[Senate Prints 116-48]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
116th Congress } { S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session } { 116-48
_______________________________________________________________________
GLOBAL FORCED MIGRATION
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME
__________
A MINORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
SECOND SESSION
June 18, 2020
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-888 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio TIM KAINE, Virginia
RAND PAUL, Kentucky EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TED CRUZ, Texas CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Chapter One--The Scale of Today's Forced Migration Crisis........ 13
Chapter Two--Trends in Forced Migration.......................... 17
Why More People Are Fleeing: The Changing Nature of Conflict
and Violence............................................... 17
Climate Change's Impact on Forced Migration.................. 24
Internally Displaced Persons Under-Recognized................ 27
New Challenges for Forced Migrants........................... 29
Chapter Three--Human Rights Denied............................... 33
Pervasive Restrictions on Freedom of Movement................ 33
Obstacles to Accessing Identity Documentation................ 34
Barriers for Accessing Healthcare and Education.............. 36
Widespread Lack of Livelihood Opportunities and Barriers to
Work....................................................... 39
Gender-Based Violence: An Under-Recognized Risk.............. 42
High Risks of Human Trafficking.............................. 45
Chapter Four--Inadequate and Inconsistent International Responses 49
Diplomatic Deficit Resulting in Persistent Conflicts and
Impunity................................................... 50
Insufficient and Inflexible Humanitarian Funding............. 51
Aid Effectiveness and Humanitarian Sector Reform............. 53
Need for Expanded International Legal Protections............ 55
Shrinking Access to Traditional Solutions.................... 63
Inconsistent Country-level Responses to Forced Migration..... 66
Chapter Five--The Trump Administration's Domestic Agenda:
Blocking All Pathways to Refuge................................ 73
The Trump Administration's Decimation of Existing Programs... 74
The Impact of Trump Administration Policies at the U.S.
Border..................................................... 85
The Positive Contributions of Refugees and Immigrants in the
United States.............................................. 97
Damage to U.S. Military Interests............................ 100
Chapter Six--The Trump Administration's Global Retreat from
Forced Migration............................................... 103
Repeated Attempts to Cut U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Funding 103
Withdrawal from International Fora........................... 106
The International Implications of the Administration's
Retreat.................................................... 109
(iii)
Chapter Seven--Current Innovative Efforts........................ 117
New Compacts to Improve International Coordination & Response 117
Innovative Models of Financial Assistance.................... 119
The Compact Model............................................ 122
Solutions to Better Serve Forced Migrants.................... 124
Incorporating Technology..................................... 128
Increasing Private Sector Participation...................... 132
Findings & Recommendations....................................... 137
Findings..................................................... 137
Recommendations.............................................. 140
Acronyms & Initialisms........................................... 147
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, June 18, 2020.
Dear Colleagues: The United States must revive its global
and moral leadership to address the urgent plight of millions
of people forced to flee their homes due to conflict, violence,
persecution, and severe climate-related events. This global
forced migration crisis is one of the most profound and least
understood challenges of our time. More than ever before,
conflict and violence are driving people from their homes and
forcing them to live decades in displacement. Warring parties
are consistently ignoring humanitarian laws designed to protect
civilians during conflict, leading to civilian casualties, the
destruction of critical infrastructure, and mass displacement.
Other drivers of forced migration, including generalized
violence and severe climate-related events, such as droughts,
flooding, extreme weather, and rising sea levels, show no signs
of abating. Meanwhile, the global response has not kept pace
with the enormity of need. The international community and
national authorities have failed to address these causes of
displacement. International organizations and host countries
are struggling to protect and facilitate solutions for a
growing population of forced migrants. More than ever before,
U.S. leadership is needed to foster and catalyze a global
coalition to address this crisis.
Since its founding, the United States has offered freedom
and opportunity to people around the world fleeing danger. Our
history of welcoming desperate people with open arms--from
European Jews following World War II to Indochinese boat people
to Kosovar victims of ethnic cleansing--has reinforced our
reputation as a place of refuge. Many of those who originally
came to the United States seeking protection have gone on to
become shining beacons for our nation--artists, innovators,
public servants, and even representatives of the U.S.
government. The Trump administration, however, has departed
sharply from this historical precedent, abdicating U.S.
leadership and undermining a global response. Available legal
pathways for asylum, refugee resettlement, and protection in
the United States have been severed. Refugees from Muslim-
majority countries, including those fleeing atrocities in
Syria, have been barred. Small children have been forcibly
separated from their families and held in detention centers.
Migrants fleeing violence and threats to their lives have been
returned by the United States to dangerous border encampments
in Mexico, waiting for decisions on their applications for
months or even years.
(v)
Given this challenging landscape, I directed my senior
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member for
Migration & Human Rights, Charlotte Oldham-Moore, and SFRC
Democratic Staff to prepare a comprehensive report on the
global forced migration crisis. In conducting research for this
report, SFRC Democratic Staff interviewed dozens of migration
and humanitarian experts, analyzed key documents and reports,
and carried out research trips to Colombia, Tunisia, Egypt,
Bangladesh, Mexico, and Ethiopia, meeting with U.S. and
national, provincial, and municipal government officials,
United Nations and international nongovernmental organization
representatives, as well as forced migrants and their host
communities. I also want to thank Marisa Lowe, Judith Williams,
and the SFRC Democratic Staff for their work on this report.
The result of this research is a comprehensive report that
lays bare the facts of today's global forced migration crisis,
the drivers of displacement, the trends impacting the
situations of forced migrants, the international community's
response, and the Trump administration's retreat. It describes
a global forced migration crisis that is, at its crux, a
political crisis requiring political solutions to confront the
drivers of forced migration, as well as address the large
numbers living in displacement.
This report makes the case for urgent and sweeping action
on the global forced migration crisis and argues the need for
the United States to make a dramatic course correction in
leading this global response. The report also makes timely
recommendations for Congress, the Executive Branch, the United
Nations, and other stakeholders to improve policies on forced
migration. Today, there must be a bipartisan sense of urgency
for renewed U.S. efforts to reform our domestic policies and
international engagement relating to migration. Ignoring the
plight of millions of forced migrants worldwide will only
ensure that our future--the world's and the United States'--
will be far less secure and far bleaker. As the world grapples
with global crisis, we must come together in global solidarity
and remember those among us who have experienced the utmost
dangers and require protection.
Sincerely,
Robert Menendez,
Ranking Member.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A young Afghan girl waits to receive assistance at her returnee and
refugee village on the outskirts of Farah City in western Afghanistan.
Lt. j.g. Matthew Stroup, 130209-N-LR347-329, U.S. Navy, Feb. 9, 2013.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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A girl born in a refugee camp lives her whole life in a
temporary shelter, waiting to return home to a community she
has never known, a community repeatedly ravaged by war. A
farmer leaves his village when insurgents arrive, then searches
and fails to find shelter, water, and food. He is told to
return home and is then displaced again by conflict, cycling
back and forth in continuous, destitute movement. A nurse,
terrorized by gang violence outside her home and domestic
violence inside her home, fears for her and her daughter's
lives and leaves. They are turned away at the border, forced to
wait, living in perilous tent encampments on the border, and
finally deported back to danger. A fisherman is forced from
their coastal community due to rising sea levels--they are no
longer able to find sufficient potable water for their family
to drink. They move to an urban slum to live amongst thousands
of others who have suffered the same plight. A local official
is forced to leave her island after tropical storm after
tropical storm forces her to come to terms with the fact that
her home is no longer inhabitable. She struggles to not only
find somewhere for herself and her family, but for her whole
island's population--now forced to flee. No one is willing to
provide them safe haven. The rich countries have closed their
borders and erected walls that thousands of individuals attempt
to circumvent daily. The poorer countries are inundated, less
stable, and unable to provide services or safety. Thousands die
each year attempting to find some place that will accept them.
Millions are subjected to violence and abuse. Millions of
children go uneducated.
These are the stories of forced migrants today. The
exponentially increasing number of men, women, and children
forced from their homes due to conflict, persecution, and
severe climate-related weather events is one of the most
profound and least understood challenges facing the world.
Despite the global upheaval this crisis presents, too few
political leaders, policymakers, and members of the public are
aware of the facts. By the end of 2018, 70.8 million people
were forcibly displaced across the world, including 25.9
million refugees, 41.3 million internally displaced persons
(IDPs), and 3.5 million asylum seekers.\1\ These figures may
not include, however, forced migrants who are not recognized
under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its accompanying
international legal framework, such as those fleeing
generalized violence or severe climate-related events. The
forced migrant crisis will continue to swell as existing
conflicts continue, new conflicts arise, and the impacts of
climate change spur new conflicts, render communities
uninhabitable, and cause severe weather events. In the absence
of swift, effective action, the number of forced migrants could
climb to more than 300 million over the next decade--a
population nearly equal to that of the entire United States.\2\
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\1\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global
Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2, 65-66, 68-69 (June 2019).
This number also includes 25.9 million refugees and 3.5 million asylum-
seekers. Id. Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A Guide to International
Refugee Protection and Building State Asylum Systems, Inter-
Parliamentary Union and UNHCR, at 11, 16 (2017).
\2\ Erol K. Yayboke & Aaron N. Milner, Confronting the Global
Forced Migration Crisis: A Report of the CSIS Task Force on the Global
Forced Migration Crisis, Center for Strategic & International Studies
(CSIS), at 33 (May 2018). Yayboke & Miller (2018) projections based on
extrapolations from trends found in UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced
Displacement in 2016 (June 19, 2017); U.S. Census Bureau, ``World and
Population Clock,'' https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited June
9, 2020).
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Faced with the magnitude of today's global forced migration
crisis, many countries, including the United States, have
chosen to turn their backs on these desperate and resilient
people. The loss of support from key world leaders has dealt a
startling blow to an international community already struggling
to address the drivers of forced migration, and to protect and
find permanent solutions for forced migrants. Without a
significant course correction towards robust U.S. leadership
and an engaged international community, the global forced
migration challenges we face today will compound in coming
decades. If we fail to act, the crisis will not only pose
serious risks to the many million forced migrant lives at
stake, but will inevitably challenge global stability, economic
growth, and U.S. national security.
Today's forced migration crisis is driven by several
factors, including increasingly frequent and intense conflict,
as well as climate change. From 2013 to 2018, the number of
active conflicts worldwide increased by 53 percent from 34 to
52 conflicts.\3\ As of 2013, the average length of conflict was
37 years.\4\ State and non-state actors alike are more
blatantly violating international humanitarian law and
deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure,
such as medical facilities and schools.\5\ In 2018, a record-
breaking 12,000-plus children were killed or maimed by
conflict.\6\ Nearly 31 million children were displaced at the
end of 2017.\7\ Furthermore, the effects of climate change,
including more frequent and severe natural disasters, are
increasingly forcing people to flee their homes.\8\ In 2016, 24
million people were newly displaced due to sudden-onset natural
disasters--outnumbering new displacement associated with
conflict and violence by 3 to 1.\9\ Unfortunately, there is no
clear end or reversal in sight for any of these trends.
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\3\ Scott Gates et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2014, Peace
Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2016). Harvard Strand et al., Trends in
Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
\4\ Christina Bennett et al., Time to Let Go: Remaking Humanitarian
Action for the Modern Era, Overseas Development Institute, at 29 (Apr.
2016).
\5\ David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue
Committee, ``Welcome to the Age of Impunity,'' Remarks at the World
Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 24, 2020.
\6\ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA), Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 11 (Dec. 2019).
\7\ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Data: Child
Displacement, https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-
displacement/displacement/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
\8\ United States Geological Survey, ``How Can Climate Change
Affect Natural Disasters?,'' https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-can-climate-
change-affect-natural-disasters-1?qt-news--science--products=0#qt-
news--science--products (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
\9\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ``Disasters and
Climate Change,'' https://www.internal-displacement.org/disasters-and-
climate-change (last visited Apr. 13, 2020); UNHCR, ``Climate change
and disaster displacement,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-
change-and-disasters.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
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International bodies, such as the United Nations (UN)
Security Council, are struggling to effectively address drivers
of forced migration, including prolonged conflicts, proxy wars,
violations of international humanitarian law, and climate
change.\10\ Furthermore, the situations of those already
displaced have continued to worsen. Despite specific
conventions affording refugees international protection,
refugees are frequently denied access to rights and
services.\11\ Without international accountability, the
situation of vulnerable refugees continues to deteriorate.\12\
Yet the circumstances are far worse for those without formal
international protections, including those forcibly displaced
within their countries (IDPs), as well as those forced to flee
due to severe climate change-related events and generalized
violence.\13\ Although some countries and regions have taken
steps to provide IDPs with protection, many still, including
the United States, have yet to recognize and address these
vulnerable populations.\14\ Moreover, the traditional solutions
for refugees--voluntary return, resettlement in a third
country, or integration into their host country--are proving
difficult to achieve, with voluntary returns and resettlement
at historic lows.\15\ Without drastic international
coordination and action, the magnitude of need will continue to
swell.
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\10\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``No Refuge: Why the World's
Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking Options,'' Feb. 12, 2019;
World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance Innovative,
A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, at 2-3
(2019).
\11\ See, e.g., Asylum Access & the Refugee Work Rights Coalition,
Global Refugee Work Rights Report 2014 (Sep. 2014); Amnesty
International, Fears and Fences: Europe's Approach to Keeping Refugees
at Bay (Nov. 2015).
\12\ World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance
Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System,
at 10, 27 (2019).
\13\ Kathleen Newland, Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels,
New Tools, Transatlantic Council on Migration & Migration Policy
Institute (Apr. 2015).
\14\ World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance
Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System,
at 10 (2019).
\15\ Danish Refugee Council et al., Joint NGO Recommendations on
Durable Solutions for the Global Compact on Refugees' Programme of
Action, at 3 (Dec. 12, 2017).
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At this critical moment, the United States has deliberately
turned its back on those seeking refuge. The Trump
administration has crippled the United States' refugee
resettlement, asylum, and temporary protection systems, and
even closed our borders to those with legitimate asylum claims
and protection needs. After resettling over 207,000 refugees in
1980, we resettled just 30,000 refugees in Fiscal Year
2019.\16\ For Fiscal Year 2020, the Trump administration's
refugee ceiling is 18,000--the lowest in U.S. history at a time
when the number of forced migrants has reached its highest in
recorded history.\17\
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\16\ Migration Policy Institute, ``U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement
Ceilings and Number of Refugees Admitted, 1980-Present,'' https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-
resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united (last visited
Aug. 27, 2019); U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration Refugee Processing Center, ``Historical
Arrivals Broken Down by Region (1975-Present),'' https://
www.wrapsnet.org/documents/
Refugee%20Admissions%20by%20Region%20since%201975%20as%20of%204-9-
20.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
\17\ Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal
Year 2020, Presidential Determination No. 2020-04, Nov. 1, 2019; UNHCR,
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 2019).
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These regressive actions have damaged the United States'
moral leadership, demonstrated a retreat from global leadership
in responding to crises, and compromised our ability to forge
cooperative relationships with our international partners. The
administration's ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' separated terrified
migrant children, including infants, from their parents, and
drew criticism from Congress, the United Nations, religious
leaders, and medical professionals, among many others.\18\ The
decimation of U.S. refugee resettlement has left refugee-
hosting countries like Jordan, Bangladesh, Uganda, and Turkey
in a bind with fewer opportunities for resolution.\19\ While
the United States previously led the charge on championing
refugee resettlement and human rights, the Trump administration
has actively hindered international efforts to respond to the
forced migration crisis. By damaging our global reputation and
relationships with other countries, the United States' actions
towards forced migrants impair our ability to effectively rally
international cooperation, including in situations where our
own security and stability is threatened.
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\18\ Kevin D. Williamson, ``Immigration Policy: Bordering on
Madness,'' National Review, June 25, 2019; Catherine E. Shoichet,
``Doctors Saw Immigrant Kids Separated from Their Parents. Now They're
Trying to Stop It,'' CNN, June 14, 2018; Amy Wang, ``Officials Blast
Trump Policy After Visiting Detained Immigrants,'' Chicago Tribune,
June 10, 2018; Emma Green, ``Religious Leaders Condemn Family
Separations--but Not Necessarily Trump'', The Atlantic, June 19, 2018;
Brad Tuttle, `` `Heartless, Cruel, Immoral.' Every Major CEO Who
Condemned Trump's `Zero Tolerance' Border Policy,''Money, June 20,
2018; Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Rights Chief Tells U.S. to Stop Taking
Migrant Children From Parents,'' The New York Times, June 18, 2018;
Tara Isabella Burton, ``Pope Francis Condemns Trump's Family Separation
Policy,'' Vox, June 20, 2018.
\19\ Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, ``Trump's Refugee Cuts Threaten Deep
Consequences at Home and Abroad,'' The New York Times, Sept. 11, 2019;
Michelle Nichols, ``Exclusive: Bangladesh PM says expects no help from
Trump on refugees fleeing Myanmar,'' Reuters, Sept. 18, 2017; Queen
Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan, ``Why Global Leadership on Refugees
Matters,'' CNN, Sept. 20, 2017.
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New tools have been developed to address the modern forced
migration crisis, but more innovation, implementation, and
commitments are needed. Such efforts are game-changing, but
nascent. The World Bank has partnered with the United Nations
and others to extend concessional financing and grants to low-
and middle-income countries struggling with the fiscal impact
of hosting large refugee populations.\20\ There is also growing
use of technology and private sector engagement working to
better serve forced migrant populations.\21\
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\20\ World Bank Group International Development Association,
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited Aug. 27, 2019);
Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), 2017-2018 Annual Report,
at 5-6 (Dec. 2018). Concessional financing can be in the form of
grants, or loans. Concessional loans have more generous terms than
market loans. They generally include below-market interest rates, grace
periods in which the recipient is not required to make debt payments
for several years or a combination of low interest rates/grace periods.
See U.S. Agency for International Development, ``What Sources of Grants
or Concessional Financing Exist to Help with Mini-Grids in Developing
Countries?,'' Feb. 13, 2018.
\21\ Ammar A. Malik et al., Private-Sector Humanitarians?: New
Approaches in the Global Refugee Response, Urban Institute (Sept.
2018).
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Despite these positive examples, the overall global
response is not keeping pace with the enormity of need. While
funding for humanitarian responses has increased, exponentially
increasing needs have created a wider gap. In 2007, the United
Nations reported a 2 percent or approximately 2 billion dollar
shortfall on its appeals for humanitarian response funding.\22\
As of 2018, the number has risen to an appalling shortfall of
39 percent, or approximately 10 billion dollars in unmet
needs.\23\ At the same time, vulnerable groups remain in limbo
while solutions to their plight cannot keep pace. In 2018, for
example, there was a more than 99 percent gap between the
number of refugees worldwide and global resettlement
spaces.\24\
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\22\ UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, ``Appeals and response
plans 2007,'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2007 (last
visited June 5, 2020). Note that OCHA/FTS figures rely on accurate and
timely reporting by governments and organizations and therefore may be
incomplete. Id.
\23\ UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, ``Appeals and response
plans 2018,'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2018 (last
visited June 9, 2020).
\24\ International Rescue Committee, 10 things to know about the
Global Refugee Crisis and America's lack of leadership: An IRC analysis
of the latest annual reports from the UN Refugee Agency (July 2019).
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Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic has reaffirmed the
vulnerability of forced migrant populations around the world--
often living in overcrowded settings, lacking adequate access
to healthcare, unable to access reliable information, working
in the informal sector, and reliant on humanitarian aid.\25\
Well-intentioned government policies to mitigate the spread of
the virus may exacerbate inequalities and disproportionately
impact the already disadvantaged, including forced
migrants.\26\ At the same time, some governments, including the
United States, have used the COVID-19 pandemic as pretext for
accelerating regressive actions--blaming foreigners for the
spread of COVID-19, deporting migrants, and denying access to
asylum procedures.\27\ As the world grapples with how to
contain the virus and recover from the pandemic, we must
remember that this is a global phenomenon, and we are only as
strong as our most vulnerable link. The fates of millions of
desperate and suffering forced migrants cannot be ignored--at
the very least, because their susceptibility to the virus
represents a potential obstacle in the global fight against the
pandemic. The path to solving global crises is forged through
international cooperation and commitments--not cowardice.
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\25\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced: Addressing
the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian Emergencies (Mar.
30, 2020); International Rescue Committee, COVID-19 in Humanitarian
Crises: A Double Emergency (Apr. 2020); Andrej Mahecic, ``Displaced
people urgently need aid and access to social safety nets as
coronavirus causes severe hardship,'' UNHCR, May 1, 2020; UNOCHA,
Global Humanitarian Response Plan: COVID-19, at 13-16 (Mar. 2020).
\26\ Mauro Testaverde, ``Social protection for migrants during the
COVID-19 crisis: The right and smart choice,'' World Bank Blogs, Apr.
28, 2020. UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Response Plan: COVID-19, at 15
(Mar. 2020).
\27\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced: Addressing
the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian Emergencies (Mar.
30, 2020); Nicole Narea, ``The US has abandoned asylum seekers in
Mexico during the pandemic,'' Vox, May 13, 2020.
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The United States can and must lead a new global effort to
address the global forced migration crisis. Current trends,
including the challenge of climate change, will force more
people to flee their homes, be on the move, and live in
displacement. As the number of those forcibly displaced
continues to balloon, the need for innovative and comprehensive
international responses is imperative. Under the Trump
administration, the United States has responded to the forced
migration crisis with fear and regressive policies. In order to
mitigate global instability and regain our standing as a nation
committed to principled leadership in the world, the United
States must reverse course and lead the charge in securing
international cooperation and new solutions for today's forced
migrants. How the United States chooses to respond to these
events will define the world we will live in, and the role the
United States plays in it.
Defining Forced Migration
For the purposes of this report, we use the term ``forced
migration'' to refer to the movement of people in which the
drivers involve force, compulsion, or coercion. This includes
those forcibly displaced by persecution and conflict across
country borders (refugees and asylum seekers) and within
country borders (IDPs), and additionally seeks to encompass
people who migrate due to other situations of violence, severe
climate-related events, trafficking, as well as a range of
potentially overlapping causes. The term ``forced migration''
is not meant to take a stand in ongoing debates regarding
protections under international law and the concept of agency
in relation to a distinction between ``forced'' and
``voluntary.''\28\ ``Forced migration'' is not used in defiance
or to criticize the various terms that have been adopted to
describe these populations, but aspires to capture the pressing
and diverse needs and realities of those forced to flee their
homes today.
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\28\ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Glossary on
Migration, at 77 (2019). ``While not an international legal concept,
this term has been used to describe the movements of refugees,
displaced persons (including those displaced by disasters or
development projects), and, in some instances, victims of trafficking.
At the international level the use of this term is debated because of
the widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists rather
than a voluntary/forced dichotomy and that it might undermine the
existing legal international protection regime.'' Id.
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Methodology
In conducting research for this report, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Democratic Staff interviewed dozens of
migration and humanitarian experts, analyzed key documents and
reports, and carried out research trips to Colombia, Tunisia,
Egypt, Bangladesh, Mexico, and Ethiopia. In each country, staff
met with U.S. and national, provincial, and municipal
government officials, UN and international nongovernmental
organization (NGO) representatives, as well as forced migrants
and their host communities. In Colombia, staff focused on the
plight of Venezuelan refugees, and in Tunisia, staff focused on
forced migrants in and traveling through Libya.\29\ Egypt is
host to Syrian, Palestinian, and African refugees.\30\
Bangladesh hosts over 900,000 stateless Rohingya refugees from
Burma.\31\ Ethiopia is not only one of the largest refugee-
hosting countries in Africa, but also has over 3 million
IDPs.\32\
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\29\ In the absence of a U.S. embassy in Tripoli, the U.S. Libya
External Liaison Office is based in Tunis.
\30\ UNHCR, Egypt Fact Sheet, at 1 (May 2019).
\31\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 22 (June
2019).
\32\ UNOCHA, Ethiopia Situation Report No. 23, at 1 (June 2019);
UNHCR, ``Ethiopia,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ethiopia.html (last
visited June 9, 2020).
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Summary of Report
This report provides an analysis of the present global
forced migration crisis, the challenges it presents to local
communities, national governments, the international system,
and to the vulnerable men, women, and children themselves who
are forced to migrate. Taken together, these facts represent a
clarion call urging for strong leadership, international
solidarity, and innovation to reduce the suffering of forced
migrants and effectively address the sheer magnitude of the
crisis. Chapter One lays out the magnitude of today's global
forced migration crisis. Chapter Two explores the global trends
catalyzing the forced migration of people and the
characteristics of their displacement. Chapter Three examines
the systematic denial of forced migrants' fundamental human
rights across all phases of their forced migration. Chapter
Four outlines international efforts to address forced
migration, including diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and
international legal frameworks. The chapter also highlights
regional and country efforts to more adequately address forced
migration, as well as dramatic inconsistencies in country-level
responses. Chapter Five details the Trump administration's
domestic policies and practices towards forced migrants, with
particular attention to refugees and asylum seekers. Chapter
Six describes the administration's erosion of U.S. diplomatic
engagement and international leadership in addressing forced
migration and humanitarian crises. Chapter Seven examines the
urgent need for new, innovative solutions as traditional
responses have proven inadequate to address the scale and
complexity of forced migration today. Finally, the Findings and
Recommendations outline necessary actions needed to respond to
the current forced migration crisis in order to prevent and
mitigate disastrous global effects.
Below, we have summarized the principal findings and
principal recommendations of this report. More detailed
Findings & Recommendations can be found beginning on page 137.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
Through expert interviews, observations from the field, and
research of current policies and best practices to date, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democratic Staff found the
following:
The scale of today's forced migration crisis is
unprecedented and, if left unaddressed, will grow in
size and complexity. A confluence of factors, including
persistent climate-related shocks and increasingly
frequent, highly violent, and protracted conflicts
impacting civilians have resulted in a record number of
people forced to flee their homes around the globe. By
the end of 2018, there were over 70 million refugees,
asylum seekers, and IDPs worldwide. Many forced
migrants are unable to return home for decades, often
live in urban environments in developing countries, and
face severe restrictions to and violations of their
human rights. The COVID-19 pandemic has only magnified
the extreme vulnerabilities of forced migrant
populations, highlighted by dangerously overcrowded
settings and inadequate access to basic healthcare.
The international community has struggled to address
drivers of forced migration and support the growing
number of forced migrants worldwide. Armed actors have
increasingly failed to adhere to international law,
attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure, and
interfering with humanitarian aid with impunity. The UN
Security Council, largely due to vetoes by its
permanent members, has struggled to uphold its core
mandate of maintaining peace and security, and has
failed to hold violators of international law
accountable. Despite specific international legal
conventions affording refugees protection, some
countries have denied refugees basic rights and
services. The situation is often much worse for those
without pathways for national and international
protection, including IDPs and those displaced by
severe climate-related events.
The United States' retreat from humanitarian obligations
and international cooperation under the Trump
administration has dealt a grave blow to the
international system. The United States has
historically served as a global leader in humanitarian
response, humanitarian diplomacy, and refugee
resettlement. The Trump administration, by contrast,
has used every mechanism at its disposal to block legal
pathways for refuge, undermining longstanding U.S.
policies. As global need continues to grow, major
donors such as the United States have reduced
humanitarian financing, and the scale of need is far
outpacing available assistance. Furthermore, the United
States' regressive leadership has emboldened other
countries to abandon their responsibilities to protect
refugees and other forced migrants, and has impaired an
already-weakened system of international cooperation
for responding to global crises like forced migration.
A dramatic change in course is needed to address the
drivers of forced migration and adequately meet the
needs of today's forced migrants. Recent efforts in
humanitarian financing, aid, diplomacy, and the private
sector highlight opportunities to reinvigorate forced
migration responses, although greater support is needed
to drive these innovations. These initiatives include
new international and national compacts on refugees,
the World Bank's concessional financing, and a myriad
of private partnerships aimed at providing services and
opportunities to forced migrants. Given the scale of
today's forced migration crisis, these efforts also
underscore a need for collaborative action and
widespread rethinking across all sectors--government,
finance, and private companies--in order to
comprehensively address the crisis.
----------
PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Forced migration will fuel future destabilization if not
addressed and managed appropriately. While President Trump has
repeatedly requested severe cuts to the humanitarian assistance
budget, Congress has consistently appropriated funds well above
the presidential request. The needs, however, remain enormous,
and more must be done to increase resources, encourage
innovation, empower policy leadership, and address root causes
diplomatically. To these ends, this report recommends the
following actions be undertaken by Congress, the Executive
Branch, and the United Nations:
The United States Government must reinvigorate efforts to
uphold international humanitarian law and resolve
conflict, a primary driver of forced migration.
Congress should authorize the expanded use of sanctions
and other tools against perpetrators of international
humanitarian law violations and those who deny aid
access for life-saving assistance. The Executive
Branch, including the Departments of State and Defense,
should ensure U.S. military assistance, such as arms
sales, military training, and other defense services,
is contingent on the implementation of civilian harm
mitigation policies and adherence to international
humanitarian law.
The United States must pursue protection for all forced
migrants worldwide. Both Congress and the Executive
Branch must ensure that protections afforded to
refugees, IDPs, and other forced migrants by
international and national laws are upheld within, at,
and outside our borders. Congress should mandate
regular reports from the State Department and USAID on
the rights and situations of forced migrant
populations, including refugees and IDPs.
The United States must reform and improve upon domestic
efforts to address forced migration by restoring the
U.S. refugee resettlement program and creating
complementary pathways for protection. Harmful Trump
administration policies towards forced migrants,
including the Remain in Mexico policy and ``safe third
country'' agreements, must be terminated. Both Congress
and the Executive Branch must take steps to ensure that
the U.S. refugee ceiling is increased in line with
global need. Both branches should also work to expand
our understanding of U.S. refugee law based on current
realities and create complementary pathways to protect
other forced migrant populations. By reclaiming our
reputation as a place of refuge, the United States can
lead on securing global solutions.
The United States must promote global cooperation efforts
to address the forced migration crisis. The Executive
Branch should join the Global Compact for Refugees, the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular
Migration, and the Paris Climate Agreement.
Reinvigorating the momentum behind the 2016 New York
Declaration, the United States should lead efforts
convening host governments, donors, the private sector,
civil society, and forced migrant representatives to
form a new compact supporting the inclusion of forced
migrant populations in host countries.
The United Nations should take further action to enforce
international humanitarian law and improve protections
for forced migrants. The UN's role in responding to and
alleviating the forced migration crisis has never been
more important. The UN must use its tools, including
Boards of Inquiry, Commissions of Inquiry, and the
International Court of Justice, to enforce
international law and end rampant impunity, including
by publishing findings and identifying perpetrators of
violations of international law. The UN Secretary-
General should call on host countries to incorporate
forced migrant populations into their national action
plans. Moreover, the UN Secretary-General should
promote awareness and renewed responses for IDP
populations by elevating the role of Special Rapporteur
on the Human Rights of IDPs to Special Representative
on IDPs and encouraging the implementation and
ratification of the UN's Guiding Principles on
International Displacement.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee staff analysis based on UNHCR Population Statistics Data
(last visited May 27, 2020). Excludes United Nations Relief Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) refugee
populations due to lack of consistent year-over-year reporting of
figures. These figures include populations categorized as refugees,
internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers and do not necessarily
capture all forced migrants who do not meet specific definitions of
these categories.
CHAPTER ONE
The Scale of Today's Forced Migration Crisis
----------
While forced migration is not a new phenomenon, the
magnitude and complexity of today's global forced migration
crisis is unprecedented.\33\ Media images and daily news from
all over the world shed light on the plight of desperate
civilians on the move. The haunting photo of a drowned three-
year old Syrian boy on the beach in Turkey.\34\ Reports of mass
rape, executions, torture, and burning villages in Burma,
driving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from their homes.\35\
These are just snapshots in time. To properly understand the
scale of today's forced migration crisis, the overarching facts
and figures need to be laid bare:
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\33\ There is some debate over whether the number of forced
migrants today is truly ``unprecedented'' given there has not been
accurate global data collected on forced migration for much of the
world's history. In addition to its scale, however, the current crisis
is unprecedented due to the protracted nature of displacement, the
atrocities driving displacement, and the incredibly vulnerable
situations of forced migrants. See Benjamin Thomas White, ``Talk of an
`unprecedented' number of refugees is wrong--and dangerous,'' The New
Humanitarian, Oct. 3, 2019; Elizabeth Ferris, ``Unpacking the numbers
on global refugees,'' Brookings Institution, June 20, 2017; UN News
Services, ``UN, humanitarian community struggling to meet unprecedented
needs of refugees,'' Oct. 5, 2015; See also Chapters 2 and 3 for
further details.
\34\ See Diane Cole, ``Study: What Was The Impact Of The Iconic
Photo Of The Syrian Boy?,'' NPR, Jan. 13, 2017.
\35\ See, e.g., ``Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the
crisis,'' BBC, Jan. 23, 2020; Human Rights Watch, ``Rohingya Crisis,''
https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya-crisis (last visited May 27, 2020).
On average, 37,000 people were forced from their homes
every single day in 2018;\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June
2019).
In 2019, 1 out of every 109 people in the world was either
a refugee, asylum seeker, or internally displaced
person (IDP);\37\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020); United Nations,
``World Population Prospects 2019,'' https://population.un.org/wpp/
DataQuery/. Using the world population of 7.7 billion in 2019 against
the UNHCR-reported figure of 70.8 million forcibly displaced from June
2019.
The world's refugee, asylum-seeking, and IDP populations
totaled at least 70.8 million in 2019.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020). This figure
includes populations categorized as refugees, internally displaced
persons, and asylum seekers, but does not necessarily capture all
forced migrants who may not be recognized under the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention and its accompanying international legal framework.
The following statistics only begin to illustrate the scale
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and complexity of today's forced migration crisis:
57 percent of refugees registered with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) fled from three
countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan;\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020); See Chapter 4 for
further details on UNHCR.
Nearly 25 million people were newly displaced due to
disasters in 2019;\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on
Internal Displacement 2020 (Apr. 2020).
About 80 percent of refugees reside in countries
neighboring the countries from which they fled;\41\and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020).
The world's refugee, asylum-seeking, and IDP populations
include approximately 30 million children.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Press Release, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Around
30 million children displaced by conflict need protection now and
sustainable solutions over the long term, June 19, 2018.
Just a handful of crises have caused massive forced
migration, and their effects are felt far beyond their borders.
Violence in Burma, Syria, South Sudan, and Venezuela has
generated massive spillover effects to neighboring
countries.\43\ As these contexts have also demonstrated,
significant surges in forced migration can exacerbate fragile
situations in impacted countries and destabilize entire
regions.\44\ Many such countries are not prepared for large
influxes of forced migrants and are unable to meet basic
humanitarian needs.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See ``MSF estimates more than 6,700 Rohingya killed in
Myanmar,'' BBC, Dec. 14, 2017; UNHCR, ``Operational Portal: South
Sudan,'' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan (last visited
May 27, 2020); UNHCR, ``Syria emergency,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
syria-emergency.html (last visited May 27, 2020); Regional Inter-Agency
Coordination Platform, ``Response for Venezuelans,'' https://r4v.info/
en/situations/platform (last visited May 27, 2020).
\44\ Uri Dadush & Mona Niebuhr, ``The Economic Impact of Forced
Migration,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Apr. 22, 2016.
\45\ Susan Fratzke & Camille Le Coz, Strengthening Refugee
Protection in Low-and Middle-Income Countries, Migration Policy
Institute (Feb. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An exhaustive review of ongoing conflicts and humanitarian
emergencies is not necessary to begin appreciating the horrors
that civilians experience in times of crisis. Still, it is
worthwhile to outline some contemporary examples of conflict--
resulting in forced migration populations Committee staff met
with in-person--that continue to challenge the humanitarian
community and the existing political and legal frameworks
intended to support vulnerable forced migrants.
Burma: In August 2017, a brutal military campaign in
Rakhine, Burma triggered the flight of an estimated
745,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, including more than
400,000 children.\46\ In Burma, entire villages were
burned to the ground, thousands were killed, families
were separated, and women and girls were raped. The
massive influx of refugees quickly overwhelmed Cox's
Bazar, Bangladesh and led to the growth of the world's
largest refugee camp.\47\ Prior to the crisis in 2017,
thousands of Rohingya refugees already resided in this
region of Bangladesh after fleeing earlier episodes of
violence and, to this day, the root causes for their
flight from Rakhine, Burma have not been resolved.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ UNOCHA, ``Rohingya Refugee Crisis,'' https://www.unocha.org/
rohingya-refugee-crisis (last visited June 8, 2020).
\47\ Id.; ``Former UN Chief Says Bangladesh Cannot Continue Hosting
Rohingya,'' Al Jazeera, July 10, 2019.
\48\ Medecins Sans Frontieres, ``Timeline: A Visual History of the
Rohingya Refugee Crisis,'' Aug. 23, 2019.
Syria: Since the conflict in Syria began in 2011, more than
half of Syria's population of 21 million has been
displaced, including 6.6 million who are internally
displaced and 5.6 million refugees who fled to and are
still residing in neighboring countries.\49\ At least
13 million who remain inside Syria need basic
humanitarian assistance.\50\ In 2018, an average 4,477
civilians were displaced each day, a figure which
increased dramatically in early 2020 during the
military offensive in northwest Syria, when nearly one
million people were displaced within three months.\51\
From December 2019 to February 2020, more than 11,000
Syrians were displaced from their homes each day.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ UNHCR, ``Syria emergency,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-
emergency.html (last visited June 8, 2020); World Bank, ``Population,
total--Syrian Arab Republic,'' https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SY (last visited June 8, 2020).
\50\ UNHCR, ``Syria Emergency,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-
emergency.html (last visited June 8, 2020).
