[JPRT, 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                ------                                

 
              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA


                                     


                                     


                             ANNUAL REPORT


                                     


                                  2022

=======================================================================

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             NOVEMBER 2022

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
         
         
         
         
         
         

                           2022 ANNUAL REPORT





              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA


                                     


                                     


                             ANNUAL REPORT


                                     


                                  2022

=======================================================================

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             NOVEMBER 2022

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
 
 
 
 
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 


         Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
         
         
         
                          ______
 
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
47-949 PDF          WASHINGTON : 2022 
          
         


              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Senate

                                     House

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair          JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California           Co-Chair
ANGUS KING, Maine                    THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana                BRIAN MAST, Florida
                                     VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
                                     MICHELLE STEEL, California

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                     UZRA ZEYA, Department of State

                  MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce

                   THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor

               DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, Department of State

                 LISA JO PETERSON, Department of State

                      Matt Squeri, Staff Director

                   Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)
                                  
                  S U M M A R Y  O F  C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Section I. Contents..............................................     v
Section II. Executive Summary....................................     1
Section III. Respect for Civil Liberties.........................    51
    Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression.............................    51
    Chapter 2--Civil Society.....................................    76
    Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion...............................    96
Section IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System....................   114
    Chapter 4--Criminal Justice..................................   114
    Chapter 5--Access to Justice.................................   132
Section V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.......   143
    Chapter 6--Governance........................................   143
Section VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in 
  Persons........................................................   160
    Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights............................   160
    Chapter 8--Status of Women...................................   169
    Chapter 9--Population Control................................   183
    Chapter 10--Human Trafficking................................   197
Section VII. Worker Rights.......................................   209
    Chapter 11--Worker Rights....................................   209
Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues..............................   225
    Chapter 12--Public Health....................................   225
    Chapter 13--The Environment and Climate Change...............   241
    Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights........................   256
    Chapter 15--North Korean Refugees in China...................   272
Section IX. Tibet................................................   280
    Chapter 16--Tibet............................................   280
Section X. Xinjiang..............................................   298
    Chapter 17--Xinjiang.........................................   298
Section XI. Hong Kong and Macau..................................   323
    Chapter 18--Hong Kong and Macau..............................   323
Section XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally....   346
    Chapter 19--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.   346
Section XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members.............   364
                          Section I. Contents

                                                                   Page
Section II. Executive Summary....................................     1
      A. Statement from the Chairs...............................     1
      B. Overview................................................     3
      C. Key Findings............................................     8
      D. Political Prisoner Cases of Concern.....................    26
      E. General Recommendations to Congress and the 
        Administration...........................................    34
      F. Political Prisoner Database.............................    43
      G. Commission Activity July 2021-October 2022..............    49
Section III. Respect for Civil Liberties.........................    51
    Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression.............................    51
      A. Findings................................................    51
      B. Recommendations.........................................    52
      C. Freedom of the Press....................................    54
        1. PRC Control over the Media............................    54
        2. Control over the Party's Image Abroad.................    55
        3. Harassment, Detention, and Imprisonment of Journalists    55
        4. Deteriorating Conditions for Foreign Journalists......    56
      D. PRC Control over the Internet...........................    57
      E. China's Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism on Social 
        Media....................................................    59
        1. Continued Censorship from TikTok and Chinese 
          Government Influence...................................    59
        2. Suppression of Freedom of Expression on Chinese and 
          U.S. Social Media......................................    59
      F. 2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games...............    61
      G. Entertainment, Art, and Literature......................    62
      H. Party Control over Educational and Research Institutions    63
      I. Detention and Imprisonment in Connection with Free 
        Speech...................................................    64
    Chapter 2--Civil Society.....................................    76
      A. Findings................................................    76
      B. Recommendations.........................................    77
      C. Introduction............................................    79
      D. The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social 
        Organizations............................................    79
      E. Foreign NGO Activity in China...........................    81
      F. Stifling Civil Society at the United Nations............    82
      G. Government Suppression of Civil Society.................    82
      H. Philanthropy and Charitable Giving......................    84
      I. Status of LGBTQ Persons.................................    84
    Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion...............................    96
      A. Findings................................................    96
      B. Recommendations.........................................    97
      C. Introduction............................................    98
      D. International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom......    98
      E. Regulations and Policies Pertaining to Religious Freedom    98
      F. Buddhism (Non-Tibetan), Taoism, and Chinese Folk 
        Religion.................................................   100
      G. Islam...................................................   101
      H. Christianity--Catholic..................................   102
      I. Christianity--Protestant................................   103
      J. Falun Gong..............................................   104
      K. Other Religious Communities.............................   105
Section IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System....................   114
    Chapter 4--Criminal Justice..................................   114
      A. Findings................................................   114
      B. Recommendations.........................................   115
      C. Introduction............................................   117
      D. Extrajudicial Detention.................................   117
        1. Enforced Disappearance................................   117
        2. Black Jails...........................................   118
        3. Psychiatric Facilities................................   118
        4. Administrative Detention..............................   119
        5. Retention in Custody..................................   119
        6. Mass Internment Camps.................................   119
      E. Abuse of Criminal Provisions............................   119
      F. Restriction of Liberty of Foreign Individuals...........   121
      G. Pretrial Detention......................................   121
      H. Denial of Counsel and Family Visits.....................   121
      I. Denial of Effective Legal Representation................   122
      J. Torture and Abuse.......................................   122
      K. Death in Custody........................................   123
      L. Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location.......   124
      M. The Death Penalty.......................................   124
      N. Legal Developments......................................   125
    Chapter 5--Access to Justice.................................   132
      A. Findings................................................   132
      B. Recommendations.........................................   132
      C. Introduction............................................   134
      D. Lack of Judicial Independence...........................   134
      E. Measures on Court Operations............................   134
      F. Judicial Transparency...................................   135
      G. New Restrictions on Lawyers.............................   135
      H. Citizen Petitioning.....................................   136
      I. Persecution of Human Rights Lawyers and Advocates.......   136
        1. Criminal Prosecution..................................   136
        2. License Revocation....................................   138
        3. Physical Attack.......................................   138
Section V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.......   143
    Chapter 6--Governance........................................   143
      A. Findings................................................   143
      B. Recommendations.........................................   144
      C. Introduction............................................   145
      D. Rule-Based Governance: Plans and Practice...............   145
      E. Xi Jinping's Personal Power.............................   145
      F. Lack of Genuine Political Participation.................   146
      G. Party Control...........................................   147
        1. Mobilization of Citizens and Social Organizations.....   147
        2. Business Sector.......................................   148
        3. Common Prosperity.....................................   148
        4. Anti-Monopoly Actions.................................   149
        5. Data Security.........................................   149
        6. Tutoring Industry.....................................   150
        7. Education.............................................   150
        8. Entertainment Industry................................   150
      H. Technology-Enhanced Social Control......................   151
        1. Surveillance..........................................   151
        2. Enhanced Social Control under Zero-COVID..............   152
        3. New Digital Privacy and Artificial Intelligence 
          Standards Raise Human Rights Concerns..................   152
Section VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in 
  Persons........................................................   160
    Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights............................   160
      A. Findings................................................   160
      B. Recommendations.........................................   160
      C. Party and State Policy toward Ethnic Minorities.........   162
        1. Investigation of Wang Zhengwei Reflects Official 
          Concern over Ethnic Policies...........................   162
      D. Language and Education Policies Marginalize Ethnic 
        Minorities...............................................   163
      E. Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture...................   163
      F. Authorities Tighten Controls over Dissent, Mongolian 
        Identity in the IMAR.....................................   164
    Chapter 8--Status of Women...................................   169
      A. Findings................................................   169
      B. Recommendations.........................................   169
      C. Introduction............................................   171
      D. Political Participation and the Right to Participate in 
        Public Life..............................................   171
      E. Tennis Star Peng Shuai's Allegations Silenced by 
        Authorities..............................................   172
      F. Violation of Freedoms of Expression, Peaceful Assembly, 
        and Association..........................................   172
      G. Discrimination..........................................   173
      H. Gender-Based Violence...................................   173
        1. Domestic Violence and Divorce.........................   173
        2. Case of the Chained Jiangsu Woman Ignites Widespread 
          Concern................................................   174
        3. Sexual Harassment and Assault.........................   175
    Chapter 9--Population Control................................   183
      A. Findings................................................   183
      B. Recommendations.........................................   183
      C. Introduction............................................   185
      D. International Standards and the PRC's Coercive 
        Population Policies......................................   185
      E. Suppression of Population in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region........................................   186
      F. The Three-Child Policy..................................   186
      G. Government Efforts to Increase Births...................   187
      H. Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy..............   189
        1. Children Denied Access to Public Services.............   189
        2. Denial of Justice for Victims of the One-Child Policy.   189
        3. Continuing Effects of the Sex Ratio Imbalance.........   190
      I. Declining Birth Rates...................................   190
    Chapter 10--Human Trafficking................................   197
      A. Findings................................................   197
      B. Recommendations.........................................   197
      C. Defining Human Trafficking under the Palermo Protocol...   199
      D. PRC Criminal Law and the Palermo Protocol...............   199
      E. Cross-Border Trafficking................................   199
      F. Domestic Trafficking....................................   199
        1. Individuals Likely Killed as a Result of Organ Removal 
          in China...............................................   200
        2. Human Trafficking and the Case of the Chained Woman...   200
      G. Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region...   201
        1. Forced Labor Linked to Statements by PRC Leadership...   201
        2. Authorities Continued to Place Individuals into Forced 
          Labor..................................................   202
        3. Government-Sponsored Forced Labor Contravenes China's 
          International Obligations..............................   202
Section VII. Worker Rights.......................................   209
    Chapter 11--Worker Rights....................................   209
      A. Findings................................................   209
      B. Recommendations.........................................   210
      C. Delivery Workers during COVID-19 Lockdowns..............   211
      D. Protecting the Rights of Gig Workers....................   211
        1. Multi-Agency Approaches to Pressuring Big Tech........   212
        2. Excessive Overtime....................................   213
        3. Promoting Gig Workers' Membership in the ACFTU........   214
      E. Worker Strikes and Protests.............................   215
      F. Continued Suppression of Labor Advocacy & Civil Society.   216
        1. Detentions of Self-Identified ``Leftist'' Supporters 
          of Worker Rights.......................................   217
Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues..............................   225
    Chapter 12--Public Health....................................   225
      A. Findings................................................   225
      B. Recommendations.........................................   226
      C. COVID-19................................................   227
        1. Zero-COVID Policy: Rhetoric, Implementation, and 
          Criticism..............................................   227
        2. Harassment and Detention..............................   229
        3. Chinese Government's Ongoing Lack of Transparency 
          regarding COVID-19 Data................................   230
        4. Amplifying Disinformation in an Effort to Influence 
          International Opinion..................................   230
      D. Responding to Concerns over Ethics Standards and Human 
        Rights Violations in the Use of Genomic Data in China....   231
      E. Concerns over the Treatment of Persons with Severe 
        Psychosocial Disabilities and Continuing Use of Forcible 
        Psychiatric Commitment...................................   231
        1. Use of Forcible Commitment as a ``Stability 
          Maintenance'' Tool.....................................   232
      F. Suppression of Public Health Advocacy...................   233
    Chapter 13--The Environment and Climate Change...............   241
      A. Findings................................................   241
      B. Recommendations.........................................   241
      C. Introduction............................................   243
      D. Pollution...............................................   244
        1. Water Pollution and Dams..............................   244
        2. Air Pollution.........................................   244
      E. Climate Change and COP26................................   245
      F. COP26 ``Glasgow Declaration'' between China and the 
        United States............................................   247
      G. Illegal Fishing.........................................   247
      H. Access to Justice for Environmental Advocates...........   247
      I. Monitoring and Data Transparency........................   249
    Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights........................   256
      A. Findings................................................   256
      B. Recommendations.........................................   256
      C. Introduction............................................   258
      D. Corporate Involvement in Mass Atrocities in the XUAR....   258
        1. State-Sponsored Forced Labor in the XUAR..............   259
        2. Firms, Audits, and Complicity in Forced Labor in the 
          XUAR...................................................   260
        3. Authorities Close Labor Auditor after It Reportedly 
          Investigates Forced Labor in the XUAR..................   261
      E. Commercial Firms' Role in Government Data Collection and 
        Surveillance across China................................   261
      F. Role of Commercial Firms in Government Censorship.......   262
      G. PRC Economic Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and Human 
        Rights Violations in the XUAR............................   263
      H. Worker Exploitation, Corporate Supply Chains, and 
        Limited Legal Right to Freedom of Association............   264
    Chapter 15--North Korean Refugees in China...................   272
      A. Findings................................................   272
      B. Recommendations.........................................   272
      C. Introduction............................................   274
      D. Border Conditions and Forced Repatriation of Refugees...   274
      E. North Korean Workers in China...........................   275
      F. Trafficking of North Korean Women.......................   276
      G. Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents............   276
Section IX. Tibet................................................   280
    Chapter 16--Tibet............................................   280
      A. Findings................................................   280
      B. Recommendations.........................................   281
      C. Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government 
        and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives................   283
      D. Tibetan Self-Immolations................................   283
      E. Religious Freedom for Tibetans..........................   283
        1. Restrictions on Religious Practice....................   284
        2. Revised TAR Implementing Measures for Regulations on 
          Religious Affairs......................................   285
        3. Crackdowns on Monastic Communities....................   285
      F. Growing Threats to Language Rights......................   287
        1. Majority of Tibetan Students Subject to ``Colonial'' 
          Boarding School System.................................   289
      G. Access to Tibet and Free Flow of Information Remain 
        Heavily Restricted.......................................   290
        1. Restrictions on the Free Flow of Information..........   290
Section X. Xinjiang..............................................   298
    Chapter 17--Xinjiang.........................................   298
      A. Findings................................................   298
      B. Recommendations.........................................   299
      C. Internal Documents Show Brutality of Mass Detention and 
        Other Forms of Repression in the XUAR....................   301
        1. The Xinjiang Police Files.............................   301
        2. The Xinjiang Papers...................................   302
      D. Expansion of Mass Detention Facilities..................   303
      E. Kyrgyz Christian Ovalbek Turdakun and Mass Detention in 
        the XUAR.................................................   303
      F. Rise in Formal Detention of Turkic Muslims..............   303
      G. Detention of 2008 Olympics Torchbearers.................   305
      H. International Observers Condemn Bachelet Visit to the 
        XUAR.....................................................   306
      I. Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents.   306
        1. Xinjiang Cotton Continues to Be, and Tomato Products 
          Likely Continue to Be, Exported to United States.......   307
      J. Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR........   307
        1. Accounts of Rape in Mass Internment Camps.............   307
        2. Government White Paper and Population Control Measures   308
      K. Forcible Displacement and Assimilation of Ethnic 
        Minority Children........................................   308
      L. Pomegranate Flower Plan.................................   309
      M. Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures   309
      N. Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic 
        Muslims..................................................   310
      O. Freedom of Religion.....................................   311
Section XI. Hong Kong and Macau..................................   323
    Chapter 18--Hong Kong and Macau..............................   323
      A. Findings................................................   323
      B. Recommendations.........................................   324
      C. Hong Kong...............................................   325
      D. Elections and Civic Participation.......................   325
        1. Election Committee....................................   325
        2. Legislative Council...................................   325
        3. Chief Executive.......................................   326
        4. District Council......................................   326
      E. National Security Law...................................   327
      F. Criminal Prosecution....................................   327
        1. Secession (NSL).......................................   328
        2. Subversion (NSL)......................................   328
        3. Terrorist Activities (NSL)............................   329
        4. Collusion with External Elements (NSL)................   329
        5. Seditious Acts........................................   329
        6. Unauthorized Assembly.................................   330
        7. Riot..................................................   330
        8. Money Laundering......................................   330
        9. Assault...............................................   331
      G. Targeting the Independent Press.........................   331
      H. Restrictions on Access to Information...................   332
        1. Collapse of Civil Society.............................   332
      I. Businesses' Complicity in Repression....................   334
      J. Securitization of Education.............................   335
        1. Pre-College Education.................................   335
        2. College Education.....................................   336
      K. Macau...................................................   336
Section XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally....   346
    Chapter 19--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.   346
      A. Findings................................................   346
      B. Recommendations.........................................   347
      C. Transnational Repression................................   348
        1. Efforts to Repatriate Critics and Others Deemed 
          Sensitive..............................................   349
        2. Transnational Repression Charges in the United States.   350
      D. Economic Coercion.......................................   350
        1. Use of Informal Economic Coercion to Punish or Silence 
          Critics................................................   351
        2. Economic Coercion against Lithuania...................   352
        3. Laws That Provide a Formal Basis for Economic Coercion   352
      E. Concerns Surrounding Belt and Road Projects.............   353
      F. Exporting Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism through 
        Surveillance and Profiling Technology....................   354
      G. Impeding UN Human Rights Bodies and Redefining Global 
        Human Rights Norms.......................................   355
Section XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members.............   364



                                   X

                          --------------------

    The Commission's executive branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of 
this
Annual Report, including its findings, views, legal 
determinations, and recommendations, does not necessarily 
reflect the views of individual executive branch members or the 
policies of the Administration.
    The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 20 to 
0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Voted to adopt: Senators Merkley, Feinstein, King, Ossoff, 
Rubio, Cotton, and Daines; Representatives McGovern, Suozzi, 
Malinowski, Wexton, Smith, Mast, Hartzler, and Steel; and Executive 
Branch Commissioners Zeya, Lago, Kritenbrink, Lee, and Peterson.
    Voted to abstain: Senator Lankford and Representative Tlaib.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                         II. Executive Summary

                       Statement from the Chairs

    As the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress approached, 
General Secretary Xi Jinping and other People's Republic of 
China (PRC) authorities continue to use the language of 
democracy
and human rights to debase both, promoting a vision of state-
determined rights, suppression of civil and political rights to 
achieve coercive control, and the use of sovereignty as a 
shield to enable violations of internationally recognized 
standards. Domestically and abroad, they touted ``whole-process 
people's democracy'' and prioritized steps to ``enhance the 
attractiveness, infectiousness and influence of the 
contemporary Chinese view of human rights.'' By advancing 
initiatives such as Xi's Global Security Initiative, Global 
Development Initiative, and World Internet Conference, PRC 
authorities sought to subjugate international norms to PRC 
interests and manipulate international human rights bodies.
    Through aggressive censorship, propaganda, and the bullying 
of critics, these officials aim to mislead PRC citizens and the 
world about the human costs of the PRC's approach to 
governance. This year's report of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China (Commission) documents the reality of 
centralized, authoritarian political control: continuing 
genocide in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the 
devastating transformation of Hong Kong into a subservient city 
under the PRC's anti-democratic rule, accelerated efforts to 
``sinicize'' ethnic and religious minorities, the spread of 
patriarchal policies weaponized against the women of China, 
harsh measures to enforce a draconian and unsustainable ``zero-
COVID'' policy, and more.
    The Commission puts a spotlight on the faces of this 
repression. Leading up to the Beijing Winter Olympics, our 
#OlympicPrisoner social media campaign told the stories of 81 
PRC citizens detained or disappeared for exercising their human 
rights or for belonging to a disfavored minority group. In our 
mission to document such cases, we continue to modernize the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database to make it more 
functional, sustainable, and secure. The database now includes 
cases in Hong Kong, in light of the tragic erosion of political 
rights and the rule of law there. With surveillance an ever-
present part of life in China, the Commission expanded its 
coverage of technology-enhanced authoritarianism this year to 
improve reporting on the use of technology to control 
populations, trample freedom of expression, and undermine 
institutions of democratic governance.
    In the face of egregious human rights abuses, the 
Commission continues to champion concrete steps to defend the 
vulnerable. The enactment of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
Act--conceived, drafted, and secured by the Commission's 
bipartisan leadership--epitomizes the impact of our work. This 
law now takes the strongest action anywhere in the world to 
prevent the importation of products of the slave labor of 
repressed minorities in China. We hope it will serve as both a 
call to action and a blueprint for similar steps in other 
countries.
    Just as we work to address the role of global businesses 
and consumers in supporting activities that abet genocide, we 
have the power to protect the persecuted who come to our 
shores. Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hong Kongers, and others 
fleeing repression in China need humanitarian pathways and 
protection from Chinese authorities' harassment, intimidation, 
and worse. This report includes practical bipartisan 
recommendations for congressional and executive action that 
puts respect for universal human rights at the heart of our 
relations with the PRC.
    Xi's attempt to replace universal rights with a ``Chinese 
view of human rights'' is unacceptable. The human rights of the 
people of China are inalienable and enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international norms and 
standards. Xi's vision of a world safe for authoritarianism, 
where the power of the state supersedes personal freedoms and 
the strong can bully the weak, pits those who yearn for liberty 
against those in power who deny it to them for ideological or 
power-hungry ends. Helping the people of China prevail in this 
struggle depends not on a naive expectation that we can change 
the PRC's government but on the confidence that a strong and 
principled America will be best able to defend universal 
values. This starts at home in revitalizing the sources of 
America's strength--our democratic institutions, innovative 
economy, and openness to ideas and people from all corners of 
the globe. Our greatest asset in the international arena lies 
in the strength in numbers offered by our alignment with other 
defenders of freedom. This report makes clear the human stakes 
of this struggle and punctures the narrative of ``Chinese human 
rights'' that Xi Jinping attempts to sell to the world.

Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley    Representative James P. McGovern
Chair                        Co-Chair

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                                Overview

    The People's Republic of China continued to flex its 
coercive power this past year as it sought to dominate many 
aspects of daily life to control how citizens express 
themselves, access information, worship, raise their children, 
interact with their neighbors, conduct business, and consume 
entertainment. These actions prioritize the power of the state 
over individual liberties and put China at the vanguard of a 
global trend toward authoritarianism.
    Leading up to the October 2022 20th Party Congress, the 
Chinese Communist Party escalated efforts to tighten political 
control and centralize power. A new official version of Party 
history and the continued proliferation of ideological 
textbooks and research centers promoted a cult of personality 
around leader Xi Jinping. This ideological indoctrination 
targeted parents, journalists, students, and others forced to 
undergo ``patriotic education'' as well as ethnic and religious 
minorities subjected to a relentless campaign of 
``sinicization.'' The mobilization of local citizen groups 
charged with advancing government objectives echoed the Mao-era 
practice of enlisting individuals to spy on their neighbors, 
while a crackdown on leading technology companies dramatized 
the prioritization of Party control over economic growth.
    The PRC continued to use the criminal justice system as a 
political tool. This system endangered PRC citizens who 
challenged
authority, as evidenced by the forcible commitment of 
``disruptive'' individuals to psychiatric facilities and the 
ongoing extralegal detentions of dissidents and human rights 
lawyers in ``black jails.'' An index assessing judicial 
independence now ranks China's judicial system as the third 
most susceptible to political interference in the world, ahead 
of only those of North Korea and Eritrea.
    A report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights presented a damning assessment of mass internment, 
torture, forced sterilizations and abortions, family 
separation, and intrusive homestays in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) and concluded that ``the conditions 
remain in place for serious violations to continue.'' Analysis 
of official documents provided new evidence that Xi and other 
top leaders directed these genocidal policies. A set of newly 
obtained files includes thousands of photographs of confirmed 
detainees and provides a window into the situation in the XUAR, 
including a detention rate in one county more than 64 times the 
national rate, ``shoot to kill'' orders issued by authorities 
for those attempting to escape mass internment camps, and the 
detentions of children and seniors. As the Chinese government's 
five-year plan for the XUAR ended in 2021, the Commission 
observed an increased reliance on formal imprisonment and long 
prison terms for Turkic Muslims.
    New evidence also emerged from survivors of the internment 
camps recounting ordeals of torture, systemic rape, and 
coercive population control policies that amount to genocide, 
and reports continued to document deaths in detention. In one 
chilling account, an ex-detective described his role torturing 
Uyghur detainees, some as young as 14 years old, to extract 
false confessions. Outside the camps, the comprehensive 
technological and human surveillance of Uyghurs, ethnic 
Kazakhs, and others in the XUAR constitute what an expert 
deemed a ``system of mass psychological torture.''
    In response to mounting proof of the systematic use of 
forced labor in the XUAR tainting global supply chains, the 
United States enacted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act to 
protect consumers and prevent businesses from being complicit 
in activities that abet atrocities. The legislative action came 
as XUAR authorities intensified the scope and scale of this 
heinous crime, likely forcing hundreds of thousands of 
internment camp detainees to work within the XUAR and 
transferring millions of ``rural surplus laborers'' throughout 
China. Officials also published plans to transfer rural 
laborers into industrial work and to train workers in revenue-
generating tasks through coercive labor programs. China's 
ratification of two international conventions related to forced 
labor in response to international condemnation of these 
policies failed to assuage ``deep concern'' from the 
International Labour Organization, which pressed for unfettered 
access to the XUAR to investigate these abuses.
    Events in this reporting year confirmed the transformation 
of Hong Kong from an open society to a city gripped by fear, 
subject to invasive political control. Authorities continued to 
use the National Security Law to carry out widespread 
detention, prosecution, and imprisonment of pro-democracy 
advocates and to threaten dissidents abroad. The climate 
produced by this law led at least 65 organizations--spanning 
religious, community, political, media, union, and human rights 
activities--to cease operating in Hong Kong, including Amnesty 
International and the Hong Kong Alliance, which previously 
commemorated the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The 
dismantling of civil society included crackdowns on prominent 
independent media that caused a ripple effect, shuttering other 
news outlets, as well as the arrests of Cardinal Zen and the 
other trustees of a group providing assistance to those 
targeted by authorities.
    A year after an overhaul of Hong Kong's electoral system 
that curtailed public participation and eliminated candidates 
lacking government approval, the selection of new leaders 
underscored the inability of the people of Hong Kong to 
participate meaningfully in their own governance and made the 
erosion of freedoms more difficult to reverse. Turnout in 
Legislative Council elections plummeted to record lows and more 
than two-thirds of District Council members resigned or were 
disqualified. Twenty-five years after the PRC took control of 
Hong Kong promising a ``high degree of autonomy'' and 
``universal suffrage,'' Xi presided over the inauguration of a 
new Hong Kong Chief Executive, John Lee, selected by a Party-
controlled committee without any opposition.
    Several of the highest profile stories of the year 
highlighted the pervasive problem of violence against women. A 
horrifying video of a mother of eight chained by her neck put 
renewed attention on issues of bride trafficking, coercive 
population policies, and lack of mental health treatment. 
Tennis star Peng Shuai's allegation of sexual assault by senior 
Party official Zhang Gaoli, along with Alibaba's mishandling of 
a rape accusation against one of its managers, reinvigorated 
China's #MeToo Movement. While domestic
violence remains widespread in China, some provincial-level 
governments sought to strengthen reporting and personal 
protection orders.
    The review of China's compliance with the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which 
the PRC has signed and ratified, did not occur as originally 
scheduled, a delay that comes at a time when the World Economic 
Forum ranks China 107th out of 156 countries in gender 
equality. The PRC's ``three-child policy'' maintains the 
decades-long intrusion of the state into families' decisions 
about whether and when to have children. Implementation of this 
policy prompted concern that, to achieve demographic goals, the 
government's coercive approach could shift to forced 
procreation.
    Women, religious believers, LGBTQ persons, and others 
experienced an escalation in online censorship and harassment 
as China retained its designation, according to Freedom House, 
as the world's worst environment for internet freedom for the 
seventh straight year. Amidst ongoing suppression of feminist 
content and a national campaign promoting traditional gender 
roles, digital platforms abetted an unprecedented attack on 
online spaces for LGBTQ people, including the closure of dozens 
of WeChat accounts connected to communities at Chinese 
universities and other actions targeting rights advocacy, 
search terms, and entertainment content. A new set of sweeping 
regulations on online religious activities, which enact onerous 
registration requirements and ban a wide range of activities, 
could tightly restrict the already limited space for online 
religious freedom.
    Technology-enhanced authoritarianism, exemplified by 
comprehensive surveillance and ``predictive policing,'' 
metastasized throughout China. Futuristic speculation about 
technology's capacity to control vast populations became 
reality for an estimated 373 million Chinese swept into 
draconian lockdowns as part of the government's ``zero-COVID'' 
policy, which leading Chinese and international medical experts 
deemed unsustainable. Using big data and artificial 
intelligence, authorities integrated information from mobile 
phone geolocation and contacts, facial recognition, consumer 
shopping habits, and personal health histories. This data 
provided the backbone for disproportionately harsh public 
security measures, often using violent implementation of 
quarantine controls, that infringed on privacy rights, freedom 
of movement and expression, and due process. Many citizens 
under lockdown reported lack of food and medicine, deaths 
related to the inability to access medical care, and 
deprivation of care among vulnerable populations. The Chinese 
government's required political vetting of scientific papers, 
active disinformation campaigns about the origins of COVID-19, 
and continued refusal to provide key data obstructed 
international cooperation to address COVID-19, investigate its 
origins, and prepare for future pandemics.
    Xi's continued assault on ethnic minority cultures, with 
the education system as the front line, stands as one of the 
year's most pernicious developments. Despite constitutional and 
legal protections for minority languages, officials introduced 
policies that
emphasized Mandarin and reduced instruction in ethnic minority 
languages. Authorities' coercive assimilation policies included 
requirements to use Mandarin in preschools, the closure of 
private schools, and bans on Tibetan-language education. Most 
insidiously, reports documented the placement of nearly 80 
percent of all
Tibetan grade-school students, as well as hundreds of thousands 
of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim children, in state-run 
boarding schools. Such schools disrupt the intergenerational 
transmission of language and culture and their students 
experience a high incidence of violence, abuse, and mental 
trauma.
    The Commission observed no change in the other ways 
authorities oppress Tibetans' freedom and self-determination. 
Chinese officials remained intransigent with regard to 
reopening dialogue with the Dalai Lama and he remained a source 
of official paranoia, as evidenced by continued Party assertion 
of control over the selection of his reincarnation and the 
detention of at least 30 Tibetans for celebrating his birthday. 
Severe access restrictions continued, with zero approvals for 
journalists to independently report from the Tibet Autonomous 
Region in 2021. Three self-immolations by Tibetans drawing 
attention to political or religious issues, the first reported 
cases in over two years, tragically illustrated the failure of 
PRC rule in Tibet.
    Heightened pressure on Tibetan Buddhists, Muslims, Falun 
Gong practitioners, Catholics, Protestants, and others produced 
an environment experts characterized as a low point for 
religious freedom in recent decades. Party officials sought to 
co-opt certain groups for nationalistic activities, restricting 
their ability to practice their religion freely. Falun Gong 
adherents faced brutal hardship, including custody-related 
deaths, lengthy prison sentences, and harassment, and a peer-
reviewed study validated years of appalling anecdotal accounts 
of Falun Gong prisoners being executed by the harvesting of 
their organs. There also continued to be accounts that Uyghurs 
and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in the XUAR 
have also been targeted for forced organ removal. Members of 
Muslim minority groups in China, beyond those subjected to 
genocide in the XUAR, suffered an escalating campaign 
throughout the country to remove characteristically Muslim 
elements from mosques. Unregistered Protestant churches 
encountered significant pressure via the detention of church 
leaders and crackdowns on religious education and media.
    Chinese authorities built on previous regulatory structures 
and pressure campaigns to constrain press freedom and suppress 
civil society. The Foreign Correspondents' Club of China 
decried the ``breakneck speed'' decline in press freedom and 
Reporters Without Borders named China the world's ``biggest 
jailer'' of journalists generally and female journalists 
specifically. Female journalists of East Asian descent and 
Chinese employees of foreign news organizations experienced 
harassment. While officials tolerated organizations providing 
social welfare services locally, those advocating for citizen 
participation in governance received harsher treatment. Human 
rights lawyers, citizen journalists, women's and LGBTQ rights 
organizations, labor organizers, and religious organizations, 
as well as foreign non-governmental organizations operating in 
those spaces, faced an especially constricted landscape, with 
many closing.
    In addition to egregious human rights abuses within China's 
borders, Chinese authorities increasingly reached into other 
countries to silence critics and enhance control over emigrant 
and diaspora communities, conduct digital and in-person 
surveillance, and force the repatriation of their targets. 
China's campaign of transnational repression, which Freedom 
House considers the most comprehensive in the world, relied on 
a suite of tools that included passport controls, cyberattacks, 
intimidation, smear campaigns, spying, threats to family 
members still in China, and abuse of INTERPOL mechanisms. 
Chinese officials used coercive means in attempts to repatriate 
individuals from such places as Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, and 
Morocco to China, where they would face risk of torture. 
Chinese authorities reported that they ``returned'' 1,273 
``fugitives'' in 2021.
    A sustained strategy of economic coercion threatened 
governments and businesses with retaliation for running afoul 
of Party priorities. This bullying, which Chinese authorities 
carried out through trade restrictions, fines, removal of 
products from commerce platforms, and calls for consumer 
boycotts, tended to be most effective on subnational levels. 
Governments generally stood their ground, epitomized by the 
resilience of Lithuania against a comprehensive assault on its 
economy after its government allowed the opening of a Taiwanese 
Representative Office. Australia also stood firm during the 
third year of China's campaign of economic reprisals for 
calling for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19. 
Conversely, companies often self-censored or complied with 
Chinese government demands.
    The Chinese government signaled its intention to further 
extend its coercive power globally. New laws with 
extraterritorial application included legislation on data 
security, personal information protection, and foreign 
sanctions. Authorities sanctioned members of the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom and two companies 
that sold arms to Taiwan. At the United Nations, Chinese 
representatives attempted to weaken human rights protections 
and help Russia avoid accountability for the invasion of 
Ukraine.
    Belt and Road Initiative projects produced extensive 
threats to human rights, the rule of law, and the environment, 
including substandard and abusive working conditions, 
corruption, destruction of fish populations, and threats to 
biodiversity posed by the promotion of certain traditional 
Chinese medicines. China continued to construct new coal 
facilities and experienced negative health effects caused by 
high air pollution levels.
    The egregious human rights violations documented in this 
report place in stark relief Chinese authorities' efforts to 
control citizens and to reshape the global governance system 
away from the primacy of universal rights. The PRC continues to 
provide authoritarians around the world a model for how to 
assert coercive power and ideological purity over human dignity 
and individual liberty. Those who value human rights must stand 
up for basic freedoms against those who would unleash the 
unlimited power of the state.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                              Key Findings

                         Freedom of Expression

         In contravention of the International Covenant 
        on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal 
        Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and China's 
        Constitution, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        enhanced control over the press; the internet; the art, 
        literature, and entertainment sectors; and educational 
        and research institutions.
         The government proposed new professional 
        requirements for media organizations and journalists, 
        including mandatory continuing education that includes 
        studying ideological concepts developed by Xi Jinping 
        and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as proposed 
        restrictions on the use of private capital to fund news 
        media activities.
         Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 
        the world's ``biggest jailer of journalists'' and 
        ``biggest jailer of female journalists'' this past 
        year. Hong Kong authorities continued a crackdown on 
        independent reporting that resulted in significant 
        erosion of press freedom. China continued to detain and 
        imprison professional journalists, non-professional 
        ``citizen'' journalists, and Chinese nationals working 
        for foreign media organizations. Of the journalists in 
        prison this past year documented by the Committee to 
        Protect Journalists, nearly half were Uyghurs.
         Authorities harassed and arbitrarily 
        restricted the press freedom of foreign journalists 
        amid what the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China 
        called a ``breakneck speed'' decline in press freedom. 
        Authorities tried Australian citizen and China Global 
        Television Network anchor Cheng Lei on a ``state 
        secrets'' charge after 19 months of detention.
         The PRC took steps to control media coverage 
        of the Party's image abroad, including coverage of 
        high-profile events that took place in China. 
        Authorities reportedly supported technology, foreign 
        social media influencers, and academic research to 
        better understand and implement manipulation of public 
        opinion abroad, including countering human rights 
        criticism, advancing disinformation about the origins 
        of COVID-19, and understanding how ``key opinion 
        leaders'' can help overcome negative international 
        perceptions of Chinese state-affiliated media.
         Freedom House ranked China the ``worst 
        environment for internet freedom for the seventh year 
        in a row.'' The Cyberspace Administration of China took 
        steps to implement Party political guidance, including 
        content controls; enforcement; and new, updated, and 
        proposed regulations that raise concerns about their 
        potential to restrict expression on broadly construed 
        ``national security'' grounds.
         The PRC continued its campaign to create 
        counternarratives to criticism of Party positions on 
        human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) and other sensitive topics 
        abroad and domestically. Some YouTube content creators 
        who developed content that discussed human rights 
        issues in China reportedly faced harassment attempts 
        and efforts to trigger censorship or demonetization of 
        their content. At the same time, the PRC paid content 
        creators to develop content in support of its 
        priorities and mandated that Uyghurs do the same. 
        Content creators, who have criticized the Chinese 
        government, leaked emails from Chinese companies and 
        state-controlled media that asked them and other 
        creators to produce content supporting PRC interests. 
        U.S. social media platforms were inconsistent in the 
        labeling of content related to Chinese authorities.
         Before and during the 2022 Winter Olympics, 
        authorities restricted press freedom arbitrarily, 
        censored both online and broadcast content that did not 
        align with PRC priorities, threatened athletes about 
        human rights criticism, and implemented preemptive 
        restrictions on high-profile critics, contravening 
        protections for freedom of expression in the ICCPR, 
        UDHR, China's Constitution, and the Host City Contract 
        for the Olympic Games.
         Authorities censored discussion of a variety 
        of topics on the internet; in the entertainment, art, 
        and literature sectors; and in educational and research 
        institutions. Sample topics included COVID-19 lockdown 
        conditions, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and 
        portrayals of gender roles and masculinity.
         Schools in China reportedly began 
        incorporating compulsory education on Xi Jinping's 
        signature political ideology into their curricula, 
        following new guidance from the Ministry of Education.
         Authorities detained and imprisoned 
        individuals in connection with their peaceful 
        expression. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
        determined that human rights advocate and China 
        Citizens Movement member Zhang Baocheng had been 
        arbitrarily detained.

                             Civil Society

         During this reporting year, People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) authorities continued to restrict the 
        already limited space for autonomous civil society and 
        public participation, using regulations and harassment 
        to suppress advocacy, expression, and assembly by 
        unregistered religious groups, ``illegal social 
        organizations,'' human rights defenders, and groups 
        promoting labor rights, women's rights, and the rights 
        of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 
        (LGBTQ) people.
         The Ministry of Civil Affairs released its 
        first-ever Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social 
        Organizations (FYP). While the FYP authorizes ``social 
        organizations'' to expand in the areas of social 
        welfare and service provision, it constitutes ``a grim 
        blueprint for the [non-profit] sector's development 
        over the next five years,'' according to an 
        international expert.
         The government continued to constrain foreign 
        non-governmental organization (NGO) activity under the 
        2017 PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
        Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland 
        China (Foreign NGO Law). Freedom House observed that 
        some foreign NGOs have decided to de-register due to 
        the heavy annual administrative burdens imposed by the 
        law. Five years into the implementation of the Foreign 
        NGO Law, the space for universities and research 
        institutions to work with foreign NGOs has been 
        severely curtailed.
         In June 2022, authorities tried China Citizens 
        Movement organizers and rights defenders Ding Jiaxi and 
        Xu Zhiyong in closed-door trials for ``subversion of 
        state power.'' They have been held for over two years 
        in connection with a private gathering of civil society 
        advocates and scholars in December 2019. Public 
        security officials also continued to hold in detention 
        feminist and labor rights advocate Li Qiaochu, after 
        she revealed that authorities had tortured Xu, and 
        charged her with ``inciting subversion of state 
        power.''
         Online platforms for civil society organizing 
        and expression were shut down, censored, subjected to 
        pressure, and their individual users harassed in an 
        ongoing effort to deprive civil society movements of 
        space and resources.
         The LGBTQ community in China continued to face 
        many challenges--including persistent stigma, 
        widespread discrimination, and harassment. Chinese 
        government authorities increased restrictions on LGBTQ 
        advocacy and organizing, as they have done with other 
        advocacy groups. Chinese law neither recognizes same-
        sex marriage nor otherwise protects same-sex 
        relationships.
         The Chinese government has signaled a shift 
        toward an emphasis on traditional gender roles and 
        family structures and Chinese authorities intensified 
        their censorship of LGBTQ-related media and squeezed 
        the online advocacy space, causing once thriving 
        organizations to shutter their operations after many 
        years.
         In July 2021, LGBTQ groups at several Chinese 
        universities were shut down. In August 2021, 
        administrative officials at Shanghai University 
        circulated surveys asking LGBTQ people to self-identify 
        with no explanation as to what would be done with the 
        information.
         In April 2022, the National Health Commission 
        revised guidelines directly affecting the transgender 
        community in what observers believe is an effort to 
        comply with international standards. Additionally, in 
        November 2021, the National Children's Medical Center 
        and Children's Hospital of Fudan University in Shanghai 
        municipality opened China's first child and youth 
        transgender clinic, aimed at providing children and 
        youth with mental health and other healthcare 
        resources.

                          Freedom of Religion

         During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, 
        the People's Republic of China (PRC) escalated efforts 
        to ``sinicize'' religion, a process it defines as 
        strengthening religious believers' allegiance to the 
        ``great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese 
        culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and socialism 
        with Chinese characteristics.''
         In December 2021, the Party and government 
        convened the first National Conference on Religious 
        Work since 2016, signaling Xi Jinping and the Party's 
        intent to prioritize religious affairs.
         The National Religious Affairs Administration 
        issued a set
        of sweeping Measures for the Administration of Internet
        Religious Information Services, which were announced on 
        December 20, 2021, and went into effect on March 1, 
        2022. The measures require religious groups to have 
        government-issued permits for their online activity, 
        enact onerous registration requirements, and limit 
        permissible online religious activity by registered 
        groups.
         The Party attempted to co-opt Buddhist and 
        Taoist groups for a Party history campaign intended to 
        inculcate patriotism and loyalty, including by forcing 
        clergy to watch ``patriotic
        movies.''
         Authorities continued to suppress the 
        religious freedom of ethnic minority Muslims throughout 
        the country, promoting the eradication of distinct 
        ethnic and religious characteristics and increasing 
        assimilation with Han Chinese culture.
         The PRC continued to exert pressure on 
        unregistered Catholic communities in 2021 and 2022, as 
        demonstrated by the
        detention of lay Catholics, clergy, and at least two 
        Vatican-
        appointed bishops. Hong Kong authorities have also 
        increasingly targeted the Catholic Church. In May, Hong 
        Kong national security police arrested former bishop of 
        Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph Zen.
         During this reporting year, PRC authorities 
        continued to violate the religious freedom of 
        Protestant Christians by engaging in pressure campaigns 
        against unregistered churches, especially by detaining 
        church leaders--often under manufactured ``fraud'' 
        charges--and by cracking down on religious education 
        and publishing.
         Public security and judicial authorities 
        continued to use Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, 
        which forbids ``organizing and using a cult to 
        undermine implementation of the law,'' to persecute 
        members of spiritual groups deemed to be illegal or to 
        be ``cults'' (xiejiao), including Falun Gong, Church of 
        the Almighty God, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and others.
         Authors of a 2022 study published in the 
        American Journal of Transplantation concluded that it 
        was highly likely that transplant surgeons in China had 
        participated in the execution of prisoners ``by organ 
        transplant'' as recently as 2015. They further 
        concurred with previous ``anecdotal and textual'' 
        accounts provided by Falun Gong-affiliated 
        organizations alleging organ harvesting from prisoners 
        of conscience. There also continued to be accounts that 
        Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic 
        minorities in the XUAR have also been targeted for 
        forced organ removal.

                            Criminal Justice

         The criminal justice system remained a 
        political instrument used for maintaining social order 
        in furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party's 
        authoritarian rule. The government punishes criminal 
        acts, but it also targets individuals who pursue 
        universal human rights, particularly when they 
        independently organize or challenge the Party's 
        authority.
         Government officials used extrajudicial and 
        extralegal means--such as mass internment camps, 
        ``black jails,'' and psychiatric hospitals--to detain 
        members of ethnic minorities, government critics, and 
        people who seek redress for harm caused by official 
        actions. ``Retention in custody'' is another form of 
        extrajudicial detention. It is provided by law and 
        allows anticorruption officials to detain people 
        without legal representation or judicial process. In 
        one example, local officials detained police officer 
        Wang Shengli through retention in custody and tortured 
        him, reportedly in retaliation for Wang's efforts to 
        expose their corrupt schemes.
         Arbitrary detention did not abate despite 
        official rhetoric promoting ``rule-based governance.'' 
        Authorities labeled rights advocates and dissidents as 
        criminals, using provisions such as ``endangering state 
        security'' and other vaguely defined offenses. For 
        example, authorities sentenced entrepreneur Sun Dawu to 
        18 years in prison on a range of criminal charges 
        including ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' 
        Previously, Sun had voiced support for human rights 
        lawyers and criticized the government's handling of the 
        African swine flu epidemic.
         Legally recognized forms of detention--such as 
        retention in custody and ``residential surveillance at 
        a designated location''--may lend a veneer of legality 
        to official actions, but detention was often 
        arbitrarily applied and used by officials as cover for 
        secret detentions. Reports emerged this past year 
        indicating that officials had tortured individuals 
        while holding them in these forms of detention. As 
        examples, petitioner Wan Wenying suffered fractured 
        ribs due to repeated beatings; citizen journalist Zhang 
        Zhan was subjected to force-feeding and was denied 
        adequate medical care despite her fast-deteriorating 
        health; and a transgender person, Chen Luo'an, 
        reportedly endured sexual assault in a detention 
        facility but the government did nothing to investigate.
         There continued to be examples of authorities 
        denying detainees family and counsel visits. In one 
        example, officials in Beijing municipality invoked 
        public health concerns in preventing Wang Su'e from 
        visiting her husband Zhang Wenhe, who was forcibly 
        committed to a psychiatric hospital for the fifth time 
        for his pro-democracy activities. In the case of Wang 
        Zang, detention center officials prevented him from 
        meeting with his lawyer for over one year and two 
        months, alleging public health reasons; they granted a 
        telephone conversation only after the lawyer filed a 
        complaint with the procuratorate.

                           Access to Justice

         To the extent that citizens rely on courts to 
        protect their rights against state encroachment, 
        political pressure on the court system undermines their 
        ability to access justice. The Chinese Communist Party 
        expressly requires absolute loyalty and obedience from 
        the courts.
         Central authorities issued rules subjecting 
        judges to performance evaluation, but such a system may 
        be incompatible with judges' duty of administering 
        justice. Morality, listed as the first evaluation 
        criterion, is primarily described as a political 
        quality, referring to the judge's political alignment 
        and rejection of ``Western'' notions of constitutional 
        democracy, judicial independence, and separation of 
        powers. Requiring judges to preserve People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) leader Xi Jinping's core leader position 
        can be problematic because judges ``should uphold the 
        laws, not a given leader.''
         Judicial transparency in China took a step 
        backward when court judgments were removed from a 
        database maintained by the government. Over a three-
        month period in early 2021, court officials removed 
        from the site at least 11 million cases that were 
        primarily criminal and administrative cases involving 
        politically sensitive subject matter or where 
        government agencies were named as defendants.
         The quasi-governmental agency All China 
        Lawyers Association issued provisional regulations that 
        prohibit lawyers from ``hyping up'' cases, thereby 
        violating their right to free speech and undermining 
        government accountability, which may lead to wrongful 
        convictions. The regulations additionally require 
        lawyers to speak in line with official policies and are 
        therefore in conflict with the duty of loyalty lawyers 
        owe their clients, particularly in administrative 
        litigation where government actions are in dispute.
         This past year, Chinese authorities continued 
        to undermine rights lawyers' ability to render legal 
        help, by means including criminal prosecution, license 
        revocation, and physical attack.

                               Governance

         The Chinese Communist Party's efforts to 
        extend control over all sectors of society violate 
        citizens' right to fully participate in public affairs. 
        As the Party's dominance permeates
        society, the space for institutions of democratic 
        governance diminishes, thereby weakening citizens' 
        ability to hold authorities accountable for human 
        rights violations.
         Central authorities issued a policy plan with 
        a stated goal of promoting the rule of law in China for 
        the next five years. While the plan outlines strategies 
        to improve bureaucratic efficiency and standardize 
        administrative actions, it makes no mention of 
        developing a mechanism to check the Party's power. The 
        Party further monopolized the narrative of the past, as 
        it adopted an official version of its historical 
        contribution to China's development, portraying events 
        in a way that served to legitimize government policies, 
        tighten political control, and bolster Party General 
        Secretary Xi Jinping's personal authority, preparing 
        him to serve at least one additional five-year term as 
        General Secretary.
         The central and local governments issued plans 
        to institutionalize the existing practice of mobilizing 
        citizens through ``social organizations,'' whose 
        members are sometimes paid to further government 
        objectives. Recent examples show that the government 
        has used social organization members to harass 
        independent candidates who planned to run for local 
        election, and to boycott businesses that allegedly 
        tried to comply with sanctions related to the Chinese 
        government's use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region.
         This past year, central authorities took a 
        series of actions against businesses that had the 
        effect of increasing the Party's power to intervene in 
        the economy so as to advance its objectives in 
        politics, security, and ideology. Substantial fines 
        were imposed on leading technology companies for 
        alleged monopolistic activities. Those companies made 
        contributions to support the ``common prosperity'' 
        wealth redistribution policy as an apparent hedge 
        against further penalties.
         The Commission observed a whole-of-government 
        approach by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 
        establishing stricter control over its population 
        through its surveillance and ``zero-COVID'' policies 
        during this reporting year. The Chinese government 
        passed a new law on data that authorized the 
        government's access to individuals' personal data, with 
        some protections for the ``rights and interests'' of 
        PRC citizens. The PRC continued to invest in 
        surveillance systems and big data analysis programs 
        that enhanced its ability to monitor citizens and 
        implement social controls, which resulted in 
        discrimination and violations of the right to privacy.

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

         During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, 
        People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities 
        implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic 
        minority groups to express their cultural and religious 
        identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic 
        Autonomy Law and international law such as the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
        Social and Cultural Rights.
         During this reporting year, PRC officials 
        introduced language and education policies that 
        prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the 
        reduction of ethnic minority language instruction. 
        Australian scholar James Leibold said, ``[T]he 
        education system is now the front lines in President Xi 
        Jinping's assault on ethnic minority cultures in 
        China.''
         Authorities implemented programs and 
        activities in Hui religious communities this past year 
        which were aimed at ``sinicizing'' Islamic practices, a 
        trend observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to 
        practice their religion and culture.
         Following protests in the Inner Mongolia 
        Autonomous Region in fall 2020 over a new policy to 
        reduce Mongolian language instruction in schools, 
        authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol 
        parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. 
        Officials launched mass ``rectification'' and ``re-
        education'' campaigns, including through ``patriotism 
        courses,'' to shore up support throughout all segments 
        of Mongol society for the PRC's sinicization policies.

                            Status of Women

         Women in China continue to face persistent 
        gender inequality through ongoing promotion of 
        traditional gender norms and gender-based 
        discrimination. The Chinese government's poor 
        implementation and lack of consistency after its 
        codification of several laws and regulations aimed at 
        addressing widespread gender inequality have failed to 
        adequately address and implement structural reforms.
         In September 2021, the Chinese government 
        announced the ``Outline of Women's Development in China 
        (2021-2030),'' which the government says will play a 
        vital role in the implementation of gender equality 
        across numerous sectors. Additionally, the National 
        People's Congress publicized proposed revisions to the 
        PRC Women's Rights and Protection Law.
         As in previous years, the Chinese government 
        has failed to fulfill its commitment to adequately 
        represent women in legislative bodies, public 
        institutions, and corporate entities.
         In response to a viral video of a mother of 
        eight chained by her neck, the Chinese government 
        announced a ``strike hard'' campaign directed at 
        combating trafficking of women and children. The video 
        brought renewed attention to the plight of rural 
        trafficked women and to widespread issues concerning 
        domestic violence in China.
         Chinese authorities continued to pressure and 
        harass the digital community of feminists and women's 
        rights advocacy organizations, which led advocates to 
        shut down social media accounts and websites and rely 
        on overseas networks to advance their causes.
         Several prominent cases this year highlighted 
        weaknesses in the Chinese legal system regarding sexual 
        harassment and assault, including professional tennis 
        player Peng Shuai's allegations, the dismissal of 
        former China Central Television (CCTV) intern Zhou 
        Xiaoxuan's #MeToo case, and the workplace sexual 
        assault case against a former manager and company 
        client at Alibaba.

                           Population Control

         People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities 
        rejected calls to end birth restrictions, even though 
        experts raised demographic, economic, and human rights 
        concerns about official population control policies. In 
        August 2021, the National People's Congress amended the 
        PRC Population and Family Planning Law from a two-child 
        policy to a three-child policy based on a policy change 
        announced by the Chinese Communist Party in May 2021. 
        The amended law also abolished ``social maintenance 
        fees,'' onerous government fines for exceeding birth 
        limits under the one- and two-child birth limit 
        policies. The government's enforcement of birth limits 
        has included forced abortion and sterilization.
         PRC authorities have used draconian population 
        control measures targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic 
        minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR), including detention in mass internment camps, 
        forced abortions, and forced sterilizations. This past 
        year, research by scholar Adrian Zenz found that 
        policies implemented since 2017 had ``drastically 
        reduced birth rates of ethnic [minority] groups.'' A 
        historian said the government's claim of a regional 
        population increase from 2010 to 2020 was a 
        ``distortion'' aimed at masking population suppression. 
        At the same time that PRC authorities have encouraged 
        higher birth rates among Han Chinese women, they have 
        continued to perform forced abortions and 
        sterilizations among ethnic minority women in the XUAR, 
        a practice that one expert described as carrying a 
        ``strong undertone of eugenics.''
         The government's population control policies 
        have exacerbated China's sex ratio imbalance; these 
        policies have been linked to the ongoing trafficking of 
        women for purposes of forced marriage and commercial 
        sexual exploitation. The plight of trafficked women 
        received considerable public attention following media 
        reports in January 2022 about a woman found chained and 
        malnourished in a shed in Jiangsu province, who 
        reportedly was a victim of bride trafficking.
         A 2022 report found that many women, perhaps 
        thousands, who suffered injuries from botched or 
        untested sterilization and other procedures under the 
        one-child policy, had sought redress for their injuries 
        to no avail.
         Observers posited that, consistent with the 
        coercive nature of the PRC's past population policies, 
        new policies aimed at raising birth rates might give 
        rise to coerced procreation which would be a violation 
        of human rights.

                           Human Trafficking

         In April 2022, the Standing Committee of the 
        National People's Congress ratified the International 
        Labour Organization's (ILO) Forced Labor and Abolition 
        of Forced Labour conventions. The People's Republic of 
        China's (PRC) multiple violations of forced labor human 
        rights standards diminish any meaningful expectations 
        that the government will work in good faith to meet the 
        newly ratified ILO forced labor conventions, according 
        to a human rights advocate.
         In November 2021, scholar Adrian Zenz and the 
        Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation published an 
        analysis of leaked classified official documents that 
        are known as the Xinjiang Papers. The analysis found 
        that forced labor programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) were implemented in order to 
        comply with ``explicit statements and demands'' made by 
        PRC officials, including Chinese leader Xi Jinping. 
        Chinese government-sponsored forced labor in the XUAR 
        is a form of human trafficking under the UN Protocol to 
        Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
        Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol).
         In February 2022, the ILO released the annual 
        report of the Committee of Experts on the Application 
        of Conventions and Recommendations. The Committee 
        requested that the Chinese government review, repeal, 
        and revise its forced labor and detention policies in 
        order to end discrimination against ethnic minorities 
        in the XUAR.
         A 2022 article in the American Journal of 
        Transplantation found 71 organ transplant cases between 
        1980 and 2015 in which the removal of organs was the 
        likely cause of an individual's death. Under the 
        Palermo Protocol, the ``abuse of power or of a position 
        of vulnerability'' to achieve consent in the removal of 
        organs is a form of human trafficking.

                             Worker Rights

         The Chinese government describes digital 
        platform workers, including food delivery workers, 
        couriers, ride-hailing drivers, and truckers, as 
        ``flexibly employed.'' Many of these workers face 
        violations of international labor standards with regard 
        to access to fair pay, employment contracts and 
        agreements, and pensions and other insurance 
        categories. They handle on-the-job risks that endanger 
        their health and safety, and often lack residential 
        permits (hukou) in the urban areas where they work, 
        which limits their options for education, healthcare, 
        and housing. Gig workers played a crucial role in 
        transporting and delivering food and other essential 
        goods to ordinary citizens in China held under 
        restrictive lockdowns due to coronavirus disease 2019 
        (COVID-19) outbreaks this past year.
         Officials have increasingly pressured 
        technology and e-commerce companies to improve gig 
        workers' conditions. The campaign included a 
        legislative amendment to allow gig workers to join the 
        All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the 
        issuance of multiple joint opinions that aim to 
        establish employment norms for gig work and the 
        platform economy, the publication of typical court 
        cases involving overtime, and new provisions on 
        algorithm management.
         The Chinese Communist Party-led ACFTU remains 
        the only trade union organization legally recognized 
        under Chinese law, and workers are not allowed to 
        establish independent unions. The Party and government 
        revised the PRC Trade Union Law to allow gig workers to 
        join the ACFTU, and instructed the ACFTU to redouble 
        outreach to unionize gig workers.
         The government does not publish official data 
        on the number of strikes and labor actions, and its 
        censorship of news and social media, along with its 
        harassment and detention of citizen journalists and 
        labor advocates, further limits access to information 
        about labor unrest. The Hong Kong-based non-
        governmental organization (NGO) China Labour Bulletin 
        (CLB) documented 1,094 strikes and other labor actions 
        in 2021, which may only reflect between 5 and 10 
        percent of total worker actions. CLB found that more 
        than 68 percent of those labor actions were related to 
        wage arrears.
         Official repression of non-governmental 
        advocacy for workers' rights intensified during the 
        past 10 years. The detentions of graduate student Fang 
        Ran and labor advocate Wang Jianbing in August and 
        September 2021, respectively, reflect local 
        authorities' aggressive approach to individuals engaged 
        in worker rights research and advocacy. Authorities 
        appear to have released food delivery workers' 
        organizer Chen Guojiang from detention in January 2022, 
        but the circumstances of his release were not reported.

                             Public Health

         As the highly infectious Delta and Omicron 
        variants of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spread 
        quickly in China this past year, the Chinese Communist 
        Party and government's public health response continued 
        to be shaped by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's 
        political priorities. Features of political influence 
        included the Party's promotion of its ``zero-COVID'' 
        policy as a success story to validate the Party's 
        decisionmaking despite a growing chorus within and 
        outside China that criticized a lack of planning for 
        coexistence with the virus; lockdown management that 
        employed disproportionally harsh public security 
        measures and surveillance to ``maintain stability''; 
        actively promoting disinformation about COVID-19; and 
        an ongoing lack of transparency in providing data 
        needed by the international scientific community to 
        more effectively handle COVID-19 through investigating 
        SARS-CoV-2's origins and better preparing for a future 
        infectious pathogen. Authorities used repressive 
        tactics against individuals, including Zhang Zhan and 
        Fang Bin, who provided unauthorized reports about the 
        government's mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak.
         International concern over the publication of 
        genetic research by Chinese scientists using DNA 
        samples taken from Uyghurs in China allegedly without 
        obtaining informed consent sparked several genetics 
        journals to investigate and retract several research 
        papers.
         A case illustrating the vulnerability to human 
        trafficking of women with developmental and mental 
        health disabilities in China galvanized the public and 
        pushed the government to prioritize aid to persons with 
        psychosocial disorders in an anti-trafficking campaign, 
        but domestic experts report a lack of systemic legal 
        protections. Public security officials also continued 
        to forcibly commit petitioners and other individuals 
        whom authorities have deemed ``disruptive'' to 
        psychiatric facilities in spite of clear provisions in 
        the PRC Mental Health Law that prohibit this. Among the 
        cases the Commission monitored this year were Li 
        Tiantian and Zhou Caifan.
         Individual and organized public health 
        advocacy continues in China, but the personal and 
        professional risks of organized public health advocacy 
        that authorities deem politically sensitive or even 
        threatening, are evident in the ongoing or new 
        detentions this past year of Cheng Yuan and Wu 
        Gejianxiong, from the advocacy organization Changsha 
        Funeng; He Fangmei, an advocate for victims of 
        defective vaccines; and Hu Xincheng, a former 
        investigative journalist and rights advocate.

                   The Environment and Climate Change

         China remained the world's leading emitter of 
        greenhouse gases, including coal mine methane 
        emissions, and is constructing 169 new coal mines and 
        at least 5 new coal-fired power plants. China's high 
        levels of air pollutants contribute to negative health 
        effects including premature death.
         At the UN Climate Change Conference of the 
        Parties (COP26) in November 2021, China and the United 
        States, the world's two largest emitters of carbon 
        dioxide, together pledged to cut greenhouse gases and 
        take other actions in the ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow 
        Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s.'' 
        In April 2022, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for 
        Climate John Kerry said that cooperation with China on 
        climate change had become more difficult after Chinese 
        authorities linked cooperation on climate change with 
        U.S. behavior on unrelated matters, a position they 
        reiterated in August 2022.
         During this reporting year, People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) citizens continued to face the problems 
        of water pollution and water scarcity. The Ministry of 
        Ecology and Environment (MEE) reported that 84.9 
        percent of tested surface water and 22.7 percent of 
        tested groundwater in China was fit for human 
        consumption. In addition, the construction of dams 
        along major rivers in China and outside China as part 
        of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was reported to 
        have negative impact on the 11 countries downstream and 
        elsewhere in the world.
         Authorities prosecuted and sentenced some 
        citizens who raised concerns about the environment 
        through protests and other forms of public advocacy. A 
        court in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region sentenced 
        environmental advocates Li Genshan, Zhang Baoqi, and 
        Niu Haibo, to prison in connection with their efforts 
        to protect local endangered species. In another case, a 
        court in Jiangxi province sentenced three individuals, 
        Xiong Yugen, Yang Fengying, and Yi Lianxiang, to one 
        year in prison, suspended for two years, in connection 
        with their protests against a polluting factory near 
        their village.
         A group consisting of 1 U.S.-based and 15 
        China-based environmental scientists concluded that 
        climate change amplified extreme rainfalls in China in 
        the summer of 2020. Heavy summer rains in July 2021 
        caused the deaths of 25 persons in Henan province, 
        including 12 who were trapped in a subway. Observers 
        noted that despite years of warnings from scientists, 
        Chinese officials and scientists scarcely mentioned 
        climate change as a contributing factor to increases in 
        rainfall.

                       Business and Human Rights

         Chinese and international businesses continue 
        to be at risk of complicity in--and of profiting from--
        the People's Republic of China's (PRC) use of forced 
        labor to repress ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). A report investigating 
        Xinjiang cotton and the global supply chain concluded 
        that ``human rights due diligence is [currently] 
        inadequate in identifying and addressing Uyghur forced 
        labor in supply chains of manufacturers outside of 
        China and enforcement mechanisms are not currently 
        responding to the export of those goods 
        internationally.''
         The PRC continued to threaten for-profit and 
        non-profit organizations with loss of revenue or other 
        forms of punishment if they mentioned human rights 
        violations in the XUAR. In one case, authorities closed 
        down an affiliate of labor auditor Verite, Inc., after 
        it reportedly investigated reports of forced labor in 
        the XUAR. In another case, pro-Chinese Communist Party 
        and Party-affiliated organizations criticized, and 
        insinuated potential retaliation against, Kodak for 
        posting pictures by a photographer who described the 
        XUAR as ``an Orwellian dystopia.''
         The Chinese government restricted freedom of 
        expression this reporting year, and corporations 
        continued to take part in censorship. Instances include 
        the following examples:

                  Apple removed a globally used Quran app from 
                the Apple app store in China.
                  Chinese companies removed media content of 
                foreign individuals whose speech or actions did 
                not conform with PRC narratives.
                  Disney Plus Hong Kong removed an episode of 
                ``The Simpsons'' that satirically referenced 
                human rights violations committed by the Party, 
                including the violent suppression of the 1989 
                Tiananmen protests.
                  Apple and two British publishing firms, 
                Octopus Books and Quarto, censored products 
                intended for sale outside of mainland China.

         The Washington Post reported that, based on 
        presentations obtained from Huawei's website, Huawei 
        marketed surveillance technology to the Chinese 
        government--including surveillance technology used in 
        the XUAR.
         The Commission observed reports that a labor 
        rights whistleblower was tortured prior to being 
        sentenced to two years in prison for exposing labor 
        rights violations. The violations took place in a 
        factory producing the Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, and 
        the Amazon Kindle.

                     North Korean Refugees in China

         Chinese and North Korean authorities arranged 
        the repatriation of reportedly 50 North Korean refugees 
        in July 2021. Repatriated North Koreans remained 
        vulnerable to torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and 
        execution, and the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea (DPRK) government signaled harsher punishment for 
        escapees as well as family members within North Korean 
        borders.
         In 2021, only 63 North Korean refugees were 
        recorded as entering South Korea, compared to 229 in 
        2020 and 1,047 in 2019, the lowest since the South 
        Korean Ministry of Reunification began recording the 
        number of escapees in 1998. The coronavirus disease 
        2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and related border closures 
        contributed to the decrease.
         The UN Security Council issued a Resolution in 
        2017 requiring Member States, which includes China, to 
        repatriate North Korean nationals working overseas to 
        the DPRK by December 2019. The Chinese government did 
        not comply with this deadline to repatriate the 
        approximately 20,000 to 100,000 North Koreans working 
        in China as dispatch workers, many of whom are 
        subjected to forced labor and abusive working 
        conditions.
         Women remain the largest demographic of North 
        Korean refugees leaving the DPRK for China and they 
        continue to be vulnerable to human trafficking and 
        forced and low-wage labor. The Chinese government's 
        refusal to recognize survivors of trafficking and abuse 
        prevents them from receiving legal protection or access 
        to vital services.

                                 Tibet

         The Commission did not observe any interest 
        from People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in 
        resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama's 
        representatives, the last round of which, the ninth, 
        was held in January 2010.
         The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to 
        control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the 
        majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. Authorities 
        in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of 
        religious worship, particularly during major religious 
        events or around the times of politically sensitive 
        anniversaries, and restricted access to Tibetan 
        Buddhist religious institutions. The PRC continued to 
        assert control over the process of selection and 
        recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, 
        including the Dalai Lama.
         The Commission observed reports of three 
        Tibetan self-
        immolations, bringing the number of self-immolations 
        since 2009 in Tibetan areas reported to focus on 
        political or religious issues to 154, of which 135 were 
        reportedly fatal. On February 25, 2022, 25-year-old pop 
        singer Tsewang Norbu fatally self-
        immolated near the Potala Palace in Lhasa municipality, 
        Tibet Autonomous Region. On March 27, 81-year-old Tashi 
        Phuntsog (or Taphun), fatally self-immolated at a 
        police station near Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) 
        county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, 
        Sichuan province. On March 30, Tsering Samdrub (or 
        Tsering) self-immolated in Yushu (Yulshul) city, Yushu 
        Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.
         Chinese authorities continued to threaten 
        linguistic rights in Tibetan areas and enforce policies 
        promoting or mandating the use of Mandarin Chinese 
        instead of Tibetan or other local languages, including 
        through ordering the closures of Tibetan-
        language schools. A rights advocacy group reported that 
        nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan students were educated 
        in state-sponsored colonial boarding schools, 
        threatening Tibetans' linguistic and cultural rights by 
        separating children from their families and 
        communities.
         In contravention of international human rights 
        standards, officials punished residents of Tibetan 
        areas for exercising protected rights, including the 
        expression of religious belief, criticism of PRC 
        policies, and sharing information online. Notable cases 
        this past year included writer Lobsang Lhundrub, better 
        known as Dhi Lhaden, sentenced to four years in prison, 
        possibly because of a book he was writing; Rinchen Kyi, 
        a teacher at a private school that officials shut down 
        in July 2021, detained for ``inciting separatism'' (and 
        later released); and Lobsang Trinle, a Tibetan Buddhist 
        monk sentenced to five years in prison after he shared 
        the Dalai Lama's teachings and writings about the Dalai 
        Lama with other Tibetans.

                                Xinjiang

         Key findings from a cache of tens of thousands 
        of files obtained from public security bureaus in two 
        counties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR) included: the key role of senior Communist Party 
        and central government officials in carrying out the 
        mass detention and other persecution of Turkic Muslims 
        in the XUAR; the highly securitized nature of detention 
        in the region's camps and prisons; the high rate of 
        imprisonment in Konasheher (Shufu) county in Kashgar 
        prefecture, XUAR, as authorities increasingly sentenced 
        Turkic Muslims to formal imprisonment; and arbitrary 
        deprivation of liberty in camps and prisons.
         Reports published during the Commission's 2022 
        reporting year indicated that XUAR officials 
        increasingly sentenced many Turkic and Muslim 
        individuals to long prison terms, sometimes following 
        their detention in mass internment camps. According to 
        international reporting and analysts' review of 
        satellite imagery, officials have converted many former 
        mass internment camps into prisons or other types of 
        formal detention facilities.
         International researchers and journalists 
        found evidence that authorities continued to expand 
        detention facilities, including mass internment camps. 
        Based on research and analysis of leaked official 
        documents and satellite imagery, BuzzFeed News 
        journalists estimated in July 2021 that authorities in 
        the XUAR had enough space in detention facilities in 
        the region, including prisons and mass internment 
        camps, to detain more than one million people at the 
        same time.
         Authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of 
        forced labor that involved former mass internment camp 
        detainees and other Turkic and Muslim individuals. In 
        its annual report released in February 2022, the 
        International Labour Organization expressed ``deep 
        concern'' over forced labor in the XUAR and asserted 
        that the ``extensive use of forced labor'' involving 
        Turkic and/or Muslim minorities in the region violated 
        the Employment Policy Convention of 1964.
         In September 2021, official media in the XUAR 
        announced a new plan pairing Uyghur children with 
        children from across the country, a move that observers 
        believe is designed to control Uyghurs' lives and 
        eliminate Uyghurs' cultural identity. Called the 
        ``Pomegranate Flower Plan,'' the initiative matched 
        Uyghur toddlers and elementary school students from a 
        village in Kashgar prefecture with predominantly Han 
        Chinese children from other parts of China, in order to 
        establish ``kinship'' ties between the children.
         During the 2022 Ramadan period, which lasted 
        from April 1 to May 1, authorities in parts of Urumqi 
        municipality and Kashgar and Hotan prefectures 
        reportedly enforced quotas for local Muslims allowed to 
        fast during the holiday, and required them to register 
        with officials. Reports published this past year showed 
        that authorities have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the 
        XUAR, including members of the clergy, to lengthy 
        prison terms.
         Turkic women who had been detained in mass 
        internment camps in the XUAR provided evidence to the 
        Uyghur Tribunal that many female detainees were raped 
        in the camps. One former camp detainee testified that 
        unmarried, divorced, and widowed women were raped in a 
        camp where she was detained and that men paid to come 
        to camps to rape female detainees.

                          Hong Kong and Macau

         The overhaul of Hong Kong's electoral system 
        in March 2021 substantially curtailed public 
        participation and created a system that eliminates 
        candidates whom central authorities do not endorse. 
        Even before the overhaul, the spectrum of political 
        voices had already narrowed rapidly, as most pro-
        democracy activists were in exile or criminal detention 
        as a result of the National Security Law (NSL), passed 
        in June 2020. The Legislative Council (LegCo) election 
        held in December 2021 had almost exclusively pro-
        Beijing candidates and saw record low turnout amidst 
        calls for boycott over the election's perceived 
        illegitimacy. In May 2022 there was only one candidate 
        for Chief Executive, who was nominated and selected by 
        a government-vetted committee. By design and in 
        practice, the electoral overhaul is a departure from 
        the ultimate aim, as stated in the Basic Law of the 
        Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Basic Law), of 
        electing the legislative and executive officeholders by 
        universal suffrage.
         Hong Kong authorities broadly applied criminal 
        charges in a manner that undermined fundamental 
        freedoms and damaged democratic institutions and the 
        rule of law. Police have arrested over 10,499 people 
        for political and protest-related offenses since June 
        2019. Of these arrests, 183 involved national security 
        offenses, which triggered procedures under the National 
        Security Law including a strict bail standard that 
        presumes guilt, trial by politically selected judges, 
        and possible
        extradition to mainland China. Cases of note include 
        Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, founder of a pro-democracy 
        newspaper who is facing national security charges and a 
        potentially lengthy prison term; Leon Tong Ying-kit, 
        who was denied a jury trial; Adam Ma Chun-man, who 
        received a five-year sentence for his speech; and 34 
        individuals whom authorities held in pretrial detention 
        for over a year for peacefully participating in an 
        informal primary election.
         The National Security Department of the Hong 
        Kong Police Force raided pro-democracy news outlets 
        Apple Daily and Stand News, froze their assets, and 
        arrested their executives and editors on NSL charges. 
        The police's actions forced the news outlets to cease 
        operations, causing a ripple effect that shuttered 
        other independent news outlets.
         Following the lead of mainland state-run 
        media, rhetoric and actions by Hong Kong officials 
        displayed a concerted effort to target civil society 
        groups that were part of the pro-democracy movement in 
        2019, isolating them from the international community 
        and causing their rapid disintegration in 2021. As of 
        January 2022, at least 65 organizations had shut down 
        or left Hong Kong after the enactment of the National 
        Security Law, a trend that accelerated in the second 
        half of 2021. These organizations include religious, 
        community, political, media, union, and human rights 
        groups, and their members cited pressure under the 
        National Security Law.
         Macau Special Administrative Region 
        authorities invoked
        political grounds in the disqualification of 21 pro-
        democracy candidates for election to the Legislative 
        Assembly, which was followed by a record low turnout 
        and the closure of a pro-
        democracy online news outlet.

            Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

         The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued 
        a multi-year campaign of transnational repression 
        against critics, Uyghurs, and others to stifle 
        criticism and enhance control over emigrant and 
        diaspora communities. Authorities and those acting at 
        their direction engaged in digital and in-person 
        harassment and surveillance, harassment and 
        intimidation of China-based relatives of overseas 
        targets, and attempted repatriation--in some cases 
        coercive--to China, where UN and other experts argued 
        they would face significant risk of torture. In June 
        2022, Freedom House reported that it had counted 229 
        cases of ``physical transnational repression''--which 
        can include ``detention, assault, physical 
        intimidation, unlawful deportation, rendition, or 
        suspected assassination''--originating from China since 
        2014.
         The PRC used economic coercion against foreign 
        governments and companies to stifle criticism of 
        China's human rights conditions and other issues 
        Chinese authorities deemed sensitive. Authorities used 
        unacknowledged, informal economic coercion, such as a 
        campaign against Lithuania--which resulted in economic 
        losses--and economic coercion against Intel, Sam's 
        Club, and Walmart--which reportedly resulted in some 
        consumers in China canceling their Sam's Club 
        memberships. The government also introduced new 
        authorities in Chinese law for carrying out economic 
        coercion and formally sanctioned officials of the 
        United States Commission on International Religious 
        Freedom, as well as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.
         Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in 
        multiple regions experienced worker rights violations, 
        environmental problems, corruption, and opacity in 
        project debt and project agreements with host country 
        institutions. Those developments were consistent with 
        reports of systemic problems in recent years as the 
        scale of BRI investment, as well as Chinese government 
        support and involvement in BRI, has increased.
         The PRC continued longstanding global campaign 
        to discredit universal rights in international 
        institutions and reshape international consensus around 
        human rights, in what Human Rights Watch described in 
        2017 as ``a systematic attempt to subvert the ability 
        of the UN human rights system to confront abuses in 
        China and beyond.'' The PRC took steps to impede UN 
        bodies in their work to hold Russia accountable for 
        human rights violations committed in its invasion of 
        Ukraine, and the government attempted to weaken human 
        rights protections in a draft instrument that would 
        create legally binding human rights obligations for 
        transnational and other businesses.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                  Political Prisoner Cases of Concern

    Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged 
to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) 
for credible and up-to-date information on individual prisoners 
or groups of prisoners. The Political Prisoner Cases of Concern 
in the Commission's 2022 Annual Report highlight a small number 
of individuals whom Chinese authorities have detained or 
sentenced for peacefully exercising their internationally 
recognized human rights. Members of Congress and the 
Administration are encouraged to advocate for these individuals 
in meetings with People's Republic of China officials. For more 
information on these cases and other cases raised in the Annual 
Report, see the PPD.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Name PPD Record No.           Case Summary (as of June 30, 2022)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xu Na                            Date of Detention: July 19, 2020
2008-00675                       Place of Detention: Dongcheng District
                                  Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention
                                  Center, Beijing municipality
                                 Charge(s): Organizing and using a cult
                                  to undermine implementation of the law
                                 Status: Sentenced to eight years
                                 Context: Xu was detained along with 12
                                  other Falun Gong practitioners for
                                  allegedly sharing photos of Beijing
                                  street scenes during the COVID-19
                                  pandemic with an overseas publication
                                  associated with Falun Gong, and for
                                  possession of Falun Gong materials
                                  found at their homes.
                                 Additional Information: Xu's original
                                  lawyer, Liang Xiaojun, was disbarred
                                  in December 2021 by Beijing officials
                                  partly over his social media posts
                                  defending the rights of Falun Gong
                                  practitioners. Xu previously served
                                  two prison sentences, from 2001 to
                                  2006 and 2008 to 2011, in connection
                                  with her practice of Falun Gong. She
                                  was detained in 2008 along with her
                                  husband Yu Zhou, who died in police
                                  custody shortly thereafter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Niu Tengyu                       Date of Detention: August 22, 2019
2021-00062                       Place of Detention: Sihui Prison,
                                  Zhaoqing municipality, Guangdong
                                  province
                                 Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble; infringing on
                                  citizens' personal information;
                                  illegal business activity
                                 Status: Sentenced to 14 years
                                 Context: In August 2019, public
                                  security officials took into custody
                                  20-year-old coder Niu Tengyu and held
                                  him in Maoming municipality,
                                  Guangdong, as part of a major
                                  crackdown on users of the internet
                                  site EsuWiki, on which personal
                                  information of two relatives of
                                  Communist Party General Secretary Xi
                                  Jinping allegedly had been published.
                                  The court sentenced Niu to serve a
                                  total of 14 years in prison and fined
                                  him 130,000 yuan (US$19,000).
                                 Additional Information: From December
                                  10, 2019, to January 22, 2020,
                                  authorities held Niu under
                                  ``residential surveillance at a
                                  designated location'' (RSDL) to
                                  investigate him on a charge of
                                  endangering state security.
                                  Authorities tortured Niu, including
                                  through use of the ``tiger bench,''
                                  hanging him by his arms, burning his
                                  genitals, pouring saline solution over
                                  his injuries, and causing permanent
                                  injury to his right hand.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tonyee Chow Hang-tung            Date of Detention: June 4, 2021
2021-00514                       Place of Detention: Tai Lam Centre for
                                  Women, Hong Kong Special
                                  Administrative Region (SAR)
                                 Charge(s): Inciting others to join an
                                  unauthorized assembly; inciting
                                  subversion of state power; failure to
                                  comply with notice to provide
                                  information
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: On June 4, 2021, Hong Kong
                                  police arrested Tonyee Chow Hang-tung,
                                  alleging that she had incited others
                                  to join a candlelight vigil
                                  commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen
                                  protests, which police had declined to
                                  authorize on public health grounds.
                                  Police released her on bail but
                                  arrested her again on June 30,
                                  accusing her of inciting others to
                                  join an unauthorized assembly on July
                                  1, the anniversary of Hong Kong's
                                  handover. Chow was a rights lawyer and
                                  vice chair of the non-governmental
                                  organization Hong Kong Alliance, which
                                  organized June 4th vigils annually. In
                                  September, police arrested Chow and
                                  several other Hong Kong Alliance
                                  members for failing to surrender
                                  documents relating to the
                                  organization's operations,
                                  additionally charging her with
                                  ``inciting subversion of state power''
                                  under the National Security Law (NSL).
                                  Chow has been sentenced to a total of
                                  22 months in prison for two charges
                                  relating to unauthorized assembly. The
                                  charges brought under the NSL remained
                                  pending as of April 2022.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jimmy Lai                        Date of Detention: August 10, 2020
Chee-ying                        Place of Detention: Stanley Prison,
2020-00323                        Hong Kong SAR
                                 Charge(s): Collusion with a foreign
                                  country or with external elements to
                                  endanger national security; conspiracy
                                  to defraud
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: On August 10, 2020, Hong Kong
                                  police took Jimmy Lai Chee-ying into
                                  custody on suspicion of ``collusion
                                  with a foreign country or with
                                  external elements to endanger national
                                  security'' under the NSL and
                                  ``conspiracy to defraud.'' Lai is the
                                  founder of Apple Daily, which media
                                  sources have described as a pro-
                                  democracy publication. On August 10,
                                  2020, police also detained nine other
                                  individuals, including Lai's two sons
                                  and other democracy advocates and
                                  newspaper executives. Police did not
                                  disclose the specific facts underlying
                                  the NSL charge and did not explain why
                                  the fraud charge, which was based on
                                  an alleged breach of a commercial
                                  lease, rose to the level of a criminal
                                  offense. Observers have said the
                                  arrests were authorities' efforts to
                                  suppress free press and to intimidate
                                  pro-democracy advocates. Lai was
                                  formally charged under the NSL on
                                  December 11. He was briefly released
                                  on bail but has remained in detention
                                  since December 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chang Weiping                    Date of Detention: January 12, 2020
2020-00014                       Place of Detention: Feng County PSB
                                  Detention Center, Baoji municipality,
                                  Shaanxi province
                                 Charge(s): Subversion of state power
                                 Status: Awaiting trial
                                 Context: Following his attendance at a
                                  December 2019 gathering of rights
                                  advocates in Xiamen municipality,
                                  Fujian province, rights lawyer Chang
                                  Weiping was placed under RSDL in
                                  January 2020. Authorities released him
                                  on bail, but after he posted a video
                                  online in which he described his
                                  maltreatment while in custody,
                                  authorities again placed him under
                                  RSDL in October 2020 on suspicion of
                                  ``inciting subversion of state
                                  power.'' During the next six months,
                                  authorities repeatedly tortured Chang,
                                  and in April 2021 he was formally
                                  arrested for ``subversion of state
                                  power.''
                                 Additional Information: During Chang's
                                  time in RSDL, authorities subjected
                                  him to torture, including extended
                                  interrogation sessions, denial of
                                  adequate nutrition and hygiene, and
                                  sleep deprivation. As a result, he
                                  suffers from nerve damage to his
                                  fingers and sores caused by being
                                  restrained in a ``tiger chair'' for
                                  several days.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Yuhan                         Date of Detention: October 9, 2017
2017-00361                       Place of Detention: Shenyang Municipal
                                  No. 1 PSB Detention Center, Liaoning
                                  province
                                 Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble, fraud
                                 Status: Tried, awaiting sentencing
                                 Context: A lawyer, Li previously
                                  represented rights lawyer Wang Yu,
                                  whom authorities detained in a
                                  crackdown on human rights legal
                                  professionals that began in mid-2015.
                                  Authorities held Li in extended
                                  pretrial detention from 2017 until her
                                  trial before the Heping District
                                  People's Court in Shenyang on October
                                  20, 2021.
                                 Additional Information: Li suffers from
                                  various health conditions, including
                                  heart disease, hypertension, and
                                  hyperthyroidism. Staff at the
                                  detention center reportedly urinated
                                  on her food, denied her hot water for
                                  showering, denied her medical
                                  treatment, and threatened to beat her
                                  to death. In March 2018, Li went on a
                                  hunger strike to protest mistreatment,
                                  which prompted detention center
                                  officials to force-feed her. Detention
                                  center officials blocked her lawyer
                                  from meeting her, citing the COVID-19
                                  pandemic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xu Qin                           Date of Detention: February 9, 2018
2016-00015                       Place of Detention: Yangzhou Municipal
                                  PSB Detention Center, Jiangsu province
                                 Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state
                                  power
                                 Status: Formally arrested, held in
                                  extended pretrial detention
                                 Context: Police in Gaoyou city,
                                  Yangzhou, detained veteran rights
                                  defender Xu Qin in February 2018 on
                                  suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble'' inP apparent
                                  connection with her advocacy on behalf
                                  ofP other rights advocates, including
                                  detained lawyer Yu Wensheng. In March,
                                  police placed Xu under ``residential
                                  surveillance at a designated
                                  location'' and accused her of
                                  ``inciting subversion of state
                                  power.'' After releasing Xu on bail in
                                  September, authorities maintained her
                                  bail conditions for 3 years. In
                                  November 2021, she was taken back into
                                  custody and formally arrested for
                                  ``inciting subversion.'' In June 2022,
                                  Xu's lawyer reported that she was
                                  paralyzed and in a wheelchair.
                                 Additional Information: A former
                                  Communist Party member, Xu was
                                  detained previously in 2016 in
                                  connection with a planned gathering of
                                  petitioners in Beijing municipality.
                                  Xu has been a member of the rights
                                  defense organizations China Human
                                  Rights Watch and Rose China, whose
                                  founder Qin Yongmin is serving a 13-
                                  year prison sentence for his democracy
                                  advocacy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Zhan                       Date of Detention: May 19, 2020
2020-00175                       Place of Detention: Shanghai Women's
                                  Prison
                                 Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble
                                 Status: Sentenced to four years
                                 Context: On May 14, 2020, unknown
                                  individuals ``disappeared'' citizen
                                  journalist Zhang Zhan in Wuhan
                                  municipality, Hubei province, the
                                  epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak, in
                                  connection with her efforts to
                                  document the epidemic on WeChat,
                                  Twitter, YouTube, and other social
                                  media platforms. The Pudong New
                                  District People's Court in Shanghai
                                  municipality tried and sentenced Zhang
                                  on December 28, 2020.
                                 Additional Information: After the
                                  trial, Zhang went on a hunger strike
                                  that reportedly left her near death;
                                  in November 2021, her family reported
                                  that she weighed less than 40
                                  kilograms and could not walk or lift
                                  her head on her own. In early 2022,
                                  her mother reported that Zhang's
                                  health began to improve after she
                                  resumed eating.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Genshan                       Date of Detention: September 9, 2020
2020-00248                       Place of Detention: Zhongwei
                                  municipality, Ningxia Hui Autonomous
                                  Region
                                 Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble; extortion; harming
                                  or endangering rare wildlife
                                 Status: Sentenced to four years and six
                                  months
                                 Context: Zhongwei police criminally
                                  detained environmental advocate Li
                                  Genshan on September 9, 2020, along
                                  with two fellow volunteers, in
                                  connection with their advocacy work.
                                  By the end of the month, police had
                                  detained 14 individuals in total as
                                  part of the case, and formally charged
                                  8 of them, including Li. Li and
                                  several of those detained were
                                  volunteers with the Zhongwei Mongolian
                                  Gazelle Patrol Team, which sought to
                                  protect local wildlife. The Shapotou
                                  District People's Court sentenced Li
                                  and two others on August 31, 2021;
                                  upon appeal, the Zhongwei Intermediate
                                  People's Court ordered a retrial on
                                  November 3. Following a January 2022
                                  retrial, the Shapotou court sentenced
                                  Li and the other two to four years and
                                  six months in prison.
                                 Additional Information: Li and other
                                  members of the patrol team had
                                  previously reported corporations for
                                  environmental destruction and local
                                  forestry police for allegedly
                                  protecting poachers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ding Jiaxi                       Date of Detention: December 26, 2019
2013-00307                       Place of Detention: Linshu County PSB
                                  Detention Center, Linyi municipality,
                                  Shandong province
                                 Charge(s): Subversion of state power
                                 Status: Tried, awaiting sentencing
                                 Context: Ding Jiaxi is a disbarred
                                  lawyer and rights advocate. His
                                  December 2019 detention is linked to
                                  other rights advocates detained the
                                  same month following a gathering at
                                  which participants discussed Chinese
                                  politics and civil society. Yantai
                                  municipality, Shandong, police
                                  initially placed Ding under RSDL in
                                  Shandong before Linyi police arrested
                                  him in June 2020 for ``inciting
                                  subversion of state power,'' a charge
                                  later changed to the more serious
                                  ``subversion of state power.'' Ding
                                  and legal advocate Xu Zhiyong have
                                  alleged that officials tortured them
                                  in custody, including by restraining
                                  them in ``tiger chairs'' during
                                  prolonged interrogations. In June
                                  2022, the Linshu County People's Court
                                  held closed trials for Xu and Ding.
                                 Additional Information: Ding served a
                                  prison sentence from 2013 to 2016 due
                                  to his anti-corruption and government
                                  transparency advocacy. Authorities
                                  sentenced him to three years and six
                                  months in prison for ``gathering a
                                  crowd to disrupt public order'' in
                                  connection with planned demonstrations
                                  calling on officials to disclose their
                                  wealth.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xu Zhiyong                       Date of Detention: February 15, 2020
2005-00199                       Place of Detention: Linshu County PSB
                                  Detention Center
                                 Charge(s): Subversion of state power
                                 Status: Tried, awaiting sentencing
                                 Context: Xu Zhiyong is a prominent
                                  legal advocate and one of the
                                  initiators of the New Citizens'
                                  Movement (also known as China Citizens
                                  Movement). His detention is connected
                                  to the December 2019 gathering that
                                  led to Ding Jiaxi's detention. Xu
                                  evaded a police search for 50 days
                                  prior to his detention, during which
                                  time he publicly urged Xi Jinping to
                                  leave office because of the
                                  government's handling of the COVID-19
                                  pandemic. Prior to Xu's arrest in June
                                  2020, authorities held him under RSDL
                                  in Beijing municipality. Xu and Ding
                                  have alleged that officials tortured
                                  them in custody, including by
                                  restraining them in ``tiger chairs''
                                  during prolonged interrogations. In
                                  June 2022, the Linshu County People's
                                  Court held closed trials for Xu and
                                  Ding.
                                 Additional Information: On February 16,
                                  2020, Beijing police detained Li
                                  Qiaochu, a women's and labor rights
                                  advocate and Xu's partner; on June 18,
                                  authorities released her on bail. Xu
                                  previously served four years in prison
                                  from 2013 to 2017 for his rights
                                  advocacy work. In November 2020, the
                                  UN Working Group on Arbitrary
                                  Detention found Xu's detention to be
                                  arbitrary and in violation of the
                                  Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hao Zhiwei                       Date of Detention: July 31, 2019
2020-00257                       Place of Detention: Ezhou No. 1 PSB
                                  Detention Center, Ezhou municipality,
                                  Hubei province
                                 Charge(s): Fraud
                                 Status: Sentenced to eight years
                                 Context: Police from Echeng district,
                                  Ezhou, detained Hao, a pastor at the
                                  unregistered Egangqiao Church in
                                  Ezhou, and two of the church's
                                  parishioners on July 31, 2019, on
                                  suspicion of ``fraud.'' Authorities
                                  alleged that Hao had directed the
                                  parishioners to fraudulently collect
                                  church offerings. A September 2019
                                  indictment charged Hao with conducting
                                  religious activities illegally because
                                  she refused to join the official
                                  Protestant Three-Self Patriotic
                                  Movement or Chinese Christian Council,
                                  and her church operated without
                                  approval from the two bodies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Helchem Pazil                    Date of Detention: Unknown date in 2018
2022-00112                        or 2019
                                 Place of Detention: Changji Women's
                                  Prison, Changji Hui Autonomous
                                  Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
                                  Region (XUAR)
                                 Charge(s): Inciting ethnic hatred;
                                  gathering a crowd to disturb public
                                  order
                                 Status: Sentenced to 17 years
                                 Context: In a court judgment issued in
                                  2019, the Korla (Ku'erle) Municipal
                                  People's Court in Bayangol
                                  (Bayinguoleng) Mongol Autonomous
                                  Prefecture, XUAR, sentenced 78-year-
                                  old Helchem Pazil and several of her
                                  relatives, including her three
                                  daughters and a daughter-in-law, to
                                  prison in connection with private
                                  gatherings in which they discussed
                                  family life and Islam.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meryem Emet                      Date of Detention: Unknown date in 2017
2022-00124                       Place of Detention: A prison in Kucha
                                  (Kuche) county, Aksu prefecture, XUAR
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Sentenced to 20 years
                                 Context: In 2017, authorities in Urumqi
                                  municipality, XUAR, detained Meryem
                                  Emet and later sentenced her to 20
                                  years in prison. Her sentence was
                                  reportedly connected with her marriage
                                  to a Turkish national, and with her
                                  having met and spoken with Turkish
                                  Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
                                  during his 2012 visit to Urumqi.
                                 Additional Information: After her
                                  detention, XUAR authorities forced her
                                  two children, then ages four and six,
                                  into boarding schools in Urumqi, where
                                  teachers subjected them to
                                  traumatizing disciplinary measures
                                  including beatings and being forced to
                                  hold stress positions. After nearly 20
                                  months at the schools, the two
                                  children were left unable to
                                  communicate in Uyghur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lobsang Trinle                   Date of Detention: July 1, 2021
2022-00016                       Place of Detention: Mianyang Prison,
                                  Mianyang municipality, Sichuan
                                  province
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Sentenced to five years
                                 Context: A monk at Kirti Monastery in
                                  Ngaba (Aba) county, Ngaba Tibetan and
                                  Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan,
                                  Lobsang Trinle was detained by police
                                  in July 2021 and held at an unknown
                                  location. He was reportedly detained
                                  for sharing the Dalai Lama's teachings
                                  and writings about the Dalai Lama with
                                  other Tibetans.
                                 Additional Information: His family was
                                  unable to attend the trial and
                                  sentencing, and he may not have had
                                  legal counsel.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thubten Lodroe                   Date of Detention: October 2021
2022-00125                       Place of Detention: Unknown; likely in
                                  Chengdu municipality, Sichuan
                                 Charge(s): Inciting separatism;
                                  possibly picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble
                                 Status: Sentenced to four years and
                                  five or six months
                                 Context: A Tibetan writer also known by
                                  his pen name Sabuche, Thubten Lodroe
                                  was detained by Sichuan province
                                  security officials near his home in
                                  Sershul (Shiqu) county, Kardze (Ganzi)
                                  Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
                                  Sichuan, in October 2021 and taken to
                                  Chengdu. His writings are well known
                                  online and cover topics including
                                  Tibetan society, politics, and
                                  language rights. Further information
                                  on Thubten Lodroe's case following his
                                  sentencing, including his whereabouts
                                  and his condition in custody, was
                                  unavailable.
                                 Additional Information: Chinese
                                  authorities reportedly blocked his
                                  social media accounts and deleted his
                                  posts, placed his family under
                                  surveillance, and prevented his two
                                  children from attending school.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                  General Recommendations to Congress
                         and the Administration

    The Commission makes the following recommendations for 
Administration and congressional action, recognizing that human 
rights are at the core of the U.S. relationship with the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), as a reflection of American 
principles and as a commitment to fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the People's Republic of China.

     Address Transnational Repression. The PRC targets 
Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, members of the 
Chinese-American diaspora community, and others in a 
sophisticated and comprehensive effort to silence criticism, 
conduct surveillance, and in some cases abduct or repatriate 
critics and others deemed sensitive. The Administration should 
send to Congress a comprehensive strategy outlining efforts to 
constrain the PRC's ability to commit acts of transnational 
repression, to increase accountability for perpetrators of such 
acts, and to better protect those at risk of intimidation and 
harassment. In addition, the Administration and Congress 
should:

          Instruct federal law enforcement to ensure protection 
        from intimidation and surveillance for U.S. residents; 
        provide outreach directly to diaspora communities; and 
        ensure there are easily accessible, safe, and secure 
        portals to report coercion or intimidation;
          Update transparency laws to better identify and take 
        legal action against foreign officials and individuals 
        acting on behalf of foreign governments to surveil and 
        intimidate dissident and diaspora communities;
          Seek to expand existing authorities to sanction 
        individuals and entities directing transnational 
        repression from abroad and bolster intelligence-
        gathering capacity to identify the perpetrators;
          Enhance training for State Department and law 
        enforcement personnel to recognize and combat 
        transnational repression;
          Describe the scope and impact of censorship and 
        surveillance on Tencent's WeChat platform, ByteDance's 
        TikTok, and Chinese-made mobile phone browsers and any 
        steps taken to protect users' sensitive personal 
        information and freedom of expression; and
          Take the lead on a UN Human Rights Council resolution 
        to create a UN special rapporteur for transnational 
        repression.

     End Forced Labor Imports. The Administration 
should fully implement the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 
(UFLPA) (Public Law No. 117-78), and the Forced Labor 
Enforcement Task Force should regularly update and expand the 
lists of entities identified as complicit in forced labor, 
pursuant to this law. Congress should provide robust funding to 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection to enforce the import 
restrictions required to carry out the law. In addition, the 
Administration should:

          Sanction individuals engaged in significant labor 
        trafficking under section 111 of the Trafficking 
        Victims Protection Act of 2000, as amended (22 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 7108) and under section 5 of the UFLPA;
          Issue a report on forced labor and the U.S. 
        Government's procurement process with the aim of 
        excluding any companies engaged in the production of 
        goods using the forced labor of ethnic minorities or 
        other persecuted groups in China;
          Direct the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
        require issuers of securities to disclose whether they 
        have established or maintained activities with entities 
        in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
        identified as complicit in the use of forced labor or 
        other gross violations of human rights; and
          Encourage foreign governments and legislatures to 
        adopt their own national legislation or regulations 
        modeled on the UFLPA.

     Stop Atrocity Crimes. The Administration should 
create and fund programs to document, preserve, and analyze 
evidence of genocide and crimes against humanity committed by 
PRC officials in the XUAR, with a view toward future 
accountability measures, including criminal prosecutions. In 
addition, the Administration should:

          Coordinate with allies and partners to request the 
        appointment of a UN special rapporteur on the XUAR or 
        other special procedures to address the PRC's egregious 
        human rights abuses, including pressing for the 
        formation of a UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights 
        in the XUAR;

          Request open debates on the XUAR at the UN Human 
        Rights Council and UN Security Council, as well as an 
        Arria-formula briefing, to address the human rights 
        violations outlined in the assessment released by the 
        Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

          Expand the Department of Commerce's ``Entity List'' 
        to include any company engaged in biometric 
        surveillance that aids in the commission of atrocity 
        crimes in the XUAR; and continue to use available 
        sanctions authorities, including those provided by the 
        Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title 
        XII, Subtitle F of Public Law No. 114-328;
        22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656 note), as well as the Uyghur Human 
        Rights Policy Act (22 U.S.C. Sec. 6901 note) as amended 
        by the UFLPA, including for any officials or entities 
        complicit in forced sterilizations and forced abortions 
        in the XUAR or the forced separation of children from 
        their families.

     Defend the People of Hong Kong. The Administration 
should robustly implement the sanctions provided in the Hong 
Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No. 116-76) and 
the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law No. 116-149), including 
those for financial institutions and individuals complicit in 
the dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy and rights protections 
and the PRC's violation of the 1984 Sino-British Declaration, 
an international treaty; and work with allies and partners at 
the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to 
issue frequent public statements and make other diplomatic 
efforts to seek the release of political prisoners and address 
violations of international human rights standards. In 
addition, the Administration and Congress should:

          Extend the lapsed prohibition on sales of police 
        equipment and crowd-control technology to the Hong Kong 
        police, as provided by Public Law No. 116-77, and make 
        this ban permanent unless the U.S. President certifies 
        that Hong Kong is again sufficiently autonomous to 
        justify special treatment under U.S. law;
          Use appropriated funding to support non-governmental 
        organizations (NGOs) outside of Hong Kong working to 
        promote the rule of law, human rights, civil society 
        development, and democratic freedom in Hong Kong; and
          Seek to preserve the flow of independent news and 
        information from Hong Kong by supporting the creation 
        of academic residency programs and media accelerator 
        projects for Hong Kong journalists and executives whose 
        news and media outlets were shuttered because of abuse 
        or threats under the PRC Law on Safeguarding National 
        Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
        Region.

     Support Victims of Persecution. Congress and the 
Administration should work to accelerate processing times for 
current refugee and asylum cases and ensure that the expansion 
of the annual cap on refugees admitted to the United States is 
used to increase protection and resettlement of those fleeing 
PRC persecution, prioritizing steps to:

          Remove barriers for properly vetted Hong Kong 
        residents to receive U.S. visas, particularly those 
        attempting to exit Hong Kong for fear of political 
        persecution, and pass the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act (S. 
        295, H.R. 461) and the Hong Kong People's Freedom and 
        Choice Act (H.R. 4276);
          Extend Priority 2 refugee sthaatus to Uyghurs and 
        other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities by passing 
        the Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act (S. 1080, H.R. 
        1630), and expand use of the T-visa provided for in the 
        Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 
        Chapter 78) for trafficking victims already in the 
        United States, to assist in investigations of both 
        labor and sex trafficking;
          Engage with countries with significant populations of 
        Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing persecution 
        in China, as well as the Organisation of Islamic 
        Cooperation, to stop forced deportations to the PRC of 
        those persecuted by the PRC; and
          Ensure that sufficient funding and authorities are 
        available for psychological and health care support for 
        victims of genocide and crimes against humanity, 
        particularly in countries of first asylum, through 
        programs authorized by the Torture Victims Relief Act 
        (Public Law No. 105-320) as funded through the 
        Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022 (Public Law No. 
        117-103).

     Address the Threat of Economic Coercion. The PRC 
has used the threat and execution of trade restrictions and 
predatory infrastructure loans as leverage to silence criticism 
and to influence discussion of its human rights violations. The 
Administration should provide Congress a strategy for reducing 
the threat of trade restrictions or other economic coercion. In 
addition, the Administration and Congress should:

          Identify legal authorities needed to create a global 
        reserve fund to assist companies, industries, 
        municipalities, and others affected by the PRC's 
        economic coercion;
          Consider trade barriers that need to be revised 
        either to impose retaliatory tariffs on Chinese imports 
        as part of joint action with allies and partners or to 
        buy products targeted by the PRC through economic 
        coercion;
          Develop a plan to deploy expert economic response 
        teams to assist countries facing economic coercion or 
        challenges related to worker rights violations, 
        environmental protection, debt restructuring, and other 
        human rights concerns created as a result of Belt and 
        Road Initiative projects; and
          Work in concert with allies and partners at the World 
        Trade Organization or other international institutions 
        to challenge boycotts and trade restrictions that 
        undermine the integrity of the rules-based global 
        economic order.

     Limit Malign Influence Operations. Malign 
political influence operations conducted by the PRC are part of 
an increasing global threat to stifle basic freedoms and 
bolster repressive forms of governance and pose significant 
challenges to the United States and countries around the world. 
The Administration and Congress should work together on 
measures to address these challenges, such as to:

          Establish an interagency ``China Censorship Monitor 
        and Action Group'' to address the impacts of censorship 
        and intimidation on American citizens, legal residents, 
        and companies, and consider expanding such group 
        globally with allies and partners;
          Employ a portion of the funds appropriated for the 
        ``Countering Chinese Influence Fund'' to promote 
        transparency and accountability projects, including 
        increasing the capacity of independent investigative 
        journalists and civil society organizations in 
        countries with Belt and Road Initiative projects to 
        expose corruption, malign influence tactics, and 
        environmental risks;
          Develop a multi-stakeholder action plan and code of 
        conduct with universities, foundations, think tanks, 
        film production companies, publishers, NGOs, and state 
        and local governments so that their interactions with 
        foreign governments or entities uphold standards of 
        academic freedom, corporate ethics, and human rights;
          Require U.S. colleges and universities, and their 
        faculty to publicly report all foreign gifts, 
        contracts, and in-kind contributions that exceed 
        $50,000 in any single year from any source associated 
        with a country designated by the Secretary of State as 
        a foreign country of concern, building on the model 
        provided by the disclosure requirements in the Research 
        and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act 
        (Public Law No. 117-167);
          Expand Mandarin language training in U.S. schools and 
        colleges by creating and funding the Liu Xiaobo Fund 
        for the Study of Chinese Language and alternatives to 
        PRC-funded Confucius Institutes and Confucius 
        Classrooms;
          Require U.S. think tanks and NGOs to disclose foreign 
        grants and gifts as part of their tax filings to 
        maintain non-profit status; and
          Update and expand the requirements of the Foreign 
        Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C. Sec. 611 et seq.) to 
        cover individuals and other entities lobbying on behalf 
        of foreign governments, entities, or organizations 
        working on educational or scientific pursuits; to 
        restrict acquisitions of technologies banned under U.S. 
        export controls; and to curtail efforts to stifle 
        academic freedom by organizations like the Chinese 
        Students and Scholars Association and Confucius 
        Institutes.

     Confront the Challenge of Digital 
Authoritarianism. The PRC is developing technology and using 
artificial intelligence (AI) to expand mass surveillance and 
social control of its citizens while exporting surveillance 
technology globally in an effort that could undermine 
democratic freedoms and governance. The Administration should 
work with like-minded allies to protect user privacy and human 
rights by developing a set of global principles for the use of 
AI-driven biometric surveillance and championing high-standard 
internet governance principles that support freedom of 
expression. In addition, the Administration and Congress should 
take steps to:

          Amend the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
        Modernization Act (Title XVII, Public Law No. 115-232) 
        to trigger a Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States (CFIUS) review of any foreign company 
        seeking to acquire U.S. assets controlling biometric 
        information of Americans or technology to more 
        efficiently collect and process biometric information; 
        and
          Expand and focus foreign assistance projects on 
        internet freedom and media literacy to provide digital 
        security training for civil society advocates, identify 
        and counter foreign government propaganda efforts, and 
        help users circumvent sophisticated internet firewalls 
        that infringe on freedom of expression and association.

     Champion Human Rights Standards Globally. The 
United States must create public messaging and public diplomacy 
programs that clearly communicate to domestic and international 
audiences the nature and scope of PRC challenges to 
international law and universal human rights standards and 
develop human rights programming that creatively supports legal 
reformers, civil society activists, independent journalists, 
and rights defenders as well as labor, religious freedom, and 
democracy advocates in China and globally. In addition, the 
Administration and Congress should work together on steps to:

          Provide sufficient funding for public diplomacy 
        efforts and the U.S. Agency for Global Media, both to 
        combat PRC propaganda and to provide messaging 
        platforms to communicate the U.S. Government's efforts 
        to protect human rights and democracy globally;
          Authorize and appropriate funds for technical 
        assistance and capacity-building initiatives for rights 
        and rule-of-law advocates in settings outside China, 
        given growing restrictions on the funding of these 
        types of civil society organizations inside mainland 
        China and in Hong Kong; and
          Support educational and cultural exchange programs, 
        including restoration of the Fulbright exchange program 
        in mainland China and Hong Kong and preservation of 
        scholarship and exchange programs for Tibetans, as a 
        valuable resource and to maintain positive influence 
        channels with the Chinese people.

     Form Global Coalitions to Protect Human Rights. 
The Administration should mobilize issue-based coalitions to 
coordinate messaging, technical assistance programming, and 
rules-based governance approaches to technology, trade, supply 
chain standards, sustainable development, and other issues. 
These coalitions would facilitate the creation of a toolkit of 
actions to address genocide and crimes against humanity and any 
new violation of international standards by the PRC--actions 
including coordinated sanctions, import restrictions to address 
forced labor, export controls on surveillance technology, 
infrastructure and development models that respect human 
rights, supply chain transparency and resilience, and joint 
action at the United Nations and other multilateral 
institutions.
     Strengthen International Organizations. The 
Administration should work to ensure that international 
organizations remain true to their founding principles. The 
Administration should work with allies and partners to ensure 
that the governance structures of entities like the 
International Telecommunication Union, the International Labour 
Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL), the World Intellectual Property Organization, the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) meet the highest standards of 
transparency, accountability, and reform; uphold universal 
human rights; and address pressing transnational challenges. In 
particular, the Administration should coordinate with allies 
and partners to strengthen commonly held positions on internet 
freedom, human rights norms, and human rights violations. The 
Administration should raise these issues repeatedly with PRC 
officials at the United Nations and other international bodies, 
including the UN Human Rights Council, and at hearings of 
treaty monitoring bodies, such as the Committee against 
Torture. In addition, the Administration and Congress should 
work together to:

          Support representation by countries that will promote 
        transparency, accountability, and reform at human 
        rights bodies and international organizations setting 
        standards on issues such as public health and the 
        internet, particularly by coordinating with like-minded 
        countries to advance candidates for leadership 
        positions and support robust staffing at all levels of 
        the organizations, including the UN Junior Professional 
        Officer Programme;
          Establish an annual report on the PRC's malign 
        influence operations in the United Nations and other 
        international
        organizations that details any actions that undermine 
        the principles and purpose of the United Nations and 
        its various agencies, particularly those related to 
        human rights, internet
        governance, law enforcement, global health, 
        environmental protection, the development of norms on 
        artificial intelligence and biometric surveillance, 
        labor, standards setting, and freedom of navigation; 
        and
          Press the WHO to conduct a transparent and credible 
        investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, including 
        a forensic investigation of relevant laboratories and 
        other venues in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province; 
        promote reforms to reliably limit malign Chinese 
        Communist Party influence in the WHO; strengthen the 
        International Health Regulations (IHR) to make clearer 
        the obligations of Member States and consequences for 
        those that fail to provide timely and transparent 
        information about infectious disease outbreaks; and 
        create a regular Periodic Review for compliance of 
        Member States with the IHR.

     Require Human Rights Due Diligence from the World 
Bank. Congress should direct the Secretary of the Treasury to 
instruct the executive directors of relevant International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) to determine whether any existing 
projects are funding entities that, directly or indirectly, 
support the PRC's ``poverty alleviation'' programs in the XUAR 
or Tibetan areas or whether IFI funding abets human right 
abuses in other parts of the PRC. Congress should require a 
report providing details of efforts by the executive directors 
to end these projects and include the specific steps taken in 
the last fiscal year to promote human rights more generally in 
IFI lending, as required by the FY2021 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act (Public Law No. 116-260).

     Condition Access to U.S. Capital Markets. The 
Administration should continue to identify and list Chinese 
companies and entities that have provided material support or 
technical capabilities that violate U.S. laws, enhance mass 
surveillance capabilities, bolster PRC police or security 
apparatus, and facilitate human rights abuses in China, 
including in the XUAR and Tibetan areas, in the Treasury 
Department's Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex 
Companies List (NS-CMIC List) and the Commerce Department's 
Entity List and Unverified List. In addition, Congress should 
strengthen disclosure and auditing requirements for any listed 
Chinese companies in U.S. capital markets to ensure that 
American retirement and investment dollars do not fund 
companies with links to the PRC's security apparatus, genocide, 
or other malevolent behavior that undermines U.S. interests or 
internationally recognized human rights.
     Defend Values While Not Abetting Anti-Asian 
Discrimination or Chinese Propaganda. The Administration and 
Congress should create public messaging strategies that clearly 
differentiate the peoples and cultures of China from the PRC 
and challenge Chinese Communist Party propaganda efforts to 
exploit protests in the United States, such as those against 
anti-Asian discrimination, as well as xenophobic rhetoric, to 
further its objectives. Poorly designed and communicated 
messaging about U.S. efforts to counter PRC policies can fuel 
Chinese Communist Party propaganda that references instances of 
intolerance or harassment of people of Chinese descent and 
other Asian American and Pacific Islander communities, 
frustrating the ability of the United States to craft a 
domestic consensus for a China policy grounded in the 
principles of human rights and the rule of law. U.S. officials 
should always be clear that they stand for human rights and the 
rule of law, and against discrimination and intolerance of any 
kind.
     Promote Women's Rights and Gender Equality. The 
Administration should work with Congress to support the 
reinstatement of international NGOs that aim to support women 
in the economic, legal, and healthcare sectors in China and 
fund cross-border training, academic exchange, and other 
technical assistance programs with the goal of adequate 
implementation of the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law, 
particularly the use of personal protection orders. In 
addition, the State Department should urge the PRC to cease 
harassment, intimidation, and other forms of mistreatment, 
offline and online, of women's rights activists and 
organizations and to ratify International Labour Organization 
Convention No. 190, the Convention Concerning the Elimination 
of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work (2019).
     Preserve Threatened Cultures and Languages. 
Congress and the Administration should respond to myriad 
threats to the cultural and linguistic heritages of repressed 
groups in the PRC by developing programming, both in the United 
States and around the world, to preserve threatened cultures 
and languages. The Administration should expand grant programs 
to assist Uyghur, Mongol, and other ethnic and religious 
minorities in cultural and linguistic preservation efforts and 
leverage the tools available in the Tibetan Policy and Support 
Act (Public Law No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 3119) to help sustain 
the religious, linguistic, and cultural identity of the people 
of Tibet. The Administration should prioritize, and Congress 
should fund, exhibitions, research, and education related to 
these efforts.
     Promote a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict. 
PRC officials continue to show no interest in responding to the 
Dalai Lama's request for dialogue and continue to disseminate 
false information about Tibet's history. To strengthen the 
longstanding, bipartisan U.S. policy of promoting dialogue, the 
Administration and Congress should ensure that calls for 
dialogue are based on the Tibetan people's right of self-
determination under international law and use available 
resources to counter disinformation about Tibet from PRC 
officials.
     Restore a Diplomatic Presence in Tibet. The 
closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan 
province, in 2020 deprived the State Department of an 
operational diplomatic presence in proximity to the Tibetan 
Plateau. The State Department should engage the PRC on opening 
a consulate in Lhasa, Tibet, as called for in the Tibetan 
Policy Act (Public Law No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1396), as 
amended, or as an interim step, reopening the consulate in 
Chengdu.
     Create a Special Advisor for Political Prisoners. 
The Administration should consider creating the position of 
Special Advisor for Political Prisoners to develop and 
coordinate diplomatic strategies to gain the release of 
political and religious prisoners and to serve as a resource to 
former political prisoners living in the United States seeking 
guidance on their travels abroad and medical and psychological 
care. The Administration should also work to end the PRC's 
unacceptable use of ``exit bans.''
     Advocate for Political Prisoners. Members of 
Congress and Administration officials at all levels, including 
the highest levels, should raise specific political prisoner 
cases in meetings with PRC officials. Experience demonstrates 
that consistently raising individual prisoner cases and the 
larger human rights issues they
represent can result in improved treatment in detention, 
lighter sentences, or, in some cases, release from custody, 
detention, or imprisonment. Members of Congress are encouraged 
to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for 
reliable information on cases of political and religious 
detention in mainland China and in Hong Kong, and to ``adopt'' 
individual prisoners and advocate on their behalf through the 
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission's ``Defending Freedoms 
Project.''

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                      Political Prisoner Database

                            Recommendations

    When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a 
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official 
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration 
officials are encouraged to:

          Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (https://
        www.ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information 
        on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a 
        prisoner's database record for more detailed 
        information about the prisoner's case, including their 
        alleged crime, specific human rights that officials 
        have violated, stage in the detention process, and 
        location of detention or imprisonment, if known.
          Advise official and private delegations traveling to 
        China to present Chinese officials with lists of 
        political and religious prisoners compiled from 
        database records.
          Urge U.S. state and local officials and private 
        citizens involved in business, economic, academic, or 
        other exchanges with China to explore the database, and 
        to advocate for the release of political and religious 
        prisoners in China.

                    A Powerful Resource for Advocacy

    The Commission's 2022 Annual Report provides information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners \1\ in the 
context of specific human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many 
of the abuses result from the People's Republic of China's 
application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the 
PPD, a publicly available online database maintained by the 
Commission, for its research, including the preparation of the 
Annual Report, and routinely uses the database as a resource to 
prepare summaries of information about and support advocacy for 
political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and 
Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to 
read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in 
sections of this Annual Report, and to access and make use of 
the PPD at https://www.ppdcecc.gov.
    The PPD is intended to provide users with prisoner 
information that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff 
members work to maintain and update political prisoner records 
based on the staff members' areas of expertise. Commission 
staff seek to provide objective analysis of information about 
individual prisoners, as well as events and trends that drive 
political and religious imprisonment in China. Commission staff 
also work on an ongoing basis to add and update records of 
political and religious imprisonment in the PPD.
    When the PPD was first launched, the Dui Hua Foundation, 
based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information 
Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and 
data on political and religious prisoners in China with the 
Commission to help establish the database. The Commission 
relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as 
well as on information provided by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), groups that specialize in promoting human 
rights and oppose political and religious imprisonment, and 
other public sources of information.

                          POLITICAL PRISONERS

    Overview. As of June 30, 2022, the PPD contained 
information on 10,645 records of political or religious 
imprisonment in China. Of those, 2,506 are records considered 
``active detentions,'' referring to records of political and 
religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained 
or imprisoned, or under coercive controls. There are 8,139 
records of prisoners who are known or believed to have been 
released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or soon 
after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there 
are considerably more cases of current political and religious 
detention in China than are contained in the PPD.
    Ethnic Group. Of the active detentions, 1,571 contained 
information on the prisoners' reported or presumed ethnicity. 
Of those, 715 were Tibetan, 478 were Uyghur, 289 were Han, 34 
were Kazakh, 28 were Mongol, and 9 were Hui. Of the 935 
prisoners without recorded ethnicities, many were likely Han.
    Religion. Of the 2,506 records of prisoners known or 
believed to be detained, 1,542 contained information on the 
prisoner's religious affiliation. Six hundred thirty were 
Tibetan Buddhists, 493 were Falun Gong practitioners, 233 were 
Muslim, 83 were Protestants, 22 were adherents of Mentu Hui 
(also known as the Association of Disciples), 18 were Jehovah's 
Witnesses, 17 were Yi Guan Dao \2\ members, 13 were members of 
the Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern Lightning), 
and 12 were Catholic.
    Sex. Of the 2,506 records of prisoners known or believed to 
be detained, 1,558 were of male prisoners, 681 were of female 
prisoners, and 267 records did not contain information on the 
prisoner's sex.
    Sentencing. Of the 2,506 records of prisoners known or 
believed to be detained, 1,312 pertain to individuals serving 
prison sentences. Of those 1,312 prisoners, 1,219 were serving 
fixed-term sentences, 62 were serving life sentences, 23 were 
sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, 7 were sentenced 
to death, and 1 was serving a term of short-term detention.
    Place of Detention. The table below shows the number of 
active detentions in each province-level administrative 
division captured in the PPD:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region                 585    Jiangxi province                                   34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sichuan province                                  375    Fujian province                                    31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibet Autonomous Region                           222    Jilin province                                     31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangdong province                                171    Shaanxi province                                   25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qinghai province                                  134    Yunnan province                                    24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gansu province                                     91    Shanxi province                                    23
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liaoning province                                  87    Shanghai municipality                              17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heilongjiang province                              84    Chongqing municipality                             17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shandong province                                  73    Hong Kong Special                                  17
                                                         Administrative Region
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing municipality                               69    Zhejiang province                                  16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hebei province                                     62    Tianjin municipality                               15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Henan province                                     58    Ningxia Hui Autonomous                             13
                                                         Region
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region                   48    Guizhou province                                    9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hunan province                                     47    Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region                    7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jiangsu province                                   46    Macau Special Administrative Region                 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hubei province                                     41    Hainan province                                     0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anhui province                                     34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   More Powerful Database Technology

    The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a 
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and 
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational 
institutions, and individuals who research political and 
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of 
such prisoners. The Commission has previously undertaken work 
to upgrade or enhance the PPD, including two major projects in 
2010 and 2015.
    In 2020, the Commission began work on the most significant 
upgrade to the PPD to date. The Commission's main goal was to 
modernize the PPD, housing it on a current software platform to 
address security and sustainability concerns stemming from the 
age of the PPD's original system. The Commission also 
redesigned certain elements of the PPD's data fields and public 
display, seeking to streamline some types of data while still 
maintaining the PPD's capacity to record and display a wide 
variety of data types. The project was completed in 2021, and 
the PPD's new platform went live in June 2021. The Commission 
continued to develop the new system during the 2022 reporting 
year and will refine and improve the PPD going forward.
    Among the major upgrades and enhancements resulting from 
the project are:

         Enhanced search functionality. The PPD's 
        public search function now returns search results in a 
        more intuitive way, allowing public users to query the 
        database using search terms and keywords, and returning 
        weighted results using a search engine. The public 
        search function also allows users to filter search 
        results using a selection of data fields, including 
        ethnic group, place of residence, place of detention, 
        and religious affiliation.
         Publishing prior detentions. Prisoner records 
        now allow users to see full details of a prisoner's 
        prior detentions, should the prisoner have such a 
        history. These prior detentions are displayed on each 
        prisoner's record page, listed in reverse chronological 
        order with the same level of detail as the current 
        detention.
         Expanded detention details. Each prisoner's 
        record now includes a more detailed timeline of their 
        progression through the detention process. This 
        detention timeline builds on the existing PPD 
        architecture to allow records to more fully and 
        accurately capture procedural details, including 
        extralegal and extrajudicial detention types.
         Non-Chinese name display. Recognizing the 
        salience of each prisoner's cultural identity and the 
        importance of providing detailed information in cases 
        of political and religious detention targeting ethnic 
        minority groups in China, the PPD can now display non-
        Chinese names, including names in Uyghur, Kazakh, and 
        Tibetan.
         Permanent archived source links. To handle 
        censorship of sources published within China and to 
        preserve a time-stamped version of the public sources 
        on which the Commission bases PPD data, prisoner 
        records can now feature hyperlinks to permanent, 
        archived versions of the sources.

    The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power 
to handle the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in 
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is 
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful search 
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human 
rights violation by Chinese authorities connected to their 
detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate for 
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government 
policy or government officials, among other rights.
    The upgraded design of the PPD still allows anyone with 
access to the internet to search the database and download 
prisoner data without providing personal information to the 
Commission, and without the PPD downloading any software to a 
user's computer.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

    Notes to Section II--Political Prisoner Database

    \1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual 
detained or imprisoned for exercising their human rights under 
international law, such as peaceful assembly; freedom of religion; 
freedom of association; and freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to advocate for peaceful social or political change and to 
criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is 
illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners documented in 
the PPD were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights 
guaranteed to them by China's Constitution and laws, by international 
human rights standards, or both. Chinese security, prosecutorial, and 
judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the 
political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto 
political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a 
generic crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt, but 
officials may attempt to coerce confessions using torture or other 
forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. A defendant may 
authorize someone to provide their legal counsel and defense, a right 
that the PRC Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 33, yet 
officials may deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, 
restrict or deny the counsel's access to evidence, or deny the counsel 
adequate time to prepare a defense.
    \2\ Yi Guan Dao is a syncretistic, salvationist religion founded in 
China in the 19th century. Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The 
Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), 98-99, 104-5.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

    The Commission's mandate is to monitor the behavior of the 
People's Republic of China according to international human 
rights standards. It is the state that incurs obligations under 
international law, and thus it is the government that bears 
responsibility thereunder for the private activities of persons 
or entities, including political parties. Given the Chinese 
Communist Party's nearly absolute control of the Chinese 
political system, there is negligible practical difference 
between Party and government when discussing the wielding of 
power in China. As a matter of monitoring human rights, the 
Commission must be clear in its reporting both that the Party 
exercises power over the government and that the government 
bears the obligation to uphold such rights.
    This Annual Report seeks to reflect the Party-state 
dynamics in China by listing the Party or the government as the 
primary actor in cases where it is appropriate to do so. In 
order to promote readability, this Annual Report uses the 
acronym ``PRC'' (People's Republic of China) as a general 
descriptor in instances in which the roles of the Party and the 
government are indistinguishable or both applicable.
    The Commission faces a similar challenge in characterizing 
Xi Jinping. His power primarily derives from his position as 
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and as 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi Jinping also 
has the title of ``zhuxi,'' a largely ceremonial post that 
carries little power but one that makes him head of state. 
While the U.S. Government translates this title as 
``President,'' some Commissioners view it as inaccurate or 
inappropriate to use this title. Thus, the report uses the 
identifier ``Chinese leader'' as shorthand for Xi Jinping's 
multiple roles. This report does not reflect any changes in 
leadership titles announced at the 20th National Party 
Congress, which occurred after this report went to press.
    Descriptions of the Party, government, and their leadership 
do not reflect judgments of the Commission regarding the 
legitimacy of these entities and individuals. The Commission 
will continue to evaluate characterizations of the 
aforementioned leadership dynamics in future Annual Reports to 
conform to standards of accuracy, relevance, and consistency 
with common practice among the community of interest.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

               Commission Activity July 2021-October 2022

                                HEARINGS

         Corporate Sponsorship of the 2022 Beijing 
        Olympics (July 2021)
         China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. 
        Responses
        (September 2021)
         Protection from Persecution: Establishing 
        Humanitarian Pathways for Hong Kongers and Uyghurs 
        (October 2021)
         Techno-Authoritarianism: Platform for 
        Repression in China and Abroad (November 2021)
         How China Uses Economic Coercion to Silence 
        Critics and Achieve Its Political Aims Globally 
        (December 2021)
         The Beijing Olympics and the Faces of 
        Repression (February 2022)
         The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, 
        Censorship, and Gender Inequality (March 2022)
         Growing Constraints on Language and Ethnic 
        Identity in Today's China (April 2022)
         The Threat of Transnational Repression from 
        China and the U.S. Response (June 2022)
         Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved 
        Conflict (June 2022)
         The Dismantling of Hong Kong's Civil Society 
        (July 2022)
         Control of Religion in China through Digital 
        Authoritarianism (September 2022)

                             ANNUAL REPORT

         2021 Annual Report (March 2022)

                          COMMISSION ANALYSIS

         Case Study: China's Economic Coercion against 
        Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart (April 2022)
         Hong Kong Prosecutors Play a Key Role in 
        Carrying Out Political Prosecutions (July 2022)
         Hong Kong's Civil Society: From an Open City 
        to a City of Fear (October 2022)

                          ENACTED LEGISLATION

         Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 
        No. 117-78, December 2021)

                                LETTERS

         Commissioners Ask IOC President to Postpone 
        and Relocate the 2022 Winter Olympics If China Does Not 
        End Abuses (July 2021)
         Xinjiang: Chairs Ask Hilton to End Hotel 
        Project on Site of Destroyed Mosque (July 2021)
         Xinjiang: Chairs Seek Affirmation That Forced 
        Labor Not Being Used by New York Fashion Week 
        Exhibitors (September 2021)

                          LETTERS (CONTINUED)

         Chairs Ask Customs to Bar Imports from 
        Companies Endorsing Use of Xinjiang Cotton as New NBA 
        Season Begins (October 2021)
         Chairs Ask International Olympic Committee to 
        Confirm Peng Shuai's Safety and Intervene on China's 
        Human Rights Violations (November 2021)
         Chairs Ask NBC to Cover Uyghurs, Hong Kong, 
        and Human Rights during Beijing Winter Olympics 
        Broadcast (December 2021)
         Chairs Seek Answers from Airbnb about Its 
        Business Activities in Xinjiang (January 2022)
         Chairs Ask IOC President to Justify Contracts 
        with Chinese Companies Using Forced Labor (January 
        2022)
         Chairs Ask UN High Commissioner for Human 
        Rights to Release Xinjiang Report before Olympics 
        (January 2022)
         Chairs Ask U.S. Olympic Committee for Plans to 
        Protect Athletes' Free Speech and Privacy (January 
        2022)
         Chairs Seek Protection for Uyghurs and Kazakhs 
        at Risk of Deportation from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and 
        Kazakhstan (February 2022)
         Bipartisan CECC Leadership Seeks Increased 
        Funding to Implement Uyghur Forced Labor Bill (February 
        2022)
         Commissioners Ask Amazon to Advocate for Labor 
        Rights Activist (February 2022)
         Commissioners Ask Whether HSBC Is Undermining 
        Democratic Freedoms in Hong Kong (March 2022)
         Chairs Promote Human Rights Provisions in 
        China Bill Conference (March 2022)
         Commissioners Ask World Bank to Stop Funding 
        Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang (April 2022)
         Commissioners Urge a UN Committee on Torture 
        Review of China (April 2022)
         Commissioners Seek Expanded Funding to Enforce 
        the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (May 2022)
         Commissioners Ask President to Sanction Hong 
        Kong Prosecutors (July 2022)

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

                    III. Respect for Civil Liberties

                         Freedom of Expression

                                Findings

         In contravention of the International Covenant 
        on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal 
        Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and China's 
        Constitution, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        enhanced control over the press; the internet; the art, 
        literature, and entertainment sectors; and educational 
        and research institutions.
         The government proposed new professional 
        requirements for media organizations and journalists, 
        including mandatory continuing education that includes 
        studying ideological concepts developed by Xi Jinping 
        and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as proposed 
        restrictions on the use of private capital to fund news 
        media activities.
         Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 
        the world's ``biggest jailer of journalists'' and 
        ``biggest jailer of female journalists'' this past 
        year. Hong Kong authorities continued a crackdown on 
        independent reporting that resulted in significant 
        erosion of press freedom. China continued to detain and 
        imprison professional journalists, non-professional 
        ``citizen'' journalists, and Chinese nationals working 
        for foreign media organizations. Of the journalists in 
        prison this past year documented by the Committee to 
        Protect Journalists, nearly half were Uyghurs.
         Authorities harassed and arbitrarily 
        restricted the press freedom of foreign journalists 
        amid what the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China 
        called a ``breakneck speed'' decline in press freedom. 
        Authorities tried Australian citizen and China Global 
        Television Network anchor Cheng Lei on a ``state 
        secrets'' charge after 19 months of detention.
         The PRC took steps to control media coverage 
        of the Party's image abroad, including coverage of 
        high-profile events that took place in China. 
        Authorities reportedly supported technology, foreign 
        social media influencers, and academic research to 
        better understand and implement manipulation of public 
        opinion abroad, including countering human rights 
        criticism, advancing disinformation about the origins 
        of COVID-19, and understanding how ``key opinion 
        leaders'' can help overcome negative international 
        perceptions of Chinese state-affiliated media.
         Freedom House ranked China the ``worst 
        environment for internet freedom for the seventh year 
        in a row.'' The Cyberspace Administration of China took 
        steps to implement Party political guidance, including 
        content controls; enforcement; and new, updated, and 
        proposed regulations that raise concerns about their 
        potential to restrict expression on broadly construed 
        ``national security'' grounds.
         The PRC continued its campaign to create 
        counternarratives to criticism of Party positions on 
        human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) and other sensitive topics 
        abroad and domestically. Some YouTube content creators 
        who developed content that discussed human rights 
        issues in China reportedly faced harassment attempts 
        and efforts to trigger censorship or demonetization of 
        their content. At the same time, the PRC paid content 
        creators to develop content in support of its 
        priorities and mandated that Uyghurs do the same. 
        Content creators, who have criticized the Chinese 
        government, leaked emails from Chinese companies and 
        state-controlled media that asked them and other 
        creators to produce content supporting PRC interests. 
        U.S. social media platforms were inconsistent in the 
        labeling of content related to Chinese authorities.
         Before and during the 2022 Winter Olympics, 
        authorities restricted press freedom arbitrarily, 
        censored both online and broadcast content that did not 
        align with PRC priorities, threatened athletes about 
        human rights criticism, and implemented preemptive 
        restrictions on high-profile critics, contravening 
        protections for freedom of expression in the ICCPR, 
        UDHR, China's Constitution, and the Host City Contract 
        for the Olympic Games.
         Authorities censored discussion of a variety 
        of topics on the internet; in the entertainment, art, 
        and literature sectors; and in educational and research 
        institutions. Sample topics included COVID-19 lockdown 
        conditions, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and 
        portrayals of gender roles and masculinity.
         Schools in China reportedly began 
        incorporating compulsory education on Xi Jinping's 
        signature political ideology into their curricula, 
        following new guidance from the Ministry of Education.
         Authorities detained and imprisoned 
        individuals in connection with their peaceful 
        expression. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
        determined that human rights advocate and China 
        Citizens Movement member Zhang Baocheng had been 
        arbitrarily detained.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Give greater public expression, including at the 
        highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of 
        press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and 
        detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the 
        denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign 
        journalists; and the censorship of foreign media 
        websites. Consistently link press freedom to U.S. 
        interests, noting that censorship and restrictions on 
        journalists and media websites prevent the free flow of 
        information on issues of public concern, including 
        public health and environmental crises and food safety, 
        and act as trade barriers for foreign companies 
        attempting to access the Chinese market.
          Sustain, and where appropriate, expand, programs that 
        develop and widely distribute technologies that will 
        assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society 
        organizations in circumventing internet restrictions--
        so as to improve their ability to access and share 
        content protected under international human rights 
        standards--as well as to protect their own information 
        from China's surveillance and interference. Continue to 
        maintain internet freedom programs for China at the 
        U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for Global 
        Media to provide digital security training and 
        capacity-building efforts for bloggers, journalists, 
        civil society organizations, and human rights and 
        internet freedom advocates in China.
          Increase media literacy and transparency with regard 
        to Chinese state-sponsored propaganda, censorship, and 
        disinformation, including through greater support and 
        funding for graduate-level area studies programs and 
        language study, and greater support for media literacy 
        efforts for international audiences. Provide forums for 
        scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, and 
        technology experts to discuss and disseminate ``best 
        practices'' in Chinese media literacy.
          Highlight the fact that content creators who 
        criticize the Chinese government on U.S. social media 
        face the risk of harassment, censorship, and 
        demonetization efforts.
          Consider ways to incentivize social media companies 
        to voluntarily establish pilot programs to improve 
        transparency on social media by labeling content from 
        foreign governments across different social media 
        platforms.
          Urge Chinese officials to end the detention and 
        harassment of rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, 
        and others subjected to reprisals for exercising their 
        right to freedom of expression. Call on officials to 
        release or confirm the release of individuals detained 
        or imprisoned for exercising freedom of expression, 
        such as Zhang Zhan, Hu Xincheng, Sophia Huang Xueqin, 
        Gulmira Imin, Ekber Eset, Haze Fan, Cheng Lei, Yan 
        Zhihong, Yang Hengjun, Ou Biaofeng, Zhang Baocheng, Guo 
        Feixiong, Xie Yang, Ding Yan, Ilham Tohti, and other 
        political prisoners mentioned in this Report and 
        documented in the Commission's Political Prisoner 
        Database.

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

                         Freedom of Expression

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) continued to restrict expression in 
contravention of Article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) \1\--which China has signed 
but not ratified \2\--Article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR),\3\ and Article 35 of China's 
Constitution.\4\ As documented throughout this chapter, 
authorities enhanced ideological, regulatory, and technical 
control across sectors in which the UN Human Rights Committee, 
the treaty monitoring body for the ICCPR, notes that expression 
is explicitly protected, including the press, the internet, 
art, literature, entertainment, and institutions of education 
and research.\5\ Article 19(3) of the ICCPR allows countries to 
impose certain restrictions or limitations on freedom of 
expression, if such restrictions are provided by law and are 
necessary for the purpose of respecting the ``rights or 
reputations of others'' or protecting national security, public 
order, public health, or morals.\6\ The UN Human Rights Council 
has specified that restrictions on the ``discussion of 
government policies and political debate,'' ``peaceful 
demonstrations or political activities,'' ``expression of 
opinion and dissent,'' ``free flow of information and ideas,'' 
and ``access to or use of information and communication 
technologies, including radio, television and the Internet'' 
are inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.\7\ The UN 
Human Rights Committee cautioned that restrictions on freedom 
of expression noted in Article 19(3) should be interpreted 
narrowly so that the restrictions ``may not put in jeopardy the 
right itself.'' \8\

                          Freedom of the Press

                       PRC CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA

    This past year, the PRC enhanced political and ideological 
control over the media, instructing the media either not to 
report on--or how to report on--new and previously designated 
topics.\9\ For example, authorities instructed the media to 
avoid reporting on a high-profile tax evasion case, the causes 
of the July 2021 flooding in Henan province (and instead focus 
on recovery efforts), and authorities' efforts to block a World 
Health Organization investigation into the origins of COVID-
19.\10\
    The directives described above are consistent with other 
high-level guidance from the Party. For example, in December 
2021, Huang Kunming--director of the Propaganda Department of 
the Party Central Committee--called on all journalists in China 
to ``[build] a reliable, admirable and respectable image of 
China.'' \11\ Later, as part of a Lunar New Year campaign, the 
Central Propaganda Department instructed news media to report 
so as to promote the Party's image, such as by focusing on 
economic and social prosperity, the PRC's ``historic 
accomplishments,'' efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19, 
and on popular excitement over the 2022 Beijing Olympic and 
Paralympic Games.\12\
    Authorities also proposed new requirements that would 
enhance state control over media organizations and journalists. 
In October 2021, the government proposed updated regulations 
that would ban the use of private capital to fund news media 
activities, for example, reporting on topics authorities deemed 
sensitive, and referencing foreign reporting, livestreaming, 
and holding journalism events.\13\ The government also released 
draft measures \14\ that--if implemented as written--would add 
to existing journalist certification requirements \15\ an 
annual minimum of 90 hours of continuing education \16\ that 
would include studying ideological concepts developed by Xi 
Jinping and the Party.\17\

                 CONTROL OVER THE PARTY'S IMAGE ABROAD

    This past year, the PRC took steps to control media 
coverage of the Party's image abroad, including coverage of 
high-profile events that took place in China. Reports in recent 
years have documented the PRC's efforts to promote 
international media ``exchange'' activities and place state-run 
media content abroad.\18\ This past year, a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs official emphasized the importance of ``media 
cooperation'' as part of ``China-Russia strategic coordination 
and cultural exchange.'' \19\ In his remarks, he advocated for 
``creating a favorable public opinion environment for the 
development and revitalization of [China and Russia],'' noting 
that ``some countries make waves under the guise of `democracy' 
and `human rights,' openly interfering in the internal affairs 
of other countries . . ..'' \20\ During the annual meetings of 
the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference in March (``Two Sessions''), Party 
official news media People's Daily reportedly placed 770 
articles in 60 countries using largely reprinted or translated 
People's Daily content.\21\ The China Media Project estimated 
those media purchases to be in the ``tens of millions of 
dollars.'' \22\ In addition, authorities reportedly supported 
the development of technology, contracted private companies, 
recruited foreign social media influencers, and supported 
academic research to better understand and implement 
manipulation of public opinion abroad in support of PRC 
narratives.\23\ Those efforts reportedly included countering 
human rights criticism, advancing disinformation about the 
origins of COVID-19, and better understanding how ``key opinion 
leaders'' can help overcome negative international perceptions 
of Chinese state-affiliated media.\24\

         HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND IMPRISONMENT OF JOURNALISTS

    This past year, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked 
China the world's ``biggest jailer of journalists.'' \25\ RSF 
noted an ``exceptional surge'' in arbitrary detentions of 
journalists worldwide, due in significant part to developments 
in Hong Kong,\26\ where authorities continued a crackdown on 
independent reporting that resulted in significant erosion of 
press freedom.\27\ Hong Kong authorities harassed, intimidated, 
and detained journalists and other media professionals--in some 
cases denying bail or charging them with national security 
offenses \28\--closed and co-opted independent media; created a 
chilling effect on independent reporting; and restricted the 
activities of foreign journalists.\29\ [For more information, 
see Section XII--Hong Kong and Macau.]

    Other selected cases follow:

         Citizen Journalists: RSF's detention data 
        included ``citizen journalists,'' \30\ non-
        professionals who publish independently to circumvent 
        official restrictions.\31\ This past year, citizen 
        journalist Zhang Zhan remained in prison for 
        independent reporting on COVID-19 conditions in China 
        and reportedly suffered from poor health.\32\ 
        Authorities in Shanxi province detained citizen 
        journalist and former professional journalist Hu 
        Xincheng after he collected signatures for a public 
        health campaign advocating free medical care in cases 
        of serious illness.\33\ Authorities in Sichuan province 
        detained citizen journalist and former editor Song 
        Yangbiao after he reported on alleged official 
        misconduct in a construction project.\34\
         Female Journalists: RSF noted that China was 
        the ``biggest jailer of female journalists, with 19 
        currently detained.'' \35\ In one case, authorities 
        charged journalist Sophia Huang Xueqin--who previously 
        reported on sexual harassment and pro-democracy 
        demonstrations in Hong Kong--with ``inciting subversion 
        of state power.'' \36\
         Uyghur Journalists: Of the journalists in 
        prison this past year documented by the Committee to 
        Protect Journalists, nearly half were Uyghurs.\37\ 
        Uyghur news website administrator Gulmira Imin 
        continued to serve a prison sentence of 19 years and 8 
        months for posting an announcement that called for 
        Uyghurs to demonstrate in 2009.\38\
         Employees of Foreign Media Organizations: This 
        past year, authorities harassed, intimidated, and held 
        in detention Chinese nationals working for foreign news 
        organizations, and in some cases harassed and 
        intimidated their families.\39\ In January 2022, 
        authorities reportedly released on bail pending trial 
        Chinese national Haze Fan--who worked for multiple 
        international news agencies--after detaining her in 
        December 2020 on suspicion of crimes related to 
        ``national security.'' \40\

            DETERIORATING CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

    Amid ongoing deterioration of conditions for foreign 
journalists in China,\41\ the Foreign Correspondents' Club of 
China (FCCC) reported that press freedom declined at 
``breakneck speed'' this past year.\42\ In the FCCC's 2021 
annual survey of foreign journalists in China, 99 percent of 
respondents indicated that reporting conditions did not meet 
international standards.\43\ Following an unprecedented number 
of journalist expulsions last year, the FCCC reported this year 
that ``[f]or a second straight year, [foreign journalists] had 
to find ways to cover China almost entirely from outside the 
mainland.'' \44\
    The FCCC reported a variety of abusive practices against 
foreign journalists, including increasing threats of lawsuits 
by authorities or sources as reprisal for negative reporting; 
\45\ online harassment--particularly against ``female 
journalists of East Asian ethnic descent'' and ``Chinese 
employees of foreign news organizations''--that in some cases 
included threats of sexual violence; online harassment carried 
out or encouraged by authorities or official media; \46\ and 
obstruction by public security officials and unidentified 
individuals.\47\ On March 31, 2022, the Beijing No. 2 
Intermediate People's Court tried Australian citizen and state-
owned China Global Television Network (CGTN) anchor Cheng Lei 
behind closed doors for ``illegally providing state secrets for 
overseas entities,'' 19 months after authorities detained 
her.\48\ Authorities reportedly denied Australian consular 
officials access to the trial and continued to deny Cheng's 
family--including her two young children--any communication 
with Cheng.\49\ Cheng previously wrote openly on Facebook about 
concerns with the Chinese government's response to COVID-19, 
among other topics.\50\ The FCCC reported multiple instances of 
harassment and intimidation of foreign journalists covering the 
July 2021 flooding in Henan province, including one case in 
which the Party-run Communist Youth League of China encouraged 
``its 1.6 million followers on Chinese social media site Weibo 
to report the whereabouts of BBC Shanghai reporter Robin Brant 
. . ..'' \51\
    Authorities also implemented arbitrary or inconsistent 
restrictions on foreign journalists' access to reporting 
locations. For example, authorities in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region reportedly temporarily denied access to 
foreign journalists attempting to report on the crash of China 
Eastern flight MU5375.\52\ Authorities reportedly maintained 
strict control over foreign journalists' access to the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR),\53\ ``ambiguous'' access requirements 
for Tibetan areas outside the TAR,\54\ restrictions on access 
to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),\55\ and 
surveillance and harassment of journalists who reported in the 
XUAR.\56\ [For more information, see Section IX--Tibet.]

                     PRC Control over the Internet

    This past year, Freedom House ranked China the ``worst 
environment for internet freedom for the seventh year in a 
row,'' \57\ as high-level Party authorities called for 
increased control over the internet to serve the Party's 
political goals. The Party's 14th Five-Year Plan for National 
Informatization--an authoritative document outlining priorities 
for the development of China's technology sector--called for 
``upholding comprehensive Party leadership,'' \58\ as well as 
``increasing international discourse power,'' \59\ a concept 
commonly linked to China's international influence and 
image.\60\
    The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) \61\ took 
steps to implement and enforce Party political guidance. 
Selected examples follow:

         Content Controls: The CAC announced a Lunar 
        New Year ``purification'' campaign targeting 
        ``unhealthy'' behavior and culture online,\62\ 
        requiring Party authorities to punish selected 
        platforms and accounts and mobilize news coverage to 
        create a ``deterrent effect.'' \63\ Within three days 
        of that announcement, microblog Weibo reportedly 
        blocked 21 accounts in connection with the 
        campaign.\64\ The CAC called for advances in an 
        integrated national mechanism by which internet users 
        would report ``illegal and unhealthy information'' 
        online,\65\ building on efforts from last year.\66\ The 
        China Media Project described the ``mechanism'' as an 
        attempt to ``leverage the eyes and ears of the general 
        population to ensure that websites and platforms comply 
        with Party-state mandates on information control,'' 
        \67\ and CAC head Zhuang Rongwen linked it to 
        ``welcoming the successful convening of the 20th Party 
        Congress.'' \68\
         Enforcement: Between January and November 
        2021, the CAC fined social media company Douban--which 
        the South China Morning Post noted had a reputation for 
        ``relatively liberal online discussions'' \69\--20 
        times in connection with the ``unlawful release of 
        information.'' \70\ In March 2022, the CAC 
        ``stationed'' a ``work supervision group'' at Douban in 
        response to ``severe online chaos.'' \71\
         New Regulations: This year, the CAC passed, 
        updated, or proposed updating various regulations on 
        digital content and services,\72\ raising concerns 
        about the regulations' potential to restrict 
        expression. Several cite as a basis national 
        security,\73\ which experts note that Chinese 
        authorities have interpreted broadly to punish speech 
        or actions that do not conform to PRC priorities.\74\ 
        Several establish requirements based on
        content's ``relation to public opinion'' or ``capacity 
        to mobilize society.'' \75\

    In addition, the National Religious Affairs Administration 
issued the Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Religious Information Services,\76\ which codify broad 
prohibitions on unregistered and foreign groups posting 
religious content on the internet,\77\ ban a wide range of 
online religious material and activities,\78\ require permits 
to host or share content online,\79\ and mandate identity 
verification and real name registration.\80\ [For more 
information, see Section III--Freedom of Religion.]
    This past year, authorities censored online discussion of 
selected topics in which sources criticized or contradicted 
official policy or positions. Selected examples follow:

         Shanghai Lockdown: In April 2022, authorities 
        took steps to remove online criticism of the COVID-19 
        lockdown in Shanghai municipality, including ``Voices 
        of April,'' a viral video containing apparent audio 
        samples of residents expressing frustration and 
        desperation regarding lockdown conditions.\81\ CAC
        authorities in Beijing municipality and Guangdong 
        province reportedly instructed authorities to remove 
        references to the video.\82\
         Russia and Ukraine: Following Russia's 
        invasion of Ukraine, observers reported that most 
        online speech in China was nationalist or pro-Russian, 
        but that some academics, students, and others in China 
        called for the Chinese government to support Ukraine or 
        de-escalate the conflict.\83\ A Party news outlet 
        reportedly published a Weibo post--later deleted--that 
        ordered staff to avoid posting ``anything unfavorable 
        to Russia or pro-Western,'' submit drafts for 
        publication permission, filter comments, and use only 
        certain state-approved hashtags.\84\ Chinese 
        authorities also reportedly amplified Russian 
        disinformation and removed social media posts and 
        comments--both pro-Russian and anti-Russian--but 
        targeted more intensively content that countered 
        official positions.\85\
         Secretary Blinken's Speech: Authorities 
        reportedly censored U.S. Secretary of State Antony 
        Blinken's May 2022 speech outlining the Biden 
        Administration's approach to China.\86\
         Gender Roles: The PRC targeted content that 
        contradicted official conceptions of gender roles and 
        masculinity. As part of its ongoing suppression of 
        feminist content, Weibo continued to delete accounts 
        related to women's rights issues.\87\ In July 2021, 
        social media platform WeChat reportedly closed 
        ``dozens'' of accounts connected to lesbian, gay, 
        bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) 
        communities at Chinese universities, without 
        warning.\88\ Also this past year, WeChat closed an 
        account that reported the closure of an ``LGBTQ-
        friendly'' hostel in Wuhan municipality, Hubei 
        province; \89\ social media platform QQ blocked certain 
        LGBTQ search terms; \90\ and LGBTQ dating app Grindr 
        disappeared from app stores in China during the Lunar 
        New Year ``purification'' campaign.\91\ [For more 
        information, see Section VI--Status of Women and 
        Section III--Civil Society.]

