initiatives, lest partners in the region view the
strategy as contributing to an unnecessary
intensification of great power rivalry that undermines
their interests.
Bolster deterrence through security and non-security
efforts. While the IPS was right to focus on non-
military tools of national power, the roles that non-
military agencies play on security issues need to be
clearly delineated so that they can be better explained
and translated into reality. This will be particularly
important in reassuring partners of the strategy's
broader trade, economic, and diplomatic aims and avoid
the perception that it contributes to an unnecessary
intensification of great power rivalry. First and
foremost, the Administration should clarify what
``integrated deterrence'' in the Indo-Pacific means.
The Administration should also explain how the
Department of State, USAID, and economic agencies'
unique roles, resources, and authorities contribute to
integrated deterrence, and how the programs and
activities of the Department of Defense should be
coordinated with and integrated into these efforts.
Prioritize climate funding for the Indo-Pacific. With
significant vulnerability to climate change--
particularly in the Pacific Islands--the PRC has seized
the opportunity to provide climate-related support to
these countries. The USAID-led President's Emergency
Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) provides a
formidable alternative to PRC investments for countries
in dire need of foreign assistance to combat the
effects of climate change. It should be fully resourced
and deployed strategically in the Indo-Pacific
region.\60\
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\60\ U.S. Agency for International Development, ``Action Plan
Released for the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and
Resilience (PREPARE),'' Sept. 15, 2022.
Restore State's leadership role in providing security
assistance in the Indo-Pacific. To realize longer-term,
strategic partnerships on security assistance in the
Indo-Pacific, the Department of State needs a
significant increase in security assistance funding
that can be directed to partners in the region. Nowhere
is this more urgent than in the case of Taiwan. The
Administration should prioritize bolstering financial
and political support to Taiwan through the TERA and
obtain full funding of these authorities. The
Administration should also continue to engage candidly
with Taiwan to ensure that it invests wisely in its
self-defense capabilities and consult closely with
Congress about threats to Taiwan and capability gaps
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that the U.S. and our partners could help to fill.
Pursue coordinated efforts to deter coercive PRC actions
against Taiwan. The Biden administration has taken
steps to reassure Taiwan about U.S. commitments as
defined by the Three Joint Communiques, the Taiwan
Relations Act, and the Six Assurances-- although mixed
messages from administration officials have undermined
some of these efforts.\61\ The Administration should
pursue coordinated efforts to deter coercive PRC
actions against Taiwan and other regional partners,
including through ASEAN and the Quad, and it should
strengthen its consultations and combined planning
activities with partners, including Japan, Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, and India.
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\61\ Phelim Kine, ``Biden Leaves No Doubt: `Strategic Ambiguity'
Toward Taiwan is Dead,'' Politico, Sept. 19, 2022.
Seek to sustain communication channels with Beijing. The
Administration should continue to press for more direct
lines of communication between key military and
civilian officials of the U.S. and China. Such channels
of communication between Washington and Beijing have
atrophied since 2016.\62\ Sustaining these channels has
important benefits. First, it reduces the risk of
miscalculations over Taiwan or other potential
flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific. [S]econd, it provides
openings to engage with Beijing on opportunities for
deconfliction or cooperation on issues such as climate
change, combatting illegal drugs, nonproliferation, and
counterterrorism.
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\62\ Barbara Usher, ``Why U.S.-China Relations are at Their Lowest
Point in Decades,'' BBC, July 24, 2022.
Invest in Public Diplomacy Efforts and Expand People-to-People Ties
The U.S. is the global leader in higher education, and U.S.
colleges and universities attract some of the world's most
talented and resourceful international students, approximately
70 percent of whom are from Asia.\63\ Education has
historically been a significant U.S. export and source of soft
power. In the 2019-2020 academic year, before the full effects
of COVID-19 were felt, international students contributed
almost $40 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than
400,000 jobs.\64\ International students attending schools in
the U.S. are often exposed to American democracy and the free
expression of ideas which can be life-changing, especially for
those from countries with authoritarian governments.
International students who rise to positions of influence
within their home countries or remain in the U.S. after their
studies create important links between the U.S. and the region.
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\63\ Karin Fischer, ``The U.S. Attracts Fewer International
Students, Loses Billions in Revenue,'' NPR, Aug. 9, 2021.
\64\ ``New NAFSA Data Show First Ever Drop in International Student
Economic Value to the U.S.,'' National Association of Foreign Student
Advisers, Nov. 16, 2022.