\51\ UNOCHA, ``Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019,'' https://hno-
syria.org/#key-figures (last visited May 27, 2020); UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: Recent Developments in Northwest Syria (Mar. 5, 2020).
\52\ `` `A horrifying new level': UN says 900,000 displaced in
Northwest Syria since December,'' France24, Feb. 17, 2020.
South Sudan: The conflict in South Sudan--which began in
December 2013--has had ripple effects across the
region, with more than two million people fleeing to
neighboring countries.\53\ To make matters worse, South
Sudan's neighboring countries were already struggling
to manage pre-existing humanitarian emergencies and
support displaced populations.\54\ As of May 2020,
Uganda hosted more than 880,000 refugees from South
Sudan.\55\ Within South Sudan, two-thirds of the
population needs humanitarian aid.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ UNHCR, ``Operational Portal: South Sudan,'' https://
data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan (last visited May 27, 2020).
\54\ See UNOCHA, Annual Report, at 1 (2013); Sulaiman Momodu,
``Refugees turn to Ethiopia for safety and asylum,'' Africa Renewal,
Apr. 2015; UNHCR, ``Dadaab Refugee Complex,'' https://www.unhcr.org/ke/
dadaab-refugee-complex (last visited June 8, 2020); USA for UNHCR,
``Central African Republic Refugee Crisis,'' https://
www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/car/ (last visited May 29, 2020).
\55\ UNHCR, ``Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal,''
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga (last visited May 27, 2020).
\56\ UNOCHA, South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, at 26
(Nov. 2019).
Venezuela: Although not considered a traditional conflict,
Venezuela's crisis is, by many measures, one of the
world's worst forced migration crises.\57\ More than
five million people have fled the country, and, if the
rate of forced displacement continues, it will soon
overtake Syria as the world's largest refugee
crisis.\58\ Widespread electricity and water shortages,
a crumbling heathcare system, as well as dwindling food
supplies, have forced many to flee in search of basic
services to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and elsewhere in
the region.\59\ Meanwhile, widespread violence,
propagated by gangs and government security forces,
have exacerbated refugee flows.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, The Brookings Institution,
``Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and most underfunded
in modern history,'' Dec. 9, 2019; Mercy Corps, ``The facts:
Venezuela's humanitarian crisis,'' Aug. 13, 2019.
\58\ Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, ``Response for
Venezuelans,'' https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform (last visited
May 27, 2020); Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, The Brookings Institution,
``Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and most underfunded
in modern history,'' Dec. 9, 2019.
\59\ Mercy Corps, ``The facts: Venezuela's humanitarian crisis,''
Aug. 13, 2019; Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, ``Venezuela refugee crisis
to become the largest and most underfunded in modern history,'' Dec. 9,
2019.
\60\ Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, ``Venezuela refugee crisis to
become the largest and most underfunded in modern history,'' Dec. 9,
2019; Oriana Van Praag, ``Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee
Crisis,'' Wilson Center, Sept. 13, 2019; Frank Jack Daniel, ``Ultra-
violent gangs thrive in chaotic Venezuela despite crackdown,'' Reuters,
Aug. 31, 2016.
These examples only begin to paint a picture of the forced
migrant crisis impacting our world today. The following
chapters provide further details with the hope that greater
understanding can spur new efforts to address the political,
economic, social, and humanitarian elements of this crisis, and
reduce the scale of immense human suffering it entails.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A child carries a water jug, part of a bundle of supplies given to
refugee families after they register, at the Dagahaley refugee camp in
Dadaab, Kenya. David Lienemann, Child with relief supplies in Kenya,
The White House, Aug. 8, 2011.
CHAPTER TWO
Trends in Forced Migration
----------
Today, more men, women, and children are forced to flee
their homes than ever before. Conflicts across the globe have
increased in frequency and intensity. Furthermore, the rise of
non-state armed actors like terrorists and violent gangs, urban
conflict, restrictions on humanitarian access, violations of
international humanitarian law, and climate change have
exacerbated migration trends and complicated the international
community's ability to respond. New trends, such as protracted
displacement and urbanization, have challenged many of the
available tools to support forced migrants. As these
developments continue, protecting the human rights and meeting
the basic needs of forced migrant populations will be
increasingly challenging.
Why More People Are Fleeing:
The Changing Nature of Conflict & Violence
Libya. South Sudan. Cameroon. Syria. Democratic Republic of
Congo. Burma. Mali. The list of countries plagued by conflict
goes on and on. The number of conflicts occurring worldwide is
more than 60 percent greater than it was a decade ago.\61\ The
characteristics of conflict have changed as well--conflicts
last longer, are more likely to be within states rather than
between states, are increasingly urban, and are more frequently
involving non-state actors. These changes have taken place
amidst major socio-economic and political changes around the
globe, including a rise in populist nationalist governments, a
weakened United Nations (UN) Security Council, and the absence
of a single superpower willing to call for principled action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Emma Samman et al., SDG Progress: Fragility, crisis and
leaving no one behind, Overseas Development Institute, at 13 (Sept.
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2019, conflict remained the primary driver of global
humanitarian need.\62\ By the end of 2018, at least 70.8
million people were forcibly displaced, primarily due to
conflict and generalized violence, as well as persecution and
human rights violations.\63\ Around 30 million children were
displaced by conflict alone.\64\ These figures are the highest
on record and represent dramatic increases over the past
decade.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 5-6 (2019).
\63\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2-3
(June 2019); Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global
Report on Internal Displacement 2019 Summary, at 6 (May 2019).
\64\ Press Release, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Around
30 million children displaced by conflict need protection now and
sustainable solutions over the long term, June 20, 2018.
\65\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 5 (June
2019); UNHCR, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees,
Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, at 2 (June 16, 2009). UNHCR
identified 42 million forcibly displaced persons at the end of 2008
compared to over 70 million in 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increasingly Frequent & Prolonged Conflicts
In 2013, there were 34 active conflicts globally.\66\ Just
five years later, in 2018, there were 52.\67\ The world is not
only seeing more outbreaks of conflict, but also conflicts that
last longer than ever before. From 1990 to 2013, the average
length of conflict nearly doubled--from 19 to 37 years.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Scott Gates et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2014, Peace
Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2016).
\67\ Harvard Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018,
Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
\68\ Christina Bennett et al., Time to let go: Remaking
humanitarian action for the modern era, Overseas Development Institute,
at 29 (Apr. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, conflict is the main driver of humanitarian need--
accounting for 80 percent of global humanitarian assistance--
whereas ten years ago, the same percentage of humanitarian
assistance went to victims of natural disasters, such as
earthquakes and floods.\69\ In 2019, the UN estimated that just
six conflict-driven humanitarian emergencies would be
responsible for more than half of all people in need of
humanitarian assistance and protection: Yemen, Syria, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Nigeria, and
South Sudan.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Statement of Nancy Lindborg, President of the United States
Institute of Peace, Hearing on Flashing Red: The State of Global
Humanitarian Affairs, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Mar. 22, 2017, at 5.
\70\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 4-5, 26 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Traditional Warring Parties & Proxy Warfare
The characteristics of contemporary armed conflicts are
vastly different from traditional wars. First, the parties to
conflict have changed--they are more likely to be non-state
actors, such as ethnic and religious groups, terrorist
organizations, and criminal enterprises.\71\ These parties
increasingly target civilian populations to further their
political ambitions, create chaos to destabilize governments,
and generally assert power.\72\ From gangs in Central America
to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, civilians increasingly
flee from persecution and violence resulting from these groups'
brutal tactics to conquer territory and assert control over the
populace.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Harvard Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018,
Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
\72\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 6 (2019).
\73\ David James Cantor & Malte Plewa, Forced displacement and
violent crime: a humanitarian crisis in Central America?, Overseas
Development Institute (June 2017); International Crisis Group,`Averting
an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, at 14 (Oct. 2019).'
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Accordingly, conflicts are increasingly within countries
(intrastate) as opposed to between countries (interstate).\74\
However, the rise of great power competition has led to
increased proxy warfare and internationalized civil conflict,
where external actors are involved in intrastate conflicts.\75\
Over the past decade, internationalized civil conflict has
grown to make up almost 40 percent of conflicts today.\76\ In
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, the influx of material support
from external powers has increased the lethality and duration
of these conflicts.\77\ Furthermore, external nations' military
support has weakened the effectiveness of humanitarian
diplomacy and relief. In the case of Yemen, the United States
is uniquely positioned to be a force for de-escalation in the
conflict, but humanitarian diplomacy efforts have been
undermined by U.S. military support for one side of the
conflict.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Harvard Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018,
Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
\75\ ``Proxy war,'' Cambridge Dictionary (2011). A proxy war is
defined as ``a war fought between groups or smaller countries that each
represent the interests of other larger powers, and may have help and
support from these.'' Id.
\76\ Kendra Dupuy & Siri Aas Rustud, Trends in Armed Conflict,
1946-2017, Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (May 2018). Based off of
2017 data of 49 armed conflicts, of which 19 were intrastate conflicts
where external states contributed to troops on at least one side. Id.
\77\ Candace Rondeaux & David Sterman, Twenty-First Century Proxy
Warfare: Confronting Strategic Innovation in a Multipolar World, New
America Foundation (Feb. 20, 2019).
\78\ Michael LaForgia & Walt Bogdanich, ``Why Bombs Made in America
Have Been Killing Civilians in Yemen,'' The New York Times, May 16,
2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Widespread Violence & Criminality Driving
Forced Migration
While armed conflict is a well-established driver of
displacement, it is increasingly urgent to address broader
patterns of violence and criminality prompting forced
migration. In Central America, for instance, the recent surge
of displacement due to violence and insecurity has reached
levels not seen since the 1980s, when the region was suffering
from widespread armed conflict.\79\ The violence--largely
perpetrated by organized gangs--is targeted against civilians
and is more deadly than many conflicts taking place across the
globe, leaving millions in need of basic humanitarian
assistance.\80\ However, generally this type of violence is not
officially recognized under international humanitarian law (the
International Committee of the Red Cross categorizes it as
``other situations of violence''), and challenges traditional
criteria for refugee status and international protection.\81\
Nevertheless, the rapidly growing number of individuals from
the region who are considered asylum seekers and refugees
underscores the urgent need to address this trend.\82\ As of
June 2020, there were 400,200 recognized refugees and asylum
seekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras--a figure
increasing at an annual rate of 13 percent.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Nora Sturm, ``UNHCR calls for urgent action as Central America
asylum claims soar,'' UNHCR News, Apr. 5, 2016.
\80\ Press Release, Norwegian Refugee Council et al., A Regional
Humanitarian Response Plan for an Intensifying Humanitarian Crisis in
the North of Central America, June 28, 2019.
\81\ Marguerite Cawley, ``Is Central America's Gang Violence A
Humanitarians Crisis?,'' Insight Crime, July 18, 2014; International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Characteristics of Armed Conflicts &
Other Situations of Violence (Oct. 2017).
\82\ UNHCR, ``Displacement in Central America,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/displacement-in-central-america.html (last visited
June 5, 2020).
\83\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urbanization of Conflict
The rise of urban warfare in places like Syria, Yemen, and
Libya presents a complex set of challenges for the humanitarian
community. First and foremost, civilian casualties are more
likely to increase during urban conflicts.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Jan Egeland & Stephen O'Brien, ``International humanitarian
law is unravelling before our eyes,'' The Guardian, Mar. 25, 2016.
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Second, urban populations depend on large-scale
infrastructure and networks for basic services, such as
electricity and water, but do not have the means to directly
control or restore them.\85\ As a result, damage to
infrastructure has large-scale impacts.\86\ For example, the
destruction of a single power line could impact an entire
neighborhood with hundreds of thousands of residents, as well
as hospitals and water pumping and treatment centers.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ ICRC, Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: a call
for a better approach to assisting affected people, at 14 (2015).
\86\ Id. at 14-15.
\87\ Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between 2015 and 2018 in Yemen, for example, the Saudi-led
coalition conducted 18,000 airstrikes--roughly one every 100
minutes--one-third of which hit non-military targets.\88\ As a
result, 50 percent of hospitals and clinics were closed, more
than 70 percent did not have regular supplies of essential
medicines, and more than 68 percent of the population was left
without access to basic health care.\89\ The conflict has
resulted in a collapsed health system unequipped to deal with
the worst cholera outbreak in modern history, as well as the
COVID-19 pandemic.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Press Release, International Rescue Committee, Civilian Deaths
in Yemen up by 164% as United States Recertifies Support for the War,
Sept. 25, 2018.
\89\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 47 (2019); Press
Release, International Rescue Committee, The Conflict in Yemen: Time
for a New Approach, Apr. 5, 2018.
\90\ World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for the
Eastern Mediterranean, ``WHO experts sustain decrease in new cholera
cases and deaths in Yemen,'' June 12, 2019; Stephanie Nebehay,
``Yemen's health system `has in effect collapsed' as COVID spreads:
U.N.,'' Reuters, May 22, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lastly, active conflicts in densely-populated urban areas
lead to volatile population movements--a rapid influx of
displaced civilians can significantly increase pressure on
basic services relied upon by host populations, an especially
dire situation when access to services was already poor.\91\
Today, most of the world's refugees and IDPs reside in cities
or other urban areas.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ ICRC, Urban Services During Protracted Armed Conflict: a call
for a better approach to assisting affected people, at 15-16 (2015).
\92\ Hans Park, ``The Power of Cities,'' UNHCR, Nov. 25, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions on Aid Organizations & Attacks on Aid Workers
In more than 40 countries, warring parties are denying
humanitarian organizations access to desperate populations,
with several of the worst crises, including Syria, Somalia, and
Yemen, considered virtually inaccessible to humanitarian
actors.\93\ Access restraints--where organizations are unable
to reach affected populations or those populations are unable
to obtain assistance--hinder humanitarian operations and
exacerbate conditions on the ground.\94\ Furthermore, these
restrictions directly violate international humanitarian law,
which states that all parties to armed conflicts ``must allow
and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian
relief for civilians in need.''\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Humanitarian Access
Overview (Aug. 2018).
\94\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 9 (2019).
\95\ International Committee of the Red Cross, ``Rule 55. Access
for Humanitarian relief to Civilians in Need,'' https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1--rul--rule55 (last visited
June 5, 2020).
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Humanitarian organizations increasingly face bureaucratic
restrictions and direct interference from warring parties.\96\
State and non-state actors employ a variety of tactics to
restrain or deny humanitarian access by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and international agencies, including but
not limited to: denying access to certain populations,
restricting movement, interfering with activities, threatening
relief personnel, and establishing burdensome bureaucratic
measures.\97\ Some of the more alarming and illustrative cases
of access challenges take form when siege is used as a tactic
of war, which we have seen recently in the contexts of Nigeria
and Yemen.\98\ In northeastern Nigeria, government authorities
have restricted aid organizations from operating outside of
government-controlled areas.\99\ As a result, aid agencies
cannot reach an estimated 1.2 million people.\100\ In Yemen at
the end of February 2020, 123 NGO projects were waiting on
government approval, having waited on average for six months--
effectively denying aid to 8.2 million people who would have
been served by the pending projects.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 9 (2019);
UNOCHA, OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Access (2012).
\97\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 9 (2019);
UNOCHA, OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Access (2012).
\98\ Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Army Restrictions Stifling Aid
Efforts (Mar. 4, 2020); UNOCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Update, at 3 (Feb.
2020).
\99\ Id.
\100\ UN Civil-Security Cooperation in Humanitarian Interventions
in the North-East Workshop, Opening Remarks by Edward Kallon, Resident
and Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria (Nov. 6, 2019).
\101\ UNOCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Update, at 3 (Feb. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, aid workers and humanitarian facilities are
frequently attacked. On what the UN considers its ``darkest
day,'' a brazen attack against the UN in Baghdad in August 2003
killed 22, including the UN Representative Sergio Vieira de
Mello.\102\ In years since, however, attacks against aid
workers have become more widespread. The Aid Worker Security
Database, which independently tracks these incidents,
documented 228 major incidents in 2018, a 31 percent increase
from 2017 and the second highest number on record.\103\
Specifically, attacks on health facilities, supplies, and
workers continue today at alarming rates--in 2019, the World
Health Organization (WHO) recorded 1,009 such attacks, compared
to 795 attacks in 2018.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ ``In solemn tributes, UN to mark first anniversary of deadly
terror attack in Baghdad,'' UN News, Aug. 18, 2004.
\103\ The Aid Worker Security Database, ``Major attacks on aid
workers: summary statistics (2008-2018),'' May 27, 2020, https://
aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary.
\104\ WHO, ``Surveillance System for Attacks on health Care
(SSA),'' https://publicspace.who.int/sites/ssa/SitePages/
PublicDashboard.aspx (last visited June 4, 2020).
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Impunity & the Degradation of International
Humanitarian Law
State and non-state actors alike are increasingly ignoring
the traditional rules of war enshrined in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which seek to reduce the devastating impact of
wars on civilians. Armed actors often fail to take precautions
to protect civilians, and some even delibera\105\1 In 2018, the
UN Security Council reported that civilians accounted for the
vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts across the
globe.\106\ 2018 also saw 12,000 children killed or maimed by
conflict--the highest figure on record.\107\ At one point
during the conflict in Yemen, civilians accounted for 93
percent of documented casualties.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 6 (2019);
UNOCHA, ``5 ways to better protect civilians in conflict zones,'' Aug.
15, 2018.
\106\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 1 (2019).
\107\ ``New UN report shows record number of children killed and
maimed in conflict,'' UN News, July 20, 2019.
\108\ Nigel Fisher, ``93% of deaths and injuries in Yemen are
civilian--this must change,'' The Guardian, Oct. 27, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, the world is witnessing widespread violations of
international humanitarian law, and yet the available
mechanisms to ensure compliance by warring parties are
limited.\109\ Formal accountability for violations of
international law are rarely pursued. Accountability mechanisms
were designed to address international armed conflicts between
states, as opposed to today's civil wars, intrastate conflicts,
and internationalized intrastate conflicts.\110\ In addition,
rising tensions between global powers has reduced the ability
to protect humanitarian access and resolve conflict through
diplomacy.\111\ The UN Security Council, the primary
international body responsible for maintaining peace and
security, has faced deadlock as some of its permanent members
are involved in conflict, particularly internationalized
intrastate conflict, and are directly or indirectly implicated
in violations of international law.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ ICRC, Strengthening Compliance With International
Humanitarian Law, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent, at 8 (Oct. 2015).
\110\ Id. at 9.
\111\ Bruce Jones et al., Competitive Multilateralism; Adapting
Institutions to Meet the New Geopolitical Environment, Brookings
Institution, at 1 (Sept. 2019).
\112\ See, e.g., United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 43rd Session (Jan. 28, 2020); Julian Borger, ``Russia
committed war crimes in Syria, finds Un report,'' The Guardian, Mar. 2,
2020; Gwendolyn Sasse, Revisiting the 2014 Annexation of Crimea,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Mar. 15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The resulting impunity impacts displacement in three
primary ways. First, the targeting of civilians and critical
civilian infrastructure causes people to flee, either in
anticipation of or as a result of direct violence.\113\ Second,
violations of international humanitarian law make it less
likely that those who have fled will return, as they will doubt
whether they can do so safely.\114\ Lastly, as violators of
international law go unpunished, more violations occur, leading
to more displacement and more suffering.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ ICRC, Displacement in Times of Armed Conflict, How
International Humanitarian Law Protects in War, and Why it Matters, at
6-7 (Apr. 2019).
\114\ Id.
\115\ David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue
Committee, ``Welcome to the age of impunity,'' Remarks at the World
Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 24, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The remnants of a patient exam room at Alzerbeh Primary Health Clinic
in the countryside of Aleppo. The clinic was targeted directly by an
air-to-surface missile, despite having previously shared its
coordinates through the UN deconfliction system to avoid targeting.
Syrian American Medical Society, Aug. 30, 2019.
In Focus: SYRIA: THE UNRAVELING OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The brutality of Syria's conflict--which has resulted in
the largest displacement crisis in a generation--persistently
underscores the horrors and impunity that exist in modern
conflicts. On top of the more than 500,000 civilians killed and
more than 10 million displaced, there has been a complete
breakdown of international humanitarian law.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2019: Syria (2019); Vincent
Bernard, Conflict in Syria: Finding Hope Amid the Ruins, International
Review of the Red Cross, at 866 and 872 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the course of the conflict, the regime has
indiscriminately targeted densely populated urban areas,
including repeated attacks against health facilities and other
civilian infrastructure.\117\ In blatant violations of the laws
of armed conflict, the Syrian regime has also routinely
besieged cities and starved civilians as a military
tactic.\118\ These tactics were on full display during the
early 2020 military offensive on Idlib province in northwest
Syria, which displaced more than one million civilians in three
months.\119\ To make matters worse, the humanitarian response
has been challenged by a complex bureaucracy imposed by the
Syrian government upon aid organizations, who are routinely
denied access to desperate populations.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Brent Eng & Jose Ciro Martinez, ``Why the Syrian regime has
been targeting civilian infrastructure,'' The Washington Post, Apr. 16,
2018.
\118\ UN Security Council, Those Besieging Syrian Cities Know
Security Council Unable, Unwilling to Stop Them, Emergency Relief
Coordinator Says in Briefing, 7817th Meeting (Nov. 21, 2016).
\119\ UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Recent Developments in
Northwest Syria (Mar. 5, 2020).
\120\ UNOCHA, Humanitarian Access Analysis: Syrian Arab Republic
(Sept. 17, 2019); Jesse Marks, ``Humanitarian aid in Syria is being
politicized--and too many civilians in need aren't getting it,'' The
Washington Post, Aug. 6, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, in January 2020, the UN Security Council, due
to disagreement among its permanent members, halved the number
of border crossings into Syria, undermining cross border
operations that 4 million Syrians rely on to survive.\121\ Over
the course of the nearly 10-year conflict, numerous formal and
independent investigative mechanisms have been established,
including by the UN Secretary General, but none have resulted
in formal accountability for these atrocities.\122\ For
instance, the UN Board of Inquiry in northwest Syria released
its findings in April 2020, but failed to conclusively identify
perpetrators or follow-on mechanisms for accountability.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Michelle Nichols, ``U.N. renews Syria cross-border aid
operation but halves crossings, length of time,'' Reuters, Jan. 10,
2020.
\122\ Press Release, United Nations Secretary General, Statement
attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General--on UN Board
of Inquiry in northwest Syria, Sept. 13, 2019; UN Security Council,
Letter dated 21 December 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council, Dec. 21, 2016.
\123\ Evan Hill, ``U.N. Inquiry into Syria Bombings Is Silent on
Russia's Role,'' The New York Times, Apr. 6, 2020.
Climate Change's Impact On Forced Migration
We cannot ignore the increasing role of climate change as a
driver of forced migration. The impacts of climate change are
innumerable, and include depleted natural resources, rising sea
levels, extreme weather events, and conflict--all of which can
force people to leave their homes.\124\ In 2016 alone, extreme
weather-related disasters displaced around 24 million
people.\125\ The UN estimates that by 2050 between 150 and 200
million people will be at risk of climate change-induced
displacement, most of whom are expected to remain inside their
countries.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ UNHCR, ``Climate change and disaster displacement,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html (last visited
June 4, 2020).
\125\ Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate Displacement in
Bangladesh (2018) (excluding those displaced by slow-onset
environmental degradation).
\126\ Michela Miletto et al., Migration and its interdependencies
with water scarcity, gender and youth employment, United Nations
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) & World Water
Assessment Programme, at 8 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While climate change is never the sole cause of conflict--
poor governance and weak state institutions often enable, if
not directly cause, conflict--climate change has certainly
contributed to factors spurring conflict. As a 2014 U.S.
Department of Defense study asserted:
The impacts of climate change may cause instability in
other countries by impairing access to food and water,
damaging infrastructure, spreading disease, uprooting
and displacing large numbers of people, compelling mass
migration, interrupting commercial activity, or
restricting electricity availability. These
developments could undermine already-fragile
governments that are unable to respond effectively or
challenge currently stable governments, as well as
increasing competition and tension between countries
vying for limited resources.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ U.S. Department of Defense, 2014 Climate Change Adaption
Roadmap, at 4 (2014).
A recent scientific study estimated that a 2-degree Celsius
rise in temperature--which the Paris Climate Agreement aims not
to exceed--would more than double the influence of climate on
conflict, rising to 13 percent.\128\ A 4-degree Celsius rise in
temperature would increase the influence of climate on conflict
to 26 percent.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ Devon Ryan, ``How much does climate change affects the risk
of armed conflict,'' Science Daily, June 12, 2019.
\129\ Id.
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In addition to spurring conflict, climate change will
inevitably result in more extreme weather events, including
droughts, floods, storms, and landslides, causing
displacement.\130\ In 2019, the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre estimated that 1,900 disasters triggered 24.9
million new displacement across 140 countries--three times the
number of new displacements caused by conflict and
violence.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ United States Geological Survey, ``How can climate change
affect natural disasters?,'' https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-can-climate-
change-affect-natural-disasters-1?qt-news--science--products=0#qt-
news--science--products (last visited June 4, 2020).
\131\ IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 (Apr.
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effects of climate change disproportionately impact the
most vulnerable people who are least able to adapt. Women and
girls are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change. For example, in regions experiencing drought, girls are
more likely to be withdrawn from school to collect water.\132\
Once girls are out of school, it is more likely that they will
become child brides, which profoundly impacts their mental,
physical, and overall wellbeing, and reduces their ability to
be financially independent.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ Maram Ahmed, World Economic Forum, Global Agenda, ``How
climate change exacerbates the refugee crisis -- and what can be done
about it,'' June 20, 2019.
\133\ Laurie Goering, ``With climate change driving child marriage
risks, Bangladesh fights back,'' Reuters, July 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT
IN BANGLADESH
In 2017, the world watched in horror as hundreds of
thousands of Rohingya were forced from their homes in Burma by
a military-led crackdown and sought safe haven in
Bangladesh.\134\ Bangladesh itself, however, was already and is
still suffering from a desperate displacement crisis. In a
country with low elevation, high population density, and
inadequate infrastructure, Bangladeshis are extremely
susceptible to climate change displacement.\135\ By 2050, it is
estimated that 1 in 7 people in Bangladesh will be displaced by
climate change.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Jennifer Chowdhury, ``Bangladesh, growing tired of hosting
Rohingya refugees, puts new squeeze on the teeming camps,'' The
Washington Post, Sept. 11, 2019.
\135\ Kumari Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal
Climate Migration, World Bank, at 127 (2018); Environmental Justice
Foundation, Climate Displacement in Bangladesh (2018).
\136\ Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate
Migration, at 127; Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate
Displacement in Bangladesh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rising sea levels are expected to displace 18 million
people in Bangladesh by 2050 due to loss of land, tidal
flooding, and other negative effects.\137\ Salinization, or the
contamination of water supplies with salt, has been and will be
exacerbated by rising sea levels, leaving 33 million people
vulnerable to related health problems by 2050.\138\ Inland,
melting Himalayan glaciers are already causing rising river
levels and erosion driving the displacement of 50,000 to
200,000 people annually.\139\ Climate change is also causing an
increasing frequency and severity of tropical storms. In 2016,
there were four cyclones in the Bay of Bengal, compared to one
normally.\140\ Other causes of climate displacement in
Bangladesh include increasingly erratic rainfall patterns
causing drought in the drier north-western regions and
landslides in the hilly north-eastern and south-eastern
regions.\141\
\137\ Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate
Migration, at 156; Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate
Displacement in Bangladesh.
\138\ Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate Displacement in
Bangladesh.
\139\ Robert Glennon, ``The Unfolding Tragedy of Climate Change in
Bangladesh,'' Scientific American, Apr. 21, 2017.
\140\ Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate Displacement in
Bangladesh (2018).
\141\ Id.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Maggie Moore, [Rohingya] Girl with bowl on head,
USAID, Jan. 16, 2018.
Internally Displaced Persons Under-Recognized
At 41.3 million globally, IDPs vastly outnumber refugees,
yet they receive a fraction of international humanitarian
assistance and lack formal international protections.\142\
National governments have the responsibility to provide
protection for IDPs and otherwise allow for humanitarian
organizations to provide assistance; however, in many contexts,
government authorities are unable or even unwilling to provide
or allow for necessary assistance.\143\ In countries like the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, persistent cycles of
violence have created huge numbers of IDPs that the government
has either chosen not to protect or struggled to serve.\144\ In
some cases, like Syria, the government has actually perpetrated
the violence and forced many to flee their homes.\145\
Humanitarian organizations often lack the resources, capacity,
and government permission to adequately respond to an IDP
crisis.\146\ IDP populations are often explicitly or implicitly
left out of national action plans and resources, and
international organizations lack the authority to enforce
sovereign responsibility for IDP populations.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 3, 7
(June 2019); UNICEF & IDMC, Protecting and Supporting Internally
Displaced Children in Urban Settings, at 2 (July 2019).
\143\ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights (UNOHCHR), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Feb. 11,
1998). The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that,
``National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced
persons within their jurisdiction.'' Id.
\144\ Mark Yarnell, ``The World Is Failing Internally Displaced
People. Here's One Solution,'' Refugees Deeply, July 10, 2018; IDMC,
Ethiopia tops global list of highest displacement in 2018 (Sept. 12,
2018).
\145\ Mark Yarnell & Mikaela Rear, ``Dear UN secretary-general,
don't forget the internally displaced,'' The New Humanitarian, July
15, 2019.
\146\ Mark Yarnell, ``The World Is Failing Internally Displaced
People. Here's One Solution,'' Refugees Deeply, July 10, 2018; Mark
Yarnell, The Crisis Below the Headlines: Conflict Displacement in
Ethiopia, Refugees International (Nov. 2018).
\147\ Press Release, International Rescue Committee, Statement by
David Miliband, President and CEO of the International Rescue
Committee, at the conclusion of his four-day visit to Chad and
Cameroon, July 10, 2019; Roberta Cohen, The Development of
International Strategies to Protect Internally Displaced Persons, The
Brookings Institution, May 7, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The failure to fully address the needs of IDPs is an urgent
and persistent problem that will only increase with time. In
addition to conflict-induced internal displacement, climate
change could increase the number of IDPs to well over 140
million people by 2050.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate
Migration, at xix.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
New Challenges for Forced Migrants
Decades in Displacement
As conflicts last longer, most displaced civilians are
unable to return home. Today, estimates for the average length
of time refugees remain displaced from their home country range
between 10 and 26 years.\149\ For IDPs, most experience serial
or cyclical displacements--after attempting to return to their
areas of origin, many are forced to flee again.\150\ Today, the
rate of new displacements vastly exceeds the rate at which
civilians are returning home or obtaining other permanent
solutions. In 2018, less than 3 percent of refugees and less
than 6 percent of IDPs returned home.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Xavier Devictor & Quy-Toan Do, How Many Years Have Refugees
Been in Exile?, World Bank (Sept. 2016); Elizabeth Ferris, ``When
refugee displacement drags on, is self-reliance the answer?,'' The
Brookings Institution (June 19, 2018); UNHCR, Contribution to the
Fifteenth Coordination Meeting on International Migration, at 2 (Feb.
10, 2017).
\150\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 2 (2019).
\151\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2-3
(June 2019). Note that IDP solutions are incredibly hard to determine,
especially the solution of local integration. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple generations are growing up in displacement. The
longest refugee situation is that of Palestinian refugees, five
million of which are eligible for services from the UN Relief
and Works Agency in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, the
West Bank, and parts of East Jerusalem.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ Id. at 23; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), ``Palestine Refugees,''
https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (last visited June 17, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numerous conflicts elsewhere have caused generational
refugee crises:
Eritrean refugees have been displaced in Sudan for close to
30 years;\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 23
(June 2019).
Many Burundian refugees have been in Tanzania for over 45
years;\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millions of forcibly displaced Afghan nationals have been
living in Pakistan for 40 years;\155\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Id. at 22.
In Ethiopia, one South Sudanese refugee camp has been
operating for over 25 years.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ UNHCR Ethiopia, Pugnido Refugee Camp (May 2019).
The number of protracted refugee situations--formally
defined as when more than 25,000 refugees have been displaced
more than five years--continues to grow.\157\ In 2018, nine
additional crises became protracted, and none were
resolved.\158\ Unsurprisingly, people experiencing protracted
displacement struggle to obtain essential support for their
development and growth, such as reliable access to education,
the opportunity to learn employable skills, or sustained
employment.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 22
(June 2019); see map on page 28, ``Protracted Refugee Situations.''
\158\ Id.
\159\ See Chapter 3 for further details.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee staff analysis based on UNHCR, ``Global trends 2018 annexes
and tables,'' June 19, 2019; World Bank, ``GDP (current US$)'' (last
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
visited Feb. 27, 2020).
Poor Countries Bear a Disproportionate Responsibility
Although migrants making the long journey to Europe
captured global attention in 2014 and 2015, the overwhelming
majority of refugees--nearly 4 in 5--reside in countries
directly adjacent to their country of origin.\160\ In addition,
84 percent of refugees and asylum seekers reside in developing
countries, which places enormous additional pressure on these
countries' already limited resources.\161\ The top ten refugee-
hosting countries host 63 percent of the world's refugees, but
account for just 7 percent of global Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).\162\ Bangladesh received more refugees from Burma in
three weeks in 2017 than mainland Europe received in all of
2016, and Bangladesh is responding with just 1.46 percent of
the European Union's (EU) GDP.\163\ Elsewhere, in Lebanon,
roughly 1 in every 5 inhabitants is a refugee, making it the
largest per capita refugee-hosting country in the world.\164\
The influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees comes at a
remarkably difficult time for Lebanon's socioeconomic balance;
among many issues, it is one of the most indebted nations in
the world.\165\ And Colombia, which already had the world's
largest IDP population and hosted 1.8 million Venezuelan
refugees as of April 2020, is confronting the worst
humanitarian emergency to hit the Western Hemisphere in a
generation.\166\ The list goes on.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June
2019).
\161\ Id. at 18.
\162\ Data retrieved from UNHCR, ``Global trends 2018 annexes and
tables (.zip),'' June 19, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/
search?comid=56b079c44&&cid=49aea93aba&tags=globaltrends.
\163\ United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee,
``Violence in Rakhine State and the UK's response'' (Dec. 8, 2017);
Committee staff calculations based on World Bank, ``GDP (current
US$),'' https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last
visited Feb. 27, 2020).
\164\ Government of Lebanon & United Nations, Lebanon Crisis
Response Plan 2017-2020 (2019 update), at 8, 10 (Jan. 2019).
\165\ Dina Eldawy, ``A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee
Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge?'', Migration Policy Institute, Feb.
21, 2019.
\166\ Ivan Duque, ``Colombia is committed to helping Venezuelan
refugees. But we can't do it alone,'' The Washington Post, Feb. 27,
2020; Response for Venezuelans, Venezuelan Refugees & Migrants in the
Region (Apr. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet increasingly, developed nations are less willing to
share the burden, and are turning their backs on migrants and
refugees by closing their borders, restricting access to their
asylum systems, and externalizing their border enforcement. The
EU, for example, has instituted security measures in West and
North Africa that have, in effect, externalized--or pushed
out--their borders. These measures include the Trust Fund for
Africa, an expansive EU-funded effort to stem irregular
migration and refugee flows to Europe. Among its programs is
support for the Libyan Coast Guard, who intercepts boats of
asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants fleeing for Europe and
returns them to areas embroiled in conflict in Libya.\167\ One
Egyptian official in the Department of Refugee Affairs
described the need for burden sharing to Committee staff: ``It
is quite obvious that Northern countries are less welcoming for
refugees and migrants. They must therefore support other host
countries.''\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ Anny Bhan et al., Pushing the boundaries: Insights into the
EU's response to mixed migration on the Central Mediterranean Route,
International Rescue Committee, at 2 (July 2018); Oxfam, The EU Trust
Fund for Africa: Trapped between aid policy and migration politics
(Jan. 29, 2020).
\168\ Department of Refugee Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Interview with Committee Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Staff Visit to Cairo, Egypt, May 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increasingly Urban Settings
Forced migration is becoming increasingly urban, resulting
in modified and increased protection needs. In contrast to past
decades, the majority of refugees, IDPs, and other migrants now
live in urban settings, as opposed to rural areas or formal
camps.\169\ The humanitarian system--which is traditionally
accustomed to short-term, life-saving, camp-based responses--is
still adapting to the new reality of more urban and longer-term
displacement. In 2014, UNHCR's Policy on Alternatives to Camps
placed a strong preference against establishing formal camps,
recommending that they only be set up as a last resort in rapid
onset displacement crises.\170\ These changes in policy aside,
however, the humanitarian system has struggled to identify and
adequately assist forced migrants in urban contexts.\171\ As
the global population continues to urbanize, the humanitarian
community and governments need to adapt to create a coherent
response to urban displacement and migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 17, 56
(June 2019); Cindy Huang & Jimmy Graham, ``How Urban are IDPs and What
Does that Mean for Their Economic Integration?,'' Center for Global
Desvelopment, May 10, 2019.
\170\ UNHCR, Policy on Alternatives to Camps, at 46 (July 2014).
\171\ Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez et al., ``Refugees and internally
displaced persons in cities--the ``hidden'' side of forced
displacement,'' World Bank, May 22, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The reality is that forced migration--in its root causes
and challenges--has radically transformed in recent decades,
rendering traditional tools no longer fit to respond
effectively. As a result, more people are displaced than ever
before. The increased frequency and duration of conflicts means
that refugees and IDPs are living in precarious conditions for
decades on end, while the available solutions are proving more
elusive than ever. Moreover, the profile of those forced to
flee has changed--climate change's effects are rendering
communities uninhabitable and forcing many to leave their
homes. These trends will continue to prompt human adaption and
force people to flee their homes in search of safety.
Forced migration is the result of the failure of national
and international community to address the root causes of
displacement--war, endemic violence, corruption, weak
governance, abusive leaders, and poor accountability. At its
crux, the international community is suffering from a political
crisis that has resulted in a global forced migration crisis.