      China's Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism on Social Media

              CONTINUED CENSORSHIP FROM TIKTOK AND CHINESE
                          GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE

    The Commission observed reports of TikTok, a social media
platform owned by the China-based parent company ByteDance, 
blaming technical difficulties for the censoring of English-
language content related to the Black Lives Matter movement and 
German-language content related to LGBTQ rights, the internment 
of Uyghurs, and the disappearance of tennis player Peng 
Shuai.\92\ In June 2022, leaked audio recordings revealed that 
engineers in China could access U.S. data, contradicting 
TikTok's testimony to Congress.\93\ During an October 2021 
Senate hearing, a TikTok
executive denied that TikTok had ever turned over user data to
the PRC government, further specifying at a later point in the 
hearing that TikTok had never turned over data on ``Chinese 
persons in the United States'' to the PRC government.\94\ The 
TikTok executive also emphasized multiple times that U.S. user 
data is stored in the United States and claimed that a ``world-
renowned, U.S.-based security team . . . handles access to U.S. 
data.'' \95\ According to BuzzFeed, however, leaked audio from 
internal TikTok meetings provided evidence that TikTok staff in 
China accessed U.S. user data ``far more frequently and 
recently than previously reported'' and therefore indicates 
``the company may have misled lawmakers . . ..'' \96\

          SUPPRESSION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON CHINESE AND
                           U.S. SOCIAL MEDIA

    During the reporting period, the Cyberspace Administration 
of China (CAC) issued provisions requiring social media 
platforms to publicly display users' locations and verify their 
accounts and credentials.\97\ Additional CAC draft provisions--
if implemented as written--would require social media companies 
to pre-screen all comments, including ``bullet chats,'' in 
which comments run in real time across the user's screen.\98\ 
In June 2022, the National Radio and Television Administration 
and Ministry of Culture and Tourism released standards of 
conduct listing the punishment for livestreamers who ``spread 
false terrorist information'' and ``disrupt social stability.'' 
\99\ Those standards also require livestreamers to submit to 
social media platforms their ``relevant practice 
qualifications'' before talking about law or other ``highly 
professional'' topics.\100\ The standards were released after 
authorities censored the feed of livestreamer Li Jiaqi, after 
he displayed images suggestive of a tank the day before the 
33rd anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 
Tiananmen protests--reportedly sparking concerns about 
associations with the iconic 1989 ``tank man'' image \101\--
although the CAC had previously issued a guiding opinion 
regarding livestreaming.\102\
    During the reporting year, the New York Times, the 
Associated Press, and Miburo reported that the Chinese 
government paid foreigners on social media to create 
counternarratives to reporting critical of the government, such 
as on genocide in the XUAR.\103\ The Associated Press reported 
that U.S. Department of Justice documents revealed that the 
Chinese consulate in New York paid a New Jersey-based media 
firm US$300,000 for a social media influencer campaign that 
reached ``roughly 4 million'' people and included an interview 
with China's Consul General in New York that discussed the 2022 
Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games.\104\ In May 2022, the 
Brookings Institution and the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States concluded that content reflecting PRC positions 
on its human rights record and the origins of COVID-19 
regularly appeared among top results on Google, Bing, and 
YouTube.\105\
    This past year, international observers reported that some 
YouTube content creators who created content that discussed 
human rights issues in China faced harassment and efforts to 
trigger censorship or demonetization of their content.\106\ 
Observers did not conclude definitively who was responsible for 
those efforts, but some described those responsible as ``pro-
Beijing online influencers'' or ``pro-China groups.'' \107\ In 
one case, YouTube briefly removed Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights' 
channel--which published thousands of videos regarding human 
rights abuses in the XUAR--after receiving complaints for 
revealing personal identifiable information that the channel 
published in connection to their advocacy for political 
prisoners.\108\ Shortly afterward, YouTube reportedly delisted 
the organization's earlier testimonials about people detained 
or imprisoned in the XUAR, for violating YouTube's ``violent 
criminal organizations policy'' and ``to allow administrators 
to make edits.'' \109\ YouTube also demonetized a video about 
Peng Shuai because ``it wasn't suitable for all advertisers,'' 
and upheld its decision on appeal.\110\
    Other content creators shared experiences of harassment or 
email requests from Chinese companies to publish sponsored 
videos matching PRC priorities.\111\ One content creator 
confirmed that the Chinese government had paid him, saying, 
``It's not different than taking out an advertisement . . ..'' 
\112\ In December 2021, the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute identified the role of state-owned media outlet CGTN 
in sponsoring videos that showcase positive depictions of `` 
`exotic' Uyghur culture'' and deny the use of forced labor in 
the XUAR.\113\
    In April 2022, the intelligence firm Nisos reported on 648 
``inauthentic'' Twitter accounts engaged in a coordinated 
campaign to counter accusations of forced labor and genocide in 
the XUAR, noting that over 90 percent of ``inauthentic posts'' 
were published during regular business hours in China Standard 
Time.\114\ Some posts reportedly contained videos with XUAR 
residents praising conditions in the XUAR or denouncing 
international criticism of conditions in the XUAR,\115\ 
consistent with earlier reporting about authorities' efforts to 
coordinate state-mandated videos of Uyghurs expressing anger at 
former U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.\116\
    This past year, social media platforms were inconsistent in 
their labeling of accounts as state controlled.\117\ For 
example, Twitter labeled a CGTN reporter's personal Twitter 
account as state media, but YouTube did not label her personal 
channel as state media.\118\ The reporter said that the YouTube 
channel was a personal account with her personal views, but 
later posted a CGTN video to her personal YouTube account, 
having cropped out the CGTN logo.\119\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Before and during the 2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games
 (``Olympics''), authorities restricted press freedom arbitrarily,
 censored online and broadcast content that did not align with PRC
 priorities, threatened athletes over human rights criticism, and
 implemented preemptive restrictions on high-profile critics. Such
 actions--examples of which are discussed below--contravened protections
 for freedom of expression in the International Covenant on Civil and
 Political Rights,\120\ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,\121\
 and China's Constitution,\122\ as well as the Host City Contract for
 the Olympic Games, which protects ``independent news coverage'' of the
 Olympics.\123\
  Restrictions on Press Freedom: The FCCC reported that the Beijing
 Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (``Organizing Committee'')
 repeatedly released insufficient, delayed, or no information about
 press events and contacts, and authorities reportedly imposed arbitrary
 restrictions on interviews and access to reporting sites, including
 restrictions imposed as reprisal for reporting on human rights.\124\
 For an interview with Peng Shuai--who appeared to be under restrictions
 imposed by authorities after accusing a former senior official of
 sexual assault \125\--authorities reportedly required French newspaper
 L'Equipe to submit questions in advance, conduct the interview with a
 Chinese Olympic Committee representative present, and publish the
 interview in the form of questions and verbatim translations of Peng's
 responses.\126\ In another case, an unidentified individual wearing a
 ``public safety volunteer'' badge physically removed Dutch journalist
 Sjoerd den Daas from his reporting location during a broadcast,
 reportedly with no explanation.\127\ In another case, Feature Story
 News journalist Patrick Fok said authorities told him he was not
 allowed to ask pedestrians in Beijing ``how they are enjoying the
 Olympics.'' \128\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
          2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Control of Online and Broadcast Content: Ahead of the Olympics,
 multiple ``pro-China'' Twitter accounts of unknown origin reportedly
 engaged in ``hashtag flooding,'' publishing large numbers of posts with
 a hashtag to dilute the visibility of posts that used that hashtag
 genuinely.\129\ On February 9, 2022, the South China Morning Post
 reported that Weibo removed over 41,000 posts and banned 850 accounts
 in connection with online criticism of Olympic athletes, which Weibo
 characterized as ``creating trouble.'' \130\ After International
 Paralympic Committee President Andrew Parsons spoke out against
 Russia's invasion of Ukraine in his opening ceremony speech, state-run
 broadcaster China Central Television reportedly altered some of his
 anti-war content in its Chinese-language interpretation and appeared to
 reduce the volume during a portion of the speech.\131\
  Censorship of Athletes: Prior to the Olympics, a member of the
 Organizing Committee reportedly said, ``Any behavior or speech that is
 against the Olympic spirit, especially against the Chinese laws and
 regulations, are [sic] also subject to certain punishment,'' \132\
 contradicting IOC guidance on athletes' freedom of expression under the
 Olympic Charter.\133\ A Citizen Lab report found that MY2022, an app
 required for all Olympics attendees, contained a censorship list for
 ``politically sensitive'' keywords.\134\ Authorities reportedly ordered
 Finnish skier Katri Lylynpera to delete photos she posted online of
 unsafe conditions in an athlete lodging space.\135\ After Olympic skier
 Eileen Gu posted a comment on Instagram stating, ``anyone can download
 a vpn its [sic] literally free on the App Store,'' authorities censored
 a screenshot of her comment that was shared widely on Weibo.\136\
  Preemptive Restrictions on Critics: Ahead of the Olympics, authorities
 in Beijing reportedly ordered rights advocate Hu Jia \137\ to stay in
 his home and threatened to restrict access to his ill mother if he
 spoke out.\138\ Former lawyer Liang Xiaojun--who previously represented
 prominent legal advocate Xu Zhiyong \139\ and whose license was revoked
 \140\--said officials visited him in January and told him ``China was
 entering its `Olympic security period,' '' subsequently calling to
 check his location repeatedly.\141\ Authorities also reportedly
 restricted social media access for prominent critics Zhang Yihe, Gao
 Yu,\142\ Guo Yuhua, and He Weifang \143\ ahead of the Olympics.\144\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Entertainment, Art, and Literature

    This past year, the PRC called for greater control over the 
entertainment, art, and literature sectors. In a December 2021 
meeting with the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles 
and the China Writers Association--official organizations under 
Party leadership \145\--Xi Jinping called on ``literature and 
art workers'' to align their creative work with authorities' 
political priorities,\146\ consistent with remarks he had made 
years prior,\147\ and warned attendees not to ``misbehave.'' 
\148\ Consistent with Xi's instructions, PRC organizations 
called for ``earnestly studying'' Xi's instructions on 
literature and art; \149\ and for literary, artistic, and 
cultural works to ``enhance propaganda work,'' ``strengthen 
[Party] leadership,'' and follow controls over their moral, 
political, aesthetic, and cultural content.\150\
    Authorities censored book, film, television, and game 
content that did not conform to PRC priorities. Selected 
examples follow:

         Reuters reported that Amazon's Chinese website 
        continued to disable reviews and ratings of a 
        collection of Xi's writings, because of authorities' 
        prior concerns about ``anything under five stars.'' 
        \151\
         The version of the U.S. film ``Fight Club'' 
        released on Chinese streaming platform Tencent Video 
        this past year featured a revision to the original 
        ending in which a criminal plot takes place, instead 
        having U.S. law enforcement authorities prevail.\152\ 
        It was unclear who was responsible for the change, but 
        one Hollywood producer attributed it to sensitivity 
        over ``anything that might create instability in 
        society,'' including depicting bad behavior with no 
        punishment.\153\ Tencent reportedly restored the 
        original ending after public criticism.\154\
         Amid a reportedly restrictive environment for 
        video game content,\155\ U.S. video game company Roblox 
        Corporation--which observers said faced censorship 
        risks because of its ``user-generated content'' model 
        \156\--published a 64-point review checklist for 
        content on its Roblox China platform that included, for 
        example, ``no content that disrespects Chinese history 
        and traditional culture,'' ``no references to social 
        media sites or offshore services that are prohibited or 
        otherwise blocked in China,'' ``no political content,'' 
        and ``China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau should not be 
        referred to as separate countries.'' \157\

    Targeting of gender roles and conceptions of masculinity--
discussed above--extended to art, entertainment, and 
literature. Authorities called for ``resolutely putting an end 
to `sissy' and other abnormal aesthetics''--which they 
described as ``unhealthy''--in literature and art.\158\ In 
January 2021, the Beijing Municipal Radio and Television Bureau 
head announced that the bureau would end ``boys love'' dramas--
or ``dangai''--a popular genre that features intimate 
relationships between men.\159\ In a re-release of U.S. 
television series ``Friends'' for streaming platforms in China, 
censors reportedly removed or altered content relating to a 
lesbian character, orgasms, and a same-sex kiss.\160\ [For more 
information, see Section III--Civil Society.]

        Party Control over Educational and Research Institutions

    This past year, the PRC took steps to increase control over 
educational and research institutions. Selected examples 
follow:

         Authorities censored critical online speech 
        from law professor Lao Dongyan and scholar Hu Wei.\161\ 
        In addition, authorities reportedly warned Lao and 
        other academics in China not to comment on the case of 
        a woman found chained in Jiangsu province that drew 
        widespread attention.\162\ [For more information, see 
        Section VI--Status of Women, Section VI--Human 
        Trafficking, and Section VIII--Public Health.]
         In early 2022, a Peking University report 
        reportedly disappeared from the university's website 
        ``a few days'' after publication.\163\ According to 
        Chinese and international media, the report found that 
        should China and the United States engage in a 
        technology ``decoupling,'' China would experience 
        greater negative consequences than would the United 
        States.\164\
         In early 2022, an academic publisher 
        affiliated with public institution Renmin University of 
        China reportedly launched a ``political content review 
        committee'' charged with ensuring that content of 
        publications accord with the Party's political 
        guidance.\165\
         The Association of Asian Studies reported that 
        some scholars from China were ``pressured'' to withdraw 
        from the Association's 2022 annual conference, although 
        its statement did not provide further details.\166\ One 
        scholar commented that the withdrawals appeared to be 
        related to Chinese authorities' increasing efforts to 
        restrict academic freedom.\167\
         This past year, scholars of Islamic and ethnic 
        minority studies based in China reportedly said that 
        authorities increased restrictions on their academic 
        work.\168\

    The PRC released new guidance intended to strengthen Party 
control over education and further integrate Party ideology 
into education. In Fall 2021, schools in China reportedly began 
incorporating compulsory education on Xi Jinping's signature 
political ideology,\169\ following new guidance from the 
Ministry of Education.\170\ That guidance reportedly requires 
various educational institutions--including primary education, 
vocational education, and higher education--to 
``comprehensively integrate'' and ``guide'' students to 
``establish faith'' in Marxism and ``belief'' in socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.\171\ In January 2022, the Party 
Central Committee General Office issued a trial opinion that, 
among other things, requires heads of schools to operate in 
accordance with Party political ideology, as well as to 
``educate people for the Party . . ..'' \172\ In addition, 
provincial and local authorities in at least 12 locations 
reportedly required schoolteachers to attend government-
organized training on how to speak to students about Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine.\173\ [For more information about control 
over education, see Section VI--Ethnic Minority Rights, Section 
V--Governance, Section X--Xinjiang, and Section IX--Tibet.]

       Detention and Imprisonment in Connection with Free Speech

    This past year, authorities detained, tried, and held in 
prison individuals in connection with their peaceful 
expression. Illustrative examples appear below. [For more 
information about detention and imprisonment, see Section IV--
Criminal Justice. For more information about detentions in Hong 
Kong, see Section XI--Hong Kong and Macau.]

         Health Concerns: Naturalized Australian 
        citizen and former Chinese diplomat, author, and 
        blogger Yang Hengjun remained in prison on espionage 
        charges and reportedly suffered from deteriorating 
        health without adequate care from authorities.\174\
         Trials: Authorities in Hainan province 
        sentenced former investigative journalist Luo Changping 
        to seven months in prison for ``infringing on the 
        reputation and honor of national heroes or martyrs'' 
        after Luo negatively referred to a military unit 
        featured in a Chinese film about the Korean War.\175\ 
        Authorities reportedly released Luo in May 2022.\176\ 
        Authorities in Zhuzhou municipality, Hunan province, 
        reportedly held a closed-door trial for rights defender 
        Ou Biaofeng for ``inciting subversion of state power'' 
        after he spoke out in support of Dong Yaoqiong--whom 
        authorities detained after she criticized Xi Jinping 
        online--and in support of Hong Kong newspaper Apple 
        Daily.\177\
         Detentions: This past year, the UN Working 
        Group on Arbitrary Detention determined that human 
        rights advocate and China Citizens Movement member 
        Zhang Baocheng--whom Beijing authorities imprisoned for 
        ``terrorism''-related charges and ``picking quarrels 
        and provoking trouble''--was arbitrarily detained 
        [``as] a result of his peaceful exercise of his rights 
        to freedom of expression and of association . . ..'' 
        \178\ Authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong 
        province, formally arrested rights activist Guo 
        Feixiong on a charge of ``inciting subversion of state 
        power,'' in apparent connection with his publishing of 
        an open letter requesting that authorities allow him to 
        visit his terminally ill wife, who later died of cancer 
        while Guo was in detention, in the United States.\179\ 
        Authorities in Changsha municipality, Hunan, detained 
        and formally arrested lawyer Xie Yang on suspicion of 
        ``inciting subversion of state power'' after he posted 
        a video online calling for the release of pregnant 
        school teacher Li Tiantian.\180\ Officials detained Li 
        for five days in a psychiatric hospital in Xiangxi 
        Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Hunan, after she 
        expressed support for another teacher who was 
        terminated for questioning the official death toll of a 
        historical event known as the Nanjing Massacre.\181\ 
        Officials in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong, detained 
        Yan Zhihong on suspicion of ``inciting subversion of 
        state power'' for adding Chinese subtitles to a video 
        of a man complaining about lockdown conditions in 
        English and posting it online.\182\ Officials in Luhe 
        district, Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, 
        forcibly committed Ding Yan to a psychiatric hospital 
        after she criticized COVID-19 lockdown measures in an 
        open letter to Xi Jinping on social media platform 
        WeChat.\183\ [For more information on detention in 
        psychiatric facilities, see Section VIII--Public 
        Health.]

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

    Notes to Section III--Freedom of Expression

    \1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19.
    \2\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed April 7, 
2022.
    \3\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
19.
    \4\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018),
art. 35.
    \5\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19 
(Freedom of Opinion and Expression), CCPR/C/GC/34, September 12, 2011, 
paras. 11-12.
    \6\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, 
May 16, 2011, para. 24.
    \7\ Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development, adopted by UN Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/
HRC/RES/12/16, October 12, 2009, para. 5(p)(i)-(iii).
    \8\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19 
(Freedom of Opinion and Expression), CCPR/C/GC/34, September 12, 2011, 
para. 21.
    \9\ Reporters Without Borders, ``The Great Leap Backward of 
Journalism in China,'' Decem-
ber 7, 2021, 8.
    \10\ Reporters Without Borders, ``The Great Leap Backward of 
Journalism in China,'' Decem-
ber 7, 2021, 8; ``Minitrue: Focus on Henan Flood Recovery; Do Not 
Report on Celebrity Tax Case or COVID Origins Press Conference,'' China 
Digital Times, July 23, 2021.
    \11\ ``Xi Meets Journalist Representatives,'' Xinhua, December 15, 
2021.
    \12\ ``Zhongxuan bu yaoqiu ge xinwen danwei renzhen zuzhi kaizhan 
2022 nian `Xinchun zou jiceng' huodong'' [Central Propaganda Department 
requires all news units to earnestly organize and carry out 2022 ``New 
Year's going to the grassroots'' activities], Xinhua, reprinted in 
People's Daily, January 16, 2022.
    \13\ National Development and Reform Commission, ``Shichang Zhunru 
Fumian Qingdan (2021 nianban gongkai zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Market 
Entry Negative List (2021 draft for public comment)], October 8, 2021, 
item 6; ``Fagaiwei zhengqiu yijian: Feigongyou ziben bu dei congshi 
xinwen caibian bofa yewu'' [NDRC solicits comments: Private capital 
should not engage in news collection, editing, or broadcasting work], 
China News, October 9, 2021; Mary Hui, ``China Wants an Even More 
Dominant State Monopoly on the Media,'' Quartz, October 11, 2021.
    \14\ National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, ``Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan 
Jixu Jiaoyu Zanxing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Interim Provisions 
on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public 
comment)], October 15, 2021.
    \15\ National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, ``Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan 
Jixu Jiaoyu Zanxing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Interim Provisions 
on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public 
comment)], October 15, 2021, art. 1; National Press and Publication 
Administration, Xinwen Jizhe Zheng Guanli Banfa [Management Measures 
for Journalist Certification], passed December 9, 2004, effective March 
1, 2005, art. 1.
    \16\ National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, ``Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan 
Jixu Jiaoyu Zanxing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Interim Provisions 
on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public 
comment)], October 15, 2021, art. 11.
    \17\ National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, ``Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan 
Jixu Jiaoyu Zanxing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Interim Provisions 
on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public 
comment)], October 15, 2021, art. 4(1); Xi Jinping, ``Strengthen 
Commitment to the Four Consciousnesses, the Four-Sphere Confidence, and 
the Two Upholds: October 25, 2017-May 31, 2019,'' in The Governance of 
China, Volume 3 (Foreign Languages Press: Beijing, 2020), reprinted in 
Seeking Truth, updated January 14, 2022. See also Stella Chen, 
``Telling the Story of the CCP Journalist,'' China Media Project, March 
22, 2022.
    \18\ See, e.g., Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, International 
Federation of Journalists, ``Telling China's Story: Reshaping the 
World's Media,'' June 2020, 3-6; Sarah Cook, ``China's Global Media 
Footprint: Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence,'' 
National Endowment for Democracy, International Forum for Democratic 
Studies, February 2021, 2-3; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 46.
    \19\ ``Zhang Weili: shenhua meiti hezuo shi Zhong'E zhanlue xiezuo 
he renwen jiaoliu de zhongyao zucheng bufen'' [Zhang Weili: deepening 
media cooperation is an important component of China-Russia strategic 
coordination and cultural exchange], China Daily, November 22, 2021.
    \20\ ``Zhang Weili: shenhua meiti hezuo shi Zhong'E zhanlue xiezuo 
he renwen jiaoliu de zhongyao zucheng bufen'' [Zhang Weili: deepening 
media cooperation is an important component of China-Russia strategic 
coordination and cultural exchange], China Daily, November 22, 2021.
    \21\ ``Tricks of the External Propaganda Trade,'' China Media 
Project, March 16, 2022. For examples, see ``Touguo Liang Hui, shijie 
dudong Zhongguo'' [Through the Two Sessions, the world reads and 
understands China], People's Daily, March 16, 2022.
    \22\ David Bandurski, ``Inside China's Global Media Blitz,'' China 
Media Project, March 17, 2021.
    \23\ Muyi Xiao, Paul Mozur, and Gray Beltran, ``Buying Influence: 
How China Manipulates Facebook and Twitter,'' New York Times, December 
20, 2021; Olivia Solon, Keir Simmons, and Amy Perrette, ``China-Linked 
Disinformation Campaign Blames Covid on Maine Lobsters,'' NBC News, 
updated October 22, 2021; Albert Zhang, ``China's Cultural Industry Is 
Being Co-Opted for Disinformation Operations,'' Strategist (blog), 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 8, 2022; Fergus Ryan et 
al., ``Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang,'' International Cyber 
Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021; 
``Elephants Must Learn to Street Dance: The Chinese Communist Party's 
Appeal to Youth in Overseas Propaganda,'' Insikt Group, Recorded 
Future, February 3, 2022, 15.
    \24\ Muyi Xiao, Paul Mozur, and Gray Beltran, ``Buying Influence: 
How China Manipulates Facebook and Twitter,'' New York Times, December 
20, 2021; Olivia Solon, Keir Simmons, and Amy Perrette, ``China-Linked 
Disinformation Campaign Blames Covid on Maine Lobsters,'' NBC News, 
updated October 22, 2021; Albert Zhang, ``China's Cultural Industry Is 
Being Co-Opted for Disinformation Operations,'' Strategist (blog), 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 8, 2022; Fergus Ryan et 
al., ``Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang,'' International Cyber 
Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021. 
``Elephants Must Learn to Street Dance: The Chinese Communist Party's 
Appeal to Youth in Overseas Propaganda,'' Insikt Group, Recorded 
Future, February 3, 2022, 15.
    \25\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 
2021, 5-6.
    \26\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 
2021, 5. See also ``Hong Kong Prosecutors Play a Key Role in Carrying 
Out Political Prosecutions,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, July 2022.
    \27\ See, e.g., International Federation of Journalists, ``Lights 
Out: Is This the End for Hong Kong's Media? An IFJ Report on Press 
Freedom in Hong Kong 2022,'' February 2022; Chris Yeung et al., Hong 
Kong Journalists Association, 2021 Annual Report: Freedom in Tatters, 
2021.
    \28\ See, e.g., Tang Huiyun, ``Xianggang Pingguo Ribao Guo'an Fa 
xia shoujia shouya guanbi meiti yu qian shimin lingchen paidui qianggou 
tingkanhao'' [Hong Kong Apple Daily is the first media company to shut 
under the National Security Law, over a thousand residents line up to 
buy the last issue], Voice of America, June 25, 2021; Brian Wong, 
``Hong Kong National Security Law: Ex-Apple Daily Chief Accused of 
Colluding with Foreign Forces Denied Bail for Second Time,'' South 
China Morning Post, August 13, 2021.
    \29\ International Federation of Journalists, ``Lights Out: Is This 
the End for Hong Kong's Media? An IFJ Report on Press Freedom in Hong 
Kong 2022,'' February 2022; Chris Yeung et al., Hong Kong Journalists 
Association, 2021 Annual Report: Freedom in Tatters, 2021.
    \30\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 
2021, 24.
    \31\ See, e.g., Yumeng Luo and Teresa M. Harrison, ``How Citizen 
Journalists Impact the Agendas of Traditional Media and the Government 
Policymaking Process in China,'' Global Media and China 4, no. 1 
(2019): 72, 74.
    \32\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 
2021, 11; Vivian Wang, ``Chinese Citizen Journalist Sentenced to 4 
Years for Covid Reporting,'' New York Times, updated October 8, 2021. 
For more information on Zhang Zhan, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2020-00175.
    \33\ ``Hubei meitiren Hu Xincheng zao qiangpo shizong 36 tian'' 
[Hubei journalist Hu Xincheng forcibly disappeared for 36 days], Radio 
Free Asia, January 9, 2022; ``Hubei meitiren Hu Xincheng shilian yuyue 
yi zao kuasheng zhuabu'' [Hubei journalist Hu Xincheng incommunicado 
for over a month, cross-provincial detention suspected], Radio Free 
Asia, January 10, 2022; ``She shandong kongbu huodong, meitiren Hu 
Xincheng zao Shanxi dangju xingshi juliu'' [For inciting terrorist 
activities, journalist Hu Xincheng criminally detained by Shanxi 
authorities], Radio Free Asia, January 12, 2022. For more information 
on Hu Xincheng, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2022-00015.
    \34\ ``Meitiren Song Yangbiao zao xingshi juliu, youren: yin jielu 
Chengdu guanshang goujie'' [Journalist Song Yangbiao criminally 
detained, friend: due to collusion between Chengdu officials and 
business], Radio Free Asia, January 20, 2022; ``Jie Chengdu bieshu 
weijian hou, dalu meitiren Song Yangbiao zao xingju'' [After exposing 
illegal villa construction in Chengdu, mainland journalist Song 
Yangbiao criminally detained], Epoch Times, January 21, 2022; Rights 
Defense Network, ``Dalu meitiren, qian diaocha jizhe Song Yangbiao yin 
yan huozui zao Chengdu jingfang xingshi juliu 48 xiaoshi hou qubao 
huoshi'' [Mainland journalist, former investigative journalist Song 
Yangbiao released on bail 48 hours after being incriminated for speech 
and criminally detained by Chengdu police], January 22, 2022. For more 
information on Song Yangbiao, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2022-00020.
    \35\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 
2021, 6.
    \36\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release 
#MeToo Activist and Fellow Civil Society Advocate,'' September 21, 
2021; Rights Defense Network, ``Duli gongyi ren Wang Jianbing, nuquan 
jizhe Huang Xueqin jiashu shoudao daibu tongzhishu'' [Family of 
independent public interest advocate Wang Jianbing and women's rights 
journalist Sophia Huang Xueqin receive notice of formal arrest], 
November 5, 2021; Yuan Yang (@YuanfenYang), ``Journalist Sophia 
(Xueqin) Huang was leaving China on her way . . .,'' Twitter, November 
5, 2021, 11:04 a.m. For more information on Sophia Huang Xueqin, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00454.
    \37\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``293 Journalists Imprisoned 
in 2021,'' accessed June 1, 2022.
    \38\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 
2021, 6. For more information on Gulmira Imin, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00238.
    \39\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 16.
    \40\ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States 
of America, `` `Press Freedom' Should Not Become a Pretext for 
Interference in Other Countries' Judicial Sovereignty,'' May 6, 2022; 
``Haze Fan, Bloomberg News Assistant, Charged with Jeopardizing 
National Security,'' China Digital Times, December 11, 2020; One Free 
Press Coalition, ``Cases of Injustice against Journalists: 10 Most 
Urgent, January 2022,'' January 3, 2022; ``Australian Journalist Faces 
China Trial on State Secrets Charges,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted 
in France 24, March 31, 2022. For more information on Haze Fan, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00316.
    \41\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Track, Trace, Expel: 
Reporting on China amid a Pandemic, March 1, 2021, 1; Reporters Without 
Borders, ``The Great Leap Backward of Journalism in China,'' December 
7, 2021; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 49-51.
    \42\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 3.
    \43\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 1.
    \44\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 2.
    \45\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 1, 7.
    \46\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 7-8.
    \47\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 9.
    \48\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``2022 nian 3 yue 31 ri Waijiaobu 
fayanren Wang Wenbin zhuchi lixing jizhe hui'' [Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin hosts regular press conference on 
March 31, 2022], March 31, 2022; Eva Dou, ``Beijing Holds Closed-Door 
Trial for Australian Journalist Cheng Lei,'' Washington Post, March 31, 
2022; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 
1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective 
March 1, 2021, art. 111. For more information on Cheng Lei, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00246.
    \49\ Eva Dou, ``Beijing Holds Closed-Door Trial for Australian 
Journalist Cheng Lei,'' Washington Post, March 31, 2022; ``Journalist 
Detained in China Denied Calls, Partner Says,'' Associated Press, 
reprinted in Washington Post, June 2, 2022.
    \50\ Eryk Bagshaw, ``From Suburban Melbourne to Detention in 
Beijing: The Rise of a TV Anchor,'' Sydney Morning Herald, September 1, 
2020.
    \51\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (@fccchina), ``1/ FCCC 
Statement on Harassment of Reporters Covering Henan Floods . . .,'' 
Twitter, July 27, 2021, 5:02 a.m. For an example of Brant's reporting 
on the flooding, see ``China Floods: Drone Footage Shows the Scale of 
Damage as Clean Up Begins'' [Video file], BBC, July 22, 2021.
    \52\ ``China Reinforces Tight Control over Plane Crash Mystery,'' 
Agence-France Presse, reprinted in Radio France Internationale, April 
21, 2022.
    \53\ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State, ``Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of 
the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 Note),'' 
March 16, 2022, 1-2, 4; Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked 
Down or Kicked Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 12.
    \54\ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State, ``Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of 
the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 Note),'' 
March 16, 2022, 3.
    \55\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 6.
    \56\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 10.
    \57\ Freedom House, ``Key Findings,'' in Freedom on the Net 2021: 
The Global Drive to Control Big Tech, September 2021, 1.
    \58\ Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, `` `Shisi 
Wu' Guojia Xinxihua Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for National 
Informatization], issued December 2021, chap. 2, sec. 2.
    \59\ Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, `` `Shisi 
Wu' Guojia Xinxihua Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for National 
Informatization], issued December 2021, chap. 1, sec. 2.
    \60\ See, e.g., Nadege Rolland, ``China's Vision for a New World 
Order,'' National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2020, 7-13.
    \61\ Observers have characterized the CAC as increasingly powerful 
in recent years. See, e.g., AJ Caughey and Shen Lu, ``How the CAC 
Became Chinese Tech's Biggest Nightmare,'' Protocol, March 11, 2022; 
CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 66-67. The CAC is supervised 
by a Party organization, the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs 
Commission. See, e.g., ``CPC Releases Plan on Deepening Reform of Party 
and State Institutions,'' People's Daily, March 22, 2018; Ryan 
Fedasiuk, ``Buying Silence: The Price of Internet Censorship in 
China,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2021; Susan V. 
Lawrence and Mari Y. Lee, ``China's Political System in Charts: A 
Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress,'' Congressional Research 
Service, November 24, 2021, 19.
    \62\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Guanyu kaizhan `Qinglang 
 2022 nian Chunjie Wangluo Huanjing Zhengzhi' zhuanxiang 
xingdong de tongzhi'' [Circular regarding the launch of the 
``Purification  2022 Lunar New Year Internet Environment 
Rectification'' special operation], January 22, 2022. See also Ryan 
McMorrow, ``China Launches Internet `Purification' Campaign for Lunar 
New Year,'' Financial Times, January 25, 2022.
    \63\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Guanyu kaizhan `Qinglang 
 2022 nian Chunjie Wangluo Huanjing Zhengzhi' zhuanxiang 
xingdong de tongzhi'' [Circular regarding the launch of the 
``Purification  2022 Lunar New Year Internet Environment 
Rectification'' special operation], January 22, 2022.
    \64\ Iris Deng, ``China Steps Up Drive against Cyberbullying, Fake 
News, Online Scams during Lunar New Year Holiday,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 25, 2022.
    \65\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Quanguo hulianwang weifa 
he buliang xinxi jubao shouli chuzhi yitihua jizhi jianshe tuijin hui 
zai Jing zhaokai'' [Meeting to advance construction of a national 
integrated mechanism for receiving and processing illegal and unhealthy 
internet information convenes in Beijing], reprinted in Legal Daily, 
January 28, 2022.
    \66\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Jubao wangshang lishi 
xuwuzhuyi cuowu yanlun qing dao `12377'--jubao zhongxin `she lishi 
xuwuzhuyi you hai xinxi jubao zhuanqu' shang xian''
[Go to ``12377'' to report incorrect historical nihilism online--
reporting center's ``dedicated reporting area for suspected historical 
nihilist and harmful information'' now online], April 9, 2021; 
``Zhonggong Wangxinban kaiting rexian jubao `lishi xuwu' yanlun yanjin 
huaiyi Zhonggong lishi'' [Party's CAC opens hotline to report 
expressions of ``historical nihilism,'' strictly forbidden to doubt 
Party history], Voice of America, April 12, 2021; CECC, 2021 Annual 
Report, March 2022, 52.
    \67\ ``Empowering China's Digital Informants,'' China Media 
Project, February 7, 2022.
    \68\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Quanguo hulianwang weifa 
he buliang xinxi jubao shouli chuzhi yitihua jizhi jianshe tuijin hui 
zai Jing zhaokai'' [Meeting to advance construction of a national 
integrated mechanism for receiving and processing illegal and unhealthy 
internet information convenes in Beijing], reprinted in Legal Daily, 
January 28, 2022.
    \69\ Coco Feng, ``China Tech Crackdown: Internet Watchdog Visits 
Social Media Firm Douban to Correct `Severe Online Chaos,' '' South 
China Morning Post, March 15, 2022.
    \70\ Cybersecurity Administration of China, ``Guojia Wangxinban 
yifa yuetan chufa Doubanwang'' [Cybersecurity Administration of China 
speaks with and punishes Douban], December 2, 2021; ``China Fines 
Social Media Firm Douban for `Unlawful' Release of Information,'' 
Reuters, December 2, 2021.
    \71\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Wangxin bumen gongzuo 
dudao zu jinzhu Doubanwang'' [Cyberspace Administration work 
supervision group stationed at Douban], reprinted in Office of the 
Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, March 15, 2022.
    \72\ See, e.g., Cyberspace Administration of China, National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, People's Bank of China, 
State Administration for Market Regulation, National Radio and 
Television Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
National Administration of State Secret Protection, and National 
Cryptography Administration, Wangluo Anquan Shencha Banfa 
[Cybersecurity Review Measures], passed November 16, 2021, effective 
February 15, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and 
State Administration for Market Regulation, Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu 
Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding [Internet Information Service Algorithmic 
Recommendation Management Provisions], passed November 16, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, Yidong 
Hulianwang Yingyong Chengxu Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Mobile Internet 
Application Information Service Management Provisions], issued June 14, 
2022, effective August 1, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, 
``Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao'an 
zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions 
(revised draft for public comment)], issued June 17, 2022.
    \73\ Cyberspace Administration of China, National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Commerce, People's Bank of China, State 
Administration for Market Regulation, National Radio and Television 
Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National 
Administration of State Secret Protection, and National Cryptography 
Administration, Wangluo Anquan Shencha Banfa [Cybersecurity Review 
Measures], passed November 16, 2021, effective February 15, 2022, arts. 
1, 2, 5; Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State 
Administration for Market Regulation, Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa 
Tuijian Guanli Guiding [Internet Information Service Algorithmic 
Recommendation Management Provisions], passed November 16, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, arts. 1, 6; Cyberspace Administration of 
China, Yidong Hulianwang Yingyong Chengxu Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding 
[Mobile Internet Application Information Service Management 
Provisions], issued June 14, 2022, effective August 1, 2022, arts. 1, 
11; Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun 
Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Internet 
Comment Service Management Provisions (revised draft for public 
comment)], issued June 17, 2022, art. 1.
    \74\ See, e.g., Raphael Viana David, ``China's Abuse of National 
Security to Curtail Human Rights: 4 Things You Need to Know,'' 
International Service for Human Rights, January 27, 2022; Helena 
Legarda, ``China's New International Paradigm: Security First,'' 
Mercator Institute for China Studies, June 15, 2021; Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN Rights Chief Concerned by 
`Broad Scope' of China's New Security Law,'' July 7, 2015.
    \75\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State 
Administration for Market Regulation, Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa 
Tuijian Guanli Guiding [Internet Information Service Algorithmic 
Recommendation Management Provisions], passed November 16, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 23; Cyberspace Administration of China, 
Yidong Hulianwang Yingyong Chengxu Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Mobile 
Internet Application Information Service Management Provisions], 
announced June 14, 2022, effective August 1, 2022, art. 14; Cyberspace 
Administration of China, ``Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli 
Guiding (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Internet Comment 
Service Management Provisions (revised draft for public comment)], 
issued June 17, 2022, art. 2.
    \76\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Hulianwang Zongjiao 
Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective 
March 1, 2022.
    \77\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Hulianwang Zongjiao 
Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective 
March 1, 2022, chap. 3, art. 17.
    \78\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Hulianwang Zongjiao 
Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective 
March 1, 2022, chap. 3, art. 14.
    \79\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Hulianwang Zongjiao 
Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective 
March 1, 2022, chap. 2, art. 6.
    \80\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Hulianwang Zongjiao 
Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective 
March 1, 2022, chap. 2, art. 7(1).
    \81\ Nectar Gan and CNN Beijing Bureau, `` `Voices of April': 
China's Internet Erupts in Protest against Censorship of Shanghai 
Lockdown Video,'' CNN, updated April 25, 2022; ``Minitrue: Silence the 
`Voices of April' Viral Video on Shanghai Lockdowns [Includes Full 
English Subtitles and Transcript],'' China Digital Times, April 22, 
2022.
    \82\ ``Minitrue: Silence the `Voices of April' Viral Video on 
Shanghai Lockdowns [Includes Full English Subtitles and Transcript],'' 
China Digital Times, April 22, 2022.
    \83\ Lily Kuo, ``Amid the Roar of Nationalism, a Few Antiwar Voices 
in China Emerge over Ukraine Crisis,'' Washington Post, February 28, 
2022; Zhifan Luo and Muyang Li, ``Online Posts May Not Reflect Chinese 
Opinion When It Comes to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,'' The 
Conversation, March 30, 2022.
    \84\ ``Minitrue: Keep Weibo Posts on Ukraine Favorable to Russia; 
Control Comments,'' China Digital Times, February 22, 2022. See also 
Xiaoshan Huang, Chingman, and Hsia Hsiao-hwa, ``China Bans Online 
Criticism of Russia, Blames U.S. for Fueling Ukraine `Tensions,' '' 
Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2022.
    \85\ Kai Wang, ``Ukraine: How China Is Censoring Online Discussion 
of the War,'' BBC, March 12, 2022; Zhifan Luo and Muyang Li, ``Online 
Posts May Not Reflect Chinese Opinion When It Comes to the Russian 
Invasion of Ukraine,'' The Conversation, March 30, 2022; Paul Mozur, 
Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, ``China's Echoes of Russia's Alternate 
Reality Intensify around the World,'' New York Times, April 11, 2022.
    \86\ John Feng, ``Blinken's China Speech Sparks 25,000-Word 
Rebuttal, Media Censoring,'' Newsweek, June 22, 2022. For the original 
speech, see Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, ``The 
Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China,'' May 26, 
2022.
    \87\ Zhang Wanqing, ``Weibo Shuts Down User Accounts for `Gender 
Opposition,' '' Sixth Tone, December 8, 2021.
    \88\ Pak Yiu, ``WeChat Deletes Chinese University LGBT Accounts in 
Fresh Crackdown,'' Reuters, July 7, 2021.
    \89\ ``Translation: LGBTQ Site's WeChat Account Shuttered after 
Report on Homophobic Backlash against Hostel,'' China Digital Times, 
August 20, 2021.
    \90\ Zeyi Yang, ``Tencent's Messaging Platform Blocks LGBTQ Search 
Terms,'' Protocol, August 30, 2021.
    \91\ ``Grindr Disappears from App Stores in China amid Olympics 
Crackdown,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted in Guardian, January 31, 
2022.
    \92\ Alistair Walsh, ``TikTok Censoring LGBTQ, Nazi Terms in 
Germany: Report,'' Deutsche Welle, March 23, 2022; Cameron Jenkins, 
``TikTok Blocked Creators From Using `Black Lives Matter' in Bios,'' 
The Hill, July 8, 2021; Sebastian Meineck, ``TikTok hat das Wort 
`Umerziehungslager' zensiert'' [TikTok censored the word ``reeducation 
camp''], Netzpolitik, February 10, 2022.
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Meetings Shows That U.S. User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from 
China,'' BuzzFeed News, June 17, 2022; Protecting Kids Online: 
Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection, Product Safety, and Data Security, Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony 
of Michael Beckerman, Vice President and Head of Public Policy, 
Americas, TikTok).
    \94\ Protecting Kids Online: Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube, Hearing 
of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Data 
Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, U.S. 
Senate, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Michael Beckerman, Vice 
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TikTok and YouTube Executives Testify at Senate Hearing--10/26'' [Video 
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Meetings Shows that US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from 
China,'' BuzzFeed News, June 17, 2022.
    \95\ Emily Baker-White, ``Leaked Audio from 80 Internal TikTok 
Meetings Shows that US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from 
China,'' BuzzFeed News, June 17, 2022; ``Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube 
Executives Testify at Senate Hearing--10/26'' [Video file], Washington 
Post, reprinted in YouTube, accessed September 30, 2022, 1:46:29-
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YouTube, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product 
Safety, and Data Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, & 
Transportation, U.S. Senate, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Michael 
Beckerman, Vice President and Head of Public Policy, Americas, TikTok).
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Meetings Shows that US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from 
China,'' BuzzFeed News, June 17, 2022.
    \97\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Hulianwang Yonghu Zhanghao 
Xinxi Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the Management of Internet User 
Account Information], issued June 9, 2022, effective August 1, 2022, 
arts. 11, 12.
    \98\ Zeyi Yang, ``Now China Wants to Censor Online Comments,'' MIT 
Technology Review, June 18, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, 
``Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao'an 
zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Internet Thread Commenting on Services 
Management Provisions (Revised Draft Seeking Comments)], June 17, 2022, 
art. 4.
    \99\ National Radio and Television Administration and Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, Wangluo Zhubo Xingwei Guifan [Standards for the 
Behavior of Livestreamers], issued June 8, 2022, art. 14.
    \100\ National Radio and Television Administration and Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, Wangluo Zhubo Xingwei Guifan [Standards for the 
Behavior of Livestreamers], issued June 8, 2022, art. 13.
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June 4. Now His Fans Are Asking about the Tiananmen Square Massacre,'' 
CNN, updated June 6, 2022; Zheping Huang, ``What Happened in China When 
the Cake Looked Like a Tank,'' Bloomberg, June 14, 2022; Xinshang, ``Li 
Jiaqi xiaoshi hou de di 26 tian'' [The 26th day after Li Jiaoqi's 
disappearance], 163.com, June 30, 2022.
    \102\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Guanyu Jiaqiang Wangluo 
Zhibo Guifan Guanli Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on 
Strengthening the Standardization and Management of Online Live 
Broadcasting], February 9, 2021.
    \103\ Nick Monaco, ``Cotton the Act: Large-Scale Network of CCP-
Aligned Facebook Accounts Deny Mass Atrocity in China's Xinjiang 
Province,'' Miburo, December 22, 2021; Amanda Seitz, Mike Catalini, and 
Eric Tucker, ``China Used TV, TikTok Stars in Discreet Olympics 
Campaign,'' Associated Press, April 8, 2022; Paul Mozur et al., ``How 
Beijing Influences the Influencers,'' New York Times, December 13, 
2021. See also Fergus Ryan et al., ``Borrowing Mouths to Speak on 
Xinjiang,'' Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021; 
Jessica Brandt et al., ``Winning the Web: How Beijing Exploits Search 
Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-19,'' Brookings 
Institution and German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 2022; 
Kerry Allen and Sophie Williams, ``The Foreigners in China's 
Disinformation Drive,'' BBC, July 11, 2021.
    \104\ Amanda Seitz, Mike Catalini, and Eric Tucker, ``China Used 
TV, TikTok Stars in Discreet Olympics Campaign,'' Associated Press, 
April 8, 2022.
    \105\ Karen Hao, ``China Tops Google, YouTube Results on Covid 
Origins and Beijing's Human Rights Record,'' Wall Street Journal, 
updated May 27, 2022; Jessica Brandt et al., ``Winning the Web: How 
Beijing Exploits Search Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-
19,'' Brookings Institution and German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, May 2022, 1-2.
    \106\ Frankie Vetch, ``Threatened, Harassed, Punished: The Uyghur 
Translators Defying China to Tell Xinjiang's Story,'' Coda, February 
17, 2022; Eileen Guo, ``How YouTube's Rules Are Used to Silence Human 
Rights Activists,'' MIT Technology Review, June 24, 2021; Victoria 
Waldersee and Paresh Dave, ``Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang 
Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,'' Reuters, June 25, 
2021; Santi Ruiz, ``YouTube Strips Ad Revenue From Channel for Video on 
Disappeared Chinese Tennis Star,'' Washington Free Beacon, November 19, 
2021; Tom Parker, ``YouTube Caught Auto-Censoring Some Comments That 
Criticize China's Propaganda Pushers (Again),'' Reclaim the Net, July 
8, 2021.
    \107\ Frankie Vetch, ``Threatened, Harassed, Punished: The Uyghur 
Translators Defying China to Tell Xinjiang's Story,'' Coda, February 
17, 2022; Victoria Waldersee and Paresh Dave, ``Exclusive: YouTube 
Takes Down Xinjiang Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,'' 
Reuters, June 25, 2021.
    \108\ Eileen Guo, ``How YouTube's Rules Are Used to Silence Human 
Rights Activists,'' MIT Technology Review, June 24, 2021; Victoria 
Waldersee and Paresh Dave, ``Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang 
Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,'' Reuters, June 25, 
2021.
    \109\ Eileen Guo, ``How YouTube's Rules Are Used to Silence Human 
Rights Activists,'' MIT Technology Review, June 24, 2021; Victoria 
Waldersee and Paresh Dave, ``Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang 
Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,'' Reuters, June 25, 
2021.
    \110\ Santi Ruiz, ``YouTube Strips Ad Revenue from Channel for 
Video on Disappeared Chinese Tennis Star,'' Washington Free Beacon, 
November 19, 2021; Saagar Enjeti (@esaagar), ``Sorry @YouTube. We Meant 
to Say Peng Shaui [sic] Is Safe and Sound . . .,'' Twitter, November 
19, 2021, 11 a.m.
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Atrocities'' [Video file], YouTube, April 17, 2021; Serpentza, 
``Traitors Working for Communist Chinese Government?'' [Video file], 
YouTube, January 16, 2021; Laowhy86, ``China Bribed Me to Post 
Propaganda'' [Video file], YouTube, June 8, 2022; Serpentza, ``China 
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June 8, 2022.
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11.
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2022, 3-4; ``Report: Fake Twitter Accounts Spread Chinese Propaganda,'' 
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2022, 9.
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Uyghurs of Abuses,'' Associated Press, May 20, 2021. See also Dake Kang 
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TikTok, Facebook Influencers Push Propaganda,'' Associated Press, March 
30, 2022; Fergus Ryan et al., ``Borrowing Mouths to Speak on 
Xinjiang,'' Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021, 29-
33; Jessica Brandt et al., ``Winning the Web: How Beijing Exploits 
Search Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-19,'' Brookings 
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June 23, 2022; Li Jingjing, ``I'm Being Targeted by the New York Times! 
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by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
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of dissent, warns Winter Olympic athletes there will be punishment for 
speaking out on human rights], Voice of America, February 1, 2022; Paul 
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of dissent, warns Winter Olympic athletes there will be punishment for 
speaking out on human rights], Voice of America, February 1, 2022; Paul 
Mozur, Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, ``Ahead of Winter Olympics, 
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of dissent, warns Winter Olympic athletes there will be punishment for 
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January 26, 2022.
    \145\ China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, ``Zhongguo 
Wenxue Yishu Jie Lianhe Hui jianjie'' [Introduction to the China 
Federation of Literary and Art Circles], accessed April 8, 2022; China 
Writers Association, ``Zhongguo Zuojia Xiehui jianjie'' [Introduction 
to the China Writers Association], June 12, 2009.
    \146\ ``Xi Stresses Cultural Confidence at Major Conference of 
Artists, Writers,'' Xinhua, reprinted in State Council, December 15, 
2021.
    \147\ ``Xi Jinping: wenyi bu neng zai shichang jingji dachao zhong 
mishi fangxiang'' [Xi Jinping: literature and art cannot lose its way 
in the tidal wave of the market economy], Xinhua, October 15, 2014.
    \148\ ``Xi Stresses Cultural Confidence at Major Conference of 
Artists, Writers,'' Xinhua, reprinted in State Council, December 15, 
2021.
    \149\ Ministry of Culture and Tourism, ``Wenhua he Luyou Bu yinfa 
tongzhi bing zhaokai zuotanhui qiangdiao jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi 
gongzuozhe jiaoyu guanli he daode jianshe gongzuo'' [Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism issues circular and convenes conference to 
emphasize further enhancing education management and moral construction 
work for literary and artistic workers], August 30, 2021.
    \150\ Central Propaganda Department, Guanyu kaizhan wenyu lingyu 
zonghe zhili gongzuo de tongzhi [Circular on launching literature and 
entertainment sector overall governance work], September 2, 2021; 
General Office of the National Radio and Television Administration, 
Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi jiemu ji qi renyuan guanli de tongzhi 
[Circular on further enhancing management of literary and artistic 
programs and personnel], September 2, 2021; Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism, ``Wenhua he Luyou Bu yinfa tongzhi bing zhaokai zuotanhui 
qiangdiao jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi gongzuozhe jiaoyu guanli he daode 
jianshe gongzuo'' [Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues circular and 
convenes conference to emphasize further enhancing education management 
and moral construction work for literary and artistic workers], August 
30, 2021.
    \151\ Steve Stecklow and Jeffrey Dastin, ``Special Report: Amazon 
Partnered with China Propaganda Arm,'' Reuters, December 18, 2021.
    \152\ Shuai Zhang, `` `Fight Club' Is Now Available to Stream 
(Legally) in China, but Wait Until You See How This Story Ends,`` CBS 
News, January 26, 2022; Mike Ives, ``The End of `Fight Club' Was Cut in 
China. The Pattern Goes Back Decades,'' New York Times, updated 
February 8, 2022.
    \153\ Mike Ives, ``The End of `Fight Club' Was Cut in China. The 
Pattern Goes Back Decades,'' New York Times, February 8, 2022; Shuai 
Zhang, `` `Fight Club' Is Now Available to Stream (Legally) in China, 
but Wait until You See How This Story Ends,`` CBS News, January 26, 
2022.
    \154\ ``China's Tencent Restores Fight Club Ending after 
Backlash,'' BBC, February 7, 2022.
    \155\ Guan Cong, ``In Depth: China's Game Studios Face Long March 
as Titles Languish Unapproved,'' Caixin, February 28, 2022.
    \156\ Eleanor Olcott, ``Roblox to Rebuild China App after Going 
Offline,'' Financial Times, January 7, 2021; Eleanor Olcott, ``Roblox's 
China Ambitions Risk Falling Flat,'' Financial Times, November 20, 
2021.
    \157\ ``China UGC Submission Checklist,'' Roblox, accessed April 8, 
2022.
    \158\ Ministry of Culture and Tourism, ``Wenhua he Luyou Bu yinfa 
tongzhi bing zhaokai zuotanhui qiangdiao jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi 
gongzuozhe jiaoyu guanli he daode jianshe gongzuo'' [Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism issues circular and convenes conference to 
emphasize further enhancing education management and moral construction 
work for literary and artistic workers], August 30, 2021; General 
Office of the National Radio and Television Administration, Guanyu 
jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi jiemu ji qi renyuan guanli de tongzhi [Circular 
on further enhancing management of literary and artistic programs and 
personnel], September 2, 2021.
    \159\ ``Beijing Shi Guangbo Dianshi Ju: quanmian jiaoting ouxiang 
yangchenglei wangzong, `dangai' ticai wangluo yingshi ju'' [Beijing 
Municipal Radio and Television Bureau: comprehensively end idol 
cultivation-style online entertainment, ``boys love''-themed online 
movies], CCTV, January 7, 2022.
    \160\ ``Chinese Sites Accused of Censoring LGBT Content from 
Friends,'' BBC, February 13, 2022; Patrick Brzeski, `` `Friends' Re-
Released in China, but LGBTQ Storylines Get Censored,'' Hollywood 
Reporter, February 14, 2022; Robert Burton-Bradley, ``China's Censors 
Increasingly Play the Part of Morality Police with the Conservative 
Values of 1950's America, Experts Say,'' South China Morning Post, 
February 24, 2022.
    \161\ David Cowhig, ``2022: Chinese Law Prof's Lament and 
Encouragement,'' David Cowhig's Translation Blog, January 29, 2022; 
Chris Buckley, ``Defying China's Censors to Urge Beijing to Denounce 
Russia's War,'' New York Times, March 18, 2022. Authorities also 
censored analysts outside of academia for posting independent policy 
analysis publicly. See, e.g., Luna Sun, ``Chinese Economist Ren Zeping 
Banned from Posting on Weibo after Comments on Financing Childbirth 
Stir Controversy,'' South China Morning Post, January 13, 2022; Simon 
Leplatre, ``China Censors Its Economists in the Name of Zero-Covid,'' 
Le Monde, May 5, 2022.
    \162\ Mimi Lau, ``China Silences Trafficking Debate Sparked by 
`Chained Woman' Scandal,'' South China Morning Post, February 22, 2022.
    \163\ Shen Lu, ``A Report Detailed the Tech Gap between China and 
the U.S. Then It Disappeared,'' Protocol, February 9, 2022.
    \164\ Shen Lu, ``A Report Detailed the Tech Gap between China and 
the U.S. Then It Disappeared,'' Protocol, February 9, 2022.
    \165\ David Bandurski, ``University Press Creates Political Review 
Team,'' China Media Project, March 8, 2022.
    \166\ Board of Directors, Association for Asian Studies, ``AAS 
Statement on Participation of PRC Scholars at AAS 2022 Annual 
Conference,'' March 29, 2022.
    \167\ Pola Lem, ``Chinese Academics `Pressured' into Conference 
Withdrawal,'' Times Higher Education, March 30, 2022.
    \168\ ``Yisilan xueshu zao daya, Zhongguo xuezhe: minzu yanjiu 
fabiao bu liao'' [Scholars of Islam oppressed, Chinese scholars: ethnic 
minority research can't get published], Radio Free Asia, February 24, 
2022.
    \169\ Ministry of Education, `` `Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo 
Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Xuesheng duben' yu jinnian qiuji xueqi qi zai 
quanguo tongyi shiyong'' [``Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Textbook'' will be used across 
the country beginning this fall semester], July 8, 2021; Shih-Wen Sue 
Chen and Sin Wen Lau, ``Little Red Children and `Grandpa Xi': China's 
School Textbooks Reflect the Rise of Xi Jinping's Personality Cult,'' 
The Conversation, November 22, 2021.
    \170\ Zhang Xin and Lin Huanxin, ``Fahui peigen zhuhun de sixiang 
weili: `Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Sixiang Jin 
Kecheng Jiaocai Zhinan' fabu'' [Bring into play the ideological power 
of cultivating the roots and molding the soul: ``Guide for Xi Jinping 
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era 
Entering the Curriculum'' released], China Education Times, reprinted 
in Ministry of Education, August 25, 2021.
    \171\ Zhang Xin and Lin Huanxin, ``Fahui peigen zhuhun de sixiang 
weili: `Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Sixiang Jin 
Kecheng Jiaocai Zhinan' fabu'' [Bring into play the ideological power 
of cultivating the roots and molding the soul: ``Guide for Xi Jinping 
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era 
Entering the Curriculum'' released], China Education Times, reprinted 
in Ministry of Education, August 25, 2021.
    \172\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office, 
Guanyu Jianli Zhongxiao Xuexiao Dang Zuzhi Lingdao de Xiaozhang Fuze 
Zhi de Yijian (Shixing) [Trial Opinion on Establishing a Head of School 
Responsibility System for Party Group Leadership in Primary and 
Secondary Schools], issued January 26, 2022, sec. 1, art. 1(1), sec. 2, 
art. 4.
    \173\ Mimi Lau, ``Russia's War on Ukraine: China Schools Its 
Teachers with Classroom Guide to Beijing's Messaging,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 30, 2022.
    \174\ Ben Doherty, `` `They Treat Me Like Dirt and Tortured Me': 
Australian Activist on Three Years in Chinese Prisons,'' Guardian, 
January 17, 2022. For more information on Yang Hengjun, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00083.
    \175\ Zhang Chen, ``Luo Changping qinhai yingxiong lieshi mingyu, 
rongyu ji xingshi fudai minshi gongyi susong yi an yi shen xuanpan'' 
[Sentence announced in trial of first instance in the criminal case 
plus public interest civil suit for Luo Changping harming the 
reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs], Legal Daily, May 6, 2022; 
Chen Zifei and Hwang Chun-mei, ``Chinese Journalist Sentenced in Hainan 
for Smearing Reputation of CCP Heroes,'' Radio Free Asia, May 6, 2022; 
Anthony Kuhn, ``China's Few Investigative Journalists Face Increasing 
Challenges,'' NPR, August 6, 2017; ``Luo Changping bei pizhun daibu'' 
[Luo Changping's formal arrest approved], People's Daily, reprinted in 
Sina, October 22, 2021; ``[Wang Weiluo zhuanfang] `Changjin Hu' 
dianying de xujia yu Luo Changping de zhenshi (shipin)'' [(Wang Weiluo 
exclusive interview) The falsehood of ``Battle at Lake Changjin'' and 
Luo Changping's truth (video)], Vision Times, October 28, 2021. For 
more information on Luo Changping, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2021-00515.
    \176\ ``Luo Changping xingman chuyu shou le 18 jin'' [Luo Changping 
released from prison after completing sentence, loses 9 kilograms], 
Radio Free Asia, May 8, 2022.
    \177\ ``Chinese Activist Who Supported Apple Daily in Secret Trial 
for `Subversion': Wife,'' Radio Free Asia, January 28, 2022; Linda Lew, 
``China Charges `Ink Girl' Supporter with Subversion as Room for 
Dissent Narrows Further,'' South China Morning Post, August 1, 2021. 
For more information on Ou Biaofeng, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2021-00008. For more information on Dong 
Yaoqiong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-
00343.
    \178\ UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 54/2021 concerning Zhang Baocheng (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2021/
54, February 16, 2022, paras. 5, 17, 67, 75, 82, 84. For more 
information about Zhang Baocheng, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2013-00132.
    \179\ ``Bingzhong Zhang Qing huhuan zhangfu, Guo Feixiong qingqiu 
Li Keqiang fang ta chu guo'' [Gravely ill Zhang Qing calls for husband, 
Guo Feixiong asks Li Keqiang to let him leave the country], Radio Free 
Asia, November 29, 2021; ``Qizi Zhang Qing zai Mei shen huan juezheng 
lairi wuduo, Zhongguo weiquan renshi Guo Feixiong yu Li Keqiang 
fangxing tanshi'' [With wife Zhang Qing terminally ill on death bed in 
the United States, Chinese human rights advocate Guo Feixiong calls on 
Li Keqiang to let him go see her], Voice of America, December 1, 2021; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) jiashu shoudao 
Zhonggong dangju zhengshi daibu Guo Feixiong de tongzhishu'' [Family of 
Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) receive notice of Guo Feixiong's formal 
arrest from Chinese Communist Party authorities], January 17, 2022. For 
more information on Guo Feixiong, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2005-00143.
    \180\ ``China Rights Lawyer Held for `Inciting State Subversion,' 
'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, January 
19, 2022; Safeguard Defenders, ``The Abrupted Video Call and Xie Yang's 
Detention,'' January 28, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Hunan zhuming 
renquan lushi Xie Yang zao dangju qiangpo shizong'' [Famous Hunan human 
rights lawyer Xie Yang forcibly disappeared by authorities], January 
13, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Bei qiangpo shizong de Hunan 
renquan lushi Xie Yang yi zao xingshi juliu'' [Forcibly disappeared 
Hunan human rights lawyer Xie Yang criminally detained], January 17, 
2022. For more information on Xie Yang, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.
    \181\ Chris Buckley, ``Fury in China after an Outspoken Teacher 
Disappears,'' New York Times, December 23, 2021. For more information 
on Li Tiantian, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2022-00001.
    \182\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yin yan huozui zao zhuabu de 
Shenzhen nianqing Jidutu Yan Zhihong de anqing tongbao'' [Update on the 
case of young Shenzhen Christian Yan Zhihong, guilty for speaking out 
and detained], May 13, 2022. For more information on Yan Zhihong, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00128.
    \183\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Ding Yan zhixin Xi Jinping 
bei songru jingshenbing yuan'' [Ding Yan sends letter to Xi Jinping 
regarding her being forcibly committed to a psychiatric institution], 
June 8, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Bei Zhonggong dangju qiangzhi 
song jingshenbing yuan de Jiangsu Nanjing nu renquan hanweizhe Ding Yan 
de jianli'' [Bio of Nanjing, Jiangsu women's human rights defender Ding 
Yan, who was forcibly committed to a psychiatric institution by Chinese 
Communist Party authorities], June 11, 2022. For more information on 
Ding Yan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-
00126.

Civil Society

Civil Society

                             Civil Society

                                Findings

         During this reporting year, People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) authorities continued to restrict the 
        already limited space for autonomous civil society and 
        public participation, using regulations and harassment 
        to suppress advocacy, expression, and assembly by 
        unregistered religious groups, ``illegal social 
        organizations,'' human rights defenders, and groups 
        promoting labor rights, women's rights, and the rights 
        of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 
        (LGBTQ) people.
         The Ministry of Civil Affairs released its 
        first-ever Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social 
        Organizations (FYP). While the FYP authorizes ``social 
        organizations'' to expand in the areas of social 
        welfare and service provision, it constitutes ``a grim 
        blueprint for the [non-profit] sector's development 
        over the next five years,'' according to an 
        international expert.
         The government continued to constrain foreign 
        non-governmental organization (NGO) activity under the 
        2017 PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
        Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland 
        China (Foreign NGO Law). Freedom House observed that 
        some foreign NGOs have decided to de-register due to 
        the heavy annual administrative burdens imposed by the 
        law. Five years into the implementation of the Foreign 
        NGO Law, the space for universities and research 
        institutions to work with foreign NGOs has been 
        severely curtailed.
         In June 2022, authorities tried China Citizens 
        Movement organizers and rights defenders Ding Jiaxi and 
        Xu Zhiyong in closed-door trials for ``subversion of 
        state power.'' They have been held for over two years 
        in connection with a private gathering of civil society 
        advocates and scholars in December 2019. Public 
        security officials also continued to hold in detention 
        feminist and labor rights advocate Li Qiaochu, after 
        she revealed that authorities had tortured Xu, and 
        charged her with ``inciting subversion of state 
        power.''
         Online platforms for civil society organizing 
        and expression were shut down, censored, subjected to 
        pressure, and their individual users harassed in an 
        ongoing effort to deprive civil society movements of 
        space and resources.
         The LGBTQ community in China continued to face 
        many challenges--including persistent stigma, 
        widespread discrimination, and harassment. Chinese 
        government authorities increased restrictions on LGBTQ 
        advocacy and organizing, as they have done with other 
        advocacy groups. Chinese law neither recognizes same-
        sex marriage nor otherwise protects same-sex 
        relationships.
         The Chinese government has signaled a shift 
        toward an emphasis on traditional gender roles and 
        family structures and Chinese authorities intensified 
        their censorship of LGBTQ-related media and squeezed 
        the online advocacy space, causing once thriving 
        organizations to shutter their operations after many 
        years.
         In July 2021, LGBTQ groups at several Chinese 
        universities were shut down. In August 2021, 
        administrative officials at Shanghai University 
        circulated surveys asking LGBTQ people to self-identify 
        with no explanation as to what would be done with the 
        information.
         In April 2022, the National Health Commission 
        revised guidelines directly affecting the transgender 
        community in what observers believe is an effort to 
        comply with international standards. Additionally, in 
        November 2021, the National Children's Medical Center 
        and Children's Hospital of Fudan University in Shanghai 
        municipality opened China's first child and youth 
        transgender clinic, aimed at providing children and 
        youth with mental health and other healthcare 
        resources.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Call on the Chinese government to release civil 
        society advocates and staffers, in particular veteran 
        human rights defenders Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, and 
        Chang Weiping, feminist and labor rights advocate Li 
        Qiaochu, journalist and gender rights advocate Sophia 
        Huang Xueqin, labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing, and 
        other civil society and rights advocates detained for 
        peacefully exercising their human rights, especially 
        their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and 
        association, guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of 
        Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
        and Political Rights.
          Encourage the Chinese government to revise its 
        regulatory framework for civil society organizations, 
        including the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas 
        Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland 
        China and the PRC Charity Law, to conform with 
        international human rights standards regarding freedom 
        of association, assembly, and expression.
          Urge the Chinese government to abide by its 
        international legal obligations with respect to Chinese 
        citizens' freedom of association, assembly, and 
        expression and cease the unlawful harassment and 
        arbitrary detention of civil society advocates and the 
        closing of civil society organizations and online 
        accounts of advocates.
          Continue to fund, monitor, and support programs 
        globally that promote human rights, democracy, and the 
        rule of law in mainland China and Hong Kong.
          Facilitate the participation of Chinese civil society 
        advocates and human rights defenders in relevant 
        international forums. Work with U.S. allies and 
        partners to counter PRC efforts to block civil society 
        groups from obtaining consultative status at the United 
        Nations. Support non-profit leadership and advocacy 
        trainings for Chinese, Hong Kong, Tibetan, and Uyghur 
        advocates who are now living outside of China and 
        convene a periodic summit of stakeholders regarding the 
        path forward for Chinese civil society, offline and 
        online.
          Urge the Chinese government to cooperate with the UN 
        Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
        Women, with respect to recommendations within the 
        Committee's mandate, in advance of a review of China's 
        compliance with the human rights treaty within its 
        remit. Specifically, urge the Chinese government to 
        provide timely information regarding the List of Issues 
        raised by various non-governmental organizations.
          Encourage the Chinese government to provide 
        information about detailed measures taken to adopt 
        comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that 
        protects LGBTQ people, among other groups, including 
        protections under the PRC Anti-
        Domestic Violence Law.
          Continue funding, oversight, and evaluation of 
        foreign assistance programs in China that support human 
        rights advocacy, including for LGBTQ rights, as part of 
        civil society programming. Ensure sufficient funding to 
        support foreign assistance programs and consider 
        boosting funding for programs outside of China that 
        focus on rights advocacy, capacity building, and 
        leadership training for Chinese lawyers and human 
        rights advocates, including those who work with the 
        LGBTQ community in China.
          Continue to arrange events at the UN Human Rights 
        Council in Geneva and at UN Headquarters in New York on 
        a variety of human rights violations, including 
        violations of LGBTQ rights.

Civil Society

Civil Society

                             Civil Society

                              Introduction

    PRC authorities have sought to deploy domestic civil 
society organizations to bolster community-level capacity and 
provide social welfare services for Chinese citizens where 
government reach is limited. The release in October 2021 of a 
five-year policy plan on the development of ``social 
organizations''--the government's term for civil society 
organizations--illustrates the PRC's intent to better resource 
approved social organizations,\1\ while ensuring that these 
groups follow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and 
adhere to government regulations and supervision.\2\ 
Additionally, authorities have exerted pressure on tech and e-
commerce entrepreneurs to make large charitable contributions 
to support state-run development priorities.\3\ In contrast to 
the official plan to expand civil society capacity to support 
Party and state-designated needs, authorities have shown little 
tolerance for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
advocates that prioritize rights protection, political 
participation, and expression. The new five-year plan builds on 
previous official crackdowns and state-led campaigns, 
constituting ``a grim blueprint for the [non-profit] sector's 
development over the next five years,'' according to an expert 
on Chinese civil society.\4\ Moreover, the Chinese government 
has also spearheaded opposition to the participation of 
international civil society at the United Nations in a 
coordinated effort to undermine multilateral UN human rights 
mechanisms and promote a concept of human rights focused on 
development and poverty alleviation rather than civil and 
political rights.

             The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of
                          Social Organizations

    In an effort to channel civil society activity into areas 
that PRC officials have designated as beneficial, the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs (MCA) in October 2021 released the 14th Five-
Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations (FYP),\5\ 
the ``first of its kind'' for social organizations.\6\ In the 
past, five-year plans have been used by the government 
primarily for centralized economic planning.\7\ Among the FYP's 
key priorities are the following:

         Building capacity for social organizations. To 
        develop social organizations' ability to support local 
        governments by providing select community services,\8\ 
        the FYP directs civil affairs bureaus to resource local 
        ``community social organizations'' with funding, policy 
        tools, and human capital.\9\ It also instructs them to 
        help social organizations cultivate expertise in their 
        service areas by improving their management, digital, 
        and technical skills, and by developing more 
        competitive branding and marketing.\10\
         Comprehensively integrating Party-building 
        within social organizations. Party-building aims to 
        increase the number of Party members and strengthen 
        Party presence within an organization, increasing the 
        likelihood that decisionmaking is influenced by Party 
        priorities.\11\ The FYP specifies that political 
        criteria should be included in official evaluations of 
        social organizations' performance,\12\ further 
        codifying a trend toward centralizing the Party's role 
        in social organizations by linking access to government 
        contracts with Party-building.\13\
         Bolstering administrative, legal, and 
        enforcement mechanisms for the social organization 
        sector. The FYP seeks to ``raise the threshold for 
        entry'' for social organizations by more closely 
        supervising and standardizing the registration 
        processes by which organizations are approved for legal 
        status.\14\ It also strengthens law enforcement within 
        the social organization sector by ``streamlining 
        channels for reporting'' on social organizations; 
        monitoring the sector for ``illegal social 
        organizations''; promoting a system for investigating 
        and punishing reported illegal activity by social 
        organizations; and ``raising the cost'' of such 
        violations.\15\
         Conducting robust supervision of social 
        organizations. Along with the MCA, the FYP tasks 
        Professional Supervisory Units (government agencies or 
        departments that serve as sponsors for some social 
        organizations \16\), Party groups within organizations, 
        law enforcement agencies, and others with monitoring 
        and guiding social organizations' political, 
        administrative, disciplinary, social, and financial 
        activities.\17\
         Guiding social organizations to serve PRC 
        development goals. The FYP directs the work of social 
        organizations toward national strategic initiatives, 
        such as rural revitalization and addressing challenges 
        associated with China's aging population; regional 
        development projects, such as those centered on the 
        Yangtze and Yellow River deltas; and international 
        initiatives, including promoting China's involvement in 
        global governance.\18\

    The FYP and other regulatory and policy documents issued 
since at least 2016 stress the ``healthy'' development of the 
social organization sector, including the need to make a 
distinction between national and community organizations.\19\ 
For example, the FYP reiterates the provision in the revised 
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations that ``strictly control[s]'' the use of 
``China,'' ``Chinese,'' ``world,'' or ``international'' in 
organization names.\20\ Local ``community social 
organizations'' are directed to participate with ``social 
workers'' and ``volunteers'' ``in community governance, offer 
social services, . . . [to] resolve community contradictions, 
and promote community harmony.'' \21\ Some civil society 
experts have characterized the Chinese government's close 
oversight of civil society groups coupled with efforts to 
direct such groups to serve state objectives as ``corporatist'' 
rather than as constituting independent civil society.\22\
    In a speech delivered at the 2022 nationwide teleconference 
on social organization registration and management work, MCA 
Vice Minister Zhan Chengfu provided an authoritative 
interpretation of the FYP and its implications for social 
organization management in 2022, and highlighted areas where 
social organization activity would be welcome.\23\ Zhan said 
that social organization work should focus on sectors such as 
employment, social service and welfare provision, rural 
revitalization, Tibet, ``Xinjiang Aid'' (an initiative directed 
by the central government that has been associated with forced 
labor \24\), care for the elderly and disabled, and early 
childhood education, most of these pertaining to either 
existing government campaigns or priority areas.\25\ In 
addition to identifying preferred sectors, Zhan reiterated the 
importance of Party-building, localization, and supervision of 
social organizations, stating that MCA social organization 
management should ``weave a tight web for social organization 
supervision.'' \26\ The FYP and Zhan's interpretation reflect 
what one expert described as an ``official preference for more 
direct control over the activities of civil society 
organizations in China.'' \27\

                     Foreign NGO Activity in China

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, the government 
continued to constrain foreign non-governmental organization 
(NGO) activity in China by imposing requirements under the PRC 
Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental 
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China (Foreign NGO Law), 
which is supervised by the Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS).\28\ International experts have reported that foreign 
NGOs have experienced difficulty registering, maintaining 
registration, and operating freely under the law.\29\ According 
to a 2022 Freedom House report, ``the number of foreign NGOs 
that choose to deregister rather than attempt to comply with 
the law has increased each year'' since the law's 2017 
implementation.\30\ One international advocacy organization 
noted that suppression of foreign NGO activity continued to 
reflect China's fraught relationship with the international 
community.\31\
    The PRC has maintained space--however limited--for some 
foreign NGO activity. ChinaFile's China NGO Project has 
documented the Chinese government's tolerance for foreign NGO 
activity in preferred sectors, mirroring its approach to civil 
society more broadly.\32\ Trade and industry, education, 
health, and poverty alleviation are among the sectors with the 
highest number of registered foreign NGOs, while the government 
has limited registration in more sensitive sectors including 
LGBTQ rights, religion and ethnic affairs, human rights 
advocacy, and media groups.\33\ While ChinaFile data showed 
that foreign NGO-supported projects in the education sector 
continued to receive approval, the space for universities and 
research institutions to work with foreign NGOs has been 
severely curtailed despite a ``carve-out'' in the law to 
protect scholarly exchange.\34\
    NGOs working in sectors with less operational latitude in 
mainland China have traditionally maintained a base in Hong 
Kong, but the enactment of the 2020 National Security Law (NSL) 
led many NGOs to depart.\35\ On October 25, 2021, Amnesty 
International announced that it would be closing its local and 
regional offices in Hong Kong, saying that the NSL made it 
``effectively impossible'' for human rights organizations to 
work ``freely and without fear of serious reprisals.'' \36\ 
Amnesty based its China-focused efforts out of its office in 
Hong Kong--a common practice for international human rights 
NGOs--and the move will leave the organization ``without a 
presence on Chinese soil'' for the first time in 40 years.\37\ 
Party-run media outlet Global Times called Amnesty's departure 
a ``fresh beginning,'' citing anonymous ``experts'' who 
observed that under the NSL ``there is no room for such NGOs 
with the intention of subverting power through Western 
values.'' \38\ [For more information on the suppression of 
civil society in Hong Kong, see Section XI--Hong Kong and 
Macau.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Stifling Civil Society at the United Nations
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Chinese government has continued to exert pressure on civil
 society organizations and deter civil society advocacy at the United
 Nations, where it has sought to shift discourse around human rights to
 focus on development rather than on civil or political rights.\39\ PRC
 country representatives have blocked civil society groups from being
 granted consultative status.\40\ According to one expert, these
 coordinated efforts to bar groups from participating in UN mechanisms
 are aimed at both asserting China's claims of territorial sovereignty
 and also at stifling contributions from groups engaged in human rights
 and advocacy work.\41\ PRC diplomats have effectively stalled the
 applications of civil society groups for consultative status, at times
 reportedly by ``comb[ing] through NGO materials for references to
 Taiwan and Tibet, and activities that [the Chinese government] may find
 objectionable.'' \42\ One study found that ``964 NGOs with applications
 . . . were deferred at least once . . . and in 25 percent of those
 instances, a question from the PRC caused the deferral.'' \43\
 Moreover, the PRC, through its role on the UN Economic and Social
 Council, has worked to facilitate the involvement of China's own
 government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs).\44\ As of
 July 2021, of the 75 ``accredited NGOs from mainland China, Hong Kong
 and Macau operating in UN spaces,'' at least 34 were GONGOs.\45\
 Several observers have expressed concerns that such activity represents
 a coordinated effort to undermine UN mechanisms intended to protect and
 uphold international human rights.\46\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Government Suppression of Civil Society

    This past year, the PRC continued to suppress human rights 
advocacy, civil society activity, and unregistered churches and 
organizations--through arbitrary detention, arrest, 
surveillance, and other means. Such actions violated 
international standards on freedom of speech, association, and 
assembly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
contravened China's Constitution, which provides for freedom of 
speech, assembly, association, and demonstration.\47\ Official 
suppression included the following representative examples:

         China Citizens Movement advocates. Authorities 
        continued to attack the civic participation and 
        advocacy network China Citizens Movement (CCM, formerly 
        the New Citizens' Movement \48\), promoted by rights 
        defenders Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi.\49\ The CCM, which 
        ``attempted to popularize a new form of civic 
        engagement,'' was loosely constituted in order to 
        bypass official repression and held open gatherings 
        focused on cultivating participants' identity as 
        citizens.\50\ On August 5, 2021, authorities in Linyi 
        municipality, Shandong province, indicted Xu and Ding 
        on the charge of ``subversion of state power,'' 
        specifically citing their work for CCM, which included 
        holding a CCM-organized gathering in Fujian province in 
        December 2019.\51\ Authorities also detained lawyer 
        Chang Weiping in connection with the 2019 event, 
        charging him with ``subversion of state power.'' \52\ 
        In June 2022, the Linshu County People's Court in Linyi 
        reportedly tried Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi in secret, 
        barring family members from attending and preventing 
        their lawyers from speaking under threat of 
        disbarment.\53\ As of June 2022, no verdicts had been 
        announced.\54\ In February 2022, the Linyi People's 
        Procuratorate indicted Xu's fiancee, Li Qiaochu, a 
        feminist and labor rights advocate, with ``inciting 
        subversion of state power'' for her advocacy on behalf 
        of Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi.\55\
         Guangzhou-based labor and women's rights 
        advocates. On September 19, 2021, Guangzhou 
        municipality, Guangdong province authorities took 
        journalist and gender rights advocate Sophia Huang 
        Xueqin and labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing into 
        custody.\56\ Authorities placed Huang and Wang under 
        ``residential surveillance at a designated location,'' 
        a form of incommunicado detention that can last up to 
        six months, restricts access to counsel, and places 
        detainees at risk of abuse by authorities.\57\ 
        Officials charged Huang and Wang with ``inciting 
        subversion of state power,'' presumably for private 
        gatherings held at Wang's residence.\58\
         Protestant Christian church pastors and 
        elders. During this reporting year, Chinese authorities 
        used ``fraud'' charges to hold, charge, or sentence 
        multiple leaders of unregistered Protestant Christian 
        churches, effectively criminalizing churches' offering-
        based funding structures.\59\ Prominent leaders charged 
        include church elder Zhang Chunlei, whom authorities 
        continued to detain on suspicion of ``inciting 
        subversion of state power'' after initially arresting 
        Zhang for ``fraud''; \60\ pastor Hao Zhiwei, whom 
        authorities sentenced to eight years in prison for 
        ``fraud'' in February 2022; \61\ and pastors Yang 
        Rongli and Wang Xiaoguang, who were indicted on 
        ``fraud'' charges in December 2021.\62\ [For more 
        information on violations of Protestant leaders' 
        religious freedom, see Section III--Freedom of 
        Religion.]
         Digital censorship. Chinese authorities 
        engaged in repression of online organizing during this 
        reporting year. Multiple online platforms for civil 
        society organizing and expression were shut down, 
        directly or indirectly, as a result of official 
        pressure.\63\ These included a women's labor 
        website,\64\ likely in connection with a wave of 
        shutdowns of feminist social media accounts by Weibo 
        earlier in 2021 for alleged content violations,\65\ and 
        a number of LGBTQ social media accounts, also for 
        alleged content violations.\66\ In addition, official 
        media targeted the Great Translation Movement, a 
        decentralized international network that has worked to 
        expose misinformation about the war in Ukraine, which 
        Chinese officials have allowed to proliferate on the 
        internet.\67\ Party-run media outlet Global Times 
        published articles in March and April 2022 that 
        condemned the group, characterizing participants as 
        ``those unfriendly or even hostile toward China with 
        the simple purpose of creating more waves of anti-China 
        sentiment'' and accused it of attacking the Chinese 
        government and conducting ``public opinion and 
        psychological warfare.'' \68\

                   Philanthropy and Charitable Giving

    PRC authorities have urged wealthy Chinese, especially 
technology and e-commerce entrepreneurs, to increase charitable 
giving as part of Xi Jinping's ``common prosperity'' program 
targeting economic inequality.\69\ In August 2021, Xi gave a 
speech at a meeting of the Party's Central Financial and 
Economic Affairs Commission where he stated that high income 
groups and businesses should be encouraged to contribute more 
to society.\70\ Several of China's most prominent executives 
publicly pledged to make significant contributions to 
charitable foundations (jijinhui, one of three types of 
``social organization'' regulated by the government) and 
private trusts, or directly to causes associated with 
government priorities, with some donations announced in the 
days and weeks following Xi's speech.\71\ According to one 
observer, these donations corresponded with an ongoing 
crackdown on the technology and e-commerce sectors.\72\ 
Moreover, one reporter observed that wealthy individuals could 
use donations as a ``grand public gesture to signal that their 
priorities are aligned with the ruling party's'' in an attempt 
to avoid being targeted by authorities.\73\ Experts commented 
that corporations and individuals largely directed funds toward 
state-linked initiatives and government-organized non-
governmental organizations (GONGOs), thus bypassing grassroots 
NGOs and undercutting civil society and independent 
organizations.\74\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Status of LGBTQ Persons
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Chinese government authorities continued to censor and suppress
 efforts by rights defenders and advocacy groups in the lesbian, gay,
 bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) community.\75\ Estimates
 indicate that China is home to the world's largest LGBTQ population,
 with around 70 million people identifying as belonging to the LGBTQ
 community.\76\ Members of the LGBTQ community continue to face legal
 and societal discrimination and lack formal protection against
 discrimination under Chinese law.\77\ In advance of the UN Committee on
 the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee)
 review, which China was initially scheduled for in October 2022, one
 LGBTQ organization pointed out the PRC government's obligations to
 provide comprehensive anti-discrimination protections under Article 2,
 Recommendation 28.\78\ China has not enacted anti-discrimination
 legislation to protect the rights of sexual and gender minorities
 despite having agreed to the UN Human Rights Council Working Group's
 recommendation that China adopt legislation within one year of their
 2018 Universal Periodic Review.\79\
  Although societal attitudes in China toward some LGBTQ issues are
 trending toward more acceptance, reporting indicates a decline in
 government and institutional support of LGBTQ organizations and
 rights.\80\ Those in the LGBTQ community continued to face widespread
 discrimination,\81\ inadequate legal protections,\82\ and
 harassment.\83\ Advocates for the LGBTQ community continued to bring
 challenges through the legal system to effect change for LGBTQ persons
 in China.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Status of LGBTQ Persons--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Stigmatization and Declining Acceptance
 
  LGBTQ-identifying people continued to face discrimination and violence
 \85\ in their families, schools, employment, health care institutions,
 and public settings.\86\ In a November 2021 Williams Institute report,
 scholar Andrew Flores concluded that China's acceptance of LGBTQ people
 and rights ``appears lower in 2020 than in 1990,'' \87\ echoing similar
 sentiments from LGBTQ advocates.\88\ Commentary from officials and
 state-sponsored media outlets continued to promote stereotyping and
 stigmatization of those in the community.\89\ In response to a
 journalist inquiring about LGBTQ representation on China's 2022 Beijing
 Winter Olympic team, the head of the 2022 Beijing Athletes' Commission
 reportedly said that they ``welcome the representation of different
 groups of people.'' \90\ The continued crackdown on the LGBTQ
 community, however, raised concerns about the promotion of inclusivity
 and diversity promised at the Olympic Games.\91\ Some observers noted
 that athletes cited pressure from statements by Chinese officials,
 International Olympic Committee officials and coaches as reasons for
 not making public statements on sensitive issues like LGBTQ
 representation.\92\
  On September 2, 2021, China's National Radio and Television
 Administration announced a ban on the broadcast of ``sissy men'' as
 part of a broader campaign of the government's tightening of the
 entertainment and technology sectors and emphasis on traditional gender
 roles.\93\ Additionally, Chinese regulatory authorities continued to
 censor LGBTQ-Prelated content in popular media,\94\ including the
 American sitcom ``Friends,'' where viewers had discovered LGBTQ
 references were removed from major story lines.\95\ Some experts have
 noted that recent calls for the ``de-feminization'' \96\ of male
 adolescents and government crackdowns in the technology and media
 sectors have had an adverse effect on marginalized communities such as
 the LGBTQ.\97\
  Regulatory activity by Chinese authorities indicate direct disapproval
 of those in the LGBTQ community.\98\ The South China Morning Post
 reported in September 2021 that the state-backed National Press and
 Publication Administration issued new internal guidelines on video game
 content, which may make obtaining official approval more difficult for
 video games containing content that includes same-sex relationships,
 characters of ambiguous gender, and ``effeminate males.'' \99\ [For
 more information, see Section III--Freedom of Expression.]
 
                   Suppression of the LGBTQ Community
 
  This past year, the space for LGBTQ people and groups to gather online
 and in person continued to deteriorate.\100\
 
   In July 2021, social media platform WeChat deleted more than
   a dozen accounts run by university students and others with LGBTQ-
   related content.\101\ Many accounts reported being ``[in] violation''
   of internet regulations and saw prior posts and usernames deleted
   from the platform.\102\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Status of LGBTQ Persons--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   In August 2021, students at Shanghai University reported that
   school officials were circulating a survey to identify LGBTQ and any
   ``non-heterosexual'' persons.\103\ The survey reportedly included
   demands for information on students' ``ideological positions'' and
   ``psychological conditions.'' \104\ It was unclear how the
   information would be used.\105\
   According to an August 2021 report, as early as March 2021,
   users of the Chinese social media platform QQ began reporting
   censorship of LGBTQ-related terms such as ``gay,'' ``lesbian,'' and
   ``LGBTQ,'' with some receiving a content warning indicating that
   their search was ``harmful.'' \106\ After the publication of the
   story, QQ reportedly resumed allowing LGBTQ-related usernames but
   continued to censor and show no results for group chats that use
   LGBTQ-related terms.\107\
   In February 2022, OutRight Action International, an LGBTQ
   rights advocacy NGO, described the ongoing and coordinated effort to
   target LGBTQ organizations and people by official Chinese entities as
   ``unprecedented.'' \108\ Since 2016, Chinese authorities have been
   issuing restrictions on the depiction of LGBTQ-related content in
   television, film, and online, and have canceled LGBTQ-themed events
   and purged LGBTQ content online.\109\
 
  In response to persistent censorship \110\ and the difficulty of
 operating in conformity with official government regulations,\111\
 LGBTQ advocacy groups have become increasingly inactive.\112\ Some
 organizations in the community reportedly have decided to rebrand and
 refocus their efforts in order to remain operational.\113\
  In November 2021, Guangzhou-based LGBTQ legal advocacy organization
 LGBT Rights Advocacy China declared that it would be suspending all
 activities indefinitely, providing further evidence of the shrinking
 space for LGBTQ advocacy.\114\ While the organization did not
 specifically cite reasons behind its sudden closure, the group changed
 its name at least once in the hope that its work would be less of a
 target for Chinese authorities amid the crackdown on non-governmental
 groups.\115\ The influential advocacy group had been responsible for a
 number of high-profile legal challenges aimed at acquiring greater
 rights for the LGBTQ community.\116\
 
            Developments Impacting the Transgender Community
 
  In April 2022, Chinese authorities signaled a change in the treatment
 of transgender people when the National Health Commission updated
 transgender diagnosis language and requirements for gender reassignment
 surgery (GRS).\117\ Among the changes were the addition of ``gender
 dysphoria'' (xingbie jiaolu) and ``gender incongruence'' (xingbie
 buyizhi) as diagnostic labels, in keeping with international diagnosis
 standards.\118\ The National Health Commission also lowered the age for
 gender reassignment surgery from 20 to 18 and removed a requirement
 that individuals obtain two irreversible surgeries before changing
 identity documents.\119\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Status of LGBTQ Persons--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In November 2021, the National Children's Medical Center and
 Children's Hospital of Fudan University in Shanghai municipality opened
 China's first child and youth transgender clinic.\120\ The
 multidisciplinary outpatient clinic reportedly aims to combine
 ``professional assessment, diagnosis, psychotherapy and necessary drug
 intervention by multidisciplinary doctors'' in order to improve
 children and youths' family relations, academic performance, and
 broader societal interactions.\121\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Civil Society

Civil Society

    Notes to Section III--Civil Society

    \1\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(6-8).
    \2\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(1, 3-5, 8).
    \3\ ``Xi Jinping zhuchi zhaokai zhongyang caijing weiyuanhui dishi 
ci huiyi qiangdiao zai gaozhiliang fazhan zhong cujin gongtong fuyu 
tongchou zuo hao zhongda jinrong fengxian fangfan huajie gongzuo Li 
Keqiang Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Han Zheng chuxi'' [Presiding over the 
convocation of the tenth meeting of the Central Financial and Economic 
Affairs Commission, Xi Jinping emphasized promoting common prosperity 
amid high-quality development, forestalling major financial risks; Li 
Keqiang, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, and Han Zheng participated] Xinhua, 
August 17, 2021; Tom Mitchell and Sun Yu, ``China's Xi Calls for Wealth 
Redistribution and Clampdown on High Incomes,'' Financial Times, August 
18, 2021; Yvonne Lau, ``China's Big Tech Billionaires Up Philanthropic 
Giving as Beijing Cracks Down,'' Fortune, August 6, 2021; Edward White, 
Tom Mitchell, Sun Yu et al., ``Jack Ma and the Chinese Tech Titans' 
Mission to Give Away Billions,'' Financial Times, August 29, 2021.
    \4\ Shawn Shieh, ``The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations 
and the Future of Civil Society in China,'' NGOs in China (blog), 
January 4, 2022.
    \5\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021.
    \6\ Shawn Shieh, ``The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations 
and the Future of Civil Society in China,'' NGOs in China (blog), 
January 4, 2022.
    \7\ ``What Is China's Five-Year Plan?,'' Economist, March 4, 2021; 
Qun Wang, ``14th Five-Year Plan for Social Organization Development: 
China's Nonprofit Sector in Transition,'' Nonprofit Policy Forum, June 
13, 2022, 1-2.
    \8\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(7).
    \9\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(8).
    \10\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(6).
    \11\ Holly Snape and Weinan Wang, ``Finding a Place for the Party: 
Debunking the `Party-State' and Rethinking the State-Society 
Relationship in China's One-Party System,'' Journal of Chinese 
Governance 5, no. 4 (2019): 477-502.
    \12\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(1).
    \13\ Ge Xin and Jie Huang, ``Party Building in an Unlikely Place,'' 
Journal of Contemporary China 31, no. 135 (2022): 13. In one study, 
researchers found that by giving more weight to Party-building in the 
government's evaluative criteria for rating organizations, social 
organizations were incentivized to develop and cultivate Party groups 
within their organizations in order to secure a favorable rating from 
local authorities. Organizations with higher ratings were more likely 
to secure government-funded contracts.
    \14\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(3).
    \15\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(4).
    \16\ International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, China 
Philanthropy Law Report, updated May 2021, 18-20.
    \17\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(4-5). See also Shawn 
Shieh, ``The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations and the 
Future of Civil Society in China,'' NGOs in China (blog), January 4, 
2022.
    \18\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 3(8).
    \19\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Gaige Shehui Zuzhi Guanli Zhidu 
Shehui Zuzhi Jiankang Youxu Fazhan de Yijian [Opinion on the Reform of 
the Social Organization Management System and Promotion of the Healthy 
and Well-Ordered Development of Social Organizations], issued August 
21, 2016, sec. 5(3). In 2021 the MCA issued the ``Circular on 
Eliminating the Breeding Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and 
Cleansing the Ecological Space for Social Organizations,'' which 
specifically targeted organizations' use of language denoting national 
scope. For prior coverage, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 
231.
    \20\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli 
[Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations], issued October 25, 1998, revised February 6, 2016, art. 
10; Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], October 8, 2021, sec. 3(3). Organization names using 
``China'' or ``nation'' are generally reserved for Party-run ``mass 
organizations,'' which use the prefix ``All-China,'' such as the All-
China Women's Federation and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. 
Professional organizations like the All China Lawyers Association and 
the All China Writers Association are similarly permitted to use ``All 
China'' in their organizational names.
    \21\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], October 8, 2021, sec. 3(8).
    \22\ Sara Newland, ``Innovators and Implementers: The Multilevel 
Politics of Civil Society Governance in Rural China,'' China Quarterly 
233 (March 1, 2018): 26; Lawrence Deane, ``Will There Be a Civil 
Society in the Xi Jinping Era? Advocacy and Non-Profit Organising in 
the New Regime,'' Made in China Journal 6, no. 1 (January-March 2021): 
125. For a discussion of corporatism in the Chinese context, see 
Jennifer Hsu and Reza Hasmath, ``The Local Corporatist State and NGO 
Relations in China,'' Journal of Contemporary China 23 (2014): 517; 
Shawn Shieh, ``Remaking China's Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era,'' 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 2, 2018. Shieh does not use the term 
``corporatist,'' but describes a corporatist process wherein the state 
establishes regulatory mechanisms for the approval of civil society 
organizations, providing legal space for them to operate, but then 
requires them to further Party and government policy goals and refrain 
from activities deemed threatening, thus effectively coopting these 
organizations.
    \23\ China Social Organization News (@chinapogov), ``Zhan Chengfu 
zai 2022 nian Quanguo Shehui Zuzhi Dengji Guanli Gongzuo Dianshi 
Dianhua Huiyi shang fabiao jianghua: tigao zhanwei fuwu daju yi youyi 
chengji yingjie dang de ershi da shengli zhaokai'' [At the 2022 
Nationwide Teleconference on Social Organization Registration and 
Management Work, Zhan Chengfu delivered a speech: improve our position, 
serve the greater good, and welcome the successful convening of the 
20th Party Congress with outstanding achievements], WeChat post, 
January 29, 2022, 3:56 a.m.
    \24\ Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, et al., 
``Uyghurs for Sale: `Reeducation,' Forced Labour and Surveillance 
beyond Xinjiang,'' International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, March 1, 2020; Amy K. Lehr and Mariefaye 
Bechrakis, ``Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced 
Assimilation, and Supply Chains,'' Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, October 2019, 9-10, Annex 3; Adrian Zenz, 
``Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, 
Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,'' Journal of 
Political Risk 7, no. 12 (December 10, 2019).
    \25\ China Social Organization News (@chinapogov), ``Zhan Chengfu 
zai 2022 nian Quanguo Shehui Zuzhi Dengji Guanli Gongzuo Dianshi 
Dianhua Huiyi shang fabiao jianghua: tigao zhanwei fuwu daju yi youyi 
chengji yingjie dang de ershi da shengli zhaokai'' [At the 2022 
Nationwide Teleconference on Social Organization Registration and 
Management Work, Zhan Chengfu delivered a speech: improve our Position, 
serve the greater good, and welcome the successful convening of the 
20th Party Congress with outstanding achievements], WeChat post, 
January 29, 2022, 3:56 a.m.
    \26\ China Social Organization News (@chinapogov), ``Zhan Chengfu 
zai 2022 nian Quanguo Shehui Zuzhi Dengli Guanli Gongzuo Dianshi 
Dianhua Huiyi shang fabiao jianghua: tigao zhanwei fuwu daju yi youyi 
chengji yingjie dang de ershi da shengli zhaokai'' [At the 2022 
Nationwide Teleconference on Social Organization Registration and 
Management Work, Zhan Chengfu delivered a speech: improve our position, 
serve the greater good, and welcome the successful convening of the 
20th Party Congress with outstanding achievements], WeChat post, 
January 29, 2022, 3:56 a.m.
    \27\ ``Elizabeth Plantan on Opportunities and Constraints for Civil 
Society in China,'' Communique Magazine, Ash Center for Democratic 
Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, December 8, 2021.
    \28\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Feizhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei 
Huodong Guanli Fa [PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China], passed April 
28, 2016, effective January 1, 2017; Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, ``China: Newly Adopted Foreign NGO Law Should Be 
Repealed, UN Experts Urge,'' May 3, 2016.
    \29\ International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, China 
Philanthropy Law Report, updated May 2021, 18-20; Heike Holbig and 
Bertram Lang, ``China's Overseas NGO Law and the Future of 
International Civil Society,'' Journal of Contemporary Asia, September 
8, 2021, 15, 20; Mark Sidel and Ming Hu, ``Party, State, Civil Society 
and Covid-19 in China,'' Nonprofit Policy Forum 12, no. 1 (January 
2021): 207.
    \30\ Freedom House, ``China,'' in Freedom in the World 2022, 
February 2022. See also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 232.
    \31\ International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, ``Barriers to 
International Contact,'' Civic Freedom Monitor: China, updated May 16, 
2022, 18-20.
    \32\ ``Elizabeth Plantan on Opportunities and Constraints for Civil 
Society in China,'' Communique Magazine, Ash Center for Democratic 
Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, December 8, 2021; 
Diana Fu and Emile Dirks, ``Xi Jinping-Style Control and Civil Society 
Responses,'' China Leadership Monitor 69 (September 1, 2021); Berthold 
Kuhn, ``Changing Spaces for Civil Society Organisations in China,'' 
Open Journal of Political Science 8 (2018): 484; Jessica Batke, 
``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign NGO Representative Offices 
and Temporary Activities,'' China NGO Project, ChinaFile, Asia Society, 
May 31, 2022.
    \33\ Jessica Batke, ``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign 
NGO Representative Offices and Temporary Activities,'' China NGO 
Project, ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 31, 2022.
    \34\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Feizhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei 
Huodong Guanli Fa [PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China], passed April 
28, 2016, effective January 1, 2017, art. 53; Mark Sidel, 
``Securitizing Overseas Nonprofit Work in China,'' USALI Perspectives 
2, no. 6 (November 11, 2021), 1-3.
    \35\ Primrose Riordan and Ho-him Chan, ``Amnesty International to 
Leave Hong Kong amid Fears for Staff Safety,'' Financial Times, October 
25, 2021.
    \36\ Amnesty International, ``Amnesty International to Close Its 
Hong Kong Offices,'' October 25, 2021.
    \37\ Pak Yiu, ``Amnesty International to Shut Asia Headquarters in 
Hong Kong,'' Nikkei Asia, October 25, 2021; Amnesty International, 
``Amnesty International to Close Its Hong Kong Offices,'' October 25, 
2021; Primrose Riordan and Ho-him Chan, ``Amnesty International to 
Leave Hong Kong amid Fears for Staff Safety,'' Financial Times, October 
25, 2021; William Nee, ``Hong Kong's National Security Law Made Amnesty 
International's Departure All but Inevitable,'' ChinaFile, Asia 
Society, December 6, 2021.
    \38\ Chen Qingqing, Huang Lanlan, and Lin Xiaoyi, ``GT 
Investigates: Plenty of Space in Hong Kong for NGOs, but No Longer for 
Subversive Groups Like Amnesty International,'' Global Times, October 
27, 2021.
    \39\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``Can China Change the Definition of Human 
Rights?,'' The Diplomat, February 23, 2021.
    \40\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021).
    \41\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 124, 127. ``Rana Siu 
Inboden,'' Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 
University of Texas at Austin, accessed July 6, 2022.
    \42\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 127.
    \43\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 25.
    \44\ Andrea Worden, ``The CCP at the UN: Redefining Development and 
Rights,'' Sinopsis, AcaMedia z.u. and the Department of Sinology, 
Charles University in Prague, March 17, 2019; International Service for 
Human Rights, ``Briefing Note: China and the UN Economic and Social 
Council,'' July 2021, 14.
    \45\ International Service for Human Rights, ``Briefing Note: China 
and the UN Economic and Social Council,'' July 2021; Sui-Lee Wee and 
Stephanie Nebehay, ``At UN, China Uses Intimidation Tactics to Silence 
Rights Activists,'' Reuters, October 6, 2015.
    \46\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 133; Ted Piccone, ``China's 
Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations,'' Foreign Policy, 
September 2018, 8; Human Rights Watch, ``The Costs of International 
Advocacy: China's Interference in United Nations Human Rights 
Mechanisms,'' September 5, 2017.
    \47\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
arts. 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 19, 21, 22. 
China has signed, and stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR. See also 
PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 
11, 2018), art. 35.
    \48\ Caroline Ding, ``Op-Ed: China Must Release Ding Jiaxi, Civil 
Rights Activist and My Father,'' Tufts Daily, July 27, 2020. Ding noted 
that the organization changed its name to China Citizens Movement.
    \49\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Authorities May Put 
Prominent Activists Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi on Trial around End-of-
Year Holidays, PEN America and China Human Rights Defenders Warn,'' 
December 20, 2021.
    \50\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Zero Tolerance for Human 
Rights Defenders in the Year of ``Zero COVID'': Annual Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2021), March 7, 2022; Eva 
Pils, ``From Independent Lawyer Groups to Civic Opposition: The Case of 
China's New Citizen Movement,'' Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 19 
(2017): 132-36.
    \51\ ``Citizens Movement Advocates Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi 
Indicted for Subversion on Scant, Slanderous `Evidence,' '' China 
Change, September 25, 2021; Rhoda Kwan and Vincent Ni, `` `This is Not 
Justice': Chinese Activists Held for Two Years Await Trial,'' Guardian, 
February 1, 2022. For more information, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database records 2005-00199 on Xu Zhiyong and 2013-00307 on 
Ding Jiaxi.
    \52\ Chen Zijuan, ``An Update on the Case of Human Rights Lawyer 
Chang Weiping,'' China Change, September 19, 2021. For more information 
on Chang Weiping, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
record 2020-00014.
    \53\ Christian Shepherd, ``They Wanted Rule of Law, so China Tried 
Them in Secret,'' Washington Post, June 24, 2022; Mimi Lau and Guo Rui, 
``Chinese Rights Advocate Xu Zhiyong on Trial for State Subversion amid 
Secrecy and Tight Security,'' South China Morning Post, June 23, 2022.
    \54\ Mimi Lau and Guo Rui, ``Chinese Rights Advocate Xu Zhiyong on 
Trial for State Subversion amid Secrecy and Tight Security,'' South 
China Morning Post, June 23, 2022; Colum Murphy, ``Human Rights Lawyer 
Who Challenged China's Xi Has Secret Trial,'' Bloomberg, June 22, 2022.
    \55\ Rights Defense Network, ``Nuquan renshi Li Qiaochu bei yi 
shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui qisu'' [Feminist Li Qiaochu 
indicted for inciting subversion of state power], March 18, 2022; The 
Beijing Olympics and the Faces of Repression, Hearing of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2022) 
(testimony of Sophie Luo, wife of detained lawyer Ding Jiaxi). In her 
testimony, Sophie Luo referred to Li Qiaochu as Xu's ``fiancee.'' For 
more information on Li Qiaochu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database Record 2020-00129.
    \56\ Alice Su, ``They Helped Chinese Women, Workers, the Forgotten 
and Dying. Then They Disappeared,'' Los Angeles Times, December 1, 
2021; Yuan Yang (@YuanfenYang), ``Journalist Sophia (Xueqin) Huang was 
leaving China on her way . . .,'' Twitter, November 5, 2021, 11:04 a.m; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Duli gongyi ren Wang Jianbing, nuquan jizhe 
Huang Xueqin jiashu shoudao daibu tongzhishu'' [Families of independent 
public interest advocate Wang Jianbing and women's rights journalist 
Huang Xueqin received notice of formal arrest], November 5, 2021. For 
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
records 2019-00454 on Sophia Huang Xueqin and 2021-00517 on Wang 
Jianbing.
    \57\ Alice Su, ``They Helped Chinese Women, Workers, the Forgotten 
and Dying. Then They Disappeared,'' Los Angeles Times, December 1, 
2021; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release 
#MeToo Activist and Fellow Civil Society Advocate,'' September 21, 
2021; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, arts. 39, 75, 79. For more on RSDL, see, e.g., Letter from the 
Mandates of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the independence of 
judges and lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; the 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and the Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment to the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission 
of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at 
Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, OL CHN 15/
2018, August 24, 2018; Safeguard Defenders, ``The Use of Solitary 
Confinement in RSDL as a Method of Torture,'' April 11, 2019; Michael 
Caster, ``China Thinks It Can Arbitrarily Detain Anyone. It Is Time for 
Change,'' Guardian, January 3, 2019. See also Benedict Rogers, 
``China's `Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location'--a 
Licence to Disappear, Hold and Torture Dissenters,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, February 4, 2018.
    \58\ Rights Defense Network, ``Duli gongyi ren Wang Jianbing, 
nuquan jizhe Huang Xueqin jiashu shoudao daibu tongzhishu'' [Family of 
independent public interest advocate Wang Jianbing and women's rights 
journalist Huang Xueqin received notice of formal arrest], November 5, 
2021; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release 
#MeToo Activist and Fellow Civil Society Advocate,'' September 21, 
2021.
    \59\ ChinaAid Association, ChinaAid's Annual Persecution Report 
2021: January-December 2021, March 1, 2022, 41. In a blog post, an 
Early Rain Covenant Church leader wrote that the use of fraud and other 
economic charges is intended to target unregistered churches by 
depriving them of resources. Li Yingqiang, ``Wo dui yi `zhapian zui' 
lai dingzui jiating jiaohui fengxian he chuandaoren de san dian 
yijian'' [My three opinions on the use of ``fraud'' to convict house 
church offerings and pastors], Li Yingqiang (blog), November 18, 2021.
    \60\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Shi ge bannian, lushi cai 
jiandao yuzhong de Guiyang Ren'ai Guizheng Jiaohui zhanglao Zhang 
Chunlei'' [Only after half a year did imprisoned Guiyang Ren'ai 
Reformed Church elder Zhang Chunlei meet with his lawyer], January 7, 
2022. For more information on Zhang Chunlei, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database Record 2022-00041.
    \61\ ``Daya zongjiao huayang fanxin Hubei jiating jiaohui mushi bei 
pan ba nian'' [Crackdown on religion revamps strategy: Hubei house 
church pastor sentenced to eight years], Radio Free Asia, February 14, 
2022. For more information on Hao Zhiwei, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database Record 2020-00257.
    \62\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao daibu de Shanxi sheng Linfen shi 
Fushan xian Jindengtang Jiating Jiaohui zhuyao fuzeren Wang Xiaoguang 
mushi de anqing ji jianli'' [Case details and biographical information 
on arrested pastor and main responsible person Wang Xiaoguang of Golden 
Lampstand House Church, in Fushan county, Linfen municipality, Shanxi 
province], January 14, 2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Shanxi 
`Linfen jiao'an' zaiqi: Jindengtai Jiaohui zhong lingxiu zaici bei bu, 
mianlin xingshi zhikong'' [Shanxi ``Linfen Case'' Returns: Golden 
Lampstand Church leaders arrested again, facing criminal charges], 
January 11, 2022. For more information, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database records 2009-00408 on Wang Xiaoguang and 2009-00428 
on Yang Rongli.
    \63\ ``Farewell Letters: A Tribute to the Civil Society Groups, 
Bloggers, and Media Outlets We Lost in 2021,'' China Digital Times, 
January 10, 2022.
    \64\ ``Jianjiao Buluo: zhuanshu Zhongguo nugong de zixun pingtai 
jiri qi yongjiu guanbi'' [Pepper Tribe: Online platform for Chinese 
female workers permanently shut down], China Digital Times, August 9, 
2021.
    \65\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 153.
    \66\ FreeChineseFeminists (@FeministChina), ``The WeChat public 
accounts of more than a dozen Chinese college associations and two NGOs 
concerned with equality of sexual orientation were censored at the . . 
.,'' Twitter, July 6, 2021, 2:50 p.m.; ``China Divided as WeChat 
Deletes LGBT Accounts from Platform,'' BBC, July 8, 2021; Jing Xuan 
Teng and Laurie Chen, ``LGBTQ Rights Groups Blocked on China's Biggest 
Social Media App,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 
July 7, 2021; Greg James, ``China's Leading LGBTQ Advocacy Group 
Deletes Social Media Accounts, Appears to Be in Jeopardy,'' SupChina, 
November 4, 2021.
    \67\ Lorenzo Tondo and Vincent Ni, ``China's Pro-Russia Propaganda 
Exposed by Online Activists,'' Guardian, May 10, 2022.
    \68\ Wang Qiang, `` `Great Translation Movement' a Despicable Anti-
China Smear Campaign,'' Global Times, March 31, 2022; Huang Lanlan and 
Lin Xiaoyi, ``Twisted in Translation: Western Media, Social Groups Set 
up Language Barriers by Intentionally Misreading, Misinterpreting 
Chinese Materials,'' Global Times, April 14, 2022.
    \69\ Ryan Hass, ``Assessing China's `Common Prosperity' Campaign,'' 
Order from Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, September 9, 2021; 
``China's Xi Jinping Defends `Common Prosperity' Crackdowns,'' BBC, 
January 18, 2022.
    \70\ ``Xi Jinping zhuchi zhaokai zhongyang caijing weiyuanhui dishi 
ci huiyi qiangdiao zai gaozhiliang fazhan zhong cujin gongtong fuyu 
tongchou zuo hao zhongda jinrong fengxian fangfan huajie gongzuo, Li 
Keqiang Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Han Zheng chuxi'' [Presiding over the 
convocation of the tenth conference of the Central Financial and 
Economic Affairs Commission, Xi Jinping emphasized promoting common 
prosperity amid high-quality development, planning to effectively 
forestall and dispel major financial risks, Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Wang 
Huning, and Han Zheng participated], Xinhua, August 17, 2021; Tom 
Mitchell and Sun Yu, ``China's Xi Calls for Wealth Redistribution and 
Clampdown on High Incomes,'' Financial Times, August 18, 2021.
    \71\ Yvonne Lau, ``China's Big Tech Billionaires Increase 
Philanthropic Giving as Beijing Cracks Down,'' Fortune, August 6, 2021; 
Edward White et al., ``Jack Ma and the Chinese Tech Titans' Mission to 
Give Away Billions,'' Financial Times, August 28, 2021. For more on 
jijinhui as a category of ``social organization'' see, e.g., 
International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, ``China Philanthropy Law 
Report,'' May 2021, 10; Shawn Shieh, ``Same Bed, Different Dreams? The 
Divergent Pathways of Foundations and Grassroots NGOs in China,'' 
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations 28:4 (August 2017): 4-5.
    \72\ Yvonne Lau, ``China's Big Tech Billionaires Increase 
Philanthropic Giving as Beijing Cracks Down,'' Fortune, August 6, 2021.
    \73\ Yvonne Lau, ``China's Big Tech Billionaires Increase 
Philanthropic Giving as Beijing Cracks Down,'' Fortune, August 6, 2021; 
Edward White et al., ``Jack Ma and the Chinese Tech Titans' Mission to 
Give Away Billions,'' Financial Times, August 29, 2021.
    \74\ Yvonne Lau, ``China's Big Tech Billionaires Increase 
Philanthropic Giving as Beijing Cracks Down,'' Fortune, August 6, 2021; 
Edward White et al., ``Jack Ma and the Chinese Tech Titans' Mission to 
Give Away Billions,'' Financial Times, August 29, 2021.
    \75\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' April 12, 2022, 78; Human 
Rights Watch, ``China,'' in World Report 2022: Events of 2021, 2022; 
Hannah Qu, ``Yanzi: Fighting the Slow Battle of LGBTQ Rights in 
China,'' Yale Daily News, February 24, 2022; Ausma Bernot, ``China's 
Forced Invisibility of LGBTQ Communities on Social Media,'' Lowy 
Institute, July 9, 2021; Huizhong Wu, ``China LGBT Rights Group Shuts 
Down amid Hostile Environment,'' Associated Press, November 4, 2021. 
For background on past censorship and suppression of the LGBTQ 
community in China, see CECC, Annual Report 2020, December 2020, 259-
60.
    \76\ Robert Burton-Bradley, ``China's LGBT Community Caught Up in 
Xi Jinping's Widening Crackdowns on Big Tech, Education and 
Celebrities,'' South China Morning Post, October 7, 2021; National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Communique of the Seventh National 
Population Census (No. 2),'' accessed May 10, 2022.
    \77\ Zhao Chenxi, ``Chutai fan jiuye qishi fa baozhang laodongzhe 
pingdeng jiuye quan'' [Promulgation of anti-employment discrimination 
law to safeguard workers' equal employment rights], Legal Daily, May 
17, 2022; Human Rights Watch, ``China,'' in World Report 2022: Events 
of 2021, 2022; Ben Westcott and Steven Jiang, ``China's LGBTQ Community 
Is Fading from Rainbow to Gray,'' CNN, July 9, 2021. See also Chris 
Lau, ``The Wins and Woes of Hong Kong's Rainbow Families--Has City Made 
Progress on Policy and Law for LGBT Community?,'' South China Morning 
Post, October 29, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, ``Transgender Workers 
Still Struggle for Equal Employment Rights in China,'' June 29, 2021; 
Yuanyuan Wang et al., ``Discrimination against LGBT Populations in 
China,'' Lancet Public Health 4, no. 9 (September 1, 2019): e440.
    \78\ UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, ``General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of 
States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women,'' CEDAW/C/GC/28, December 
16, 2010, para. 18; China Queer Women Working Group, ``Information 
Submitted by the China Queer Women Working Group to the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, List of Issues Related 
to the Combined Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China 
Pre-Sessional Working Group Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' 
January 31, 2021, 5.
    \79\ Human Rights Watch, ``China,'' in World Report 2022: Events of 
2021, 2022; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6 26, December 2018, 10; UN 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review--China (Addendum), A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15, 2019, 
para. 2(28.90).
    \80\ Colum Murphy, ``Being Gay Gets Harder Under Xi Jinping, 
Bloomberg, February 17, 2022; Maryann Xue, ``Chinese Social Media 
Shutdown of LGBT Student Groups `Highlights Backlash against Western 
Influences,' '' South China Morning Post, July 11, 2021; Robert Burton-
Bradley, ``China's LGBT Community Caught Up in Xi Jinping's Widening 
Crackdowns on Big Tech, Education and Celebrities,'' South China 
Morning Post, October 7, 2021; Zeyi Yang, ``Tencent Dominates Digital 
Donations in China. That's the Problem.,'' Protocol, September 15, 
2021.
    \81\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' April 12, 2022, 78; Peng 
Yanhui, ``For China's Same-Sex Couples, Even Guardianship Is Often Out 
of Reach,'' Sixth Tone, June 30, 2022; Chanchan Wu, Edmond Pui Hang 
Choi, and Pui Hing Chau, ``The Holistic Health Status of Chinese 
Homosexual and Bisexual Adults: A Scoping Review,'' Frontiers in Public 
Health 9 (August 24, 2021): 2; Jian Shi et al., ``Speech after Long 
Silence--An Appraisee-Based Comprehensive Analysis with Retrospective 
and Future Perspectives on Current ID Policy of Transpersons in 
China,'' Frontiers in Public Health 9 (November 30, 2021): 2. See also 
China LBT Rights Initiative, ``Information Submitted by the China LBT 
Rights Initiative to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, List of Issues related to the Combined Ninth Periodic 
Report of the People's Republic of China Pre-Sessional Working Group 
Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' January 31, 2021, 1, 3; 
China Queer Women Working Group, ``Information Submitted by the China 
Queer Women Working Group to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, List of Issues Related to the Combined 
Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China Pre-Sessional 
Working Group Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' January 31, 
2021, 5-6.
    \82\ Zhao Chenxi, ``Chutai fan jiuye qishi fa baozhang laodongzhe 
pingdeng jiuye quan'' [Promulgate an anti-employment discrimination law 
to safeguard workers' equal employment rights], Legal Daily, May 17, 
2022. See also China Queer Women Working Group, ``Information Submitted 
by the China Queer Women Working Group to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, List of Issues Related to 
the Combined Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China 
Pre-Sessional Working Group Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' 
January 31, 2021, 5.
    \83\ Jiang Yalin, ``China's `Anti-Sissy' Campaign Unleashes a Wave 
of Online Transphobia,'' Sixth Tone, February 24, 2022; Waiyee Yip, 
``China: The Death of a Man Bullied for Being `Effeminate,' '' BBC, 
December 15, 2021.
    \84\ Hannah Qu, ``Yanzi: Fighting the Slow Battle of LGBTQ Rights 
in China,'' Yale Daily News, February 24, 2022; `` `Living in the UK 
Made Me Realize That the Chinese-Speaking Queer Diaspora Lacked 
Sufficient Support and Visibility': Qiuyan Chen from Queer China UK on 
Creating Belonging,'' Queer China UK, December 25, 2021; ``Red Vs Are 
After China's Queer Community,'' Protocol, July 13, 2021. See also 
Timmy Shen, ``China's Transgender Community Welcomes Court Ruling on 
Employment Discrimination,'' Caixin, July 6, 2020.
    \85\ Chen Tao, ``A Transgender Woman Was Killed in Wuhan. The CCP's 
Reaction: Hiding the Facts,'' Bitter Winter, March 21, 2022. See also 
China Queer Women Working Group, ``Information Submitted by the China 
Queer Women Working Group to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, List of Issues Related to the Combined 
Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China Pre-Sessional 
Working Group Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' January 31, 
2021, 2-3.
    \86\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' April 12, 2022, 78; Kate 
Strong, ``Why Gay Men and Lesbian Women in China Are Marrying Each 
Other,'' Columbia Political Review (blog), June 3, 2022; Jian Shi et 
al., ``Speech after Long Silence--An Appraisee-Based Comprehensive 
Analysis with Retrospective and Future Perspectives on Current ID 
Policy of Transpersons in China,'' Frontiers in Public Health 9 
(November 30, 2021): 2; ``China Divided as WeChat Deletes LGBT Accounts 
from Platform,'' BBC, July 8, 2021; Robert Burton-Bradley, ``China's 
LGBT Community Caught Up in Xi Jinping's Widening Crackdowns on Big 
Tech, Education and Celebrities,'' South China Morning Post, October 7, 
2021. For background information on the issues that the LGBTQ community 
continues to face, see CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 259-60; 
Human Rights Watch, `` `Have You Considered Your Parents' Happiness?': 
Conversion Therapy against LGBT People in China,'' November 15, 2017.
    \87\ Andrew R. Flores, ``Social Acceptance of LGBTI People in 175 
Countries and Locations: 1981-2020,'' Williams Institute, University of 
California Los Angeles School of Law, November 2021, 19-20.
    \88\ Ben Westcott and Steven Jiang, ``China's LGBTQ Community Is 
Fading from Rainbow to Gray,'' CNN, July 9, 2021; Marrian Zhou, ``LGBTQ 
Activists Give Voice to China's Censored WeChat Groups,'' Nikkei Asia, 
July 17, 2021.
    \89\ Chen Xianyi, ``Niangpao xingxiang deng jixing shenmei bixu 
ezhi'' [Deformed aesthetics such as images of sissies must be curbed], 
Guangming Daily, August 27, 2021; Tim Culpan, ``China's Crackdown Has a 
Straight Eye for the Queer Guy,'' Bloomberg, September 18, 2021; Zhang 
Wanqing, ``China's Ongoing Struggle against `Sissy' Young Men,'' Sixth 
Tone, August 31, 2021. See also Theodora Yu, ``Gay Games in Hong Kong 
Face Attacks as China's Proxies Target LGBT Groups,'' Washington Post, 
August 31, 2021.
    \90\ ``Diversity among Athletes Including Gay Competitors Welcome--
Yang Yang,'' Reuters, February 13, 2022.
    \91\ Cat Wang, ``As the Winter Olympics Approach, Where Are China's 
Gay Athletes? Beijing 2022 Set to Be a Barometer for Games' Progress,'' 
South China Morning Post, January 31, 2022; Orion Rummler and Kate 
Sosin, ``A Record Number of Out LGBTQ+ Olympians Are Competing. China 
Doesn't Want to Talk about It.,'' The 19th, February 15, 2022. See also 
International Olympic Committee, ``Unity in Diversity: How the Olympic 
Games Foster Inclusion,'' June 15, 2022.
    \92\ Eva Dou, ``China Warns Foreign Olympic Athletes against 
Speaking Out on Politics at Winter Games,'' Washington Post, January 
19, 2022; John Leicester, ``Human Rights? China Won That Winter 
Olympics Battle. Almost.,'' Associated Press, February 20, 2022; Orion 
Rummler and Kate Sosin, ``A Record Number of Out LGBTQ+ Olympians Are 
Competing. China Doesn't Want to Talk about It.,'' The 19th, February 
15, 2022.
    \93\ National Radio and Television Administration General Office, 
Guojia Guangbo Dianshi Zongju bangongting guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi 
jiemu ji qi renyuan guanli de tongzhi [Circular from the National Radio 
and Television Administration General Office regarding further 
strengthening the management of cultural programs and their staff], 
September 2, 2021; Joe McDonald, ``China Bans Men It Sees as Not 
Masculine Enough from TV,'' Associated Press, September 3, 2021; Shan 
Jie and Lu Yameng, ``Proposal on Strengthening Education Aimed at 
Making Boys More `Masculine' Triggers Debate,'' Global Times, January 
31, 2021.
    \94\ Wenlei Ma, ``Harry Potter Movie The Secrets of Dumbledore 
Censors Gay References in China,'' Nationwide News (Australia), April 
12, 2022; ``Sensitive Words: Top 10 Censored Terms of 2021,'' China 
Digital Times, January 13, 2022. For background information on 
government regulations prohibiting LGBTQ content, see China Internet 
Audiovisual Program Services Association, Wangluo Shiting Jiemu Neirong 
Shenhe Tongze [General Rules for Content Review of Online Audiovisual 
Programming], issued and effective June 30, 2017.
    \95\ Lily Kuo, ``China Censors `Friends' to Remove References to 
Ross's Lesbian Ex-Wife--and Orgasms,'' Washington Post, February 14, 
2022.
    \96\ Ministry of Education, ``Guanyu Zhengxie shisan jie quanguo 
weiyuanhui disan ci huiyi di 4404 hao (jiaoyu lei 410 hao) ti'an dafu 
de han'' [Letter of Reply to Proposal No. 4404 (No. 410 for Education) 
of the Third Session of the Thirteenth National Committee of the 
CPPCC], December 8, 2020.
    \97\ Robert Burton-Bradley, ``Has China's Push to Ban `Effeminate' 
and `Sissy' Men Claimed Its First Victim? The Tragic Case of Zhou 
Peng,'' South China Morning Post, January 4, 2022; ``China Tells 
Effeminate Male Celebrities to Man Up,'' Voice of America, September 
26, 2021; Xintian Wang, ``China's Government Is Targeting `Sissy' Men, 
with Devastating Consequences,'' Gal-Dem, January 26, 2022.
    \98\ Jiang Yalin, ``China's `Anti-Sissy' Campaign Unleashes a Wave 
of Online Transphobia,'' Sixth Tone, February 24, 2022; Josh Ye, 
``Headache for China's Game Developers as Memo Details Beijing's Red 
Lines,'' South China Morning Post, September 30, 2021; Mandy Zuo, 
``China Moves to Kill Romantic Gay-Themed `Boys' Love' Dramas amid 
Wider Crackdown on Entertainment Industry,'' South China Morning Post, 
February 2, 2022. See also Darius Longarino, ``Precarious Progress: 
Advocacy for the Human Rights of LGBT People in China,'' OutRight 
Action International, 2020, 4, 7-8.
    \99\ Josh Ye, ``New Video Game Approvals Dry Up in China as 
Internal Memo Shows That Developers Now Have Many Red Lines to Avoid,'' 
South China Morning Post, September 29, 2021.
    \100\ For background on the shrinking space for civil society, see 
CECC, Annual Report 2021, March 2022, 235-37.
    \101\ FreeChineseFeminists (@FeministChina), ``The WeChat public 
accounts of more than a dozen Chinese college associations and two NGOs 
concerned with equality of sexual orientation were censored at the . . 
.,'' Twitter, July 6, 2021, 2:50 p.m.; ``China Divided as WeChat 
Deletes LGBT Accounts from Platform,'' BBC, July 8, 2021; Jing Xuan 
Teng and Laurie Chen, ``LGBTQ Rights Groups Blocked on China's Biggest 
Social Media App,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 
July 7, 2021.
    \102\ ``China Divided as WeChat Deletes LGBT Accounts from 
Platform,'' BBC, July 8, 2021.
    \103\ Greg James, ``A Chinese University Seems to Be Making a List 
of LGBT+ Students. No One Knows What It Will Do with the 
Information.,'' SupChina, August 26, 2021.
    \104\ Greg James, ``A Chinese University Seems to Be Making a List 
of LGBT+ Students. No One Knows What It Will Do with the 
Information.,'' SupChina, August 26, 2021.
    \105\ Greg James, ``A Chinese University Seems to Be Making a List 
of LGBT+ Students. No One Knows What It Will Do with the 
Information.,'' SupChina, August 26, 2021.
    \106\ Zeyi Yang, ``Tencent's Messaging Platform Blocks LGBTQ Search 
Terms,'' Protocol, August 30, 2021.
    \107\ Zeyi Yang, ``Tencent's Messaging Platform Blocks LGBTQ Search 
Terms,'' Protocol, August 30, 2021.
    \108\ OutRight Action International, ``Fading Rainbow: A Q&A on 
LGBTQ Equality in China,'' February 2022; Pak Yiu, ``WeChat Deletes 
Chinese University LGBT Accounts in Fresh Crackdown,'' Reuters, July 7, 
2021.
    \109\ ``How Life in China Has Gotten Tougher for LGBTQ,'' 
Bloomberg, June 21, 2022; CECC, Annual Report 2020, December 2020, 261.
    \110\ FreeChineseFeminists (@FeministChina), ``A spokesperson for 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the deletion of LGBTQ 
accounts on WeChat . . .,'' Twitter, July 8, 2021, 5:06 a.m; Weng 
Weikai, ``Neidi gaoxiao tongzhi pingquan zhi lu--bei fenghao, wuminghua 
yu guojia anquan. Tongyun renshi: `ba nide zuiba wuzhu, feichang zhixi' 
'' [The road to equal rights for comrades in mainland universities--
banned, stigmatized, and [considered] national security. Activists: 
``to cover your mouth is extremely suffocating''], Hong Kong Citizen 
News, July 7, 2021. Gay and lesbian people in China appropriated the 
term ``comrades'' to refer to LGBT persons. Stephanie Yingyi Wang, 
``Unfinished Revolution: An Overview of Three Decades of LGBT Activism 
in China,'' Made in China Journal 6, no. 1 (April-July 2021): 90.
    \111\ Cat Wang, ``Chinese LGBT Support Group Shuts Down 
Operations,'' South China Morning Post, November 5, 2021; Maryann Xue, 
``Chinese Social Media Shutdown of LGBT Student Groups `Highlights 
Backlash against Western Influences,' '' South China Morning Post, July 
11, 2021; Stephanie Yingyi Wang, ``Unfinished Revolution: An Overview 
of Three Decades of LGBT Activism in China,'' Made in China Journal 6, 
no. 1 (April-July 2021): 90-95. See also Sexual Rights Initiative, 
``Stakeholder Submission on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
(LGBT) Rights in China for the 17th Session of the Universal Periodic 
Review,'' October 2013, 6.
    \112\ Weng Weikai, ``Neidi gaoxiao gongzhi pingquan zhi lu--bei 
fenghao, wuminghua yu guojia anquan. Tongyun renshi: `ba nide zuiba 
wuzhu, feichang zhixi' '' [The road to equal rights for comrades in 
mainland universities--banned, stigmatized, and [considered] national 
security. Activists: ``to cover your mouth is extremely suffocating''], 
Hong Kong Citizen News, July 7, 2021; Cat Wang, ``Chinese LGBT Support 
Group Shuts Down Operations,'' South China Morning Post, November 5, 
2021; Maryann Xue, ``Chinese Social Media Shutdown of LGBT Student 
Groups `Highlights Backlash against Western Influences,' '' South China 
Morning Post, July 11, 2021.
    \113\ ``Red Vs Are After China's Queer Community,'' Protocol, July 
13, 2021; Ben Westcott and Steven Jiang, ``China's LGBTQ Community Is 
Fading from Rainbow to Gray,'' CNN, January 27, 2022; ``China Divided 
as WeChat Deletes LGBT Accounts from Platform,'' BBC, July 8, 2021; 
Zeyi Yang, ``Tencent Dominates Digital Donations in China. That's the 
Problem.,'' Protocol, September 15, 2021.
    \114\ Huizhong Wu, ``China LGBT Rights Group Shuts Down amid 
Hostile Environment,'' Associated Press, November 5, 2021.
    \115\ Greg James, ``China's Leading LGBTQ Advocacy Group Deletes 
Social Media Accounts, Appears to Be in Jeopardy,'' SupChina, November 
4, 2021.
    \116\ Greg James, ``China's Leading LGBTQ Advocacy Group Deletes 
Social Media Accounts, Appears to Be in Jeopardy,'' SupChina, November 
4, 2021. See also Sarah Wu, `` `We're Part of China's Population': LGBT 
Couples Seek Recognition in Census,'' Reuters, November 8, 2020; ``LGBT 
Supporters Lobby for Same-Sex Marriage in Revised Civil Code,'' Sixth 
Tone, December 20, 2019; Greg James, ``Chinese Court Sides with 
Publisher of Homophobic Textbooks,'' SupChina, September 4, 2020.
    \117\ Phoebe Zhang, ``LGBT Rights in China: Transgender Youth 
Seeking Gender Affirming Surgery Find Family Approval Still Biggest 
Hurdle,'' South China Morning Post, June 24, 2022.
    \118\ Nathan Wei, ``China Lowers Minimum Age to 18 for Gender 
Reassignment Surgery,'' SupChina, May 31, 2022; National Health 
Commission, Guojia Weisheng Jiankangwei bangongting guanyu yinfa Guojia 
Xianzhilei Jishu Mulu he Linchuang Yingyong Guanli Guifan (2022 
nianban) de Tongzhi [Circular on the publication of the General Office 
of the National Health Commission's National Restricted Technology 
Catalog and Clinical Application Management Standards (2022 edition)], 
April 20, 2022.
    \119\ Nathan Wei, ``China Lowers Minimum Age to 18 for Gender 
Reassignment Surgery,'' SupChina, May 31, 2022; National Health 
Commission, Guojia Weisheng Jiankangwei bangongting guanyu yinfa Guojia 
Xianzhilei Jishu Mulu he Linchuang Yingyong Guanli Guifan (2022 nian 
ban) de Tongzhi [Circular on the publication of the General Office of 
the National Health Commission's National Restricted Technology Catalog 
and Clinical Application Management Standards (2022 edition)], April 
20, 2022.
    \120\ Li Jiawei, ``Shanghai kaichu guonei shou ge kua xingbie 
ertong yu qingshaonian duo xueke menzhen'' [Shanghai opens China's 
first multidisciplinary outpatient clinic for transgender children and 
adolescents], The Paper, November 4, 2021; ``Fudan Erke kaishe guonei 
shou ge kuaxingbie ertong yu qingshaonian duo xueke menzhen'' [Fudan 
Pediatrics opens China's first multidisciplinary clinic for transgender 
children and adolescents], Xinmin Evening News, reprinted in Fudan 
University Pediatric Hospital Weixin Public Account, November 10, 2021.
    \121\ ``Fudan Erke kaishe guonei shou ge kuaxingbie ertong yu 
qingshaonian duo xueke menzhen'' [Fudan Pediatrics opens China's first 
multidisciplinary clinic for transgender children and adolescents], 
Xinmin Evening News, reprinted in Fudan University Pediatric Hospital 
Weixin Public Account, November 10, 2021.

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Religion

                          Freedom of Religion

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, 
        the People's Republic of China (PRC) escalated efforts 
        to ``sinicize'' religion, a process it defines as 
        strengthening religious believers' allegiance to the 
        ``great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese 
        culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and socialism 
        with Chinese characteristics.''
         In December 2021, the Party and government 
        convened the first National Conference on Religious 
        Work since 2016, signaling Xi Jinping and the Party's 
        intent to prioritize religious affairs.
         The National Religious Affairs Administration 
        issued a set
        of sweeping Measures for the Administration of Internet
        Religious Information Services, which were announced on 
        December 20, 2021, and went into effect on March 1, 
        2022. The measures require religious groups to have 
        government-issued permits for their online activity, 
        enact onerous registration requirements, and limit 
        permissible online religious activity by registered 
        groups.
         The Party attempted to co-opt Buddhist and 
        Taoist groups for a Party history campaign intended to 
        inculcate patriotism and loyalty, including by forcing 
        clergy to watch ``patriotic
        movies.''
         Authorities continued to suppress the 
        religious freedom of ethnic minority Muslims throughout 
        the country, promoting the eradication of distinct 
        ethnic and religious characteristics and increasing 
        assimilation with Han Chinese culture.
         The PRC continued to exert pressure on 
        unregistered Catholic communities in 2021 and 2022, as 
        demonstrated by the
        detention of lay Catholics, clergy, and at least two 
        Vatican-
        appointed bishops. Hong Kong authorities have also 
        increasingly targeted the Catholic Church. In May, Hong 
        Kong national security police arrested former bishop of 
        Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph Zen.
         During this reporting year, PRC authorities 
        continued to violate the religious freedom of 
        Protestant Christians by engaging in pressure campaigns 
        against unregistered churches, especially by detaining 
        church leaders--often under manufactured ``fraud'' 
        charges--and by cracking down on religious education 
        and publishing.
         Public security and judicial authorities 
        continued to use Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, 
        which forbids ``organizing and using a cult to 
        undermine implementation of the law,'' to persecute 
        members of spiritual groups deemed to be illegal or to 
        be ``cults'' (xiejiao), including Falun Gong, Church of 
        the Almighty God, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and others.
         Authors of a 2022 study published in the 
        American Journal of Transplantation concluded that it 
        was highly likely that transplant surgeons in China had 
        participated in the execution of prisoners ``by organ 
        transplant'' as recently as 2015. They further 
        concurred with previous ``anecdotal and textual'' 
        accounts provided by Falun Gong-affiliated 
        organizations alleging organ harvesting from prisoners 
        of conscience. There also continued to be accounts that 
        Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic 
        minorities in the XUAR have also been targeted for 
        forced organ removal.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Call on the Chinese government to guarantee freedom 
        of religion to all citizens in accordance with its 
        international human rights obligations and PRC law. 
        Stress to PRC authorities that freedom of religion 
        includes the right to freely adopt beliefs and engage 
        in religious practice without government interference.
          Call for the release of religious leaders and 
        practitioners whom Chinese authorities confined, 
        detained, or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their 
        religious beliefs, including Catholic bishop Zhang 
        Weizhu; Protestant pastors Wang Yi, An Yankui, Yang 
        Rongli, and Wang Xiaoguang; and Falun Gong 
        practitioners Xu Na and Zhou Deyong, as well as those 
        confined, detained, or imprisoned in connection with 
        their association with those citizens. The 
        Administration should use existing laws to hold 
        accountable Chinese government officials and others 
        complicit in severe religious freedom restrictions, 
        including the sanctions available in the Global 
        Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law 
        No. 114-328) and the International Religious Freedom 
        Act of 1998 (Public Law No. 105-292). Ensure that 
        conditions related to religious freedom are taken into 
        account when negotiating trade agreements.
          Call on the Chinese government to fully implement 
        accepted recommendations from the November 2018 session 
        of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic 
        Review, including taking necessary measures to ensure 
        that the rights to freedom of religion and to religious 
        culture and expression are fully observed and 
        protected; cooperating with the UN human rights system, 
        specifically UN special procedures mandate holders; 
        taking steps to ensure that lawyers working to advance 
        religious rights can practice their profession freely, 
        and promptly investigating allegations of violence and 
        intimidation impeding their work; and considering 
        possible revisions to legislation and administrative 
        rules to provide better protection of freedom of 
        religion.
          Call on the Chinese government to abolish Article 300 
        of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes 
        ``organizing and using a cult to undermine 
        implementation of the law,'' and Article 27 of the PRC 
        Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which 
        provides for detention or fines for organizing or 
        inciting others to engage in ``cult activities'' and 
        for using a ``cult'' or the ``guise of religion'' to 
        ``disturb social order'' or to harm others' health.
          Encourage U.S. political leaders to visit religious 
        sites in China to raise awareness of and promote 
        freedom of religion.

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Religion

                          Freedom of Religion

                              Introduction

    During the 2022 reporting year, the Commission observed 
ongoing violations of religious freedom by the Chinese 
Communist Party and government aimed at increasing control of 
believers in both registered and unregistered communities. The 
Party and government sought to further cement its policy of 
``sinicization'' (zhongguohua), defined as the strengthening of 
religious believers' allegiance to the ``great motherland, the 
Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party, 
and socialism with Chinese characteristics.'' \1\ Authorities 
signaled that increased oversight of religion would be an 
ongoing priority by convening the first National Conference on 
Religious Work in five years, enacting sweeping legislation 
circumscribing religious expression and activity on the 
internet, and bolstering surveillance and supervision of 
religious groups in the name of national security. A U.S.-based 
advocacy organization concluded that this reporting year 
``might have been one of the worst periods for religious 
freedom in recent history.'' \2\

           International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom

    Both Chinese and international law guarantee religious 
freedom. Under international law, freedom of religion or belief 
encompasses both the right to form, hold, and change 
convictions, beliefs, and religions--which cannot be 
restricted--and the right to outwardly manifest those beliefs, 
or none at all, which can be limited by certain specific 
justifications.\3\ These principles are codified in various 
international instruments, including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).\4\ Article 36 of China's Constitution 
guarantees citizens ``freedom of religious belief'' and 
protection for ``normal religious activities.'' \5\ With terms 
such as ``normal'' undefined, it is unclear whether China's 
Constitution is intended to protect the same range of beliefs 
and outward manifestations that is recognized under 
international law.\6\ Nevertheless, China's Constitution and 
other legal provisions \7\ align with the ICCPR in prohibiting 
discrimination based on religion \8\ and loosely parallel the 
ICCPR's prohibition on coercion \9\ by forbidding groups or 
individuals from compelling citizens to believe or not believe 
in any religion.\10\ China's Constitution prohibits ``making 
use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt social 
order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the 
educational system of the State.'' \11\

        Regulations and Policies Pertaining to Religious Freedom

    In December 2021, the Party and government convened the 
first National Conference on Religious Work since 2016, 
signaling Xi Jinping and the Party's intent to prioritize 
national security in religious affairs.\12\ In his speech at 
the conference, Xi emphasized the ongoing importance of 
national security in religious work, especially with regard to 
online religious activity and content.\13\ Experts have 
identified such ``securitization'' as a major theme of 
governance under Xi: since assuming leadership, Xi has applied 
a national security framework to non-traditional sectors, 
including the online activity of many businesses, individuals, 
and civil society groups.\14\ A Beijing municipality-based 
professor characterized the religious work conference's 
emphasis on online activity as noteworthy, saying that 
religious practitioners would be ``disciplined for 
inappropriate online commentary.'' \15\ This is consistent with 
Xi's speech at the event, which called for adherence to the 
``overall national security concept'' including 
``strengthen[ed] management of online religious affairs.'' \16\ 
To this end, at a December 2021 Ministry of Public Security 
meeting on implementing the goals set by the religious work 
conference, Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi said that 
religious affairs work should guard against ``radicalism,'' 
``terrorism,'' and ``infiltration by hostile forces,'' and 
should crack down on ``illegal missionary activity'' and on 
xiejiao (a historical term usually translated as ``evil cults'' 
or ``heretical teachings,'' and used by the Party to refer to 
new religious movements it perceives as threatening, notably 
Falun Gong).\17\
    At the December conference, Xi also reiterated the need for 
religious groups to pursue greater autonomy from foreign 
influence through ``sinicization.'' Omitting reference to the 
traditional ``three-self'' formula for institutional autonomy 
mandated by the Party for approved religious groups--that these 
groups be ``self-governing,'' ``self-financing,'' and ``self-
propagating,'' and from which the Three-Self Patriotic Movement 
organization governing Protestant churches in China takes its 
name \18\--Xi said that religious work should strengthen 
``self-education, self-management, and self-discipline.'' \19\ 
Scholar Carsten Vala concluded that the intent behind this 
``twist'' on the formula is not merely to limit foreign 
influence on religious groups, as the traditional formula did, 
but to ``ensure [religious practitioners'] activities are 
circumscribed within Party-state bounds.'' \20\ Xi added that 
education in Party history was essential to cultivating 
patriotism among religious groups and believers, most likely 
referring to a nationwide history campaign associated with the 
Party's centenary and urging its appropriation by religious 
believers.\21\ [For more information on the new iteration of 
Party history issued this past year, see Section V--
Governance.]
    Concurrent with the conference, the National Religious 
Affairs Administration (NRAA) and four other agencies, 
including the Ministries of Public Security and of State 
Security, issued the Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services, which went into effect 
on March 1, 2022.\22\ In an authoritative response to 
reporters, NRAA authorities characterized the wide-ranging 
measures as intended to ensure both ``network security and 
ideological security.'' \23\ The measures increased state 
oversight of online religious activity by:

         Prohibiting unregistered domestic 
        organizations and all foreign groups from posting 
        religious content on the internet \24\ and banning a 
        range of online religious material and activities, 
        including most forms of proselytizing, many forms of 
        worship,\25\ and content targeted at ``enticing'' 
        minors; \26\
         Requiring that groups apply for an internet 
        religious information services permit in order to host 
        or share even licit content online,\27\ with the permit 
        to be renewed every three years; \28\ and
         Instituting identity verification and real-
        name registration requirements in order to use online 
        religious platforms,\29\ preach,\30\ or participate in 
        online religious training or religious education.\31\

    Formally issued in December 2021, the measures came amid 
what one journalist described as a ``harsh and capricious 
regulatory crackdown'' on China's internet and technology 
sectors, targeting a number of platforms and content deemed 
inconsistent with Party goals.\32\ Observers and stakeholders 
expressed concern that the measures provide a framework for 
curtailing the already diminishing space for religious 
believers in China.\33\ [For more information on cyberspace and 
technological developments, see Section III--Freedom of 
Expression.]

       Buddhism (Non-Tibetan), Taoism, and Chinese Folk Religion

    The Chinese Communist Party and government's relationship 
with Buddhist, Taoist, and folk religious groups has continued 
to reflect the tension between appropriation of these groups by 
PRC leadership and coercive control, both of which infringe on 
the ability of these religious groups to exercise their freedom 
of religion in accordance with international standards.\34\ 
Consistent with the Party and central government's 
``sinicization'' policy, PRC officials have lauded Taoist and 
Buddhist groups that are perceived as serving the Party's 
agenda.\35\ While the Commission documented ongoing efforts by 
Chinese authorities during its 2021 reporting year to restrict 
Buddhist, Taoist, and folk religious groups from exercising 
their religious freedom,\36\ during the 2022 reporting year, 
the Commission observed the Party targeting these groups for 
patriotic activities to coincide with the Party's centenary 
year.\37\ Examples of efforts to engage Buddhist, Taoist, and 
folk religious groups in national campaigns and to bolster 
``sinicization'' efforts among these groups include the 
following:

         In July 2021, a group of teachers and students 
        from the Party-controlled Buddhist Association of China 
        (BCA)-sponsored Emeishan Buddhist Institute in Emeishan 
        municipality, Sichuan province, participated in a ``red 
        tour'' for the Party's centenary, visiting 
        revolutionary sites in Sichuan.\38\ In September, over 
        40 Buddhist leaders, teachers, and monks from several 
        BCA-affiliated Buddhist institutions in Shaoxing 
        municipality, Zhejiang province, traveled to Party 
        historical sites in Jiangxi as part of a ``red tour,'' 
        where they placed wreaths at the Red Army Martyrs 
        Memorial Tower and ``paid their respects'' at a former 
        residence of Mao Zedong.\39\
         In October 2021, Buddhist monks at Huasheng 
        Temple in Tianjin municipality were forced to view 
        ``red movies,'' or propaganda films.\40\ According to 
        the temple's official WeChat account, one viewing 
        featured the Korean War film ``The Battle at Lake 
        Changjin'' (reportedly commissioned and funded by the 
        central government for the Party's centenary) \41\ and 
        was intended to ``thoroughly carry out Party history 
        study and education'' and ``promote the patriotic 
        spirit.'' \42\ On October 14, all instructors and 
        students at the official Chinese Taoist College were 
        also made to view the ``patriotic film.'' \43\
         According to the International Campaign for 
        Tibet, the PRC has increasingly barred ethnically Han 
        Chinese Buddhists from practicing Tibetan Buddhism, as 
        part of official efforts to enforce the 
        ``sinicization'' of Buddhism by marginalizing Tibetan 
        Buddhist influences among the broader Han population, 
        likely in order to maintain a distinctly ``Chinese'' 
        Buddhist identity outside of Tibetan areas.\44\ In one 
        instance, PRC authorities expelled Han Chinese 
        Buddhists from the Larung Gar Buddhist Institute 
        (Larung Gar), in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi (Kardze) 
        Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, a site targeted 
        in previous crackdowns.\45\ After forcibly returning 
        them to their hometowns, authorities required former 
        Han Chinese residents of Larung Gar to register with 
        their local police station and submit to regular 
        monitoring.\46\ In November 2021, Larung Gar webcasts 
        accessed by Han Chinese practitioners were shut 
        down.\47\

[For information on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists, 
see Section IX--Tibet.]

                                 Islam

    This past year, the PRC continued to impose the policy of 
``sinicization'' on ethnic minority Muslims throughout the 
country, promoting the eradication of distinct ethnic and 
religious characteristics and increasing assimilation with Han 
Chinese culture. The PRC continued its campaign to remove 
characteristically Muslim elements from mosques throughout the 
country.\48\ Authorities also continued to target girls wearing 
headscarves to school, ``quietly'' rooting out the practice 
``at the majority of schools, at all levels, by various means'' 
since 2019, according to Radio Free Asia.\49\ Along with large-
scale surveillance operations targeting Muslim communities, the 
central government has also continued to target Muslim worship 
by undertaking surveillance and interfering with religious 
activities at mosques and has imposed quotas on the number of 
Muslims permitted to gather to observe Ramadan.\50\ Examples of 
widespread violations of freedom of religion include:

         In July 2021, authorities in Xining 
        municipality, Qinghai province, announced the removal 
        of domes and a minaret from the front gate of Dongguan 
        Mosque. Scholar David R. Stroup has described Dongguan 
        Mosque as China's ``most prominent and culturally 
        important mosque'' and one of its largest.\51\ One 
        report claimed that authorities had implemented similar 
        removals from at least 10 other mosques throughout 
        Xining.\52\
         On November 3, 2021, seven Muslim girls were 
        locked out of their elementary school in Changge city, 
        Xuchang municipality, Henan province, for wearing 
        headscarves.\53\
         Beginning on October 15, government and Party 
        officials launched their latest round of ``wo'erzi'' (a 
        Chinese transliteration of the Arabic word for 
        ``admonition,'' or sermon) preaching tours, sending 
        preaching groups to mosques throughout Qinghai to 
        promote Party and government policies, loyalty to the 
        Party, and Party-approved interpretations of the 
        Quran.\54\
         In 2022, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
        reported that the Central Commission for Discipline 
        Inspection had launched a corruption investigation into 
        Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Vice 
        Chair and member of the Hui ethnic minority Wang 
        Zhengwei.\55\ Wang, formerly head of the State Ethnic 
        Affairs Commission and former Governor of the Ningxia 
        Hui Autonomous Region, was known for encouraging the 
        building of mosques ``on a relatively grand scale'' and 
        supporting mechanisms for the certification of halal 
        foods.\56\ According to the WSJ, the investigation into 
        Wang Zhengwei was ``prompted by concerns that Mr. Wang 
        had promoted `unrestrained Muslim culture' and 
        encouraged religious extremism.'' \57\

[For more information on Uyghur, Hui, and other Muslims in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and other locations, see 
Section VI--Ethnic Minority Rights and Section X--Xinjiang.]