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The number of Indo-Pacific students studying in the United
States remains much lower than pre-pandemic levels (see Figure
13). Since taking office, President Biden has eased travel
restrictions and expanded the degrees that allow international
students to qualify for a three-year work permit after
graduation.\65\ In July 2022, Secretary Blinken said that
``continuing to nurture a vibrant community of international
students is a foreign policy imperative.'' \66\ His remarks
were accompanied by a joint statement by the Departments of
State, Education, Commerce, and Homeland Security, which laid
out principles for encouraging international students,
researchers, and scholars to study in the U.S. as well as
Americans to study abroad.\67\
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\65\ Suzanne Monyak, ``U.S. Expands Work Program to Retain More
Foreign STEM Students,'' Roll Call, Jan. 24, 2022.
\66\ U.S. Department of State, ``Joint Statement of Principles in
Support of International Education,'' accessed Nov. 22, 2022.
\67\ Id.
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The U.S. must use all public diplomacy tools at its
disposal to further its IPS goals. To promote U.S. values, the
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) broadcasts news and information
``to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in
support of freedom and democracy.'' \68\ In Asia, USAGM
oversees the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and
the Open Technology Fund (OTF).\69\ VOA focuses on explaining
U.S. perspectives in a global context, while RFA broadcasters
offer news and information in places where local media is
repressed or in a nascent stage, and OTF supports global
internet freedom technologies. VOA allocates the largest
proportion of its budget to the Indo-Pacific region, while
Radio Free Asia has consistently received less funding than the
other regional broadcasters (see Figures 11 and 12 and Tables 2
and 3).\70\
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\68\ U.S. Agency for Global Media, ``Who We Are,'' accessed Nov.
22, 2022.
\69\ Id.
\70\ ``U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM),'' USASpending.gov,
accessed Nov. 22, 2022, https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/us-agency-
for-global-media?fy=2022.
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To counter PRC disinformation campaigns, the IPS should use
the Department of State's Global Engagement Center, whose
mission is to ``recognize, understand, expose, and counter
foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation
efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies,
security, or stability of the U.S., its allies, and partner
nations.'' \71\ The IPS should enhance interagency coordination
with U.S. Combatant Commands working in this space, including:
the U.S. Southern Command that undertakes internet-based
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) efforts to
counter global threats\72\ and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
that undertakes MISO ``to support a diversity of voices in the
information space, to deter aggression and malign actions, to
build partner-nation capacity, and to assist partner-nation
counter-terror operations, counter-recruitment efforts, and
counter-radicalization programs.''\73\
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\71\ U.S. Department of State, ``Global Engagement Center: Core
Mission and Vision,'' accessed Nov. 22, 2022.
\72\ U.S. Southern Command, ``Military Information Support
Operations,'' accessed Nov. 21, 2022.
\73\ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, ``Useful Theater Information,''
accessed Nov. 21, 2022.
Recommendations to Expand Public Diplomacy Efforts
If the IPS is going to be successful, the U.S. must
capitalize and expand upon the success that people-to-people
programs offer in creating positive perceptions of the U.S.
around the world. Furthermore, the U.S. must improve our
ability to project information and awareness campaigns about
positive U.S. policies and relationships in the region and
develop and execute a more coordinated effort to counter
disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda.
Assess funding, impact, and policy coordination among U.S.
government entities involved in public diplomacy,
including countering disinformation. The U.S. has a
number of entities engaged in different aspects of the
information space, including USAGM, the Global
Engagement Center, and Military Information Support
Operations (MISO). The Administration should use the
IPS to enhance effectiveness and coordination among
these entities to increase their coherence and
messaging impact as well as assess how agencies overlap
with USAGM.
Reinforce welcoming students from the Indo-Pacific to the
U.S. as a core IPS line of effort. The Administration
should take further steps to encourage educational
exchanges as a core line of effort under the IPS:
shortening visa processing times for international
students; addressing barriers to working in the U.S.
after graduation; offering scholarships; and increasing
the scope and scale of professional education programs
like the U.S.-ASEAN and U.S.-Pacific Institutes for
Rising Leaders.\74\
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\74\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in
Washington, DC,'' May 12, 2022; The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Roadmap
for a 21st-Century U.S.-Pacific Island Partnership,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
Cultivate regional expertise at home. Expanding funding for
U.S. students, academics, and experts to research and
study in the Indo-Pacific will be important to building
and sustaining regional expertise. Expanding funding,
including through public-private partnerships, to
organizations like the Council of American Overseas
Research Centers, the Boren Fellowship, and Fulbright
for the Indo-Pacific will be important for achieving
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this goal.