International bodies, like the UN Security Council, must use
all of the powers at its disposal to pursue its core mandate--
maintaining international peace and security--by resolving and
preventing conflicts, and holding perpetrators of international
humanitarian law violations accountable. In addition, the
United States must make concerted efforts to address drivers of
displacement--promoting international law and accountability,
imposing sanctions, supporting conflict resolution and atrocity
prevention, strengthening the UN Security Council, and
rejoining and championing global efforts to act on climate
change.
Without dramatic efforts, these trends suggest the forced
migrant crisis will continue to grow in numbers and severity,
impacting the stability of the entire world and the United
States.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ashique Rushdi, [Rohingya] Man with umbrella, USAID, Jan. 16, 2018.
CHAPTER THREE
Human Rights Denied
----------
Many forced migrants face unimaginable trauma and severe
violations of their human rights during the course of their
journey, such as exploitation, family separation, kidnapping,
torture, enslavement, arbitrary detention, sexual violence,
drowning, and arbitrary killing. Those that survive continue to
face significant challenges once they reach safety. Forced
migrants often face severe restrictions on their human rights,
including the right to freedom of movement, and access to
identity documents, education, and healthcare. These
restrictions push many to the fringes of society, and make it
difficult for forced migrants to provide for themselves and
their families, and contribute to their host communities. Women
and children face especially severe restrictions, and are
vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation.
Pervasive Restrictions on Freedom of Movement
For ordinary people forcibly displaced by conflict, their
circumstances vary widely--the image of a fenced refugee camp
represents life for only a fraction of forced migrants
globally.\172\ Whether living in a camp or not, many forced
migrants experience restrictions on their ability to move
freely. In Bangladesh, the government bars Rohingya refugees
from leaving their camps--confining 900,000 people.\173\ In
Lebanon, local authorities illegally enact curfews on Syrian
refugee populations.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 57
(June 2019).
\173\ Bill Frelick, ``Bangladesh is not my Country'': The Plight of
Rohingya Refugees from Myanmar, Human Rights Watch (Aug. 5, 2018).
\174\ ``Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian
Refugees,'' Human Rights Watch, Oct. 3, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In extreme cases, authorities restrict the movement of
refugees by holding them in detention centers with appalling
living conditions. Most migrants arrive at detention centers
already weakened by the hardships of the journey, and human
rights abuses at detention centers further compound their
vulnerability and can be fatal.\175\ For example, in Libya,
forced migrants are held for months in squalid and disease-
ridden conditions.\176\ Detainees lack food, clean water, and
ventilation, and continuously face exploitation and abuse,
including forced labor, physical abuse, sexual violence,
trafficking, torture, and even murder.\177\ Moreover, many of
these Libyan detention centers are located on the frontlines of
the armed conflict, exposing migrants to an additional level of
danger due to their restricted movement.\178\ In July 2019, a
Libyan National Army missile struck the Tajoura detention
center near Tripoli, killing 53 migrants held there.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ See, e.g., Sally Hayden, ``The U.N. Is Leaving Migrants to
Die in Libya,'' Foreign Policy, Oct. 10, 2019.
\176\ Maggie Michael, ``Migrants stranded in Libya endure sewage,
maggots, disease,'' AP, June 30, 2019; Izza Leghtas, ``Death Would Have
Been Better'': Europe Continues to Fail Refugees and Migrants in Libya,
Refugees International, at 3 (Apr. 2018).
\177\ Maggie Michael, ``Migrants stranded in Libya endure sewage,
maggots, disease,'' AP, June 30, 2019; Izza Leghtas, ``Death Would Have
Been Better'': Europe Continues to Fail Refugees and Migrants in Libya,
Refugees International, at 3 (Apr. 2018); Sally Hayden, ``The U.N. Is
Leaving Migrants to Die in Libya,'' Foreign Policy, Oct. 10, 2019.
\178\ Sally Hayden, ``The U.N. Is Leaving Migrants to Die in
Libya,'' Foreign Policy, Oct. 10, 2019.
\179\ ``Six children among 53 confirmed fatalities after Libya
detention centre airstrikes: Security Council condemns attack,'' UN
News, July 5, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obstacles to Accessing Identity Documentation
Many forced migrants lack proper identity documents, such
as birth certificates--a significant obstacle as they seek to
travel to a safe location and gain legal recognition,
protection of their human rights, and access to services.\180\
Forced migrants are more likely to lack identity documents
because of the extreme conditions of their home countries and
journeys. Reasons vary widely--from those whose home
governments lacked the capacity to provide identity
documentation, to those facing persecution who fear approaching
government officials to request or renew documents, to those
whose documents were lost, damaged, or stolen on their
journey.\181\ In Somalia, for example, the process for gaining
identity documentation is cost prohibitive for most Somalis,
involving travel to Mogadishu, a criminal reference check, and
a fee of 12.50 U.S. dollars.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ Nicholas Oakeshott et al., ``Empowering refugees and
internally displaced persons through digital identity,'' World Bank
Blogs, June 19, 2018; Bronwen Manby, Identification in the Context of
Forced Displacement, The World Bank, at 1 (June 2016).
\181\ Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA),
Refugees and Identity: Considerations for Mobile-Enabled Registration
and Aid Delivery, at 6 (June 2017).
\182\ Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada, Ottawa, ``Somalia: Identification documents, including national
identity cards, passports, driver's licenses, and any other document
required to access government services; information on the issuing
agencies and the requirements to obtain documents,'' European Country
of Origin Information Network, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/
1167317.html (last visited June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced migrants without identity documents face a long list
of obstacles, including:
Risk of detention or deportation;
Risk of abuse or exploitation;
Risk of statelessness, particularly for children;
Limited access to services and benefits, including
education, health care, and banking;
Inability to document subsequent life events such as
marriage, birth, and death (and potentially those of an
undocumented individuals' children as well); and
Inability to repatriate, especially for children of forced
migrants.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ Bronwen Manby, Identification in the Context of Forced
Displacement, World Bank, at 1, 8-9, 21 (June 2016).
Formal documentation often serves as the basis for the
provisioning of other legal rights and basic services. As such,
forced migrants without identity documents often lack access to
rights, including freedom of movement and the right to work,
and are often more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.\184\
Furthermore, forced migrants without identity documents are
less likely to report abuse or exploitation due to fear of
arrest or deportation.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ GSMA, Refugees and Identity: Considerations for Mobile-
Enabled Registration and Aid Delivery, at 6, 21; Bronwen Manby,
Identification in the Context of Forced Displacement, World Bank, at 9.
\185\ GSMA, Refugees and Identity, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While states are ultimately responsible for registering
refugees and issuing identity documentation, the UN High
Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) often plays a supporting
role.\186\ UNHCR has implemented and partnered with various
technological solutions for identity documentation.\187\ These
efforts are discussed further in Chapter 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ Bronwen Manby, Identification in the Context of Forced
Displacement, World Bank, at 1 (June 2016).
\187\ GSMA, Refugees and Identity, at 9-13; Mark Latonero et al.,
Digital Identity in the Migration and Refugee Context: Italy Case
Study, Data & Society Research Institute, at 4 (Apr. 2019).
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Sidebar: STATELESSNESS AND FORCED MIGRATION
Within the growing numbers of refugees, IDPs, and other
forced migrants around the world, there are millions of
stateless persons.\188\ As defined in international law, a
stateless person is someone whom no state considers as a
national under operation of its law.\189\ Stateless people have
no legal status and no right to vote, and they often lack
access to education, employment, health care, justice systems,
property rights, and registration of birth, marriage, and
death.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 51-52
(June 2019); UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011: Addressing
Statelessness (Dec. 1, 2009).
\189\ UN, Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
at 6 (Sept. 28, 1954).
\190\ Anna Roberts & Mehgan Gallagher, ``No Place to Run: The
Forgotten Vulnerabilities of the Stateless,'' O'Neill Institute for
National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center,
Oct. 3, 2016; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNOHCHR) & UNHCR, Meeting Report: Regional Expert Meeting on the Human
Rights of Stateless Persons in the Middle East and North Africa, at 17,
19, 21, 26 (Feb. 18-19, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced migration is both a cause and consequence of
statelessness for millions of people. Lacking citizenship in
any country, stateless people are highly vulnerable to forced
displacement, trafficking in persons, and other abuses.\191\ In
some situations, like that of Rohingya, statelessness can be
grounds for persecution in an asylum claim.\192\ Forced
migration can cause statelessness when states stipulate the
loss of citizenship with residency abroad, identity documents
are lost, forfeited, or destroyed, or children born to refugees
are unable to register with host countries or countries of
origin.\193\ For example, because Syria's citizenship law
permits only fathers to transmit Syrian citizenship to children
born outside of Syria, millions of Syrian refugee children are
at risk of statelessness due to difficulty documenting their
connections to a Syrian father, including situations where
fathers have been killed or separated from their families and
where parents lack official documentation of their
marriage.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Anna Roberts & Mehgan Gallagher, ``No Place to Run: The
Forgotten Vulnerabilities of the Stateless,'' O'Neill Institute for
National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center,
Oct. 3, 2016.
\192\ UNHCR, Representing Stateless Persons Before U.S. Immigration
Authorities: A Legal Practice Resource from the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees, at 17-18 (Aug. 2017).
\193\ UNHCR, Self-Study Module on Statelessness, at 26 (Oct. 1,
2012).
\194\ Dilys Hartley, ``Statelessness and the Syrian Conflict,''
Oxford Human Rights Hub, June 21, 2017; Zahra Albarazi & Laura van
Waas, Understanding statelessness in the Syria refugee context,
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion & Norwegian Refugee Council,
at 37 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because they are not recognized by any government, official
statistics on stateless people remain largely unavailable.\195\
UNHCR--the agency mandated to prevent and reduce
statelessness--reported data on 3.9 million stateless persons
from 78 countries at the end of 2018, but has estimated that
the global figure may be closer to 12 million.\196\ In the
United States alone, one Center for Migration Studies report
estimated 218,000 U.S. residents were potentially stateless or
at risk of statelessness.\197\ Although UNHCR launched a 10-
year Global Campaign to End Statelessness by 2024 and UN member
states, civil society organizations, and international and
regional organizations have made over 350 pledges to take
concrete actions to prevent and reduce statelessness, progress
in reducing statelessness remains limited.\198\ Furthermore,
the risks of creating new stateless populations grow as forced
migration and xenophobia increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 51
(June 2019).
\196\ Id.; `` `12 million' stateless people globally, warns UNHCR
chief in call to States for decisive action,'' UN News, Nov. 12, 2018.
\197\ Donald Kerwin et al., Statelessness in the United States: A
Study to Estimate and Profile the US Stateless Population, The Center
for Migration Studies of New York, at 2-4 (Jan. 2020). The availability
of data on stateless persons in the U.S. is inconsistent due to
insufficient and inconsistent tracking practices.
\198\ UNHCR, Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024
(Nov. 4, 2014); UNHCR, The Campaign to End Statelessness: October--
December 2019 Update, at 2 (Jan. 20, 2020); `` `Dangerous nationalism'
seriously threatens efforts to tackle statelessness: UNHCR chief,'' UN
News, Oct. 7, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barriers for Accessing Healthcare and Education
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A health clinic at an IDP camp on the former site of the Petionville
country club in Haiti. Ben Edwards, Health Clinic, USAID (Mar. 29,
2011).
Although international law affords everyone the right to
access healthcare, ready access is rarely the case for forced
migrants.\199\ Given the complete collapse of Venezuela's
healthcare system, thousands of pregnant Venezuelan women have
made the dangerous crossing into Colombia to give birth.\200\
Colombian emergency rooms along the border are on the verge of
collapse due to strained resources, forcing many patients to go
unseen by a health care professional.\201\ For many forced
migrants, poor living conditions and the difficult journey
result in disease, infections, and other ailments.\202\ The
inability to receive the most basic medical attention can cause
a treatable illness to be fatal.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ UNOHCHR, The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 31, at 3-4, 18-
20 (June 2008).
\200\ Alejandra Romo, ``Pregnant women flee lack of maternal health
care in Venezuela,'' UNHCR, July 23, 2019.
\201\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Hospital in
Cucuta, Colombia, Mar. 20-23, 2019; Anastasia Moloney, ``FEATURE--As
Venezuela's health system crumbles, pregnant women flee,'' Reuters,
June 18, 2018; Luisa Torres, ``Colombia Kindly Offers Free Health Care
to Venezuelans--Up To A Point,'' NPR, Aug. 20, 2019.
\202\ See e.g., Anastasia Moloney, ``FEATURE--As Venezuela's health
system crumbles, pregnant women flee to Colombia,'' Reuters, June 18,
2018.
\203\ See e.g., id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced migrants also frequently struggle to access
education. The benefit of quality education cannot be
overstated. In addition to providing a venue for children to
expand their knowledge, schools serve as safe havens and
sources of psycho-social development.\204\ These forms of
education and intervention are critically important for
children living in crisis who often experience violence,
separation from caregivers, and severe restrictions on their
most basic rights.\205\ During critical stages of development,
particularly from birth to five years old, these adverse
experiences have detrimental effects on the developing brain
and stress response system with life-long repercussions for the
child's future health and well-being.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers:
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 15
(Oct. 2018); Jenni Lee, ``5 Reasons to Care About Education for
Refugees,'' United Nations Foundation, Nov. 23, 2016.
\205\ NGO Committee on Migration, Positive Effects of Innovative
Early Childhood Development Programs on Refugee Youth Resilience (Nov.
2016); Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers:
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 13
(Oct. 2018).
\206\ NGO Committee on Migration, Positive Effects of Innovative
Early Childhood Development Programs on Refugee Youth Resilience (Nov.
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More than half of the 7.1 million school-age refugee
children are not in school.\207\ Many refugees who do receive
primary education do not or cannot access secondary education.
While 63 percent of refugees are enrolled in primary education,
only 24 percent are enrolled in secondary education--compared
to the global rate of 84 percent.\208\ Only 3 percent of
refugees have access to higher education.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ UNHCR, Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis, at 11
(2019).
\208\ Id. at 6.
\209\ UNHCR, ``Tertiary Education,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
tertiary-education.html (last visited June 2, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Often, host countries do not provide or even allow
educational resources or institutions for forced migrants
living within their borders. Only 16 out of 25 UNHCR priority
countries allow refugees full access to their education systems
at the primary and secondary level.\210\ Until January 2020,
Rohingya refugees living in Cox's Bazaar in Bangladesh were
only allowed access to provisional learning centers providing
playtime and early primary education.\211\ These limited
resources, in combination with their inability to move freely
beyond the refugee camps, effectively denied a majority of the
world's Rohingya populations an education for several years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Sebastien Hine & Joseph Nhan-O'Reilly, Losing out on
Learning: Providing refugee children the education they were promised,
Save the Children, at 7 (2017).
\211\ ``Bangladesh: Rohingya children get access to education,''
Amnesty International, Jan. 28, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2020, Bangladesh finally announced it would
begin to allow formal schooling and skills training for
Rohingya refugee children.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While inadequate education access for refugees and other
forced migrants is a common challenge, children often need to
work to help support their families, presenting an additional
and complex barrier to accessing education.\213\ In Jordan, for
example, 47 percent of Syrian refugee households entirely or
partly rely on income generated by a child.\214\ In certain
contexts, working almost always guarantees that a child will
not return to school.\215\ Additional barriers to accessing
education include safety concerns, prohibitive transportation,
uniform and supplies costs, the need for remedial education for
refugee children who have been out of school, and restrictions
on movement.\216\ Such barriers have contributed to the over
250,000 Syrian refugee children who remained out of school in
Lebanon in 2018.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers:
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 24
(Oct. 2018).
\214\ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) & Save the Children,
Small Hands Heavy Burden: How the Syria Conflict is Driving more
Children into the Workforce, at 2 (July 2, 2015).
\215\ Id.
\216\ UNHCR, Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis, at 29
(2019); Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers:
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 25, 38
(Oct. 2018).
\217\ ``Lebanon: Stalled Effort to Get Syrian Children in School,''
Human Rights Watch, Dec. 13, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whole generations of children are missing educations, which
has repercussions for not only them, but for their families,
their communities, and, ultimately, their countries. The need
for greater access to education has been highlighted on the
global stage, including at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit
with the creation of a global fund for education in emergency
situations--Education Cannot Wait.\218\ As a result, education
funding as a proportion of humanitarian assistance reached a
five-year high in 2018 at 4.3 percent, with a remaining 56
percent funding gap in appeals.\219\ More needs to be done to
support refugee populations and their host communities to help
them secure a brighter future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ Education Cannot Wait, ``About Us,'' https://
www.educationcannotwait.org/about-ecw/ (last visited June 3, 2020).
\219\ Education Cannot Wait, Annual Report 2018, at 6, 9 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Widespread Lack of Livelihood Opportunities
and Barriers To Work
Inadequate job opportunities for forced migrants can
increase their vulnerability to other abuses, including
exploitation, abuse, and even trafficking.\220\ Numerous
refugee-hosting countries, such as Egypt and Bangladesh,
completely bar refugees from legal employment.\221\ In others,
such as Lebanon, refugees are only permitted to work in
specific sectors.\222\ One study of 15 countries found that 45
percent legally barred employment for refugees.\223\ In
countries where migrants can legally work, significant de-facto
barriers to employment--such as discrimination, restrictions on
mobility, access to safe transportation, barriers to
registering home-based businesses, prohibitive start-up costs,
and access to financial services--undermine forced migrants'
ability to access sustainable employment.\224\ Women often face
these barriers and more, including lack of affordable childcare
options and cultural norms.\225\ Even without these
restrictions, sustainable employment for forced migrants is by
no means guaranteed and is especially challenging in economies
that already suffer from high unemployment rates. In Ethiopia,
the government has set aside 30,000 economic opportunities,
including work permits, for refugees through the World Bank
Jobs Compact.\226\ However, the Ethiopian government told
Committee staff that work permits will not be available to
South Sudanese refugees in camps because of the prioritized
employment needs of the Ethiopian host community, as well as
potentially Ethiopian IDPs.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ Anna Wirth et al., Global Refugee Work Rights Report: Taking
the Movement from Theory to Practice, Asylum Access & the Refugee Work
Rights Coalition, at 28, 31 (Sept. 2014).
\221\ Email Attachment from Karim Saad, Counselor, Embassy of Egypt
in Washington D.C., to Committee Staff, Apr. 15, 2019; Kristy
Siegfried, ``The Refugee Brief--30 April 2019,'' UNHCR, Apr. 30, 2019;
Anna Wirth et al., Global Refugee Work Rights Report: Taking the
Movement from Theory to Practice, Asylum Access & the Refugee Work
Rights Coalition, at 5 (Sept. 2014).
\222\ Shelly Culbertson & Krishna B. Kumar, ``Jobs Can Improve the
Lives of Syrian Refugees and Their Host Communities--and Support
Stability in the Middle East,'' RAND Corporation, Mar. 11, 2019.
\223\ Anna Wirth et al., Global Refugee Work Rights Report: Taking
the Movement from Theory to Practice, Asylum Access & the Refugee Work
Rights Coalition, at 5 (Sept. 2014).
\224\ Id.; International Rescue Committee, In Search of Work:
Creating Jobs for Syrian Refugees: A Case Study of the Jordan Compact
(Feb. 2017), at 13, 15-16; Cindy Huang & Kate Gough, ``The Jordan
Compact: Three Years on, Where Do We Stand?'' Center for Global
Development, Mar. 11, 2019.
\225\ International Rescue Committee, In Search of Work: Creating
Jobs for Syrian Refugees: A Case Study of the Jordan Compact, at 12
(Feb. 2017); Raiyan Kabir & Jeni Klugman, ``Unlocking Refugee Women's
Potential: Closing Economic Gaps to Benefit All,'' International Rescue
Committee & Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, at 11
(July 2019).
\226\ World Bank, International Development Association Program
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit From the IDA18 Regional Sub-
Window on Refugees in the Amount of SDR 58 Million (US $83.33 Million
Equivalent) and a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 82.6 Million (US
$118.67 Million Equivalent) Including US $83.34 Million Equivalent from
the IDA18 Regional Sub-Window on Refugees to the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia for a Program-For-Results/Investment Project
Financing Economic Opportunities Program, at 2, June 4, 2018, http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/226021530243071432/pdf/NEW-ETHIOPIA-
PAD-06072018.pdf.
\227\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia,
May 24-June 1, 2019.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Children playing in the streets of the Hittein Refugee Camp in Zarqa,
Jordan. Simple Pleasures of Running Around, USAID/Jordan, Jan. 24,
2014.
In Focus: AN ALARMING INCREASE IN CHILDREN WHO ARE FORCED MIGRANTS
At the end of 2018, nearly 31 million children were
displaced as refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs.\228\ For
children, the probability of being a refugee, asylum seekers,
or IDP is about 50 percent greater than for the overall
population.\229\ The number of child refugees under UNHCR's
mandate has more than doubled in just 10 years.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ UNICEF, ``Data: Child displacement,'' https://
data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-displacement/displacement/
(last visited June 3, 2020).
\229\ For children, the probability is approximately 1 in 71 based
on 31 million children forced migrants and 2.2 billion children
worldwide. Committee staff calculations based on UNICEF, ``Data: Child
displacement,'' https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-
displacement/displacement/ (last visited June 8, 2020); UNICEF, ``The
State of the World's Children 2017 Statistical Tables,'' Dec. 2017,
https://data.unicef.org/resources/state-worlds-children-2017-
statistical-tables/. For the overall population, the probability is
approximately 1 in 109 (see Chapter 1) based on 2019 figures for forced
migration (70.8 million) and world population (7.7 billion). UNHCR,
``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-
glance.html (last visited May 27, 2020); United Nations, ``World
Population Prospects 2019,'' https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/.
\230\ UNICEF, Uprooted: The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant
Children, at 3 (Sep. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions on access to healthcare and education, as well
as restrictions on movement, such as detention, can have
devastating consequences on children. These consequences can
overshadow the rest of their lives.\231\ Furthermore,
children--and especially unaccompanied minors--are often
particularly vulnerable to some of the worst forms of abuse and
harm, including trafficking.\232\ In 2015, nearly 100,000
children filed asylum claims with UNHCR as unaccompanied or
separated children--representing a three-fold increase from the
previous year and the highest number on record.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ Id.
\232\ Id.
\233\ Id. at 38-39.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A young Farahi girl stares into the camera at a local returnee and
refugee village in Farah province, Afghanistan. HMC Josh Ives, 130209-
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N-IE116-052, U.S. Navy, Feb. 9, 2013.
In Focus: VULNERABILITIES FOR
WOMEN AND GIRLS
Women and girls make up around half of the world's forced
migrant population and face significant additional barriers,
including discrimination and violence.\234\ While forced
migrant populations, such as refugees and IDPs, are often
treated as second-class citizens within their host countries,
the treatment of women and girls is even further degraded on
account of their gender. This places a double burden on women
and girl forced migrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ UNHCR, ``Women,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/women.html
(last visited June 3, 2020); UN Secretary General, In safety and
dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, 70th
Session, at 9 (Apr. 21, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Women often face gender-specific restrictions that limit
their ability to access human rights. In addition to child and
family care responsibilities, women face significant additional
economic barriers. The 15 largest refugee-hosting countries in
2014 together had 170 women-only legal restrictions on seeking
employment.\235\ The five economies with the most restrictions
on women's right to work include four of the top refugee
hosts.\236\ These economic restrictions not only impact women,
but also whole families. During and after conflict, there is
often a significant increase in female-headed households.\237\
In Jordan, 29 percent of Syrian households are female-
headed.\238\ In southern Syria, studies have shown that the
income of female-headed households is 15 to 32 percent less
than male-headed households.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach
Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts, at 87
(2017).
\236\ The four countries are Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and Yemen.
Id.
\237\ Mira Philips, ``Gender & post-conflict development:
Experiences of female-headed households,'' The Island, Aug. 25, 2014.
\238\ CARE International in Jordan, Fact Sheet: 8 Years Into
Exile--Urban Syrian refugees, non-Syrian refugees, and vulnerable host
communities, at 1 (Aug. 2018).
\239\ Beatrix Buecher & James Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala, Women, Work &
War: Syrian women and the struggle to survive five years of conflict,
CARE, at 16 (Mar. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the context of healthcare and education, women and girls
face extreme vulnerability to restricted access to these
critical services. Sixty percent of all preventable maternal
deaths take place in settings of conflict, displacement, or
natural disasters, where women and girls cannot access critical
health care.\240\ Moreover, girls in conflict settings are 2.5
times more likely to be out of school than boys.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State of World
Population 2015--Shelter from the Storm: A Transformative Agenda for
Women and Girls in a Crisis-Prone World, at 4 (2015).
\241\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 17 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Women and girls also face particular protection risks
during transit and displacement. These include, but are not
limited to, health complications, physical harm and injury, and
risks of exploitation, gender-based violence, and
trafficking.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ UN Women--Europe and Central Asia, ``Women refugees and
migrants,'' https://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-refugees-
and-migrants (last visited June 3, 2020).
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Gender-Based Violence: An Under-Recognized Risk
Though the international humanitarian community has
increased its attention towards gender-based violence (GBV), it
remains a major challenge as both a driver of and risk during
forced migration.\243\ Women and girls are particularly
vulnerable to GBV abuses in humanitarian settings. The risk of
GBV rises during times of conflict and emergency.\244\ An
estimated 2 out of every 3 women killed in Central America is a
victim of femicide--killed specifically because of their
gender.\245\ The COVID-19 pandemic has also been accompanied by
an increase in GBV cases in countries around the world.\246\
GBV can and does affect men and boys as well, but nowhere near
the magnitude experienced by women and girls.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration, ``Gender and Gender-Based Violence,'' https://www.state.gov/
other-policy-issues/gender-and-gender-based-violence/#ftn1ref (last
visited June 3, 2020). According to the Department of State, gender-
based violence (GBV) is an umbrella term for any harmful threat or act
directed at an individual or group based on actual or perceived
biological sex, gender identity and/or expression, sexual orientation,
and/or lack of adherence to varying socially constructed norms around
masculinity and femininity. It is rooted in structural gender
inequalities, patriarchy, and power imbalances. Id. Anja Parish,
``Gender-Based Violence against Women: Both Cause for Migration and
Risk along the Journey,'' Migration Policy Institute, Sept. 7, 2017.
\244\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration, ``Gender and Gender-Based Violence,'' https://www.state.gov/
other-policy-issues/gender-and-gender-based-violence/#ftn1ref (last
visited June 3, 2020).
\245\ Sebastian Essayag, From Commitment to Action: Policies to End
Violence Against Women in Latin America and the Caribbean, United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) & UN Women, at 11 (Nov. 15, 2017).
\246\ Oscar Lopez, ``Femicides in Argentina reach 10-year high
under coronavirus lockdown,'' Reuters, May 18, 2020.
\247\ European Institute for Gender Equality, ``What is gender-
based violence?,'' https://eige.europa.eu/gender-based-violence/what-
is-gender-based-violence (last visited June 8, 2020).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A woman from Kassab IDP camp in North Darfur shows her sorrow for the
increase of rapes in the area. She addressed the United Nations-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative Ibrahim
Gambari and asked him to assure their protection. Albert Gonzalez
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Farran, Woman's sorrow, UNAMID, Jan. 19, 2012.
An estimated one in five women refugees or displaced women
in humanitarian settings has experienced sexual violence.\248\
Due to stigma and shame surrounding sexual violence, incidences
of GBV often go underreported.\249\ Moreover, there is a
shortage of trained experts to monitor, prevent, mitigate, and
respond to GBV.\250\ For example, at a South Sudanese refugee
camp Committee staff visited in Ethiopia, there were no
protection officers for GBV for a population of 80,000.\251\
The South Sudanese refugee women at the camp said they have to
go in groups to collect their daily firewood for cooking, as
they are afraid for their safety if they go alone.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ International Rescue Committee, Clinical Care for Survivors
of Gender-Based Violence, at 2 (Aug. 2016).
\249\ Charles North, ``Overcoming the Stigma of Gender-Based
Violence,'' USAID, Dec. 9, 2016.
\250\ Elhra Humanitarian Innovation Fund, Gender-Based Violence
Interventions: Opportunities for Innovation--Gap Analysis, at 54
(2016); U.S. Department of State Archive, ``Safe from the Start,''
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm (last
visited June 9, 2020).
\251\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to the
Nguenyyiel Camp in Ethiopia, May 30, 2019.
\252\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For women and girls, extreme restrictions on their other
rights, including healthcare and education, makes them even
more vulnerable to GBV. Lack of education, poverty, gender
inequality, and displacement can all serve as factors creating
situations where girls are more at risk of being forced into
child marriages.\253\ In Jordan, for example, child marriages
among Syrian refugees more than doubled in 4 years--from 15
percent in 2014 to 36 percent by 2018.\254\ In Syria itself, 69
percent of communities assessed by the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported early
marriage as a concern.\255\ In child marriages where girls
marry before 15, girls are 50 percent more likely to experience
physical and sexual violence from their partner.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ Girls Not Brides, ``Why Does Child Marriage Happen?,''
https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/why-does-it-happen/ (last visited June
4, 2020); Omer Karasapan & Sajjad Shah, ``Forced displacement and child
marriage: A growing challenge in MENA,'' The Brookings Institution,
June 19, 2019.
\254\ ``Child marriage on the rise among Syrian refugee girls in
Jordan,'' Al Jazeera, Apr. 18, 2018.
\255\ UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: The Humanitarian Crisis in
Syria, at 1 (Apr. 23, 2018).
\256\ Girls Not Brides, ``What is the impact of Child Marriage:
Violence against girls'' https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/themes/
violence-against-girls/ (last visited June 4, 2020).
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GBV causes severe and long-lasting physical, psychological,
and emotional trauma.\257\ Access to post-GBV services,
however, is extremely limited for forced migrants.\258\ Despite
recent initiatives focused on GBV, the international community
too often fails to prioritize GBV as a pressing issue. In 2013,
the United Kingdom and Sweden launched a multi-stakeholder
initiative, the Call to Action on Protection from Gender-based
Violence in Emergencies, with the aim of providing
comprehensive post-GBV services as well as mitigating GBV risk
from the earliest phases of a crisis.\259\ In September 2013,
the United States launched Safe from the Start, a joint
Department of State and USAID initiative, to help reduce the
incidence of GBV and ensure quality services for survivors from
the onset of emergencies.\260\ Safe from the Start dedicates
new resources to GBV interventions, risk mitigation, and
accountability in emergency settings.\261\ These initiatives
are extremely positive steps, but collectively the
international community can do more to prioritize GBV,
including increasing funding. Between 2016 and 2018, less than
0.2 percent of humanitarian response funding was spent on GBV
prevention for women and girls.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ World Health Organization Health Cluster, ``Gender-based
violence in health emergencies.''
\258\ See Marcy Hersh et al., The Call to Action on Protection from
Gender-based Violence in Emergencies: Field-Level Implementation
Urgently Required, Women's Refugee Commission (Dec. 2016).
\259\ Id. at 1.
\260\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration, ``Gender and Gender-Based Violence,'' https://www.state.gov/
other-policy-issues/gender-and-gender-based-violence/ (last visited
June 4, 2020).
\261\ U.S. Department of State Archive, ``Safe from the Start,''
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm (last
visited June 9, 2020).
\262\ Megan Clement, ``Q&A: Why does so little aid money go to
preventing violence against women and girls?,'' The New Humanitarian,
Nov. 27, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sidebar: THE UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), established in
1969, is the UN's reproductive health agency, which seeks to
end preventable maternal deaths, meet needs for voluntary
family planning, and end gender-based violence, child marriage,
female genital mutilation, and other harmful practices.\263\
UNFPA works on the ground during and after humanitarian
emergencies, distributing health supplies in refugee camps and
setting up birthing centers in IDP camps.\264\ UNFPA does not
provide or fund abortion services anywhere in the world.\265\
UNFPA prioritizes the provision of voluntary family planning to
reduce recourse to abortion and also provides post-abortion
care to save the life of a woman.\266\ UNFPA also provides
essential aid during conflicts, natural disasters and public
health emergencies, when access to health care is diminished
and women are most vulnerable.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ UNFPA, ``About us,'' https://www.unfpa.org/about-us (last
visited June 9, 2020).
\264\ UNFPA, ``Humanitarian Emergencies,'' https://www.unfpa.org/
emergencies (last visited June 9, 2020); ``Refugees' and migrants'
reproductive health needs overlooked,'' UNFPA, Sept. 14, 2016; Press
Release, UNFPA, UNFPA Helps Displaced Pakistani Mothers Deliver Safely,
Mar. 2, 2010.
\265\ Press Statement, UNFPA, Statement on the United States
Decision to Again Withhold Funding from UNFPA, July 15, 2019.
\266\ Id. UNFPA, ``Frequently Asked Questions,'' https://
www.unfpa.org/frequently-asked-questions (last visited June 8, 2020).
\267\ See UNFPA, Humanitarian Action 2020 Overview (Feb. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Risks of Human Trafficking
Human trafficking is one of the world's most serious human
rights violations, involving the acquisition and exploitation
of human beings for labor or sex through fraud, force or
deception.\268\ Forced migrants are at a particularly high risk
for human trafficking. Dangerous living conditions, trauma and
their lack of legal status makes them easy prey for
traffickers.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ UN, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15,
2000.
\269\ Anne P. Wilson, Trafficking Risks for Refugees, Third Annual
Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, University of
Nebraska--Lincoln, at 1 (Nov. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of their displacement, forced migrants often cannot
meet their individual or family's basic needs, making them
targets for organized criminal networks who profit from human
trafficking.\270\ Destitute Iraqi refugees, for example, have
received offers of up to 6,000 U.S. dollars to sell their
daughters to criminal trafficking rings.\271\ Human traffickers
readily exploited the Rohingya, who are stateless and
considered one of the most oppressed minorities in the
world.\272\ Destitute Rohingya refugees have recounted stories
of men, women, and children being recruited with false promises
of paid work in fishing, small commerce, and domestic
work.\273\ Once they started their jobs, they were not paid
what was promised, often deprived of sleep, and were barred
from leaving their work sites.\274\ Women and girls were
sexually abused.\275\ According to an International
Organization for Migration (IOM) counter-trafficking officer in
Bangladesh, ``Many of them were physically tortured and abused
psychologically they were paid little money or no money at
all.''\276\ Credible reports indicate that some Bangladeshi
border guards, military, and police officials facilitated the
trafficking of Rohingya women and children, ranging from
receiving bribes from traffickers to allowing them access to
refugee camps, to direct involvement in facilitating their
exploitation.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\ Jamille Bigio & Rachel Vogelstein, The Security Implications
of Human Trafficking, Council on Foreign Relations, at 12 (Oct. 2019).
\271\ Id.
\272\ Naimul Karim, ``Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh warned to be
wary with human trafficking rising,'' Reuters, Aug. 23, 2019; UNOCHA,
`Rohingya Refugee Crisis,'' https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-
crisis (Last visited June 8, 2020).
\273\ ``UN warns of trafficking, sexual abuse in shadow of Rohingya
refugee crisis,'' UN News, Nov. 14, 2017.
\274\ Id.
\275\ Id.
\276\ Naimul Karim, ``Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh warned to be
wary with human trafficking rising,'' Reuters, Aug. 23, 2019.
\277\ U.S. Department of State,Trafficking in Persons Report, at 87
(June 2019).
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In addition, fear of human trafficking can be a powerful
driver of displacement.\278\ In Central America's Northern
Triangle region, many women and girls reported that high levels
of gang violence, including human trafficking, was a major
factor in their decision to migrate.\279\ The region has come
under increasing control by sophisticated, organized criminal
armed groups, often with transnational reach, driving up rates
of murder and gender based violence.\280\ In September 2019,
Committee staff traveled to Matamoros, Mexico to assess the
impact of the Trump administration's Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP), also known as the Remain in Mexico policy. In
Matamoros, Committee staff observed between 700 and 1,000 women
and children asylum-seekers living in squalid, makeshift camps,
where they waited their turn for months under the MPP.\281\ A
female asylum-seeker from Honduras shared with Committee staff
her terror of being forced to return home after receiving
threats of sexual violence from gang members who engaged in
human trafficking.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ Jamille Bigio & Rachel Vogelstein, The Security Implications
of Human Trafficking, Council on Foreign Relations, at 13 (Oct. 2019).
\279\ UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of
Organized Gangs, at 3, 7-8 (Mar. 31, 2010; UNHCR, Women on the Run:
First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Mexico, at 15-16 (Oct. 2015).
\280\ UNHCR, Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees
Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, at 2.
\281\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Matamoros,
Mexico, Sept. 2019.
\282\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Forced migrants experience restrictions on basic rights
limiting their ability to work, move freely, and access basic
services. These restrictions make them particularly vulnerable
to extreme abuses, including those that exist in informal and
illicit sectors. The situation is particularly stark for women
and girls, who face greater challenges in accessing employment,
healthcare, and education, and are also often targets of
gender-based violence and human trafficking.
Governments in host countries and the international
community must work to ensure that the human rights of forced
migrant are upheld and that they have access to basic services.
National, regional, and municipal governments in host countries
should enact more inclusive and rights-respecting policies,
incorporate forced migrant populations into national plans, and
work to protect forced migrant populations from violations of
their rights and abuse. Global leaders, like the United States,
the United Nations, and international organizations, should
mandate more robust human rights reporting, increase diplomatic
pressure around human rights, continue efforts to provide basic
services and protections, and provide economic incentives for
host countries to enact inclusive policies that promote the
human rights of forced migrants.