                         Christianity--Catholic

    Official efforts to assert control over Chinese Catholic 
leadership and religious practice have continued. The Sino-
Vatican Agreement of 2018 established a mechanism for 
appointing bishops ``in full communion'' with the pope and 
``recognized by authorities of the People's Republic of 
China.'' \58\ Renewed in 2020, the Agreement led to the 
appointment and ordination of six bishops ``within the 
[Agreement's] framework'' as of 2021, according to the 
Vatican.\59\ In spite of the apparent thaw in Sino-Vatican 
relations signaled by the Agreement, the PRC exerted ongoing 
pressure on unregistered Catholic communities in 2021 and 2022, 
detaining seminarians, clergy, and at least two unregistered 
Vatican-appointed bishops.\60\ In May 2021, authorities 
detained Zhang Weizhu, bishop of Xinxiang Apostolic Prefecture 
in Henan, reportedly subjecting him to political indoctrination 
and holding him at an unknown location for over nine months 
without charge.\61\ On October 25, 2021, authorities in Wenzhou 
municipality, Zhejiang province, detained Bishop coadjutor of 
Wenzhou Shao Zhumin; they released him the following month, 
then detained him again on April 9, 2022.\62\ One observer said 
that Shao's repeated detentions before major Chinese Catholic 
holidays are ``almost scientific'' in their regularity, noting 
his disappearance before Easter.\63\
    Hong Kong authorities have also increasingly targeted the 
Catholic Church. Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper owned by the Liaison 
Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region,\64\ issued a series of attacks 
on Christian education, Catholic church leaders, and the role 
of religion in the 2019 protests.\65\ In an editorial targeting 
former Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph Zen, the paper said that 
students from over 300 schools had been arrested during the 
2019 protests and that many of these schools had been 
Christian-run.\66\ One Hong Kong Catholic clergy member 
concluded that ``once they control the school, they could 
control the churches fairly easily,'' asserting that the focus 
on religious education represents a key component of mainland 
Chinese leaders' strategy for consolidating control over the 
Catholic Church in Hong Kong.\67\ Another approach has been for 
the United Front Work Department to facilitate meetings between 
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) leaders and key 
members of Hong Kong's Catholic clergy: on October 31, 2021, 
Hong Kong bishop-elect Stephen Chow, then-acting bishop 
Cardinal John Tong, and 13 priests attended a meeting where 
CCPA bishops and leaders briefed them on Xi's vision for 
``sinicization.'' \68\ On May 11, 2022, Hong Kong national 
security police arrested Cardinal Zen, along with four other 
trustees of the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund.\69\ On May 12, 
Zen was released on bail.\70\ A West Kowloon court charged the 
other four with failing to register the fund with the police, 
and a trial was set for September 19, 2022.\71\ [For more 
information on the suppression of civil society in Hong Kong, 
see Section XI--Hong Kong and Macau.]

                        Christianity--Protestant

    During this reporting year, PRC authorities continued to 
violate the religious freedom of Protestant Christians, 
engaging in pressure campaigns against unregistered churches by 
detaining church leaders and cracking down on religious 
education and media. The Commission has observed the Chinese 
government using charges such as ``fraud'' \72\ and ``illegal 
business activity'' \73\ to project a veneer of criminality 
onto activities that--according to international law--fall 
within the scope of normal religious practices.\74\ Local 
authorities also continued to target several influential 
unregistered or ``house'' churches.\75\ Widespread violations 
of Protestant Christians' freedom of religion included:

         Fraud charges used against church leaders.
                  In August 2021, police in Linfen 
                municipality, Shanxi province, detained nine 
                members of Linfen's Golden Lampstand Church, 
                including pastors Yang Rongli and Wang 
                Xiaoguang, in a series of raids on the church 
                and its network.\76\ After releasing several 
                members on bail, Linfen authorities charged 
                both pastors, along with members Li Shuangping, 
                Dong Yongyong, Zhao Guo'ai, Huo Zhuangping, and 
                Wu Ling'e, with ``fraud.'' \77\
                  In November 2021, Deyang municipality, 
                Sichuan province, authorities detained elder Wu 
                Jiannan and former elder Hao Ming of Qingcaodi 
                Church in Deyang on suspicion of ``fraud.'' 
                \78\ A ChinaAid Association report noted that 
                Chinese authorities commonly deploy this charge 
                against Christian leaders, effectively 
                criminalizing churches' offering-based funding 
                structures.\79\
         Church members detained for international 
        travel. In November 2021, Fenyang city, Luliang 
        municipality, Shanxi, public security officers detained 
        An Yankui, pastor of Taiyuan Zion (Xuncheng) Reformed 
        Church in Luliang, along with a coworker, Zhang 
        Chenghao, for ``illegally crossing the border'' after 
        traveling to a Christian conference in Malaysia in 
        2020.\80\ In July 2021, authorities detained five other 
        church members for attending the same conference, 
        despite the two leaders and five members having valid 
        passports.\81\ Luliang authorities initially denied 
        both men access to legal counsel.\82\ The church has 
        remained under pressure from authorities; in April 
        2022, police raided the congregation during a worship 
        service.\83\
         Christian schools targeted.
                  In May 2021, Wuhu municipality, Anhui 
                province, authorities raided the Mount Carmel 
                Church-run Jordan River Learning Center, 
                shutting down the church and detaining 10 
                teachers, 4 of whom they formally arrested for 
                ``illegal business activity'' in August 
                2021.\84\ Two of the teachers, Wan Hongxia and 
                Wang Minghai, remained in custody as of June 
                2022.\85\
                  In September 2021, local officials raided the 
                Maizi Christian Music High School in Harbin 
                municipality, Heilongjiang province, holding 
                all of the students for questioning and 
                detaining the school's principal.\86\
                  In November 2021, Tongzhou district, Beijing 
                municipality, authorities evicted and closed 
                the Golden Lampstand-run Golden Reed Learning 
                Center, which served the children of Christian 
                families who did not want to place their 
                children in state-run public schools as well as 
                ``many children with autism and other special 
                needs.'' \87\
         Christian homeschooling targeted.
                  Authorities in Wenshui county, Luliang, 
                detained Taiyuan Zion Reformed Church member 
                Zhao Weikai in July 2021 for ``illegal 
                possession of materials promoting terrorism or 
                extremism,'' likely based on materials relating 
                to the 1989 Tiananmen protests and to the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region found during 
                a previous raid on his residence.\88\ Local 
                officials had visited Zhao and his wife, Li 
                Xin, on several previous occasions in an effort 
                to pressure the couple to send their children 
                to state schools.\89\
                  In October 2021, Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu 
                province, police detained five Chinese 
                representatives of the United States-based 
                Abeka homeschooling program, including country 
                representative Wang Jian.\90\ According to 
                ChinaAid, Abeka's curriculum is used widely by 
                homeschooling families and Christian schools in 
                China.\91\
         Crackdowns on Christian media.
                  In July 2021, the Bao'an District People's 
                Court in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong 
                province, sentenced four employees of Shenzhen 
                Tree of Life, a communications company focused 
                on producing multimedia and digital Christian 
                resources, to prison terms ranging from one 
                year and three months to six years, and fines 
                ranging from 10,000 to 200,000 yuan (US$1,500 
                to US$30,000) for ``illegal business activity'' 
                associated with the sale of audio Bibles.\92\ 
                In December 2021, the Taizhou Intermediate 
                People's Court in Taizhou municipality, 
                Zhejiang province, upheld on appeal Christian 
                bookseller Chen Yu's original seven-year 
                sentence for ``illegal business activity.'' 
                \93\

                               Falun Gong

    Chinese authorities continued to prosecute Falun Gong 
practitioners under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, which 
criminalizes ``organizing and using a cult to undermine 
implementation of the law.'' \94\ The Falun Gong-affiliated 
website Minghui reported the deaths of dozens of Falun Gong 
practitioners due to treatment while in custody and hundreds of 
cases of Falun Gong practitioners being sentenced by 
authorities, apparently for their connection with Falun 
Gong.\95\ The Commission observed the following reports of 
authorities targeting Falun Gong practitioners and seeking to 
impede or deter their legal counsel:

         In November 2021, the Xiangyang District Court 
        in Jiamusi municipality, Heilongjiang province, 
        sentenced Falun Gong practitioner and former teacher 
        Liu Lijie to three years and six months in prison.\96\ 
        Liu was detained in October 2020 in connection with a 
        gathering she attended at the home of an elderly Falun 
        Gong practitioner and released on bail.\97\ In 2021, 
        she was tried and sentenced without her lawyer or legal 
        advisors present and was reportedly taken into custody 
        on January 12, 2022, after her appeal was denied.\98\
         On January 16, 2022, authorities sentenced 11 
        Falun Gong practitioners detained in 2020 for sharing 
        COVID-19-related materials with an overseas publication 
        and in connection with Falun Gong religious materials 
        confiscated at their residences.\99\ Beijing 
        municipality authorities imposed a sentence of eight 
        years on artist Xu Na, who was also fined 20,000 yuan 
        (US$3,000), in connection to having shared photos with 
        the Falun Gong media outlet Epoch Times, which showed 
        Beijing during the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak 
        in China.\100\
         In December 2021, Beijing Justice Bureau 
        officials disbarred Xu Na's original lawyer, Liang 
        Xiaojun, partly over his social media posts that 
        defended the rights of Falun Gong practitioners.\101\

    In a peer-reviewed study in the American Journal of 
Transplantation, two researchers shared their findings from ``a 
forensic review of 2,838 papers drawn from a dataset of 124,770 
Chinese-
language transplant publications'' published between 1980 and 
2015.\102\ Noting the common use of death row prisoners in 
China to harvest organs during this period, the authors of the 
study concluded that it was highly likely that transplant 
surgeons in China had participated in the execution of 
prisoners ``by organ removal,'' in violation of the medical 
field's ``dead donor rule.'' \103\ They also described their 
findings as consistent with previous ``anecdotal and textual'' 
accounts provided by Falun Gong-affiliated organizations 
regarding alleged organ harvesting from prisoners of 
conscience.\104\ There also continued to be accounts that 
Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in the 
XUAR have also been targeted for forced organ removal.\105\

                      Other Religious Communities

    According to a Dui Hua Foundation report, the Chinese 
government has taken increased measures to crack down on 
practitioners it has deemed to be part of ``unorthodox'' 
religious communities, defined as groups outside of the five 
religions subject to official regulation.\106\ Authorities had 
designated certain groups as ``cults'' or ``heterodox 
teachings'' (xiejiao), such as the Church of Almighty God \107\ 
and the Association of Disciples,\108\ and have continuously 
prosecuted adherents under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal 
Law.\109\ Dui Hua noted an official focus on controlling 
religious activity in rural areas, as seen in an opinion issued 
by the Supreme People's Court in July 2021,\110\ which calls 
for ``more severe punishment of illegal religious activities, 
`cults,' and overseas infiltration in rural areas.'' \111\ 
Examples of the suppression of religious communities outside of 
the five religions subject to official regulation included:

         According to a report produced by the Church 
        of Almighty God, the PRC central government has 
        continued to crack down on this new religious movement 
        as part of a three-year campaign launched in 2020.\112\ 
        The online magazine Bitter Winter reported that between 
        August and November 2021, authorities in Guangdong, 
        Henan, and Shandong provinces and the Guangxi Zhuang 
        Autonomous Region detained over 300 members of the 
        Church of Almighty God.\113\
         In November 2021, the Dalad (Dalate) Banner 
        People's Court in Ordos (E'erduosi) municipality, Inner 
        Mongolia Autonomous Region, reportedly sentenced eight 
        members of the Association of Disciples to prison 
        sentences and fines under Article 300 of the PRC 
        Criminal Law.\114\

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Religion

    Notes to Section III--Freedom of Religion

    \1\ ``Xi Jinping zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi shang qiangdiao 
jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang jiji yindao zongjiao yu 
shehui zhuyi shehui xiang shiying'' [At the National Conference on 
Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: persevere on the path of [China's] 
sinicization of religion and actively lead religion in the adaptation 
of religion with socialism,'' Xinhua, December 4, 2021.
    \2\ ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's 2021 Annual Persecution 
Report,'' March 7, 2022.
    \3\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human 
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
19, 24, 203-4.
    \4\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR 
upholds a person's right to ``have or adopt a religion or belief'' and 
the ``freedom . . . to manifest [that] religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching.'' Article 18 also prohibits coercion 
that impairs an individual's freedom to freely hold or adopt a religion 
or belief. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted 
and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 25, 
1981. China has signed and stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR, which 
obligates China to refrain in good faith from acts that would defeat 
the treaty's purpose. State Council Information Office, ``Guojia 
Renquan Xingdong Jihua (2016-2020 Nian)'' [National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2016-2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5; United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, entry into force January 27, 1980, art. 
18.
    \5\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36.
    \6\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; Liu Peng, ``A Crisis of Faith,'' 
China Security 4, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 30.
    \7\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 
1982 (amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; State Council, Zongjiao Shiwu 
Tiaoli [Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, 
amended June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018, art. 2; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July 5, 1994, 
effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018, art. 12.
    \8\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 26.
    \9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18(2).
    \10\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; State Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli 
[Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, amended 
June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018, art. 2.
    \11\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 
18; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: Article 18 
(Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 
September 27, 1993, para. 8. The ICCPR does allow State Parties to 
restrict outward manifestations of religion or belief, but such 
restrictions must be ``prescribed by law and . . . necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.''
    \12\ Amber Wang, ``China Tightens Control of Religion, with Focus 
on National Security,'' South China Morning Post, December 6, 2021.
    \13\ ``Xi Jinping zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi shang 
qiangdiao jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang jiji yindao 
zongjiao yu shehui zhuyi shehui xiang shiying'' [At the National 
Conference on Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: persevere on the 
path of [China's] sinicization of religion and actively lead religion 
in the adaptation of religion with socialism,'' Xinhua, December 4, 
2021; Amber Wang, ``China Tightens Control of Religion, with Focus on 
National Security,'' South China Morning Post, December 6, 2021.
    \14\ Experts have noted that Chinese authorities have broadly 
interpreted ``national security,'' using it as grounds to punish speech 
or actions that did not conform to Chinese Communist Party and 
government priorities. See, e.g., Rudolf Furst, ``Cultivating the Art 
of Anxiety: Securitising Culture in China,'' China Report 57 (October 
19, 2021): 4; Nis Grunberg, ``Unlocking Anti-Fragile China: How Xi 
Reinforces the Party State for Global Leadership,'' in The CCP's Next 
Century: Expanding Economic Control, Digital Governance and National 
Security, eds. Nis Grunberg and Claudia Wessling, MERICS Papers on 
China 10, June 2021; Raphael Viana David, International Service for 
Human Rights, ``China's Abuse of National Security to Curtail Human 
Rights: 4 Things You Need to Know,'' January 27, 2022; Helena Legarda, 
Mercator Institute for China Studies, ``China's New International 
Paradigm: Security First,'' June 15, 2021; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN Rights Chief Concerned by `Broad 
Scope' of China's New Security Law,'' July 7, 2015.
    \15\ Amber Wang, ``China Tightens Control of Religion, with Focus 
on National Security,'' South China Morning Post, December 6, 2021.
    \16\ ``Xi Jinping zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi shang 
qiangdiao jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang jiji yindao 
zongjiao yu shehui zhuyi shehui xiang shiying'' [At the National 
Conference on Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: persevere on the 
path of [China's] sinicization of religion and actively lead religion 
in the adaptation of religion with socialism,'' Xinhua, December 4, 
2021; Amber Wang, ``China Tightens Control of Religion, with Focus on 
National Security,'' South China Morning Post, December 6, 2021.
    \17\ Dong Fanchao, ``Renzhen xuexi guanche Xi Jinping Zongshuji 
zhongyao jianghua jingshen nuli wei kaichuang zongjiao gongzuo xin 
jumian zuochu jiji gongxian'' [Earnestly study and implement the spirit 
of Chairman Xi Jinping's important speech; strive to make positive 
contributions to creating a new situation for religious work], Legal 
Daily, December 6, 2021. For information on the translation and 
application of the term xiejiao, see Richard Madsen, ``Introduction,'' 
in The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below (Leiden: 
Brill, 2021), 7; Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Persecution of Unorthodox 
Religious Groups in China,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, March 29, 
2022, 4; Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question 
in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 29, 339-
40; J. Gordon Melton, ``Xiejiao, Cults, and New Religions,'' in The 
Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below, ed. Richard 
Madsen (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 148, 152-54. Melton traces Chinese 
leaders' use of the term xiejiao to characterize new religious 
movements across the Qing Dynasty, Nationalist, and PRC governments, 
observing that ``China has a long history of banning dissenting groups 
as heretical and/or chaotic, a threat to the public and political 
order.''
    \18\ Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question 
in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 158-59.
    \19\ ``Xi Jinping zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi shang 
qiangdiao jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang jiji yindao 
zongjiao yu shehui zhuyi shehui xiang shiying'' [At the National 
Conference on Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: persevere on the 
path of [China's] sinicization of religion and actively lead religion 
in the adaptation of religion with socialism,'' Xinhua, December 4, 
2021.
    \20\ Carsten T. Vala, ``Reading Tea Leaves from the 2021 National 
Religious Work Conference,'' ChinaSource (blog), February 4, 2022.
    \21\ ``Xi Jinping zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi shang 
qiangdiao jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang jiji yindao 
zongjiao yu shehui zhuyi shehui xiang shiying'' [At the National 
Conference on Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: persevere on the 
path of [China's] sinicization of religion and actively lead religion 
in the adaptation of religion with socialism,'' Xinhua, December 4, 
2021; ``Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Dang de bainian fendou zhongda 
chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi'' [Resolution of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee on the major achievements and 
historical experience of the Party's struggles over the past century], 
passed November 11, 2021. The mention of ``Party history'' refers to 
the ``Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of 
the Party's 100-Year Struggle,'' adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 
19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The campaign has 
been interpreted by many observers as an effort to legitimize Xi's and 
the Party's leadership and thereby cultivate loyalty to the Party. For 
a discussion of the campaign and its aims, see Center for Advanced 
China Research, Past as Prologue: Studying Party History for Xi's New 
Era, ed. Anna Scott Bell, January 31, 2022; Carsten T. Vala, ``Reading 
Tea Leaves from the 2021 National Religious Work Conference,'' 
ChinaSource (blog), February 4, 2022. According to scholar Carsten 
Vala, education of religious believers in Party history supports the 
sinicization of religion by legitimizing Party leadership and 
increasing religious believers' identification with the Party and 
nation, ``all with the goal of enhancing `national security.' ''
    \22\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022.
    \23\ National Religious Affairs Administration, ``[Quanwei jiedu] 
Guojia Zongjiao Shiwu Ju xiangguan fuzeren jiu `Hulianwang Zongjiao 
Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa' da jizhe wen'' [Authoritative interpretation: 
Relevant responsible individual from the National Religious Affairs 
Administration answers reporters' questions on the ``Measures for the 
Administration of Internet Religious Information Services''], December 
29, 2022.
    \24\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 6.
    \25\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 17.
    \26\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 14(8).
    \27\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, arts. 6-7.
    \28\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 13.
    \29\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 20.
    \30\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 15.
    \31\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022, art. 16.
    \32\ Li Yuan, ``As Beijing Takes Control, Chinese Tech Companies 
Lose Jobs and Hope,'' New York Times, January 12, 2022; Freedom House, 
``China,'' in Freedom on the Net 2021: The Global Drive to Control Big 
Tech, 2021; ``China's Red New Deal: A Guide to All the Different 
Crackdowns on Companies Going on Right Now,'' SupChina, October 26, 
2021; Helen Davidson, ``China Bans Celebrity Rankings in Bid to 
`Rectify Chaos in the Fan Community,' '' Guardian, August 27, 2021. For 
coverage of these developments over the previous reporting year, see 
CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 31, 2022, 53-54.
    \33\ Tibet Watch, ``China Announces Further Restrictions on 
Buddhism on the Internet,'' February 2, 2022; Jerry An, ``Chinese 
Christian Media Ministries Face Bitter Winter of Censorship,'' 
Christianity Today, December 24, 2021; Joann Pittman, ``Raising the 
Walls of the Sandbox,'' ChinaSource (blog), January 14, 2022; Zhensai 
Gao, ChinaAid Association, ``Explained: New CCP Regulations on 
Religious Internet Content,'' January 6, 2022; Grace Song, ``TSPM 
Churches Attempt to Obtain Internet Religious Information Service 
License,'' China Christian Daily, April 6, 2022.
    \34\ Nathan Vanderklippe, ``How China Is Turning Religion into 
Another State-Controlled Tool to Support Its Communist Ideals,'' Globe 
and Mail, June 30, 2021; Weishan Huang, ``The Sinicization of Buddhism 
and Its Competing Reinventions of Tradition,'' in The Sinicization of 
Chinese Religions: From Above and Below, ed. Richard Madsen, Religion 
in Chinese Societies 18 (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 65, 67, 69, 83; Ian 
Johnson, ``China's New Civil Religion,'' New York Times, December 21, 
2019.
    \35\ Nathan Vanderklippe, ``How China Is Turning Religion into 
Another State-Controlled Tool to Support Its Communists Ideals,'' Globe 
and Mail, June 30, 2021; Weishan Huang, ``The Sinicization of Buddhism 
and Its Competing Reinventions of Tradition,'' in The Sinicization of 
Chinese Religions: From Above and Below, ed. Richard Madsen, Religion 
in Chinese Societies 18 (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 65, 67, 69, 83; Ian 
Johnson, ``China's New Civil Religion,'' New York Times, December 21, 
2019.
    \36\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 31, 2022, 99.
    \37\ Because non-Tibetan Buddhism and Taoism are seen as models of 
``sinicization,'' they were more publicly mobilized around centenary 
activities than were other groups. In 2021, local governments 
throughout the country featured Buddhist and Taoist clergy, leadership, 
and laity participating in patriotic activities or expressing patriotic 
sentiments. See, e.g., Xuancheng Municipal Buddhist Association, 
``Xuancheng Shi Fojiao jie kaizhan jinian Zhongguo Gongchandang danchen 
100 zhounian qingzhu huodong'' [Xuancheng Municipality Buddhist 
community holds celebratory activities to commemorate the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party], July 9, 
2021; Jiangbei District Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, 
``Jiangbei Qu Fojiao jie juban qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang chengli 
100 bainian quanguo mingjia Fojiao yinglian zuopin zhan'' [Jiangbei 
District Buddhist community held an exhibition of Buddhist couplets by 
national master artists to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the 
founding of the Chinese Communist Party], June 29, 2021; Heilongjiang 
Provincial Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, ``Suihua Shi Fojiao 
jie qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang bainian huadan--mianhuai geming 
xianlie xuexi wangwo jingshen ji sao huodong'' [Suihua Municipality 
Buddhist community celebrates the 100th anniversary of the Chinese 
Communist Party--remembering the revolutionary martyrs, studying the 
spirit of selflessness, and conducting a memorial sweeping rite], June 
30, 2021; Jiangxi Provincial Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, 
``Cao Guoqing chuxi Ganzhou Shi Fojiao Xiehui qingzhu Zhongguo 
Gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian shuhua zhan'' [Cao Guoqing attended a 
Ganzhou Buddhist Association calligraphy exhibit celebrating the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party], July 20, 
2021.
    \38\ Emeishan Buddhism Online, ``Emeishan Foxueyuan shi sheng fu 
Bazhong, Nanchong deng di kaizhan hongse zhi lu'' [Emeishan Buddhist 
Institute teachers and students travel to Bazhong, Nanchong, and other 
sites to launch a red tour], Emeishan Buddhist Association, July 19, 
2021.
    \39\ Zhejiang Provincial Buddhist Association (@gh_7d06e2b24417), 
``Shaoxing Shi zhi Fojiao jie fu Jiangxi Ruijin kaizhan hongse zhi lu'' 
[Shaoxing Municipality Buddhist community goes to Ruijin city, Jiangxi 
to launch a red tour], WeChat post, September 29, 2021.
    \40\ Tianjin Huasheng Temple (@tianjinhuashengsi), ``Tianjin 
Huasheng Si zuzhi guankan hongse dianying `Changjin Hu' '' [Huasheng 
Temple, Tianjin organizes a viewing of the red movie ``The Battle at 
Changjin Lake''], WeChat post, October 29, 2021.
    \41\ Xu Xiaolei, ``Chen Kaige gankai: `Changjin Hu' de wancheng shi 
Zhongguo dianying de dashi'' [Chen Kaige is deeply moved: the 
completion of ``The Battle at Changjin Lake'' is a major event in 
Chinese cinema], Southern Metropolis Daily, reprinted in QQ, June 13, 
2021; Laura He, ``China's Korean War Propaganda Movie Smashes Box 
Office Record,'' CNN, October 4, 2021; Carice Witte, `` `The Battle at 
Lake Changjin' and China's New View of War,'' The Diplomat, October 14, 
2021.
    \42\ Tianjin Huasheng Temple (@tianjinhuashengsi), ``Tianjin 
Huasheng Si zuzhi guankan hongse dianying `Changjin Hu' '' [Huasheng 
Temple, Tianjin organizes a viewing of the red movie ``The Battle at 
Changjin Lake''], WeChat post, October 29, 2021.
    \43\ Chinese Taoist College, ``Wo yuan zuzhi quanti shisheng 
guankan dianying `Changjin Hu' '' [All Chinese Taoist College students 
and teachers watched the movie ``The Battle at Lake Changjin''], 
October 15, 2021.
    \44\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Containing the `Eastward 
Movement of Tibetan Mysticism': Targeting Chinese Buddhist 
Practitioners at Larung Gar Academy,'' January 20, 2022.
    \45\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Containing the `Eastward 
Movement of Tibetan Mysticism': Targeting Chinese Buddhist 
Practitioners at Larung Gar Academy,'' January 20, 2022. Larung Gar is 
considered a prominent Tibetan Buddhist institution; for more 
information on the demolitions and expulsions that took place as part 
of previous crackdowns on Larung Gar, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, 
October 8, 2018, 294 and CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 
303-4.
    \46\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Containing the `Eastward 
Movement of Tibetan Mysticism': Targeting Chinese Buddhist 
Practitioners at Larung Gar Academy,'' January 20, 2022.
    \47\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Containing the `Eastward 
Movement of Tibetan Mysticism': Targeting Chinese Buddhist 
Practitioners at Larung Gar Academy,'' January 20, 2022.
    \48\ Emily Feng, ``China Is Removing Domes from Mosques as Part of 
a Push to Make Them More `Chinese,' '' NPR, October 24, 2021; David R. 
Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from Country's Biggest 
Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,'' The 
Conversation, September 28, 2021.
    \49\ Liu Quan, ``Peidai toujin nusheng jinzhi ru xiao Henan yi 
xuexiao xingwei yin zhongnu'' [Girls wearing headscarves are prohibited 
from entering school; a school in Henan draws mass anger], Radio Free 
Asia, November 9, 2021.
    \50\ Daria Impiombato, ``Xinjiang's Oppression Has Shifted Gears,'' 
Foreign Policy, November 1, 2021; Michael Clarke, ``Turning Ghosts into 
Humans: Surveillance as an Instrument of Social Engineering in 
Xinjiang,'' War on the Rocks (blog), November 2, 2021; Shohret Hoshur, 
``Chinese Officials Restrict Number of Uyghurs Observing Ramadan,'' 
Radio Free Asia, April 1, 2022. For background information on 
surveillance of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR, see U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, ``Treasury Identifies Eight Chinese Tech Firms as Part of the 
Chinese Military-Industrial Complex,'' December 16, 2021.
    \51\ David R. Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from 
Country's Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim 
Assimilation,'' The Conversation, September 28, 2021.
    \52\ David R. Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from 
Country's Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim 
Assimilation,'' The Conversation, September 28, 2021.
    \53\ Liu Quan, ``Peidai toujin nusheng jinzhi ru xiao Henan yi 
xuexiao xingwei yin zhongnu'' [Girls wearing headscarves are prohibited 
from entering school; a school in Henan draws mass anger], Radio Free 
Asia, November 9, 2021.
    \54\ Liu Quan, ``Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu 
qingzhensi jiasu `Yisilan zhongguo hua' '' [Government-organized 
Islamic preaching group stationed in mosques to accelerate 
``sinicization of Islam''], Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2021.
    \55\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022.
    \56\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022.
    \57\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022.
    \58\ ``New Bishop Ordained in China,'' Vatican News, September 8, 
2021. For more on the Sino-Vatican Agreement, see CECC, 2021 Annual 
Report, March 31, 2022, 101-2.
    \59\ ``New Bishop Ordained in China,'' Vatican News, September 8, 
2021.
    \60\ ``Henan's Msgr Zhang Weizhu in Prison for 9 Months,'' 
AsiaNews, February 21, 2022; ``Wenzhou Authorities Detain Bishop Shao 
Zhumin Again,'' AsiaNews, October 26, 2021.
    \61\ ``Henan's Msgr Zhang Weizhu in Prison for 9 Months,'' 
AsiaNews, February 21, 2022; ``Xinxiang Faithful Worried for Msgr Zhang 
Weizhu, His Fate Still Unknown,'' AsiaNews, July 15, 2021.
    \62\ ``Wenzhou Authorities Detain Bishop Shao Zhumin Again,'' 
AsiaNews, October 26, 2021; ``Xi Jinping's Easter: Another Crackdown on 
the Unofficial Church,'' AsiaNews, April 11, 2022.
    \63\ ``Wenzhou Authorities Detain Bishop Shao Zhumin Again,'' 
AsiaNews, October 26, 2021; ``Xi Jinping's Easter: Another Crackdown on 
the Unofficial Church,'' AsiaNews, April 11, 2022.
    \64\ Blake Schmidt, ``The Publishing Empire Helping China Silence 
Dissent in Hong Kong,'' Bloomberg, August 17, 2020. Schmidt reports 
that Hong Kong newspapers Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po are owned by the 
Chinese company Guangdong Xin Wenhua, whose ``ownership of publishing 
assets in Hong Kong is spelled out in documents in the city's corporate 
registry and on the websites of the companies it controls.'' ``China 
Merges Two Communist Party-backed Newspapers in Hong Kong,'' Radio Free 
Asia, February 2, 2016. In 2016, the outlets merged, becoming the Hong 
Kong Ta Kung Wen Wei Media Group.
    \65\ ``Wufawutian: Chen Rijun lanyong shenzhi shenfen luan Gang'' 
[Lawless: Joseph Zen abuses his clerical status to stoke chaos in Hong 
Kong], Ta Kung Pao, January 27, 2022; ``Yu shi bingjin / Guan Haoming 
cheng gaige: `Huaren Miaoyu Tiaoli' bupingdeng'' [Keeping up with the 
times / Reverend Peter Koon supports reform: the ``Chinese Temple 
Ordinance'' is unfair], Ta Kung Pao, January 27, 2022; ``Houcibobi Tang 
Enjia Hua yang zongjiao daiyu cha tian gong di'' [Favoring one over the 
other, Tong Yun Kai: treatment of Chinese and foreign religions vastly 
different], Ta Kung Pao, January 27, 2022; ``Jiaqiang jianguan / da 
zhuang chang lifa daji jiduan zongjiao zuzhi'' [Strengthening 
oversight: barrister advocates legislation to crack down on extremist 
religious groups], Ta Kung Pao, January 28, 2022.
    \66\ ``Wufawutian: Chen Rijun lanyong shenzhi shenfen luan Gang'' 
[Lawless: Joseph Zen abuses his clerical status to stoke chaos in Hong 
Kong], Ta Kung Pao, January 27, 2022.
    \67\ Nina Shea, Hudson Institute, ``Transcript: The Olympics 
Boycott Series--Part 3: The New Threat to Religious Freedom in Hong 
Kong,'' March 31, 2022.
    \68\ Greg Torode, ``Historic Conclave: Chinese Bishops, Priests 
Brief Hong Kong Clerics on Xi's Religious Views,'' Reuters, December 
30, 2021.
    \69\ Theodora Yu, ``Hong Kong Police Arrest 90-Year-Old Cardinal on 
Foreign Collusion Charges,'' Washington Post, May 11, 2022.
    \70\ Lok-kei Sum, ``Arrest of Cardinal Zen Sends Chill through Hong 
Kong's Catholic Community,'' Guardian, May 16, 2022.
    \71\ Zen Soo, ``Hong Kong Catholic Cardinal Denies Charges Over 
Relief Fund,'' Associated Press, May 24, 2022.
    \72\ Sun Cheng, ``Shanxi Linfen Jin Dengtang Jiaohui zao dangju 
daya duo ren bei pibu qisu'' [Golden Lampstand Church of Linfen, 
Shanxi, suppressed by authorities, many people approved for arrest and 
indicted], Radio Free Asia, January 13, 2022; Rights Defense Network, 
``Sichuan Deyang shi Qingcaodi jiaohui Hao Ming zhanglao he Wu Jiannan 
zhanglao bei xingshi juliu'' [Sichuan Deyang municipality Qingcaodi 
Church elder Hao Ming and elder Wu Jiannan are criminally detained], 
November 20, 2021; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Sichuan sheng 
Deyang shi Qingcaodi Jiaohui liang wei zhanglao beizhua hou gai xingshi 
juliu'' [Two elders from Qingcaodi Church in Deyang municipality, 
Sichuan, criminally detained after being seized], November 20, 2021; 
ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's Annual Persecution Report 2021: 
January-December 2021,'' March 1, 2022, 41; In a blog post, an Early 
Rain Covenant Church leader writes that authorities use the charge of 
fraud in order to target unregistered churches by depriving them of 
resources. Li Yingqiang, ``Wo dui yi `zhapian zui' lai dingzui jiating 
jiaohui fengxian he chuandaoren de san dian yijian [My three comments 
on the use of `fraud' to convict house church pastors and offerings], 
Li Yingqiang (blog), November 18, 2021.
    \73\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Two Teachers Released on 
Bail, Two Teachers Arrested with No Update,'' March 4, 2022; Kexin 
Wang, ``Sentenced Up to Six Years in Jail for Selling Bible Players,'' 
Bitter Winter, August 3, 2021; ChinaAid Association, ``Bao'an District 
Court Authorities Harshly Sentence Four Christians, Fu Xuanjuan, Deng 
Tianyong, Han Li, and Feng Qunhao for Selling Bible Players,'' July 31, 
2021; Rights Defense Network, ``Yin hefa xiaoshou Shengjing bofangqi er 
zao zhuabu de Fu Xuanjuan, Deng Tianyong, Han Li, Feng Qunhao deng si 
Jidutu mianlin 5 nian yu 1 nian 6 ge yue budeng de xingqi'' [Four 
Christians, including Fu Xuanjuan, Deng Tianyong, Han Li, and Feng 
Qunhao, who were arrested for legally selling Bible players, face 
sentences ranging from five years to one year and six months], December 
12, 2020.
    \74\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 25, 1981, arts. 
6(b), 6(d), 6(f).
    \75\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Chi hefa huzhao chuguo de 
Taiyuan Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui wu wei tonggong yishen beipan 
youzui'' [Five fellow workers from Taiyuan Xuncheng (Zion) Reformed 
Church who traveled abroad with valid passports found guilty in court 
of first instance], January 7, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Sichuan 
Deyang shi Qingcaodi Jiaohui Hao Ming zhanglao he Wu Jiannan zhanglao 
bei xingshi juliu'' [Elder Hao Ming and elder Wu Jiannan of Qingcaodi 
Church in Deyang municipality, Sichuan, are criminally detained], 
November 20, 2021; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Sichuan sheng 
Deyang shi Qingcaodi Jiaohui liang wei zhanglao beizhua hou gai xingshi 
juliu'' [Two elders from Qingcaodi Church in Deyang municipality, 
Sichuan, criminally detained after being seized], November 20, 2021; 
Sun Cheng, ``Shanxi Linfen Jin Dengtang Jiaohui zao dangju daya duo ren 
bei pibu qisu'' [Golden Lampstand Church of Linfen, Shanxi, suppressed 
by authorities, many people approved for arrest and indicted], Radio 
Free Asia, January 13, 2022; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 31, 2022, 
104.
    \76\ Qiao Long, ``Shanxi Linfen jiaohui jiu ren beibu duonian 
kangju jiaru Sanzi Jiaohui'' [Nine people from Linfen, Shanxi, church 
arrested, for many years they resisted joining the Three-Self Church], 
Radio Free Asia, August 9, 2021; Sun Cheng, ``Shanxi Linfen Jin 
Dengtang Jiaohui zao dangju daya duo ren bei pibu qisu'' [Golden 
Lampstand Church of Linfen, Shanxi, suppressed by authorities, many 
people approved for arrest and indicted], Radio Free Asia, January 13, 
2022. Authorities had previously demolished the church building in 
2018. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2009-00428 on Yang Rongli and 2009-00408 on Wang 
Xiaoguang.
    \77\ Sun Cheng, ``Shanxi Linfen Jin Dengtang Jiaohui zao dangju 
daya duo ren bei pibu qisu'' [Golden Lampstand Church of Linfen, 
Shanxi, suppressed by authorities, many people approved for arrest and 
indicted], Radio Free Asia, January 13, 2022. For more information, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00102 on Li 
Shuangping, 2022-00103 on Dong Yongyong, 2009-00478 on Zhao Guoai, 
2022-00105 on Huo Zhuangping, and 2022-00106 on Wu Ling'e.
    \78\ Rights Defense Network, ``Sichuan Deyang shi Qingcaodi jiaohui 
Hao Ming zhanglao he Wu Jiannan zhanglao bei xingshi juliu'' [Sichuan 
Deyang municipality Qingcaodi Church elder Hao Ming and elder Wu 
Jiannan are criminally detained], November 20, 2021; Yu Bing, ChinaAid 
Association, ``Sichuan sheng Deyang shi Qingcaodi Jiaohui liang wei 
zhanglao beizhua hou gai xingshi juliu'' [Two elders from Qingcaodi 
Church in Deyang municipality, Sichuan, criminally detained after being 
seized], November 20, 2021. For more information, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00042 on Hao Ming and 2022-
00043 on Wu Jiannan.
    \79\ ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's Annual Persecution Report 
2021: January-December 2021,'' March 1, 2022, 41. In a blog post, an 
Early Rain Covenant Church leader writes that authorities use the 
charge of fraud in order to target unregistered churches by depriving 
them of resources. Li Yingqiang, ``Wo dui yi `zhapian zui' lai dingzui 
jiating jiaohui fengxian he chuandaoren de san dian yijian [My three 
comments on the use of `fraud' to convict house church pastors and 
offerings],'' Li Yingqiang (blog), November 18, 2021.
    \80\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``An Yankui and Zhang Chenghao 
of Taiyuan Xuncheng Reformed Church Officially Arrested,'' January 6, 
2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Chi hefa huzhao chuguo de 
Taiyuan Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui wu wei tonggong yishen beipan 
youzui'' [Five fellow workers from Taiyuan Zion (Xuncheng) Reformed 
Church who traveled abroad with valid passports found guilty in court 
of first instance], January 7, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Zao jiya 
de Shanxi Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui chuandao, Jidutu An Yankui, Zhang 
Chenghao huijian lushi de hefa quanli bei boduo lushi yu jiandu'' 
[Detained Shanxi Zion (Xuncheng) Reformed Church preachers, Christians 
An Yankui and Zhang Chenghao denied legal right to meet lawyer, lawyer 
calls for oversight], January 26, 2022.
    \81\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``An Yankui and Zhang Chenghao 
of Taiyuan Xuncheng Reformed Church Officially Arrested,'' January 6, 
2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Chi hefa huzhao chuguo de 
Taiyuan Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui wu wei tonggong yishen beipan 
youzui'' [Five fellow workers from Taiyuan Zion (Xuncheng) Reformed 
Church who traveled abroad with valid passports found guilty in court 
of first instance], January 7, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Zao jiya 
de Shanxi Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui chuandao, Jidutu An Yankui, Zhang 
Chenghao huijian lushi de hefa quanli bei boduo lushi yu jiandu'' 
[Detained Shanxi Zion (Xuncheng) Reformed Church preachers, Christians 
An Yankui and Zhang Chenghao denied legal right to meet lawyer, lawyer 
calls for oversight], January 26, 2022. For more information, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2021-00388 on An 
Yankui and 2021-00545 on Zhang Chenghao.
    \82\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao jiya de Shanxi Xuncheng Guizheng 
Jiaohui chuandao, Jidutu An Yankui, Zhang Chenghao huijian lushi de 
hefa quanli bei boduo lushi yu jiandu'' [Detained Shanxi Zion 
(Xuncheng) Reformed Church preachers, Christians An Yankui and Zhang 
Chenghao denied legal right to meet lawyer, lawyer calls for 
oversight], January 26, 2022. In June 2022, ChinaAid Association 
reported that Zhang had later been allowed to meet with his lawyer. Yu 
Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Shanxi Taiyuan Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui 
An Yankui chuandao he tonggong Zhang Chenghao she `tou yue (guo) 
bianjing zui' an yi yijiao fayuan'' [Shanxi Taiyuan Zion (Xuncheng) 
Reformed Church preacher An Yankui and coworker Zhang Chenghao 
``crossing (the country's) border'' case has already been transferred 
to the court], June 16, 2022.
    \83\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Taiyuan Zion Reformed Church 
Raided--Seven Christians Questioned,'' April 6, 2022.
    \84\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Two Teachers Released on 
Bail, Two Teachers Arrested with No Update,'' March 4, 2022.
    \85\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Two Teachers Released on 
Bail, Two Teachers Arrested with No Update,'' March 4, 2022. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2022-00140 on Wan Hongxia and 2022-00141 on Wang Minghai.
    \86\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``CCP Police Arrest Staff and 
Students at Maizi Christian Music High School / Principal Xu 
Unreachable for More than 60 Hours,'' September 7, 2021.
    \87\ John Ma, ChinaAid Association, ``Beijing Government Shuts Down 
Another Private School,'' November 3, 2021.
    \88\ Rights Defense Network, ``Taiyuan Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui 
Jidutu Zhao Weikai bei zhengshi pibu'' [Taiyuan Zion (Xuncheng) 
Reformed Church Christian Zhao Weikai formally approved for arrest], 
July 21, 2021; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Taiyuan Xuncheng 
Jiaohui tonggong Zhao Weikai bei zhengshi daibu'' [Taiyuan Zion 
(Xuncheng) Reformed Church coworker Zhao Weikai formally arrested], 
July 21, 2021. For more information on Zhao Weikai, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00513.
    \89\ Rights Defense Network, ``Taiyuan Xuncheng Guizheng Jiaohui 
Jidutu Zhao Weikai bei zhengshi pibu'' [Taiyuan Zion (Xuncheng) 
Reformed Church Christian Zhao Weikai formally approved for arrest], 
July 21, 2021; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Taiyuan Xuncheng 
Jiaohui tonggong Zhao Weikai bei zhengshi daibu'' [Taiyuan Zion 
(Xuncheng) Reformed Church coworker Zhao Weikai formally arrested], 
July 21, 2021.
    \90\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Meiguo Jidujiao jiating 
jiaoyu jigou Abeka Zhongguo daili bei jingfang daizou'' [China 
representatives of U.S. Christian homeschooling education program, 
Abeka, are taken away by police], October 13, 2021.
    \91\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Meiguo Jidujiao jiating 
jiaoyu jigou Abeka Zhongguo daili bei jingfang daizou'' [China 
representatives of U.S. Christian homeschooling education program, 
Abeka, are taken away by police], October 13, 2021.
    \92\ Wang Kexin, ``Sentenced Up to Six Years in Jail for Selling 
Bible Players,'' Bitter Winter, August 3, 2021; ChinaAid Association, 
``Bao'an District Court Authorities Harshly Sentence Four Christians, 
Fu Xuanjuan, Deng Tianyong, Han Li, and Feng Qunhao for Selling Bible 
Players,'' July 31, 2021; Rights Defense Network, ``Yin hefa xiaoshou 
Shengjing bofangqi er zao zhuabu de Fu Xuanjuan, Deng Tianyong, Han Li, 
Feng Qunhao deng si Jidutu mianlin 5 nian yu 1 nian 6 ge yue budeng de 
xingqi'' [Four Christians, including Fu Xuanjuan, Deng Tianyong, Han 
Li, and Feng Qunhao, who were arrested for legally selling Bible 
players, face sentences ranging from five years to one year and six 
months], December 12, 2020. For more information, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00015 on Fu Xuanjuan, 2021-
00030 on Deng Tianyong, 2021-00031 on Han Li, and 2021-00032 on Feng 
Qunhao.
    \93\ ChinaAid Association, ``Jidujiao shudian `Xiaomai Shufang' 
Chen Yu an ershen: weichi yuanpan'' [Second instance trial in case of 
Chen Yu's Christian bookstore ``Xiaomai Bookstore'': original verdict 
upheld], January 7, 2022; ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's Annual 
Persecution Report 2021: January-December 2021,'' March 1, 2022, 42. 
For more information on Chen Yu, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2020-00247. Chen Yu is also known as Zhang 
Xiaomai.
    \94\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 300.
    \95\ ``Reported in 2021: 132 Falun Gong Practitioners Die in the 
Persecution of Their Faith,'' Minghui, January 8, 2022; ``Reported in 
2021: 1,187 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their Faith,'' 
Minghui, January 5, 2022.
    \96\ ``Jiamusi Liu Lijie an bei yishen fayuan feifa panjue yi tichu 
shangsu'' [The Jiamusi Liu Lijie case was illegally judged by the Court 
of First Instance, appeal already filed], Minghui, November 20, 2021; 
``Lu zao pohai Jiamusi shi youxiu rencai Liu Lijie you mianlin 
tingshen'' [Repeatedly suffering persecution, Jiamusi municipality 
outstanding talent Liu Lijie once again faces a court hearing], 
Minghui, September 22, 2021. For more information on Liu Lijie, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00535.
    \97\ ``Lu zao pohai Jiamusi shi youxiu rencai Liu Lijie you mianlin 
tingshen'' [Repeatedly suffering persecution, Jiamusi municipality 
outstanding talent Liu Lijie once again faces a court hearing], 
Minghui, September 22, 2021.
    \98\ ``Heilongjiang Woman Imprisoned to Serve Wrongful Term Despite 
High Blood Pressure,'' Minghui, January 22, 2022.
    \99\ ``Beijing shiyi ming Falun Gong xueyuan bei feifa panxing er 
zhi ba nian'' [Eleven Beijing Falun Gong practitioners illegally 
sentenced to between two and eight years], Minghui, January 24, 2022; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Yin yiqing qijian fabu yixie guonei yiqing 
zhaopian, Falun Gong xueyuan Xu Na nushi jin huo xing ba nian'' [Falun 
Gong practitioner Ms. Xu Na was sentenced to eight years for sharing 
some photographs of the domestic epidemic situation during the period 
of the epidemic], January 16, 2022. For more information on Xu Na and 
the ten other Falun Gong practitioners sentenced concurrently on 
January 12, 2022, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
record 2008-00675.
    \100\ ``Beijing shiyi ming Falun Gong xueyuan bei feifa panxing er 
zhi ba nian'' [Eleven Beijing Falun Gong practitioners illegally 
sentenced to between two and eight years], Minghui, January 24, 2022; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Yin yiqing qijian fabu yixie guonei yiqing 
zhaopian, Falun Gong xueyuan Xu Na nushi jin huo xing 8 nian'' [Falun 
Gong practitioner Ms. Xu Na was sentenced to eight years for sharing 
some photographs of the domestic epidemic situation during the period 
of the epidemic], January 16, 2022.
    \101\ Liang Xiaojun (@liangxiaojunlawyer), ``Suimo, diao zhao 
ganyan'' [An end-of-year reflection on my disbarment], WeChat post, 
December 31, 2021.
    \102\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation, April 4, 2022, 1-3.
    \103\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation, April 4, 2022, 1, 4, 6-7.
    \104\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation, April 4, 2022, 1, 4, 6-7. While the latest date of 
sources that comprise the dataset used by the researchers was in 2015, 
they state that ``if prisoners--of whatever sort--are indeed still 
being used as an organ source, we think it is most rational to believe 
that the procurement of their organs continues to occasion violations 
of the DDR.'' For prior anecdotal and textual claims, see World 
Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, ``Zhongguo 
dalu yixue zhuanye lunwen zhong youguan Zhonggong huoti zhai qu Falun 
Gong xueyuan qiguan de zhengju'' [Evidence of the CCP harvesting of 
organs from Falun Gong practitioners in medical papers in mainland 
China], September 24, 2014.
    \105\ Forced Organ Harvesting in China: Examining the Evidence, 
Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 117th Cong. (2022), (testimony of Ethan Gutmann, 
Senior Research Fellow in China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial 
Foundation).
    \106\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious 
Groups,'' March 29, 2022, 1, 3.
    \107\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious 
Groups,'' March 29, 2022, 4, 12-14; Wang Yichi, ``600 Church of 
Almighty God Members Sentenced in 2021,'' Bitter Winter, November 3, 
2021; Jiang Tao, ``Church of Almighty God: Another 300+ Arrested in 
China,'' Bitter Winter, December 16, 2021.
    \108\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious 
Groups,'' March 29, 2022, 25-26; Dui Hua uses ``Society of Disciples'' 
for ``Association of Disciples.'' Fang Yongrui, ``Crackdown on 
Association of Disciples Extends to Inner Mongolia,'' Bitter Winter, 
December 30, 2021.
    \109\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 300.
    \110\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Wei Quanmian Tuijin Xiangcun 
Zhenxing Jiakuai Nongye Nongcun Xiandaihua Tigong Sifa Fuwu he Baozhang 
de Yijian [Opinion on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for 
Comprehensively Advancing Rural Revitalization and Accelerating the 
Modernization of Agriculture and Rural Areas], July 14, 2021, para. 9.
    \111\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious 
Groups,'' March 29, 2022, 63.
    \112\ The Church of Almighty God, 2021 Annual Report on the Chinese 
Communist Government's Persecution of the Church of Almighty God, March 
3, 2022.
    \113\ Jing Tao, ``Church of Almighty God: Another 300+ Arrested in 
China,'' Bitter Winter, December 16, 2021.
    \114\ Fang Yongrui, ``Crackdown on Association of Disciples Extends 
to Inner Mongolia,'' Bitter Winter, December 30, 2021.

Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice

                 IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System

                            Criminal Justice

                                Findings

         The criminal justice system remained a 
        political instrument used for maintaining social order 
        in furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party's 
        authoritarian rule. The government punishes criminal 
        acts, but it also targets individuals who pursue 
        universal human rights, particularly when they 
        independently organize or challenge the Party's 
        authority.
         Government officials used extrajudicial and 
        extralegal means--such as mass internment camps, 
        ``black jails,'' and psychiatric hospitals--to detain 
        members of ethnic minorities, government critics, and 
        people who seek redress for harm caused by official 
        actions. ``Retention in custody'' is another form of 
        extrajudicial detention. It is provided by law and 
        allows anticorruption officials to detain people 
        without legal representation or judicial process. In 
        one example, local officials detained police officer 
        Wang Shengli through retention in custody and tortured 
        him, reportedly in retaliation for Wang's efforts to 
        expose their corrupt schemes.
         Arbitrary detention did not abate despite 
        official rhetoric promoting ``rule-based governance.'' 
        Authorities labeled rights advocates and dissidents as 
        criminals, using provisions such as ``endangering state 
        security'' and other vaguely defined offenses. For 
        example, authorities sentenced entrepreneur Sun Dawu to 
        18 years in prison on a range of criminal charges 
        including ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' 
        Previously, Sun had voiced support for human rights 
        lawyers and criticized the government's handling of the 
        African swine flu epidemic.
         Legally recognized forms of detention--such as 
        retention in custody and ``residential surveillance at 
        a designated location''--may lend a veneer of legality 
        to official actions, but detention was often 
        arbitrarily applied and used by officials as cover for 
        secret detentions. Reports emerged this past year 
        indicating that officials had tortured individuals 
        while holding them in these forms of detention. As 
        examples, petitioner Wan Wenying suffered fractured 
        ribs due to repeated beatings; citizen journalist Zhang 
        Zhan was subjected to force-feeding and was denied 
        adequate medical care despite her fast-deteriorating 
        health; and a transgender person, Chen Luo'an, 
        reportedly endured sexual assault in a detention 
        facility but the government did nothing to investigate.
         There continued to be examples of authorities 
        denying detainees family and counsel visits. In one 
        example, officials in Beijing municipality invoked 
        public health concerns in preventing Wang Su'e from 
        visiting her husband Zhang Wenhe, who was forcibly 
        committed to a psychiatric hospital for the fifth time 
        for his pro-democracy activities. In the case of Wang 
        Zang, detention center officials prevented him from 
        meeting with his lawyer for over one year and two 
        months, alleging public health reasons; they granted a 
        telephone conversation only after the lawyer filed a 
        complaint with the procuratorate.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Publicly advocate for political prisoners. Chinese 
        officials have deprived individuals of liberty on 
        unsubstantiated criminal charges and for political 
        reasons. Experience demonstrates that consistently and 
        prominently raising individual prisoner cases--and the 
        larger human rights issues they represent--can result 
        in improved treatment in detention, lighter sentences 
        or, in some cases, release from custody, detention, or 
        imprisonment. Specific cases of prisoners can be found 
        in this section and other sections in this report. For 
        additional cases, refer to the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database and the Tom Lantos Human Rights 
        Commission's ``Defending Freedoms'' Project.
          Advocate for United States citizens and lawful 
        permanent residents, such as Kai Li and Pastor David 
        Lin, whom Chinese authorities arbitrarily detained in 
        or prevented from leaving China. Devise and implement 
        measures to proactively counter the PRC's use of 
        hostage diplomacy as leverage to advance its political 
        objectives.
          Prioritize an end to arbitrary detention through 
        diplomatic engagement. The Administration should urge 
        Chinese officials to end all forms of arbitrary 
        detention, and raise this issue in all bilateral 
        discussions and in multilateral institutions of which 
        the United States and China are members. The 
        Administration should create public diplomacy campaigns 
        and support media efforts to raise global awareness 
        about the detention of political and religious 
        prisoners in ``black jails,'' psychiatric institutions, 
        compulsory drug detoxification centers, police and 
        state security detention centers, and mass internment 
        camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 
        addition, the Administration should consider funding 
        non-governmental projects that assist individuals with 
        evidence collection and submissions to accumulate 
        evidence on Chinese officials complicit in the 
        arbitrary detention of political and religious 
        prisoners.
          Take the necessary steps to ensure that U.S. 
        businesses are not complicit in People's Republic of 
        China (PRC) abuses of police power. The Administration 
        and Members of Congress should take the necessary steps 
        to prohibit the export of U.S. surveillance 
        technologies and equipment to PRC security services. 
        Members of Congress should hold public hearings and 
        private meetings with companies from their districts to 
        raise awareness of the risk of complicity in human 
        rights abuses and privacy violations that U.S. 
        companies working in China may face. Topics of meetings 
        could include complicity in the use of artificial 
        intelligence technology and surveillance equipment to 
        monitor human rights advocates, religious believers, 
        and ethnic minority groups in China.
          Voice support for human rights advocates in China. 
        Members of Congress and Administration officials, 
        especially the President, should regularly meet with 
        Chinese civil society and democracy advocates and human 
        rights defenders, as well as other targets of Chinese 
        government repression. The Administration and Members 
        of Congress should discuss with Chinese counterparts 
        the importance of protection for such individuals in a 
        wide range of bilateral and multilateral discussions 
        with Chinese officials.
          Emphasize to the Chinese government the need for 
        greater transparency in its use of the death penalty. 
        The Administration and Members of Congress should urge 
        Chinese officials to disclose the number and 
        circumstances of executions. The Administration and 
        Members of Congress should urge the Chinese government 
        to ban explicitly, in national legislation, the 
        procurement of organs from live and executed prisoners, 
        prisoners of conscience, and other persons detained in 
        the PRC.

Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice

                            Criminal Justice

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, PRC officials 
continued to use the criminal justice system and various other 
forms of detention to arbitrarily detain individuals. As of 
February 2022, the human rights monitoring group Rights Defense 
Network documented 1,279 cases of active detention, which it 
estimated to be a small fraction of the total number of 
political and religious prisoners in China.\1\ In reviewing 
PRC's administration of justice in 2020, a scholar observed a 
standardization of abusive procedures in politically sensitive 
cases, such as total isolation and torture of detainees, the 
scope of which had expanded given the diminishing space for 
speech and civil society activity.\2\ These factors are 
relevant, for example, in evaluating diplomatic assurances made 
by the Chinese government that it will protect the due process 
rights of a person subject to extradition to China.\3\
    The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considers a 
detention arbitrary if 1) it has no legal basis, 2) it is used 
to suppress the exercise of universal human rights, 3) the 
detainee's due process rights are violated, 4) asylum seekers 
or refugees are subjected to prolonged detention, or 5) the 
detention is discriminatory on grounds such as religion, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, and political opinion.\4\ 
Arbitrary detention violates international human rights 
standards \5\ and China's Constitution, which prohibits 
unlawful deprivation or restriction of a person's liberty.\6\ 
All forms of arbitrary detention are prohibited under 
international law, including ``detention within the framework 
of criminal justice, administrative detention, detention in the 
context of migration and detention in the health-care 
settings.'' \7\

                        Extrajudicial Detention

    Chinese authorities used the following forms of 
extrajudicial detention this past year to arbitrarily detain 
individuals:

                         ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

    Reports of enforced disappearance continued to emerge this 
past year.\8\ ``Enforced disappearance'' is any form of 
deprivation of a person's liberty carried out by the government 
or with its acquiescence, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
the detention or to disclose the detainee's whereabouts.\9\
    As of February 2022, rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng remained 
missing since his disappearance in August 2017, after he wrote 
a book detailing his experience of being tortured and his 
outlook on democratization in China.\10\ In December 2021, 
domestic security protection officers detained another rights 
lawyer, Tang Jitian, in Beijing municipality before his planned 
attendance at a human rights event organized by the European 
Union.\11\ As of June 2022, Tang's detention location remained 
unknown, and he reportedly fainted because of deteriorating 
health, prompting concerns that he had suffered 
mistreatment.\12\
    In another case, tennis player Peng Shuai disappeared in 
November 2021, after she wrote a post on a social media 
platform accusing a former vice premier of sexually assaulting 
her.\13\ About two weeks later, state-run news media published 
a message in which Peng recanted her accusation and denied her 
disappearance.\14\ Peng subsequently gave media interviews 
arranged by Chinese officials, but some journalists and human 
rights experts expressed doubt that Peng was actually free.\15\ 
[For more information on the case of Peng Shuai, see Section 
VI--Status of Women.]

                              BLACK JAILS

    The informal term ``black jail'' refers to buildings such 
as hotels and training centers that government officials or 
their agents use to detain people.\16\ These extralegal 
detention facilities operate under different names, including 
``assistance and service center'' or ``legal education 
center.'' \17\ Their existence and use have no legal basis, and 
people detained in such sites--many of whom are petitioners 
\18\ and Falun Gong practitioners \19\--do not know when they 
will be released and do not have any procedural protection.\20\
    One report indicates that the use of black jails is not 
limited to China. Non-governmental organization (NGO) ChinaAid 
Association reported that Chinese officials in Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates, held Wu Huan for 10 days in a detention facility 
converted from a villa, releasing her on June 8, 2021.\21\ 
During detention, officials repeatedly threatened Wu, denied 
her food, and asked her to sign a document incriminating her 
fiance Wang Jingyu, who had fled China because he was wanted by 
the Chinese government for questioning the official death toll 
in the 2020 conflict between the Indian and Chinese 
militaries.\22\

                         PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES

    Forcibly committing individuals without mental illness to 
psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) for acts such as 
expressing political opinions or grievances against the 
government continued during this past year,\23\ despite 
domestic legal provisions prohibiting such abuse.\24\ In 
particular, the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care 
provide that a ``determination that a person has a mental 
illness shall be made in accordance with internationally 
accepted medical standards'' and must not be based on 
``political, economic or social status . . . or any other 
reason not directly relevant to mental health status.'' \25\
    Between July 2021 and June 2022, the Chinese human rights 
organization Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch documented 14 
cases of forcible psychiatric commitment across China.\26\ One 
notable case concerned teacher Li Tiantian, whom officials 
forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital in Xiangxi Tujia 
and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Hunan province, in December 
2021 because she voiced support for a professor in Shanghai 
municipality who was terminated for questioning the official 
death toll in the historical event known as the Nanjing 
Massacre.\27\ Li was four months pregnant at the time, and 
people who looked for her went missing.\28\ Authorities 
released her from the hospital about a week later but placed 
her under constant surveillance and restricted her speech.\29\

                        ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

    Chinese authorities continued to suppress freedoms such as 
protest,\30\ movement,\31\ and religion \32\ by employing 
administrative detention,\33\ which is among several types of 
administrative penalties authorized by the PRC Public Security 
Administration Punishment Law and the PRC Administrative 
Penalty Law,\34\ and referenced in about 90 domestic laws and 
regulations.\35\ Some political detainees are subjected to 
further criminal detention and prosecution after completion of 
administration detention.\36\

                          RETENTION IN CUSTODY

    The PRC Supervision Law (Supervision Law),\37\ authorizes 
the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to investigate 
suspected official misconduct \38\ using methods including 
``retention in custody'' (liuzhi),\39\ an extrajudicial form of 
detention that allows NSC officials to hold individuals without 
legal representation and deny them the right to be tried.\40\
    According to an official report, the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission 
detained 5,006 persons under retention in custody in 2021 as 
part of their efforts to investigate corruption.\41\ In one 
case, Wang Shengli, a police officer from the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region who specialized in economic crimes, became 
permanently disabled as a result of torture he endured during 
retention in custody.\42\ In a transcript that became available 
around January 2022, Wang said that local officials placed him 
under ``retention in custody'' in retaliation for his efforts 
to expose their corrupt schemes.\43\ Beginning in January 2018, 
officials held Wang in two facilities for nearly six months, 
during which time they ordered him to sit still, and deprived 
him of sleep and sufficient food.\44\ He hallucinated, became 
emaciated, and had extensive blood clots in his legs.\45\

                         MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS

    Authorities continued to operate a system of extrajudicial 
mass internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) in which they have arbitrarily detained over a million 
individuals from predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups, 
including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others.\46\ In 
April 2022, the U.S. Government reiterated its determination 
that the Chinese government is committing genocide against 
Muslim minorities in China.\47\ [For more information on 
arbitrary detention in China's mass internment camps, see 
Section X--Xinjiang.]

                      Abuse of Criminal Provisions

    As ``law-based governance'' remained a theme in official 
rhetoric,\48\ Chinese authorities continued to suppress the 
exercise of universal human rights through the use of criminal 
charges. Commonly applied criminal charges include the 
following:

         Crimes of endangering state security is a 
        category of 12 offenses that carry a maximum of life 
        imprisonment \49\ and have been lodged against 
        government critics and rights lawyers.\50\
         Picking quarrels and provoking trouble, often 
        considered a catch-all offense and encompassing 
        internet activities,\51\ carries up to 10 years in 
        prison \52\ and is an offense that the government 
        sometimes uses against people whom it deems to be 
        troublemakers.\53\ Ahead of the National People's 
        Congress annual meeting in March 2022, Chinese People's 
        Political Consultative Conference member Zhu Zhengfu 
        said the offense should be repealed because it is 
        vaguely defined and additionally may result in a legal 
        absurdity, in that, conduct that does not otherwise 
        satisfy the elements of a lighter offense may be 
        subject to a lengthier prison term under this 
        offense.\54\
         Extortion, carrying over 10 years of 
        imprisonment depending on the amount of money 
        involved,\55\ has been applied to individuals who 
        petition the government for redress of grievances.\56\
         Illegal business activity,\57\ carrying a 
        maximum sentence of over five years, has been used in 
        cases involving religious and political 
        publications.\58\
         Fraud,\59\ the maximum sentence for which can 
        be life imprisonment depending on the amount involved, 
        has been lodged against church leaders who collected 
        offerings from church members.\60\
         Organizing and using a cult to undermine 
        implementation of the law, with sentences ranging from 
        under three years to life imprisonment,\61\ is 
        typically used to prosecute individuals considered to 
        be ``cult members,'' such as Falun Gong 
        practitioners,\62\ and lawyers are prohibited from 
        contesting the government's ``cult designation'' in the 
        course of defending the accused.\63\

    Defendants sometimes face multiple criminal charges and 
hence lengthy sentences, such as in the case of entrepreneur 
Sun Dawu, whom authorities accused of eight offenses: ``picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble,'' ``obstructing official 
business,'' ``conducting coercive transactions,'' ``illegal 
mining,'' ``illegal occupying of agricultural land,'' ``illegal 
fundraising,'' ``gathering a crowd to attack a government 
agency,'' and ``disrupting production operations.'' \64\ In 
July 2021, the Gaobeidian City People's Court in Baoding 
municipality, Hebei province, sentenced Sun to 18 years in 
prison, and additionally sentenced his employees, his son, and 
his brothers to prison terms ranging from 1 to 12 years.\65\ 
Sun had voiced support for human rights lawyers and criticized 
the government's handling of the African swine flu 
epidemic.\66\ Before Sun's detention, personnel of a state-run 
farm attempted to demolish one of his company's offices; after 
his detention, local officials took over management of his 
company.\67\ Sun's lawyers noted that court proceedings would 
last over 12 hours on most days during the 14-day trial \68\ 
and ``were conducted with unusual urgency.'' \69\ They further 
pointed out that authorities had illegally detained Sun under 
``residential surveillance at a designated location.'' \70\ 
[For more information on this form of coercive measure under 
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, see the subsection 
``Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location'' below.]

             Restriction of Liberty of Foreign Individuals

    The Chinese government continued to arbitrarily restrict 
the liberty of foreign individuals as leverage to advance its 
political goals,\71\ a practice that has sharply escalated 
since 2018, as observed by the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI).\72\ In a report published in August 2020, 
ASPI noted that this type of arbitrary detention often involved 
``enforced disappearances, unusual trial delays, harsh 
punishments, prolonged interrogations and lack of transparency 
to maximise the effects of coercion.'' \73\ Furthermore, 
Chinese authorities are ``known to reinstate Chinese 
citizenship to detainees to prevent them from being repatriated 
. . ..'' \74\

                           Pretrial Detention

    Reports continued to emerge indicating that Chinese 
authorities subjected political prisoners to prolonged pretrial 
detention, a violation of the right to a speedy trial under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\75\ The 
PRC Criminal Procedure Law requires that a decision to formally 
arrest an individual must be made within 37 days of the initial 
detention.\76\ Thereafter, absent special circumstances, the 
procuratorate has one month to indict an individual, and the 
court is required to complete trial and sentencing within two 
months of receiving the case from the procuratorate.\77\ NGO 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders observed that ``Chinese 
authorities routinely use prolonged pretrial detention, for no 
particular reason, to lock up rights defenders and dissidents 
without any judicial review.'' \78\ One recent example involves 
lawyer Qin Yongpei, who remained in pretrial detention as of 
March 2022, over 21 months after his detention in October 
2019.\79\ [For more information on Qin Yongpei's case, see 
Section IV--Access to Justice.]
    In an article that does not focus on political cases, a 
China-based scholar acknowledged China's high rate of pretrial 
detention but noted a sudden decline in 2020, possibly due to 
public health concerns surrounding COVID-19.\80\ ``[T]he 
national average pretrial detention rate was almost 95%'' 
between 1990 and 2009, which, according to the scholar's 
estimates, was followed by a trend of gradual decline, reaching 
66 percent in 2019.\81\ The Supreme People's Procuratorate 
reported in 2021 that the pretrial detention rate fell to 53 
percent in 2020.\82\ The sharp decline could be attributed to 
local authorities' attempt to reduce the number of detainees so 
as to abate COVID-19 transmission within detention facilities, 
as reflected by case officers proactively processing bails, 
rather than waiting for the lawyers to make the request.\83\ 
The scholar noted that the continuation of a low pretrial 
detention rate after the pandemic would be consistent with the 
Party's stated goal of promoting non-custodial measures, but he 
cautioned that it was also possible that the downward trend 
would reverse course.\84\

                  Denial of Counsel and Family Visits

    The Commission observed cases in which Chinese authorities 
denied detainees the right to counsel and family visits, in 
violation of international law.\85\ While domestic legal 
provisions permit counsel and family visits, they do not 
describe such visits as rights.\86\ In particular, the PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law does not provide for family visits per 
se but permits visitation only if the family member is acting 
as a defense representative.\87\ The law likewise circumscribes 
counsel visits during the investigation phase of a case if it 
involves state security, requiring prior permission by relevant 
authorities.\88\
    For example, Radio Free Asia reported that officials in 
Sichuan and Qinghai provinces denied Tibetan political 
prisoners visitation by their family members, citing concern 
about the spread of COVID-19, despite the lack of reported 
transmission for over a year.\89\ Officials in Beijing 
municipality likewise invoked public health concerns in 
preventing Wang Su'e from visiting her husband Zhang Wenhe, who 
was forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for the fifth 
time for his pro-democracy activities.\90\

                Denial of Effective Legal Representation

    Chinese authorities denied criminal defendants the right to 
effective legal assistance by a representative of his or her 
own choosing, especially in political cases.\91\ NGO Safeguard 
Defenders observed that effective legal representation ``may 
help mitigate the sentence, provide a degree of accountability 
by making abuses public knowledge, [and] provide a lifeline 
between the detainee and their loved ones,'' but authorities 
openly, repeatedly, and systematically denied legal 
representation by means including coercing detainees into 
firing their lawyers, disbarring lawyers, and holding people 
under false names or setting up bureaucratic hurdles to prevent 
counsel visits.\92\ In one example, detention center officials 
prevented writer Wang Zang from meeting with his lawyer for 
over one year and two months, alleging public health reasons; 
they granted a telephone conversation only after the lawyer 
filed a complaint with the procuratorate.\93\

                           Torture and Abuse

    Reports indicate that the practice of torture and abuse of 
detainees continues in China, a violation of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, to which China is a signatory.\94\
    In one report of torture, police took petitioner Wan 
Wenying into custody after she had traveled to Beijing, where 
she intended to file a petition regarding bodily injuries she 
sustained from being beaten by a police officer in Shanghai 
municipality in 2018.\95\ Beginning in September 2021, her 
captors detained Wan in different rooms in two hotels, beating 
her on two occasions and fracturing her ribs, and denied her 
medical care over a period of 50 days.\96\
    Zhang Zhan, whom authorities sentenced to four years in 
prison for documenting the government's mishandling of the 
COVID-19 outbreak, suffered from ``severe malnutrition, a 
gastric ulcer, [and] advanced oedema of her lower limbs and is 
unable to walk or raise her head without being assisted,'' 
according to a group of UN human rights experts, who called for 
her immediate release.\97\ In July 2021, officials committed 
her to a prison hospital for 11 days, subjecting her to force-
feeding.\98\ The experts noted that Zhang's health was fast 
deteriorating and said that Chinese authorities' ``failure to 
provide adequate medical treatment flies in the face of [its 
duty of care owed to Zhang].'' \99\
    In an article published in October 2021, a former Chinese 
detective who worked in the detention system in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region told CNN that he and his colleagues 
systematically tortured Uyghur detainees, some as young as 14 
years old, to extract confessions from them.\100\ In his 
opinion, however, none of the detainees he encountered actually 
committed a crime.\101\ According to the detective, methods of 
torture used by detention camp officials include kicking, 
beating, applying electric shocks to detainees' genitals, and 
ordering other detainees to rape new male inmates.\102\
    Sexual assault is also reported in the case of Chen Luo'an, 
a transgender person whom authorities sentenced to two years 
and six months in prison on the charges of ``picking quarrels 
and provoking trouble'' and ``theft'' in connection with 
allegations that information about PRC leader Xi Jinping's 
relatives was made public.\103\ A person who was detained with 
Chen reported that Chen was sexually assaulted by a homicide 
suspect in the detention facility and that the government did 
nothing to investigate.\104\ Custodial abuses may amount to 
torture if they are committed ``by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official,'' and 
international law obligates state officials to promptly report 
such abuses.\105\ [For information on other instances of sexual 
assault, see Section III--Freedom of Expression, Section VI--
Status of Women, and Section X--Xinjiang. For information on 
torture experienced by lawyer Chang Weiping, see the subsection 
``Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location'' below.]

                            Death in Custody

    Reports of custodial death continued to emerge this past 
year, one of which involved a petitioner whose death could be 
attributed to abuse.\106\ Public security officials in Jiangyin 
city, Wuxi municipality, Jiangsu province, who had been 
detaining petitioner Mao Lihui in a hotel, informed her family 
in March 2022 that Mao had died as a result of self-
immolation.\107\ A person familiar with the case speculated 
that self-immolation was impossible since her captors would 
have searched her and subjected her to constant 
surveillance.\108\ An unknown source surmised that Mao's body 
was set on fire after she had been beaten to death.\109\ 
Previously, authorities had detained Mao on at least three 
occasions since 2016, after she filed reports about local 
officials' misconduct, including fraudulently requisitioning 
communal farmland and forcibly demolishing her father's 
residence.\110\
    Multiple custodial deaths of Uyghurs occurred, some of 
which involved allegations of torture and neglect:

         Imam Qeyimahun Qari, whom authorities detained 
        in 2017 and held in a mass internment camp, died in 
        2018 in the XUAR.\111\ He previously served a 15-year 
        prison term after having been sentenced in 1991 for 
        ``separatism.'' \112\ The cause of Qeyimahun's death 
        was unknown, but a source described him as a healthy 
        man prior to his detention; the source further reported 
        that ``police frequently interrogated [Qeyimahun] 
        inside the camp to try to obtain information about the 
        Uyghurs who came to his mosque . . ..'' \113\
         Shahzadigul Tomur, a 45-year-old woman and 
        detainee at a mass internment camp, died in September 
        2020 after vomiting blood and losing consciousness in a 
        sock factory in the XUAR where she performed forced 
        labor since 2018.\114\ Despite knowledge of her 
        condition, camp officials forced her to continue 
        working.\115\ Prior to her death, Shahzadigul Tomur had 
        been unable to eat because of allergies, but camp 
        officials interpreted her condition as a voluntary 
        hunger strike and subjected her to torture and 
        interrogations.\116\
         Niyaz Nasir, a retired civil servant whom 
        authorities had detained in an internment camp in the 
        XUAR since 2018, died at the end of 2020.\117\ 
        Authorities ordered the family to immediately bury the 
        body and did not provide any explanation for his 
        detention or death.\118\
         Businessman Yaqub Haji died in September 2021 
        after having been detained in the XUAR since 2018 on 
        suspicion of ``religious extremism,'' a charge that was 
        related to the financial support he gave to a religious 
        cleric and for building a mosque.\119\ Authorities 
        reportedly tortured Yaqub Haji for not confessing to 
        the alleged crime.\120\

           Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location

    Chinese authorities continued to abuse the form of 
detention known as ``residential surveillance at a designated 
location'' (RSDL), which the PRC Criminal Procedure Law 
reserves for situations where the detainee does not have a 
permanent residence or if the case involves state security or 
terrorism.\121\ The law does not provide for the right to 
family visits, requiring only that the family be notified of 
the fact of the detention within 24 hours if possible; it does 
not require the disclosure of the detention location.\122\ The 
law further subjects counsel visits to approval by the 
investigation unit.\123\ A group of UN experts observed that 
``these conditions of detention are analogous to incommunicado 
and secret detention and tantamount to enforced 
disappearance,'' which heighten the risk of torture and 
abuse.\124\ According to a research report focusing on the 
application of RSDL to human rights defenders, NGO Safeguard 
Defenders documented 175 individual cases as of June 2021 and 
noted that ``RSDL may be being used as a tool of intimidation 
and to coerce testimony against others.'' \125\
    In one example, detained rights lawyer Chang Weiping told 
his lawyer during a counsel visit in September 2021 that when 
he was previously held under RSDL, authorities forced him to 
sit in an interrogation chair continuously for six days and six 
nights, subjected him to prolonged interrogation, and denied 
him privacy, sanitary needs, and sufficient food.\126\ 
Authorities detained Chang for providing legal representation 
in discrimination cases and for revealing his experience of 
being tortured in a previous detention.\127\

                           The Death Penalty

    The Chinese government continued to classify statistics 
relating to the use of the death penalty as a ``state secret.'' 
\128\ Despite the official claim that this punishment is 
reserved for a small number of crimes and only the most serious 
offenders,\129\ the human rights group Amnesty International 
``believed that the number of death sentences imposed and 
executions carried out during [2021] remained in the 
thousands.'' \130\ [For more information on organ procurement 
from death row prisoners, see Section V, Chapter 10--Human 
Trafficking.]
    The new PRC Legal Aid Law, which became effective in 
January 2022, expands state-sponsored legal aid services to 
cover several groups of people, including capital defendants 
and those seeking review of a death sentence.\131\ At a 
conference held during the law's drafting stage, a group of 
China-based legal experts highlighted the importance of 
providing sufficient compensation and establishing 
qualifications for lawyers to ensure the quality of 
representation.\132\ In its final form, the law delegates to 
local governments the setting of standards of compensation but 
specifies that representation in capital and death sentence 
review cases must be rendered by lawyers with at least three 
years of experience.\133\ The effectiveness of the new law, 
however, is not yet clear.

                           Legal Developments

    In December 2021, the Supreme People's Court, Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and 
Ministry of Justice jointly issued an opinion aiming at 
improving the adjudication of sentence commutation and parole 
requests.\134\ Under the PRC Criminal Law, these requests are 
submitted by the detention facility to a people's court for 
adjudication based on a set of factors such as repentance or 
major contributions to society.\135\ Intended to counter 
corruption and to develop a better mechanism for ascertaining 
facts,\136\ the opinion was prompted in part by an incident in 
which a person committed homicide and assault after being 
released from jail as a result of multiple commutations, 
facilitated by prison and court officials who had accepted 
bribes from the person's family.\137\ A China-based scholar 
welcomed the opinion's emphasis on the court's factfinding 
duty, rather than relying on the materials submitted by the 
agency.\138\ She noted, however, that the opinion did not 
explicitly provide for an adversarial proceeding between the 
detention facility (as the requester) and the procuratorate (as 
the supervisor), a proceeding which would enhance the court's 
factfinding capacity.\139\

Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice

    Notes to Section IV--Criminal Justice

    \1\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, 
liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2022 nian 2 yue 28 ri) di 77 qi (gong 1279 
ren) (yi)'' [Monthly report on political prisoners and prisoners of 
conscience detained in mainland China (February 28, 2022) No. 77 (total 
1,279 persons) (I)], February 28, 2022.
    \2\ Chen Yu-Jie, ``Human Rights in the Chinese Administration of 
Justice: Formalizing Ideology in the Political and Legal System and 
Institutionalizing and Normalizing Human Rights Abuses,'' trans. 
Siodhbhra Parkin, in China Human Rights Report 2020, Taiwan Foundation 
for Democracy, 2012, 8, 14, 28.
    \3\ Donald Clarke, ``New Zealand's Troubling Precedent for China 
Extradition,'' Lawfare (blog), June 15, 2021; Michael Caster, ``To the 
Supreme Court: Diplomatic Assurances from China Are Meaningless,'' 
Stuff, June 12, 2021.
    \4\ See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
at its 78th session, (19-27 April 2017), A/HRC/WGAD/2017/5, July 28, 
2017.
    \5\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 9.
    \6\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018),
art. 37.
    \7\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Deliberation No. 11 on Prevention of Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty 
in the Context of Public Health Emergencies, May 8, 2020, para. 7.
    \8\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan meitiren, 
jizhe, zuojia, `dabing mianfei yiliao ni wo meiri yihu' yundong 
tuiguangren Hu Xincheng zao qiangpo shizong 36 tian'' [Hu Xincheng of 
Wuhan, Hubei, who is a media worker, journalist, writer, and promoter 
of you and I proclaim ``major sickness deserves free medical care'' 
campaign, was forcibly disappeared for 36 days], January 9, 2022.
    \9\ International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 47/
133, December 18, 1992, art. 2.
    \10\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, 
liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2022 nian 2 yue 28 ri) di 77 qi (gong 1279 
ren) (san)'' [Monthly report on political prisoners and prisoners of 
conscience detained in mainland China (February 28, 2022) No. 77 (total 
1,279 persons) (III)], February 28, 2022; ``Gao Zhisheng shizong zheng 
san nian qizi huyu Meiguo jiu ren'' [Gao Zhisheng has been disappeared 
for three full years, wife asks the U.S. to save him], Radio Free Asia, 
August 14, 2020.
    \11\ International Observatory of Lawyers, ``China: The Observatory 
Denounces the Disappearance of the Lawyer Tang Jitian, His Arbitrary 
Detention Incommunicado in a Secret Location, the Silence of the 
Chinese Authorities and the Censorship Imposed on This Arbitrary 
Detention by the Chinese Authorities,'' February 24, 2022; ``Shilian 
bannian de lushi Tang Jitian chuanchu bei juya qijian toubu shouchuang, 
kong zao bu rendao duidai'' [Lawyer Tang Jitian who has been missing 
for half a year reportedly injured his head during detention, might 
have suffered inhuman treatment], Radio Free Asia, June 9, 2022.
    \12\ ``Shilian bannian de lushi Tang Jitian chuanchu bei juya 
qijian toubu shouchuang, kong zao bu rendao duidai'' [Lawyer Tang 
Jitian who has been missing for half a year reportedly injured his head 
during detention, might have suffered inhuman treatment], Radio Free 
Asia, June 9, 2022.
    \13\ Bindu Bansinath, ``What We Know About the Disappearance of 
Peng Shuai,'' The Cut, February 8, 2022.
    \14\ Bindu Bansinath, ``What We Know About the Disappearance of 
Peng Shuai,'' The Cut, February 8, 2022.
    \15\ Bindu Bansinath, ``What We Know About the Disappearance of 
Peng Shuai,'' The Cut, February 8, 2022.
    \16\ ``Zhongguo hei jianyu daguan'' [Overview of black jails in 
China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
    \17\ ``Zhongguo hei jianyu daguan'' [Overview of black jails in 
China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
    \18\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Ren Chunhua bei 
guan `xuexiban' zao nueda'' [Ren Chunhua detained in ``study class,'' 
suffered beating], August 10, 2021.
    \19\ See, e.g., Li Chencai, ``Hebei Honghe binguan she hei jianyu 
gengduo neimu xianwei renzhi'' [Hotel in Honghe, Hebei, has black jail 
installed, more rarely known inside information], Epoch Times, November 
17, 2021.
    \20\ ``Zhongguo hei jianyu daguan'' [Overview of black jails in 
China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
    \21\ ChinaAid Association, ``Jingtian heimu: Zao Zhonggong kuajing 
tongji xiebi de Wang Jingyu weihunqi tibao Zhonggong zai haiwai sheli 
`hei jianyu' '' [Shocking dark secret: Fiancee of Wang Jingyu, who is 
on the CCP's international wanted list, exposes ``black jail'' set up 
by the CCP on foreign soil], August 15, 2021.
    \22\ ChinaAid Association, ``Jingtian heimu: Zao Zhonggong kuajing 
tongji xiebi de Wang Jingyu weihunqi tibao Zhonggong zai haiwai sheli 
`hei jianyu' '' [Shocking dark secret: Fiancee of Wang Jingyu, who is 
on the CCP's international wanted list, exposes ``black jail'' set up 
by the Chinese CCP on foreign soil], August 15, 2021; ``Wang Jingyu yu 
weihunqi taoli Zhongguo zaidu tashang liumanglu'' [Wang Jingyu and his 
fiancee fled China and again tread the path of exile], Voice of 
America, July 23, 2021.
    \23\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen 
jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 year-
end report on mental health and human rights (forcible psychiatric 
commitment) situation in China], March 3, 2021.
    \24\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental 
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, arts. 27, 
29, 30, 32, 75(5), 78(1); Supreme People's Procuratorate, Renmin 
Jianchayuan Qiangzhi Yiliao Zhixing Jiancha Banfa (Shixing) [Measures 
on the Examination of Implementation of Compulsory Medical Treatment by 
People's Procuratorates (Trial)], issued May 13, 2016, effective June 
2, 2016, arts. 9, 12.
    \25\ Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 46/119 of December 17, 1991, principle 4(1), (2).
    \26\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Bei jingshenbing wenzhang 
liebiao'' [List of articles on cases involving forcible psychiatric 
commitment], accessed July 19, 2022.
    \27\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xiangxi nu jiaoshi Li 
Tiantian bei qiangzhi songjin jingshenbing yuan'' [Li Tiantian, female 
teacher from Xiangxi, forcibly committed to psychiatric hospital], 
December 22, 2021; ``Weibo shengyuan Shanghai jiaoshou Song Gengyi 
Xiangxi jiaoshi bei song jingshengbing yuan'' [Xiangxi teacher forcibly 
committed to psychiatric hospital after voicing support on Weibo for 
Shanghai professor Song Gengyi], Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2021.
    \28\ ``Li Tiantian chuyuan ziyou reng shou xianzhi dangju dingxing 
anjian nai jingwai shili caozong'' [Li Tiantian subjected to 
restrictions after leaving hospital, government characterizes the case 
as one concerning manipulation by foreign forces], Radio Free Asia, 
December 27, 2021; ``Weibo shengyuan Shanghai jiaoshou Song Gengyi 
Xiangxi jiaoshi bei song jingshengbing yuan'' [Xiangxi teacher forcibly 
committed to psychiatric hospital after voicing support on Weibo for 
Shanghai professor Song Gengyi], Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2021.
    \29\ ``Li Tiantian chuyuan ziyou reng shou xianzhi dangju dingxing 
anjian nai jingwai shili caozong'' [Li Tiantian subjected to 
restrictions after leaving hospital, government characterizes the case 
as one concerning manipulation by foreign forces], Radio Free Asia, 
December 27, 2021.
    \30\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hunan gongmin Peng Peiyu faqi fandui 
Eluosi dui Wukelan qinlue de fanzhan youxing er juliu,'' [Citizen Peng 
Peiyu of Hunan administratively detained for initiating an anti-war 
demonstration over Russia's invasion of Ukraine], March 3, 2022.
    \31\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei sheng ji minzhu renshi Liu 
Benqi danqi fu Xuzhou Fengxian tanfang `tielian nu' zao Xuzhou jingfang 
juliu'' [Liu Benqi, democracy proponent from Hubei province rode his 
motorcycle alone to Feng county, Xuzhou to visit ``chained woman,'' 
detained by Xuzhou police], February 23, 2022.
    \32\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shi'an Jiaohui zai zao dangju daya: 
Shanghai muqu chuandaoren Li Zhenhua zai Zhonggong guoqing qijian bei 
juliu 15 ri'' [Zion Church suffers persecution at the hands of the 
government again: Pastor Li Zhenhua of the Shanghai diocese detained 
for 15 days on the CCP's national day], October 25, 2021.
    \33\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ju bupa! Ha'erbin Mulan xian nongmin 
Liu Mingku yin jin Jing weiquan jintian zai song juliusuo'' [Not afraid 
of detention! Farmer Liu Mingku from Mulan county, Ha'erbin sent to 
detention facility today for going to Beijing to defend his rights], 
November 28, 2021.
    \34\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhi'an Guanli Chufa Fa [PRC Public 
Security Administration Punishment Law], passed August 28, 2005, 
amended October 26, 2012, effective January 1, 2013, art. 10; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [PRC Administrative Penalty Law], 
passed March 17, 1996, amended January 22, 2021, effective July 15, 
2021, art. 9.
    \35\ Ministry of Public Security, Weifan Gong'an Xingzheng Guanli 
Xingwei de Mingcheng ji Qi Shiyong Yijian [Opinion on the Titles and 
Applicable Laws for Public Security Administrative Violations], issued 
August 6, 2020.
    \36\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Shanxi `zhiming falu 
renshi' Hao Jingsong jiangyu 2021 nian 10 ye 12 zhi 13 ri zai Shanxi 
Dingxiang xian fayuan kaiting shenli'' [Well-known legal professional 
Hao Jingsong of Shanxi will have court hearing from October 12 to 13, 
2021, at the court in Dingxiang county, Shanxi], October 10, 2021.
    \37\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], 
passed and effective March 20, 2018.
    \38\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], 
passed and effective March 20, 2018, art. 3.
    \39\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], 
passed and effective March 20, 2018, art. 22; CECC, 2018 Annual Report, 
October 10, 2018, 103.
    \40\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], 
passed and effective March 20, 2018; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 
14(d); Safeguard Defenders, ``Submission to Select UN Special 
Procedures on China's National Supervision Commission and Its Detention 
Tool Liuzhi,'' August 21, 2019, para. 41; Gordon Watts, ``Mystery 
Deepens over Ex-Interpol Chief Meng,'' Asia Times, January 21, 2020.
    \41\ ``Zhao Leji zai shijiu jie Zhongyang Jiwei liu ci quanhui 
shang de gongzuo baogao'' [Zhao Leji presents work report at the sixth 
plenary session of the nineteenth Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection], February 24, 2022.
    \42\ Tianxia Shuofa (wulaws), ``Neimenggu jingcha Wang Shengli bei 
miekou qian de yishu'' [Will of Inner Mongolia policeman Wang Shengli 
made before he is killed], CareerEngine.us, January 23, 2022.
    \43\ Tianxia Shuofa (wulaws), ``Neimenggu jingcha Wang Shengli bei 
miekou qian de yishu'' [Will of Inner Mongolia policeman Wang Shengli 
made before he is killed], CareerEngine.us, January 23, 2022.
    \44\ Tianxia Shuofa (wulaws), ``Neimenggu jingcha Wang Shengli bei 
miekou qian de yishu'' [Will of Inner Mongolia policeman Wang Shengli 
made before he is killed], CareerEngine.us, January 23, 2022.
    \45\ Tianxia Shuofa (wulaws), ``Neimenggu jingcha Wang Shengli bei 
miekou qian de yishu'' [Will of Inner Mongolia policeman Wang Shengli 
made before he is killed], CareerEngine.us, January 23, 2022.
    \46\ Roseanne Gerin, ``Uyghur Camp Inmates Detail `Crimes Against 
Humanity' in New Amnesty Report,'' Radio Free Asia, June 10, 2021. See 
also Emma Graham-Harrison, ``China Has Built 380 Internment Camps in 
Xinjiang, Study Finds,'' Guardian, April 2, 2021.
    \47\ U.S. Department of State, ``Secretary Antony J. Blinken on the 
Release of the 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,'' April 
12, 2022; Paula Newton and Ben Westcott, ``Canada's Parliament Says 
China Committed Genocide against Muslim Minorities,'' CNN, February 23, 
2021.
    \48\ See, e.g., Wang Chen, ``Jianchi quanmian yifa zhiguo fazhi 
Zhongguo jianshe maichu jianshi bufa (xuexi guanche Dang de shijiu jie 
liu zhong quanhui jingshen)'' [Insist on comprehensive law-based 
governance, staunchly march toward building China with rule of law 
(studying to thoroughly implement the spirit expressed in the Party's 
sixth plenary session of the nineteenth Central Committee)], People's 
Daily, November 23, 2021.
    \49\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, arts. 102-5, 107-12.
    \50\ See, e.g., ``Guangxi lushi Chen Jiahong shandong dianfu guojia 
zhengquan zui cheng panqiu san nian'' [Lawyer Chen Jiahong of Guangxi 
sentenced to three years in prison for inciting subversion of state 
power], Radio Free Asia, December 14, 2021; ``Yijian shiren Wang Zang 
fufu she `shandian' zeri xuanpan shengyuan Yusan Yundong wei zhuyao 
zuizheng'' [Dissident and poet Wang Zang and his wife to be sentenced 
on another day on their case involving ``inciting subversion''; voicing 
support for the Umbrella Movement being the primary evidence], Radio 
Free Asia, December 15, 2021.
    \51\ Guo Rui, ``Explainer: `Picking Quarrels and Provoking 
Trouble': How China's Catch-all Crime Muzzles Dissent,'' South China 
Morning Post, August 25, 2021; Jeremy Daum, ``Updated: Quick Note on 
`Picking Quarrels,' '' China Law Translate (blog), August 1, 2014; 
``Wuyi shuo: Daodi shenme shi xunxin zishi zui?'' [Wuyi speaks: What is 
the crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble?], reprinted in 
China Digital Times, December 29, 2020; Supreme People's Court and 
Supreme People's Procuratorate, Guanyu Banli Liyong Xinxi Wangluo 
Shishi Feibang Deng Xingshi Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi 
[Interpretation on Some Questions Regarding Applicable Law When 
Handling Uses of Information Networks to Commit Defamation and Other 
Such Criminal Cases], passed September 2, 2013, effective September 10, 
2013.
    \52\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 293.
    \53\ See, e.g., Liu Yuting, ``Hudu guancha: Jiazhang fanying wenti 
za jiu `xunxin zishi' le?'' [Hudu watch: Why is the charge ``picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble'' lodged just because some parents 
raised concerns over a problem?], reprinted in China Digital Times, 
October 23, 2021.
    \54\ ``Zhongguo Zhengxie weiyuan jianyi quxiao xunxin zishi zui' 
[CPPCC member suggests repealing picking quarrels and provoking trouble 
as a crime], Lianhe Zaobao, March 7, 2022.
    \55\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 274.
    \56\ See, e.g., ``Wu zhong dangju quantao? Shanxi fangmin shang 
Jing bei zhi `qiaozha lesuo' panqiu wu nian'' [Fell into the 
government's trap? Petitioner from Shanxi who traveled to Beijing 
sentenced to five years in prison for ``extortion''], Radio Free Asia, 
January 24, 2022.
    \57\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 225.
    \58\ See, e.g., Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Zhejiang dangju 
qiqiao ershen `Xiaomai Shufang an,' Chen Yu muqin biaoshi jiang jixu 
shensu'' [Strange appeal decision issued by Zhejiang authorities in 
``Xiaomai Shufang case,'' Chen Yu's mother says she will continue to 
seek review], January 8, 2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Yin yan huozui 
bei pan 3 nian de zhuming meitiren Geng Xiaonan nushi yi zhuan Beijing 
nuzi jianyu fuxing'' [Well-known media worker Ms. Geng Xiaonan, who was 
sentenced to three years for her speech, has been transferred to 
Beijing Women's Prison to serve her sentence], July 28, 2021.
    \59\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 266.
    \60\ See, e.g., Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Most Recent Update 
from Elder Zhang Chunlei's Lawyer,'' January 12, 2022; Yu Bing, 
ChinaAid Association, ``Hubei Ezhou jiating jiaohui mushi Hao Zhiwei 
yishen bei pan ba nian'' [Pastor Hao Zhiwei of a house church in Ezhou, 
Hubei, sentenced to eight years in prison after trial], February 12, 
2022.
    \61\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 300.
    \62\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Zao panxing 5 nian de 
Heilongjiang Falun Gong xueyuan Jiang Zengchao de anqing ji jianli'' 
[Case summary and biographical information of Jiang Zengchao, 
Heilongjiang Falun Gong practitioner who was sentenced to 5 years], 
March 14, 2022.
    \63\ Ministry of Justice, Lushi Zhiye Guanli Banfa [Measures on 
Managing Lawyers' Practice of Law], issued July 18, 2008, amended 
September 18, 2016, effective November 1, 2016, art. 39(3).
    \64\ Gaobeidian People's Court, Baoding municipality, Hebei 
province, ``Sun Dawu an yishen xuanpan'' [Sentence announced by court 
of first instance in the case of Sun Dawu], July 28, 2021.]
    \65\ Gaobeidian People's Court, Baoding municipality, Hebei 
province, ``Sun Dawu an yishen xuanpan'' [Sentence announced by court 
of first instance in the case of Sun Dawu], July 28, 2021; ``Zhongguo 
qiyejia Sun Dawu yin fanghai gongwu zui deng ba zuiming bei panxing 18 
nian'' [Chinese entrepreneur Sun Dawu sentenced to 18 years in prison 
on eight charges including obstructing official business], BBC, July 
28, 2021.
    \66\ Chun Han Wong, ``Outspoken Chinese Industrialist Gets 18-Year 
Sentence for Causing Public Disorder, Other Offenses,'' Wall Street 
Journal, July 28, 2021.
    \67\ Chun Han Wong, ``Outspoken Chinese Industrialist Gets 18-Year 
Sentence for Causing Public Disorder, Other Offenses,'' Wall Street 
Journal, July 28, 2021.
    \68\ ``Zhongguo qiyejia Sun Dawu yin fanghai gongwu zui deng ba 
zuiming bei panxing 18 nian'' [Chinese entrepreneur Sun Dawu sentenced 
to 18 years in prison on eight charges including obstructing official 
business], BBC, July 28, 2021.
    \69\ Chun Han Wong, ``Outspoken Chinese Industrialist Gets 18-Year 
Sentence for Causing Public Disorder, Other Offenses,'' Wall Street 
Journal, July 28, 2021.
    \70\ ``Zhongguo qiyejia Sun Dawu yin fanghai gongwu zui deng ba 
zuiming bei panxing 18 nian'' [Chinese entrepreneur Sun Dawu sentenced 
to 18 years in prison on eight charges including obstructing official 
business], BBC, July 28, 2021.
    \71\ Daren Nair and Harrison Li, ``Free Kai Li, American Held in 
China,'' October 13, 2021, in Pod Hostage Diplomacy; Michael Martina, 
``Exclusive: American Barred from Leaving China Returned to U.S. before 
Biden-Xi Meeting,'' Reuters, November 18, 2021; James Griffiths, 
``Which Canadians Are Left in Chinese Prisons?,'' Globe and Mail, 
September 28, 2021.
    \72\ Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, ``Opinion: There Is Nothing 
Diplomatic about Hostage Diplomacy,'' The Star, March 10, 2021; Fergus 
Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive Diplomacy,'' Policy 
Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
    \73\ Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive 
Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
    \74\ Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive 
Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
    \75\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(c).
    \76\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 91.
    \77\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, arts. 172, 208.
    \78\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: End Persecution of 
Free Speech with Frivolous Crimes,'' July 21, 2021.
    \79\ Rights Defense Network, ``Sheyan suowei shandian an de Guangxi 
renquan lushi Qin Yongpei bei yanzhong chaoqi jiya'' [Guangxi human 
rights lawyer Qin Yongpei detained on suspicion of so-called inciting 
subversion far exceeding prescribed time period], March 12, 2022.
    \80\ Shao Cong, ``In China, COVID-19 Had an Unlikely Side Effect: 
Bail Reform,'' Sixth Tone, October 28, 2021.
    \81\ Shao Cong, ``In China, COVID-19 Had an Unlikely Side Effect: 
Bail Reform,'' Sixth Tone, October 28, 2021.
    \82\ ``Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's 
Procuratorate work report], March 8, 2021.
    \83\ Shao Cong, ``In China, COVID-19 Had an Unlikely Side Effect: 
Bail Reform,'' Sixth Tone, October 28, 2021.
    \84\ Shao Cong, ``In China, COVID-19 Had an Unlikely Side Effect: 
Bail Reform,'' Sixth Tone, October 28, 2021.
    \85\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly
resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 
1976, art. 14(3)(b); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 2015/20, A/C.3/70/L.3, September 29, 2015, rules 
58, 61; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principles 18, 19.
    \86\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Kanshousuo Tiaoli [PRC Public 
Security Detention Center Regulations], issued and effective March 17, 
1990, arts. 28, 32; Kanshousuo Liusuo Zhixing Xingfa Zuifan Guanli 
Banfa [Management Measures for Carrying Out Punishment in Public 
Security Detention Centers], passed August 20, 2013, effective November 
23, 2013, arts. 45, 46; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianyu Fa [PRC Prison 
Law], passed and effective December 29, 1994, art. 48; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 
1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts. 38, 39, 293.
    \87\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, arts. 33(3), 39.
    \88\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 39.
    \89\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetan Political Prisoners Denied Family 
Visits over `COVID Concerns,' '' Radio Free Asia, December 22, 2021.
    \90\ Rights Defense Network, ``Beijing minyun renshi Zhang Wenhe 
diwu ci bei jingfang songjin jingshenbing yuan qizi Wang Su'e tifa 
mingzhi shiyan weiquan daodi'' [Beijing democracy advocate Zhang Wenhe 
forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital by police for the fifth 
time, wife Wang Su'e shaves head to express determination, vows to 
defend rights to the end], October 29, 2021.
    \91\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14.
    \92\ Safeguard Defenders, ``China's Legal Blockade,'' December 7, 
2021.
    \93\ ChinaAid Association, `` `Xintai pinghe, wusuo weiju': bei 
juya yi nian duo yinxun quanwu de Zhongguo shiren, zuojia Wang Zang 
zhongyu he lushi tongshang dianhua'' [``Having a calm and fearless 
mindset'': Poet and writer Wang Zang finally talks with lawyer on the 
phone after over a year of detention and losing contact with the 
outside world], July 25, 2021.
    \94\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987; 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), accessed March 10, 2021. China signed the CAT on 
December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
    \95\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Wan Wenying: Kuxing ji hei 
jianyu baogao--hei jianyu 50 tian, wo bei kanshou daduan liang gen 
yishang leigu'' [Wan Wenying of Shanghai: Report of black jail and 
torture--I suffered at least two broken ribs from being beaten by a 
guard during my 50-day detention in black jails], December 3, 2021.
    \96\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Wan Wenying: Kuxing ji hei 
jianyu baogao--hei jianyu 50 tian, wo bei kanshou daduan liang gen 
yishang leigu'' [Wan Wenying of Shanghai: Report of black jail and 
torture--I suffered at least two broken ribs from being beaten by a 
guard during my 50-day detention in black jails], December 3, 2021.
    \97\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: 
Journalist Jailed for COVID Reporting Seriously Ill, Must Be Released--
UN Experts,'' November 22, 2021.
    \98\ Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: 
Journalist Jailed for COVID Reporting Seriously Ill, Must Be Released--
UN Experts,'' November 22, 2021.
    \99\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: 
Journalist Jailed for COVID Reporting Seriously Ill, Must Be Released--
UN Experts,'' November 22, 2021.
    \100\ Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom Booth, `` 
`Some Are Just Psychopaths': Chinese Detective in Exile Reveals Extent 
of Torture against Uyghurs,'' CNN, October 5, 2021.
    \101\ Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom Booth, `` 
`Some Are Just Psychopaths': Chinese Detective in Exile Reveals Extent 
of Torture against Uyghurs,'' CNN, October 5, 2021.
    \102\ Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom Booth, `` 
`Some Are Just Psychopaths': Chinese Detective in Exile Reveals Extent 
of Torture against Uyghurs,'' CNN, October 5, 2021.
    \103\ ``Esu Weiji chuangshiren zhi huoshi she'an renyuan zhengshi 
kuxing Niu Tengyu muqin cheng zaoyu konghe'' [Founder of Vulgar Wiki 
says people connected to the case confirmed torture, Niu Tengyu's 
mother says she has received threats], Voice of America, September 13, 
2021.
    \104\ ``Esu Weiji chuangshiren zhi huoshi she'an renyuan zhengshi 
kuxing Niu Tengyu muqin cheng zaoyu konghe'' [Founder of Vulgar Wiki 
says people connected to the case confirmed torture, Niu Tengyu's 
mother says she has received threats], Voice of America, September 13, 
2021.
    \105\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, 
arts. 1, 12; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principle 7.
    \106\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 21, 2022, 83-84.
    \107\ ``Jiangsu fangmin zao jiefang siyu feiming gongmin guanzhu 
siyin bei xingju'' [Jiangsu petitioner intercepted and died from 
unnatural causes, citizen who voiced concerns over cause of death was 
criminally detained], Radio Free Asia, March 8, 2022.
    \108\ ``Jiangsu fangmin zao jiefang siyu feiming gongmin guanzhu 
siyin bei xingju'' [Jiangsu petitioner intercepted and died from 
unnatural causes, citizen who voiced concerns over cause of death was 
criminally detained], Radio Free Asia, March 8, 2022.
    \109\ ``Jiangsu fangmin zao jiefang siyu feiming gongmin guanzhu 
siyin bei xingju'' [Jiangsu petitioner intercepted and died from 
unnatural causes, citizen who voiced concerns over cause of death was 
criminally detained], Radio Free Asia, March 8, 2022.
    \110\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhuiwen Jiangsu weiquan 
renshi Mao Lihui zai hei jianyu de siyin'' [Questioning the reason 
behind Jiangsu rights defender Mao Lihui's death in a black jail], 
March 5, 2022.
    \111\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Death of Detained Uyghur Imam Underscores 
Harsh Conditions in Xinjiang Re-education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 
October 22, 2021.
    \112\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Death of Detained Uyghur Imam Underscores 
Harsh Conditions in Xinjiang Re-education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 
October 22, 2021.
    \113\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Death of Detained Uyghur Imam Underscores 
Harsh Conditions in Xinjiang Re-education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 
October 22, 2021.
    \114\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Forced Laborer Died at Factory in 
China's Xinjiang, Officials Say,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2021.
    \115\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Forced Laborer Died at Factory in 
China's Xinjiang, Officials Say,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2021.
    \116\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Forced Laborer Died at Factory in 
China's Xinjiang, Officials Say,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2021.
    \117\ ``Retired Uyghur Civil Servant Confirmed to Have Died in 
Xinjiang Internment Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2021.
    \118\ ``Retired Uyghur Civil Servant Confirmed to Have Died in 
Xinjiang Internment Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2021.
    \119\ ``Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in 
Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2021.
    \120\ ``Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in 
Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2021.
    \121\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 75.
    \122\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 75.
    \123\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 39.
    \124\ Letter from the mandates of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; 
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special 
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health; the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; the Special 
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers; the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to privacy; the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism; and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to the Permanent 
Representative to the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of 
China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International 
Organizations in Switzerland, OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018.
    \125\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Locked Up: Inside China's Secret RSDL 
Jails,'' October 5, 2021, 4.
    \126\ `` `Xiamen juhui an': Chang Weiping zaici pilu zao kuxing 
neimu lushi yuejuan shouzhu'' [``Xiamen gathering case'': Chang Weiping 
again exposes inside story of being tortured; lawyer faced obstacle in 
reviewing case file], Radio Free Asia, September 15, 2021.
    \127\ `` `Xiamen juhui an': Chang Weiping zaici pilu zao kuxing 
neimu lushi yuejuan shouzhu'' [``Xiamen gathering case'': Chang Weiping 
again exposes inside story of being tortured; lawyer faced obstacle in 
reviewing case file], Radio Free Asia, September 15, 2021.
    \128\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 
2021,'' May 24, 2022, 28.
    \129\ Zhou Qiang, ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu jiaqiang xingshi 
shenpan gongzuo qingkuang de baogao,'' [Supreme People's Court report 
on the situation of strengthening criminal trial work], October 23, 
2019, sec. 1(2).
    \130\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 
2021,'' May 24, 2022, 28.
    \131\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu Yuanzhu Fa [PRC Legal Aid 
Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, art. 25.
    \132\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``China's National People's Congress May 
Expand Legal Aid in Death Penalty Cases,'' Dui Hua Human Rights 
Journal, July 7, 2021.
    \133\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu Yuanzhu Fa [PRC Legal Aid 
Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, arts. 26, 52.
    \134\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice, Guanyu Jiaqiang 
Jianxing, Jiashi Anjian Shizhihua Shenli de Yijian [Opinion on 
Strengthening Actual Adjudication of Sentence Commutation and Parole 
Requests], issued December 1, 2021.
    \135\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, arts. 78-86.
    \136\ Supreme People's Court, `` `Guanyu Jiaqiang Jianxing, Jiashi 
Anjian Shizhihua Shenli de Yijian'; xinwen fabu'' [Press release for 
the ``Opinion on Strengthening Actual Adjudication of Sentence 
Commutation and Parole Requests''], December 8, 2021.
    \137\ Cao Yin, ``Prison Term Reduction Faces Tougher Scrutiny,'' 
China Daily, December 9, 2021; Susan Finder, ``Supreme People's Court's 
2021 Year-End Accomplishments,'' Supreme People's Court Monitor (blog), 
January 4, 2022.
    \138\ Xiong Qiuhong, ``Tuijin jianxing, jiashi anjian shizhihua 
shenli, bixu rang shenli huigui sifa chengxu'' [In order to promote 
actual adjudication of sentence commutation and parole requests, 
adjudication must return to the judicial procedures], People's Court 
Daily, December 11, 2021.
    \139\ Xiong Qiuhong, ``Tuijin jianxing, jiashi anjian shizhihua 
shenli, bixu rang shenli huigui sifa chengxu'' [In order to promote 
actual adjudication of sentence commutation and parole requests, 
adjudication must return to the judicial procedures], People's Court 
Daily, December 11, 2021.

Access to Justice

Access to Justice

                           Access to Justice

                                Findings

         To the extent that citizens rely on courts to 
        protect their rights against state encroachment, 
        political pressure on the court system undermines their 
        ability to access justice. The Chinese Communist Party 
        expressly requires absolute loyalty and obedience from 
        the courts.
         Central authorities issued rules subjecting 
        judges to performance evaluation, but such a system may 
        be incompatible with judges' duty of administering 
        justice. Morality, listed as the first evaluation 
        criterion, is primarily described as a political 
        quality, referring to the judge's political alignment 
        and rejection of ``Western'' notions of constitutional 
        democracy, judicial independence, and separation of 
        powers. Requiring judges to preserve People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) leader Xi Jinping's core leader position 
        can be problematic because judges ``should uphold the 
        laws, not a given leader.''
         Judicial transparency in China took a step 
        backward when court judgments were removed from a 
        database maintained by the government. Over a three-
        month period in early 2021, court officials removed 
        from the site at least 11 million cases that were 
        primarily criminal and administrative cases involving 
        politically sensitive subject matter or where 
        government agencies were named as defendants.
         The quasi-governmental agency All China 
        Lawyers Association issued provisional regulations that 
        prohibit lawyers from ``hyping up'' cases, thereby 
        violating their right to free speech and undermining 
        government accountability, which may lead to wrongful 
        convictions. The regulations additionally require 
        lawyers to speak in line with official policies and are 
        therefore in conflict with the duty of loyalty lawyers 
        owe their clients, particularly in administrative 
        litigation where government actions are in dispute.
         This past year, Chinese authorities continued 
        to undermine rights lawyers' ability to render legal 
        help, by means including criminal prosecution, license 
        revocation, and physical attack.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Call attention to the arbitrary detention of rights 
        lawyers or advocates such as Chang Weiping, Zhou 
        Xiaoyun, Nie Min, Li Yuhan, Chen Jiahong, Qin Yongpei, 
        Xie Yang, Hao Jinsong, Hu Shigen, and Wu Gan, and urge 
        the Chinese government to unconditionally exonerate 
        them and other similarly situated lawyers.
          Highlight and discuss with Chinese officials cases of 
        human rights lawyers such as Liang Xiaojun, Xu Zhiyong, 
        Lin Qilei, Xie Yang, Lu Siwei, Ren Quanniu, and Xi 
        Xiangdong, whose law licenses were revoked or whose 
        ability to practice law was otherwise restricted 
        because of their legal representation and advocacy in 
        cases that Chinese authorities deemed politically 
        sensitive.
          Continue to designate and impose sanctions under the 
        Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2656 note) on Chinese officials responsible for 
        arbitrarily detaining or otherwise persecuting 
        petitioners, human rights lawyers, and advocates.
          Urge the Chinese government to protect the 
        fundamental civil and professional rights of China's 
        lawyers, investigate all allegations of abuse against 
        them, and ensure that those responsible for abuse are 
        brought to justice. Urge the Chinese government to end 
        all forms of harassment or persecution against the 
        family members of human rights lawyers and advocates, 
        including surveillance and restrictions on their 
        freedom of movement.

Access to Justice

Access to Justice

                           Access to Justice

                              Introduction

    The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which China signed and expressed its intention to 
ratify,\1\ provides that all persons are equal before the 
courts; it also obligates a State Party to ensure that people 
have enforceable legal remedies for any violation of the rights 
and freedoms recognized in the convention, even if the 
violation has been committed by an official.\2\ While China's 
Constitution recognizes certain universal human rights,\3\ 
citizens do not have any legal channel through which to assert 
or protect them.\4\ Moreover, political control over the 
judiciary and the legal profession and the ongoing persecution 
of human rights lawyers that the Commission observed during the 
2022 reporting year are inconsistent with the relevant ICCPR 
provisions.

                     Lack of Judicial Independence

    According to an index assessing judicial independence 
across 198 countries, the PRC's judicial system is ranked as 
the third-most susceptible to political interference, where 
judges are ``expected to align with and submit to the [Chinese 
Communist] Party's dictates.'' \5\ Consistent with this 
finding, the work reports published by the Supreme People's 
Court (SPC) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) in 
March 2022 reiterated the importance of political alignment 
with the absolute leadership of the Party and General Secretary 
Xi Jinping.\6\ To instill Xi's ideology and extend the ``red 
bloodline,'' the two bodies conducted rectification education 
concerning the Party's history for personnel in the political-
legal system.\7\ While matters germane to court operations 
(such as holding virtual hearings and using blockchain to 
preserve evidence) are discussed in the SPC report, it 
prioritizes political building and describes the court system 
as being part of various policy initiatives such as pandemic 
control, food safety, and advancing socialist values.\8\

                      Measures on Court Operations

    This past year, central authorities made efforts to further 
promote consistency in court rulings. For example, the Supreme 
People's Court issued a set of measures requiring judges to 
conduct a search for prior decisions when dealing with certain 
types of cases, such as sensitive cases or cases that may 
affect social stability.\9\ The SPC established a platform and 
a database dedicated to the uniform application of the law and 
designated a court office to plan and coordinate related 
duties.\10\ In a separate document, the SPC required that a 
similar but narrower set of cases be flagged for supervision by 
court leaders, who are evaluated in part on ensuring consistent 
application of the law.\11\
    Another set of rules tasks court leaders with evaluating 
the performance of judges working under them, but such a system 
may be incompatible with judges' obligation to justice. 
Effective in January 2022, the rules set forth five criteria 
for evaluating judicial performance, to be used as a basis for 
promotion, termination, and allocation of bonuses.\12\ The 
rules require judges to undergo annual Party-led evaluations, 
which rank them from excellent to incompetent, in four 
categories.\13\ ``Morality,'' listed as the first criterion, is 
primarily described as a political quality, referring to the 
judge's political alignment and rejection of ``Western'' 
notions of constitutional democracy, judicial independence, and 
separation of powers.\14\ Other evaluation criteria include the 
quantity of case completion and the quality of case handling, 
defined mainly as the
frequency with which decisions are remanded on appeal.\15\ 
Making decisions that generate negative public opinion is 
considered an indicator of incompetence.\16\ A scholar 
observed, however, that ``the logic that works for an 
administrative bureaucracy is not always a good fit for the 
judiciary,'' as judges must exercise discretion in
administering justice, which may not fit into bureaucratic 
standards of efficiency and uniformity.\17\ He further found it 
problematic to require that judges preserve Xi's core leader 
position as an evaluation criterion because judges ``should 
uphold the laws, not a given leader.'' \18\

                         Judicial Transparency

    According to a study published in February 2022, 
``[j]udicial transparency in China has taken a significant step 
backward in recent months'' due to the removal of court 
judgments from the official database called China Judgements 
Online.\19\ Created as part of a broader judicial reform 
initiative that began in 2013, the database is a centralized 
platform that publishes documents issued by courts of different 
levels across China, and is reported to have published over 100 
million cases as of August 2020.\20\ The study noted, however, 
that ``court officials removed at least 11 million cases from 
the site over a three-month period in early 2021.'' \21\ An 
official notice acknowledged the removal of judgments but did 
not specify the underlying reason, saying only that it was part 
of a ``migration'' process.\22\ Cases known to have been 
removed were primarily criminal and administrative cases, which 
included convictions for state security crimes and ``picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble,'' an offense often used by 
authorities to suppress political speech.\23\ Another type of 
judgment being removed involved controversial cases ``that have 
been the subject of public scrutiny in ways that reflect badly 
on either the Party itself or on Chinese society as a whole.'' 
\24\ A Beijing municipality-based lawyer stressed the 
importance of transparency in safeguarding justice, pointing 
out another concerning development in which some video 
recordings of court proceedings had been removed from another 
official platform.\25\

                      New Restrictions on Lawyers

    This past year, lawyers faced additional restrictions that 
are inconsistent with their ethical duty to loyally advance 
their clients' interests.\26\ In October 2021, the quasi-
governmental agency All China Lawyers Association issued 
provisional regulations with the stated goal of strengthening 
professional ethics.\27\ Without providing a definition, the 
regulations prohibit lawyers from ``hyping up'' cases by means 
including publishing open letters, organizing online 
gatherings, and generating public opinion to affect case 
handling.\28\ Some observers said that the regulations violate 
lawyers' right to free speech and undermine government 
accountability, which may lead to wrongful convictions.\29\ The 
regulations further prohibit lawyers from denying the Party's 
leadership, criticizing national policies, or instigating 
discontent toward the Party and the government.\30\ Provisions 
requiring lawyers to speak in line with official policies are 
in conflict with the duty of loyalty that lawyers owe their 
clients,\31\ particularly in administrative litigation where 
government actions are in dispute.

                          Citizen Petitioning

    The petitioning system (xinfang), also known as the 
``letters and visits'' system, is a popular mechanism outside 
of the formal legal system for citizens to present their 
grievances to authorities, either in writing or in person.\32\ 
While the financial cost to use the petitioning system is 
low,\33\ the system can be inefficient because of staff 
shortages and the large number of petitions.\34\ Additionally, 
a structural conflict of interest exists whereby local 
governments have police power over petitioners who bring claims 
against them and have used such power to prevent petitioners 
from asserting their rights.\35\
    The Commission continued to observe instances of 
petitioners being subjected to different kinds of control and 
mistreatment by local authorities, such as criminal prosecution 
and commitment to psychiatric hospitals.\36\ ``Stability 
maintenance'' efforts intensified during events such as the 
2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games and the annual meetings of 
the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference, at which authorities 
systematically detained petitioners in Beijing municipality and 
prevented them from traveling into the city to air their 
grievances.\37\

           Persecution of Human Rights Lawyers and Advocates

    This past year, Chinese authorities continued to persecute 
rights advocates and lawyers and undermine lawyers' ability to 
render legal help, by means including criminal prosecution, 
license revocation, and physical attack.

                          CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

         Chang Weiping, detained since October 2020 
        under the charge of ``inciting subversion of state 
        power,'' told his lawyer that he suffered torture while 
        being held incommunicado for over five months in Baoji 
        municipality, Shaanxi province.\38\ National security 
        protection officials subjected Chang to prolonged 
        interrogation and ordered him to sit on an 
        interrogation chair continuously for six days, 
        depriving him of sleep and sufficient food.\39\ Chang's 
        most recent detention took place after he posted on 
        social media his experience of being tortured during a 
        previous incommunicado detention.\40\
         Around August 2021, police from Panjin 
        municipality, Liaoning province, took Zhou Xiaoyun and 
        Nie Min into custody in Guangdong province and Beijing, 
        respectively.\41\ Police held them at undisclosed 
        locations under incommunicado detention on the charge 
        of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \42\ 
        Before their detentions, Zhou and Nie were representing 
        a criminal defendant in Panjin who allegedly bribed 
        judicial officers in connection with a court case.\43\ 
        In the course of the proceedings, a procurator made a 
        comment defending judicial officers who accepted the 
        bribes; Zhou posted a video recording of that comment 
        on social media earlier in July 2021.\44\ In September, 
        the procuratorate decided not to formally arrest Zhou 
        and Nie.\45\
         Li Yuhan remained in criminal detention as of 
        April 2022 on charges of ``picking quarrels and 
        provoking trouble'' and ``fraud,'' over four years 
        after her disappearance in October 2017.\46\ The Heping 
        District People's Court in Shenyang municipality, 
        Liaoning province, reportedly tried Li in October 2021, 
        excluding people who asked to observe the proceeding, 
        including lawyers Wang Yu and Xie Yang and diplomats 
        from at least six countries.\47\ Wang Yu said that 
        authorities were retaliating against Li for having 
        filed lawsuits against the local government and for 
        having represented Wang in the 709 Crackdown (a 
        nationwide and coordinated crackdown on human rights 
        lawyers and rights defenders that began around July 9, 
        2015).\48\
         Other rights lawyers likewise faced criminal 
        prosecution in part for representing or showing support 
        for colleagues who were targeted by the government. For 
        example, Yu Wensheng in March 2022 completed a four-
        year sentence for the state security offense ``inciting 
        subversion of state power.'' \49\ Yu had represented 
        lawyer Wang Quanzhang, who was detained during the 709 
        Crackdown.\50\ Yu's lawyer, Chen Jiahong, in turn was 
        sentenced to three years in prison in December 2021 on 
        the same charge.\51\ Qin Yongpei, who worked in the 
        same law firm as Chen and represented him, was tried on 
        the same charge in December.\52\
         Xie Yang disappeared in January 2022 after he 
        showed support for a pregnant teacher who was 
        reportedly detained for her speech.\53\ In February 
        2022, authorities in Changsha municipality, Hunan 
        province, formally arrested Xie on the charge of 
        ``inciting subversion of state power'' and repeatedly 
        denied him counsel visits.\54\
         In November 2021, the Dingxiang County 
        People's Court in Xinzhou municipality, Shanxi 
        province, tried Hao Jinsong on the charges of 
        ``defamation,'' ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble,'' and ``fraud,'' \55\ but had not sentenced 
        Hao as of April 2022.\56\ Radio Free Asia reported that 
        the criminal case could be related to a pollution 
        complaint that Hao filed with the local ecology and 
        environment bureau.\57\ Legally trained but not 
        licensed, Hao had previously handled public interest 
        cases in which several government agencies were named 
        as the defendant.\58\ Hao's defense lawyer explained 
        that Chinese law permits non-lawyers to provide legal 
        services.\59\
         As of April 2022, Zhou Shifeng, Hu Shigen, and 
        Wu Gan, whom authorities detained during the 709 
        Crackdown, continued to serve their sentences ranging 
        from seven to eight years on state security 
        charges.\60\

                           LICENSE REVOCATION

         In December 2021, the Beijing Municipal 
        Justice Bureau revoked Liang Xiaojun's law license, 
        alleging that he said on social media that Falun Gong 
        was not an evil cult, contrary to the official 
        designation.\61\ Radio Free Asia reported that the 
        revocation also might be related to his representation 
        of Xu Zhiyong, whom authorities criminally charged with 
        ``subversion of state power'' for his promotion of 
        constitutionalism through the movement he initiated, 
        the China Citizens Movement (formerly known as New 
        Citizens' Movement).\62\
         The Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau also 
        revoked the law license of Lin Qilei, using a different 
        approach.\63\ In January 2021, the justice bureau 
        canceled his law firm's registration and later revoked 
        his license, invoking the regulation requiring that a 
        lawyer's license be revoked if he or she has not been 
        hired by a law firm for over six months.\64\ Lin 
        reported that a court in Beijing refused to accept the 
        papers that he filed seeking review of his firm's 
        deregistration.\65\ The justice bureau also refused to 
        accept an employment contract as evidence for his 
        employment by another law firm.\66\ Lin tried to 
        provide legal representation for some of a group of 12 
        Hong Kong protesters who tried to flee from Hong Kong 
        to Taiwan.\67\ Two other lawyers who were involved in 
        that case--Lu Siwei and Ren Quanniu--likewise had their 
        licenses revoked earlier in 2021.\68\ Lin believed that 
        the revocation was related to this and other sensitive 
        cases that he had handled over the years.\69\
         Xi Xiangdong wrote in August 2021 that the 
        court and administrative bodies ignored his submissions 
        seeking review of the Shandong Province Justice 
        Department's decision to revoke his law license.\70\ Xi 
        said he was afraid to follow up with the court because 
        another lawyer who tried to do so was beaten by court 
        police.\71\ The revocation of Xi's license was 
        reportedly related to his having published on social 
        media details of mistreatment experienced by one of his 
        clients.\72\

                            PHYSICAL ATTACK

         In January 2022, a group of about four court 
        police officers physically attacked Wang Yu and her 
        husband Bao Longjun, causing injuries that required 
        Wang to seek medical attention.\73\ The assault took 
        place at the Gusu District People's Court in Suzhou 
        municipality, Jiangsu province, after Wang's client 
        contested the records prepared by court staff on 
        grounds that the records did not reflect the fact that 
        the judge read out the client's pleadings and answered 
        questions on her behalf without her consent.\74\ Wang 
        was providing legal services as a non-lawyer 
        representative after her law license was revoked in 
        December 2020 in connection with the 709 Crackdown.\75\

Access to Justice

Access to Justice

    Notes to Section IV--Access to Justice

    \1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed July 8, 
2019; State Council Information Office, ``Guojia Renquan Xingdong Jihua 
(2016-2020 nian)'' [National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-
2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5.
    \2\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 2(3), 14.
    \3\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 22, 2018), arts. 33-48.
    \4\ Luoyang Municipal Intermediate People's Court, Henan province, 
Xingzheng Caidingshu [Administrative Order], (2018) Yu 03 Xing Zhong 
No. 368, November 28, 2018, reprinted in China Judgements Online, 
January 14, 2019; Thomas E. Kellogg, ``Arguing Chinese 
Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate and the `Urgency' of 
Political Reform,'' University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 11, no. 
3 (2016): 349.
    \5\ Capucine May, ``Judicial Independence Under Attack in 45 
Countries,'' Human Rights Outlook 2021, Verisk Maplecroft, November 18, 
2021, 3-4.
    \6\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], March 8, 2022; ``Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo 
baogao'' [Supreme People's Procuratorate work report], March 8, 2022.
    \7\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], March 8, 2022; ``Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo 
baogao'' [Supreme People's Procuratorate work report], March 8, 2022.
    \8\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], March 8, 2022. The term ``political building'' is one 
aspect of ``Party building,'' which refers to the multifaceted efforts 
by the Chinese Communist Party to strengthen its governance capacity 
through approaches including improving its organizational flexibility, 
and enforcing discipline and ideological obedience among Party members. 
Shao Chunbao, ``Lun jian Dang yu Dang jian'' [Discussion on the 
founding of the Party and Party building], Xinhua, June 7, 2021; Liu 
Shaoqi, ``On the Party,'' May 14, 1945, Marxists Internet Archive, 
accessed August 29, 2022.
    \9\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tongyi Shiyong Gongzuo Shishi Banfa 
[Supreme People's Court's Implementation Measures for the Uniform 
Application of the Law], effective December 1, 2021, art. 6.
    \10\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tongyi Shiyong Gongzuo Shishi Banfa 
[Supreme People's Court's Implementation Measures for the Uniform 
Application of the Law], effective December 1, 2021, arts. 2, 6, 15.
    \11\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan `Silei Anjian' 
Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo Jizhi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on 
Further Improving the System for Supervising and Managing ``Four Types 
of Cases''], issued November 4, 2021, effective November 5, 2021, secs. 
2, 7, 14.
    \12\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jiaqiang he Wanshan Faguan 
Kaohe Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Evaluation of Judges], issued October 12, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, secs. 5(34), 6(40).
    \13\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jiaqiang he Wanshan Faguan 
Kaohe Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Evaluation of Judges], issued October 12, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, secs. 1(4), 3(16).
    \14\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jiaqiang he Wanshan Faguan 
Kaohe Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Evaluation of Judges], issued October 12, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, sec. 2(8).
    \15\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jiaqiang he Wanshan Faguan 
Kaohe Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Evaluation of Judges], issued October 12, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, secs. 2(11)(1),(2), 2(12)(2).
    \16\ Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Jiaqiang he Wanshan Faguan 
Kaohe Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Evaluation of Judges], issued October 12, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, sec. 3(21)(7).
    \17\ Jeremy Daum, ``Judging the Judges,'' China Law Translate 
(blog), December 12, 2021.
    \18\ Jeremy Daum, ``Judging the Judges,'' China Law Translate 
(blog), December 12, 2021.
    \19\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022.
    \20\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022.
    \21\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022.
    \22\ Echo Xie, ``Millions of Court Rulings Removed from Official 
Chinese Database,'' South China Morning Post, June 26, 2021.
    \23\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022; Dui Hua Foundation, ``China: All State 
Security Judgments Purged from Supreme Court Site,'' Dui Hua Human 
Rights Journal, July 26, 2021.
    \24\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022.
    \25\ Echo Xie, ``Millions of Court Rulings Removed from Official 
Chinese Database,'' South China Morning Post, June 26, 2021.
    \26\ Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the eighth 
UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Havana, Cuba, September 7, 1990, art. 15.
    \27\ Zhonghua Quanguo Lushi Xiehui Guanyu Jinzhi Wegui Chaozuo 
Anjian de Guize (Shixing) [All China Lawyers Association Regulations on 
the Prohibition of Unlawfully Hyping Up Cases (Provisional)], passed 
October 15, 2021, art. 1.
    \28\ Zhonghua Quanguo Lushi Xiehui Guanyu Jinzhi Wegui Chaozuo 
Anjian de Guize (Shixing) [All China Lawyers Association Regulations on 
the Prohibition of Unlawfully Hyping Up Cases (Provisional)], passed 
October 15, 2021, art. 4.
    \29\ Mimi Lau, ``Chinese Lawyers Banned from Discussing Cases in 
Public in Latest Move to Tighten Control Over Legal Sector,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 23, 2021; Cheng Yangzhi, ``Weiquan pinglun: 
Quanguo Luxie jinzhi `weigui chaozuo,' lushi zaishang jinguzhou!'' 
[Rights defense opinion: All China Lawyers Association bans 
``unlawfully hyping up cases,'' more restrictions on lawyers!], Rights 
Defense Network, October 26, 2021.
    \30\ Zhonghua Quanguo Lushi Xiehui Guanyu Jinzhi Wegui Chaozuo 
Anjian de Guize (Shixing) [All China Lawyers Association Regulations on 
the Prohibition of Unlawfully Hyping Up Cases (Provisional)], passed 
October 15, 2021, art. 8.
    \31\ Mimi Lau, ``Chinese Lawyers Banned from Discussing Cases in 
Public in Latest Move to Tighten Control Over Legal Sector,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 23, 2021.
    \32\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
Xinfang Gongzuo Tiaoli [Regulations on Letters and Visits Work], passed 
January 24, 2022, effective May 1, 2022; Benjamin L. Liebman, ``A 
Populist Threat to China's Courts?,'' in Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute 
Resolution in Contemporary China, eds. Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E. 
Gallagher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 269-313; Liang 
Shibin, ``Jianjue da ying huajie xinfang ji'an gong jian zhan'' 
[Resolutely fight to win the battle on clearing backlog of petitioning 
cases], Legal Daily, April 27, 2016. Such grievances reportedly include 
cases concerning demolition or expropriation of property, social 
security, agriculture, land and resources, and environmental 
protection.
    \33\ Lu Dewen, `` `Jie ju' nu jiaoshi juebi xin shijian: yi tiao 
guiyi de shangfang zhi lu'' [``Solution'' to female teacher's last 
letter incident: a strange road of petitioning], People's Daily, August 
6, 2019.
    \34\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Beijing Guojia 
Xinfangju bei shuwan shangfang minzhong baowei'' [Beijing's State 
Bureau of Letters and Visits surrounded by tens of thousands of 
petitioners], February 26, 2018; ``29 shengshi yu wan ming minban 
jiaoshi zai xian quanguo jiti shangfang chao'' [Over ten thousand 
minban teachers from 29 provinces and municipalities caused another 
national wave of group petitioning], Radio Free Asia, October 19, 2016; 
``Shaanxi liangqian min shi sheng xinfangju shangfang yaoqiu shifang 
weiquan daibiao'' [Two thousand petitioners from Shaanxi petition at 
provincial letters and visits bureau, ask for release of rights defense 
representative], Radio Free Asia, April 13, 2017; Yi Lili, ``Zengqiang 
xinfang gangwei guazhi zhidu xiaoguo de youxiao tujing tantao'' 
[Exploring efficient ways to improve results of temporary position 
assignments in the petition system], Administration Reform, reprinted 
in Views.ce.cn, December 25, 2018.
    \35\ Lu Dewen, `` `Jie ju' nu jiaoshi juebi xin shijian: yi tiao 
guiyi de shangfang zhi lu'' [``Solution'' to female teacher's last 
letter incident: a strange road of petitioning], People's Daily, August 
6, 2019.
    \36\ See, e.g., ``Wuzhong dangju quantao? Shanxi fangmin shang Jing 
beizhi `qiaozha lesuo' panqiu wu nian'' [Fell into the government's 
trap? Shanxi petitioner traveled to Beijing and accused of 
``extortion,'' sentenced to five years], Radio Free Asia, January 24, 
2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xiangyang fangmin Hao Mingjing 
bei guan jingshenbing yuan'' [Xiangyang petitioner Hao Mingjing 
forcibly committed to psychiatric hospital], September 9, 2021.
    \37\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lianghui lailin fangmin 
zaoyu xiezhen Zhongguo minsheng kunjing'' [As Two Sessions approach, 
experience of petitioners depicts difficulties faced by people in 
China], March 3, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhongguo 
weiwen yu renquan dongtai (zong di yibai shiliu qi 2022 nian 2 yue)'' 
[Developments in stability maintenance and human rights in China 
(cumulative issue no. 116, February 2022)], April 1, 2022.
    \38\ ``Chang Weiping: Tamen shijin shouduan yao ba ren biancheng 
gou'' [Chang Weiping: They use all means to turn people into dogs], 
Radio France Internationale, September 17, 2021; ``Renquan lushi Chang 
Weiping zao Shaanxi difang guan baofu, kuli mingdan baoguang'' [Human 
rights lawyer Chang Weiping suffers retaliation by local officials in 
Shaanxi, names of officials involved in torture exposed], Radio Free 
Asia, October 7, 2021; ``Renquan lushi Chang Weiping zai bei `jianju' 
ceng pai shipin toulu zao kuxing'' [Human rights lawyer Chang Weiping 
detained under ``residential surveillance'' again, previously revealed 
in a video that he had suffered torture], Radio Free Asia, October 23, 
2020.
    \39\ ``Chang Weiping: Tamen shijin shouduan yao ba ren biancheng 
gou'' [Chang Weiping: They use all means to turn people into dogs], 
Radio France Internationale, September 17, 2021; ``Renquan lushi Chang 
Weiping zao Shaanxi difang guan baofu, kuli mingdan baoguang'' [Human 
rights lawyer Chang Weiping suffers retaliation by local officials in 
Shaanxi, names of officials involved in torture exposed], Radio Free 
Asia, October 7, 2021.
    \40\ ``Chang Weiping: Tamen shijin shouduan yao ba ren biancheng 
gou'' [Chang Weiping: They use all means to turn people into dogs], 
Radio France Internationale, September 17, 2021; ``Renquan lushi Chang 
Weiping zao Shaanxi difang guan baofu, kuli mingdan baoguang'' [Human 
rights lawyer Chang Weiping suffers retaliation by local officials in 
Shaanxi, names of officials involved in torture exposed], Radio Free 
Asia, October 7, 2021.
    \41\ ChinaAid Association, ``Yin zhuanfa tingshen zhong jianchaguan 
huangtang shipin, Zhou Xiaoyun he Nie Min lushi she `xunxin zishi' bei 
zhuabu'' [Lawyers Zhou Xiaoyun and Nie Min detained for ``picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble'' in connection with reposting 
ridiculous video recording of procurator during court proceeding], 
August 16, 2021; Ge Xinghang, ``Lushi Zhou Xiaoyun, Nie Min bei 
fangle'' [Lawyers Zhou Xiaoyun and Nie Min released], Caixin, October 
2, 2021.
    \42\ ChinaAid Association, ``Yin zhuanfa tingshen zhong jianchaguan 
huangtang shipin, Zhou Xiaoyun he Nie Min lushi she `xunxin zishi' bei 
zhuabu'' [Lawyers Zhou Xiaoyun and Nie Min detained for ``picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble'' in connection with reposting 
ridiculous video recording of procurator during court proceeding], 
August 16, 2021; Ge Xinghang, ``Lushi Zhou Xiaoyun, Nie Min bei 
fangle'' [Lawyers Zhou Xiaoyun and Nie Min released], Caixin, October 
2, 2021.
    \43\ ``Liangming Zhongguo lushi bei kuasheng zhuabu jiancheng 
wuzui'' [Two Chinese lawyers detained in cross-province operation, 
maintain their innocence], Radio Free Asia, August 10, 2021.
    \44\ ``Liangming Zhongguo lushi bei kuasheng zhuabu jiancheng 
wuzui'' [Two Chinese lawyers detained in cross-province operation, 
maintain their innocence], Radio Free Asia, August 10, 2021; ChinaAid 
Association, ``Yin zhuanfa tingshen zhong jianchaguan huangtang shipin, 
Zhou Xiaoyun he Nie Min lushi she `xunxin zishi' bei zhuabu'' [Lawyers 
Zhou Xiaoyun and Nie Min detained for ``picking quarrels and provoking 
trouble'' in connection with reposting ridiculous video recording of 
procurator during court proceeding], August 16, 2021.
    \45\ Panjin Municipal Procuratorate, ``Jiancha jiguan yifa dui Nie 
Min, Zhou Xiaoyun, Teng Rouhan zuochu bu pizhun daibu jueding'' 
[Procuratorate decides not to arrest Nie Min, Zhou Xiaoyun, and Teng 
Rouhan in accordance with the law], October 9, 2021.
    \46\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, 
liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2022 nian 4 yue 30 ri) di 79 qi (gong 1316 
ren) (si)'' [Monthly report of political prisoners and prisoners of 
conscience currently detained in China (April 30, 2022) issue no. 79 
(1,316 persons in total) (IV)], April 30, 2022; ``709 an bianhu lushi 
Li Yuhan bei jiya si nian hou chuting shoushen'' [709 Crackdown lawyer 
Li Yuhan appears in court to be tried, four years after being 
detained], Radio Free Asia, October 20, 2021.
    \47\ ``709 an bianhu lushi Li Yuhan bei jiya si nian hou chuting 
shoushen'' [709 Crackdown defense lawyer Li Yuhan appears in court to 
be tried, four years after being detained], Radio Free Asia, October 
20, 2021.
    \48\ ``709 an bianhu lushi Li Yuhan bei jiya si nian hou chuting 
shoushen'' [709 Crackdown defense lawyer Li Yuhan appears in court to 
be tried, four years after being detained], Radio Free Asia, October 
20, 2021; Josh Chin and Te-Ping Chen, ``China Targets Human-Rights 
Lawyers in Crackdown,'' Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2015; Human 
Rights Watch, ``China: On `709' Anniversary, Legal Crackdown 
Continues,'' July 7, 2017.
    \49\ ``Weiquan lushi Yu Wensheng shandian zui xingman huoshi fanhui 
Beijing'' [Rights lawyer Yu Wensheng released after completing sentence 
for inciting subversion, returns to Beijing], Radio Free Asia, March 1, 
2022; Xiao Man, ``Renquan lushi Yu Wensheng bei mimi guanya liang nian 
ban qi qi Xu Yan 5 yue 1 ri zai fa qiujiu shipin'' [Rights Lawyer Yu 
Wensheng detained for two and a half years, his wife Xu Yan again posts 
video recording calling for help on May 1], Radio France 
Internationale, May 1, 2020.
    \50\ ``Weiquan lushi Yu Wensheng shandian zui xingman huoshi fanhui 
Beijing'' [Rights lawyer Yu Wensheng released after completing sentence 
for inciting subversion, returns to Beijing], Radio Free Asia, March 1, 
2022; Xiao Man, ``Renquan lushi Yu Wensheng bei mimi guanya liang nian 
ban qi qi Xu Yan 5 yue 1 ri zai fa qiujiu shipin'' [Rights Lawyer Yu 
Wensheng has been secretly detained for two and a half years, his wife 
Xu Yan again posts video recording calling for help on May 1], Radio 
France Internationale, May 1, 2020.
    \51\ ``Guangxi lushi Chen Jiahong shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan 
zuicheng panqiu san nian'' [Guangxi lawyer Chen Jiahong sentenced to 
three years in prison for inciting subversion of state power], Radio 
Free Asia, December 14, 2021; ChinaAid Association, ``She `shandong 
dianfu guojia zhengquan zui' de Zhongguo renquan lushi Chen Jiahong 
xingman huoshi: bian canglao xuduo'' [Chinese rights lawyer Chen 
Jiahong is released after having completed sentence for ``inciting 
subversion of state power'': he has aged considerably], April 29, 2022.
    \52\ ``Shexian shandian an Guangxi renquan lushi Qin Yongpei bei 
yanzhong chaoqi jiya'' [In case involving inciting subversion, Guangxi 
human rights lawyer Qin Yongpei is being detained far beyond the legal 
limit], Radio Free Asia, March 12, 2022.
    \53\ ``709 an lushi Xie Yang bei zhua zai she `shandong dianfu'?'' 
[709 case lawyer Xie Yang detained, violated ``inciting subversion'' 
again?], Radio Free Asia, January 13, 2022; Chris Buckley, ``Fury in 
China after an Outspoken Teacher Disappears,'' New York Times, December 
23, 2021.
    \54\ ``Hunan lushi Xie Yang bei yi shandian zui pibu'' [Hunan 
lawyer Xie Yang arrested on inciting subversion charge], Radio Free 
Asia, February 22, 2022; Chen Guiqiu (@709chenguiqiu), ``#XieYanglushi 
shiqu ziyou di 85 tian . . .'' [It's been 85 days since #LawyerXieYang 
lost his liberty . . .], Nitter post, April 6, 2022.
    \55\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Hao Jinsong an kaiting 
lushi zuo wuzui bianhu'' [Trial held in Hao Jinsong's case, lawyer 
defends client's innocence], November 23, 2021.
    \56\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, 
liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2022 nian 4 yue 30 ri) di 79 qi (gong 1316 
ren) (san)'' [Rights Defense Network: Monthly report of political 
prisoners and prisoners of conscience detained in China (April 30, 
2022) issue no. 79 (total 1,316 persons) (III)], April 30, 2022.
    \57\ ``Shanxi weiquan renshi Hao Jinsong an `Renquan Ri' kaiting 
zao quxiao'' [The trial in the case of Shanxi rights defender Hao 
Jinsong, scheduled for ``Human Rights Day,'' has been canceled], Radio 
Free Asia, December 10, 2020.
    \58\ ``Shanxi weiquan renshi Hao Jinsong an `Renquan Ri' kaiting 
zao quxiao'' [The trial in the case of Shanxi rights defender Hao 
Jinsong, scheduled for ``Human Rights Day,'' has been canceled], Radio 
Free Asia, December 10, 2020; Wang He'ai, ``Zhiming gongyi susong ren 
Hao Jinsong bei kong sanzong zui yishen jibian gongmin daili'' 
[Renowned public interest litigator Hao Jinsong accused of three 
crimes, heated debate at trial on issue of representation by citizen], 
Caixin, November 21, 2021.
    \59\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Hao Jinsong an kaiting 
lushi zuo wuzui bianhu'' [Trial held in Hao Jinsong's case, lawyer 
defends client's innocence], November 23, 2021.
    \60\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, 
liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2022 nian 4 yue 30 ri) di 79 qi (gong 1316 
ren) (yi)'' [Monthly report of political prisoners and prisoners of 
conscience detained in China (April 30, 2022) issue no. 79 (1,316 
persons in total) (I)], April 30, 2022.
    \61\ Liang Xiaojun (@liangxiaojun), ``2021 nian 12 yue 16 ri, 
Beijing Shi Sifaju diaoxiao wo lushi zhizhao de xingzheng chufa jueding 
shu . . .'' [Administrative decision issued on December 16, 2021, by 
the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau revoked my law license . . .], 
Twitter, December 21, 2021, 10:40 a.m.
    \62\ ``Wei Xu Zhiyong bianhu cheng daohuo suo? Lushi Liang Xiaojun 
mianlin chupai'' [Is defending Xu Zhiyong the cause? Lawyer Liang 
Xiaojun faces license revocation], Radio Free Asia, November 29, 2021; 
Christian Shepherd, ``They Wanted Rule of Law, So China Tried Them in 
Secret,'' Washington Post, June 24, 2022.
    \63\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021.
    \64\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021; Ministry of 
Justice, Lushi Zhiye Guanli Banfa [Measures on Managing Lawyers' 
Practice of Law], issued July 18, 2008, amended September 18, 2016, 
effective November 1, 2016, art. 23.
    \65\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021; Rights Defense 
Network, ``Lin Qilei lushi: Falu dou yu wuzhi goulian le, wo bei 
naihe?'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei: What are we to do when the law hooks up 
with shamelessness?], October 31, 2021.
    \66\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021.
    \67\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021; Wenxin Fan and 
John Lyons, ``China Snatched the `Hong Kong 12' Off a Speedboat, Giving 
Protest Movement New Life,'' Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2020.
    \68\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021.
    \69\ ``Ceng wei shi'er Gangren bianhu lushi Lin Qilei zao zhuxiao 
zhiyezheng'' [Lawyer Lin Qilei, who defended the 12 Hong Kongers, has 
license revoked], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021.
    \70\ Xi Xiangdong, ``Xi Xiangdong: Lushi diaozhao weiquan wumen'' 
[Xi Xiangdong: No way to defend rights for lawyer who has license 
revoked], reprinted in Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, August 10, 
2021.
    \71\ Xi Xiangdong, ``Xi Xiangdong: Lushi diaozhao weiquan wumen'' 
[Xi Xiangdong: No way to defend rights for lawyer who has license 
revoked], reprinted in Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, August 10, 
2021.
    \72\ ``You yi lushi mianlin diaozhao Xi Xiangdong gongkai wei 
dangshiren fasheng bei zhi weifan `Lushi Fa' '' [Another lawyer facing 
license revocation, Xi Xiandong accused of violating the ``Lawyers 
Law'' for publicly speaking out for his client], Radio Free Asia, 
January 28, 2021.
    \73\ ``Lushi Wang Yu fayuan yuxi renquan baogao: Xi shidai tese shi 
pohai renquan'' [Lawyer Wang Yu attacked in court, human rights report: 
Xi's era is characterized by persecution and human rights violations], 
Radio Free Asia, January 13, 2022.
    \74\ ``Lushi Wang Yu fayuan yuxi renquan baogao: Xi shidai tese shi 
pohai renquan'' [Lawyer Wang Yu attacked in court, human rights report: 
Xi's era is characterized by persecution and human rights violations], 
Radio Free Asia, January 13, 2022.
    \75\ ``Zi `709' an yizhi wufa zhengchang zhiye weiquan lushi Wang 
Yu bei Beijing dangju zhuxiao zhizhao'' [Rights lawyer Wang Yu, who has 
been unable to practice law normally since the ``709'' case, has her 
license revoked by the Beijing Authorities], Radio Free Asia, December 
1, 2020.

Governance

Governance

           V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

                               Governance

                                Findings

         The Chinese Communist Party's efforts to 
        extend control over all sectors of society violate 
        citizens' right to fully participate in public affairs. 
        As the Party's dominance permeates
        society, the space for institutions of democratic 
        governance diminishes, thereby weakening citizens' 
        ability to hold authorities accountable for human 
        rights violations.
         Central authorities issued a policy plan with 
        a stated goal of promoting the rule of law in China for 
        the next five years. While the plan outlines strategies 
        to improve bureaucratic efficiency and standardize 
        administrative actions, it makes no mention of 
        developing a mechanism to check the Party's power. The 
        Party further monopolized the narrative of the past, as 
        it adopted an official version of its historical 
        contribution to China's development, portraying events 
        in a way that served to legitimize government policies, 
        tighten political control, and bolster Party General 
        Secretary Xi Jinping's personal authority, preparing 
        him to serve at least one additional five-year term as 
        General Secretary.
         The central and local governments issued plans 
        to institutionalize the existing practice of mobilizing 
        citizens through ``social organizations,'' whose 
        members are sometimes paid to further government 
        objectives. Recent examples show that the government 
        has used social organization members to harass 
        independent candidates who planned to run for local 
        election, and to boycott businesses that allegedly 
        tried to comply with sanctions related to the Chinese 
        government's use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region.
         This past year, central authorities took a 
        series of actions against businesses that had the 
        effect of increasing the Party's power to intervene in 
        the economy so as to advance its objectives in 
        politics, security, and ideology. Substantial fines 
        were imposed on leading technology companies for 
        alleged monopolistic activities. Those companies made 
        contributions to support the ``common prosperity'' 
        wealth redistribution policy as an apparent hedge 
        against further penalties.
         The Commission observed a whole-of-government 
        approach by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 
        establishing stricter control over its population 
        through its surveillance and ``zero-COVID'' policies 
        during this reporting year. The Chinese government 
        passed a new law on data that authorized the 
        government's access to individuals' personal data, with 
        some protections for the ``rights and interests'' of 
        PRC citizens. The PRC continued to invest in 
        surveillance systems and big data analysis programs 
        that enhanced its ability to monitor citizens and 
        implement social controls, which resulted in 
        discrimination and violations of the right to privacy.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Support U.S. research programs that document and 
        analyze the governing institutions and ideological 
        campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as 
        its relationships with companies, government agencies, 
        legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental 
        organizations (NGOs).
          Encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        and release individuals detained or imprisoned for 
        exercising their rights to freedom of speech, 
        association, and assembly.
          Support organizations working in and outside China 
        that seek to work with local governments and NGOs to 
        improve transparency, especially with regard to efforts 
        to expand and improve China's open government 
        information initiatives.
          Support technological development that respects 
        privacy, protects sensitive personal information, and 
        defends against censorship. Establish an initiative to 
        help countries around the world implement governing 
        regulations for the procurement and use of technology 
        consistent with civil and political rights.

