

AUGUST 29, 2024

**RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 118–44**  
**TEXT OF H.R. 1425, NO WHO PANDEMIC PRE-**  
**PAREDNESS TREATY WITHOUT SENATE AP-**  
**PROVAL ACT**

**[Showing the text of H.R. 1425 as ordered reported by the  
Committee on Foreign Affairs]**

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2       This Act may be cited as the “No WHO Pandemic  
3 Preparedness Treaty Without Senate Approval Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5       Congress makes the following findings:

6           (1) On May 18, 2020, President Donald Trump  
7       sent a letter to World Health Organization (referred  
8       to in this Act as “WHO”) Director-General Tedros  
9       Adhanom Ghebreyesus (referred to in this Act as the  
10      “Director-General”), announcing that—

11           (A) United States contributions to WHO  
12       would be halted due its mismanagement of the  
13       COVID–19 outbreak and its lack of independ-  
14       ence from the People’s Republic of China; and

15           (B) the United States would withdraw  
16       from WHO if it did not commit to substantive  
17       improvements within 30 days.

1           (2) President Trump’s May 18 letter cited nu-  
2           merous instances of WHO mismanagement of the  
3           COVID–19 pandemic, including—

4                   (A) unjustified delays informing member  
5           states about a potentially serious disease out-  
6           break in Wuhan, China; and

7                   (B) repeated grossly inaccurate or mis-  
8           leading claims about the transmissibility of the  
9           virus and about the Government of China’s  
10          handling of the outbreak.

11          (3) On June 30, 2020, Secretary of State Mike  
12          Pompeo formally notified the United Nations of the  
13          United States decision to withdraw from WHO,  
14          which would have taken effect on July 6, 2021,  
15          under the terms of a joint resolution adopted by  
16          Congress on June 14, 1948 (Public Law 80–643; 62  
17          Stat. 441).

18          (4) A Pew Research Center survey conducted in  
19          April and May 2020 indicated that 51 percent of  
20          Americans felt that WHO had done a poor or fair  
21          job in managing the COVID–19 pandemic.

22          (5) On January 20, 2021, President Joseph  
23          Biden sent United Nations Director-General António  
24          Guterres a letter retracting the United States notice  
25          of withdrawal from WHO.

1           (6) On December 1, 2021, at the second special  
2 session of the World Health Assembly (referred to in  
3 this Act as the “WHA”) decided—

4           (A) to establish an intergovernmental ne-  
5 gotiating body (referred to in this section as the  
6 “INB”) to draft and negotiate a WHO conven-  
7 tion (referred to in this section as the “Conven-  
8 tion”), agreement, or other international instru-  
9 ment on pandemic prevention, preparedness,  
10 and response, with a view to adoption under Ar-  
11 ticle 19 or any other provision of the WHO  
12 Constitution; and

13           (B) that the INB shall submit a progress  
14 report to the Seventy-sixth WHA and a working  
15 draft of the convention for consideration by the  
16 Seventy-seventh WHA, which is scheduled to  
17 take place beginning on March 18, 2024.

18           (7) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and  
19 June 6 through 8 and 15 through 17, 2022, the  
20 INB held its inaugural meeting at which the Direc-  
21 tor-General proposed the following 5 themes to guide  
22 the INB’s work in drafting the Convention:

23           (A) Building national, regional, and global  
24 capacities based on a whole-of-government and  
25 whole-of-society approach.

1 (B) Establishing global access and benefit  
2 sharing for all pathogens, and determining a  
3 global policy for the equitable production and  
4 distribution of countermeasures.

5 (C) Establishing robust systems and tools  
6 for pandemic preparedness and response.

7 (D) Establishing a long-term plan for sus-  
8 tainable financing to ensure support for global  
9 health threat management and response sys-  
10 tems.

11 (E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its man-  
12 date as the directing and coordinating authority  
13 on international health work, including for pan-  
14 demic preparedness and response.

15 (8) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held  
16 its second meeting at which it agreed that the Con-  
17 vention would be adopted under Article 19 of the  
18 WHO Constitution and legally binding on the par-  
19 ties.

20 (9) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB  
21 held its third meeting at which it accepted a concep-  
22 tual zero draft of the Convention and agreed to pre-  
23 pare a zero draft for consideration at the INB's next  
24 meeting.

1           (10) In early January 2023, an initial draft of  
2           the Convention was sent to WHO member states in  
3           advance of its formal introduction at the fourth  
4           meeting of the INB, which is scheduled for February  
5           27 through March 3, 2023. The draft includes broad  
6           and binding provisions, including rules governing  
7           parties’ access to pathogen genomic sequences and  
8           how the products or benefits of such access are to  
9           be distributed.

10          (11) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Depart-  
11          ment of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual states that  
12          when “determining whether any international agree-  
13          ment should be brought into force as a treaty or as  
14          an international agreement other than a treaty, the  
15          utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion  
16          or compromise of the constitutional powers of the  
17          President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole”  
18          and includes the following criteria to be considered  
19          when determining whether an international agree-  
20          ment should take the form of a treaty or an execu-  
21          tive agreement:

22                (A) “The extent to which the agreement  
23                involves commitments or risks affecting the na-  
24                tion as a whole”.

1 (B) “Whether the agreement is intended to  
2 affect state laws”.

3 (C) “Whether the agreement can be given  
4 effect without the enactment of subsequent leg-  
5 islation by the Congress”.

6 (D) “Past U.S. practice as to similar  
7 agreements”.

8 (E) “The preference of the Congress as to  
9 a particular type of agreement”.

10 (F) “The degree of formality desired for  
11 an agreement”.

12 (G) “The proposed duration of the agree-  
13 ment, the need for prompt conclusion of an  
14 agreement, and the desirability of concluding a  
15 routine or short-term agreement”.

16 (H) “The general international practice as  
17 to similar agreements”.

18 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that—

20 (1) a significant segment of the American pub-  
21 lic is deeply skeptical of the World Health Organiza-  
22 tion, its leadership, and its independence from the  
23 pernicious political influence of certain member  
24 states, including the People’s Republic of China;

1           (2) Congress strongly prefers that any agree-  
2           ment related to pandemic prevention, preparedness,  
3           and response adopted by the World Health Assembly  
4           pursuant to the work of the INB be considered a  
5           treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Sen-  
6           ate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring;

7           (3) the scope of the agreement which the INB  
8           has been tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Di-  
9           rector-General, is so broad that any application of  
10          the factors referred to in section 2(11) will weigh  
11          strongly in favor of it being considered a treaty; and

12          (4) given the level of public distrust, any rel-  
13          evant new agreement by the World Health Assembly  
14          which cannot garner the two-thirds vote needed for  
15          Senate ratification should not be agreed to or imple-  
16          mented by the United States.

17 **SEC. 4. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR**  
18 **AGREEMENT OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL IN-**  
19 **STRUMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTER-**  
20 **NATIONAL NEGOTIATING BODY'S FINAL RE-**  
21 **PORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY SUBJECT TO**  
22 **ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.**

23          Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any con-  
24          vention, agreement, or other international instrument on  
25          pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached

1 by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the rec-  
2 ommendations, report, or work of the International Nego-  
3 tiating Body established by the second special session of  
4 the World Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that  
5 is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2,  
6 clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which  
7 requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-  
8 thirds of Senators concurring.