Today, too many forced migrants are living in vulnerable
situations and being denied ``recognition of the[ir] inherent
dignity.''\283\ Guaranteeing forced migrants rights provides
them with the opportunity to not only survive, but also thrive
and contribute in their new communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ United Nations, ``Universal Declaration of Human Rights,''
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited
June 6, 2020).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A young girl in Sudan holding a baby near a USAID tent in the Al Salam
IDP camp. Sven Torfinn, Sudan, USAID, Oct. 3, 2011.
CHAPTER FOUR
Inadequate and Inconsistent International Responses
----------
The scale of today's crisis has made abundantly clear that
existing international instruments are insufficient to meet the
current challenges.\284\ Today's migration flows are often
mixed--refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and victims of severe
climate-related events are moving along the same routes and
often vulnerable to the same abuses.\285\ The international
community has struggled to respond to large, mixed flows of
forced migrants with its traditional toolbox of diplomacy,
humanitarian assistance, international law, and durable
solutions. Without appropriate international legal conventions,
monitoring, and enforcement, countries are provided more leeway
in how they respond to the global forced migration crisis, and
many react in ways that are harmful to forced migrants, violate
human rights and international law, hinder international
coordination, and exacerbate an already overwhelming crisis.
Furthermore, humanitarian financing and assistance mechanisms
must evolve in order to better serve vulnerable populations and
account for the changing nature of forced migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), Worldwide displacement tops 70 million, UN Refugee Chief urges
greater solidarity in response, June 19, 2019 (regarding the scale of
today's crisis).
\285\ UNHCR, ``Asylum and Migration,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
asylum-and-migration.html (last visited June 9, 2020); Mixed Migration
Centre, ``MMC's Understanding and Use of the Term Mixed Migration,''
Oct. 2019; International Organization for Migration (IOM), Challenges
of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed Migration Flows Discussion
Note, 96th Session (Nov. 7, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic Deficit Resulting in Persistent
Conflicts and Impunity
International diplomacy has repeatedly failed to resolve
the underlying political, economic, and climate-related sources
of conflict.\286\ Furthermore, international diplomatic efforts
and institutions have struggled to strengthen fragile state
institutions that would prevent new conflicts and help meet the
needs of refugees and IDPs on their territories.\287\ As a
result, the number of individuals impacted by conflicts and
forced migration has ballooned, unmitigated by international
pressure.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ See e.g., Katy Collin, ``The year in failed conflict
prevention,'' The Brookings Institution, Dec. 14, 2017; see e.g.,
Celine Charveriat & Thorfinn Stainforth, ``Despite bold UN diplomacy,
Climate Action Summit fails to galvanise world's largest emitters,''
Institute for European Environmental Policy, Sept. 24, 2019.
\287\ See Katy Collin, ``The year in failed conflict prevention,''
The Brookings Institution, Dec. 14, 2017.
\288\ Press Release, UNHCR, Worldwide displacement tops 70 million,
UN Refugee Chief urges greater solidarity in response, June 19, 2019;
World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance Innovative,
A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, at 2 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Traditional conflict response tools in place since the end
World War II have been challenged by the nature of today's
conflicts. The UN Security Council, the primary body charged
with maintaining international peace and security, has
repeatedly failed to prevent and resolve conflicts, and thus
forestall displacement crises.\289\ Intensifying rivalries
between the five veto-wielding permanent members of the
Security Council have crippled the Council's
effectiveness.\290\ Despite numerous UN reports and briefings
on war crimes committed in Syria, UN Security Council permanent
members Russia and China have exercised the veto 13 times since
2011 to block resolutions addressing war crimes against Syrian
civilians.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``No Refuge: Why the World's
Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking Options,'' Feb. 12, 2019.
\290\ Id.
\291\ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ``UN
Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect,'' Jan. 17, 2020.
See e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Panel Says Russia Bombed Syrian
Civilian Targets, a War Crime,'' The New York Times, Mar. 2, 2020; see
e.g., Sherine Tadros, ``New low for the UN Security Council as Russia
takes Syrian human rights off the table,'' Amnesty International, Mar.
23, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repeated failures to enforce international rules and hold
violators accountable sends a dangerous signal to political
leaders, armed forces, and perpetrators of violence and abuse
worldwide. These high levels of impunity are likely to fuel
more conflict and forced migration in decades to come.\292\
Without peaceful resolutions of conflicts--and a global
recommitment to conflict prevention, the laws of war, and
conflict resolution--forced migrants cannot return home safely.
In 2018, less than three percent of the global refugee
population of nearly 26 million were able to return home.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\ UNOHCHR, ``Combating impunity and strengthening
accountability and the rule of law,'' https://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/
Pages/Combatingimpunityandstrengtheningaccountability.aspx (last
visited June 9, 2020).
\293\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 and 7
(June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insufficient and Inflexible Humanitarian Funding
As humanitarian need continues to grow, humanitarian
funding and practices have not kept pace. In 2020, nearly 168
million people will need humanitarian assistance--a fivefold
increase from 2007.\294\ In 2020, there were 23 UN Humanitarian
Response Plans for humanitarian emergencies--up from 12 in
2008.\295\ If current trends continue, more than 200 million
people will need assistance by 2022.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 4 (Dec. 4,
2019); Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE),
Briefing: EU Humanitarian Aid Matters More Than Ever (Feb. 2020).
\295\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 26 (Dec. 4,
2019); UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 18 (Dec. 4, 2018).
\296\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 4 (Dec. 4,
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, humanitarian financing has not kept up with
growing humanitarian need, and financing has instead stagnated
in recent years as major donors, such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Germany, have reduced humanitarian
financing.\297\ UN appeals are chronically underfunded. In
2007, the UN reported a 28 percent shortfall on its
humanitarian appeals.\298\ In 2017, that number had risen to an
astounding 40 percent.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance
Report 2019, at 32 (2019). Humanitarian assistance financing grew by 1
percent from 2017 to 2018, compared to 30 percent in cumulative growth
during the five years before 2018. Id. at 32; Ben Parker, ``Ten donors
and 10 crises dominate humanitarian spending,'' The New Humanitarian,
Oct. 9, 2019.
\298\ David Miliband, ``A Battle Plan for the World Bank: Why
Refugees Are at the Center of the Fight Against Poverty,'' Foreign
Affairs, Feb. 19, 2019.
\299\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given existing trends, humanitarian aid is increasingly
directed to protracted crises. Globally, 89 percent of
humanitarian aid funding goes to locations that have been
served for over three years, and 66 percent of funding goes to
locations with needs stretching more than eight years.\300\ The
average length of the UN's Humanitarian Response Plans has
increased from 5.2 years in 2014 to 9.3 years in 2018.\301\
Furthermore, a handful of large, protracted crises command the
majority of resources.\302\ In 2019, just two emergencies
received 42 percent of all humanitarian funding: Yemen and
Syria.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach
Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts, at 127
(2017).
\301\ Press Release, UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Appeal aims to
reach 93.6 million people with assistance in 2019, Dec. 4, 2018.
\302\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 4 (Dec. 4,
2018).
\303\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With increasingly drawn-out forced migrant situations, the
current international financing model struggles to sufficiently
support host countries and communities who shoulder tremendous
global responsibility. Although migration to Europe from
countries including Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq captured
global attention in 2015, the reality is that the overwhelming
majority of refugees--nearly 4 out of 5--remain close to their
home country.\304\ These host countries are often those least
equipped to meet the needs of forced migrants. As previously
discussed in Chapter 2, the top ten refugee-hosting countries
host 63 percent of the world's refugees, but only account for 7
percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\305\ Although
host governments' policies and national plans are critical to
ensuring the safety, health, education, and self-reliance of
refugees over the long term, humanitarian responses typically
bypass host governments systems.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ Press Release, Eurostat, Asylum in the EU Member States:
Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered
in 2015, Mar. 4, 2016; UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in
2018, at 2 (June 2019).
\305\ See Chapter 2.
\306\ Paul Harvey, Towards good humanitarian government: The role
of the affected state in disaster response, Overseas Development
Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, at 1 (Sept. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to address both short-term needs as well as
longer-term development, donors need to find ways to provide
humanitarian funding that allows for greater flexibility in
programming and is multi-year, which is known to increase
planning and efficiency.\307\ Short-term funding produces
short-term solutions to long-term problems, limiting strategic
and effective programming in protracted situations.\308\
Although humanitarian appeals today typically last for 7 years,
the vast majority of large donors still grant funding in 12
month cycles.\309\ Based on evidence that demonstrates
multiyear financing reduces operational costs and delivers
better outcomes, multiyear financing is already a core
component of many countries' development assistance.\310\
Donors, including the United States, should increase multiyear
financing to support multiyear planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance
Report 2019, at 68 (2019); Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, at 3, 6 (2017).
\308\ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, at 1 (2017).
\309\ UNOCHA, An end in sight: Multi-year planning to meet and
reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises, at 4 (July 2015); Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al., Living up to
the Promise of Multi-Year Humanitarian Financing, at 12 (2017); see,
e.g., U.S. Department of State, ``General NGO Guidelines,'' Dec. 2019,
https://www.state.gov/funding-opportunities/general-ngo-guidelines/
(last visited June 10, 2020).
\310\ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, at 3, 6 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the majority of forced migrants now live in urban
areas, the international community should also continue to
shift away from the delivery of services and in-kind assistance
and instead prioritize providing cash or vouchers (commonly
grouped together and referred to as ``cash and voucher
assistance,'' or CVA).\311\ Evidence shows CVA can reach people
faster and at lower cost, secure better outcomes for health,
education and livelihoods, is more secure than in-person
service delivery, and can generate twice the return to local
economies.\312\ Although CVA is increasing in popularity, the
majority of CVA is still concentrated among a minority of
humanitarian organizations, and challenges remain in attaining
wider adoption of a cash-first model.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 57
(June 2019); see International Rescue Committee, CVA for Protection: A
mapping of IRC's use of Cash and Voucher Assistance to help achieve
protection outcomes (2019); Tina Rosenberg, ``For Refugees in Lebanon,
Cash Instead of Camps,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016.
\312\ Magdalena Mikulak, Cost-effectiveness in humanitarian work:
cash-based programming, Knowledge, Evidence, and Learning for
Development (K4D), at 2 (Sept. 2018); Overseas Development Institute,
Doing cash differently: How cash transfers can transform humanitarian
aid, at 6, 13 (Sept. 2015); The Campbell Collaboration, Cash-based
humanitarian assistance approaches can increase food security and are
more cost effective than in-kind food transfers (2017).
\313\ The Cash Learning Partnership, The State of the World's Cash
Report: Cash Transfer Programming in Humanitarian Aid, at 6-7 (Feb.
2018).
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Aid Effectiveness and Humanitarian Sector Reform
The humanitarian system is composed of an interconnected
network of operational entities that provide support when
national and local-level resources are insufficient to meet
humanitarian needs. While increased levels of need have forced
the system to rapidly grow in recent decades, this has
inevitably resulted in inefficiencies across the vast
humanitarian system.\314\ The UN, which receives the majority
of humanitarian funding, is often criticized for having
agencies with overlapping mandates and responsibilities.\315\
In some contexts, this overlap can result in unnecessary
competition and poorly coordinated assistance in humanitarian
responses. For example, in Bangladesh in 2017, the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) experienced friction while
vying to be the designated official lead responding to the
Rohingya refugee crisis.\316\ In another example, two different
UN agencies share responsibility for responding to
malnutrition--the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) for severely
malnourished children and the World Food Programme (WFP) for
moderately acute malnourished children--and use two different
procurement and treatment systems with little coordination,
resulting in unnecessary costs and malnourished children left
untreated.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\ Rachel Scott, Imagining More Effective Humanitarian Aid: A
Donor Perspective, OECD, The Development Assistance Committee, at 7-8
(Oct. 2014).
\315\ Charlotte Lattimer, ``Will a `grand bargain' solve the
humanitarian funding crisis?,'' The Guardian, Jan. 18, 2016; Heba Aly &
Imogen Wall, ``Humanitarian reform: What's on--and off--the table,''
The New Humanitarian, Feb. 11, 2016.
\316\ Ben Parker, ``Bangladesh resists greater UNHCR role in
Rohingya crisis,'' The New Humanitarian, Oct. 23, 2017.
\317\ Press Release, UNICEF & World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF
and WFP intensify efforts to defeat malnutrition in South Sudan, Sept.
9, 2015; David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue
Committee, Speech at the World Innovation Summit for Health in Doha,
Qatar, New York, NY, Nov. 13, 2018.
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Despite these criticisms, UN agencies are often viewed as
possessing the necessary expertise and capacity to identify
critical needs across numerous sectors, lead prominent advocacy
campaigns, and implement humanitarian programs.\318\
Accordingly, the UN has been viewed as the most viable large-
scale actors to absorb substantial international funding, and,
as a result, has developed significant influence across the
humanitarian system by assuming an ``end-to-end'' role in
assistance--serving as a global coordinator, donor to NGOs,
implementer, monitor, and evaluator.\319\ Critics of this
system assert that because the UN often dominates humanitarian
programming, its assessments are self-reinforcing, and little
incentive exists for objective evaluations, checks-and-
balances, and reform to resolve issues, such as the overlapping
mandates described above.\320\ On the other hand, the UN's
unique role across leadership and program implementation, in
combination with its global reputation, allows the organization
to not only fund programs, but also management, coordination,
and advocacy--costs that NGOs usually struggle to find donors
to fund.\321\
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\318\ Boston Consulting Group & MANNET, OCHA Functional Review
Final Report, at 3 (July 29, 2016); Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the
Humanitarian Business Model, Center for Global Development, at 2 (May
2018).
\319\ Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model,
Center for Global Development, at 2, 5, 11 (May 2018).
\320\ Id. at 2; Heba Aly & Imogen Wall, ``Humanitarian reform:
What's on--and off--the table,'' The New Humanitarian, Feb. 11, 2016;
Katharine Derderian et al., ``UN humanitarian reforms: a view from the
field,'' Humanitarian Practice Network (July 2008).
\321\ Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model,
Center for Global Development, at 11 (May 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During an international forum in 2015 on improving
humanitarian action, a group of leading humanitarian non-
governmental organizations recommended a set of priority areas
for UN reform, such as simplifying and streamlining the UN
system for managing natural disasters and rectifying
overlapping and competing mandates of different UN
agencies.\322\ Similarly, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit
launched an agreement termed the ``Grand Bargain,'' which
promised improvements in aid efficiency and efficacy from large
donors, UN organizations, and NGOs.\323\ Although major UN
organizational restructuring has yet to occur, many of the
operational commitments from the Grand Bargain could be
achieved through sustained investment over the course of the
coming years.\324\ These recent efforts at humanitarian sector
reform have resulted in important new models of financing and
assistance delivery recognizing the unique and diverse needs of
forced migrants and host communities, including increased focus
on impartial needs analyses, more support for local responders,
cash transfers, and country-based ``pooled funds'' where
funding is allocated based on on-the-ground needs.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\ Imogen Wall, `` `Outdated and resistant to change': how can
we fix the humanitarian system?'' The Guardian, Feb. 10, 2016.
\323\ Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General, at Round
Table, Commits to Making Humanitarian Action `Local as Possible,
International as Necessary,' May 23, 2016; Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain (last
visited June 10, 2020).
\324\ Victoria Metcalfe-Hough et al., Grand Bargain annual
independent report 2019, Humanitarian Policy Group, at 4 (June 2019).
\325\ Andras Derzsi-Horvath et al., Independent Grand Bargain
Report, Global Public Policy Institute, at 7-8 (June 2017); UNOCHA,
Country-Based Pooled Funds and the Grand Bargain (June 5, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: THE ``CLUSTER'' SYSTEM COORDINATION
MECHANISM
A critical element of international response in
humanitarian contexts is the coordination among a constellation
of different actors and across various sectors. In major
crises, the humanitarian community uses a formal ``cluster
approach,'' where humanitarian organizations are grouped by
each of the sectors of a response, such as shelter, food
security, education, water, health, and many others.\326\ The
``clusters'' were established during a larger humanitarian
reform effort in 2005 as a way to ``strengthen system-wide
preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian
emergencies, and provide clear leadership and accountability in
the main areas of humanitarian response.''\327\ In the context
of major humanitarian emergencies--including conflicts and
natural disasters--the clusters are established to enable a
clear line of responsibility and coordination among
organizations and the local authorities.\328\ Overall, the
approach is generally viewed as having improved humanitarian
response during emergencies, though recent evaluations have
pointed out a range of possible improvements, such as better
inclusion of local NGOs in the process.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\ UNOCHA Humanitarian Response, ``Clusters,'' https://
www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters (last visited
June 9, 2020). In scenarios where the ``cluster approach'' is not
activated, the humanitarian sector nonetheless tends to organize itself
along these sectors to improve coordination among all actors involved
in a response.
\327\ Id.
\328\ Id.
\329\ Overseas Development Institute, Cluster Approach Evaluation
(Nov. 2007); Paul Knox Clarke & Leah Campbell, Exploring Coordination
in Humanitarian Clusters, ALNAP, at 9 (2015); Brian Majewski et al.,
Joint Evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster, The Konterra Group,
at 2 (Aug. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need for Expanded International Legal Protections
International conventions, complemented by regional
treaties and declarations, provide legal protection to refugees
and serve as the bedrock upon which international response
systems to forced migration operate today.\330\ Unfortunately,
these binding international legal frameworks have not been
updated in the past half-century and do not provide protection
to large swaths of vulnerable forced migrant populations today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A guide to international
refugee protection and building state asylum systems, Inter-
Parliamentary Union & UNHCR at 15-32 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the more than 70 million forcibly displaced from their
homes worldwide today, only 20 million--or 29 percent--are
considered refugees under UNHCR's mandate and afforded formal
protections under the relevant international refugee
conventions.\331\ The remaining 50 million are not protected
under the same conventions that specifically protect refugees,
including over 41 million IDPs.\332\ Our world leaders must
realize that the current international system is in dire need
of reform to ensure protection and support for forced migrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June
2019). This 70 million forcibly displaced figure includes populations
categorized as refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum
seekers, but does not necessarily capture all forced migrants who may
not be recognized under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its
accompanying international legal framework.
\332\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
was created during the aftermath of World War II in 1950 and
established by the General Assembly on January 1, 1951 to help
millions of refugees who had fled or lost their homes.\333\
UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action
for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of
refugee problems.\334\ UNHCR also works with IDPs, persons who
are stateless or whose nationality is disputed, and former
refugees who have returned to their homeland.\335\ During times
of displacement, UNCHR provides emergency assistance including
protection, shelter, and health services and advocates for
policies and services that affect displaced people to better
safeguard their human rights.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\ UNHCR, ''History,'' https://www.unhcr.org/ph/history (last
visited June 10, 2020); The Nobel Prize, ``Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees History,'' https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/peace/1954/refugees/history/ (last visited June 10, 2020).
\334\ The Nobel Prize, ``Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees History,'' https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
peace/1954/refugees/history/ (last visited June 10, 2020).
\335\ UNHCR, ``Persons of Concern to UNHCR,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/ph/persons-concern-unhcr (last visited June 10, 2020).
\336\ UNHCR, ``What we do,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/what-we-
do.html (last visited June 10, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
Sidebar: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR MIGRATION
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was
established in 1951 to arrange transport and resettlement for
the large number of displaced people following World War
II.\337\ IOM's works to ensure the orderly and humane
management of migration, and provides humanitarian assistance
to refugees and other displaced persons.\338\ In September
2016, IOM became a related organization of the UN.\339\ Today,
IOM has offices in over 100 countries.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\ See OECD, International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
(Oct. 2017); Megan Bradley, The International Organization for
Migration (IOM): Gaining Power in the Forced Migration Regime, Refuge
(2017).
\338\ See OECD, International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
(Oct. 2017); Megan Bradley, The International Organization for
Migration (IOM): Gaining Power in the Forced Migration Regime, Refuge
(2017).
\339\ Megan Bradley, The International Organization for Migration
(IOM): Gaining Power in the Forced Migration Regime, Refuge (2017).
\340\ IOM, ``Contact Us,'' https://www.iom.int/contact-us (last
visited June 9, 2020).
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International Legal Frameworks for Protection
On the basis of their personhood, forced migrants are
afforded rights based on numerous international conventions,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.\341\ These include protections against arbitrary
detention and non-refoulement, as well as the right to freedom
of expression, property, education, and work.\342\ Governments
are traditional enforcers of these rights.\343\ However, forced
migrants' governments have proven unwilling or unable to
protect them from threats that have driven their displacement
and prevented their safe return home.\344\ Without governments
to protect their rights, forced migrants require international
protection.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ UN, ``Human Rights,'' https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/human-rights/ (last visited June 9, 2020); UN Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights, Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984);
UN, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989 (The United
States is the only UN Member State that is not a party to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child).
\342\ UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
\343\ UNHCR, ``Protecting Refugees: questions and answers,'' Feb.
1, 2002.
\344\ UNHCR, Persons in need of international protection, at 1-2
(June 2017).
\345\ Id.
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In response to the sixty million displaced in Europe by
World War II, the international community came together to
develop the first legal framework to provide international
protection to refugees.\346\ The 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (``1951 Convention'') serves as the
cornerstone of international legal protection frameworks, and
defines a refugee as anyone who:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\ UNHCR Canada, ``The 1951 Refugee Convention `is as Relevant
Today,' '' Dec. 5, 2016.
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\347\ UNHCR, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article
1A(2), at 14 (1951).
Under the 1951 Convention, this definition applied only to
refugees in Europe in the aftermath of World War II.\348\ The
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees removed
geographic and temporal limitations.\349\ The 1951 Convention
also prescribed a number of rights to refugees, cardinal of
which was the principle of non-refoulement, or protection
against return to a country where a person has reason to fear
persecution.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\ Id. at 15.
\349\ UNOHCHR, Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Article
1 (1967).
\350\ UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High
Commissioner) EC/SCP/2, Aug. 23, 1977.
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International and national implementation of the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol is inconsistent and
unenforced. The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol mandate
UNHCR to supervise implementation; however, it does not provide
any authorities for monitoring and enforcement.\351\ Some
states are not party to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
(such as Iraq), and many states who are party also reserve
against specific provisions (such as China and the United
States).\352\ As a consequence of inconsistent levels of
commitment to refugee protections, their rights and protections
vary across different countries.\353\
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\351\ UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the Unites Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (Oct. 2010); UNHCR, Protecting Refugees:
Cyprus (Dec. 2017). UNHCR's role as laid out in the 1951 Convention
complements that of States by: ``Promoting accession to, and
implementation of, refugee conventions and laws; Ensuring that refugees
are treated in accordance with internationally recognized legal
standards; Ensuring that refugees are granted asylum and are not
forcibly returned to the countries from which they have fled; Promoting
appropriate procedures to determine whether or not a person is a
refugee according to the 1951 Convention definition and/or to other
definitions found in regional conventions; and Seeking durable
solutions for refugees.'' Id. at 4.
\352\ UN Treaty Collection, ``Status of Treaties: Chapter V
Refugees and Stateless Persons,'' https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg--no=V-5&chapter=5 (last visited June
9, 2020); Library of Congress, ``Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq,'' June 9, 2015.
\353\ See World Refugee Council, Centre for International
Governance Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global
Refugee System, at 21-25 (2019); Council on Foreign Relations, ``No
Refuge: Why the World's Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking
Options,'' Feb. 12, 2019.
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In addition, the 1951 Convention's refugee definition fails
to protect many forced migrants, including victims of
generalized violence, severe climate-related events, and
internal displacement.\354\ As many of these populations
forcibly migrate alongside refugees, implementation of the 1951
Convention thus requires sorting through mixed migration flows
to identify who among these vulnerable populations meets the
refugee definition.\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\ See IOM, Challenges of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed
Migration Flows, 96th Session, at 2 (Nov. 7, 2008); Anny Bhan et al.,
Pushing the boundaries: Insights into the EU's response to mixed
migration on the Central Mediterranean Route, International Rescue
Committee, at 9 (July 2018).
\355\ See IOM, Challenges of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed
Migration Flows, 96th Session (Nov. 7, 2008); Anny Bahn et al., Pushing
the boundaries: Insights into the EU's response to mixed migration on
the Central Mediterranean Route, International Rescue Committee, at 9
(July 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One example of the 1951 Convention's limitations in
addressing contemporary forced migration is the current crisis
in Libya. In Libya's urban settings and detention centers,
forced migrants converge from Syria, Sudan, Eritrea, the West
Bank and Gaza, Somalia, Iraq, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Yemen,
Mali, Nigeria, and Libya itself.\356\ Given that the 1951
Refugee Convention only affords refugees international legal
protections, in application this often requires intensive
search and screening efforts to locate and identify individuals
fitting the definition of refugee among large flows of mixed
migrants.\357\ As of April 2020, UNHCR had identified 870,909
people of concern in Libya and had registered 48,627 refugee
and asylum cases--less than 6 percent of the population of
concern.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\ UNHCR, ``Operational Portal: Libya,'' https://
data2.unhcr.org/en/country/lby (last visited June 9, 2020); IOM,
Libya's Migrant Report Round 29, at 12-13 (April 21, 2020).
\357\ UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, at 7, 12 (Jan. 1992).
\358\ UNHCR, ``UNHCR Libya Response in 2020,'' Apr. 10, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee staff analysis based on UNHCR, ``Global Trends 2018 annexes
and tables'' June 19, 2019; UNRWA, ``UNRWA Figures 2018-2019,'' Feb. 1,
2019. This figure includes populations categorized as refugees,
internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers, but does not
necessarily capture all forced migrants who may not be recognized under
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its accompanying international legal
framework.
Regional Efforts for Comprehensive Frameworks
In addition to international frameworks, regional bodies
have also developed frameworks to coordinate and share
responsibility for responses to forced migrant flows.\359\ Due
to their non-binding and regional natures, the effectiveness of
these regional frameworks in addressing a global crisis remains
in question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\ See Susan Kneebone, Comparative Regional Protection
Frameworks for Refugees: Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs, The
International Journal of Human Rights (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted
in 1984, is a regional, non-binding instrument meant to govern
protection of refugees in Latin America.\360\ Prompted by
challenges Organization of American States (OAS) members faced
in responding to large flows of refugees from Central America,
the Cartagena Declaration provides an expanded refugee
definition beyond the scope of the 1951 Convention definition,
including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\ Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 4-5 (June 2013).
persons who have fled their country because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal
conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public
order.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ Id. at 4; Declaracion de Cartagena sobre Refugiados, adopted
during the Coloquio Sobre la Proteccion Internacional de los Refugiados
en America Central, Mexico y Panama: Problemas Juridicos y
Humanitarios, held in Cartagena, 19-22 November 1984 (hereinafter
``Cartagena Declaration''), art. III(3). The Cartagena Declaration
noted ``that, in view of the experience gained from the massive flows
of refugees in the Central American area, it is necessary to consider
enlarging the concept of a refugee.''
This expanded refugee definition has gained legal force in
some countries through incorporation into national laws.\362\
According to Colombian officials Committee staff met with in
March 2019, Colombia's incorporation of the Cartagena
Declaration's refugee definition into national legislation has
shaped efforts to address Venezuelans fleeing to Colombia, and
recognized them as refugees.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia,
Mar. 2019; Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 5 (June 2013).
\363\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia,
Mar. 2019; Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 17 (June 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the broader region, however, a 2013 UNHCR study
concluded that the Cartagena Declaration has largely failed to
effectively expand the definition of refugee.\364\ The study
found inconsistent adoption and arbitrary application among
states, including some states that required both the regional
definition and the 1951 Convention definition be met.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\ Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 5 (June 2013)
(concluding that the Cartagena Declaration ``has been seldom applied in
practice, guidance on its interpretation is undeveloped and national
authorities rarely consult its provisions when providing international
refugee protection.'')
\365\ Id. at 18-23, 32-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ongoing Debate over Protections for Climate-Related
Forced Migrants
For those who flee their countries as a result of severe
climate-related events, as well as those displaced within their
countries by climate-related events, there are no formal
protections provided by international law.\366\ Some countries,
including the United States, have developed tools that allow
the admission of civilians displaced by disaster, but these are
usually circumstantial and temporary in nature.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\ The Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-
Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate
Change: Volume 1, at 7-8 (Dec. 2015).
\367\ Id. at 8; see e.g., Temporary Protected Status under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254a; see Chapter
5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A robust debate is taking place in various multilateral
fora, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
on affording legal protections to those displaced by events
linked to, or exacerbated by, climate change.\368\ Most
recently, in January 2020, a landmark decision by the UN Human
Rights Committee acknowledged that it might be illegal to
return individuals to countries where they face immediate or
long-term risks due to climate change, potentially paving the
way for future recognition of climate refugees.\369\ However,
progress on adopting new international principles has been
slow, due in part to the Trump administration's unfounded
skepticism of climate change.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
``Workplan--Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism
for Loss and Damage,'' https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-
bodies/executive-committee-of-the-warsaw-international-mechanism-for-
loss-and-damage-wim-excom/workplan (last visited June 6, 2020); see
Abdikarim Ali, Climate-Induced Migrants, International Law, and Human
Rights, University of Ottawa (Apr. 2015).
\369\ ``UN Human Rights Ruling Could Boost Climate Change Asylum
Claims,'' UN News, Jan. 21, 2020.
\370\ Helier Cheung, ``What does Trump actually believe on climate
change?,'' BBC, Jan. 23, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Children belonging to families displaced from Miran Shan, North
Waziristan at IDP Camp, Bannu. Asad Zaidi, AZ--Banu--IDP--063, USAID,
July 16, 2014.
Internally Displaced Persons Largely Left Unprotected
While the international community has granted refugees
certain legal rights and protection, less protections exist for
IDPs. In response to a growing number of IDPs worldwide, the UN
enlisted a panel of international legal experts to develop
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that were presented
to the UN in 1998.\371\ These Guiding Principles provide
governments and NGOs with a framework for responding to IDP
crises--defining internally displaced persons, addressing the
protection and assistance of IDPs, and recommending
solutions.\372\ The Guiding Principles were met with broad
support on the international stage, helped catalyze numerous
regional frameworks, including the 2009 Kampala Convention on
IDPs, and have had its provisions incorporated into some
countries' national laws.\373\ However, the non-binding nature
of the document means it is unable to uniformly enforce
protections for IDPs nor accountability for governments
responding to IDPs.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), E.S.C.
Res. 1998/53, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at 4 (July 22, 1998);
Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, ``The Genesis and the Challenges,'' in
Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson (eds.), ``Ten Years of the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement,'' Forced Migration Review, at 4
(Dec. 2008).
\372\ Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, ``The Genesis and the
Challenges,'' in Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson (eds.), ``Ten Years
of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,'' Forced Migration
Review, at 4 (Dec. 2008).
\373\ Roberta Cohen, ``Lessons Learned from the Development of the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,'' Institute for the Study
of International Migration, at 11 (Oct. 2013).
\374\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without binding international conventions for international
protection, IDPs depend primarily on their own governments for
protection.\375\ These same governments are sometimes either
perpetrators of abuses that prompt displacement (in the case of
the Syrian regime), complicit in such abuses (as in the case of
the DRC), incapable of or unwilling to stop abuses by non-state
actors (as in the case of Colombia), or unwilling to
acknowledge the extent of problems resulting from displacement
(in the case of Ethiopia).\376\ As Committee staff observed in
Ethiopia in May 2019, governments are often unable or unwilling
to provide adequate protection, leaving IDPs without national
protection and without the same international legal protections
as refugees.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), E.S.C.
Res. 1998/53, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at Principle 3.1 (July 22,
1998).
\376\ See UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 31st session (Feb. 3,
2016); ``Syria: `Massive waves of civilian displacement and loss of
life must stop now': UN Special Envoy,'' UN News, Feb. 6, 2020; Press
Release, UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR),
DRC: UN reports hundreds of human rights violations as security
situation in North Kivu deteriorates, Dec. 19, 2018; UN Human Rights
Council, Situation of human rights in Colombia, 43rd session, at 10
(Feb. 26, 2020) (concluding that ``police presence remained
insufficient in most rural areas,'' and more); Mark Yarnell, The Crisis
Below the Headlines: Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees
International, at 9 (Nov. 2018).
\377\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia,
May 24-June 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional bodies have also attempted to close the
``protection gap'' and create protections for IDPs. African
countries in particular have struggled to deal with mass
internal displacement due to armed conflict, internal strife,
climate change-related severe droughts and flooding, and
upheavals due to natural or human-made disasters.\378\ In
response, countries on the continent developed the first
legally binding regional instrument, mirroring many elements of
the UN's Guiding Principles, to address internal displacement:
the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance
of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known as the
Kampala Convention.\379\ This instrument, which builds on many
elements of the UN's Guiding Principles, was adopted in 2009
and entered into force in 2012.\380\ As of March 2020, the
Kampala Convention has been ratified by only 31 of the African
Union's 55 member states, and Niger remains the only country to
have implemented its provisions through national
legislation.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ See John Podesta, The Climate Crisis, Migration, and
Refugees, The Brookings Institution (July 25, 2019); ``Southern Africa:
Conflict, development and natural disasters fuel internal
displacement,'' The New Humanitarian, Feb. 14, 2006; Anthony Navone,
``How to Address Africa's `Staggering' Displacement Crisis,'' United
States Institute of Peace, May 30, 2019.
\379\ Allehone M. Abebe, The Emerging Law of Forced Displacement in
Africa, at 2 (Oct. 2017) Megan Bradley, A Landmark for Human Rights:
The Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement Comes into Effect, The
Brookings Institution (Dec. 6, 2012).
\380\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Making the Kampala
Convention work for IDPs, at 7 (July 2010); International Committee of
the Red Cross, Translating the Kampala Convention Into Practice: A
Stocktaking Exercise, at 7 (Oct. 2016); African Union Commission,
African Union Model Law for the Implementation of the African Union
Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced
Persons in Africa [``Kampala Convention''] (Apr. 2018).
\381\ Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia's ratification
of Kampala Convention, Feb. 14, 2020; Press Release, UNHCR, Niger
becomes the first country in Africa to adopt a national law for the
protection and assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, Dec. 5,
2018.
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Sidebar: THE UNITED NATIONS ON IDPs
The limitations of traditional humanitarian response tools
are even more glaring when considering the situation of IDPs.
In the 1990s, the UN Secretary-General established a Special
Representative for IDPs.\382\ Since then, however, the position
has been downgraded as a Special Rapporteur to the UN Human
Rights Council and no longer reports directly to the Secretary-
General.\383\ In response to a letter signed by 37 UN member
states, the UN Secretary-General announced in October 2019 the
establishment of a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement to
increase global attention and support, and identify long-term
solutions for IDPs.\384\ The Panel began work in early 2020 and
should submit its final recommendations in early 2021.\385\
With over 41 million IDPs living in dire conditions and
receiving minimal if any humanitarian assistance, the global
system for responding to and supporting IDPs needs urgent
reform.
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\382\ UNOHCHR, ``Introduction to the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs),'' https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Mandate.aspx
(last visited June 4, 2020).
\383\ Mark Yarnell, ``The World Is Failing Internally Displaced
People. Here's One Solution,'' Refugees Deeply, July 10, 2018.
\384\ Mark Yarnell & Mikaela Rear, ``Dear UN secretary-general,
don't forget the internally displaced,'' The New Humanitarian, July
15, 2019; Press Release, UN, High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement,
Dec. 3, 2019;``UN chief: New panel to focus on millions of displaced
people,'' AP, Oct. 23, 2019.
\385\ Press Release, UN, High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement,
Dec. 3, 2019; ``UN panel to rally global political will to tackle
internal displacement crisis,'' UN News, Feb. 25, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Shrinking Access to Traditional Solutions
UNHCR's statute mandates that the organization searches for
``permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.''\386\
Therefore, UNHCR, in line with the broader international
community, promotes three ``durable solutions'' for refugees:
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\386\ UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, at 8 (Dec. 14, 1950).
Voluntarily return to their country or place of origin once
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the conditions there are deemed permissible;
Integration into the host community with legal status; or
Resettlement in a third country.\387\
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\387\ UNHCR, ``Solutions,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
solutions.html (last visited June 4, 2020).
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The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and
corresponding Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally
Displaced Persons discuss the need for durable solutions for
IDPs and describes solutions of return, local integration, and
settlement.\388\ However, the promotion and creation of such
solutions is left up to ``national and local authorities,
humanitarian and development actors'' without any international
mechanisms for monitoring or enforcement.\389\
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\388\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Representative of the
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons,
Walter Klin: Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced
Persons, 13th Session, at 1-2 (Feb. 9, 2010).
\389\ Id. at 2; Roberta Cohen, Introduction to the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, The Brookings Institution (Sept.
23, 2001); Global Protection Cluster Working Group, Handbook for the
Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, at 32 (Oct. 2009).
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Other forced migrant populations, such as those displaced
by severe climate-related events, who are not covered by the
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, also do not have a
formal international mechanism to assist them in evaluating and
facilitating solutions to their forced migration.\390\ For all
forced migrant populations, however, accessing durable
solutions has become increasingly challenging.\391\
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\390\ Megan Bradley and Jane McAdam, Rethinking Durable Solutions
to Displacement in the Context of Climate Change, The Brookings
Institution (May 14, 2012).
\391\ Megan Bradley, Resolving Refugee Situations: Seeking
Solutions Worthy of the Name, World Refugee Council, at 1 (Mar. 2019).
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Voluntary return, for example, is predicated on the
assumption that a forced migrant could return home after
fighting stopped or the repressive regime was replaced--and
that the timeline for such returns would be months or years,
not the decades seen today.\392\ Most forced migrants will
never be able to return home because their homes are engulfed
by protracted conflict or because they fear persecution if they
return. In 2018, only three percent of global refugees and five
percent of IDPs voluntarily returned to their country or place
of origin.\393\ As climate change forces more migration, return
may be increasingly impossible as communities of origin are
submerged underwater, vulnerable to frequent disasters, or
otherwise uninhabitable.\394\
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\392\ Kathleen Newland, Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels,
New Tools, Transatlantic Council on Migration & Migration Policy
Institute, at 6 (Apr. 2015).