Governance

Governance

                               Governance

                              Introduction

    China's one-party authoritarian political system controlled 
by the Chinese Communist Party remains out of compliance with 
the standards defined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.\1\ According to some observers, the political climate 
in the People's Republic of China (PRC)--with General Secretary 
Xi Jinping at the apex of political power--has regressed to 
that of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and '70s.\2\ One 
scholar highlighted some recent developments supporting this 
view: ``Xi has revived one-man rule, escalated political 
repression to its worst level since Mao Zedong died in 1976, 
reintroduced ideological indoctrination, and launched an 
aggressive foreign policy that openly challenges the theory and 
practice of a liberal, rules-governed international order.'' 
\3\ Reports from the Commission's 2022 reporting period 
continue to indicate that the Party seeks to control every 
sector of society with little regard for citizens' fundamental 
rights.

               Rule-Based Governance: Plans and Practice

    In assessing rule of law developments in China, a scholar 
noted that recent trends show increasingly distinctive 
characteristics of personal rule, partly because ``the 
restriction of administrative powers did not touch on the 
Party's supreme status [as] a ruler above any legal 
constraints.'' \4\ In particular, ``the 2018 amendment [to 
China's constitution] explicitly entrenched the leadership of 
the Party in the main text of the Constitution,'' creating ``a 
legal foundation for Party domination.'' \5\ In addition, the 
creation of the National Supervisory Commission, through the 
2018 amendment and accompanying legislation, had the effect of 
bringing the entire public sector under the Party's 
jurisdiction and legalizing a form of detention that was 
illegal when it was previously carried out under informal 
rules.\6\ As the Party increasingly uses the law to achieve its 
political goals, the scholar observed, it has moved farther 
away from the core elements of the rule of law.\7\
    Recent policy announcements do not indicate that the Party 
is moving in a different direction. For example, in August 
2021, central authorities issued a plan for implementing a 
rule-based government for the next five years,\8\ the second 
such plan since 2015.\9\ The document opens with a mandate to 
implement Xi Jinping Thought and to guard the leadership of Xi 
and the Party; it ends with a call to propagandize the success 
story of the project.\10\ The balance of the document outlines 
objectives such as improving
bureaucratic efficiency, standardizing administrative actions, 
and requiring public hearings on major projects.\11\ The 
document describes the Party as having a dominant role in 
supervising administrative actions and does not propose plans 
to place any legal constraints on the Party itself.\12\

                      Xi Jinping's Personal Power

    Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the Party laid down a 
version of history that would legitimize Xi ruling indefinitely 
and further reinforced his personal power through institutions 
and education. In November 2021, the Party adopted a resolution 
summarizing its version of Party history since its 
establishment a century ago.\13\ The resolution was adopted 
ahead of the First Plenum of the 20th National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party, expected to be held in the second half 
of 2022,\14\ when senior Party members would select a person to 
fill the General Secretary position, the highest political 
office.\15\ The Party previously adopted two similar 
resolutions--in 1945 and 1981 under the leadership of Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping--to fashion history in furtherance of 
their respective political goals.\16\ According to some 
interpretations, the 2021 resolution created an official 
narrative that serves to legitimize government policies, 
tighten political control, and bolster Xi Jinping's personal 
authority, preparing him to serve at least one additional five-
year term as General Secretary.\17\
    Substantial coverage and praise given to Xi Jinping in the 
resolution is consistent with other official actions that some 
observers characterize as steps to build a personality cult 
around Xi.\18\ Such actions include the establishment of 
ideological ``research centers'' beginning in October 2017,\19\ 
the most recent one being the Xi Jinping Economic Thought 
Research Center located in Beijing municipality, bringing the 
total number of similar centers to 18 as of July 2021.\20\ The 
center is tasked with ``talking politics'' and promoting 
central authorities' strategic plans.\21\
    Evidence of a personality cult also is seen in the 
introduction of ideological textbooks in schools. Beginning in 
September 2021, primary and secondary school students were 
required to use a new series of standardized textbooks 
outlining Xi Jinping Thought.\22\ Two authors who wrote about 
this development compared prior textbooks, which focused on the 
Party in general, with this new series, which focused on Xi 
himself.\23\ The authors further observed that ``the growing 
personality cult of Xi Jinping [is] eerily reminiscent of the 
days of China's founding father Mao Zedong,'' with the 
qualification that current propaganda has not yet advocated 
violence or deified Xi.\24\

                Lack of Genuine Political Participation

    The Party holds exclusive political power, and China's 
Constitution contains language that effectively prohibits acts 
that would damage the Party's leadership.\25\ Eight satellite 
parties are formally recognized, but their funding and 
operations are controlled by the Party.\26\ Although the Party 
declares that it represents ``the fundamental interests of the 
greatest possible majority of the Chinese people,'' \27\ 
citizens' direct electoral participation is limited to sub-
provincial legislative bodies \28\ and village and residents 
committees,\29\ the latter of which are semi-autonomous 
grassroots bodies outside of the state bureaucracy.\30\ 
Elections for these local offices, however, are subject to 
political interference, such as through candidate selection and 
harassment of independent candidates.\31\ Furthermore, people 
who participate in elections are required by law to support the 
Party's leadership unwaveringly.\32\
    Elections for local-level people's congresses took place 
across China beginning in the second half of 2021.\33\ 
Elections in Beijing municipality, for example, concluded in 
November 2021 and generated nearly 4,900 newly elected 
delegates at the district level, about 69 percent of whom were 
Party members.\34\ In October 2021, rights defenders Wang 
Qiaoling, Li Wenzu, Ye Jinghuan, and 11 other independent 
candidates announced that they would run for the district-level 
people's congress in Beijing, intending to improve 
representation of people's needs.\35\ After the announcement, 
Wang was unable to take a call from what she believed was a 
media inquiry originating from Hong Kong and instead received 
an official warning message.\36\ Two weeks later, the 
candidates announced that they were aborting their plans, 
citing personal liberty and safety concerns.\37\ They said 
police harassed them almost every day by summoning them for 
questioning, forcing them to travel to another location, or 
threatening to demolish their homes.\38\ Li said that her 
landlord, possibly pressed by authorities, retracted an 
agreement to renew her lease and asked her to move out.\39\
    It is against this backdrop that the Chinese government 
claimed in a December 2021 white paper that it has a robust 
``whole-process people's democracy'' that ``has been fully 
tested through wide participation.'' \40\ The white paper 
proceeds to claim that China's political system is a ``people's 
democratic dictatorship'' with no opposition party, where ``[a] 
tiny minority is sanctioned in the interests of the great 
majority, and `dictatorship' serves democracy.'' \41\ It 
further presents China's system as a ``new model of democracy'' 
that always prioritizes economic development.\42\ One observer 
expressed concern that the government's unfounded claim of 
having attained democracy is indicative of a loss of 
institutional resiliency necessary for democratic reforms.\43\

                             Party Control

           MOBILIZATION OF CITIZENS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

    Recent official actions indicate an attempt to 
institutionalize the existing practice of mobilizing citizens 
to further the government's objectives, which include fighting 
crime, suppressing citizens' civic engagement, and countering 
international criticism of the PRC's human rights violations. 
In September 2021, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the 
14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations 
(shehui zuzhi), a national plan aiming to install a centralized 
system of registration and management by 2025 to strengthen the 
Party's control over social organizations and to increase the 
number of Party members dedicated to working in this 
sector.\44\ The plan requires social organizations to write 
Party-building into their charters and to follow the Party's 
orders.\45\ Supervision over these groups is exercised through 
official bodies and the social credit system.\46\ In addition 
to performing community services, social organizations are 
tasked with facilitating the PRC's national and international 
policies, such as to ``augment social organizations' capacity 
to participate in global governance and enhance . . . China's 
`soft power.' '' \47\
    Following the national plan, the Beijing municipal 
government issued an implementation plan in October 2021 with a 
goal of establishing at least 15 social organizations in each 
urban community and 8 in each rural community by 2023.\48\ 
Under the ideological guidance of local Party organizations, 
these social organizations are to build a platform for 
grassroots-level governance encompassing areas such as 
community services, law and order, dispute settlement, and drug 
rehabilitation.\49\ To enhance public appeal and influence, 
each community is required to develop its own ``branding'' of 
social organization.\50\
    One such branding is Chaoyang Masses based in Beijing's 
Chaoyang district, which has a total of 190,000 registered 
social organization members and a population of 3.45 million, 
representing a ratio of about 1 member in every 20 
residents.\51\ The Chaoyang district government pays a monthly 
stipend of between 300 and 500 yuan (approximately US$40 to 
$70) to members who actively assist in policing.\52\ The 
government also reportedly hands out rewards in amounts ranging 
from 20,000 to 40,000 yuan (approximately US$3,000 to $6,000) 
or more for tips that help crack major cases.\53\ Members of 
Chaoyang Masses, however, carry out assignments beyond 
combating crimes; for example, they were among those who 
harassed rights defenders including the 14 independent 
candidates who tried to run for local election, a case 
described in more detail above.\54\
    On a broader scale, authorities mobilized the general 
public and internet users to carry out political objectives:

         Reporting Religious Activities. Some local 
        governments, for example, enacted measures in recent 
        years to give out monetary rewards for citizens who 
        report on religious activities that are deemed illegal 
        by the government.\55\
         Targeting the ``Unpatriotic.'' In October 
        2021, an official military newspaper called for a 
        ``people's war'' to hunt down U.S. spies in China, 
        which according to two analysts could encompass anyone 
        deemed ``unpatriotic,'' given the broad and vague 
        definition of the term ``national security'' used by 
        Chinese authorities.\56\
         Boycotting U.S. Companies. In December 2021, 
        Party-run newspaper Global Times and the Communist 
        Youth League initiated a social media campaign, calling 
        on Chinese citizens to boycott U.S. companies accused 
        of refusing to source goods from the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) in light of anti-forced labor 
        legislation passed in the United States.\57\

                            BUSINESS SECTOR

    This past year, central authorities took a series of 
actions against businesses that resulted in the loss of 
approximately US$1.1 trillion in the top six technology stocks 
alone, suggesting that they were in part motivated by non-
economic considerations.\58\ According to one expert, these 
actions represented a ``pivot to the state'' and had the effect 
of increasing the Party's power to intervene in the economy so 
as to advance its objectives in politics, security, and 
ideology.\59\

                           COMMON PROSPERITY

    In August 2021, Xi Jinping presided over the 10th meeting 
of the Party Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, 
announcing that common prosperity (gongtong fuyu) would be the 
next phase of development, given the Party's claim of having 
eliminated poverty and having established a moderately 
prosperous society.\60\ The policy aims to expand the middle 
class and adjust the low- and high-income groups' earnings 
through a three-tiered distribution system.\61\ In this system, 
the first distribution refers to spending; the second refers to 
taxation, social security, and transfer payments; and the third 
refers to charitable donations, either voluntary, incentivized 
by estate and gift tax, or encouraged by the government's 
socialist appeal.\62\
    After the policy announcement, Chinese companies including 
Alibaba, Tencent, and Pinduoduo separately pledged to 
contribute 100 billion yuan each (approximately US$15 billion) 
by 2025 to support the common prosperity initiative.\63\ 
Reuters reported that the fund set up by Alibaba, about two-
thirds of the company's earnings in 2020, would be managed by a 
committee led by the company's chief executive, but ``outsiders 
have limited visibility into how shareholder earnings will be 
used.'' \64\ The companies' contributions, according to a 
researcher, ``are clearly hedges against potential punitive 
actions taken by the government `against the unfettered action 
of capitalist interests.' '' \65\

                         ANTI-MONOPOLY ACTIONS

    The punitive actions mentioned above included penalties 
imposed in the name of anti-monopoly measures, but those 
penalties did not extend to state-owned enterprises. Beginning 
in late 2020, the government imposed substantial penalties for 
alleged monopolistic conduct and unreported mergers on at least 
60 companies in areas
including technology, gaming, and food delivery.\66\ To further 
strengthen enforcement, central authorities allocated 
additional resources for the State Anti-Monopoly Bureau and 
planned to amend the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, proposing to 
increase penalties and prohibit using data, algorithms, and 
technologies to impede competition.\67\ One economist observed 
that the series of actions had the effect of weakening the 
position of private enterprises, while authorities had not 
taken similar actions against monopolies created by state-owned 
banks and enterprises.\68\

                             DATA SECURITY

    Authorities likewise exerted control in data security 
practices through intrusive administrative actions. In July 
2021, two days after Didi Chuxing (a transportation service 
company) had listed its stock on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE),\69\ the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) 
suspended new user registration and ordered online platforms to 
take down the company's application (app) pending 
investigation, which involved government officials being 
stationed in the company's office.\70\ While official notices 
did not specify the nature of the underlying conduct, the CAC's 
actions could be linked to concerns over the potential 
disclosure of government employees' travel history and the 
company's ability to apply big data technology to analyze the 
information it had gathered.\71\ In December 2021, Didi Chuxing 
delisted from the NYSE, hours after the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission adopted a rule requiring foreign companies 
listed in the United States to submit to open-book audits.\72\ 
This series of events took place before relevant legal 
provisions became effective--the PRC Data Security Law, which 
created a system to review data practices that may affect 
national security,\73\ and the Cybersecurity Review Measures, 
which require online platform operators with over one million 
users to undergo security review before listing in overseas 
stock exchanges.\74\

                           TUTORING INDUSTRY

    Concerned about population decline, the government 
encouraged childbearing, in part by cracking down on the 
tutoring industry in an attempt to reduce the cost of rearing 
children.\75\ In July 2021, central authorities announced a 
policy aiming to alleviate students aged 6 to 15 from the 
burden of homework and private tutoring.\76\ The policy 
restricts the amount of homework that schools may assign and 
requires private tutors and tutoring organizations to re-
register as non-profit organizations under strict 
standards.\77\ Seven months after the announcement, the South 
China Morning Post reported that while the policy had resulted 
in fewer homework assignments, it did not reduce students' 
burdens, as parents continued to seek additional 
extracurricular activities and tutoring classes, which were 
rebranded in a way to circumvent the rules.\78\ With the 
passage of the new PRC Family Education Promotion Law, however, 
parents may be breaking the law if they overburden their 
children with studies.\79\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Education
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The PRC Family Education Promotion Law, which aims to cultivate the
 next generation of socialists, brings a private family matter within
 the purview of state regulation.\80\ The law obligates parents to avoid
 overburdening their children with schoolwork and to prevent their
 children from becoming addicted to the internet; they also must teach
 their children to love the Party, form an intention to protect national
 unity, develop a healthy aesthetic, and ensure that they have enough
 sleep.\81\ Parents who refuse to carry out family education or whose
 child has engaged in ``seriously inappropriate behavior'' are punished
 by means of criticism or admonition, or ordered to receive family
 education guidance, terms that are not defined in the law.\82\
 Punishing parents for their children's misconduct may amount to
 collective punishment,\83\ and, according to ChinaAid, the law
 signifies the government's reach into people's homes to exert control
 over minor children.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

    Beginning in late August 2021, the Party started a campaign 
to further regulate the entertainment industry and fandom 
culture. The Propaganda Department of the Party Central 
Committee issued a notice announcing a campaign to 
comprehensively manage the entertainment sector, seeking to 
address a range of issues relating to celebrities, including 
tax evasion, contract fraud, ``distorted'' aesthetics, moral 
corruption, and fan club activities.\85\ The notice calls for 
ideological control, supervision of public opinion, and 
guidance on aesthetics.\86\ Simultaneously, the National Radio 
and Television Administration declared a determination to get 
rid of effeminate aesthetics and promote revolution and 
socialist culture.\87\ The Central Cyberspace Affairs 
Commission (CCAC) also issued a notice stating its continued 
efforts to disband fan clubs that collect funds and influence 
online commentaries and to shut down online forums that allow 
fans to gather and discuss celebrity scandals.\88\

                   Technology-Enhanced Social Control

    In a March 2021 policy document covering the period between 
2021 and 2025, central authorities outlined the next phase of 
digitalization strategy, known as ``Digital China,'' as a key 
component of China's long-term economic and social 
development.\89\ Previously, the CCAC called for the 
construction of an integrated data system encompassing image 
recognition, big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and other 
technologies,\90\ which can be used to enhance the PRC's 
authoritarian control.\91\

                              SURVEILLANCE

    Since the conceptual development of the smart city in 2009, 
the PRC's surveillance program has evolved to include broader 
economic and social management concerns.\92\ The surveillance 
industry implemented by the PRC government uses surveillance 
cameras, behavioral analysis, biometrics, and other 
technologies including cellphone trackers which have the 
ability to connect a person's digital footprint, identity, and 
physical location.\93\ Cases of concern from this reporting 
year include the following:

         Authorities in Tianjin municipality in 2022 
        purchased ``combat platform'' software from Hikvision 
        that tracks petitioners in real time and uses a 
        ``social attribute'' score to predict the chances of 
        individuals entering Beijing municipality to file 
        complaints with the government.\94\ Hikvision is one of 
        eight companies that the U.S. Government identified in 
        October 2019 as having been ``implicated in human 
        rights violations . . . against members of Muslim 
        minority groups in the XUAR.'' \95\
         In September 2021, police in Henan province 
        awarded technology company Neusoft a contract to build 
        a tracking system using a range of technologies, 
        including facial recognition, smartphone monitoring, 
        and cross-platform data analysis to target people, such 
        as journalists, international students, and foreign 
        women illegally staying in the province.\96\ An expert 
        noted that the procurement tender ``illustrates the 
        first known instance of the PRC building custom 
        security technology to streamline state suppression of 
        journalists.'' \97\
         A January 2022 bidding document from public 
        security officials in Jingzhou municipality, Hubei 
        province, sought to build a public security video 
        platform that is integrated into the province-wide 
        system of local-level ``Sharp Eye'' surveillance 
        platforms.\98\ The proposed project calls for a network 
        of 3,500 new and modified security cameras, 200 
        biometric collection terminals, and big data processing 
        capabilities that can track people using facial and 
        vehicle recognition and behavior analysis.\99\

[For more information on commercial firms' role in government 
data collection and surveillance across China, see Section 
VIII--Business and Human Rights.]

                ENHANCED SOCIAL CONTROL UNDER ZERO-COVID

    Since 2020, officials have used technologies such as drones 
and health code apps to facilitate coercive enforcement of the 
``zero-COVID'' policy in ways that violated citizens' 
fundamental rights.\100\ Local governments used health code 
apps to control people's movement based on their exposure to 
the virus.\101\ While the algorithms used by different health 
apps were similar, how strictly the information was applied 
varied among local governments, as some officials chose to take 
drastic actions to prevent outbreaks, reportedly in fear of 
being terminated or disciplined.\102\ In Chengdu municipality, 
Sichuan province, for example, police defined close contact as 
having been within 800 meters (2,600 feet) of a confirmed 
infection for a period of time, leading to 82,000 people being 
considered as at risk.\103\ In another example, authorities 
halted two trains traveling to Beijing and placed nearly 350 
passengers in centralized quarantine because a single passenger 
on each train was considered a close contact of a confirmed 
case.\104\
    According to a June 2022 article posted by a data resource 
management bureau, citizens continued to experience 
inconsistent or erroneous enforcement as a result of health 
code data being used differently across localities.\105\ The 
article further noted that the lack of oversight could lead to 
the health code system being abused, and highlighted an example 
from Henan province.\106\ Beginning in April 2022, customers of 
at least four rural banks operating in Henan experienced 
difficulty making withdrawals, as the banks had frozen their 
deposits.\107\ Some customers reported that their health codes 
had been changed from green to red for no apparent reason, 
which prevented them from traveling to the banks to make 
inquiries or join protests to seek redress.\108\ They accused 
authorities of tampering with the health code system to 
restrict people's movement for purposes unrelated to public 
health.\109\ [For more information on China's zero-COVID 
policy, see Section VIII--Public Health.]

       NEW DIGITAL PRIVACY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STANDARDS
                      RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

    New legal and judicial standards on digital rights were 
issued this past year, the content of which raised concerns 
about the power of the government to infringe on the right to 
privacy given legal exceptions on consent.\110\ In August 2021, 
the National People's Congress passed the PRC Personal 
Information Protection Law, a legislative framework that 
maintains government access to personal data while ostensibly 
safeguarding the ``rights and interests'' of persons within the 
PRC from unlawful commercial handling of private 
information.\111\ According to Michael Caster, Asia Digital 
Programme Manager at the human rights organization Article 19, 
the law's private sector protections are inadequate because 
they contain exceptions to the requirement to obtain consent, 
such as for ``safeguarding public security,'' that can be 
exploited by government authorities to collect personal 
information.\112\ Companies must store personal data in China 
under an expansive view of national security, and the 
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) must issue a favorable 
security assessment before data can leave China.\113\ In July 
2021, the Supreme People's Court issued an interpretation 
requiring companies to disclose how they use facial and 
biometric information and prohibiting them from requiring 
customers to consent to companies' processing of facial 
information as a condition to use their services if it is not 
necessary for the provision of such services, with exemptions 
for public health and public security purposes.\114\ [For more 
information on the Chinese government's view of data security 
abroad, see Section XII--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. 
and Globally.]
    New standards on AI and online algorithms lack anti-
discrimination protections for consumers. In April 2022, the 
Netherlands-based think tank Leiden Asia Centre noted that the 
Ministry of Science and Technology's draft of the ``Ethical 
Norms of New Generation Artificial Intelligence'' initially 
contained text discouraging the use of discriminatory tools in 
AI, but the final draft replaced that text, stating ``[AI 
should] offer alternative products and services based on the 
need[s] of the underprivileged.'' \115\ The Leiden Asia Centre 
expressed concern that this change in wording indicates that 
future AI ethical standards may promote ethnic and socio-
economic discrimination.\116\ In December 2021, the CAC, 
together with several other state agencies, released final 
regulations that also omitted a prohibition on ``discriminatory 
or biased user tags'' in algorithmic recommendation systems, 
which had been included in the draft version.\117\

Governance

Governance

    Notes to Section V--Governance

    \1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 25.
    \2\ ``Zhongguo guanmei: Yichang `shenke biange' zhengzai fasheng 
Cai Xia: Wenge huilai le'' [China's official media: ``A deep 
transformation'' is taking place; Cai Xia: Cultural Revolution has 
returned], Radio Free Asia, August 30, 2021; Daniel Kwan, ``From Mao to 
Now: David Shambaugh Compares and Contrasts China's Leaders,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 10, 2021.
    \3\ Minxin Pei, ``China: Totalitarianism's Long Shadow,'' Journal 
of Democracy 32, no. 2 (April 2021): 6.
    \4\ Ruiping Ye, ``Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China's Journey 
Toward Socialist Rule of Law,'' International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1880.
    \5\ Ruiping Ye, ``Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China's Journey 
Toward Socialist Rule of Law,'' International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1876-77.
    \6\ Ruiping Ye, ``Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China's Journey 
Toward Socialist Rule of Law,'' International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1878-79.
    \7\ Ruiping Ye, ``Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China's Journey 
Toward Socialist Rule of Law,'' International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1860, 1861, 1879, 1881.
    \8\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
``Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021-2025 nian)'' [Outline for 
the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021-2025)], issued 
August 11, 2021.
    \9\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
``Fazhi Zhengfu jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2015-2020 nian)'' [Outline for 
the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2015-2020)], issued 
December 28, 2015.
    \10\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
``Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021-2025 nian)'' [Outline for 
the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021-2025)], issued 
August 11, 2021, secs. 1(1), 10(35).
    \11\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
``Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021-2025 nian)'' [Outline for 
the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021-2025)], issued 
August 11, 2021, secs. 2(4), 4(11), 7(22), 8(24).
    \12\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
``Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021-2025 nian)'' [Outline for 
the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021-2025)], issued 
August 11, 2021, secs. 8(24), (25).
    \13\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Dang de bai nian fendou zhongda 
chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi'' [Resolution of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee on the major achievements and 
historical experience of the Party's struggles over the past century], 
passed November 11, 2021.
    \14\ Wu Jiatong, ``Zhongguo fabu: Zhongguo Gongchandang Di'ershi ci 
Quanguo Daibiao dahui 2022 nian xiabannian zhaokai'' [Announcement from 
China: Chinese Communist Party 20th National Congress to be convened in 
the second half of 2022], China Release, November 11, 2021.
    \15\ Chris Buckley, ``A Succession Drama, Chinese Style, Starring 
Xi Jinping,'' New York Times, February 14, 2022. See also Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Zhangcheng [Chinese Communist Party Constitution], adopted 
September 6, 1982, amended October 24, 2017, art. 23.
    \16\ ``Zhonggong Liu Zhong Quan Hui tongguo disan ge lishixing 
jueyi, gonggu Xi Jinping diwei'' [CCP's Sixth Plenum passes the third 
historical resolution, bolstering Xi Jinping's position], BBC, November 
12, 2021.
    \17\ Jesse Turland, ``China's Sixth Plenum Report Proclaims Bright 
Future under Xi,'' The Diplomat, November 16, 2021; Jin Zhe, 
``Zhuanfang xuezhe Ni Lingchao: Tan Zhonggong lishi jueyi yu Zhongguo 
gongzong zhishang'' [Exclusive interview with scholar Ni Lingchao: A 
discussion of the CCP's historical resolution and Chinese public's 
intelligence], Voice of America, November 30, 2021; Chris Buckley et 
al., ``China's Xi Jinping Remakes the Communist Party's History in His 
Image,'' New York Times, March 10, 2022.
    \18\ Jin Zhe, ``Zhuanfang xuezhe Ni Lingchao: Tan Zhonggong lishi 
jueyi yu Zhongguo gongzong zhishang'' [Exclusive interview with scholar 
Ni Lingchao: A discussion of the CCP's historical resolution and 
Chinese public's intelligence], Voice of America, November 30, 2021; 
Song Ren, ``Beijing gongbu 3 wan 6 qian zi Zhonggong bai nian zhongda 
chengjiu jueyi wei Xi Jinping di 3 renqi taijiao mingluo'' [Beijing 
announces 36,000-word resolution on the important successes of the 
CCP's past 100 years, harbinger of Xi Jinping's third term], Voice of 
America, November 16, 2021.
    \19\ Gu Li, ``Zhongguo chengli di 18 ge Xi Jinping Sixiang yanjiu 
zhongxin'' [China establishes the 18th Xi Jinping Thought research 
center], Radio France Internationale, July 9, 2021.
    \20\ ``Xi Jinping Jingji Sixiang Yanjiu Zhongxin chengli'' [Xi 
Jinping Economic Thought Research Center is established], People's 
Daily, July 7, 2021; Su-Lin Tan, ``Economic Thought of China's Xi 
Jinping to Be Immortalised in Newly Established Research Centre,'' 
South China Morning Post, July 6, 2021; Gu Li, ``Zhongguo chengli di 18 
ge Xi Jinping Sixiang yanjiu zhongxin'' [China establishes the 18th Xi 
Jinping Thought research center], Radio France Internationale, July 9, 
2021.
    \21\ ``Xi Jinping Jingji Sixiang Yanjiu Zhongxin chengli'' [Xi 
Jinping Economic Thought Research Center is established], People's 
Daily, July 7, 2021.
    \22\ Ministry of Education, `` `Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese 
Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang xuesheng duben' yu jin nian qiuji xueqi qi zai 
quanguo tongyi shiyong'' [``Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era textbook'' will be used across 
the country beginning this fall semester], July 8, 2021.
    \23\ Shih-Wen Sue Chen and Sin Wen Lau, ``Little Red Children and 
`Grandpa Xi': China's School Textbooks Reflect the Rise of Xi Jinping's 
Personality Cult,'' The Conversation, November 22, 2021.
    \24\ Shih-Wen Sue Chen and Sin Wen Lau, ``Little Red Children and 
`Grandpa Xi': China's School Textbooks Reflect the Rise of Xi Jinping's 
Personality Cult,'' The Conversation, November 22, 2021.
    \25\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), preamble, art. 1.
    \26\ State Council, ``Ba da minzhu dangpai'' [Eight major 
democratic parties], March 9, 2020; State Council, `` `Zhongguo 
zhengdang zhidu' baipi shu'' [White paper on ``China's political party 
system''], November 15, 2007; Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
Kuomintang et al., ``Guanyu minzhu dangpai zuzhi fazhan ruogan wenti 
zuotanhui jiyao'' [Minutes of forum on several questions on the 
organization and development of democratic parties], June 3, 1996; 
Andrew Jacobs, ``Non-Communist Parties Lend China an Air of Pluralism, 
Without the Mess,'' New York Times, March 14, 2013.
    \27\ Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng [Chinese Communist Party 
Constitution], adopted September 6, 1982, amended October 24, 2017, 
general program.
    \28\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), arts. 97, 100; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xuanju 
Fa [PRC Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and Local 
People's Congresses], passed July 1, 1979, effective January 1, 1980, 
amended October 17, 2020, art. 3.
    \29\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa [PRC 
Organic Law of Village Committees], passed November 4, 1998, amended 
December 29, 2018, arts. 5, 7-20, 24; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Chengshi Jumin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa [PRC Organic Law of Urban Residents 
Committees], passed December 26, 1989, effective, January 1, 1990, 
amended December 29, 2018, arts. 3, 19; PRC Constitution, passed and 
effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), art. 111.
    \30\ Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and 
Yang Yao, ``The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off,'' National Bureau of 
Economic Research, November 2017, 10.
    \31\ See, e.g., ``Guangdong Tianwu cun huanjie xuanju houxuanren 
zao konghe beibi tuixuan'' [In Guangdong's Tianwu village, election 
candidate is threatened and forced to withdraw], Radio Free Asia, March 
4, 2021; ``China Protest Village Leader Lin Zuluan Convicted,'' BBC, 
September 8, 2016; John Sudworth, ``China Elections: Independent 
Candidates Fight for the Ballot,'' BBC, November 17, 2016.
    \32\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui he 
Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xuanju Fa [PRC Election Law of the 
National People's Congress and People's Congresses of Different Local 
Levels], passed October 17, 2020, effective October 18, 2020, arts. 2, 
12, 58; Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai 
``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji 
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Suanju Fa'' de Jueding [Decision of the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee on amending the ``PRC Election Law 
of the National People's Congress and People's Congresses of Different 
Local Levels''], October 17, 2020; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zongzhi 
Renyuan Zhengwu Chufen Fa [PRC Administrative Discipline for Public 
Officials], passed July 1, 1979, amended October 17, 2020, effective 
October 18, 2020.
    \33\ Luo Sha and Chen Fei, ``Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi minzhu: 
Quanguo xian xiang liangji renda huanjie xuanju gongzuo yifa youxu 
wenbu tuijin'' [Socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics: 
Elections for people's congresses at the county and village levels are 
advancing according to law in an orderly and steady manner across 
China], Xinhua, August 17, 2021.
    \34\ Li Zewei, ``Benshi xinyijie qu xiang zhen renda daibiao xuanju 
chansheng'' [Elections have generated a new term of district-, town-, 
and township-level people's congress delegates for this municipality], 
Beijing Youth Daily, November 24, 2021.
    \35\ `` `709 Dazhuabu' weiquan lushi jiashu: canxuan Beijing qu 
renda daibiao'' [Family members of lawyers in ``709 Crackdown'': Will 
run for Beijing district-level people's congress], Deutsche Welle, 
October 18, 2021.
    \36\ `` `709 Dazhuabu' weiquan lushi jiashu: canxuan Beijing qu 
renda daibiao'' [Family members of lawyers in ``709 Crackdown'': Will 
run for Beijing district-level people's congress], Deutsche Welle, 
October 18, 2021.
    \37\ ``Beijing shisi ming duli houxuanren yin renshen anquan xuanbu 
tingzhi canxuan jiceng renda xuanju xingdong'' [14 independent 
candidates from Beijing announce that they will stop their run for 
grassroots-level people's congress due to [concerns for] personal 
safety], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021.
    \38\ ``Beijing shisi ming duli houxuanren yin renshen anquan xuanbu 
tingzhi canxuan jiceng renda xuanju xingdong'' [14 independent 
candidates from Beijing announce that they will stop their run for 
grassroots-level people's congress due to [concerns for] personal 
safety], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2021.
    \39\ ``Beijing shisi ming duli houxuanren yin renshen anquan xuanbu 
tingzhi canxuan jiceng renda xuanju xingdong'' [14 independent 
candidates from Beijing announce that they will stop grassroots-level 
people's congress due to personal safety], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 
2021.
    \40\ State Council Information Office, ``Full Text: China: 
Democracy That Works,'' December 4, 2021.
    \41\ State Council Information Office, ``Full Text: China: 
Democracy That Works,'' December 4, 2021.
    \42\ State Council Information Office, ``Full Text: China: 
Democracy That Works,'' December 4, 2021.
    \43\ `` `Women de minzhu caishi zhen minzhu' Zhonggong chongxin 
dingyi minzhu duikang Baideng Minzhu Fenghui'' [``Our democracy is real 
democracy''; CCP opposes Biden's Democracy Summit by redefining 
democracy], Voice of America, December 13, 2021.
    \44\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued September 30, 2021, sec. 2(3), (4).
    \45\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued September 30, 2021, secs. 1, 2(2). The term 
``Party-building'' refers to a multi-faceted approach for enhancing the 
Party's governance capabilities through ideological, organizational, 
and disciplinary means.
    \46\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued September 30, 2021, sec. 3(4).
    \47\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued September 30, 2021, sec. 3(8).
    \48\ Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, ``Beijing shi peiyu 
fazhan shequ shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang xingdong shishi fang'an'' 
[Implementation of special action plan for cultivating and developing 
community and social groups in Beijing municipality], issued October 
14, 2021, sec. 1. See also Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Peiyu fazhan 
shequ shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang xingdong fang'an (2021-2023 nian)'' 
[Special action plan for cultivating and developing community social 
groups (2021-2023)], December 7, 2020.
    \49\ Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, ``Beijing shi peiyu 
fazhan shequ shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang xingdong shishi fang'an'' 
[Implementation of special action plan for cultivating and developing 
community and social groups in Beijing municipality], issued October 
14, 2021, sec. 2(3), (4).
    \50\ Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, ``Beijing shi peiyu 
fazhan shequ shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang xingdong shishi fang'an'' 
[Implementation of special action plan for cultivating and developing 
community and social groups in Beijing municipality], issued October 
14, 2021, sec. 2(5).
    \51\ Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, ``Beijing shi peiyu 
fazhan shequ shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang xingdong shishi fang'an'' 
[Implementation of special action plan for cultivating and developing 
community and social groups in Beijing municipality], issued October 
14, 2021, sec. 2(5); Zhang Xuehong, ``Qunzhong na douyou, weihe 
Chaoyang de zheme yaoyan'' [There are crowds everywhere, why is the 
crowd in Chaoyang this eye-catching?], Legal Daily, November 1, 2021.
    \52\ ``Jiemi `Chaoyang Qunzhong': 13 wan ren zhuce, huoyuezhe yue 
butie zuigao 500 yuan'' [Exposing the secrets of ``Chaoyang Masses'': 
130 thousand registered members, active members can get a stipend of up 
to 500 yuan a month], The Paper, September 21, 2021.
    \53\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2021 nian Zhongguo shehui 
kongzhi nianzhong baogao'' [2021 year-end report on social control in 
China], March 19, 2021.
    \54\ ``Beijing jiang dazao geng duo `Chaoyang Qunzhong' `shijie 
diwu da qingbao zuzhi' yi pianbu quan Zhongguo'' [Beijing to create 
more groups like ``Chaoyang Masses,'' ``the world's fifth largest 
intelligence organization'' has spread across China], Radio Free Asia, 
November 18, 2021.
    \55\ ``Zhongguo pohai zongjiao ziyou shijian peizeng dangju guli 
qunzhong huxiang jiefa jubao'' [Religious persecution cases in China 
multiply, government encourages people to report each other], Voice of 
America, September 24, 2021.
    \56\ Nectar Gan and Brett McKeehan, ``China's Propaganda Machine Is 
Intensifying Its `People's War' to Catch American Spies,'' CNN, October 
18, 2021.
    \57\ Liza Lin, ``Walmart Sparks Public Outcry in China Over 
Products from Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2021; U.S. 
Department of State, ``Department Press Briefing--March 26, 2021,'' 
March 26, 2021.
    \58\ Kevin Rudd, Asia Society Policy Institute, ``Xi Jinping's 
Pivot to the State,'' September 8, 2021.
    \59\ Kevin Rudd, Asia Society Policy Institute, ``Xi Jinping's 
Pivot to the State,'' September 8, 2021.
    \60\ ``Xi Jinping zhuchi zhaokai Zhongyang Caijing Weiyuanhui dishi 
ci huiyi'' [Xi Jinping convenes and presides over the 10th meeting of 
the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission], Xinhua, August 
17, 2021.
    \61\ ``Xi Jinping zhuchi zhaokai Zhongyang Caijing Weiyuanhui dishi 
ci huiyi'' [Xi Jinping convenes and presides over the 10th meeting of 
the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission], Xinhua, August 
17, 2021.
    \62\ Song Xiaowu, ``Ruhe goujian chuci fenpei, zai fenpei, san ci 
fenpei xietiao peitao de jichuxing zhidu anpai'' [How to make 
arrangements to set up a basic system to facilitate the first, second, 
and third distribution package], GMW.cn, October 9, 2021.
    \63\ Robyn Mak, ``Xi's Common Prosperity Becomes Financial Black 
Box,'' Reuters, September 3, 2021.
    \64\ Robyn Mak, ``Xi's Common Prosperity Becomes Financial Black 
Box,'' Reuters, September 3, 2021.
    \65\ Jane Zhang, ``Alibaba's Charity Fund Updates Its Strategic 
Priority to Answer Xi's Common Prosperity Call and Help Narrow Nation's 
Wealth Gap,'' South China Morning Post, September 6, 2021.
    \66\ Matthew Brooker, ``China Submits to a Painful Market 
Reality,'' Bloomberg, reprinted in Washington Post, March 17, 2022; 
``China to Tighten Antitrust Legal Enforcement--New Antitrust Bureau 
Head,'' Reuters, December 20, 2021; Wan Jing, ``Guojia Shichang 
Jianguan Zongju gongbu 13 qi fanlongduan xingzheng chufa anjian'' 
[State Administration for Market Regulation announces administrative 
penalties in 13 anti-monopoly cases], Legal Daily, January 5, 2022; 
State Administration for Market Regulation, ``Shichang Jianguan Zongju 
yifa dui hulianwang lingyu ershi'er qi weifa shishi jingjingzhe jizhong 
an zuochu xingzheng chufa jueding'' [State Administration for Market 
Regulation makes decision on 22 cases of unlawful mergers in the 
internet sector], July 7, 2021.
    \67\ Gibson Dunn, ``Antitrust in China--2021 Year in Review,'' 
February 11, 2022; State Administration for Market Regulation, 
``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduan Fa (xiuzheng cao'an)'' [PRC 
Anti-Monopoly Law (draft amendment)], issued October 23, 2021, 16, 30 
et seq.
    \68\ ``Zhongguo qipashi fanlongduan zhilu huo ling minqi jiti 
`tangping' huo `wodao' '' [China's strange anti-monopoly path may lead 
private enterprises to ``lie flat'' or ``lie down''], Voice of America, 
August 12, 2021.
    \69\ Raymond Zhong, ``China's Crackdown on Didi Is a Reminder That 
Beijing Is in Charge,'' New York Times, August 27, 2021.
    \70\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Wangluo anquan shencha 
bangongshi guanyu dui `Didi Chuxing' qidong wangluo anquan shencha de 
gonggao'' [Notice of the investigation office of the Cybersecurity 
Administration of China concerning the launch of a cybersecurity review 
on ``Didi Chuxing''], July 2, 2021; Cyberspace Administration of China, 
``Guanyu xiajia `Didi Chuxing' App de tongbao'' [Notice concerning 
taking down ``Didi Chuxing's'' app], July 4, 2021; ``Zhongguo Guojia 
Wangxinban he Guo'anbu deng 7 bumen jinzhu Didi shishi anquan shencha'' 
[Seven agencies, including the Cyberspace Administration of China and 
Domestic Security, stationed at Didi to carry out security review], 
Voice of America, July 16, 2021.
    \71\ ``Huanshi ruiping: Guojia yaoqiu Didi Chuxing xiajia zhenggai 
weihe shende renxin'' [Global Times sharp opinion: Why is the 
government's order to take down Didi Chuxing's app welcomed by so many 
people], Global Times, July 4, 2021; Anna, ``Zhonggong dula zhengshu 
Didi shaji jinghou fang guanyuan waishe'' [CCP's sinister rectification 
of Didi is intended to give a warning to others, to prevent leaks of 
officials' information], ipkmedia.com, July 7, 2021; Emily Feng and 
David Gura, ``A Top Chinese Ride-Hailing Company Delists from the NYSE 
Just Months After Its IPO,'' NPR, December 3, 2021.
    \72\ Alexandra Stevenson and Paul Mozur, ``With Its Exit, Didi 
Sends a Signal: China No Longer Needs Wall Street,'' New York Times, 
December 5, 2021; Emily Feng and David Gura, ``A Top Chinese Ride-
Hailing Company Delists from the NYSE Just Months After Its IPO,'' NPR, 
December 3, 2021.
    \73\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data Security 
Law], passed June 10, 2021, effective September 1, 2021.
    \74\ Cyberspace Administration of China et al., ``Wangluo Anquan 
Shencha Banfa'' [Cybersecurity Review Measures], issued December 28, 
2021, effective February 15, 2022, art. 7.
    \75\ ``China's New Private Tutoring Rules Put Billions of Dollars 
at Stake,'' Reuters, July 26, 2021; Ni Dandan, ``What China's Parents 
Really Think about the Three-Child Policy,'' Sixth Tone, August 30, 
2021; ``Zhongguo jiada xiaowai jiaopei hangye jianguan chujin `san hai' 
zhengce luoshi?'' [Will China increase supervision of off-campus 
training to boost implementation of ``three-child'' policy?], Radio 
Free Asia, June 16, 2021.
    \76\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yiwu Jiaoyu Fa [PRC Compulsory 
Education Law], passed June 29, 1986, amended December 29, 2018, arts. 
2, 11; General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party and State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu Jianqing Yiwu 
Jiaoyu Jieduan Xuesheng Zuoye Fudan he Xiaowai Peixun Fudan de Yijian 
[Opinion on Further Reducing the Burden of Students in Compulsory 
Education in Their Homework and Extracurricular Training], issued July 
24, 2021.
    \77\ General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party and State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu 
Jianqing Yiwu Jiaoyu Jieduan Xuesheng Zuoye Fudan he Xiaowai Peixun 
Fudan de Yijian [Opinion on Further Reducing the Burden of Students in 
Compulsory Education in Their Homework and Extracurricular Training], 
July 24, 2021, secs. 2(5), 4(13).
    \78\ Coco Feng, ``China Tech Crackdown: Beijing's Off-Campus 
Tutoring Ban Puts 90 Percent of Firms Out of Business,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 1, 2022.
    \79\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiating Jiaoyu Chujin Fa [PRC Family 
Education Promotion Law], passed October 23, 2021, effective January 1, 
2022, arts. 22, 48, 49.
    \80\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiating Jiaoyu Cujin Fa [PRC Family 
Education Promotion Law], passed October 23, 2021, effective January 1, 
2022, art. 1; Mandy Zuo, ``China Parenting Law: First Case under New 
Legislation Sees Divorced Mother Ordered to Live with Neglected 
Child,'' South China Morning Post, January 8, 2022.
    \81\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiating Jiaoyu Cujin Fa [PRC Family 
Education Promotion Law], passed October 23, 2021, effective January 1, 
2022, arts. 16, 22.
    \82\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiating Jiaoyu Cujin Fa [PRC Family 
Education Promotion Law], passed October 23, 2021, effective January 1, 
2022, arts. 48, 49.
    \83\ ``Zhongguo weichengnian zinu you `buliang xingwei' huo fanzui 
shi, fumu jiang bei zhuize'' [In China, parents will be held liable for 
their minor children's ``inappropriate behavior'' or crimes], Radio 
Free Asia, October 20, 2021.
    \84\ ChinaAid Association, `` `Jiating Jiaoyu Cujin Fa' daxiang 
Zhonggong `kongzhi weichengnianren chaoxian zhan,' jiang dui Jidujiao 
jiaoyu zaocheng geng da chongji'' [``Family Education Promotion Law'' 
kicks off the CCP's ``unrestrained war to control minors,'' will have 
greater impact on Christian education], October 25, 2021.
    \85\ ``Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu yinfa tongzhi, bushu wenyu lingyu 
zonghe zhili gongzuo'' [Central Propaganda Department issues a 
circular, implements comprehensive management on cultural and 
entertainment sectors], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, September 
2, 2021.
    \86\ ``Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu yinfa tongzhi, bushu wenyu lingyu 
zonghe zhili gongzuo'' [Central Propaganda Department issues a 
circular, implements comprehensive management on cultural and 
entertainment sectors], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, September 
2, 2021.
    \87\ National Radio and Television Administration General Office, 
Guojia Guangbo Dianshi Zongju bangongting guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi 
jiemu ji qi renyuan guanli de tongzhi [Circular from National Radio and 
Television Administration General Office regarding further 
strengthening the management of cultural and entertainment programs and 
their staff], September 2, 2021.
    \88\ Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission 
Secretariat, Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang `fanquan' luanxiang zhili de 
tongzhi [Circular concerning further strengthening the management of 
the fan club chaos], August 25, 2021.
    \89\ ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan 
Dishisi ge Wu nian Guihua he 2035 nian Yuanjing Mubiao Gangyao'' [14th 
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the 
Outline of Long-Term Goals for 2035], March 13, 2021. See also David 
Dorman, ``China's Plan for Digital Dominance,'' War on the Rocks, March 
28, 2022.
    \90\ Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, `` `Shisi 
Wu' guojia Xinxihua Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for National 
Informatization], December 28, 2021, 30. See also ``Tujie: Jianshe 
`Shuzi Zhongguo' Xi Jinping Zongshuji zheyang buju'' [Illustration: 
General Secretary Xi Jinping's layout for building a ``Digital 
China''], People's Daily, October 13, 2020.
    \91\ Techno-Authoritarianism: Platform for Repression in China and 
Abroad, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2021) (written statement of Samantha Hoffman, Senior 
Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute); Yaya J. Fanusie, 
``China's NFT Plans Are a Recipe for the Government's Digital 
Control,'' Lawfare (blog), April 22, 2022.
    \92\ Alexander Rosas, ``What To Know about China's Smart Cities and 
How They Use AI, 5G, and IoT,'' China Guys, August 26, 2021; Stephen 
Chen, ``The Chinese Technology Helping New York Police Keep a Closer 
Eye on the United States' Biggest City,'' South China Morning Post, 
January 11, 2019; ``Zhongguo Ping'an Chengshi fazhan baipi shu'' 
[China's Safe City development white paper], CCID Consulting and Huawei 
Technologies Co., January 2014, 10.
    \93\ Isabelle Qian, Muyi Xiao, Paul Mozur, and Alexander Cardia, 
``Four Takeaways from a Times Investigation into China's Expanding 
Surveillance State,'' New York Times, July 26, 2022.
    \94\ Paul Mozur, Muyi Xiao, and John Liu, `` `An Invisible Cage': 
How China Is Policing the Future,'' New York Times, June 25, 2022; 
Charles Rollet, ``Hikvision Wins PRC Police Project to Predict 
Protesters Entering Capital,'' IPVM, June 25, 2022; Stella Chen, 
``Petitioning,'' China Media Project, May 20, 2022.
    \95\ Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
``Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,'' 84 Federal 
Register 54002, October 9, 2019.
    \96\ ``Henan sheng Gonganting 325 pingtai jianshe xiangmu'' [325 
platform construction projects of the Henan province Public Security 
Department], reprinted in IPVM, July 29, 2021, 7, 8, 60, 83; ``Chinese 
Province Targets Journalists, Foreign Students with Planned New 
Surveillance System,'' Reuters, November 29, 2021.
    \97\ ``Chinese Province Targets Journalists, Foreign Students with 
Planned New Surveillance System,'' Reuters, November 29, 2021.
    \98\ ``Jingzhou shi shiji zhengfu caigou zhaobiao wenjian'' 
[Bidding documents for procurement by the Jingzhou municipal 
government], January 2022, 20, 24, 31.
    \99\ ``Jingzhou shi shiji zhengfu caigou zhaobiao wenjian'' 
[Bidding documents for procurement by the Jingzhou municipal 
government], January 2022, 20, 24, 31, 40-42.
    \100\ Bethany Dawson, ``A Robot Dog Issuing COVID-19 Safety 
Instructions Is Roaming the Streets of Locked Down Shanghai,'' Business 
Insider, April 3, 2022; Lu Ming, ``Yancheng jiaojing chudong wurenji, 
gua fangyi erweima hanhua siji saoma tongxing'' [Traffic police in 
Yancheng use UAVs to display hanging QR codes and blast out messages; 
drivers proceed after scanning the code], The Paper, August 3, 2021; 
Peng Guangrui, ``Wurenji xunfang! Gaoxin jingfang dazao 3D litihua 
zhi'an xunfang xinmoshi'' [Drone patrols! High-tech police create a new 
3D security patrol model], Chongqing Fazhi Bao, reprinted in qq.com, 
November 12, 2021; ``China: Solution for Public Using Mobile Phones to 
Film/Sci-Fi Film Coming to Reality in China?'' [Video file], YouTube, 
China Insights, August 11, 2021; Xu Hui and Li Wenxue, ``[Gongtong 
zhanyi] wurenji, dalaba, Weixin qun . . . zhexie `xuanchuanyuan' 
zhenshi jiediqi'' [Common fight against the epidemic] drones, 
loudspeakers, WeChat groups . . . these `propagandists' are really 
down-to-earth], CCTV, February 3, 2020; Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, ``Wurenji anquan feixing de `baohusan'--wurenji zhuang 
`tiao jianxiu gong' xin zhiye zhengshi fabu'' [``Protection umbrella'' 
for safe UAV flight--new occupations officially announced for ``jobs in 
UAV assembly, adjustment, inspection, and maintenance''], April 27, 
2020; Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``She yiqing fangkong de weifa xingwei 
he Zhi'an Guanli Chufa Fa xiangguan fatiao'' [Illegal acts involving 
epidemic prevention and control and legal provisions related to the 
Public Security Administration Punishment Law], April 15, 2021; CECC, 
2021 Annual Report, March 2022,
183-92.
    \101\ Phoebe Zhang, ``China's Covid-19 Health Code: Algorithms 
Weigh on Lives and Freedoms, Leaving Some Confused and Miserable'' 
South China Morning Post, April 4, 2022; Zhong Yuhao, ``Jiceng jianyi 
jiankangma shougui quanguo tongyi guanli, sheli tongyi de tousu, jianju 
qudao'' [Local [bureau] suggests managing health codes under a unified 
national system and creating a unified complaint and reporting system], 
The Paper, June 30, 2022.
    \102\ Phoebe Zhang, ``China's Covid-19 Health Code: Algorithms 
Weigh on Lives and Freedoms, Leaving Some Confused and Miserable'' 
South China Morning Post, April 4, 2022.
    \103\ ``China Deems People Almost a Kilometer Apart as `Close 
Contacts,' '' Bloomberg, November 8, 2021.
    \104\ Christian Shepherd, ``In China, 300 Coronavirus Cases Means 
Public Shaming, Marooned Travelers and a Nationwide Dragnet,'' 
Washington Post, October 29, 2021.
    \105\ Zhong Yuhao, ``Jiceng jianyi jiankangma shougui quanguo 
tongyi guanli, sheli tongyi de tousu, jianju qudao'' [Local [bureau] 
suggests managing health codes under a unified national system and 
creating a unified complaint and reporting system], The Paper, June 30, 
2022. See also Shu Yi'er, Zhao Zuoyan, Wei Yao, and Xinyuan Xu, ``Ge 
sheng zhengce he 98 tiao guzhang liuyan gaosu ni, jiankangma shi 
zenyang bianhuang de?'' [Provincial policies and 98 error messages tell 
you: how does the health code turn yellow?], The Paper, January 18, 
2022.
    \106\ Zhong Yuhao, ``Jiceng jianyi jiankangma shougui quanguo 
tongyi guanli, sheli tongyi de tousu, jianju qudao'' [Local [bureau] 
suggests managing health codes under a unified national system and 
creating a unified complaint and reporting system], The Paper, June 30, 
2022.
    \107\ Tessa Wong, ``Henan: China Covid App Restricts Residents 
After Banking Protests,'' BBC, June 14, 2022; Nectar Gan, ``China's 
Bank Run Victims Planned to Protest. Then Their Covid Health Codes 
Turned Red,'' CNN, June 15, 2022.
    \108\ Tessa Wong, ``Henan: China Covid App Restricts Residents 
After Banking Protests,'' BBC, June 14, 2022; Nectar Gan, ``China's 
Bank Run Victims Planned to Protest. Then Their Covid Health Codes 
Turned Red,'' CNN, June 15, 2022.
    \109\ Tessa Wong, ``Henan: China Covid App Restricts Residents 
After Banking Protests,'' BBC, June 14, 2022.
    \110\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 17; UN Human Rights Council, The Right 
to Privacy in the Digital Age, Report of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, A/HRC/48/31, September 13, 2021.
    \111\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal 
Information Protection Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective November 
1, 2021, arts. 1, 9, 10, 13, 18, 26, 28, 29, 36, 40.
    \112\ Michael Caster, ``Opinion: Data Protection Law Will Not Rein 
in China's `Techno-Authoritarianism,' '' Thomson Reuters Foundation, 
August 24, 2021; For information on the organization Article 19, see 
Article 19, ``Submissions to General Comment No. 37 on Article 21 (the 
Right of Peaceful Assembly),'' accessed August 9, 2022, 1.
    \113\ Tingting Liu, Lester Ross, and Kenneth Zhou, WilmerHale, 
``China Publishes Draft Measures on Security Assessment of Cross-Border 
Data Transfer,'' JD Supra, November 3, 2021; Hui Xu, Kieran Donovan, 
and Bianca Lee, ``China Issues New Rules on Cybersecurity Review for 
Network Platform Operators Listing Abroad,'' Client Alert Commentary 
2934, Latham & Watkins, March 4, 2022, 2, 4; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal Information Protection Law],'' 
passed August 20, 2021, effective November 1, 2021, arts. 10, 36, 40, 
42.
    \114\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shiyong Renlian Shibie 
Jishu Chuli Geren Xinxi Xiangguan Minshi Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan 
Wenti de Guiding [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several 
Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases 
Involving the Processing of Personal Information Using Facial 
Recognition Technology], passed June 8, 2021, issued July 28, 2021, 
effective August 1, 2021, arts. 2, 5; Laney Zhang, ``China: Supreme 
People's Court Issues Judicial Interpretation Against Misuse of Facial 
Recognition Technology,'' Global Legal Monitor, Law Library of 
Congress, August 19, 2021.
    \115\ John Lee, Eric Zhang, and Rogier Creemers, ``China's 
Standardisation System--Trends, Implications and Case Studies in 
Emerging Technologies,'' LeidenAsiaCentre, April 2022, 28-29. See also 
Ministry of Science and Technology, Xin Yidai Rengong Zhineng Lunli 
Guifan [Ethical Norms of New Era Artificial Intelligence], September 
25, 2021, art. 3.
    \116\ John Lee, Eric Zhang, and Rogier Creemers, ``China's 
Standardisation System--Trends, Implications and Case Studies in 
Emerging Technologies,'' LeidenAsiaCentre, April 2022, 29.
    \117\ John Lee, Eric Zhang, and Rogier Creemers, ``China's 
Standardisation System--Trends, Implications and Case Studies in 
Emerging Technologies,'' LeidenAsiaCentre, April 2022, 26-27; 
Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State 
Administration for Market Regulation, Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa 
Tuijian Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the Management of Algorithmic 
Recommendations in Internet Information Services], passed November 16, 
2021, effective March 1, 2022; Cai Rongwei and Yang Jie, ``Suanfa 
hegui--jiedu `Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding 
(zhengqiu yijian gao)'' [Algorithm compliance--An interpretation of the 
Provisions on the Management of Algorithmic Recommendations in Internet 
Information Services (draft for public comment)], Zhong Lun Law Firm, 
September 6, 2021, 6(2).

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ethnic Minority Rights

                VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and
                         Trafficking in Persons

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, 
        People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities 
        implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic 
        minority groups to express their cultural and religious 
        identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic 
        Autonomy Law and international law such as the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
        Social and Cultural Rights.
         During this reporting year, PRC officials 
        introduced language and education policies that 
        prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the 
        reduction of ethnic minority language instruction. 
        Australian scholar James Leibold said, ``[T]he 
        education system is now the front lines in President Xi 
        Jinping's assault on ethnic minority cultures in 
        China.''
         Authorities implemented programs and 
        activities in Hui religious communities this past year 
        which were aimed at ``sinicizing'' Islamic practices, a 
        trend observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to 
        practice their religion and culture.
         Following protests in the Inner Mongolia 
        Autonomous Region in fall 2020 over a new policy to 
        reduce Mongolian language instruction in schools, 
        authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol 
        parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. 
        Officials launched mass ``rectification'' and ``re-
        education'' campaigns, including through ``patriotism 
        courses,'' to shore up support throughout all segments 
        of Mongol society for the PRC's sinicization policies.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Develop programming, both in the United States and 
        around the world, to preserve threatened cultures and 
        languages. The Administration should expand grant 
        programs to assist Uyghur, Mongol, and other ethnic and 
        religious minorities in cultural and linguistic 
        preservation efforts and leverage the tools available 
        in the Tibet Policy and Support Act (Public Law 116-
        260) to help sustain Tibetan religion, language, 
        culture, and identity. The Administration should 
        prioritize, and Congress should fund, research, 
        exhibitions, and education related to these efforts.
          Urge the PRC government to abide by the protections 
        guaranteed to ethnic minorities to speak, use, and 
        receive an education in their mother tongue, under 
        China's Constitution, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, 
        and international laws such as the ICCPR and the UN 
        Convention on the Rights of the Child. Urge Chinese 
        authorities to repeal policies that infringe upon the 
        rights of ethnic minorities to teach and learn in their 
        own language. Press Chinese officials to release 
        political prisoners who were detained for their 
        advocacy of language education rights.
          Urge Chinese authorities to allow Hui and other 
        predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations to 
        freely engage in Islamic religious rituals, as a matter 
        of their right to religious freedom, and in accordance 
        with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
        ICCPR, as well as China's Constitution, which prohibit 
        discrimination based on religion.
          The U.S. Agency for Global Media should consider 
        establishing a Mongolian language service to provide a 
        reliable, accurate, and timely source of information to 
        Mongols in China.

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ethnic Minority Rights

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

            Party and State Policy toward Ethnic Minorities

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, Chinese 
Communist Party and government authorities implemented policies 
that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express 
their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of 
the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law \1\ and international law 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.\2\ At the Party's Central Work Conference on 
Ethnic Affairs held in Beijing municipality in August 2021, 
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping told top officials of the 
necessity of ``guiding all ethnic groups to always put the 
interests of the Chinese nation first.'' \3\ Several scholars 
and analysts said Xi's speech represented a policy of forced 
assimilation at the expense of ethnic minorities' languages and 
cultures.\4\ In a March 2022 speech that was held during the 
annual meeting of the National People's Congress, Xi similarly 
called on government officials to build a ``Chinese nation'' 
(``Zhonghua minzu,'' a term that also encompasses notions of 
ethnicity and race),\5\ saying, ``[a]ny activity that is 
harmful to fostering such a sense should be resolutely 
forbidden.'' \6\

                INVESTIGATION OF WANG ZHENGWEI REFLECTS
                 OFFICIAL CONCERN OVER ETHNIC POLICIES

    In March 2022, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that 
authorities had launched a rare investigation into a senior 
official, which reflected Xi Jinping's push for assimilation 
and desire to eliminate resistance to his ethnic policies.\7\ 
The Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
reportedly launched an investigation into whether Wang 
Zhengwei, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, had engaged in abuse of power and 
corruption.\8\ According to the WSJ report, the investigation 
represented the concerns of senior Party officials that Wang--
an ethnic Hui who formerly served as head of the State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission and chairman of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region--had been too aggressive in his promotion of Muslim 
culture while serving in those positions.\9\ His advocacy of 
legislation on halal food certification and the construction of 
mosques reportedly conflicted with the goals of Xi Jinping to 
downplay ethnic differences in favor of assimilation.\10\ [For 
more information on Party and state policy toward ethnic 
minorities in China, see Section IX--Tibet and Section X--
Xinjiang.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Language and Education Policies Marginalize Ethnic Minorities
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  During this reporting year, PRC officials implemented language and
 education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese
 and the reduction of ethnic minority language instruction. Australian
 scholar James Leibold observed, ``[T]he education system is now the
 front lines in President Xi Jinping's assault on ethnic minority
 cultures in China,'' noting that ``[g]roups like the Mongols, Uyghurs
 and Tibetans must disown their constitutionally protected languages and
 cultural traditions in the name of [sic] in upholding the party's
 regime security and a Han-centric nation.'' \11\ In July 2021, the
 Ministry of Education published a plan to establish mandatory Mandarin
 Chinese-based instruction in preschools throughout China, beginning in
 fall 2021.\12\ Although preschool enrollment is not itself mandatory, a
 separate plan issued in February 2019 by the Communist Party Central
 Committee and the State Council set universal preschool attendance as a
 goal by 2035.\13\ Scholars Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud
 concluded in a Jamestown Foundation analysis that the 2021 plan would
 likely reduce the ability of ethnic minority children to learn school
 subjects in their native languages, and that this would in turn hinder
 intergenerational language transmission and the use of these languages
 more broadly.\14\ According to Grey and Baioud, under current education
 policies toward ethnic minorities, ``[I]t is no longer accepted that
 good students and citizens can be bicultural and bilingual in minority
 languages.'' \15\
  Reports this past year documented the coercive placement of Tibetans,
 Uyghurs, and other ethnic minority children in boarding schools that
 serve official goals of displacing children from their families,
 communities, and cultures.\16\ In Tibetan areas of China, around three
 out of every four Tibetan children between the ages of six and eighteen
 were educated in boarding schools, which the advocacy group Tibet
 Action Institute described as ``colonial'' in design and practice.\17\
 Reports highlighted the high incidence of violence and abuse at such
 schools, and the lasting mental trauma this caused students.\18\ [For
 more information on boarding schools for ethnic minorities in China,
 see Section IX--Tibet and Section X--Xinjiang.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture

    During this reporting year, authorities implemented 
programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were 
aimed at ``sinicizing'' Islamic practices,\19\ a trend 
observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to practice their 
religion and culture.\20\ Authorities demolished and removed 
features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve 
Hui communities, in order to ``sinicize'' the mosques and 
eradicate ``Saudi and Arabic influence.'' \21\ In one case, 
beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and 
minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining 
municipality, Qinghai province.\22\ The mosque, one of the 
largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the 
Hui community.\23\ In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong 
municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and 
minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who 
had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be 
hospitalized for their injuries.\24\ According to human rights 
organization Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), local 
authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them 
part of a project to get rid of ``Saudi and Arabic influence.'' 
\25\ CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only 
three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes 
and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of 
the mosques.\26\
    An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another 
example of official actions to ``sinicize'' Islamic 
practices.\27\ Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level 
government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious 
personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the 
fourth such tour of its kind, to ``promote a Chinese communal 
national consciousness'' and ``guide the Muslim masses to unite 
closely around the Party and the government.'' \28\ A Chinese 
scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the 
official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious 
believers into ``believers in the Party.'' \29\ [For more 
information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see 
Section III--Freedom of Religion and Section X--Xinjiang.]

               Authorities Tighten Controls over Dissent,
                     Mongolian Identity in the IMAR

    Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
(IMAR) in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian 
language instruction in schools, authorities worked to 
eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and 
others in the region.\30\ Officials launched mass 
``rectification'' and ``re-education'' campaigns, including 
through ``patriotism courses,'' to shore up support throughout 
all segments of Mongol society for the PRC's sinicization 
policies.\31\ According to testimony from U.S.-based Mongol 
rights advocate Enghebatu Togochog at a Commission hearing in 
April 2022, an IMAR resident who had been subjected to two 
months of ``training'' mandated by the IMAR bureau of education 
following the implementation of the new language policy said he 
and his coworkers had been required to confess past 
``mistakes'' such as the wearing of traditional Mongolian 
clothing.\32\ Authorities' efforts to eliminate dissent 
extended to government and Party officials in the region whom 
they viewed as having been too protective of Mongolian language 
and identity and too reticent to enforce reforms promoting a 
Han Chinese identity.\33\ The ``rectification,'' dismissal, and 
punishment of such officials included the apparent dismissal of 
IMAR chairwoman Bu Xiaolin in August 2021 and the dismissal of 
two education officials who had worked to preserve Mongolian-
language instruction.\34\
    In the wake of the 2020 protests, IMAR authorities issued 
new regulations regarding language, education, and ethnic unity 
that solidified official control and assimilation efforts.\35\ 
Two regional regulations on language and education that came 
into force in January 2022 invalidated regulations enacted in 
2005 and 2016 which protected and promoted the use of the 
Mongolian language in government and education.\36\ The 2005 
regulations protected Mongolian as a common language in the 
IMAR, requiring its use alongside Mandarin Chinese by 
government organs; the 2016 regulations provided incentives for 
supporting education using Mongolian-based instruction.\37\ The 
two new regulations enforce the prioritization of Mandarin 
Chinese over Mongolian in education and emphasize the primacy 
of Mandarin Chinese in order to promote Chinese culture and 
``ethnic unity.'' \38\
    After regional officials implemented education reforms in 
primary and secondary schools, reforms were extended to the 
university level.\39\ In fall 2021, the University of Inner 
Mongolia reduced its quota for social science majors taught in 
the Mongolian language by nearly half, and in 2021 also 
eliminated several majors taught in the Mongolian language.\40\ 
In September 2021, regional education authorities announced 
plans to eventually eliminate the extra points ethnic 
minorities had previously been awarded on the university 
entrance exam.\41\

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ethnic Minority Rights

    Notes to Section VI--Ethnic Minority Rights

    \1\ The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for 
the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority 
``nationalities'' in addition to a system of regional autonomy in 
designated areas. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa [PRC 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 
1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 
53.
    \2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, accessed October 4, 2022. China has signed but 
not ratified the ICCPR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed July 15, 
2020. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on 
March 27, 2001. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 4; 
Jiaoyubu Bangongting guanyu Shishi Xueqian Ertong Putonghua Jiaoyu 
``Tong Yu Tong Yin'' Jihua de Tongzhi [Ministry of Education General 
Office Circular on Implementing the ``Children Speak in Unison'' Plan 
for Mandarin Education for Preschool Children], issued July 21, 2021; 
Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, Hidden from 
the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools Inside 
Tibet,'' December 2021; ``Children of Detained Uyghur Parents Held in 
`Welfare Schools' in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, August 16, 
2021; Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at 
Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \3\ ``Xi Jinping zai Zhongyang Minzu Gongzuo Huiyi shang qiangdiao 
yi zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi wei zhuxian tuidong xin 
shidai Dang de minzu gongzuo gao zhiliang fazhan Li Keqiang zhuchi Li 
Zhanshu Wang Huning Zhao Leji Han Zheng chuxi Wang Yang jianghua'' [At 
the Central Ethnic Work Conference, Xi Jinping stressed the primacy of 
building the common consciousness of the Chinese nation in order to 
promote the high-quality development of the Party's ethnic work in the 
new era. Li Keqiang presided, Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and 
Han Zheng attended, Wang Yang gave a speech], Xinhua, August 28, 2021; 
``Xi Focus: Xi Stresses High-Quality Development of Party's Work on 
Ethnic Affairs,'' Xinhua, August 28, 2021; ``Ethnic Groups Fear More 
Repression After Chinese President's Speech on Minorities,'' Radio Free 
Asia, September 3, 2021.
    \4\ ``Ethnic Groups Fear More Repression After Chinese President's 
Speech on Minorities,'' Radio Free Asia, September 3, 2021.
    \5\ See, e.g., Uradyn Bulag, ``Nationality/Minzu,'' China Columns, 
Made in China Journal, September 4, 2020. Uradyn Bulag discusses the 
complex historical and political forces that have influenced Chinese 
leaders' use and promotion of the concepts of nation, nationality, 
race, and ethnicity denoted by the terms ``minzu'' and ``Zhonghua 
minzu.'' See also ``Minzu,'' Xinjiang Documentation Project, University 
of British Columbia, accessed September 30, 2022.
    \6\ ``Xi Warns Missteps on Ethnic Issues Would `Destabilize' 
China,'' Bloomberg, March 7, 2022; ``Xi Jinping canjia Nei Menggu 
daibiao tuan shenyi'' [Xi Jinping participates in the deliberations of 
the Inner Mongolia delegation], Xinhua, March 5, 2022.
    \7\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022.
    \8\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022.
    \9\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022.
    \10\ Josh Chin, ``China Launches Investigation into Official Who 
Promoted Respect for Islam,'' Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2022. See 
also Shen Pengda, ``Zhongguo gaoguan Wang Zhengwei xianshen ceng bei 
zhi xuanyang Musilin wenhua zao cha'' [Chinese senior official Wang 
Zhengwei appears [in public], accused of promoting Muslim culture, now 
under investigation], Central News Agency, March 30, 2022.
    \11\ ``Xi Warns Missteps on Ethnic Issues Would `Destabilize' 
China,'' Bloomberg, March 7, 2022. See also PRC Constitution, passed 
and effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), arts. 4, 30, 
34, 52, 59, 65, 70, 89, 95, 97, 99, 102, 107, 112-22, 139.
    \12\ Jiaoyubu Bangongting guanyu Shishi Xueqian Ertong Putonghua 
Jiaoyu ``Tong Yu Tong Yin'' Jihua de Tongzhi [Ministry of Education 
General Office Circular on Implementing the ``Children Speak in 
Unison'' Plan for Mandarin Education for Preschool Children], issued 
July 21, 2021, sec. 1; Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, 
``Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the 
PRC,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 23; 
``China Imposes Mandarin-Language Teaching on Kindergartens in Ethnic 
Minority, Rural Areas,'' Radio Free Asia, August 6, 2021. See also Yang 
Yiming and Yuan Wei, ``Tong yu tong yin, zhu meng weilai'' [Children 
speak in unison, building a dream for the future], Guangming Daily, 
October 10, 2021.
    \13\ Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, ``Educational Reforms Aim 
to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 23; ``Zhonggong Zhongyang, 
Guowuyuan yinfa `Zhongguo Jiaoyu Xiandaihua 2035' '' [The Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council Issue 
``China's Education Modernization 2035''], Xinhua, February 23, 2019.
    \14\ Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, ``Educational Reforms Aim 
to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 28.
    \15\ Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, ``Educational Reforms Aim 
to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 27.
    \16\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
Inside Tibet,'' December 2021; ``Children of Detained Uyghur Parents 
Held in `Welfare Schools' in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 
August 16, 2021; Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental 
Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 
2022.
    \17\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
Inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 22.
    \18\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
Inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 1, 28-29, 41, 44,
51-52; Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at 
Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \19\ David R. Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from 
Country's Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim 
Assimilation,'' The Conversation, September 28, 2021.
    \20\ James Jennion, ``China's Repression of the Hui: A Slow Boil,'' 
The Diplomat, June 15, 2021; Emily Feng, `` `Afraid We Will Become the 
Next Xinjiang': China's Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,'' NPR, September 
26, 2019; ``Hui Muslims and the `Xinjiang Model' of State Suppression 
of Religion,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, March 2021.
    \21\ Emily Feng, ``China Is Removing Domes from Mosques as Part of 
a Push to Make Them More `Chinese,' '' NPR, October 24, 2021; David R. 
Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from Country's Biggest 
Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,'' The 
Conversation, September 28, 2021. See also Emily Feng, `` `Afraid We 
Will Become the Next Xinjiang': China's Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,'' 
NPR, September 26, 2019.
    \22\ David R. Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from 
Country's Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim 
Assimilation,'' The Conversation, September 28, 2021; Emily Feng, 
``China Is Removing Domes from Mosques as Part of a Push to Make Them 
More `Chinese,' '' NPR, October 24, 2021.
    \23\ David R. Stroup, ``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from 
Country's Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim 
Assimilation,'' The Conversation, September 28, 2021.
    \24\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``China: Hui Muslims Beaten as 
Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,'' June 21, 2022.
    \25\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``China: Hui Muslims Beaten as 
Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,'' June 21, 2022.
    \26\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``China: Hui Muslims Beaten as 
Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,'' June 21, 2022.
    \27\ ``Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu qingzhensi jiasu 
`Yisilan Zhongguohua' '' [The government organizes an Islamic preaching 
group to enter mosques to accelerate the ``sinicization of Islam''], 
Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2021.
    \28\ Chinese Islamic Association, ``Qinghai sheng Yisilan jiao jie 
zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi ji disi jie `wo'erzi' xunhui 
xuanjiang huodong qidong'' [The Islamic community in Qinghai province 
strongly forges the common consciousness of the Chinese nation, and the 
fourth ``wo`erzi'' tour propaganda event was launched], October 18, 
2021; ``Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu qingzhensi jiasu 
`Yisilan Zhongguohua' '' [The government organizes an Islamic preaching 
group to enter mosques to accelerate the ``sinicization of Islam''], 
Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2021.
    \29\ ``Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu qingzhensi jiasu 
`Yisilan Zhongguohua' '' [The government organizes an Islamic preaching 
group to enter mosques to accelerate the ``sinicization of Islam''], 
Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2021.
    \30\ James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's 
Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), 
December 1, 2021. See also Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, 
``Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the 
PRC,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021. For more 
information on the fall 2020 protests, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, 
March 2022, 117-19.
    \31\ Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, ``Educational Reforms Aim 
to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021; James Leibold, ``The Not-so 
Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership 
Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021; Liselotte Mas, ``Cultural 
Assimilation of Mongolians in China: `We Could Be the Next Uyghurs,' '' 
Observers--France 24, September 3, 2021.
    \32\ Growing Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in Today's 
China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Enghebatu Togochog, Director, Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center).
    \33\ James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's 
Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), 
December 1, 2021.
    \34\ James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's 
Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), 
December 1, 2021. See also Linda Lew, ``Inner Mongolia's Old Order 
Makes Way as Outsider Takes Over as Chairwoman,'' South China Morning 
Post, August 5, 2021.
    \35\ James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's 
Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), 
December 1, 2021; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress 
Standing Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Jiaoyu Tiaoli [Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region Education Regulations], passed September 29, 2021, 
effective January 1, 2022; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's 
Congress Standing Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu shishi ``Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzi Fa'' Banfa [Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region Measures on the Implementation of the ``PRC Standard 
Spoken and Written Language Law''], passed September 29, 2021, 
effective January 1, 2022.
    \36\ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Menggu Yuyan Wenzi Gongzuo Tiaoli [Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations on Mongolian Spoken and Written 
Language Work], passed November 26, 2004, effective May 1, 2005; Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, Nei 
Menggu Zizhiqu Minzu Jiaoyu Tiaoli [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
Regulations on Ethnic Education], passed September 29, 2016, effective 
November 1, 2016; James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi 
Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 
2021), December 1, 2021.
    \37\ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Menggu Yuyan Wenzi Gongzuo Tiaoli [Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations on Mongolian Spoken and Written 
Language Work], passed November 26, 2004, effective May 1, 2005, arts. 
16-29; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Minzu Jiaoyu Tiaoli [Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region Regulations on Ethnic Education], passed September 
29, 2016, effective November 1, 2016, arts. 22-27, 36-47; James 
Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian 
Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 
2021.
    \38\ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Jiaoyu Tiaoli [Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region Education Regulations], passed September 29, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, arts. 8-10; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's 
Congress Standing Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzi Fa'' Banfa [Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region Measures on the Implementation of the ``PRC Standard 
Spoken and Written Language Law''], passed September 29, 2021, 
effective January 1, 2022, arts. 1-4, 7-15, 18-26; James Leibold, ``The 
Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown,'' China 
Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021.
    \39\ Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, ``Educational Reforms Aim 
to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021; James Leibold, ``The Not-so 
Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership 
Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021. See also Liselotte Mas, 
``Cultural Assimilation of Mongolians in China: `We Could Be the Next 
Uyghurs,' '' Observers--France 24, September 3, 2021. For more 
information on education reforms in primary and secondary schools in 
the IMAR, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 117-19.
    \40\ Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, ``Educational Reforms Aim 
to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021; Inner Mongolia University 
Admissions Network, ``Nei Menggu Daxue 2020 nian benke zhaosheng 
laiyuan jihua biao'' [Inner Mongolia University sourcing plan chart for 
undergraduate admissions in 2020], June 29, 2020; Inner Mongolia 
University Admissions Network, ``Nei Menggu Daxue 2021 nian benke 
zhaosheng laiyuan jihua biao'' [Inner Mongolia University sourcing plan 
chart for undergraduate admissions in 2021], June 16, 2021.
    \41\ ``Nei Menggu chutai shenhua gaozhuan jiafen gaige gongzuo 
shishi fang'an'' [Inner Mongolia issues an implementation plan for 
deepening the reform of college entrance examination bonus points], 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Bureau of Education, reprinted in The 
Paper, September 15, 2021; James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: 
Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 
2021), December 1, 2021.

Status of Women

Status of Women

                            Status of Women

                                Findings

         Women in China continue to face persistent 
        gender inequality through ongoing promotion of 
        traditional gender norms and gender-based 
        discrimination. The Chinese government's poor 
        implementation and lack of consistency after its 
        codification of several laws and regulations aimed at 
        addressing widespread gender inequality have failed to 
        adequately address and implement structural reforms.
         In September 2021, the Chinese government 
        announced the ``Outline of Women's Development in China 
        (2021-2030),'' which the government says will play a 
        vital role in the implementation of gender equality 
        across numerous sectors. Additionally, the National 
        People's Congress publicized proposed revisions to the 
        PRC Women's Rights and Protection Law.
         As in previous years, the Chinese government 
        has failed to fulfill its commitment to adequately 
        represent women in legislative bodies, public 
        institutions, and corporate entities.
         In response to a viral video of a mother of 
        eight chained by her neck, the Chinese government 
        announced a ``strike hard'' campaign directed at 
        combating trafficking of women and children. The video 
        brought renewed attention to the plight of rural 
        trafficked women and to widespread issues concerning 
        domestic violence in China.
         Chinese authorities continued to pressure and 
        harass the digital community of feminists and women's 
        rights advocacy organizations, which led advocates to 
        shut down social media accounts and websites and rely 
        on overseas networks to advance their causes.
         Several prominent cases this year highlighted 
        weaknesses in the Chinese legal system regarding sexual 
        harassment and assault, including professional tennis 
        player Peng Shuai's allegations, the dismissal of 
        former China Central Television (CCTV) intern Zhou 
        Xiaoxuan's #MeToo case, and the workplace sexual 
        assault case against a former manager and company 
        client at Alibaba.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Urge the Chinese government to provide the UN 
        Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
        Women with timely and comprehensive information in 
        response to the List of Concerns raised by domestic and 
        international non-governmental organizations.
          Noting the publication of the ``Outline of Women's 
        Development in China (2021-2030)'' and proposed 
        revisions to the PRC Women's Rights and Protection Law, 
        urge the Chinese government to use formal support 
        organizations to implement services aimed at protecting 
        women's rights and interests.
          Support the promotion and reinstatement of 
        international non-governmental organizations that aim 
        to support women in the economic, legal, and healthcare 
        sectors. Encourage the facilitation of cross-border 
        training and academic exchange in order to adequately 
        implement anti-domestic violence legislation, 
        particularly the use of personal protection orders.
          Urge the Chinese government to cease the harassment, 
        intimidation, and other forms of mistreatment, offline 
        and online, of women's rights activists and 
        organizations.
          Urge the Chinese government to ratify International 
        Labour Organization Convention 190, the Convention 
        Concerning the Elimination of Violence and Harassment 
        in the World of Work (2019).

Status of Women

Status of Women

                            Status of Women

                              Introduction

    Women in China continue to face persistent gender 
inequality through the ongoing promotion of gender norms that 
align with Party and government priorities,\1\ and the failure 
of the Chinese government to adequately address the legal and 
cultural barriers to equality.\2\ During the Commission's 2022 
reporting year, high-profile news accounts concerning 
individual Chinese women focused domestic and international 
attention on the plight of trafficked women and survivors of 
reported assault by powerful male figures.\3\ Additionally, 
women's participation in the labor force has continued to 
decline,\4\ and women's political participation has remained 
stagnant.\5\ The Chinese government proposed revisions to the 
PRC Women's Rights and Protection Law,\6\ though some observers 
viewed the announcement as conflicting with the government's 
actions to suppress the #MeToo and feminist movements 
domestically and abroad.\7\ Similar to other laws and 
regulations, the proposed revisions lack specific penalties for 
violations, as some are already codified in other areas of 
Chinese national law yet remain poorly implemented.\8\ In 
September 2021, the Chinese government announced the ``Outline 
of Women's Development in China (2021-2030),'' which included 
initiatives aimed at promoting family fertility.\9\ While the 
guidelines appear to promote women's rights, the changes occur 
mostly in the context of the government's pro-natalist agenda, 
failing to acknowledge the entrenched cultural inequality that 
affects women in the workplace and at home.\10\
    The Chinese government has not adopted a ``comprehensive 
definition of discrimination against women in national 
legislation,'' despite recommendations that it do so by the 
committee that assesses China's compliance with the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).\11\ In October 2022, the Chinese 
government was scheduled to address its commitments under 
CEDAW; as of March 2022, however, China no longer appeared on 
the schedule for review.\12\

  Political Participation and the Right to Participate in Public Life

    According to the 2021 World Economic Forum's Global Gender 
Gap report, China ranks 107th out of 156 countries on gender 
parity and inequality.\13\ Women in China continue to hold few 
positions in the top levels of government and other 
institutions despite government commitments to increase their 
participation.\14\ While women constitute 28.8 percent of 
Communist Party membership, female representatives occupy a 
disproportionately small percentage of the Party Central 
Committee, at less than 10 percent.\15\ In an analysis of 
anticipated leadership changes in the lead-up to the 20th Party 
Congress, Brookings Institution scholar Cheng Li predicted that 
there would not be an increase in the number of women at the 
highest levels of the Party.\16\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Tennis Star Peng Shuai's Allegations Silenced by Authorities
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The case of tennis star Peng Shuai highlighted concerns over the risks
 Chinese women face when going public with allegations of sexual
 assault, especially against high-ranking officials.\17\ On November 2,
 2021, Peng Shuai posted a statement on microblog Weibo accusing Zhang
 Gaoli, previously a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist
 Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) and a senior
 government official, of sexual assault.\18\ Chinese authorities quickly
 censored the post, and Peng subsequently disappeared from public view,
 with many believing she had been disappeared by force.\19\ On November
 14, Women's Tennis Association (WTA) Chief Executive Steve Simon called
 for a full inquiry into her sexual assault allegations.\20\
  The start of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games reignited concern
 over Peng's well-being.\21\ Although Chinese authorities heavily
 censored Peng's story for domestic audiences,\22\ concerns for her well-
 being circulated on social media.\23\ Unsatisfied with the Chinese
 government's response, the WTA Chief Executive announced the suspension
 of all tournaments \24\ in mainland China and Hong Kong until a ``full
 and transparent investigation--without censorship--into Peng Shuai's .
 . . accusation'' occurs.\25\ Despite the International Olympic
 Committee (IOC) and state-sponsored media claiming that Peng was
 ``safe'' and not under duress,\26\ observers criticized the IOC's
 apparent complicity in the government's handling of the incident.\27\
 In December 2021, the New York Times and ProPublica published an
 analysis of Chinese social media accounts and found evidence of state-
 sponsored narratives and propaganda surrounding the case.\28\ On
 February 7, 2022, Peng--accompanied by a Chinese Olympic official--
 announced her retirement from competitive tennis and reiterated that
 her accusations against Zhang Gaoli had been a ``misunderstanding.''
 \29\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Violation of Freedoms of Expression, Peaceful Assembly,
                            and Association

    The People's Republic of China (PRC) has directly or 
indirectly forced the closure of domestic and international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China, including those 
organizations advocating for women's rights.\30\ The decreasing 
space to operate, in part due to the strict registration 
requirements of the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China, 
contributed to many rights defenders relying on the internet 
and overseas networks to engage in advocacy efforts.\31\ In an 
ongoing suppression of feminist-related content, Weibo deleted 
accounts related to women's rights issues, in some cases citing 
``gender opposition'' as their reason for deletion.\32\ In 
November 2021, authorities in Zhongshan municipality, Guangdong 
province, criminally detained Li Ronghao, a rural women's 
property rights advocate, on suspicion of ``picking quarrels 
and provoking trouble'' for publicly expressing concern about 
the condition of Zhang Zhan, a citizen journalist who 
documented the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan municipality, Hubei 
province, in February 2020.\33\

                             Discrimination

    Although gender discrimination is illegal in China, 
evidence of it persists in employment, wages, and property 
rights disputes. Despite China's ratification of the 
International Labour Organization conventions on equal pay 
(Convention 100) and employment discrimination (Convention 
111), Chinese women still face persistent wage inequality, and 
as of 2020, the wage gap with men stood at more than 20 
percent.\34\ Critics of the ``three-child policy'' expressed 
concern that the policy and some of its proposed supporting 
measures would worsen the already pervasive issue of pregnancy- 
and gender-based discrimination.\35\ Some women have been 
fired, demoted, or refused hiring after becoming pregnant or 
from the employer's fear that they would become pregnant.\36\
    Chinese property law stipulates that women's property 
rights are equal to those of men and guaranteed irrespective of 
marriage status, though in practice Chinese women endure 
continued property rights discrimination because of custom and 
the failure of the court system to uphold Chinese law.\37\ 
Advocates for rural ``married-out'' women, who are frequently 
disenfranchised from land inheritance and compensation after 
marriage,\38\ continued to petition authorities to allow these 
women to join collective farming organizations and obtain 
proper compensation for land use.\39\
    Chinese authorities continued to discriminate against 
single and unmarried women through ``social maintenance fees'' 
for having children out of wedlock, and by failing to provide 
government benefits those women would otherwise receive if they 
were married.\40\ For example, a single mother in Beijing 
municipality was reportedly fired and denied maternity benefits 
after having a child out of wedlock in 2016.\41\ In March 2020, 
the Chaoyang District People's Court and the Beijing Third 
Intermediate People's Court both ruled that the birth violated 
family planning policies, ruling that her request for maternity 
benefits had no legal basis.\42\ In April 2021, the mother 
successfully submitted her case to the Beijing High People's 
Court, but her case was dismissed in December 2021, with the 
court again citing the violation of family planning policy as 
grounds to deny her maternity benefits.\43\

                         Gender-Based Violence

                     DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND DIVORCE

    During the reporting year, the PRC's promotion of 
traditional gender roles, combined with the continued societal 
treatment of domestic violence as a family affair,\44\ 
contributed to Chinese women's ongoing struggle with gender-
based violence and with obtaining a divorce.\45\ A year after 
the implementation of the PRC Civil Code's controversial 
divorce ``cooling-off'' period, which requires couples to wait 
30 days before divorce finalization,\46\ officials reported a 
significant decline in divorce rates.\47\ One psychologist 
pointed out that authorities' concern appeared to prioritize 
``stability'' over ``individual happiness.'' \48\
    During this reporting year, several national-level 
institutions, including the Party-affiliated All-China Women's 
Federation, jointly issued an opinion to increase the 
effectiveness of domestic violence legislation, including the 
use of personal protection orders, in response to the continued 
pervasiveness of domestic violence in China.\49\ The opinion 
highlights the obligation of institutions to report on 
instances of domestic violence, promotes the establishment of 
an integrated system for reporting, and indicates that 
applicants can apply to the courts to see their personal 
protection orders executed.\50\ Consistent with the PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law, the opinion's guidelines only apply to 
family members and those living in the same household, leaving 
out protection from previous spouses or partners.\51\ Several 
cases of domestic violence in China captured attention in 
domestic and international media, including:

         Hubei province. In July 2021, a court in 
        Qichun county, Huangguang municipality, scheduled a 
        pretrial hearing for a woman who had filed her eighth 
        divorce petition.\52\ In an earlier ruling, court 
        authorities determined that there was still a 
        possibility of reconciliation between the couple 
        despite the woman's mentally ill husband subjecting her 
        to domestic violence within a year after their marriage 
        in 2016.\53\
         Shaanxi province. A video of a man assaulting 
        his wife in Xi'an municipality prompted online 
        discussion of authorities' willingness to punish the 
        perpetrators of domestic violence.\54\ According to a 
        statement from public security officials, authorities 
        ``educated and criticized'' the wife for her part in 
        the incident, while the husband received five days in 
        administrative detention and was released with no 
        criminal charges.\55\
         Hebei province. In November 2021, the Ci 
        County People's Court, in Handan municipality, released 
        details in the case of a man sentenced to eight months 
        in prison for raping his wife.\56\ Despite the lack of 
        recognition for marital rape in Chinese civil or 
        criminal law, the judge in the case ruled that the man 
        had committed rape, predicating the rape conviction 
        partly on the couple's pending divorce application.\57\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Case of the Chained Jiangsu Woman Ignites Widespread Concern
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In March 2022, the central government announced a ``strike hard'' \58\
 anti-trafficking campaign after a video appeared in the media that
 showed a woman shackled by her neck in an outdoor shed in Fengxian
 county, Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province. The woman, who
 reportedly lived chained in the shed no matter the time of year, had
 eight children with a man she had been forced to marry and suffered
 from an untreated, severe mental illness.\59\ Although Chinese
 authorities censored the story for domestic audiences,\60\ public
 pressure appeared to have forced local officials to investigate the
 woman's condition.\61\ In late February, officials in Jiangsu confirmed
 the woman as a repeat victim of human trafficking.\62\ Chinese
 authorities reportedly arrested the alleged traffickers,\63\ and the
 case brought renewed attention to issues particularly affecting rural
 Chinese women, including bride trafficking \64\ as well as other forms
 of human trafficking affecting Chinese women.\65\ [For more
 information, see Section VI--Population Control, Section VI--Human
 Trafficking, and Section VIII--Public Health.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT

    During the reporting year, there were several high-profile 
incidents of sexual harassment and assault affecting Chinese 
women. Although the Chinese government provided input on the 
International Labour Organization's Violence and Harassment 
Convention (Convention 190),\66\ it failed to ratify the 
convention, which would have promoted a ``zero tolerance'' 
policy on gender-based violence and harassment in the 
workplace.\67\
    In November 2021, the Yuanzhong Family and Community 
Development Service Center, a non-governmental organization in 
Dongcheng district, Beijing municipality, released an empirical 
study entitled ``Sexual Harassment Prevention Law and the 
Judicial Trial Case Study Report (2019-2021),'' which analyzed 
the current state and application of sexual assault and 
harassment policies and laws in China.\68\ Key findings 
included the following:

         Only 21.82 percent of the sexual harassment 
        cases identified listed sexual harassment as the civil 
        cause of action, indicating that the recent addition of 
        provisions to combat sexual harassment in the PRC Civil 
        Code had yet to make a significant impact for those 
        cases in the court system; \69\
         Analysis of publicly available cases indicated 
        that 62.27 percent of cases stemmed from workplace 
        sexual harassment; \70\
         Chinese courts disproportionately determine 
        other main causes of findings besides sexual harassment 
        in cases brought to court; \71\ and
         Shortcomings in the legal system contributing 
        to the inability to fully address assault and 
        harassment include the lack of uniform legal standards, 
        an overreliance on physical evidence, economic barriers 
        to taking perpetrators to court, and low rates of 
        actual compensation even in successful cases.\72\

    Despite the implementation of legislation,\73\ sexual 
harassment persists. Two high-profile cases from this reporting 
year illustrate the lack of legal redress for survivors of 
harassment.\74\

         In 2019, Zhou Xiaoxuan brought a landmark 
        #MeToo case against popular China Central Television 
        (CCTV) host Zhu Jun, accusing the host of sexually 
        harassing her in 2014 when she was a college intern at 
        CCTV.\75\ After the addition of provisions to combat 
        sexual harassment to the PRC Civil Code in 2020, Zhou 
        tried to reclassify her case, but the court denied her 
        application.\76\ In September 2021, the Haidian 
        District People's Court, in Beijing, ruled that Zhou 
        failed to meet the standard of proof in her sexual 
        harassment claim.\77\ She still faced a defamation 
        lawsuit from her alleged perpetrator, illustrating the 
        ease with which alleged perpetrators doubly victimize 
        survivors of sexual harassment.\78\ Despite the 
        repeated setbacks, including Weibo banning Zhou in July 
        2021 from its service for one year for violating 
        ``Weibo complaint regulations,'' \79\ supporters of 
        Zhou attended court hearings and posted messages of 
        support online, but Chinese censors deleted topics 
        related to the case.\80\
         In late September 2021, Chinese authorities in 
        Jinan municipality, Shandong province, opted to dismiss 
        a sexual assault case against a male manager at 
        technology firm Alibaba after a 15-day administrative 
        detention, which authorities characterized as 
        ``punishment'' for his crimes.\81\ In early September 
        2021, a female subordinate accused the manager and a 
        company client of sexual assault while on a business 
        trip in July,\82\ and the incident went unresolved 
        until the survivor's account appeared online.\83\ 
        Alibaba soon faced public backlash for its mishandling 
        of the incident and later fired the accused.\84\ After 
        Chinese prosecutors dropped the criminal case against 
        the manager, Alibaba reportedly fired the accuser in 
        December, alleging that she had damaged the company's 
        reputation with her ``false'' allegations.\85\ In June 
        2022, in a rare example of accountability in a high-
        profile sexual assault case in China, the Huaiyin 
        District People's Court in Jinan found the accused 
        company client guilty of ``forcible indecency'' and 
        sentenced him to 18 months in prison for his part in 
        the July 2021 assault.\86\

Status of Women

Status of Women

    Notes to Section VI--Status of Women

    \1\ National Radio and Television Administration General Office, 
Guojia Guangbo Dianshi Zongju bangongting guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Wenyi 
Jiemu ji Qi Renyuan Guanli de tongzhi [Circular from National Radio and 
Television Administration General Office regarding further 
strengthening the management of cultural programs and their staff], 
September 2, 2021; Ministry of Education, ``Guanyu Zhengxie shisan jie 
quanguo weiyuanhui di san ci huiyi di 4404 hao (jiaoyu lei 410 hao) 
tian dafu de han'' [Letter of Reply to Proposal No. 4404 (No. 410 for 
Education) of the Third Session of the Thirteenth National Committee of 
the CPPCC], December 8, 2020. See also Xi Jinping, ``Jianchi nannu 
pingdeng jiben guoce, fahui woguo funu weida zuoyong'' [Upholding the 
fundamental state policy of gender equality, exerting women's great 
role in our country], Xinhua, October 31, 2013.
    \2\ Vivian Wang, ``China Moves to Overhaul Protections for Women's 
Rights, Sort of,'' New York Times, January 3, 2022. See also China 
Queer Women Working Group, ``Information Submitted by the China Queer 
Women Working Group to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, List of Issues Related to the Combined 
Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China Pre-Sessional 
Working Group Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' January 31, 
2021; China Human Rights Defenders, ``Information Submitted by the 
China Human Rights Defenders to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, List of Issues Related to the Combined 
Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China Pre-Sessional 
Working Group Meeting of the Committee's 80th Session,'' January 21, 
2021.
    \3\ Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``Chinese Businessman Tied to Alibaba Rape 
Case Is Sentenced to Prison,'' New York Times, June 22, 2022; Li Yuan, 
``Seeking Truth and Justice, Chinese See Themselves in a Chained 
Woman,'' New York Times, March 1, 2022; Viola Zhou, ``How China Managed 
to Wipe Out All Mentions of Its Most Explosive #MeToo Case,'' Vice, 
November 26, 2021.
    \4\ ``Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of Female 
Population Ages 15+) China, 2021,'' World Bank, DataBank (2021).
    \5\ Sierra Janik, Daniel Blaugher, and Jonathan Ray, ``Women in 
China's Leadership,'' U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, March 30, 2022, 6.
    \6\ Lu Haina, ``Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa xiuding'' [Amendment to the 
Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests], People's Daily, 
May 6, 2022; ``China Prepares Legislative Revision to Better Safeguard 
Women's Rights,'' Xinhua, December 21, 2021; Niu Qichang, ``Funu Quanyi 
Baozhang Fa `daxiu': yongren danwei he xuexiao ying jianli fang 
xingsaorao guizhi'' [``Overhaul'' of the Law on the Protection of 
Women's Rights and Interests: Employers and schools should establish 
anti-sexual harassment regulations], Jiemian News, December 20, 2021; 
``Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fagongwei: Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa xiuding 
cao'an jiang ershen'' [Legislative Work Committee of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress: The draft revision of the 
Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests will be reviewed 
for a second time], April 14, 2022.
    \7\ Vivian Wang, ``China Moves to Overhaul Protections for Women's 
Rights, Sort of,'' New York Times, January 3, 2022; Niu Qichang, ``Funu 
Quanyi Baozhang Fa `daxiu': yongren danwei he xuexiao ying jianli fang 
xingsaorao guizhi'' [``Overhaul'' of the Law on the Protection of 
Women's Rights and Interests: Employers and schools should establish 
anti-sexual harassment regulations], Jiemian News, December 20, 2021; 
``Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fagongwei: Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa xiuding 
cao'an jiang ershen'' [Legislative Work Committee of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress: The draft revision of the 
Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests will be reviewed 
for a second time], April 14, 2022.
    \8\ Vivian Wang, ``China Moves to Overhaul Protections for Women's 
Rights, Sort of,'' New York Times, January 3, 2022; ``Quanguo Renda 
Changweihui Fagongwei: Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa xiuding cao'an jiang 
ershen'' [Legislative Work Committee of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress: The draft revision of the Law on the 
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests will be reviewed for a 
second time], April 14, 2022.
    \9\ State Council National Working Committee on Children and Women, 
``Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021-2030 nian)'' [Outline for the 
Development of Chinese Women (2021-2030)], September 27, 2021; State 
Council Information Office, ``Xin `Liang Gang' xianzhu tisheng funu 
ertong huode gan xingfu gan anquan gan'' [New `Two Outlines 
significantly improve women and children gaining a sense of happiness 
and security], September 28, 2021.
    \10\ Luna Sun, `` `Two Sessions' 2022: Calls for China's Family 
Planning Restrictions to Be Fully Abolished Gather Steam,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 4, 2022; Fang Gao and Xia Li, ``From One to Three: 
China's Motherhood Dilemma and Obstacle to Gender Equality,'' Women 1 
(2021): 258, 261, 263-64; State Council Information Office, ``Xin 
`Liang Gang' xianzhu tisheng funu ertong huode gan xingfu gan anquan 
gan'' [New ``Two Outlines'' significantly improve women and children 
gaining a sense of happiness and security], September 28, 2021.
    \11\ UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, ``List of issues and questions in relation to the ninth 
periodic report of China,'' CEDAW/C/CHN/Q/9, March 10, 2021, para. 2; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD Submission to Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women for Consideration for the 
List of Issues on the Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of 
China,'' January 21, 2021; Equality Rights Project (Affiliated with 
Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong), Media Monitor for Women 
Network, and Lanxin Sisters Mutual Aid, ``A Parallel Report to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for 
Consideration of the List of Issues on the Ninth Periodic Report of the 
People's Republic of China,'' February 1, 2021 (requesting the CEDAW 
Committee to ask the Chinese government to ``provide a timeline for the 
adoption of a comprehensive definition of discrimination against women 
in national legislation that is in line with Article 1 of the 
Convention''); UN Human Rights Council, Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the combined 
seventh and eighth periodic reports of China, CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8, 
November 14, 2014.
    \12\ ``CEDAW--Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women--83 Session (10 Oct 2022-28 Oct 2022),'' 
UN Treaty Body Database, accessed March 29, 2022.
    \13\ World Economic Forum, ``Global Gender Gap Report 2021,'' March 
2021, 13, 24, 36.
    \14\ State Council, Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa Zhongguo Funu Fazhan 
Gangyao he Zhongguo Ertong Fazhan Gangyao de tongzhi [State Council 
circular on issuing the Outline for the Development of Chinese Women 
and the Outline for the Development of Chinese Children], September 8, 
2021; Ministry of Science and Technology et al., ``Keji bu deng shisan 
bumen yinfa `Guanyu Zhichi Nuxing Keji Rencai Zai Keji Chuangxin Zhong 
Fahui Geng Da Zuoyong de Ruogan Cuoshi' de tongzhi'' [Ministry of 
Science and Technology and 13 other agencies issue a circular on 
``Several Measures to Support Female Science and Technology Talents in 
Playing a Greater Role in Science and Technology Innovation''], July 
17, 2021; Coco Feng, ``Gender Equality: China Will Give Female 
Scientists Priority in Recruitment and Research Funding, Provided They 
Meet the Mark,'' South China Morning Post, July 21, 2021; Greg James, 
``Why There Are So Few Women in Chinese Politics,'' SupChina, July 1, 
2021.
    \15\ Sierra Janik, Daniel Blaugher, and Jonathan Ray, ``Women in 
China's Leadership,'' U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, March 30, 2022, 6; Cheng Li, ``Preparation: Procedures and 
Selections for China's 20th Party Congress,'' China-US Focus, China-
United States Exchange Foundation, February 20, 2022.
    \16\ Cheng Li, ``Female Representation in the Chinese Leadership 
Prior to the Party Congress,'' China-US Focus, China-United States 
Exchange Foundation, June 9, 2022.
    \17\ Guo Rui, `` `A Bed of Nails': China's #MeToo Accusers Crushed 
by Burden of Proof and Counterclaims,'' South China Morning Post, 
February 14, 2022.
    \18\ Christopher Clarey, ``WTA Tour Seeks Chinese Inquiry into 
Player's Sexual Assault Accusation,'' New York Times, November 14, 
2021.
    \19\ Matthew Futterman, ``WTA Suspends Tournaments in China over 
Treatment of Peng Shuai,'' New York Times, December 1, 2021; Viola 
Zhou, ``How China Managed to Wipe Out All Mentions of Its Most 
Explosive #MeToo Case,'' Vice, November 26, 2021.
    \20\ ``WTA Seeks Full, Fair and Transparent Investigation into 
Sexual Assault Allegations against Former Chinese Leader,'' Women's 
Tennis Association, November 14, 2021.
    \21\ Andrew Keh, ``Peng Shuai, the Chinese Tennis Player, Meets the 
I.O.C. Leader in Beijing.,'' New York Times, February 6, 2022.
    \22\ Viola Zhou, ``How China Managed to Wipe Out All Mentions of 
Its Most Explosive #MeToo Case,'' Vice, November 26, 2021.
    \23\ Matthew Futterman, ``WTA Suspends Tournaments in China over 
Treatment of Peng Shuai,'' New York Times, December 1, 2021.
    \24\ ``Statement by Steve Simon, WTA Chairman & CEO,'' Women's 
Tennis Association, November 17, 2021.
    \25\ ``Steve Simon Announces WTA's Decision to Suspend Tournaments 
in China,'' Women's Tennis Association, December 3, 2021.
    \26\ Amy Chang Chien and Alexandra Stevenson, `` `Where Is **?': 
Fans in China Elude Censors to Talk about Peng Shuai,'' New York Times, 
December 2, 2021; Amy Qin and Paul Mozur, ``China's Silence on Peng 
Shuai Shows Limits of Beijing's Propaganda,'' New York Times, November 
30, 2021; Matthew Futterman, ``WTA Suspends Tournaments in China over 
Treatment of Peng Shuai,'' New York Times, December 1, 2021.
    \27\ Tariq Panja and Steven Lee Myers, ``In I.O.C.'s `Quiet 
Diplomacy,' Critics See Whitewash of China's Actions,'' New York Times, 
November 26, 2021; Emma Kemp and Daniel Hurst, ``Peng Shuai: IOC 
Accused of `Publicity Stunt' over Video Call,'' Guardian, November 22, 
2021.
    \28\ Paul Mozur et al., ``Beijing Silenced Peng Shuai in 20 
Minutes, Then Spent Weeks on Damage Control,'' New York Times, December 
8, 2021.
    \29\ Christian Shepherd, ``China's Peng Shuai Says There Was 
`Misunderstanding' over Her Allegations, Announces Retirement,'' 
Washington Post, February 7, 2022; Teng Biao, ``The Forced Smiles of 
Beijing's Olympics,'' Foreign Policy, February 20, 2022. Law scholar 
Teng Biao described Chinese authorities' continued use of ``forced 
confessions,'' comparing Peng Shuai's case to that of others whose 
public ``confessions'' have been used by the Chinese government for 
propaganda purposes domestically and abroad.
    \30\ Katherine Wilhelm, Shawn Shieh, Elizabeth Knup, et al., ``What 
Future for International NGOs in China?,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, 
November 24, 2021; Jude Howell, ``From Green Shoots to Crushed Petals: 
Labour NGOs in China,'' Made in China Journal: Then and Now 6, no. 1 
(January-April 2021): 102-7.
    \31\ Katherine Wilhelm, Shawn Shieh, Elizabeth Knup, et al., ``What 
Future for International NGOs in China?,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, 
November 24, 2021; Jude Howell, ``From Green Shoots to Crushed Petals: 
Labour NGOs in China,'' Made in China Journal: Then and Now 6, no. 1 
(January-April 2021): 102-7.
    \32\ Zhang Wanqing, ``Weibo Shuts Down User Accounts for `Gender 
Opposition,' '' Sixth Tone, December 8, 2021.
    \33\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao xingshi juliu de Guangdong 
Zhongshan weiquan renshi Li Ronghao de anqing ji jianli'' [Case and bio 
of Li Ronghao, rights defender from Zhongshan, Guangdong, who was 
criminally detained], December 13, 2021. For more information on Li 
Ronghao, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-
00292.
    \34\ World Economic Forum, ``Global Gender Gap Report 2021,'' March 
2021, 13, 24, 36; International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications of 
ILO Conventions: Ratifications for China,'' accessed June 22, 2022.
    \35\ Lao Ying, ``Pinglun: Yanchang shengyu jia xu peitao fan jiuye 
qishi cuoshi'' [Opinion: Extending maternity leave will require 
supplementary anti-discrimination measures], Beijing Youth Daily, 
reprinted in China News, January 4, 2022; Greg James, ``In China, 
Longer Maternity Leave Is a Tough Sell,'' SupChina, November 29, 2021. 
See also Human Rights Watch, `` `Take Maternity Leave and You'll Be 
Replaced': China's Two-Child Policy and Workplace Gender 
Discrimination,'' June 2021; ``San hai zhengce luodi! Wangyou zha 
guole! `Shengle ni yang ah!' '' [The three-child policy has arrived! 
Netizens are heated! ``If I give birth to you, I'll raise you!''], 
Sohu, May 31, 2021.
    \36\ Aaron Halegua, ``Workplace Gender-Based Violence and 
Harassment in China: Harmonizing Domestic Law and Practice with 
International Standards,'' U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University 
School of Law (2021), 11; ``China's Three-Child Policy Puts More 
Pressure on Working Women,'' Bloomberg, July 15, 2021. See also Human 
Rights Watch, `` `Take Maternity Leave and You'll Be Replaced': China's 
Two-Child Policy and Workplace Gender Discrimination,'' June 2021, 19-
23.
    \37\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao xingshi juliu de Guangdong 
Zhongshan weiquan renshi Li Ronghao de anqing ji jianli'' [Case and bio 
of Li Ronghao, rights defender in Zhongshan, Guangdong, who was 
criminally detained], December 13, 2021; Rights Defense Network, 
``Fujian sheng Ningde zhai jidi shenqing ren Zhang Lifang xiang Pingnan 
xian he Tangkou zhen liang ji zhengfu tijiao luxing fading zhize 
shenqing shu'' [Zhang Lifang, an applicant for a housing plot in 
Ningde, Fujian province, submitted application to the governments of 
Pingnan county and Tangkou town to perform their statutory duties], 
September 3, 2021; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa 
[PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests], passed 
April 3, 1992, amended August 28, 2005, effective December 1, 2005, 
arts.
30-33.
    \38\ Rights Defense Network, ``Quanguo `nongjianu' daibiao Zhang 
Mengying liu zhong quanhui qian qingqiu Zhongyang luoshi nannu pingdeng 
de xianfa tiaokuan'' [Zhang Mengying, representing the country's `` 
`rural married women,'' asked the Party Central Committee to implement 
the constitutional provisions of equality between men and women prior 
to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee], October 18, 
2021; Rights Defense Network, ``Nuquan hanweizhe Wang Xiaoli xiang 
Changzhou Xihu jiedao ban tijiao shenqing shu, yaoqiu huifu jiti jingji 
zuzhi chengyuan zige'' [Women's rights defender Wang Xiaoli submitted 
an application to the Changzhou Xihu district office requesting the 
restoration of her membership in the collective economic organization], 
June 20, 2021; Ke Li, ``Land Dispossession and Women's Rights 
Contention in Rural China,'' China Law and Society Review 5, no. 1 
(2020): 37-38, 45. Chinese women were traditionally excluded from 
inheritance after marrying out of their natal families. After the 
revisions to the PRC Marriage Law in 2011, China's Supreme People's 
Court ruled that marital property belonged to the person named on the 
deed of the marital property. As most ``married-out'' rural women enter 
into marriages without property, they continue to be deprived of 
equitable property rights.
    \39\ Rights Defense Network, ``Quanguo `nongjianu' daibiao Zhang 
Mengying liu zhong quanhui qian qingqiu Zhongyang luoshi nannu pingdeng 
de xianfa tiaokuan'' [Zhang Mengying, representing the country's `rural 
married women,' asked the Party Central Committee to implement the 
constitutional provisions of equality between men and women prior to 
the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee], October 18, 2021; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Chujianu quanyi hanweizhe Zhang Mengying: Gei 
Guojia Xinfang juzhang Li Wenzhang he Hebei shengwei shuji Wang 
Dongfeng de yi feng gongkai xin--qudi `shudi guanli' fenji fuze de 
xinfang zhidu'' [Defender of married women's rights Zhang Mengying: 
sent open letter to Li Wenzhang, director of State Bureau of Letters 
and Visits, and Wang Dongfeng, secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party 
Committee--abolish ``localized management'' that divides up 
responsibility in the petitioning system], August 1, 2020.
    \40\ Alexandra Stevenson, ``China Offers Women Perks for Having 
Babies. Single Moms Don't Qualify.,'' New York Times, July 6, 2022; 
Guangdong Province People's Congress, Guangdong Sheng Renkou yu Jihua 
Shengyu Tiaoli [Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning 
Regulations], passed and effective December 1, 2021; Advocates for 
Diverse Family Network, ``Beijing danma diyi an zaishen zao bohui: wo 
jiushi Qiu Ju, yao jixu kangsu'' [Beijing single mother's first case 
dismissed upon retrial: I am Qiu Ju, and I will continue to appeal], 
reprinted in China Digital Times, January 26, 2022. See also Advocates 
for Diverse Family Network, ``Shenzhen shouli: Feihun mama qisu shi 
weijianwei zhengqu shengyu baoxian an, yi jichu li'an cailiao'' 
[Shenzhen's first case: Unmarried mother sued municipal health 
commission for maternity insurance, case materials have been filed], 
WeChat, September 8, 2021.
    \41\ Advocates for Diverse Family Network, ``Beijing danma diyi an 
zaishen zao bohui: Wo jiushi Qiu Ju, yao jixu kangsu'' [Beijingsingle 
mother's first case dismissed upon retrial: I am Qiu Ju, and I will 
continue to appeal], reprinted in China Digital Times, January 26, 
2022; Advocates for Diverse Family Network, ``Beijing diyi an: Gaoyuan 
shouli zaishen shenqing: danshen mama zhengqu chanjia gongzi'' 
[Beijing's first case: High court accepts retrial application: Single 
mother fights for maternity leave pay], WeChat, May 7, 2021.
    \42\ Advocates for Diverse Family Network, ``Beijing danma diyi an 
zaishen zao bohui: Wo jiushi Qiu Ju, yao jixu kangsu'' [Beijing single 
mother's first case dismissed upon retrial: I am Qiu Ju, and I will 
continue to appeal], reprinted in China Digital Times, January 26, 
2022. See also Advocates for Diverse Family Network, ``Beijing diyi an: 
Gaoyuan shouli zaishen shenqing: danshen mama zhengqu chanjia gongzi'' 
[Beijing's first case: High court accepts retrial application: Single 
mother fights for maternity leave pay], WeChat, May 7, 2021.
    \43\ Advocates for Diverse Family Network, ``Beijing danma diyi an 
zaishen zao bohui: Wo jiushi Qiu Ju, yao jixu kangsu'' [Beijingsingle 
mother's first case dismissed upon retrial: I am Qiu Ju, and I will 
continue to appeal], reprinted in China Digital Times, January 26, 
2022; Advocates for Diverse Family Network, ``Shenzhen shouli: Feihun 
mama qisu shi weijianwei zhengqu shengyu baoxian an, yi ji chuli an 
cailiao'' [Shenzhen's first case: Unmarried mother sued municipal 
health commission for maternity insurance, case materials have been 
filed], WeChat, September 8, 2021. See also Advocates for Diverse 
Family Network, ``Beijing diyi an: Gaoyuan shouli zaishen shenqing: 
danshen mama zhengqu chanjia gongzi'' [Beijing's first case: High court 
accepts retrial application: Single mother fights for maternity leave 
pay], WeChat, May 7, 2021.
    \44\ Equality (Wei Ping), ``Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the 
People's Republic of China,'' accessed March 20, 2022; Zhaohui Su et 
al., ``What `Family Affair?' Domestic Violence Awareness in China,'' 
Frontiers in Public Health 10 (March 4, 2022): 4; Ludovica Meacci, 
``China's Conservative Turn on Gender Roles,'' Italian Institute for 
International Political Studies (blog), January 31, 2022.
    \45\ Alexandra Stevenson, ``Divorce Is Down in China, but So Are 
Marriages,'' New York Times, March 23, 2022; Helen Davidson, ``China 
Divorces Drop 70% after Controversial `Cooling Off' Law,'' Guardian, 
May 18, 2021.
    \46\ For background information on the divorce ``cooling off'' 
period, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 155.
    \47\ Helen Davidson, ``China Divorces Drop 70% after Controversial 
`Cooling Off' Law,'' Guardian, May 18, 2021.
    \48\ Mandy Zuo, ``China Divorce Cooling-Off Rule: One Year after 
Controversial Law Enacted Authorities Claim Rates of Separation 
Declining,'' South China Morning Post, January 15, 2022; Alexandra 
Stevenson, ``Divorce Is Down in China, but So Are Marriages,'' New York 
Times, March 23, 2022.
    \49\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Quanguo Fulian Jiaoyubu Gong'anbu 
MinzhengbuSifabu Weisheng Jiankang wei guanyu Jiaqiang Renshen Anquan 
Baohu Ling Zhidu Guanche Shishi de Yijian [Supreme People's Court, All-
China Women's Federation, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and National 
Health Commission Opinions on Strengthening the Implementation of the 
Personal Safety Protection Order System], March 3, 2022; ``Better 
Protection for Domestic Violence Victims,'' China Daily, March 18, 
2022.
    \50\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Quanguo Fulian Jiaoyubu Gong'anbu 
Minzhengbu Sifabu Weisheng Jiankang wei guanyu Jiaqiang Renshen Anquan 
Baohu Ling Zhidu Guanche Shishi de Yijian [Supreme People's Court, All-
China Women's Federation, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and National 
Health Commission Opinions on Strengthening the Implementation of the 
Personal Safety Protection Order System], March 3, 2022.
    \51\ ``Better Protection for Domestic Violence Victims,'' China 
Daily, March 18, 2022.
    \52\ Liao Yan, ``Nuzi di 8 ci ti lihun susong, fayuan: zhengyi jiao 
da, jianyi chengxu zhuan putong chengxu'' [Woman files for divorce for 
the 8th time, court transfers case from summary to regular procedure on 
grounds that there exist relatively big disputes], The Paper, July 7, 
2021.
    \53\ Liao Yan, ``Nuzi di 8 ci ti lihun susong, fayuan: zhengyi jiao 
da, jianyi chengxu zhuan putong chengxu'' [Woman files for divorce for 
the 8th time, court transfers case from summary to regular procedure on 
grounds that there exist relatively big disputes], The Paper, July 7, 
2021.
    \54\ Zhang Wanqing, ``A Man Brutally Beat His Wife on Camera. He 
Got 5 Days' Detention,'' Sixth Tone, January 24, 2022.
    \55\ Zhang Wanqing, ``A Man Brutally Beat His Wife on Camera. He 
Got 5 Days' Detention,'' Sixth Tone, January 24, 2022; ``China Police 
Response to Lockdown Domestic Violence Case Sparks Uproar,'' Agence 
France-Presse, reprinted in Straits Times, January 25, 2022.
    \56\ Ministry of Justice, ``Nanzi hunnei qiangjian qizi, bei 
panxing!'' [Man jailed for raping wife during marriage], November 25, 
2021.
    \57\ Ministry of Justice, ``Nanzi hunnei qiangjian qizi, bei 
panxing!'' [Man jailed for raping wife during marriage], November 25, 
2021; Zhang Wanqing, ``Man's Sentencing Underscores Absence of Marital 
Rape Law in China,'' Sixth Tone, November 24, 2021.
    \58\ Wang Yun, Jane Tang, and Isaak Liu, ``China's Anti-trafficking 
Activists Face Vast Network of Vested Interests,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 11, 2022; ``Special Campaign to Crack Down on Trafficking Women, 
Children Launched in China,'' Global Times, March 2, 2022.
    \59\ Li Yuan, ``Seeking Truth and Justice, Chinese See Themselves 
in a Chained Woman,'' New York Times, March 1, 2022; Leng Shumei and 
Cui Fandi, ``17 Officials Punished in Woman Trafficking Case in East 
China,'' Global Times, February 23, 2022; ``Guanyu wangmin fanying 
`shengyu ba hai nuzi' qingkuang de diaocha tongbao'' [Investigative 
report on internet users' reflections on the situation of the ``woman 
with eight children''], Sina, January 30, 2022. See also Chen Xiaoping, 
``Shishi dajia tan: Yan Geling wei ba hai muqin fennu fasheng zao 
fengsha, `Quanguo Fulian' yi yan bu fa gai jiesan?'' [Let's discuss the 
issues: Yan Geling was banned for speaking out in anger for the mother 
of eight children, should the ``All-China Women's Federation'' be 
dissolved for not saying one word?], Voice of America, February 18, 
2022.
    \60\ Mimi Lau, ``China Silences Trafficking Debate Sparked by 
`Chained Woman' Scandal,'' South China Morning Post, February 22, 2022.
    \61\ Liyan Qi, ``Chained Woman in China Was Sold as a Bride 
Twice,'' Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2022; Liyan Qi, ``In China, 
Footage of a Chained-Up Rural Mother of Eight Draws Outcry,'' Wall 
Street Journal, February 1, 2022.
    \62\ Liyan Qi, ``Chained Woman in China Was Sold as a Bride 
Twice,'' Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2022.
    \63\ Leng Shumei and Cui Fandi, ``17 Officials Punished in Woman 
Trafficking Case in East China,'' Global Times, February 23, 2022.
    \64\ Heather Barr and Yaqiu Wang, ``Chained Woman Has Become the 
Face of Bride Trafficking in China,'' Women's eNews, April 5, 2022. For 
more information on bride trafficking in China, see Human Rights Watch, 
``Myanmar: Women, Girls Trafficked as `Brides' to China,'' March 21, 
2019.
    \65\ Leng Shumei and Cui Fandi, ``17 Officials Punished in Woman 
Trafficking Case in East China,'' Global Times, February 23, 2022; Li 
Yuan, ``Seeking Truth and Justice, Chinese See Themselves in a Chained 
Woman,'' New York Times, March 1, 2022.
    \66\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 190) 
Concerning Violence and Harassment, June 21, 2019, entry into force 
June 25, 2021.
    \67\ Aaron Halegua, ``Workplace Gender-Based Violence and 
Harassment in China: Harmonizing Domestic Law and Practice with 
International Standards,'' U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University 
School of Law (2021), 6-7, 9; International Labour Organization, 
``Countries That Have Not Ratified This Convention--Violence and 
Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190),'' accessed July 15, 2022.
    \68\ Yuanzhong Family and Community Development Service Center, 
``Fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli yanjiu baogao'' 
[Research report on sexual harassment prevention law and judicial 
cases], November 2021; Yuanzhong Family and Community Development 
Service Center (@bjyuanzhong), ``Fan xingbie baoli 16 ri xilie xingdong 
(yi): Yuanzhong fabu `fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli 
yanjiu baogao' '' [16-day series of actions against gender-based 
violence (one): Yuanzhong releases research report on sexual harassment 
prevention law and judicial cases], WeChat post, November 25, 2021.
    \69\ Yuanzhong Family and Community Development Service Center, 
``Fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli yanjiu baogao'' 
[Research report on sexual harassment prevention law and judicial 
cases], November 2021; Yuanzhong Family and Community Development 
Service Center (@bjyuanzhong), ``Fan xingbie baoli 16 ri xilie xingdong 
(yi): Yuanzhong fabu `fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli 
yanjiu baogao' '' [16-day series of actions against gender-based 
violence (one): Yuanzhong releases research report on sexual harassment 
prevention law and judicial cases], WeChat post, November 25, 2021; 
Aaron Halegua, ``Workplace Gender-Based Violence and Harassment in 
China: Harmonizing Domestic Law and Practice with International 
Standards,'' U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law 
(2021), 15.
    \70\ Yuanzhong Family and Community Development Service Center, 
``Fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli yanjiu baogao'' 
[Research report on sexual harassment prevention law and judicial 
cases], November 2021; Yuanzhong Family and Community Development 
Service Center (@bjyuanzhong), ``Fan xingbie baoli 16 ri xilie xingdong 
(yi): Yuanzhong fabu `fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli 
yanjiu baogao' '' [16-day series of actions against gender-based 
violence (one): Yuanzhong releases research report on sexual harassment 
prevention law and judicial cases], WeChat post, November 25, 2021.
    \71\ Yuanzhong Family and Community Development Service Center, 
``Fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli yanjiu baogao'' 
[Research report on sexual harassment prevention law and judicial 
cases], November 2021; Yuanzhong Family and Community Development 
Service Center (@bjyuanzhong), ``Fan xingbie baoli 16 ri xilie xingdong 
(yi): Yuanzhong fabu `fangzhi xing saorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli 
yanjiu baogao' '' [16-day series of actions against gender-based 
violence (one): Yuanzhong releases research report on sexual harassment 
prevention law and judicial cases], WeChat post, November 25, 2021.
    \72\ Yuanzhong Family and Community Development Service Center, 
``Fangzhi xingsaorao falu yu sifa shenpan anli yanjiu baogao'' 
[Research report on sexual harassment prevention law and judicial 
cases], November 2021; Aaron Halegua,``Workplace Gender-Based Violence 
and Harassment in China: Harmonizing Domestic Law and Practice with 
International Standards,'' U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University 
School of Law (2021), 7, 16, 21.
    \73\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Dian [PRC Civil Code], passed 
May 28, 2020, effective January 1, 2021, art. 1010.
    \74\ Darius Longarino, Changhao Wei, and Yixin (Claire) Ren, 
``China's Lawmakers Take More (Cautious) Steps against Workplace Sexual 
Harassment,'' The Diplomat, January 21, 2022; Chen Yuanyuan and Ren Wu, 
``Naxie zoujin `zhichang xingsaorao' cong ji de nuxing'' [Those women 
who walked into the thorns of ``workplace sexual harassment''], The 
Paper,'' September 7, 2021; Yu Yan, Wang Xin, and Li Danyu, ``Guotai 
jiuye qian nu yuangong jiangshu `zao tongshi xingqin' qianhou: tuirang 
huan lai qingshi'' [A former female employee of Guotai Liquor Group 
tells about before and after being sexually assaulted by a colleague: 
yielding in exchange for contempt], The Paper,'' August 18, 2021; Aaron 
Halegua,``Workplace Gender-Based Violence and Harassment in China: 
Harmonizing Domestic Law and Practice with International Standards,'' 
U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law (2021), 6, 
15; Darius Longarino, Yixin (Claire) Ren, and Changhao Wei, ``How Do 
Sexual Harassment Claims Fare in China's Courts?,'' The Diplomat, 
August 6, 2021; ``Cong Wu Yifan dao Alibaba, `wo ye shi' yu nuquan 
yundong zai Zhongguo qude jinbu?'' [From Kris Wu to Alibaba, has the 
``Me Too'' and feminist movement made progress in China?], Voice of 
America, August 16, 2021. See also Viola Zhou, ``Recruiter Fired for 
Offering to Drug His Female Co-Workers in Exchange for Resumes,'' Vice, 
May 28, 2021.
    \75\ Vincent Ni, ``China #MeToo: Court to Hear Landmark Case of 
Intern versus TV Star,'' BBC, December 2, 2020.
    \76\ Jianghu you ge xiao wu (@Aussenseiter2015), ``Xianzi su Zhu 
Jun an mingri kaiting: Ta shuo xiangguo keneng baisu, dan jieguo dui 
ziji hen zhongyao'' [Xianzi's lawsuit against Zhu Jun starts tomorrow: 
She said she's thought about the possibility of losing the case, but 
the result is very important to her], Wechat post, December 1, 2020.
    \77\ Helen Davidson and Vincent Ni, ``Court Rules against Woman Who 
Became Face of China's #MeToo Movement,'' Guardian, September 14, 2021.
    \78\ Chao Deng, ``#MeToo Supporters in China Discouraged as Accuser 
Faces Court Delay,'' Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2021. See also Caiwei 
Chen, ``12 Hours Outside Haidian People's Court: China's Landmark 
#MeToo Case,'' SupChina, December 10, 2020; Sophie Beach, 
``Translation: `I Want People to View My Case as a Drill'--An Interview 
with Xianzi,'' China Digital Times, December 3, 2020.
    \79\ Vincent Ni and Helen Davidson, ``Outrage over Shutdown of 
LGBTQ WeChat Accounts in China,'' Guardian, July 8, 2021.
    \80\ Sophie Beach, ``Translation: Xianzi's Friends `Surround and 
Watch' in #MeToo Solidarity,'' China Digital Times, December 4, 2020; 
Sophie Beach, ``Translation: `I Want People to View My Case as a 
Drill'--An Interview with Xianzi,'' China Digital Times, December 3, 
2020.
    \81\ ``China Prosecutors Drop Case against Ex-Alibaba Employee 
Accused of Sexual Assault,'' BBC, September 20, 2021.
    \82\ Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``Chinese Businessman Tied to Alibaba 
Rape Case Is Sentenced to Prison,'' New York Times, June 22, 2022; 
Phoebe Zhang, ``Client Who Molested Alibaba Worker Jailed for 18 Months 
in China,'' South China Morning Post, June 22, 2022; China Labour 
Bulletin, ``Alibaba Employee's Stand Shows Failure of Corporate Anti-
Harassment Policies,'' August 12, 2021.
    \83\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Alibaba Employee's Stand Shows 
Failure of Corporate Anti-Harassment Policies,'' August 12, 2021.
    \84\ Yvonne Lau, ``#MeToo Accusers Have Faced Backlash in China. 
With the Alibaba Rape Case, That Changed,'' Fortune, August 10, 2021; 
Chao Deng and Keith Zhai, ``Sexual-Assault Allegation at Alibaba 
Triggers Outrage, Investigation,'' Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2021.
    \85\ ``Alibaba Fires Woman Who Claimed Sexual Assault,'' BBC, 
December 12, 2021.
    \86\ Phoebe Zhang, ``Client Who Molested Alibaba Worker Jailed for 
18 Months in China,'' South China Morning Post, June 22, 2022; Daisuke 
Wakabayashi, ``Chinese Businessman Tied to Alibaba Rape Case Is 
Sentenced to Prison,'' New York Times, June 22, 2022.

Population Control

Population Control

                           Population Control

                                Findings

         People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities 
        rejected calls to end birth restrictions, even though 
        experts raised demographic, economic, and human rights 
        concerns about official population control policies. In 
        August 2021, the National People's Congress amended the 
        PRC Population and Family Planning Law from a two-child 
        policy to a three-child policy based on a policy change 
        announced by the Chinese Communist Party in May 2021. 
        The amended law also abolished ``social maintenance 
        fees,'' onerous government fines for exceeding birth 
        limits under the one- and two-child birth limit 
        policies. The government's enforcement of birth limits 
        has included forced abortion and sterilization.
         PRC authorities have used draconian population 
        control measures targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic 
        minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR), including detention in mass internment camps, 
        forced abortions, and forced sterilizations. This past 
        year, research by scholar Adrian Zenz found that 
        policies implemented since 2017 had ``drastically 
        reduced birth rates of ethnic [minority] groups.'' A 
        historian said the government's claim of a regional 
        population increase from 2010 to 2020 was a 
        ``distortion'' aimed at masking population suppression. 
        At the same time that PRC authorities have encouraged 
        higher birth rates among Han Chinese women, they have 
        continued to perform forced abortions and 
        sterilizations among ethnic minority women in the XUAR, 
        a practice that one expert described as carrying a 
        ``strong undertone of eugenics.''
         The government's population control policies 
        have exacerbated China's sex ratio imbalance; these 
        policies have been linked to the ongoing trafficking of 
        women for purposes of forced marriage and commercial 
        sexual exploitation. The plight of trafficked women 
        received considerable public attention following media 
        reports in January 2022 about a woman found chained and 
        malnourished in a shed in Jiangsu province, who 
        reportedly was a victim of bride trafficking.
         A 2022 report found that many women, perhaps 
        thousands, who suffered injuries from botched or 
        untested sterilization and other procedures under the 
        one-child policy, had sought redress for their injuries 
        to no avail.
         Observers posited that, consistent with the 
        coercive nature of the PRC's past population policies, 
        new policies aimed at raising birth rates might give 
        rise to coerced procreation which would be a violation 
        of human rights.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          In bilateral meetings, urge PRC government officials 
        to abolish and forgo all birth restrictions on 
        families, and instead employ an approach based on 
        international human rights law and norms, including 
        treaties signed or ratified by China, to provide the 
        Chinese people the freedom to build their families as 
        they wish.
          Urge PRC authorities to end all coercive population 
        control practices targeting Uyghur and other ethnic 
        groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
        and elsewhere. Use authorities provided in the Foreign 
        Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2000 (Public 
        Law No. 106-113) and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
        Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328) to deny 
        Chinese officials entry into the United States and 
        impose sanctions on officials involved in the 
        formulation, implementation, or enforcement of coercive 
        population control policies, including those officials 
        who have forced women to undergo sterilizations and 
        abortions in the XUAR and elsewhere.
          Support the Uyghur Stop Oppressive Sterilizations Act 
        (H.R. 3306), which imposes sanctions on individuals 
        responsible for or complicit in forced sterilizations 
        and forced abortions in the XUAR.
          Call on PRC central and local governments to provide 
        redress to citizens who suffered adverse health effects 
        from procedures performed under the one-child policy.
          Publicly link and address in bilateral dialogues the 
        sex ratio imbalance exacerbated by PRC population 
        control policies with regional humanitarian and 
        security concerns--human trafficking, crime, increased 
        internal and external migration, and other social, 
        economic, and political problems.
          Urge PRC officials to reform the household 
        registration (hukou) system in order to extend public 
        services to the millions of persons born outside of the 
        one- or two-child policies who still lack access to 
        education, medical care, legal protection of their 
        human rights, and other government services.

Population Control

Population Control

                           Population Control

                              Introduction

    The Chinese Communist Party and government began to relax 
the country's population control policy around 2012-2013.\1\ A 
decade of incremental loosening of the policy with the 
expectation of raising the birth rate, however, has not brought 
the forecasted increase in new births. After years of warnings 
by experts, the government now acknowledges that the aging 
population combined with the below-replacement birth rate over 
the past five years presents a ``serious challenge.'' \2\ To 
address this, the central government adopted a three-child 
policy in 2021, but its implementation at the local levels thus 
far seems uneven. While the policy seeks to increase the 
majority Han Chinese population, the government is concurrently 
implementing birth control methods against ethnic minority 
communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as 
part of its broad policy to repress Uyghurs and other 
predominantly Muslim groups.

             International Standards and the PRC's Coercive
                          Population Policies

    Despite calls in recent years from experts and other 
observers to remove all birth limits in China on both 
demographic and human rights grounds \3\ and domestic proposals 
aimed at increasing the number of births,\4\ the Party and 
government continued to implement a coercive birth limit 
policy--the new three-child policy--that violates international 
standards.\5\ Coercive controls imposed on women and their 
families, as well as additional abuses engendered by the PRC 
population and family planning system, violate standards set 
forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development.\6\ China was a state 
participant in the negotiation and adoption of both 
documents.\7\ Acts of official coercion committed in the 
implementation of population control policies also contravene 
provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,\8\ which China 
has ratified.\9\
    In response to demographic concerns,\10\ the Party Central 
Committee Political Bureau announced a new three-child policy 
in May 2021--a change from the two-child policy that had been 
in effect since 2016 \11\--and in August 2021 the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee amended the 2015 PRC 
Population and Family Planning Law, allowing couples to have 
three children and abolishing ``social maintenance fees,'' 
onerous fines that were imposed on couples who had children in 
violation of the one- and two-child birth policies.\12\ The 
one-child policy, in force from 1980 until 2016, restricted 
most couples to one child.\13\ It was enforced by the National 
Health and Family Planning Commission, often using fines, 
forced sterilizations, and forced abortions.\14\

            Suppression of Population in the Xinjiang Uyghur
                           Autonomous Region

    In recent years, Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Turkic Muslim 
women who were formerly detained in mass internment camps in 
the XUAR have reported being subjected to coercive birth 
control measures, including forced insertion of intrauterine 
devices (IUDs), forced sterilization, and forced abortion.\15\ 
This past year, research by scholar Adrian Zenz found that 
policies implemented by authorities since 2017 had 
``drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic [minority] 
groups.'' \16\ Two authors who published research in 2021 on 
population suppression in the XUAR observed that as Party 
officials are loosening population control rules on Han women, 
they are simultaneously ``cracking down'' on the rights of 
Uyghur and other ethnic minority communities to have children, 
because of ``perceived fears of instability and uneven 
growth.'' \17\ A historian commented that the State Council 
Information Office's claim in a white paper published in 
September 2021, that the Uyghur population in Xinjiang 
increased from 2010 to 2020, is a ``distortion'' that ignores 
the decline from 2017 onwards when ``Uyghur births were 
brutally suppressed.'' \18\ At the same time that the PRC has 
encouraged higher birth rates among Han Chinese women, it has 
continued to perform forced abortions and sterilizations among 
ethnic minority women in the XUAR, a practice that one expert 
described as carrying a ``strong undertone of eugenics.'' \19\ 
[For more information on forcible population control measures 
used against ethnic minority families in the XUAR, see Section 
X--Xinjiang.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         The Three-Child Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  On May 31, 2021, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
 Political Bureau announced plans for a three-child policy in response
 to demographic concerns,\20\ replacing the two-child policy in effect
 since 2016, which had not significantly increased birth rates.\21\ In
 July 2021, the State Council released a more detailed decision,
 clarifying that the policy allows married couples to have three
 children and will ``cancel restrictive measures,'' ``cleanup and
 abolish relevant penalties,'' and ``implement active childbearing
 support measures,'' in an effort to increase birth rates.\22\ The
 decision also said the new policy aims to achieve a more balanced sex
 ratio and population structure by 2025.\23\ The National People's
 Congress Standing Committee in August 2021 amended the 2015 PRC
 Population and Family Planning Law, allowing couples to have three
 children and abolishing ``social maintenance fees,'' onerous fines that
 were imposed on couples who had children in violation of the one- and
 two-child birth policies.\24\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    The Three-Child Policy--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Following the new policy announcement, experts asked why the
 government refused to completely remove birth limits; \25\ demographers
 pointed to several factors including government concerns about uneven
 regional growth and the growth of ethnic minority populations.\26\ One
 expert commented, ``Despite all the overwhelming demographic evidence,
 they're saying, `We need to control you.' '' \27\ The human rights non-
 governmental organization Amnesty International said that the PRC's
 adoption of a three-child policy in response to the demographic crisis
 is still a violation of people's right to decide how many children to
 have.\28\
  The State Council's decision further specified that the government
 would enact tax breaks, provide other support services, lower costs for
 raising children, and protect the rights of women in employment.\29\
 Sources noted that many couples, urban and rural, said that even with
 the policy change they did not plan to have more children, as many
 found the financial difficulties involved in raising a child
 prohibitive.\30\ Some women said that the likelihood of negative
 effects on their careers also discouraged them from having
 children.\31\ Observers noted that permission to have children remained
 limited to married couples; although unmarried women are not explicitly
 prohibited from giving birth, they cannot obtain official permission to
 do so.\32\ According to the most recent report observed by the
 Commission, Guangdong province was the only location that allowed
 unmarried women to submit applications for maternity insurance, while
 in other places unmarried women could still be fined or penalized for
 having a child.\33\ [For more information on official restrictions on
 childbearing for unmarried women, see Section VI--PStatus of Women.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Government Efforts to Increase Births

    Central and local-level officials held discussions and made 
proposals on ways to implement the new three-child policy, 
including language for possible propaganda aimed at increasing 
births.\34\ Some of these proposals elicited negative reactions 
on social media from citizens.\35\ One county reportedly 
collected information from single women to be used in a 
matchmaking database.\36\ A study from a research institute in 
India found that many rural women in China do not want to get 
married, but officials ``encourage'' young women to be ``baby 
makers'' and ``bring warmth'' to unmarried, aging rural 
men.\37\ Some international commenters posited that the 
government may introduce forced procreation to achieve its 
demographic goals; \38\ thousands in China responded with 
``shock and indignation'' online to an opinion piece that said 
Party members have an obligation to marry and have three 
children.\39\ During the March 2022 meeting of the PRC National 
People's Congress, delegates reportedly made numerous proposals 
to increase the birth rate, some of which were mocked on 
Chinese social media.\40\ Noting the inconsistency of birth-
limit policies over time, one social media user reportedly 
commented, ``This is crazy . . . forced sterilization and 
abortion . . . now three children. Are women just machines?'' 
\41\
    Authorities' plans to increase the birth rate were linked 
to women's and men's fertility and reproductive health. The 
State Council in September 2021 issued an Outline on the 
Development of Women (2021-2030) that included a section on 
women's reproductive health, promoting more health checkups for 
women before and after getting married, and increasing sex 
education in the schools.\42\ Additionally, the Outline 
included a directive stating the aim of reducing ``medically 
unnecessary'' abortions,\43\ but did not specify how to 
accomplish this goal.\44\ The China Family Planning 
Association, in its 2022 work plan, directed its offices 
throughout the country to conduct educational outreach to young 
people and people of childbearing age, one goal of which is to 
reduce the number of abortions among unmarried young 
people.\45\ A U.S.-based commentator cautioned that the 
government would need to launch a range of reform-oriented 
government measures in order to reduce the number of abortions 
among young people, and raised a concern that fostering an 
increase in the birth rate would not necessarily prevent 
illegal sex-selective abortions and abandoned children.\46\ The 
lack of specific guidance on raising the birth rate reportedly 
has fostered uncertainty among hospitals and medical 
practitioners regarding men's fertility and reproductive 
health, as demonstrated by reports that some regional hospitals 
in China had stopped performing vasectomies as a result of the 
three-child birth policy.\47\ While vasectomies are not 
explicitly prohibited by the three-child policy, observers 
raised concerns that the government might turn to coercive 
measures to increase births in the future.\48\ Mei Fong of 
Human Rights Watch testified before the Commission in March 
2022 that ``Beijing's early approach to a demographic decline 
appear to be more stick than carrot, with growing curbs on 
divorce and abortion.''\49\
    After the release of the national policy decision in July 
2021, a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference called for equal treatment for children born to 
single women and advocated for permission for all women over 30 
to freeze their eggs.\50\ At the subnational level, officials 
in various locations
implemented or proposed specific plans to encourage more 
births, including:

         Exceeding the national baseline of 98 days of 
        maternity leave, at least two provinces (Henan and 
        Hainan) gave 190 days, others 158 days,\51\ while some 
        increased these amounts for second or third children; 
        \52\
         Some local governments offered financial 
        incentives, including cash and housing subsidies, for 
        couples who gave birth to second and third children; 
        \53\ and
         Officials in Xiangyin county, Yueyang 
        municipality, Hunan province, aimed to change rural 
        practices by discouraging
        expensive wedding customs, encouraging young women to
        stay in rural areas, creating matchmaking services, 
        helping couples obtain housing, and improving wages and 
        training for workers.\54\

               Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy

    The legacy of the one-child policy continues to negatively 
affect many in China. A 2021 sociological study that focused on 
the human impact of the policy concluded, ``[T]he one-child 
policy was an unnecessary and catastrophic blunder, and because 
of it, many did not get the chance to be born to see the world 
today.'' \55\ Some Chinese people in July 2021 spoke of the 
still painful memories of abuses suffered under the one-child 
policy, including forcible abortions, having their children 
killed just after live birth, being beaten, kidnapped, or 
threatened with violence to force them to abort their children, 
or going into hiding to give birth; one expressed fear of 
harassment for speaking of past abuses.\56\ Another story that 
emerged in December 2021, in which a man in his 30s who was 
abducted at age 4 was reunited with his family after more than 
three decades, also pointed to a link between the one-child 
policy and an increased incidence of child abduction.\57\
    The following are some additional long-term harmful effects 
of the enforcement of, and social pressures created or 
exacerbated by, China's population control policies.

               CHILDREN DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES

    A 2019 study found that about 13 million people--at least 
60 percent (approximately 7.8 million) of whom were born in 
violation of China's population control policies--did not have 
official registration (hukou), and therefore lacked access to 
public services and faced difficulties in protecting their 
rights.\58\ Of these, the majority were children, who were 
blocked from accessing medical care, education, and other 
services.\59\ Many of these unregistered children were born to 
migrant worker parents who left them in rural villages while 
they worked in cities where the children could not be 
registered in schools, giving rise to the phenomenon of ``left-
behind children.'' \60\ Studies have described hardships faced 
by these children, including educational and societal 
discrimination, and mental health challenges, among others.\61\ 
[For information on the status of children born in China to 
North Korean mothers and Chinese fathers, see Section VIII--
North Korean Refugees.]

         DENIAL OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY

    Government authorities continued to deny access to justice 
to women who suffered harm under the one- and two-child 
policies. Under the one-child policy, botched procedures and 
poor medical care caused permanent disabilities including loss 
of fertility for many women.\62\ The hardships of avoiding 
detection by officials during pregnancy meant forgoing adequate 
medical care.\63\ One source reported that IUD removals, a 
practice encouraged under the two-child policy, also carried 
risks.\64\ An April 2022 report said that many Chinese women, 
possibly in the thousands, who suffered adverse health effects 
resulting from sterilizations or other botched or untested 
procedures administered under the one- and two-child policies, 
had sought redress for their injuries to no avail.\65\ One 
woman reported that among hundreds of women she knew who were 
injured from forced or coerced sterilization drugs, some died, 
and others, like herself, were permanently disabled and unable 
to care for their children.\66\ In one case, a woman in Anhui 
province suffered perforated internal organs during a botched 
IUD insertion in 2013, but no hospital would help her ``because 
of the association with the family planning regime.'' \67\ Two 
women interviewed by Radio Free Asia said they gave up 
petitioning for redress, one because of ``exhaustion'' and 
``official violence,'' and one from fear of harm to her 
children's careers.\68\

             CONTINUING EFFECTS OF THE SEX RATIO IMBALANCE

    The government's restrictive population control policies 
have exacerbated the sex ratio imbalance in China caused by the 
cultural preference for having a son, which has led to the 
abortion of unborn females.\69\ This has caused a shortage of 
women of marriageable age--referred to as ``missing women''--
that observers have linked to the trafficking of women within 
China and from abroad into China for purposes of forced 
marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.\70\
    A study published in September 2021 found that the 
phenomenon of millions of missing women created competition for 
potential brides that has led parents whose sons were of 
marriageable age to seek higher paying, more dangerous jobs for 
themselves in order to help their sons attract a mate.\71\ In 
response, some employers have neglected workplace safety, 
resulting in more workplace fatalities.\72\ One writer said 
that the sex ratio imbalance has led to higher property prices 
in cities because many parents have bought apartments for their 
sons to help them attract a spouse in a marriage market with 
``millions of missing women.'' \73\ The writer predicted that 
these deleterious economic effects ``will be felt in the 
generation ahead.'' \74\
    The plight of trafficked women in China, including women 
with disabilities, received widespread media coverage this past 
year. Reports in January 2022 about a woman who was found 
chained and malnourished in a shed in Jiangsu province prompted 
widespread discussion of the treatment of women, including the 
role of the one-child policy in engendering the trafficking of 
women.\75\ The woman reportedly had been forced to marry a 
local farmer in rural Jiangsu province with whom she had eight 
children.\76\ [For more information, see Section VI--Status of 
Women and Human Trafficking, and Section VIII--Public Health.]