Deepen Engagements with Allies and Partners
The U.S. alliances that were built in Asia after World War
II are critical components of U.S. security posture in the
Indo-Pacific--as are security relationships with India, New
Zealand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan,
Mongolia, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Marshall Islands. These arrangements have supported regional
stability and helped facilitate the Indo-Pacific's peace and
prosperity.
The Biden administration has been careful in its messaging
to avoid presenting the IPS as forcing countries to pick sides
between the U.S. and the PRC. As Secretary Blinken said in his
speech on U.S. policy toward China in May 2022, ``This is not
about forcing countries to choose. It's about giving them a
choice.'' \75\ That message should be reinforced and clarified.
The U.S. offers the rule of law rather than coercion; support
for civil society, human rights, and democracy rather than
authoritarianism; and good governance, transparency, and
accountability rather than corruption. Prioritizing host
country-led development activities that provide high-quality
outcomes without transactional caveats sets the U.S. apart from
the PRC. It also increases resilience and prosperity among
nations in the Indo-Pacific region.
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\75\ U.S. Department of State, ``The Administration's Approach to
the People's Republic of China,'' May 26, 2022.
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The frequency and quality of the Administration's
engagement with allies and partners have demonstrated the
strength of President Biden's commitment to them and to the
IPS. For example, in September 2021, President Biden hosted the
first-ever in-person Quad Leaders' Summit, which focused on
increasing production and access to vaccines to end the COVID-
19 pandemic; promoting high-standards infrastructure;
addressing climate change; working jointly on emerging
technologies, space, and cybersecurity; and enhancing people-
to-people exchange.\76\ On a visit to Korea and Japan in May
2022, largely in pursuit of the IPS, Biden participated in a
second in-person Quad Leaders' Summit in Tokyo, which expanded
on many of the same themes as the first, and included the
launch of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain
Awareness.\77\ Before that trip, the President hosted the U.S.-
ASEAN Special Summit, held for the first time in Washington
D.C., and recently attended the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia.\78\
Furthermore, in September, the Administration hosted the first-
ever U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit at the White House,
where it unveiled the ``Pacific Partnership Strategy.'' \79\
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\76\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders' Summit,'' Sept.
24, 2021.
\77\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders' Tokyo Summit
2022,'' May 23, 2022.
\78\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in
Washington, DC,'' May 12, 2022; Joshua Kurlantzick, ``Reflections on
the ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN-U.S. Summit in Cambodia,'' Council on
Foreign Relations, Nov. 15, 2022.
\79\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: President Biden Unveils First-
Ever Pacific Partnership Strategy,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
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IPS programs and policies have and should be developed in
close consultation with countries in the region. The U.S.
should therefore continue to engage governments and populations
of the Indo-Pacific on an ongoing basis to gain an
understanding of how to meet their needs. By fully considering
the interests and aspirations of Indo-Pacific partners in
adapting and implementing the IPS going forward, the U.S. will
increase the chance that the strategy gains the necessary buy-
in to succeed.
Recommendations to Deepen Ties
The Indo-Pacific Strategy rightly recognizes that the U.S.'
rich network of allies and partners across the region is a
source of strength. Many of the most important IPS efforts,
therefore, will require continuous work to deepen engagement
with these allies and partners.
Explore ways to make U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation
more meaningful and resilient. Even as the U.S. is
working closely with Japan and Korea to modernize each
bilateral alliance, it is also working trilaterally
with the two countries to improve coordination in the
face of threats posed by North Korea. But the potential
for greater U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation extends beyond
North Korea to the broader Indo-Pacific. Efforts in
that respect may offer something of a proof-of-concept
for networking the current alliance system. In July
2022, Washington and Tokyo launched the U.S.-Japan
Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC)--a
``2+2'' economic meeting including the Secretaries of
State and Commerce and their counterparts, the Japanese
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Economy, Trade and
Industry--aimed at ``countering threats to economic
security and to the rules-based international economic
order.'' \80\ Given Korea's shared interest in the
EPCC's aims, as well as the country's leadership in key
technologies central to economic and technological
security, the U.S. and Japan should consider inviting
Korea to join the EPCC or meet in the ``2+2+2'' format
to address specific economic security issues.