\393\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 7 (June
2019).
\394\ UNHCR, Reach Out Refugee Protection Training Project: Module
9, at 5 (2005); Megan Bradley and Jane McAdam, Rethinking Durable
Solutions to Displacement in the Context of Climate Change, The
Brookings Institution (May 14, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the vast majority of forced migrants, local integration
into the host community, while imperfect, is the most viable
path to a secure life. A host of legal, regulatory, and other
systemic challenges, however, stand in the way. Refugees in
many countries face serious restrictions to human rights,
including the right to work, freedom of movement, access to
identity documentation, and access to healthcare and education,
all of which prevent them from achieving self-sufficiency or
contributing to host communities.\395\ At the same time,
research demonstrates how inclusive integration policies lead
to benefits for refugees and their host communities.\396\
According to one such study in 2014 in Kampala, Uganda, one of
the few countries where refugees have the right to work, 21
percent of refugees run a business with one or more employees,
of which 40 percent are Ugandan citizens.\397\
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\395\ See Chapter 3 for details on human rights restrictions.
\396\ Catholic Relief Services, Exploring the Impact of Social
Acceptance on Refugee Integration into Host Communities: Policy
Research (2017); Council of Europe, Human Rights Aspects of Immigrant
and Refugee Integration Policies, at 7-8 (Apr. 16, 2019).
\397\ Alexander Betts, et al., Refugee Economies: Rethinking
Popular Assumptions, University of Oxford Humanitarian Innovation
Project, at 19 (June 2014).
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Finally, while resettlement can be a lifesaving permanent
solution for extremely vulnerable refugees, the opportunity is
available to less than one percent of the world's
refugees.\398\ Refugee resettlement is reserved for only the
most vulnerable refugees who cannot return home and who cannot
find safety in countries of first refuge. These include victims
of torture or gender-based violence who may need specific
support, families with medical needs, victims of religious or
ethnic persecution who remain at risk in countries of first
refuge, or, specifically for the United States, those at risk
because of their assistance to the U.S. Government.\399\
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\398\ International Rescue Committee (IRC), 10 things to know about
the Global Refugee Crisis and America's lack of leadership: An IRC
analysis of the latest annual reports from the UN Refugee Agency (July
2019).
\399\ UNHCR, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, at 243 (2011); U.S.
Department of State Archive, ``Refugee Admissions and Resettlement,''
https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/prm/c26471.htm (last visited June 10,
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, despite the fact that the number of refugees
under UNHCR's mandate nearly doubled from 2012 to 2018, the
number of global refugee resettlement slots has tumbled in
recent years.\400\ The gap between resettlement needs and
resettlement slots is more than 90 percent.\401\ At the 2016
Leaders' Summit on Refugees, hosted by the United States, 52
countries and international organizations made wide-ranging
humanitarian commitments, including significant contributions
in humanitarian financing and an increased number of global
resettlement slots.\402\ However, in 2019, just 29 countries
were accepting refugees for resettlement.\403\ The risk of this
retreat has both humanitarian and strategic consequences: as
wealthy nations turn away from obligations to refugees, low-
and middle-income countries who host the vast majority of
refugees are closing borders, tightening policies on refugee
access to work or other pathways to self-reliance, and
encouraging and coercing premature returns.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\ UNHCR, UNCHR Global Report, at 216 (2017); UNHCR, Refugee
Resettlement Facts (Mar. 2020); UNHCR USA, ``Information on UNHCR
Resettlement,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/information-on-unhcr-
resettlement.html (last visited June 4, 2020); UNHCR, Global Trends:
Forced Displacement in 2018, at 13 (June 2019).
\401\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 30
(June 2019).
\402\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on the Leaders'
Summit on Refugees, Sept. 20, 2016.
\403\ UNHCR, Refugee Resettlement Facts (Mar. 2020); U.S.
Department of State, ``Leaders' Summit on Refugees,'' https://2009-
2017.state.gov/p/io/c71574.htm (last visited June 10, 2020).
\404\ See Stephanie Schwartz, ``Sending Refugees Back Makes the
World More Dangerous,'' Foreign Policy, Nov. 27, 2019; Kareem Chehayeb
& Sarah Hunaidi, ``Turkey's Deportation Policy is Killing Syrian
Refugees,'' Foreign Policy, Aug. 8, 2019; Afghanistan's refugees: forty
years of dispossession, Amnesty International, June 20, 2019.
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These traditionally durable solutions of return, local
integration, and resettlement are insufficient to deal with the
number of forced migrants nor the length of their displacement.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ashique Rushdi, [Rohingya] Group of women and children, USAID, Jan. 16,
2018.
Inconsistent Country-level Responses to Forced Migration
Given the limitations of current international frameworks,
countries have met today's global forced migration crisis with
wildly varying responses. Some countries have made commendable
efforts to address forced migration and protect forced
migrants--at least as far as refugees are concerned. When
refugee numbers surged in 2015, Germany opened its borders to
those fleeing Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, admitting close to
900,000 refugees in 2015 alone.\405\ Jordan hosted over 1.3
million Syrians as of December 2018 and has sought to create
livelihood opportunities for both Syrians and Jordanians.\406\
Uganda, the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, has a
history of providing refugees freedom of movement and the right
to work, as well as small plots of land for growing food.\407\
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\405\ Wesley Dockery, ``Two years since Germany opened its borders
to refugees: A chronology,'' Deutsche Welle, Sept. 4, 2017; Pew
Research Center, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3
Million in 2015 (Aug. 2, 2016).
\406\ Nazanin Ash & Cindy Huang, Using the Compact Model to Support
Host States and Refugee Self-reliance, World Refugee Council, at 6-7
(Dec. 2018).
\407\ Sulaiman Momodu, ``Uganda Stands Out in Refugees
Hospitality,'' Africa Renewal, Dec. 2018-Mar. 2019.
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Committee staff observed the progressive refugee policies
of both Ethiopia and Colombia. In Ethiopia, the government has
instituted a number of reforms supporting refugees. In February
2019, the government passed a Refugee Proclamation providing
refugees the right to work, freedom of movement, and access to
education among other rights.\408\ Since 2016, the Ethiopian
government has also improved refugee access to vital
documentation by issuing birth certificates for refugees and
capturing them in the national system.\409\ Civil documentation
is critical in helping to prevent statelessness, protect a
range of human rights, and provide access to services.\410\
While these developments are positive steps for Ethiopia's
treatment of refugees, however, the Ethiopian government has
also been overwhelmed and unable to meet the needs of its
millions of IDPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ This proclamation was done in the context of the Global
Compact on Refugees and to align with the Comprehensive Refugee
Response Framework; [ETHIOPIA FEDERAL REGISTER] Refugees Proclamation,
Proclamation No. 1110/2019, Federal Negarit Gazette of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Feb. 27, 2019, at 1, 15-24.
\409\ Cindy Huang et al., Tackling the Realities of Protracted
Displacement: Case Studies on What's Working and Where We Can Do
Better, Center for Global Development (CGD) and International Rescue
Committee (IRC), at 8 (Apr. 18, 2018).
\410\ Norwegian Refugee Council & the International Human Rights
Clinic at Harvard Law School, Registering rights: Syrian refugees and
the documentation of births, marriages, and deaths in Jordan (Oct.
2015).
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In Colombia, the government granted many Venezuelans
temporary border-crossing and temporary residence permits,
allowing them access to basic health services, education, and
work for up to two years.\411\ To prevent statelessness among
children of Venezuelan refugees, Colombia's president announced
in August 2019 that his government would grant them Colombian
citizenship.\412\ Committee staff visited the border city of
Cucuta where the hospital serves over 3,000 Venezuelans
monthly, half of the 1,600 school students are Venezuelan
children, and a soup kitchen serves two meals daily to over
4,000 Venezuelans.\413\
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\411\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia,
Mar. 2019; Melanie Teff & Daphne Panayotatos, Crisis Colliding: The
Mass Influx of Venezuelans Into the Dangerous Fragility of Post-Peace
Agreement Colombia, Refugees International, at 10-12 (Jan. 13, 2019).
\412\ Anatoly Kurmanaev & Jenny Carolina Gonazalez, ``Colombia
Offers Citizenship to 24,000 Children of Venezuelan Refugees,'' The New
York Times, Aug. 5, 2019.
\413\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Hospital in
Cucuta, Colombia, Mar. 2019.
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As generous as some governments have been, available
resources do not match the level of need among vulnerable
forced migrants, including unaccompanied minors, sick children
and infants, pregnant women, and elderly. Some Venezuelans whom
Committee staff spoke with at the soup kitchen in Colombia, for
example, said they had walked for several hours just to get a
meal.\414\ The Venezuelans that staff spoke with hoped they
would be able to find work in Colombia, but had not been able
to obtain citizenship documentation from their own government
and, therefore, a Colombian temporary work visa.\415\ The
school staff visited only received 1,050 lunch rations a day
for its 1,600 students.\416\ Consequently, unregistered
Venezuelan children over age eight do not get fed on a daily
basis.\417\ The hospital in Cucuta was at three times its
capacity.\418\ Undocumented Venezuelans were only able to
access emergency healthcare, and subsequently emergency rooms
along the border were on the verge of collapse due to
strain.\419\ Despite positive efforts to address the forced
migrant crisis, the need for additional assistance, services,
documentation, and jobs in Colombia remains critical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia,
Mar. 2019.
\415\ Id.
\416\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to School in
Cucuta, Colombia, Mar. 2019.
\417\ Id.
\418\ Id.
\419\ Id.
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Without additional international support, Colombia will not
be able to sustain its early progressive policies for displaced
Venezuelans, and the Venezuelan displacement crisis could
possibly catalyze further crisis across the region.\420\ The
Venezuelan crisis remains severely underfunded relative to the
scale of displacement. In 2019, the UN's humanitarian response
plan for Venezuela was only 34 percent funded; the regional
response plan was 53 percent funded.\421\ In 2020, funding
needs for the region doubled to 1.4 billion dollars.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ International Rescue Committee, The Venezuelan Displacement
Crisis: A Test of Global Commitments and Solidarity, at 1 (Oct. 2019).
\421\ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, ``Venezuela 2019
(Humanitarian response plan),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/827/
summary (last visited June 4, 2020); UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service,
``Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (for Refugees and Migrants
from Venezuela) (Other),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/726/summary
(last visited June 4, 2020).
\422\ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, ``Regional Refugee and
Migrant Response Plan (for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela)
(Other),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/726/summary (last visited
June 4, 2020); UNOCHA Financial Tacking Service, ``Refugee and Migrant
Response Plan 2020 for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (RMRP
(Other)),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/944/summary (last visited
June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's forced migration crisis has also resulted in
restrictive practices shrinking protection space. Countries
have closed borders, increased detention, refused asylum on the
basis of nationality, coerced early returns, externalized
border controls, and fomented xenophobic violence by depicting
refugees and asylum seekers as threats to public health and
national security.\423\ This in turn has served to increase the
vulnerability of already desperate populations and exacerbated
the effects of an already growing crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\ See Amnesty International, Fears and Fences: Europe's
Approach to Keeping Refugees at Bay, at 7-10, 79 (Nov. 2015); Kavitha
Surana, ``Italy quietly rejects asylum seekers by nationality,
advocates say,'' Al Jazeera, Oct. 19, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, although refugees are not explicitly denied
the right to work in Egypt, refugees need permits to work,
which are costly and require evidence that no Egyptian is
available to fill the same job.\424\ Without access to the
labor market, refugees are unable to achieve self-sufficiency,
contribute to the local economy, and are often pushed into
informal markets where exploitation is rampant.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ Asylum Access & the Refugee Work Rights Coalition, Global
Refugee Work Rights Report 2014, at 26 (Sep. 2014).
\425\ Id. at 6, 38 (Sep. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The European Union has spent millions of euros supporting
the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and forcibly returning
migrants and refugees to often inhumane detention centers in
Libya rife with trafficking, sexual abuse, and torture.\426\
Italy and Malta have also denied embarkation to rescue boats
that reach their shores, and Italy passed a law fining boats
that rescue refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean.\427\ In
2019 alone, more than 1,200 migrants died while trying to cross
the Mediterranean to Europe.\428\ The fate of hundreds more
remains unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ See e.g., Tom Miles & Steve Scherer, ``EU support of Libyan
coast guard `inhuman:' UN rights chief,'' Reuters, Nov. 15, 2017; UN
Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on
the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya, at 4-7
(Dec. 20, 2018); UN Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Abuse Behind
Bars: Arbitrary and unlawful detention in Libya, at 3-6 (Apr. 2018).
\427\ ``Italy forces 130 migrants to stay on docked coast guard
vessel,'' Deutsche Welle, July 28, 2019; Associated Press, ``Migrant
ship with 64 people denied safe port by Italy and Malta,'' The
Guardian, Apr. 4, 2019; Samuel Osborne, ``Italy passes law to fine
people who rescue refugees at sea: Repeat offenders risk having boats
seized,'' The Independent, June 12, 2019.
\428\ Press Release, IOM, IOM: Mediterranean Arrivals Reach 110,699
in 2019; Deaths Reach 1,283. World Deaths Fall, Jan. 3, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed and exacerbated
inconsistencies in protections and available services for
forced migrant populations around the world. The pandemic is a
huge concern for already vulnerable populations of forced
migrants living in crowded environments, often with limited
access to basic sanitation, health services, and reliable
information, and frequently dependent on humanitarian aid.\429\
The UN, aid groups, and experts have all pleaded with national
governments to include forced migrant populations in national
COVID-19 plans and allow forced migrant populations access to
national health systems.\430\ Similarly, groups have appealed
to Bangladesh's government to lift telecommunications
restrictions on Cox's Bazaar that hinder the delivery of
critical and credible health information to hundreds of
thousands of Rohingya refugees.\431\ Amid the pandemic, some
governments have barred access to asylum systems and placed
additional restrictions on forced migrants. Greece, Hungary,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States effectively
shut down access to asylum systems.\432\ In Lebanon, at least
eight municipalities used COVID-19 as justification for
implementing discriminatory curfews that targeted Syrian
refugees.\433\ Furthermore, countries and leaders across the
world have exploited the virus to advance xenophobia.\434\ In
Malaysia, authorities conducted mass raids to detain refugees
and migrants after the COVID-19 pandemic stoked a spike in
xenophobia against refugees.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced:
Addressing the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian
Emergencies (Mar. 30, 2020).
\430\ UNHCR, Coronavirus emergency appeal UNHCR's preparedness and
response plan (REVISION), at 13 (May 9, 2020); Jonathan Clayton, ``Q&A:
Access to health services is key to halting COVID-19 and saving refugee
lives,'' UNHCR, Mar. 27, 2020; Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, ``New front:
Worry over COVID--19 spreading in African refugee camps,'' Al Jazeera,
Mar. 29, 2020.
\431\ ``Joint Letter: Re: Restrictions on Communication, Fencing,
and COVID-19 in Cox's Bazar District Rohingya Refugee Camps,'' April 2,
2020; ``Bangladesh Urged to Lift Telecom Ban on Rohingya Camps to Ease
COVID-19 Risks,'' Voice of America, Apr. 2, 2020.
\432\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced:
Addressing the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian
Emergencies (Mar. 30, 2020).
\433\ ``Lebanon: Refugees at Risk in COVID-19 Response,'' Human
Rights Watch, Apr. 2, 2020.
\434\ ``Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia
Worldwide,'' Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2020.
\435\ Zsombor Peter, ``Malaysia Rounds up Hundreds of Undocumented
Migrants amid Coronavirus Fears,'' Voice of America, May 3, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without consistent implementation and enforcement of
international legal protections, countries violate refugees'
human rights with impunity. The situation is often more dire
for forced migrants without the same international legal
conventions for protection as refugees, including millions of
victims of generalized violence, severe climate-related events,
and internal displacement.
In Focus: SITUATION OF IDPs IN ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia has struggled to deal with a growing population of
IDPs. In 2018, the number of conflict-induced IDPs in Ethiopia
was almost three million people--more than four times the
number in 2017.\436\ While the government of Prime Minister
Abiy Amed has been praised for its positive response to refugee
influxes, the government only ratified the Kampala Convention
in February 2020 and has struggled to deal with its IDP
crisis.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on
Internal Displacement, at 14 (May 2019).
\437\ Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia law granting
more rights to refugees, Jan. 18, 2019. For details on Refugee
Proclamation see Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia's
ratification of Kampala Convention, Feb. 14, 2020; Mark Yarnell, The
Crisis Below the Headlines: Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees
International, at 4 (Nov. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After over 800,000 Ethiopians were displaced by ethnic
clashes and violence in the first half of 2018, the government
initially collaborated with the UN and other organizations to
mobilize a large-scale humanitarian response.\438\ Within a
couple of months, however, the government began pushing for the
premature return of IDPs to their homes.\439\ The government
even restricted aid--including food assistance--at IDP sites,
telling IDPs they would receive assistance if they returned
home.\440\ And in May 2019, the Ethiopian government announced
a new Strategic Plan to Address Internal Displacement in
Ethiopia, forcing all IDPs to return home within 2 months.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ Mark Yarnell, The Crisis Below the Headlines: Conflict
Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees International, at 8-9 (Nov. 2018).
\439\ Id. at 9.
\440\ Id. at 9.
\441\ Ethiopian Ministry of Peace and National Disaster Risk
Management Commission, Strategic Plan to address internal displacement
in Ethiopia, at 3 (Apr. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Ethiopia, Committee staff visited horrendous IDP sites
lacking any semblance to ``satisfactory conditions'' as called
for in the Guiding Principles and Kampala Convention.\442\ At
one IDP site Committee staff visited, tiny makeshift shelters
made of cloth and sticks housed whole families, and left them
completely vulnerable to the impending rainy season.\443\ At
this same site, the NGO that delivered water had to shut down
its operations two days prior due to lack of funding.\444\
Recently-built latrines were located hundreds of feet from the
makeshift shelters, with no lights or other protection
mechanisms along the way.\445\ People therefore chose instead
to defecate out in the open instead of risk the journey.\446\
At another IDP site, IDPs had not received food for three days,
also due to the provider's lack of funding.\447\ Many of the
IDPs were already on the brink of starvation, and yet food
assistance was not expected for two weeks.\448\ Host
communities, who were often quite poor themselves, were
generously providing rice for the IDPs.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), E.S.C.
Res. 1998/53, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at 7 (July 22, 1998);
African Union Commission, African Union Model Law for the
Implementation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of
and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa [``Kampala
Convention''], at 8 (Apr. 2018).
\443\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia,
May 24-June 1, 2019.
\444\ Id.
\445\ Id.
\446\ Id.
\447\ Id.
\448\ Id.
\449\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the horrible conditions of the IDP sites, IDPs
often preferred to stay. For many IDPs, there was nothing to
return to. Their homes had been burned, their property looted,
and their livelihoods destroyed. Without significant assistance
upon their return, IDPs who returned in effect experienced
secondary displacement.\450\ IDPs most often ended up in
abandoned churches or warehouses--ostensibly the same as IDP
sites, except with fewer services available.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ Mark Yarnell, The Crisis Below The Headlines: Conflict
Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees International, at 7-10 (Nov. 2018).
\451\ Tom Gardner, `` `Go and we die, stay and we starve': the
Ethiopians facing a deadly dilemma,'' The Guardian, May 15, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, IDPs still feared the armed groups that drove
them from their homes. Although the government had brokered
peace deals among local ethnic groups in the IDPs' home areas,
these areas were still active conflict zones, and IDPs did not
believe it was safe to return. Committee staff heard from U.S.
and NGO officials that some IDPs were forcibly displaced
multiple times as the government continued to force IDP returns
amidst continued violence.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia,
May 24-June 1, 2019.
Conclusion
Traditional international frameworks have been unable to
adequately protect and address today's forced migrants.
Traditional diplomacy has failed to prevent and mitigate
conflicts and crises. Humanitarian assistance has not grown and
evolved to meet the scale and demands of need. And finally, the
failure to mandate specific legal protection for those persons
displaced by war, violence, climate change, and internal
displacement leaves millions vulnerable. Individual countries
are reacting to a global crisis with wildly inconsistent
standards.
Our international response needs a reboot. The UN Security
Council and its permanent members must recommit to their core
mandate of maintaining international peace and security, and
consider measures to prevent obstructions in the Council that
thwart efforts to effectively address conflict and flagrant
violations of international humanitarian law. The United States
and other UN member states should redouble efforts to prevent
and end protracted conflict, as well as violations of
international human rights law. Innovative reforms to
humanitarian assistance that have proven to be best practice,
including multi-year funding and cash assistance, should be
quickly implemented. Governments of host communities,
international leaders like the United States, and the United
Nations should consider codifying complementary protections for
forced migrants not included under the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol in order to address this growing population that
includes IDPs and those displaced by severe climate-related
events.
By reinvigorating international norms, laws, and solutions,
we can ensure better responses, greater protection for forced
migrants, and more effective international coordination.
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Photo: Robert Bushell, U.S. Marines fortify the border near San Luis
PoE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Nov. 21, 2018.
CHAPTER FIVE
Trump's Domestic Agenda: Blocking All Legal Pathways to Refuge
----------
For many in the United States, our history with immigration
is best exemplified by Emma Lazarus's poem at the Statue of
Liberty: ``Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free . . . Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tost to me!''\453\ Lazarus's vision, however, fails to
reflect the varied history of U.S. immigration policies, which
have always existed in tension with debates about U.S.
identity. At our most inclusive, the United States was
perceived as the world's standard-bearer in welcoming
immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees. In times of hostility
towards foreigners, the United States has banned and mistreated
desperate victims of violence and persecution seeking refuge
within our borders.
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\453\ Emma Lazarus, ``The New Colossus,'' National Park Service,
Nov. 2, 1883, https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/
colossus.htm.
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The ebb and flow of U.S. immigration policy is most
apparent in the periods before and after World War II. In the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, growing religious, racial,
and ethnic intolerance resulted in exclusionary policies
against Asians and the establishment of national-origin
quotas.\454\ In 1939, Jewish passengers fleeing Nazi Germany on
the St. Louis were denied the opportunity to disembark in the
United States.\455\ After World War II, the United States'
refusal of these Jewish refugees, in conjunction with the
United States' enhanced role on the global stage, pushed us to
become a leader in responding to refugee crises around the
world.\456\ In the decades following, the United States
provided refuge to Hungarian dissidents, Indochinese boat
people, Soviet Jewry, Sudanese orphans and Kosovar victims of
ethnic cleansing, among many others.\457\
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\454\ Walter A. Ewing, Opportunity and Exclusion: A Brief History
of U.S. Immigration Policy, American Immigration Council, at 3-4 (Jan.
2012).
\455\ David W. Haines, Learning from Our Past: The Refugee
Experience in the United States, American Immigration Council, at 4
(Nov. 25, 2015).
\456\ Id.
\457\ International Crisis Group, How to Save the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program, Sept. 12, 2018.
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Under the Trump administration, the United States has
reverted to xenophobic and racist migration policies creating
some of the darkest chapters in our history. President Trump
and his administration have enacted executive actions and
policies to restrict legal pathways to refuge in the United
States, including travel restrictions on people from Muslim-
majority countries, the destruction of the U.S. refugee
resettlement program, and additional barriers to asylum. These
policies represent a regression on forced migrant issues and a
failure to uphold international law, including the principle of
non-refoulement, and have been received with domestic and
international criticism.\458\
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\458\ See, e.g., Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's
Travel Ban,'' The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017; Ana Campoy, ``Pro-
immigrant Americans are beating Trump back with a flood of lawsuits,''
Quartz, July 25, 2018; Letter from Chad Hayward, CEO of Accord Network,
et al., to President Trump & Vice President Pence, Jan. 29, 2017;
Sophia Tareen, ``Jewish groups speaking out against Trump immigration
policy,'' AP, Aug. 22, 2019; ``Trump executive order banning refugees:
World reacts,'' BBC, Jan. 29, 2017; Amnesty International, Overlooked
and Under-Protected: Mexico's Deadly Refoulemont of Central Americans
Seeking Asylum (Jan. 2018).
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Furthermore, the Trump administration's actions have
violated the rights outlined in the U.S. Constitution,
conferred on the basis of personhood--not citizenship.\459\ The
violation of these rights, including the right to due process
and the right to legal counsel, undermine the sanctity of our
laws and our values in the name of hatred and fear.\460\
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\459\ Corey Brettschneider, ``Why Trump's Immigration Rules Are
Unconstitutional,'' Politico, Feb. 1, 2017; Gretchen Frazee, ``What
constitutional rights do undocumented immigrants have?,'' PBS, June 25,
2018.
\460\ Gretchen Frazee, ``What constitutional rights do undocumented
immigrants have?,'' PBS, June 25, 2018.
The Trump Administration's Decimation of Existing Programs
SUMMARY OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS AIMED TO RESTRICT OR PREVENT
REFUGE SOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
The following courses of action have been pursued by
the Trump administration to restrict legal pathways for
seeking refuge in the United States for those fleeing
dire situations in their home countries:
Travel restrictions for individuals from 14 countries,
including 10 Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, North Korea,
Venezuela, Nigeria, Burma, Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, and
Tanzania;\461\
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\461\ Executive Order 13769, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27,
2017.
Suspension of all refugee admissions for 120 days;\462\
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\462\ Id.
Reduction in the U.S. refugee ceiling from FY 2016 to FY
2020 by 79 percent;\463\
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\463\ Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 2016, Oct. 1, 2015; Press Release, U.S. Department of State,
PRM, Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, Nov.
2, 2019.
New regional and thematic allocations for refugee
resettlement irrespective of global need;\464\
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\464\ President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, The White House, Nov. 1, 2019.
The discontinuation of UNHCR referrals for
resettlement;\465\
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\465\ Id.
Reduction in refugees resettled in the United States from
FY 2016 to FY 2019 by 65 percent;\466\
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\466\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
Termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6 countries:
El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and
Sudan;\467\
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\467\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on
Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador, Jan. 8, 2018; Press
Release, DHS, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary
Protected Status for Haiti, Nov. 20, 2017; Press Release, DHS, Acting
Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for
Nicaragua and Honduras, Nov. 6, 2017; Press Release, DHS, Secretary
Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for
Nepal, Apr. 26, 2018; Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), Temporary Protected Status for Sudan to Terminate in
November 2018, Sept. 18, 2017.
Termination of the Central American Minors Program;\468\
and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\ Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82
Fed. Reg. 38926, Aug. 16, 2017.
Disqualification of domestic violence and gang violence
asylum claims.\469\
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\469\ Matter of A-B-, Interim Decision 3929, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.
June 11, 2018).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Demonstrators block traffic as they protest against Donald Trump's
immigration order at San Francisco International Airport. Getty Images,
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Jan. 28, 2017.
The Muslim Ban
On January 27, 2017--just days after taking office--
President Trump issued an executive order decreasing the number
of refugees admitted to the United States in Fiscal Year 2017
from 110,000 to 50,000, suspending the U.S. Refugees Admissions
Program (USRAP) for 120 days, suspending the entry of Syrian
refugees indefinitely, and suspending the entry of individuals
from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90
days.\470\ This order came to be known as the ``Muslim Ban,''
since all of the countries targeted were predominately
Muslim.\471\
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\470\ Executive Order 13769, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27,
2017.
\471\ Pew Research Center, ``Religious Composition by Country,
2010-2050,'' Apr. 2, 2015.
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Tens of thousands of Americans denounced the Trump
administration's actions, showing up to more than forty
protests across the country.\472\ Muslim, Jewish, and Christian
religious groups voiced public criticism.\473\ Lawyers set up
informal pro-bono shops at airports to provide legal services
to those impacted by the ban.\474\ Legal challenges began
almost immediately.\475\
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\472\ Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's Travel Ban,''
The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017.
\473\ Letter from Chad Hayward et al., to President Trump & Vice
President Pence, Jan. 29, 2017; Sophia Tareen, ``Jewish groups speaking
out against Trump immigration policy,'' AP, Aug. 22, 2019; Hans
Holznagel, ``UCC, Muslim leaders urge limits on presidential travel
bans,'' United Church of Christ, Aug. 29, 2019; Press Release, CAIR,
CAIR Files Federal Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of Trump's
`Muslim Ban,' Jan. 30, 2017.
\474\ Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's Travel Ban,''
The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017.
\475\ American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), ``Timeline of the
Muslim Ban,'' https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban (last
visited Apr. 17, 2020).
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The executive order tasked the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) with reviewing the refugee admissions
process and implementing new procedures to ensure that
prospective refugees do not threaten U.S. security and
welfare.\476\ The agency heads concluded that refugee
admissions could resume subject to certain conditions,
including the de-prioritization of refugee admissions of
nationals from 11 countries designated as higher risk on the
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) list.\477\ The memo also
declared an indefinite pause in admitting all ``following-to-
join'' refugees--spouses and unmarried minor children of
principal refugees--until further screening mechanisms were
implemented.\478\ However, a District Court injunction on
December 23, 2017 blocked the administration's enforcement of
most provisions in the memo, particularly those regarding
refugees from the 11 SAO countries and ``following-to-join''
refugees.\479\ These actions sought to gut U.S. migration from
Muslim-majority countries and paralyze the U.S. refugee
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\ Executive Order 13769, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27,
2017; Executive Order 13780, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, Mar. 6,
2017.
\477\ Memorandum from Rex W, Tillerson, Secretary of State, et al.,
to President Trump, ``Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions
Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities,'' Oct. 23, 2017; Krishnadev
Calamur, ``Trump's New Refugee Policy Targets These 11 Countries,'' The
Atlantic, Oct. 25, 2017 (Although the 11 countries were not named, they
were widely understood to be Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, North
Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen).
\478\ Memorandum from Rex W, Tillerson, Secretary of State, et al.,
to President Trump, ``Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions
Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities,'' Oct. 23, 2017.
\479\ Doe et al. v. Trump, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order Issuing a Preliminary Injunction, No. 2:17-cv-00178-JLR (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 23, 2017); Josh Gerstein, ``Judge blocks Trump refugee
order,'' Politico, Dec. 23, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 24, 2017, President Trump issued another
executive order resuming the refugee admissions program subject
to certain conditions, including ``special measures'' for
refugees who ``pose potential threats'' to U.S. security and
welfare based on a review by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).\480\ In January 2018, following the 90-day
review, DHS announced ``additional security enhancements and
recommendations,'' including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\480\ Executive Order 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee
Admissions Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, 82 Fed. Reg.
50055, Oct. 27, 2017.
Additional screening for certain nationals of ``high-risk
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
countries;''
Administering the Refugee Admissions Program with an
emphasis on risk when considering the overall
admissions ceiling, allocations, and groups of
applicants considered for resettlement; and
Periodic reviews and updates of the refugee ``high-risk
country'' list and selection criteria.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\ Id.; Press Release, DHS, DHS Announces Additional, Enhanced
Security Procedures for Refugees Seeking Resettlement in the United
States, Jan. 31, 2018.
On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the Trump
administration's travel bans and restrictions in a 5-4
ruling.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\ Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. (2018); Adam Liptak & Michael D.
Shear, ``Trump's Travel Ban Is Upheld by the Supreme Court,'' The New
York Times, June 26, 2018.
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On January 31, 2020, President Trump expanded the travel
ban, adding travel restrictions for six additional countries in
a proclamation.\483\ This expansion suspended immigrant visas
for four countries--Nigeria, Burma, Eritrea, and Kyrgyzstan--
while people from Sudan and Tanzania were barred from the U.S.
diversity visa program.\484\
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\483\ President Donald J. Trump, ``Proclamation on Improving
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry,'' White House, Jan. 31, 2020; Caitlin Oprysko et al., ``Trump
administration expands travel ban,'' Politico, Jan. 31, 2020.
\484\ President Donald J. Trump, ``Proclamation on Improving
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry,'' White House, Jan. 31, 2020; Caitlin Oprysko et al., ``Trump
administration expands travel ban,'' Politico, Jan. 31, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sidebar: BACKGROUND ON U.S. REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS PROGRAM
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 to create a
permanent and systematic procedure for refugee resettlement to
the United States.\485\ The act, which amended the U.S.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), largely incorporated the
1967 Refugee Protocol's definition of a refugee into U.S. law
and established the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP).\486\ The INA authorizes the admission of refugees to
the United States who satisfy certain requirements. The INA
generally defines a refugee as a person who is outside his or
her country and is unable or unwilling to return to his or her
country of origin because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.\487\ To be eligible for admission as a refugee, an
individual must meet the above definition, must not be firmly
resettled in any foreign country, must be determined to be of
special humanitarian concern to the United States, and must be
admissible to the United States according to the terms of the
INA.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\485\ Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212.
\486\ Immigration and Naturalization Act Sec. 101(a)(42)(A), 8
U.S.C. Sec. 1001(a)(42)(A) (A unique aspect of the refugee definition
in U.S. law is that it allows for in-country processing. In addition,
the Refugee Act incorporated the 1967 Protocol's criteria for excluding
individuals from admission to the United States as refugees, such as
perpetrating war crimes or crimes against humanity. This definition
conforms with the definition used in the United Nations 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.)
\487\ Id.
\488\ Id.
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A Bipartisan U.S. Tradition in Refugee Resettlement
Until recently, the United States was by far the global
leader in refugee resettlement, admitting more refugees than
all other resettlement countries combined.\489\ Prior to the
Trump administration, the United States resettled roughly
80,000 refugees per year since 1980, reaching near record-high
totals under Republican administrations.\490\ Even in the years
following 9/11, when ``security protocols threatened to
strangle it in red tape,'' both the Bush and Obama
administrations maintained a robust U.S. resettlement
program.\491\
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\489\ Jens Manuel Krogstad, ``Key facts about refugees to the
U.S.,'' Pew Research Center, Oct. 7, 2019.
\490\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
\491\ International Crisis Group, How to Save the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program, at i (Sept. 2018).
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The USRAP was not only viewed as an important humanitarian
program for protecting some of the world's most vulnerable
people, but also as a tool for advancing U.S. strategic
interests.\492\ Republican and Democratic national security
leaders recognized that refugee resettlement enhanced America's
global influence, demonstrated U.S. burden-sharing with
refugee-hosting countries such as Jordan, Thailand, and Kenya,
undercut anti-U.S. and anti-Western propaganda, supported the
recruitment of military partners and foreign intelligence
assets abroad, and helped promote stability in countries to
which refugees initially flee.\493\ In addition, prioritizing
resettlement for highly vulnerable refugees, such as female-
headed households, the elderly, and victims of torture,
reflected a proud U.S. tradition of responding to grave human
suffering.\494\
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\492\ Idean Salehyan, Insider's Perspectives: Forgotten Refugee
Resettlement Consensus and Motivation, Niskanen Center, at 2 (Sept.
2019).
\493\ Refugee Council USA, ``20 Former National Security Officials
Sign Letter to Congress in Support of the U.S. Refugee Program,'' Dec.
1, 2015; Letter from General Keith B. Alexander, Former Director,
National Security Agency, et al., to President Donald J. Trump, Sept.
3, 2019; Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, ``Trump
Administration Considers a Drastic Cut in Refugees Allowed to Enter
U.S.,'' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2019.
\494\ David Miliband, Rescue: Refugees and the Political Crisis of
Our Time, TED Books Simon & Schuster, at 94-95 (2017).
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In recent years, efforts have sought to diversify the USRAP
to better meet the resettlement needs of highly vulnerable
refugees.\495\ The program evolved from focusing on refugee
admissions from relatively few nationalities to resettling
refugees from over 60 nationalities by 2011.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\ Congressional Research Service (CRS), U.S. Refugee
Resettlement Assistance, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2011).
\496\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Trump, however, has drastically cut the number of
refugee resettlement slots and has distorted the few remaining
allocations to serve his political objectives.\497\ New
security screenings and criteria also have substantially
reduced the number of refugees resettled to the United States,
particularly from Muslim-majority countries.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the
Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,''
Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019.
\498\ Statement of Eric Schwartz, President of Refugees
International, A Global Crisis: Refugees, Migrants, and Asylum Seekers,
Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations, Feb. 26, 2019, at 6.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee staff analysis based on U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions--Refugee
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Processing Center, Summary of Refugee Admissions, Jan. 31, 2020.
Sharp Reductions to Refugee Resettlement Ceilings
By law, annual refugee admission numbers are set by the
President in consultation with Congress.\499\ One of the
President's first official acts upon taking office was to
reduce the FY 2017 refugee ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000 with
an executive order.\500\ This downward trend continued in FY
2018 when the ceiling was lowered to 45,000, again in FY 2019
when the ceiling was lowered to 30,000, and most recently in FY
2020 when the administration announced a ceiling of just
18,000.\501\ In the midst of the world's worst displacement
crisis in modern history, the Trump administration authorized
the lowest refugee ceiling in U.S. history.\502\ As a result,
global refugee resettlement capacity has plummeted. UNHCR
reports that 92,400 refugees were resettled to 25 countries
during 2018, representing only 7 percent of refugees in need of
resettlement, and only 0.4 percent of the global refugee
population.\503\ Other resettlement countries have not stepped
up to fill the large gap created by the United States, and the
bold resettlement commitments made at President Obama's 2016
Leaders' Summit and subsequent Global Compact on Refugees
remain largely neglected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\ INA Sec. 207(a), 8 USC Sec. 1157(a).
\500\ Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27,
2017.
\501\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 2018, at 6 (Oct. 4, 2017); U.S. Department of State, PRM,
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2019, at 4 (Nov. 24, 2018); Press
Release, U.S. Department of State, PRM, Presidential Determination on
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, Nov. 2, 2019.
\502\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June
2019); Press Release, PRM, Presidential Determination on Refugee
Admissions for FY 2020, Nov. 2, 2019.