                         Declining Birth Rates

    Experts and economists continued to predict that declining 
birth rates, which fell for a fifth straight year to new lows 
in 2021,\77\ would bring a demographic crisis--one called it a 
``long-term time bomb''--unless the trend is reversed.\78\ At 
least six provincial-level regions experienced a decline in the 
number of permanent residents in 2021, caused in part by fewer 
births.\79\ These include Beijing municipality, Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, and Henan, Hebei, Jiangxi, and Gansu 
provinces.\80\ The greatest decline in the number of births 
occurred in Shandong province, which in 2016 saw the highest 
number of births nationwide, but has dropped by 57.6 percent in 
five years.\81\ The former Vice President of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences and member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the People's Bank of China, Cai Fang, said that 
China's population growth was near zero, and that the total 
population may peak in 2022.\82\ The National Bureau of 
Statistics of China reported an overall population increase of 
480,000 people in 2021, totaling 1.4126 billion, up from 1.412 
billion a year ago.\83\ One expert expressed shock that the 
natural growth rate dropped to 0.34 per thousand, falling below 
1.0 for the first time, indicating that the population is aging 
faster than expected.\84\

Population Control

Population Control

    Notes to Section VI--Population Control

    \1\ Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 
Children, Up from 2,'' New York Times, September 27, 2021.
    \2\ State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua 
Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding 
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the 
Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021.
    \3\ Ren Zeping, ``Ren Zeping: quanmian er hai hou faner chuxian 
shengyu duanya, ying liji quanmian fangkai bing guli shengyu'' [Ren 
Zeping: following the universal two-child policy, a fertility drop-off 
nevertheless appears; [the policy] should be fully relaxed immediately 
and fertility should be encouraged], Yicai, February 3, 2021; Keith 
Zhai, ``China Considers Lifting All Childbirth Restrictions by 2025,'' 
Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2021; Amnesty International, ``China: 
`Three-Child Policy' Still a Violation of Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights,'' May 31, 2021; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Says It Will Allow Couples 
to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,'' New York Times, September 27, 2021.
    \4\ Luna Sun, ``Chinese Economist Ren Zeping Banned from Posting on 
Weibo After Comments on Financing Childbirth Stir Controversy,'' South 
China Morning Post, January 13, 2022; ``Political Advisor Proposes to 
Allow Unmarried Women Aged Over 30 with One Child to Gain Access to 
Maternity Leave, Insurance,'' Global Times, March 5, 2022.
    \5\ Amnesty International, ``China: `Three-Child Policy' Still a 
Violation of Sexual and Reproductive Rights,'' May 31, 2021; Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by UN General 
Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 23, 1996, Annex I, paras. 9, 17, 
96. The Beijing Declaration states that governments that participated 
in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their commitment to 
``[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of women and of 
the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms'' (Annex I, para. 9); and ``[t]he 
explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to 
control all aspects of their health, in particular their own fertility, 
is basic to their empowerment'' (Annex I, para. 17); and ``[t]he human 
rights of women include their right to have control over and decide 
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including 
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and 
violence.'' (Annex I, para. 96). United Nations Population Fund, 
Programme of Action, adopted at the Cairo International Conference on 
Population and Development, September 13, 1994, paras. 1.15, 7.2, 7.6, 
8.25. Paragraph 1.15 states, ``While the International Conference on 
Population and Development does not create any new international human 
rights, it affirms the application of universally recognized human 
rights standards to all aspects of population programmes.'' Paragraph 
7.2 states, ``Reproductive health therefore implies that people . . . 
have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and 
how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of 
men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, 
affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice . 
. ..'' Paragraph 7.6 states, ``Reproductive health care in the context 
of primary health care should, inter alia, include: family-planning 
counselling, information, education, communication and services; 
education and services for prenatal care, safe delivery and post-natal 
care, especially breast-feeding and infant and women's health care; 
prevention and appropriate treatment of infertility; abortion as 
specified in paragraph 8.25, including prevention of abortion and the 
management of the consequences of abortion . . ..'' Paragraph 8.25 
states, ``In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family 
planning.''
    \6\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by 
UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 23, 1996, Annex I, 
paras. 9, 17; United Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action, 
adopted at the Cairo International Conference on Population and 
Development, September 13, 1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25.
    \7\ United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 
A/CONF.177/20/Rev. 1, September 15, 1995, chap. II, para. 3; chap. VI, 
para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action. United Nations, Report of the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD), A/CONF.171/13/Rev. 1, September 13, 
1994, chap. II, sec. C; chap. VI,
para. 1.
    \8\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, 
art. 1; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the 
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at Its 1391st 
and 1392d Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 
2016, para. 51. In 2016, the UN Committee against Torture noted its 
concern regarding ``reports of coerced sterilization and forced 
abortions, and . . . the lack of information on the number of 
investigations into such allegations . . . [and] the lack of 
information regarding redress provided to victims of past violations.'' 
For acts of coercion committed in the implementation of population 
planning policies, see, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid Association, 
``Xinjiang Musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong bei baofuxing 
jubu'' [Pregnant Muslim woman in Xinjiang underwent forced abortion, 
her brother, a Muslim imam, detained as retaliation], February 4, 2018.
    \9\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, last visited July 5, 2022. China signed the 
Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
    \10\ ``Quanwei kuaibao: san hai shengyu zhengce laile'' 
[Authoritative announcement: three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, 
May 31, 2021; Andrew Mullen, ``Explainer: China's One-Child Policy: 
What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,'' South China Morning Post, 
June 1, 2021.
    \11\ ``Quanwei kuaibao: san hai shengyu zhengce laile'' 
[Authoritative announcement: three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, 
May 31, 2021; Andrew Mullen, ``Explainer: China's One-Child Policy: 
What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,'' South China Morning Post, 
June 1, 2021.
    \12\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC 
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended 
and effective August 20, 2021; Laney Zhang, ``China: Three-Child Policy 
Becomes Law, Social Maintenance Fee Abolished,'' Global Legal Monitor, 
Library of Congress, September 23, 2021; Peter Ford, ``As China Ends 
One-Child Policy, Illegally Born Kids Ask: `What About Us?,' '' 
Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 2015.
    \13\ Andrew Mullen, ``Explainer: China's One-Child Policy: What Was 
It and What Impact Did It Have?,'' South China Morning Post, June 1, 
2021.
    \14\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family 
Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022. 
The National Health and Family Planning Commission was preceded by the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission. Andrew Mullen, 
``Explainer: China's One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did 
It Have?,'' South China Morning Post, June 1, 2021.
    \15\ See, e.g., Amy Qin, ``China Targets Muslim Women in Push to 
Suppress Births in Xinjiang,'' New York Times, May 10, 2021; Matthew 
Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, `` `Their Goal Is to Destroy 
Everyone': Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape,'' BBC, 
February 2, 2021; Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, ``Allegations of 
Shackled Students and Gang Rape inside China's Detention Camps,'' CNN, 
February 19, 2021; ``Kazakhs Speak Out about Rape in China's Xinjiang 
Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, February 10, 2021; Asim Kashgarian, ``China 
Uses Rape as Torture Tactic against Uighur Detainees, Victims Say,'' 
Voice of America, February 9, 2021. XUAR authorities have also used 
coercive birth control measures on minority women who have not been 
detained in camps. See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, `` `End the Dominance of the 
Uyghur Ethnic Group': An Analysis of Beijing's Population Optimization 
Strategy in Southern Xinjiang,'' Central Asian Survey 40, no. 3 (2021): 
293-94.
    \16\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 5.
    \17\ Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, ``Family De-planning: The 
Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,'' 
International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, Policy Brief Report No. 44 (2021): 3. See also Amy Qin, 
``China Targets Muslim Women in Push to Suppress Births in Xinjiang,'' 
New York Times, updated September 23, 2021.
    \18\ ``China's Xinjiang Population Growth Report Raises Eyebrows,'' 
Radio Free Asia, September 30, 2021; Rian Thum (@RianThum), ``Chinese 
gov has a new white paper out focused on Xinjiang population. Its 
central distortion is to say Uyghur pop. increased from 2010 to 2020 
(it did), when . . .,'' Twitter, September 26, 2021, 5:42 p.m.; State 
Council Information Office, ``Xinjiang de Renkou Fazhan'' [Xinjiang's 
Population Development], September 2021, reprinted in Xinhua, September 
26, 2021.
    \19\ The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, Censorship, and Gender 
Inequality, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Dr. Leta Hong Fincher, Adjunct 
Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, 
Columbia University), 3.
    \20\ ``Quanwei kuaibao: san hai shengyu zhengce laile'' 
[Authoritative announcement: three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, 
May 31, 2021.
    \21\ Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 
Children, Up from 2,'' New York Times, September 27, 2021.
    \22\ State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua 
Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding 
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the 
Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], Xinhua, July 20, 
2021.
    \23\ State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua 
Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding 
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the 
Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021.
    \24\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC 
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended 
and effective August 20, 2021; Laney Zhang, ``China: Three-Child Policy 
Becomes Law, Social Maintenance Fee Abolished,'' Global Legal Monitor, 
Library of Congress, September 23, 2021; Peter Ford, ``As China Ends 
One-Child Policy, Illegally Born Kids Ask: `What About Us?,' '' 
Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 2015.
    \25\ Cissy Zhou, ``China Population: Why Did Beijing Opt for a 
Three-Child Policy When It Could Scrap Birth Caps Altogether?,'' South 
China Morning Post, June 4, 2021; Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child 
Policy Continues to Haunt Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021.
    \26\ Cissy Zhou, ``China Population: Why Did Beijing Opt for a 
Three-Child Policy When It Could Scrap Birth Caps Altogether?,'' South 
China Morning Post, June 4, 2021.
    \27\ Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt 
Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021.
    \28\ Amnesty International, ``China: `Three-Child Policy' Still a 
Violation of Sexual and Reproductive Rights,'' May 31, 2021.
    \29\ State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua 
Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding 
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the 
Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021; 
``Xinhua Headlines: China Unveils Details of Three-Child Policy, 
Support Measures,'' Xinhua, July 21, 2021.
    \30\ Greg James, ``Average Cost of Raising a Child in Urban China 
Hits Almost $100,000,'' SupChina, February 23, 2022; Liang Jianzhang et 
al., ``Liang Jianzhang: Zhongguo shengyu chengben baogao 2022 ban'' 
[Liang Jianzhang: China's childbearing cost report 2022 edition], Sina 
Finance, February 22, 2022; Kang Bing, ``Many Challenges Facing New 
Family Planning Policy,'' China Daily, November 2, 2021. See also Ni 
Dandan, ``What China's Parents Really Think about the Three-Child 
Policy,'' Sixth Tone, August 30, 2021.
    \31\ Luna Sun, ``China's Working Mothers Struggle with Career 
Setbacks and Discrimination, Finding `Balance Is a False Premise,' '' 
South China Morning Post, July 29, 2021. See also Wang Qingkai, 
``Baogao cheng jin jiucheng shou diaoyan yihun nuxing qiuzhi bei wenguo 
shengyu jihua'' [Report says nearly 90 percent of the surveyed married 
women were asked about their family planning when applying for jobs], 
China News Service, November 16, 2020; Greg James, ``Motherhood Is 
Still a Career Killer for Chinese Women, New Research Finds,'' 
SupChina, November 16, 2020.
    \32\ Alice Yan, ``Call for China to Support Single Women Over 30 to 
Give Birth to One Child as Country's Population Ages,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 8, 2022.
    \33\ Vivian Wang, ``For China's Single Mothers, a Road to 
Recognition Paved with False Starts,'' New York Times, May 31, 2021.
    \34\ See, e.g., State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu 
Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding 
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the 
Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021; Zhu 
Ningning, ``Ruhe youhua shengyu baozhang jianshao houguzhiyou'' [How to 
optimize maternity safeguards and reduce worries about future 
consequences], Legal Daily, December 28, 2021; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China 
Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,'' New York 
Times, September 27, 2021; He Huifeng, ``China Population: Economic 
Powerhouse Guangdong Aims to Add 1 Million Residents a Year, Even as 
Birth Rate Keeps Falling,'' South China Morning Post, February 23, 
2021.
    \35\ Ji Siqi, ``China Population: County Sparks Uproar by Telling 
`Leftover' Women to Marry Unemployed Men,'' South China Morning Post, 
January 28, 2022; Phoebe Zhang, `` `Have Babies or Go to Jail': China's 
Internet Mocks 3-Child Policy Slogan Call,'' South China Morning Post, 
August 6, 2021.
    \36\ Ji Siqi, ``China Population: County Sparks Uproar by Telling 
`Leftover' Women to Marry Unemployed Men,'' South China Morning Post, 
January 28, 2022.
    \37\ Hemant Adlakha, ``Women in China: `Baby Makers' and `Bed 
Warmers'?,'' Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, November 2021, 15. 
See also Zhu Yonghua, ``Shei jie nongcun daling nan qingnian ze'ou 
nan'' [Who can solve the difficulty of choosing a mate for older men in 
rural areas?], Voice of China, October 7, 2021.
    \38\ Adam Minter, ``As China Limits Vasectomies, Many Ask What's 
Next,'' Bloomberg, December 16, 2021; Gordon Chang, ``Opinion: Is 
Forced Procreation Coming to China?,'' Newsweek, June 8, 2021. See also 
answers posted by users on March 28, 2018 and December 25, 2021, 
``Weile shengyulu: shifou keyi caiqu qiangzhi jihua shengyu cuoshi, 
zuizhong dadao shengyulu zengzhang mubiao . . .,'' [For the sake of 
birth rates, might [the government] adopt forcible family planning 
measures, finally achieve its fertility growth target . . .?], Zhihu [a 
Chinese Q&A website modeled on Quora], accessed May 5, 2022.
    \39\ Luna Sun, ``China Population: Article Demanding Communist 
Party Members Have Three Children Goes Viral,'' South China Morning 
Post, December 9, 2021.
    \40\ Brenda Goh and Albee Zhang, ``Union Matchmakers a Turn-off, 
Say Chinese Web Users as Birth Rate Debate Heats Up,'' Reuters, March 
9, 2022.
    \41\ Brenda Goh and Albee Zhang, ``Union Matchmakers a Turn-off, 
Say Chinese Web Users as Birth Rate Debate Heats Up,'' Reuters, March 
9, 2022.
    \42\ State Council, ``Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021-2031 
nian)'' [Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021-2030)], 
issued September 8, 2021, sec. 2(1.6).
    \43\ State Council, ``Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021-2030 
nian)'' [Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021-2030)], 
issued September 8, 2021, sec. 2(1.6); Vivian Wang, ``China's Vow to 
Reduce Abortions Sparks Public Worries,'' New York Times, September 27, 
2021; Zhong Yuhao, ``Zhongguo Jishengxie: Jinnian kaizhan weihun renqun 
rengong liuchan ganyu zhuanxiang xingdong'' [China Family Planning 
Association: This year, we will launch a special campaign for abortion 
intervention for unmarried people], The Paper, February 9, 2022; Mimi 
Lau, ``China's Family Planning Agency Says It Will `Intervene' in 
Abortions for Unmarried Women, Teens,'' South China Morning Post, 
February 11, 2022.
    \44\ State Council, ``Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021-2030 
nian)'' [Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021-2030)], 
issued September 8, 2021, sec. 2(1.6).
    \45\ ``Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu Xiehui 2022 nian gongzuo yaodian'' 
[China Family Planning Association key work for 2022], January 27, 
2022; Qiao Long and Chingman, ``China Orders `Interventions' to Prevent 
Teen and Single-Parent Abortions,'' Radio Free Asia, February 10, 2022; 
Zhong Yuhao, ``Zhongguo Jishengxie: Jinnian kaizhan weihun renqun 
rengong liuchan ganyu zhuanxiang xingdong'' [China Family Planning 
Association: This year, we will launch a special campaign for abortion 
intervention for unmarried people], The Paper, February 9, 2022.
    \46\ Yi Fuxian, ``China's Abortion Problem Can't Be Regulated 
Away,'' Project Syndicate, April 14, 2022.
    \47\ Adam Minter, ``As China Limits Vasectomies, Many Ask What's 
Next,'' Bloomberg, December 16, 2021. See also Alicia Chen, Lyric Li, 
and Lily Kuo, ``In Need of a Baby Boom, China Clamps Down on 
Vasectomies,'' Washington Post, October 9, 2021.
    \48\ Adam Minter, ``As China Limits Vasectomies, Many Ask What's 
Next,'' Bloomberg, December 16, 2021. See also Alicia Chen, Lyric Li, 
and Lily Kuo, ``In Need of a Baby Boom, China Clamps Down on 
Vasectomies,'' Washington Post, October 9, 2021.
    \49\ The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, Censorship, and Gender 
Inequality, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Congress, (2022) (testimony of Mei Fong, Chief Communications 
Officer, Human Rights Watch).
    \50\ Alice Yan, ``Call for China to Support Single Women Over 30 to 
Give Birth to One Child as Country's Population Ages,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 8, 2022; ``Political Advisor Proposes to Allow 
Unmarried Women Aged Over 30 with One Child to Gain Access to Maternity 
Leave, Insurance,'' Global Times, March 5, 2022.
    \51\ Luna Sun, ``China's Population Crisis: 5 Ways Beijing Is 
Trying to Tackle a Worryingly Low Birth Rate,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 1, 2022.
    \52\ Luna Sun, ``China's Population Crisis: 5 Ways Beijing Is 
Trying to Tackle a Worryingly Low Birth Rate,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 1, 2022.
    \53\ Luna Sun, ``China's Population Crisis: 5 Ways Beijing Is 
Trying to Tackle a Worryingly Low Birth Rate,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 1, 2022; ``Chinese City Offers Subsidies to Families with 
Multiple Children,'' Xinhua, July 28, 2021.
    \54\ Zhong Yuhao, ``Xiangyin, Hunan huiying `nongcun daling nan 
qingnian ze'ou nan': guli nu qingnian liu zai jiaxiang'' [Xiangyin, 
Hunan, responds to the `difficulty in choosing a spouse for older men 
in rural areas': encouraging young women to stay in their hometowns], 
The Paper, October 5, 2021.
    \55\ Yong Cai and Wang Feng, ``The Social and Sociological 
Consequences of China's One-Child Policy,'' Annual Review of Sociology 
47, no. 1 (2021): 601.
    \56\ Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt 
Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021.
    \57\ Zhu Xuan, ``Nanzi 4 sui bei guai 33 nian hou shouhui ditu 
zhaodao mama: xiang huijia shi yi zhong benneng'' [Thirty-three years 
after being kidnapped as four-year-old boy, man uses a hand-drawn map 
to find his mom: wanting to return home is an instinct], The Paper, 
December 30, 2021; Jessie Yeung, ``Map Drawn from Memory Helps Man 
Reunite with Family Decades after Abduction,'' CNN, January 3, 2022.
    \58\ Samantha A. Vortherms, ``China's Missing Children: Political 
Barriers to Citizenship through the Household Registration System,'' 
China Quarterly 238 (June 2019): 309.
    \59\ Samantha A. Vortherms, ``China's Missing Children: Political 
Barriers to Citizenship through the Household Registration System,'' 
China Quarterly 238 (June 2019): 309.
    \60\ Samantha A. Vortherms, ``China's Missing Children: Political 
Barriers to Citizenship through the Household Registration System,'' 
China Quarterly 238 (June 2019): 309; Kam Wing Chan, ``China's Hukou 
Reform Remains a Major Challenge to Domestic Migrants in Cities,'' 
World Bank Blogs, December 17, 2021. See also John James Kennedy and 
Yaojiang Shi, Lost and Found: The ``Missing Girls'' in Rural China (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2019),
8-12.
    \61\ Calvin Oliver, ``The Hukou Impact on the Welfare of 
Children,'' European Guanxi, November 8, 2021.
    \62\ Ayushi Singh Ahluwalia, ``Impact of China's One-Child Policy 
on Women,'' The Geopolitics, July 23, 2021; Yong Cai and Wang Feng, 
``The Social and Sociological Consequences of China's One-Child 
Policy,'' Annual Review of Sociology 47 (2021): 593.
    \63\ Ayushi Singh Ahluwalia, ``Impact of China's One-Child Policy 
on Women,'' The Geopolitics, July 23, 2021; Yong Cai and Wang Feng, 
``The Social and Sociological Consequences of China's One-Child 
Policy,'' Annual Review of Sociology 47 (2021): 593.
    \64\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family 
Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022.
    \65\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family 
Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022.
    \66\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family 
Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022.
    \67\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family 
Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022.
    \68\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family 
Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022.
    \69\ Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt 
Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021; Andrew Mullen, ``Explainer: China's One-
Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,'' South China 
Morning Post, June 1, 2021.
    \70\ Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, ``Deadly 
Discrimination: Implications of `Missing Girls' for Workplace Safety,'' 
Journal of Development Economics 152, (September 2021): 1, 8; Cheryl 
Heng, ``China Home to 30 Million Men in Search of a Bride, Census 
Shows,'' South China Morning Post, May 17, 2021; Eleanor Olcott, 
``China's Chained Woman Exposes Horror of Beijing's One-Child Policy,'' 
Financial Times, March 7, 2022. See also Heather Barr, ``China's Bride 
Trafficking Problem,'' The Diplomat, October 30, 2019.
    \71\ Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, ``Deadly 
Discrimination: Implications of `Missing Girls' for Workplace Safety,'' 
Journal of Development Economics 152, (September 2021): 1, 8.
    \72\ Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, ``Deadly 
Discrimination: Implications of `Missing Girls' for Workplace Safety,'' 
Journal of Development Economics 152, (September
2021): 1.
    \73\ Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt 
Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021.
    \74\ Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt 
Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021.
    \75\ Eleanor Olcott, ``China's Chained Woman Exposes Horror of 
Beijing's One-Child Policy,''
Financial Times, March 8, 2022.
    \76\ Eleanor Olcott, ``China's Chained Woman Exposes Horror of 
Beijing's One-Child Policy,''
Financial Times, March 8, 2022.
    \77\ Orange Wang and Luna Sun, ``China's Population Up Less than 
Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,'' South 
China Morning Post, February 4, 2022; National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, ``Wang Pingping: renkou zongliang baochi zengzhang chengzhenhua 
shuiping wenbu tisheng'' [Wang Pingping: Total population has steadily 
increased and the level of urbanization has steadily risen], January 
18, 2022; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Diqi ci quanguo 
renkou pucha zhuyao shuju qingkuang'' [Main data of the seventh 
national census], May 11, 2021. For the total number of births reported 
for 2019, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2019 nian 
guomin jingji yunxing zongti pingwen fazhan zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiaohao 
shixian'' [National economy was generally stable in 2019 with main 
projected targets for development achieved], January 17, 2020. For the 
total number of births reported for 2018, see National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji yunxing baochi zai heli qujian 
fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao wancheng'' [The economy moved 
within reasonable range in 2018, main expected development targets were 
reached], January 21, 2019. For the total number of births reported for 
2017, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2017 nian jingji 
yunxing wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi'' [The economy was stable in 
2017, exceeding expectations], January 18, 2018. See also Robin Brant, 
``China Census: Data Shows Slowest Population Growth in Decades,'' BBC, 
May 11, 2021.
    \78\ Orange Wang and Luna Sun, ``China's Population Up Less than 
Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,'' South 
China Morning Post, February 4, 2022; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China's `Long-Term 
Time Bomb': Falling Births Stunt Population Growth,'' New York Times, 
May 31, 2021; Ren Zeping, Xiong Chai, and Zhou Zhe, ``Ren Zeping: 
Jianyi liji quanmian fangkai bing guli shengyu'' [Ren Zeping: [(We) 
recommend immediate and complete liberalization and encouragement of 
childbearing], Zeping Hongguan, reprinted in China Finance Online, 
April 6, 2020; Fuxian Yi, ``China's Population Numbers Are Almost 
Certainly Inflated to Hide the Harmful Legacy of Its Family Planning 
Policy,'' South China Morning Post, July 20, 2019.
    \79\ ``At Least 6 Chinese Provincial-Level Regions Show Declining 
Population in 2021,'' Global Times, March 15, 2022.
    \80\ ``At Least 6 Chinese Provincial-Level Regions Show Declining 
Population in 2021,'' Global Times, March 15, 2022.
    \81\ Lin Xiaozhao, ``16 shengfen qunian chusheng renkou shuju 
chulu: Shandong 5 nian xiajiang 57.6%'' [Last year's birth data for 16 
provinces released: Shandong dropped by 57.6 percent in 5 years], China 
Business News, March 20, 2022.
    \82\ Yang Zhijin, ``Yanghang huobi zhengce weiyuanhui weiyuan Cai 
Fang: 2022 nian Zhongguo renkou zongliang huo da fengzhi'' [Cai Fang, 
member of the Central Bank's Monetary Policy Committee: China's 
population may peak in 2022], 21jingji.com, March 19, 2022.
    \83\ ``Wang Pingping: renkou zongliang baochi zengzhang 
chengzhenhua shuiping wenbu tisheng'' [Wang Pingping: Total population 
has steadily increased and the level of urbanization has steadily 
risen], Economic Daily, January 18, 2022; Orange Wang and Luna Sun, 
``China's Population Up Less than Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge 
Again as Crisis Deepens,'' South China Morning Post, January 17, 2022.
    \84\ Orange Wang and Luna Sun, ``China's Population Up Less than 
Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,'' South 
China Morning Post, January 17, 2022. See also Orange Wang, ``China 
Population: Forget 2 or 3 Kids, Getting Couples to Have the First `Most 
Pressing Problem,' '' South China Morning Post, January 6, 2022.

Human Trafficking

Human Trafficking

                           Human Trafficking

                                Findings

         In April 2022, the Standing Committee of the 
        National People's Congress ratified the International 
        Labour Organization's (ILO) Forced Labor and Abolition 
        of Forced Labour conventions. The People's Republic of 
        China's (PRC) multiple violations of forced labor human 
        rights standards diminish any meaningful expectations 
        that the government will work in good faith to meet the 
        newly ratified ILO forced labor conventions, according 
        to a human rights advocate.
         In November 2021, scholar Adrian Zenz and the 
        Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation published an 
        analysis of leaked classified official documents that 
        are known as the Xinjiang Papers. The analysis found 
        that forced labor programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) were implemented in order to 
        comply with ``explicit statements and demands'' made by 
        PRC officials, including Chinese leader Xi Jinping. 
        Chinese government-sponsored forced labor in the XUAR 
        is a form of human trafficking under the UN Protocol to 
        Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
        Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol).
         In February 2022, the ILO released the annual 
        report of the Committee of Experts on the Application 
        of Conventions and Recommendations. The Committee 
        requested that the Chinese government review, repeal, 
        and revise its forced labor and detention policies in 
        order to end discrimination against ethnic minorities 
        in the XUAR.
         A 2022 article in the American Journal of 
        Transplantation found 71 organ transplant cases between 
        1980 and 2015 in which the removal of organs was the 
        likely cause of an individual's death. Under the 
        Palermo Protocol, the ``abuse of power or of a position 
        of vulnerability'' to achieve consent in the removal of 
        organs is a form of human trafficking.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Fully implement the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
        Act (UFLPA) which was signed into law in December 2021 
        and went into effect in June 2022. Congress should 
        consider increased funding to Customs and Border 
        Protection (CBP) to bolster CBP enforcement of the 
        UFLPA.
          Monitor and support the Tier 3 designation for China 
        in the annual U.S. State Department Trafficking in 
        Persons Report. As part of that designation, employ the 
        actions described in Section 110 of the Trafficking 
        Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) as amended (22 
        U.S.C. 7107) to address government-sponsored forced 
        labor. Ensure that significant traffickers in persons 
        in China are identified and sanctioned. Traffickers can 
        be sanctioned under Section 111 of the TVPA as amended 
        (22 U.S.C. 7108).
          Consider actions, including through legislation as 
        needed, that bolster supply chain transparency, 
        including by requiring supply chain mapping, 
        disclosure, comprehensive human rights due diligence, 
        and country of origin labels for goods purchased and 
        sold online.
          Provide humanitarian pathways for victims of human 
        trafficking in the PRC, including protections for those 
        seeking asylum to ensure they are not deported to the 
        PRC and are resettled in countries that have no 
        extradition agreement with China, including the United 
        States.

Human Trafficking

Human Trafficking

                           Human Trafficking

         Defining Human Trafficking under the Palermo Protocol

    As a State Party to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (Palermo Protocol),\1\ China is obligated to combat 
human trafficking and enact legislation criminalizing human 
trafficking as defined in the Palermo Protocol.\2\ The Palermo 
Protocol definition of human trafficking comprises three 
components:

         the action of recruiting, transporting, 
        harboring, or receiving persons;
         the means of coercion, deception, or control; 
        and
         the purpose of exploitation, including sexual 
        exploitation, forced labor, or the forced removal of 
        organs.\3\

Under the Palermo Protocol, crossing international borders is 
not required for an action to constitute human trafficking, 
such as in cases of government-sponsored forced labor.\4\

               PRC Criminal Law and the Palermo Protocol

    The definition of human trafficking under the PRC Criminal 
Law \5\ remains inconsistent with Palermo Protocol 
standards.\6\ Chinese law focuses on the act of selling a woman 
or child,\7\ rather than on the purpose of exploitation.\8\ 
Furthermore, while forced labor is illegal under the Criminal 
Law,\9\ its definition of trafficking does not clearly cover 
all forms of trafficking listed in the Palermo Protocol,\10\ 
including certain types of non-physical coercion,\11\ offenses 
against male victims,\12\ and forced labor.\13\

                        Cross-Border Trafficking

    China is both a source and destination country for human 
trafficking across international borders. During the 
Commission's 2022 reporting year, China remained \14\ a 
destination country for trafficking, particularly of women and 
children from Southeast Asia.\15\ In addition, China was a 
source country for trafficking to Cambodia.\16\ Furthermore, 
the Commission observed reports that Indonesian and Filipino 
nationals on board Chinese-flagged distant-water fishing 
vessels were subjected to conditions that the ILO lists as 
indicators of forced labor.\17\

                          Domestic Trafficking

    During this reporting year, the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS) reported anti-trafficking efforts by 
the PRC government, and the Commission continued to observe 
reports of domestic human trafficking. Citing statistics from 
2020, the NBS reported a continued campaign against human 
trafficking of children and further revealed that 4,858 
abducted children had been recovered since 2016.\18\ This 
figure likely includes cases of illegal adoption.\19\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Individuals Likely Killed as a Result of Organ Removal in China
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  A January 2022 study in the American Journal of Transplantation
 highlighted evidence of unethical surgical activity with regard to
 organ donors' status and informed consent at the time of surgery. The
 study examined a total of 2,838 Chinese-language ``transplant-related
 papers published in scientific journals'' from 1980 to 2015 in order to
 determine whether or not the organs discussed in the papers were
 procured from living or brain-dead donors.\20\ The authors found 71
 cases of heart and lung transplants in which ``the removal of the heart
 during organ procurement must have been the proximate cause of the
 donor's death.'' \21\ The reliance on organ procurement from prisoners
 sentenced in death penalty cases prior to 2015 sustains the authors'
 observation that almost all the organs discussed in the scientific
 papers examined in the article came from prisoners in China.\22\
 Additionally, the authors noted that ``the inherently coercive
 circumstances in which condemned prisoners are held impairs their (or
 their families') capacity to give free and informed consent to donate
 organs upon death.'' \23\ The authors described their findings as
 consistent with previous ``anecdotal and textual'' accounts provided by
 Falun Gong-affiliated organizations that alleged organ harvesting from
 prisoners of conscience.\24\ Under the Palermo Protocol, the ``abuse of
 power or of a position of vulnerability'' to achieve consent in the
 removal of organs is a form of human trafficking.\25\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Human Trafficking and the Case of the Chained Woman
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Mei Fong, Chief Communications Officer at Human Rights Watch and
 author of a book on China's one-child policy, testified at a March 2022
 Commission hearing that ``the one-child policy has created a huge
 shortage of women and hence a surge in bride trafficking in China as
 well as countries across the region.'' \26\ She went on to discuss the
 case of the ``chained woman'' that emerged in early 2022, describing it
 as ``a representation of some of the ongoing concerns with human
 trafficking.'' \27\ In January 2022, a video went viral on the Chinese
 social media app Weibo, depicting a woman chained in a shed in Feng
 county, Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province.\28\ Local officials
 initially claimed that the woman was not a victim of human
 trafficking.\29\ After social media backlash, local officials issued
 another statement saying that she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia
 and that they were investigating her husband.\30\
  A provincial Party committee and government investigation team from
 Xuzhou determined that the woman was originally from Fugong county,
 Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province.\31\ According to
 the investigation, in 1998 an individual brought her to Jiangsu on the
 pretext of helping her get medical treatment.\32\ In Jiangsu, she was
 sold multiple times before being sold to her husband.\33\ Officials
 believed that her husband had kept her chained in the shed since
 2017.\34\ She had given birth to eight children, all of whom
 authorities identified as the children of her and her husband.\35\
 Public security officials criminally detained several individuals on
 suspicion of human trafficking, including her husband.\36\ Officials
 suspected her husband of abuse for chaining her and denying her medical
 treatment.\37\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Human Trafficking and the Case of the Chained Woman-- Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The case of the chained woman continued to attract widespread
 attention for some time on Chinese social media \38\ despite domestic
 censorship. An NPR article described a February 2022 post by the
 investigation team as the ``top trending topic on social media,
 exceeding public  interest in the Winter Olympics that week.'' \39\
 According to a February article in the Wall Street Journal, the social
 media account of the individual ``who originally posted the video . . .
 on Douyin, China's version of TikTok, could no longer be found,'' and
 some discussions on Weibo about the woman were no longer
 accessible.\40\ [For more information, see Section VI--Status of Women
 and Population Control, and Section VIII--Public Health.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

         Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

          FORCED LABOR LINKED TO STATEMENTS BY PRC LEADERSHIP

    In November 2021, scholar Adrian Zenz and the Victims of 
Communism Memorial Foundation, a non-governmental organization 
in Washington, D.C., published an analysis of leaked classified 
official documents obtained by the London-based independent 
tribunal known as the Uyghur Tribunal. The new analysis 
uncovered a more prominent role by PRC leaders in the forced 
labor scheme than previously understood, linking government-
sponsored forced labor to ``explicit statements and demands by 
central government figures,'' including Xi Jinping.\41\ The 
documents were part of the Xinjiang Papers, a cache of internal 
official documents which the New York Times reported on in 
2019.\42\ While the 2019 analysis of the Xinjiang Papers showed 
the officially directed nature of the repression of ethnic 
minorities in the XUAR, it had not strongly linked the 
repression, including programs tied to forced labor, directly 
to Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.\43\
    The Xinjiang Papers contained speeches made in May 2014 by 
Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and then member of the Standing 
Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee Political 
Bureau Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central Xinjiang Work 
Forum.\44\ In their speeches, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and Yu 
Zhengsheng all emphasized the need for officials to address 
unemployment as a key factor in the stability of the region, 
with Yu mentioning that ``labor intensive industries,'' and 
specifically the ``textile and garment industry,'' should be 
encouraged to move production to the XUAR in order to promote 
employment and stability.\45\ In his speech, Xi said that such 
employment could cause ethnic minorities to ``. . . 
imperceptibly study Chinese culture,'' and that authorities 
should ``. . . expand the scale of ethnic minorities going from 
Xinjiang to eastern parts of China for education, employment, 
and residence . . .'' in order to ``promote ethnic unity.'' 
\46\ Analysis by Zenz of publicly available evidence found that 
in 2016, local government officials perceived these speeches as 
``containing the `strategic deployment of the Party Central 
Committee for Xinjiang work.' '' \47\
    In this reporting year and in previous reporting years,\48\ 
the Commission observed strong connections between PRC 
government-sponsored forced labor and (1) labor transfer 
programs within and from the XUAR; \49\ (2) the ``Xinjiang 
Aid'' program (duikou yuanjiang); \50\ and (3) work in the 
textile and garment industries in the XUAR.\51\ Labor transfer 
programs moved individuals who are from rural areas to 
factories and cotton fields.\52\ The ``Xinjiang Aid'' program 
has encouraged local governments and companies in other parts 
of China either to invest in factories and industrial parks in 
the XUAR or to recruit ethnic minority workers from the XUAR to 
work in factories in other parts of China.\53\

               AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO PLACE INDIVIDUALS
                           INTO FORCED LABOR

    According to subsequent research published by Zenz in June 
2022, XUAR authorities intensified and institutionalized the 
placement of Turkic Muslims into forced labor situations, 
likely forcing hundreds of thousands of mass internment camp 
detainees to work within the XUAR and transferring millions of 
``rural surplus laborers'' within and outside of the XUAR.\54\ 
Zenz's research indicates that authorities increased ``the 
scope and scale'' of forced labor transfers in 2021 and 
published plans to move increasing numbers of rural laborers 
into industrial work, as well as to train workers in coercive 
labor programs in higher skilled labor.\55\

  GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR CONTRAVENES CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL 
                              OBLIGATIONS

    PRC government-sponsored forced labor contravenes 
international human rights standards and China's international 
obligations. Government-sponsored forced labor programs in the 
XUAR \56\ constitute human trafficking under the Palermo 
Protocol \57\ and a crime against humanity under the Rome 
Statute.\58\ In February 2022, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) released the annual report of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations.\59\ The Committee expressed its ``. . . deep 
concern in respect of the policy directions expressed in 
numerous national and regional policy and regulatory documents 
. . .'' with regard to the government's detention and labor 
policies among ethnic minorities from the XUAR.\60\ The 
Committee requested that the Chinese government review, repeal, 
and revise its policies in order to serve ethnic minority 
individuals in the XUAR rather than discriminate against 
them.\61\ According to the report, as a signatory to the ILO's 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (C111), 
China is obligated to create a ``. . . national policy to 
promote equality of opportunity and treatment and eliminate 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation,'' and 
``. . . to repeal any statutory provisions and modify any 
administrative instructions or practices which are inconsistent 
with such policy.'' \62\ In April 2022, the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee ratified the ILO's Forced Labour 
Convention of 1930 (C029) and Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention of 1957 (C105).\63\ C029 requires countries to 
prohibit the use of forced labor and make the use of forced 
labor ``punishable as a penal offence.'' \64\ Countries that 
ratify C105 are prohibited from using forced labor ``as a means 
of political coercion or education'' or ``as a means of racial, 
social, national or religious discrimination.'' \65\ According 
to a human rights advocate, the PRC's multiple violations of 
international human rights standards on forced labor diminished 
meaningful expectations that the government will work in good 
faith to meet the ILO forced labor conventions.\66\ [For more 
information on forced labor and other human rights violations 
in the XUAR, see Section X--Xinjiang. For more information on 
corporate involvement in forced labor in the XUAR, see Section 
VIII--Business and Human Rights.]

Human Trafficking

Human Trafficking

    Notes to Section VI--Human Trafficking

    \1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, accessed June 10, 
2022, art. 12.
    \2\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, arts. 5.1, 9.1. See also UN Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/HRC/35/37, 
March 28, 2017, para. 14.
    \3\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``The Crime,'' accessed July 21, 
2022. Note that for children younger than 18 years old, the means 
described in Article 3(a) are not required for an action to constitute 
human trafficking; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c), (d). For information on how 
international standards regarding forced labor fit into the framework 
of the Palermo Protocol, see International Labour Office, International 
Labour Organization, ``Human Trafficking and Forced Labour 
Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislation and Law Enforcement,'' 2005, 
7-15; International Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on 
Forced Labour,'' June 1, 2012. The International Labour Organization 
lists ``withholding of wages'' as an indicator of forced labor. See 
also Peter Bengsten, ``Hidden in Plain Sight: Forced Labour 
Constructing China,'' openDemocracy, February 16, 2018.
    \4\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a); Anti-Slavery International, ``What 
Is Human Trafficking?,'' accessed July 21, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 
``Smuggling and Trafficking Human Beings,'' July 7, 2015; Rebekah Kates 
Lemke, ``7 Things You May Not Know about Human Trafficking, and 3 Ways 
to Help,'' Catholic Relief Services, January 5, 2020. For examples of 
human trafficking reports that list government-sponsored forced labor 
in China as part of human trafficking, see Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in 
Persons Report,'' June 2020, 10, 153-57; ``Global Supply Chains, Forced 
Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, March 2020, 9.
    \5\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 240. For a discussion of the human 
trafficking related provisions of the PRC Criminal Law, see Laney 
Zhang, ``Training Related to Combating Human Trafficking: China,'' 
Library of Congress, February 16, 2016.
    \6\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). Topics that need to be addressed in 
domestic human trafficking legislation to bring Chinese law into 
compliance with the Palermo Protocol include the addition of non-
physical forms of coercion into the legal definition of trafficking, 
the trafficking of men, and providing the ``purpose of exploitation.'' 
For an examination of the ways in which Chinese laws are inconsistent 
with the Palermo Protocol, see Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and 
China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' 
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (June 15, 
2016): 148-77. See also CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 176.
    \7\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines 
trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, 
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose 
of selling [the victim].'' In contrast, the purpose of exploitation is 
a key determinant of the Palermo Protocol definition of human 
trafficking. For reports from the Commission's 2022 reporting year that 
describe the sale of children as human trafficking without specifying 
the purpose of the sale as exploitation, see, e.g., ``Man from C. China 
Reunites with Son Abducted 14 Years Ago by Efforts of Police via DNA 
Analysis,'' Global Times, December 6, 2021; Mandy Zuo, ``Man in China 
Jailed after Selling His 5 Children to Human Traffickers,'' South China 
Morning Post, December 15, 2021.
    \8\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a); Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and 
China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' 
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (June 15, 
2016): 159. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6, December 26, 
2018, para. 28.173; Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review--China (Addendum), A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15, 2019, 
para. 28.173. In response to a recommendation from Ukraine at China's 
Universal Periodic Review requesting that China ``[e]laborate 
comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation that provides for the 
criminalization of all forms of trafficking,'' the Chinese government 
stated that the recommendation was ``[a]ccepted and already 
implemented.''
    \9\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 244. For a discussion of the human 
trafficking related provisions of the PRC Criminal Law, see Laney 
Zhang, ``Training Related to Combating Human Trafficking: China,'' 
Library of Congress, February 2016.
    \10\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of 
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (June 15, 2016): 151, 166-7; 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 
1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective 
March 1, 2021, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, 
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime, ``The Crime,'' accessed July 21, 2022.
    \11\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of 
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (June 15, 2016): 159; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, 
revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 
2021, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a).
    \12\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of 
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (June 15, 2016): 160, 166; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, 
revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 
2021, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). The PRC Criminal Law defines 
trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, 
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose 
of selling [the victim].'' See also ``Sifa da shuju zhuanti baogao zhi 
she guai fanzui'' [Judicial big data special report on crimes involving 
trafficking], Supreme People's Court Information Center and Judicial 
Cases Research Institute, December 22, 2016, 11.
    \13\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of 
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (June 15, 2016): 159; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, 
revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 
2021, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a).
    \14\ For information on cross-border trafficking to and from China 
in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 
164; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 177; CECC, 2019 Annual 
Report, November 18, 2019, 160; CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 
2018, 178-79.
    \15\ See, e.g., ``COVID-19 Drives New Surge in Trafficking of Women 
from Laos to China,'' Radio Free Asia, July 3, 2021; Sen Nguyen, 
``Young Members of Ethnic Minority Groups Most at Risk in Vietnam-China 
Human Trafficking Trade: Report,'' South China Morning Post, July 8, 
2021.
    \16\ Cindy Liu and Marta Kasztelan, ``Online Fraud: How Chinese 
Nationals Forced to Run Internet Scams in Cambodia Earn Millions for 
Their Captors, Sometimes Paying with Their Lives,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 30, 2022; Alice Yan, `` `Blood Slave' Kidnapped by 
Chinese Crime Gang in Cambodia Drained for Months and Threatened with 
Organ Harvesting.'' South China Morning Post, February 17, 2022.
    \17\ These indicators are debt bondage, physical violence, 
excessive overtime, and abusive living conditions. Mongabay, Tansa, and 
the Environmental Reporting Collective, ``Worked to Death: How a 
Chinese Tuna Juggernaut Crushed Its Indonesian Workers,'' September 13, 
2021; International Labour Organization, ``ILO Indicators of Forced 
Labor,'' October 1, 2012, 1, 2. Under international law, China has 
jurisdiction over Chinese-flagged distant water fishing vessels. UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted by the Third UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, entry into force November 16, 
1994, art. 94(2)(b), (3)(b), (6); United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Chapter XXI, Law of the Sea, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
accessed March 24, 2022. See also CECC 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 
165.
    \18\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, `` `Zhongguo Ertong 
Fazhan Gangyao (2011-2020 nian)' zhongqi tongji jiance baogao'' 
[``Chinese Children's Development Summary (2011-2020)'' final 
statistical monitoring report], December 21, 2021, sec. 1(5)(2).
    \19\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines 
trafficking as ``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, 
fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of 
selling [the victim].'' The illegal sale of children for adoption thus 
can be considered trafficking under Chinese law. In contrast, under the 
Palermo Protocol, illegal adoptions constitute trafficking only if the 
purpose is exploitation. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, 
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also UN General 
Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its 
First to Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the 
Official Records (Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto, A/55/383/Add.1, November 3, 2000, para. 66.
    \20\ The determination of brain-death--called the ``dead donor 
rule''--is a prerequisite for the ethical procurement of organs. 
Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ Procurement: 
Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal of 
Transplantation, (January 19, 2022): 1-3.
    \21\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation, (January 19, 2022): 1, 3, 6.
    \22\ Olivia Geng and Laurie Burkitt, ``China to Halt Harvesting of 
Organs from Executed Prisoners for Transplant,'' Wall Street Journal, 
December 14, 2014; Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by 
Organ Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American 
Journal of Transplantation, (January 19, 2022): 2.
    \23\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation, (January 19, 2022): 6.
    \24\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation, April 4, 2022, 1, 4, 6-7. While the latest date of 
sources that comprise the dataset used by the researchers was in 2015, 
they state that ``if prisoners--of whatever sort--are indeed still 
being used as an organ source, we think it is most rational to believe 
that the procurement of their organs continues to occasion violations 
of the DDR.'' For prior anecdotal and textual claims, see World 
Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, ``Zhongguo 
dalu yixue zhuanye lunwen zhong youguan Zhonggong huoti zhai qu Falun 
Gong xueyuan qiguan de zhengju'' [Evidence of the CCP harvesting of 
organs from Falun Gong practitioners in medical papers in mainland 
China], September 24, 2014.
    \25\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3.
    \26\ The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, Censorship, and Gender 
Inequality, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Mei Fong, Chief Communications 
Officer, Human Rights Watch), 22:57, 39:36.
    \27\ The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, Censorship, and Gender 
Inequality, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Mei Fong, Chief Communications 
Officer, Human Rights Watch), 39:36. See also Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, 
``The Mystery of the Chained Woman in China'' NPR, February 17, 2022.
    \28\ Liyan Qi, ``In China, Footage of a Chained-Up Rural Mother of 
Eight Draws Outcry,'' Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2022.
    \29\ Chinese Communist Party Feng County Propaganda Department, 
``Guanyu wangmin fanying `shengyu ba hai nuzi' de qingkuang shuoming'' 
[Statement regarding the situation of online reports of the ``Woman who 
gave birth to eight children''], QQ, January 28, 2022; Liyan Qi, ``In 
China, Footage of a Chained-Up Rural Mother of Eight Draws Outcry,'' 
Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2022.
    \30\ Xuzhou Municipal Party Committee and Government Joint 
Investigation Team, `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi diaocha jinzhan 
qingkuang'' [Investigation progress regarding the situation of ``The 
Feng County woman who gave birth to eight children''], QQ, February 7, 
2022; Liyan Qi, ``In China, Footage of a Chained-Up Rural Mother of 
Eight Draws Outcry,'' Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2022.
    \31\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022; Aowen 
Cao and Emily Feng, ``The Mystery of the Chained Woman in China'' NPR, 
February 17, 2022.
    \32\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022.
    \33\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022.
    \34\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022.
    \35\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022.
    \36\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022; Aowen 
Cao and Emily Feng, ``The Mystery of the Chained Woman in China'' NPR, 
February 17, 2022.
    \37\ `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' shijian shisan wen--
Xinhuashe jizhe fang Jiangsu Shengwei Sheng Zhengfu diaocha zu 
fuzeren'' [13 questions on the case of ``The Feng County woman who gave 
birth to eight children''--Xinhua News Agency reporter interviews the 
head of the investigation team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee and Provincial Government], Xinhua, February 23, 2022.
    \38\ Xuzhou Municipal Party Committee and Government Joint 
Investigation Team, `` `Fengxian shengyu ba hai nuzi' diaocha jinzhan 
qingkuang'' [Investigation progress regarding the situation of ``The 
Feng County woman who gave birth to eight children''], QQ, February 7, 
2022; Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, ``The Mystery of the Chained Woman in 
China'' NPR, February 17, 2022.
    \39\ Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, ``The Mystery of the Chained Woman 
in China'' NPR, February 17, 2022.
    \40\ Liyan Qi, ``In China, Footage of a Chained-Up Rural Mother of 
Eight Draws Outcry,'' Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2022.
    \41\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 3; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, 
``The Xinjiang Papers: Document No. 2,'' December 13, 2021, 15.
    \42\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 2, 3. See also Austin Ramzy and 
Chris Buckley, `` `Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China 
Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,'' New York Times, November 16, 
2019; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 298-99.
    \43\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 2, 3. See also Austin Ramzy and 
Chris Buckley, `` `Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China 
Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,'' New York Times, November 16, 
2019.
    \44\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 7.
    \45\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: 
Document No. 2,'' December 13, 2021, 20, 39, 40, 65, 72.
    \46\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: 
Document No. 2,'' December 13, 2021, 15, 20.
    \47\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 9, 10.
    \48\ For more information on the connections between forced labor 
and the ``Xinjiang Aid'' program, labor transfers, and textile and 
garment industries, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 166-67, 
213-4, 278-79; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 178-9, 237-41, 
302-3; CECC, 2019 Annual Report, November 2019, 162, 205-7, 272.
    \49\ `` `To Make Us Slowly Disappear': The Chinese Government's 
Assault on the Uyghurs,'' Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of 
Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2021, 32.
    \50\ This program is also translated as ``Pairing Assistance,'' 
``Mutual Pairing Assistance,'' or ``Pairing Program.'' Vicky Xiuzhong 
Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, et al., ``Uyghurs for Sale: 
`Reeducation,' Forced Labour and Surveillance beyond Xinjiang,'' 
International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, March 1, 2020; Amy K. Lehr and Mariefaye Bechrakis, 
``Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, 
and Supply Chains,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
October 2019, 9-10, Annex 3; Adrian Zenz, ``Beyond the Camps: Beijing's 
Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social 
Control in Xinjiang,'' Journal of Political Risk 7, no. 12 (December 
10, 2019). See also ``Xi Jinping zai di'er ci Zhongyang Xinjiang 
Gongzuo Zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua'' [Xi Jinping delivers 
important speech at second Central Xinjiang Summit], People's Daily, 
May 30, 2014.
    \51\ See, e.g., Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How 
Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena 
Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, 
November 2021; Emily Feng, ``Forced Labour Being Used in China's `Re-
Education' Camps,'' Financial Times, December 15, 2018; Dake Kang, 
Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear Traced to Factory in 
China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press, December 19, 2018.
    \52\ See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, ``Coercive Labor in Xinjiang: Labor 
Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton'' 
Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, December 2020, 15; Alice 
Su, ``China Fulfills a Dream to End Poverty. Not All Poor People Are 
Feeling Better Off,'' Los Angeles Times, November 27, 2020.
    \53\ Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, et al., 
``Uyghurs for Sale: `Reeducation,' Forced Labour and Surveillance 
beyond Xinjiang,'' International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, March 1, 2020; Amy K. Lehr and Mariefaye 
Bechrakis, ``Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced 
Assimilation, and Supply Chains,'' Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, October 2019, 9-10, Annex 3; Adrian Zenz, 
``Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, 
Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,'' Journal of 
Political Risk 7, no. 12 (December 10, 2019). See also ``Xi Jinping zai 
di'er ci Zhongyang Xinjiang Gongzuo Zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao 
jianghua'' [Xi Jinping delivers important speech at second Central 
Xinjiang Summit], People's Daily, May 30, 2014.
    \54\ Adrian Zenz, ``Early Warning Brief--Unemployment Monitoring 
and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang's Coercive Labor Placement 
Systems,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022, 9, 14, 15, 
17.
    \55\ Adrian Zenz, ``Early Warning Brief--Unemployment Monitoring 
and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang's Coercive Labor Placement 
Systems,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022, 10, 16, 17.
    \56\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021; Shohret Hoshur, ``Chinese Company Transfers Thousands of Uyghurs 
from Xinjiang to Nanjing,'' Radio Free Asia, November 13, 2021; Shohret 
Hoshur, ``After 4 Years in Detention, Uyghur Brothers Forced to Work at 
Factories in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, January 12, 2022.
    \57\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c), (d); `` `To Make Us Slowly 
Disappear': The Chinese Government's Assault on the Uyghurs,'' Simon-
Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, November 2021, 38, 39.
    \58\ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 
17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7; `` `To Make Us Slowly 
Disappear': The Chinese Government's Assault on the Uyghurs,'' Simon-
Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, November 2021, 38, 39.
    \59\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 110th Session, February 9, 2022, 3.
    \60\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 110th Session, February 9, 2022, 515, 
516, 519-21.
    \61\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 110th Session, February 9, 2022, 520-
1.
    \62\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 110th Session, February 9, 2022, 519; 
International Labour Organization, Convention C111--Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, International Labour 
Conference, 42nd Session, June 25, 1958.
    \63\ ``Shisan jie Quanguo Renda Changwei Hui disanshisi ci huiyi 
zai Jing bimu biaojue tongguo Qihuo he Yansheng Pin Fa xin xiuding de 
Zhiye Jiaoyu Fa deng Xi Jinping qianshu zhuxi ling Li Zhanshu zhuchi 
huiyi'' [The 34th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th 
National People's Congress concludes in Beijing, voted to pass the 
Futures and Derivatives Law, the newly revised Vocational Education 
Law, etc., Xi Jinping signed the Presidential decree and Li Zhanshu 
presided over the meeting], Xinhua, reprinted in National People's 
Congress, April 20, 2022; Nadya Yeh, ``China Ratifies Two International 
Treaties on Forced Labor,'' SupChina, April 20, 2022. See also 
International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29) Concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930; International Labour 
Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of 
Forced Labour, January 17, 1959.
    \64\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 029) 
Concerning Forced Labour, May 1, 1932, arts. 1, 25.
    \65\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, art. 1(a), 
(e). See also Phoebe Zhang, ``China Ratifies Forced Labour Conventions 
Ahead of UN Rights Chief's Visit,'' South China Morning Post, April 21, 
2022.
    \66\ Nicola Macbean, ``China's Ratification of the ILO Forced 
Labour Conventions: A Hollow Gesture?,'' Made in China Journal 7, no. 1 
(January-June 2022): 28, 33, 179.

Worker Rights

Worker Rights

                           VII. Worker Rights

                             Worker Rights

                                Findings

         The Chinese government describes digital 
        platform workers, including food delivery workers, 
        couriers, ride-hailing drivers, and truckers, as 
        ``flexibly employed.'' Many of these workers face 
        violations of international labor standards with regard 
        to access to fair pay, employment contracts and 
        agreements, and pensions and other insurance 
        categories. They handle on-the-job risks that endanger 
        their health and safety, and often lack residential 
        permits (hukou) in the urban areas where they work, 
        which limits their options for education, healthcare, 
        and housing. Gig workers played a crucial role in 
        transporting and delivering food and other essential 
        goods to ordinary citizens in China held under 
        restrictive lockdowns due to coronavirus disease 2019 
        (COVID-19) outbreaks this past year.
         Officials have increasingly pressured 
        technology and e-commerce companies to improve gig 
        workers' conditions. The campaign included a 
        legislative amendment to allow gig workers to join the 
        All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the 
        issuance of multiple joint opinions that aim to 
        establish employment norms for gig work and the 
        platform economy, the publication of typical court 
        cases involving overtime, and new provisions on 
        algorithm management.
         The Chinese Communist Party-led ACFTU remains 
        the only trade union organization legally recognized 
        under Chinese law, and workers are not allowed to 
        establish independent unions. The Party and government 
        revised the PRC Trade Union Law to allow gig workers to 
        join the ACFTU, and instructed the ACFTU to redouble 
        outreach to unionize gig workers.
         The government does not publish official data 
        on the number of strikes and labor actions, and its 
        censorship of news and social media, along with its 
        harassment and detention of citizen journalists and 
        labor advocates, further limits access to information 
        about labor unrest. The Hong Kong-based non-
        governmental organization (NGO) China Labour Bulletin 
        (CLB) documented 1,094 strikes and other labor actions 
        in 2021, which may only reflect between 5 and 10 
        percent of total worker actions. CLB found that more 
        than 68 percent of those labor actions were related to 
        wage arrears.
         Official repression of non-governmental 
        advocacy for workers' rights intensified during the 
        past 10 years. The detentions of graduate student Fang 
        Ran and labor advocate Wang Jianbing in August and 
        September 2021, respectively, reflect local 
        authorities' aggressive approach to individuals engaged 
        in worker rights research and advocacy. Authorities 
        appear to have released food delivery workers' 
        organizer Chen Guojiang from detention in January 2022, 
        but the circumstances of his release were not reported.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Promote and support bilateral and multilateral 
        exchanges among government officials, academics, legal 
        experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor 
        issues such as freedom of expression, collective 
        bargaining, employment discrimination, occupational 
        health and safety, and wage arrears. Seek opportunities 
        to support capacity-building programs to strengthen 
        Chinese labor and legal aid organizations defending the 
        rights of workers. Moreover, recognizing the challenges 
        of safeguarding the rights of gig economy workers, 
        convene exchanges to develop international standards on 
        labor rights for workers in the digital platform 
        economy, such as transparency in contractual labor 
        relationships, data privacy, and dispute resolution, 
        among others.
          Advocate for the immediate release of detained labor 
        advocates such as Fang Ran and Wang Jianbing, and other
        individuals who have been detained because of their 
        labor advocacy.
          Call on the Chinese government to respect 
        internationally recognized rights to freedom of 
        association and collective bargaining and allow workers 
        to organize and establish independent labor unions. 
        Raise concern in all appropriate trade negotiations and 
        bilateral and multilateral dialogues about the Chinese 
        Communist Party's role in collective bargaining and 
        elections of trade union representatives, emphasizing 
        that wage rates should be determined by free bargaining 
        between labor and management.
          When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society 
        participation into bilateral and multilateral 
        dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite 
        international unions and labor NGOs and domestic civil 
        society groups from all participating countries, to 
        observe relevant government-to-government dialogues.
          Encourage compliance with fundamental International 
        Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Request that the 
        ILO increase its monitoring of core labor standards in 
        China, including freedom of association and the right 
        to organize.

Worker Rights

Worker Rights

                             Worker Rights

               Delivery Workers during COVID-19 Lockdowns

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, food delivery 
workers, couriers, and truck drivers played a critical role in 
helping ordinary citizens in China who were held under 
restrictive lockdowns due to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19) outbreaks, primarily by transporting and delivering food 
and other essential goods.\1\ The government's restrictive 
``zero-COVID'' policy made work and navigation more difficult 
for the workers providing these crucial services.\2\ Caixin, a 
media outlet known for its investigative journalism, reported 
from Shanghai municipality that delivery workers were mostly 
left to fend for themselves to secure housing, leading many to 
sleep in the streets, under bridges, and in railway stations 
during the Shanghai lockdown in spring 2022.\3\ Some ``rest 
stations'' set up at hotels to house drivers in Shanghai 
reportedly did not permit delivery drivers to stay because of 
the perception that the drivers were at risk for having COVID-
19.\4\ Taiwan's Central News Agency reportedly estimated in 
April 2022 that 30 million long-haul truck drivers in mainland 
China had been stranded between cities or on major highways,\5\ 
often without sufficient food.\6\ Local pandemic rules were not 
uniform, with some requiring truck drivers to take multiple 
nucleic acid tests per day in order to obtain official 
authorization to drive on the highway to another 
destination.\7\ Travel between areas designated as high or 
medium risk could result in having an asterisk displayed on 
truck drivers travel itinerary code apps, which prevented 
drivers from entering or leaving a location.\8\ Access to big 
data allowed government monitoring of long-haul truck drivers 
whom authorities could designate as high-risk pandemic targets 
even if they had only driven by a high-risk city.\9\ [For more 
information about the zero-COVID policy, see Section VIII--
Public Health. Developments this past year regarding Chinese 
government-sponsored forced labor and the issue of gender 
discrimination in the workplace are examined in Section VI--
Status of Women, Section VIII--Business and Human Rights, and 
Section X--Xinjiang.]

                  Protecting the Rights of Gig Workers

    The Chinese government describes digital platform workers, 
including food delivery workers, couriers, ride-hailing 
drivers, and truckers, as ``flexibly employed'' \10\ and 
engaged in ``new forms of employment'' that are yet to be 
defined in Chinese labor law.\11\ The ``flexibly employed'' 
also comprise workers who provide elder and child care, 
construction workers, and cleaners, among others,\12\ and 
numbered around 200 million in official estimates.\13\ Many of 
these workers are at risk of being subjected to violations of 
international labor standards \14\ in access to fair pay, 
employment contracts and agreements, and pensions and other 
insurance categories.\15\ They face on-the-job risks that 
endanger their health and safety, and often lack residential 
permits (hukou) in the urban areas where they work, which 
limits their options in education, healthcare, and housing.\16\ 
Workers in the digital platform economy number around 84 
million, according to official data,\17\ and are subject to the 
platform economy companies' use of big data, algorithms,\18\ 
and surveillance.\19\ Couriers and food delivery workers, for 
example, face financial penalties if they fail to meet delivery 
times based on platform algorithms.\20\ This often leads 
drivers to speed and results in traffic incidents and injuries; 
moreover, drivers have inadequate recourse to occupational 
compensation,\21\ reinforcing the public perception that e-
commerce companies value efficiency and profits over worker 
health and safety.\22\ Tech company employees and gig workers 
have drawn attention to labor law violations and the risks to 
worker health and safety resulting from the culture of overwork 
characteristic of the e-commerce sector.\23\

             MULTI-AGENCY APPROACHES TO PRESSURING BIG TECH

    As People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities shifted to 
rein in big tech in the past two years, the government has 
increasingly put pressure on technology and e-commerce 
companies to improve gig workers' conditions.\24\ This past 
year, the government's campaign was conducted across multiple 
agencies, including a legislative amendment meant to allow gig 
workers to join the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU),\25\ the issuance of multiple joint opinions that aim 
to establish employment norms for gig work and the platform 
economy,\26\ the publication of 10 ``typical'' court cases 
involving overtime,\27\ and new provisions on algorithm
management.\28\ At a press conference following the March 2022 
meeting of the National People's Congress, Premier Li Keqiang 
emphasized the urgency of developing policies to protect the 
rights of gig workers.\29\
    The joint opinions issued over the past year primarily 
address safeguarding wages, worker safety, and insurance 
coverage for gig workers \30\ by requiring that employers 
provide ``employment relationships'' (laodong guanxi), to which 
social insurance benefits are tied.\31\ Few gig workers have 
contracts or written agreements with e-commerce companies.\32\ 
Delivery drivers, for example, typically are hired ``outside of 
the scope'' of China's labor laws through third-party dispatch 
labor agencies \33\ or by registering on an app as self-
employed.\34\ The July 2021 guiding opinion on safeguarding the 
rights of workers in ``new forms of employment'' provided that 
both e-commerce and third-party dispatch companies have 
responsibilities toward workers in their employ, including 
providing a formal contract or a written agreement regarding 
employment.\35\ The July 2021 guiding opinion on ``new forms of 
employment'' also noted that workers without a formal contract 
also should be considered as having an employment relationship 
with the enterprise, albeit ``less than complete [sic].'' \36\ 
State media outlet Xinhua reiterated that having an employment 
relationship will safeguard gig workers' rights and provide the 
full array of social insurance benefits that cover workers' 
compensation, occupational injury, unemployment, pension, and 
healthcare.\37\
    Some China labor advocates observed that the government's 
effort to improve gig workers' rights ``appears driven more by 
efforts to consolidate top-down control than by workers' 
concerns.'' \38\ While e-commerce companies like Didi and 
JD.com announced the formation of enterprise unions in 
September 2021 \39\ and Meituan purportedly modified its 
delivery algorithms,\40\ a researcher from the Hong Kong-based 
non-governmental organization China Labour Bulletin (CLB) 
pointed out that it is not clear how tech companies will 
implement the guidelines.\41\ The July 2021 guiding opinion on 
``new forms of employment,'' for example, devolves enforcement 
and oversight of the substance of the opinion,\42\ such as 
projects to improve worker compensation, to local government 
agencies.\43\ Local officials, however, are under pressure to 
prioritize economic growth and have little incentive to enforce 
labor protections.\44\ The mechanisms to protect the rights of 
workers are chronically under resourced and understaffed,\45\ 
and penalties are weak or unenforceable and can be too time-
consuming and expensive for ordinary workers in cases of 
litigation and mediation.\46\ At the same time, observers 
commented that the guidelines do not have the force of law, and 
have recommended amending labor laws to address gaps with 
regard to safeguarding the rights of platform economy 
workers.\47\ Given the economic impact of COVID-19 lockdowns 
this past year, local governments reportedly waived oversight 
of labor violations in favor of bolstering the position of 
employers.\48\ Central authorities convened multiple in-person 
meetings in Beijing municipality with tech executives during 
the past year to emphasize official priorities regarding gig 
workers.\49\ But as China's economy began to slow in spring 
2022, tech companies began laying off tech employees in the 
tens of thousands and government pressure toward these 
companies eased.\50\

                           EXCESSIVE OVERTIME

    Long working hours among gig workers like food delivery 
workers \51\ and the tech sector's ``white collar'' 
employees,\52\ are ``a built-in feature of the whole model of 
industrial development in China,'' according to a U.S.-based 
expert on Chinese labor.\53\ In October 2021, several thousand 
tech workers posted their work hours to a publicized 
spreadsheet reportedly as a means of holding companies 
accountable for excessive overtime.\54\ Public concern about 
the consequences of excessive overtime is widespread in 
China,\55\ especially where excessive hours and the culture of 
overwork reportedly continued to be a significant factor in 
workers' deaths in the past year,\56\ That many of the deceased 
were in their twenties and thirties was a striking 
characteristic of the reported deaths,\57\ including the 
following examples.

         China Labour Bulletin noted that in February 
        2022 alone there were three deaths at tech companies 
        linked to excessive hours.\58\
         In April 2022, four workers reportedly 
        attempted suicide at a BYD car factory in Changsha 
        municipality, Hunan province.\59\ While it is unclear 
        if excessive work hours contributed to all of those 
        attempts, workers at the Changsha BYD factory 
        reportedly worked 14-hour days.\60\ Family members of a 
        BYD worker in Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi province, 
        linked his sudden death in November 2021 to excessive 
        hours.\61\
         In June 2021, a 17-year-old vocational school 
        student died by suicide in connection with the 
        excessive hours and harsh working conditions at a 
        factory in Shenzhen municipality where he was 
        completing a mandatory ``internship''; \62\ and
         Multiple COVID-19 outbreaks across China and 
        implementation of the PRC's zero-COVID policy required 
        hospital staff and workers at testing facilities to 
        work excessive hours this past year.\63\ The death of 
        the deputy director of a hospital laboratory in 
        Shandong province from cardiac arrest in March 2022 was 
        ascribed to overwork and exhaustion in connection with 
        her participation in COVID-19 prevention activity.\64\

    In August 2021, the Supreme People's Court and the Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security jointly issued 10 
typical cases of overtime,\65\ which highlighted examples of 
employer violations of Chinese labor law.\66\ The first case 
featured a delivery person who was fired for refusing to work a 
``996'' schedule--shorthand for working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., 
six days a week \67\--which many companies demand of 
workers.\68\ The court found that the ``996'' schedule is in 
violation of Chinese labor law.\69\ In spite of the guidance 
provided by these typical cases, reports of excessive overtime 
continued following their publication.\70\ At Tesla's Giga 
factory in Shanghai municipality, for example, workers 
reportedly worked 12-hour days for six days a week and slept on 
the factory floor during Shanghai's citywide lockdown in April 
2022, until production was suspended due to a lack of 
parts.\71\

             PROMOTING GIG WORKERS' MEMBERSHIP IN THE ACFTU

    Promoting gig workers' membership in the ACFTU--the Party's 
``mass organization'' for workers \72\--has been a key part of 
the government's plan to improve labor conditions for gig 
workers.\73\ The ACFTU previously recruited gig workers during 
campaigns in 2015 and 2018.\74\ The July 2021 guiding opinion 
on safeguarding gig worker rights included a directive that the 
ACFTU actively engage in unionizing gig workers.\75\ In a 
separate opinion, also released in July, the ACFTU framed its 
responsibilities to gig workers as communicating Xi Jinping's 
ideology, promoting legal rights education, communicating with 
employers, and providing social welfare services and vocational 
training, among other tasks.\76\ The National People's 
Congress, moreover, formalized the right of gig workers to 
become union members in an amendment to the PRC Trade Union Law 
in December 2021.\77\ The amended Trade Union Law also added 
``social organizations'' to the list of employer groups.\78\ 
This revision may be linked to the ACFTU's interest in 
increasing interaction with gig workers at the grassroots \79\ 
by building the presence of the ACFTU in ``social 
organizations'' (shehui zuzhi) \80\--the official term to refer 
to non-governmental organizations such as social groups, 
community-based social welfare groups, and foundations.\81\
    Chinese law violates international worker rights standards 
\82\ with regard to trade unions in that the Party-led ACFTU is 
the only legally recognized trade union organization \83\ and 
Chinese workers are not allowed to create or join independent 
trade unions.\84\ As a mass organization, the ACFTU acts as an 
intermediary organization between the Party and workers, and is 
required to ``adhere to the leadership of the Party'' and thus 
is compromised in its mission to protect workers' rights.\85\ 
Although the ACFTU has prioritized reforms in recent years,\86\ 
it has not been known for effectively representing workers' 
rights to employers \87\ and generally has been aligned with 
enterprise management rather than workers.\88\ The ACFTU's 
capacity to negotiate with employers, mediate disputes, or 
provide legal aid as anticipated in the July 2021 guidelines on 
new forms of employment \89\ also may be compromised by its 
responsibility to disseminate Party propaganda
and engage in Party projects, as has been the case during 
poverty alleviation efforts.\90\ As a labor researcher 
observed, ``As the Chinese economy gradually transforms from 
the industrial economy to service and on to today's digital 
economy, the ACFTU has become less relevant and increasingly 
incapable of protecting workers' rights and settling worker 
disputes in the emerging economic
sector . . ..'' \91\

                      Worker Strikes and Protests

    Chinese law does not explicitly prohibit Chinese workers 
from striking, but authorities have prosecuted such activity in 
prior years by accusing Chinese workers who have participated 
in strikes and worker demonstrations of disturbing public order 
in violation of Chinese criminal law.\92\ China Labour Bulletin 
(CLB) documented 1,094 strikes and other labor actions in 
2021,\93\ over 200 more than it documented in 2020,\94\ marking 
a steady return to pre-pandemic rates.\95\ CLB uses traditional 
media and social media reports to compile its data, but 
speculates that it can document only approximately 5 to 10 
percent of total worker actions.\96\ One difficulty is the 
Chinese government does not publicly report on the number of 
worker strikes and protests, making it difficult to obtain 
comprehensive information on worker actions.\97\ Pervasive 
government censorship of news media outlets and social media, 
as well as the harassment and detention of citizen journalists 
and labor advocates, also limits access to information about 
labor unrest.\98\


                                                       \99\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                   Total number
 Year      Manufacturing       Construction       Transportation *       Services       Other       documented
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2021   6.0%                38.4%              33.6%                  14.4%          7.5%         1,094
        (66)                (420)              (368)                  (158)          (82)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2020   10.9%               44.8%              19.5%                  18%            6.9%         800
        (87)                (358)              (156)                  (144)          (55)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2019   13.8%               42.8%              12.3%                  23.0%          8.0%         1,385
        (191)               (593)              (171)                  (319)          (111)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2018   15.4%               44.8%              15.9%                  16.8%          7.1%         1,706
        (263)               (764)              (272)                  (286)          (121)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2017   21.1%               41.4%              9.2%                   20.7%          7.6%         1,258
        (265)               (521)              (116)                  (261)          (95)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* CLB data for the transportation sector includes digital platform services, such as food delivery, couriers,
  hauling, and ride-hailing services. It also includes regular taxi service as well as bus and train
  transportation.\100\


    Although CLB has cautioned against drawing firm conclusions 
from year-to-year comparisons,\101\ its data for 2021 points to 
the following trends:

         Wage arrears in China were a significant 
        source of worker unrest.\102\ In 2021, 748 (68.4 
        percent) of the strikes and other labor actions that 
        CLB documented specified wage arrears.\103\ In the wage 
        arrears category, 413 (55.2 percent) strikes and 
        actions involved the construction industry.\104\ Forty-
        eight of the wage arrears cases involved the continuing 
        education and tutoring sector.\105\ The bulk of these 
        latter cases took place following the government's 
        release of new rules for the private tutoring sector in 
        summer 2021, which resulted in the closure of many 
        tutoring centers.\106\ [For more information on the 
        crackdown in the private education sector, see Section 
        V--Governance.]
         CLB observed that an increasing number of 
        worker protests are taking place in Henan and other 
        inland areas, which it believes marks a shift from the 
        earlier center of protests in the manufacturing 
        municipalities in Guangdong province.\107\
         The majority of the labor actions documented 
        by CLB were small in scale: In 2021, 825 incidents 
        (75.4 percent) involved 100 people or fewer, and only 
        12 (1.1 percent) involved over 1,000 people.\108\
         CLB observed an uptick in the number of 
        protests in connection with COVID-19-related 
        restrictions in spring 2022 \109\ when as many as 44 
        cities in China were under full or partial pandemic 
        lockdowns.\110\ For example, in late May 2022, hundreds 
        of workers reportedly left a Quanta factory in Shanghai 
        municipality because they were dissatisfied with being 
        sealed in the factory as part of the ``closed-loop'' 
        system to prevent the spread of COVID-19.\111\

        Continued Suppression of Labor Advocacy & Civil Society

    Non-governmental advocacy for workers' rights has been an 
ongoing target of official repression in China.\112\ Over the 
past decade, the Commission has observed harassment of labor 
NGOs and advocates in the manufacturing centers of Guangdong 
province in 2012,\113\ and suppression and detentions in 
2015,\114\ 2018,\115\ and 2019 \116\ that led to prison 
sentences for non-affiliated labor advocates and staff from 
prominent Guangdong NGOs.\117\ Many of those individuals and 
organizations provided support to the collective bargaining 
process, ran programs to integrate rural migrant workers into 
urban environments, conducted advocacy for victims of 
industrial accidents and occupational diseases, and assisted 
workers in resolving grievances, such as for payment of wage 
and social insurance arrears.\118\
    China Digital Times, a U.S.-based news portal about human 
rights in China,\119\ highlighted the closure this past year of 
the Masses and Pepper Tribe, two websites that provided 
information on worker rights.\120\ Whether those closures were 
directly linked to official directives or harassment is not 
clear, but the farewell letter from the Masses implied that 
official pressure contributed to its closure.\121\ Pepper Tribe 
reported on conditions for women workers. Its closure in August 
2021 is also likely connected to a wave of shutdowns of 
feminist social media accounts by Weibo earlier in 2021 for 
alleged content violations.\122\ CLB continued to provide 
robust reporting on worker rights developments in China on its 
website, including by mapping strikes and workplace 
accidents.\123\
    The incommunicado detentions of Fang Ran and Wang Jianbing 
in August and September 2021,\124\ respectively, illustrate 
local authorities' aggressive approach toward individuals 
engaged in worker rights research and advocacy. Fang--a Ph.D. 
student at Hong Kong University studying labor relations in 
China \125\--reportedly was conducting fieldwork in his 
hometown of Nanning municipality, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region.\126\ Wang, who resided in Guangzhou municipality, 
Guangdong province, focused his advocacy on workers with 
occupational health problems.\127\ In a case that drew 
attention to the travails of food delivery workers, Chen 
Guojiang--leader of an alliance of food delivery workers who 
had created several WeChat groups with approximately 15,000 
food delivery workers \128\--was seen walking outside and 
waving in a short video posted in January 2022,\129\ after more 
than 10 months of detention in Beijing municipality.\130\ As of 
June 30, 2022, the Commission had observed no further reports 
on Chen's status since the video's release.\131\

          DETENTIONS OF SELF-IDENTIFIED ``LEFTIST'' SUPPORTERS
                            OF WORKER RIGHTS

    The reemergence of a leftist critique of working conditions 
and inequality in China reportedly has had a broad appeal among 
a younger generation of Chinese, associated in part with Xi 
Jinping's greater emphasis on patriotic education in 
schools.\132\ The awareness of worker rights also has led some 
to participate in university-based Maoist or Marxist labor 
groups and websites.\133\ While leftist supporters of worker 
rights have been highly critical of China's ``capitalist'' 
class, they also point to the Chinese Communist Party's 
promotion of economic growth that has fostered inequality.\134\
    The Party has responded to the ``leftist'' critique by 
portraying it as destabilizing.\135\ Authorities from several 
provinces detained six leftist critics in May 2021, in advance 
of the Party's centenary celebration in July 2021, including an 
elderly former professor who previously served time in prison 
for attempting to establish an independent political 
party.\136\ Authorities in Henan province detained six people 
in May 2021 who were associated with a group called the Red 
Culture Association on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and 
provoking trouble.'' \137\ In December 2021, a court in Xuhua 
district, Pingdingshan municipality, Henan, sentenced five of 
the six to prison terms of between nine months and two years 
not only because of the group's online activity but also for 
having monetized access to articles.\138\ Evidence brought 
against the five included social media posts or reposts of 
essays on their WeChat group accounts that allegedly 
``slandered'' the Chinese Communist Party, Party history, and 
senior leaders.\139\

Worker Rights

Worker Rights

    Notes to Section VII--Worker Rights

    \1\ Beiyi Seow and Yuanhao Zhang, ``Battle the Algorithms: China's 
Delivery Riders on the Edge,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong 
Kong Free Press, November 14, 2021; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``China: Immediately Release Frontline Delivery Worker Chen Guojiang,'' 
March 18, 2021; Meaghan Tobin and Viola Zhou, ``China's Gig Workers Pay 
a Heavy Price for the Country's Zero-Covid Policy,'' Rest of World, 
March 31, 2022.
    \2\ Meaghan Tobin and Viola Zhou, ``China's Gig Workers Pay a Heavy 
Price for the Country's Zero-Covid Policy,'' Rest of World, March 31, 
2022.
    \3\ Jiang Moting, ``Reng you bushao songhuo qishou lusu Shanghai 
jietou'' [Still quite a few delivery drivers sleeping on Shanghai 
streets], Caixin, April 27, 2022.
    \4\ Jiang Moting, ``Reng you bushao songhuo qishou lusu Shanghai 
jietou'' [Still quite a few delivery drivers sleeping on Shanghai 
streets], Caixin, April 27, 2022.
    \5\ Jane Tang and Jia Ao, ``Seriously Ill Patients Die after Being 
Denied Hospital Care in Shanghai Lockdown,'' Radio Free Asia, April 11, 
2022.
    \6\ ``Voices of May,'' China Digital Times [Video file], June 21, 
2022, 3:27-3:35.
    \7\ Peng Leyi, Tang Jiayan, and Cai Jingyuan, ``Baogong fangyi jia 
ji huoche siji'' [Ensuring supply and preventing disease squeezes truck 
drivers], Caixin, April 14, 2022.
    \8\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Yiqing xia de huoche siji: Kun zai 
lushang, shouru xiajiang, mei fan chi'' [Truck drivers during the 
pandemic: Stuck on the road, falling incomes, nothing to eat], May 3, 
2022; Peng Leyi, Tang Jiayan, and Cai Jingyuan, ``Baogong fangyi jia ji 
huoche siji'' [Ensuring supply and preventing disease squeezes truck 
drivers], Caixin, April 14, 2022.
    \9\ Peng Leyi, Tang Jiayan, and Cai Jingyuan, ``Baogong fangyi jia 
ji huoche siji'' [Ensuring supply and preventing disease squeezes truck 
drivers], Caixin, April 14, 2022.
    \10\ ``Zhongguo liang yi ren `linghuo jiuye', `zhudong xuanze'? 
Xuezhe: Meihua shiye renkou'' [Did China's 200 million ``flexibly 
employed'' persons ``actively choose this'' for themselves? Scholar: 
It's a euphemism for the unemployed population], Radio Free Asia, 
February 14, 2022.
    \11\ Jiang Lin and Fan Xi, ``Waimai qishou, wang yueche siji deng 
quanyi baozhang you na xie tupo?--Ba bumen fawen guifan pingtai 
yonggong jiaodian wenti'' [What are the breakthroughs in the guaranteed 
rights and interests of food delivery workers, web-based ride-hailing 
drivers among others?--Eight agencies issue standards for digital 
platform workers' central problems], Xinhua, July 27, 2021.
    \12\ Chen Yun and Cao Jia, ``Linghuo jiuye zhong zai zuo hao fuwu 
he baozhang'' [The crux of flexible employment is in providing good 
services and safeguards], Economic Daily, April 28, 2022.
    \13\ Zhang Jun et al., ``Woguo linghuo jiuye guimo da 2 yi, Li 
Keqiang: Baozhang laodong quanyi, gei qishoumen `xishang anquan dai'!'' 
[The scale of China's flexible employment has reached 200 million, Li 
Keqiang: Safeguard the rights and interests of workers, help delivery 
men ``fasten their seatbelts!''], Shanghai Observer, Liberation Daily, 
March 11, 2022; Kelsey Cheng, Yuan Ruiyang, and Guan Cong, ``In Depth: 
Plight of China's Gig Workers Poses Policymaking Dilemma,'' Caixin, 
August 26, 2021.
    \14\ Irene Zhou, ``Digital Labour Platforms and Labour Protection 
in China,'' International Labour Organization, ILO Working Paper 11, 
October 2020, secs. 3.2-3.3. See also International Labour 
Organization, World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The Role of 
Digital Labour Platforms in Transforming the World of Work 2021, 
Executive Summary, February 3, 2021, 1-10.
    \15\ Kelsey Cheng, Yuan Ruiyang, and Guan Cong, ``In Depth: Plight 
of China's Gig Workers Poses Policymaking Dilemma,'' Caixin, August 26, 
2021.
    \16\ Zhao Limei, ``Lianghui zonglun: Baozhang linghuo jiuyezhe 
quanyi, bie rang chenda de shuzi zhezhu weixiao de suqiu'' [Broad 
discussion at the Two Sessions: Safeguard the rights and interests of 
flexibly employed workers, don't let the huge numbers obstruct smaller-
sized demands], China Youth Daily, March 11, 2022; Jonathan Isaacs, 
Zheng Lu, and Bofu An, ``China Employment Law Update October 2021,'' 
Baker McKenzie FenXun, October 6, 2021.
    \17\ Chen Yun and Cao Jia, ``Linghuo jiuye zhong zai zuo hao fuwu 
he baozhang'' [The crux of flexible employment is in providing good 
services and safeguards], Economic Daily, April 28, 2022. According to 
official estimates, there are 10 million food delivery drivers in 
China. Li Na, ``Waimai qishou quanyi baozhang de beixi yu gongming'' 
[Delivery drivers' joys and sorrows, and the public cries to safeguard 
their rights and interests], Procuratorial Daily, April 28, 2022.
    \18\ Beiyi Seow and Yuanhao Zhang, ``Battle the Algorithms: China's 
Delivery Riders on the Edge,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong 
Kong Free Press, November 14, 2021; Rita Liao, ``Viral Article Puts the 
Brakes on China's Food Delivery Frenzy,'' TechCrunch, September 9, 
2020.
    \19\ Greg James, ``Chinese Tech Workers Outraged by Surveillance 
Tool That Flags Employees Who Look Likely to Quit,'' SupChina, February 
21, 2022; Nikki Sun, ``China's Tech Workers Pushed to Limits by 
Surveillance Software,'' Nikkei Asia, June 9, 2021.
    \20\ Beiyi Seow and Yuanhao Zhang, ``Battle the Algorithms: China's 
Delivery Riders on the Edge,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong 
Kong Free Press, November 14, 2021; Rita Liao, ``Viral Article Puts the 
Brakes on China's Food Delivery Frenzy,'' TechCrunch, September 9, 
2020.
    \21\ ``Delivery Riders, Trapped in the System,'' Renwu, translated 
and reprinted in Chuang (blog), November 12, 2020.
    \22\ ``Qianwan Zhongguo waimai qishou: `luoben' dajun haishi `xin 
lanling' '' [Ten million Chinese take-out delivery workers: Are they a 
new army of ``naked streakers'' or the new ``blue collar [workers]''], 
BBC, June 6, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, ``Reimagining Workers' Rights 
in China,'' March 2022, 89.
    \23\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Attempts to Regulate Overtime Work at 
China's Tech Giants Are Not Going Well,'' February 25, 2022.
    \24\ Kelsey Cheng, Yuan Ruiyang, and Guan Cong, ``In Depth: Plight 
of China's Gig Workers Poses Policymaking Dilemma,'' Caixin, August 26, 
2021; David Kirton, ``Explainer: How Unions Work in China,'' Reuters, 
September 2, 2021.
    \25\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 2021, art. 3; Zhang Yong, 
``Guanyu `Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Gonghui Fa (xiuzhen cao'an)' de 
shuoming'' [Explanation of the (draft amendment) to the ``PRC Trade 
Union Law''], National People's Congress, December 24, 2021, sec. 3(2). 
The amendment to the PRC Trade Union Law is discussed in the sub-
section below on the All-China Federation of Trade Unions' efforts to 
increase union membership among gig workers.
    \26\ Ministry of Transport, State Post Bureau, National Development 
and Reform Commission, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
Ministry of Commerce, State Administration for Market Regulation, and 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Jiaotong Yunshu Bu, Guojia 
Youzheng Ju, Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang Bu, 
Shangwu Bu, Shichang Jianguan Zongju, Quanguo Zong Gonghui guanyu Zuo 
Hao Kuaidiyuan Qunti Hefa Quanyi Baozhang Gongzuo de Yijian [Opinion on 
Effectively Safeguarding the Legal Rights and Interests of the Mass of 
Couriers], June 23, 2021; Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of 
Transport, Ministry of Emergency Management, State Administration for 
Market Regulation, National Healthcare Security Administration, Supreme 
People's Court, and All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Renli Ziyuan 
Shehui Baozhang Bu, Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Jiaotong Yunshu Bu, Yingji 
Bu, Shichang Jianguan Zongju, Guojia Yibao Ju, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, 
Quanguo Zong Gonghui guanyu Weihu Xin Jiuye Xingtai Laodongzhe Laodong 
Baozhang Quanyi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Safeguarding 
Workers' Guaranteed Rights and Interests in the New Forms of 
Employment], July 16, 2021; State Administration for Market Regulation, 
``Guojia Shichang Jianguan Zongju deng qi bumen lianhe yinfa Guanyu 
Luoshi Wangluo Canyin Pingtai Zeren Qieshi Weihu Waimai Songcanyuan 
Quanyi de Zhidao Yijian'' [State Administration for Market Regulation 
among seven agencies that jointly release Guiding Opinion Regarding the 
Implementation of Online Food Platform Responsibilities to Effectively 
Protect the Rights and Interests of Take-Out Food Delivery Workers], 
July 26, 2021; Luo Wangshu, ``Ride-Hailing Drivers' Rights Get 
Protection,'' China Daily, December 1, 2021; National Reform and 
Development Commission, State Administration for Market Regulation, 
Cybersecurity Administration of China, Ministry of Information and 
Industry Technology, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, 
People's Bank of China, and State Taxation Administration, Guojia 
Fazhan Gaige Wei, Shichang Jianguan Zongju, Zhongyang Wangxin Ban, 
Gongye he Xinxihua Bu, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang Bu, Nongye Nongcun 
Bu, Shangwu Bu, Renmin Yinhang, Shuiwu Zongju guanyu Tuidong Pingtai 
Jingji Guifan Jiankang Chixu Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian [Several Opinions 
on Promoting the Healthy and Sustainable Development of Standardization 
for the Platform Economy], December 24, 2021.
    \27\ Supreme People's Court, ``Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhangbu, Zui 
Gao Renmin Fayuan lianhe fabu chaoshi jiaban laodong renshi zhengyi 
dianxing anli'' [Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and 
Supreme People's Court jointly release typical cases of excessive 
overtime and personnel disputes], August 26, 2021; Zoey Zhang, `` `996' 
Is Ruled Illegal: Understanding China's Changing Labor System,'' Dezan 
Shira & Associates, China Briefing, September 9, 2021.
    \28\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State 
Administration for Market Regulation, Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa 
Tuijian Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the Management of Algorithmic 
Recommendations in Internet Information Services], issued December 31, 
2021, effective March 1, 2022. For an unofficial English translation of 
the Provisions, see ``Provisions on the Management of Algorithmic 
Recommendations in Internet Information Services,'' China Law Translate 
(blog), January 4, 2022; Arjun Kharpal, ``China's Next Regulatory 
Target--Algorithms, the Secret of Many Tech Giants' Success,'' CNBC, 
January 7, 2022.
    \29\ Zhang Jun et al., ``Woguo linghuo jiuye guimo da 2 yi, Li 
Keqiang: Baozhang laodong quanyi, gei qishoumen `xishang anquandai'!'' 
[The scale of China's flexible employment has reached 200 million, Li 
Keqiang: Safeguard the rights and interests of workers, help delivery 
men ``fasten their seatbelts!''], Shanghai Observer, Liberation Daily, 
March 11, 2022.
    \30\ Kelsey Cheng, Yuan Ruiyang, and Guan Cong, ``In Depth: Plight 
of China's Gig Workers Poses Policymaking Dilemma,'' Caixin, August 26, 
2021.
    \31\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, National 
Reform and Development Commission, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of 
Emergency Management, State Administration for Market Regulation, 
National Healthcare Security Administration, Supreme People's Court, 
and All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang 
Bu, Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Jiaotong Yunshu Bu, Yingji Bu, Shichang 
Jianguan Zongju, Guojia Yibao Ju, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Quanguo Zong 
Gonghui guanyu Weihu Xin Jiuye Xingtai Laodongzhe Laodong Baozhang 
Quanyi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Safeguarding Workers' 
Rights and Interests in the New Forms of Employment], July 16, 2021, 
sec. 1(1-3); Ministry of Transport, State Post Bureau, National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, Ministry of Commerce, State Administration for Market 
Regulation, and All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Jiaotong Yunshu 
Bu, Guojia Youzheng Ju, Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Renli Ziyuan Shehui 
Baozhang Bu, Shangwu Bu, Shichang Jianguan Zongju, Quanguo Zong Gonghui 
guanyu Zuo Hao Kuaidiyuan Qunti Hefa Quanyi Baozhang Gongzuo de Yijian 
[Opinion on Effectively Safeguarding the Legal Rights and Interests of 
the Mass of Couriers], June 23, 2021, sec. 2(3, 6-7); State 
Administration for Market Regulation, ``Guojia Shichang Jianguan Zongju 
deng qi bumen lianhe yinfa Guanyu Luoshi Wangluo Shiyin Pingtai Zeren 
Qieshi Weihu Waimai Songcanyuan Quanyi de Zhidao Yijian'' [State 
Administration for Market Regulation among seven agencies that jointly 
release Guiding Opinion Regarding the Implementation of Online Food 
Platform Responsibilities to Effectively Protect the Rights and 
Interests of Take-Out Food Delivery Workers], July 26, 2021; National 
Reform and Development Commission, State Administration for Market 
Regulation, Cybersecurity Administration of China, Ministry of 
Information and Industry Technology, Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Ministry of 
Commerce, People's Bank of China, and State Taxation Administration, 
Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Shichang Jianguan Zongju, Zhongyang Wangxin 
Ban, Gongye he Xinxihua Bu, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang Bu, Nongye 
Nongcun Bu, Shangwu Bu, Renmin Yinhang, Shuiwu Zongju guanyu Tuidong 
Pingtai Jingji Guifan Jiankang Chixu Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian [Several 
Opinions on Promoting the Healthy and Sustainable Development of 
Standardization for the Platform Economy], December 24, 2021, sec. 
3(10).
    \32\ Chen Yun and Cao Jia, ``Linghuo jiuye zhong zai zuo hao fuwu 
he baozhang'' [The crux of flexible employment is in providing good 
services and safeguards], Economic Daily, April 28, 2022; Li Na, 
``Waimai qishou quanyi baozhang de beixi yu gongming'' [Delivery 
drivers' joys and sorrows, and the public cries to safeguard their 
rights and interests], Procuratorial Daily, April 28, 2022.
    \33\ Irene Zhou, ``Digital Labour Platforms and Labour Protection 
in China,'' International Labour Organization, ILO Working Paper 11, 
October 2020, 16-17.
    \34\ Irene Zhou, ``Digital Labour Platforms and Labour Protection 
in China,'' International Labour Organization, ILO Working Paper 11, 
October 2020, 4.
    \35\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of 
Emergency Management, State Administration for Market Regulation, 
National Healthcare Security Administration, Supreme People's Court, 
and All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang 
Bu, Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Jiaotong Yunshu Bu, Yingji Bu, Shichang 
Jianguan Zongju, Guojia Yibao Ju, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Quanguo Zong 
Gonghui guanyu Weihu Xin Jiuye Xingtai Laodongzhe Laodong Baozhang 
Quanyi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Safeguarding Workers' 
Rights and Interests in the New Forms of Employment], July 16, 2021, 
sec. 1(1-3).
    \36\ Jonathan Isaacs, Zheng Lu, and Bofu An, ``China Employment Law 
Update October 2021,'' Baker McKenzie FenXun, October 6, 2021.
    \37\ Jiang Lin and Fan Xi, ``Waimai qishou, wangyueche siji deng 
quanyi baozhang you na xie tupo?--Ba bumen fawen guifan pingtai 
yonggong jiaodian wenti'' [What are the breakthroughs in the 
safeguarded rights and interests of food delivery workers and web-based 
ride-hailing drivers, among others?--Eight agencies issue standards for 
digital platform workers' central problems], Xinhua, July 27, 2021.
    \38\ Sha Hua, ``China Wants Gig Workers to Have More Power--Just 
Not Too Much,'' Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021.
    \39\ Brenda Goh and Yilei Sun, ``Didi and JD.com Workers Get Unions 
in Watershed Moment for China's Tech Sector,'' Reuters, September 1, 
2021.
    \40\ ``Meituan to Change Delivery Algorithm Rules as China Urges 
Labour Protection,'' Reuters, September 13, 2021.
    \41\ Sha Hua, ``China Wants Gig Workers to Have More Power--Just 
Not Too Much,'' Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021.
    \42\ Kelsey Cheng, Yuan Ruiyang, and Guan Cong, ``In Depth: Plight 
of China's Gig Workers Poses Policymaking Dilemma,'' Caixin, August 26, 
2021.
    \43\ Jonathan Isaacs, Zheng Lu, and Bofu An, ``China Employment Law 
Update October 2021,'' Baker McKenzie FenXun, October 6, 2021.
    \44\ Wenwen Ding and J. H. Verkerke, ``Has China's Labor Contract 
Law Curtailed Economic Growth?,'' Denver University Law Review 99, no. 
3 (2022): 43-45; China Labour Bulletin, ``Reimagining Workers' Rights 
in China,'' March 2022, 89.
    \45\ Wenwen Ding and J. H. Verkerke, ``Has China's Labor Contract 
Law Curtailed Economic Growth?,'' Denver University Law Review 99, no. 
3 (2022): 41-42.
    \46\ Li Na, ``Waimai qishou quanyi baozhang de beixi yu gongming'' 
[Delivery drivers' joys and sorrows, and the public cries to safeguard 
their rights and interests], Procuratorial Daily, April 28, 2022; 
Wenwen Ding and J. H. Verkerke, ``Has China's Labor Contract Law 
Curtailed Economic Growth?,'' Denver University Law Review 99, no. 3 
(2022): 43-45.
    \47\ Zhao Limei, ``Lianghui zonglun: Baozhang linghuo jiuyezhe 
quanyi, bie rang juda de shuzi zhezhu weixiao de suqiu'' [Broad 
discussion at the Two Sessions: Safeguard the rights and interests of 
flexibly employed workers, don't let the huge numbers obstruct smaller-
sized demands], China Youth Daily, March 11, 2022.
    \48\ Sun Yu and Emma Zhou, ``China Turns a Blind Eye to Labour 
Violations to Spur Economy,'' Financial Times, May 25, 2022.
    \49\ Sha Hua, ``China Wants Gig Workers to Have More Power--Just 
Not Too Much,'' Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021; Coco Feng, 
``Beijing Lectures Alibaba, Tencent, Other Big Tech Firms on Gig 
Workers' Rights Despite Progress from Last Year,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 22, 2022.
    \50\ Laura He, ``China's Tech Layoffs Could Become a Self-Inflicted 
Headache for Xi,'' CNN, March 31, 2022.
    \51\ Masha Borak, ``China's Gig Workers Are Challenging Their 
Algorithmic Bosses,'' Wired, March 14, 2022; Lawyer Friends' of Migrant 
Workers, ``Qishou miyun: Falu ruhe dakai waimai pingtai yonggong de 
`ju' '' [Delivery workers in a cloud of mystery: How can the law break 
open delivery platforms' hiring ``game''?], September 13, 2021. 
According to SupChina, the author of the report on delivery platforms' 
hiring practices is the Beijing Zhicheng Migrant Workers Legal Aid and 
Research Center. See Greg James, ``Food Delivery Giants Ele.me and 
Meituan Promise to Stop Treating Delivery Workers Like Disposable 
Garbage. Sort of.,'' SupChina, September 22, 2021.
    \52\ Josh Horwitz, ``Chinese Tech Disclose Working Hours in 
Criticism of `996,' '' Reuters, October 14, 2021; Kevin Lin, ``Tech 
Worker Organizing in China: A New Model for Workers Battling a 
Repressive State,'' New Labor Forum 29, no. 2 (2020): 54-55.
    \53\ Wilfred Chan, ``Elon Musk Praises Chinese Workers for `Burning 
the 3 am Oil'--Here's What That Really Looks Like,'' Guardian, May 12, 
2022.
    \54\ Josh Horwitz, ``Chinese Tech Workers Disclose Working Hours in 
Criticism of `996,' '' Reuters, October 14, 2021. See also Kevin Lin, 
``Tech Worker Organizing in China: A New Model for Workers Battling a 
Repressive State,'' New Labor Forum 29, no. 2 (2020): 55.
    \55\ Kevin Lin, ``The Chinese Trade Union to the Rescue: A Real 
Solution to Platform Workers' Woes?,'' Made in China Journal, October 
25, 2021.
    \56\ Wu Yuli, ``Biyadi huiying 36 sui yuangong cusi: yuanyin you 
dai diaocha, zheng yu jiashu jiji goutong'' [BYD responds to sudden 
death of 36-year-old worker: cause [of death] pending investigation and 
[we are] in direct communication with family members], The Paper, 
November 18, 2021; Greg James, ``A Star Worker's Suicide at Tencent,'' 
SupChina, December 16, 2021; Greg James, ``Tech Workers Angered as 
Bilibili Censors Posts After Employee's Death,'' SupChina, February 8, 
2022; Ling Tai LT and Wu Jiong, ``28 sui yuangong cusi: ZijieTiaodong 
zheng zai shiqu 90 hou'' [28-year-old worker suddenly dies: ByteDance 
is losing the post-90's generation], Jiemian, February 23, 2022.
    \57\ Wu Yuli, ``Biyadi huiying 36 sui yuangong cusi: yuanyin you 
dai diaocha, zheng yu jiashu jiji goutong'' [BYD responds to sudden 
death of 36-year-old worker: cause [of death] pending investigation and 
[we are] in direct communication with family members], The Paper, 
November 18, 2021; Greg James, ``A Star Worker's Suicide at Tencent,'' 
SupChina, December 16, 2021; Greg James, ``Tech Workers Angered as 
Bilibili Censors Posts After Employee's Death,'' SupChina, February 8, 
2022; Ling Tai LT and Wu Jiong, ``28 sui yuangong cusi: ZijieTiaodong 
zheng zai shiqu 90 hou'' [28-year-old worker suddenly dies: ByteDance 
is losing the post-90's generation], Jiemian, February 23, 2022.
    \58\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Attempts to Regulate Overtime Work at 
China's Tech Giants Are Not Going Well,'' February 25, 2022.
    \59\ John Feng, ``Multiple Suicide Attempts Reported at Chinese 
Factory in the Same Week,'' Newsweek, April 28, 2022.
    \60\ ``Changsha Biyadi jielian fasheng san qi tiaolou shijian, 
xianchang puguang, yi sizhe yishu neirong pilu'' [Three consecutive 
incidents of jumping off a building at Changsha BYD, situation onsite 
is exposed, contents of the deceased's suicide note disclosed], 
Doctorate Observer, reprinted in NetEase, April 27, 2022.
    \61\ Wu Yuli, ``Biyadi huiying 36 sui yuangong cusi: yuanyin you 
dai diaocha, zheng yu jiashu jiji goutong'' [BYD responds to sudden 
death of 36-year-old worker: cause [of death] pending investigation and 
[we are] in direct communication with family members], The Paper, 
November 18, 2021.
    \62\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Vocational School Intern Jumps to His 
Death at Shenzhen Factory,'' July 17, 2021.
    \63\ Yvaine Ye and Kevin Schoenmakers, ``Medical Workers Are 
Collateral Damage in China's Zero-COVID-19 Policy,'' Foreign Policy, 
April 5, 2022. See also Li Songlin, ``Chengshi huoyue zhe gese `da bai' 
'' [The city is alive with ``big whites''], Beijing Evening News, May 
12, 2022.
    \64\ Yvaine Ye and Kevin Schoenmakers, ``Medical Workers Are 
Collateral Damage in China's Zero-COVID-19 Policy,'' Foreign Policy, 
April 5, 2022.
    \65\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and Supreme 
People's Court, ``Guanyu lianhe fabu di'er pi laodong renshi zhengyi 
dianxing anli de tongzhi [Circular on the joint issuance of typical 
cases involving labor and personnel disputes (second batch)], August 
25, 2021.
    \66\ Yang Ming, ``China's High Court Warns Employers' `996' 
Schedule Illegal,'' Voice of America, September 4, 2021.
    \67\ CECC, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 65.
    \68\ Josh Horwitz, ``Chinese Tech Workers Disclose Working Hours in 
Criticism of `996,' '' Reuters, October 14, 2021.
    \69\ Zoey Zhang, `` `996' Is Ruled Illegal: Understanding China's 
Changing Labor System,'' Dezan Shira & Associates, China Briefing, 
September 9, 2021. Article 36 of the PRC Labor Law stipulates that the 
workday should not exceed 8 hours per day, and that the workweek may 
not exceed on average 44 hours per week. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 
1995, art. 36.
    \70\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Attempts to Regulate Overtime Work at 
China's Tech Giants Are Not Going Well,'' February 25, 2022.
    \71\ Wilfred Chan, ``Elon Musk Praises Chinese Workers for `Burning 
the 3 am Oil'--Here's What That Really Looks Like,'' Guardian, May 12, 
2022.
    \72\ Judith Audin and Jerome Doyon, ``Intermediary Political Bodies 
of the Party-State: A Sociology of Mass and Grassroots Organisations in 
Contemporary China,'' editorial, China Perspectives, no. 2 (2019): 4.
    \73\ Sha Hua, ``China Wants Gig Workers to Have More Power--Just 
Not Too Much,'' Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021.
    \74\ Kevin Lin, ``The Chinese Trade Union to the Rescue: A Real 
Solution to Platform Workers' Woes?,'' Made in China Journal, October 
25, 2021; ``The Gig Economy Challenges China's State-Run Labour 
Unions,'' Economist, January 28, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, 
``Reimagining Workers' Rights in China,'' March 2022, 109.
    \75\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of 
Emergency Management, State Administration for Market Regulation, 
National Healthcare Security Administration, Supreme People's Court, 
and All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Renli Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang 
Bu, Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei, Jiaotong Yunshu Bu, Yingji Bu, Shichang 
Jianguan Zongju, Guojia Yibao Ju, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Quanguo Zong 
Gonghui guanyu Weihu Xin Jiuye Xingtai Laodongzhe Laodong Baozhang 
Quanyi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinion on Safeguarding Workers' 
Rights and Interests in the New Forms of Employment], July 16, 2021, 
sec. 17.
    \76\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Zhonghua Quanguo Zong 
Gonghui guanyu Qieshi Weihu Xin Jiuye Xingtai Laodongzhe Laodong 
Baozhang Quanyi de Yijian [Opinion on Conscientiously Upholding the 
Guaranteed Employment Protections and Rights of Workers in New Forms of 
Employment], July 2021, sec. 2(4); China Labour Bulletin, ``ACFTU in 
Beijing Issues Guidelines for Unionizing Gig Workers: What Comes 
Next?,'' September 28, 2021.
    \77\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 2021, art. 3; Zhang Yong, 
``Guanyu `Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Gonghui Fa (xiuzhen cao'an)' de 
shuoming'' [Explanation of the (draft amendment) to the ``PRC Trade 
Union Law''], National People's Congress, December 24, 2021, sec. 3(2); 
Jianjun Ma and Meng Li, JunHe LLP, ``Labour Union Law Revised to 
Include Gig Workers Clause,'' Lexology, February 9, 2022.
    \78\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 2021, art. 3; Jianjun Ma and 
Meng Li, JunHe LLP, ``Labour Union Law Revised to Include Gig Workers 
Clause,'' Lexology, February 9, 2022.
    \79\ China Labour Bulletin, ``ACFTU in Beijing Issues Guidelines 
for Unionizing Gig Workers: What Comes Next?,'' September 28, 2021.
    \80\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions and Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, Zhonghua Quanguo Zong Gonghui Minzheng Bu Guanyu Jiaqiang 
Shehui Zuzhi Gonghui Jianshe De Yijian (Shixing) [Opinion on 
Strengthening Trade Union-Building in Social Organizations 
(Provisional)], August 23, 2021.
    \81\ Shawn Shieh, ``Remaking China's Civil Society in the Xi 
Jinping Era,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 2, 2018.
    \82\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 22(1); United Nations 
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, accessed June 1, 2022. China has signed but 
not ratified the ICCPR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8; FIDH 
and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' December 18, 
2020, 7.
    \83\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 2021, arts. 10-12.
    \84\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 2021, arts. 10-12; 
International Labour Organization, Interim Report--Report No. 392, Case 
No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020, para. 
485; FIDH and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' 
December 18, 2020, 7.
    \85\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 2021, art. 2; All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions and Ministry of Civil Affairs, Zhonghua 
Quanguo Zong Gonghui Minzheng Bu Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Zuzhi Gonghui 
Jianshe De Yijian (Shixing) [Opinion on Strengthening ACFTU-Building in 
Social Organizations (Provisional)], August 23, 2021, preamble, sec. 
1(1).
    \86\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Holding China's Trade Unions to 
Account,'' February 17, 2020.
    \87\ Jude Howell, ``From Green Shoots to Crushed Petals: Labour 
NGOs in China,'' Made in China Journal: Then and Now 6, no. 1 (January-
April 2021): 102-7.
    \88\ Chloe Froissart, Yan Liu, and Quan Meng, ``Trade-offs between 
State Organisations and Workers' Organisations: Chinese Unions in 
Search of Authoritarian Collective Bargaining,'' Chinese Perspectives 
2, 2019.
    \89\ Jiang Lin and Fan Xi, ``Waimai qishou, wangyueche siji deng 
quanyi baozhang you na xie tupo?--Ba bumen fawen guifan pingtai 
yonggong jiaodian wenti'' [What are the breakthroughs in the guaranteed 
rights and interests of food delivery workers and web-based ride-
hailing drivers, among others?--Eight agencies issue standards for 
digital platform workers' central problems], Xinhua, July 27, 2021.
    \90\ China Labour Bulletin, ``ACFTU Trumpets Self-Proclaimed 
Achievements in Poverty Alleviation,'' October 13, 2020.
    \91\ Hong Yu Liu, ``The Role of the State in Influencing Work 
Conditions in China's Internet Industry: Policy, Evidence, and 
Implications for Industrial Relations,'' Journal of Industrial 
Relations, January 24, 2022: 4.
    \92\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers' Rights and Labour Relations 
in China,'' August 13, 2020; International Labour Organization, 
``Interim Report--Report No. 392, Case No. 3184 (China),'' October 
2020; FIDH and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' 
December 18, 2020, 7. See also International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 
3, 1976, art. 8(1)(d); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, 
Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, accessed June 8, 2022. China signed and ratified the ICESCR on 
October 27, 1997 and March 27, 2001, respectively.
    \93\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \94\ China Labour Bulletin (CLB), ``Increase in Strikes in 
Logistics and Service Sectors in 2021 Not Expected to Let Up,'' 
February 15, 2022; China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 
7, 2022. Sometime after it published its February 15, 2022, article, 
CLB added one further labor action to its strike map for 2021, revising 
the total number from 1,093 to 1,094.
    \95\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Increase in Strikes in Logistics and 
Service Sectors in 2021 Not Expected to Let Up,'' February 15, 2022.
    \96\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China 
Labour Bulletin's Strike Map,'' January 10, 2020.
    \97\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China 
Labour Bulletin's Strike Map,'' January 10, 2020.
    \98\ Kevin Lin, ``Tech Worker Organizing in China: New Model for 
Workers Battling a Repressive State,'' New Labor Forum 29, no. 2 
(2020): 56.
    \99\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \100\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \101\ China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour 
Bulletin's Strike Map,'' January 10, 2020.
    \102\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \103\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \104\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \105\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022.
    \106\ ``China Crackdown on Tutoring Sector Leads to Protests,'' 
Bloomberg, reprinted in Al Jazeera, August 23, 2021.
    \107\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Increase in Strikes in Logistics and 
Service Sectors in 2021 Not Expected to Let Up,'' February 15, 2022; 
China Labour Bulletin, ``Henan Overtakes Guangdong in Number of Worker 
Protests,'' August 24, 2021.
    \108\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map,'' accessed June 7, 2022; 
China Labour Bulletin, ``The State of Labour Relations in China, 
2019,'' January 13, 2020; China Labour Bulletin, ``Reimagining Workers' 
Rights in China,'' March 2022, 18.
    \109\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Pandemic Prevention Measures Lead to 
Variety of Worker Protests,'' June 16, 2022.
    \110\ Simone McCarthy, ``China's Covid Controls Risk Sparking 
Crisis for the Country--and Its Leader Xi Jinping,'' CNN, April 16, 
2022.
    \111\ ``Buman fangyi yan ke Guangda Shanghai yuangong jiti chutao'' 
[Unhappy with the strict pandemic controls, Quanta Shanghai workers 
collectively fled], Radio Free Asia, May 9, 2022.
    \112\ Jude Howell, ``From Green Shoots to Crushed Petals: Labour 
NGOs in China,'' Made in China Journal: Then and Now 6, no. 1 (January-
April 2021): 102-7.
    \113\ CECC, 2012 Annual Report, October 10, 2012, 122.
    \114\ Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of 
Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,`` China Change, December 
10, 2015; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 84-85.
    \115\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Reimagining Workers' Rights in 
China,'' March 2022, 45; CECC, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 
62-64.
    \116\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Five Labour Activists Released After 
15 Months in Detention,'' May 9, 2020; `` `Xin shengdai' bianji bei bu 
bai ming chenfeibing gongren lianshu shengjuan'' [``New Generation'' 
editor arrested, one hundred workers suffering from pneumoconiosis 
jointly sign names in solidarity], Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2019; 
CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 70-71.
    \117\ ``Prosecution of Labor Advocates Has Chilling Effect on Labor 
NGOs, Strikes Continue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
February 22, 2017.
    \118\ Jude Howell, ``From Green Shoots to Crushed Petals: Labour 
NGOs in China,'' Made in China Journal: Then and Now 6, no. 1 (January-
April 2021): 102-7. For descriptions of several leading Guangdong-based 
NGOs that were targeted in 2015, see Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities 
Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting 
Leaders,'' China Change, December 10, 2015.
    \119\ ``About China Digital Times,'' China Digital Times, accessed 
April 12, 2022.
    \120\ ``Farewell Letters: A Tribute to the Civil Society Groups, 
Bloggers, and Media Outlets We Lost in 2021,'' China Digital Times, 
January 10, 2022.
    \121\ ``Farewell Letters: A Tribute to the Civil Society Groups, 
Bloggers, and Media Outlets We Lost in 2021,'' China Digital Times, 
January 10, 2022; ``Translation: Pepper Tribe, Online Platform for 
Female Chinese Workers, Shut Down,'' China Digital Times, August 13, 
2021.
    \122\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 153.
    \123\ China Labour Bulletin, ``About Us,'' accessed April 13, 2022.
    \124\ NGOCN (@ngocncat), ``Gangda laogong yanjiuzhe Fang Ran 
`shexian dianfu guojia zhengquan,' pengyou cheng `Ta zhi shi ge dui 
laogong yanjiu you rechen de xuesheng' '' [HKU labor researcher Fang 
Ran ``suspected of subversion of state power,'' friends say ``He's just 
a student with a great enthusiasm for researching workers''], Matters, 
September 1, 2021; Guo Rui, ``Chinese Activists Sophia Huang and Wang 
Jianbing Expected to Face Court,'' South China Morning Post, April 4, 
2022. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2021-00517 on Wang Jianbing and 2021-00534 on Fang 
Ran.
    \125\ NGOCN (@ngocncat), ``Gangda laogong yanjiuzhe Fang Ran 
`shexian dianfu guojia zhengquan,' pengyou cheng `Ta zhi shi ge dui 
laogong yanjiu you rechen de xuesheng' '' [HKU labor researcher Fang 
Ran ``suspected of subversion of state power,'' friends say ``He's just 
a student with a great enthusiasm for researching workers''], Matters, 
September 1, 2021.
    \126\ Mimi Lau and Jack Lau, ``Fang Ran: The Haunting Case of the 
Hong Kong Labour Rights Researcher Held in China,'' South China Morning 
Post, September 11, 2021; Man Hoi Yan and Cheng Yut Yiu, ``Left-Wing 
Labor Rights Researcher Detained for `Subversion' in China's Guangxi,'' 
Radio Free Asia, September 2, 2021.
    \127\ Rights Defense Network, ``Duli gongyi ren Wang Jianbing, 
nuquan jizhe Huang Xueqin jiashu shoudao daibu tongzhishu'' [Family 
members of independent public interest worker Wang Jianbing and women's 
rights journalist Huang Xueqin received arrest notices], November 5, 
2021; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release 
#MeToo Activist and Fellow Civil Society Advocate,'' September 21, 
2021.
    \128\ Karl Hu, ``China: Leader of Delivery Riders Alliance 
Detained, Solidarity Movement Repressed,'' Labor Notes, April 15, 2021.
    \129\ Chuang (@chuangcn), ``Breaking: A video of delivery driver 
organizer Chen Guojiang, better known as Meng Zhu, has been released 
via his WeChat channel. Chen may finally be free (1/6),'' Twitter, 
January 3, 2022, 6:09 a.m.
    \130\ Karl Hu, ``China: Leader of Delivery Riders Alliance 
Detained, Solidarity Movement Repressed,'' Labor Notes, April 15, 2021. 
For more information on Chen Guojiang, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2021-00061.
    \131\ Chuang (@chuangcn), ``However, some key facts are unclear: 
Did Chen make the video himself? Under his own free will? And when was 
the video shot? There are still many unanswered questions about his 
status and safety (2/6),'' Twitter, January 3, 2022, 6:12 a.m.
    \132\ Li Yuan, `` `Who Are Our Enemies?' China's Bitter Youths 
Embrace Mao.,'' New York Times, July 8, 2021; Javier C. Hernandez, 
``China's Leaders Confront an Unlikely Foe: Ardent Young Communists,'' 
New York Times, September 28, 2018. See also ``Free the Fujian Six! 
Open Letter from a Young Maoist Awaiting Prison,'' Chuang (blog), 
January 10, 2022.
    \133\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China's Leaders Confront an Unlikely 
Foe: Ardent Young Communists,'' New York Times, September 28, 2018.
    \134\ Li Yuan, `` `Who Are Our Enemies?' China's Bitter Youths 
Embrace Mao.,'' New York Times, July 8, 2021; Javier C. Hernandez, 
``China's Leaders Confront an Unlikely Foe: Ardent Young Communists,'' 
New York Times, September 28, 2018. See also Ian Liujia Tian, 
``Socialism from the Grassroots: New Directions of Leftist Organizing 
in Post-Socialist China,'' Upping the Anti: A Journal of Theory and 
Action, January 30, 2022.
    \135\ ``Bai nian Dang qing bijin weiwen wu fen zuoyou Maozuo 
zhenying chuanzao gong'an kuasheng zhuabu'' [As Party centenary 
approaches, no effort spared in stability maintenance, leftist Maoist 
faction rumored to have been taken into custody by public security 
across provinces], Radio Free Asia, June 9, 2021.
    \136\ ``Bai nian Dang qing bijin weiwen wu fen zuoyou Maozuo 
zhenying chuanzao gong'an kuasheng zhuabu'' [As Party centenary 
approaches, no effort spared in stability maintenance, leftist Maoist 
faction rumored to have been taken into custody by public security 
across provinces], Radio Free Asia, June 9, 2021.
    \137\ ``Free the Fujian Six! Open Letter from a Young Maoist 
Awaiting Prison,'' Chuang (blog), January 10, 2022; ``Henan sheng 
Pingdingshan shi Xinhua qu fayuan yu `Hongse Wenhua Hui' an de 
panjueshu'' [Henan province, Pingdingshan municipality, Xinhua district 
court decision in the case of ``Red Culture Association''], Red China, 
January 6, 2022.
    \138\ ``Henan sheng Pingdingshan shi Xinhua qu fayuan yu `Hongse 
Wenhua Hui' an de panjueshu'' [Henan province, Pingdingshan 
municipality, Xinhua district court decision in the case of ``Red 
Culture Association''], Red China, January 6, 2022. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2022-00009 on Zhang Zhijing, 2022-00010 on Yu Chaoquan, 2022-00011 on 
Qiu Pingqin, 2022-00012 on Qiu Pinghui, and 2022-00013 on Huang 
Xiaochun. According to the court decision, Yu Yixin--the sixth person 
detained in the case--was designated the ``ring leader'' of the group, 
but his case was being handled separately.
    \139\ ``Henan sheng Pingdingshan shi Xinhua qu fayuan yu `Hongse 
Wenhua Hui' an de panjueshu'' [Henan province, Pingdingshan 
municipality, Xinhua district court decision in the case of ``Red 
Culture Association''], Red China, January 6, 2022.

Public Health

Public Health

                      VIII. Other Thematic Issues

                             Public Health

                                Findings

         As the highly infectious Delta and Omicron 
        variants of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spread 
        quickly in China this past year, the Chinese Communist 
        Party and government's public health response continued 
        to be shaped by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's 
        political priorities. Features of political influence 
        included the Party's promotion of its ``zero-COVID'' 
        policy as a success story to validate the Party's 
        decisionmaking despite a growing chorus within and 
        outside China that criticized a lack of planning for 
        coexistence with the virus; lockdown management that 
        employed disproportionally harsh public security 
        measures and surveillance to ``maintain stability''; 
        actively promoting disinformation about COVID-19; and 
        an ongoing lack of transparency in providing data 
        needed by the international scientific community to 
        more effectively handle COVID-19 through investigating 
        SARS-CoV-2's origins and better preparing for a future 
        infectious pathogen. Authorities used repressive 
        tactics against individuals, including Zhang Zhan and 
        Fang Bin, who provided unauthorized reports about the 
        government's mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak.
         International concern over the publication of 
        genetic research by Chinese scientists using DNA 
        samples taken from Uyghurs in China allegedly without 
        obtaining informed consent sparked several genetics 
        journals to investigate and retract several research 
        papers.
         A case illustrating the vulnerability to human 
        trafficking of women with developmental and mental 
        health disabilities in China galvanized the public and 
        pushed the government to prioritize aid to persons with 
        psychosocial disorders in an anti-trafficking campaign, 
        but domestic experts report a lack of systemic legal 
        protections. Public security officials also continued 
        to forcibly commit petitioners and other individuals 
        whom authorities have deemed ``disruptive'' to 
        psychiatric facilities in spite of clear provisions in 
        the PRC Mental Health Law that prohibit this. Among the 
        cases the Commission monitored this year were Li 
        Tiantian and Zhou Caifan.
         Individual and organized public health 
        advocacy continues in China, but the personal and 
        professional risks of organized public health advocacy 
        that authorities deem politically sensitive or even 
        threatening, are evident in the ongoing or new 
        detentions this past year of Cheng Yuan and Wu 
        Gejianxiong, from the advocacy organization Changsha 
        Funeng; He Fangmei, an advocate for victims of 
        defective vaccines; and Hu Xincheng, a former 
        investigative journalist and rights advocate.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Strengthen existing international technical 
        assistance and exchange programs on emerging and 
        zoonotic infectious diseases, and global public health 
        preparedness and response. Expand information sharing, 
        particularly drawing on the legal framework established 
        in the International Health Regulations (IHR). 
        Contribute to the international community's efforts to 
        improve the IHR provisions and communications channels 
        to effectively respond to public health emergencies.
          Urge the Chinese government to end the unlawful 
        detention and official harassment of individuals in 
        China who have shared opinions and information about 
        COVID-19. Release or confirm the release of individuals 
        detained, held in home confinement, or imprisoned for 
        exercising freedom of expression, such as Zhang Zhan 
        and Fang Bin. Amplify the work of Chinese citizen 
        journalists, scientists, and medical professionals in 
        documenting COVID-19 and other public health 
        developments in China.
          Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on both 
        effective implementation of laws and regulations that 
        prohibit health-based discrimination in access to 
        employment and education, and on the development of a 
        barrier-free environment. Where appropriate, share with 
        Chinese officials the United States' ongoing efforts to 
        promote and enhance the rights of persons with 
        disabilities and other health-based conditions. Expand 
        the number of site visits and exchanges for Chinese 
        non-governmental health advocates, universities, and 
        state-affiliated social work agencies to meet with U.S. 
        rights groups, lawyers, and state and Federal agencies 
        to share best practices in outreach to, and services 
        for, vulnerable communities. Release or confirm the 
        release of Cheng Yuan, Wu Gejianxiong, He Fangmei, and 
        Hu Xincheng, whom authorities detained for public 
        health advocacy. Raise these cases in bilateral 
        dialogues, as well as through multilateral mechanisms 
        such as the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

Public Health

Public Health

                             Public Health

                                COVID-19

    The highly infectious Delta and Omicron variants of 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spread quickly in China 
this past year, intensifying the risk of SARS-CoV-2 to public 
health in China. With at least 45 municipalities in full or 
partial lockdown in April 2022, an estimated 373 million 
Chinese people were reportedly under some form of lockdown.\1\ 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights prioritizes the right to health, whereby 
the ``right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health'' includes 
the ``prevention, treatment and control of epidemic . . . 
diseases.'' \2\ While the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights allows governments to impose some restrictions 
on freedom of expression in cases of public emergency, such 
restrictions must meet ``standards of legality, 
proportionality, and necessity.'' \3\ The People's Republic of 
China's (PRC) public health response continued to be shaped by 
Chinese Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping's political 
priorities. Features of the political influence included the 
promotion of the ``zero-COVID'' policy as a success story to 
validate the Party's decisionmaking despite a growing chorus 
within and outside China that criticized a lack of planning for 
coexistence with the virus; lockdown management that employed 
disproportionally harsh public security measures and 
surveillance to ``maintain stability''; actively promoting 
disinformation about COVID-19; and an ongoing lack of 
transparency in providing data needed by the international 
scientific community to more effectively handle COVID-19, 
through investigating SARS-CoV-2's origins and better preparing 
for a future infectious pathogen.\4\

       ZERO-COVID POLICY: RHETORIC, IMPLEMENTATION, AND CRITICISM

    The PRC's zero-COVID policy entails prevention and control 
of the disease by employing mass testing, snap lockdowns, 
quarantine,\5\ and limits on travel into China \6\ and within 
China.\7\ Party General Secretary Xi Jinping declared the 
policy a Party success story \8\--at the May 5, 2022, meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee 
Political Bureau,\9\ Xi reportedly asserted that the Party's 
``nature'' had determined the policy and that the Party's 
``prevention and control policies have stood the test of 
history.'' \10\ Xi's personal leadership also has been linked 
to the policy. According to a Beijing-based commenter, the 
policy is ``. . . an unquestionable, unchallengeable policy 
that is closely tied to his political authority--and therefore 
there will be no flexibility when it comes to its 
implementation.''\11\ Policy implementation was designated a 
top ``political task'' for local-level officials, and viral 
outbreaks resulted in Party disciplinary punishment, including 
job loss or a diminished prospect for promotion.\12\
    Implementation of the policy \13\ during the Commission's 
2022 reporting year exposed planning and emergency management 
shortcomings \14\ and rights violations \15\ not only in 
locations under full or partial lockdown such as Shanghai, 
Jilin, and Xi'an municipality, but also in Hong Kong \16\ and 
throughout mainland China.\17\ The use of digital surveillance 
technology, as exemplified by the health code application (app) 
in the mainland, played an instrumental role in pandemic 
prevention and control.\18\ Based on an individual's personal, 
health, biometric, and travel data, the app's QR code produced 
a color code to indicate that individual's level of risk and 
determines whether the user will have access to public spaces 
like parks and hospitals, as well as use of public 
transportation, or whether they should go into isolation or 
quarantine.\19\ This collection by big data--including results 
of users' COVID-19 testing, real-time geolocation tracking, and 
contacts--is accessible by the government and has raised 
concerns that it will be used as a means of political 
control,\20\ in spite of China's growing data privacy legal 
framework.\21\ In mid-June 2022, for example, individuals 
planning to protest at a bank in Henan province that had frozen 
their savings discovered their QR code turned ``red'' before 
they left for Henan.\22\ International athletes, foreign 
journalists, and other attendees of the 2022 Beijing Winter 
Olympic Games were required to install the My2022 app on 
smartphones to capture primarily health-related data, but a 
report by Citizen Lab, a technology and human rights monitoring 
group in Canada, identified an encryption flaw that left users' 
voice audio data vulnerable to misuse.\23\ [For more 
information on this issue, see Section V--Governance.]
    In addition to the tools of ``digital authoritarianism'' 
was ``old-fashioned analog authoritarianism,'' as one scholar 
described it, ``that relies on people-to-people contact and 
people-to-people pressure,'' requiring urban residential 
committee members to assist in coordinating COVID-19 testing, 
distributing food,\24\ and responding to residents' needs.\25\ 
Implementation resulted in food shortages; \26\ fatalities 
related to hospitals unwilling or unable to admit patients with 
urgent conditions; \27\ and instances of limited access to 
medical care \28\ or deprivation of care for vulnerable elderly 
persons,\29\ persons with chronic illness,\30\ and young 
children.\31\ Coercive implementation of isolation and 
quarantine controls to prevent community transmission included 
erecting fencing around residential buildings, housing blocks, 
and streets to prevent residents from leaving their homes,\32\ 
and forcing COVID-positive residents to transfer to makeshift 
quarantine facilities at any time.\33\ Video captured scenes of 
physical assault carried out by persons wearing white PPE gear, 
of public security officials using riot tactics against 
protesting community members, and other disproportionate uses 
of force.\34\
    Countering the ``unswerving'' adherence to the policy \35\ 
were comments by medical and legal experts, as well as social 
media users,\36\ that the policy is not sustainable. In July 
2021, Zhang Wenhong, a prominent virologist in Shanghai 
municipality, publicly raised concerns about the long-term 
sustainability of the policy given the likelihood that COVID-19 
will be a long-term public health threat, but the substance of 
his comments was officially rebuked.\37\ Another medical doctor 
in Shanghai was censored in April 2022 when he reportedly 
suggested a ``middle road'' between the policy and co-existence 
with the virus, based on his concern about the lack of medical 
treatment for patients with chronic illnesses and acute 
diseases.\38\ He cited evidence of higher mortality rates for 
patients with diabetes during the 2020 lockdown in Wuhan 
municipality, Hubei province.\39\ A Chinese study released in 
June 2022, moreover, found relatively low risks associated with 
the Omicron variant, prompting questions about the ongoing need 
for harsh measures.\40\ Public comments on a policy shift 
toward co-existence with the virus, however, have been deemed 
by Chinese authorities to be a political critique of the policy 
rather than of a viable alternative public health approach.\41\ 
Thus, following World Health
Organization (WHO) Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus's comment on May 10, 2022, that the Chinese 
government's zero-COVID policy ``will not be sustainable'' 
given the changing nature of the virus as well as the existence 
of effective medical tools,\42\ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
described that comment as ``irresponsible.'' \43\ At the same 
WHO event, another senior WHO official, Michael Ryan, stressed 
``show[ing] due respect to individual and human rights'' by 
calibrating pandemic prevention measures in consideration of 
``the impact on society [and] the impact on the economy.'' \44\ 
Two days before Ryan's comments, a law professor at East China 
University of Politics and Law had argued that ``[p]andemic 
prevention needs to be balanced with ensuring people's rights 
and freedoms'' in a critique of two coercive measures that he 
described as unconstitutional.\45\ Other critiques raised by 
legal experts in China included the threat to personal data 
privacy posed by excessive use of surveillance and facial 
recognition technology in pandemic surveillance,\46\ and the 
possible ``normalization'' of measures like nucleic acid (PCR) 
testing beyond an immediate need for pandemic prevention and 
control.\47\

                        HARASSMENT AND DETENTION

    Authorities used repressive tactics against individuals who 
provided unauthorized reports about the government's handling 
of the COVID-19 outbreak. While the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights allows governments to impose some 
restrictions on freedom of expression in cases of public 
emergency, such restrictions must meet standards of legality, 
proportionality, and necessity.\48\ The Chinese government's 
repression of activity related to free speech and access to 
information about COVID-19 violated those standards, as seen in 
the ongoing detentions this past year of citizen journalists 
Zhang Zhan \49\ and Fang Bin.\50\ Authorities detained Zhang in 
May 2020 \51\ and Fang in February 2020 \52\ in connection with 
their efforts to document the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan 
municipality, Hubei province. Similarly, in January 2022, a 
group of 11 Falun Gong practitioners were sentenced to prison 
terms of between two and eight years, partly in connection with 
having provided photos of street scenes in Beijing municipality 
in the early days of the epidemic in China to Epoch Times, an 
overseas media outlet affiliated with Falun Gong.\53\ Rights 
Defense Network also reported on the use of confinement in a 
quarantine facility as a pretext to arbitrarily detain two 
petitioners from Fujian province in March 2022.\54\

 CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ONGOING LACK OF TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COVID-19 
                                  DATA

    The Chinese government's refusal to provide requested data, 
together with its requirement that officials vet research 
papers on COVID-19 prior to submission to scientific 
journals,\55\ has intensified the perception that the Chinese 
government is ``withholding data on COVID-19's origins'' \56\ 
and is not cooperating with the WHO and the international 
community's efforts to identify the origins of SARS-CoV-2.\57\ 
Scientific research on the origins of SARS-CoV-2 this past year 
concentrated on gathering more data about the sale of live wild 
animals at wet markets in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, 
the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak in late 2019.\58\ 
Further research requires access to genetic data and raw 
samples from Wuhan that the government failed to provide 
despite multiple requests from the WHO \59\ and commentary by
scientists.\60\ Under the rubric of a new WHO advisory group 
established in October 2021 to study the origins of novel 
pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2,\61\ WHO Director General 
Tedros also submitted requests to the Chinese government to 
provide raw data in February 2022, to no avail.\62\ Moreover, 
the WHO advisory group reported in June 2022 that ``there had 
not been any new data made available to evaluate the laboratory 
as a pathway of SARS-CoV-2 into the human population and 
recommend[ed] further investigations into this and all other 
possible pathways.'' \63\

   AMPLIFYING DISINFORMATION IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE INTERNATIONAL 
                                OPINION

    This past year, researchers continued to identify and 
analyze disinformation and propaganda efforts by PRC state 
media outlets and diplomats.\64\ According to the ChinaPower 
project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
a think tank in Washington, D.C., the PRC government's efforts 
have aimed to ``[deflect] criticisms that China is to blame for 
the pandemic.'' \65\ In September 2021, for example, a 
disinformation researcher at the University of Oxford 
documented the emergence of a new ``cold chain'' theory of 
COVID-19 origins in the social media accounts of PRC diplomats 
and official media outlets alleging that frozen imported 
lobsters from Maine were the source of COVID-19.\66\ In another 
example, official media amplified a conspiracy theory that the 
United States had been pressuring the World Health Organization 
to blame China for the pandemic, based on a July 2021 post on 
the Facebook account of a Swiss biologist whom Facebook later 
found to be a fake persona created by a Chinese cybersecurity 
company.\67\ ChinaPower found that international public opinion 
continued to hold China accountable for the COVID-19 pandemic 
and negative perceptions of China were widespread in many 
countries in spite of PRC disinformation and propaganda efforts 
since the outbreak in December 2019.\68\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responding to Concerns over Ethics Standards and Human Rights Violations
                   in the Use of Genomic Data in China
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Spurred by international concerns over violations of research
 integrity and human rights regarding the publication of genetic
 research by Chinese scientists using DNA samples taken from
 Uyghurs,\69\ two genetics journals retracted three such articles in
 August, September, and December 2021 following additional inquiry.\70\
 The concerns included claims about the lack of consent from Uyghurs in
 the collection of their biometric data,\71\ Chinese authorities'
 specific interest in genomic profiling of ethnic minority groups to
 advance state surveillance goals,\72\ research on vulnerable minorities
 in the context of the Chinese government's official campaign of mass
 detention in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,\73\ and the names
 of public security officials among the publication authors.\74\ In a
 related development, the Intercept reported in August 2021 that 8 out
 of 25 board members from the journal Molecular Genetics & Genomic
 Medicine resigned over the publication of ``a slew of controversial
 papers that critics fear could be used for DNA profiling and
 persecution of ethnic minorities in China,'' including Uyghurs,
 Tibetans, and Hui Muslims.\75\ Given the role of ethics committees from
 the PRC Ministries of Public Security and Justice in approving genomic
 studies, scientists associated with the European Society for Human
 Genetics have advised that genetics journal publishers ``conduct a mass
 reassessment of this literature and require further information on
 consent and ethical approvals in addition to considering whether the
 studies fulfil the basic ethical requirements for non-maleficence,
 beneficence, justice and veracity.'' \76\ While some publishers have
 begun investigations, most of these papers have not yet been
 retracted.\77\ In June 2022, the American Society of Human Genetics
 (ASHG) issued a statement that ``[l]ong-standing ethical principles for
 genetics research help respect and protect research participants, and
 they are especially important for preventing harm to marginalized or
 vulnerable populations,'' and indicated thatP the ASHG would in future
 address ethics standards, including for publications.\78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

           Concerns over the Treatment of Persons with Severe

             Psychosocial Disabilities and Continuing Use of
                    Forcible Psychiatric Commitment

    A video from late January 2022 showing a woman in Feng 
county, Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, chained by her 
neck to a shed,\79\ exposed her individual suffering and the 
far-reaching vulnerability to human trafficking of women with 
developmental and mental health disabilities in China.\80\ The 
woman reportedly had symptoms of mental illness before being 
trafficked from Yunnan province to Jiangsu in the late 
1990s.\81\ After the video's release, authorities in Xuzhou 
brought her to a hospital where she was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.\82\ Widespread public criticism drew attention 
to the local government's apparent disregard for human 
trafficking \83\ and the woman's abusive living conditions,\84\ 
the inconsistencies in the official investigative reports about 
her background,\85\ and lax criminal penalties for the 
``buyers'' of trafficked persons.\86\ Although both a 
nationwide anti-trafficking campaign launched in March 2022 
\87\ and a ten-year anti-trafficking action plan issued in 
April 2021 \88\ specify the need to identify and assist 
trafficking victims among women with psychosocial disabilities, 
neither the campaign nor the action plan mentions engaging 
legal protections for disabled persons. The committee 
conducting the August 2022 review of China's compliance with 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) \89\ previously signaled its concern about legal 
protections in a recommendation that the government ``develop a 
comprehensive legal framework to protect women and children 
with disabilities, particularly those with intellectual or 
psychosocial disabilities, against all forms of exploitation, 
violence, abuse, abduction and trafficking'' \90\ under Article 
16 of the CRPD.\91\ [For more information about the case of the 
woman trafficked to Feng county, see Section VI--Human 
Trafficking, Population Control, and Status of Women.]
    The Chinese government has committed to improving mental 
health services under the ``right to health'' in its National 
Human Rights Action Plan for 2021-2025,\92\ which is in line 
with a long-term commitment to developing mental health policy, 
legal protection provisions, and greater national capacity for 
treatment.\93\ The chained woman's experience nevertheless 
highlights gaps in access to treatment and services for persons 
with severe psychosocial disorders,\94\ particularly in rural 
areas.\95\ The heavy healthcare \96\ and legal guardianship 
\97\ responsibilities placed on family members, as well as 
broader societal stigmatization and institutional 
discrimination,\98\ also are factors that exacerbate the 
precarity of their lives. The woman's experience also pointed 
to the ongoing use of shackling to restrain mentally ill 
persons.\99\ In its 2020 report on the global prevalence of 
shackling persons with psychosocial disorders, Human Rights 
Watch cited Party-affiliated media reports from 2013 and 2015 
that estimated 100,000 shackled persons in Hebei province 
alone.\100\ Lawyer Huang Xuetao, the founder of an anti-
discrimination non-governmental organization (NGO), commented 
that the government's failure to have ever sanctioned anyone 
for chaining up a person with mental illness is evidence that 
the personal liberty of persons with mental illness is 
unprotected.\101\ Additionally, a disability rights advocate 
noted that mentally ill individuals are often unfairly 
perceived to be vectors of violence, when the reality is that 
they are more likely to be the victims of violence.\102\ A 
concern over potential violent outbursts by persons with severe 
mental disorders as a risk to public safety was an element in 
an administrative lawsuit decision in one of ten ``typical'' 
disability rights public interest lawsuits issued by the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Chinese Disabled Persons 
Federation in May 2022.\103\

     USE OF FORCIBLE COMMITMENT AS A ``STABILITY MAINTENANCE'' TOOL

    The PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) provides protections 
against wrongful involuntary admission and treatment at 
psychiatric facilities,\104\ provisions that were aimed, in 
part, to prevent the forced commitment to psychiatric 
facilities of people without mental illness (bei 
jingshenbing).\105\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW), a 
Chinese NGO, has documented public security officials' use of 
bei jingshenbing against petitioners and persons whom Chinese 
authorities deem to be engaged in ``disruptive'' activity and 
speech.\106\ CRLW underscored the PRC's pervasive use of 
forcible psychiatric commitment as a ``stability maintenance'' 
tool in its 2020 report on the use of bei jingshenbing,\107\ 
and stressed that the extent of forcible commitment is 
difficult to estimate due to government information 
control.\108\ Two cases from this past year are illustrative of 
its use:

         Jiangxi province. Government staff in Anyuan 
        district, Pingxiang municipality, Jiangxi, 
        involuntarily admitted Zhou Caifan to a local 
        hospital's psychiatric unit in August 2021,\109\ even 
        though she did not meet the criteria in the MHL that 
        stipulate involuntary admission in cases of harm to 
        oneself or others.\110\ Prior to being hospitalized, 
        Zhou had petitioned the Pingxiang bureau of letters and 
        visits about her sister's death.\111\
         Hunan province. When schoolteacher Li Tiantian 
        refused to retract or apologize for her online support 
        of a college professor's skepticism of the official 
        estimate of deaths during the 1937 Nanjing 
        Massacre,\112\ public security officers in Yongshun 
        county, Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, 
        Hunan, held Li at a psychiatric facility for seven days 
        in December 2021.\113\

                 Suppression of Public Health Advocacy

    Authorities have ``hollow[ed] out'' grassroots civil 
society organizations that have worked on public health 
advocacy, observed China Digital Times in an introduction to an 
essay by disability rights advocate Xie Renci \114\ about the 
lack of accessible public spaces for persons using 
wheelchairs.\115\ Individual and organized advocacy continues 
in China,\116\ but the personal and professional risks of 
organized public health advocacy that authorities deem 
politically sensitive or even threatening were evident in the 
ongoing detention of Cheng Yuan \117\ and Wu Gejianxiong,\118\ 
a founder and staff member, respectively, of the NGO Changsha 
Funeng that works to counter health discrimination.\119\ He 
Fangmei, the founder of a group advocating for the child 
victims of defective vaccines, has been frequently harassed and 
detained by authorities since 2018 when her daughter became 
disabled through a faulty vaccine.\120\ Authorities took He 
into custody again in October 2020 when she was seven months' 
pregnant.\121\ She gave birth while in detention.\122\ This 
past year, she reportedly was tried on the charges of 
``bigamy'' and ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble,'' and 
is thought to be held at the Xinxiang Municipal Public Security 
Bureau Detention Center, in Henan province.\123\ Former 
investigative journalist and petitioners' rights advocate Hu 
Xincheng was traveling throughout the country to collect 
signatures for a public health campaign advocating for free 
medical care in cases of serious illness before authorities 
detained him in December 2021.\124\ Authorities arrested Hu on 
the charge of ``advocating terrorism or extremism and inciting 
implementation of terrorist activities'' on January 9, 
2022,\125\ illustrating the government's hardline approach to 
non-governmental advocacy despite high-level policy plans this 
past year on the issue of healthcare reform.\126\