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\80\ U.S. Department of State, ``Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan
Economic Policy Consultative Committee: Strengthening Economic Security
and the Rules-Based Order,'' July 29, 2022.
Follow through on the U.S.' extensive commitments outlined
in the Pacific Partnership Strategy. In September 2022,
President Biden hosted the U.S.-Pacific Islands Country
Summit, at which assembled leaders signed the
Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership.\81\ The White
House also released a Pacific Partnership Strategy with
ten accompanying lines of effort.\82\ This document
rightly prioritizes many of the issues of greatest
concern to Pacific Island countries, such as investment
in climate change resilience efforts, support for
marine conservation, bolstered health architecture, and
promotion of economic opportunity.\83\ As some Pacific
Island leaders have criticized U.S. administrations for
failing to follow through on commitments to the region,
it is important that the Biden administration, in
consultation with Congress, adequately prioritize and
resource these efforts. The U.S. should finalize
negotiations and enhance consultations with Congress
regarding the Compacts of Free Association for the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
and Palau, which are set to expire in 2023 with the
Marshall Islands and Micronesia and in 2024 with
Palau.\84\ Successful conclusion of these agreements is
a prerequisite for continued U.S. credibility in the
Pacific Islands.
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\81\ The White House, ``Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership,''
Sept. 29, 2022.
\82\ The White House, Pacific Partnership Strategy, Sept. 2022.
\83\ Id.
\84\ U.S. Department of the Interior, ``Compacts of Free
Association,'' Office of Insular Affairs, accessed Nov. 21, 2022.
Expand the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) initiative.
In June 2022, the Biden administration announced PBP,
which brings together the U.S., Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom to ameliorate the
existential threat climate change poses to the Pacific
Island Countries.\85\ Focusing on six pillars, the PBP
takes a collaborative, multi-sectoral approach to
building resilience in Pacific Island countries.\86\
Initiatives like the PBP are critical to these
countries' survival as sea levels rise. Climate change
devastates economic well-being and eliminates physical
land, infrastructure, and cultural heritage sites.
President Biden must continue to build support among
new partners--like Canada, Germany, France, the
European Union, the Republic of Korea, and India--who
are newly-engaged.\87\ The Administration should
leverage new USG-led programs such as the ``Resilient
Pacific Blue Economy Program'' to crowd in new public-
private investment in our Pacific Island partner
countries.
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\85\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Roadmap for a 21st-Centuary
U.S.-Pacific Island Partnership,'' Sept. 29, 2022.
\86\ The six pillars are as follows: ``climate change resilience,
adaptation, and disasters; secure and resilient technology and
connectivity; protection of the ocean and environment; people centered
development; resources and economic development; and political
leadership and regionalism.''
\87\ Id.
Routinize the Quad. The Biden administration has invested
heavily in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which
has become a versatile and important new element of the
Indo-Pacific diplomatic and security architecture,
engaged in issues from vaccine provision to critical
and emerging technologies. New initiatives within the
Quad can take years to mature, and the Administration
should continue to invest patiently in the dialogue.
The Quad is an informal body without a secretariat,
budget, or binding commitments by its members.\88\ This
informality has allowed for flexibility and appeals to
its members--particularly India. The Quad does not need
a formal secretariat, but as its ambitions and agenda
continue to grow, the Administration should continue to
take steps to institutionalize a more routine tempo of
meetings, preparatory consultations, and structured
working groups. Moreover, there have been proposals for
``Quad-Plus'' arrangements that go beyond the dialogues
to date on health security; the Quad may be
sufficiently mature that countries such as South Korea
or France could be invited to Quad-Plus dialogues on
certain issues.\89\
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\88\ Patrick Gerard and Benjamin Rimland, ``Defining the Diamond:
The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,''
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mar. 16, 2020.
\89\ Jyotsna Mehra, ``An Evolving Agenda for the Quad,'' The
Stimson Center, June 7, 2022.
Deepen U.S.-ASEAN ties. The Joint Vision Statement from the
2022 ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit outlined a wide range of
areas in which the U.S., ASEAN, and its member states
will partner. These include health security, economic
ties, maritime cooperation, technology, climate change,
security, and people-to-people connectivity.\90\ Even
though engagements with ASEAN often move at a slow
pace, it is important that senior administration
leaders continue to participate in ASEAN's major
gatherings and that the U.S. government remains
attentive to the diverse array of interests and
concerns expressed by member countries. The
Administration should prioritize building up ASEAN as
an institution and bilateral engagement with ASEAN
member states.