\503\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2-3,
30, 32 (June 2019) (Committee staff calculations based on 92,400
refugees resettled, 1.4 million refugees in need of resettlement, and
25.9 million refugees).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2020 Changes to Refugee Resettlement
In addition to drastically lowering the refugee ceiling,
the administration altered the composition of where refugees
are being resettled from. From FY 2016 to FY 2018, the largest
increase was from Europe (from 5 to 16 percent) and the largest
decrease was from Near East/South Asia (from 42 to 17
percent).\504\ Whereas the top five home countries for refugees
admitted to the U.S. in FY 2016 were the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Syria, Burma, Iraq, and Somalia, in FY 2018 the top five
were Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma, Ukraine, Bhutan, and
Eritrea.\505\ With measures meant to prevent refugee admissions
from Muslim-majority countries, admissions from Syria, Iraq,
and Somalia dropped dramatically in FY 2018 to less than 2
percent of FY 2016 admissions.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
\505\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019.
U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing
Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://
www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--
01--31--.xlsx.
\506\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY
2020--01--31--.xlsx (Committee staff calculations based on 459
admissions in FY 2018 and 31,487 admission in FY 2016. Admissions from
these three countries combined represented about 37% of total refugee
admissions in FY 2016 and about 2% of total refugee admissions in FY
2018 admissions.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its FY 2020 plan, the administration took the
unprecedented step of designating new regional and thematic
allocations for resettlement--not only altering how many
refugees the United States resettles, but who we resettle.\507\
These changes represent a dramatic shift from resettlement
decisions that have historically considered global needs as
well as U.S. interests, to decisions now solely based on
national or ``special interest'' to the United States.\508\ The
new categories include allocations for refugees persecuted on
account of religion, but exclude designations for crises
resulting in large numbers of refugees, including the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Syria.\509\ Many
groups allege that these categorizations surreptitiously
complicate the process in order to make it all but impossible
to meet the annual ceiling.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\ President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, The White House, Nov. 1, 2019; Kristie
De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the Details: Digging
Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' Niskanen Center, Nov.
18, 2019.
\508\ International Rescue Committee, Who is left behind when the
U.S. resettles fewer refugees?, Mar. 17, 2020.
\509\ President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, The White House, Nov. 1, 2019; Kristie
De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the Details: Digging
Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' Niskanen Center, Nov.
18, 2019.
\510\ Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the
Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,''
Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019; Letter from Senator Kamala D. Harris,
et al., to Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State & Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Nov. 6, 2019.
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In keeping with the Trump administration's pattern of
cutting ties with international organizations, the
administration also eliminated UNCHR referrals, except those
related to the new categories in its FY 2020 plan.\511\ As a
result, the United States is squandering valuable data that
UNHCR has collected on millions of refugees seeking
resettlement--data that could help vet refugees, improve the
security of resettlement programs, and make U.S. decision more
informed.\512\ The United States also loses insight into
whether individuals are already under consideration for
resettlement to another country, thereby making U.S.
resettlement activities far more inefficient and
ineffective.\513\ Lastly, without UNHCR referrals and an active
system for embassy referrals, it is unclear how the United
States will fill its pipeline to meet its annual ceilings.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\ Ted Hesson, ``Trump ending U.S. role as worldwide leader on
refugees,'' Politico, Oct. 11, 2019; Kristie De Pena & Matthew La
Corte, ``The Devil is in the Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee
Resettlement Changes,'' Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019.
\512\ Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the
Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,''
Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019.
\513\ Id.
\514\ Id.
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In September 2019, President Trump issued an executive
order providing state and local officials with the authority to
consent or reject to refugee resettlement placements in their
jurisdictions.\515\ The order required that refugee
resettlement organizations receive written consent from state
and local jurisdictions in order to pursue resettlement.\516\
As of January 2020, 42 states and 100 localities had consented
to receive refugees.\517\Only one state, Texas, had rejected
refugee resettlement.\518\ On January 15, 2020, the District
Court of Maryland issued a preliminary injunction, placing a
hold on the executive order's implementation.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\ President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order on Enhancing State
and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement, The White House, Sept.
26, 2019.
\516\ Bobby Allyn, ``Judge Blocks Trump's Executive Order Allowing
Local Officials to Reject Refugees,'' NPR, Jan. 15, 2020.
\517\ Miriam Jordan, ``Judge Halts Trump Policy That Allows States
to Bar Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 15, 2020.
\518\ Id.
\519\ Hias v. Trump, Memorandum Opinion, No. 8:19-cv-03346 (D. Md.
Jan. 15, 2020); Bobby Allyn, ``Judge Blocks Trump's Executive Order
Allowing Local Officials to Reject Refugees,'' NPR, Jan. 15, 2020;
Miriam Jordan, ``Judge Halts Trump Policy That Allows States to Bar
Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 15, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cumulative effect of the Trump administration's
restrictive policies has decimated the U.S. Refugee
Resettlement Program. As a result, the number of refugees
resettled in the United States represented a 65 percent drop in
FY 2019 from FY 2016 levels.\520\ This drastic drop has
impacted the capacity of non-profit and faith-based agencies to
support refugees' reception and integration into American
communities. From January 2017 to April 2020, over 100 local
resettlement offices closed, weakening the United States'
refugee resettlement infrastructure and the ability to reverse
current trends and respond to growing resettlement needs.\521\
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\520\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
\521\ Refugee Council USA, Where are the Refugees?: Drastic Cuts to
Refugee Resettlement Harming Refugees, Communities, and American
Leadership, at 19-20 (2019).
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Ending Temporary Protected Status Designations
As part of the Immigration Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
649), Congress established the Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
program to provide humanitarian relief to foreign nationals
within the United States who are unable to return to their
country of origin due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or
other extraordinary circumstances that prevent their safe
return. In establishing TPS, Congress re-affirmed the need to
provide temporary safe haven to certain foreign nationals that
did not meet the legal definition of refugee or asylee.\522\
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\522\ CRS, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues,
Mar. 29, 2019.
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In 2017 and 2018, the Trump administration announced plans
to terminate TPS designations for six of the ten countries
whose citizens were eligible: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,
Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan.\523\ The administration argued
that conditions in these countries no longer warranted
extending their TPS status.
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\523\ Press Release, DHS, Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen
M. Nielsen Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador,
Jan. 8, 2018; Press Release, DHS, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke
Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti, Nov. 20, 2017;
Press Release, DHS, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on
Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua and Honduras, Nov. 6, 2017;
Press Release, DHS, Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on
Temporary Protected Status for Nepal, Apr. 26, 2018; Press Release,
USCIS, Temporary Protected Status for Sudan to Terminate in November
2018, Sept. 18, 2017; President Donald J. Trump, Presidential
Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, The White House, Mar. 27, 2018 (The Trump Administration also
attempted to phase-out Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Liberians.
DED is similar to TPS but is based on the President's constitutional
powers to conduct foreign relations, and Liberia is the only country
currently with this designation. The number of Liberians affected is
between 850 and 4,000).
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The administration's plans to terminate TPS for these six
countries would affect more than 400,000 current TPS
beneficiaries, including many who have been living the United
States for at least 20 years.\524\ More than 80 percent of
these beneficiaries are Central American, including
approximately 252,000 Salvadorans, 81,000 Hondurans, and 4,500
Nicaraguans.\525\ While the U.S. Government does not keep data
on the number of U.S.-born children of TPS recipients, external
organizations have produced estimates of 273,000 to 279,000
children of TPS recipients from El Salvador, Honduras, and
Haiti.\526\ In terminating the TPS designations for these
countries, the Trump administration consciously decided to
strip legal protections from hundreds of thousands of foreign-
born individuals and put hundreds of thousands of their U.S.-
citizen children at risk.
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\524\ CRS, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues,
Mar. 29, 2019; Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, ``A Statistical and
Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti,'' Journal on Migration and
Human Security 5, no. 3, at 1 (2017).
\525\ CRS, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues,
Mar. 29, 2019.
\526\ Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, ``A Statistical and
Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti,'' Journal on Migration and
Human Security 5, no. 3, at 2 (2017); Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, ``What
Do We Know About Immigrants With Temporary Protected Status?,'' Center
for American Progress, Feb. 11, 2019.
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Additionally, the termination of TPS would result in lost
work authorization and potential removal from the U.S. for
beneficiaries. According to the Center for Migration Studies,
more than 80 percent of TPS recipients from El Salvador,
Honduras, and Haiti have jobs, and many hold home
mortgages.\527\ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has expressed
concern that termination will result in a shortage of
authorized, experienced workers for the construction, food
services, landscaping, and childcare industries.\528\
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\527\ Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, ``A Statistical and
Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti,'' Journal on Migration and
Human Security 5, no. 3, at 1 (2017).
\528\ Letter from Neil L. Bradley, Senior Vice President & Chief
Policy Officer at the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, to Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Oct.
26, 2017.
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The U.S. District Court for Northern California issued a
preliminary injunction on October 3, 2018 enjoining DHS from
terminating TPS for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and
Sudan.\529\ The court ruled that DHS had failed to consider
recent events in those countries when making its decision, and
noted serious questions as to whether DHS's decision violated
the equal protection clause given Trump's statements suggesting
race was ``a motivating factor.''\530\ Separate court cases
enjoined the termination of TPS for Honduras and Nepal pending
resolution of the government's appeal.\531\
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\529\ Ramos v. Nielsen, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for
Preliminary Injunction (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018); U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), ``Temporary Protected Status,'' https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited
Apr. 15, 2020).
\530\ Ramos v. Nielsen, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for
Preliminary Injunction (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018).
\531\ Bhattarai v. Nielsen, Stipulation to Stay Proceedings, No.
3:19-cv-00731-EMC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019); USCIS, ``Temporary
Protected Status,'' https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-
protected-status (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
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A Human Rights Watch report investigated 138 cases of
Salvadorans killed after deportation from the United States,
underscoring the dangerous and often fatal conditions for those
forcibly returned to El Salvador and other TPS countries.\532\
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\532\ Human Rights Watch, Deported to Danger: United States
Deportation Policies Expose Salvadorans to Death and Abuse, Feb. 5,
2020.
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In Focus: TERMINATION OF THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN MINORS PROGRAM
In December 2014, the Obama administration stood up the
Central American Minors (CAM) Program, a refugee/parole program
created in response to a surge in unaccompanied child arrivals
from the Northern Triangle.\533\ The program allowed eligible
minors with a parent lawfully present in the United States to
apply for refugee resettlement in the United States while
remaining in their home country. The objective was to remove
the need for unaccompanied children to undertake the dangerous
journey across Mexico to the U.S. border to seek asylum.
Applicants ineligible for refugee status under the program were
considered for parole, which allowed temporary entrance to the
United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit.\534\ According to the Department of State,
about 2,300 individuals were granted refugee status and about
1,500 granted parole under the CAM program.\535\ The majority
of refugees and parolees were from El Salvador.\536\
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\533\ USCIS, ``In-Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (Central American Minors--CAM),''
Nov. 15, 2017, https://www.uscis.gov/CAM; David Nakamura, ``Trump
administration ends Obama-era protection program for Central American
minors,'' The Washington Post, Aug. 16, 2017.
\534\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, ``In-Country Refugee/Parole
Program for Minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras With Parents
Lawfully Present in the United States,'' Nov. 14, 2014; USCIS, ``In-
Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Honduras, El Salvador
and Guatemala (Central American Minors--CAM),'' Nov. 15, 2017, https://
www.uscis.gov/CAM (Qualified parents included individuals with lawful
permanent resident status, temporary protected status, deferred
enforced departure, and deferred action, among others).
\535\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019.
\536\ Id.
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Despite the fact that the CAM program pertained only to
vulnerable children who were legally processed in-country,
legally travelled to the United States, and legally placed in
the care of relatives, in August 2017, the Trump administration
announced it was ending the CAM parole program and would no
longer automatically consider unsuccessful refugee applicants
for parole.\537\ Furthermore, the administration indicated in a
report on proposed refugee admissions for FY 2018 that it
planned to phase out the CAM refugee program, because most of
the individuals applying were not eligible for refugee
resettlement.\538\ Indeed, State stopped accepting new CAM
applications in November 2017 and DHS stopped interviewing
applicants in early 2018.\539\ In March 2019, a federal court
ordered the U.S. government to resume processing the
applications of the approximately 2,700 children in the CAM
program.\540\
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\537\ Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82
Fed. Reg. 38926, Aug. 16, 2017; David Nakamura, ``Trump administration
ends Obama-era protection program for Central American minors,'' The
Washington Post, Aug. 16, 2017.
\538\ U.S. Department of State, DHS, United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2018
Report to Congress, at 43 (Sept. 2017).
\539\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019.
\540\ S.A. v. Trump, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Case No. 18-cv-03539-LB
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019); Press Release, International Refugee
Assistance Project, Court Orders Government to Resume Processing
Central American Minors in Terminated Humanitarian Program, Mar. 4,
2019.
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Disqualification of Domestic & Gang Violence Asylum
Claims in Matter of A-B-
Prior to the Trump administration, gender-based persecution
had been recognized as a basis for asylum for decades in the
United States.\541\ In 2016, the Board of Immigration Appeals
found that the applicant in Matter of A-B- qualified for asylum
as a ``particular social group'' because as a woman in El
Salvador, her government was not able to protect her.\542\ A-B-
had credibly testified that she had endured 15 years of abuse
by her husband, including death threats, rapes, and beatings,
and had fled to different parts of El Salvador, divorced her
husband, and filed two restraining orders against him, yet he
continued to find and abuse her without consequence.\543\ In
June 2018, Attorney General Sessions vacated the 2016 Board of
Immigration Appeals decision and remanded the case to the
immigration judge for further proceedings.\544\ Sessions
concluded that domestic and gang violence asylum cases involve
``private criminal activity'' and ``generally . . . will not
qualify for asylum.''\545\ This decision was then passed down
into U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) guidance
for officers screening asylum cases.\546\
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\541\ Cody Wofsy & Katrina Eiland, ``Jeff Sessions' Illegal Attacks
on Asylum Seekers,'' ACLU, Aug. 7, 2018.
\542\ Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, ``Sessions Says Domestic
and Gang Violence Are Not Grounds for Asylum,'' The New York Times,
June 11, 2018.
\543\ Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Slamming the Door on
Domestic Violence Survivors: Matter of A-B- (July 2019); Deborah Anker,
``The History and Future of Gender Asylum Law and Recognition of
Domestic Violence as a Basis for Protection in the United States,''
American Bar Association, Apr. 28, 2020.
\544\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019;
``In re A-B-,'' 132 Harv. L. Rev. 803, Dec. 10, 2018.
\545\ Matter of A-B-, Interim Decision 3929, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.
June 11, 2018).
\546\ DHS & USCIS, Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear,
Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of
A-B-, at 10 (July 11, 2018).
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In December 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that policies set forth in Matter of A-B- and
USCIS's memorandum conflicted with provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act, and defied
Congress' intention for the credible fear determination to be a
``low screening standard.''\547\ The court thus vacated several
of the policies established by Matter of A-B- and USCIS's
policy memorandum, and enjoined the government from applying
them in future credible fear screenings.\548\
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\547\ Grace v. Whitaker, Memorandum Opinion, No. 18-cv-01853 at 8
(D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018); Jennifer Chang Newell, ``Federal Judge Blocks
Trump's Policy Gutting Asylum for People Fleeing Domestic and Gang
Violence,'' ACLU, Dec. 19, 2018.
\548\ Grace v. Whitaker, Memorandum Opinion, No. 18-cv-01853
(D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018).
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The Impact of Trump Administration
Policies at the U.S. Border
Coupled with efforts to limit the number of refugees
resettled in the United States, Trump administration policies
have made the process of applying for asylum increasingly
difficult and inhumane, particularly for asylum seekers
arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, most of whom are from
Central America.
Under the INA, most foreign nationals in the United States
or arriving at or between U.S. Ports of Entry may apply for
asylum regardless of immigration status.\549\ To be granted
asylum, an applicant must establish that they meet the INA's
refugee definition, among other requirements.\550\ The Trump
administration has taken a number of troubling and potentially
illegal actions to restrict asylum seekers' access to the
United States.
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\549\ CRS, Immigration: U.S. Asylum Policy, Feb. 19, 2019. Special
asylum provisions apply to aliens who are subject to a streamlined
removal process known as expedited removal. To be considered for
asylum, these aliens must first be determined by a USCIS asylum officer
to have a credible fear of persecution. Under the INA, credible fear of
persecution means that ``there is a significant possibility, taking
into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in
support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the
officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.''
Individuals determined to have a credible fear may apply for asylum
during standard removal proceedings. Id.
\550\ INA Sec. 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1001(a)(42)(A). This
definition conforms with the definition used in the United Nations 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Jerry Glaser, Mexico Repatriation Flight, January 16, 2020, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Jan. 16, 2020
SUMMARY OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS EXTERNALIZING THE BORDER &
HARMING VULNERABLE FORCED MIGRANT POPULATIONS
The following courses of action have been pursued by the
Trump administration to restrict entry at our borders, and
access to our asylum system and other migration systems:
Under the ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' all adults apprehended
crossing the border between Ports of Entry were
prosecuted and more than, 4,200 children were separated
from their families;\551\
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\551\ Memorandum from Attorney General, Zero-Tolerance for Offenses
Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325(a), Apr. 6, 2018; Leila Rafei, ``Family
Separation, Two Years After Ms. L,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
Metering policies restricted the number of asylum seekers
allowed to cross into U.S. territory--at the El Paso
Port of Entry, the average number of asylum cases
processes dropped 66 percent with metering in
effect;\552\
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\552\ Stephanie Leutert, et al. Asylum Processing and Waitlists at
the U.S.-Mexico Border, Robert Strauss Center for International
Security and Law, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Migration Policy
Centre, at 5, 13 (Dec. 2018).
The Remain in Mexico policy (MPP) has pushed more than
62,000 asylum seekers into dangerous settings where
they face kidnapping, abuse, murder, and refoulement--
75 percent of Doctors Without Borders (MSF) patients in
Nuevo Laredo due to MPP had experienced
kidnapping;\553\
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\553\ Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers, The devastating toll
of `Remain in Mexico' asylum policy one year later, Jan. 29, 2020.
A new Interim Final Rule prevents asylum seekers from
applying for asylum in the United States if they had
not already sought protection from countries through
which they transited;\554\
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\554\ Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg.
33829, July 16, 2019.
``Safe third country'' agreements allow the swift removal
of asylum seekers to Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador, where concerns about threats to safety and
protection remain;\555\ and
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\555\ DHS, Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador, Nov. 7, 2019; Nicole Narea, ``Trump's agreements in
Central America are dismantling the asylum system as we know it,'' Vox,
Nov. 20, 2019.
Under two new expedited removal policies, asylum seekers
are effectively denied counsel and therefore access to
the U.S. asylum system.\556\
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\556\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum
Seekers at the Border: The Migrant Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum
Claim Review, Humanitarian Asylum Review Process, Metering, Asylum
Transit Ban, and How They Interact (Jan. 2020).
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Family Separation & Zero Tolerance
The Trump administration has implemented cruel and unusual
policies to deter asylum seekers from coming to the United
States.\557\ On April 6, 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
announced a new ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' that would criminally
prosecute all adult migrants apprehended crossing the border in
between ports of entry for improper entry into the United
States, including asylum seekers and those with minor
children.\558\ Although thousands of children had been
separated prior to the announcement, this represented a drastic
escalation in the enforcement of existing law--one that
resulted in a substantial increase in family separation.\559\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\557\ Daniella Diaz, ``Kelly: DHS Is Considering Separating
Undocumented Children from Their Parents at the Border,'' CNN, Mar. 7,
2017. In a March 7, 2017 interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, on ``The
Situation Room,'' then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly was
asked if DHS was considering separating children from their parents to
deter migration to the United States and he responded, ``Yes, I am
considering [it], in order to deter more movement along this terribly
dangerous network, I am considering exactly that.'' Id.
\558\ Memorandum from Attorney General, Zero-Tolerance for Offenses
Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325(a), Apr. 6, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Public Affairs, ``Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks
Discussing the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the Trump
Administration,'' May 7, 2018; CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero
Tolerance'' Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019.
\559\ CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero Tolerance''
Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019; Family separation
occurred prior to the May 2018 policy when DHS suspected the veracity
of the familial relationship or were concerned about the child's
safety. For example, DHS separated 1,065 children from the parents in
FY 2017 and 703 children in the first five months of FY 2018. Email
correspondence from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Legislative Affairs to CRS, June 8, 2018. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this new level of law enforcement, adults crossing
the border between Ports of Entry were criminally prosecuted
and subjected to detention in federal criminal detention
centers, where children cannot be housed. As a result, any
accompanying children were designated as Unaccompanied Alien
Children and transferred to the custody of the Department of
Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR), which housed them in their own shelter facilities.\560\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\560\ CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero Tolerance''
Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A February 2020 Government Accountability Office study
found that inaccurate record keeping was due in part to Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) officers' human error, preventing
an accurate count of the total number of separations.\561\ In
total, it estimated that the Trump administration separated
over 4,200 children from their parents.\562\
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\561\ U.S .Government Accountability Office, Southwest Border:
Actions Needed to Improve DHS Processing of Families and Coordination
Between DHS and HHS (Feb. 2020).
\562\ Leila Rafei, ``Family Separation, Two Years After Ms. L,''
ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
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After tremendous public uproar, including from Congress,
Fortune 500 companies, the United Nations, religious leaders,
and medical professionals, President Trump issued an executive
order on June 20, 2018, mandating that DHS maintain custody of
migrant families together pending any criminal trial or
immigration proceedings.\563\ CBP subsequently stopped
referring most illegal border crossers to DOJ for criminal
prosecution, but DHS is still separating some families based on
DHS enforcement protocols in place prior to the ``Zero
Tolerance Policy.''\564\
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\563\ CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero Tolerance''
Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019; Kevin D. Williamson,
``Immigration Policy: Bordering on Madness,'' National Review, June 25,
2019; Catherine E. Shoichet, ``Doctors Saw Immigrant Kids Separated
from Their Parents. Now They're Trying to Stop It,'' CNN, June 14,
2018; Amy Wang, ``Officials Blast Trump Policy After Visiting Detained
Immigrants,'' Chicago Tribune, June 10, 2018; Emma Green, ``Religious
Leaders Condemn Family Separations--but Not Necessarily Trump,'' The
Atlantic, June 19, 2018; Brad Tuttle, `` `Heartless, Cruel, Immoral.'
Every Major CEO Who Condemned Trump's `Zero Tolerance' Border Policy,''
Money, June 20, 2018; Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Rights Chief Tells
U.S. to Stop Taking Migrant Children From Parents,'' The New York
Times, June 18, 2018; Tara Isabella Burton, ``Pope Francis Condemns
Trump's Family Separation Policy,'' Vox, June 20, 2018; Executive Order
13841, Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separation,
83 Fed. Reg. 29435, June 25, 2019.
\564\ A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, Class Action Complaint, No. 4:19-cv-
00481 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 26, 2018, the U.S. District Court for Southern
California ruled that the policy violated constitutional rights
and issued a preliminary injunction, which remains in effect,
barring the Trump administration from involuntarily separating
families and requiring the reunification of separated
families.\565\
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\565\ CRS, Family Separation at the Border and the Ms. L.
Litigation, July 31, 2018.
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The U.S. government, however, has struggled to reunite
families that were separated under the Zero Tolerance Policy.
CBP records omitted information about the separated children's
family members; the IT systems for tracking families were
limited, separate, and unable to be integrated with each other;
and, uncoordinated implementation forced several thousand
children to wait days if not months in Office of Refugee
Resettlement shelters for reunification.\566\ According to
government status reports to the court, 27 children still had
not been reunited with their parents as of September 2019--15
months after the District Court's ruling.\567\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\566\ DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), Special Review--
Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero
Tolerance Policy (Sept. 27, 2018); U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) OIG, Separated Children Placed in Office of Refugee
Resettlement Care (Jan. 2019).
\567\ Mike LaSusa, ``Feds Say Dozens of Migrant Kids in Class Suit
Still Separated,'' Law360, Sept. 12, 2019. Of the 27 remaining
separated, 1 where the parent is not eligible for reunification or
discharge at this time, 4 arrived without parents, 8 had parents deemed
unfit for reunification, 13 whose parents did not intend to reunify
with their children, 1 for whom parental preference could not be
obtained. Id.
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In Focus: FAMILY SEPARATION & THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN
Thousands of children impacted by the Trump
administration's ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' experienced
significant trauma as a result of being unexpectedly separated
from their families and placed in detention centers.\568\ Once
separated, children were often moved several times to different
facilities, which exacerbated the trauma they experienced.\569\
For some infants, at the time of reunification, they had spent
more time in immigration custody than they had with their
parents.\570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\568\ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Reform, Child Separations by the Trump Administration, at 1 (July
2019).
\569\ Id. at 19.
\570\ Id. at 1.
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The HHS Inspector General released a report on the mental
health needs of children in U.S. custody, detailing ``intense
trauma from a variety of events before and upon their arrival
in the United States.''\571\ In the report, a program director
described the extent of emotional trauma in separated children:
``A seven or eight year-old boy was separated from his father,
without any explanation as to why the separation occurred. The
child was under the delusion that his father had been killed
and believed that he would also be killed. This child
ultimately required emergency psychiatric care to address his
mental health distress.''\572\ A medical director spoke to the
physical manifestation of the trauma caused by separation,
``Physical symptoms felt by separated children are
manifestations of their psychological pain. You get a lot of
`my chest hurts,' even though everything is fine [medically].
Children describe symptoms, `Every heartbeat hurts,' `I can't
feel my heart,' of emotional pain.''\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\ HHS OIG, Separated Children Placed in Office of Refugee
Resettlement Care, at 9 (Jan. 2019).
\572\ Id. at 11.
\573\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An October 2019 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
lawsuit describes the story of Jairo and Beatriz, a father and
his three-year-old daughter. Jairo and Beatriz were separated
after watching CBP officers beat a mother who refused to turn
over her young child. Jairo was told by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officers that if he signed paperwork in
English--a language he did not understand--he would be reunited
with his daughter sooner. Jairo signed a voluntary deportation
form and was sent back to Guatemala. Meanwhile, Beatriz was
moved to custody in New York. When Beatriz was finally reunited
with her family in Guatemala, they noticed scars on her back
and bruises on her legs. Beatriz told Jairo that a woman in New
York had hit her with the hard part of a belt. Furthermore, by
the time Beatriz was reunited with her family, she had lost the
ability to speak Mam, an indigenous Mayan language, and
therefore lost the ability to communicate with her mother and
other family members.\574\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\574\ A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, Class Action Complaint, No. 4:19-cv-481
(D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Physicians for Human Rights evaluation of 17 adults and 9
children separated under the ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' found
that most individuals experienced severe trauma, met diagnostic
criteria for at least one major mental health condition,
exhibited ongoing functional impairment, and required further
intervention and therapeutic support.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\575\ Hajar Habbach et al., ``You Will Never See Your Child
Again'': The Persistent Psychological Effects of Family Separation,
Physicians for Human Rights (Feb. 25, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Trump administration's policies have scarred thousands
of children. The families subjected to these policies will deal
with the psychological and emotional fallout for years to
come.\576\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\576\ See, e.g., Kimberly Howard et al., ``Early Mother-Child
Separation, Parenting, and Child Well-Being in Early Head Start
Families,'' Attachment & Human Development Journal (Jan. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Metering at U.S. Ports of Entry
The Trump administration has implemented metering policies
to discourage and turn away asylum seekers at the U.S. border.
Also referred to as ``queue management,'' metering regulates
the number of individuals allowed to claim asylum or enter the
United States without proper documentation to address
overcrowding at U.S. Ports of Entry.\577\ When metering is in
effect, CBP officers walk halfway across the U.S.-Mexico border
to stand at the international boundary. Before allowing a
potential asylum seeker to cross into U.S. territory, they
radio back to the Port of entry to confirm that space is
available in holding facilities.\578\ If the facilities are
full, the asylum seeker is refused entry until space opens
up.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\577\ DHS OIG, Special Review-Initial Observations Regarding Family
Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 6 (Sept. 27,
2018); American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum Seekers
at the Border: The Migrant Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum Claim
Review, Humanitarian Asylum Review Process, Metering, Asylum Transit
Ban, and How They Interact, at 1 (Jan. 2020).
\578\ DHS OIG, Special Review-Initial Observations Regarding Family
Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 6 (Sept. 27,
2018).
\579\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a September 2018 DHS Office of the Inspector
General report, the metering policy has existed at least as far
back as 2016, although a December 2018 report co-authored by
the University of Texas's Strauss Center for International
Security and Law found that CBP only began ``solidifying and
uniformly implementing the turn-back practices'' in May
2018.\580\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\580\ Id.; Stephanie Leutert, et al. Asylum Processing and
Waitlists at the U.S.-Mexico Border, Robert Strauss Center for
International Security and Law, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies,
Migration Policy Centre, at 3 (Dec. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's metering policy raises serious legal questions
regarding federal immigration statutes, including whether these
statutes apply to foreign nationals who are physically about to
enter the United States but have not yet reached the
border.\581\ Specifically, if CBP officers are stopping
migrants before they have an opportunity to request asylum, it
is unclear if they are violating asylum processes mandated in
the INA.\582\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\581\ CRS, The Department of Homeland Security's Reported
``Metering'' Policy: Legal Issues, Aug. 13, 2019.
\582\ Id. A lawsuit (Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen) brought by an
immigration advocacy organization and 14 asylum seekers contends that
CBP's metering policy denies, and in some cases unreasonably delays
asylum seekers' access to the asylum processes violates INA provisions
that allow any alien who is physically present or arriving in the
United States to pursue asylum, and that require CBP to refer any alien
subject to expedited removal who indicates an intention to apply for
asylum or a fear of persecution for a credible fear interview. The
plaintiffs also argued that CBP has violated their due process rights
by denying or delaying their ``access to the asylum process.'' Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that CBP's policy violates the international law
concept of non-refoulement, which instructs that no country should
expel or return an individual to a place where he or she faces
persecution. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Metering significantly reduced access to legal processes
for asylum seekers at the U.S. border, thus pushing more asylum
seekers to seek illegal methods for gaining entry to the United
States. By limiting the number of people who could enter at
legal Ports of Entry, the metering policy resulted in higher
numbers entering between legal Ports of Entry, thus also
increasing the likelihood of criminal prosecution.\583\ Citing
CBP data for the El Paso Ports of Entry, the University of
Texas report indicates that between April and June 2018--when
metering was in effect--the average number of asylum seekers
processed each day fell from 77 to 26.\584\ Moreover, the
metering practice coincided with the administration's
implementation of the ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' and criminal
prosecution of all persons apprehended for not using official
ports of entry in May 2018. The DHS Office of Inspector General
found that both Border Patrol officers and aliens reported an
increase in illegal border crossings when metering was in
place.\585\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\583\ DHS OIG, Special Review-Initial Observations Regarding Family
Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 7 (Sept. 27,
2018).
\584\ Stephanie Leutert, et al. Asylum Processing and Waitlists at
the U.S.-Mexico Border, Robert Strauss Center for International
Security and Law, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Migration Policy
Centre, at 13 (Dec. 2018).
\585\ DHS OIG, Special Review--Initial Observations Regarding
Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Remain in Mexico Policy
In addition to restricting the number of asylum seekers who
can enter the United States to begin their asylum process, the
administration developed an additional layer of cruelty with
the Remain in Mexico policy, denying asylum seekers entrance to
the U.S. while they wait for their immigration court date. The
Remain in Mexico policy, also known as the Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP), began on January 28, 2019 at the San Ysidro,
California Port of Entry--the country's busiest--but
subsequently expanded to all ports of entry along the southern
U.S. border. The Remain in Mexico policy requires many asylum
seekers who arrive at the southern border to wait in Mexico
while U.S. immigration courts process their case.\586\ As of
January 2020, more than 62,000 asylum seekers had been returned
to Mexico under MPP, including more than 16,000 children.\587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\586\ CBP, ``MPP Guiding Principles, Jan. 28, 2019. According to
CBP's ``MPP Guiding Principles,'' categories of individuals ``not
amenable to MPP'' include unaccompanied alien children, citizens or
nationals of Mexico, aliens processed for expedited removal, and aliens
more likely than not to face persecution or torture in Mexico. Id.
\587\ Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers, The devastating toll
of `Remain in Mexico' asylum policy one year later, Jan. 29, 2020;
Kristina Cooke et al., ``Exclusive: U.S. migrant policy sends thousands
of children, including babies, back to Mexico,'' Reuters, Oct. 11,
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While waiting in Mexico, asylum seekers have limited access
to lawyers and shelter, making it nearly impossible for them to
prepare their cases and effectively denying them meaningful
access to the U.S. asylum system.\588\ An estimated 4 percent
of people returned to Mexico under MPP are able to find
representation for their court cases, compared to 32 percent
for those who were allowed to stay in the U.S.\589\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\588\ Priscilla Alvarez, `` `I don't want to return to Mexico, your
honor': Asylum seekers make their plea to immigration judges,'' CNN,
Mar. 24, 2019; Kate Morrissey, ``Scheduling glitch affects first
hearings for `Remain in Mexico' returnees,'' San Diego Tribune, Mar.
14, 2019; Statement of Laura Pena, Pro Bono Counsel, American Bar
Association Commission on Immigration, Examining the Human Rights and
Legal Implications of DHS' `Remain in Mexico' Policy, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations, U.S.
House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov. 19, 2019.
\589\ TRAC Immigration, ``Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP
Immigration Court Cases, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/587/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The processing of U.S. immigration cases can last for
months and even years, forcing a growing number of men, women,
and children to wait in dangerous situations in parts of Mexico
plagued by violence. Asylum seekers under MPP are still
expected to appear at their court hearings in the United
States, and are living in dangerous and overcrowded Mexican
border cities, including Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo,
and Matamoros.\590\ Tijuana, for example, counted 2,009
homicide cases in 2018, an increase of 22 percent from
2017.\591\ In Ciudad Juarez, there were 1,004 homicide cases in
2018, a 62 percent increase from 2017.\592\ The State
Department issued a travel advisory for the Mexican border
state of Tamaulipas, which includes the cities of Nuevo Laredo
and Matamoros, due to the prevalence of crime and
kidnapping.\593\ Overcrowding in border cities has forced many
migrants to live in large tent encampments without access to
drinking water and bathrooms, and vulnerable to severe weather
and abuse.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\590\ Caitlin Dickerson, ``Confusion on the Border as Appeals Court
Rules Against Trump's `Remain in Mexico' Policy,'' The New York Times,
Feb. 29, 2020; Caitlin Dickerson, ``Desperate Migrants on the Border:
`I Should Just Swim Across,''' The New York Times, Nov. 1, 2019.
\591\ NBC staff and Telemundo 20 Staff, ``More than 2,000 Homicides
Reported in Tijuana, Mexico,'' NBC San Diego, Oct. 28. 2018.
\592\ Laura Y. Calderon et al., Organized Crime and Violence in
Mexico, University of San Diego, at 4 (Apr. 2019); Patrick Timmons,
``Across Mexico Border from safe El Paso, violence surges in Juarez,''
United Press International, Jan. 23, 2019.
\593\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Mexico
Travel Advisory, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html (last
visited June 8, 2019).
\594\ Dickerson, ``Confusion on the Border as Appeals Court Rules
Against Trump's `Remain in Mexico' Policy,'' The New York Times, Feb.
29, 2020; Caitlin Dickerson, ``Desperate Migrants on the Border: `I
Should Just Swim Across,''' The New York Times, Nov. 1, 2019; ``US
`Remain in Mexico' policy endangers lives of asylum seekers in
Tamaulipas state,'' Medecins Sans Frontiers, Sept. 5, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of May 2020, Human Rights First had documented at least
1,114 publicly reported cases of murder, kidnapping, rape,
torture, and violent assault against asylum seekers in Mexico
under MPP, including 265 cases of children kidnapped or nearly
kidnapped.\595\ In October 2019, Doctors Without Borders (MSF)
reported that 75 percent of their patients sent to Nuevo Laredo
through MPP had been kidnapped.\596\ Approximately 80 percent
of MSF patients in Nuevo Laredo during the first nine months of
2019 had suffered at least one violent incident.\597\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\595\ Human Rights First, ``Delivered to Danger: Trump
Administration sending asylum seekers and migrants to danger,'' https:/
/www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico (last visited Apr. 20,
2020); Human Rights First, Publicly reported cases of violent attacks
on individuals returned to Mexico under the ``Migrant Protection
Protocols,'' as compiled by Human Rights First, May 13, 2020, https://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
PubliclyReportedMPPAttacks-5.13.2020.pdf.
\596\ Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers, The devastating toll
of `Remain in Mexico' asylum policy one year later, Jan. 29, 2020.
\597\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since its inception, MPP has been the subject of legal
proceedings with mixed results. First, in April 2019, the
District Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction
questioning DHS's authority to carry out returns and potential
violations of the principle of non-refoulement.\598\ However,
in May 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
granted an emergency stay of the injunction, which effectively
allowed for the implementation and enforcement of MPP.\599\
Subsequently, in February 2020, the Ninth Circuit reinstated a
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the policy violates
federal law.\600\ However, a few hours later, the judges
granted the administration an emergency stay allowing MPP to
continue pending further order of the court.\601\ In March
2020, the Supreme Court granted a stay allowing MPP to continue
while legal challenges play out.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\598\ UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees (Oct. 4, 1967). The 1967 UN Refugee
Protocol, to which the United States is a party, includes language that
prohibits member states from returning refugees to territories where
their ``life or freedom would be threatened'' on the basis of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. Id.
\599\ Stephanie Manning, ``Ninth Circuit allows `Remain in Mexico'
policy to stay in effect,'' Innovation Law Lab, May 8, 2019.
\600\ Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, Opinion, No. 19-15716 (9th Cir.
Feb. 28, 2020); Maria Sacchetti et al., ``Federal appeals court blocks
President Trump's `Remain in Mexico' policy but stays its own ruling,''
The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 2020.