Public Health

Public Health

    Notes to Section VIII--Public Health

    \1\ ``370 Mil. People Under Some Form of Lockdown in China Due to 
COVID,'' Kyodo News, April 16, 2022.
    \2\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 12(1), (2)(c); United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed July 15, 
2022. China signed the convention on October 27, 1997, and ratified it 
on March 27, 2001. See also Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), adopted at the Twenty-second 
Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
August 11, 2000, para. 16.
    \3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2022. China has signed but not 
ratified the ICCPR. Daphne Eviatar, ``Human Rights Guidelines for the 
Fight Against COVID-19,'' Just Security (blog), March 27, 2020; UN 
Human Rights Council, Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David 
Kaye, A/HRC/44/49, April 23, 2020, paras. 16, 20, 63(e-f).
    \4\ Maria D. Van Kerkhove, Michael J. Ryan, and Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, ``Preparing for `Disease X,' '' editorial, Science 374, 
no. 6566, October 13, 2021: 377.
    \5\ ``Ask the Experts: How Does China's Dynamic Zero-COVID Policy 
Impact the Global Economy?,'' London School of Economics, China 
Dialogues (blog), March 29, 2022.
    \6\ Giulia Interesse, ``China Eases Travel Requirements: New 
Guidelines from May 19, 2022,'' Dezan Shira & Associates, China 
Briefing, May 19, 2022.
    \7\ Ken Moritsugu and Emily Wang, ``China's `Zero-COVID' 
Restrictions Curb May 1 Holiday Travel,'' Associated Press, May 1, 
2022.
    \8\ Nectar Gan, ``Xi Jinping Sends Warning to Anyone Who Questions 
China's Zero-Covid Policy,'' CNN, May 6, 2022.
    \9\ Qi Zhongxi, Dong Ruifeng, and Hu Zhe, ``Jianjue zhu lao yiqing 
fangkong pingzhang jianjue gonggu zhu yiqing fangkong chengguo--zhuajin 
zhuashi yiqing fangkong zhongdian gongzuo shuping'' [Resolutely build a 
barrier for pandemic prevention and control, resolutely consolidate 
pandemic prevention and control achievements--grasp tightly and 
securely to commentary on the key points of pandemic prevention and 
control work], Xinhua, May 6, 2022; Nectar Gan, ``Xi Jinping Sends 
Warning to Anyone Who Questions China's Zero-Covid Policy,'' CNN, May 
6, 2022.
    \10\ Qi Zhongxi, Dong Ruifeng, and Hu Zhe, ``Jianjue zhu lao yiqing 
fangkong pingzhang jianjue gonggu zhu yiqing fangkong chengguo--zhuajin 
zhuashi yiqing fangkong zhongdian gongzuo shuping'' [Resolutely build a 
barrier for pandemic prevention and control, resolutely consolidate 
pandemic prevention and control achievements--grasp tightly and 
securely to commentary on the key points of pandemic prevention and 
control work], Xinhua, May 6, 2022; Nectar Gan, ``Xi Jinping Sends 
Warning to Anyone Who Questions China's Zero-Covid Policy,'' CNN, May 
6, 2022.
    \11\ Nectar Gan, ``Xi Jinping Sends Warning to Anyone Who Questions 
China's Zero-Covid Policy,'' CNN, May 6, 2022.
    \12\ William Zheng, ``Dozens of Chinese Officials Punished over 
Latest Wave of Covid-19 Cases,'' South China Morning Post, March 22, 
2022.
    \13\ ``Ask the Experts: How Does China's Dynamic Zero-COVID Policy 
Impact the Global Economy?,'' London School of Economics, China 
Dialogues (blog), March 29, 2022.
    \14\ Anne Yang Stevenson, ``China's Governance Implosion,'' Forbes, 
April 13, 2022; ``China City Mayor Apologizes over COVID-19 Lockdown 
Response,'' Reuters, June 14, 2022.
    \15\ Human Rights Watch, ``Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 
Response,'' March 19, 2020.
    \16\ Timothy McLaughlin, ``What Happened to Hong Kong?,'' Atlantic, 
March 17, 2022.
    \17\ Rachel Liang, ``Overshadowed by Shanghai, Millions Caught in 
China's Forgotten Lockdowns,'' Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2022.
    \18\ Phoebe Zhang, ``China's Covid-19 Health Code: Algorithms Weigh 
on Lives and Freedoms, Leaving Some Confused and Miserable,'' South 
China Morning Post, April 4, 2022.
    \19\ Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong, and Aaron Krolik, ``In Coronavirus 
Fight, China Gives Citizens a Color Code, with Red Flags,'' New York 
Times, July 26, 2021.
    \20\ ``[Tiewan qingling] Minzhong ge ren xinxi jin shou dashujuku 
baokuo Gang'Ao diqu siyin wusuo dunxing'' [[Iron-fisted zero clearance] 
Everyone's complete information is stored in a big data database, 
including from Hong Kong and Macao, with privacy nowhere to be found], 
Radio Free Asia, January 27, 2022.
    \21\ Jeffrey Knockel, ``Cross-Country Exposure: Analysis of the 
MY2022 Olympics App,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & 
Public Policy, University of Toronto, January 18, 2022.
    \22\ Engen Tham, ``China Bank Protest Stopped by Health Codes 
Turning Red, Depositors Say,'' Reuters, June 16, 2022.
    \23\ Jeffrey Knockel, ``Cross-Country Exposure: Analysis of the 
MY2022 Olympics App,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & 
Public Policy, University of Toronto, January 18, 2022.
    \24\ See, e.g., ``3 Shanghai Officials Sacked over COVID-19 
Response,'' Associated Press, April 8, 2022; Ryan Woo, ``Capital of 
China's Jilin Province Apologises for Food Shortages Due to COVID 
Curbs,'' Reuters, March 29, 2022; Greg James, ``Xi'an Residents Face 
Shortages of Food and Critical Supplies as Lockdown Continues,'' 
SupChina, December 29, 2021.
    \25\ ``The Forever Lockdown--COVID-19 and the Closing of China'' 
[Webcast], Hauser Symposium: China's Domestic Evolution, Council on 
Foreign Relations, March 23, 2022, 43:20-43:44. See also CECC, 2020 
Annual Report, December 2020, 204.
    \26\ See, e.g., ``3 Shanghai Officials Sacked over COVID-19 
Response,'' Associated Press, April 8, 2022; Ryan Woo, ``Capital of 
China's Jilin Province Apologises for Food Shortages Due to COVID 
Curbs,'' Reuters, March 29, 2022; Greg James, ``Xi'an Residents Face 
Shortages of Food and Critical Supplies as Lockdown Continues,'' 
SupChina, December 29, 2021.
    \27\ See, e.g., ``Violinist Shunping Chen Has Died, Aged 71,'' 
Violin Channel, April 20, 2022; Christian Shepherd, ``Tales of Anguish 
Emerge from China's Locked-down Xian, as Hospital Staffers Are Fired 
over Woman's Treatment,'' Washington Post, January 6, 2022; Natasha 
Khan, ``Shanghai Nurse's Death Fuels Skepticism over Cost of China's 
Covid-19 Measures,'' Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022.
    \28\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Treatment for Non-Covid Illnesses 
Denied,'' April 6, 2022.
    \29\ Nectar Gan, ``Outcry as Shanghai Sends Vulnerable Senior 
Citizens into Makeshift Quarantine Camps,'' CNN, April 21, 2022; 
Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, ``Shanghai Hospital Pays the Price for 
China's COVID Response,'' Associated Press, April 9, 2022.
    \30\ See, e.g., Natasha Khan, ``Shanghai Nurse's Death Fuels 
Skepticism Over Cost of China's Covid-19 Measures,'' Wall Street 
Journal, March 25, 2022; Vivian Wang and Isabelle Qian, ``Shanghai 
Seethes in Covid Lockdown, Posing Test to China's Leadership,'' New 
York Times, April 25, 2022.
    \31\ Brenda Goh and Engen Tham, ``Shanghai Separates COVID-positive 
Children from Parents in Virus Fight,'' Reuters, April 2, 2022; Nectar 
Gan and Steve George, ``Analysis: Separated from His Parents, an 
Infected 4-Year-Old Highlights the Human Cost of China's Zero-Covid 
Policy,'' CNN, September 17, 2021.
    \32\ Huizhong Wu, ``Explainer: How China Is Using Metal Barriers to 
Fight COVID,'' Associated Press, April 29, 2022.
    \33\ Nectar Gan, ``Outcry as Shanghai Sends Vulnerable Senior 
Citizens into Makeshift Quarantine Camps,'' CNN, April 21, 2022; 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``Chinese Omicron Study Renews Debate Over `Zero 
Covid' Policy,'' New York Times, June 21, 2022.
    \34\ See, e.g., China Change, ``Shanghai Spring'' [Video], May 17, 
2022, 33:11-34:37, 1:15:13-1:17:05, 1:19:45-1:23:59.
    \35\ Nectar Gan, ``Xi Jinping Sends Warning to Anyone Who Questions 
China's Zero-Covid Policy,'' CNN, May 6, 2022.
    \36\ Ji Siqi, ``Chinese Economists Censored, Removed from Social 
Media after Critical Takes on Zero-Covid Policy,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 2, 2022.
    \37\ Bill Birtles, ``China's COVID-Zero Strategy Could Leave It 
Isolated for Years. That May Be the Way Beijing Wants It,'' Australian 
Broadcasting Company, August 13, 2021; ``Pandemic Control Strategy: A 
Subject for Debate, and Debate Suppression,'' China Digital Times, 
August 27, 2021.
    \38\ Jennifer Bateman, ``Shanghai Infectious Disease Experts Call 
on Authorities to Stop `Zero-Covid' Policy,'' Epoch Times, May 9, 2022; 
Vivian Wang, Joy Dong, and Amy Chang Chien, ``Shanghai's Low Covid 
Death Toll Revives Questions About China's Numbers,'' New York Times, 
April 20, 2022.
    \39\ Jennifer Bateman, ``Shanghai Infectious Disease Experts Call 
on Authorities to Stop `Zero-Covid' Policy,'' Epoch Times, May 9, 2022; 
Vivian Wang, Joy Dong, and Amy Chang Chien, ``Shanghai's Low Covid 
Death Toll Revives Questions About China's Numbers,'' New York Times, 
April 20, 2022.
    \40\ Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``Chinese Omicron Study Renews Debate 
Over `Zero Covid' Policy,'' New York Times, June 21, 2022.
    \41\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on May 11, 2022,'' May 11, 2022; 
Jane Li, ``China Is Policing Speech That Supports `Living with Covid,' 
'' Quartz, August 17, 2021.
    \42\ Remarks by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the 
World Health Organization, ``COVID-19, Ukraine, and Other Global Health 
Issues, Virtual Press Conference,'' World Health Organization, May 10, 
2022, 00:46:40.
    \43\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on May 11, 2022,'' May 11, 2022.
    \44\ Remarks by Michael Ryan, Executive Director of the World 
Health Organization Health Emergencies Programme, ``COVID-19, Ukraine, 
and Other Global Health Issues, Virtual Press Conference,'' World 
Health Organization, May 10, 2022, 00:48:44; ``China Labels WHO Remarks 
on `Zero-COVID' `Irresponsible,' '' Associated Press, May 11, 2022.
    \45\ ``Tong Zhiwei: Dui Shanghai xinguan fangyi liang cuoshi de 
falu yijian'' [Tong Zhiwei: Legal opinion on two coronavirus pandemic 
control measures in Shanghai], Yibao, May 8, 2022; Phoebe Zhang, ``Stop 
Shanghai's Covid-Prevention Excesses, Academics Urge in Online 
Appeal,'' South China Morning Post, May 9, 2022.
    \46\ Yitong Wu, Chingman, and Qiao Long, ``Chinese Censors Delete 
Post Hitting Out at Mass, High-Tech Pandemic Surveillance,'' Radio Free 
Asia, May 26, 2022.
    \47\ ``Guowuyuan fa `Jiu Bu Zhun' jin guodu fangyi xuezhe pi 
`changtaihua hesuan' yin guanzhu'' [State Council issues ``Nine 
Prohibitions'' to stop excesses in pandemic prevention, scholars' 
criticism of ``normalized nucleic acid testing'' draws attention], 
Radio Free Asia, June 6, 2022.
    \48\ Daphne Eviatar, ``Human Rights Guidelines for the Fight 
Against COVID-19,'' Just Security (blog), March 27, 2020; UN Human 
Rights Council, Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David 
Kaye, A/HRC/44/49, April 23, 2020, 16, 20, 63(e)-(f).
    \49\ William Yang, ``Zhang Zhan chuan jiankang zhuangkuang gaishan 
Fang Bin anjian reng pushuo mili'' [Zhang Zhan's health condition 
reportedly has improved, Fang Bin's case still bewildering], Deutsche 
Welle, February 15, 2022. For more information on Zhang Zhan, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00175.
    \50\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan gongmin jizhe, renquan 
hanweizhe Fang Bin zuixin jingkuang tongbao (2022 nian 2 yue 4 ri)'' 
[Most recent status bulletin on Fang Bin, citizen journalist and rights 
defender from Wuhan, Hubei (2/4/2022)], February 4, 2022. For more 
information on Fang Bin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2020-00140.
    \51\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhuming renquan hanweizhe, gongmin 
jizhe Zhang Zhan nushi yin baodao Wuhan yiqing jin huoxing 4 nian'' 
[Prominent rights defender and citizen journalist Ms. Zhang Zhan 
sentenced today to 4 years in prison for reporting on the Wuhan 
epidemic], December 28, 2020; Vivian Wang, ``Chinese Citizen Journalist 
Sentenced to 4 Years for Covid Reporting,'' New York Times, October 8, 
2021.
    \52\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Ceng paishe Wuhan yiqing de 
Fang Bin shizong yi liang zhou'' [After taking video of the Wuhan 
epidemic, Fang Bin was disappeared for two weeks], February 22, 2020; 
Vivian Wang, ``They Documented the Coronavirus Crisis in Wuhan. Then 
They Vanished.,'' New York Times, February 21, 2020.
    \53\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yin yiqing qijian fabu yixie guonei 
yiqing zhaopian, Falun Gong xueyuan Xu Na nushi jin huoxing 8 nian'' 
[For having posted some photos of the pandemic in China during the 
pandemic, Falun Gong practitioner Ms. Xu Na was today sentenced to 8 
years' imprisonment], January 16, 2022; Xiao Lusheng and Yi Rucai, 
``Dong'ao qian 11 ming Falun Gong xueyuan zao zhongpan, lushi qianzi'' 
[Prior to the winter Olympics, 11 Falun Gong practitioners were given 
heavy sentences, lawyer denounces [the sentences]], Epoch Times, 
January 21, 2022; ``Beijing Falun Gong xueyuan Xu Na deng 11 ren bei 
gouxian dao Dongcheng qu fayuan'' [Beijing Falun Gong practitioner Xu 
Na was one of 11 who were framed and sent to the Dongcheng district 
court], Clear Wisdom, April 22, 2021. For more information, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00675 on Xu Na, 
2022-00048 on Li Zongze, 2022-00049 on Zheng Yujie, 2022-00050 on Li 
Lixin, 2022-00051 on Zheng Yanmei, 2022-00052 on Deng Jingjing, 2022-
00053 on Zhang Renfei, 2022-00054 on Liu Qiang, 2022-00055 on Meng 
Qingxia, 2022-00056 on Li Jiaxuan, and 2022-00057 on Jiao Mengjiao. 
Authorities released on bail two other Falun Gong practitioners who 
were detained in connection to the case in August 2021. For more 
information, see record 2022-00058 on Wang Yu and 2022-00059 on Fu Wen.
    \54\ Rights Defense Network, ``Feifa jujin bei hai ren yaoqiu 
li'an, Fuzhou gong'an juran cheng shi zhengfu fangyi cuoshi'' [Victims 
of illegal detention demand to file legal case, Fuzhou public security 
say that [the detention] was the government's pandemic prevention 
measure], March 26, 2022. Rights Defense Network reported that one of 
the petitioners was held for 38 days and the other for 16 days in these 
quarantine facilities.
    \55\ See also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 187.
    \56\ Amy Maxmen, ``Scientists Struggle to Probe COVID's Origins 
amid Sparse Data from China,'' Nature 603, no. 7903, March 17, 2022; 
Violet Law, ``COVID-19: The Endless Search for the Origins of the 
Virus,'' Al Jazeera, April 5, 2022.
    \57\ Benjamin Mueller and Carl Zimmer, ``Mysteries Linger About 
Covid's Origins, W.H.O. Report Says,'' New York Times, June 9, 2022.
    \58\ Gigi Kwik Gronvall, ``The Contested Origin of SARS-CoV-2,'' 
Survival 63, no. 6 (November 26, 2021): 7-36.
    \59\ Jeremy Page and Drew Hinshaw, ``China Refuses to Give WHO Raw 
Data on Early Covid-19 Cases,'' Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2021; 
Stephanie Nebahay, ``WHO Proposes Fresh Coronavirus Mission to China 
and Lab Audits,'' Reuters, July 16, 2021.
    \60\ Michael Worobey, ``Dissecting the Early COVID-19 Cases in 
Wuhan,'' Science Vol 374, no. 6572 (November 18, 2021): 1202-4; Gigi 
Kwik Gronvall, ``The Contested Origin of SARS-CoV-2,'' Survival 63, no. 
6 (November 26, 2021): 7-36.
    \61\ Maria D. Van Kerkhove, Michael J. Ryan, and Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, ``Preparing for `Disease X,' '' editorial, Science 374, 
no. 6566 (October 13, 2021); Kai Kupferschmidt, ``WHO Unveils New 26-
Member Panel to Restart Study of the Pandemic's Origins,'' Science 374, 
no. 6566 (October 13, 2021).
    \62\ World Health Organization, ``Preliminary Report for the 
Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens,'' June 9, 
2022, 9, 16.
    \63\ World Health Organization, ``Preliminary Report for the 
Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens, June 9, 
2022, 6.
    \64\ See, e.g., Zhang Legu, ``Nianzhong baodao: Zhongguo shi 
quanqiu xinguan xujia xinxi gongshi de lingtouzhe'' [Year-end report: 
China is leading the world's COVID disinformation offensive], Voice of 
America, December 31, 2021; Elen Aghekyan and Bret Schafer, ``Deep in 
the Data Void: China's COVID-19 Disinformation Dominates Search Engine 
Results,'' Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund, 
October 5, 2021; Ben Dubow, Edward Lucas, Jake Morris, ``Jabbed in the 
Back: Mapping Russian and Chinese Information Operations during COVID-
19,'' Center for European Policy Analysis, December 2, 2021; Vera 
Zakem, Edward Lucas, and James Lamond, ``Owning the Conversation: 
Assessing Responses to Russian and Chinese Information Operations 
Around COVID-19,'' Center for European Policy Analysis, March 31, 2022; 
Alexander Gabuev and Leonid Kovachich, ``Comrades in Tweets? The 
Contours and Limits of China-Russia Cooperation on Digital 
Propaganda,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 3, 2021; 
Christian Johnson and William Marcellino, ``Reining in COVID-19 
Disinformation from China, Russia, and Elsewhere,'' RAND Blog, November 
19, 2021. See also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 46, 187; CECC, 
2020 Annual Report, December 2021, 49-50.
    \65\ ``Is China Succeeding at Shaping Global Narratives about 
Covid-19?,'' ChinaPower, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, updated March 17, 2022.
    \66\ Olivia Solon, Keir Simmons, and Amy Perrette, ``China-Linked 
Disinformation Campaign Blames Covid on Maine Lobsters,'' NBC News, 
October 22, 2021. For background information on the PRC government's 
promotion of ``cold chain'' origins, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, 
March 2022, 189.
    \67\ Ben Nimmo, ``The Swiss Scientist That Never Was: A Chinese 
Influence Operation Focused on Covid-19,'' in ``November 2021 
Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report,'' Meta, November 2021, 12-26; 
Kevin Collier, ``China-Based Covid Disinformation Operation Pushed Fake 
Swiss Scientist, Facebook Says,'' NBC News, December 1, 2021; Shannon 
Bond, ``Facebook Takes Down China-Based Network Spreading False COVID-
19 Claims,'' NPR, December 1, 2021.
    \68\ ``Is China Succeeding at Shaping Global Narratives about 
Covid-19?,'' ChinaPower, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, updated March 17, 2022.
    \69\ Yves Moreau, ``Crack Down on Genomic Surveillance,'' Nature 
576, no. 7785 (December 2019): 36-38; Human Rights Watch, ``China: 
Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,'' December 13, 2017; Sui-
Lee Wee and Paul Mozur, ``China Uses DNA to Map Faces, with Help from 
the West,'' New York Times, updated October 22, 2021. This article 
originally was published on December 3, 2019. See also the Commission's 
prior reporting on this issue, CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 
2018, 199-200, 230, 249, 278; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 6, 
2017, 283.
    \70\ ``Retraction Note to: Revisiting the Male Genetic Landscape of 
China: A Multi-center Study of Almost 38,000 Y-STR Haplotypes, Human 
Genetics 141 (December 11, 2021): 175-76; Sui-Lee Wee, ``Two Scientific 
Journals Retract Articles Involving Chinese DNA Research,'' New York 
Times, September 9, 2021; ``Retraction Note: Predicting Adult Height 
from DNA Variants in a European'Asian Admixed Population,'' 
International Journal of Legal Medicine 135, September 7, 2021: 2151; 
``Retraction Note: EDAR, LYPLAL1, PRDM16, PAX3, DKK1, TNFSF12, 
CACNA2D3, and SUPT3H Gene Variants Influence Facial Morphology in a 
Eurasian Population,'' Human Genetics 140, August 30, 2021: 1499.
    \71\ Sui-Lee Wee, ``Two Scientific Journals Retract Articles 
Involving Chinese DNA Research,'' New York Times, September 9, 2021; 
Sui-Lee Wee and Paul Mozur, ``China Uses DNA to Map Faces, with Help 
from the West,'' New York Times, updated October 22, 2021. This article 
originally was published on December 3, 2019.
    \72\ Sui-Lee Wee, ``Two Scientific Journals Retract Articles 
Involving Chinese DNA Research,'' New York Times, September 9, 2021; 
British Medical Association et al., ``Statement on the Abuse of Uyghurs 
in China,'' December 7, 2021.
    \73\ Dennis Normile, ``Genetic Papers Containing Data from China's 
Ethnic Minorities Draw Fire,'' Science 373, no. 6556 (August 10, 2021); 
Human Rights Watch, `` `Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots': 
China's Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic 
Muslims,'' April 2021, 1, 23.
    \74\ Dennis Normile, ``Genetic Papers Containing Data from China's 
Ethnic Minorities Draw Fire,'' Science 373, no. 6556 (August 10, 2021); 
Yves Moreau, ``Crack Down on Genomic Surveillance,'' Nature 576, no. 
7785 (December 2019): 36-38.
    \75\ Mara Hvistendahl, ``Mass Resignations at Scientific Journal 
over Ethically Fraught China Genetics Papers,'' Intercept, August 4, 
2021.
    \76\ Francesca Forzano, Maurizio Genuardi, and Yves Moreau on 
behalf of the European Society of Human Genetics, ``ESHG Warns against 
Misuses of Genetic Tests and Biobanks for Discrimination Purposes,'' 
European Journal of Human Genetics 29 (January 18, 2021): 894-96.
    \77\ Linda Lew, ``China's Genetic Profiling Research Faces Pushback 
from Academic Journals over Ethics Concerns,'' South China Morning 
Post, September 12, 2021; Samuel Pitchford, ``Science Papers Retracted 
for Using Non-Consensual DNA Samples from Tibetans and Uyghurs,'' Human 
Rights Pulse, January 5, 2022.
    \78\ American Society of Human Genetics, ``The Importance of 
Universal Ethical Standards in Science,'' American Journal of Human 
Genetics (AJHG) 109, No. 6 (June 2, 2022): 979-80.
    \79\ Manya Koetse, ``Mother of Eight Found Chained Up in Shed Next 
to Family Home in Xuzhou,'' What's on Weibo, January 29, 2022; Lu 
Zhenhua and Cai Xuejiao, ``Update: Shackled Mother Had Been Sold At 
Least Three Times, Probe Finds,'' Caixin, February 24, 2022.
    \80\ ``On International Women's Day, Chinese Citizens Continue to 
Pressure PSB, Government Over Abuse and Trafficking of Women,'' China 
Digital Times, March 7, 2022; Zhou Dongxu, ``Analysis: Shackled Mother 
of Eight Is Only One of Thousands of Trafficked Women,'' Caixin, 
February 23, 2022.
    \81\ Alice Yan, ``Chinese Authorities Investigate Case of Mentally 
Ill Woman Chained Up in a Shed in Freezing Temperatures by Husband,'' 
South China Morning Post, February 8, 2022; Lu Zhenhua and Cai Xuejiao, 
``Update: Shackled Mother Had Been Sold At Least Three Times, Probe 
Finds,'' Caixin, February 24, 2022. The South China Morning Post, 
citing reports, asserted that the chained woman--known locally by the 
name Xiao Huamei--was trafficked in Yunnan before she was trafficked to 
Jiangsu. Caixin, citing an official report, asserted she had been sold 
three times in marriage in Jiangsu.
    \82\ Alice Yan, ``Chinese Authorities Investigate Case of Mentally 
Ill Woman Chained Up in a Shed in Freezing Temperatures by Husband,'' 
South China Morning Post, February 8, 2022.
    \83\ ``Muddle over Woman in Chains in China Stirs Online Anger with 
Authorities,'' Reuters, February 8, 2022.
    \84\ Manya Koetse, ``Mother of Eight Found Chained Up in Shed Next 
to Family Home in Xuzhou,'' What's on Weibo, January 29, 2022; ``On 
International Women's Day, Chinese Citizens Continue to Pressure PSB, 
Government Over Abuse and Trafficking of Women,'' China Digital Times, 
March 7, 2022.
    \85\ ``More Questions Than Answers Two Weeks After Uproar over 
Chained Mother in Xuzhou,'' SupChina, February 16, 2022.
    \86\ Li Yuan, ``Seeking Truth and Justice, Chinese See Themselves 
in a Chained Woman,'' New York Times, March 1, 2022; Guo Rui, ``In 
China, Buying Trafficked Women and Children Gets Less Jail Time Than 
Buying Illegal Plants or Animals,'' South China Morning Post, February 
18, 2022.
    \87\ ``On International Women's Day, Chinese Citizens Continue to 
Pressure PSB, Government Over Abuse and Trafficking of Women,'' China 
Digital Times, March 7, 2022; ``Gong'anbu bushu quanguo gong'an jiguan 
kaizhan daji guaimai funu ertong fanzui zhuanxiang xingdong'' [Ministry 
of Public Security deploys public security entities nationwide to 
launch a specialized action against the crime of trafficking of woman 
and children], Ministry of Public Security website, reprinted in 
Central People's Government, March 2, 2022.
    \88\ State Council, ``Zhongguo Fandui Guaimai Renkou Xingdong Jihua 
(2021-2030 nian)'' [China Action Plan Against Human Trafficking (2021-
2030)], sec. 2.2, para. 2.2.
    \89\ Committee Secretariat, UN Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, ``When Will the Committee Consider My Country? Note 
on the Status of Reports of 185 Parties to the Convention,'' May 9, 
2022, para. 34.
    \90\ UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, List 
of issues in relation to the combined second and third periodic reports 
of China, CRPD/C/CHN/Q/2-3*, April 21, 2020, para. 15 (a-d).
    \91\ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 61/106 of December 13, 2006, entry 
into force 3 May 3, 2008, art. 16. China signed the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities on March 30, 2007, and ratified it 
on August 1, 2008.
    \92\ State Council Information Office, ``Human Rights Action Plan 
of China (2021-2025),'' September 2021, sec. 1.5.
    \93\ National Health Commission, ``Dui Shisan ju Quanguo Renda Si 
Ci Huiyi Di 7535 Hao Jianyi de dafu'' [Response to suggestions from 
number 7535 of the Fourth Meeting at the Thirteenth Plenary of the 
National People's Congress], August 21, 2021; Jianyu Que, Lin Lu, and 
Le Shi, ``Development and Challenges of Mental Health in China,'' 
General Psychiatry 32, no. 1 (2019): 3; Di Liang, Vickie M. Mays, and 
Wei-Chin Hwang, ``Integrated Mental Health Services in China: 
Challenges and Planning for the Future,'' Health Policy and Planning 
33, no. 1 (2018): 108.
    \94\ National Health Commission, `` `Yanzhong Jingshen Zhang'ai 
Fabing Baogao Guanli Banfa (shixing)' Jiedu'' [Interpretation of the 
``Measures on the Management of Reporting on the Incidence of Severe 
Mental Disorders (Implementing)''], September 2, 2013. The Chinese 
government classifies the following as serious psychosocial disorders: 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, persistent delusional 
disorder, bipolar disorder, mental disorders due to epilepsy, and 
mental disorders related to intellectual disability.
    \95\ Yao Hao, ``China's Rural Mental Health Crisis,'' Sixth Tone, 
February 23, 2022; Lawrence H. Yang, Michael R. Phillips, Xianyun Li et 
al., ``Determinants of Never-treated in Rural Versus Urban Contexts for 
Individuals with Schizophrenia in a Population-Based Study in China,'' 
BMC Psychiatry 22, (February 17, 2022): 2. See also CECC, 2017 Annual 
Report, October 5, 2017, 204.
    \96\ Zhiying Ma, ``Promises and Perils of Guan: Mental Healthcare 
and the Rise of Biopolitical Paternalism in Contemporary China,'' 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 7, no. 2 (September 30, 2020): 154, 161-
62.
    \97\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Dian [PRC Civil Code], passed 
May 28, 2020, effective January 1, 2021, general, chap. 2, sec. 2, art. 
28. See also Cheng Dafa, ``Ruhe baohu he jiuzhu jingshen zhang'ai 
huanzhe? Lianghui jujiao'' [How to protect and assist people with 
mental disorders? A focus at the Two Sessions], Jiemian, March 9, 2022; 
Yang Weihua, ``In Search of Freedom: Personhood, Capacity and China's 
Mental Health Law,'' translated by Jayasree Kalathil, Mad in Asia, 
accessed May 15, 2022. For the Chinese original, see Yang Weihua, `` 
`Jingshen Weisheng Fa diyi an' de 4 ge falu jinbu'' [4 legal advances 
from the ``First case of the PRC Mental Health Law''], WeChat, November 
29, 2017.
    \98\ Yao Hao, ``China's Rural Mental Health Crisis,'' Sixth Tone, 
February 23, 2022.
    \99\ Zhao Siliu and Yi Xiao'ai, ``Yuanfang de kusheng: cong ba 
haizi muqin dao bei yiwang de nongcun nuxing jingshen zhang'ai 
huanzhe'' [Cries from afar: From the mother of eight to the forgotten 
rural women suffering from mental disorders], Initium, reprinted in 
Yahoo!, February 8, 2022; Human Rights Watch, ``Living in Chains: The 
Shackling of People with Psychosocial Disabilities Worldwide,'' October 
6, 2020, 57-58.
    \100\ Human Rights Watch, ``Living in Chains: The Shackling of 
People with Psychosocial Disabilities Worldwide,'' October 6, 2020, 39.
    \101\ Zhao Qiliu and Yi Xiao'ai, ``Yuanfang de kusheng: Cong ba 
haizi muqin dao bei yiwang de nongcun nuxing jingshen zhang'ai 
huanzhe'' [Cries from afar: From the mother of eight to the forgotten 
rural women suffering from mental disorders], Initium, February 8, 
2022.
    \102\ Zhao Qiliu and Yi Xiao'ai, ``Yuanfang de kusheng: Cong ba 
haizi muqin dao bei yiwang de nongcun nuxing jingshen zhang'ai 
huanzhe'' [Cries from afar: From the mother of eight to the forgotten 
rural women suffering from mental disorders], Initium, February 8, 
2022. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 204.
    \103\ ``Liang bumen fabu 10 jian canjiren quanyi baozhang jiancha 
gongyi susong dianxing anli'' [Two agencies issue 10 typical public 
interest lawsuits protecting the rights and interests of disabled 
persons], China News, May 13, 2022.
    \104\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental 
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, art. 30. 
See also Hua Jian Ma, Bin Xie, Yang Shao et al., ``Changing Patterns 
and Influencing Factors of Involuntary Admissions Following the 
Implementation of China's Mental Health Law: A 4-Year Longitudinal 
Investigation,'' Nature Scientific Reports 9, 15252 (October 24, 2019).
    \105\ Zhiying Ma, ``Promises and Perils of Guan: Mental Healthcare 
and the Rise of Biopolitical Paternalism in Contemporary China,'' 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 7, no. 2 (September 30, 2020): 154, 162-
63. See also Liu Xing and Gao Siwei, `` `Jingshen Weisheng Fa' zhongjie 
`bei jingshenbing' '' [``Mental Health Law'' puts end to ``forcible 
psychiatric commitment''], China Youth Daily, October 29, 2012.
    \106\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2013 nian 
Zhongguo weiwen yu renquan nianzhong baogao'' [2013 year-end report on 
stability maintenance and human rights in China], February 3, 2014; 
Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2014 nian Zhongguo jingshen jiankang 
yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2014 year-end report 
on mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric 
commitment)], January 14, 2015; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 
nian Zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong 
zongjie'' [2015 year-end summary on mental health and human rights in 
China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], February 8, 2016; Civil 
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2016 nian Zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu 
renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie'' [2016 year-end summary 
on mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric 
commitment)], January 26, 2017.
    \107\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen 
jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 year-
end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible 
psychiatric commitment)], March 3, 2021.
    \108\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo jingshen 
jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2020 year-
end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible 
psychiatric commitment)], March 3, 2021.
    \109\ Right Defense Network, ``Jiangxi Pingxiang weiquan renshi 
Zhou Caifan yin shangfang bei qiangzhi song jingshenbing yuan `zhiliao' 
'' [Zhou Caifan, a rights defender from Pingxiang, Jiangxi, was 
forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for ``medical treatment'' 
because of petitioning], August 20, 2021. For more information on Zhou 
Caifan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-
00088.
    \110\ Hua Jian Ma, Bin Xie, Yang Shao et al., ``Changing Patterns 
and Influencing Factors of Involuntary Admissions Following the 
Implementation of China's Mental Health Law: A 4-Year Longitudinal 
Investigation,'' Nature Scientific Reports 9, 15252 (October 24, 2019).
    \111\ Right Defense Network, ``Jiangxi Pingxiang weiquan renshi 
Zhou Caifan yin shangfang bei qiangzhi song jingshenbing yuan `zhiliao' 
'' [Zhou Caifan, a rights defender from Pingxiang, Jiangxi, was 
forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for ``medical treatment'' 
because of petitioning], August 20, 2021.
    \112\ David Bandurski, ``Struggling for Historical Truth,'' China 
Media Project, December 20, 2021.
    \113\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hunan Yongshun xian huaiyun jiaoshi 
Li Tiantian zao dangju qiangzhi song jingshenbing yuan pohai shijian 
yinfa quan wang guanzhu zhong renquan hanweizhe fu Yongshun xian 
weiquan jin Li Tiantian huoshi'' [Incident of persecution in which Li 
Tiantian, a pregnant teacher from Yongshun county, Hunan, was forcibly 
sent to psychiatric hospital by authorities draws the attention of the 
entire internet, a group of human rights defenders go to Yongshun for 
rights defense, today Li Tiantian was released], December 26, 2021; 
Chris Buckley, ``Fury in China After an Outspoken Teacher Disappears,'' 
New York Times, December 23, 2021; Huang Huizhao and Wang Lijun, 
``Hunan jiaoshi Li Tiantian shilian, zeng cheng bei `qiangxing guanjin' 
jingshenbing yuan'' [Hunan teacher Li Tiantian out of contact, said 
that she was ``being forcibly held'' in a psychiatric hospital], 
Caixin, December 22, 2021. For more information on Li Tiantian, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00001.
    \114\ ``Quanna jiaoyu `zhumeng' xingdong: rang wo de zhaopian rao 
diqiu yi quan'' [Inclusive education ``build a dream'' activity: Let my 
photo travel around the earth], People's Daily, December 4, 2017.
    \115\ Xie Renci, ``Zai Zhongguo, 8500 wan ren bu gan chumen'' [In 
China, 85 million people fear going out of doors], WeChat, December 3, 
2021, 6:55 a.m.; ``Translation: China's Invisible Disabled Community,'' 
China Digital Times, February 18, 2022. Xie's essay described the lack 
of accessible public spaces for persons using wheelchairs, despite 
legislation from 2012 that established accessible building standards. 
Xie also wrote about the deaths of two disability rights activists in 
2019 and 2021 who fell to their deaths because of a dangerously 
substandard sidewalk curb and the unmarked entrance to an underground 
parking garage, respectively.
    \116\ See, e.g., New Coronavirus Claims Legal Advisory Panel, ``Wei 
Shanghai fengcheng sinan ji shouhai jiating tigong fayuan xiezhu ge an 
weiquan ji jiti shenqing guojia peichang'' [Providing legal assistance 
to individual and collective applications for state compensation to the 
families of those who died and were harmed during the Shanghai 
lockdown], April 28, 2022, reprinted in Rights Defense Network, April 
30, 2022.
    \117\ Rights Defense Network, ``Changsha gongyi an Cheng Yuan yi 
bei rujian Hunan Jinshi Jianyu, Wu Gejianxiong yi bei mimi song zhi 
Hunan Hengzhou Jianyu, qinshu yu `ji mingxinpian pei tamen duguo 
zuojian de hei'an'' [Changsha public interest case Cheng Yuan has 
already been incarcerated at Jinshi Prison, Hunan; Wu Gejianxiong has 
been secretly sent to Hengzhou Prison, Hunan; family members call for 
``sending postcards to help them survive the darkness of their prison 
sentence''], October 11, 2021. For more information on Cheng Yuan, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00300.
    \118\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Authorities Must 
Release Three NGO Staff Sentenced by Changsha Intermediate Court, End 
Crackdown on Rights Advocacy,'' July 23, 2021. For more information on 
Wu Gejianxiong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2019-00302.
    \119\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
at its eighty-seventh session, 27 April-1 May 2020 Opinion No. 11/2020 
concerning Cheng Yuan, Liu Dazhi and Wu Gejianxiong (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2020/11, June 5, 2020, paras. 5, 20, 21.
    \120\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yimiao shouhai jiazhang He 
Fangmei bei daibu'' [He Fangmei, parent of a faulty vaccine victim, is 
arrested], April 30, 2019; ``Zhuanlan: Wangluo boyi: Tuite dailai qiji: 
Henan yimiao shouhai baobao zhi jia He Fangmei cheng suqiu jiao gei 
Renda daibiao'' [Exclusive: Online game: Twitter brings about a 
miracle: He Fangmei, of Henan's vaccine victim babies' home, says she 
gave appeal to NPC deputies], Radio Free Asia, May 27, 2020.
    \121\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Yimiao Baobao zhi Jia' weiquan 
tuanti faqiren He Fangmei zao qiangpo shizong yi da 1 nian 5 ge duo 
yue'' [Founder of ``Tainted Vaccine Babies' Home'' rights defender 
group He Fangmei has been forcibly disappeared for more than 1 year and 
5 months], March 24, 2022. For more information on He Fangmei, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00185.
    \122\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``He Fangmei qiuzhong chanzi 
lushi wufa huijian'' [He Fangmei gives birth while imprisoned, lawyer 
has no way of meeting with her], June 18, 2022; ``Shizong jin liang 
nian yimiao zhi can weiquan jiazhang He Fangmei qinren ku qiu xialuo'' 
[Relatives of He Fangmei, rights defender and the parent of child 
disabled by vaccine and who has been disappeared for nearly two years, 
cry out in search of her whereabouts], Radio Free Asia, June 17, 2022.
    \123\ ``Shizong jin liang nian yimiao zhi can weiquan jiazhang He 
Fangmei qinren ku qiu xialuo'' [Relatives of He Fangmei, rights 
defender and the parent of child disabled by vaccine who has been 
disappeared for nearly two years, cry out in search of her 
whereabouts], Radio Free Asia, June 17, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood 
Watch, ``He Fangmei qiuzhong chanzi lushi wufa huijian'' [He Fangmei 
gives birth while imprisoned, lawyer has no way of meeting with her], 
June 18, 2022.
    \124\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan meiti ren, jizhe, 
zuojia, `dabing mianfei yiliao ni wo meiri yi hu' yundong tuiguangren 
Hu Xincheng zao qiangpo shizong 36 tian'' [Hu Xincheng, a media 
personality, journalist, and writer from Wuhan, Hubei, and a campaigner 
for ``free healthcare for catastrophic illness, with you and me, every 
day another voice calls [for it]'' has been forcibly disappeared for 36 
days], January 9, 2022. For more information on Hu Xincheng, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00015.
    \125\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhiming meitiren, jizhe, zuojia 
`dabing mianfei zhiliao ni wo meiri yihu' yundong tuiguangren Hu 
Xincheng zao Shanxi Taiyuan jingfang daibu'' [Hu Xincheng, a media 
personality, journalist, writer, and campaigner for ``free healthcare 
for catastrophic illness, with you and me, every day another voice 
calls [for it]'' arrested by police in Taiyuan, Shanxi], January 13, 
2022; Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan meitiren, jizhe, zuojia, 
`dabing mianfei yiliao ni wo meiri yi hu' yundong tuiguangren Hu 
Xincheng zao qiangpo shizong 36 tian'' [Hu Xincheng, a media 
personality, journalist, and writer from Wuhan, Hubei, and a campaigner 
for ``free healthcare for catastrophic illness, with you and me, every 
day another voice calls [for it]'' has been forcibly disappeared for 36 
days], January 9, 2022.
    \126\ Xi Jinping, ``Zhashi tuidong gongtong fuyu'' [Strongly 
promote common prosperity], Seeking Truth, October 15, 2021; Jin 
Honglei, ``Youhua shehui baozhang zhidu tuijin gongtong fuyu'' 
[Optimizing the social security system and promoting common 
prosperity], Beijing Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, September 28, 2021; 
``China Pledges Funds to Boost Infectious Disease Prevention,'' 
Reuters, July 2, 2021.

The Environment and Climate Change

The Environment and Climate Change

                   The Environment and Climate Change

                                Findings

         China remained the world's leading emitter of 
        greenhouse gases, including coal mine methane 
        emissions, and is constructing 169 new coal mines and 
        at least 5 new coal-fired power plants. China's high 
        levels of air pollutants contribute to negative health 
        effects including premature death.
         At the UN Climate Change Conference of the 
        Parties (COP26) in November 2021, China and the United 
        States, the world's two largest emitters of carbon 
        dioxide, together pledged to cut greenhouse gases and 
        take other actions in the ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow 
        Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s.'' 
        In April 2022, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for 
        Climate John Kerry said that cooperation with China on 
        climate change had become more difficult after Chinese 
        authorities linked cooperation on climate change with 
        U.S. behavior on unrelated matters, a position they 
        reiterated in August 2022.
         During this reporting year, People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) citizens continued to face the problems 
        of water pollution and water scarcity. The Ministry of 
        Ecology and Environment (MEE) reported that 84.9 
        percent of tested surface water and 22.7 percent of 
        tested groundwater in China was fit for human 
        consumption. In addition, the construction of dams 
        along major rivers in China and outside China as part 
        of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was reported to 
        have negative impact on the 11 countries downstream and 
        elsewhere in the world.
         Authorities prosecuted and sentenced some 
        citizens who raised concerns about the environment 
        through protests and other forms of public advocacy. A 
        court in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region sentenced 
        environmental advocates Li Genshan, Zhang Baoqi, and 
        Niu Haibo, to prison in connection with their efforts 
        to protect local endangered species. In another case, a 
        court in Jiangxi province sentenced three individuals, 
        Xiong Yugen, Yang Fengying, and Yi Lianxiang, to one 
        year in prison, suspended for two years, in connection 
        with their protests against a polluting factory near 
        their village.
         A group consisting of 1 U.S.-based and 15 
        China-based environmental scientists concluded that 
        climate change amplified extreme rainfalls in China in 
        the summer of 2020. Heavy summer rains in July 2021 
        caused the deaths of 25 persons in Henan province, 
        including 12 who were trapped in a subway. Observers 
        noted that despite years of warnings from scientists, 
        Chinese officials and scientists scarcely mentioned 
        climate change as a contributing factor to increases in 
        rainfall.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Call on the PRC government to cease harassment of 
        environmental advocates and censorship of environmental 
        reporting, and to follow international standards on 
        freedom of speech, association, and assembly, including 
        those contained in the International Covenant on Civil 
        and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of 
        Human Rights, and China's Constitution. Highlight to 
        PRC officials the important role that civil society and 
        an independent media, including foreign media, can play 
        in strengthening environmental monitoring and improving 
        the environment.
          In meetings with Chinese officials, raise the 
        detentions of environmental researcher and former 
        Xinjiang University President Tashpolat Teyip and 
        environmental protection advocates Li Genshan, Zhang 
        Baoqi, and Niu Haibo.
          In meetings with international counterparts, develop 
        a coordinated response to reports of forced labor in 
        the solar power supply chain, and to PRC government 
        sanctions placed on research institutes and individual 
        scholars, including those that do important 
        environmental work.
          Call on the PRC government to cooperate with the 
        United States and other countries to implement the 
        goals spelled out in the ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow 
        Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s'' 
        and the Glasgow Climate Pact.
          Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working to 
        use satellite analysis and remote sensing to monitor 
        environmental problems and supply chains in China.

The Environment and Climate Change

The Environment and Climate Change

                   The Environment and Climate Change

                              Introduction

    In October 2021, the UN Human Rights Council for the first 
time recognized ``the right to a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment as a human right that is important for 
the enjoyment of human rights.'' \1\ The Council, moreover, 
reaffirmed this past year that the exercise of human rights--
including the rights to information, participation, and 
remedy--is ``vital to the protection of the environment.'' \2\ 
The current Special Rapporteur on human rights and the 
environment, David R. Boyd, also identified ``a non-toxic 
environment as one of the substantive elements of the right to 
a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment'' in a 
report to the Human Rights Council.\3\
    While many environmental organizations worldwide have 
advocated for environmental protection aimed at achieving a 
``safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment,'' the PRC 
government has curtailed the work of environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in China. Chinese officials 
have detained many
environmental advocates in recent years, causing others to fear 
criticizing the government or raising environmental 
concerns.\4\ Environmental NGOs have helped to collect evidence 
and pressure local officials through public interest lawsuits 
and public calls for action,\5\ but their efforts to file 
environmental public interest cases--by which civil society 
organizations such as NGOs can sue the government--continue to 
be obstructed by the prohibitive costs associated with such 
cases as well as legal hurdles in establishing standing.\6\ 
Furthermore, one expert said the PRC government's ``top-down'' 
environmental governance model favors participation by large 
NGOs over small ones, increasingly constrains NGOs by requiring 
``explicit government collaboration,'' and limits them to 
participating at the local level.\7\
    Senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and 
government have recognized the need to mitigate the negative 
environmental impact of the past decades of fast economic 
growth through protection of natural resources and remediation 
of water, air, and other forms of pollution.\8\ At least one 
observer has argued that Party legitimacy is linked with the 
government's ability to stop further
environmental degradation.\9\ Despite the PRC government's 
recognition that environmental policy and governance are 
crucial, the implementation of top-down policies is 
counterbalanced by pressure to sustain economic growth, 
particularly China's need for energy and other resources, which 
has led to developments and initiatives from various ministries 
and provinces that run contrary to and even undermine the 
central government's pledges regarding carbon neutrality and 
other goals.\10\ In addition, as researcher Yaqiu Wang of Human 
Rights Watch observed, ``[T]he Chinese government has been 
exploiting environmental causes to consolidate political 
control and expand its power at the expense of human rights 
inside--and increasingly outside--its borders.'' \11\ The 
following subsections describe developments this past year in 
water pollution, air pollution, and climate change vis-a-vis 
the right to health and the obstacles protesters faced in 
obtaining justice.

                               Pollution

                        WATER POLLUTION AND DAMS

    PRC citizens continue to face the problems of water 
pollution and water scarcity.\12\ According to a report from 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the 
majority of China's drinking water supply comes from surface 
water, followed by groundwater sources.\13\ The Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment (MEE) reported in May 2022 that the 
percentage of tested surface water fit for human consumption 
increased to 84.9 percent in 2021, up 1.5 percent from 
2020.\14\ China's vice minister of water resources said in 
November 2021 that 22.7 percent of tested groundwater in China 
was fit for human consumption.\15\ Studies published in 2021 
and 2022 indicate that some water sources in China had been 
contaminated by unsafe amounts of toxic heavy metals that can 
threaten the health of large numbers of people, especially in 
areas where groundwater is used as drinking water.\16\ Research 
shows that water pollution causes disease and premature 
death.\17\
    In China, water pollution, as well as climate change and 
industrialization, all exacerbate the problem of water 
scarcity, i.e., when the supply of freshwater does not meet the 
demand.\18\ Sources in the past two years indicate that at 
least nine provinces and municipalities suffer from water 
scarcity, including severe water shortages in southeastern 
China due to a drought in 2021.\19\
    The PRC government has built dams both in China and abroad 
(including in Cambodia and Argentina) that have contributed to
environmental damage and rights violations, such as flooding, 
drought, disruption of glacial movement and wildlife habitat, 
low water levels, lack of access to freshwater, destruction of 
fish populations, loss of sediment, and loss of livelihood, 
possibly impacting tens of millions of people.\20\ As part of 
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the construction of two 
hydroelectric dams on the Santa Cruz River in Argentina has 
proceeded despite protests, lawsuits, and court orders to pause 
construction until accurate and credible environmental impact 
studies can be completed.\21\ Conservationists say the dams 
would destroy breeding grounds for birds and habitat for 
endemic terrestrial flora, and may ``flood vital wetlands, 
disrupt the trajectory of some of the world's largest glaciers 
found outside of the poles, and destroy ancestral Mapuche 
land.'' \22\ In Cambodia, the Chinese government financed a dam 
as a BRI project that ``has undermined the lives and 
livelihoods of thousands of indigenous and ethnic minority 
people by flooding sections of two tributaries of the Mekong 
River.'' \23\

                             AIR POLLUTION

    China continues to experience high levels of air pollution, 
contributing to negative health effects including premature 
death.\24\ For example, environmental researchers estimate that 
exposure to air pollution in Beijing and Shanghai 
municipalities resulted in approximately 49,000 premature 
deaths in the first half of 2020,\25\ and one 2022 scientific 
study estimates that approximately 100 daily excess deaths 
occurred because of the combination of high temperatures and 
severe ozone pollution in a northeast China region that 
includes Beijing and Tianjin municipalities and neighboring 
provinces.\26\
    In its 2021 report on pollution and the environment in 
China, the MEE wrote that 218 out of 339 prefecture-level or 
higher jurisdictions met the 2021 targeted air quality standard 
for fine particulate matter pollution.\27\ It further reported 
that the percentage of good air quality days in these cities in 
2021 was 87.5 percent, up 0.5 percentage points from 2020.\28\
    The Beijing Municipal Ecology and Environment Bureau and 
the Beijing Daily, a news outlet, reported that Beijing 
successfully met its air quality goals, reaching them for the 
first time in 2021.\29\ Observers had attributed the previously 
worsening air quality in areas around Beijing in 2020 and 2021 
to multiple factors, including heavy industrial activity, in 
particular cement and steel production,\30\ and dust storms 
caused by land degradation.\31\ One climate observer said in 
January 2022 that in Beijing, concentrations of fine 
particulate matter have decreased by two-thirds since 2012, but 
still remain far above guidelines set by the World Health 
Organization.\32\ Another observer noted that public 
``outrage'' over the return of heavy pollution in the years 
following the 2008 Olympics, informed by air quality data 
published by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, drove the Chinese 
government to take nationwide action to reduce pollution.\33\

                        Climate Change and COP26

    The UN Human Rights Council, in its 2021 recognition of the 
right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as 
a human right, noted that the impact of climate change is among 
the factors that interfere with the enjoyment of these 
rights.\34\ This reaffirms earlier comments made by UN Special 
Rapporteur David Boyd, who also wrote about the importance of 
human rights in addressing climate change.\35\
    In October 2021, in advance of the UN Climate Change 
Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow, the PRC 
government submitted its updated nationally determined 
contributions (NDC) and its new long-term strategy to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and state media agency 
Xinhua referred to these as ``concrete action'' toward 
implementing the Paris Agreement,\36\ which China ratified in 
2016.\37\ The Paris Agreement obliges participating countries 
to set their own goals and publicly report their progress, but 
lacks concrete enforcement mechanisms.\38\ The submission 
reaffirms Xi Jinping's pledge at the UN General Assembly in 
September 2020 to have China's carbon dioxide emissions peak 
before 2030, and to achieve carbon neutrality (net-zero 
emissions) before 2060.\39\ China's updated NDC submission did 
not give a specific date for peak emissions, and some observers 
expressed disappointment that the submission did not contain 
more aggressive targets.\40\ While China is achieving its 
climate commitments, experts said it needs to establish and 
meet more aggressive targets to fulfill its pledge.\41\ Some 
observers have noted that China in recent years has made 
progress in implementing its domestic climate goals,\42\ 
although they and others also said that this progress is 
insufficient.\43\ As an example of progress, the Beijing 
municipal government reported that Beijing reached its air 
quality targets for the first time in 2021.\44\ A human rights 
observer, however, commented that this achievement came at the 
cost of a crackdown on coal usage for home heating.\45\ This 
crackdown, an example of top-down governance, violated the 
right to adequate housing and used surveillance technology to 
tighten state control.\46\
    Despite a pledge to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the 
coming decades and its record increase in renewable energy 
production in 2021,\47\ the PRC led a rebound in global carbon 
dioxide emissions that exceeded pre-pandemic levels.\48\ The 
rebound was driven by a record 10-percent increase in demand 
for electricity that was largely met by coal power, given 
limited supplies of low-emission energy sources.\49\ China's 
2021 carbon dioxide emissions exceeded 11.9 billion tons, 
amounting to about 33 percent of the worldwide total and 
offsetting declines in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.\50\ 
China's carbon dioxide emissions in 2021 grew by 350 Mt, more 
than double the annual increase of around 160 Mt seen in recent 
years.\51\ China also remains the world's largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases \52\ and the biggest producer of coal, 
responsible for 73 percent of the world's coal mine methane 
emissions, which are 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide 
as a greenhouse gas.\53\ China's biggest coal-producing 
province, Shanxi, emits approximately 13.1 million tons (Mt) of 
coal mine methane per year, nearly equivalent to the rest of 
the world combined.\54\ One report said that methane gas, in 
addition to being a ``super pollutant'' that can accelerate 
climate change, poses health and safety risks to nearby 
residents, as it is highly explosive and contains poisonous 
chemicals that can cause illness or death.\55\ As of March 
2022, China was constructing 169 new coal mines, which are 
expected to increase methane emissions by 6 Mt per year.\56\ 
According to one international monitoring group, an energy 
crisis in late 2021 prompted the Chinese government to increase 
coal output by 270 Mt in the high-producing Shanxi and Shaanxi 
provinces and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; this surge 
in output was expected to have an ``immediate climate impact, 
even before burning the coal at power plants.'' \57\ In early 
2022, the government approved the construction of five coal-
fired power plants in several provinces.\58\ New mapping 
research found that Chinese steel and power companies continued 
to build coal-based plants, with new projects surpassing the 
annual average capacity additions of the rest of the world by 
as much as 15 times.\59\
    Observers said that climate change exacerbated the negative 
effects of natural occurrences.\60\ A study on the harmful 
combination of ozone pollution and seasonal heat waves found 
that ``[w]ith global warming, extreme high temperatures and 
heat events have become natural hazards in China in recent 
decades, with substantial effect on socioeconomics, ecosystems, 
and human health,'' and that such events ``have intensified in 
the past 60 years and are expected to become more frequent and 
severe in the coming decades.'' \61\ Another report suggested 
that climate change amplified extreme rainfalls in China in the 
summer of 2020.\62\ Heavy summer rains in July 2021 caused the 
deaths of 25 persons in Henan province,\63\ including 12 who 
were trapped in a subway.\64\ Researchers attributed such 
deadly extreme weather events around the globe to climate 
change.\65\ Observers noted that despite warnings from 
scientists over many years, Chinese officials and scientists 
scarcely mentioned climate change as a contributing factor to 
increases in rainfall.\66\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
   COP26 ``Glasgow Declaration'' between  China and the United States
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  At the UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) held in
 Glasgow in November 2021, the United States and China, the world's two
 largest emitters of carbon dioxide, together pledged to cut greenhouse
 gases in the ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing
 Climate Action in the 2020s.'' \67\ The two sides agreed to cooperate
 on methane emissions, carbon dioxide emissions, greenhouse gases,
 transition to a global net-zero economy, the Paris Agreement, global
 illegal deforestation, international thermal coal power generation, and
 agreed to establish a ``Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in
 the 2020s.'' \68\ The PRC pledged to (1) ``phase down'' coal for the
 duration of the 15th Five-Year Plan, starting in 2026; and (2) reach
 peak carbon emissions by 2030.\69\ Additionally, China joined the
 United States and more than 100 countries in a pledge to end
 deforestation by 2030.\70\ Currently, China remains a global leader in
 the destruction of forests associated with international trade.\71\
  Scientists and other observers said that the Glasgow Climate Pact,
 signed by all 197 countries present at the summit, marks an important
 step toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but many said the pact
 will not achieve the necessary goal of keeping global temperatures
 within 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.\72\ In April
 2022, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry said that
 cooperation with the PRC on climate change had become more difficult
 after Chinese authorities linked cooperation on climate change with
 U.S. behavior on unrelated matters, a position they reiterated in
 August 2022.\73\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            Illegal Fishing

    A report by the Environmental Justice Foundation found that 
illegal fishing is widespread in China's distant-water fishing 
operations, and some Chinese vessels target endangered and 
protected marine life.\74\ The report said, ``China's State 
subsidies have allowed the grossly overcapacity fleet to 
exploit the waters of developing nations that rely on marine 
resources for livelihoods and food security.'' \75\ Over 95 
percent of interviewed crew members of Chinese distant-water 
fishing vessels reported witnessing illegal fishing, including 
killing sharks (for their fins), dolphins, and protected 
turtles and seals.\76\ The report also found that these fishing 
operations used front companies to hide their illegal 
activities, and that senior Chinese crew members on the vessels 
committed ``gross human rights abuses'' against migrant crew 
members on Chinese-owned vessels.\77\

             Access to Justice for Environmental Advocates

    During the 2022 reporting year, PRC citizens continued to 
raise concerns related to the environment through various forms 
of
public advocacy, at the risk of being harassed or detained. 
China's Constitution provides for freedom of speech, assembly, 
and association,\78\ as do the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) \79\ and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.\80\ According to the Principles on Human 
Rights and the Environment, ``States should provide a safe and 
enabling environment in which individuals, groups and organs of 
society that work on human rights or environmental issues can 
operate free from threats, harassment, intimidation and 
violence.'' \81\

         Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. On August 31, 
        2021, the Shapotou District People's Court in Zhongwei 
        municipality, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, sentenced 
        volunteers from a local wildlife conservation 
        association who worked to protect endangered wildlife 
        from poachers, for alleged participation in the 
        endangerment of wildlife and disturbing social 
        order.\82\ Li Genshan and Niu Haibo were sentenced to 
        four years and six months, and three years and eight 
        months in prison, respectively, on the charges of 
        ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' \83\ and 
        ``harming rare and endangered wild animals.'' \84\ Both 
        were fined 10,000 yuan (US$1,500).\85\ A third 
        individual, Zhang Baoqi, was sentenced to one year and 
        two months for ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble'' and owning an illegal gun, after he had 
        turned in hunting guns seized from poachers.\86\ On 
        appeal, the Zhongwei Intermediate People's Court 
        vacated the first-instance decision on November 3, 
        2021, because of a procedural error, and remanded the 
        case for retrial.\87\ The Shapotou People's Court 
        retried the defendants from January 25 through January 
        29, 2022, but sentenced all three to the same prison 
        terms and fines.\88\ During the retrial, defense 
        lawyers said at least one of the confessions was 
        obtained through ``fatigue interrogation'' (pilao 
        shenxun).\89\ Before being detained in 2020, Li and 
        other environmental protection volunteers also 
        reportedly alleged that local forestry officials had 
        sheltered poachers.\90\ Sources attributed Li's 
        detention to retaliation by officials for his prior 
        efforts to expose heavy pollution in the Tengger Desert 
        in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,\91\ for which 
        two local officials and executives of the polluting 
        company were punished.\92\
         Jiangxi province. Five years after Xiong 
        Yugen, Yang Fengying, and Yi Lianxiang from Dinglong 
        village, Le'an county, Fuzhou municipality, blocked a 
        road several times to prevent the transport of 
        unidentified waste from a nearby polluting factory and 
        demanded its closure, a court sentenced them to serve 
        one year in prison, suspended for two years, for the 
        crime of ``gathering a crowd to disturb social order.'' 
        \93\ Eight months later, Xiong Zhichao, a 
        representative of the rights-defending villagers, was 
        also found guilty of ``gathering a crowd to disturb 
        social order,'' but was exempted from criminal 
        punishment.\94\ After the first-instance verdict was 
        pronounced, Xiong Zhichao appealed, but the second-
        instance court upheld the original verdict.\95\ 
        Subsequently, Xiong Zhichao and the other three 
        continued to file complaints with the Le'an County 
        People's Court and the Fuzhou Municipal Intermediate 
        People's Court.\96\

                    Monitoring and Data Transparency

    According to the Framework Principles on Human Rights and 
the Environment, issued by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of 
a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, states 
should be transparent in providing the public with 
environmental information and should ensure that their 
environmental standards are effectively enforced.\97\ In 
November 2021, China's Central Political and Legal Affairs 
Commission (PLAC) said that an environmental monitoring NGO, 
Shanghai-based Rendu Ocean NPO Development Centre, had 
published sensitive data that could threaten national 
security.\98\ The PLAC issued the NGO a warning and shut down 
22 monitoring stations that it said were close to military 
installations and ordered the ``confiscation of illegal 
gains.'' \99\ Rendu Ocean had previously received positive 
coverage in state-run media for
organizing volunteer cleanup efforts.\100\ At a hearing on 
environmental challenges convened in 2021 by the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, a civil society expert commented 
that the Chinese government wants transparency on environmental 
information within the various levels of government, but it 
does not necessarily want that information shared with the 
public.\101\

The Environment and Climate Change

The Environment and Climate Change

    Notes to Section VIII--The Environment and Climate Change

    \1\ UN Human Rights Council, ``The Human Right to a Safe, Clean, 
Healthy and Sustainable Environment,'' A/HRC/48/L.23/Rev.1, October 5, 
2021, 2-3; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Environment, The Right to a Clean, Healthy, and 
Sustainable Environment: Non-Toxic Environment, David R. Boyd, A/HRC/
49/53, January 12, 2022, Summary, para. 1; ``Access to a Healthy 
Environment, Declared a Human Right by UN Rights Council,'' UN News, 
October 8, 2021. See also UN General Assembly, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John 
H. Knox, A/73/188, July 19, 2018, para. 12.
    \2\ UN Human Rights Council, The Human Right to a Safe, Clean, 
Healthy and Sustainable Environment, A/HRC/48/L.23/Rev.1, October 5, 
2021, 2. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John 
H. Knox, A/HRC/37/59, January 24, 2018, para 2.
    \3\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Environment, The Right to a Clean, Healthy, and 
Sustainable Environment: Non-Toxic Environment, David R. Boyd, A/HRC/
49/53, January 12, 2022, Summary.
    \4\ Helen Davidson, `` `You Follow the Government's Agenda': 
China's Climate Activists Walk a Tightrope,'' Guardian, August 16, 
2021; China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jessica C. Teets, Associate Professor, Middlebury 
College).
    \5\ China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jessica C. Teets, Associate Professor, Middlebury 
College).
    \6\ Sasha Kong, ``China's Climate Litigation Policy Must Change,'' 
FairPlanet, February 3, 2022; Yu Zhuang, ``The Challenge of Litigation 
Costs and Damage Assessment Fees in Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation in China,'' Comparative Jurist: William & Mary Law School's 
International and Comparative Law Blog, May 13, 2017.
    \7\ China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jessica C. Teets, Associate Professor, Middlebury 
College).
    \8\ Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro, China Goes Green: Coercive 
Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet (Cambridge, UK; Medford, MA: 
Polity, 2020), 4. See also David Stanway, ``China's Giant State-Owned 
Companies Struggle to Align Climate Rhetoric with Reality,'' Reuters, 
November 1, 2021; Lindsay Maizland, ``China's Fight Against Climate 
Change and Environmental Degradation,'' Council on Foreign Relations, 
May 19, 2021.
    \9\ See, e.g., Yanzhong Huang, Toxic Politics: China's 
Environmental Health Crisis and Its Challenge to the Chinese State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 4, 187.
    \10\ David Stanway, ``China's Giant State-Owned Companies Struggle 
to Align Climate Rhetoric with Reality,'' Reuters, November 1, 2021; 
Jianqiang Liu, ``Analysis: Nine Key Moments That Changed China's Mind 
about Climate Change,'' Carbon Brief, October 25, 2021.
    \11\ Yaqiu Wang, ``Beijing's Green Fist,'' Breakthrough Institute, 
March 29, 2022. See also Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro, China Goes Green: 
Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet (Cambridge, UK; 
Medford, MA: Polity, 2020), 16-19.
    \12\ UN Water, ``The United Nations World Water Development Report 
2022: Groundwater: Making the Invisible Visible,'' March 21, 2022. See 
also ``How Does Water Security Affect China's Development?,'' Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (China Power), August 26, 2020; 
UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights and the Global Water Crisis: 
Water Pollution, Water Scarcity and Water-Related Disasters, A/HRC/46/
28, January 19, 2021, para. 25. According to a 2021 UN Human Rights 
Council report on human rights and the global water crisis, ``Water 
pollution, water scarcity and water-related disasters have major 
impacts on a wide range of human rights, including the rights to life, 
health, water, sanitation, food, a healthy environment, education, an 
adequate standard of living, development and culture, and on the rights 
of the child.''
    \13\ ``How Does Water Security Affect China's Development?,'' 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (China Power), August 
26, 2020.
    \14\ Ministry of Ecology and Environment, ``Huang Runqiu zai 
Quanguo Renda Changweihui shang zuo baogao'' [Huang Runqiu gave a 
report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress], 
April 21, 2022.
    \15\ ``China Aims to Safeguard Groundwater with New Rule,'' China 
Daily, November 23, 2021; Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 
``Shengtai Huanjing bu 2021 nian Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Gongzuo Niandu 
Baogao'' [Ministry of Ecology and Environment's 2021 Annual Report on 
Government Information Disclosure], 2021.
    \16\ Hanjiang Pan et al.,``Heavy Metals and As in Groundwater, 
Surface Water, and Sediments of Dexing Giant Cu-Polymetallic Ore 
Cluster, East China,'' Water 14, no. 3:352, January 2022, 352-53; 
Zhifeng Huang et al., ``Distribution, Toxicity Load, and Risk 
Assessment of Dissolved Metal in Surface and Overlying Water at the 
Xiangjiang River in Southern China,'' Scientific Reports 11, no. 109 
(2021), 2, 10.
    \17\ Mark T. Buntaine et al., ``Citizen Monitoring of Waterways 
Decreases Pollution in China by Supporting Government Action and 
Oversight,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 
29 (July 12, 2021): 1; UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights and the 
Global Water Crisis: Water Pollution, Water Scarcity and Water-related 
Disasters, A/HRC/46/28, January 19, 2021, paras. 27, 28; Zhifeng Huang 
et al., ``Distribution, Toxicity Load, and Risk Assessment of Dissolved 
Metal in Surface and Overlying Water at the Xiangjiang River in 
Southern China,'' Scientific Reports 11:109 (2021), 10.
    \18\ David Kirton, ``China's Southern Megacities Warn of Water 
Shortages during East River Drought,'' Reuters, December 9, 2021; Hal 
Brands, ``China Is Running Out of Water and That's Scary for Asia,'' 
Bloomberg, December 29, 2021; Xingcai Liu et al., ``Global Agricultural 
Water Scarcity Assessment Incorporating Blue and Green Water 
Availability Under Future Climate Change,'' Earth's Future 10, no. 4 
(2022), 14; ``How Does Water Security Affect China's Development?,'' 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (China Power), August 
26, 2020.
    \19\ David Kirton, ``China's Southern Megacities Warn of Water 
Shortages during East River Drought,'' Reuters, December 9, 2021; 
Genevieve Donnellon-May and Guangtao Fu, ``Are `Sponge Cities' the 
Answer to Shenzhen's Water Scarcity?,'' The Diplomat, January 5, 2022; 
``How Does Water Security Affect China's Development?'' Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (China Power), August 26, 2020.
    \20\ Tyler Roney, ``What Are the Impacts of Dams on the Mekong 
River?,'' The Third Pole, July 1, 2021; Maxwell Radwin, ``China-Funded 
Dam Could Disrupt Key Argentine Glaciers and Biodiversity,'' Mongabay 
Environmental News, May 12, 2022. See also Jack Silvers, ``Water Is 
China's Greatest Weapon and Its Achilles Heel,'' Harvard Political 
Review, October 16, 2020; Jagannath P. Panda, ``Beijing Boosts Its 
Position as a `Himalayan Hegemon' Through Hydropower,'' China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, June 7, 2021; Brian Eyler, ``Science Shows 
Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong,'' Foreign Policy, April 22, 
2020; Alan Basist and Claude Williams, ``Monitoring the Quantity of 
Water Flowing Through the Upper Mekong Basin Under Natural (Unimpeded) 
Conditions,'' Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership, Lower Mekong 
Initiative, and Pact, April 10, 2020, 12, 18. See also Conn Hallinan, 
``The World Needs a Water Treaty,'' Common Dreams, July 11, 2019. 
Despite sharing over 40 waterways that cross boundaries with 14 
neighboring countries, China did not sign the UN Watercourses 
Convention, a global treaty effective since 2014, which aims to protect 
multinational water sources by multiple means including reducing 
pollution, and by bringing countries that share important water sources 
into multilateral collaborative management agreements. See UN 
Watercourses Convention, ``UN Watercourses Convention,'' 2022, arts. 
21, 24.
    \21\ Maxwell Radwin, ``China-Funded Dam Could Disrupt Key Argentine 
Glaciers and Biodiversity,'' Mongabay Environmental News, May 12, 2022.
    \22\ Maxwell Radwin, ``China-Funded Dam Could Disrupt Key Argentine 
Glaciers and Biodiversity,'' Mongabay Environmental News, May 12, 2022.
    \23\ Human Rights Watch, ``Cambodia: China's `Belt and Road' Dam Is 
a Rights Disaster,'' August 10, 2021; Human Rights Watch, ``Underwater: 
Human Rights Impacts of a China Belt and Road Project in Cambodia,'' 
August 10, 2021.
    \24\ Peng Yin et al., ``The Effect of Air Pollution on Deaths, 
Disease Burden, and Life Expectancy Across China and Its Provinces, 
1990-2017: An Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017,'' 
Lancet Planetary Health 4, no. 9, September 1, 2020: e387. See also 
Pinya Wang et al., ``North China Plain as a Hot Spot of Ozone Pollution 
Exacerbated by Extreme High Temperatures,'' Atmospheric Chemistry and 
Physics 22, no. 7 (April 11, 2022): 4710; UN Human Rights Council, 
Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, 
Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, A/HRC/40/55, January 8, 2019, para. 26.
    \25\ David Stanway, ``CORRECTED--Smog Causes an Estimated 49,000 
Deaths in Beijing, Shanghai in 2020--Tracker,'' Reuters, July 9, 2020. 
An October 2020 journal article found that up to 30.8 million people in 
China had died prematurely from 2000 to 2016 as a result of air 
pollution. See Fengchao Liang et al., ``The 17-y Spatiotemporal Trend 
of PM2.5 and Its Mortality Burden in China,'' Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 41, October 13, 2020: 25601.
    \26\ Pinya Wang et al., ``North China Plain as a Hot Spot of Ozone 
Pollution Exacerbated by Extreme High Temperatures,'' Atmospheric 
Chemistry and Physics 22, no. 7 (April 11, 2022): 4707, 4710.
    \27\ Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), ``2021 nian 
Zhongguo shengtai huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao'' [2021 Bulletin on the 
state of China's ecological environment], May 26, 2022, 7. The MEE's 
2021 target for PM2.5 pollution, 34.5 micrograms per cubic 
meter of air, is over three times higher than the World Health 
Organization's standard for healthy air quality. Muyu Xu and David 
Stanway, ``China Target to Allow Air Pollution to Rise Slightly in 
2021--Environment Ministry,'' Reuters, February 24, 2021. In October 
2021, a group of 17 government entities issued a circular of pollution 
reduction targets for over 70 municipalities and cities in eastern 
China for the fall-winter 2021-22 high pollution season. See Ministry 
of Ecology and Environment, Guanyu yinfa ``2021-2022 nian Qiu Dongji 
Daqi Wuran Zonghe Zhili Gongjian Fang'an'' de Tongzhi [Circular on 
issuing the ``2021-2022 Autumn and Winter Air Pollution Comprehensive 
Control Plan''], October 28, 2021.
    \28\ Ministry of Ecology and Environment, ``2021 nian Zhongguo 
shengtai huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao'' [2021 Bulletin on the State of 
China's Ecological Environment], May 26, 2022, 8.
    \29\ Beijing Municipal Ecology and Environment Bureau, ``2021 nian 
Beijing shi kongqi zhiliang shouci [In 2021, Beijing's air quality 
fully met the standard for the first time], February 28, 2022; Gao Zhi, 
``Beijing shengtai huanjing zhiliang jiaochu liang yan `chengjidan' 
2021 nian kongqi zhiliang shouci quanmian dabiao'' [Beijing's 
ecological and environmental quality handed over a dazzling ``report 
card,'' and the air quality in 2021 will fully meet standards for the 
first time], Beijing Daily, March 31, 2022.
    \30\ Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, ``Air Pollution 
Increases around Beijing as Steel Mills Fail to Cut Capacity,'' 
December 3, 2020, 5; Jane Cai, ``Beijing Chokes on Smog as China Tries 
to Balance Industrial Recovery and Greener Growth,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 11, 2021.
    \31\ Steven Lee Myers, ``The Worst Dust Storm in a Decade Shrouds 
Beijing and Northern China,'' New York Times, March 15, 2021.
    \32\ Lauri Myllyvirta, ``Beijing's Air Quality Meets National 
Standards: A Major Milestone in China's War on Smog,'' Centre for 
Research on Energy and Clean Air, January 5, 2022.
    \33\ Lili Pike, ``From `Airpocalypse' to Olympic Blue: China's Air 
Quality Transformation,'' Grid, February 22, 2022.
    \34\ UN Human Rights Council, The Human Right to a Safe, Clean, 
Healthy and Sustainable Environment, A/HRC/48/L.23/Rev.1, October 5, 
2021, 2-3.
    \35\ UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, 
David Boyd, ``A Safe Climate: Human Rights and Climate Change,'' 
October 16, 2019.
    \36\ ``China Submits Key Documents on Tackling Climate Change to 
United Nations,'' Xinhua, October 29, 2021; Hongqiao Liu and Xiaoying 
You, ``Q&A: What Does China's New Paris Agreement Pledge Mean for 
Climate Change?,'' Carbon Brief, December 16, 2021.
    \37\ United Nations Treaty Collection, ``United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter XXVII, Environment, Paris Agreement,'' accessed 
June 21, 2022.
    \38\ Lindsay Maizland, ``Global Climate Agreements: Successes and 
Failures,'' Council on Foreign Relations, updated November 17, 2021; 
Jon Greenberg, ``Fact-Check: Does the Paris Accord Fail to Hold China 
and India Accountable?,'' Austin-American Statesman, January 27, 2021.
    \39\ State Council Information Office, ``Full Text: Responding to 
Climate Change: China's Policies and Actions,'' October 27, 2021; 
Hongqiao Liu and Xiaoying You, ``Q&A: What Does China's New Paris 
Agreement Pledge Mean for Climate Change?,'' Carbon Brief, December 16, 
2021; ``Full Text: Statement by Xi Jinping at General Debate of 75th 
UNGA,'' China Daily, September 23, 2020.
    \40\ Hongqiao Liu and Xiaoying You, ``Q&A: What Does China's New 
Paris Agreement Pledge Mean for Climate Change?,'' Carbon Brief, 
December 16, 2021.
    \41\ China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing 
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jennifer L. Turner, Director of the China Environment 
Forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center), 2; David Stanway, ``China's Giant 
State-Owned Companies Struggle to Align Climate Rhetoric with 
Reality,'' Reuters, November 1, 2021.
    \42\ Xie Chunping, ``Guest Post: Is China Living up to Its Pledges 
on Climate Change and Energy Transition?,'' Carbon Brief, February 21, 
2022; UN Human Rights Council, Supplementary Information on the Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations 
Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment, David Boyd, A/74/161, Annex, A Safe Climate: Good 
Practices, September 26, 2019, para. 20; Joanna Lewis and Laura 
Edwards, ``Assessing China's Energy and Climate Goals,'' Center for 
American Progress, May 6, 2021.
    \43\ Joanna Lewis and Laura Edwards, ``Assessing China's Energy and 
Climate Goals,'' Center for American Progress, May 6, 2021; China's 
Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jennifer L. Turner, Director of the China Environment 
Forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center), 2.
    \44\ Beijing Municipal Ecology and Environment Bureau, ``2021 nian 
Beijing shi kongqi zhiliang shouci quanmian dabiao'' [In 2021, 
Beijing's air quality fully met the standard for the first time], 
January 4, 2022. See also Joe Lo, `` `Extraordinary Progress'--Beijing 
Meets Air Pollution Goals After Coal Crackdown,'' Climate Home News, 
January 4, 2022.
    \45\ Yaqiu Wang, ``Beijing's Green Fist: How Environmental Policy 
Became a Tool of State Control,'' Breakthrough Institute, March 29, 
2022.
    \46\ Yaqiu Wang, ``Beijing's Green Fist: How Environmental Policy 
Became a Tool of State Control,'' Breakthrough Institute, March 29, 
2022; Eva Dou, ``A Novel Way to Reduce Emissions? China Tries 
Confiscating Coal from Households.,'' Washington Post, November 3, 
2021; Joe Lo, `` `Extraordinary Progress'--Beijing Meets Air Pollution 
Goals After Coal Crackdown,'' Climate Home News, January 4, 2022; 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``The Right to 
Adequate Housing,'' Fact Sheet No. 21 (Rev. 1), May 2014, 4.
    \47\ State Council Information Office, ``Full Text: Responding to 
Climate Change: China's Policies and Actions,'' October 27, 2021; 
Hongqiao Liu and Xiaoying You, ``Q&A: What Does China's New Paris 
Agreement Pledge Mean for Climate Change?,'' Carbon Brief, December 16, 
2021; ``Full Text: Statement by Xi Jinping at General Debate of 75th 
UNGA,'' China Daily, September 23, 2020.
    \48\ International Energy Agency, ``Global CO2 Emissions Rebounded 
to Their Highest Level in History in 2021,'' March 8, 2022.
    \49\ ``China Briefing, 17 March 2022: Beijing `Doubling Down on 
Fossil Fuels'; China's CO2 Emissions Increase; Coal Production 
Growth,'' Carbon Brief, March 17, 2022; International Energy Agency, 
``Global CO2 Emissions Rebounded to Their Highest Level in History in 
2021,'' March 8, 2022; European Space Agency, ``Air Pollution Returning 
to Pre-COVID Levels,'' Phys.org, March 16, 2021.
    \50\ International Energy Agency, ``Global CO2 Emissions Rebounded 
to Their Highest Level in History in 2021,'' March 8, 2022.
    \51\ ``China Briefing, 17 March 2022: Beijing `Doubling Down on 
Fossil Fuels'; China's CO2 Emissions Increase; Coal Production 
Growth,'' Carbon Brief, March 17, 2022.
    \52\ China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing 
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jennifer L. Turner, Director, China Environment 
Forum, Woodrow Wilson Center).
    \53\ Global Energy Monitor, ``Why China's Coal Mine Boom 
Jeopardizes Short-Term Climate Targets,'' May 2022; ``New Coal Mine 
Projects Seen Swelling Global Methane Emissions by a Fifth,'' Reuters, 
March 15, 2022.
    \54\ Ryan Driskell Tate, ``Bigger than Oil or Gas? Sizing Up Coal 
Mine Methane,'' Global Energy Monitor, March 2022, 8.
    \55\ Deborah Gordon, ``Methane: A Threat to People and Planet,'' 
RMI, July 7, 2021.
    \56\ Ryan Driskell Tate, ``Bigger than Oil or Gas? Sizing Up Coal 
Mine Methane,'' Global Energy Monitor, March 2022, 20.
    \57\ Global Energy Monitor, ``Why China's Coal Mine Boom 
Jeopardizes Short-Term Climate Targets,'' May 2022.
    \58\ ``Guojia Nengyuan Jituan, Datang, Zheneng deng, 5 ge mei dian 
xiangmu huo hezhun! Han 2 ge baiwan dianchang!'' [National Energy 
Group, Datang, Zheneng, etc., 5 coal power projects have been approved! 
Including 2 million [kilowatt] power plants!], Polaris Electricity 
Network, February 11, 2022.
    \59\ Lauri Myllyvirta, ``Briefing: Most Coal Power Plants since 
2016 Entered Construction in China in 2021, Investment in Coal-Based 
Steelmaking Accelerated,'' Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, 
February 24, 2022. This finding is based on data from 2016 2020.
    \60\ Steven Lee Myers, `` `Please Save Us!' Grim Scenes in China as 
Flood Inundates a Subway,'' New York Times, July 20, 2021; Pinya Wang 
et al., ``North China Plain as a Hot Spot of Ozone Pollution 
Exacerbated by Extreme High Temperatures,'' Atmospheric Chemistry and 
Physics 22, no. 7 (2022): 4706.
    \61\ Pinya Wang,et al., ``North China Plain as a Hot Spot of Ozone 
Pollution Exacerbated by Extreme High Temperatures,'' Atmospheric 
Chemistry and Physics 22, no. 7 (2022): 4705-19.
    \62\ Yang Yang et al., ``Abrupt Emissions Reductions during COVID-
19 Contributed to Record Summer Rainfall in China,'' Nature 
Communications 13, no. 1 (2022): 959.
    \63\ Steven Lee Myers, `` `Please Save Us!' Grim Scenes in China as 
Flood Inundates a Subway,'' New York Times, July 20, 2021.
    \64\ Nectar Gan and Jessie Yeung, ``Record-Breaking Rains 
Devastated Central China, but There Is Little Talk of Climate Change,'' 
CNN, July 23, 2021.
    \65\ Steven Lee Myers, `` `Please Save Us!' Grim Scenes in China as 
Flood Inundates a Subway,'' New York Times, July 20, 2021.
    \66\ Nectar Gan and Jessie Yeung, ``Record-Breaking Rains 
Devastated Central China, but There Is Little Talk of Climate Change,'' 
CNN, July 23, 2021.
    \67\ Lisa Friedman, ``What Happened at COP26 on Wednesday: China 
and U.S. Say They'll `Enhance' Climate Ambition,'' New York Times, 
November 13, 2021; Echo Xie, ``China Sends `Modest' Climate Pledge to 
Glasgow for COP26,'' South China Morning Post, October 29, 2021.
    \68\ U.S. Department of State, ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow 
Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s,'' November 10, 
2021.
    \69\ U.S. Department of State, ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow 
Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s,'' November 10, 
2021; Echo Xie, ``China Sends `Modest' Climate Pledge to Glasgow for 
COP26,'' South China Morning Post, October 29, 2021.
    \70\ Catrin Einhorn and Chris Buckley, ``Global Leaders Pledge to 
End Deforestation by 2030,'' New York Times, November 10, 2021.
    \71\ Luciana Tellez-Chavez, ``Without China, Efforts to Reverse 
Deforestation Will Fail,'' The Diplomat, October 27, 2021; Beatrice 
Wedeux and Anke Schulmeister-Oldenhove. ``Stepping Up: The Continuing 
Impact of EU Consumption on Nature,'' World Wildlife Fund, April 2021.
    \72\ UN Climate Change, ``Report of the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on Its 
Third Session, Held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021,'' 
March 8, 2022; Ehsan Masood and Jeff Tollefson, `` `COP26 Hasn't Solved 
the Problem': Scientists React to UN Climate Deal,'' Nature 599, no. 
7885 (November 18, 2021): 355-56; Christina E. Hoicka et al., ``COP26: 
Experts React to the UN Climate Summit and Glasgow Pact,'' The 
Conversation, November 15, 2021.
    \73\ Owen Churchill, ``US Climate Chief Says Fraught Relations with 
China Spell `Serious Trouble' for Efforts to Achieve Goals,'' South 
China Morning Post, April 21, 2022; Chris Buckley and Lisa Friedman, 
``Climate Change Is `Not a Geostrategic Weapon,' Kerry Tells Chinese 
Leaders.'' New York Times, September 1, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 
``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in 
the 2020s,'' November 10, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announces Countermeasures in Response to 
Nancy Pelosi's Visit to Taiwan,'' August 5, 2022.
    \74\ Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Illegal Fishing and Human 
Rights Abuse in China's Distant Water Fleet,'' April 5, 2022.
    \75\ Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Illegal Fishing and Human 
Rights Abuse in China's Distant Water Fleet,'' April 5, 2022.
    \76\ Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Illegal Fishing and Human 
Rights Abuse in China's Distant Water Fleet,'' April 5, 2022.
    \77\ Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Illegal Fishing and Human 
Rights Abuse in China's Distant Water Fleet,'' April 5, 2022. See also 
CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 165.
    \78\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018),
art. 35.
    \79\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 19, 21, 22; United Nations 
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2022. China has signed 
but not ratified the ICCPR.
    \80\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
arts. 19, 20.
    \81\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a 
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox, A/HRC/
37/59, Annex, Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 
January 24, 2018, principle 4.
    \82\ Yuan Ye, ``Environmental Activist Sentenced to 54 Months in 
Prison,'' Sixth Tone, September 5, 2021; Xue Shasha and Liao Yan, 
``Tenggeli wuran shijian jubao ren Li Genshan yishen bei pan hou 
shangsu, tingshen you liang da jiaodian'' [Li Genshan, the 
whistleblower of the Tengger pollution incident, appealed after being 
sentenced in the first instance, the trial has two major focuses], The 
Paper, September 4, 2021.
    \83\ Yuan Ye, ``Environmental Activist Sentenced to 54 Months in 
Prison,'' Sixth Tone, September 5, 2021; Shen Du, ``Zhiming dong bao 
zhiyuanzhe Li Genshan yishen huoxing 4 nian ban, Li Genshan jiashu 
hanyuan, jiang shangsu'' [Li Genshan, a well-known animal protection 
volunteer, was sentenced to 4 and a half years in prison in the first 
instance; Li Genshan's family complains, will appeal], Shangyou News, 
reprinted in Sohu, September 3, 2021; Xue Shasha and Liao Yan, 
``Tenggeli wuran shijian jubao ren Li Genshan yishen bei pan hou 
shangsu, tingshen you liang da jiaodian'' [Li Genshan, the 
whistleblower of the Tengger pollution incident, appealed after being 
sentenced in the first instance, the trial has two major focuses], The 
Paper, September 4, 2021.
    \84\ Yuan Ye, ``Environmental Activist Sentenced to 54 Months in 
Prison,'' Sixth Tone, September 5, 2021; Shen Du, ``Zhiming dong bao 
zhiyuanzhe Li Genshan yishen huoxing 4 nian ban, Li Genshan jiashu 
hanyuan, jiang shangsu'' [Li Genshan, a well-known animal protection 
volunteer, was sentenced to 4 and a half years in prison in the first 
instance; Li Genshan's family complains, will appeal], Shangyou News, 
reprinted in Sohu, September 3, 2021; Xue Shasha and Liao Yan, 
``Tenggeli wuran shijian jubao ren Li Genshan yishen bei pan hou 
shangsu, tingshen you liang da jiaodian'' [Li Genshan, the 
whistleblower of the Tengger pollution incident, appealed after being 
sentenced in the first instance, the trial has two major focuses], The 
Paper, September 4, 2021. For more information, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database records 2020-00248 on Li Genshan and 2020-
00255 on Niu Haibo.
    \85\ Xue Shasha and Liao Yan, ``Tenggeli wuran shijian jubao ren Li 
Genshan yishen bei pan hou shangsu, tingshen you liang da jiaodian'' 
[Li Genshan, the whistleblower of the Tengger pollution incident, 
appealed after being sentenced in the first instance, the trial has two 
major focuses], The Paper, September 4, 2021.
    \86\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Tenggeli Shamo wuran 
jubaozhe bei xingju'' [Tengger Desert pollution whistleblower 
criminally detained], October 1, 2020; Yuan Ye, ``Environmental 
Activist Sentenced to 54 Months in Prison,'' Sixth Tone, September 5, 
2021; ``Zhiming dong bao zhiyuanzhe Li Genshan yishen huoxing 4 nian 
ban, Li Genshan jiashu hanyuan, jiang shangsu'' [Li Genshan, a well-
known animal protection volunteer, was sentenced to 4 and a half years 
in prison in the first instance; Li Genshan's family complains, will 
appeal], Shangyou News, reprinted in Sohu, September 3, 2021. For more 
information on Zhang Baoqi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2020-00256.
    \87\ ``Susong chengxu bu hefa, zhiming dong bao zhiyuanzhe Li 
Genshan an yishen panjue bei chexiao'' [The proceedings were illegal, 
and the first-instance judgment of the well-known animal protection 
volunteer Li Genshan was revoked], Shangyou News, reprinted in Sohu, 
November 15, 2021; Du Caicai, ``Ningxia huanbao zhiyuanzhe an chongshen 
xuanpan 11 ren weichi yuanpan lushi cheng yi shangsu'' [Court judgment 
announced in the case of the Ningxia environmental protection 
volunteers' retrial, [the court] maintained the original sentences for 
all 11 individuals, lawyers say they have already appealed], Caixin, 
February 9, 2022.
    \88\ Du Caicai, ``Ningxia huanbao zhiyuanzhe an chongshen xuanpan 
11 ren weichi yuanpan lushi cheng yi shangsu'' [Court judgment 
announced in the case of the Ningxia environmental protection 
volunteers' retrial, [the court] maintained the original sentences for 
all 11 individuals, lawyers say they have already appealed], Caixin, 
February 9, 2022.
    \89\ Du Caicai, ``Ningxia huanbao zhiyuanzhe an chongshen xuanpan 
11 ren weichi yuanpan lushi cheng yi shangsu'' [Court judgment 
announced in the case of the Ningxia environmental protection 
volunteers' retrial, [the court] maintained the original sentences for 
all 11 individuals, lawyers say they have already appealed], Caixin, 
February 9, 2022.
    \90\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Tenggeli Shamo wuran 
jubaozhe bei xingju'' [Tengger Desert pollution whistleblower 
criminally detained], October 1, 2020.
    \91\ John Liu and Karoline Kan, ``China Wants More Climate Court 
Cases, but Only the Right Ones,'' Bloomberg, June 18, 2021; Civil 
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Tenggeli Shamo wuran jubaozhe bei xingju'' 
[Tengger Desert pollution whistleblower criminally detained], October 
1, 2020.
    \92\ Hou Liqiang, ``11 Punished After 120,000 Tons of Pollutants 
Dumped in Tengger Desert,'' China Daily, March 17, 2020.
    \93\ Feng Huamei, ``Jiangxi Le'an cunmin fandui wuran bei dingzui; 
jijing shensu fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Villagers in Le'an, Jiangxi who 
protested against pollution convicted; court decides to retry after 
several appeals], Caixin, December 23, 2021; Wei Jiaming, ``Jiangxi 
cunmin du lu kangyi wuran bei pan huanxing, jing shensu Le'an xian 
fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Jiangxi villagers who blocked roads to 
protest pollution given suspended sentences, Le'an County court decides 
to retry on appeal], The Paper, December 23, 2021.
    \94\ Feng Huamei, ``Jiangxi Le'an cunmin fandui wuran bei dingzui; 
jijing shensu fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Villagers in Le'an, Jiangxi who 
protested against pollution convicted; court decides to retry after 
several appeals], Caixin, December 23, 2021; Wei Jiaming, ``Jiangxi 
cunmin du lu kangyi wuran bei pan huanxing, jing shensu Le'an xian 
fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Jiangxi villagers who blocked roads to 
protest pollution given suspended sentences, Le'an County court decides 
to retry on appeal], The Paper, December 23, 2021.
    \95\ Feng Huamei, ``Jiangxi Le'an cunmin fandui wuran bei dingzui; 
jijing shensu fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Villagers in Le'an, Jiangxi who 
protested against pollution convicted; court decides to retry after 
several appeals], Caixin, December 23, 2021; Wei Jiaming, ``Jiangxi 
cunmin du lu kangyi wuran bei pan huanxing, jing shensu Le'an xian 
fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Jiangxi villagers who blocked roads to 
protest pollution given suspended sentences, Le'an County court decides 
to retry on appeal], The Paper, December 23, 2021.
    \96\ Feng Huamei, ``Jiangxi Le'an cunmin fandui wuran bei dingzui; 
jijing shensu fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Villagers in Le'an, Jiangxi who 
protested against pollution convicted; court decides to retry after 
several appeals], Caixin, December 23, 2021; Wei Jiaming, ``Jiangxi 
cunmin du lu kangyi wuran bei pan huanxing, jing shensu Le'an xian 
fayuan jueding zaishen'' [Jiangxi villagers who blocked roads to 
protest pollution given suspended sentences, Le'an County court decides 
to retry on appeal], The Paper, December 23, 2021.
    \97\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a 
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, A/HRC/37/59, January 
24, 2018, Annex, paras. 17-19, 34-35. Principle 7 reads, ``States 
should provide public access to environmental information by collecting 
and disseminating information and by providing affordable, effective 
and timely access to information to any person upon request.'' 
Principle 12 states ``States should ensure the effective enforcement of 
their environmental standards against public and private actors.''
    \98\ Laura Zhou, ``China Says Foreign-Funded NGO's Coastal Ocean 
Data Could Be Used for Spying,'' South China Morning Post, November 2, 
2021; ``Yu guoji huanbao zuzhi hezuo cheng zui zheng, Shanghai huanbao 
tuanti bei guo'an jiguan chengchu'' [Cooperation with international 
environmental protection organization becomes evidence of a crime, 
Shanghai environmental protection group punished by national security 
agency], Radio Free Asia, November 25, 2021.
    \99\ Laura Zhou, ``China Says Foreign-Funded NGO's Coastal Ocean 
Data Could Be Used for Spying,'' South China Morning Post, November 2, 
2021; ``Yu guoji huanbao zuzhi hezuo cheng zui zheng, Shanghai huanbao 
tuanti bei guo'an jiguan chengchu'' [Cooperation with international 
environmental protection organization becomes evidence of a crime, 
Shanghai environmental protection group punished by national security 
agency], Radio Free Asia, November 25, 2021.
    \100\ Lou Kang, ``Thousand Folds [sic] Increase in Ocean Cleanup 
Volunteers Reflects Chinese Environmental Protection Awareness,'' 
Global Times, October 7, 2021.
    \101\ China's Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing 
of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Dr. 
Jessica C. Teets, Associate Professor, Middlebury College).

Business and Human Rights

Business and Human Rights

                       Business and Human Rights

                                Findings

         Chinese and international businesses continue 
        to be at risk of complicity in--and of profiting from--
        the People's Republic of China's (PRC) use of forced 
        labor to repress ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). A report investigating 
        Xinjiang cotton and the global supply chain concluded 
        that ``human rights due diligence is [currently] 
        inadequate in identifying and addressing Uyghur forced 
        labor in supply chains of manufacturers outside of 
        China and enforcement mechanisms are not currently 
        responding to the export of those goods 
        internationally.''
         The PRC continued to threaten for-profit and 
        non-profit organizations with loss of revenue or other 
        forms of punishment if they mentioned human rights 
        violations in the XUAR. In one case, authorities closed 
        down an affiliate of labor auditor Verite, Inc., after 
        it reportedly investigated reports of forced labor in 
        the XUAR. In another case, pro-Chinese Communist Party 
        and Party-affiliated organizations criticized, and 
        insinuated potential retaliation against, Kodak for 
        posting pictures by a photographer who described the 
        XUAR as ``an Orwellian dystopia.''
         The Chinese government restricted freedom of 
        expression this reporting year, and corporations 
        continued to take part in censorship. Instances include 
        the following examples:

                  Apple removed a globally used Quran app from 
                the Apple app store in China.
                  Chinese companies removed media content of 
                foreign individuals whose speech or actions did 
                not conform with PRC narratives.
                  Disney Plus Hong Kong removed an episode of 
                ``The Simpsons'' that satirically referenced 
                human rights violations committed by the Party, 
                including the violent suppression of the 1989 
                Tiananmen protests.
                  Apple and two British publishing firms, 
                Octopus Books and Quarto, censored products 
                intended for sale outside of mainland China.

         The Washington Post reported that, based on 
        presentations obtained from Huawei's website, Huawei 
        marketed surveillance technology to the Chinese 
        government--including surveillance technology used in 
        the XUAR.
         The Commission observed reports that a labor 
        rights whistleblower was tortured prior to being 
        sentenced to two years in prison for exposing labor 
        rights violations. The violations took place in a 
        factory producing the Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, and 
        the Amazon Kindle.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Work with like-minded governments and legislatures to
        encourage implementation of policies and legislation 
        similar
        to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 
        No. 117-78), which prohibits the importation of goods 
        made in whole or in part in the XUAR.
          Consider actions, including through legislation as 
        needed, that bolster supply chain transparency, 
        including by requiring supply chain mapping, 
        disclosure, comprehensive human rights due diligence, 
        and country of origin labels for goods purchased and 
        sold online.
          Increase Customs and Border Protection funding to 
        bolster its ability to monitor imported goods for links 
        to forced labor.
          Update as appropriate the Xinjiang and Hong Kong 
        business advisories issued by the U.S. Government, and 
        consider issuing advisories on other regions or sectors 
        in China.
          Impose Global Magnitsky sanctions on both Chinese 
        government officials carrying out severe human rights 
        abuses in the XUAR and on companies directly complicit 
        in those abuses.
          Work together and with like-minded governments to 
        decrease reliance on imports from China that could be 
        linked to human rights abuses, including in supply 
        chains and industries such as solar panel production 
        and medical equipment manufacturing.
          Members should engage U.S. companies on human rights 
        issues in China such as forced labor in the XUAR, 
        government surveillance, government censorship, and 
        worker rights. Such engagement should include:

                  Encouraging companies such as Amazon that 
                source a significant percentage of their 
                products from China to trace the supply chain 
                of these goods to ensure that they are not 
                produced in the XUAR or in Chinese factories 
                that subject their workers to labor abuse. 
                Members should encourage such companies to 
                protect both workers and whistleblowers at 
                their factories and facilities in China and 
                worldwide;
                  Encouraging companies in their districts to 
                change their approach to conducting due 
                diligence in China, moving beyond codes of 
                conduct and third-party factory audits, which 
                have proven to be ineffective and even harmful; 
                and
                  Holding public hearings and private meetings 
                with companies from their districts to raise 
                awareness of the risk of complicity in human 
                rights abuses and privacy violations that U.S. 
                companies working in China face. Topics of 
                meetings could include complicity in the use of 
                artificial intelligence technology and 
                surveillance equipment to monitor human rights 
                advocates, religious believers, and ethnic 
                minority groups in China, as well as corporate 
                complicity in Chinese government censorship.

Business and Human Rights

Business and Human Rights

                       Business and Human Rights

                              Introduction

    Chinese and international businesses are directly complicit 
in or at risk of being complicit in human rights abuses 
committed by the Chinese government. These abuses include the 
severe repression of ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), government surveillance of 
citizens without adequate privacy protections, government 
censorship, and lack of protection for Chinese workers. 
Companies complicit in such abuses contravene the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which state that 
businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights and 
should seek to avoid ``contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts . . ..'' \1\ [For information on China's efforts to 
weaken international standards relating to business and human 
rights, see Section XII--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. 
and Globally.]

          Corporate Involvement in Mass Atrocities in the XUAR

    Companies that do business in, source from, or work with 
companies in the XUAR continue to be at great risk of 
complicity in the human rights abuses being committed in the 
region.\2\ The PRC's actions in the XUAR constitute crimes 
against humanity \3\ and genocide.\4\ Experts have documented 
the arbitrary detention of up to 1.8 million individuals from 
predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups since 2017 in a 
network of mass internment camps in the XUAR.\5\ Authorities 
have subjected individuals from ethnic minority groups in the 
XUAR to extreme levels of surveillance; deprivation of freedom 
of movement and residence; destruction of religious sites; 
invasive population control methods such as forced 
sterilization, forced insertion of intrauterine devices (IUDs), 
and forced abortion; forced placement of children in state-run 
orphanages and boarding schools; and forced labor.\6\
    Companies are particularly at risk of complicity in crimes 
against humanity and genocide in the XUAR if they do business 
with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), its 
affiliate companies, or any other companies that have close 
ties to the XPCC.\7\ In July 2020, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce sanctioned the XPCC, a paramilitary organization, for 
its contributions to human rights abuses in the XUAR.\8\
    In December 2021, Tesla announced it would open a new 
showroom in the XUAR.\9\ Several organizations criticized the 
announcement,\10\ and National Communications Director of the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations Ibrahim Hooper said that 
``[n]o American corporation should be doing business in a 
region that is the focal point of a campaign of genocide 
targeting a religious and ethnic minority.'' \11\
    As of April 2022, Airbnb had offered hundreds of listings 
in both the XUAR and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).\12\ In 
addition, a November 2021 Axios report found that more than a 
dozen Airbnb listings in the XUAR were located on land owned by 
the XPCC.\13\ Further reporting found that throughout China, 
Airbnb hosts had discriminated against potential guests based 
on ethnicity--in some cases citing pressure from local 
authorities as the reason they could not host ethnic 
minorities.\14\ In May 2022, Airbnb reportedly planned to 
remove ``listings for hosted experiences in China'' starting in 
the summer of 2022 because of a ``decline in business'' after 
two years of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
restrictions.\15\ [For more information on human rights 
violations in the XUAR, see Section X--Xinjiang. For more 
information on human rights violations in the TAR, see Section 
IX--Tibet.]

                STATE-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR IN THE XUAR

    Reports continued to highlight evidence that potentially 
linked the supply chains of international corporations to 
forced labor in the XUAR.\16\ Some affected products include:

         Tomato products. An August 2021 investigative 
        report published by non-profit research organization 
        C4ADS showed that tomato products potentially made by 
        XPCC-owned companies using forced labor may have been 
        sold in the United States and elsewhere.\17\
         Electronics. An October 2021 Reuters article 
        reported that American remote control manufacturer 
        Universal Electronics Inc. (UEI), participated in labor 
        transfers of Uyghurs from the XUAR.\18\ Labor transfer 
        programs in and from the XUAR are Chinese government 
        programs that move large numbers of ethnic minorities 
        into forced labor.\19\ From May 2019 to February 2020, 
        UEI employed ``at least 400 Uyghur workers'' from the 
        XUAR at their factory in Qinzhou, Guangxi Autonomous 
        Region.\20\ According to Reuters, workers were 
        subjected to police surveillance, restricted movement, 
        and ``education activities.'' \21\ Due diligence was 
        reportedly conducted by a ``third-party agent working 
        with the Xinjiang government'' \22\--which is 
        problematic given the fact that the government is the 
        implementer of forced labor in the XUAR.\23\
         Cotton products. Multiple reports this year 
        linked cotton products from the XUAR to international 
        supply chains.\24\ A November 2021 report entitled 
        ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in 
        International Supply Chains,'' by Sheffield Hallam 
        University's Helena Kennedy Centre for International 
        Justice, reviewed publicly accessible customs data in 
        order to trace cotton produced in the XUAR to the 
        products of international brands.\25\ The report 
        examined five Chinese textile companies connected with 
        cotton produced in the XUAR.\26\ These companies' 
        problematic connections to the XUAR included: 1) owning 
        a subsidiary in the XUAR; 2) purchasing cotton produced 
        in the XUAR; \27\ 3) working with the XPCC; \28\ 4) 
        participating in state-sponsored labor transfers; \29\ 
        and 5) receiving government subsidies in the XUAR.\30\ 
        By tracing the supply chains of the above-mentioned 
        Chinese companies connected with forced labor in the 
        XUAR, the report identified ``53 intermediary 
        manufacturers'' outside of China and 103 international 
        brands that are ``at high risk of having Xinjiang 
        cotton in their supply chains.'' \31\ The report 
        concludes that the high risk of Xinjiang cotton being 
        used in the products of international brands indicates 
        ``that human rights due diligence is [currently] 
        inadequate in identifying and addressing Uyghur forced 
        labor in supply chains of manufacturers outside of 
        China and enforcement mechanisms are not currently 
        responding to the export of those goods 
        internationally.'' \32\

    In December 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law 
the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law No. 117-
78).\33\ The Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that all 
goods made in whole or in part in the XUAR have been made with 
forced labor, and that the importation of such goods is 
prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.\34\ A May 
2022 C4ADS report found that a significant amount ``of the 
world's cotton, tomato products, pepper products, walnuts, 
rayon, calcium carbide, polysilicon, wind turbines, and 
beryllium'' were produced in the XUAR.\35\ [For information on 
how government-sponsored forced labor violates international 
standards prohibiting human trafficking and forced labor, see 
Section VI--Human Trafficking. For more information on cotton 
and tomato products likely made with forced labor and exported 
to the United States, see Section X--Xinjiang.]

       FIRMS, AUDITS, AND COMPLICITY IN FORCED LABOR IN THE XUAR

    Firms cannot rely on factory audits to ensure that their 
supply chains are free of forced labor in the XUAR.\36\ When 
sourcing goods alleged to be made in whole or in part with 
forced labor, international brands often point to their use of 
audits to ensure compliance with corporate codes of conduct 
prohibiting involvement in forced labor.\37\ Due diligence 
organizations, human rights and labor experts, and national 
government agencies, however, have pointed to the unreliability 
of audits conducted in the XUAR.\38\ Reasons cited by the 
above-mentioned observers for the unreliability of audits 
conducted in the XUAR include:

         the inability of workers subjected to forced 
        labor to speak freely; \39\
         the harassment and detention of auditors 
        conducting due diligence in the XUAR; \40\
         the inability of auditors to obtain the 
        information needed to conduct an audit; \41\ and
         the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which 
        deters auditors from speaking about the XUAR.\42\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities Close Labor Auditor after It Reportedly  Investigates Forced
                            Labor in the XUAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  According to August 2021 reporting from the Wall Street Journal,
 authorities closed Shenzhen Verite, an affiliate of U.S.-based labor
 auditor Verite, Inc.\43\ In April, Chinese authorities interrogated and
 restricted the movement of staff, froze bank accounts, and raided the
 offices of Shenzhen Verite.\44\ In March, the Party-run media outlet
 Global Times had published an article criticizing reports of forced
 labor in the XUAR and particularly the social compliance organization
 Better Cotton Initiative (BCI).\45\ The article was critical of
 Shenzhen Verite for reportedly conducting an investigation into forced
 labor in the XUAR commissioned by BCI.\46\ An August Global Times
 article further lambasted Shenzhen Verite, claiming that the company
 ``cited untenable claims from anti-China organizations and [came to] a
 predetermined guilty conclusion.'' \47\ The August article was
 reportedly based on information obtained by authorities who
 investigated Shenzhen Verite in April and interviews from former
 Shenzhen Verite employees.\48\
  Chinese authorities' closure of Shenzhen Verite, one of the recent
 actions taken against companies in response to claims regarding forced
 labor in the XUAR, indicates the risk involved to companies making such
 claims. According to the sourcing and labor editor of Sourcing Journal,
 Jasmin Malik Chua,\49\ there is evidence that the closing of Shenzhen
 Verite ``is another pointed act of retaliation on the part of [the
 Chinese government], which previously stoked nationalist fervor to
 trigger a wave of consumer boycotts against Western brands such as
 Adidas, Nike and H&M for cutting business relationships in Xinjiang
 over forced-labor concerns.'' \50\ According to the Wall Street
 Journal, ``[s]upply-chain experts say China's closure of Shenzhen
 Verite is likely to discourage Chinese factories and auditors from
 cooperating with multinational brands seeking to comply with U.S. rules
 on forced labor, due to fear of possible retribution by the Chinese
 government.'' \51\ [For information on cases in which Chinese
 authorities threatened or punished foreign companies whose speech or
 actions related to human rights abuses in the XUAR did not align with
 PRC narratives, see Section XII--Human Rights Violations in the U.S.
 and Globally and the text box in this chapter entitled ``PRC Economic
 Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and Human Rights Violations in the
 XUAR.'']
------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Commercial Firms' Role in Government Data Collection and Surveillance 
                              across China

    During the 2022 reporting year, the Commission observed 
reports linking Chinese tech firms with human rights abuses. In 
December 2021, the Washington Post reported that Huawei likely 
marketed surveillance technology to the Chinese government that 
the government could use to identify, monitor, manage, and 
track individuals.\52\ The report was based on 100 confidential 
marketing presentations from 2016 to 2018 obtained from 
Huawei's website that outlined various Huawei surveillance 
products.\53\ The Huawei presentations included information 
regarding voice recording
analysis technology to be used for broadly defined ``national 
security'' purposes, and facial recognition technology used in 
the XUAR.\54\ These technologies were co-developed with iFlytek 
and DeepGlint, respectively, both of which the U.S. Department 
of Commerce sanctioned for involvement in human rights abuses 
in the XUAR.\55\ [For more information on corporate involvement 
in the export of Chinese surveillance technology abroad, see 
Section XII--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

           Role of Commercial Firms in Government Censorship

    Companies were both targets and enablers of Chinese 
government censorship. Examples of corporate censorship in 
China during the reporting year include the following cases:

         Censorship of globally used Quran app. On 
        October 15, 2021, the BBC reported that Apple had 
        removed a Quran app, Quran Majeed, from its app store 
        in China.\56\ According to the app's creator, Apple 
        said that Quran Majeed was ``removed from the China app 
        store because it includes content that requires 
        additional documentation from Chinese authorities.'' 
        \57\ According to the website Apple Censorship, of 155 
        Apple app stores around the world, China is the only 
        country in which the app Quran Majeed is 
        unavailable.\58\
         Disney Plus censors content in Hong Kong. In 
        November 2021, the New York Times reported that an 
        episode of ``The Simpsons'' was removed from Disney 
        Plus in Hong Kong, which launched in Hong Kong in 
        November.\59\ The episode satirically references Mao 
        Zedong and the censorship of the violent suppression of 
        the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\60\ According to a media 
        regulation expert, Disney likely preemptively self-
        censored ``The Simpsons'' episode.\61\
         Chinese companies remove media content in 
        retaliation for the speech or action of foreign 
        individuals. In March 2022, the Los Angeles Times 
        reported that Chinese streaming services including 
        Bilibili, iQiyi, Migu Video, Tencent Video, Xigua 
        Video, and Youku had removed films starring Canadian 
        actor Keanu Reeves from their streaming platforms.\62\ 
        In January of the same year, Tibet House, an 
        organization that was founded at the request of the 
        Dalai Lama in order to promote Tibetan culture, 
        announced that Reeves would perform during a March 
        benefit concert.\63\ In another case, music streaming 
        services in China removed the music of Australian 
        singer Kimberley Chen and Malaysian rapper Namewee 
        after the release of ``Fragile,'' a song critical of 
        the PRC.\64\ According to the Party-run media outlet 
        Global Times, Weibo also blocked Chen's account after 
        the song was released.\65\

    In addition, foreign companies exported Chinese censorship 
outside of mainland China. Such censorship included the 
following cases:

         Apple censors content of engravings. In an 
        August 2021 analysis piece about Apple,\66\ Citizen Lab 
        found that Apple disallowed customer requests in Hong 
        Kong and Taiwan to have engraved on Apple products 
        phrases related to Chinese political topics.\67\ Apple 
        censored the keywords ``human rights'' and ``Dalai'' in 
        mainland China; ``freedom of the press,'' ``double 
        universal suffrage,'' and ``Ai Weiwei'' in Hong Kong 
        and mainland China; and ``Chairman Mao'' and ``Falun 
        Gong'' in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China.\68\
         Publishing firms remove book content. In 
        another case, according to a March 2022 article by the 
        Financial Times, publishing firms Octopus Books (an 
        affiliate of Hachette UK) \69\ and Quarto \70\ censored 
        books intended for sale in foreign markets in order to 
        be able to print the books in China, where printing was 
        cheaper.\71\ Octopus Books removed references to 
        Taiwan, and Quarto removed or altered references to 
        Hong Kong, Taiwan, Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, and 
        Tibet.\72\
         Bing censors autofill results. A May 2022 
        Citizen Lab report concluded that the U.S. version of 
        Microsoft's Bing search engine had censored autofill 
        results related to Chinese political figures, Chinese 
        dissidents, Falun Gong, and the violent suppression of 
        the Tiananmen protests in June 1989, autofill results 
        that were also censored through the version of Bing 
        only available in China.\73\ In June 2021, Reuters 
        reported that Bing searches for images using the phrase 
        ``tank man'' did not yield any image results.\74\ The 
        searches for ``tank man'' were made in the United 
        States and elsewhere around the anniversary of the 
        violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\75\ 
        In its report on Bing, Citizen Lab said that it ``may 
        be fundamentally untenable'' for an internet platform 
        to facilitate free speech in one region and 
        simultaneously apply political censorship in another 
        region (e.g., China).\76\

[For more information on Chinese government censorship inside 
China, see Section III--Freedom of Expression. For more 
information on Chinese government censorship outside of China, 
see Section XII--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and 
Globally.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
     PRC Economic Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and  Human Rights
                         Violations in the XUAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The PRC continued to threaten corporations with loss of revenue or
 other forms of punishment if they mentioned human rights violations in
 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). On July 10, 2021, Patrick
 Wack, a French photographer who took photos in the XUAR from 2016 to
 2020, posted about the release of his book on Instagram.\77\ In his
 post, Wack referenced the ``mass-incarceration of [the XUAR's] Uyghur
 population and other Muslim minorities'' \78\ and said that his book
 ``captures a visual narrative of the region and is a testimony to its
 abrupt descent into an Orwellian dystopia.'' \79\ Wack took the photos
 using Kodak film and Kodak shared 10 of Wack's images on Instagram.\80\
  On July 18, 2021, Chinese nationalist news site Guancha posted an
 article criticizing the Instagram posts of Kodak and Wack.\81\ The
 article said both Kodak and Wack were attempting to give the XUAR a bad
 name by adding prejudiced captions to photos of daily life in the
 XUAR.\82\ On the same day, the Communist Youth League of China posted
 the article on the Chinese social media app Weibo.\83\ The Communist
 Youth League also initiated social media campaigns against U.S.
 companies in March 2021 and December 2021.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
     PRC Economic Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and  Human Rights
                    Violations in the XUAR--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  On July 19, 2021, Kodak apologized for its Instagram post and said
 that its Instagram page was ``not intended to be a platform for
 political commentary.'' \85\ Kodak also posted a statement on WeChat
 and its website blaming loopholes in supervision that may have allowed
 the original post to be approved.\86\ The Party-run media outlet Global
 Times published an article quoting a Chinese professor who warned that
 the PRC would retaliate against companies that contradicted the PRC's
 narrative on the XUAR.\87\ He said that ``[c]ompanies should know that
 Xinjiang-related issues are the bottom line of China, and for those who
 cross the line, we should use the law to defend our rights.'' \88\
  Such statements are consistent with other cases of economic coercion,
 in which Chinese authorities threatened or punished foreign companies
 such as H&M, Intel, Walmart, Sam's Club, an affiliate of U.S.-based
 labor auditor Verite, Inc., and others, for speech or actions related
 to human rights in the XUAR that did not align with PRC narratives.\89\
 Among the threats aimed at Intel, Walmart, and Sam's Club was a Global
 Times article that discussed the possibility of using the PRC Anti-
 Foreign Sanctions Law, passed in June 2021,\90\ which provides a legal
 basis for retaliatory measures against individuals and organizations
 with direct or indirect involvement in the implementation ofP foreign
 sanctions.\91\ The Commission did not observe reports that authorities
 used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against the companies mentioned in
 this text box, but this past year authorities did use the Anti-Foreign
 Sanctions Law against four officials of the United States Commission on
 International Religious Freedom, as well as two U.S. companies that
 sold arms to Taiwan, in response to sanctions imposed on Chinese
 officials for their involvement in human rights abuses in China.\92\
 [For more information on cases in which Chinese authorities threatened
 or punished foreign organizations whose speech or actions related to
 human rights abuses in the XUAR did not align with PRC narratives, see
 the text box in this chapter entitled ``Authorities Close Labor Auditor
 after It Reportedly Investigates Forced Labor in the XUAR,'' and the
 Commission's April 2022 analysis piece entitled ``Case Study: China's
 Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart.'']
------------------------------------------------------------------------

           Worker Exploitation, Corporate Supply Chains, and
             Limited Legal Right to Freedom of Association

    Outside the XUAR, the lack of protection for Chinese 
workers under Chinese law, as well as a lack of enforcement of 
existing Chinese laws, allowed for continued abusive practices 
toward workers in the supply chains of Chinese and 
international businesses. The Party-led All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization 
permitted under Chinese law,\93\ and Chinese law does not grant 
Chinese workers the right to freedom of association or permit 
them to form or join independent unions.\94\ In a 2020 joint 
submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the International Federation for Human Rights and China 
Labor Watch (CLW) stated that the ``lack of enforcement of 
labor laws and regulations is the single greatest factor 
limiting individuals' right to just and favorable conditions of 
employment. Despite strong legislation, government labor 
bureaus and labor inspectorates are not equipped to enforce the 
provisions, giving employers wide latitude to disregard the 
law.'' \95\
    In one example, authorities punished a labor rights 
advocate for revealing labor violations at a factory in China 
that made Amazon devices.\96\ According to a January 2022 
Guardian article, public security officials tortured labor 
rights advocate Tang Mingfang \97\ before he confessed to 
``leaking confidential company information,'' \98\ and 
authorities sentenced him to two years in prison and fined him 
10,000 RMB (approximately US$1,500) on the same charge.\99\ In 
2019, Tang, a former employee of Hengyang Foxconn affiliate 
Hengyang Futaihong Precision Industrial Co., Ltd., leaked 
company documents to the Guardian and CLW.\100\ The documents 
revealed that student interns were required to work overtime 
and on night shifts at Amazon's supplier Hengyang Foxconn, in 
some cases against their will.\101\ Hengyang Foxconn produced 
Amazon devices such as the Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, and 
the Amazon Kindle.\102\ [For more information on torture in the 
Chinese criminal justice system, see Section IV--Criminal 
Justice. For more information on the right of Chinese workers 
to form trade unions, and information on additional labor 
rights advocates in China, see Section VII--Worker Rights.]

Business and Human Rights

Business and Human Rights

    Notes to Section VIII--Business and Human Rights

    \1\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ``Protect, Respect and Remedy'' Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, June 
16, 2011, principle 13.
    \2\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 213-15; CECC, 2020 Annual 
Report, December 2020, 237-41.
    \3\ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 
17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7; Human Rights Watch, 
``Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots,'' April 19, 2021; Naomi 
Kikoler, ``Simon-Skjodt Center Director Delivers Remarks on China's 
Systematic Persecution of Uyghurs,'' United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, March 6, 2020; Gene A. Bunin, ``Detainees Are Trickling Out of 
Xinjiang's Camps,'' Foreign Policy, January 18, 2019; Uyghur Human 
Rights Project, ``Universal Children's Day 2018: China Must Reunite 
Uyghur Children and Parents. Forcible Placement of Children of Living 
Parents in State-Run Facilities Constitutes a Crime Against Humanity,'' 
November 19, 2018. See also CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 
300-01.
    \4\ ``The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of 
the 1948 Genocide Convention,'' Newlines Institute for Strategy and 
Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, March 2021, 50; 
Jackson Neagli, ``The Importance of `Biological Destruction' in 
Responsible Coverage of Xinjiang,'' Lawfare (blog), April 14, 2021; 
Beth Van Schaack, ``Genocide Against the Uyghurs: Legal Grounds for the 
United States' Bipartisan Genocide Determination,'' Just Security, 
January 27, 2021; Joanne Smith Finley, ``Why Scholars and Activists 
Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang,'' Journal of Genocide 
Research (November 19, 2020): 1-23; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), adopted and 
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 260 (III) of December 9, 
1948; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
accessed August 1, 2022.
    \5\ See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, `` `Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts': 
Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent 
of Xinjiang's Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,'' Journal of Political 
Risk 7, no. 11 (November 2019); Megha Rajagopalan, Alison Killing, and 
Christo Buschek, ``China Secretly Built a Vast New Infrastructure to 
Imprison Muslims,'' BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020; Adrian Zenz, 
``China Didn't Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the 
Talking.,'' New York Times, November 24, 2019; Fergus Ryan, Danielle 
Cave, and Nathan Ruser, ``Mapping Xinjiang's `Re-Education' Camps,'' 
International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, November 1, 2018. See also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 
2022, 213; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 298-300.
    \6\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Program 
Targets Xinjiang's Muslims,'' December 9, 2020; Adrian Zenz, ``Coercive 
Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang's Cross-Regional Labor 
Transfer Program: A Process-Oriented Evaluation,'' Jamestown 
Foundation, March 2021, 17, 49; Sigal Samuel, ``China's Genocide 
Against the Uyghurs, in 4 Disturbing Charts,'' Vox, March 10, 2021; 
Isobel Cockerell, ``Revealed: New Videos Expose China's Forced 
Migration of Uyghurs During the Pandemic,'' Coda Story, July 9, 2020; 
Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``China Is Erasing Mosques and Precious 
Shrines in Xinjiang,'' New York Times, September 25, 2020; ``How 
Xinjiang's Gulag Tears Families Apart,'' Economist, October 17, 2020.
    \7\ CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 240-41; U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, ``CBP Issues Detention Order on Cotton Products 
Made by Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Using Prison 
Labor,'' December 2, 2020; U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury 
Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky 
Human Rights Executive Order,'' July 31, 2020.
    \8\ The XPCC is a paramilitary organization that advances Chinese 
Communist Party control over the XUAR. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
``Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,'' July 31, 2020. For a 
discussion of the XPCC and its links to human rights abuses in the XUAR 
from the Commission's 2020 reporting year, see CECC, 2020 Annual 
Report, December 2020, 240-41.
    \9\ Helen Davidson, ``Tesla Criticised for Opening Showroom in 
Xinjiang despite Human Rights Abuses,'' Guardian, January 4, 2022.
    \10\ Helen Davidson, ``Tesla Criticised for Opening Showroom in 
Xinjiang despite Human Rights Abuses,'' Guardian, January 4, 2022; 
Ivana Saric, ``Tesla Opens Showroom in Xinjiang Province, despite 
China's Human Rights Abuses,'' Axios, January 4, 2022.
    \11\ Helen Davidson, ``Tesla Criticised for Opening Showroom in 
Xinjiang despite Human Rights Abuses,'' Guardian, January 4, 2022.
    \12\ ``Olympic Sponsor Airbnb Profits from Xinjiang, Tibet 
Listings,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France 24, February 18, 
2022; ``Places to Stay: Xinjiang, China,'' Airbnb, accessed April 15, 
2022; ``Places to Stay: Tibet, China,'' Airbnb, accessed April 15, 
2022. According to a CNN article, Airbnb plans to remove ``listings for 
hosted experiences in China'' in the summer of 2022 due to a ``decline 
in business'' after two years of Covid-19 restrictions. Sahar Akbarzai 
and Michelle Toh, ``Airbnb Is Closing Its Listings Business in China,'' 
CNN, May 24, 2022.
    \13\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Jacque Schrag, ``Airbnb Hosts 
Xinjiang Rentals on Land Owned by Sanctioned Group,'' Axios, November 
29, 2021.
    \14\ Sophia Yan, ``Uyghurs and Tibetans Locked Out of Airbnb in 
China's Latest Crackdown on Ethnic Minorities,'' Telegraph, July 27, 
2021; Charles Rollet, ``Airbnb Listings in China Are Littered with 
Racist Discrimination,'' Wired UK, March 5, 2019. See also 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 
December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4, 1969; Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ``Protect, Respect and 
Remedy'' Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, June 16, 2011, principles 12, 13; 
Airbnb, ``Nondiscrimination Policy,'' February 10, 2022.
    \15\ Sahar Akbarzai and Michelle Toh, ``Airbnb Is Closing Its 
Listings Business in China,'' CNN, May 24, 2022.
    \16\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021; Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, ``Hugo Boss and Other Big 
Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China--but These 
Shipping Records Raise Questions,'' BuzzFeed News, January 13, 2022; 
CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022,
214, 215.
    \17\ Irina Bukharin, C4ADS, ``Long Shadows: How the Global Economy 
Supports Oppression in Xinjiang,'' August 10, 2021, 20-21. See also 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold 
Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,'' January 
13, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions Chinese 
Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Executive Order,'' July 31, 2020. For a discussion of the XPCC, Cofco 
Tunhe, and their links to forced labor in the XUAR from the 
Commission's 2020 reporting year, see CECC, 2020 Annual Report, 
December 2020, 240-41.
    \18\ Cate Cadell, ``Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to 
Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,'' Reuters, October 8, 2021.
    \19\ See, e.g., `` `To Make Us Slowly Disappear': The Chinese 
Government's Assault on the Uyghurs,'' Simon-Skjodt Center for the 
Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
November 2021, 32; John Sudworth, `` `If the Others Go I'll Go': Inside 
China's Scheme to Transfer Uighurs into Work,'' BBC, March 2, 2021; 
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., ``Uyghurs for Sale: `Reeducation,' Forced 
Labour and Surveillance beyond Xinjiang,'' International Cyber Policy 
Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 21, 2022, 3, 6.
    \20\ Cate Cadell, ``Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to 
Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,'' Reuters, October 8, 2021.
    \21\ Cate Cadell, ``Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to 
Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,'' Reuters, October 8, 2021.
    \22\ Cate Cadell, ``Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to 
Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,'' Reuters, October 8, 2021.
    \23\ Adrian Zenz, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,'' Uyghur 
Tribunal, February 10, 2022, 2, 3; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 
2022, 164, 166, 167.
    \24\ See, e.g., Irina Bukharin, C4ADS, ``Long Shadows: How the 
Global Economy Supports Oppression in Xinjiang,'' August 10, 2021, 25-
26; Megha Rajagopalan, ``Goods Linked to a Group That Runs Chinese 
Detention Camps May Be Ending Up in U.S. Stores,'' BuzzFeed News, 
August 10, 2021; Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, ``Hugo Boss and 
Other Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China--but 
These Shipping Records Raise Questions,'' BuzzFeed News, January 13, 
2022.
    \25\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021, 2.
    \26\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021, 2, 26. The five Chinese textile companies are Huafu Fashion Co. 
Ltd., Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co. Ltd., Luthai Textile Co. Ltd., Texhong 
Textile Group, and Weiqiao Textile Co. Ltd. For more information on 
Huafu Fashion Co. Ltd., see pages 34-37; for more information on 
Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co. Ltd., see pages 30-33; for more information 
on Luthai Textile Co. Ltd., see pages 38-42; for more information on 
Texhong Textile Group, see pages 43-46; and for more information on 
Weiqiao Textile Co. Ltd., see pages 47-50.
    \27\ For more information on the coercive nature of cotton 
harvesting in the XUAR, see Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering 
Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply 
Chains,'' Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield 
Hallam University, November 2021, 14, 16, 17; Adrian Zenz, ``Labor 
Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton,'' 
Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, December 2020, 13-16; John 
Sudworth, ``China's `Tainted' Cotton,'' BBC, December 2020.
    \28\ For a discussion of the XPCC and its links to human rights 
abuses in the XUAR from the Commission's 2020 reporting year, see CECC, 
2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 240-41.
    \29\ For information on the coercive nature of labor transfers, see 
`` `To Make Us Slowly Disappear': The Chinese Government's Assault on 
the Uyghurs,'' Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2021, 31-32.
    \30\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021, 27, 30, 35, 38. For more information on the connection between
government subsidies and forced labor in the XUAR, see CECC, 2021 
Annual Report, March 2022, 214.
    \31\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021, 2.
    \32\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021, 3.
    \33\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: U.S. Should Fully Apply New 
Forced Labor Law,'' March 11, 2022. See also Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78).
    \34\ Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78). See 
also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``CBP Issues Region-Wide 
Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,'' 
January 13, 2021; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operational 
Guidance for Importers,'' June 13, 2022.
    \35\ Irina Bukharin, C4ADS, ``Everybody's Business: The Xinjiang 
Goods Entering Global Supply Chain,'' May 19, 2022, 12-16.
    \36\ For a discussion of audits in the XUAR from the Commission's 
2020 reporting year, see CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 239.
    \37\ See, e.g., Beth Timmins, ``France Investigates Retailers Over 
China Forced Labour Claims,'' BBC, July 2, 2021; Ben Fox, ``Gloves 
Linked to Forced Labor in China Stopped at LA Port,'' Associated Press, 
October 15, 2020.
    \38\ See CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 215. For warnings 
from due diligence organizations, see Fair Labor Association, ``FLA 
Statement on Sourcing from China,'' December 23, 2020; John Sudworth, 
``China's `Tainted' Cotton,'' BBC, December 2020. For warnings from 
human rights and labor experts, see ``Interview: Laura Murphy on Forced 
Labor in Xinjiang,'' China Digital Times, March 21, 2022; Beth Timmins, 
``France Investigates Retailers Over China Forced Labour Claims,'' BBC, 
July 2, 2021; Eva Xiao, ``Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in 
China's Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,'' Wall Street Journal, 
September 21, 2020. The governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States have all issued warnings against the use of audits in 
the XUAR. See Global Affairs Canada, ``Global Affairs Canada Advisory 
on Doing Business with Xinjiang-Related Entities,'' January 12, 2021; 
United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ``Overseas 
Business Risk: China,'' March 11, 2022; U.S. Department of State, U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, ``Risks and Considerations for 
Businesses with Supply Chain Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced 
Labor and Other Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,'' July 1, 2020.
    \39\ ``Interview: Laura Murphy on Forced Labor in Xinjiang,'' China 
Digital Times, March 21, 2022; Beth Timmins, ``France Investigates 
Retailers Over China Forced Labour Claims,'' BBC, July 2, 2021; Eva 
Xiao, ``Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China's Xinjiang 
Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,'' Wall Street Journal, September 21, 
2020.
    \40\ United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 
``Overseas Business Risk: China,'' March 11, 2022; U.S. Department of 
State, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``Risks and Considerations 
for Businesses with Supply Chain Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced 
Labor and Other Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,'' July 1, 2020; Eva 
Xiao, ``Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China's Xinjiang 
Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,'' Wall Street Journal, September 21, 
2020.
    \41\ Beth Timmins, ``France Investigates Retailers Over China 
Forced Labour Claims,'' BBC, July 2, 2021; Eva Xiao, ``Auditors to Stop 
Inspecting Factories in China's Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor 
Concerns,'' Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2020.
    \42\ ``Interview: Laura Murphy on Forced Labor in Xinjiang,'' China 
Digital Times, March 21, 2022; Eva Xiao, ``Auditors to Stop Inspecting 
Factories in China's Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,'' Wall 
Street Journal, September 21, 2020. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa [PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed June 10, 
2021, effective June 10, 2021; ``Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fa Gong Wei 
fuzeren jiu Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa da jizhe wen'' [The head of the 
Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee answers reporters' questions regarding the Anti-
Foreign Sanctions Law], Xinhua, June 10, 2021; Embassy of the People's 
Republic of China in the Republic of Seychelles, ``NPC Standing 
Committee Approves Bill to Better Safeguard National Security,'' June 
11, 2021.
    \43\ Lingling Wei, Eva Xiao, and Trefor Moss, ``China Closes U.S. 
Auditor as Tensions Mount Over Forced Labor Allegations,'' Wall Street 
Journal, August 19, 2021.
    \44\ Lingling Wei, Eva Xiao, and Trefor Moss, ``China Closes U.S. 
Auditor as Tensions Mount Over Forced Labor Allegations,'' Wall Street 
Journal, August 19, 2021.
    \45\ Liu Xin, Fan Lingzhi, and Yang Ruoyu, ``Exclusive: How U.S. 
Forces `Xinjiang Forced Labor' Narrative on Enterprises, Industry 
Agencies,'' Global Times, March 27, 2021.
    \46\ Liu Xin, Fan Lingzhi, and Yang Ruoyu, ``Exclusive: How U.S. 
Forces `Xinjiang Forced Labor' Narrative on Enterprises, Industry 
Agencies,'' Global Times, March 27, 2021.
    \47\ Liu Xin and Fan Lingzhi, ``Exclusive: How BCI's Predetermined 
Guilty Report on Xinjiang Was Made Up?,'' Global Times, August 3, 2021.
    \48\ Liu Xin and Fan Lingzhi, ``Exclusive: How BCI's Predetermined 
Guilty Report on Xinjiang Was Made Up?,'' Global Times, August 3, 2021.
    \49\ Jasmin Malik Chua (@jasminchua), ``Sourcing + labor editor 
@sourcingjournal . . .,'' Twitter, accessed April 22, 22.
    \50\ Jasmin Malik Chua, ``New China Auditor Drama: Authorities Shut 
Down Shenzhen Verite After Raid,'' Sourcing Journal, August 19, 2021. 
For more information on Chinese government retaliation against H&M and 
other companies for statements and actions regarding forced labor in 
the XUAR, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 218; ``Case Study: 
China's Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 14, 2022.
    \51\ Lingling Wei, Eva Xiao, and Trefor Moss, ``China Closes U.S. 
Auditor as Tensions Mount Over Forced Labor Allegations,'' Wall Street 
Journal, August 19, 2021. See also Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ``State 
Dept. Fears Chinese Threats to Auditors Looking for Forced Labor 
Evidence,'' Axios, June 24, 2021. For more information on the Chinese 
government's use of threats and coercive measures against BCI and its 
affiliates, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 218. For 
information on cases in which Chinese authorities threatened or 
punished foreign companies whose speech or actions related to human 
rights abuses in the XUAR did not align with Party and government 
political priorities, see ``Case Study: China's Economic Coercion 
Against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, April 14, 2022.
    \52\ Eva Dou, ``Documents Link Huawei to China's Surveillance 
Programs,'' Washington Post, December 14, 2021.
    \53\ Huawei removed the presentations in 2020. Eva Dou, ``Documents 
Link Huawei to China's Surveillance Programs,'' Washington Post, 
December 14, 2021.
    \54\ Eva Dou, ``Documents Link Huawei to China's Surveillance 
Programs,'' Washington Post, December 14, 2021.
    \55\ Eva Dou, ``Documents Link Huawei to China's Surveillance 
Programs,'' Washington Post, December 14, 2021. For more information on 
Huawei, DeepGlint, and iFlytek, see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 
2022, 216.
    \56\ James Clayton, ``Apple Takes Down Quran App in China,'' BBC, 
October 15, 2021.
    \57\ James Clayton, ``Apple Takes Down Quran App in China,'' BBC, 
October 15, 2021.
    \58\ Apple Censorship, ``Quran Majeed is unavailable in 1 App 
Stores,'' accessed June 25, 2022.
    \59\ Vivian Wang, ``A `Simpsons' Episode Lampooned Chinese 
Censorship. In Hong Kong, It Vanished,'' New York Times, November 29, 
2021.
    \60\ Vivian Wang, ``A `Simpsons' Episode Lampooned Chinese 
Censorship. In Hong Kong, It Vanished,'' New York Times, November 29, 
2021.
    \61\ Vivian Wang, ``A `Simpsons' Episode Lampooned Chinese 
Censorship. In Hong Kong, It Vanished,'' New York Times, November 29, 
2021.
    \62\ Rebecca Davis, ``China Streamers Scrub Keanu Reeves Titles 
over His Support for Tibet,'' Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2022.
    \63\ Tibet House U.S., ``Home,'' accessed April 4, 2022; Tibet 
House U.S. (@tibethouseus), ``Excited to announce the @tibethouseus 
#TibetBenefit2022 Virtual Concert on 3/3. Get your tix now! thus.org/
benefitconcert'', Twitter, January 20, 2022, 4 a.m.
    \64\ `` `Insulting': Aussie Singer Banned in China after Releasing 
Controversial Song,'' news.com.au, October 19, 2021.
    \65\ Weibo previously blocked Namewee's account in August 2021 
when, according to the Global Times, he made ``sarcastic comments about 
the [Chinese Communist Party].'' ``Singers Removed from China's 
Streaming Platforms after Releasing Song Insulting China,'' Global 
Times, October 18, 2021.
    \66\ Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, ``Engrave Danger: 
An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions,'' August 
18, 2021.
    \67\ Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, ``Engrave Danger: 
An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions,'' August 
18, 2021.
    \68\ Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, ``Engrave Danger: 
An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions,'' August 
18, 2021.
    \69\ ``About Us,'' Octopus Books, accessed April 13, 2022.
    \70\ ``About Us,'' The Quarto Group, accessed April 13, 2022.
    \71\ Chinese law restricts what content Chinese printers can print. 
Oliver Telling, ``British Publishers Censor Books for Western Readers 
to Appease China,'' Financial Times, March 15, 2022.
    \72\ Oliver Telling, ``British Publishers Censor Books for Western 
Readers to Appease China,'' Financial Times, March 15, 2022.
    \73\ Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, ``Bada Bing, Bada 
Boom: Microsoft Bing's Chinese Political Censorship of Autosuggestions 
in North America,'' May 19, 2022, 1, 18, 20,
26-27.
    \74\ Joseph Menn and Paresh Dave, ``Microsoft Says Error Led to No 
Matching Bing Images for Tiananmen `Tank Man,' '' Reuters, June 4, 
2021.
    \75\ Joseph Menn and Paresh Dave, ``Microsoft Says Error Led to No 
Matching Bing Images for Tiananmen `Tank Man,' '' Reuters, June 4, 
2021.
    \76\ Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, ``Bada Bing, Bada 
Boom: Microsoft Bing's Chinese Political Censorship of Autosuggestions 
in North America,'' May 19, 2022, 40-41.
    \77\ Patrick Wack (@patwack), ``The pre-sale for DUST is Live. Link 
in bio . . .,'' Instagram, July 10, 2021.
    \78\ Patrick Wack (@patwack), ``The pre-sale for DUST is Live. Link 
in bio . . .,'' Instagram, July 10, 2021.
    \79\ Patrick Wack (@patwack), ``The pre-sale for DUST is Live. Link 
in bio . . .,'' Instagram, July 10, 2021. In an interview with the New 
York Times, Wack said that the photos show how the region has radically 
changed over the years. ``Muslim symbols,'' ``golden domes,'' and 
``women wearing veils'' he saw in 2016 had ``disappeared'' by 2019. 
Mike Ives, ``Kodak Deletes Post by Photographer Who Called Xinjiang an 
`Orwellian Dystopia,' '' New York Times, July 21, 2021.
    \80\ Mike Ives, ``Kodak Deletes Post by Photographer Who Called 
Xinjiang an `Orwellian Dystopia,' '' New York Times, July 21, 2021.
    \81\ Ju Feng, ``Xinjiang zheme mei, Keda que pianyao jiadai sihuo'' 
[Xinjiang is so beautiful, but Kodak tries to sneak in its own bias], 
Guancha, reprinted in Sina, July 18, 2021. Guancha published similar 
nationalist articles around the same time as early social media 
criticism of Sam's Club and H&M appeared, in December 2021 and March 
2021, respectively. ``Shanmu Huiyuan shangdian huiying xiajia Xinjiang 
shangpin: mei kucunle, you huo hui chongxin shangjia'' [Sam's Club 
responds to its removal of Xinjiang products: products are out of 
stock, and will be restocked when available], Guancha, December 24, 
2022; ``H&M fabu shengming, jubu rencuo'' [H&M releases statement, but 
refuses to admit its mistake], Guancha, March 24, 2021.
    \82\ Ju Feng, ``Xinjiang zheme mei, Keda que pianyao jiadai sihuo'' 
[Xinjiang is so beautiful, but Kodak tries to sneak in its own bias], 
Guancha, reprinted in Sina, July 18, 2021.
    \83\ Chinese Communist Youth League (@gongqingtuanzhongyang), 
``Xinjiang zheme mei, Keda que pianyao jiadai sihuo shua cunzai gan 
[zhuakuang]'' [Xinjiang is so beautiful, but Kodak tries to sneak in 
its own bias; me while scrolling [``crazy'' emoji]], Weibo, July 18, 
2021, 8:08 p.m.
    \84\ These campaigns targeted H&M as well as other Better Cotton 
Initiative-affiliated companies and Walmart-owned Sam's Club. Liza Lin, 
``Walmart Sparks Public Outcry in China over Products from Xinjiang,'' 
Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2021; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 
2022, 218; ``Case Study: China's Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam's 
Club, and Walmart,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 
14, 2022.
    \85\ Kodak (@kodak), ``Content from the photographer Patrick Wack 
was recently posted . . .,'' Instagram, July 19, 2021.
    \86\ Rhoda Kwan, ``Kodak Deletes Xinjiang Photo from Instagram, 
Vows to `Respect Chinese Gov't,' '' Hong Kong Free Press, July 21, 
2021; Mike Ives, ``Kodak Deletes Post by Photographer Who Called 
Xinjiang an `Orwellian Dystopia,' '' New York Times, July 21, 2021.
    \87\ Lu Yameng, ``Kodak Apologizes over Instagram Post That Claims 
Xinjiang Is under `Acute Repression' '' Global Times, July 21, 2021.
    \88\ Lu Yameng, ``Kodak Apologizes over Instagram Post That Claims 
Xinjiang Is under `Acute Repression' '' Global Times, July 21, 2021.
    \89\ Lingling Wei, Eva Xiao, and Trefor Moss, ``China Closes U.S. 
Auditor as Tensions Mount Over Forced Labor Allegations,'' Wall Street 
Journal, August 19, 2021. The Commission documented the case of H&M and 
other Better Cotton Initiative affiliates in its 2021 Annual Report, 
documented the cases of H&M, Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart in its 
April 2022 analysis piece entitled ``Case Study: China's Economic 
Coercion Against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' and documented the 
case of Shenzhen Verite, affiliate of U.S.-based labor auditor Verite 
Inc., in the text box in the Business and Human Rights chapter in this 
year's report entitled ``Authorities Close Labor Auditor after It 
Reportedly Investigates Forced Labor in the XUAR.'' See CECC, 2021 
Annual Report, March 2022, 218; ``Case Study: China's Economic Coercion 
Against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, April 14, 2022.
    \90\ Fan Lingzhi and Liu Xin, ``[Jieju] Meiguo jie suowei `qiangpo 
laodong' dui Xinjiang jichu efa, women gai ruhe yingdui?'' [Analysis: 
When the United States uses so-called `forced labor' as excuse to 
produce malicious law against Xinjiang, how should we respond?], Global 
Times, December 24, 2021; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa 
[PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed June 10, 2021, effective June 
10, 2021. See also ``Case Study: China's Economic Coercion Against 
Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, April 14, 2022.
    \91\ Measures authorized under the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law 
include visa denial, exit bans, and the confiscation of property and 
freezing of assets. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa [PRC 
Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed and effective June 10, 2021, arts. 
4-6.
    \92\ Ma Ziqing, ``Zhongfang xuanbu yiju `Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa' dui 4 
ming Meifang renyuan jinxing duideng zhicai'' [China announces 
reciprocal sanctions against 4 Americans under the ``Anti-Foreign 
Sanctions Law''], China Youth Daily, December 21, 2021; U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions Perpetrators of Serious Human 
Rights Abuse on International Human Rights Day,'' December 10, 2021; 
``Beijing Sanctions Lockheed, Raytheon Again over Taiwan Arms Sales,'' 
Reuters, February 21, 2022. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
``2021 nian 12 yue 21 ri waijiaobu fayanren Zhao Lijian zhuchi liexing 
jizhehui'' [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's regular press 
conference on December 21, 2021], December 21, 2021.
    \93\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9-11; Freedom 
House, ``China,'' in Freedom in the World: Democracy Under Seige, 2021; 
China Labour Bulletin, ``Holding China's Trade Unions to Account,'' 
February 17, 2020; International Labour Organization, Interim Report--
Report No. 391, Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 
2016, October 2019, para. 149.
    \94\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9-11; FIDH and 
China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' December 18, 
2020, 3. For relevant international standards regarding the right to 
freely form and join independent unions, see International Labour 
Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 4, 1950, arts. 2, 3, 5; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by 
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 22.1; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 
3, 1976, art. 8.1.
    \95\ FIDH and China Labor Watch, ``Submission to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,'' 
December 18, 2020, 3. For information on the role of labor rights 
advocates in uncovering labor rights abuses in Chinese factories 
against a backdrop of potentially unreliable labor auditing practices, 
see CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 219, 220.
    \96\ For a discussion of the protection of whistleblowers under 
international law, see Dimitrios Kafteranis, ``The International Legal 
Framework on Whistle-Blowers: What More Should Be Done?,'' Seattle 
Journal for Social Justice 19, no. 3 (May 1, 2021): 747, 753-57.
    \97\ For more information about Tang Mingfang, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00379.
    \98\ Gethin Chamberlain, ``Alexa Whistleblower Demands Amazon 
Apology After Being Jailed and Tortured,'' Guardian, January 30, 2022. 
Coercing a detainee to confess to wrongdoing is a violation of the PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law, and torture is a violation of the Chinese 
government's international human rights obligations as a State Party to 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong 
Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and 
effective October 26, 2018, arts. 52, 56; Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, 
entry into force June 26, 1987. China signed the CAT on December 12, 
1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988. United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 
accessed August 1, 2022.
    \99\ Hengyang Zhengxiang People's Court, ``Hunan sheng Hengyangshi 
Zhengxiangqu Renmin Fayuan xingshi panjue shu'' [People's Court in 
Zhengxiang district, Hengyang City, Hunan Province: criminal judgment], 
July 1, 2020.
    \100\ Hengyang Zhengxiang People's Court, ``Hunan sheng Hengyangshi 
Zhengxiangqu Renmin Fayuan xingshi panjue shu'' [People's Court in 
Zhengxiang district, Hengyang City, Hunan Province: criminal judgment], 
July 1, 2020; Gethin Chamberlain, ``Schoolchildren in China Work 
Overnight to Produce Amazon Alexa Devices,'' Guardian, August 8, 2019.
    \101\ Gethin Chamberlain, ``Schoolchildren in China Work Overnight 
to Produce Amazon Alexa Devices,'' Guardian, August 8, 2019; China 
Labor Watch, ``Amazon's Supplier Factory Foxconn Recruits Illegally: 
Interns Forced to Work Overtime,'' August 8, 2019. Making students work 
night shifts is against Chinese regulations. Ministry of Education, 
Zhiye Xuexiao Xuesheng Shixi Guanli Guiding [Regulations on the 
Management of Vocational School Student Internships], issued and 
effective April 12, 2016, art. 16.
    \102\ Gethin Chamberlain, ``Schoolchildren in China Work Overnight 
to Produce Amazon Alexa Devices,'' Guardian, August 8, 2019; China 
Labor Watch, ``Amazon's Supplier Factory Foxconn Recruits Illegally: 
Interns Forced to Work Overtime,'' August 8, 2019.

North Korean Refugees in China

North Korean Refugees in China

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                                Findings

         Chinese and North Korean authorities arranged 
        the repatriation of reportedly 50 North Korean refugees 
        in July 2021. Repatriated North Koreans remained 
        vulnerable to torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and 
        execution, and the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea (DPRK) government signaled harsher punishment for 
        escapees as well as family members within North Korean 
        borders.
         In 2021, only 63 North Korean refugees were 
        recorded as entering South Korea, compared to 229 in 
        2020 and 1,047 in 2019, the lowest since the South 
        Korean Ministry of Reunification began recording the 
        number of escapees in 1998. The coronavirus disease 
        2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and related border closures 
        contributed to the decrease.
         The UN Security Council issued a Resolution in 
        2017 requiring Member States, which includes China, to 
        repatriate North Korean nationals working overseas to 
        the DPRK by December 2019. The Chinese government did 
        not comply with this deadline to repatriate the 
        approximately 20,000 to 100,000 North Koreans working 
        in China as dispatch workers, many of whom are 
        subjected to forced labor and abusive working 
        conditions.
         Women remain the largest demographic of North 
        Korean refugees leaving the DPRK for China and they 
        continue to be vulnerable to human trafficking and 
        forced and low-wage labor. The Chinese government's 
        refusal to recognize survivors of trafficking and abuse 
        prevents them from receiving legal protection or access 
        to vital services.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Continue to designate the Chinese government as a 
        ``Tier 3'' violator of human trafficking standards, 
        noting not only the Chinese government's refusal to 
        repatriate North Korean dispatch workers, but also its 
        continued solicitation of such workers, especially 
        women. As part of that designation, employ the actions 
        described in Section 110 of the Trafficking Victims 
        Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) as amended (22 U.S.C. 
        7107) to address government-sponsored forced labor. 
        Ensure that Chinese companies and officials that employ 
        dispatch workers are identified and sanctioned. 
        Additionally, encourage designated State Department 
        bureaus to pursue enforcement operations aimed at 
        disrupting the DPRK government's international funding 
        schemes involving products made with forced labor.
          Appoint and confirm a U.S. Special Envoy on North 
        Korean Human Rights Issues, in recognition of the 2022 
        expiration of the North Korean Human Rights Act (22 
        U.S.C. 7814). Once appointed, the Special Envoy should 
        work with South Korean counterparts to coordinate 
        efforts related to humanitarian assistance and human 
        rights promotion for North Korean refugees in China, in 
        accordance with the North Korean Human Rights 
        Reauthorization Act of 2017 (Public Law No. 115-198).
          Urge the Chinese government to recognize North 
        Koreans in China as refugees. Especially important is 
        recognizing them as refugees sur place who fear 
        persecution upon return to their country of origin, 
        regardless of their reason for leaving the DPRK. In 
        addition, urge the Chinese government to immediately 
        halt the repatriation of North Korean refugees; adopt 
        asylum or refugee legislation and incorporate the 
        principle of non-refoulement into domestic legislation; 
        consider the feasibility of a partnership with non-
        governmental organizations and private individuals to 
        sponsor North Korean refugees for resettlement in the 
        United States or to coordinate resettlement in South 
        Korea; establish a responsible government institution 
        and mechanism to determine asylee or refugee status for 
        North Koreans seeking international protection in 
        China, in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for 
        Refugees; and allow North Korean refugees safe passage 
        to other countries, including South Korea.
          Urge Chinese authorities to grant legal status to 
        North Korean women and men who marry or have children 
        with People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens. Ensure 
        that children born of such marriages are granted 
        resident status and access to education and other 
        public services in accordance with Chinese law and 
        international standards.

North Korean Refugees in China

North Korean Refugees in China

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                              Introduction

    The Chinese government considers North Korean refugees in 
China to be illegal migrants and maintains a policy of forcible 
repatriation based on a 1998 border protocol with the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).\1\ While the 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic halted forced 
repatriations \2\ during the DPRK's border closure from January 
2020 through July 2021,\3\ the Chinese government reportedly 
resumed repatriations in July 2021.\4\ Repatriated North 
Koreans often face torture, imprisonment, forced labor, 
execution, and other inhumane treatment,\5\ and the DPRK 
government's treatment of forcibly repatriated refugees renders 
North Koreans in China refugees sur place \6\ who fear 
persecution upon return to their country of origin, regardless 
of their reason for leaving the DPRK.\7\
    The Chinese government's forced repatriation of North 
Korean refugees contravenes its international obligations under 
the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol, to which China has acceded.\8\ Under the 
principle of non-refoulement, China is also obligated under the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which it has ratified, to 
refrain from forcibly repatriating persons if there are 
``substantial grounds for believing that [they] would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.'' \9\

         Border Conditions and Forced Repatriation of Refugees

    In 2021, 63 North Korean refugees reached South Korea, the 
lowest total in any year since South Korea's Ministry of 
Unification began recording arrivals in 1998.\10\ The figure 
represents a 73-
percent drop from 2020 and a 98-percent drop from the peak in 
2009.\11\ The substantial decrease in refugee flows since 2019 
can be attributed to North Korean border controls, including 
alleged ``shoot-on-sight'' directives for border guards \12\ 
and strict COVID-19 prevention measures within China that made 
domestic and international travel difficult.\13\ Some North 
Koreans who fled to China faced difficulties traveling to a 
third country, placing them at risk of repatriation.\14\

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    On August 23, 2021, several UN special rapporteurs wrote a 
letter to the DPRK government describing their concerns 
regarding a reported August 2020 proclamation on the use of 
lethal force against those making unauthorized entry into the 
buffer zone along the border of the DPRK.\15\ In the letter, 
the experts requested clarification from the government on the 
alleged order, saying that if authentic, the order would 
violate rights guaranteed under international human rights 
law.\16\
    Despite a city-wide lockdown related to COVID-19, on July 
14, 2021, the Chinese government reportedly repatriated 50 
North Korean refugees from Dandong municipality, Liaoning 
province, to the North Korean city of Sinuiju.\17\ In his final 
report published in March 2022, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea estimated that Chinese authorities held in 
detention around 1,500 North Koreans who were at risk of 
repatriation.\18\
    In October 2021, the Chinese government passed the PRC Land 
Borders Law which took effect on January 1, 2022.\19\ The law 
was reportedly influenced by concerns over the COVID-19 
pandemic, longstanding territory issues with India, and 
concerns regarding the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.\20\ The 
law states that the government will ``take effective measures 
to resolutely protect territorial sovereignty and land border 
security.'' \21\ According to a policy expert, the codification 
of the Land Borders Law could embolden the Chinese government 
to use ``national security'' as justification for the continued 
``unlawful treatment and repatriation'' of North Korean 
defectors.\22\

                     North Korean Workers in China

    In their March 2022 final report, the UN Panel of Experts 
on North Korea found sufficient evidence that DPRK entities 
dispatched North Korean workers to China despite a 2017 UN 
order that the Chinese government repatriate them--with limited 
exceptions--to the DPRK.\23\ The UN Security Council issued a 
Resolution in 2017 requiring Member States, which includes 
China, to repatriate North Korean nationals working overseas to 
the DPRK by December 2019.\24\ The Chinese government, however, 
did not comply with the deadline.\25\ According to the Daily 
NK, in early March 2022, DPRK authorities issued an order 
directed at dispatch workers in at least one Chinese province 
indicating that they should be prevented from leaving their 
worksites.\26\ Additionally, the U.S. State Department reported 
in its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report that approximately 
20,000 to 100,000 North Korean workers remained in China, where 
many are subjected to forced labor and abusive working 
conditions.\27\

                   Trafficking of North Korean Women

    North Korean women who enter China as refugees, defectors, 
or dispatch workers on behalf of the DPRK government remain 
vulnerable to human trafficking. The South Korean Ministry of 
Unification reports that the majority of North Korean refugees 
have been women since it began recording arrivals of refugees 
in 1998.\28\ In addition, businesses located in China continued 
to employ North Korean workers, including women, who were not 
refugees or defectors.\29\ While working in China, dispatch 
workers are subjected to mistreatment that the International 
Labour Organization identifies as forced labor, which is a form 
of human trafficking.\30\ Reporting has suggested that the 
trafficking of North Korean women can be linked to the sex 
ratio imbalance caused by the Chinese government's restrictive 
population policies, with many North Korean women trafficked 
for purposes of forced marriages with Chinese men and sexual 
exploitation.\31\

              Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents

    Children born to undocumented North Korean mothers and 
Chinese fathers continue to be deprived of legal protections 
guaranteed under Chinese law.\32\ Estimates suggest that 
approximately 30,000 unregistered children in China have been 
born to North Korean mothers and Chinese fathers.\33\ The PRC 
Nationality Law provides that all children born in China are 
entitled to Chinese nationality if either parent is a Chinese 
citizen,\34\ but the parents of such children are often unable 
to obtain birth registration or nationality documents.\35\ Some 
Chinese fathers have reportedly avoided registering children in 
order to keep their undocumented partner's status unknown to 
authorities.\36\ Without proof of resident status, these 
children often find it difficult to access education and other 
public services.\37\ The denial of nationality rights and 
access to education for these children contravenes China's 
obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\38\ 
Despite some North Korean women having lived in China for years 
with their Chinese husbands and children, authorities detained 
several of these women this past year and reportedly planned to 
repatriate them to North Korea.\39\

North Korean Refugees in China

North Korean Refugees in China

    Notes to Section VIII--North Korean Refugees in China

    \1\ UN General Assembly, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/74/268, August 2, 2019; 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination Reviews the Report of China,'' 
August 13, 2018. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination expressed concern that ``China continued to deny refugee 
status to asylum-seekers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and it also continued to forcibly return them to their country of 
origin, regardless of a serious threat of persecution and human rights 
violations.'' Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State 
Security and People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security, 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong'anbu Chaoxian Minzhu Zhuyi Renmin 
Gongheguo Guojia Baoweibu Guanyu Zai Bianjing Diqu Weihu Guojia Anquan 
He Shehui Zhixu De Gongzuo Zhong Xianghu Hezuo De Yidingshu [Mutual 
Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and 
Social Order in the Border Areas], signed July 8, 1998, effective 
August 28, 1998, arts. 4, 9. The protocol commits each side to treat as 
illegal those border crossers who do not have proper visa certificates, 
except in cases involving ``calamity or unavoidable factors.''
    \2\ Jong So Yong, ``N. Korea Refuses Repatriation of Defectors 
Imprisoned in Dandong,'' Daily NK, March 4, 2020.
    \3\ Lina Yoon, Human Rights Watch, ``China Restarts Forced Returns 
of Refugees to North Korea,'' July 22, 2021.
    \4\ ``Concern About Fate of 50 North Korean Escapees Sent Home by 
China,'' Radio Free Asia, July 20, 2021.
    \5\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021--
Democratic People's Republic of Korea,'' April 12, 2022, 3, 6, 7, 15, 
20, 37; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
A/76/392, October 8, 2021, paras. 8, 13, 19; Amnesty International, 
Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The State of the World's Human 
Rights, POL 10/4870/2022, March 29, 2022, 280-82; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, `` `I Still Feel the Pain . . ., ' Human 
Rights Violations against Women Detained in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea,'' July 28, 2020, paras. 23, 65, 67, 80; Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Report: Women Detainees 
Face Serious Human Rights Violations,'' July 28, 2020.
    \6\ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ``Refugee Protection and 
International Migration,'' January 17, 2007, paras. 20-21.
    \7\ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ``Refugee Protection and 
International Migration,'' January 17, 2007, paras. 20-21; Human Rights 
Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing Oppression,'' May 14, 
2019; Roberta Cohen, ``Legal Grounds for Protection of North Korean 
Refugees,'' Brookings Institution, September 13, 2010; Jeong Eun Lee 
and Jeong Yon Park, ``Husbands of Undocumented North Koreans Beg China 
Not to Deport Their Wives,'' Radio Free Asia, November 15, 2021.
    \8\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the 
UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons on July 28, 1951, entry into force April 22, 1954, 
arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by 
the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, ``owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country . . . .'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that, 
``No Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
accessed April 1, 2021. China acceded to the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees on September 24, 1982. Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/
2198 of December 16, 1966, entry into force October 4, 1967, art. 1; 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, accessed April 1, 
2021. China acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
on September 24, 1982.
    \9\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, 
art. 3. Article 3 states that, ``No State Party shall expel, return 
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, 
Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed April 1, 2021. China signed 
the Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 
1988. UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the 
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st 
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 
2016, para. 46.
    \10\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North 
Korean Defectors,'' accessed March 15, 2022. The Ministry of 
Unification does not provide the number of North Korean defectors for 
the years 1999 and 2000.
    \11\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North 
Korean Defectors,'' accessed March 15, 2022. The Ministry of 
Unification does not provide the number of North Korean defectors for 
the years 1999 and 2000.
    \12\ ``U.N. Asks North Korea to Clarify Alleged Shoot-on-Sight 
Orders,'' Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2021; Yuna Ha, ``N. Korea Sets 
up `Strict Security Zones' on Sino-North Korean Border,'' Daily NK, 
September 7, 2020.
    \13\ Arendse Huld, ``China Travel Restrictions 2021/2022: An 
Explainer,'' Dezan Shira & Associates, China Briefing, July 21, 2022; 
``Chinese Embassy in Laos Cracks down Soaring Intl. Air Ticket 
Prices,'' Global Times, December 22, 2021; ``Concern About Fate of 50 
North Korean Escapees Sent Home by China,'' Radio Free Asia, July 20, 
2021; Civil Aviation Administration of China, ``Notice on Further 
Reducing International Passenger Flights during the Epidemic Prevention 
and Control Period,'' March 26, 2020. For more information concerning 
containment and surveillance measures used by the Chinese government 
during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, see CECC, 2020 
Annual Report, December 2020, 203-4.
    \14\ ``Concern About Fate of 50 North Korean Escapees Sent Home by 
China,'' Radio Free Asia, July 20, 2021.
    \15\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter 
from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OL PRK 5/2021, August 23, 2021; Kim 
Tong-hyung, ``UN Asks North Korea to Clarify Alleged Shoot-on-Sight 
Orders,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Los Angeles Times, August 27, 
2021.
    \16\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter 
from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human 
Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OL PRK 5/2021, August 23, 2021; Kim 
Tong-hyung, ``UN Asks North Korea to Clarify Alleged Shoot-on-Sight 
Orders,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Los Angeles Times, August 27, 
2021.
    \17\ ``Concern About Fate of 50 North Korean Escapees Sent Home by 
China,'' Radio Free Asia, July 20, 2021.
    \18\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, A/HRC/49/74, March 17, 2022; Josh Smith and Sunghyuk An, ``Kim 
Jong Un's Crackdowns Leave North Korea Defectors with Little Hope, 
Reuters, December 16, 2021.
    \19\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ludi Guojie Fa [PRC Land Borders 
Law], passed October 23, 2021, effective January 1, 2022.
    \20\ Ralph Jennings, ``What Does China's New Land Borders Law Mean 
for Its Neighbors?'' Voice of America, November 5, 2021.
    \21\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ludi Guojie Fa [PRC Land Borders 
Law], passed October 23, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, art. 4. See 
also ``China Adopts Land Borders Law,'' Xinhua, October 23, 2021.
    \22\ Jason Bartlett, ``China's New Land Borders Law Is a Nightmare 
for North Korean Refugees,'' The Diplomat, October 21, 2021. See also 
Shuxian Luo, ``China's Land Border Law: A Preliminary Assessment,'' 
Brookings Institution, Order from Chaos (blog), November 4, 2021.
    \23\ Panel of Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council 
resolution 1874 (2009), Final Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted 
Pursuant to Resolution 2569 (2021), S/2022/132, March 1, 2022, paras. 
168-70, Annexes 78, 79; UN Security Council, Resolution 2397 (2017), S/
RES/2397 (2017), December 22, 2017, para. 8; Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking 
in Persons Report--North Korea,'' July 2022, 327. See also Jieun Kim, 
``North Korean Labor Managers in China Demand More Money as Job Market 
Tightens,'' Radio Free Asia, May 11, 2022.
    \24\ UN Security Council, Resolution 2397 (2017), S/RES/2397 
(2017), December 22, 2017, para. 8. China is a member of the United 
Nations Security Council. UN Security Council, ``Current Members,'' 
accessed July 26, 2022.
    \25\ Panel of Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council 
resolution 1874 (2009), Final Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted 
Pursuant to Resolution 2569 (2021), S/2022/132, March 1, 2022, paras. 
168-70, Annexes 78, 79; David Brunnstrom, ``China Fails to Repatriate 
North Korea Workers despite UN Sanctions: U.S. Official,'' Reuters, 
January 22, 2020.
    \26\ Seulkee Jang, ``N. Korean Workers in China Have Become 
`Virtual Prisoners' Confined to Their Dorms and Workplaces,'' Daily NK, 
April 7, 2022. See also Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: 
North Korea,'' July 2022, 327.
    \27\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea,'' 
July 2022, 327; Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to UN Security 
Council Resolution 1874 (2009), Final Report of the Panel of Experts 
Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2569 (2021), S/2022/132, March 1, 
2022, paras. 168, 170, 172, Annex 78; UN Security Council, Resolution 
2397 (2017), S/RES/2397 (2017), December 22, 2017, para. 8; Countering 
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 9401, sec. 
302(a). Reports this past year indicated that North Korean workers 
remained in China despite the December 2019 deadline. See, e.g., Hyemin 
Son and Jeong Eun Lee, ``North Korean Workers and Their Manager 
Disappear from Shanghai Dormitory,'' Radio Free Asia, April 20, 2022; 
Seulkee Jang, ``North Korea May Be Preparing to Repatriate Some Workers 
from China,'' Daily NK, August 3, 2021.
    \28\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North 
Korean Defectors,'' accessed March 15, 2022. The Ministry of 
Unification does not provide the number of North Korean defectors for 
the years 1999 and 2000.
    \29\ Seulkee Jang, ``N. Korean Workers in China Have Become 
`Virtual Prisoners' Confined to Their Dorms and Workplaces,'' Daily NK, 
April 7, 2022; Hyemin Son and Jeong Eun Lee, ``North Korean Workers and 
Their Manager Disappear from Shanghai Dormitory,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 22, 2022; ``North Korea to Replace 10,000 Workers Dispatched to 
China,'' Radio Free Asia, June 23, 2021; Hyemin Son, ``North Korean 
Waitresses in China Are Made to Work without Masks,'' Radio Free Asia, 
December 2, 2021; ``North Korea Dispatches 2,000 Additional Workers to 
China,'' Daily NK, October 30, 2019.
    \30\ Deception, restriction of movement, intimidation, threats, 
withholding of wages, abusive working and living conditions, and 
excessive overtime are all indicators of forced labor according to the 
International Labour Organization. International Labour Organization, 
``ILO Indicators of Forced Labor,'' October 1, 2012, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 
17, 21, 23. Hyemin Son, ``North Korean Waitresses in China Are Made to 
Work without Masks,'' Radio Free Asia, December 2, 2021; Anu Singh et 
al., ``Canadian Brands Sold Clothing from Factory Suspected of Secretly 
Using North Korean Forced Labour,'' CBC, November 6, 2021; Hyemin Son 
and Jeong Eun Lee, ``North Korean Workers and Their Manager Disappear 
from Shanghai Dormitory,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2022; Panel of 
Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1874 
(2009), Final Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to 
Resolution 2569 (2021), S/2022/132, March 1, 2022, paras. 168-70, 
Annexes 78, 79; Lam Ka-sing, ``Li Ning Refutes US Claim of Using North 
Korean Forced Labour,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2022; 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into force 
December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also Countering America's Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 9401, sec. 302(a); Teodora 
Gyupchanova, ``Labor and Human Rights Conditions of North Korean 
Workers Dispatched Overseas: A Look at the DPRK's Exploitative 
Practices in Russia, Poland, and Mongolia,'' Cornell International Law 
Journal 51, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 184, 186-87.
    \31\ All Party Parliamentary Group for North Korea, ``APPG on North 
Korea: Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in North Korea 2014-2020/
1,'' July 2021, 50. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: 
North Korea,'' July 2022, 176-77, 327-28.
    \32\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea,'' 
July 2022, 176, 328.
    \33\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea,'' 
July 2022, 328. See also Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean 
Children Living in Limbo in China,'' Guardian, February 5, 2016.
    \34\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoji Fa [PRC Nationality Law], 
passed and effective September 10, 1980, art. 4. Article 4 of the PRC 
Nationality Law provides that, ``Any person born in China whose parents 
are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese 
national shall have Chinese nationality.''
    \35\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea,'' 
July 2022, 328; See also Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean 
Children Living in Limbo in China,'' Guardian, February 5, 2016.
    \36\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021--China 
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),'' April 12, 2022, 60.
    \37\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea,'' 
July 2022, 328; Eduardo Jaramillo, ``China's Hukou Reform in 2022: Do 
They Mean It This Time?,'' Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, New Perspectives on Asia (blog), April 20, 2022; Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021--China (Includes Tibet, Hong 
Kong and Macau),'' April 12, 2022, 60. See also Jenna Yoojin Yun, 
``30,000 North Korean Children Living in Limbo in China,'' Guardian, 
February 5, 2016.
    \38\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force 
September 2, 1990, arts. 2, 7, 28(1)(a). Under the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, China is obligated to register children born 
within the country immediately after birth and also to provide all 
children with access to education without discrimination on the basis 
of nationality. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 24.
    \39\ Jeong Yon Park, ``North Korean Wives of Chinese Men Asked to 
Apply for Temporary ID Cards,'' Radio Free Asia, November 29, 2021; 
Jeong Eun Lee and Jeong Yon Park, ``Husbands of Undocumented North 
Koreans Beg China Not to Deport Their Wives,'' Radio Free Asia, 
November 15, 2021; ``Arrests of North Korean Wives of Chinese Men Spook 
Refugee Community,'' Radio Free Asia, August 20, 2021.