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\90\ The White House, ``ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit 2022, Joint
Vision Statement,'' May 13, 2022.
Advancing AUKUS in the near term. The Administration's
September 2021 announcement of the ambitious Australia-
United Kingdom-U.S. Partnership has been followed by
interagency efforts to determine a path to realize this
goal.\91\ The Administration should work closely with
Congress throughout this process and ensure that
thorough consultations, including on safeguards, are
prioritized to facilitate congressional consideration
of any agreement. Because capabilities will likely not
be delivered for some time, it will also be important
to identify areas where the AUKUS partnership can
deepen trilateral cooperation on security issues in the
near-to-medium term.
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\91\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Implementation of the
Australia--United Kingdom--U.S. Partnership (AUKUS),'' Apr. 5, 2022.
Support a strong and democratic India. The U.S. and the PRC
vie for the position of India's largest trading
partner, with India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry
reporting in June 2022 that trade with the U.S.
exceeded that of China, an important marker in the
increasingly close ties between Washington and New
Delhi.\92\ Indeed, the relationship between the world's
two largest democracies has been on an upward
trajectory for more than two decades, overcoming Cold
War antagonism and division over India's nuclear
program and the country's testing of a nuclear device
in 1998. Security ties have deepened dramatically in
recent years as both countries are increasingly
concerned about the implications of a more assertive
China. The U.S. and India are now Major Defense
Partners and the two countries have launched a new
Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies to
enhance cooperation on quantum computing, 5G and 6G
networks, space, semiconductors, biotech, and
artificial intelligence.\93\ Even as the Administration
rightly treats India as an important security partner,
it will need to address the very real complications of
India's continued ties with, and dependence on, Russia
for defense equipment and its recent downward trend of
democratic values and institutions.
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\92\ ``U.S. Becomes India's Largest Trade Partner, is China Trade
Decoupling?,'' The Economic Times, updated June 21, 2022.
\93\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``Joint India-U.S. Statement on
the Visit of Secretary of Defense Carter to India,'' U.S. Department of
Defense, Dec. 8, 2016; The White House, ``Readout of President Biden's
Meeting with Prime Minister Modi of India,'' May 24, 2022. The White
House, ``FACT SHEET: United States and India Elevate Strategic
Partnership with the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology
(iCET),'' Jan. 31, 2023.
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CONCLUSION
The IPS reflects the U.S.' growing reliance on the Indo-
Pacific for U.S. prosperity and security and on ``the fact that
the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from
the People's Republic of China (PRC).'' The Biden
administration was correct not to make its Indo-Pacific
strategy solely about competition with the PRC, but if it is to
succeed, it has to grapple with the realities of this
competition for the U.S. and the challenges it poses for our
regional allies and partners.
The IPS states, ``We will also seek to manage competition
with the PRC responsibly. We will cooperate with our allies and
partners while seeking to work with the PRC in areas like
climate change and nonproliferation.'' \94\ Responsible
management of the China challenge and working with allies and
partners to address coercive PRC activities are key
distinctions of the Biden administration's IPS and are critical
to the policy's long-term success. This can and should include
deeper dialogues with allies and partners on the full spectrum
of challenges from enhancing supply chain security, to
providing quality infrastructure alternatives, to growing their
support for bolstering Taiwan's military and economic
resilience.
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\94\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,
Feb. 11, 2022.
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Responsible management of this challenge also means working
with the PRC where we can. Unfortunately, after Speaker
Pelosi's trip to Taiwan, the PRC unilaterally suspended
discussions with the U.S. on climate change, illegal drugs, and
other transnational issues.\95\ Reviving those discussions, and
ensuring they achieve tangible results, would demonstrate that
the U.S. and China can address critical matters of mutual
interest even amid heightened tensions.
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\95\ Johnson Lai, ``China Halts Climate and Military Dialogue with
the U.S. over Pelosi's Taiwan Visit,'' Politico, Aug. 5, 2022.
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Bipartisan support for the main objectives of the IPS and
its underlying premise regarding the growing importance of the
Indo-Pacific remains strong, given the close parallels to Indo-
Pacific strategies offered by previous administrations of both
parties over the past two decades, but should not be taken for
granted. Maintaining bipartisan support for the IPS will
require the Administration to engage more closely with
Congress, as well as with the U.S. public, to explain the
rationale behind the strategy, and the benefits to the American
people of prioritizing U.S. funding and engagement in this
dynamic region.
FIGURES AND TABLES
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