\601\ Maria Sacchetti et al., ``Federal appeals court blocks
President Trump's `Remain in Mexico' policy but stays its own ruling,''
The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 2020.
\602\ Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 589 U.S., Mar. 11, 2020; Adam
Liptak & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, ``Supreme Court Revives `Remain in Mexico'
Policy for Asylum Seekers, The New York Times, Mar. 11, 2020; Ariane de
Vogue, ``Supreme Court lets Remain in Mexico' asylum policy stay in
place,'' CNN, Mar. 11, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interim Final Rule
On July 16, 2019, DHS and DOJ jointly issued an Interim
Final Rule (IFR) rendering aliens ineligible for asylum in the
United States if they arrived at the southern border without
first seeking protection from countries through which they
transited.\603\ The IFR would apply both to unlawful entrants
and to aliens who present themselves at ports of entry on the
southern border. The IFR effectively prohibits almost all non-
Mexican nationals who reach the U.S. southern border from
seeking asylum. The new rule also makes it easier for DHS to
swiftly remove aliens without proceedings in immigration court
if they lack visas or other valid entry documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\603\ Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg.
33829, July 16, 2019. The IFR would not apply to Mexicans who seek
asylum in the United States, as Mexico is the only country through
which they transited. U.S. Department of Justice, DOJ Guidelines
Regarding New Regulations Governing Asylum and Protection Claims, July
16, 2019. Exceptions to the Interim Final Rule include: 1) if an alien
applied for protection in at least one transit country and was denied;
2) if the alien is a victim of ``a severe form of trafficking in
persons'' provided in 8 C.F.R. 214.11; or 3) if the only countries the
alien transited were not (at the time of transit) parties to the 1951
UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, or
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural
Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33829, July 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By restricting access to the U.S. asylum system, the United
States has placed even greater stress on a flawed Mexican
immigration system. Mexico's own human rights commission
declared the protection system ``broken.''\604\ The Mexican
government has at times violated the international legal
principle of non-refoulement by involuntarily returning Central
American asylum seekers to their home countries despite fears
of persecution or torture.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\604\ Human Rights Watch, Deported to Danger: United States
Deportation Policies Expose Salvadorans to Death and Abuse (Feb. 5,
2020).
\605\ Amnesty International, Overlooked and Under-Protected:
Mexico's Deadly Refoulemont of Central Americans Seeking Asylum (Jan.
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost immediately after the IFR was announced, two
separate lawsuits were filed challenging the legality of the
rule.\606\ On July 24, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction
blocking the IFR's implementation nationwide while lawsuits
moved forward.\607\ On September 11, 2019, the Supreme Court
stayed the lower court ruling pending appeal, allowing the
administration to enforce the IFR in the interim.\608\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\606\ Debra Cassens Weiss, ``New Asylum Rule Is Quickly Challenged
in Two Lawsuits,'' ABA Journal, July 17, 2019.
\607\ East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction, No. 19-cv-04073 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2019).
\608\ Pete Williams, ``Supreme Court allows Trump administration to
enforce toughest restriction yet on asylum requests,'' NBC News, Sept.
12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Safe Third Country'' Agreements
Simultaneously with the Interim Final Rule, the Trump
administration has pursued ``safe third country'' agreements--
also known as Asylum Cooperative Agreements--that similarly
seek to deter and deflect asylum applications in the United
States. Under the INA, an alien is ineligible to apply for
asylum in the United States if he or she can be removed,
pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a third
country where the ``alien's life or freedom would not be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
and where the alien would have access to a full and fair
procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent
temporary protection.''
Between July and September 2019, the Trump administration
signed ``safe third country'' agreements with Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador, though to date it has only begun
implementing the Guatemala agreement.\609\ Under these
bilateral agreements, some asylum seekers who arrive at a
southern U.S. port of entry can be deemed ineligible for
protection in the United States, and subsequently sent to the
third country where they can apply for asylum.\610\ Per U.S.
law the agreements must satisfy two primary requirements: (i)
the partner country provides access to ``full and fair'' asylum
procedures; and (ii) must be a place where the individual would
not face persecution.\611\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\609\ Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
American and the Government of the Republic of Guatemala for
Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims, 84 Fed. Reg.
64095, Nov. 20, 2019; Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of American and the Government of the Republic of Honduras for
Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims, 85 Fed. Reg.
25463, May 1, 2020; DHS, Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements with Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador, Nov. 7, 2019; CRS, Safe Third Country
Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries: Background and Legal
Issues, Jan, 30, 2020.
\610\ CRS, Safe Third Country Agreements with Northern Triangle
Countries: Background and Legal Issues, Jan, 30, 2020.
\611\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the Guatemala agreement was publicly
announced on July 26, 2019, Guatemala's Constitutional Court
blocked the agreement from going into force without
Congressional approval.\612\ The court issued a subsequent
ruling that was more ambiguous, however, and the Morales
administration proceeded to implement the agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\612\ Sofia Menchu, ``Guatemalan court halts `safe third country'
designation for asylum seekers,'' Reuters, July 15, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Trump administration made the determination that asylum
seekers in Guatemala have access to a full and fair procedure,
although it has not made that determination public nor
responded to SFRC requests to provide the determination.\613\
The determination reportedly refers to Guatemala having a legal
framework meeting that standard, not whether it is implemented
in practice.\614\ Guatemala passed an immigration law in 2017
that reformed its migration system and listed refugees' rights
in accordance with international instruments. However, in 2019,
the U.S. Department of State report on Guatemala still cited
inadequacies regarding identification and referral mechanisms
for asylum seekers, as well as inadequate training for
authorities on establishing refugee status.\615\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\613\ Nicole Narea, ``Trump's agreements in Central America are
dismantling the asylum system as we know it,'' Vox, Nov. 20, 2019.
\614\ Id.
\615\ U.S. Department of State, ``2019 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: Guatemala,'' Mar. 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the United States, the immigration and humanitarian
community expressed serious concerns over the proposed
agreement. Refugees International doubted the legality of the
Guatemala ``safe third country'' agreement given that
``Guatemala lacks a full and fair procedure for determining a
claim to asylum,'' and ``individuals forced into Guatemala
would constitute an especially vulnerable social group subject
to grave risks at the hands of gangs and other criminal
elements'' thus constituting persecution.\616\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\616\ Press Release, Refugees International, Statement: Reported
U.S.-Guatemala Asylum Pact `A Stain on this Nation's Honor,' July 12,
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the ``safe third country'' agreement with Guatemala
went into effect in November 2019, more than 900 Central
Americans have been sent by the United States to Guatemala,
including more than 300 children.\617\ On January 15, 2020, the
ACLU and its partner organizations filed a lawsuit challenging
the Trump administration's ``safe third country'' agreements,
arguing that the countries fail to pass the test of having
``full and fair'' asylum procedures as required by the
INA.\618\ One of the plaintiffs in the case, referred to as
U.T., is a gay Salvadoran man who was removed by U.S.
authorities to Guatemala.\619\ U.T. still fears of homophobic
persecution in Guatemala, where the UN High Commission on Human
Rights found persistent ``discrimination and violence against
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.''\620\ In March
2020, Guatemala temporarily suspended the transfer of asylum
seekers from the United States to Guatemala under the ``safe
third country'' agreement, citing the need to establish
``sanitary protocols'' amid the COVID-19 pandemic.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\617\ Kirk Semple, ``Asylum Sekers Say U.S. is Returning Them to
the Dangers They Fled,'' The New York Times, Mar. 17, 2020; Reuters,
``Guatemala wants to limit migrants returned under U.S. asylum
agreement,'' NBC News, Mar. 6, 2020.
\618\ Press Release, ACLU, Groups File Federal Lawsuit Challenging
Trump Administration's So-Called `Safe Third Country' Asylum Policy,''
Jan. 15, 2020.
\619\ Id.
\620\ Id.; United Nations Human Rights Council, Activities of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Guatemala: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, 40th Session, at 13 (Jan. 29, 2019).
\621\ Camila DeChalus, ``Guatemala suspends US flights carrying
asylum-seekers,'' Roll Call, Mar. 17, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expedited Removal Programs
In October 2019, the Trump administration secretly rolled
out two ``expedited removal'' programs in El Paso, the Prompt
Asylum Claim Review (PACR) and the Humanitarian Asylum Review
Process (HARP), to speed up asylum processes for non-Mexican
and Mexican migrants, respectively.\622\ Under PACR and HARP,
asylum seekers do not go through the formal asylum process,
going through an expedited process instead to receive a
decision on their asylum request in less than 10 days.\623\ In
essence, these programs hollow out an already imperfect asylum
process in order to expediently remove asylum seekers from the
United States.\624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\622\ American Immigration Lawyers Association, ``Featured Issue:
Border Processing and Asylum,'' Mar. 13, 2020; American Immigration
Council, Policies Affecting Asylum Seekers at the Border: The Migrant
Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum Claim Review, Humanitarian Asylum
Review Process, Metering, Asylum Transit Ban, and How They Interact
(Jan. 2020); Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging
Programs That Push Migrants Through Asylum Screenings Without Access to
Attorneys in Border Patrol Facilities, Dec. 6, 2019.
\623\ American Immigration Lawyers Association, ``Featured Issue:
Border Processing and Asylum,'' Mar. 13, 2020.
\624\ Ruth Epstein & Shaw Drake, ``Ban on Attorney Access for
Asylum Proceedings in Inhumane CBP Jails Key to Trump's Attack on
Asylum,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asylum seekers under PACR and HARP are held in short-term
CBP holding cells known as hieleras or iceboxes, because of
their freezing temperatures.\625\ Whereas under formal asylum
procedures ICE is required to provide access to a telephone and
the ability to meet with attorneys, CBP only provides asylum
seekers under PACR and HARP 30 minutes to contact a lawyer or
family member before their credible fear interview, which
occurs within the first 24 hours of their detainment.\626\ CBP
does not provide any means to locate people in its custody, and
detainees do not have access to a phone outside of their 30-
minute window for counsel to return a call or reach out.\627\
These processes effectively deny asylum seekers access to
counsel and allow for courts to easily deny their cases without
adequate assessment of their protection needs, and expediently
remove them from the United States.\628\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\625\ Ruth Epstein & Shaw Drake, ``Ban on Attorney Access for
Asylum Proceedings in Inhumane CBP Jails Key to Trump's Attack on
Asylum,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020; J. Edward Moreno, ``Federal judge sides
with migrants in lawsuit over conditions in border facilities,''' The
Hill, Feb. 19, 2020.
\626\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum
Seekers at the Border; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit
Challenging Programs That Push Migrants Through Asylum Screenings
Without Access to Attorneys in Border Patrol Facilities, Dec. 6, 2019;
Press Release, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Congressional
Leaders Call for Immediate Halt of Trump Programs that Rush Migrants
Through Asylum Screenings, Jan. 31, 2020.
\627\ Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Programs
That Push Migrants Through Asylum Screenings Without Access to
Attorneys in Border Patrol Facilities, Dec. 6, 2019.
\628\ Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center v. Wolf, First Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:19-cv-03640
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between October and December 2019, more than 1,000 asylum
seekers had been subjected to PACR and HARP programs.\629\ The
program was set to expand to the rest of the border by early
February 2020.\630\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\629\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum
Seekers at the Border; Ruth Epstein & Shaw Drake, ``Ban on Attorney
Access for Asylum Proceedings in Inhumane CBP Jails Key to Trump's
Attack on Asylum,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
\630\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum
Seekers at the Border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2019, a lawsuit challenged PACR and HARP
practices arguing that the policies are wholly inadequate and
unlawful substitutes for a fair and meaningful asylum
process.\631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\631\ Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center v. Wolf, First Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:19-cv-03640
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exploiting the COVID-19 Pandemic
Amidst the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trump
administration has effectively halted the United States' asylum
and refugee system, closing the U.S.-Mexico border,
implementing an expulsion order, and postponing immigration
court hearings for those applying for asylum under MPP.\632\
Between March 21, 2020 and May 13, 2020, only 2 people seeking
humanitarian protection at the southern border were allowed to
stay.\633\ Over a similar period, the Trump administration
chartered more than 59 deportation flights to Guatemala,
Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and
Jamaica.\634\ The United States did not test deportees for
COVID-19, and several countries have reported positive cases
among migrants deported by the United States, including more
than 200 cases in Guatemala.\635\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\632\ Priscilla Alvarez, ``Refugee admissions to the US temporarily
suspended,'' CNN, Mar. 18, 2020; Letter from Grace Meng, senior US
researcher at Human Rights Watch & Sirine Shebaya, Executive Director
at the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, to
Joseph V. Cuffari, Department of Homeland Security Inspector General &
Cameron Quinn, Officer at DHS Office for Civil Rights & Civil
Liberties, Apr. 13, 2020; Letter from Patrick Leahy, United States
Senator, et al., to Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security,
Apr. 7, 2020; Nicole Narea, ``Trump is continuing deportations during
the pandemic. It's causing the coronavirus to spread.,'' Vox, May 12,
2019.
\633\ Nick Miroff, ``Under Trump border rules, U.S. has granted
refuge to just two people since late March, records show,'' The
Washington Post, May 13, 2020.
\634\ Jake Johnston, ``Exporting COVID-19: ICE Air Conducted
Deportation Flights to 11 LAC Countries, Flight Data Shows,'' Center
for Economic and Policy Research, Apr. 27, 2020 (between March 23, 2019
and April 26, 2019).
\635\ Nicole Narea, ``Trump is continuing deportations during the
pandemic. It's causing the coronavirus to spread,'' Vox, May 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Trump administration's actions amid the COVID-19
pandemic are only their latest attempts to gut existing
refugee, protection, and immigration programs--placing the
burden on other countries, including our neighbors in Mexico
and Central America, to deal with today's global crisis.
The Positive Contributions of Refugees and
Immigrants in the United States
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
VH Produce owner Vue Her is a Hmong farmer on a 10-acre field, who
grows several Asian specialty crops in Singer, CA, near Fresno. Lance
Chueng, 20181109-FPAC-LSC-1236, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Nov. 9,
2018.
Since the announcement of his presidential campaign in
2015, in which he described Mexico as sending ``drugs,''
``crime,'' and ``rapists'' to the United States, President
Trump has spewed xenophobic rhetoric and promoted false anti-
immigrant and anti-refugee narratives.\636\ These hateful words
distort the true public benefit of accepting forced migrants
into our communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\636\ Todd Scribner, ``You are Not Welcome Here Anymore: Restoring
Support for Refugee Resettlement in the Age of Trump,'' T3Journal on
Migration and Human Security,T1 at 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safe Members of Communities
The Trump administration has sought to justify its
restrictive approach to resettlement by suggesting that
refugees are potential terrorists, and therefore pose an
outsize security risk to the United States.\637\ This is a
misleading narrative that has been denounced by an array of
experienced diplomats, military, and national security
experts.\638\ In reality, no resettled refugee has committed a
lethal attack on U.S. soil since the 1980 Refugee Act.\639\ The
probability of an American being killed in a terrorist attack
carried out by a refugee in a given year is estimated to be 1
in 3.64 billion.\640\ In comparison, the odds of being struck
by lightning are far greater at 1 in 1.22 million.\641\ The
threat in the U.S. of being killed by a U.S.-born terrorist is
far greater than a foreign-born terrorist, with the odds of
being murdered by a U.S.-born terrorist at 1 in 28
million.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\637\ Dan De Luce and Julia Ainsley, `` Trump admin rejected report
showing refugees did not pose major security threat,'' NBC News, Sept.
5, 2018.
\638\ Refugee Council USA, Blogs & Stories, ``20 Former National
Security Officials Sign Letter to Congress in Support of the U.S.
Refugee Program'' Dec. 1 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael D.
Shear, ``Trump Administration Considers a Drastic Cut in Refugees
Allowed to Enter U.S.,'' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2019.
\639\ Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and
Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2017, CATO, at 23 (May 2019).
\640\ Id. at 1; Methodological issues involving the distinction
between immigration status at time of entry into the U.S. and status at
the time of an incident, and a reliance on publicly available data to
conduct the research likely impact this estimate, but according to the
report, when ``conflicting numerical estimates exist, the highest
plausible figures are used with the intent to maximize the risks and
costs of terrorism in terms of human life. Id.
\641\ National Weather Service, ``How Dangerous is Lightning?,''
https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-odds (last visited June 8,
2019).
\642\ Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and
Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2017, CATO, at 1 (May 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More often, refugees are the victims--not the
perpetrators--of terrorism. Many refugees have fled the same
terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Al
Shahab, which the United States and its allies seek to
dismantle. Closing the door on refugees and labeling victims
potential terrorists emboldens the anti-U.S. narratives of the
extremists they have fled.\643\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\643\ Refugee Council USA, Blogs & Stories, ``20 Former National
Security Officials Sign Letter to Congress in Support of the U.S.
Refugee Program,'' Dec. 1 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael D.
Shear, ``Trump Administration Considers a Drastic Cut in Refugees
Allowed to Enter U.S.,'' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Refugees were already the most heavily vetted group in the
U.S. before the Trump administration added additional security
measures in 2017.\644\ Refugees considered for resettlement in
the United States ``face the most rigorous vetting of any
individuals or groups that come to the United States,''
according to James Ziglar and Doris Meissner, former
commissioners of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service for Republican and Democratic administrations,
respectively.\645\ This rigorous screening process can take
anywhere from 18 months to 3 years and involves numerous stages
of screening that include the collection and analysis of
biographical and biometric data, multiple security background
checks, and in-person interviews.\646\ These screenings are all
conducted before a potential refugee sets foot in the United
States.\647\ Once they arrive at their point of entry, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection and Transportation Security
Administration officials conduct additional screening.\648\
Mostafa Hassoun, a Syrian refugee living in the United States,
said of his experience: ``Over 15 months I was interviewed five
times--in person, over the phone, by the United Nations and by
the United States. They asked me about my family, my politics,
my hobbies, my childhood, my opinions of the U.S., and even my
love life. No less than four U.S. government agencies had the
opportunity to screen me. By the time I received my offer to
live in the United States, the U.S. officials in charge of my
case file knew me better than my family and friends do.''\649\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\644\ Amy Pope, The White House, ``Infographic: The Screening
Process for Refugee Entry into the United States'' Nov. 20, 2015.
\645\ Doris Meissner & James Ziglar, ``Halting refugee resettlement
compromises the security of all,'' The Hill, Dec. 3, 2015.
\646\ Idean Salehyan, The Strategic Case for Refugee Resettlement,
Niskanen Center, at 1 (Sept. 2019); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service, Refugee Security Screening Fact Sheet (June 3, 2020).
\647\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, Refugee Security
Screening Fact Sheet, at 4 (June 3, 2020).
\648\ Id. at 4; Erol K. Yayboke & Aaron N. Milner, Confronting the
Global Forced Migration Crisis, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, at 70 (May 2018); Memorandum from Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary,
Department of State, to President Donald Trump, Oct, 23. 2017.
\649\ Mostafa Hassoun, ``I Went Through America's Extreme
Vetting,'' Politico, Jan. 28, 2017.
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The Economic Contributions of Refugees
The Trump administration has also sought to paint refugees
as an economic drain on the United States.\650\ In contrast to
this misleading message, refugees generally contribute more in
taxes than they receive in benefits, revitalize cities and
towns by offsetting population decline, and boost economic
growth by buying homes and opening businesses.\651\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\650\ Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S.
Government A New Foundation For American Greatness FY 2018, at 16 (May
23, 2017); ``The Economic Impact of Refugee Admission & Resettlement,''
University of Pennsylvania, Nov. 20, 2018, https://
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/2720-the-economic-impact-of-
refugee-admission-.
\651\ William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald, National Bureau of
Economic Research, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the
United States: Evidence From The ACS, at 33 (June 2017); Matthew La
Corte, Refugees are Revitalizing Some Great Americans Cities Facing
Decline, Niskanen Center (June 2016); New American Economy, From
Struggle to Resilience: The Economic Impact of Refugees in America
(June 2017); Charles Kenny, ``The Real Immigration Crisis: The Problem
Is Not Too Many, but Too Few,'' Foreign Affairs, Nov. 11, 2019; Global
Detroit, The Economic Impact of Refugees in Southeast Michigan (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research has overwhelmingly debunked the idea that refugees
strain the U.S. economy. In July 2017, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services conducted an internal study
subsequently suppressed by the Trump administration, which
found that ``the net fiscal impact of refugees was positive
over the ten year period, at 63 billion dollars, meaning they
contributed more in revenue than they consumed in
expenditures.''\652\ Similarly, a National Bureau of Economic
Research report based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2015 Economic
Community Survey estimated that on average refugees pay 21,000
dollars more in taxes than they receive in benefits over their
first twenty years in the United States.\653\ And a New
American Economy (NAE) report based on the same U.S. Census
data found that refugee households earned 77 billion dollars in
2014, of which 21 billion dollars went to taxes, leaving 56
billion dollars in spending power to be invested into the U.S.
economy.\654\ The NAE study showed that while refugees may
receive initial assistance upon arrival, they see sharp income
increases and remarkable upward mobility. The average refugee
earned around 21,782 dollars their first 0 to 5 years in the
United States, but 67,000 dollars after 25 years in the United
States--greater than the median U.S. household income.\655\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\652\ Department of Health and Human Services, The Fiscal Costs of
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program at the Federal, State, and Local
Levels, from 2005-2014 (Draft), at 31 (July 29, 2019).
\653\ William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald, National Bureau of
Economic Research, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the
United States: Evidence From The ACS, at 33 (June 2017).
\654\ New American Economy, From Struggle to Resilience: The
Economic Impact of Refugees in America, at 5-6 (June 2017). The 2.3
million ``likely refugees'' categorized based on country of origin and
year of arrival. Id.
\655\ Id. at 8; Gloria Guzman, ``New Data Show Income Increased in
14 States and 10 of the Largest Metros,'' U.S. Census Bureau, Sept. 26,
2019.
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On a local level, studies have shown that refugees have a
positive economic impact on their communities.\656\ In Akron,
Ohio, where the local economy has struggled in recent years,
the influx of refugees has revitalized the city, boosted
property values, and turned once vacant neighborhoods into
vibrant economic corridors.\657\ In Erie, Pennsylvania, where
refugees and their children comprise approximately one-fifth of
the population, refugees have opened an estimated 100
businesses and helped forestall population decline.\658\ In the
2010 census, Michigan was the only U.S. state whose population
declined. Since then, refugees have been responsible for the
state's net population growth, and Michigan was the fourth
largest state for resettlement between 2007 and 2016.\659\ A
study of Southeast Michigan, where over half of the refugees
who arrived in that period resettled, found that refugees
arriving between 2007 and 2016 created over 220 million dollars
in new spending and over 1,700 new jobs.\660\ In Georgia, where
the state does not fund any programs specifically for refugees,
91 percent of refugee households manage to work and pay their
own expenses within 6 months of arrival.\661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\656\ Matthew La Corte, Refugees are Revitalizing Some Great
Americans Cities Facing Decline, Niskanen Center (June 2016).
\657\ Partnership For A New American Economy & Knight Foundation,
Welcome to Akron: How Immigrants and Refugees Are Contributing to
Akron's Economic Growth (June 2016).
\658\ Tim Henderson, ``Immigrants Prevented or Minimized Population
Loss in a Fifth of U.S. Counties,'' The Pew Charitable Trusts, Apr. 24,
2019; Deborah Fallows, ``What It Takes to Settle Refugees,'' The
Atlantic, Oct. 28, 2016.
\659\ Global Detroit, The Economic Impact of Refugees in Southeast
Michigan, at 7 (2017).
\660\ Id.; In Macomb, Oakland, Washtenaw, and Wayne Counties,
including cities like Detroit and Ann Arbor. New spending was estimated
between 229.6 million to 295.3 million, and jobs created was between
1,798 and 2,311. Id.
\661\ ``Refugees and Immigrants in Georgia: The Facts,'' Coalition
of Refugee Services Agencies, Feb. 2017.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane, Refugee camp, U.S. Air Force, Jan. 19, 2014.
Damage to U.S. Military Interests
The Trump administration's gutting of the refugee system
has damaged the effectiveness of U.S. military, diplomatic, and
intelligence operations abroad. For example, tens of thousands
of Iraqi and Afghan nationals have put their lives on the line
to support U.S. intelligence gathering, operations planning,
and other essential services during the Afghan and Iraq
conflicts. Resettlement is not only an instrument to ensuring
their safety, but also maintaining strong intelligence and
counter-terrorism partnership in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite
this--as well as the fact that they are heavily vetted before
ever serving alongside U.S. troops--the Trump administration
has severely reduced resettlement numbers through the U.S.
Government's Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) and the Iraqi direct
access (P-2) programs. Responding to the administration's
resettlement reductions, 27 national security leaders,
including General Martin Dempsey, General Joseph Votel, and
General Raymond Odierno wrote to the President. In their letter
they explained that, ``U.S. military, diplomatic and
intelligence operations abroad rely on the support of thousands
of interpreters, translators, advisors, engineers and others to
fulfill their objectives. When their lives and those of their
families are threatened because of this support, the U.S.
refugee resettlement provides a critical lifeline. We have
personally borne witness to how these programs ensure the
safety of our service members and success of US
missions.''\662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\662\ Letter from General Keith B. Alexander, et al., to President
Donald J. Trump, Sept. 3, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drastically reducing refugee numbers also feeds into the
anti-American narratives of terrorist groups, threatening the
success of U.S. counter-terrorism work. In refusing to admit
refugees into the United States and issuing travel bans for
Muslim-majority countries, the United States' reputation abroad
suffered. Narratives propagated by al-Qaida and ISIS about U.S.
and Western hostility towards Muslims is validated by the Trump
administration's actions. As General Michael Hayden and Admiral
James Stavridis stated, ``Welcoming refugees regardless of
their religion, nationality, or race exposes the falseness of
terrorist propaganda and counters the warped vision of the
extremists.''\663\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\663\ Michael Hayden & James Stayridis, ``U.S. must lead on refugee
crisis,'' Miami Herald, July 8, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The Trump administration's destructive policies toward
immigrants and asylum seekers have sparked domestic dissent
from humanitarian organizations, immigration organizations,
civil rights groups, religious groups, and individuals from
coast to coast.\664\ Moreover, the Trump administration's
actions have been met with significant international criticism.
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle
Bachelet responded to the United States' ``Zero Tolerance'' and
family separation policies, stating: ``This should never happen
anywhere.''\665\ On the issue of the Muslim Ban alone, UNHCR,
IOM, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, the German Chancellor,
and the French President all spoke out against the
administration's actions.\666\ These domestic policies
undermine the United States' ability to speak and lead with
credibility on the global stage.
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\664\ See, e.g., Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's
Travel Ban,'' The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017; Ana Campoy, ``Pro-
immigrant Americans are beating Trump back with a flood of lawsuits,''
Quartz, July 25, 2018; Letter from Chad Hayward, CEO of Accord Network,
et al., to President Trump & Vice President Pence, Jan. 29, 2017;
Sophia Tareen, ``Jewish groups speaking out against Trump immigration
policy,'' AP, Aug. 22, 2019.
\665\ ``UN rights chief `appalled' by US border detention
conditions, says holding migrant children may violate international
law,'' UN News, July 8, 2019.
\666\ ``Trump executive order banning refugees: World reacts,''
BBC, Jan. 29, 2017; Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Joint IOM-UNHCR Statement on President Trumps' Refugee Order,
Jan. 28, 2017.
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In order to re-establish U.S. leadership on the global
stage, the United States must first reckon with the morality of
actions taken within and at our borders. As a first step, the
United States must terminate harmful policies, including the
Remain in Mexico policy and ``safe third country'' agreements,
ensure that asylum seekers, immigrants, migrants, and refugees
are afforded protections, restore refugee resettlement to
historic norms, and create new methods for resettlement and
complementary protections in order to help meet tremendous
global need.
CHAPTER SIX
The Trump Administration's Global
Retreat from Forced Migration
----------
Over the past three years, the Trump administration has
drastically eroded U.S. diplomatic engagement and leadership in
addressing humanitarian crises and forced migration. Prior to
the Trump administration, the United States helped lead the
world through humanitarian assistance, political engagement,
and coordination on the international stage. President Trump,
however, has promoted an ``America First'' foreign policy that
often rejects multilateral action and coordination.\667\ The
Trump administration has pulled the United States out of
international agreements that U.S. diplomats helped design,
proposed severe cuts to humanitarian funding, and drastically
reduced the number of refugees resettled to the United States.
The Trump administration's anti-immigrant policies and
mistreatment of asylum seekers and refugees have badly undercut
the United States' credibility in advocating for other
countries to offer protection and asylum, and in some cases,
even emboldened harsh policies by foreign governments.\668\ As
a result, the United States has ceded international leadership
and emboldened other nations to turn their backs on the current
global forced migration crisis.
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\667\ See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, President Donald
J. Trump's Foreign Policy Puts America First, Jan. 30, 2018; President
Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump to 74th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Headquarters, New York,
NY, Sept. 24, 2019. Donald Trump, President of the United States,
Remarks at the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
United Nations, Sept. 25, 2018. In his remarks before the UN General
Assembly in 2018, President Trump said, ``America is governed by
Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the
doctrine of patriotism.''
\668\ See ``Jordan, US Discuss Ties, Refugee Crisis,'' Jordan
Times, Feb. 14, 2017. Shortly after the White House announced its first
travel ban and reduction in the U.S. refugee admissions ceiling, in
Feb. 2017 Acting Assistant Secretary of State Simon Henshaw met with
Jordanian government officials to urge them not to forcibly return
Syrian refugees. Instead, Jordanian authorities increased deportations
of Syrian refugees, including some already approved for resettlement in
the United States. Id.; ``Aid Groups: Jordan Deports Thousands of
Syrian Refugees,'' Voice of America, May 12, 2017.
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Repeated Attempts to Cut U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance Funding
Global humanitarian need is rapidly outpacing the provision
of aid. These are international, system-wide challenges, but as
the world's largest humanitarian donor, the United States plays
a critical role in shaping global responses to these
challenges.\669\ U.S. contribution to humanitarian funding
accounts for one quarter to one third of global public
expenditures.\670\ As a percentage of Gross National Income
(GNI), however, the United States is the seventeenth largest
international donor.\671\ Under the Trump administration,
multiple proposed cuts to humanitarian assistance have signaled
a global retreat. The global community has largely followed,
resulting in a stagnation of global humanitarian financing in
the face of growing needs. For example, the growth in financing
from 2017 to 2018 was just one percent, which stands in stark
contrast to 30 percent cumulative growth over the five years
before 2018.\672\
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\669\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance
Report 2019, at 10-11 (2019). The United States is the largest
international humanitarian assistance donor, spending more than $6
billion in 2018.
\670\ Id. at 36.
\671\ Id. at 38.
\672\ Id. at 32; Ben Parker, ``Ten Donors and 10 Crises Dominate
Humanitarian Spending,'' The New Humanitarian, Oct. 9, 2019.
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Every year in office, President Trump has proposed
significant reduction in humanitarian assistance funding from
previously appropriated levels. And every year, Congress has
come to the rescue by appropriating humanitarian assistance
funding levels far greater than the administration's request,
allowing lifesaving humanitarian assistance programs to
continue. In the administration's first budget proposal, for FY
2018, the request for 5.3 billion dollars in humanitarian
funding was a 43 percent decrease from the previous years'
appropriation.\673\ In FY 2021, the Trump administration
requested 6.27 billion dollars--a 34 percent decrease from the
9.55 billion dollars appropriated in FY 2020.\674\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\673\ U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, Administration's Detailed
FY18 Budget Request Similar to Skinny Budget: Proposal Would Make
America Less Safe by Slashing International Affairs Budget, at 4 (May
23, 2017).
\674\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification:
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Fiscal
Year 2021 (Feb. 10, 2020); U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, Out of
Touch With America's Interests: International Affairs Programs Slashed
for Fourth Straight Year Despite Growing Global Crises, at 8 (Feb. 10,
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In most years, the United States allocates more than half
of its humanitarian assistance to UN entities, many of which
address the needs of forced migrant populations. Key recipients
of this assistance include UNHCR, IOM, and numerous other
specialized UN agencies and programs.\675\ Thanks to Congress's
engagement and recognition of pressing global needs, U.S.
obligations to UNHCR increased from 1 billion dollars in FY
2013 to 1.57 billion dollars in FY 2018, and U.S. funding to
IOM has remained steady based on needs and priorities.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\675\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, May 9, 2019, at
4. The International Committee of the RedCross, WFP, UNICEF, and UNOCHA
also receive assistance. Id.
\676\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration, FY 2018 Summary of Major Activities, at 4 (Feb. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite robust Congressional support for humanitarian
assistance to address forced migration, the administration has
successfully cut funding to a number of critical UN programs
that seek to assist these populations. In August 2018, the
administration announced it would no longer provide voluntary
funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an organization that
provides life-saving assistance to Palestinian refugees in the
West Bank, Gaza, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.\677\ In addition,
the Trump administration has withheld funding from the UN
Population Fund (UNFPA), the lead UN agency for ensuring that
women and girls who have fled conflict have access to life-
saving services relating to gender-based violence, and sexual
and reproductive health.\678\ In doing so, the Trump
administration has further endangered women and girls, who are
particularly vulnerable to abuses in humanitarian
settings.\679\ Furthermore, in April 2020 amid the COVID-19
pandemic, President Trump suspended U.S. financial support for
the World Health Organization (WHO), and, in May 2020,
President Trump declared that the United States would terminate
its relationship with the WHO.\680\ In doing so, the Trump
administration suspended critical support for global activities
working to combat COVID-19, polio, Ebola, HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and other diseases, particularly among
vulnerable populations like forced migrants.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\677\ Hady Amr, ``In One Move, Trump Eliminated US Funding for
UNRWA and the US Role as Mideast Peacemaker,'' The Brookings
Institution, Sept. 7, 2018; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), ``Who We Are,'' https://
www.unrwa.org/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 21, 2020).
\678\ Planned Parenthood, ``Tracking Trump,'' https://
www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/tracking-trump/policy/un-population-
fund (last visited Apr. 21, 2020); Liz Ford & Nadia Khomami, ``Trump
Administration Halts Money to UN Population Fund over Abortion Rules,''
The Guardian, Apr. 4, 2017; see Congressional Research Service,
Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provision in U.S. Foreign
Assistance Law and Policy, Oct. 23, 2019.
\679\ Eric Schwartz, A Global Crisis: Refugees, Migrants, and
Asylum Seekers, Refugees International, at 9 (Feb. 26, 2019).
\680\ Kaiser Family Foundation, ``The U.S. Government and the World
Health Organization,'' Apr. 16, 2020; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., ``Trump
Says the U.S. Will Cut Ties with World Health Organization,'' CNBC, May
29, 2020.
\681\ Stephanie Nebehay & Kate Kelland, ``Explainer: What the U.S.
Funds Freeze Could Mean for WHO and Its Work,'' Reuters, Apr. 15, 2020;
Amy S. Patterson & Emmanuel Balogun, ``Trump Wants to Defund the World
Health Organization. That Could Hurt Health Partnerships in Africa,''
The Washington Post, May 5, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A huge number of Haitians make their way to the relief supplies (food
and water) handed out at the stadium in Port au Prince, Haiti. Master
Sgt. Jeremy Lock, 00120-F-1644L-189, U.S. Air Force, Jan. 20, 2010.
Sidebar: PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. HUMANITARIAN FUNDING AND POLICY
OPERATIONS
In addition to slashing humanitarian assistance funding in
its annual budget request to Congress, the Trump administration
has sought to consolidate distinct U.S. overseas humanitarian
assistance accounts into a single new global International
Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account.\682\ Under the new
proposal, the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) newly established Humanitarian Assistance Bureau would
manage the IHA account, while the Department of State's
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Bureau would lose its
authorities to program and administer humanitarian assistance
in response to overseas crises.\683\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\682\ U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, Analysis of the
Administration's FY 20 International Affairs Budget Request (Mar. 12,
2019).
\683\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification:
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal
Year 2020, at 77 (Mar. 2019); U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Fiscal Year 2021, at 78 (Feb. 10, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the United States to effectively respond to
humanitarian crises, most of which are the result of conflict,
the Department of State must be enabled to marshal a wide range
of tools, including diplomatic engagement, humanitarian
assistance funding, and refugee resettlement.\684\ The existing
architecture between State and USAID provides for comprehensive
responses to crises, including diplomatic pressure for
political resolutions to humanitarian emergencies,
collaborative work toward permanent solutions for refugees and
other displaced populations, and strategic engagement on
emerging humanitarian policy issues.\685\ State's PRM bureau
excels at leveraging robust humanitarian diplomacy and policies
to protect refugees, internally displaced people, and other
vulnerable forced migrants based on experience managing
programs on the ground.\686\ The direct channels of
communication between PRM field staff and the Ambassador, or
between PRM program officers in Washington and the Secretary of
State, are critical to advocating for humanitarian access,
humane border policies, and other life-saving protections under
international human rights and humanitarian laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\684\ Refugees International, Congress Urged to Resist Massive Cuts
in U.S. Humanitarian Aid, Mar. 26, 2019; UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian
Overview 2019, at 5-6 (2019).
\685\ Refugees International, Congress Urged to Resist Massive Cuts
in U.S. Humanitarian Aid.