Tibet

Tibet

                               IX. Tibet

                                 Tibet

                                Findings

         The Commission did not observe any interest 
        from People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in 
        resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama's 
        representatives, the last round of which, the ninth, 
        was held in January 2010.
         The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to 
        control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the 
        majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. Authorities 
        in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of 
        religious worship, particularly during major religious 
        events or around the times of politically sensitive 
        anniversaries, and restricted access to Tibetan 
        Buddhist religious institutions. The PRC continued to 
        assert control over the process of selection and 
        recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, 
        including the Dalai Lama.
         The Commission observed reports of three 
        Tibetan self-
        immolations, bringing the number of self-immolations 
        since 2009 in Tibetan areas reported to focus on 
        political or religious issues to 154, of which 135 were 
        reportedly fatal. On February 25, 2022, 25-year-old pop 
        singer Tsewang Norbu fatally self-
        immolated near the Potala Palace in Lhasa municipality, 
        Tibet Autonomous Region. On March 27, 81-year-old Tashi 
        Phuntsog (or Taphun), fatally self-immolated at a 
        police station near Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) 
        county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, 
        Sichuan province. On March 30, Tsering Samdrub (or 
        Tsering) self-immolated in Yushu (Yulshul) city, Yushu 
        Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.
         Chinese authorities continued to threaten 
        linguistic rights in Tibetan areas and enforce policies 
        promoting or mandating the use of Mandarin Chinese 
        instead of Tibetan or other local languages, including 
        through ordering the closures of Tibetan-
        language schools. A rights advocacy group reported that 
        nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan students were educated 
        in state-sponsored colonial boarding schools, 
        threatening Tibetans' linguistic and cultural rights by 
        separating children from their families and 
        communities.
         In contravention of international human rights 
        standards, officials punished residents of Tibetan 
        areas for exercising protected rights, including the 
        expression of religious belief, criticism of PRC 
        policies, and sharing information online. Notable cases 
        this past year included writer Lobsang Lhundrub, better 
        known as Dhi Lhaden, sentenced to four years in prison, 
        possibly because of a book he was writing; Rinchen Kyi, 
        a teacher at a private school that officials shut down 
        in July 2021, detained for ``inciting separatism'' (and 
        later released); and Lobsang Trinle, a Tibetan Buddhist 
        monk sentenced to five years in prison after he shared 
        the Dalai Lama's teachings and writings about the Dalai 
        Lama with other Tibetans.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Work with the United Nations and like-minded 
        countries to help set up visits by UN special 
        procedures and human rights experts--including the 
        Special Rapporteur on minority issues, the Special 
        Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and 
        members of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and 
        the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
        Disappearances--to Tibetan areas of the PRC to 
        independently assess the human rights situation there, 
        free of any restrictions or hindrances by PRC 
        officials, to be followed by a full report to the 
        United Nations on their findings. Advocate for free and 
        transparent access to Tibetan areas by diplomats and 
        foreign journalists.
          Monitor and report on developments in colonial 
        boarding schools in Tibetan areas of the PRC and 
        determine the necessity of imposing sanctions on 
        Chinese officials responsible for any violations of the 
        rights of Tibetans stemming from the coercive boarding 
        school system.
          Work with government officials, parliamentarians, and 
        non-governmental organizations in like-minded countries 
        to pressure PRC authorities to respect, as a matter of 
        the right to
        religious freedom and as recognized under Chinese and 
        international law, that it is the right of Tibetan 
        Buddhists to identify and educate all religious 
        teachers, including the Dalai Lama, in a manner 
        consistent with Tibetan Buddhist practices and 
        traditions.
          Encourage the resumption of genuine dialogue, without 
        preconditions, between the Chinese government and the 
        Dalai Lama or his representatives. To that end, ensure 
        that calls for dialogue are based on the Tibetan 
        people's right to self-determination under 
        international law, which has been precluded by current 
        Chinese policies, and use available resources to 
        counter disinformation about Tibet from Chinese 
        officials, including disinformation about the history 
        of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, 
        including that of the Dalai Lama.
          In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the 
        release of Tibetan political prisoners currently 
        detained or imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of 
        their human rights, such as Lobsang Lhundrub (Dhi 
        Lhaden), Lobsang Trinle, Thubten Lodroe, and Go Sherab 
        Gyatso. The records of detained Tibetans in the 
        Commission's Political Prisoner Database provide a 
        useful resource for such advocacy. Urge PRC officials, 
        law enforcement, and security forces to end the use of 
        arbitrary detention, disappearance, beatings, torture, 
        and intimidation to suppress and punish Tibetans for 
        the peaceful exercise of their rights.

          Urge Chinese officials to invite the U.S. Ambassador 
        to China and representatives of international 
        organizations to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima, whom 
        the Dalai Lama recognized as the 11th Panchen Lama, and 
        his parents, all three of whom disappeared shortly 
        after his recognition as Panchen Lama in 1995.

Tibet

Tibet

                                 Tibet

       Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government and
                 the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, the Commission 
did not observe any interest on the part of People's Republic 
of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with 
the Dalai Lama's representatives, the last round of which, the 
ninth round of negotiations, was held in January 2010.\1\ Penpa 
Tsering, Sikyong (political leader) of the Tibetan government-
in-exile, has made restarting dialogue with the Chinese 
government a major goal of his administration,\2\ and in 
September 2021 said that he had received ``signals'' indicating 
possible Chinese interest in resuming negotiations; \3\ as of 
June 2022 the Commission had observed no further developments.

                        Tibetan Self-Immolations

    This past year, the Commission observed for the first time 
since November 2019 reports of Tibetan self-immolations.\4\ The 
three self-immolations of Tsewang Norbu, Tashi Phuntsog, and 
Tsering Samdrub bring the number of self-immolations since 2009 
in Tibetan areas of China which were reported to focus on 
political or religious issues to 154.\5\ Of these self-
immolations, 135 were fatal.\6\
    On February 25, 2022, Tibetan pop singer Tsewang Norbu 
self-immolated near the Potala Palace in Lhasa municipality, 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),\7\ in protest against Chinese 
government policies in Tibetan areas.\8\ The Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs reportedly cast doubt on accounts of his 
death, and suggested that a self-immolator--ostensibly 
referring to Tsewang Norbu--had attempted suicide due to mental 
illness and had been taken away for treatment.\9\ Shortly after 
his self-immolation, authorities blocked his Weibo profile.\10\ 
Tsewang Norbu was 25 years old at the time of his death.\11\
    Tsewang Norbu's self-immolation was followed a month later 
by the March 27, 2022, fatal self-immolation of 81-year-old 
Tashi Phuntsog (or Taphun), in front of a police station near 
Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and 
Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.\12\ Authorities 
quickly took him away, though reports did not confirm whether 
he died at the scene or afterward.\13\
    Days later on March 30, Tsering Samdrub (or Tsering) 
carried out a self-immolation in Jiegu (Kyegudo) subdistrict, 
Yushu (Yulshul) city, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 
Qinghai province.\14\ Reporting on his self-immolation was 
limited; police took him away immediately, and further 
information, including whether he was alive, was 
unavailable.\15\

                     Religious Freedom for Tibetans

    The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the 
religious practices of Tibetans, particularly practitioners of 
Tibetan Buddhism. International observers and rights advocacy 
groups reported on continuing violations of international human 
rights standards, including the right to freely worship and to 
choose one's own religion, that result from Chinese religious 
policy and its implementation.\16\ PRC officials exercise 
political control and supervision of Tibetan Buddhist monastic 
and educational institutions through the United Front Work 
Department's National Religious Affairs Administration. [For 
more information on religion in China, see Section III--Freedom 
of Religion.]
    During the 2022 reporting year, PRC organizations, 
including United Front Work Department branches and monastic 
management committees,\17\ continued to target Tibetan Buddhist 
monks and nuns with propaganda on PRC policy on ethnic and 
religious issues in ideological education sessions held at 
monastic institutions and other sites. These propaganda efforts 
incorporated into monastic curricula the study of Party ethnic 
and religious policy initiatives and priorities, including the 
``sinicization'' of religion; \18\ Xi Jinping's speech during 
his July 2021 visit to the TAR to mark the 70th anniversary of 
the ``peaceful liberation of Tibet''; \19\ Xi's speech on the 
100th anniversary of the founding of the Party on July 1, 2021; 
\20\ and the December 2021 National Conference on Religious 
Work; \21\ as well as Chinese legal provisions, including the 
Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living 
Buddhas \22\ and local religious regulations.\23\ These study 
sessions emphasized the Party and government's primacy over and 
control of religious institutions and practices such as 
monastic education \24\ and the recognition of reincarnated 
Tibetan Buddhist teachers.\25\

                   RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

    During the 2022 reporting year, authorities in Tibetan 
areas issued prohibitions on forms of religious worship, 
particularly during major religious events or around the times 
of politically sensitive anniversaries, and restricted access 
to Tibetan Buddhist religious institutions, including 
monasteries and temples. Illustrative examples included:

         Kirti Rinpoche. In August 2021, authorities in 
        Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, 
        Sichuan province, banned religious activities at Aba's 
        Kirti Monastery and in surrounding areas in both Aba 
        (Ngaba) and Ruo'ergai (Dzoege) counties.\26\ August 8 
        was the 80th birthday of Tibetan Buddhist religious 
        leader Kirti Rinpoche (currently in exile), and his 
        birthday is normally widely celebrated by his 
        followers.\27\
         Monastic expulsions. In the second half of 
        2021, authorities in Gansu and Qinghai provinces 
        expelled monks from Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. In 
        July, authorities forcibly closed Hongcheng Monastery 
        \28\ in Yongjing county, Linxia Hui Autonomous 
        Prefecture, Gansu, and expelled monks and nuns residing 
        or studying there.\29\ Sources asserted that 
        authorities
        targeted the monastery for closure in order to seize 
        charitable donations collected by the monastery during 
        the COVID-19 pandemic.\30\ The Qinghai expulsions, at 
        Ditsa Monastery and Jakhyung Monastery, both located in 
        Hualong (Bayan) Hui Autonomous County, Haidong 
        prefecture, occurred in late October,\31\ several weeks 
        after new provincial regulations on religious affairs 
        took effect in Qinghai.\32\ Authorities forced several 
        dozen young monks from each monastery to disrobe and 
        banned them from rejoining their monasteries' 
        schools.\33\
         Losar restrictions. In February 2022, 
        authorities in Lhasa municipality, TAR, prohibited 
        religious gatherings to celebrate the early March 
        Tibetan New Year (Losar) at religious institutions and 
        other major cultural sites in the Lhasa area, including 
        Drepung and Sera Monasteries and the Potala Palace.\34\ 
        Authorities cited public health concerns from the 
        ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in ordering the 
        restrictions.\35\
         March 10. Several weeks later, in the runup to 
        the March 10 anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, 
        authorities in Tibetan areas of Sichuan and Gansu 
        provinces prohibited religious gatherings by 
        Tibetans.\36\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Revised TAR Implementing Measures for Regulations  on Religious Affairs
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In September 2021, the TAR government issued revised implementing
 measures for the national Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took
 effect in 2018.\37\ The revised measures, which took effect on November
 1, 2021, are an update of the previous 2007 measures \38\ and contain
 several new provisions restricting the rights of TAR residents to
 freely practice religion.\39\
 
   Party religious policy. Article 15 of the revised measures
   mandates that religious groups work with the government to spread
   propaganda on Party policy as well as on state laws and
   regulations.\40\
   Education. Article 23 stipulates that the TAR government's
   responsibilities in managing religious institutions include providing
   for ``patriotic education'' and ``anti-separatist education,'' as
   well as ``managing'' and ``guiding'' religious activities and
   religious instruction.\41\
   Religious institution limits. Article 35 prohibits religious
   institutions from exceeding a prescribed number of instructors,\42\
   in line with Party policy seeking to prevent an increase in the
   numbers of both instructors and students at religious schools,
   including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.\43\
   Online activities. Articles 47 through 49 place new limits on
   online religious activities, requiring application to and approval
   from TAR government agencies before holding such activities.\44\
   Article 47 orders those holding or hosting online religious
   activities to govern the content of these activities such that
   illegal and ``adverse'' information is prevented from being
   broadcast, and violations are recorded and reported to officials.\45\
 
  The revised measures retain provisions prohibiting religious
 instructors, groups, and organizations from being ``controlled'' by
 ``foreign forces,'' and mandates that the reincarnation of Tibetan
 Buddhist leaders should not be ``subject to control or interference''
 by ``foreign organizations or individuals.'' \46\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   CRACKDOWNS ON MONASTIC COMMUNITIES

    In some cases, restrictions on Tibetans' religious freedom 
occurred in large-scale crackdowns targeting religious 
institutions, monastics, and sometimes residents of nearby 
areas.\47\ A prominent example developed in Luhuo (Draggo) 
county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), 
Sichuan province, where in mid-October 2021, authorities 
detained Palga,\48\ abbot of Draggo Monastery, and Nyima,\49\ 
the monastery's treasurer, after they refused demands by the 
Luhuo county government to ensure monks' and local residents' 
compliance with orders to demolish a school affiliated with the 
monastery.\50\ Sources reported that police tortured Palga and 
Nyima in custody.\51\ Luhuo authorities razed a 99-foot-tall 
statue of the Buddha and 45 prayer wheels near the monastery 
around December 12, 2021, and on December 21 demolished another 
30-foot-tall Buddha statue located inside the monastery.\52\ 
Police subsequently detained at least 10 Tibetans, including 
monks and Luhuo residents, for sharing news of the demolitions 
outside Tibet.\53\ Authorities held most of the detainees at a 
detention facility in Thangnagma, near Niba (Nyipa) township, 
Luhuo, and subjected some detainees to forced labor and 
torture.\54\ Several months later, sources reported that local 
authorities ordered monks to sign documents taking 
responsibility for the demolitions.\55\
    A similar crackdown targeting a monastery and local 
residents continued in Wenbo (Dza Bonpo) town, Shiqu (Sershul) 
county, Ganzi TAP, where on August 22, 2021, public security 
officials took into custody approximately 59 local residents 
and monks from Dza Bonpo (or Wonpo) Monastery for possessing 
images of the Dalai Lama, which are banned by Chinese 
authorities.\56\ Authorities had conducted raids on homes in 
the area in March 2021, and at that time had noted which 
residents had such images, targeting them in August for 
detention.\57\ Among the detainees were 40 local residents and 
19 monks from Dza Bonpo Monastery; authorities likely held them 
at the Shiqu Public Security Bureau Detention Center.\58\ On 
August 25, officials summoned local residents to a public 
meeting where they issued warnings against possessing images of 
the Dalai Lama or contacting people outside China.\59\ Over the 
next four days, authorities detained another 53 Tibetans in 
connection with images of the Dalai Lama, foreign contacts, or 
membership in an online group promoting Tibetan language 
rights, holding them at a Shiqu-area detention facility.\60\ On 
September 3, authorities detained eight more Tibetans in 
connection with the crackdown: six Dza Bonpo monks and two 
local laywomen.\61\ Sources reported that officials abused some 
of the detainees in custody, including by denying them adequate 
food and clothing, and ordered the detainees to undergo 
``political education'' sessions.\62\ Authorities released four 
unidentified detainees, a monk and three laypersons, around 
August 31, and all but three of the others by September 27; the 
remaining three monks were released by late October.\63\
    Chinese authorities continued to penalize Tibetans for 
expressions of reverence for the Dalai Lama through criminal 
and other punishments. Authorities in Ganzi TAP detained at 
least 31 Tibetans in connection with celebrations or 
observances of the Dalai Lama's birthday, including the 
following cases:

         Public security officials in Seda (Serthar) 
        county, Ganzi TAP, detained four Tibetans at a Seda 
        restaurant after police searched their mobile 
        phones.\64\ The four--Rinchen Zangpo, Loga, Dagther, 
        and Wangchug Kyi--were students at a Seda middle 
        school.\65\ Authorities were searching Tibetan 
        residents' phones for images of the Dalai Lama, banned 
        in China, around the time of the Dalai Lama's 86th 
        birthday on July 6.\66\
         Authorities in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi 
        TAP, detained Dzapo \67\ and Konchog Tashi,\68\ two 
        Tibetan residents of Kalong (Khyaglung) town, Ganzi 
        county, in connection with making social media posts 
        encouraging Tibetans to offer prayers for the Dalai 
        Lama's birthday.\69\
         Around the same time, authorities in Litang 
        (Lithang) county, Ganzi TAP, detained at least 25 
        Tibetans, 15 of whom were monks at Lithang Monastery, 
        possibly in connection with celebrations of the Dalai 
        Lama's birthday.\70\ The detainees, none of whom were 
        identified, shared images of the Dalai Lama on the 
        social media platform WeChat.\71\

                   Growing Threats to Language Rights

    Although China's Constitution and laws contain provisions 
affirming the freedom of ethnic minorities to ``use and 
develop'' \72\ their languages, authorities continued to 
threaten linguistic rights in Tibetan areas, including through 
active efforts to institute policies promoting or enforcing the 
use of Mandarin Chinese instead of Tibetan, as well as policies 
of neglect with regard to minority languages. PRC ethnic policy 
ignores unrecognized linguistic communities, including in 
Tibetan areas of China,\73\ and individuals or communities with 
languages that lack official recognition are deprived of access 
to official support in education and other government 
services.\74\ The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to 
which China is a State Party,\75\ recognizes and protects the 
rights of ethnic and linguistic minority groups to use their 
languages.\76\ [For more information on language rights and 
ethnic policy, see Section VI--Ethnic Minority Rights.]
    PRC policy continued to promote the use of Mandarin Chinese 
at the expense of Tibetan and other local languages. In July 
2021, the Ministry of Education issued a circular announcing 
that beginning in September 2021, kindergartens in ethnic and 
rural areas would be required to use Mandarin in classrooms, 
and laying out plans for teachers to receive training to 
enhance instruction in Mandarin.\77\ At a September 2021 
conference in Xining municipality, Qinghai province, Party and 
government officials called on Tibetan Buddhist institutions to 
use Mandarin,\78\ saying that using Mandarin instead of Tibetan 
served the Party goal of furthering the ``sinicization'' of 
Tibetan Buddhism.\79\ During the reporting year, authorities 
ordered local government officials in parts of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) to carry out government business only 
using Mandarin.\80\ In spring 2022, local officials in parts of 
Qinghai and the TAR held a series of workshops aimed at 
increasing area Tibetan residents' knowledge of Mandarin so 
that they can assist their children's study of the 
language.\81\ The workshops were mandatory and reportedly 
included explicit instruction that the language study was 
meant, in part, to further PRC political goals.\82\
    Alongside official actions taken to promote the use of 
Mandarin, during the 2022 reporting year authorities in Tibetan 
areas continued to restrict the ability of Tibetans to use 
Tibetan or other local languages in educational settings,\83\ 
including by ordering the closure or demolition of several 
privately run schools in Tibetan areas, threatening other 
schools with closure orders, and maintaining or extending bans 
on supplemental Tibetan-language instruction, eliminating for 
many Tibetans the option to receive Tibetan-
language education.\84\ Examples of these restrictions 
included:

         Sengdrug Tagtse Middle School. In July 2021, 
        authorities in Dari (Darlag) county, Guoluo (Golog) 
        Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai province, 
        ordered the closure of Dari's private Sengdrug Tagtse 
        (or Sengdruk Taktse) Middle School, which offered 
        classes mainly in Tibetan, with a curriculum focused on 
        Tibetan culture.\85\ Guoluo officials warned other 
        private Tibetan schools that they might be closed in 
        the near future.\86\ Many former Sengdrug Tagtse 
        students faced difficulties in enrolling in other 
        schools in the area.\87\
         Gyaltsen Getsa school. In August 2021, 
        authorities in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi (Kardze) 
        TAP, Sichuan province, ordered teachers at Gyaltsen 
        Getsa school, a private Tibetan school that provides 
        free education to primary grade students, to switch all 
        instruction and curricula to Mandarin Chinese, and 
        threatened the school with closure if the order was 
        refused.\88\
         Ban on winter holiday classes. In October 
        2021, Qinghai province officials issued a province-wide 
        ban on Tibetan children attending classes offering 
        instruction in Tibetan outside their schools during the 
        winter school break.\89\
         Gaden Rabten Namgyalling school (Draggo 
        Monastery). In early October 2021, authorities in Luhuo 
        (Draggo) county, Ganzi TAP, forced school staff and 
        local residents to demolish Gaden Rabten Namgyalling 
        school, affiliated with Luhuo's Draggo Monastery.\90\ 
        The school taught young monks and other local residents 
        and focused instruction on Tibetan traditional 
        culture.\91\
         Shiqu (Sershul) county. Authorities in Shiqu 
        (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP, ordered that all private 
        schools in the county close by April 20, 2022.\92\ The 
        Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported 
        that most of the Tibetan schools closed under this 
        order served nomadic communities, and that the closures 
        followed years of increasing interference from Chinese 
        officials seeking to restrict the ability of Tibetan 
        schools to teach their own curricula.\93\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Majority of Tibetan Students Subject to  ``Colonial'' Boarding School
                                 System
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In December 2021, the advocacy group Tibet Action Institute (Tibet
 Action) issued a report on boarding schools in Tibetan areas of China,
 where nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children between the ages of 6
 and 18 are educated.\94\ Tibet Action described the boarding schools as
 ``colonial'' in design and practice, serving the PRC goal of
 ``sinicizing'' Tibetans by separating children from their families and
 communities, educating them mainly in Mandarin Chinese, and
 implementing a ``highly politicized curriculum'' intended to inculcate
 a Chinese identity in students.\95\ The percentage of students living
 at boarding schools was ``drastically higher'' for Tibetan students
 compared to students elsewhere in China, indicating that the boarding
 school system targeted non-Han Chinese populations.\96\ The report
 noted ``high rates of mental and emotional distress'' among students in
 boarding schools, due in part to separation from their families and
 communities, strict living and teaching conditions at the schools, and
 bullying and violence among students.\97\ The report also highlighted
 the coercive nature of the schools; Tibetan parents are often faced
 with no choice but to send their children to boarding schools because
 of school closures and consolidation--particularly in rural areas with
 proportionally greater Tibetan populations--and also in some cases
 fines or threats for noncompliance.\98\ Tibet Action later published
 claims by a Tibetan education expert that authorities in Tibetan areas
 of China had established a similar system of boarding preschools aimed
 at eliminating education in Tibetan or focused on Tibetan culture for
 children between the ages of four and six.\99\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Chinese officials punished Tibetans in connection with 
language rights, including for expressions of discontent with 
or opposition to official measures restricting the rights of 
Tibetans to use their language or languages freely. 
Representative examples include:

         Rinchen Kyi. In August 2021, police in Dari 
        (Darlag) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province, 
        detained Rinchen Kyi,\100\ a teacher at Dari's private 
        Sengdrug Tagtse Middle School, on suspicion of 
        ``inciting separatism.'' \101\ Police then took her to 
        Xining municipality, the capital of Qinghai, where she 
        was briefly hospitalized, and then transferred her to 
        an unknown detention location.\102\ Rinchen Kyi was a 
        long-time teacher at the school until its closure.\103\ 
        In February 2022, six United Nations human rights 
        experts wrote to the Chinese government regarding the 
        cases of Rinchen Kyi and two other Tibetan detainees, 
        expressing ``serious concern'' that these detentions 
        infringe upon their right to free expression and their 
        cultural and linguistic rights as members of a minority 
        group.\104\ Authorities released her in late 
        April.\105\
         Sherab Dorje. In August 2021, police in Hezhi 
        (Trotsig) township, Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba (Ngaba) 
        Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, 
        detained several Tibetan students after they refused to 
        attend an Aba county propaganda session on Communist 
        Party policies.\106\ Authorities released all but one, 
        19-year-old Sherab Dorje,\107\ whom authorities may 
        have targeted after he and several other students from 
        a secondary school in Maqu (Machu) county, Gannan 
        (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 
        submitted a petition to local officials opposing plans 
        to end Tibetan-language instruction there beginning in 
        fall 2021.\108\
         Palsang, Sarmo, and Yangkyi. In October, 
        authorities in Mangkang (Markham) county, Changdu 
        (Chamdo) municipality, TAR, detained three teenage 
        students, Palsang,\109\ Sarmo,\110\ and Yangkyi,\111\ 
        after they expressed opposition to the replacement of 
        Tibetan with Mandarin Chinese as the language of 
        instruction in local schools.\112\ Officials reportedly 
        said the three children needed ``psychological 
        counseling'' and held them in a Mangkang detention 
        facility described by Tibet Watch as a ``reform through 
        education center.'' \113\

              Access to Tibet and Free Flow of Information
                       Remain Heavily Restricted

    During the 2022 reporting year, Chinese authorities 
continued to severely limit access to Tibetan areas, 
particularly the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with foreign 
journalists and diplomats facing especially heavy restrictions. 
The TAR remained the only province-level administrative 
division to require all foreigners to apply for approval to 
visit,\114\ while requirements for access to Tibetan areas in 
other province-level entities were ``ambiguous.'' \115\ The 
U.S. Department of State, in its report to Congress on 
reciprocal access to Tibet and Tibetan areas, found again that 
Chinese officials ``systematically impeded travel'' and 
``regularly denied travel permits to international journalists, 
diplomats, and other officials often with indications the 
central government had denied the request'' to visit Tibetan 
areas.\116\ The Foreign Correspondents' Club of China's (FCCC) 
annual report found that central PRC officials tightly 
controlled foreign journalists' ability to independently report 
in Tibetan areas.\117\ The FCCC reported that authorities 
limited access in the TAR to only state-organized reporting 
groups and did not approve any journalists' applications to 
independently report from the TAR in 2021,\118\ and harassed 
journalists working in Tibetan areas of other provinces.\119\

              RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

    Chinese authorities continued to monitor or restrict 
contact between Tibetans in Tibetan areas of China and 
individuals or groups abroad, including by threatening to 
punish those found to have contact with Tibetans in exile--
particularly those in India--or who have shared information 
within Tibetan areas about Tibetans living abroad.\120\ For 
example, on August 8, 2021, public security officials in Yushu 
(Kyegudo) city, Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai, took into custody 
three Tibetan men--Rinchen Dorje,\121\ Kalsang Nyima,\122\ and 
Lhundrub \123\--after they shared photos of an event 
celebrating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the 
Yushu TAP in a WeChat group, reportedly because the group had 
members outside China.\124\
    Chinese authorities also strictly monitored WeChat and 
other online communications platforms to find and punish 
Tibetans who were alleged to have committed crimes by holding 
discussions online,\125\ and maintained or extended 
restrictions on the kinds of content Tibetans could freely 
share or post online.\126\ Observers expressed concern that new 
national measures on online religious content \127\ and at 
least one set of local regulations \128\ would further shrink 
the already restricted online space for discussion of Tibetan 
Buddhism and other religious matters in Tibet.\129\

Tibet

Tibet

    Notes to Section IX--Tibet

    \1\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Tibet 
Negotiations, Section 613(b) of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 
U.S.C. 6901 note),'' 1, accessed June 15, 2022. See also International 
Campaign for Tibet, ``US Report Documents Need for Greater Efforts to 
Revive China-Tibet Dialogue,'' June 15, 2022.
    \2\ Namrata Biji Ahuja, ``Tibetan President Penpa Tsering: Priority 
Is to Restart Talks with China,'' The Week, December 19, 2021.
    \3\ ``Tibet's Exile Leader Sees Signals on Possible Talks with 
China,'' Radio Free Asia, September 22, 2021.
    \4\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 296; CECC, 2020 Annual 
Report, December 2020, 327.
    \5\ This cumulative total does not include six deaths by self-
immolation of Tibetans in 2012 and 2013. ``CECC Update: Tibetan Self-
Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, January 10, 
2017. See also International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolation Fact 
Sheet,'' accessed May 3, 2022.
    \6\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 294-95; CECC, 2019 
Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 295; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, 
December 2020, 327; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 296.
    \7\ ``Potala Palace Self-Immolation Protester Identified as Popular 
Tibetan Singer,'' Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022; International 
Campaign for Tibet, ``Report of Popular Tibetan Singer's Self-
Immolation,'' March 9, 2022.
    \8\ ``Potala Palace Self-Immolation Protester Identified as Popular 
Tibetan Singer,'' Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022; Tibetan Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy, ``Popular Tibetan Singer Tsewang Norbu Dies 
of Self-Immolation Protest,'' March 15, 2022.
    \9\ ``Deciphering a Tibetan Pop Star's Self-Immolation,'' 
Economist, April 2, 2022.
    \10\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Popular 
Tibetan Singer Tsewang Norbu Dies of Self-Immolation Protest,'' March 
15, 2022.
    \11\ ``Potala Palace Self-Immolation Protester Identified as 
Popular Tibetan Singer,'' Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022.
    \12\ Central Tibetan Administration, ``81 Years Old Taphun Self 
Immolated in Kirti, Ngaba,'' April 2, 2022; ``81-Year-Old Tibet Man 
Dies after Self-Immolation Protest at Kirti Monastery,'' Radio Free 
Asia, April 3, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``An 81 Year Old Sets Himself on Fire 
in Protest against the Chinese Government,'' April 4, 2022; 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Octogenarian Tibetan Sets Himself 
on Fire in Protest against Chinese Rule,'' April 5, 2022.
    \13\ Central Tibetan Administration, ``81 Years Old Taphun Self 
Immolated in Kirti, Ngaba,'' April 2, 2022; ``81-Year-Old Tibet Man 
Dies after Self-Immolation Protest at Kirti Monastery,'' Radio Free 
Asia, April 3, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``An 81 Year Old Sets Himself on Fire 
in Protest against the Chinese Government,'' April 4, 2022; 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Octogenarian Tibetan Sets Himself 
on Fire in Protest against Chinese Rule,'' April 5, 2022.
    \14\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibet Man Attempts Self-Immolation near 
Monastery in Qinghai,'' Radio Free Asia, March 31, 2022.
    \15\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibet Man Attempts Self-Immolation near 
Monastery in Qinghai,'' Radio Free Asia, March 31, 2022; International 
Campaign for Tibet, ``Octogenarian Tibetan Sets Himself on Fire in 
Protest against Chinese Rule,'' April 5, 2022.
    \16\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 
18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 18.
    \17\ Monastic management committees are organized as joint 
monastic-official bodies to monitor resident monks and nuns at monastic 
institutions. International Campaign for Tibet, ``Party Above Buddhism: 
China's Surveillance and Control of Tibetan Monasteries and 
Nunneries,'' March 2021.
    \18\ See, e.g., Changdu Municipality United Front Work Department, 
``Zizhiqu fu zhuxi, Changdu shi wei shuji Pubu Dunzhu shenru Karuo Qu 
Zuozi Si diaoyan zhu si gongzuo'' [TAR Deputy Chair and Chamdo 
Municipal Committee Secretary Pubu Dunzhu deepens Karuo District's 
Dzodzi Monastery investigation of monastery-resident work], September 
7, 2021.
    \19\ See, e.g., Tashi Lhunpo Monastic Management Committee, 
``Zhashi Lunbu Si Guanweihui zuzhi zhaokai xuexi guanche Xi Jinping 
Zongshuji zai Xizang shicha shi de zhongyao jianghua jingshen xuanjiang 
dahui'' [Tashi Lhunpo Monastic Management Committee organizes 
propaganda meeting to study and carry out the spirit of General 
Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech during his inspection tour of 
Tibet], August 16, 2021, reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United 
Front Work Department.
    \20\ See, e.g., Sakya Monastery Monastic Management Committee, 
``Sajia Si Guanweihui zuzhi kaizhan Xi Jinping Zongshuji zai qingzhu 
Zhongguo Gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian dahui shang de zhongyao 
jianghua jingshen xuanjiang hui'' [Sakya Monastery Monastic Management 
Committee organizes propaganda event on the spirit of General Secretary 
Xi Jinping's important speech at the celebration event for the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party], July 20, 
2021, reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work 
Department; Anduo County United Front Work Department, ``Anduo Xian 
zongjiao lingyu xianqi xuexi Xi Jinping Zong Shuji `Qi Yi' zhongyao 
jianghua he shicha Xizang shi zhongyao jianghua jingshen gaohu'' [Surge 
among Anduo County religious sector in studying General Secretary Xi 
Jinping's major `July 1' speech and the spirit of his important speech 
during his inspection tour of Tibet], August 16, 2021.
    \21\ See, e.g., Tashi Lhunpo Monastery Monastic Management 
Committee, ``Zhaxi Lunbu Si zhaokai sengzhong xuexi Dang de Shijiu jie 
Liu Zhongquanhui he Zizhiqu Di Shi ci Dang Daibiaohui jingshen 
xuanjiang dahui'' [Tashi Lhunpo Monastery convenes propaganda event for 
monks on studying the Sixth Plenum of the Party's Nineteenth Congress 
and the spirit of the TAR's Tenth Party Congress], December 15, 2021, 
reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department.
    \22\ See, e.g., Pulan County Committee United Front Work 
Department, ``Zizhiqu xuanjiang tuan fu Pulan Xian kaizhan `Zangchuan 
Fojiao Huofo Zhuanshi Guanli Banfa' xunhui xuanjiang huodong'' [TAR 
propaganda group holds touring propaganda activities on ``Measures for 
the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan 
Buddhism'' in Pulan County], August 26, 2021; Naqu Municipal Committee 
United Front Work Department, ``Naqu Shi zuzhi gaoseng dade shenru ge 
simiao kaizhan Zangchuan Fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli fagui zhengce 
xuanjiang huodong'' [Nagchu municipality organizes senior monks' visits 
to various monasteries to hold propaganda activities on laws, 
regulations, and policy on the management of the reincarnation of 
living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism], November 17, 2021.
    \23\ See, e.g., Baqing County Committee United Front Work 
Department, ``Baqing Xian kaizhan `Falu, zhengce jin simiao' xunhui 
xuanjiang huodong'' [Baqing County holds touring propaganda activities 
for ``law and policy entering monasteries''], February 28, 2022.
    \24\ See, e.g., Shannan Municipal Committee United Front Work 
Department, ``Shannan Shi di shiyi, shi'er Zangchuan Fojiao zongjiao 
jiaozhi renyuan peixun ban kaiban'' [Shannan municipality holds 
eleventh and twelfth sessions of Tibetan Buddhist religious personnel 
training], December 10, 2021.
    \25\ See, e.g., Pulan County Committee United Front Work 
Department, ``Zizhiqu xuanjiang tuan fu Pulan Xian kaizhan `Zangchuan 
Fojiao Huofo Zhuanshi Guanli Banfa' xunhui xuanjiang huodong'' [TAR 
propaganda group holds touring propaganda activities on ``Measures for 
the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan 
Buddhism'' in Pulan County], August 26, 2021; Naqu Municipal Committee 
United Front Work Department, ``Naqu Shi zuzhi gaoseng dade shenru ge 
simiao kaizhan Zangchuan Fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli fagui zhengce 
xuanjiang huodong'' [Nagchu municipality organizes senior monks' visits 
to various monasteries to hold propaganda activities on laws, 
regulations, and policy on the management of the reincarnation of 
living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism], November 17, 2021; Shannan 
Municipal Committee United Front Work Department, ``Shannan Shi di 
shiyi, shi'er Zangchuan Fojiao zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan peixun ban 
kaiban'' [Shannan municipality holds eleventh and twelfth sessions of 
Tibetan Buddhist religious personnel training], December 10, 2021.
    \26\ Tibet Watch, ``Birthday Celebrations in Honor of Kirti 
Rinpoche Banned,'' August 10, 2021.
    \27\ Tibet Watch, ``Birthday Celebrations in Honor of Kirti 
Rinpoche Banned,'' August 10, 2021.
    \28\ Qiao Long, Xiaoshan Huang, and Chingman, ``Local Government in 
Gansu Shuts Down Tibetan Temple, Evicts Monks, Nuns,'' Radio Free Asia, 
August 2, 2021; International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Shuts Down 
Historic Monastery, Evicts Monks and Nuns,'' August 4, 2021. The 
monastery's name was also reported as ``Yulingta'' and ``Kharmar.''
    \29\ Qiao Long, Xiaoshan Huang, and Chingman, ``Local Government in 
Gansu Shuts Down Tibetan Temple, Evicts Monks, Nuns,'' Radio Free Asia, 
August 2, 2021; International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Shuts Down 
Historic Monastery, Evicts Monks and Nuns,'' August 4, 2021.
    \30\ Qiao Long, Xiaoshan Huang, and Chingman, ``Local Government in 
Gansu Shuts Down Tibetan Temple, Evicts Monks, Nuns,'' Radio Free Asia, 
August 2, 2021; Pranoti Abhyankar, ``China Closes a Tibetan Monastery 
and Forces the Monks to Return to Lay Life,'' Tibet Post International, 
August 2, 2021; International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Shuts Down 
Historic Monastery, Evicts Monks and Nuns,'' August 4, 2021.
    \31\ Tibet Watch, ``80 Tibetan Monks Forcibly Expelled from Their 
Monasteries,'' December 5, 2021.
    \32\ Qinghai Sheng Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Qinghai Province 
Regulations on Religious Affairs], passed July 28, 2021, effective 
October 1, 2021.
    \33\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``China Forces Young Tibetans Out of 
Monasteries in Qinghai,'' Radio Free Asia, November 4, 2021; Tibet 
Watch, ``80 Tibetan Monks Forcibly Expelled from Their Monasteries,'' 
December 5, 2021.
    \34\ Lobe Socktsang, ``China Bans New Year Religious Gatherings in 
Tibetan Capital Lhasa,'' Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok and Lobe Socktsang, ``Security Tight in Tibet's Lhasa on 
Anniversary of Uprising,'' Radio Free Asia, March 10, 2022.
    \35\ Lobe Socktsang, ``China Bans New Year Religious Gatherings in 
Tibetan Capital Lhasa,'' Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022.
    \36\ Sangyal Kunchok and Lobe Socktsang, ``Security Tight in 
Tibet's Lhasa on Anniversary of Uprising,'' Radio Free Asia, March 10, 
2022.
    \37\ For more on the 2017 Regulations on Religious Affairs, see 
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 129; CECC, 2018 Annual 
Report, October 10, 2018, 123.
    \38\ The 2007 TAR measures implemented the previous version of the 
national Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took effect in 2005. 
Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa (Shixing) [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs (Trial)], passed May 18, 2006, effective July 1, 2007; State 
Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Regulations on Religious Affairs], 
issued November 30, 2004, amended June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 
2018.
    \39\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021.
    \40\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021, art. 15.
    \41\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021, art. 23.
    \42\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021, art. 35.
    \43\ Daojie, ``Zhonggong dui Xizang Fojiaotu qiangzhi shixing `san 
ge bu zengjia' xianzhi cuoshi'' [CCP forcibly implements restrictive 
``three no increases'' measures against Tibetan Buddhists], Voice of 
Tibet, April 20, 2021.
    \44\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021, arts. 47, 48, 49.
    \45\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021, art. 47.
    \46\ Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli'' Banfa [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for ``Regulations on Religious 
Affairs''], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective 
November 1, 2021, art. 34.
    \47\ Previous prominent examples include the demolitions and 
expulsions at the monastic complexes at Yachen Gar and Larung Gar in 
Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. CECC, 
2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 303-4; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 
October 5, 2017, 303-4; CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 
294.
    \48\ For more information on Palga, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00082.
    \49\ For more information on Nyima, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00083.
    \50\ Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan School Forcibly Demolished by Chinese 
State,'' December 5, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``China Heightens Restrictions after Demolishing Giant 
Buddha Statue and Buddhist School,'' December 30, 2021.
    \51\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China 
Heightens Restrictions after Demolishing Giant Buddha Statue and 
Buddhist School,'' December 30, 2021; Central Tibetan Administration, 
``Around a Dozen Tibetans Arbitrarily Detained and Tortured, Second 
Buddha Statue Dismantled in Drakgo Crackdown,'' January 12, 2022.
    \52\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China 
Heightens Restrictions after Demolishing Giant Buddha Statue and 
Buddhist School,'' December 30, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 
and Democracy, ``Second Buddha Statue Torn Down and Dozen Tibetans 
Detained in Drango,'' January 12, 2022.
    \53\ Sangyal Kunchok and Tashi Wangchuk, ``Tibetan Monks Beaten, 
Arrested for Sharing Buddha Statue Destruction News,'' Radio Free Asia, 
January 7, 2022; Central Tibetan Administration, ``Around a Dozen 
Tibetans Arbitrarily Detained and Tortured, Second Buddha Statue 
Dismantled in Drakgo Crackdown,'' January 12, 2022.
    \54\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Second Buddha 
Statue Torn Down and Dozen Tibetans Detained in Drango,'' January 12, 
2022; Central Tibetan Administration, ``Around a Dozen Tibetans 
Arbitrarily Detained and Tortured, Second Buddha Statue Dismantled in 
Drakgo Crackdown,'' January 12, 2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 
and Democracy, ``China Subjects Tibetan Detainees to `Re-Education' and 
Tightens Restrictions on Social Media after Destroying Buddha Statues 
in Drango,'' February 23, 2022.
    \55\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetan Monks Told to Take Blame for Statue 
Demolitions,'' Radio Free Asia, May 23, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Monks 
Coerced into Taking Responsibility for Destruction of Buddha Statue,'' 
May 26, 2022.
    \56\ ``Mass Arrest of Tibetans in Sichuan over Dalai Lama Photos,'' 
Radio Free Asia, August 26, 2021; Yangchen Dolma, ``China Detains 59 
Tibetans over His Holiness the Dalai Lama Photos,'' Tibet Post 
International, August 27, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``60 Tibetans Detained for Keeping Dalai Lama Photo after a 
Sweeping Crackdown in Dzachuka,'' August 27, 2021. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2022-00062 on Loden Chunglam, 2022-00063 on Palkyab, 2022-00064 on 
Tenzin Losal, 2022-00065 on Pando, 2022-00066 on Losher, 2022-00067 on 
Gaden, 2022-00068 on Sherab, 2022-00069 on Jampal, 2022-00070 on Dalo, 
2022-00071 on Choepa, 2022-00072 on Sonam Galeg, and 2022-00073 on 
Tadrin Norbu.
    \57\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``60 Tibetans 
Detained for Keeping Dalai Lama Photo after a Sweeping Crackdown in 
Dzachuka,'' August 27, 2021; Yangchen Dolma, ``China Detains 59 
Tibetans over His Holiness the Dalai Lama Photos,'' Tibet Post 
International, August 27, 2021.
    \58\ ``Mass Arrest of Tibetans in Sichuan over Dalai Lama Photos,'' 
Radio Free Asia, August 26, 2021; Yangchen Dolma, ``China Detains 59 
Tibetans over His Holiness the Dalai Lama Photos,'' Tibet Post 
International, August 27, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``60 Tibetans Detained for Keeping Dalai Lama Photo after a 
Sweeping Crackdown in Dzachuka,'' August 27, 2021.
    \59\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Detains 
113 Tibetans in a Week in Expanding Crackdown in Dzachuka,'' September 
1, 2021; ``Dozens More Tibetans Are Arrested in Sichuan over Dalai Lama 
Photos,'' Radio Free Asia, September 1, 2021.
    \60\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Detains 
113 Tibetans in a Week in Expanding Crackdown in Dzachuka,'' September 
1, 2021; ``Dozens More Tibetans Are Arrested in Sichuan over Dalai Lama 
Photos,'' Radio Free Asia, September 1, 2021. For more information, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00074 on 
Lobsang Choezin, 2022-00075 on Soepa, 2022-00076 on Tsangpa, and 2022-
00077 on Choe Lhamo.
    \61\ ``Eight More Tibetans Are Arrested in Sichuan over Dalai Lama 
Photos, Language Rights,'' Radio Free Asia, September 7, 2021; Tibet 
Watch, ``Eight More Tibetans Detained amid Heightened Climate of Fear 
and Internal Spies,'' September 9, 2021. For more information on 
Kalsang Dolma, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2022-00078.
    \62\ ``Tibetans Detained in Kardze Language Rights Arrests Are 
Denied Proper Food, Medical Care,'' Radio Free Asia, September 15, 
2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Deteriorating 
Situation in Dza Wonpo,'' September 16, 2021.
    \63\ Central Tibetan Administration, ``Chinese Authorities Hold 
Three Dza Wonpo Tibetans, Releases Rest with Strict Orders,'' October 
1, 2021; Tibet Watch, ``Over 100 Tibetan Detainees Released in Dza 
Wonpo after Month-Long Torture and Interrogation,'' October 5, 2021; 
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetans Subjected to 
Extrajudicial Detention, Random Home Inspections and Seizure of Cell 
Phones under China's Social Media Purge in Dzachuka,'' October 29, 
2021.
    \64\ ``Gong sa mchog gi `khrungs skar srung brtsi zhus nas bod pa 4 
`dzin bzung'' [4 Tibetans detained for celebrating Dalai Lama's 
birthday], Voice of America, July 16, 2021; Tibet Watch, ``Wave of 
Arrests across Eastern Tibet after Digital Search Operations,'' July 
21, 2021. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2022-00031 on Rinchen Zangpo, 2022-00032 on Loga, 
2022-00033 on Dagther, and 2022-00034 on Wangchug Kyi.
    \65\ ``Gong sa mchog gi `khrungs skar srung brtsi zhus nas bod pa 4 
`dzin bzung'' [4 Tibetans detained for celebrating Dalai Lama's 
birthday], Voice of America, July 16, 2021; Tibet Watch, ``Wave of 
Arrests across Eastern Tibet after Digital Search Operations,'' July 
21, 2021.
    \66\ ``Gong sa mchog gi `khrungs skar srung brtsi zhus nas bod pa 4 
`dzin bzung'' [4 Tibetans detained for celebrating Dalai Lama's 
birthday], Voice of America, July 16, 2021; Tibet Watch, ``Wave of 
Arrests across Eastern Tibet after Digital Search Operations,'' July 
21, 2021. Reports did not indicate whether police found images of the 
Dalai Lama on their phones.
    \67\ For more information on Dzapo, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00005.
    \68\ For more information on Konchog Tashi, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00006.
    \69\ ``Two Tibetans Arrested for Celebrating Dalai Lama's 
Birthday,'' Radio Free Asia, July 13, 2021; Zhamo, ``Qingzhu Dalai Lama 
shengri youzui? Zhonggong dangju jieji jubu jingei Zangren'' [Guilty of 
celebrating Dalai Lama's birthday? CCP authorities seize opportunity to 
detain Tibetans in China], Voice of Tibet, July 15, 2021; Tibet Watch, 
``Wave of Arrests across Eastern Tibet after Digital Search 
Operations,'' July 21, 2021.
    \70\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrests over 20 People in Tibet for 
Posting Photos and Sharing Contents,'' Tibet Post International, 
September 16, 2021.
    \71\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrests over 20 People in Tibet for 
Posting Photos and Sharing Contents,'' Tibet Post International, 
September 16, 2021.
    \72\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 4; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu 
Zizhi Fa, [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, 
effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, art. 10; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzi Fa [PRC Law on the 
Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language], passed October 31, 2000, 
effective January 1, 2001, art. 8.
    \73\ See, e.g., State Council Information Office, ``Minzu Quyu 
Zizhi Zhidu zai Xizang de Chenggong Shijian'' [Successful Practice of 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet], September 6, 2015, sec. 6. The 
State Council white paper on the ethnic autonomy system in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region notes bilingual education policy in Tibetan and 
Chinese, but does not mention use of any other languages in schools or 
any other context.
    \74\ Gerald Roche, ``Articulating Language Oppression: Colonialism, 
Coloniality and the Erasure of Tibet's Minority Languages,'' Patterns 
of Prejudice 53, no. 5 (2019): 498.
    \75\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, accessed June 8, 2022. China 
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on August 29, 1990, 
and ratified it on March 2, 1992.
    \76\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force 
September 2, 1990, art. 30.
    \77\ Ministry of Education, Jiaoyubu Bangongting guanyu Shishi 
Xueqian Ertong Putonghua Jiaoyu ``Tong Yu Tong Yin'' Jihua de Tongzhi 
[Ministry of Education General Office Circular on Implementing the 
``Children Speak in Unison'' Plan for Mandarin Education for Preschool 
Children], issued July 21, 2021; ``China Imposes Mandarin-Language 
Teaching on Kindergartens in Ethnic Minority, Rural Areas,'' Radio Free 
Asia, August 6, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 
``China Enforces Compulsory Mandarin Chinese Learning for Preschool 
Children in Tibet,'' September 17, 2021.
    \78\ ``Foxue yong guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi kecheng jianshe 
yantaohui zai Qinghai sheng Zangyu xi Foxue Yuan juxing'' [Seminar on 
course construction for using the standard spoken and written Chinese 
language in Buddhist studies held at Qinghai Province Tibetan Language 
Buddhist Institute], Qinghai Daily, reprinted in Buddhist Association 
of China, September 30, 2021; ``China Pushes New Plan for Tibetan 
Buddhist Study in Chinese Only,'' Radio Free Asia, October 5, 2021.
    \79\ ``Foxue yong guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi kecheng jianshe 
yantaohui zai Qinghai sheng Zangyu xi Foxue Yuan juxing'' [Seminar on 
course construction for using the standard spoken and written Chinese 
language in Buddhist studies held at Qinghai Province Tibetan Language 
Buddhist Institute], Qinghai Daily, reprinted in Buddhist Association 
of China, September 30, 2021.
    \80\ Sangyal Kunchok and Yangdon, ``Tibetan Village Leaders Told to 
`Speak in Chinese,' '' Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2022.
    \81\ Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Parents Forced to Learn Chinese 
Language to Teach Children,'' April 11, 2022.
    \82\ Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Parents Forced to Learn Chinese 
Language to Teach Children,'' April 11, 2022.
    \83\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Renews Attacks on 
Remaining Tibetan-Language Schools,'' November 30, 2021.
    \84\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Renews Attacks on 
Remaining Tibetan-Language Schools,'' November 30, 2021.
    \85\ Tibet Watch, ``Outcry from Tibetans after School Is Given 
Orders to Close,'' July 19, 2021; ``China Closes Tibetan School in 
Qinghai, Leaving Many Students Adrift,'' Radio Free Asia, September 14, 
2021.
    \86\ ``China Closes Tibetan School in Qinghai, Leaving Many 
Students Adrift,'' Radio Free Asia, September 14, 2021.
    \87\ ``China Closes Tibetan School in Qinghai, Leaving Many 
Students Adrift,'' Radio Free Asia, September 14, 2021; Tibet Watch, 
``Many Students from Forcibly Closed Tibetan School Can't Register at 
New Schools,'' September 21, 2021.
    \88\ Tibet Watch, ``Renowned Tibetan School Ordered to Teach in 
Chinese or Face Shutdown,'' August 23, 2021.
    \89\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Chinese Authorities Ban Outside-School 
Classes for Tibetan Children,'' Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2021.
    \90\ Pema Ngodup, ``Tibetans Forced to Demolish School Attached to 
Monastery in Sichuan's Karze,'' Radio Free Asia, November 6, 2021; 
Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan School Forcibly Demolished by Chinese State,'' 
December 5, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 
``China Heightens Restrictions after Demolishing Giant Buddha Statue 
and Buddhist School,'' December 30, 2021. See above in this section for 
more information on the crackdown at Draggo Monastery.
    \91\ Pema Ngodup, ``Tibetans Forced to Demolish School Attached to 
Monastery in Sichuan's Karze,'' Radio Free Asia, November 6, 2021; 
Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan School Forcibly Demolished by Chinese State,'' 
December 5, 2021; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 
``China Heightens Restrictions after Demolishing Giant Buddha Statue 
and Buddhist School,'' December 30, 2021.
    \92\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Orders 
Tibetan Private Schools to Be Closed and Students Enrolled in Chinese 
Medium Schools in Sershul County,'' April 22, 2022; Tibetan Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy and Asian Dignity Initiative, ``Sucked Our 
Marrow: Tibetan Language and Education Rights under Xi Jinping,'' May 
11, 2022, 15.
    \93\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Orders 
Tibetan Private Schools to Be Closed and Students Enrolled in Chinese 
Medium Schools in Sershul County,'' April 22, 2022; Tibetan Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy and Asian Dignity Initiative, ``Sucked Our 
Marrow: Tibetan Language and Education Rights under Xi Jinping,'' May 
11, 2022, 15-16.
    \94\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 24.
    \95\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 1.
    \96\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 10.
    \97\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 28.
    \98\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
inside Tibet,'' December 2021, 4.
    \99\ Tibet Action Institute, ``Eyewitness: China Operating 
Mandatory Boarding Preschools across Tibet,'' May 24, 2022.
    \100\ For more information on Rinchen Kyi, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00540.
    \101\ Tibet Watch, ``Teacher from Forcibly Closed School Is 
Arrested and Charged with Separatism,'' August 10, 2021; ``Rgya nag 
nyen rtog pas seng `brug stag rtse slob grwa'i dge rgan rin chen skyid 
lags su rgyal khab la ngo rgol byas pa'i nyes ming `og `dzin bzung byas 
`dug'' [Chinese police detain Sengdrug Tagtse teacher Rinchen Kyi on 
suspicion of inciting separatism], Radio Free Asia, August 10, 2021; 
``China Closes Tibetan School in Qinghai, Leaving Many Students 
Adrift,'' Radio Free Asia, September 14, 2021.
    \102\ Tibet Watch, ``Teacher from Forcibly Closed School Is 
Arrested and Charged with Separatism,'' August 10, 2021; ``Rgya nag 
nyen rtog pas seng `brug stag rtse slob grwa'i dge rgan rin chen skyid 
lags su rgyal khab la ngo rgol byas pa'i nyes ming `og `dzin bzung byas 
`dug'' [Chinese police detain Sengdrug Tagtse teacher Rinchen Kyi on 
suspicion of inciting separatism], Radio Free Asia, August 10, 2021.
    \103\ Tibet Watch, ``Teacher from Forcibly Closed School Is 
Arrested and Charged with Separatism,'' August 10, 2021; ``Rgya nag 
nyen rtog pas seng `brug stag rtse slob grwa'i dge rgan rin chen skyid 
lags su rgyal khab la ngo rgol byas pa'i nyes ming `og `dzin bzung byas 
`dug'' [Chinese police detain Sengdrug Tagtse teacher Rinchen Kyi on 
suspicion of inciting separatism], Radio Free Asia, August 10, 2021; 
``China Closes Tibetan School in Qinghai, Leaving Many Students 
Adrift,'' Radio Free Asia, September 14, 2021.
    \104\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter 
from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural 
rights; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to education; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; and the 
Special Rapporteur on minority issues to Chen Xu, Permanent 
Representative to the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of 
China to the UN Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations 
in Switzerland, AL CHN 14/2021, February 17, 2022.
    \105\ Free Tibet, ``Rinchen Kyi Released after Eight Months in 
Detention,'' April 25, 2022.
    \106\ ``Tibetan Man Arrested in Sichuan for Failure to Attend 
Chinese Propaganda Lecture,'' Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2021; Tibet 
Watch, ``Teenage Tibetan Petitioner Arrested in Ngaba by Chinese Police 
Authorities,'' August 18, 2021.
    \107\ ``Tibetan Man Arrested in Sichuan for Failure to Attend 
Chinese Propaganda Lecture,'' Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2021; Tibet 
Watch, ``Teenage Tibetan Petitioner Arrested in Ngaba by Chinese Police 
Authorities,'' August 18, 2021. For more information on Sherab Dorje, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00541.
    \108\ ``Tibetan Man Arrested in Sichuan for Failure to Attend 
Chinese Propaganda Lecture,'' Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2021; Tibet 
Watch, ``Teenage Tibetan Petitioner Arrested in Ngaba by Chinese Police 
Authorities,'' August 18, 2021.
    \109\ For more information on Palsang, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00099.
    \110\ For more information on Sarmo, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00100.
    \111\ For more information on Yangkyi, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00101.
    \112\ ``Bod rigs slob ma gsum `dzin bzung bkag nyar byas yod `dug'' 
[Three Tibetan students detained and held in custody], Tibet Times, 
March 15, 2022; ``Rgya gzhung gis chab mdo khul gyi bod pa slob phrug 
gsum `dzin bzung'' [Chinese authorities detained three Tibetan students 
in Chamdo], Voice of America, March 17, 2022; Matthew McDonald, ``San 
ming Xizang xuesheng kangyi hanhua jiaoyu bei Zhonggong jubu'' [Three 
Tibetan students detained by CCP for protesting sinicized education], 
Tibet Post International, March 18, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Three Children 
Arrested after New Language Restriction Announced,'' March 21, 2022.
    \113\ Tibet Watch, ``Three Children Arrested after New Language 
Restriction Announced,'' March 21, 2022.
    \114\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Access to 
Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 
(8 U.S.C. 1182 note),'' March 16, 2022; Foreign Correspondents' Club of 
China, Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 12.
    \115\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Access to 
Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 
(8 U.S.C. 1182 note),'' March 16, 2022.
    \116\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Access to 
Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 
(8 U.S.C. 1182 note),'' March 16, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 
``Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), Sec. 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act 
of 2018, PL 115-330 // 22USC 1182,'' August 5, 2020.
    \117\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 12, 19.
    \118\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 12.
    \119\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Locked Down or Kicked 
Out: Covering China, January 31, 2022, 12, 19.
    \120\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Authorities in Tibet Demand Information 
on Relatives Living Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, July 30, 2021.
    \121\ For more information on Rinchen Dorje, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00035.
    \122\ For more information on Kalsang Nyima, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00036.
    \123\ For more information on Lhundrub, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00037.
    \124\ ``Skad `phrin nang par ris bskur rkyen skye rgu mdo nas bod 
mi gsum `dzin bzung btsan khrid byas yod `dug'' [For sending photos on 
WeChat, three Tibetans from Kyegudo taken away to detention], Radio 
Free Asia, August 9, 2021; Tibet Watch, ``Three Tibetans Arrested for 
Sharing Photos of an Official Event in WeChat Group,'' August 10, 2021.
    \125\ See, e.g., ``Tibetan Monk Held in Sichuan's Ngaba County on 
Unknown Charges,'' Radio Free Asia, August 5, 2021; Dasang, ``Xizang 
Guoluo Zangren jiu Zhonggong hanhua zhengce fabiao yiyi zaobu hou, 
zhijin xialuo buming'' [After Tibetan is detained in Golog, Tibet, for 
speaking out in opposition to CCP's sinicization policy, his 
whereabouts are still unknown], Voice of Tibet, March 23, 2022. For 
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
records 2022-00025 on Konme and 2022-00114 on Palsang.
    \126\ Tibet Watch, ``China Announces Further Restrictions on 
Buddhism on the Internet,'' February 2, 2022.
    \127\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Cyberspace 
Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of State 
Security, Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures on the 
Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], issued 
December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022. For more information on the 
measures, see Section III--Freedom of Religion.
    \128\ Chakmo Tso, ``Tibetan Online Religious Groups Banned in 
Qinghai,'' Radio Free Asia, January 24, 2022.
    \129\ Tibet Watch, ``China Announces Further Restrictions on 
Buddhism on the Internet,'' February 2, 2022.

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

                              X. Xinjiang

                                Xinjiang

                                Findings

         Key findings from a cache of tens of thousands 
        of files obtained from public security bureaus in two 
        counties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR) included: the key role of senior Communist Party 
        and central government officials in carrying out the 
        mass detention and other persecution of Turkic Muslims 
        in the XUAR; the highly securitized nature of detention 
        in the region's camps and prisons; the high rate of 
        imprisonment in Konasheher (Shufu) county in Kashgar 
        prefecture, XUAR, as authorities increasingly sentenced 
        Turkic Muslims to formal imprisonment; and arbitrary 
        deprivation of liberty in camps and prisons.
         Reports published during the Commission's 2022 
        reporting year indicated that XUAR officials 
        increasingly sentenced many Turkic and Muslim 
        individuals to long prison terms, sometimes following 
        their detention in mass internment camps. According to 
        international reporting and analysts' review of 
        satellite imagery, officials have converted many former 
        mass internment camps into prisons or other types of 
        formal detention facilities.
         International researchers and journalists 
        found evidence that authorities continued to expand 
        detention facilities, including mass internment camps. 
        Based on research and analysis of leaked official 
        documents and satellite imagery, BuzzFeed News 
        journalists estimated in July 2021 that authorities in 
        the XUAR had enough space in detention facilities in 
        the region, including prisons and mass internment 
        camps, to detain more than one million people at the 
        same time.
         Authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of 
        forced labor that involved former mass internment camp 
        detainees and other Turkic and Muslim individuals. In 
        its annual report released in February 2022, the 
        International Labour Organization expressed ``deep 
        concern'' over forced labor in the XUAR and asserted 
        that the ``extensive use of forced labor'' involving 
        Turkic and/or Muslim minorities in the region violated 
        the Employment Policy Convention of 1964.
         In September 2021, official media in the XUAR 
        announced a new plan pairing Uyghur children with 
        children from across the country, a move that observers 
        believe is designed to control Uyghurs' lives and 
        eliminate Uyghurs' cultural identity. Called the 
        ``Pomegranate Flower Plan,'' the initiative matched 
        Uyghur toddlers and elementary school students from a 
        village in Kashgar prefecture with predominantly Han 
        Chinese children from other parts of China, in order to 
        establish ``kinship'' ties between the children.
         During the 2022 Ramadan period, which lasted 
        from April 1 to May 1, authorities in parts of Urumqi 
        municipality and Kashgar and Hotan prefectures 
        reportedly enforced quotas for local Muslims allowed to 
        fast during the holiday, and required them to register 
        with officials. Reports published this past year showed 
        that authorities have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the 
        XUAR, including members of the clergy, to lengthy 
        prison terms.
         Turkic women who had been detained in mass 
        internment camps in the XUAR provided evidence to the 
        Uyghur Tribunal that many female detainees were raped 
        in the camps. One former camp detainee testified that 
        unmarried, divorced, and widowed women were raped in a 
        camp where she was detained and that men paid to come 
        to camps to rape female detainees.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Coordinate with allies and partners to advocate for 
        the formation of a UN commission of inquiry to 
        investigate forced labor abuses involving Turkic and 
        Muslim XUAR residents.
          Urge Chinese authorities to immediately cease all 
        programs involving the forced labor of mass internment 
        camp detainees and prisoners in the XUAR, along with 
        programs involving the forced labor of other ethnic 
        minority individuals within and outside the XUAR.
          Work with allies and partners in the United Nations 
        to establish a coalition to request a special session 
        to address human rights violations against Uyghurs and 
        other Turkic and Muslim people from the XUAR.
          Work together with allies and partners to raise 
        awareness about the transnational repression of Uyghurs 
        and other Turkic Muslims from the XUAR, including 
        through discussion of digital rights. Seek ways to 
        ensure that Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the 
        United States and other countries can be free from 
        surveillance, intimidation, and harassment by Chinese 
        Communist Party and government actors.
          Work with allies and partners to counter third 
        countries' cooperation with China in conducting 
        transnational repression, including the refoulement, 
        surveillance, and harassment of Uyghurs and other 
        Turkic and Muslim Chinese nationals. Impose sanctions, 
        including through freezing assets and restricting 
        travel, on officials in China and third countries who 
        participate in such transnational repression. Advocate 
        for the
        appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on transnational 
        repression.
          Prioritize the resettlement of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and 
        other Turkic and Muslim refugees in the United States, 
        including by granting them Priority 2 status in the 
        United States' refugee program. Urge other like-minded 
        countries to implement similar refugee resettlement 
        programs for Turkic and Muslim refugees from China. 
        Identify countries likely to deport Turkic and Muslim 
        refugees from China and engage these countries through 
        diplomatic channels to prevent such deportations.
          Urge People's Republic of China (PRC) officials to 
        allow foreign diplomats and journalists to travel 
        freely to and within the XUAR.
          Direct the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for 
        International Development to create programming to 
        provide care for former mass internment camp detainees, 
        to include such psychosocial counseling and other 
        assistance as may be necessary to address the trauma 
        these detainees have faced.
          Work with groups and through forums such as the 
        Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
        Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) to 
        advocate for improved human rights and fair labor 
        practices in the XUAR; work with allies to raise the 
        issue of human rights in the XUAR in discussions with 
        ASEAN and APEC members, as well as with Muslim 
        countries in other forums. Work with allies and 
        partners to support public events and civil society 
        organizations in ASEAN and APEC Member States in order 
        to raise awareness of human rights conditions in the 
        XUAR.
          Work with officials at American universities to 
        protect Uyghur and other Turkic and Muslim students who 
        hold a Chinese passport and/or who speak out about 
        human rights abuses in the XUAR, to ensure that they 
        enjoy freedom of expression and are protected from 
        harassment and threats to their safety.

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

                                Xinjiang

        Internal Documents Show Brutality of Mass Detention and
                 Other Forms of Repression in the XUAR


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        The Xinjiang Police Files
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In May 2022, international researchers and journalists reported new
 findings on the nature and scope of mass detention in the Xinjiang
 Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), based on information contained in a
 cache of tens of thousands of files obtained from public security
 bureaus in two counties in the XUAR.\1\ The files, containing
 documents, images, spreadsheets, and speeches mainly from 2017 and
 2018, were provided to scholar Adrian Zenz by an unnamed individual who
 accessed internal computer systems in Konasheher (Shufu) county in
 Kashgar prefecture and Tekes (Tekesi) county in Ili (Yili) Kazakh
 Autonomous Prefecture in the XUAR.\2\ The files, which Zenz then shared
 with 14 news agencies, included more than 5,000 images of individuals
 from Konasheher county, 2,800 of whom researchers confirmed had been
 detained.\3\ The youngest detainee was 15 years old, and the oldest was
 73.\4\ Key findings include:
 
   The role of senior Communist Party and central government
   officials in carrying out the mass detention and other persecution of
   Turkic Muslims in the XUAR.\5\ In a classified speech delivered in
   June 2018, Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi describes Chinese
   leader Xi Jinping's knowledge, support, and direction of mass
   detentions and other repressive policies in the region.\6\ Zhao's
   speech outlines a five-year plan for achieving ``comprehensive
   stability'' in the XUAR, beginning around the time mass internment
   camps \7\ appeared in 2017 and ending in 2021, and roughly concurrent
   with the tenure of XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo.\8\
   The highly securitized nature of detention in the region's
   camps and prisons.\9\ Internal documents and a speech delivered by
   former XUAR Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo instruct security
   personnel to ``shoot to kill'' anyone attempting to escape camp
   facilities; security personnel stationed in camp watchtowers were
   armed with machine guns and sniper rifles; and documents instruct
   security personnel to blindfold and shackle detainees when
   transferring them between different locations.\10\ Images from
   detention facilities show security personnel armed with guns, clubs,
   and/or batons, some while wearing combat gear, while carrying out
   security drills and monitoring detainees.\11\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  The Xinjiang Police Files--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The high rate of imprisonment in Konasheher county, as
   authorities increasingly sentenced Turkic Muslims to formal
   imprisonment.\12\ According to the Associated Press (AP), nearly 1 in
   every 25 people in the county had been sentenced to prison on charges
   related to terrorism--the highest imprisonment rate in the world.\13\
   The AP reported that more than 10,000 people in Konasheher, most of
   whom were arrested in 2017, had been sentenced to lengthy prison
   terms.\14\ Internal spreadsheets show that in 2018, more than 12
   percent of ethnic minority adults in the county were held in some
   type of detention facility, which was more than 64 times the national
   detention rate.\15\
   Arbitrary deprivation of liberty in camps and prisons.\16\
   Reasons for imprisonment included studying Islamic scripture with a
   relative seven years earlier, installing encrypted apps on one's cell
   phone, and inactivity on one's cell phone.\17\ Zhao Kezhi's
   characterization of cultural and religious heritage as traits that
   determined millions of Turkic Muslims to be threats in need of ``re-
   education'' indicates that authorities detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and
   others primarily because of their cultural and religious
   identity.\18\ Intake guidelines for mass internment camps listed 21
   categories of detainees, including people with a connection to
   another country and husbands of women who were pregnant in violation
   of population planning policies.\19\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          THE XINJIANG PAPERS

    Another set of highly sensitive documents, leaked in 
September 2021 to a London-based independent tribunal known as 
the Uyghur Tribunal,\20\ which included records of speeches 
delivered by Xi Jinping, shows the role of Xi, Premier Li 
Keqiang, and other top PRC officials in directing and guiding 
repressive policies in the XUAR.\21\ The documents, dated 
between 2014 and 2018, detail the role of these officials in 
shaping policies such as mass internment, forced labor, 
population control, homestay programs, and forced placement in 
boarding schools targeting Uyghur and other ethnic minority 
communities in the XUAR in subsequent years.\22\ The documents 
are part of what are known internationally as the Xinjiang 
Papers, a cache of internal government and Party documents that 
the New York Times reported on in 2019.\23\ According to new 
analysis of the Xinjiang Papers published by scholar Adrian 
Zenz, two of Xi's speeches contained in the documents 
authorized the drafting of the region's first anti-extremism 
regulations.\24\ Official Chinese media portrayed the 
regulations, which the XUAR People's Congress revised in 
October 2018, as justification for mass internment camps, but 
the camps remained illegal under both Chinese and international 
law.\25\ The documents, and Zenz's analysis, also reveal a 
previously unreported link between clear demands made by Xi 
Jinping and a subsequent push to assimilate ethnic minority 
children in the XUAR in Chinese-language boarding schools, as 
well as an initiative to assign primarily Han Chinese cadres to 
live with and surveil ethnic minority families in their 
homes.\26\ [For more information on the Xinjiang Papers and PRC 
involvement in forced labor, see Section VI--Human 
Trafficking.]

                 Expansion of Mass Detention Facilities

    International researchers and journalists found evidence 
during this reporting year that authorities continued to expand 
detention facilities in the XUAR, including mass internment 
camps.\27\ Based on research and analysis of leaked official 
documents and satellite imagery, BuzzFeed News journalists 
estimated in July 2021 that authorities in the XUAR had enough 
space in detention facilities in the region, including prisons 
and mass internment camps, to detain more than one million 
people at the same time.\28\ The journalists noted that this 
figure likely underestimated the true capacity of detention 
facilities in the XUAR, because it did not account for the 
overcrowded conditions reported by many former detainees.\29\ 
In addition, this estimate did not include the capacity of the 
more than 100 facilities built prior to 2016.\30\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Kyrgyz Christian Ovalbek Turdakun and  Mass Detention in the XUAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The case of an ethnic Kyrgyz Christian who was detained in a mass
 internment camp in 2018 and who arrived in the United States in April
 2022 illustrates several unique and significant aspects of mass
 detention in the XUAR. Authorities detained Ovalbek Turdakun, a Chinese
 national, for 10 months in a camp in Kizilsu (Kezilesu) Kyrgyz
 Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, accusing him of having overstayed a visa
 on a trip to Kyrgyzstan and criticizing him for his marriage to a
 Kyrgyz national and for visiting mosques abroad.\31\ Ovalbek Turdakun
 is the first Christian formerly detained in a mass internment camp to
 publicly speak out about his detention, and is a member of the Kyrgyz
 ethnic group, whose numbers in the XUAR are smaller than those of
 Uyghurs or Kazakhs and whose plight has received less international
 attention.\32\ His legal background strengthened his ability to
 document details of his detention, including details regarding torture,
 surveillance cameras, and camp layout.\33\ In addition, observers
 believe the harassment and risk of deportation Ovalbek Turdakun faced
 after fleeing to Kyrgyzstan following his detention demonstrates a
 pattern of harassment of ethnic minorities fleeing to Central Asia from
 the XUAR that could help strengthen a case being submitted by
 international lawyers to the International Criminal Court regarding the
 repression of XUAR residents in Tajikistan.\34\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Rise in Formal Detention of Turkic Muslims

    Reports published this past year indicated that XUAR 
officials increasingly sentenced many Turkic and Muslim 
individuals to long prison terms, sometimes following their 
detention in mass internment camps.\35\ According to reporting 
by the Associated Press (AP), officials have converted some 
former mass internment camps into prisons or other types of 
formal detention facilities.\36\ The AP reported in July 2021 
that, based on an in-person tour conducted in April 2021, 
Urumqi No. 3 Detention Center in Dabancheng district, Urumqi 
municipality, had been converted from a mass internment camp 
into a pretrial detention facility.\37\ Satellite imagery 
showed that new buildings added in 2019 to the facility--the 
largest detention facility in China, and possibly the world--
reached nearly a mile in length.\38\ Analysis of two reports 
released by XUAR judicial authorities in March 2022 also 
indicates a shift in the detention of Uyghurs from mass 
internment camps to prisons, according to Radio Free Asia 
(RFA).\39\
    Chinese authorities' lack of transparency often makes it 
difficult for relatives of detained Turkic Muslims to obtain 
confirmation of their sentences and other information.\40\ In 
July 2021, RFA reported that Xinjiang University sources 
confirmed that authorities had sentenced Uyghur ethnographer 
Rahile Dawut to a prison term of unknown length, possibly in 
2020.\41\ Chinese authorities did not provide public 
information about Rahile Dawut's case following her 
disappearance in December 2017 and likely detention in a mass 
internment camp.\42\
    Cases of Uyghurs sentenced to long-term imprisonment that 
were reported this past year include:

         Yusupjan Memtimin.\43\ In March 2022, RFA 
        reported that in late 2018, authorities in the XUAR 
        sentenced businessman and philanthropist Yusupjan 
        Memtimin (also known as Yusup Saqal) to 14 years in 
        prison, reportedly in connection with ``taking 
        criminals under his wing.'' \44\ Authorities detained 
        Yusupjan Memtimin in 2017 because he had driven the 
        family members of a detained Uyghur man to visit him at 
        his detention facility in 2014.\45\
         Nurmemet Omer Uchqun.\46\ XUAR authorities 
        sentenced Uyghur literature professor and translator 
        Nurmemet Omer Uchqun to 10 years in prison on charges 
        related to ``separatism'' and ``promoting Western 
        culture.'' \47\ Security personnel detained Nurmemet 
        Omer Uchqun in Urumqi in early 2018 and transferred him 
        to Keriye (Yutian) Prison in Keriye (Yutian) county, 
        Hotan prefecture, after sentencing him.\48\
         Almire Erkin.\49\ In May 2022, RFA reported 
        that in 2017, XUAR authorities detained 32-year-old 
        nurse Almire Erkin and subsequently sentenced her to 10 
        years in prison for watching Turkish movies on her cell 
        phone.\50\ Authorities held Almire Erkin at a women's 
        prison in Urumqi municipality.\51\ Her father, a police 
        officer in Kashgar prefecture, once received an award 
        from the municipal government for detaining 2,000 
        individuals for ``re-education.'' \52\
         Meryem Emet.\53\ In 2022, RFA and National 
        Public Radio reported that in 2017, authorities in 
        Urumqi had detained Meryem Emet and later sentenced her 
        to 20 years in prison.\54\ Her sentence was reportedly 
        connected to her having met and spoken with Turkish 
        Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan when he visited 
        Urumqi in 2012, and to her having married a 
        foreigner.\55\ Authorities held Meryem Emet in a prison 
        in Kucha (Kuche) county, Aksu prefecture.\56\ After she 
        was detained, officials placed her two young children 
        in state-run boarding schools in Urumqi for more than a 
        year and a half.\57\ [For more information on Meryem 
        Emet's children, see Forcible Displacement and 
        Assimilation of Ethnic Minority Children in this 
        section.]

    Reports published throughout the year documented 
authorities' continued use of torture and other forms of 
mistreatment against prisoners and camp detainees.\58\ As in 
the past reporting year,\59\ reports emerged documenting the 
deaths of individuals in mass internment camps and prisons or 
after they were held in camps or prisons. Examples include the 
following:

         Yaqup Haji, a 45-year-old Uyghur businessman 
        and philanthropist from Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili 
        (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, who died in or 
        around September 2021 after being tortured in a mass 
        internment camp or prison, where he had been held since 
        2018.\60\ A friend of Yaqup Haji told RFA that 
        authorities had detained him for making contributions 
        to religious causes, and that authorities had tortured 
        him, including by holding him in solitary 
        confinement.\61\
         Zeynephan Memtimin, a 40-year-old Uyghur woman 
        who died in 2020 in a prison in Keriye (Yutian) county, 
        Hotan prefecture, where she was serving a 10-year 
        sentence for violating family planning policies.\62\ 
        Authorities previously held Zeynephan Memtimin in a 
        mass internment camp beginning in 2017, for having fled 
        a hospital where she was due to undergo a forced 
        abortion in 2014.\63\ Officials did not disclose the 
        cause of her death to relatives.\64\
         Yaqup Hesen, a 43-year-old goldsmith who died 
        on May 1, 2022, 20 days after being released from a 
        prison in Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh 
        Autonomous Prefecture, where he had been held for three 
        years.\65\ A neighborhood committee official told RFA 
        that authorities had detained him for praying.\66\ 
        Family members sought medical treatment for Yaqup Hesen 
        for an unspecified illness at multiple hospitals 
        following his release.\67\ Yaqup Hesen's 20-year-old 
        son died, reportedly of grief, at his father's 
        funeral.\68\

                Detention of 2008 Olympics Torchbearers

    Reports this past year highlighted the detention of at 
least eight Uyghurs \69\ who had served as torchbearers at the 
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, including the following:

         In early 2018, authorities detained cardiac 
        surgeon Abduqeyyum Semet, who had served as director of 
        the Kashgar Prefecture Health Department, and later 
        sentenced him to 18 years in prison.\70\ Authorities 
        reportedly detained Abduqeyyum Semet for his failure to 
        carry out government directives and policies.\71\
         In or around 2017, authorities detained Uyghur 
        civil servant Adil Abdurehim for watching 
        ``counterrevolutionary'' videos, and in 2018, the 
        Urumqi Intermediate People's Court in Urumqi 
        municipality, XUAR, tried and sentenced him to 14 years 
        for attempted ``separatism.'' \72\ Adil Abdurehim led a 
        local culture and sports bureau, and reportedly 
        received many awards for his work, including for being 
        an exemplary member of the Chinese Communist Party and 
        a model of ``ethnic unity.'' \73\
         In 2017, authorities detained Uyghur 
        volleyball coach Alimjan Mehmut for being in contact 
        with Muslim Uyghurs whom they deemed suspicious, and 
        later sentenced him to eight years in prison.\74\ 
        Alimjan Mehmut, who was viewed as a leader in sports 
        and activism in the Uyghur community, was one of at 
        least six or seven instructors at the Kashgar Sports 
        School in Kashgar prefecture whom authorities detained 
        in recent years.\75\

       International Observers Condemn Bachelet Visit to the XUAR

    The U.S. Government,\76\ human rights groups,\77\ and 
scholars \78\ around the world were highly critical of the May 
2022 visit to the XUAR by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Michelle Bachelet, saying she failed to hold Chinese 
authorities accountable for their repression of Uyghurs and 
other ethnic minorities in the region. In advance of her visit, 
officials in the XUAR warned residents not to speak out about 
mass internment camps or other rights abuses.\79\ As of August 
8, 2022, Bachelet's office had yet to issue a long-awaited 
report on human rights in the XUAR, despite Bachelet having 
told the UN Human Rights Council in late 2021 that her office 
was finalizing the report.\80\

        Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents

    During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR 
maintained a system of forced labor that involved former mass 
internment camp detainees and other Turkic and Muslim 
individuals.\81\ In its annual report released in February 
2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) expressed 
``deep concern'' over forced labor in the XUAR and asserted 
that the ``extensive use of forced labor'' involving Turkic 
and/or Muslim minorities in the region violated the Employment 
Policy Convention of 1964.\82\ In April 2022, the
National People's Congress Standing Committee ratified the 
ILO's Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention of 1957.\83\ In June, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada were among countries who 
called on the ILO to establish a mission to investigate labor 
abuses in the XUAR.\84\ Scholar Adrian Zenz wrote that 
``Beijing's ratification of these conventions is likely a 
calculated strategy to allay criticism.'' \85\
    According to research Zenz published in June 2022, XUAR 
authorities intensified and institutionalized the placement of 
Turkic Muslims in forced labor, likely forcing hundreds of 
thousands of mass internment camp detainees to work within the 
XUAR and transferring millions of ``rural surplus laborers'' 
within and outside of the XUAR.\86\ Zenz's research indicates 
that authorities increased ``the scope and scale'' of forced 
labor transfers in 2021 and published plans to move increasing 
numbers of rural laborers into industrial work, as well as to 
train workers for coercive labor programs involving higher 
skilled labor.\87\

          XINJIANG COTTON CONTINUES TO BE, AND TOMATO PRODUCTS
            LIKELY CONTINUE TO BE, EXPORTED TO UNITED STATES

    Reports published this past year by international scholars, 
analysts, and journalists documented the continued presence of 
products containing cotton originating in the XUAR, and 
products containing tomatoes possibly originating in the XUAR, 
in the international supply chain and in goods imported into 
the United States. In a report published in November 2021, 
researchers from Sheffield Hallam University documented how 
cotton products, often cotton-based apparel, entered the United 
States and other countries, after the raw cotton and semi-
finished cotton goods were processed in intermediary 
countries.\88\ These cotton products were imported into the 
United States in spite of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's 
January 2021 ban on cotton and tomato products from the XUAR 
prompted by the prevalence of forced labor in the region.\89\ 
An investigative report published by non-profit research 
organization C4ADS in August 2021 showed that cotton and tomato 
products likely made with forced labor by companies owned by 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) \90\ may 
have continued to be sold in the United States, in the wake of 
the January 2021 ban on cotton and tomato products from the 
XUAR and in violation of sanctions placed on the XPCC by the 
U.S. Treasury Department in July 2020.\91\ In a report 
published in January 2022, BuzzFeed News reporters described 
shipment records from between January 2021 and December 2021, 
showing that Hugo Boss, Ralph Lauren, and PVH Corporation had 
imported shipments from Esquel Group, which gins and spins 
cotton in the XUAR, into the United States.\92\ BuzzFeed's 
report cited procurement records and company statements showing 
that a Guangdong province-based subsidiary of Esquel Group that 
had been exporting clothes to the United States had been 
working with cotton spinning factories in the XUAR, although 
the U.S. Government had restricted trade with a XUAR-based 
Esquel subsidiary in July 2020 over concerns of forced 
labor.\93\ Hugo Boss removed Esquel companies from its list of 
suppliers following the publication of BuzzFeed's report.\94\ 
[For more information on forced labor involving Turkic and 
Muslim XUAR residents, see Section VIII--Business and Human 
Rights.]

            Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR

               ACCOUNTS OF RAPE IN MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS

    The London-based independent tribunal known as the Uyghur 
Tribunal found in its December 2021 judgment that rape, other 
sexual violence, and forced sterilization perpetrated against 
Turkic Muslims in the XUAR constitute crimes against humanity, 
and said that it was ``beyond reasonable doubt'' that 
population control measures imposed in the XUAR constitute 
genocide.\95\ Turkic women who had been detained in mass 
internment camps in the XUAR provided evidence to the Tribunal 
that many female detainees were raped in the camps.\96\ Ethnic 
Kazakh Gulzire Awulqanqizi, also known as Gulzira Auelhan, who 
was detained in four different camps beginning in July 2017, 
testified that unmarried, divorced, and widowed women were 
raped in one of the camps where she was detained.\97\ Gulzire 
Awulqanqizi said that she was responsible for helping the women 
shower after they were raped, and that men paid to come to 
camps to rape the women.\98\

         GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER AND POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES

    The State Council Information Office issued a white paper 
in September 2021 on XUAR population developments that made 
unsupported claims about population growth and failed to 
address the documented decrease in birth rates in southern 
areas of the XUAR, which resulted from forced population 
control measures.\99\ The white paper reports that according to 
census data, the population of five prefectures in the southern 
part of the XUAR, an area dominated by ethnic minority 
populations, experienced an absolute growth rate of more than 
two million people.\100\ At the same time as authorities 
heightened population control measures for ethnic minority 
women in the XUAR, officials throughout China had relaxed the 
enforcement of population control measures for the majority Han 
Chinese population, and recently a number of public hospitals 
in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou municipalities reportedly 
stopped performing vasectomies in response to government 
pressure.\101\

               Forcible Displacement and Assimilation of
                        Ethnic Minority Children

    Reports published during the past year described 
authorities' systematic separation of ethnic minority children 
in the XUAR from their families and their forcible placement in 
state-run orphanages, boarding schools, or other 
facilities.\102\ This forcible displacement of children has 
been carried out in violation of the PRC Law on the Protection 
of Minors \103\ and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which the PRC has signed and ratified.\104\ Many of the 
children placed in these facilities reportedly had at least one 
parent in detention,\105\ and authorities placed some children 
in orphanages or other state-run facilities while forcing or 
coercing their parents to work.\106\ According to American 
researcher Elise Anderson, the removal of Uyghur children from 
their families for placement in such facilities, ``where 
Mandarin is the predominant language,'' ``ensures their 
acculturation into a linguistically and culturally Chinese 
world.'' \107\ In its December 2021 judgment regarding mass 
atrocity crimes committed against Turkic Muslims in the XUAR, 
the United Kingdom-based Uyghur Tribunal described acts of 
forcible placement of children in state-run institutions as 
``grave threats to the integrity of the Uyghur group [that] 
could be a means by which the State could effect its 
destruction over the longer term.'' \108\
    Two Uyghur children now living in Turkey who were forced 
into boarding schools in Urumqi municipality in February 2018 
described undergoing harsh mistreatment at two separate 
boarding schools in the city.\109\ Age four and six at the time 
authorities placed them at the schools, the children said 
teachers often hit them, confined them in dark rooms, and 
forced them into stress positions as punishment during their 
nearly 20 months at the schools.\110\ Now suffering from mental 
trauma, they said students who spoke in the Uyghur language 
were hit with rulers; the two children left school no longer 
able to communicate in Uyghur.\111\ Authorities sent the 
children to the schools after officials deported their father 
to Turkey and detained their mother, later sentencing her to 20 
years in prison.\112\

                        Pomegranate Flower Plan

    In September 2021, official media in the XUAR announced a 
new plan pairing Uyghur children with children from across the 
country, a move that observers believe is designed to control 
Uyghurs' lives and eliminate Uyghurs' cultural identity.\113\ 
Called the ``Pomegranate Flower Plan,'' the initiative matched 
Uyghur toddlers and elementary school students from a village 
in Kashgar prefecture with predominantly Han Chinese children 
from other parts of China, which officials said was designed to 
establish ``kinship'' ties between the children.\114\ The 
coerced familial relationships assigned by officials under the 
plan, under which mainly Han Chinese ``relative'' children 
would place phone calls and make visits to the XUAR, bear 
similarities to the forced family relationships assigned under 
the ``Becoming Family'' homestay program implemented in recent 
years, under which cadres and government workers, usually of 
Han Chinese ethnicity, live with ethnic minority families in 
their homes to conduct surveillance and compile information on 
family members.\115\ In addition, the plan appears to encourage 
the celebration of Han Chinese cultural norms among the paired 
children, such as Chinese holiday celebrations, but not the 
exchange of Uyghur cultural norms.\116\

        Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures

    Authorities used both technological and human surveillance 
to comprehensively monitor and control Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and 
other Turkic and Muslim groups in the XUAR.\117\ Facial 
recognition and mobile phone technology were key aspects of the 
digital surveillance system.\118\ According to American scholar 
Darren Byler, based on a government manual from 2018, at the 
time of its publication, more than 100,000 people had been 
either questioned or detained after authorities detected 
religious content or other ``untrustworthy'' content on their 
cell phones through a digital scan.\119\ Chinese artificial 
intelligence company DeepGlint, which the United States 
sanctioned in 2021,\120\ cooperated with security personnel in 
the XUAR to integrate facial recognition technology that can 
identify ethnic characteristics into systems used to surveil 
and detain Uyghurs.\121\ Public security personnel surveilled 
local Uyghurs through centralized camera feeds monitored at 
``command centers'' located in counties and cities in the 
XUAR.\122\ Officials also integrated data gathered from 
surveillance technology and other forms of policing into a 
system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), 
which automatically identifies people for detention.\123\
    Reports this past year indicated that authorities used 
surveillance technology such as IJOP and human surveillance to 
conduct ``predictive policing,'' preventatively identifying 
behaviors considered dangerous or disloyal to the PRC by 
analyzing large quantities of video and other surveillance 
data.\124\ American journalist and technology writer Geoffrey 
Cain testified at a Commission hearing that the surveillance 
technologies employed in the XUAR constituted a ``system of 
mass psychological torture,'' telling Commissioners that 
residents of the XUAR had a ``feeling of constantly being 
watched, not by humans, but by crude software algorithms 
designed to predict future crimes and acts of terrorism with 
great inaccuracy.'' \125\
    Former mass internment camp detainees described being under 
intense surveillance both while in detention, with cameras 
placed throughout camp facilities, and following their release 
from detention.\126\ Former camp detainee Ovalbek Turdakun said 
cameras placed in cells constantly monitored detainees, whom 
authorities punished if they did something that violated the 
rules, such as talking with cellmates, and he said detainees 
had to face the camera to request permission to use the cell's 
crude toilet.\127\ Authorities continued to closely monitor 
former camp detainees following their release from detention--
they fitted Ovalbek Turdakun with a GPS tracker and tracked his 
movements through the many cameras installed in his 
neighborhood; Baqitali Nur, an ethnic Kazakh former camp 
detainee, said authorities placed him under home confinement 
and installed a camera inside his home.\128\

      Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims

    Reports published this past year documented the PRC's 
continued transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslims through in-person and digital methods, in order to 
prevent them from seeking refuge outside China or to stop them 
from conducting advocacy on behalf of detained relatives and on 
other human rights issues.\129\ A report published by the 
Wilson Center in April 2022 indicated that, according to 
publicly available reports, more than 400 Uyghurs were refouled 
to China, primarily from the Middle East, North Africa, and 
South Asia, between 1997 and 2022.\130\ This figure is likely a 
small fraction of the total number of Uyghurs deported to China 
from other countries, since many refoulements go 
unreported.\131\ During this reporting year, observers 
expressed concern about reports that four Uyghurs in Saudi 
Arabia and a Uyghur man in Morocco were at risk of imminent 
deportation to China.\132\ In Saudi Arabia, authorities 
reportedly planned to extradite Hemdulla Weli (or Abduweli), 
Nurmemet Rozi, and Nurmemet Rozi's ex-wife Buhelchem Abla and 
their 13-year-old daughter.\133\ In Morocco, authorities 
reportedly planned to extradite Uyghur computer engineer Idris 
Hasan, in connection with a bilateral extradition treaty signed 
in 2016 that was tied to economic cooperation between the two 
countries.\134\ If they deported these individuals to China, 
Morocco and Saudi Arabia would be violating the customary 
international law principle of non-refoulement.\135\ In 
addition, as States Parties to the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Morocco and Saudi Arabia are required to refrain 
from repatriating individuals if there are ``grounds for 
believing that [they] would be in danger of being subject to 
torture.'' \136\ A body of evidence from international 
organizations indicates there is a high likelihood they would 
face torture upon their return to China.\137\
    In addition to the detention of Uyghurs in, and their 
deportation from, other countries, which security agencies in 
host countries in some cases carried out under pressure from 
Chinese officials, authorities have in recent years carried out 
transnational repression through methods including ``asset 
freezes; passport controls; cyberattacks and malware; 
intimidation and surveillance from . . . embassies and 
consulates; pressure on families and coercion-by-proxy; spying 
through informants; [and] smear campaigns.'' \138\ A September 
2021 Coda report illustrated the varied methods of 
transnational repression used by Chinese authorities and 
described the methods organizers of the London-based Uyghur 
Tribunal suspect were used by Chinese authorities to intimidate 
individuals who were participating in the Tribunal.\139\ In 
addition, a person identifying himself as a Kazakh state 
security agent harassed by telephone an ethnic Kazakh in 
Kazakhstan who had been detained in a mass internment camp in 
the XUAR after he agreed to provide testimony at the Tribunal; 
a border official in Almaty, Kazakhstan subsequently refused to 
allow him to board the flight he was taking to attend the 
Tribunal.\140\ Other actions taken by Chinese authorities to 
disrupt the Tribunal included the imposition of sanctions 
against the Tribunal and its organizers, pressure placed on the 
host venue, possible hacking attempts targeting organizers and 
participants, and a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press 
conference aimed at contradicting witnesses' testimony.\141\ 
[For more information on the transnational repression of 
Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, see Section XII--Human Rights 
Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

                          Freedom of Religion

    XUAR government officials curtailed Muslim residents' 
freedom to practice their religious beliefs, including by 
implementing restrictions on prayer \142\ and detaining, 
continuing to hold in detention, and sentencing Uyghurs for 
practicing Islam.\143\ As in previous reporting years,\144\ 
XUAR officials reportedly imposed controls on Muslims' 
observance of Ramadan.\145\ During the 2022 Ramadan period, 
from April 1 to May 1, authorities in parts of Urumqi 
municipality and Kashgar and Hotan prefectures reportedly 
enforced quotas for the number of local Muslims who were 
allowed to fast during the holiday, and required them to 
register with officials.\146\ In July 2021, during the Islamic 
holiday of Eid al-Adha, also known as Qurban Heyt, in Aykol 
township, Aksu city, Aksu prefecture, police detained more than 
170 Uyghurs for questioning after they violated regulations 
related to the holiday stipulating that they must be at least 
50 years old in order to pray.\147\ During the Eid al-Adha 
holiday, in a move a Uyghur and an ethnic Uzbek living abroad 
described as propaganda, officials held a news conference in 
Urumqi during which Uyghurs from different parts of the XUAR 
spoke of ethnic unity and how happy their lives were, and a 
live feed showed Uyghurs in Aksu and Hotan celebrating the 
holiday.\148\
    Reports published this past year showed that authorities 
have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the XUAR to lengthy prison 
terms \149\ and have also sentenced many Muslim clergy members 
to prison.\150\ In one example, according to a January 2022 
Radio Free Asia report, in 2019, authorities in Korla (Ku'erle) 
city, Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, 
jointly sentenced five Uyghur women from one family to long 
prison terms for engaging in ``illegal religious activities.'' 
\151\ The Korla Municipal People's Court reportedly sentenced 
78-year-old Helchem Pazil, her three daughters, and a daughter-
in-law on charges including ``gathering a crowd to disturb 
public order'' and ``inciting ethnic hatred'' after they held 
family gatherings to talk about practicing Islam and to talk 
about their children.\152\ According to a July 2021 Radio Free 
Asia report, in early 2018, authorities detained seven clergy 
members from one mosque in Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) 
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, later sentencing them to prison, 
and leaving the local community without any clergy able to 
officiate at religious ceremonies.\153\ In recent years, the 
detention and imprisonment of religious leaders from other 
mosques in the city have similarly led to an absence of clergy 
able to conduct weddings and funerals, and authorities have 
forbidden clergy members' relatives from disclosing information 
about their prison terms.\154\ [For more information on 
official restrictions on Muslims' right to practice their faith 
throughout China, see Section III--Freedom of Religion.]

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

    Notes to Section X--Xinjiang

    \1\ See, e.g., John Sudworth, ``The Faces from China's Uyghur 
Detention Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022; John Sudworth and Visual 
Journalism Team, ``Xinjiang Police Files: Inside a Chinese Internment 
Camp,'' BBC, May 24, 2022; ``The Xinjiang Police Files,'' Victims of 
Communism Memorial Foundation, accessed June 1, 2022; Adrian Zenz, 
``The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political 
Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,'' Journal of the 
European Association for Chinese Studies 3 (May 24, 2022): 1-56; Adrian 
Zenz, ``Public Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's 
Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, 
May 24, 2022; Scilla Alecci, ``The Faces of China's Detention Camps in 
Xinjiang,'' International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 
24, 2022.
    \2\ Scilla Alecci, ``The Faces of China's Detention Camps in 
Xinjiang,'' International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 
24, 2022; Adrian Zenz, ``Public Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi 
Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia 
Society, May 24, 2022.
    \3\ Adrian Zenz, ``The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp 
Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region,'' Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies 3 
(May 24, 2022): 4; Scilla Alecci, ``The Faces of China's Detention 
Camps in Xinjiang,'' International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists, May 24, 2022.
    \4\ John Sudworth, ``The Faces from China's Uyghur Detention 
Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022.
    \5\ Adrian Zenz, ``The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp 
Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region,'' Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies 3 
(May 24, 2022): 7, 11; Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu 
gong'an he wending gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while 
listening to the report on public security and stability work on the 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region], June 5, 2018, translated in Xinjiang 
Police Files, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Chen Quanguo, 
``5 yue 28 ri Chen Quanguo Shuji zai Zizhiqu Weiwen Zhihui Bu shipin 
tiao du hui shang de jianghua'' [Secretary Chen Quanguo's speech during 
a video management meeting of the Autonomous Region Stability 
Maintenance Headquarters], May 28, 2017, translated in Xinjiang Police 
Files, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, ``Public 
Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass 
Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.
    \6\ Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu gong'an he wending 
gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while listening to the 
report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region], June 5, 2018, translated in ``Xinjiang Police Files,'' Victims 
of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, ``Public Security 
Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions 
in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.
    \7\ Sources cited in this report sometimes use other terms to refer 
to mass internment camps, including `` `re-education' camps,'' 
``detention camps,'' and ``internment camps.''
    \8\ Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu gong'an he wending 
gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while listening to the 
report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region], June 5, 2018, translated in ``Xinjiang Police Files,'' Victims 
of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, ``Public Security 
Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions 
in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.
    \9\ Adrian Zenz, ``The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp 
Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region,'' Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies 3 
(May 24, 2022): 1, 12-16, 22, 26; John Sudworth, ``The Faces from 
China's Uyghur Detention Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022.
    \10\ Adrian Zenz, ``The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp 
Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region,'' Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies 3 
(May 24, 2022): 12-16, 22; John Sudworth, ``The Faces from China's 
Uyghur Detention Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022.
    \11\ John Sudworth, ``The Faces from China's Uyghur Detention 
Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022; Scilla Alecci, ``The Faces of China's 
Detention Camps in Xinjiang,'' International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022.
    \12\ Adrian Zenz, ``Public Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi 
Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia 
Society, May 24, 2022; ``China Database Reveals the Thousands Detained 
in Xinjiang,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France 24, May 13, 
2022; Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, ``Uyghur County in China Has Highest 
Prison Rate in the World,'' Associated Press, May 16, 2022. See also 
Xinjiang Victims Database (@shahitbiz), ``Today, we finished importing 
a list of 10294 Uyghur prisoners . . .,'' Twitter, April 11, 2022, 1:32 
p.m.
    \13\ Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, ``Uyghur County in China Has 
Highest Prison Rate in the World,'' Associated Press, May 16, 2022.
    \14\ Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, ``Uyghur County in China Has 
Highest Prison Rate in the World,'' Associated Press, May 16, 2022.
    \15\ Adrian Zenz, ``The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp 
Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region,'' Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies 3 
(May 24, 2022): 3.
    \16\ John Sudworth, ``The Faces from China's Uyghur Detention 
Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022.
    \17\ John Sudworth, ``The Faces from China's Uyghur Detention 
Camps,'' BBC, May 24, 2022.
    \18\ Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu gong'an he wending 
gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while listening to the 
report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region], June 5, 2018, translated in Xinjiang Police Files, Victims of 
Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, ``Public Security 
Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions 
in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.
    \19\ Scilla Alecci, ``The Faces of China's Detention Camps in 
Xinjiang,'' International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 
24, 2022.
    \20\ Uyghur Tribunal, ``About,'' accessed March 22, 2022; Tara 
John, Nectar Gan, and Steve George, ``Uyghur Tribunal Rules That China 
`Committed Genocide' against the Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minorities,'' 
CNN, December 10, 2021. The Tribunal's panel of jurors comprised 
lawyers and academics.
    \21\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 2-3, 9-10; David Tobin, ``The 
`Xinjiang Papers': How Xi Jinping Commands Policy in the People's 
Republic of China,'' University of Sheffield, accessed June 9, 2022, 
10-19; Adrian Zenz, ``Evidence of the Chinese Central Government's 
Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang's Re-Education Internment 
Campaign,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, September 14, 2021, 8, 
16-17.
    \22\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 3, 5; Patrick Wintour, ``Leaked 
Papers Link Xinjiang Crackdown with China Leadership,'' Guardian, 
November 29, 2021.
    \23\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 2. See also Austin Ramzy and Chris 
Buckley, `` `Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China 
Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,'' New York Times, November 16, 
2019; Austin Ramzy, ``5 Takeaways from the Leaked Files on China's Mass 
Detention of Muslims,'' New York Times, November 16, 2019; CECC, 2020 
Annual Report, December 2020, 298-99.
    \24\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 3, 18-19, 42; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur 
Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers--Document No. 1, General Secretary Xi 
Jinping's Speeches while Inspecting Xinjiang (April 28-30, 2014), 
Introduction, Authentication and Transcription,'' November 27, 2021, 
10; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers--Document 
No. 2, Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at 
the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28-29, 2014), Introduction, 
Authentication and Transcription,'' November 27, 2021, 15, 16; Adrian 
Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers--Document No. 1, 
General Secretary Xi Jinping's Speeches While Inspecting Xinjiang 
(April 28-30, 2014), Transcript,'' December 13, 2021, 8; Adrian Zenz 
and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers--Document No. 2, Speeches by 
Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central 
Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28-30, 2014), Transcript,'' December 13, 2021, 
9; Adrian Zenz, ``Evidence of the Chinese Central Government's 
Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang's Re-Education Internment 
Campaign,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, September 14, 2021, 12, 
14-17.
    \25\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Xinjiang Weiwu'er Zizhiqu Jiduanhua Tiaoli [Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations], passed March 29, 2017, 
amended and effective October 9, 2018; ``Xinjiang Rolls Out China's 
First Law to Purge Religious Extremism,'' Xinhua, March 30, 2017; Liu 
Caiyu and Liu Xuanzun, ``Xinjiang Revises Its Anti-Extremism 
Regulation,'' Global Times, reprinted in Wayback Machine, October 10, 
2018; Cui Jia, ``Xinjiang Fighting Extremist Thought,'' China Daily, 
October 12, 2018. International law also prohibits the mass detention 
taking place in mass internment camps. UN Human Rights Council, 
``Followup Report on the Joint Study (2010) on Global Practices in 
Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain,'' A/HRC/49/45, March 25, 2022, para. 33. According 
to the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, 
``[t]he assertion that mass detention and incommunicado detention is 
justified by `re-education' to prevent extremism is inconsistent with 
the governments' international law obligations. The Special Rapporteur 
has consistently held that the term `extremism' has no purchase in 
binding international legal standards, and when operative as a criminal 
legal category is irreconcilable with the principle of legal certainty 
and is therefore, per se, incompatible with the exercise of certain 
fundamental human rights.'' Article 1 of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
prohibits the forced internment of Uyghurs on the basis of their 
ethnicity. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 
(XX) of December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4, 1969, art. 1; 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, accessed May 15, 2022. The Chinese government acceded 
to ICERD on December 29, 1981. Mass internment camps also remained 
illegal under the following international legal instruments: 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed May 15, 
2022. China signed and ratified the ICESCR. Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, 
entry into force September 3, 1981, arts. 7, 24; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed June 16, 2022. 
China signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 
1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and obligations 
contained in these articles. Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by 
UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into 
force June 26, 1987, arts. 1, 2; United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed June 16, 2022. 
China signed the CAT on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 
4, 1988. Mass internment camps also remained illegal under domestic 
legal instruments. Hilary Hurd, ``China's Human Rights Abuses against 
Uighurs in Xinjiang,'' Lawfare (blog), October 9, 2018; Donald Clarke, 
``No, New Xinjiang Legislation Does Not Legalize Detention Centers,'' 
Lawfare (blog), October 11, 2018; Jeremy Daum, ``Explainer on Xinjiang 
Regulations,'' China Law Translate (blog), October 11, 2018. Daum's 
analysis includes a chart titled ``Decision to Revise the `Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification,' '' which 
juxtaposes provisions in the 2017 version of the regulations with 
changes in the 2018 revised version. Jeremy Goldkorn, ``China 
Explicitly Acknowledges, Tries to Justify Concentration Camps in 
Xinjiang,'' SupChina, October 10, 2018; Nectar Gan and Mimi Lau, 
``China Changes Law to Recognise `Re-education Camps' in Xinjiang,'' 
South China Morning Post, October 13, 2018; Eva Dou, ``China 
Acknowledges Re-Education Centers for Uighurs,'' Wall Street Journal, 
October 10, 2018. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [PRC 
Legislation Law], passed March 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, 
amended March 15, 2015, arts. 7, 8, 9; ``New Law Aims to Justify 
Xinjiang Camps,'' China Digital Times, October 10, 2018; CECC, 2019 
Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 267; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 
October 5, 2017, 286.
    \26\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 3, 5, 6, 38, 40; David Tobin, ``The 
`Xinjiang Papers': How Xi Jinping Commands Policy in the People's 
Republic of China,'' University of Sheffield, accessed June 9, 2022, 
33.
    \27\ See, e.g., Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, ``China Can 
Lock Up a Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,'' BuzzFeed News, July 
21, 2021; Dake Kang, ``Room for 10,000: Inside China's Largest 
Detention Center,'' Associated Press, July 22, 2021.
    \28\ Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, ``China Can Lock Up a 
Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,'' BuzzFeed News, July 21, 2021.
    \29\ Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, ``China Can Lock Up a 
Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,'' BuzzFeed News, July 21, 2021.
    \30\ Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, ``China Can Lock Up a 
Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,'' BuzzFeed News, July 21, 2021.
    \31\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, ``Former Xinjiang 
Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,'' Axios, April 12, 
2022; Chao Deng, ``Former Xinjiang Detainee's Arrival in U.S. Marks 
Rare Escape from China's Long Reach,'' Wall Street Journal, April 12, 
2022; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to 
Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,'' Guardian, 
April 12, 2022.
    \32\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, ``Former Xinjiang 
Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,'' Axios, April 12, 
2022; Chao Deng, ``Former Xinjiang Detainee's Arrival in U.S. Marks 
Rare Escape from China's Long Reach,'' Wall Street Journal, April 12, 
2022; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to 
Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,'' Guardian, 
April 12, 2022.
    \33\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, ``Former Xinjiang 
Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,'' Axios, April 12, 
2022; Chao Deng, ``Former Xinjiang Detainee's Arrival in U.S. Marks 
Rare Escape from China's Long Reach,'' Wall Street Journal, April 12, 
2022.
    \34\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, ``Former Xinjiang 
Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,'' Axios, April 12, 
2022; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to 
Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,'' Guardian, 
April 12, 2022. For more information on Ovalbek Turdakun, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00118.
    \35\ Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Ben Westcott, ``Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang Are Being Given Long Prison Sentences. Their Families Say They 
Have Done Nothing Wrong,'' CNN, August 2, 2021; Mihray Abdilim and Alim 
Seytoff, ``Court Cases Signal Shift from `Re-Education' to Prison for 
Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, March 8, 2022; ``Zizhiqu Gaoji Renmin 
Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Work report of the XUAR High People's Court], 
Tianshan Net, March 3, 2022; ``Zizhiqu Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo 
baogao'' [Work report of the XUAR People's Procuratorate], Tianshan 
Net, March 3, 2022; Dake Kang, ``Room for 10,000: Inside China's 
Largest Detention Center,'' Associated Press, July 22, 2021; ``(Ab)Use 
of Law: Criminal Proceedings in Xinjiang,'' The Rights Practice, 
February 2022, 2, 3, 15.
    \36\ Dake Kang, ``Room for 10,000: Inside China's Largest Detention 
Center,'' Associated Press, July 22, 2021.
    \37\ Dake Kang, ``Room for 10,000: Inside China's Largest Detention 
Center,'' Associated Press, July 22, 2021. See also John Sudworth, 
``China's Hidden Camps,'' BBC, October 24, 2018. The BBC report cites 
analysis by an architectural firm which found that the Dabancheng 
facility had a maximum capacity of 130,000 detainees. CECC, 2019 Annual 
Report, November 18, 2019, 266.
    \38\ Dake Kang, ``Room for 10,000: Inside China's Largest Detention 
Center,'' Associated Press, July 22, 2021.
    \39\ Mihray Abdilim and Alim Seytoff, ``Court Cases Signal Shift 
from `Re-Education' to Prison for Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, March 8, 
2022. See also ``Zizhiqu Gaoji Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Work 
report of the XUAR High People's Court], Tianshan Net, March 3, 2022; 
``Zizhiqu Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Work report of the XUAR 
People's Procuratorate], Tianshan Net, March 3, 2022.
    \40\ Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Ben Westcott, ``Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang Are Being Given Long Prison Sentences. Their Families Say They 
Have Done Nothing Wrong,'' CNN, August 2, 2021; ``Noted Uyghur Folklore 
Professor Serving Prison Term in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 
December 13, 2021.
    \41\ ``Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term in 
China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 13, 2021. For more 
information on Rahile Dawut, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2018-00552.
    \42\ ``Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term in 
China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 13, 2021; Chris Buckley 
and Austin Ramzy, ``Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs 
Western China,'' New York Times, August 10, 2018.
    \43\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Qaramaydiki jama'et erbabi yusup saqalning 
yetim-yesirlargha ige chiqqanliqi uchun 14 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Karamay public figure Yusup Saqal confirmed sentenced to 
14 years for taking care of orphans], Radio Free Asia, March 24, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, ``Uyghur Businessman Jailed for 14 
Years for Allegedly Helping Families of Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 24, 2022. For more information on Yusupjan Memtimin, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00107.
    \44\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Qaramaydiki jama'et erbabi yusup saqalning 
yetim-yesirlargha ige chiqqanliqi uchun 14 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Karamay public figure Yusup Saqal confirmed sentenced to 
14 years for taking care of orphans], Radio Free Asia, March 24, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, ``Uyghur Businessman Jailed for 14 
Years for Allegedly Helping Families of Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 24, 2022.
    \45\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Qaramaydiki jama'et erbabi yusup saqalning 
yetim-yesirlargha ige chiqqanliqi uchun 14 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Karamay public figure Yusup Saqal confirmed sentenced to 
14 years for taking care of orphans], Radio Free Asia, March 24, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, ``Uyghur Businessman Jailed for 14 
Years for Allegedly Helping Families of Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 24, 2022.
    \46\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Shinjang pedagogika uniwersitetining 
oqutquchisi nurmemet omer uchqunning 10 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Xinjiang Normal University lecturer Nurmemet Omer Uchqun 
confirmed sentenced to 10 years], Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur University Lecturer Serving 10-Year Sentence 
in Xinjiang for Translations,'' Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2022. For 
more information on Nurmemet Omer Uchqun, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00108.
    \47\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Shinjang pedagogika uniwersitetining 
oqutquchisi nurmemet omer uchqunning 10 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Xinjiang Normal University lecturer Nurmemet Omer Uchqun 
confirmed sentenced to 10 years], Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur University Lecturer Serving 10-Year Sentence 
in Xinjiang for Translations,'' Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2022. See 
also ``Nurmuhemmet Omer, Entry 2295,'' Xinjiang Victims Database 
(www.shahit.biz), accessed April 11, 2022.
    \48\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Shinjang pedagogika uniwersitetining 
oqutquchisi nurmemet omer uchqunning 10 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Xinjiang Normal University lecturer Nurmemet Omer Uchqun 
confirmed sentenced to 10 years], Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur University Lecturer Serving 10-Year Sentence 
in Xinjiang for Translations,'' Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2022.
    \49\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Cop's Daughter Serving 10 Years in 
Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,'' Radio Free Asia, May 31, 
2022. For more information on Almire Erkin, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00123.
    \50\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Cop's Daughter Serving 10 Years in 
Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,'' Radio Free Asia, May 31, 
2022.
    \51\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Cop's Daughter Serving 10 Years in 
Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,'' Radio Free Asia, May 31, 
2022.
    \52\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Cop's Daughter Serving 10 Years in 
Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,'' Radio Free Asia, May 31, 
2022.
    \53\ Jilil Kashgary, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for 
Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2022; 
Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese 
Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022. For more 
information on Meryem Emet, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2022-00124.
    \54\ Jilil Kashgary, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for 
Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2022; 
Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese 
Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \55\ Jilil Kashgary, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for 
Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2022.
    \56\ Jilil Kashgary, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for 
Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2022; 
Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese 
Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \57\ Jilil Kashgary, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for 
Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2022; 
Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese 
Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \58\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Death of Detained Uyghur Imam Underscores 
Harsh Conditions in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 
October 22, 2021; ``Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead 
in Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2021; Rebecca 
Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom Booth, `` `Some Are Just 
Psychopaths': Chinese Detective in Exile Reveals Extent of Torture 
against Uyghurs,'' CNN, October 5, 2021.
    \59\ CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 275-76.
    \60\ ``Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in 
Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2021.
    \61\ ``Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in 
Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2021. For more 
information on Yaqup Haji, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2022-00120.
    \62\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Woman Who Escaped Forced Abortion 
Said to Have Died in Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, March 29, 2022.
    \63\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Woman Who Escaped Forced Abortion 
Said to Have Died in Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, March 29, 2022.
    \64\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Woman Who Escaped Forced Abortion 
Said to Have Died in Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, March 29, 2022. For 
more information on Zeynephan Memtimin, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00121.
    \65\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Xinjiang Goldsmith's Death after Release 
from Prison Is Followed by Son's Demise,'' Radio Free Asia, May 23, 
2022.
    \66\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Xinjiang Goldsmith's Death after Release 
from Prison Is Followed by Son's Demise,'' Radio Free Asia, May 23, 
2022.
    \67\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Xinjiang Goldsmith's Death after Release 
from Prison Is Followed by Son's Demise,'' Radio Free Asia, May 23, 
2022.
    \68\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Xinjiang Goldsmith's Death after Release 
from Prison Is Followed by Son's Demise,'' Radio Free Asia, May 23, 
2022. For more information on Yaqup Hesen, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00122.
    \69\ Uyghur Hjelp, ``Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 
Summer Olympic,'' February 21, 2022.
    \70\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Another Uyghur Torchbearer at 2008 Beijing 
Olympics Said to Be Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, February 25, 2022; 
Uyghur Hjelp, ``Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer 
Olympic,'' February 21, 2022. For more information on Abduqeyyum Semet, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00110.
    \71\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Another Uyghur Torchbearer at 2008 Beijing 
Olympics Said to Be Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, February 25, 2022.
    \72\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Torchbearer for 2008 Beijing Olympics 
Serving 14-Year Sentence in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, February 11, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Sabiq mesh'el koturguchi adil abdurehimning 
`Doletni parchilashqa urunush jinayiti' bilen 14 yilliq kesilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Former torchbearer Adil Abdurehim confirmed sentenced to 
14 years in prison for ``attempted separatism''], Radio Free Asia, 
February 14, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Sabiq mesh'el yetkuzguchi, aktip 
emeldar adil abdurehimning tutqunda ikenliki delillendi'' [Former 
torchbearer, active official Adil Abdurehim's reported detention 
confirmed], Radio Free Asia, February 9, 2022. See also ``Adiljan 
Abdurehim, Entry 15897,'' Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), 
accessed February 18, 2022. For more information on Adil Abdurehim, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00045.
    \73\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Torchbearer for 2008 Beijing Olympics 
Serving 14-Year Sentence in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, February 11, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Sabiq mesh'el koturguchi adil abdurehimning 
`Doletni parchilashqa urunush jinayiti' bilen 14 yilliq kesilgenliki 
delillendi'' [Former torchbearer Adil Abdurehim confirmed sentenced to 
14 years in prison for ``attempted separatism''], Radio Free Asia, 
February 14, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Sabiq mesh'el yetkuzguchi, aktip 
emeldar adil abdurehimning tutqunda ikenliki delillendi'' [Former 
torchbearer, active official Adil Abdurehim's reported detention 
confirmed], Radio Free Asia, February 9, 2022.
    \74\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Volleyball Coach Gets 8 Years in Jail 
for `Befriending Bearded Men,' '' Radio Free Asia, March 16, 2022; 
Uyghur Hjelp, ``Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer 
Olympic,'' February 21, 2022. For more information on Alimjan Mehmut, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00111.
    \75\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Volleyball Coach Gets 8 Years in Jail 
for `Befriending Bearded Men,' '' Radio Free Asia, March 16, 2022; 
Uyghur Hjelp, ``Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer 
Olympic,'' February 21, 2022.
    \76\ Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, ``Concerns with 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Visit to the People's Republic of 
China,'' May 28, 2022.
    \77\ ``Dozens of NGOs Call on UN Rights Chief to Resign after China 
Visit,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in News24, June 8, 2022.
    \78\ Rachel Cheung, ``UN Human Rights Chief Is Silent on China's 
Abuses in Xinjiang, and Scholars Are Fuming,'' Vice, June 8, 2022.
    \79\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Authorities Warn Uyghurs Not to Talk about 
`Re-Education' with UN Team,'' Radio Free Asia, May 11, 2022; Antony J. 
Blinken, U.S. Department of State, ``Concerns with UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Visit to the People's Republic of China,'' May 28, 
2022.
    \80\ Vincent Ni, ``West Demands Publication of UN's Long-Awaited 
Xinjiang Report,'' Guardian, June 1, 2022.
    \81\ See, e.g., Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How 
Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena 
Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, 
November 2021, 6, 9, 10; Adrian Zenz, ``Early Warning Brief--
Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang's 
Coercive Labor Placement Systems,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 
June 5, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``After 4 Years in Detention, Uyghur 
Brothers Forced to Work at Factories in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 
January 12, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Chinese Company Transfers Thousands 
of Uyghurs from Xinjiang to Nanjing,'' Radio Free Asia, November 13, 
2021.
    \82\ International Labour Organization, ``Application of 
International Labour Standards 2022: Report of the Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,'' 2022, 515, 
520; Jamey Keaten, ``UN Labor Agency Cites Concerns about China's 
Xinjiang Region,'' Associated Press, February 11, 2022; Emma Farge, 
``China's Labour Policies in Xinjiang Are Discriminatory, ILO Body 
Says,'' Reuters, February 11, 2022. See also International Labour 
Organization, ILO Convention (No. 122) Concerning Employment Policy, 
July 9, 1964, entry into force July 15, 1966, art. 1(2).
    \83\ ``Shisan jie Quanguo Renda Changwei Hui disanshisi ci huiyi 
zai Jing bimu biaojue tongguo Qihuo he Yansheng Pin Fa xin xiuding de 
Zhiye Jiaoyu Fa deng Xi Jinping qianshu zhuxi ling Li Zhanshu zhuchi 
huiyi'' [The 34th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th 
National People's Congress concludes in Beijing, voted to pass the 
Futures and Derivatives Law, the newly revised Vocational Education 
Law, etc., Xi Jinping signed the Presidential decree and Li Zhanshu 
presided over the meeting], Xinhua, reprinted in National People's 
Congress, April 20, 2022; Nadya Yeh, ``China Ratifies Two International 
Treaties on Forced Labor,'' SupChina, April 20, 2022; ``China Ratifies 
International Forced Labor Conventions,'' Deutsche Welle, April 20, 
2022. See also International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 
29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, entry into 
force May 1, 1932; International Labour Organization, ILO Convention 
(No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, 
entry into force January 17, 1959.
    \84\ Emma Farge, ``U.S. and Others Seek ILO China Mission to Probe 
Alleged Xinjiang Abuses,'' Reuters, June 2, 2022; U.S. Mission to 
International Organizations in Geneva, ``Statement by Ambassador 
Crocker at the International Labor Conference,'' June 2, 2022; 
Government of the United Kingdom, ``ILO Committee on the Application of 
Standards: UK Statement (June 2022),'' June 2, 2022.
    \85\ Adrian Zenz, ``Early Warning Brief--Unemployment Monitoring 
and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang's Coercive Labor Placement 
Systems,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022.
    \86\ Adrian Zenz, ``Early Warning Brief--Unemployment Monitoring 
and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang's Coercive Labor Placement 
Systems,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022.
    \87\ Adrian Zenz, ``Early Warning Brief--Unemployment Monitoring 
and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang's Coercive Labor Placement 
Systems,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022.
    \88\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang 
Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy 
Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 
2021, 2, 3, 6, 7, 25, 26; Eva Dou, ``China's Xinjiang Cotton Is Banned 
in the U.S. but Still Making It to Store Shelves, Report Says,'' 
Washington Post, November 17, 2021.
    \89\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, ``CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on 
Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,'' January 13, 2021; Laura T. 
Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in 
International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy Centre for International 
Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 2, 3, 6, 7, 25, 
26.
    \90\ The XPCC is an entity under the administration of both the 
central government and the XUAR government that plays a key role in 
development and urbanization in the XUAR. State Council Information 
Office, ``The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps,'' October 5, 2014, sec. II; Wade Shepard, ``The 
Complex Impact of Urbanization in Xinjiang,'' The Diplomat, December 
16, 2015. For more information on the XPCC and its links to human 
rights abuses and international supply chains, see CECC, 2020 Annual 
Report, December 2020, 240-41.
    \91\ Irina Bukharin, ``Long Shadows: How the Global Economy 
Supports Oppression in Xinjiang,'' C4ADS, 2021, 4, 20, 21, 24, 26; 
Megha Rajagopalan, ``Goods Linked to a Group that Runs Chinese 
Detention Camps May Be Ending Up in US Stores,'' BuzzFeed News, August 
10, 2021. See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, ``CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order 
on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,'' January 13, 2021; U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and 
Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,'' 
July 31, 2020.
    \92\ Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, ``Hugo Boss and Other 
Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China--but These 
Shipping Records Raise Questions,'' BuzzFeed News, January 13, 2022.
    \93\ Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, ``Hugo Boss and Other 
Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China--but These 
Shipping Records Raise Questions,'' BuzzFeed News, January 13, 2022; 
Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
``Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing 
Entries on the Entity List,'' July 22, 2020.
    \94\ Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, ``Was This Shirt Made 
with Forced Labor? Hugo Boss Quietly Cut Ties with the Supplier.,'' 
BuzzFeed News, February 3, 2022.
    \95\ Uyghur Tribunal, ``Uyghur Tribunal Judgment,'' December 9, 
2021, 49, 50, 51, 56, 57. See also Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7(1); 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 
resolution 260 (III) of December 9, 1948, art. 2(d).
    \96\ Uyghur Tribunal, ``Witness Statement: Gulzire Awulqanqizi,'' 
September 13, 2021, 3, 4, 9, 13, 17; Uyghur Tribunal, ``Witness 
Statement: Gulbahar Jelilova,'' June 6, 2021, 8, 9, 14, 16, 21. For 
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
records 2022-00119 on Gulzire Awulqanqizi and 2019-00032 on Gulbahar 
Jelilova.
    \97\ Uyghur Tribunal, ``Witness Statement: Gulzire Awulqanqizi,'' 
September 13, 2021, 3, 4, 8-10, 15, 17, 19. For Gulzire Awulqanqizi's 
ethnicity and alternate name, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2022-00119.
    \98\ Uyghur Tribunal, ``Witness Statement: Gulzire Awulqanqizi,'' 
September 13, 2021, 4, 9, 10, 13, 17, 18.
    \99\ State Council Information Office, `` `Xinjiang de Renkou 
Fazhan' baipi shu'' [White paper on ``Xinjiang's Population 
Development''], September 26, 2021; ``China's Xinjiang Population 
Growth Report Raises Eyebrows,'' Radio Free Asia, September 30, 2021; 
Rian Thum (@RianThum), ``Chinese gov has a new white paper out focused 
on Xinjiang population . . .,'' Twitter, September 26, 2021, 5:42 p.m.; 
Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, ``Family De-Planning: The Coercive 
Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,'' 
International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, May 12, 2021, 4, 7, 11, 13, 16, 25. See also CECC, 2021 
Annual Report, March 2022, 280-81.
    \100\ State Council Information Office, `` `Xinjiang de Renkou 
Fazhan' baipi shu'' [White paper on ``Xinjiang's Population 
Development''], September 26, 2021; Adrian Zenz, `` `End the Dominance 
of the Uyghur Ethnic Group': An Analysis of Beijing's Population 
Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang,'' Social Science Research 
Network, June 3, 2021, 4, 17. See also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 
2022, 280-81.
    \101\ Alicia Chen, Lyric Li, and Lily Kuo, ``In Need of a Baby 
Boom, China Clamps Down on Vasectomies,'' Washington Post, December 9, 
2021; ``CCP Gestures toward Women's Rights to Sweeten Pro-Natalist 
Shift,'' China Digital Times, February 18, 2022; Adrian Zenz, ``A 
Response to the Report Compiled by Lin Fangfei, Associate Professor at 
Xinjiang University,'' Medium (blog), October 6, 2020; Sigal Samuel, 
``China's Genocide against the Uyghurs, in 4 Disturbing Charts,'' Vox, 
March 10, 2021; Amy Qin, ``China Targets Muslim Women in Push to 
Suppress Births in Xinjiang,'' New York Times, September 23, 2021. See 
also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 280.
    \102\ ``Children of Detained Uyghur Parents Held in `Welfare 
Schools' in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, August 16, 2021; Emily 
Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese 
Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022; Elise Anderson, 
Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower 
Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 1, 
2, 10, 11; Mihray Abdilim, ``Uyghurs See Assimilation as China Touts 
Investment in Xinjiang Preschools,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 
2021; Darren Byler, `` `Ethnic Extinction' in Northwest China,'' Art of 
Life in Chinese Central Asia (blog), February 14, 2022.
    \103\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wei Chengnian Ren Baohu Fa [PRC Law 
on the Protection of Minors], passed September 4, 1991, revised 
December 29, 2006, effective June 1, 2007, art. 43; Human Rights Watch, 
``China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,'' September 15, 
2019.
    \104\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force 
September 2, 1990, arts. 5, 9, 10, 29, 30; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, accessed June 15, 2022. China signed the Convention in 1990 and 
ratified it in 1992. Human Rights Watch, ``China: Xinjiang Children 
Separated from Families,'' September 15, 2019.
    \105\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 10; ``Children of Detained Uyghur 
Parents Held in `Welfare Schools' in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free 
Asia, August 16, 2021.
    \106\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 10.
    \107\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 11.
    \108\ Uyghur Tribunal, ``Uyghur Tribunal Judgment,'' December 9, 
2021, 55.
    \109\ Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment 
at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \110\ Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment 
at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \111\ Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment 
at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022.
    \112\ Emily Feng, ``Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment 
at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,'' NPR, February 3, 2022. For 
more information on the children's mother, Meryem Emet, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00124.
    \113\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 1-3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12. Gulchehra Hoja, 
``Chinese Government Targets Uyghur Children with `Pomegranate Flower' 
Policy,'' Radio Free Asia, October 21, 2021; Kang Haoyan, ``Nanjiang 
xiaocun kaichu 36 dui `shiliu hua' '' [36 pairs of ``pomegranate 
flowers'' bloom in a small village in southern Xinjiang], Tianshan Net 
and Xinjiang Daily, September 24, 2021.
    \114\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 2, 3; Gulchehra Hoja, ``Chinese 
Government Targets Uyghur Children with `Pomegranate Flower' Policy,'' 
Radio Free Asia, October 21, 2021; Kang Haoyan, ``Nanjiang xiaocun 
kaichu 36 dui `shiliu hua' '' [36 pairs of ``pomegranate flowers'' 
bloom in a small village in southern Xinjiang], Tianshan Net and 
Xinjiang Daily, September 24, 2021.
    \115\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 8, 9; Gulchehra Hoja, ``Chinese 
Government Targets Uyghur Children with `Pomegranate Flower' Policy,'' 
Radio Free Asia, October 21, 2021; Kang Haoyan, ``Nanjiang xiaocun 
kaichu 36 dui `shiliu hua' '' [36 pairs of ``pomegranate flowers'' 
bloom in a small village in southern Xinjiang], Tianshan Net and 
Xinjiang Daily, September 24, 2021. See also Ruth Ingram, ``Sexual 
Abuse of Uyghur Women by CCP Cadres in Xinjiang: A Victim Speaks Out,'' 
Bitter Winter, September 19, 2020; Nathan VanderKlippe, ``China's New 
Demands for `National Unity' Take the State Deeper into Xinjiang 
Homes,'' Globe and Mail, February 21, 2021; Ivan Watson and Rebecca 
Wright, ``The Chinese Policy That Makes Uyghurs Feel Like Hostages in 
Their Own Homes,'' CNN, May 8, 2021. For more information on homestay 
programs in the XUAR, see ``Blogging Fanghuiju: State Surveillance, 
Propaganda Work, and Coerced Gratitude,'' Xinjiang Documentation 
Project, University of British Columbia, accessed June 15, 2022; 
Timothy A. Grose, ``Hosting the Hostage: Looking beneath China's Policy 
to Infiltrate Uyghur Homes,'' SupChina, July 24, 2020; CECC, 2021 
Annual Report, March 2022, 279-80; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 
2020, 305.
    \116\ Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Coerced 
Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of 
Uyghur Children,'' January 2022, 4, 9.
    \117\ See, e.g., Helen Davidson and Vincent Ni, ``Chinese Effort to 
Gather `Micro Clues' on Uyghurs Laid Bare in Report,'' Guardian, 
October 19, 2021; Isobel Cockerell, `` `Surveillance' Doesn't Begin to 
Describe What Beijing Is Doing to Uyghurs,'' Coda Story, November 2, 
2021; Michael Clarke, ``Turning Ghosts into Humans: Surveillance as an 
Instrument of Social Engineering in Xinjiang,'' War on the Rocks, 
November 2, 2021; Johana Bhuiyan, `` `There's Cameras Everywhere': 
Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of Uyghurs in China,'' 
Guardian, September 30, 2021; Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and 
Daria Impiombato, ``The Architecture of Repression,'' Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, October 19, 2021, 5, 6, 24, 26; Charles 
Rollet, ``DeepGlint: Uyghur Detection, Race Analytics, PRC Police 
Deals,'' IPVM, April 7, 2022.
    \118\ Darren Byler, ``Xinjiang: On Technology and Crimes against 
Humanity,'' SupChina, December 1, 2021.
    \119\ Matthias Sander, ``China Uses Digital Surveillance to Repress 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang,'' Neue Zurcher Zeitung, January 28, 2022; Darren 
Byler, ``Xinjiang: On Technology and Crimes against Humanity,'' 
SupChina, December 1, 2021; ``The `Four Togethers' and `Three Gifts' 
Handbook,'' Xinjiang Documentation Project, University of British 
Columbia, accessed May 12, 2022.
    \120\ Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
``Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing 
Entry on the Entity List; Removal of Entity from the Unverified List; 
and Addition of Entity to the Military End-User (MEU) List,'' July 12, 
2021.
    \121\ Charles Rollet, ``DeepGlint: Uyghur Detection, Race 
Analytics, PRC Police Deals,'' IPVM, April 7, 2022.
    \122\ Charles Rollet, ``Hikvision Dominant Provider of Xinjiang 
Command Centers,'' IPVM, May 10, 2022.
    \123\ Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato, ``The 
Architecture of Repression,'' Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
October 19, 2021, 6, 24-26.
    \124\ Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato, ``The 
Architecture of Repression,'' Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
October 19, 2021, 24; Helen Davidson and Vincent Ni, ``Chinese Effort 
to Gather `Micro Clues' on Uyghurs Laid Bare in Report,'' Guardian, 
October 19, 2021. See also Darren Byler, ``The Covid Tech That Is 
Intimately Tied to China's Surveillance State,'' MIT Technology Review, 
October 11, 2021; Jordi Perez Colome, `` `Xinjiang Is the First Great 
Model in the Era of Digital Mass Surveillance. Nothing Like It Has Ever 
Been Seen,' '' El Pais, May 7, 2022.
    \125\ Techno-Authoritarianism: Platform for Repression in China and 
Abroad, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Geoffrey Cain, author of The Perfect 
Police State: An Undercover Odyssey into China's Terrifying 
Surveillance Dystopia of the Future) (20:53-21:18); Roseanne Gerin and 
Alim Seytoff, ``China's Persecution of Uyghurs Is Preview of Wider 
Surveillance Scheme, Lawmakers Say,'' Radio Free Asia, November 17, 
2021; ``The Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey into China's 
Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future'' (web page), 
PublicAffairs, accessed May 12, 2022. See also Darren Byler, 
``Xinjiang: On Technology and Crimes against Humanity,'' SupChina, 
December 1, 2021.
    \126\ Zack Whittaker, `` `Always On and Watching': A Former 
Xinjiang Prisoner Describes Life inside China's Detention Camps,'' 
TechCrunch (blog), April 13, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Former Xinjiang 
Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was 
Subjected To,'' Guardian, April 12, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, `` `There's 
Cameras Everywhere': Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of 
Uyghurs in China,'' Guardian, September 30, 2021.
    \127\ Zack Whittaker, `` `Always On and Watching': A Former 
Xinjiang Prisoner Describes Life inside China's Detention Camps,'' 
TechCrunch (blog), April 13, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Former Xinjiang 
Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was 
Subjected To,'' Guardian, April 12, 2022.
    \128\ Zack Whittaker, `` `Always On and Watching': A Former 
Xinjiang Prisoner Describes Life inside China's Detention Camps,'' 
TechCrunch (blog), April 13, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, `` `There's Cameras 
Everywhere': Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of Uyghurs in 
China,'' Guardian, September 30, 2021; Uyghur Tribunal, ``Uyghur 
Tribunal--Fact Witness Statement: UTFW2-008--Baqitali Nur,'' accessed 
May 13, 2022, 9. For more information on Baqitali Nur, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00117.
    \129\ See, e.g., Bradley Jardine, Great Wall of Steel: China's 
Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs (Washington, DC: Kissinger 
Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, March 2022), xviii, xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvi, 74, 75; 
Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Uyghurs Surveilled and Harassed in 22 
Countries, New Research Reveals,'' November 10, 2021; Uyghur Human 
Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, `` `Nets 
Cast from the Earth to the Sky': China's Hunt for Pakistan's Uyghurs,'' 
2021, 4-5, 19, 24, 59-60; Isobel Cockerell, ``Hacks, Threats and 
Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,'' Coda 
Story, September 16, 2021. For reporting from past years on the 
transnational repression of Uyghurs, see, e.g., Eva Xiao, ``Exiled 
Uighurs in Turkey Fear China's Long Reach--`We Are All Panicking Now,' 
'' Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2021; Ben Fox and Christina Larson, 
``Targets of Crackdown in China Fear Government's Reach in US,'' 
Associated Press, March 8, 2020; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 
140; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 2020, 154-55.
    \130\ Bradley Jardine, Great Wall of Steel: China's Global Campaign 
to Suppress the Uyghurs (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China 
and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, March 2022), xviii.
    \131\ Bradley Jardine, Great Wall of Steel: China's Global Campaign 
to Suppress the Uyghurs (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China 
and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, March 2022), xviii.
    \132\ Human Rights Watch, ``Saudi Arabia: Imminent Deportation of 
Uyghur Detainees,'' January 10, 2022; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter from the Mandates of the Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special 
Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief, AL SAU 3/2022, March 3, 2022; Inter-Parliamentary 
Alliance on China, ``IPAC Calls for Saudi Arabia to Block Forcible 
Return of Uyghurs to China: Letter,'' March 31, 2022; Amnesty 
International, ``Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four `Facing 
Deportation' and Torture in China,'' April 4, 2022; Amnesty 
International, ``Morocco: Detained Uyghur Must Not Be Transferred to 
China,'' September 21, 2021.
    \133\ Jilil Kashgary, ``Uyghurs Detained in Saudi Arabia Face Risk 
of Deportation to China,'' Radio Free Asia, March 25, 2022; Jilil 
Kashgary and Alim Seytoff, ``Two More Uyghurs Detained in Saudi Arabia 
Face Risk of Deportation to China,'' Radio Free Asia, April 5, 2022; 
Human Rights Watch, ``Saudi Arabia: Imminent Deportation of Uyghur 
Detainees,'' January 10, 2022; Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Letter from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on minority 
issues and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL 
SAU 3/2022, March 3, 2022; Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, 
``IPAC Calls for Saudi Arabia to Block Forcible Return of Uyghurs to 
China: Letter,'' March 31, 2022; Amnesty International, ``Saudi Arabia: 
Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four `Facing Deportation' and Torture in 
China,'' April 4, 2022. Some sources write Hemdulla Weli (or 
Abduweli)'s name as ``Hemdullah''; some sources write Buhelchem Abla's 
name as ``Buhelchem Abdullah.''
    \134\ Ehsan Azigh, ``Moroccan Court Rules in China's Favor to 
Extradite Uyghur Accused of `Terrorism,' '' Radio Free Asia, December 
16, 2021; Mariam Kiparoidze, ``Authoritarian Regimes Are Using Interpol 
to Target Minorities and Pro-Democracy Activists,'' Coda Story, 
September 28, 2021; Amnesty International, ``Morocco: Detained Uyghur 
Must Not Be Transferred to China,'' September 21, 2021.
    \135\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``The 
Principle of Non-Refoulement under International Human Rights Law,'' 
accessed May 10, 2022, 1. According to the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``[u]nder international human rights 
law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be 
returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.
    \136\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, 
art. 3; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, accessed May 10, 2022. Saudi Arabia acceded to 
the Convention on September 23, 1997, and Morocco signed the Convention 
on January 8, 1986, and ratified it on June 21, 1993.
    \137\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``Saudi Arabia: Imminent 
Deportation of Uyghur Detainees,'' January 10, 2022; Amnesty 
International, ``Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four `Facing 
Deportation' and Torture in China,'' April 4, 2022; Uyghur Human Rights 
Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, `` `Nets Cast from 
the Earth to the Sky': China's Hunt for Pakistan's Uyghurs,'' 2021, 9-
10, 24, 25, 45, 46, 57, 58; Bradley Jardine, Great Wall of Steel: 
China's Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs (Washington, DC: 
Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, March 2022), xviii, xxvi, xxxi, 
xlii, 63, 65, 74.
    \138\ Bradley Jardine, Great Wall of Steel: China's Global Campaign 
to Suppress the Uyghurs (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China 
and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, March 2022), xxii, 108, 115. See also Isobel Cockerell, 
``Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the 
Uyghur Tribunal,'' Coda Story, September 16, 2021; Austin Ramzy, `` 
`They Have My Sister': As Uyghurs Speak Out, China Targets Their 
Families,'' New York Times, July 27, 2021; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, ``Chinese Government Transnational Repression Violates 
US Laws and US-based Uyghurs' Rights,'' August 11, 2021, 1, 2.
    \139\ Isobel Cockerell, ``Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China 
Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,'' Coda Story, September 16, 
2021.
    \140\ Isobel Cockerell, ``Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China 
Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,'' Coda Story, September 16, 
2021.
    \141\ Isobel Cockerell, ``Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China 
Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,'' Coda Story, September 16, 
2021.
    \142\ ``Police in China's XUAR Question Uyghurs for Attending Eid 
Prayers without Permission,'' Radio Free Asia, July 30, 2021.
    \143\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Retiree Serving 10 Years for 
`Illegal Religious Activities' in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, March 2, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Sisters Jailed for `Illegal' Religious 
Activities in Xinjiang Women's Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, January 24, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghurs Jailed for Religious `Crimes' Believed 
to Be in Xinjiang Women's Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, February 1, 2022.
    \144\ For information on official religious restrictions enforced 
during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., CECC, 2021 
Annual Report, March 2022, 283; CECC, 2020 Annual Report, December 
2020, 306; CECC, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, 277.
    \145\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Chinese Officials Restrict Number of 
Uyghurs Observing Ramadan,'' Radio Free Asia, April 1, 2022.
    \146\ ``Shohret Hoshur, Chinese Officials Restrict Number of 
Uyghurs Observing Ramadan,'' Radio Free Asia, April 1, 2022.
    \147\ ``Police in China's XUAR Question Uyghurs for Attending Eid 
Prayers without Permission,'' Radio Free Asia, July 30, 2021.
    \148\ ``China Stages Dancing, Happy Talk for Uyghur Religious 
Holiday Celebrations,'' Radio Free Asia, July 21, 2021.
    \149\ See, e.g., Shohret Hoshur, ``Five Women from Uyghur Family 
Sentenced to Long Prison Terms in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 
January 21, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Retiree Serving 10 Years for 
`Illegal Religious Activities' in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, March 2, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Sisters Jailed for `Illegal' Religious 
Activities in Xinjiang Women's Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, January 24, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghurs Jailed for Religious `Crimes' Believed 
to Be in Xinjiang Women's Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, February 1, 2022.
    \150\ ``Purge of Mosque Clergy in Xinjiang's Ghulja Leaves Nobody 
Left to Conduct Ceremonies,'' Radio Free Asia, July 16, 2021.
    \151\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Five Women from Uyghur Family Sentenced to 
Long Prison Terms in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, January 21, 
2022.
    \152\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Five Women from Uyghur Family Sentenced to 
Long Prison Terms in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, January 21, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``78 yashliq xelchem pazilning 17 yilliq 
kesilgenliki we sanji ayallar turmiside jaza mudditini otewatqanliqi 
delillendi'' [Helchem Pazil, 78, confirmed sentenced to 17 years in 
prison and to be serving her sentence in Changji Women's Prison], Radio 
Free Asia, January 24, 2022. For more information, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00112 on Helchem Pazil, 2022-
00135 on Melikizat Memet, 2022-00136 on Patigul Memet, 2022-00137 on 
Zahire Memet, and 2022-00138 on Bostan Ibrahim.
    \153\ ``Purge of Mosque Clergy in Xinjiang's Ghulja Leaves Nobody 
Left to Conduct Ceremonies,'' Radio Free Asia, July 16, 2021.
    \154\ ``Purge of Mosque Clergy in Xinjiang's Ghulja Leaves Nobody 
Left to Conduct Ceremonies,'' Radio Free Asia, July 16, 2021.

Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Macau

                        XI. Hong Kong and Macau

                          Hong Kong and Macau

                                Findings

         The overhaul of Hong Kong's electoral system 
        in March 2021 substantially curtailed public 
        participation and created a system that eliminates 
        candidates whom central authorities do not endorse. 
        Even before the overhaul, the spectrum of political 
        voices had already narrowed rapidly, as most pro-
        democracy activists were in exile or criminal detention 
        as a result of the National Security Law (NSL), passed 
        in June 2020. The Legislative Council (LegCo) election 
        held in December 2021 had almost exclusively pro-
        Beijing candidates and saw record-low turnout amidst 
        calls for boycott over the election's perceived 
        illegitimacy. In May 2022 there was only one candidate 
        for Chief Executive, who was nominated and selected by 
        a government-vetted committee. By design and in 
        practice, the electoral overhaul is a departure from 
        the ultimate aim, as stated in the Basic Law of the 
        Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Basic Law), of 
        electing the legislative and executive officeholders by 
        universal suffrage.
         Hong Kong authorities broadly applied criminal 
        charges in a manner that undermined fundamental 
        freedoms and damaged democratic institutions and the 
        rule of law. Police have arrested over 10,499 people 
        for political and protest-related offenses since June 
        2019. Of these arrests, 183 involved national security 
        offenses, which triggered procedures under the National 
        Security Law including a strict bail standard that 
        presumes guilt, trial by politically selected judges, 
        and possible
        extradition to mainland China. Cases of note include 
        Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, founder of pro-democracy newspaper 
        who is facing national security charges and a 
        potentially lengthy prison term; Leon Tong Ying-kit, 
        who was denied a jury trial; Adam Ma Chun-man, who 
        received a five-year sentence for his speech; and 34 
        individuals whom authorities held in pretrial detention 
        for over a year for peacefully participating in an 
        informal primary election.
         The National Security Department of the Hong 
        Kong Police Force raided pro-democracy news outlets 
        Apple Daily and Stand News, froze their assets, and 
        arrested their executives and editors on NSL charges. 
        The police's actions forced the news outlets to cease 
        operations, causing a ripple effect that shuttered 
        other independent news outlets.
         Following the lead of mainland state-run 
        media, rhetoric and actions by Hong Kong officials 
        displayed a concerted effort to target civil society 
        groups that were part of the pro-democracy movement in 
        2019, isolating them from the international community 
        and causing their rapid disintegration in 2021. As of 
        January 2022, at least 65 organizations had shut down 
        or left Hong Kong after the enactment of the National 
        Security Law, a trend that accelerated in the second 
        half of 2021. These organizations include religious, 
        community, political, media, union, and human rights 
        groups, and their members cited pressure under the 
        National Security Law.
         Macau Special Administrative Region 
        authorities invoked
        political grounds in the disqualification of 21 pro-
        democracy candidates for election to the Legislative 
        Assembly, which was followed by a record-low turnout 
        and the closure of a pro-
        democracy online news outlet.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Continue to support Hong Kong pro-democracy activists 
        who have been charged, detained, or imprisoned under 
        the National Security Law or for other political 
        reasons, including Joshua Wong, Jimmy Lai, Albert Ho, 
        Cyd Ho, Lee Cheuk-yan, Leung Kwok-hung, Benny Tai, 
        Claudia Mo, Tam Tak-chi, Tiffany Yuen, Lester Shum, 
        Andy Li, and Tony Chung.
          Develop a strategy to implement the measures 
        suggested by 50 independent United Nations human rights 
        experts in a joint letter dated July 2020, which 
        included creating a special session to evaluate China's 
        human rights violations; establishing an impartial and 
        independent mechanism to monitor, analyze, and report 
        on China's practices; and engaging in dialogue with 
        China to demand that it fulfill its human rights 
        obligations.
          Fully implement the sanctions provided in the Hong 
        Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No. 
        116-76) and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law No. 
        116-149) including those for financial institutions and 
        individuals complicit in the dismantling of Hong Kong's 
        autonomy and rights protections and the Chinese 
        government's violation of the 1984 Sino-British 
        Declaration, an international treaty. Work with allies 
        and partners at the United Nations and other 
        multilateral organizations to issue frequent public 
        statements and engage in other diplomatic efforts to 
        seek the release of political prisoners and address 
        violations of international humans rights standards.
          Work to speed up processing times for refugee cases 
        already in the system and consider expanding the annual 
        cap on refugees admitted to the United States in an 
        increased effort to protect those fleeing People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) persecution. Prioritize steps 
        to remove barriers to properly vetted Hong Kong 
        residents receiving U.S. visas, particularly those 
        attempting to exit Hong Kong for fear of political 
        persecution. Pass the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act (S. 
        295, H.R. 461) and the Hong Kong People's Freedom and 
        Choice Act (H.R. 4276).
          Advocate for freer and more transparent access by 
        foreign journalists to Hong Kong and Macau.

Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Macau

                          Hong Kong and Macau

                               Hong Kong

    Events from the 2022 reporting year illustrate the effects 
of landmark changes in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) that central authorities have made since the 2019 
protests, including the overhaul of the electoral system and 
the passage of the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National 
Security in the Hong Kong SAR (National Security Law, or NSL). 
These changes enabled the Hong Kong government to carry out 
political prosecution, eliminate opposition voices, dismantle 
civil society, and restrict press and academic freedom, as 
discussed in more detail below.

                   Elections and Civic Participation

    The overhaul of Hong Kong's electoral system in March 2021 
substantially curtailed public participation and installed a 
system that eliminates candidates whom central authorities do 
not endorse. Before the overhaul, the spectrum of political 
voices had already narrowed rapidly, as most pro-democracy 
activists were in exile or criminal detention as a result of 
the National Security Law passed in June 2020.\1\ The 
Legislative Council (LegCo) election held in December 2021 had 
almost exclusively pro-Beijing candidates and saw a record low 
turnout amidst calls for boycott over the election's perceived 
illegitimacy. In May 2022 there was only one candidate for 
Chief Executive, who was nominated and selected by a 
government-vetted committee. By design and in practice, the 
electoral overhaul is a departure from the stated aim, as 
provided in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (Basic Law), of electing the legislative 
and executive officeholders by universal suffrage.\2\

                           ELECTION COMMITTEE

    The selection procedures for Chief Executive and LegCo 
members are prescribed in Annexes I and II of the Basic Law, 
respectively, which the National People's Congress (NPC) 
Standing Committee amended in March 2021 to ensure that Hong 
Kong is governed only by ``patriots,'' \3\ that is, people 
endorsed by the central government.\4\ The amendment reshaped 
the Election Committee that selects the Chief Executive,\5\ 
resulting in guaranteed representation for the government, a 
reduction in participation by individual voters (from 246,440 
in 2016 to 7,971 in 2021), and an increase in the number of 
uncontested seats.\6\ In the committee's election held in 
September 2021, only 364 of the 1,500 seats were contested.\7\ 
Except for 52 temporary vacancies,\8\ the remaining seats were 
either appointed, filled by current officeholders, or 
unopposed.\9\ In the newly constituted committee, all but one 
of its members were pro-Beijing.\10\

                          LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

    The revised Annex II further authorizes the Election 
Committee to nominate LegCo candidates and select 40 of the 
total 90 council seats.\11\ The amendment restructured the 
LegCo's constituencies in a way that reduced popularly elected 
seats (from 57 to 22 percent) and favored corporate voters over 
individual voters.\12\ Corporate voters vote through natural 
persons and are not required to maintain residency in Hong 
Kong.\13\ Some corporations that are controlled by pro-Beijing 
individuals are allocated multiple votes through sister 
companies, and some of them are led by directors based mostly 
in mainland China.\14\ According to one political scientist, 
the selection process of these corporations lacks transparency 
and procedural fairness.\15\
    The first LegCo election after the overhaul was scheduled 
for December 2021.\16\ Some critics called the election 
illegitimate and advocated for a boycott, saying that the 
election was designed to exclude opposition candidates.\17\ 
This prompted authorities to arrest 10 people and issue arrest 
warrants for 7 others for ``inciting another person not to 
vote, or to cast an invalid vote,'' a new offense created in 
May 2021.\18\ Ahead of the December election, the Hong Kong 
government tried to boost participation, but the turnout was a 
record low 30.2 percent, a drop from 58 percent in the last 
LegCo election in 2016.\19\ The number of invalid ballots also 
reached about 2 percent of the total votes, the highest since 
1997.\20\

                            CHIEF EXECUTIVE

    In an uncontested election held in May 2022, the Election 
Committee chose the sole candidate, John Lee Ka-chiu, as the 
new Chief Executive to replace Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor.\21\ 
Lee received 1,416 votes in support of his candidacy, 
representing 99.2 percent of all valid ballots.\22\ Lee 
previously served as the Secretary of Security and defended the 
use of excessive force by the police in cracking down on pro-
democracy protesters in 2019.\23\ Under the new electoral 
system, the Chief Executive chairs the National Security 
Committee and appoints members of the Candidate Eligibility 
Review Committee, both of which vet candidates for the Election 
Committee, the LegCo, and the chief executive office itself, 
thereby creating a conflict of interest.\24\ The non-
governmental organization (NGO) Asian Network for Free 
Elections described this as creating ``an endless feedback loop 
of pro-Beijing institutions letting only
the most `patriotic' candidates run for office at the expense 
of all others.'' \25\

                            DISTRICT COUNCIL

    Before the electoral overhaul, pro-democracy candidates won
392 of the 452 directly elected seats in the 2019 district 
council elections with a turnout rate of 71 percent.\26\ 
Beginning in July 2021, however, at least 260 district 
councilors resigned after new legislation required them to take 
an oath by which they could be disqualified for their pro-
democracy activities.\27\ The government additionally 
disqualified 55 district councilors on political grounds, 
prompting international criticism.\28\ The U.S. Department of 
State, for example, called the disqualifications retroactive, 
targeted, and arbitrary, adding that they ``prevent[ed] people 
in Hong Kong from participating meaningfully in their own 
governance.'' \29\

                         National Security Law

    On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee enacted the National Security Law.\30\ The new law, 
incorporated into Annex III of Hong Kong's Basic Law (the 
city's constitutional document),\31\ claims to ``safeguard 
national security'' and criminalizes ``secession,'' 
``subversion,'' ``terrorist activities,'' and ``collusion with 
a foreign country or with external elements to endanger 
national security.'' \32\ The law created a new department 
within the police force--the National Security Department 
(NSD),--to implement the NSL's criminal provisions, which have 
international reach.\33\ In addition, the NSL requires Hong 
Kong's Chief Executive to handpick judges in national security 
cases,\34\ confers on the PRC central government jurisdiction 
under some circumstances,\35\ and orders the Hong Kong SAR 
government to ``strengthen propaganda [and] guidance, 
supervision, and administration'' of ``schools, social groups, 
media, and the internet.'' \36\
    There have been instances in which authorities applied the 
NSL retroactively as a basis on which to conduct 
investigations,\37\ exacerbating due process concerns created 
by the expanded investigatory powers conferred on the NSD.\38\ 
Under the NSL and its implementing rules, the NSD may conduct 
warrantless searches and
surveillance, confiscate travel documents, freeze assets, 
censor published materials, and compel foreign political 
organizations and Hong Kong residents to provide 
information.\39\ Under the new legal regime, judicial oversight 
of these police powers is either removed or carried out by 
judges who are subject to one-year terms of opaque political 
appointment.\40\ These judges also preside over bail hearings 
under the NSL's strict standard, which effectively creates a 
presumption of guilt for bail purposes,\41\ resulting in ``a 
system of de facto long-term detention without trial.'' \42\ In 
December 2021, the Court of Final Appeal affirmed that the bail 
standard and procedures provided in the NSL were applicable to 
non-NSL crimes, which encompass any crime predicated on ``acts 
. . . capable of constituting an offence under the NSL.'' \43\ 
With weakened procedural protections, expanded police powers 
increase the likelihood of political abuse and have the effect 
of intimidating dissenters and NGO workers.\44\
    In October 2021, four UN human rights experts wrote to the 
Chinese government, noting that national security charges 
should not be used to ``justify quelling domestic dissent, 
limiting protests and curbing criticism by civil society and 
human rights defenders.'' \45\ The experts further urged the 
government to repeal the NSL, as it is fundamentally 
incompatible with international law and with China's human 
rights obligations.\46\

                          Criminal Prosecution

    Hong Kong authorities broadly applied criminal charges in a 
manner that undermined fundamental freedoms and damaged 
democratic institutions and the rule of law in Hong Kong.\47\ 
As of March 2022, four people charged under the NSL have been 
sentenced to lengthy prison terms ranging from three to nine 
years, creating a deterrent for the pro-democracy 
community.\48\ According to one tally, ``at least 10,499 people 
have been arrested [and] 2,944 . . . prosecuted'' on NSL and 
protest-related charges between June 9, 2019, and February 15, 
2022.\49\ Another tally, which more narrowly tracks arrests 
made by the National Security Department (NSD), shows that 
police arrested 183 individuals, charging 113 of them with NSL 
and non-NSL offenses between July 1, 2020, and March 28, 
2022.\50\ Some examples of these prosecutions are outlined 
below:

                            SECESSION (NSL)

         In July 2021, Hong Kong High Court Judges 
        Anthea Pang Po-kam, Esther Toh Lye-ping, and Wilson 
        Chan Ka-shun sentenced 24-year-old Leon Tong Ying-kit 
        to a total of nine years in prison for ``inciting 
        secession'' and ``terrorist activities'' because of an 
        incident in July 2020 in which he rode a motorcycle 
        carrying a flag with a protest slogan and ran into 
        three police officers as he was trying to evade the 
        police.\51\ It was the first conviction under the 
        NSL.\52\ The court effectively outlawed the popular 
        protest slogan ``Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of our 
        Times,'' that appeared on the flag, ruling that a
        slogan is illegal if it is capable of being interpreted 
        as secessionist, irrespective of whether it has 
        multiple meanings.\53\ Authorities subjected Tong to 
        prolonged pretrial detention and denied his request for 
        a jury trial, which violated his due process 
        rights.\54\
         In November 2021, District Court Judge Stanley 
        Chan Kwong-chi sentenced 31-year-old Adam Ma Chun-man 
        to five years and nine months in prison for ``inciting 
        secession,'' based on allegations that he had 
        ``advocated Hong Kong independence on 20 occasions, 
        chanting slogans . . . and making pro-independence 
        speeches.'' \55\ The judge speculated that ``Ma's 
        actions could have provoked others to resort to radical 
        ways'' and refused to consider the lighter sentencing 
        range applicable to a case involving circumstances of a 
        ``minor nature.'' \56\ A human rights expert, however, 
        disagreed with the conviction, saying that ``[s]houting 
        slogans that the authorities dislike is not a crime.'' 
        \57\

                            SUBVERSION (NSL)

         As of July 2022, 34 of the 47 pro-democracy 
        advocates arrested in February 2021 on ``subversion'' 
        charges had remained in pretrial detention for over a 
        year.\58\ Police arrested them for participating in an 
        informal poll conducted in July 2020 for selecting 
        candidates from the pro-democracy camp to run in the 
        Legislative Council election.\59\ Among those detained 
        are Nobel Peace Prize nominee Joshua Wong Chi-fung, law 
        professor Benny Tai Yiu-ting, journalist and 
        Legislative Council member Claudia Mo Man-ching, labor 
        union leader Carol Ng Man-yee, and social activist 
        Leung Kwok-hung.\60\ Leung's wife reported that when 
        she and another person protested outside a court 
        building, about seven police officers surrounded her, 
        checked her identification, and searched her personal 
        belongings without giving any reason, saying only that 
        they were doing their duty.\61\ The defendants in this 
        case have made repeated requests to open pretrial 
        proceedings to the press, but they were opposed by the 
        prosecution and denied by the court,\62\ thereby 
        undermining transparency in the case.\63\
         In September 2021, the NSD arrested four 
        members of the prisoner support group Student 
        Politicism, charging them with ``conspiracy to incite 
        subversion.'' \64\ The four individuals, aged 18 to 20, 
        are Wong Yat-chin, Chan Chi-sum, Chu Wai-ying, and Wong 
        Yuen-lam.\65\ Police alleged that the group had uttered 
        unspecified hateful speech against the government and 
        had planned to deliver to prisoners items such as 
        candy, cookies, surgical masks, and books, which 
        according to Reuters are not contraband.\66\ Shortly 
        after the arrests, the group announced that it would 
        disband, citing the lack of ``foreseeable space'' for 
        activism.\67\

                       TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (NSL)

         In August 2021, police arrested four 
        university students for ``advocating terrorism'' after 
        they took part in a livestreamed student union council 
        meeting that passed a motion mourning a man who had 
        killed himself after stabbing a police officer.\68\ The 
        students, aged 18 to 20, were Charles Kwok Wing-ho, 
        Kinson Cheung King-sang, Anthony Yung Chung-hei, and 
        Chris Shing-hang Todorovski.\69\ The arrests took place 
        after then Chief Executive Carrie Lam called on the 
        university and the police to take action, despite the 
        student union having apologized and having retracted 
        the motion.\70\ The offense of ``advocating terrorism'' 
        carries a sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment 
        depending on the nature of the circumstances.\71\

                 COLLUSION WITH EXTERNAL ELEMENTS (NSL)

         In August 2021, activist Andy Li Yu-hin and 
        paralegal Chan Tsz-wah pleaded guilty to ``conspiracy 
        to collude with external elements.'' \72\ Authorities 
        alleged that they had conspired with pro-democracy 
        newspaper founder Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, his aide Mark 
        Simon, and activist Finn Lau to lobby foreign countries 
        to impose sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong 
        officials.\73\ In January 2022, High Court Judge Alex 
        Lee Wan-tang, acting on the prosecution's application, 
        adjourned the sentencing of Li and Chan until at least 
        May 2022 pending Jimmy Lai's criminal case.\74\

                             SEDITIOUS ACTS

         In March 2022, District Court Judge Stanley 
        Chan Kwong-chi convicted radio host Tam Tak-chi, who 
        had been in detention since September 2020, on seven 
        counts of ``uttering seditious words'' and multiple 
        other charges.\75\ The charges were related to Tam's 
        use of protest slogans that did not advocate 
        violence.\76\ A human rights scholar explained that the 
        sedition law has a scope broader than the NSL because 
        it ``[does] not require prosecutors to prove any acts 
        of subversion or secession.'' \77\ The law had not been 
        used in over four decades and may contravene 
        international human rights standards with its overly 
        broad restrictions on expression.\78\
         In July 2021, police arrested five members of 
        a speech therapists' union for conspiring to ``print, 
        publish, distribute, display [or] reproduce seditious 
        publications'' \79\ over three children's books about 
        ``sheep defending their village from invading wolves.'' 
        \80\ The detainees, aged 25 to 28, are Sidney Ng Hau-
        yi, Samuel Chan Yuen-sum, Marco Fong Tsz-ho, Lorie Lai 
        Man-ling, and Melody Yeung Yat-yee.\81\ Observers said 
        that the fear instilled by these arrests would likely 
        end creative arts and political satire in Hong 
        Kong.\82\
         Other individuals charged with sedition 
        included four elderly persons who displayed a banner 
        demanding genuine universal suffrage,\83\ a man who 
        displayed posters insulting the judges who presided 
        over an NSL case,\84\ a pop singer whose performance 
        contained protest slogans,\85\ and six individuals who 
        clapped during court proceedings in the public gallery 
        to show support for pro-democracy defendants.\86\

                         UNAUTHORIZED ASSEMBLY

         In January 2022, principal magistrate Amy Chan 
        Wai-mun of the West Kowloon Magistrates' Courts 
        sentenced 36-year-old rights lawyer Tonyee Chow Hang-
        Tung to 15 months in prison for ``inciting an 
        unauthorized assembly'' in connection with a 
        candlelight vigil held on June 4, 2021.\87\ Chow did 
        not attend the vigil, and analysis showed that the 
        judge ignored exculpatory evidence that contradicted 
        the prosecution's allegations.\88\ This conviction 
        brought Chow's total sentence length to 22 months, as 
        she had previously been sentenced for the vigil held 
        the previous year.\89\ Chow was facing an additional 
        charge of ``inciting subversion,'' which remained 
        pending as of April 2022.\90\

                                  RIOT

         Then Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced in 
        October 2021 the plan to construct a high capacity 
        court by mid-2023 with the aim of clearing a large 
        backlog of protest-related cases,\91\ including what 
        one lawyer described as ``a flood of sweeping and hasty 
        charges.'' \92\ In one example, the prosecutor charged 
        two individuals with ``rioting'' despite a lack of 
        evidence showing the defendants' involvement, asking 
        the court to ``convict them based on their black 
        attire, as well as the time and location of their 
        arrests.'' \93\ In November, the Court of Final Appeal 
        delineated the scope of the offense, holding that 
        people cannot be held criminally liable for rioting 
        without being actually present at the scene.\94\

                            MONEY LAUNDERING

         In November 2021, District Court Judge Stanley 
        Chan Kwong-chi sentenced 20-year-old student activist 
        Tony Chung Hon-lam to 43 months in prison for 
        ``secession'' and ``money laundering.'' \95\ With 
        respect to the latter charge, reports did not indicate 
        that it was supported by wrongdoing independent of 
        Chung's activism; the prosecution alleged that Chung's 
        political group Studentlocalism received over 
        HK$135,000 (approximately US$17,000) from 95 supporters 
        through the sale of shirts, flags, and books bearing 
        political messages espoused by his group.\96\

                                ASSAULT

         In February 2022, High Court Judge Esther Toh 
        Lye-ping dismissed the appeal filed by American lawyer 
        Samuel Bickett, affirming his 18-week sentence stemming 
        from a December 2019 incident in which Bickett was 
        alleged to have assaulted a plainclothes police 
        officer.\97\ Bickett reported that he was trying to 
        disarm a man who was beating a passerby, adding that 
        the man ``said repeatedly that he was not a police 
        officer in both English and Chinese, and refused to 
        show any warrant card to those present.'' \98\

                    Targeting the Independent Press

    This past year, the National Security Department arrested 
editors and executives on NSL and sedition charges, forcing 
pro-
democracy news outlets to close. As a result, ``Hong Kong . . . 
has fallen from 18th place in 2002 to 80th place in the 2021 
[Reporters Without Borders] World Press Freedom Index.'' \99\ 
About 1,115 media workers lost their jobs in 2021, amounting to 
one in five workers in the Chinese-language media outlets in 
Hong Kong.\100\ Some of these workers, concerned about legal 
risk and the pressure to self-censor, decided to find 
employment in other industries.\101\ According to a poll 
conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, 
62 percent of people surveyed thought press and information in 
Hong Kong was ``not free,'' and 54 percent thought news outlet 
closures would cause a decline in government 
accountability.\102\
    In June 2021, over 500 NSD officers raided the offices of 
pro-
democracy newspaper Apple Daily and froze its assets, forcing 
it to cease operations.\103\ Police also arrested at least 
seven editors and executives of the newspaper on NSL charges: 
Cheung Kim-hung, Chow Tat-kuen, Chan Pui-man, Cheung Chi-wai, 
Lam Man-chung, Yeung Ching-kee, and Fung Wai-kong.\104\ Police 
alleged that they had colluded with the newspaper's founder 
Jimmy Lai Chee-ying in asking foreign countries to impose 
sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials.\105\
    In December 2021, pro-democracy online publication Stand 
News announced its closure after over 200 police officers 
raided its newsroom, froze its assets, and arrested seven of 
its present and former editors and executives for ``conspiracy 
to publish seditious content'': Chung Pui-kuen, Patrick Lam 
Shiu-tung, Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee, Denise Ho Wan-see, Chow Tat-
chi, Christine Fang Meng-sang, and Chan Pui-man (Chan is Chung 
Pui-kuen's wife and was also detained in connection with the 
Apple Daily's case).\106\ Police also issued arrest warrants 
for former consultant Joseph Lian Yizheng and director Tony 
Tsoi Tung-ho, who had moved to Japan and Australia, 
respectively.\107\ Prompted by the arrests at Stand News, 
another pro-democracy online publication
Citizen News announced its closure a few days later in January 
2022.\108\ In April 2022, the NSD arrested former Stand News 
columnist Allan Au Ka-lun, again alleging that he had published 
seditious materials.\109\ Smaller outlets such as Rice Post, 
Mad Dog Daily, and White Night also disbanded.\110\ While some 
independent news outlets survived, a veteran journalist and 
scholar observed that ``Hong Kong's media system is undergoing 
a fundamental change, . . . as private outlets operate under 
increasing government control.'' \111\
    In April 2022, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) 
considered disbanding in light of mounting pressure from the 
government.\112\ The Secretary for Security Chris Tang Ping-
keung criticized the HKJA for `` `infiltrating' local schools 
to lure student journalists'' and demanded that the association 
disclose its sources of funding and membership list, which the 
association said would violate privacy laws.\113\

                 Restrictions on Access to Information

    The Hong Kong government imposed restrictions that could 
undermine government accountability and the free flow of 
information. In October 2021, the Hong Kong government passed 
the ``anti-doxxing law,'' formally known as the Personal Data 
(Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021, which criminalizes the 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information and grants the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data the 
authority to request that local and overseas internet service 
providers remove offending content.\114\ The amended law 
further authorizes the privacy commissioner to search premises 
and seize material with a warrant and to access electronic 
devices without a warrant.\115\ Internet and technology 
companies expressed concern that the broadly written law could 
expose them and their staff to criminal liability, and human 
rights groups worried that authorities would unevenly apply the 
law against government critics and encroach on more people's 
privacy, given the commissioner's broad powers.\116\
    Relying on the new legal authority, the Hong Kong 
government tightened access to the Land Registry and Companies 
Registry. Beginning in November 2021, users are required to 
provide their names and identification numbers and acknowledge 
that their personal information could be transferred to law 
enforcement under the amended privacy ordinance.\117\ The 
government in recent years has restricted access to other 
databases including birth records, vehicle registration, and 
voter information.\118\ Historically, land and company records 
have played a role in exposing misconduct by Hong Kong and 
Chinese officials; the chairperson of the Hong Kong Journalists 
Association said that the new restrictions could weaken the 
press's ability to hold the government to account.\119\

                       COLLAPSE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

    Rhetoric and actions by Hong Kong officials displayed a 
concerted effort to target civil society groups that were part 
of the pro-democracy movement in 2019, isolating them from the 
international community \120\ and causing their rapid 
disintegration in 2021. In August 2021, Carrie Lam asserted 
that disbandment was the only option for groups that crossed 
the national security ``red line,'' \121\ adding in October 
that the National Security Law is ``about arresting people who 
have committed a crime [as much as it is] about trying to 
prevent and suppress the activities which will have that impact 
of undermining national security.'' \122\ Other officials also 
discussed applying measures against offending organizations, 
which included the denial of tax exempt status, for charities 
and criminal prosecution of individual members.\123\
    As of January 2022, at least 65 organizations had shut down 
or left Hong Kong after the enactment of the National Security 
Law,\124\ a trend that accelerated in the second half of 
2021.\125\ These organizations include religious, community, 
political, media, union, and human rights groups,\126\ and 
their members cited pressure under the National Security 
Law.\127\ Representative cases include the following:

         Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union, the 
        largest teachers' union in Hong Kong, with a 47-year 
        history, disbanded in August 2021.\128\ In July, state-
        run news outlet Xinhua called the union a ``malignant 
        tumor'' because it ``openly slandered the Nation's 
        socialist system and the central government's policies 
        in Hong Kong.'' \129\ The Education Bureau followed up 
        with an announcement severing ties with the union, 
        which it said had politicized school campuses.\130\ The 
        Secretary for Security further vowed to ``launch an 
        attack from all directions,'' accusing the union of 
        harboring violent forces that endanger national 
        security, despite not having completed an 
        investigation.\131\ The South China Morning Post 
        reported that several unidentified people with close 
        contacts in the central government unequivocally had 
        told the union leaders that the group must ``cease to 
        exist.'' \132\ According to a school principal, the 
        union had been a major platform of communication 
        between teachers and the government, and there was not 
        a comparable organization in Hong Kong that could 
        replace its role.\133\
         Civil Human Rights Front also disbanded in 
        August 2021, saying that it could not continue to 
        operate because its convenor, Figo Chan Ho-wun, was in 
        detention.\134\ Chan was sentenced in May 2021 to 18 
        months in prison for organizing an assembly in October 
        2019, and the group's vice convener and treasurer also 
        were facing NSL charges.\135\ Despite the disbandment, 
        the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office pressed for a 
        thorough investigation.\136\ Thereafter, police 
        conducted a series of raids to collect evidence because 
        the group had refused to turn over financial documents 
        pursuant to a request issued in April 2021.\137\ Civil 
        Human Rights Front was founded in 2002 to coordinate 
        protests among civil society groups.\138\ One of the 
        protests that it organized in 2019 reportedly had close 
        to two million participants.\139\
         Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic 
        Democratic Movements of China (Hong Kong Alliance) was 
        established in 1989 and had organized annual vigils to 
        commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen protests. The 
        organization disbanded in September 2021 after police 
        had frozen its assets and criminally charged five of 
        its members for refusing to surrender documents for a 
        national security investigation.\140\ Three of the 
        group's leaders were facing national security charges 
        and two of them had already been sentenced for 
        ``unauthorized assembly'' over their roles in the 2019 
        protests.\141\ Police additionally ordered the group to 
        shut down its website and social media platforms and 
        raided a museum that it operated.\142\
         Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions had 31 
        years of history and 75 affiliated unions, the biggest 
        independent trade union in Hong Kong.\143\ It disbanded 
        in September 2021, after some members received messages 
        threatening their safety.\144\ Pro-government news 
        outlets had accused the confederation of colluding with 
        foreign forces and of promoting strikes during the 2019 
        protests.\145\
         The 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund announced in 
        August 2021 that it would cease operations after police 
        demanded that it hand over operational records, 
        including information about its donors and 
        beneficiaries.\146\ The fund provided assistance to 
        individuals detained in connection with the series of 
        large-scale pro-democracy protests in 2019, giving them 
        legal, medical, psychological, and financial 
        assistance.\147\ In May 2022, police from the National 
        Security Department arrested all five trustees of the 
        612 Humanitarian Relief Fund--Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-
        kiun, singer and activist Denise Ho Wan-see, barrister 
        Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee, former professor Hui Po-keung, 
        and former lawmaker Cyd Ho Sau-lan--based on
        allegations that they had asked other countries or 
        overseas organizations to sanction Hong Kong 
        officials.\148\

                  Businesses' Complicity in Repression

    The Hong Kong government created an environment in which 
international businesses voluntarily or involuntarily 
contributed to the repression of freedoms in Hong Kong. For 
example--

         In July 2021, the Hong Kong government 
        appointed Clement Chan Kam-wing, the managing director 
        for assurance of the accounting firm BDO, to 
        investigate alleged illegal activities of Next 
        Digital.\149\ Next Digital was the parent company of 
        the pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily, which ceased 
        operations a month earlier in June after authorities 
        arrested five top executives and froze HK$18 million in 
        assets.\150\ In September 2021, the Financial Secretary 
        presented a winding-up petition to liquidate Next 
        Digital based on Chan's interim report.\151\
         In September 2021, HSBC, Hang Seng Bank, and 
        Bank of East Asia, froze HK$2.2 million (approximately 
        US$280,000) worth of assets of the Hong Kong Alliance 
        in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of 
        China.\152\ Prior to this reporting year, HSBC froze 
        the bank accounts of the Good Neighbour North District 
        Church and Pastor Roy Chan,\153\ former legislator Ted 
        Hui,\154\ and Apple Daily's publisher Jimmy Lai, his 
        aide Mark Simon, and CEO Cheung Kim-hung.\155\ In 
        response to a letter by 13 U.S. lawmakers asking it to 
        justify its actions, HSBC said that it was required to 
        comply with local laws; the bank, however, did not 
        address key questions raised in the letter, such as 
        whether its actions contributed to the `` `inability of 
        the people of Hong Kong (a) to enjoy freedom of 
        assembly, speech, press, or independent rule of law; or 
        (b) to participate in democratic outcomes' as 
        stipulated under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act of 2020 
        (Public Law No. 116-149).'' \156\
         In October 2021, the Hong Kong Association of 
        Banks advised local and international member banks to 
        disclose property held by clients who have been 
        arrested or charged under the NSL.\157\

[For more information on Apple Daily, see the subsection 
``Targeting the Independent Press'' above. For more information 
on Hong Kong Alliance, see the subsection ``Collapse of Civil 
Society'' above.]

                      Securitization of Education

    The Hong Kong government--as part of its statutory 
obligation to ``promote national security education in schools 
and universities'' \158\--worked to establish political control 
over schools as it politicized students and simultaneously 
required school officials to prevent ``political 
interference.'' \159\ The ``politicization of children from 
secondary school'' and other government actions, prompted three 
UN independent human rights experts to raise concerns that 
students' right to education and academic freedom have been 
undermined; they further asked the Hong Kong government to 
define the scope of the National Security Law.\160\ In response 
to the UN experts, the PRC Mission to the United Nations 
circularly explained that the law calls for all ``necessary 
measures'' to safeguard national security.\161\

                         PRE-COLLEGE EDUCATION

    The Education Bureau continued to carry out plans to insert 
national security components into school curricula,\162\ 
further requiring schools to fully implement related programs 
beginning in the 2022-2023 school year.\163\ Available 
documents show that some schools were setting up working groups 
beginning in September 2021 to plan and coordinate the 
implementation of national security measures in schools,\164\ 
as required by an Education Bureau directive issued in February 
2021.\165\
    The government ordered teachers to clear political hurdles 
to keep their jobs, such as passing a test on the Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong SAR and potentially taking an oath of 
allegiance.\166\ It also required schools to provide political 
education. In April 2021 the Education Bureau distributed to 
primary and secondary schools a textbook on safeguarding 
national security. In July the textbook was distributed to 
kindergartens, with a reminder to help children cultivate a 
sense of national identity and to understand that Hong Kong is 
a part of China.\167\
    Beginning in September 2021, liberal studies as a secondary 
school course was replaced by a new curriculum called 
``Citizenship and Social Development,'' which is designed to 
have embedded national security elements.\168\ While the 
official guide encourages ``exploration, analysis and 
reflection,'' it also requires teachers to ``point out to 
students that there is no room for discussions or compromise'' 
on ``issues with absolute right and wrong or clear legal 
principles,'' requiring them to ``clearly state all the facts 
about the history, moral standards and legal principles.'' 
\169\

                           COLLEGE EDUCATION

    According to an index updated in 2022, academic freedom in 
Hong Kong significantly declined between 2011 and 2021, a trend 
that ``began with a dip in the institutional autonomy and 
freedom of academic and cultural expression indicators . . . 
with [an accelerated and] continuous decline in all indicators, 
including notable dips in . . . campus integrity,'' which 
refers to an increase in ``security-infringements and 
surveillance on campus.'' \170\
    A professor who taught in Hong Kong until mid-August 2021 
likewise observed that during the 18 months before his 
departure, he witnessed ``the near total subordination of the 
city's universities to the Chinese Communist Party . . ..'' 
\171\ For instance, university administrators suppressed 
student dissent by depriving student unions of funding and by 
removing political artwork from university premises.\172\ The 
professor also noted that the university where he taught 
conducted digital surveillance on all faculty, planned to 
install closed circuit cameras in classrooms, and required 
teachers to record their lectures, all of which serve as tools 
of intimidation because of possible criminal prosecution under 
the NSL.\173\

                                 Macau

    This past year, Macau SAR authorities invoked overtly 
political grounds in the disqualification of 21 pro-democracy 
candidates for the Legislative Assembly election, which was 
followed by a record low election turnout and the closure of a 
pro-democracy online news outlet.
    In July 2021, the Electoral Affairs Commission disqualified 
21 pro-democracy candidates for election to the Legislative 
Assembly on grounds that they did not support the Basic Law of 
Macau or were disloyal to the Macau government, based on 
information compiled by the police and Macau's Secretariat for 
Security.\174\ In the case of disqualified candidate Ng Kuok 
Cheong, authorities considered factors such as photographs he 
had taken with democracy advocates, his calls for universal 
suffrage, and his role in organizing vigils commemorating the 
1989 Tiananmen protests \175\ (the applications for which were 
denied by the government) as a ``challenge to the central 
government's authority'' in June 2021.\176\
    Three disqualified candidates unsuccessfully appealed the 
decision to the Court of Final Appeal.\177\ In support of its 
finding of disloyalty, the court concluded that the vigils were 
at odds with the central government's characterization of the 
1989 Tiananmen protests, and that the appellants' call for 
ending one-party rule was a violation of the PRC Constitution, 
which provides for the Chinese Communist Party's 
leadership.\178\
    The Legislative Assembly election in September 2021 saw a 
record low turnout, with all 12 indirectly elected seats 
uncontested, and 11 of the 14 directly elected seats won by 
pro-Beijing candidates.\179\ The Macau Electoral Affairs 
Committee reported a
substantial percentage increase in blank and invalid 
ballots.\180\ According to photographs published by online news 
outlet Macau Concealers, some voters had defaced their ballots 
with words demanding universal suffrage, the initials of a 
disqualified candidate, and other protest language.\181\
    In the following month, Macau Concealers announced that it 
would cease operations, citing ``unprecedented environmental 
changes'' and ``[a] shortage of resources.'' \182\ Macau 
Concealers was founded and financed by the pro-democracy 
political party New Macau Association, one of whose members was 
among the 21 candidates disqualified in July 2021.\183\

Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Macau

    Notes to Section XI--Hong Kong and Macau

    \1\ Shibani Mahtani, ``The Opposition Is in Jail. Hong Kong Wants 
Its `Patriots'-Only Vote to Look Legitimate,'' Washington Post, 
December 17, 2021.
    \2\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, passed April 4, 1990, effective July 1, 
1997, arts. 45, 68.
    \3\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, passed April 4, 1990, effective July 1, 
1997, Annexes I and II, Instrument 30; National People's Congress 
Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie 
Xingzhengqu Jiben Fa Fujian Yi Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Xingzheng 
Zhangguan de Chansheng Banfa [Annex I of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China--
Measures for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region], passed April 4, 1990, revised and 
effective March 30, 2021; National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jiben 
Fa Fujian Er Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Lifahui de Chansheng Banfa he 
Biaojue Chengxu [Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China--Method for the 
Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures], passed April 4, 1990, 
revised and effective March 30, 2021.
    \4\ John Ruwitch, ``Activists in Hong Kong Plan Not to Vote or to 
Cast Blank Ballots in Upcoming Election,'' NPR, December 18, 2021.
    \5\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, passed April 4, 1990, effective July 1, 
1997, Annex I.
    \6\ Asian Network for Free Elections, ``Elections without Choice: 
State-Controlled Elections in Hong Kong,'' April 8, 2022, 19.
    \7\ Gary Cheung and Ng Kang-chung, ``Hong Kong Now Has a Powerful 
Election Committee. Will It Be a New `Superstructure' Reshaping City's 
Political Landscape?,'' South China Morning Post, September 20, 2021; 
Asian Network for Free Elections, ``Elections without Choice: State-
Controlled Elections in Hong Kong,'' April 8, 2022, 20.
    \8\ ``Explainer: Hong Kong's Election Committee Elections in 8 
Keywords,'' China Daily, September 18, 2020.
    \9\ Asian Network for Free Elections, ``Elections without Choice: 
State-Controlled Elections in Hong Kong,'' April 8, 2022, 20.
    \10\ Ng Kang-chung and Chris Lau, ``Hong Kong Elections: Just 1 
Opposition-Leaning Candidate Wins Seat on 1,500-Strong Election 
Committee,'' South China Morning Post, September 20, 2021.
    \11\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China, passed April 4, 1990, effective July 1, 
1997, Annex II.
    \12\ Michael Martin, ``Hong Kong in 2022,'' Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, February 2, 2022; Asian Network for Free 
Elections, ``Elections without Choice: State-Controlled Elections in 
Hong Kong,'' April 8, 2022, 24.
    \13\ Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569), secs. 1(1), 
19(A), 13(1)-(2), 28(3); Chris Lau, ``Hong Kong Electoral Overhaul: 
Corporate Voters' Mainland China Ties Raise Concerns over Beijing's 
Influence on City Polls,'' South China Morning Post, April 16, 2021.
    \14\ Chris Lau, ``Hong Kong Electoral Overhaul: Corporate Voters' 
Mainland China Ties Raise Concerns over Beijing's Influence on City 
Polls,'' South China Morning Post, April 16, 2021.
    \15\ Chris Lau, ``Hong Kong Electoral Overhaul: Corporate Voters' 
Mainland China Ties Raise Concerns over Beijing's Influence on City 
Polls,'' South China Morning Post, April 16, 2021.
    \16\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``153 Validly Nominated Candidates 
for Legislative Council General Election,'' November 19, 2021.
    \17\ Natalie Wong, ``Hong Kong Elections: 4 More Arrested on 
Suspicion of Inciting Boycott of Legislative Council Poll,'' South 
China Morning Post, December 15, 2021; John Ruwitch, ``Activists in 
Hong Kong Plan Not to Vote or to Cast Blank Ballots in Upcoming 
Election,'' NPR, December 18, 2021.
    \18\ Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong Man Gets Suspended Jail Sentence for 
Inciting Others to Cast Invalid Votes in Legislative Council 
Election,'' South China Morning Post, May 4, 2022; Natalie Wong, ``Hong 
Kong Elections: 4 More Arrested on Suspicion of Inciting Boycott of 
Legislative Council Poll,'' South China Morning Post, December 15, 
2021.
    \19\ Clare Jim and James Pomfret, ``Exclusive: Hong Kong Officials 
Push Turnout in First `Patriots' Election,'' Reuters, December 18, 
2021; Candice Chau, ``Explainer: 7 Charts Showing Voter Demographics in 
Hong Kong's First `Patriots-Only' Legislative Election,'' Hong Kong 
Free Press, updated June 23, 2022.
    \20\ ``Highest Percentage of Invalid Ballots since Handover in Hong 
Kong's First `Patriots Only' Election,'' Hong Kong Free Press, December 
20, 2021.
    \21\ ``As It Happened: John Lee Confirmed as Hong Kong's Next 
Leader with 1,416 Votes, Vows to Recruit Talent,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 9, 2021.
    \22\ ``As It Happened: John Lee Confirmed as Hong Kong's Next 
Leader with 1,416 Votes, Vows to Recruit Talent,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 9, 2021.
    \23\ Cannix Yau, ``Hong Kong Security Chief John Lee Refuses to 
Step Down over Government's Failure to Quell Protests,'' South China 
Morning Post, October 13, 2019; Alvin Lum, ``Don't Blame Police for 
Clashes, Hong Kong's Security Chief Says, While Apologising for Rifts 
Caused by Government's Handling of Extradition Bill,'' South China 
Morning Post, June 19, 2019.
    \24\ Asian Network for Free Elections, ``Elections without Choice: 
State-Controlled Elections in Hong Kong,'' April 8, 2022, 30.
    \25\ Asian Network for Free Elections, ``Elections without Choice: 
State-Controlled Elections in Hong Kong,'' April 8, 2022, 31.
    \26\ Owen Churchill, ``US, Britain and EU Voice Objections to Hong 
Kong's Disqualification of Opposition District Councillors,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 22, 2021; Candice Chau, ``Explainer: 7 
Charts Showing Voter Demographics in Hong Kong's First `Patriots-Only' 
Legislative Election,'' Hong Kong Free Press, updated June 23, 2022; 
Clare Jim and Felix Tam, ``Record Turnout in Hong Kong Local Elections 
amid Calls for Full Democracy,'' Reuters, November 23, 2019; Lilian 
Cheng, Natalie Wong, and Tony Cheung, ``National Security Law: At Least 
150 Hong Kong District Councillors Face Disqualification Next Month 
under New Oath-Taking Legislation,'' South China Morning Post, June 16, 
2021.
    \27\ Owen Churchill, ``US, Britain and EU Voice Objections to Hong 
Kong's Disqualification of Opposition District Councillors,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 22, 2021; Jeffie Lam, ``Explainer: Hong 
Kong's District Councils: With Opposition Members Resigning in Droves 
as Oath Looms, What Happens Next to These Local Bodies?,'' South China 
Morning Post, July 16, 2021; Lilian Cheng, Natalie Wong, and Tony 
Cheung, ``National Security Law: At Least 150 Hong Kong District 
Councillors Face Disqualification Next Month under New Oath-Taking 
Legislation,'' South China Morning Post, June 16, 2021.
    \28\ Owen Churchill, ``US, Britain and EU Voice Objections to Hong 
Kong's Disqualification of Opposition District Councillors,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 22, 2021.
    \29\ Ned Price, U.S. Department of State, ``On the Continued 
Erosion of Freedoms in Hong Kong,'' October 21, 2021.
    \30\ ``Quanguo Renda Changweihui tongguo Xianggang Tebie 
Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia Anquan Fa bing jueding lieru Xianggang Jiben 
Fa Fujian San'' [National People's Congress Standing Committee passes 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and decides to 
incorporate it in Annex III of Hong Kong's Basic Law], Xinhua, June 30, 
2020; ``Shisan jie Quanguo Renda Changweihui di ershi ci huiyi biaojue 
tongguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia Anquan Fa Xi Jinping 
qianshu zhuxi ling yuyi gongbu'' [Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region voted on and passed at the 20th meeting of the 
13th NPC Standing Committee; Xi Jinping signs Presidential order for 
publication], Xinhua, June 30, 2020; ``Promulgation of National Law 
2020,'' L.N. 136 of 2020, Gazette, June 30, 2020.
    \31\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China, passed April 4, 1990, effective July 1, 
1997, art. 18, Annex III.
    \32\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, arts. 20-30. The prohibition on 
``separatism'' in articles 20 and 21 has been translated elsewhere as 
``secession.''
    \33\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, arts. 16, 38.
    \34\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 44.
    \35\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, arts. 55-56.
    \36\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 9.
    \37\ Austin Ramzy, ``Student Sentenced as Hong Kong Uses Security 
Law to Clamp Down on Speech,'' New York Times, November 23, 2021; 
Michael Caster, ``Blog: A Year of Creeping Darkness under the National 
Security Law in Hong Kong,'' Article 19, June 29, 2021. The National 
Security Law provides that the law should be applied prospectively 
``for the purpose of conviction and imposition of punishment.'' This 
provision, however, does not expressly encompass police investigation. 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia 
Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 39.
    \38\ Lydia Wong, Thomas E. Kellogg, and Eric Yanho Lai, ``Hong 
Kong's National Security Law and the Right to a Fair Trial,'' Center 
for Asian Law, Georgetown Law, June 28, 2021, 4.
    \39\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 43; Implementation Rules for 
Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, L.N. 
139 of 2020, B2397, issued July 6, 2020.
    \40\ Lydia Wong, Thomas E. Kellogg, and Eric Yanho Lai, ``Hong 
Kong's National Security Law and the Right to a Fair Trial,'' Center 
for Asian Law, Georgetown Law, June 28, 2021, 6-7.
    \41\ Suzanne Sataline, `` `Assumed as Criminals': Hong Kong 
Defendants Find Bail Elusive,'' Al Jazeera, January 27, 2022; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia Anquan Fa 
[Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National 
Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], passed and 
effective June 30, 2020, art. 42.
    \42\ Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas Kellogg, ``Arrest Data Show 
National Security Law Has Dealt a Hard Blow to Free Expression in Hong 
Kong,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, April 5, 2022.
    \43\ HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney, (2021) Court of Final Appeal 42, 
paras. 9, 12, 23.
    \44\ Lydia Wong, Thomas E. Kellogg, and Eric Yanho Lai, ``Hong 
Kong's National Security Law and the Right to a Fair Trial,'' Center 
for Asian Law, Georgetown Law, June 28, 2021, 7-8.
    \45\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Hong 
Kong: Arrests under Security Law Are Serious Concern, UN Experts Call 
for Review,'' October 12, 2021.
    \46\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Hong 
Kong: Arrests under Security Law Are Serious Concern, UN Experts Call 
for Review,'' October 12, 2021.
    \47\ Angeli Datt, Freedom House, ``The Impact of the National 
Security Law on Media and Internet Freedom in Hong Kong,'' October 19, 
2021; Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas Kellogg, ``Arrest Data Show National 
Security Law Has Dealt a Hard Blow to Free Expression in Hong Kong,'' 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, April 5, 2022.
    \48\ Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas Kellogg, ``Arrest Data Show 
National Security Law Has Dealt a Hard Blow to Free Expression in Hong 
Kong,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, April 5, 2022; Holmes Chan and Su 
Xinqi, ``Hong Kong Activists Fade from View as National Security Case 
Drags,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 
updated April 8, 2022.
    \49\ Kong Tsung-gan, ``Arrests and Trials of Hong Kong Protesters 
and Opposition Leaders,'' Medium, February 16, 2022.
    \50\ Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas Kellogg, ``Arrest Data Show 
National Security Law Has Dealt a Hard Blow to Free Expression in Hong 
Kong,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, April 5, 2022.
    \51\ Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong National Security Law: 9 Years' Jail 
for First Person Convicted under Legislation,'' South China Morning 
Post, July 30, 2021.
    \52\ Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong National Security Law: 9 Years' Jail 
for First Person Convicted under Legislation,'' South China Morning 
Post, July 30, 2021.
    \53\ Brian Wong, ``National Security Law: Protest Slogan `Liberate 
Hong Kong' Can Have Multiple Meanings, but Is It Ultimately a Call for 
Secession?,'' South China Morning Post, July 28, 2021.
    \54\ Thomas E. Kellogg and Eric Yan-ho Lai, ``The Tong Ying-kit NSL 
Verdict: An International and Comparative Law Analysis,'' Center for 
Asian Law, Georgetown Law, October 20, 2021, 6.
    \55\ `` `Captain America' Jailed for Nearly Six Years,'' RTHK, 
November 11, 2021.
    \56\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 21; Brian Wong, ``National 
Security Law: Hong Kong's Self-Styled `Captain America' Jailed for 
Nearly 6 Years for Inciting Secession,'' South China Morning Post, 
November 11, 2021.
    \57\ Human Rights Watch, ``Hong Kong: Harsh Sentence for Shouting 
Slogans,'' November 11, 2021.
    \58\ ``(Chuxuan 47 ren an) 4 beigao ti shenqing He Guilan pengshou 
xie biji qinzi chenci huo zhangsheng guan ya 9.15 jueding'' [(47-person 
primary election case) Four defendants make applications; Gwyneth Ho 
personally delivers statement while holding handwritten notebook, 
winning applause; judge adjourns case to September 15 for decision], 
InMediaHK.net, July 25, 2022; Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas Kellogg, 
``Arrest Data Show National Security Law Has Dealt a Hard Blow to Free 
Expression in Hong Kong,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, April 5, 2022.
    \59\ Holmes Chan and Su Xinqi, ``Hong Kong Activists Fade from View 
as National Security Case Drags,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Hong Kong Free Press, updated April 8, 2022.
    \60\ Holmes Chan and Su Xinqi, ``Hong Kong Activists Fade from View 
as National Security Case Drags,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Hong Kong Free Press, updated April 8, 2022.
    \61\ ``(47 ren an) luo'an yinian anjian jindu man Sheminlian fating 
wai kangyi `lanbu lanqiu' '' [(47-person case) case progresses slowly 
one year after formal charge, League of Social Democrats members 
protest outside the court building: ``abuse of arrest,'' ``abuse of 
detention''], Radio Free Asia, February 28, 2022.
    \62\ Holmes Chan and Su Xinqi, ``Hong Kong Activists Fade from View 
as National Security Case Drags,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Hong Kong Free Press, updated April 8, 2022; Tang Huiyun, ``Xianggang 
minzhupai 47 ren bei kong dianfuzui yi nian weiding shenqi zhengdang pi 
wei shen xian qiu boduo tan'' [Trial date still not set in the case in 
which 47 pro-democracy persons are charged with subversion, political 
party criticizes that this amounts to imprisonment without trial and 
denial of visitation], Voice of America, March 1, 2022.
    \63\ Holmes Chan and Su Xinqi, ``Hong Kong Activists Fade from View 
as National Security Case Drags,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Hong Kong Free Press, updated April 8, 2022.
    \64\ ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Three Members of Student Prisoner-
Support Group,'' Reuters, September 20, 2021; ``Fourth Student 
Politicism Activist Arrested,'' The Standard, September 22, 2021.
    \65\ ``Fourth Student Politicism Activist Arrested,'' The Standard, 
September 22, 2021.
    \66\ ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Three Members of Student Prisoner-
Support Group,'' Reuters, September 20, 2021.
    \67\ Kelly Ho, ``Hong Kong Student Group Disbands after Leaders 
Detained under Security Law,'' Hong Kong Free Press, September 28, 
2021.
    \68\ Tiffany May, ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Students Over 
`Advocating Terrorism,' '' New York Times, August 18, 2021.
    \69\ Tiffany May, ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Students Over 
`Advocating Terrorism,' '' New York Times, August 18, 2021.
    \70\ Tiffany May, ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Students Over 
`Advocating Terrorism,' '' New York Times, August 18, 2021.
    \71\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 27.
    \72\ Helen Davidson, ``Hong Kong Protest Pair Swept Up in National 
Security Crackdown Plead Guilty,'' Guardian, August 19, 2021; ``Andy Li 
Yu-hin Pleads Guilty over Global Campaign for Foreign Sanctions,'' The 
Standard, August 19, 2021.
    \73\ Helen Davidson, ``Hong Kong Protest Pair Swept Up in National 
Security Crackdown Plead Guilty,'' Guardian, August 19, 2021; Kelly Ho, 
``Security Law: Case Adjourned for Hong Kong Activist Andy Li and 
Paralegal Who Pleaded Guilty to Foreign Collusion Charges,'' Hong Kong 
Free Press, January 3, 2022.
    \74\ Kelly Ho, ``Security Law: Case Adjourned for Hong Kong 
Activist Andy Li and Paralegal Who Pleaded Guilty to Foreign Collusion 
Charges,'' Hong Kong Free Press, January 3, 2022.
    \75\ ``Hong Kong DJ Convicted of Sedition in Watershed Trial,'' 
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Voice of America, March 2, 2022.
    \76\ ``Hong Kong DJ Convicted of Sedition in Watershed Trial,'' 
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Voice of America, March 2, 2022.
    \77\ Chris Lau, ``Explainer: What Is Hong Kong's Colonial-Era 
Sedition Law, and How Does It Fit into Landscape of National Security 
Legislation?,'' South China Morning Post, September 9, 2020.
    \78\ Chris Lau, ``Explainer: What Is Hong Kong's Colonial-Era 
Sedition Law, and How Does It Fit into Landscape of National Security 
Legislation?,'' South China Morning Post, September 9, 2020.
    \79\ Candice Chau, ``Security Law: Hong Kong Court Denies Bail to 
Speech Therapists behind Kid's Book about Sheep and Wolves,'' Hong Kong 
Free Press, August 30, 2021.
    \80\ Brian Wong and Clifford Lo, ``National Security Law: Hong Kong 
Children's Books Trio Remanded in Custody after Being Charged with 
Conspiracy to Distribute Seditious Material,'' South China Morning 
Post, August 30, 2021.
    \81\ Brian Wong and Clifford Lo, ``National Security Law: Hong Kong 
Children's Books Trio Remanded in Custody after Being Charged with 
Conspiracy to Distribute Seditious Material,'' South China Morning 
Post, August 30, 2021.
    \82\ Kenji Kawase, ``Hong Kong Speech Therapists Charged over 
`Seditious' Kids' Books,'' Nikkei Asia, July 22, 2021.
    \83\ Rhoda Kwan, ``Hong Kong Police Arrest 4 for `Seditious Intent' 
over Banner Calling for Democracy,'' Hong Kong Free Press, November 2, 
2021.
    \84\ Brian Wong, ``Hongkonger Who Displayed Posters Insulting 
Judges Overseeing First National Security Law Trial Pleads Guilty to 
Sedition,'' South China Morning Post, January 26, 2022.
    \85\ ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Singer for Alleged Sedition--
Media,'' Reuters, February 15, 2022.
    \86\ Cheryl Tung and Raymond Chung, ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Six 
for `Sedition' over Courtroom Protests, Support,'' Radio Free Asia, 
April 6, 2022.
    \87\ ``Hong Kong Tiananmen Vigil Leader Sentenced to 15 Months in 
Jail,'' The Standard, January 4, 2022.
    \88\ Samuel Bickett, ``Chow Hang Tung Conviction: Magistrate 
Mischaracterizes Facts, Conceals Police Misconduct,'' Samuel Bickett on 
Hong Kong Law & Policy (blog), January 4, 2022.
    \89\ ``Hong Kong Tiananmen Vigil Leader Sentenced to 15 Months in 
Jail,'' The Standard, January 4, 2022.
    \90\ ``Hong Kong Tiananmen Vigil Leader Sentenced to 15 Months in 
Jail,'' The Standard, January 4, 2022.
    \91\ Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong Protests: Second Mega Court for 
Clearing Backlog of Cases to Accommodate 250 People,'' South China 
Morning Post, October 13, 2021.
    \92\ Greg Torode, ``Top Hong Kong Court Rules against Government 
Bid to Expand Riot Prosecutions,'' Reuters, November 4, 2021.
    \93\ Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong Protests: First Aid Volunteer Cleared 
of Rioting Charge as Judge Rules Helping the Injured No `Basis for 
Conviction,' '' South China Morning Post, August 23, 2021.
    \94\ Greg Torode, ``Top Hong Kong Court Rules against Government 
Bid to Expand Riot Prosecutions,'' Reuters, November 4, 2021.
    \95\ Brian Wong, ``National Security Law: Student Activist Who 
Advocated Hong Kong Independence Jailed for 43 Months,'' South China 
Morning Post, November 23, 2021.
    \96\ Brian Wong, ``National Security Law: Student Activist Who 
Advocated Hong Kong Independence Jailed for 43 Months,'' South China 
Morning Post, November 23, 2021; Song Ren, ``Guo'an Fa fawei, qian 
Gangdu zuzhi zhaojiren Zhong Hanlin bei pan ruyu 43 ge yue'' [National 
Security Law shows its might, former Hong Kong independence group Chung 
Hon-lam sentenced to 43 months in prison], Voice of America, November 
23, 2021.
    \97\ Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong Protests: Judge Rejects American 
Lawyer's Appeal against 41/2-Month Sentence for 
Assaulting Plain-Clothes Policeman,'' South China Morning Post, 
February 8, 2022.
    \98\ Samuel Bickett, ``How a Magistrate Falsified Evidence to Send 
Me to Prison,'' Samuel Bickett on Hong Kong Law & Policy (blog), 
January 31, 2022.
    \99\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Hong Kong: RSF Urges for Release 
of a Former Stand News Columnist,'' April 12, 2022.
    \100\ Kari Soo Lindberg, Olivia Tam, Krystal Chia, and Josie Wong, 
``How Xi's China Put 1,000-Plus Hong Kong Journalists Out of Work,'' 
Bloomberg, January 20, 2022.
    \101\ Viola Zhou, ``They Were Reporters in Hong Kong. Now They 
Drive Cabs and Sell Fried Chicken,'' Vice, January 25, 2022.
    \102\ Viola Zhou, ``They Were Reporters in Hong Kong. Now They 
Drive Cabs and Sell Fried Chicken,'' Vice, January 25, 2022; Hong Kong 
Public Opinion Research Institute, ``PopPanel Research Report No. 120 
cum, `We Hongkongers' Research Report No. 82,'' January 7, 2022,
10, 24.
    \103\ Tang Huiyun, ``Xianggang Pingguo Ribao Guo'an Fa xia shoujia 
shouya guanbi meiti yu qian shimin lingchen paidui qianggou 
tingkanhao'' [Hong Kong Apple Daily is the first media company to shut 
under the National Security Law, over a thousand residents line up to 
buy the last issue], Voice of America, June 25, 2021; Anne Marie 
Roantree, ``Exclusive: HK's Apple Daily to Shut within Days, Says Jimmy 
Lai Adviser,'' Reuters, June 23, 2021.
    \104\ Tang Huiyun, ``Xianggang Pingguo Ribao Guo'an Fa xia shoujia 
shouya guanbi meiti yu qian shimin lingchen paidui qianggou 
tingkanhao'' [Hong Kong Apple Daily is the first media company to shut 
under the National Security Law, over a thousand residents line up to 
buy the last issue], Voice of America, June 25, 2021; Brian Wong, 
``Hong Kong National Security Law: Ex-Apple Daily Chief Accused of 
Colluding with Foreign Forces Denied Bail for Second Time,'' South 
China Morning Post, August 13, 2021.
    \105\ Tang Huiyun, ``Xianggang Pingguo Ribao Guo'an Fa xia shoujia 
shouya guanbi meiti yu qian shimin lingchen paidui qianggou 
tingkanhao'' [Hong Kong Apple Daily is the first media company to shut 
under the National Security Law, over a thousand residents line up to 
buy the last issue], Voice of America, June 25, 2021; Brian Wong, 
``Hong Kong National Security Law: Ex-Apple Daily Chief Accused of 
Colluding with Foreign Forces Denied Bail for Second Time,'' South 
China Morning Post, August 13, 2021.
    \106\ Jane Cheung, ``Bail Rejected for Top Pair of Stand News,'' 
The Standard, December 31, 2021; Jessie Pang and Edmond Ng, ``Hong 
Kong's Citizen News Says Closure Triggered by Stand News Collapse,'' 
Reuters, January 3, 2022.
    \107\ Jane Cheung, ``Bail Rejected for Top Pair of Stand News,'' 
The Standard, December 31, 2021.
    \108\ Jessie Pang and Edmond Ng, ``Hong Kong's Citizen News Says 
Closure Triggered by Stand News Collapse,'' Reuters, January 3, 2022.
    \109\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Hong Kong: RSF Urges for Release 
of a Former Stand News Columnist,'' April 12, 2022.
    \110\ Viola Zhou, ``They Were Reporters in Hong Kong. Now They 
Drive Cabs and Sell Fried Chicken,'' Vice, January 25, 2022.
    \111\ Viola Zhou, ``They Were Reporters in Hong Kong. Now They 
Drive Cabs and Sell Fried Chicken,'' Vice, January 25, 2022.
    \112\ Danny Mok, ``Hong Kong's Largest Journalist Group to Consider 
Disbanding in Response to Mounting Government Pressure for More 
Transparency,'' South China Morning Post, April 13, 2022.
    \113\ Danny Mok, ``Hong Kong's Largest Journalist Group to Consider 
Disbanding in Response to Mounting Government Pressure for More 
Transparency,'' South China Morning Post, April 13, 2022.
    \114\ Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021, Ordinance 
No. 32 of 2021; Pak Yiu, ``Hong Kong Legislature Passes Controversial 
Anti-Doxxing Privacy Bill,'' Reuters, September 29, 2021.
    \115\ Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021, Ordinance 
No. 32 of 2021; Pak Yiu, ``Hong Kong Legislature Passes Controversial 
Anti-Doxxing Privacy Bill,'' Reuters, September 29, 2021.
    \116\ ``Experts Fear New Hong Kong Doxxing Law Will Punish 
Opposition,'' Voice of America, November 7, 2021; Scott Ikeda, ``Anti-
Doxxing Law Passed in Hong Kong; Critics Fear Uneven Application, 
Targeting of Government Critics,'' CPO Magazine, October 5, 2021; Pak 
Yiu, ``Hong Kong Legislature Passes Controversial Anti-Doxxing Privacy 
Bill,'' Reuters, September 29, 2021; Primrose Riordan, Tabby Kinder, 
and Nicolle Liu, ``Hong Kong Privacy Law Change Will Let Government 
Block Social Media,'' Financial Times, July 22, 2022.
    \117\ Zoe Low, ``2 Hong Kong Government Databases to Tighten Access 
Rules, Triggering Warning over Threat to Press Freedom,'' South China 
Morning Post, October 26, 2021; ``(Shoujing chace) Gang tudi, gongsi 
chace xu shimingzhi diaocha xinwen jiang jinyibu shouya'' [(Tightening 
access to records) Hong Kong land and companies registries impose a 
real-name system, accessing information will face further pressure], 
Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2021.
    \118\ ``(Shoujing chace) Gang tudi, gongsi chace xu shimingzhi 
diaocha xinwen jiang jinyibu shouya'' [(Tightening access to records) 
Hong Kong land and companies registries impose a real-name system, 
accessing information will face further pressure], Radio Free Asia, 
October 26, 2021.
    \119\ ``(Shoujing chace) Gang tudi, gongsi chace xu shimingzhi 
diaocha xinwen jiang jinyibu shouya'' [(Tightening access to records) 
Hong Kong land and companies registries impose a real-name system, 
accessing information will face further pressure], Radio Free Asia, 
October 26, 2021.
    \120\ UN Human Rights Council, Cooperation with the United Nations, 
Its Representatives and Mechanisms in the Field of Human Rights, A/HRC/
48/28, September 17, 2021, para. 20.
    \121\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Tuanti chupeng hongxian jiesan 
shu weiyi xuanze'' [The only option for groups that cross the red line 
is to disband], August 17, 2021.
    \122\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Transcript of Remarks by CE at 
Media Session before ExCo,'' October 26, 2021.
    \123\ Rachel Yeo and Christy Leung, ``Groups that Endanger National 
Security to Lose Charities Status, Tax Exemptions, Hong Kong's 
Financial Services Chief Warns,'' South China Morning Post, September 
13, 2021; Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Xingze buhui yin zuzhi jiesan bei 
mozou'' [Criminal liabilities will not be erased by a group's 
disbandment], August 15, 2021.
    \124\ Kari Soo Lindberg, Olivia Tam, Krystal Chia, and Josie Wong, 
``How Xi's China Put 1,000-Plus Hong Kong Journalists Out of Work,'' 
Bloomberg, January 20, 2022. See also European Parliament, Resolution 
of 20 January 2022 on Violations of Fundamental Freedoms in Hong Kong, 
2022/2503(RSP).
    \125\ ``Timeline: 58 Hong Kong Civil Society Groups Disband 
Following the Onset of the Security Law,'' Hong Kong Free Press, June 
30, 2022.
    \126\ Kari Soo Lindberg, Olivia Tam, Krystal Chia, and Josie Wong, 
``How Xi's China Put 1,000-Plus Hong Kong Journalists Out of Work,'' 
Bloomberg, January 20, 2022.
    \127\ See, e.g., Tony Cheung, ``Hong Kong's National Security Law 
No Concern for Law-Abiding Groups, Carrie Lam Says after Amnesty 
International Reveals Exit Plans,'' South China Morning Post, October 
26, 2021; Tony Cheung and Lilian Cheng, ``Hong Kong's Professional 
Teachers' Union Saw No Choice but to `Disband after Beijing Emissaries 
Warned It Could No Longer Exist,' '' South China Morning Post, August 
14, 2021.
    \128\ Tony Cheung and Lilian Cheng, ``Hong Kong's Professional 
Teachers' Union Saw No Choice but to `Disband after Beijing Emissaries 
Warned It Could No Longer Exist,' '' South China Morning Post, August 
14, 2021.
    \129\ Liu Mingyang, ``Xianggang jiaoyu yao zhengben qingyuan bixu 
chanchu `Jiaoxie' zhe ke duliu'' [The root of Hong Kong's education 
must be rectified and its source purified, the malignant tumor that is 
the ``Teachers' Union'' must be eradicated], Xinhua, July 31, 2021.
    \130\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Jiaoyuju xuanbu zhongzhi yu 
Jiaoxie de gongzuo guanxi'' [Education Bureau announces termination of 
work relationship with Teachers' Union], July 31, 2021.
    \131\ Chris Tang Ping-keung, ``Zhifa bumen jiang yange zhifa, 
burong ji jiesan mozou xingze'' [Law enforcement agencies will strictly 
enforce the law, evading criminal liability through disbandment will 
not be allowed], Security Bureau, Hong Kong SAR Government, August 16, 
2021.
    \132\ Tony Cheung and Lilian Cheng, ``Hong Kong's Professional 
Teachers' Union Saw No Choice but to `Disband after Beijing Emissaries 
Warned It Could No Longer Exist,' '' South China Morning Post, August 
14, 2021.
    \133\ ``[Fengsha Jiaoxie] Zhongxue xiaozhang: shiqu pingtai 
lingting jiaoshi shengyin weijian tuanti ke qudai'' [Blocking Teacher 
Union] Secondary school principal: it is a loss of a platform to listen 
to teachers' voices, cannot see there is another organization that can 
take its place], Stand News, reprinted in news.discuss.com.hk, August 
4, 2021.
    \134\ Civil Human Rights Front, ``Xiangang ren jiayou, ren zai 
xiwang zai . . ..'' [Come on, people of Hong Kong, where there are 
people there is hope . . ..], Facebook, August 14, 2021.
    \135\ Jasmine Siu, ``Hong Kong Protests: Jimmy Lai Jailed for 14 
Months over Role in 2019 Illegal Rally, While Co-Defendants Receive up 
to 18 Months,'' South China Morning Post, May 28, 2021; Chris Lau, 
``Depriving Hongkongers of Platform to Voice Their Grievances Could 
Trigger Mass Protests, Rally Organiser Says,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 17, 2021.
    \136\ ``Guowuyuan Gang Ao Ban: Weifa huo Gang de `minjian renquan 
zhenxian' zuize nan tao!'' [Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the 
State Council: Illegal ``Civil Human Rights Front'' that brings 
disaster to Hong Kong cannot avoid criminal liabilities!], Xinhua, 
August 15, 2021.
    \137\ Clifford Lo, ``Hong Kong Police Launch Series of Raids on 
Civil Human Rights Front Following Missed Deadline for Disclosing 
Financial, Other Records,'' South China Morning Post, October 28, 2021.
    \138\ Candice Chau, ``Organiser of Mass Hong Kong Demos Civil Human 
Rights Front Disbands Citing `Unprecedented Challenges,' '' Hong Kong 
Free Press, August 15, 2021.
    \139\ ``Xianggang Minzhen cheng jin 200 wan ren canyu `fan song 
Zhong' hei yi da youxing'' [Hong Kong Civil Human Rights Front claims 
nearly 2 million people joined ``anti-extradition march'' in black 
clothing], Voice of America, June 17, 2019.
    \140\ ``Hong Kong Tiananmen Vigil Group Disbands amid Crackdown on 
Dissent,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Guardian, September 25, 
2021; ``Hong Kong: Tiananmen Vigil Organisers Charged with Inciting 
Subversion,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, September 10, 
2021.
    \141\ ``Hong Kong: Tiananmen Vigil Organisers Charged with Inciting 
Subversion,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, September 10, 
2021.
    \142\ ``Hong Kong Tiananmen Vigil Group Disbands amid Crackdown on 
Dissent,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Guardian, September 25, 
2021.
    \143\ Ng Kang-chung and Natalie Wong, ``National Security Law: Hong 
Kong's Biggest Opposition Trade Union Votes by Overwhelming Majority to 
Disband,'' South China Morning Post, October 3, 2021; Pak Yiu, ``Hong 
Kong Opposition Trade Union Group to Disband,'' Reuters, September 19, 
2021.
    \144\ Pak Yiu, ``Hong Kong Opposition Trade Union Group to 
Disband,'' Reuters, September 19, 2021.
    \145\ Ye Lan, ``Gangmei: Goujie waili, fan Zhong luan Gang, 
`Zhigongmeng' deng zuzhi zheng bei Xianggang jingfang Guo'an chu 
diaocha'' [Hong Kong media: ``Confederation of Trade Unions,'' which 
colludes with foreign forces, opposes China and disrupts Hong Kong, is 
under investigation by Hong Kong police and National Security 
Department], Global Times, August 12, 2021.
    \146\ Rhoda Kwan, ``Humanitarian Fund Helping Arrested Hong Kong 
Protesters Will Halt Operations by October 31,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 
August 18, 2021.
    \147\ 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund, ``612 Humanitarian Relief 
Fund'' (web page), accessed June 3, 2022.
    \148\ ``Last Trustee of 612 Fund Cyd Ho Arrested in Prison: 
Sources,'' The Standard, May 12, 2022.
    \149\ Enoch Yiu and Denise Tsang, ``Hong Kong Appoints Investigator 
to Probe Fraud Allegations in the Financial Affairs of Apple Daily's 
Publisher Next Digital,'' South China Morning Post, July 28, 2021. For 
more information, see ``Hong Kong's Apple Daily Overkill,'' editorial, 
Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2021; Kara Wheeler, ``Next Digital 
Headquarters Raided by Hong Kong Government,'' Acton Institute 
PowerBlog (blog), September 29, 2021.
    \150\ Candice Chau, ``Thursday to Be Final Edition of Apple Daily, 
as Board Forced to Halt All Hong Kong Operations,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, June 24, 2021.
    \151\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Petition by Financial Secretary 
to Wind Up Next Digital Limited under Section 879(1) of Companies 
Ordinance,'' September 29, 2021.
    \152\ Rhoda Kwan, ``Hong Kong National Security Police Freeze Funds 
and Property Held by Tiananmen Massacre Vigil Group, Despite 
Disbandment,'' Hong Kong Free Press, September 30, 2021.
    \153\ Denise Tsang, ``Hong Kong Social Welfare Sector Calls for 
Church Account Frozen in Fraud Investigation to Be Restored so Services 
for City's Homeless Can Continue,'' South China Morning Post, December 
10, 2020; Candice Chau, ``Hong Kong Church Says HSBC Account Frozen `in 
Retaliation' for Helping Protesters Last Year,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 
December 8, 2020.
    \154\ ``Former Hong Kong Lawmaker Ted Hui Asks Why HSBC Is Still 
Freezing His Accounts,'' Straits Times, June 29, 2021; ``Former Hong 
Kong Lawmaker Rejects HSBC's Explanation over Frozen Accounts,'' 
Reuters, January 18, 2021.
    \155\ Denise Tsang and Danny Mok, ``Hong Kong Media Firm Next 
Digital Executives Say HSBC Has Frozen Their Bank, Credit Card 
Accounts,'' South China Morning Post, August 28, 2020.
    \156\ Letter from Jeffrey A. Merkley, James P. McGovern et al., 
U.S. members of Congress, to Noel Quinn, Group Chief Executive, HSBC, 
February 28, 2022; Kari Soo Lindberg, ``HSBC Defends Against U.S. 
Lawmakers Claims Over Hong Kong Moves,'' Bloomberg, March 24, 2022. See 
also Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149.
    \157\ The Hong Kong Association of Banks, ``Frequently Asked 
Questions in Relation to Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of 
Terrorism,'' reprinted in Hong Kong Monetary Authority, October 22, 
2021, items 69-71; Kane Wu, ``Hong Kong Banks to Disclose Related 
Property of Clients Who Breach Security Law,'' Reuters, October 24, 
2021.
    \158\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 10; Jessie Pang and Sara 
Cheng, ``Exclusive--New Hong Kong University Classes Set Out Dangers of 
Breaking Security Law,'' Reuters, November 5, 2021.
    \159\ See, e.g., Education Bureau, ``National Security: Maintaining 
a Safe Learning Environment Nurturing Good Citizens,'' Circular No. 3/
2021, February 4, 2021, 7.
    \160\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter 
from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education; 
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression; and the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association to Chen Xu, 
Permanent Representative to the Permanent Mission of the People's 
Republic of China to the United Nations in Geneva and Other 
International Organizations in Switzerland, AL CHN 9/2021, August 13, 
2021, 6.
    \161\ Letter from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of 
China to the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, No. 
GJ/60/2021, November 1, 2021.
    \162\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``EDB Announces Guidelines and 
Curriculum Arrangements for Safeguarding National Security and National 
Security Education,'' February 4, 2021; Education Bureau, ``National 
Security: Maintaining a Safe Learning Environment Nurturing Good 
Citizens,'' Circular No. 3/2021, February 4, 2021; Education Bureau, 
``National Security Education in School Curriculum--Implementation Mode 
and Learning and Teaching Resources,'' Circular No. 2/2021, February 4, 
2021; Education Bureau, ``Curriculum Framework of National Security 
Education in Hong Kong,'' May 2021.
    \163\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``LCQ20: Implementation of National 
Security Education in Schools,'' September 1, 2021.
    \164\ S.T.F.A.Wu Mien Tuen Primary School, ``2021-2022 xuenian 
weihu guojia anquan ji guojia anquan jiaoyu xiangguan cuoshi jihuashu'' 
[Plan for measures related to safeguarding national security and 
national security education for the 2021-2022 school year], accessed 
March 3, 2022, 1; Heep Woh Primary School (Cheung Sha Wan), ``2021-2022 
du weihu guojia anquan ji guojia anquan jiaoyu xiangguan cuoshi de 
gongzuo jihua'' [Plan for measures related to safeguarding national 
security and national security education for the 2021-2022 school 
year], accessed March 3, 2022, 58.
    \165\ Education Bureau, ``Guojia anquan: Xuexiao juti cuoshi'' 
[National security: Specific measures for schools], February 4, 2021.
    \166\ ``Government May Ask Teachers to Swear Allegiance Oath,'' The 
Standard, October 23, 2021.
    \167\ `` `Guo'an Duben' pai ru you yuan Jiaoyuju tonghan: zhu 
you'er renshi Zhongguoren shenfen'' [``National Security Textbook'' 
distributed in kindergarten, Education Department issues circular: help 
children understand Chinese identity], Ming Pao, July 13, 2021.
    \168\ Curriculum Development Council and the Hong Kong Examinations 
and Assessment Authority, ``Citizenship and Social Development, 
Curriculum and Assessment Guide (Secondary
4-6),'' 2021, 39; Zeng Kaixin, ``Gongsheke: Daxue tongshike biyesheng 
jue qi jiaoshi meng, zhi xin ke buzai zhongshi pipan sikao'' 
[Citizenship and Social Development course: Recent college graduate who 
majored in liberal studies decides to abandon dream to become a 
teacher, says new course no longer values critical thinking], HK01, 
September 10, 2021.
    \169\ Curriculum Development Council and the Hong Kong Examinations 
and Assessment Authority, ``Citizenship and Social Development, 
Curriculum and Assessment Guide (Secondary
4-6),'' 2021.
    \170\ Katrin Kinzelbach, Staffan I. Lindberg, Lars Pelke, and 
Janika Spannagel, ``Academic Freedom Index 2022 Update,'' FAU Erlangen-
Nurnberg and V-Dem Institute, March 2022,
3, 8.
    \171\ Peter Baehr, ``Hong Kong Universities in the Shadow of the 
National Security Law,'' Society 59, no. 3 (April 2022): 226.
    \172\ Peter Baehr, ``Hong Kong Universities in the Shadow of the 
National Security Law,'' Society 59, no. 3 (April 2022): 231-32.
    \173\ Peter Baehr, ``Hong Kong Universities in the Shadow of the 
National Security Law,'' Society 59, no. 3 (April 2022): 229, 234.
    \174\ Macau SAR Government, ``You 7 fen houxuan mingdan cunyou wu 
bei xuan zige de houxuanren'' [There are seven lists that contain 
candidates who are ineligible to stand for election], July 9, 2021; 
Rhoda Kwan, ``Macau Bans 21 Democrats from Legislative Elections,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, July 10, 2021.
    \175\ Selina Cheng, ``Macau Democrat Banned from Election over Pics 
with Hong Kong Opposition, Taiwan Tour, and Tiananmen Massacre 
Vigils,'' Hong Kong Free Press, July 14, 2021.
    \176\ Li Chengxin, ``Zhuanfang: Aomen minzhupai bei DQ `guai haizi' 
lunshu pomie?,'' [Exclusive interview: Macau pro-democracy camp 
candidates were disqualified; theory of ``obedient child'' shattered?], 
Deutsche Welle, July 20, 2021.
    \177\ Rocky Chan and Others v Legislative Assembly Electoral 
Affairs Commission, No. 113/2021, Tribunal de Ultima Instancia (Court 
of Final Appeal), July 31, 2014.
    \178\ Rocky Chan and Others v Legislative Assembly Electoral 
Affairs Commission, No. 113/2021, Tribunal de Ultima Instancia (Court 
of Final Appeal), July 31, 2014.
    \179\ ``(Aomen xuanju) toupiao lu chuang huigui hou xin dibai fei 
piao gong yu 5 qian zhang fenxi: xuanmin juede `wu yiyi' '' [(Macau 
election) election turnout record low after handover, with over 5,000 
blank and invalid ballots; analysis: voters feel that it is 
``pointless''], Radio Free Asia, September 13, 2021; Rhoda Kwan, 
``Macau Bans 21 Democrats from Legislative Elections,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, July 10, 2021.
    \180\ Selina Cheng, ``Macau: Legislative Election Turnout at 
Historic Low after Opposition Barred from Running, Gov't Blames Weather 
and Covid,'' Hong Kong Free Press, September 13, 2021.
    \181\ Candice Chau, ``In Pictures: `I Want Real Universal 
Suffrage'--Macau Voters Protest on Ballots amid Record-Low Turnout,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, September 15, 2021.
    \182\ Macau Concealers, ``Notice from Macau Concealers,'' Facebook, 
October 19, 2021.
    \183\ Kelly Ho, ``News Outlet Macau Concealers Closes and Deletes 
Content, Blames `Unprecedented Environmental Changes,' '' Hong Kong 
Free Press, October 20, 2021; ``Aomen `Aiman Ribao' turan tingyun Gang 
Ao yiyi wangmei shengcun kongjian liang hongdeng'' [Macau's Macau 
Concealers suddenly stops operations, a red flag for the existence of 
online media with dissenting voices in Hong Kong and Macau], Voice of 
America, October 26, 2021.

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

         XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

            Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

                                Findings

         The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued 
        a multi-year campaign of transnational repression 
        against critics, Uyghurs, and others to stifle 
        criticism and enhance control over emigrant and 
        diaspora communities. Authorities and those acting at 
        their direction engaged in digital and in-person 
        harassment and surveillance, harassment and 
        intimidation of China-based relatives of overseas 
        targets, and attempted repatriation--in some cases 
        coercive--to China, where UN and other experts argued 
        they would face significant risk of torture. In June 
        2022, Freedom House reported that it had counted 229 
        cases of ``physical transnational repression''--which 
        can include ``detention, assault, physical 
        intimidation, unlawful deportation, rendition, or 
        suspected assassination''--originating from China since 
        2014.
         The PRC used economic coercion against foreign 
        governments and companies to stifle criticism of 
        China's human rights conditions and other issues 
        Chinese authorities deemed sensitive. Authorities used 
        unacknowledged, informal economic coercion, such as a 
        campaign against Lithuania--which resulted in economic 
        losses--and economic coercion against Intel, Sam's 
        Club, and Walmart--which reportedly resulted in some 
        consumers in China canceling their Sam's Club 
        memberships. The government also introduced new 
        authorities in Chinese law for carrying out economic 
        coercion and formally sanctioned officials of the 
        United States Commission on International Religious 
        Freedom, as well as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.
         Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in 
        multiple regions experienced worker rights violations, 
        environmental problems, corruption, and opacity in 
        project debt and project agreements with host country 
        institutions. Those developments were consistent with 
        reports of systemic problems in recent years as the 
        scale of BRI investment, as well as Chinese government 
        support and involvement in BRI, has increased.
         The PRC continued longstanding global campaign 
        to discredit universal rights in international 
        institutions and reshape international consensus around 
        human rights, in what Human Rights Watch described in 
        2017 as ``a systematic attempt to subvert the ability 
        of the UN human rights system to confront abuses in 
        China and beyond.'' The PRC took steps to impede UN 
        bodies in their work to hold Russia accountable for 
        human rights violations committed in its invasion of 
        Ukraine, and the government attempted to weaken human 
        rights protections in a draft instrument that would 
        create legally binding human rights obligations for 
        transnational and other businesses.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

          Include as part of the comprehensive strategy with 
        respect to the PRC required by the fiscal year 2022 
        National Defense Authorization Act a strategy to 
        counter China's transnational repression within the 
        United States and globally. This should integrate U.S. 
        Government capabilities that relate to identification 
        of transnational repression, law enforcement, 
        protection of victims, appropriate sanctions, and 
        prevention of the use of technology for transnational 
        repression.
          Develop a strategy to counter China's use of economic 
        coercion to chill criticism and avoid accountability 
        for its human rights abuses, as part of the 
        comprehensive strategy required by the fiscal year 2022 
        National Defense Authorization Act. This could include, 
        for example, coordination with allies and partners to 
        diversify economic footprints away from China to reduce 
        risk of coercion, the creation of a fund to compensate 
        targets of China's economic coercion, or other 
        coordinated efforts.
          Call on BRI host governments and the United Nations 
        to insist that Chinese entities provide increased 
        transparency in BRI projects. This should include 
        publication of--at a minimum--rigorous assessments of 
        potential impacts on human rights and rule of law 
        conditions; detailed data regarding PRC involvement; 
        terms of agreements for projects (especially those with 
        state involvement), including transparency in ownership 
        and lending commitments; measures taken to ensure human 
        rights; and detailed information about labor standards 
        and working conditions. Engage relevant allies, 
        partners, and U.S. embassies and consulates in order to 
        better understand conditions in BRI projects.
          Ensure broad, sustained U.S. engagement in UN bodies 
        with human rights functions to ensure that these bodies 
        remain true to their founding principles. This 
        engagement should include putting forth qualified U.S. 
        candidates to serve on those bodies, encouraging allies 
        and partners to do the same with their candidates, and 
        building coalitions to support those candidates.
          Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that 
        incentivize the study of languages spoken within the 
        PRC (including ethnic minority languages), the deep 
        study of China's political system, and the Chinese 
        Communist Party's efforts to violate and undermine 
        human rights globally. The effort to counter these 
        violations--and generating consensus around timely, 
        effective, and culturally appropriate responses--must 
        be informed by greater understanding of China's 
        political and legal system and its linguistic, 
        religious, and cultural diversity.
          Employ existing sanctions authorities, or create new 
        authorities if needed, that will hold foreign 
        government officials accountable for returning 
        individuals to countries, including the PRC, where they 
        are at risk of torture and other human rights abuses, 
        in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

            Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

                        Transnational Repression

    During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) continued a multi-year campaign of 
transnational repression against critics, Uyghurs, and others 
to stifle criticism and enhance control over emigrant and 
diaspora communities.\1\ ``Transnational repression'' refers to 
transnational efforts to stifle dissent or independent 
organizing from emigrant or diaspora communities,\2\ and 
Freedom House has called China's transnational repression 
campaign ``the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive . 
. . in the world.'' \3\ In June 2022, Freedom House reported 
that ``the Chinese government uses transnational repression 
more than any other country,'' counting 229 cases of ``physical 
transnational repression'' originating from China since 
2014.\4\ In the category of ``physical transnational 
repression,'' Freedom House includes ``detention, assault, 
physical intimidation, unlawful deportation, rendition, or 
suspected assassination.'' \5\ [For more information about 
transnational repression against Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslims, see Section X--Xinjiang.]
    This past year, authorities and those acting at their 
direction engaged in digital and in-person harassment and 
surveillance, harassment and intimidation of China-based 
relatives of overseas
targets (``coercion by proxy'' \6\), and other forms of 
transnational repression. As a result, some observers and 
victims reported lasting emotional trauma or a chilling effect 
in the form of self-censorship.\7\ Selected examples of 
transnational repression follow:

         Digital Harassment and Surveillance. Reports 
        documented authorities' multi-year efforts to procure 
        and use technology to--among other objectives--track 
        online discussion overseas of issues authorities deemed 
        sensitive, identify social media users overseas, and 
        surveil the online activity of Uyghurs and other ethnic 
        minorities overseas.\8\
         In-Person Harassment and Surveillance. The 
        Index on Censorship reported that two self-identified 
        Chinese individuals followed a Uyghur woman attending a 
        World Uyghur Congress meeting in Athens and waited for 
        her ``with [people she] suspected to be undercover 
        agents.'' \9\
         Targeting Family Members. Chinese public 
        security officials reportedly visited relatives of 
        Netherlands-based Chinese national Gao Ronghui after he 
        posted comments online in support of Ukraine.\10\ 
        Officials reportedly called him and warned him that 
        ``If there is a problem with your political stance, it 
        will affect your family for generations . . ..'' \11\ 
        This past year, U.S.-based Uyghur and American citizen 
        Rushan Abbas reported that her sister, retired Uyghur 
        doctor Gulshan Abbas, continued to serve a 20-year 
        sentence for the alleged crimes of ``participating in a 
        terrorist organization,'' ``aiding terrorist 
        activities,'' and ``gathering a crowd to disrupt social 
        order'' after Chinese authorities detained her in 2018 
        in apparent retaliation for Rushan Abbas's advocacy 
        work.\12\
         Extraterritorial Application of Law. Hong Kong 
        authorities reportedly ordered London-based non-
        governmental organization (NGO) Hong Kong Watch chief 
        executive Benedict Rogers to remove the organization's 
        website or face potential imprisonment under the PRC 
        Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region.\13\
         Educational Institutions. An article in the 
        Party-run media outlet Global Times, authored by two 
        George Washington University (GWU) alumni, criticized 
        GWU's president \14\ after he said posters on campus 
        designed by dissident artist Badiucao \15\ protesting 
        the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games were not 
        ``racist,'' but rather were ``political statements.'' 
        \16\ GWU's chapter of the Chinese Students and Scholars 
        Association--a larger organization with ties to Chinese 
        authorities \17\--had previously urged GWU leadership 
        to remove the posters, calling them ``slanderous'' and 
        ``racist.'' \18\ In another case, Istanbul authorities 
        reportedly closed a Uyghur elementary school after 
        Chinese officials alleged that it violated Turkish 
        regulations and may be providing ``anti-China'' 
        education, allegations the school head refuted.\19\

       EFFORTS TO REPATRIATE CRITICS AND OTHERS DEEMED SENSITIVE

    As part of their transnational repression efforts, the PRC 
continued a multi-year campaign to repatriate critics, Uyghurs, 
and others \20\--in some cases through coercive means--to 
China, where UN and other experts argued they would face 
significant risk of torture.\21\ According to a senior Party 
official, in 2021 authorities ``returned'' 1,273 ``fugitives'' 
through Operation Skynet.\22\ Operation Skynet is part of 
multi-year efforts that, in some cases, reportedly targeted 
corruption suspects and, in others, critics and members of 
ethnic minority emigrant and diaspora communities.\23\ In 2018, 
the Party and government explicitly authorized ``irregular 
measures,'' including ``kidnapping'' and ``entrapment,'' \24\ 
and international observers have documented cases of 
kidnapping, harassment of targets' families, and other coercive 
practices.\25\ Selected cases from this past year follow:

         According to Safeguard Defenders, Chinese 
        authorities--some unidentified and some ``from the . . 
        . embassy''--
        obstructed Chinese national Liu Lingshuang outside a 
        courthouse in Cyprus and warned her to stop assisting 
        her partner Ma Chao, the subject of an extradition 
        request from China.\26\ As extradition proceedings 
        continued, authorities reportedly detained relatives of 
        Liu in China and refused to renew the passports of 
        Liu's children.\27\
         In early 2022, Human Rights Watch reported 
        that Saudi authorities were preparing to extradite 
        Uyghurs Nurmemet Rozi and Hemdulla Weli (or Abduweli) 
        to China after detaining them since November 2020 
        without charge.\28\ UN experts expressed concern at the 
        lack of ``proper legal justification or implementation 
        of fundamental safeguards, reportedly on the basis of 
        an extradition request made by China.'' \29\ In March 
        2022, Saudi authorities reportedly detained Rozi's ex-
        wife Buhelchem Abla and their 13-year old daughter and 
        indicated they would be deported to China.\30\
         Chinese authorities reportedly harassed the 
        family and ex-husband of Kazakhstan-based ethnic Kazakh 
        and Chinese national Ulnur Bozhykhan after she wrote 
        publicly about abuses she suffered in a Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) detention facility, to 
        pressure her to return to China.\31\
         Chinese national Wu Huan reported that 
        individuals including Chinese consular officials held 
        her for 10 days in a converted villa in the United Arab 
        Emirates and pressured her to incriminate her fiance 
        Wang Jingyu.\32\ Wang previously questioned the Chinese 
        government's reporting on the conflict between the 
        Indian and Chinese militaries.\33\

    This past year, a Moroccan court ruled to extradite to 
China Idris Hasan, a Uyghur who documented human rights 
violations in the XUAR while living in Turkey, and who was 
detained in
Morocco in July 2021 under a since-canceled Red Notice from 
China.\34\ Upon member state request, the International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) publishes Red Notices, 
requests that authorities in other countries ``provisionally 
arrest'' subjects.\35\ Red Notices of a ``political, military, 
religious or racial character'' violate INTERPOL rules,\36\ but 
experts have documented Chinese authorities' abuse of Red 
Notices to trigger detentions of transnational repression 
targets in prior years.\37\ Of the 1,273 ``fugitives'' 
discussed above, authorities reportedly ``returned'' 22 under 
Red Notices.\38\ The Commission did not observe disaggregated 
data for those 22 cases. In February 2022, the South China 
Morning Post reported that ``dozens'' of Red Notices for 
Chinese subjects disappeared from public view.\39\ The 
Commission did not observe reports confirming why they 
disappeared, or whether they were
canceled.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Transnational Repression Charges in the United States
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In March and May 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice reported
 criminal charges against 10 individuals accused of engaging in
 transnational repression in the United States.\40\ The accusations
 included spying on and conspiring to harass dissidents and others, as
 well as pressuring individuals to return to China.\41\ Those allegedly
 targeted included a congressional candidate,\42\ democracy
 advocates,\43\ a U.S. Olympic figure skater, the skater's father, and a
 dissident artist whose sculpture--which depicted Xi Jinping's head as a
 coronavirus molecule and was titled ``CCP VIRUS''--was burned down.\44\
 Chinese authorities reportedly held the pregnant daughter--a U.S.
 national--of another victim of transnational repression against her
 will in China to pressure that victim to return to China.\45\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Economic Coercion

    This past year, the PRC used economic coercion against 
foreign governments and companies to stifle criticism of 
China's human rights conditions and other issues Chinese 
authorities deemed sensitive.\46\ ``Economic coercion'' refers 
to the threat or actual imposition of economic costs to extract 
concessions in areas other than trade policy itself.\47\

              USE OF INFORMAL ECONOMIC COERCION TO PUNISH
                           OR SILENCE CRITICS

    Chinese authorities used unacknowledged, informal economic 
coercion to prevent and punish unwanted speech. Experts have 
noted that informal measures lend a degree of plausible 
deniability, flexibility with targeting and implementation, and 
protection from legal countermeasures under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) or other authorities.\48\ The following are 
illustrative examples:

         Australia. Authorities continued a multi-year 
        campaign of economic coercion against Australia \49\ 
        that began in response to Australian authorities' calls 
        for an independent investigation into the origins of 
        coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) and the Chinese 
        government's initial handling of the pandemic; speech 
        about conditions in the XUAR, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; 
        and other issues.\50\ One study estimated trade 
        restrictions on Australian imports including barley, 
        wine, timber, lobster, coal, beef, cotton, and copper 
        caused a loss of AU$6.6 billion (US$4.5 billion) to 
        Australia over the period of July 2020 to February 
        2021.\51\
         Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart.\52\ Chinese 
        authorities, Party-run media, and internet users in 
        China publicly criticized U.S. companies Intel, Sam's 
        Club, and Sam's Club's parent company Walmart after 
        Intel asked suppliers to stop sourcing from the XUAR 
        and Sam's Club products sourced from the XUAR 
        disappeared from shelves and online shopping sites in 
        China.\53\ The Party-run Communist Youth League 
        reportedly called for a boycott of Sam's Club, and some 
        consumers in China canceled their Sam's Club 
        memberships.\54\ The Global Times and the PRC's 
        highest-level disciplinary bodies--the Central 
        Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the 
        National Supervisory Commission (NSC)--publicly 
        criticized the companies, encouraged boycotts, and 
        warned of potential economic consequences.\55\ In an 
        article posted on the joint website of the CCDI and 
        NSC, the author criticized Intel and Sam's Club's 
        actions, referencing a prior case involving the Swedish 
        apparel brand H&M, in which the company's information 
        disappeared from apps and websites in China, reportedly 
        as a result of the company's stance on the XUAR.\56\
         7-Eleven. A Japanese-owned operator of 7-
        Eleven stores in Beijing municipality apologized after 
        Beijing municipal authorities fined the company 150,000 
        yuan (US$22,000) after finding that the company's 
        website listed Taiwan as a country, did not use Chinese 
        names for islands in the South China Sea that China 
        claims, and contained ``mistakes'' in its depiction of 
        borders along the XUAR and Tibet Autonomous Region 
        (TAR).\57\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Economic Coercion against Lithuania
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  This past year, the Chinese government launched a comprehensive
 campaign of economic coercion against Lithuania after the Lithuanian
 government allowed the opening of a ``Taiwanese Representative
 Office''--a name chosen by Taiwan's government--in Vilnius.\58\
 Following that decision, Chinese authorities reportedly took various
 steps to punish Lithuania; for example:
 
   Chinese authorities banned all Lithuanian imports, as well as
   imports from other countries containing Lithuanian components; \59\
   The Global Times encouraged China to ``join hands with Russia
   and Belarus'' and ``punish'' Lithuania; \60\
   Chinese customs officials reportedly found ``additional
   microorganisms'' in Lithuanian dairy and meat exports,\61\ echoing
   similar claims in past cases of economic coercion; \62\ and
   Chinese authorities reportedly pressured German company
   Continental not to use Lithuanian-made parts.\63\
 
  Five months after the decision to allow the opening of a ``Taiwanese
 Representative Office'' in Vilnius, Lithuanian exports to China in
 December 2021 reportedly dropped more than 90 percent as compared to
 December 2020.\64\ In response to China's economic coercion, the
 European Union (EU) brought a dispute settlement case before the WTO,
 to which China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian
 reportedly replied, ``[t]he problem between China and Lithuania is a
 political problem, not an economic problem.'' \65\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    In some cases, companies appeared to self-censor or adopt 
positions consistent with the PRC's political priorities 
without an explicit demand. For example:

         Prague Marriott. The Marriott Hotel in Prague 
        declined to host a meeting of the World Uyghur Congress 
        on the basis of ``political neutrality.'' \66\
         Octopus and Quarto. British publishers Octopus 
        and Quarto reportedly censored and revised content 
        related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, artist Ai Weiwei,\67\ and 
        the TAR in books intended to be printed in China and 
        sold to audiences outside of China.\68\
         Moleskine. Italian notebook manufacturer 
        Moleskine reportedly erased all references to Taiwan 
        from its journals--after previously changing ``Taiwan'' 
        to ``Taiwan (Province of China)''--which Newsweek 
        characterized as ``a consequence of the Chinese 
        Communist Party's `disturbing micromanagement' as it 
        combs global markets for perceived challenges to its 
        territorial claims.'' \69\

         LAWS THAT PROVIDE A FORMAL BASIS FOR ECONOMIC COERCION

    This past year, the PRC took steps to provide new 
authorities in Chinese law for carrying out economic coercion 
to punish or chill criticism outside China, or otherwise demand 
compliance with their political priorities.

         In September 2021, the PRC Data Security Law 
        came into effect.\70\ The Data Security Law applies 
        extraterritorially,\71\ classifies data according to 
        factors including ``national security'' \72\--which 
        experts noted Chinese authorities have interpreted 
        broadly in other contexts to punish speech or actions 
        that do not conform to PRC priorities \73\--allows for 
        data export controls,\74\ and authorizes civil and 
        criminal penalties for those who fail to fulfill data 
        security obligations outlined in the Data Security 
        Law.\75\
         In August 2021, the government passed the PRC 
        Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL).\76\ The 
        PIPL applies extraterritorially,\77\ cites ``national 
        security'' as a basis,\78\ and allows for retaliatory 
        measures against countries that implement 
        ``discriminatory'' measures against China.\79\ While 
        the PIPL appears to mirror some privacy protections in 
        the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, observers 
        expressed concern about the latitude the PIPL gives 
        authorities to investigate and punish those who handle 
        data, as well as to seize personal data.\80\
         During the controversy over Intel, Walmart, 
        and Sam's Club described above, a Global Times article 
        discussed the possibility of using the PRC Anti-Foreign 
        Sanctions Law, passed in June 2021.\81\ The Commission 
        did not observe reports that authorities used the Anti-
        Foreign Sanctions Law against those companies, but this 
        past year, authorities used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions 
        Law against four officials of the United States 
        Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well 
        as two U.S. companies that sold arms to Taiwan.\82\ The 
        Commission did not observe reports of specific 
        penalties applied to those officials or companies under 
        the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law this past year.

              Concerns Surrounding Belt and Road Projects

    This past year, international experts reported that Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in multiple regions 
experienced worker rights violations, environmental problems, 
corruption, and opacity in project debt and project agreements 
with host country institutions.\83\ Multiple expert sources 
have reported concerns about systemic problems in those areas 
in recent years \84\ as the scale of BRI investment, as well as 
Chinese government support and involvement in BRI, has 
increased.\85\ The following are illustrative examples from 
this past year:

         Worker Rights. Angolan security forces 
        reportedly killed three people and injured five workers 
        protesting conditions at a construction project with 
        Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) involvement.\86\ 
        The European Parliament expressed concerns about 
        substandard and abusive conditions for Vietnamese 
        workers at the Linglong Tire factory,\87\ a project 
        initiated under an agreement between China and Serbia 
        \88\ with Chinese SOE involvement.\89\ In another case, 
        the New York Times reported an alleged ``dramatic 
        decline in worker safety'' in a Democratic Republic of 
        Congo (DRC) cobalt mine under the ownership of China 
        Molybdenum--now known as CMOC--which reportedly 
        received Chinese state-backed financing.\90\ According 
        to reporting from this past year, in recent years CMOC 
        impeded inspectors from the mine site; and Chinese 
        companies involved in that and at least one other DRC 
        cobalt mine have increasingly used subcontracting to 
        provide ``lower pay, minimal or no benefits, and 
        precarious job security.'' \91\
         Environment. In Argentina, experts and 
        observers voiced concerns over the environmental 
        assessment, lack of indigenous community consultation, 
        and potential social and environmental impact of a dam 
        project with Chinese SOE involvement.\92\ In Peru, 
        locals demonstrated after a Chinese SOE's \93\ 
        activities reportedly depleted lakes, affecting grazing 
        and irrigation.\94\ International NGO Environmental 
        Investigation Agency reported that expansion of 
        traditional Chinese medicine companies through BRI, 
        which the Chinese government identified as a priority 
        for 2016-2030,\95\ posed a threat to Africa's 
        biodiversity.\96\
         Corruption and Transparency. In the DRC case 
        above, China Molybdenum employees reportedly attempted 
        to bribe and assaulted safety inspectors,\97\ and 
        Congolese authorities reported that China Molybdenum 
        authorities ``failed to declare'' copper and cobalt 
        reserves, thus avoiding required payments to Congolese 
        authorities.\98\

Exporting Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism through Surveillance and 
                          Profiling Technology

    This past year, the Commission observed reports that some 
Chinese companies, which previously created or helped create 
surveillance technology that can be used to profile Uyghurs and 
target other marginalized communities in China,\99\ exported 
surveillance technology and equipment. In December 2021, the 
surveillance research firm IPVM reported that Chinese company 
Tiandy sold surveillance equipment, including networked video 
recorders with Intel chips, to Iran's security services.\100\ 
In another case, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that 
a ``predominantly Serb provisional authority in southeastern 
Kosovo'' agreed to purchase--with Serbian government funding--
Dahua equipment including 196 surveillance cameras and 30 DVR 
recorders for use in ``about 30 facilities, mostly schools, in 
12 Kosovar communities.'' \101\ A February 2022 report from UK 
nonprofit Big Brother Watch reported that ``almost 800'' of the 
1,300 public organizations that responded to its requests for 
information said they had equipment made by either Hikvision or 
Dahua, and Big Brother Watch found over 164,000 ``Hikvision IP 
cameras'' and over 14,000 ``Dahua tagged products'' connected 
to the internet in the United Kingdom.\102\ In addition, this 
past year, Privacy International and Stanford University's 
Hoover Institution published reports documenting the multi-year 
procurement and implementation of Huawei surveillance and 
facial recognition technology in Mauritius, Burma (Myanmar), 
Uganda, and Serbia.\103\
    The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 
(USCC) 2020 Annual Report provided information on PRC exports 
of surveillance technology and equipment under the Digital Silk 
Road project to promote its concept of ``internet sovereignty'' 
by giving certain countries the ability to control their 
domestic internet.\104\ In its 2021 Annual Report, the USCC 
reported the PRC had previously sold surveillance, facial 
recognition, and ``integrated social tracking'' technologies to 
multiple governments, including Argentina, Bolivia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, and Venezuela.\105\ The 
Venezuela case was notable for the sale of an in-development 
social credit system called the ``Fatherland Card'' that 
monitors social media, rations food and supplies, and tracks 
voting patterns, and may have the capability of distributing 
COVID-19 vaccines.\106\

             Impeding UN Human Rights Bodies and Redefining
                       Global Human Rights Norms

    This past year, the PRC continued a longstanding global 
campaign to discredit universal rights in international 
institutions and reshape international consensus around human 
rights, in what Human Rights Watch described in 2017 as ``a 
systematic attempt to subvert the ability of the UN human 
rights system to confront abuses in China and beyond.'' \107\ 
As scholar Nadege Rolland observed, the PRC has taken steps to 
``[expand] its international institutional power'' as part of 
its efforts to advance a new order that excludes universal 
human rights, an order that Rolland notes Chinese leader Xi 
Jinping has associated with a concept the Party calls a 
``community of common human destiny'' (renlei mingyun 
gongtongti).\108\ Several reports published by experts this 
past year documented those efforts,\109\ concluding that in 
recent years China took a leading role in undermining the 
participation of NGOs and civil society organizations--
``especially those focused on human rights and North Korea'' 
\110\--in UN processes,\111\ acting together with other 
authoritarian states to inhibit human rights scrutiny \112\ and 
using its influence in the United Nations to promote BRI 
projects without appropriate human rights guarantees.\113\
    Chinese authorities took steps consistent with those 
efforts this past year. For example:

         Following reports that Russia committed human 
        rights violations after invading Ukraine in February 
        2022,\114\ China abstained from a UN vote to establish 
        a commission to investigate potential human rights 
        violations committed by Russia in Ukraine \115\ and 
        voted ``no'' to a UN vote to suspend Russia's 
        membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council 
        (UNHRC) in light of ``reports of [Russia's] gross and 
        systematic violations and abuses of human rights.'' 
        \116\ Regarding the alleged human rights violations, 
        Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian 
        said that ``humanitarian issues shouldn't be 
        politicized,'' \117\ and Chinese authorities took steps 
        to amplify Russian narratives on human rights 
        conditions in Ukraine.\118\ [For more information on 
        those efforts, see Section III--Freedom of Expression.]
         The Chinese government attempted to weaken 
        human rights protections in a draft UN instrument that 
        would create legally binding obligations for 
        transnational and other businesses. In February 2022, 
        the UNHRC released a third draft of that instrument 
        with proposals for textual changes submitted by 
        states.\119\ China proposed to--among other things--
        remove some references to ``human rights defenders''; 
        remove guarantees for ``effective, adequate and timely 
        remedy'' for victims;
        remove States Parties' obligation to prevent ``unlawful 
        interference'' with human rights and fundamental 
        freedoms; and remove States Parties' obligation to 
        investigate and address human rights abuses.\120\

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

    Notes to Section XII--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and 
Globally

    \1\ This past year, multiple reports documented the PRC's multi-
year transnational repression efforts. See, e.g., Safeguard Defenders, 
``No Room to Run: China's Expanded (Mis)use of INTERPOL since the Rise 
of Xi Jinping,'' 2021; Natalie Hall and Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human 
Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, `` `Your 
Family Will Suffer': How China Is Hacking, Surveilling, and 
Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal Democracies,'' 2021; Safeguard 
Defenders, ``Pursued for Life: Hong Kong's Global Hunt for Fugitives, 
the National Security Law, and Risk of INTERPOL Misuse,'' 2021; Cate 
Cadell, ``China Harvests Masses of Data on Western Targets, Documents 
Show,'' Washington Post, December 31, 2021; Muyi Xiao and Paul Mozur, 
``A Digital Manhunt: How Chinese Police Track Critics on Twitter and 
Facebook,'' New York Times, December 31, 2021; Safeguard Defenders, 
``Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' 
Overseas Back Home,'' January 2022; Index on Censorship, ``China's Long 
Arm: How Uyghurs Are Being Silenced in Europe,'' February 2022; 
Safeguard Defenders, ``Hide and Seek: China's Extradition Problem,'' 
February 2022; Safeguard Defenders, ``Returned without Rights: State of 
Extradition to China,'' February 2022; Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, 
Sophie Barnett et al., Citizen Lab, ``Psychological and Emotional War: 
Digital Transnational Repression in Canada,'' March 1, 2022; Bradley 
Jardine, Great Wall of Steel: China's Global Campaign to Suppress the 
Uyghurs (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United 
States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022). 
For more information, see The Threat of Transnational Repression from 
China and the U.S. Response, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2022).
    \2\ See, e.g., Dana M. Moss, The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora 
Activism against Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2022), 5; Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out 
of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 1; Safeguard Defenders, ``Involuntary 
Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back 
Home,'' January 2022, 8-9; Dana M. Moss, ``Transnational Repression, 
Diaspora Mobilization, and the Case of the Arab Spring,'' Social 
Problems 63 (2016): 480, 481-82; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
``Transnational Repression,'' accessed June 27, 2022.
    \3\ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out of 
Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 15.
    \4\ The Threat of Transnational Repression from China and the U.S. 
Response, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (statement for the record of Freedom House). For 
more information, see Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, 
``Out of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of 
Transnational Repression,'' February 2021, 15-21.
    \5\ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out of 
Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 1.
    \6\ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out of 
Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 2.
    \7\ Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sophie Barnett, et al., Citizen 
Lab, ``Psychological and Emotional War: Digital Transnational 
Repression in Canada,'' March 1, 2022, 15-18, 23-24; Muyi Xiao and Paul 
Mozur, ``A Digital Manhunt: How Chinese Police Track Critics on Twitter 
and Facebook,'' New York Times, December 31, 2021; Natalie Hall and 
Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus Society for 
Central Asian Affairs, `` `Your Family Will Suffer': How China Is 
Hacking, Surveilling, and Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal 
Democracies,''
2021, 7.
    \8\ Cate Cadell, ``China Harvests Masses of Data on Western 
Targets, Documents Show,'' Washington Post, December 31, 2021; Muyi 
Xiao and Paul Mozur, ``A Digital Manhunt: How Chinese Police Track 
Critics on Twitter and Facebook,'' New York Times, December 31, 2021; 
Natalie Hall and Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus 
Society for Central Asian Affairs, `` `Your Family Will Suffer': How 
China Is Hacking, Surveilling, and Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal 
Democracies,'' 2021, 10-17.
    \9\ Index on Censorship, ``China's Long Arm: How Uyghurs Are Being 
Silenced in Europe,'' February 10, 2022, 12.
    \10\ ``Chinese National Living in the Netherlands Forced to Shut 
Down Twitter Account,'' Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2022.
    \11\ ``Chinese National Living in the Netherlands Forced to Shut 
Down Twitter Account,'' Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2022.
    \12\ Austin Ramzy,`` `They Have My Sister': As Uyghurs Speak Out, 
China Targets Their Families,'' New York Times, updated November 9, 
2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang 
Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on December 31, 2020,'' December 31, 
2020. See also CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 84, 277. For more 
information on Gulshan Abbas, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2021-00002.
    \13\ Elaine Yu, ``Hong Kong Officials Threaten British Activist 
with National Security Law,'' Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2022; 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia 
Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020.
    \14\ Zhang Sheng and Bao Haining, ``Freedom of Speech as the Last 
Refuge of Racist Hater: GWU Asylum for Racism Reflects Double Standard 
of US Society,'' Global Times, February 10, 2022.
    \15\ Badiucao (@badiucao), ``1/ @GWtweets George Washington 
University Chinese Students and Scholars Association (GWUCSSA) . . .,'' 
Twitter, February 4, 2022, 10:44 p.m.
    \16\ Office of the President, George Washington University, 
``Message Regarding Posters Displayed on Campus,'' February 7, 2022. 
George Washington University staff reportedly removed the posters prior 
to the publication of this statement.
    \17\ See, e.g., Lahav Harkov, ``China Asks Visiting Students in 
Israel to Collect Information,'' Jerusalem Post, updated April 12, 
2022; Human Rights Watch, `` `They Don't Understand the Fear We Have': 
How China's Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedom at 
Australia's Universities,'' June 2021, i, 15.
    \18\ Qiaozhi Huashengdun GWUSCCA [George Washington University 
Chinese Students and Scholars Association], ``Spotlight 
Meizhou Subao 1/29-2/4'' [Spotlight Weekly Newsletter 
1/29-2/4], Weixin, February 4, 2022.
    \19\ ``Turkey Closes Uyghur School in Istanbul after China 
Complains,'' Radio Free Asia, February 28, 2022.
    \20\ For background information on the history of these efforts, 
see Safeguard Defenders, ``Hide and Seek: China's Extradition 
Problem,'' February 2022; Safeguard Defenders, ``Returned without 
Rights: State of Extradition to China,'' February 2022; Safeguard 
Defenders, ``Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force 
`Fugitives' overseas Back Home,'' January 2022; Safeguard Defenders, 
``Pursued for Life: Hong Kong's Global Hunt for Fugitives, the National 
Security Law, and Risk of INTERPOL Misuse,'' 2021; Safeguard Defenders, 
``No Room to Run: China's Expanded (Mis)use of INTERPOL since the Rise 
of Xi Jinping,'' 2021; Natalie Hall and Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human 
Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, `` `Your 
Family Will Suffer': How China Is Hacking, Surveilling, and 
Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal Democracies,'' 2021; Cholpon 
Orozobekova, ``Kidnapped by China: Beijing's Battle against Dissidents 
and Free Speech,'' The Diplomat, October 7, 2016.
    \21\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Saudi 
Arabia: UN Experts Say Uyghurs Must Not Be Extradited to China, Urge 
Proper Risk Assessment,'' April 1, 2022; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Morocco: UN Experts Say Extradition of 
Uyghur Asylum Seeker to China Violates Principle of Non-Refoulement,'' 
December 16, 2021; Safeguard Defenders, ``Returned without Rights: 
State of Extradition to China,'' February 2022, 12-13. See also 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/
46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, art. 3.
    \22\ Zhao Leji, ``Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shijiu Jie Zhongyang 
Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui Di Liu Ci Quanti Huiyi shang de gongzuo 
baogao'' [Work report of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Chinese 
Communist Party's 19th Central Discipline Inspection Commission], 
January 18, 2022, chap. 1, sec. 2. See also ``China's Manhunt Campaign 
Brings Back 1,273 Fugitives in 2021,'' Xinhua, February 25, 2022.
    \23\ See, e.g., Safeguard Defenders, ``Involuntary Returns: China's 
Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' overseas Back Home,'' January 
2022, 12; Edward White and Victor Mallet, ``How Xi Jinping's Anti-
Corruption Crusade Went Global,'' Financial Times, February 22, 2022; 
Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of 
Justice, ``Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Government Inside 
the U.S.,'' January 31, 2022; Cholpon Orozobekova, ``Kidnapped by 
China: Beijing's Battle against Dissidents and Free Speech,'' The 
Diplomat, October 7, 2016.
    \24\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National 
Supervisory Commission, `` `Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa' 
Shiyi: Di Liu Zhang Fan Fubai Guoji Hezuo Di Wushi'er Tiao'' [``PRC 
Supervision Law'' Interpretation: Chapter 6, International Cooperation 
to Counter Corruption, Article 52], July 4, 2018.
    \25\ See, e.g., Safeguard Defenders, ``Involuntary Returns: China's 
Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' overseas Back Home,'' January 
2022, 12; Edward White and Victor Mallet, ``How Xi Jinping's Anti-
Corruption Crusade Went Global,'' Financial Times, February 22, 2022; 
Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ``Countering Threats 
Posed by the Chinese Government Inside the U.S.,'' January 31, 2022; 
Cholpon Orozobekova, ``Kidnapped by China: Beijing's Battle against 
Dissidents and Free Speech,'' The Diplomat, October 7, 2016.
    \26\ Safeguard Defenders, ``In Cyprus, a Microcosm of China's 
Transnational Repression Crystalizes,'' April 29, 2022; Christian 
Shepherd, ``China's Aggressive Efforts to Bring Back Fugitives Grow 
More Brazen,'' Washington Post, April 29, 2022.
    \27\ Safeguard Defenders, ``In Cyprus, a Microcosm of China's 
Transnational Repression Crystalizes,'' April 29, 2022; Christian 
Shepherd, ``China's Aggressive Efforts to Bring Back Fugitives Grow 
More Brazen,'' Washington Post, April 29, 2022.
    \28\ Human Rights Watch, ``Saudi Arabia: Imminent Deportation of 
Uyghur Detainees,'' January 10, 2022. See also Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Saudi Arabia: UN Experts Say Uyghurs 
Must Not Be Extradited to China, Urge Proper Risk Assessment,'' April 
1, 2022. Some sources have also written Hemdulla as ``Hemdullah.'' See, 
e.g., Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Mandates 
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression; the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues and the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief,'' AL SAU 3/2022, March 3, 
2022.
    \29\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Saudi 
Arabia: UN Experts Say Uyghurs Must Not Be Extradited to China, Urge 
Proper Risk Assessment,'' April 1, 2022.
    \30\ Amnesty International, ``Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among 
Four `Facing Deportation' and Torture in China,'' April 4, 2022; 
Safeguard Defenders, ``Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four Facing 
Deportation to China,'' April 4, 2022.
    \31\ Ulnur Bozhykhan, ``I Exposed Torture and Rape in the Xinjiang 
Camps: the CCP Wants Me Back,'' Bitter Winter, March 31, 2022; Ulnur 
Bozhykhan, ``I told My Story in Bitter Winter, the CCP Is Taking 
Revenge on My Relatives,'' Bitter Winter, March 17, 2022; Turarbek 
Kusainov, ``Chinese Humiliation: Rape and Torture in Xinjiang's 
`Vocational Schools,' '' Bitter Winter, February 7, 2022.
    \32\ Tom Cheshire, ``How China Is Using Black Sites in the UAE as 
They Target Uyghurs Abroad,'' Sky News, February 9, 2022. ``Wang Jingyu 
yu weihunqi taoli Zhongguo zaidu tashang liuwanglu'' [Wang Jingyu and 
his fiancee fled China and are once again on the road to exile], Voice 
of America, July 23, 2021.
    \33\ Tom Cheshire, ``How China Is Using Black Sites in the UAE as 
They Target Uyghurs Abroad,'' Sky News, February 9, 2022. ``Wang Jingyu 
yu weihunqi taoli Zhongguo zaidu tashang liuwanglu'' [Wang Jingyu and 
his fiancee fled China and are once again on the road to exile], Voice 
of America, July 23, 2021.
    \34\ Linda Lew, ``Yidiresi Aishan: Rights Group Appeals to UN over 
Moroccan Court's Extradition Ruling against Uygur Dissident,'' South 
China Morning Post, December 16, 2021; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Morocco: UN Experts Say Extradition of 
Uyghur Asylum Seeker to China Violates Principle of Non-Refoulement,'' 
December 16, 2021; Reporters Without Borders, ``RSF Urges Morocco Not 
to Extradite Uyghur Journalist to China, Where He Risks Torture,'' 
December 20, 2021; Asim Kashgarian, ``Uyghur Man's Long Journey to 
Freedom May End with Return to China,'' Voice of America, updated 
January 14, 2022.
    \35\ International Criminal Police Organization, ``Red Notices,'' 
accessed April 15, 2022.
    \36\ International Criminal Police Organization, ``Red Notices,'' 
accessed April 15, 2022; International Criminal Police Organization, 
Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL, effective June 13, 1956, arts. 2-3.
    \37\ See, e.g., Christian Shepherd, ``China's Aggressive Efforts to 
Bring Back Fugitives Grow More Brazen,'' Washington Post, April 29, 
2022; Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ``Countering 
Threats Posed by the Chinese Government Inside the U.S.,'' January 31, 
2022; Safeguard Defenders, ``No Room to Run: China's Expanded (Mis)use 
of INTERPOL since the Rise of Xi Jinping,'' 2021, 3, 5.
    \38\ Zhao Leji, ``Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shijiu Jie Zhongyang 
Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui Di Liu Ci Quanti Huiyi shang de gongzuo 
baogao'' [Work report of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Chinese 
Communist Party's Nineteenth Central Discipline Inspection Commission], 
January 18, 2022, chap. 1, sec. 2; ``China's Manhunt Campaign Brings 
Back 1,273 Fugitives in 2021,'' Xinhua, February 25, 2022.
    \39\ Ian Young, ``Dozens of Interpol `Red Notices' for Chinese 
Suspects Vanish from View as Skynet Corruption Strategy Seems to 
Shift,'' South China Morning Post, February 18, 2022.
    \40\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Five Individuals Charged 
Variously with Stalking, Harassing, and Spying on U.S. Residents on 
Behalf of the PRC Secret Police,'' March 16, 2022; U.S. Department of 
Justice, ``Chinese National Charged With Acting as an Unregistered 
Agent of the Chinese Government in the United States,'' March 30, 2022; 
U.S. Department of Justice, ``U.S. Citizen and Four Chinese 
Intelligence Officers Charged with Spying on Prominent Dissidents, 
Human Rights Leaders and Pro-Democracy Activists,'' May 18, 2022.
    \41\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Five Individuals Charged 
Variously with Stalking, Harassing, and Spying on U.S. Residents on 
Behalf of the PRC Secret Police,'' March 16, 2022; U.S. Department of 
Justice, ``Chinese National Charged With Acting as an Unregistered 
Agent of the Chinese Government in the United States,'' March 30, 2022; 
U.S. Department of Justice, ``U.S. Citizen and Four Chinese 
Intelligence Officers Charged with Spying on Prominent Dissidents, 
Human Rights Leaders and Pro-Democracy Activists,'' May 18, 2022.
    \42\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Five Individuals Charged 
Variously with Stalking, Harassing, and Spying on U.S. Residents on 
Behalf of the PRC Secret Police,'' March 16, 2022; Jan Wolfe, ``Justice 
Department Accuses China of Spying on, Intimidating Dissidents Living 
in U.S.,'' March 16, 2022.
    \43\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``U.S. Citizen and Four Chinese 
Intelligence Officers Charged with Spying on Prominent Dissidents, 
Human Rights Leaders and Pro-Democracy Activists,'' May 18, 2022.
    \44\ Sally Ho, ``US Olympian Alysa Liu, Father Targeted in Chinese 
Spy Case,'' Associated Press, March 17, 2022. See also U.S. Department 
of Justice, ``Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking, 
Harassing, and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret 
Police,'' March 16, 2022; Richard Winton, ``Stalking a Skater. 
Derailing a Campaign. Destroying Art. China Is behind `Insidious' Acts, 
Feds Say,'' Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2022.
    \45\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Chinese National Charged With 
Acting as an Unregistered Agent of the Chinese Government in the United 
States,'' March 30, 2022.
    \46\ See, e.g., Alan Beattie, ``Australia Offers Timely Lessons in 
Resisting Chinese Trade Coercion,'' Financial Times, February 9, 2022; 
Andy Bounds, ``Lithuania Complains of Trade `Sanctions' by China after 
Taiwan Dispute,'' Financial Times, December 3, 2021; ``Case Study: 
China's Economic Coercion against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 14, 2022. For more 
information, see How China Uses Economic Coercion to Silence Critics 
and Achieve Its Political Aims Globally, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021).
    \47\ See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley 
Feng, Center for a New American Security, ``A New Arsenal for 
Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China 
Relationship,'' April 24, 2020, 5; Murray Scot Tanner, ``Economic 
Coercion: Factors Affecting Success and Failure,'' in Chinese Economic 
Coercion against Taiwan: a Tricky Weapon to Use (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2007), 11-12; Darren Lim, Zack Cooper, and Ashley Feng, 
United States Studies Center, University of Sydney, ``Trust and 
Diversify: a Geoeconomic Strategy for the Australia-US Alliance,'' 
September 2021, 7.
    \48\ Darren Lim, Zack Cooper, and Ashley Feng, United States 
Studies Center, University of Sydney, ``Trust and Diversify: a 
Geoeconomic Strategy for the Australia-US Alliance,'' September 2021, 
7-8.
    \49\ Ralph Jennings, ``China-Australia Relations: US Exports Ease 
the Pain of China Trade Reduction, but Not Enough,'' South China 
Morning Post, April 9, 2022; Alan Beattie, ``Australia Offers Timely 
Lessons in Resisting Chinese Trade Coercion,'' Financial Times, 
February 9, 2022.
    \50\ Jonathan Kearsley, Eryk Bagshaw, and Anthony Galloway, `` `If 
You Make China the Enemy, China Will Be the Enemy': Beijing's Fresh 
Threat to Australia,'' Sydney Morning Herald, November 18, 2020; Brett 
Worthington, ``Marise Payne Calls for Global Inquiry into China's 
Handling of the Coronavirus Outbreak,'' ABC News, updated April 19, 
2020.
    \51\ Ye Xue, Lowy Institute, ``China's Economic Sanctions Made 
Australia More Confident,'' Interpreter, October 22, 2021; Su-Lin Tan, 
``China-Australia Relations: What's Happened over the Past Year, and 
What's the Outlook?'' South China Morning Post, April 20, 2021; Ron 
Wickes, Mike Adams, and Nicolas Brown, Institute for International 
Trade, University of Adelaide, ``Economic Coercion by China: the Impact 
on Australia's Merchandise Exports,'' July 2021, 3.
    \52\ For a more detailed discussion of this case, see ``Case Study: 
China's Economic Coercion against Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 14, 2022.
    \53\ Liza Lin, ``Walmart Sparks Public Outcry in China over 
Products from Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2021; 
``Chinese Consumers Shrug Off Sam's Club's `No-Membership-
Reapplication' Warning as Anger Continues to Boil Up over Xinjiang 
Products Removal,'' Global Times, updated January 4, 2022.
    \54\ Liza Lin, ``Walmart Sparks Public Outcry in China over 
Products from Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2021; 
``Chinese Consumers Shrug Off Sam's Club's `No-Membership-
Reapplication' Warning as Anger Continues to Boil Up over Xinjiang 
Products Removal,'' Global Times, updated January 4, 2022.
    \55\ Hu Xijin, ``Yingte'er jinzhi gongyinglian caigou shiyong 
Xinjiang chanpin, Hu Xijin: Yingte'er hen xiaozhang'' [Intel prohibits 
the purchasing and use of Xinjiang products in its supply chain, Hu 
Xijin: Intel is very arrogant], Hu Xijin Observes, reprinted in Sina, 
December 22, 2021; ``Intel's Xinjiang Statement Full of Calculations 
and Speculations: Global Times Editorial,'' Global Times, December 23, 
2021; Chen Li, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and 
National Supervisory Commission, ``Shanmu Huiyuandian eyi xiajia 
Xinjiang chanpin: yuanze lichang wenti burong hanhu'' [Sam's Club 
maliciously removes Xinjiang products from shelves: issues concerning 
principle and stance must not be left ambiguous], December 31, 2021.
    \56\ Chen Li, ``Shanmu Huiyuandian eyi xiajia Xinjiang chanpin: 
yuanze lichang wenti burong hanhu'' [Sam's Club maliciously removes 
Xinjiang products from shelves: issues concerning principle and stance 
must not be left ambiguous], Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection and National Supervisory Commission, December 31, 2021; Eva 
Xiao, ``H&M Is Erased from Chinese E-Commerce over Xinjiang Stance,'' 
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2021. See also U.S. Department of State, 
``Department Press Briefing--March 26, 2021,'' March 26, 2021.
    \57\ Shunsuke Tabeta, ``Beijing Slams 7-Eleven for Labeling Taiwan 
a Country on Website,`` Nikkei Asia, January 7, 2022.
    \58\ ``Taiwan Opens Lithuania Representative Office Using Its Own 
Name,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France 24, November 18, 
2021.
    \59\ See, e.g., Andy Bounds, ``Lithuania Complains of Trade 
`Sanctions' by China after Taiwan Dispute,'' Financial Times, December 
3, 2021; Joe Miller, Guy Chazan, and Andy Bounds, ``German Business 
Hits Out at China after Lithuania Trade Row Snares Exports,'' Financial 
Times, December 17, 2021; Jakob Hanke Vela, Giorgio Leali, and Stuart 
Lau, ``France Eyes Quick Anti-China Action to Bail Out Lithuania in 
Trade War,'' Politico, January 6, 2022.
    \60\ ``China, Russia Can Cooperate to Punish Lithuania: Global 
Times Editorial,'' Global Times, August 11, 2021.
    \61\ Finbarr Bermingham, ``Keeping Big Brothers at Bay: Why 
Lithuania Is Taking on China,'' South China Morning Post, December 1, 
2021.
    \62\ Li Hongyang, ``Mainland Issues Temporary Ban on Import of 
Taiwan Pineapples,'' China Daily, February 26, 2021; Dalton Lin, 
``Commentary: China's Pineapple Ban Another Pickle in Relations With 
Taiwan,'' CNA, April 19, 2021.
    \63\ Andrius Sytas and John O'Donnell, ``Exclusive: China Pressures 
Germany's Continental to Cut Out Lithuania,'' Reuters, December 17, 
2021.
    \64\ Finbarr Bermingham, ``Lithuanian Exports Nearly Obliterated 
from China Market amid Taiwan Row,'' South China Morning Post, January 
21, 2022; ``Taiwan Opens Lithuania Representative Office Using Its Own 
Name,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France 24, November 18, 
2021.
    \65\ Andy Bounds, Richard Milne, and Kathrin Hille, ``Brussels 
Challenges China at WTO over Block on Lithuania Imports,'' Financial 
Times, January 27, 2022; ``EU Files a WTO Case against China for 
Targeting Lithuania,'' Al Jazeera, January 27, 2022.
    \66\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Dave Lawler, ``Exclusive: 
Marriott Refused To Host Uyghur Conference, Citing `Political 
Neutrality,' '' Axios, November 18, 2021.
    \67\ For more information on Ai Weiwei, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00334.
    \68\ Oliver Telling, ``British Publishers Censor Books for Western 
Readers to Appease China,'' Financial Times, March 14, 2022.
    \69\ John Feng and Marlaine Glicksman, ``Moleskine Erases Taiwan 
from Diaries after Listing It as Province of China,'' Newsweek, January 
14, 2022.
    \70\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data Security Law], passed June 10, 
2021, effective September 1, 2021.
    \71\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data Security Law], passed June 10, 
2021, effective September 1, 2021, chap. 1, art. 2.
    \72\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data Security Law], passed June 10, 
2021, effective September 1, 2021, chap. 3, art. 21.
    \73\ See, e.g., Raphael Viana David, International Service for 
Human Rights, ``China's Abuse of National Security to Curtail Human 
Rights: 4 Things You Need to Know,'' January 27, 2022; Helena Legarda, 
Mercator Institute for China Studies, ``China's New International 
Paradigm: Security First,'' June 15, 2021; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN Rights Chief Concerned by `Broad 
Scope' of China's New Security Law,'' July 7, 2015.
    \74\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data Security Law], passed June 10, 
2021, effective September 1, 2021, chap. 3, art. 25.
    \75\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data Security Law], passed June 10, 
2021, effective September 1, 2021, chap. 4, arts. 27, 29, 30, chap. 6, 
art. 45.
    \76\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal Information Protection 
Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective November 1, 2021.
    \77\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal Information Protection 
Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective November 1, 2021, chap. 1, art. 
3.
    \78\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal Information Protection 
Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective November 1, 2021, chap. 1, art. 
10.
    \79\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal Information Protection 
Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective November 1, 2021, chap. 3, art. 
43.
    \80\ Xu Ke et al., International Association of Privacy 
Professionals, ``Analyzing China's PIPL and How It Compares to the EU's 
GDPR,'' August 24, 2021; Lingling Wei, ``China's New Power Play: More 
Control of Tech Companies' Troves of Data,'' Wall Street Journal, June 
12, 2021; Natasha Lomas, ``China Passes Data Protection Law,'' 
TechCrunch, August 20, 2021.
    \81\ Fan Lingzhi and Liu Xin, ``[Jieju] Meiguo jie suowei `qiangpo 
laodong' dui Xinjiang jichu efa, women gai ruhe yingdui?'' [Analysis: 
when the United States uses so-called `forced labor' as excuse to 
produce malicious law against Xinjiang, how should we respond?], Global 
Times, December 24, 2021; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Waiguo Zhicai 
Fa [PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed June 10, 2021, effective 
June 10, 2021. See also ``Case Study: China's Economic Coercion against 
Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, April 14, 2022.
    \82\ Ma Ziqing, ``Zhongfang xuanbu yiju `Fan Waiguo Zhicai Fa' dui 
4 ming Meifang renyuan jinxing duideng zhicai'' [China announces 
reciprocal sanctions against 4 Americans under the ``Anti-Foreign 
Sanctions Law''], China Youth Daily, December 21, 2021; U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions Perpetrators of Serious Human 
Rights Abuse on International Human Rights Day,'' December 10, 2021; 
``Beijing Sanctions Lockheed, Raytheon Again over Taiwan Arms Sales,'' 
Reuters, February 21, 2022.
    \83\ See, e.g., Brad Parks, Ammar A. Malik, and Alex Wooley, 
AidData, College of William & Mary, ``Is Beijing a Predatory Lender? 
New Evidence from a Previously Undisclosed Loan Contract for the 
Entebbe International Airport Upgrading and Expansion Project,'' 
February 27, 2022, 2-3; Colectivo sobre Financiamiento e Inversiones 
Chinas, Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, Federacion Internacional por los 
Derechos Humanos, and International Service for Human Rights, 
``Derechos Humanos y Actividades Empresariales Chinas en Latinoamerica: 
Casos de Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru y Venezuela: Informe de Mitad de Periodo del Examen Periodico 
Universal de la Republica Popular de China'' [Human rights and Chinese 
corporate activities in Latin America: Cases from Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela: People's 
Republic of China Universal Periodic Review Midterm Report], February 
2022; Kathrin Hille and David Pilling, ``China Applies Brakes to Africa 
Lending,'' Financial Times, January 11, 2022; European Parliament, 
Resolution of 16 December 21 on Forced Labour in the Linglong Tire 
Factory and Environmental Protests in Serbia, December 16, 2021; 
Environmental Investigation Agency, ``Lethal Remedy: How the Promotion 
of Some Traditional Chinese Medicine in Africa Poses a Major Threat to 
Endangered Wildlife,'' November 2021, 4; Liza Lin, Yifan Wang, and Jon 
Emont, ``Chinese Workers Say They Are Lured Abroad and Exploited for 
Belt and Road Jobs,'' Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2021; Ammar A. 
Malik et al., AidData, College of William & Mary, ``Banking on the Belt 
and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese 
Development Projects,'' September 2021, 1; Business & Human Rights 
Resource Centre, `` `Going Out' Responsibly: the Human Rights Impact of 
China's Global Investments,'' August 2021, 5; Rebecca W. Y. Wong, 
``Shadow Operations in Wildlife Trade under China's Belt and Road 
Initiative,'' China Information 35(2) (2021): 202.
    \84\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``Underwater: Human Rights 
Impacts of a China Belt and Road Project in Cambodia,'' August 10, 
2021; China Labor Watch, ``Silent Victims of Labor Trafficking: China's 
Belt and Road Workers Stranded Overseas amid Covid-19 Pandemic,'' April 
30, 2021; Rebecca W. Y. Wong, ``Shadow Operations in Wildlife Trade 
under China's Belt and Road Initiative,'' China Information 35(2) 
(2021); Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger, Asia Society Policy 
Institute, ``Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative,'' June 2019, 11, 
13-15; Anna Gelpern et al., AidData, College of William & Mary, Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy, Center for Global Development, and 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, ``How China Lends: a 
Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments,'' March 
2021, 2.
    \85\ Ammar A. Malik et al., AidData, College of William & Mary, 
``Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 
13,427 Chinese Development Projects,'' September 2021, 1; Business & 
Human Rights Resource Centre, `` `Going Out' Responsibly: the Human 
Rights Impact of China's Global Investments,'' August 2021, 3; Daniel 
R. Russel and Blake Berger, Asia Society Policy Institute, ``Navigating 
the Belt and Road Initiative,'' June 2019, 7.
    \86\ Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, ``Angola: Two Caculo 
Cabassa Dam Construction Workers Killed in Police Repression of Protest 
for Better Working Conditions,'' June 26, 2022; Avelino Miguel, ``Nova 
Manifestacao no Kwanza Norte Faz pelo Menos Dois Mortos'' [New 
demonstration in Kwanza Norte results in at least two dead], Radio 
France Internationale, May 28, 2022; Business & Human Rights Resource 
Centre, ``China Gezhouba Group Did Not Respond,'' June 26, 2022; CB 
Insights, ``China Gezhouba Group,'' accessed July 13, 2022.
    \87\ European Parliament, Resolution of 16 December 21 on Forced 
Labour in the Linglong Tire Factory and Environmental Protests in 
Serbia, December 16, 2021. See also Andrew Higgins, `` `Miserable and 
Dangerous': a Failed Chinese Promise in Serbia,'' New York Times, 
January 22, 2022.
    \88\ Maja Zivanovic, ``$3bn Economic Agreements Boost China's Role 
in Serbia,'' Balkan Insight, September 18, 2018.
    \89\ Andrew Higgins, `` `Miserable and Dangerous': a Failed Chinese 
Promise in Serbia,'' New York Times, January 22, 2022; China Energy 
Engineering Corporation Limited, ``Overview,'' accessed May 11, 2022; 
Fitch Ratings, ``China Energy Engineering Corporation Limited,'' 
October 3, 2021.
    \90\ Eric Lipton and Dionne Searcey, ``Chinese Company Removed as 
Operator of Cobalt Mine in Congo,'' New York Times, February 28, 2022. 
See also Dionne Searcey, Michael Forsythe, and Eric Lipton, ``A Power 
Struggle over Cobalt Rattles the Clean Energy Revolution,'' New York 
Times, updated December 7, 2021; China Molybdenum Co., Ltd, ``About 
Us,'' accessed May 11, 2022.
    \91\ RAID and CAJJ, ``The Road to Ruin? Electric Vehicles and 
Worker Rights' Abuses at DR Congo's Industrial Cobalt Mines,'' November 
2021, 25; Child Labor and Human Rights Violations in the Mining 
Industry of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Hearing of the Tom Lantos 
Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 
(2022) (testimony of Thea Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for International 
Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Labor).
    \92\ Maxwell Radwin, ``China-Funded Dam Could Disrupt Key Argentine 
Glaciers and Biodiversity,'' Mongabay, May 12, 2022.
    \93\ Fitch Ratings, ``Aluminum Corporation of China,'' October 15, 
2019.
    \94\ ``Con Bloqueo en la Carretera Central, Comunidad Campesina de 
Morococha Protesta Contra Chinalco'' [Blocking the central highway, 
rural Morococha community protests against Chinalco], Gestion, March 
24, 2022.
    \95\ State Council, ``Zhongyiyao fazhan zhanlue guihua gangyao 
(2016-2030 nian)'' [Outline of the plan for the strategy for 
development of Chinese medicine (2016-2030)], issued February 22, 2016, 
chap. 1.
    \96\ Environmental Investigation Agency, ``Lethal Remedy: How the 
Promotion of Some Traditional Chinese Medicine in Africa Poses a Major 
Threat to Endangered Wildlife,'' November 2021, 4.
    \97\ Dionne Searcey, Michael Forsythe, and Eric Lipton, ``A Power 
Struggle over Cobalt Rattles the Clean Energy Revolution,'' New York 
Times, updated December 7, 2021.
    \98\ Eric Lipton and Dionne Searcey, ``Chinese Company Removed as 
Operator of Cobalt Mine in Congo,'' New York Times, February 28, 2022.
    \99\ See, e.g., Tate Ryan-Mosley, ``This Huge Chinese Company Is 
Selling Video Surveillance Systems to Iran,'' MIT Technology Review, 
December 15, 2021; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Major Camera Company Can Sort 
People by Race, Alert Police When It Spots Uighurs,'' Los Angeles 
Times, February 9, 2021; ``Dahua Provides `Uyghur Warnings' to China 
Police,'' IPVM, February 9, 2021; ``Dahua Racist Uyghur Tracking 
Revealed,'' IPVM, November 4, 2020; Charles Rollet, ``Hikvision Markets 
Uyghur Ethnicity Analytics, Now Covers Up,'' IPVM, November 11, 2019; 
``Huawei / Megvii Uyghur Alarms,'' IPVM, December 8, 2020; ``Huawei 
shipin yun jiejue fang'an yu kuangshi dongtai renlian shibie xitong 
hutong ceshi baogao'' [Huawei video cloud solution and Megvii Dynamic 
face recognition interoperability test report], Huawei, January 8, 
2018, 5; CECC, 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 216.
    \100\ Charles Rollet, ``Tiandy's Iran Business, Sells to 
Revolutionary Guard and Military,'' IPVM, December 6, 2021; Tate Ryan-
Mosley, ``This Huge Chinese Company Is Selling Video Surveillance 
Systems to Iran,'' MIT Technology Review, December 15, 2021; Scott 
Ikeda, ``Chinese Company Found to be Selling Video Surveillance Systems 
to Iran; Product Line Includes `Ethnicity Tracking,' Accessories for 
Torture Chairs,'' CPO Magazine, January 6, 2022. The Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps was designated a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization on April 15, 2019. See United States Department of State, 
``Foreign Terrorist Organizations,'' accessed August 9, 2022.
    \101\ Mila Djurdjevic, Sandra Cvetkovic, and Andy Heil, ``Serbia's 
Back-Door Bid to Embed Chinese Snooping Tools in Kosovo,'' Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, January 8, 2022.
    \102\ Big Brother Watch, ``Who's Watching You? The Dominance of 
Chinese State-Owned CCTV in the UK,'' February 7, 2022, 5, 31.
    \103\ Privacy International, ``Mapping Huawei's Smart Cities 
Creep,'' November 17, 2021; Roukaya Kasenally, ``The Trappings of the 
Mauritius Safe City Project,'' Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 
January 18, 2022, 2-8.
    \104\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021 
Report to Congress, November 2021, 69, 101; U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 2020 Report to Congress, December 2020, 
153-154.
    \105\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021 
Report to Congress, November 2021, 93.
    \106\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021 
Report to Congress, November 2021, 79.
    \107\ Human Rights Watch, ``The Costs of International Advocacy: 
China's Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,'' 
September 5, 2017.
    \108\ Nadege Rolland, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 
``China's Vision for a New World Order,'' NBR Special Report, no. 83, 
January 2020, 36, 39-40. For information on different English 
translations of renlei mingyun gongtongti, see Stella Chen, ``Community 
of Common Destiny for Mankind,'' China Media Project, August 25, 2021.
    \109\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 124; Yu-Jie Chen, `` 
`Authoritarian International Law' in Action? Tribal Politics in the 
Human Rights Council,'' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 54, no. 
5 (2021), 1203; International Service for Human Rights, ``Briefing 
Note: China and the UN Economic and Social Council,'' July 2021.
    \110\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 124.
    \111\ Rana Siu Inboden, ``China at the UN: Choking Civil Society,'' 
Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (July 2021): 124, 125; International 
Service for Human Rights, ``Briefing Note: China and the UN Economic 
and Social Council,'' July 2021, 14-15.
    \112\ Yu-Jie Chen, `` `Authoritarian International Law' in Action? 
Tribal Politics in the Human Rights Council,'' Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 54, no. 5 (2021), 1203, 1229.
    \113\ International Service for Human Rights, ``Briefing Note: 
China and the UN Economic and Social Council,'' July 2021, 8-14.
    \114\ See, e.g., Amanda Macias, ``U.S. Secretary of State Blinken 
Warns of Mounting Russian Human Rights Abuses in Ukraine,'' CNBC, March 
1, 2022; Marti Flacks, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
``Will There Be Accountability for Russian Abuses in Ukraine?'' 
February 28, 2022; Amnesty International, ``Russia/Ukraine: Invasion of 
Ukraine Is an Act of Aggression and Human Rights Catastrophe,'' March 
1, 2022; Lorenzo Tondo, ``Dozens of Bucha Civilians Were Killed by 
Metal Darts from Russian Artillery,'' Guardian, April 24, 2022.
    \115\ UN Human Rights Council, Resolution Adopted by UN Human 
Rights Council on March 4, 2022, A/HRC/RES/49/1, March 7, 2022, para. 
11.
    \116\ UN General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by UN General 
Assembly on April 7, 2022,
A/RES/ES-11/3, April 8, 2022, para. 1; ``Suspension of the Rights of 
Membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council: 
Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly,'' UN Digital Library, 
accessed April 20, 2022.
    \117\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on April 11, 2022,'' April 11, 
2022.
    \118\ See, e.g., Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, 
``China's Echoes of Russia's Alternate Reality Intensify around the 
World,'' New York Times, April 11, 2022; ``Minitrue: Keep Weibo Posts 
on Ukraine Favorable to Russia; Control Comments,'' China Digital 
Times, February 22, 2022. See also Xiaoshan Huang, Chingman, and Hsia 
Hsiao-hwa, ``China Bans Online Criticism of Russia, Blames US for 
Fueling Ukraine `Tensions,' '' Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2022; Kai 
Wang, ``Ukraine: How China Is Censoring Online Discussion of the War,'' 
BBC, March 12, 2022; Zhifan Luo and Muyang Li, ``Online Posts May Not 
Reflect Chinese Opinion when It Comes to the Russian Invasion of 
Ukraine,'' The Conversation, March 30, 2022.
    \119\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Text of the Third Revised Draft 
Legally Binding Instrument with the Textual Proposals Submitted by 
States during the Seventh Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights,'' A/HRC/49/65/Add.1, February 
28, 2022. For the pre-
proposal draft text, see UN Human Rights Council, ``OEIGWG Chairmanship 
Third Revised Draft: Legally Binding Instrument To Regulate, In 
International Human Rights Law, The Activities Of Transnational 
Corporations And Other Business Enterprises,'' August 17, 2021.
    \120\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Text of the Third Revised Draft 
Legally Binding Instrument with the Textual Proposals Submitted by 
States during the Seventh Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights,'' A/HRC/49/65/Add.1, February 
28, 2022, PP3, para. 4, PP12, para. 3, art. 1.1, para. 5, art. 1.2, 
para. 4, art. 1.3, para. 4, art. 2.1(d), para. 6, art. 2.1(e), para. 4, 
art. 5.1, para. 3, art. 5.2, para. 1, art. 5.3, para. 1, art. 8.4, 
para. 1.

Additional Views of Commission Members

Additional Views of Commission Members

              XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members

               Additional Views of Senator James Lankford

    I wholeheartedly support the important work of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in 
monitoring human rights and rule of law in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). This year's Annual Report (``the 
Report'') should be one of the most important to date due to 
the escalating severity of ongoing issues in the PRC. While, 
several areas of the Report effectively address the most 
concerning trends in the PRC, each year the Report expands to 
cover areas which I believe to be outside the mandate of the 
CECC. Therefore, I will abstain from voting on this year's 
Annual Report.
    Last year, I reluctantly voted yes on the report and 
submitted an accompanying statement. It was my hope that the 
statement would help refocus the CECC on the most egregious 
human rights abuses happening in the PRC. Unfortunately, this 
year's Report seems to once again be a platform for arbitrating 
social and political issues that are contentious in the United 
States. The Report continues to contain citations of reports by 
United Nations Treaty Monitoring bodies or Independent Experts, 
the inclusion of these non-binding reports divert attention 
away from China's failure to meet its hard-law obligations. The 
Report, also, continues to identify United States' insistence 
and PRC cooperation on the adoption of human rights legislation 
as a solution to changing human rights situations in China but 
the PRC routinely uses the absence of rule of law to cover up 
human rights abuses and deny their existence.
    Essentially, the scope of the CECC reporting has expanded 
too far, which jeopardizes its effectiveness. There is no 
greater threat to the United States and the cause of freedom 
than the CCP. It is essential that we focus on the most serious 
and egregious human rights abuses, such as the ongoing 
genocide, crimes against humanity, eugenics and organ 
harvesting--to name a few. The CECC should prioritize 
documenting the CCP's unspeakable crimes against Uyghurs, 
Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, Christians, journalists, 
defense lawyers, and others who suffer grave abuses for China's 
forced assimilation policies.
    For these reasons, I abstain from voting on this year's 
Annual Report.