\686\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contrary to the administration's desire to shift PRM's
mandate to USAID and potentially even DHS, it is imperative
that PRM remain positioned with State to coordinate directly
with State Department officials, UN agencies, foreign
governments, and NGO partners on the ground.\687\ The United
States' stellar record at responding to international
humanitarian emergencies relies upon a fusion of diplomatic and
humanitarian expertise, and dismantling this would hamper U.S.
efforts in this time of immense global humanitarian need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\687\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Withdrawal from International Fora
Over the past several years, the international community
has convened high-level meetings and events to address the
forced migration crisis. The United States was previously an
active participant and lead convener of these diplomatic
efforts to address humanitarian issues, including the forced
migration crisis. For example:
At the first UN World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, 180
countries came together to address the challenges
facing the global humanitarian system.\688\ A key
outcome was the signing of a ``Grand Bargain,'' which
aimed to make aid more efficient and effective, to
include greater local and national participation and
partnerships, and to establish coherence between
humanitarian and development responses.\689\ USAID led
the U.S. delegation, which also included
representatives from the White House, Department of
State, and the Department of Defense.\690\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\688\ Agenda for Humanity, ``World Humanitarian Summit,'' https://
agendaforhumanity.org/summit (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
\689\ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ``The Grand Bargain
(Official website),'' https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-
bargain (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
\690\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: World
Humanitarian Summit--U.S. Government Priorities, May 24, 2016.
On September 19, 2016, at the UN General Assembly High-
Level Plenary Summit on Refugees and Migrants, world
leaders agreed to the New York Declaration, which aimed
to save lives, protect rights, and share responsibility
for refugees and migrants on a global scale.\691\ The
United States participated in the High-Level Plenary
Summit as part of the regular General Assembly session
that unanimously adopted the Declaration.\692\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\691\ UNHCR, ``New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,''
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-
migrants.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
\692\ Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Adopts
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, as United Nations, International
Organization for Migration Sign Key Agreement, Sept. 19, 2016; UNHCR,
The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: Answers to
Frequently Asked Questions, at 2 (Feb. 2018).
On September 20, 2016, as a complement to the High-Level
Plenary Summit, President Obama co-hosted a Leaders'
Summit on Refugees asking nations to increase their
efforts to respond to the global displacement
crisis.\693\ Participants agreed to increase
contributions to UN appeals, expand options for
resettlement and other legal channels of admission, and
improve access to education for one million refugee
children and lawful work for one million refugees.\694\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\693\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on the Leaders'
Summit on Refugees, Sept. 20, 2016.
\694\ Id.
Since President Trump took office, however, the United
States has disengaged from cooperative international efforts
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and even jeopardized their success.
Under President Obama, the United States participated in
all of the member state consultation meetings prior to
the start of negotiations of the Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM).\695\ Under
the Trump administration, however, the United States
withdrew from negotiations in December 2017, stating
concerns regarding U.S. sovereignty even though the
Compact is nonbinding.\696\ In early December 2018, the
international community met in Marrakech, Morocco to
sign the GCM. The United States was not present in
Marrakech.\697\ The United States did, however, attend
a December 19, 2018 session of the UN General Assembly
where member 154 member states voted in favor of
adopting a resolution endorsing the GCM.\698\ At the
session, the United States called for a vote on the
resolution and subsequently voted against it.\699\
Moreover, according to reporting, the United States
sought to convince other nations to vote against the
Compact.\700\ Ultimately, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Israel, and Poland also voted against it.\701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\695\ Olivia Beavers, ``US Pulls out of Global Compact on
Migration,''' The Hill, Dec. 3, 2017.
\696\ Press Release, U.S. Mission to International Organizations in
Geneva, U.S. Ends Participation in the Global Compact on Migration,
Dec. 3, 2017; Press Release, United States Mission to the United
Nations, National Statement of the United States of America on the
Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular
Migration, Dec. 7, 2018.
\697\ Faras Ghani, ``UN members adopt global migration pact,'' Al
Jazeera, Dec. 10, 2018.
\698\ Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Endorses
First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation among
Members States in Protecting Migrants, Dec. 19, 2018.
\699\ Id.
\700\ Georgi Gotev, ``Nine EU Members Stay Away From UN Migration
Pact,'' EURACTIV, Dec. 20, 2018; AFP & The Times of Israel Staff, ``UN
Ratifies Migrant Pact; Israel and US Among Five to Vote Against,'' The
Times of Israel, Dec. 19, 2018.
\701\ Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Endorses
First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation among
Members States in Protecting Migrants, Dec. 19, 2018.
Similar to the GCM, the United States participated in the
consultative process for the Global Compact on Refugees
(GCR). However, at the eleventh hour the Trump
administration withdrew from the GCR in November 2018
based on objections to its reference to the New York
Declaration.\702\ In December 2018, the UN General
Assembly adopted the GCR in New York by a voting margin
of 181-2, with only the United States and Hungary
voting against the resolution adopting the
Compact.\703\ The United States explained that:
``Although we value much of what is contained in the
resolution and the [GCR], including improving UNHCR's
responses to refugee crises as well as facilitating the
work of UNHCR in refugees hosting countries, concerns
expressed by my government during negotiations remain
unaddressed.''\704\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\702\ Alice Thomas & Mark Yarnell, Ensuring that the Global
Compacts on Refugees and Migration Deliver, Refugees International
(Nov. 2018).
\703\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, May 9, 2019;
Nayla Rush, ``A Historic Victory for the UN: Global Compacts on
Migration and Refugee Adopted This Week,'' Center for Immigration
Studies, Dec. 20, 2018.
\704\ Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations,
Explanation of Vote in a Meeting of the Third Committee on a UNHCR
Omnibus Resolution, Nov. 13, 2018.
In addition to withdrawing from the Compacts, the Trump
administration has also ceased U.S. participation in
IOM's annual International Dialogues on Migration,
which discuss challenges and opportunities related to
migration. Whereas the State Department sent three
delegates in 2016 and two delegates in 2017, no U.S.
government officials attended the Dialogues in 2018 and
2019.\705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\705\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, May 9, 2019.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee staff calculations based on data from UNHCR, ``Population
Statistics: Resettlement,'' (last visited June 15, 2020).
The International Implications of the Trump Administration's Retreat
Leading the World in Retreat from the Global Forced Migration Crisis
While the United States is still the world's largest
humanitarian donor, the Trump administration's efforts to
undercut a holistic response to the global forced migration
crisis sends a message to other nations and impacts their
actions. It was U.S. leadership at the 2016 Leaders' Summit on
Refugees that drew commitments from countries on funding,
resettlement slots, and basic human rights protections.\706\ By
the same token, the absence of U.S. humanitarian leadership
since then has contributed to a lack of global progress on
meeting the 2016 commitments. For example, although global
funding has increased, it has not caught up nor kept pace with
increasing need; underfunding of UN appeals has grown from a 28
percent shortfall in 2007 to 46 percent in 2019.\707\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\706\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: World
Humanitarian Summit--U. S. Government Priorities, May 24, 2016.
\707\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 26 (Dec. 31,
2019); David Miliband, ``A Battle Plan for the World Bank: Why Refugees
Are at the Center of the Fight Against Poverty,'' Foreign Affairs, Feb.
19, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the U.S. led the world in a global retreat
from refugee resettlement. In 2016, the United States was by
and far the world's leader in refugee resettlement, resettling
over 96 thousand refugees--50 thousand more refugees than the
next highest refugee resettlement country.\708\ Therefore, when
U.S. refugee resettlement declined by over 65 percent in 2017,
this gap was felt globally.\709\ Furthermore, the next leading
refugee resettlement country, Canada, followed the United
States' suit, reducing refugee resettlement by 43 percent in
2017.\710\ Overall, while refugee resettlement in the United
States alone has declined by 76 percent from 2016 to 2018,
refugee resettlement totals for the next four largest refugee
resettlement countries in 2016--Canada, Australia, the United
Kingdom, and Norway--also declined by 41 percent from 2016 to
2018.\711\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\708\ Committee staff calculations based on U.S. Department of
State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing Center, ``Summary
of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://www.wrapsnet.org/
documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--01--31--.xlsx (based
on calendar year); UNHCR, ``Population Statistics: Resettlement,''
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement (last visited June 15, 2020).
\709\ Committee staff calculations based on U.S. Department of
State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing Center, ``Summary
of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://www.wrapsnet.org/
documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--01--31--.xlsx
(calendar year figures of 96,874 resettled in 2016 and 33,368 resettled
in 2017);
\710\ Committee staff calculations based on UNHCR, ``Population
Statistics: Resettlement,'' http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement
(last visited June 15, 2020).
\711\ Committee staff calculations based on U.S. Department of
State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing Center, ``Summary
of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://www.wrapsnet.org/
documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--01--31--.xlsx (based
on calendar year); UNHCR, ``Population Statistics: Resettlement,''
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement (last visited June 15, 2020)
(2019 figures not yet available).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global refugee resettlement fell by 51 percent in 2018
compared to 2016.\712\ While 37 countries committed to
resettling refugees in 2016, just two years later only 25
countries resettled refugees.\713\ In 2019, 63,696 refugees
were resettled through UNHCR--just 4.5 percent of the 1.4
million refugees in need of resettlement.\714\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\712\ Committee staff calculations based on UNHCR, ``Population
Statistics: Resettlement,'' http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement
(last visited June 15, 2020).
\713\ International Rescue Committee (IRC), 10 things to know about
the Global Refugee Crisis and America's lack of leadership: An IRC
analysis of the latest annual reports from the UN Refugee Agency (July
2019).
\714\ Press Release, UNHCR, More resettlement needed as only 4.5
per cent of global resettlement needs met in 2019, Feb. 5, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regardless of intent, the United States leads by example.
The Trump administration's regressive actions towards forced
migrants in the international sphere have set the stage for
other countries to follow suit. These actions have aggravated
imbalanced burden sharing, increased global instability, and
furthered the plight of forced migrants worldwide.
Placing Increased Burden on U.S. Allies & Partners
Refugee resettlement programs and humanitarian assistance
can serve as political release valves, relieving economic and
social pressure to ease some of the burden for countries
hosting large refugee populations.\715\ Though global refugee
resettlement accounts for less than one percent of the refugee
population, the Trump administration's decision to slash U.S.
resettlement has significantly impacted major refugee-hosting
countries, many of which are developing countries.\716\ In the
past, the United States leveraged its willingness to resettle a
small percentage of refugees to encourage host countries to
provide safe haven to significantly larger populations of
displaced people, thereby preventing forced returns of refugees
as well as discouraging onward migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\715\ Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, ``Trump's Refugee Cuts Threaten
Deep Consequences at Home and Abroad,'' The New York Times, Sept. 11,
2019.
\716\ UNHCR, ``Resettlement,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
resettlement.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, however, these same countries are less willing to
continue hosting large refugee populations when the United
States and other wealthy nations will not. In 2016, almost
19,300 of Jordan's mostly Syrian refugees were resettled to
countries like the United States and Canada, providing critical
relief.\717\ In FY 2018, however, the United States resettled
just 47 refugees from Jordan.\718\ As Jordan continues to host
a significant number of Syrian refugees, the abdication of U.S.
commitments has not gone unnoticed. King Abdullah of Jordan has
made clear his country needs greater international support,
saying, ``We are shouldering an immense refugee burden and
cannot be left alone as we undertake this humanitarian
responsibility on behalf of the world.''\719\ Queen Rania of
Jordan went further, saying that the country has reached a
breaking point: ``Our infrastructure, social services and
economy are buckling under the strain. Nonetheless, Jordan--and
other countries such as mine--continues to do the right thing.
The same cannot be said of wealthy nations.''\720\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\717\ UNHCR, Jordan Factsheet (June 2017); U.S. Department of
State, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017
Report to Congress, at iv, September 2016; Press Release, UNHCR,
Canada's 2016 record high level of resettlement praised by UNHCR, April
24, 2017.
\718\ IRC, Refugee resettlement by the numbers: FY17 vs. FY18
Arrivals Comparison (Sept. 18, 2018).
\719\ Michele Kambas, ``Jordan, Greece and Cyprus Say More Support
Needed to States on Refugee Frontline,'' Reuters, Jan. 16, 2018.
\720\ Queen Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan, ``Why Global Leadership on
Refugees Matters,'' CNN, Sept. 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan is not alone in its criticism of the United States
and other wealthy, developed nations for their inadequate
response to the current forced migration crisis. For example,
Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stated that she does
not expect any help from the United States: ``Already America
declared that they will not allow any refugees. . . . What I
can expect from them, and especially [the] president. He
already declared his mind . . . so why should I ask?''\721\ UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has said that
President Trump's slashing of refugee resettlement slots leaves
thousands without a ``life saving'' option and hurts the UN's
efforts to increase resettlement numbers across the world.\722\
This sentiment was echoed by UNHCR officials who spoke with
Committee staff in Egypt in May 2019: ``U.S. actions have
greatly affected UNHCR's work. The United States had been
taking three-quarters of our resettlement slots. Now they've
gone from number one [in terms of slots] to number seven.
People who would have proceeded onwards are now in a protracted
asylum situation. Absence of U.S. leadership has made it
tougher to convince other countries to accept more.''\723\ The
United States' failure to accept and resettle refugees
domestically emboldens other countries to also shirk
responsibility and amplifies the tremendous burden placed on
those countries who have chosen to respond positively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\721\ Michelle Nichols, ``Exclusive: Bangladesh PM Says Expects No
Help From Trump on Refugees Fleeing Myanmar,'' Reuters, Sept. 18, 2017.
\722\ Rebecca Kheel, ``UN Refugee Chief: Trump Refugee Cap Takes
Away `Life Saving' Option,'' The Hill, Oct. 20, 2017.
\723\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Cairo,
Egypt, May 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Risk of Global Instability
This increased burden has implications for security and
global stability. Of the 25.9 million refugees in 2018, 84
percent lived in developing regions.\724\ These countries
included Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Turkey, and Lebanon,
which hosts the largest percentage of refugees relative to its
national population--1 out of every 6 people in Lebanon is a
refugee.\725\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\724\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2, 18
(June 2019).
\725\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in Chapter 5, research shows that in the long-
run forced migrants are a great benefit to societies; however,
in the immediate-term, large influxes of forced migrants can
increase security concerns and place enormous economic and
political pressure on host countries.\726\ These poor and
middle-income countries hosting large numbers of forced
migrants have weak political and socio-economic infrastructures
less equipped to handle a large influx of forced migrants--many
of whom will remain for decades, unable to return home due to
ongoing instability.\727\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\726\ William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald, National Bureau of
Economic Research, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the
United States: Evidence From The ACS, at 33 (June 2017); UNHCR, Social
and economic impact of large refugee populations on host developing
countries, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme
(Jan. 6, 1997); see Kevin Shellito, The Economic Effect of Refugee
Crises on HostCountries and Implications for the Lebanese Case,
University of Pennsylvania (2016).
\727\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 18, 22
(June 2019); Stephanie Nebehay, ``Poor Nations Hosting Most Refugees
Worldwide, Need More Western Help: U.N.,'' Reuters, June 18, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, since 4 out of 5 refugees live in host
countries which neighbor their home country, conflicts that
triggered refugees to flee their own country in the first place
may potentially spill across borders and destabilize host
countries.\728\ In Tunisia, for example, government officials
told Committee staff they fear their fragile democratic
transition could be reversed if a large influx of Libyan forced
migrants suddenly enter Tunisia and strain its already fragile
economic situation.\729\ In Colombia, Committee staff heard
from government officials, civil society leaders and
journalists their fear that the Venezuelan refugee crisis would
place additional pressure on the country's fragile peace
process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and the National Liberation Army (ELN).\730\ Reporting from
2019 suggests that Colombia's armed groups were keen to recruit
desperate Venezuelan civilians as they crossed the porous
1,380-mile border, with some forced migrants willing to take up
arms in return for food and shelter.\731\ Colonial Arnulfo
Traslavina, a military commander of a special unit fighting
armed groups in Colombia's eastern border states, noted that,
``[r]ecruitment of Venezuelans is happening. The ranks of the
illegal armed groups are increasing. It's a major threat to
Colombia.''\732\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\728\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June
2019).
\729\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Tunis,
Tunisia, April 2019.
\730\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia,
March 2019.
\731\ Helen Murphy & Luis Jaime Acosta, ``Exclusive: Colombian
Armed Groups Recruiting Desperate Venezuelans, Army Says,'' Reuters,
June 20, 2019.
\732\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The abdication of U.S. leadership on forced migrant issues
is felt globally--by wealthy countries who have chosen to mimic
the United States' inaction and regression, by poor and middle-
income countries forced to deal with large influxes of forced
migrants, and by forced migrants struggling in their quest to
find safety and security.
Forced Returns and Cycles of Conflict & Forced Migration
Stymied by inadequate resources and solutions to deal with
large influxes of forced migrants, some developing countries
resort to policies that force or even coerce premature returns
of forced migrants to their home countries.\733\ As opposed to
being a solution, however, forced returns to unstable
environments can foment instability and result in repeated
forced migration.\734\ Measures to coerce returns--including
threats of camp closures, reduction in humanitarian assistance,
and harassment by government officials--have been implemented
with regard to Rohingya in Bangladesh, Somalis in Kenya,
Afghans in Pakistan, Syrians in Lebanon and Turkey, and
Burundians in Tanzania.\735\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\733\ Jeff Crisp, ``Unwilling and Fearful Refugees Should Not Be
Forced to Return Home,'' The Guardian, Oct. 7, 2019; Jesse Marks, ``Why
Syrian Refugees Are at Risk of A Forced Return to Syria,'' The
Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2019.
\734\ Stephanie Schwartz, ``Sending Refugees Back Makes the World
More Dangerous,'' Foreign Policy, Nov. 27, 2019.
\735\ Jeff Crisp, ``Unwilling and Fearful Refugees Should Not Be
Forced to Return Home,'' The Guardian, Oct. 7, 2019; UNHCR, Global
Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 29 (June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced and premature returns of refugees and other forced
migrants to unstable areas can exacerbate current
conflicts.\736\ Of the fifteen largest population returns since
1991, approximately one-third were followed by renewed fighting
within a couple of years.\737\ As the U.S. military works to
contain terrorist insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and
the Horn of Africa, compelling refugees and other forced
migrants to return would not only violate international law and
risk their safety, but would also challenge existing efforts to
create peace.\738\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\736\ See World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development
Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts
(2017).
\737\ Id. at 108.
\738\ Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Eric Schmitt, ``Despite Vow to End
`Endless Wars,' Here's Where About 200,000 Troops Remain,'' The New
York Times, Oct. 21, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States' refugee resettlement reductions have
contributed to the dire situations of developing host
countries, and the United States' retreat from international
responsibilities has compromised its ability to prevent
countries from enacting policies and taking actions that lead
to forced and premature returns. In 2016, Kenya threatened to
close Dadaab--at that time the largest refugee camp in the
world--and return hundreds of thousands of refugees back to an
unstable Somalia.\739\ Intense engagement from U.S. diplomats
at the time helped convince the Kenyan government to reverse
course.\740\ However, the threat of camp closure and reduced
food rations in Dadaab, combined with diminished hope for
resettlement, has left many Somali refugees with no option
other than to consider premature return to Somalia.\741\
Meanwhile, refugees continue to flee from Somalia, and in some
cases, refugees who have returned to Somalia have fled again
back to Kenya in search of safety.\742\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\739\ Michel Martin & Gregory Warren, ``Kenya Threatens to Close
Refugee Camp,'' NPR, May 21, 2016.
\740\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``Kenya Backpedals on Decision to Close
World's Biggest Refugee Camp Yet Again,'' Quartz Africa, Aug. 24, 2016.
\741\ Maggie Fick, ``Somali Refugees in Kenya Caught Between Ration
Cuts and War at Home,'' Reuters, Dec. 19, 2017; Amnesty International,
Not Time to Go Home: Unsustainable Returns of Refugees to Somalia, at
19 (Dec. 21, 2017).
\742\ Tonny Onyulo, ``Somalis Who Returned Home Flee to Kenya a
Second Time,'' News Deeply, Jan. 10, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obstacles to Legal Pathways Make Forced Migrants More Vulnerable to
Exploitation
There are also profound, unintended security consequences
of drastically reducing safe and legal ways for forced migrants
to find asylum. In 2016, President Trump was elected, in part,
by promising to extend a wall the entire length of the U.S.
border with Mexico to keep out Central American asylum seekers
among others.\743\ Other foreign leaders have promised or built
barriers to keep Africans out of Israel, Zimbabweans out of
South Africa, and Pakistanis out of Iran to name a few.\744\
But shutting down borders and closing off legal pathways to
refuge only serve to create greater security risks. Desperate
people fleeing for their lives are going to flee one way or
another. When countries shut their borders or severely restrict
access to their asylum systems, people have no choice but to
move into the shadows.\745\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\743\ ``Trump Wants to Build a Wall on the Border with Mexico. Can
He Do It?'' PBS, May 2, 2016.
\744\ Charles Bybelezer & Terrance J. Mintner, ``Israel's Border
Walls: a Case Study for Trump's Mantra,'' The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 17,
2018; Maxim Bolt, ``The Precarious Road Zimbabweans Travel to Seek a
New Life in South Africa,'' The Conversation, May 8, 2016; Naimat Khan,
``Pakistan Approves $18.6 Million to Fence Border with Iran,'' Arab
News, Apr. 29, 2020.
\745\ Erol K. Yayboke & Aaron N. Milner, Confronting the Global
Forced Migration Crisis, Center for Strategic & International Studies,
at 35 (May 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forcing people into the shadows, however, means that
governments have less insight into who enters their countries
and by which means. When states restrict legal pathways for
people to escape danger, many forced migrants are driven to use
irregular migration routes also used by smugglers and
traffickers.\746\ Human traffickers, for example, not only
enslave and exploit vulnerable people, but their illicit
trafficking activities can in turn fuel the growth of national
and international organized criminal networks.\747\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\746\ Id. at 35-37.
\747\ Victoria Greenfield et al., Human Smuggling from Central
America to the United States, RAND Corporation (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Along the U.S.-Mexico border, for example, a wide range of
actors including gangs, ``coyotes,'' and ad hoc smugglers have
taken up migrant smuggling and human trafficking because of the
enormous profits derived from their human cargo.\748\ In the
Sahel region of Africa, smugglers and human traffickers prey on
vulnerable forced migrants attempting to cross the Sahara on
their way to the Mediterranean and on to Europe.\749\ At the
mercy of smugglers, migrants are subject to starvation,
dehydration, physical abuse, and even abandonment in the
desert.\750\ Close to 7,000 migrants have died trying to cross
the Sahara over the past five years.\751\ For those who make it
to Libya, the final crossing to Europe can prove fatal--since
2014, more than 20,000 people have died or gone missing while
making the dangerous Mediterranean Sea crossing.\752\ In Libya
itself, these same smugglers and traffickers taking advantage
of the chaos are helping to fuel militias in the armed
conflict.\753\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\748\ Id. Yayboke & Milner, Confronting the Global Forced Migration
Crisis, Center for Strategic & International Studies, at 36 (May 2018).
\749\ Richard Skretteberg, ``Living off human suffering,''
Norwegian Refugee Council, June 20, 2016.
\750\ Id.
\751\ Lisa Schlein, ``Thousands of African Migrants Die Crossing
Sahara Desert,'' Voice of America, Dec. 23, 2018.
\752\ Retrieved data from International Organization for Migration
Missing Migrants Project, ``Download Missing Migrants Project data,''
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/downloads (last visited Apr. 23, 2020).
\753\ See UN Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Detained and
Dehumanized: Report on Human Rights Abuses Against Migrants in Libya
(Dec. 13, 2016); UN Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Desperate and
Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and
refugees in Libya (Dec. 20, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Today's unprecedented levels of forced migration demand
action from world leaders. In the face of this global crisis,
the United States has abandoned its role as an exemplar and
abdicated its responsibilities to shoulder this increased
burden. More than ever, we are demonstrating a willingness to
turn away those who seek our protection, spurn international
mechanisms designed to support forced migrants throughout the
world, and actively reduce our financial and diplomatic support
for these efforts worldwide. Consequently, our global standing
is compromised, not only in the humanitarian sector but more
broadly as a global force for good. The Trump administration
has transformed the United States from a leader on addressing
forced migration issues to a deadweight ignoring the plight of
today's global forced migration crisis and emboldening other
countries to do the same.
In order to reverse this trend and resuscitate U.S. moral
and global leadership, the United States must first end harmful
practices toward forced migrants, revive humanitarian
assistance to meet global need, restore refugee resettlement to
historic norms, and rejoin global efforts to address the forced
migration crisis and its drivers. Then, the work of proactively
addressing the crisis and supporting forced migrants and their
host communities can begin.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Current Innovative Efforts
----------
The scale, complexity, and protracted nature of forced
migration has resulted in need that far surpasses the world's
traditional efforts to respond to forced migration. Recent
diplomatic efforts have proved inadequate to resolve protracted
conflicts that simmer and flare in a seemingly unending
cycle.\754\ Without conditions of peace and safety, the number
of voluntary returns of forced migrants to their home countries
has hovered at historic lows.\755\ Refugee resettlement has
also plummeted in the absence of U.S. leadership.\756\
Government donors have not kept pace with the growing
humanitarian needs.\757\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\754\ See e.g., Katy Collin, ``The Year in Failed Conflict
Prevention,'' The Brookings Institution, Dec. 14, 2017; Thomas M. Hill
& Nate Wilson, ``From Foreign Interference to Failed Diplomacy, Libya's
Conflict Drags On,'' United States Institute of Peace, Mar. 24, 2020.
\755\ Kathleen Newland, Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels,
New Tools, Transatlantic Council on Migration & Migration Policy
Institute, at 2-3 (Apr. 2015).
\756\ World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance
Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System,
at 6 (2019).
\757\ David Miliband, ``A Battle Plan for the World Bank,'' Foreign
Affairs, Feb. 19, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diminishing access to voluntary return and resettlement as
solutions has spurred new responses in support of local
integration as an interim solution.\758\ At the crux of these
efforts is the mission to provide not only short-term
humanitarian aid, but also longer-term development
assistance.\759\ With access to work education, and the right
support, many forced migrants are net contributors to their
host nations.\760\ While the international community has
undertaken some efforts to reform and innovate to meet today's
challenges, new solutions will be critical to bend the
trajectory of global forced migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\758\ UNHCR, ``Local Integration,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
local-integration-49c3646c101.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
\759\ ``Consequences of Severe Global Funding Shortages for
Refugees and Migrants `All Too Real', Warns UNHCR,'' UN News, Oct. 9,
2018; UN High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, Too important to
fail--addressing the humanitarian financing gap (Jan. 2016);
Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019
(2019); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
The United States: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2011
(2011).
\760\ Dany Bahar, ``Why Accepting Refugees is a Win-Win-Win
Formula,'' The Brookings Institution, June 19, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Compacts to Improve International
Coordination & Response
In response to the acute challenges posed by global forced
migration, members of the international community have come
together in a variety of forums to identify innovative ways to
better manage the crisis. In 2016 alone, international events
included President Obama's Leaders' Summit on Refugees, the
Supporting Syria and the Region conference in London, the World
Humanitarian Summit, and the UN General Assembly High-Level
Plenary Summit on Refugees and Migrants.\761\ At the latter
event, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.\762\ The Declaration
expressed a determination to address the root causes of mass
movements, save lives, protect human rights, and increase
responsibility sharing through cooperation on a global
scale.\763\ As a result of this initiative, UN member states
developed two global compacts--a Global Compact on Refugees
(GCR), and a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration (GCM).\764\ Both compacts were launched in
politically turbulent global contexts that pose challenges to
their implementation.\765\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\761\ Elizabeth Ferris, In Search of Commitments: The 2016 Refugee
Summits, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, at 1-2 (Nov.
2016).
\762\ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the
General Assembly on 19 September 2016: New York Declaration for
Refugees and Migrants, 71st Session (Oct. 3, 2016).
\763\ Id.
\764\ Cindy Huang et al., Tackling the Realities of Protracted
Displacement: Case Studies on What's Working and Where We Can Do
Better, Center for Global Development (CGD) and International Rescue
Committee (IRC), at 2 (Apr. 18, 2018).
\765\ Solon Ardittis, ``What's to Fear in the U.N. Global Compact
for Migration?,'' News Deeply, Dec. 5, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Compact on Refugees
Despite the United States' vote against it, the GCR was
approved with overwhelming support by UN member states on
December 17, 2018.\766\ The GCR put forward a wealth of policy
ideas for addressing the record flow of refugees by not only
engaging traditional humanitarian actors, but also multilateral
institutions, global development actors, and the private
sector.\767\ The GCR is a legally non-binding pledge to
strengthen international cooperation for ``predictable and
equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing'' for hosting and
supporting refugees among Member States and other
stakeholders.\768\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\766\ Edith M. Lederer, ``UN Approves Compact to Support World's
Refugees; US Objects,'' AP, Dec. 17, 2018.
\767\ UNHCR, Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II)
(Aug. 2, 2018).
\768\ Id. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GCR's four objectives are to:
Ease pressures on host countries;
Enhance refugee self-reliance;
Expand access to resettlement in third countries; and
Support conditions in countries of origin for return in
safety and dignity.\769\
\769\ Id. at 4.
The GCR provides a potentially transformative blueprint for
refugee response in a period of rising nationalism and
xenophobia.\770\ By incorporating the New York Declaration's
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, the GCR provides an
action plan to facilitate comprehensive responses geared
towards the GCR's objectives.\771\ Critics argue, however, that
instead of a non-binding GCR, the international community
should move toward binding multinational solutions, pointing to
failed refugee governance before World War II, which relied on
the voluntary, collective action of states.\772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\770\ Alice Thomas & Mark Yarnell, Ensuring that the Global
Compacts on Refugees and Migration Deliver, Refugees International
(Nov. 2018).
\771\ Sergio Carciotto & Filippo Ferraro, ``Building Blocks and
Challenges for the Implementation of the Global Compact of Refugees in
Africa,'' Journal on Migration and Human Security , at 87 (2020).
\772\ Lama Mourad & Kelsey P. Norman, ``The World Is Turning Its
Back on Refugees,'' The Atlantic, Dec. 24, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
The Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
(GCM) is the first global pact to create a universal framework
to address all aspects of international migration, and was
adopted overwhelmingly by UN member states on December 18,
2018.\773\ The GCM sets forth 23 objectives, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\773\ See UN, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly ad Regular Migration
(July 13, 2018); Nick Cummings-Bruce, ``U.N. Approves Sweeping Deal on
Migration, but Without U.S. Support,'' The New York Times, Dec. 10,
2018.
Utilizing accurate and timely information for decision-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
making;
Providing access to basic services;
Managing borders in integrated, secure, and coordinated
manners; and
Enhancing the availability and flexibility of pathways for
regular migration.\774\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\774\ UN, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly ad Regular Migration,
16-39 (July 13, 2018).
Participating states committed to fulfilling these
objectives by implementing measures at the global, regional,
and national levels, ``taking into account different national
realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting
national policies and priorities.''\775\ As with the GCR,
implementation and review of progress involves an International
Migration Review Forum to take place every four years beginning
in 2022.\776\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\775\ Id. 41.
\776\ Id. 49. The International Migration Review Forum will take
the place of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development, previously scheduled to take place every fourth session of
the General Assembly. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While U.S. participation in the Compact process began in
2016, the Trump administration ended US participation,
asserting its global approach was ``simply not compatible with
U.S. sovereignty.''\777\ It is also notable that the United
States--the world's largest humanitarian donor and, until
recently, the largest refugee resettlement country--voted
against both Global Compacts in December 2018.\778\ While the
vast majority of member states voted for and easily adopted the
Compacts, there were a few nations who followed the United
States' lead in voting against them, including Israel and
Hungary.\779\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\777\ Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations,
``United States Ends Participation in Global Compact on Migration,''
Dec. 2, 2017.
\778\ ``UN Affirms `Historic' Global Compact to Support World's
Refugees,'' UN News, Dec. 17, 2018; ``General Assembly Officially
Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering,'' UN
News, Dec. 19, 2018.
\779\ Georgi Gotev, ``Nine EU Members Stay Away From UN Migration
Pact,'' Euractiv, Dec. 20, 2018.
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Innovative Models of Financial Assistance
The World Bank has launched significant new financing
mechanisms focused on the economic development of refugee
populations and host communities. Specifically, the World Bank
helped create the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF)
for middle-income countries impacted by refugee crises, and the
International Development Association (IDA) Window for Host
Communities and Refugees (WHR) for low-income countries hosting
large refugee populations.\780\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\780\ Global Concessional Financing Facility, ``About Us,'' https:/
/globalcff.org/about-us/ (last visited May 18, 2020); Rebecca Root,
``World Bank Pledges $2.2B for Refugees and Host Communities,'' Devex,
Dec. 19, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is still too early to know whether these two new World
Bank financing mechanisms will be transformative of the current
global response to forced migrant populations; however, they do
represent some of the most significant and innovative new
financing streams in decades.\781\ They also point towards a
new model in refugee response providing long-term, development
financing to host countries to support refugees, while
encouraging host governments to reform policies to allow
refugees access to work, education, and other benefits that
support refugee self-reliance and ultimately independence from
aid.\782\ Both mechanisms require host governments to enact
policy changes favorable to refugees, as well as focus
programming to benefit host communities and refugees
alike.\783\ Both are unique in that they provide multi-year
concessional financing and grants through host government
systems to meet the needs of refugees and their hosts.\784\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\781\ Courtenay Cabot Venton et al., Innovative Financing For
Responses to Refugee Crises, at 14 (Mar. 2019); Lauren Post et al.,
World Bank Financing to Support Refugees and Their Hosts:
Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 1 (June 2019).
\782\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC (June 2019).
\783\ Id.
\784\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Concessional Financing Facility
The World Bank first established the Global Concessional
Financing Facility (GCFF) to help middle-income countries
hosting at least 25,000 refugees that otherwise could not
access financing on concessional terms. The World Bank, UN,
Islamic Development Bank, and other organizations created the
GCFF in 2016 to address this gap, with an initial focus on
Jordan and Lebanon, who were hosting large influxes of Syrian
refugees.\785\ In Lebanon, for example, 1 in 6 residents was a
refugee in 2017.\786\ As of June 2019, 695 million dollars had
been pledged in total, with the United States pledging 75
million dollars, of which 35 million dollars has been
received.\787\ To date, Jordan has received the most GCFF
funding, which the government has used to support the Jordan
Compact, detailed below.\788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\785\ World Bank, Global Concessional Financing Facility 2017-2018
Annual Report, at 5 (2018).
\786\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, at 2 (June
2018).
\787\ World Bank, 2018-2019 Global Concessional Financing Facility
Annual Report, at 59 (2019).
\788\ Veronique Barbelet et al., The Jordan Compact: Lessons Learnt
and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts, Overseas Development
Institute (ODI), at 2 (Feb. 2018) (Recognition of the dual nature of
protracted displacement in countries that are already struggling
economically gave rise to a new policy model, the so-called refugee
compacts); Cindy Huang et al., Tackling the Realities of Protracted
Displacement: Case Studies on What's Working and Where We Can Do
Better, CGD & IRC, at 13 (Apr. 2018) (These compacts seek sustainable
solutions in displacement contexts through enabling refugee self-
reliance, which makes them less dependent on aid while also allowing
them to contribute to and thus strengthen their local host
communities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities
The second World Bank mechanism is a fund for the poorest
countries, the International Development Association (IDA). In
late 2016, the Bank decided to raise a dedicated 2 billion
dollars in its IDA18 replenishment (for the period of July 1,
2017 to June 30, 2020) to create a regional sub-window for
refugees and host communities.\789\ The IDA18 sub-window,
renewed for IDA19 with an additional 2 billion dollars in
financing, makes concessional financing available to low-income
countries hosting large refugee populations.\790\ Like the
GCFF, the IDA18 and IDA19 sub-windows require host governments
to enact policy changes, and funds are provided on more
favorable terms for medium-term investments that benefit host
communities as well as refugees.\791\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\789\ World Bank Group International Development Association,
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited June 8, 2020).
\790\ Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Announces $2.2 Billion
Scale-up in Support for Refugees and Host Communities at First Global
Refugee Forum, Dec. 17, 2019.
\791\ World Bank Group International Development Association,
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early results are promising. Fourteen countries are
eligible for refugee sub-window financing; as of June 2019, 10
countries had projects approved.\792\ All projects are designed
to deliver benefits to both refugee and host communities.\793\
For example, a project in Djibouti aims to strengthen existing
host country health systems to improve services for host
communities and extend services to refugees.\794\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\792\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 1 (June
2019).
\793\ World Bank Group International Development Association,
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
\794\ Press Release, World Bank, Djibouti: World Bank Approves $6
Million to Ensure Refugees and Host Communities Access Healthcare
Services, May 3, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While it may be too soon to gauge programmatic impact, the
promise of financing alone though the GCFF and the IDA18 sub-
window has had a positive impact on national refugee policies
and on the inclusion of refugees in national systems in select
countries. In Jordan, World Bank financing and dialogue secured
a commitment to provide 200,000 work permits to refugees, and
the legalization of refugee home-based business.\795\ In
Lebanon, World Bank engagement has extended education to half
the population of Syrian refugee children.\796\ In Ethiopia,
World Bank dialogue led to the adoption of reforms that shift
away from the decades-old encampment model and offer refugees
socioeconomic rights, including to move freely, work, and
access services.\797\ In Pakistan, World Bank dialogue
contributed to a new policy that allows refugees to open bank
accounts.\798\ In Cameroon and Chad, the World Bank is
supporting the transition from humanitarian to national service
delivery of health, education, and social protection, reducing
reliance on humanitarian financing and supporting sustainable
service provision.\799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\795\ World Bank International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and International Development Association, Program
Appraisal Document on Proposed Loan and Credit in the Amount of US$300
Million to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for Economic Opportunities
for Jordanian and Syrian Refugees Program-for-Results, at 4, 29 (Sept.
2, 2015); World Bank, Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian
Refugees P4R (P159522) (July 20, 2018).
\796\ World Bank, ``Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon
Support Project,'' https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/project-detail/P159470?lang=en&tab=ratings (last visited
Apr. 14, 2020); see Noah Yarrow, ``Addressing the Education Emergency
in Lebanon,'' World Bank Blog, Mar. 24, 2016.
\797\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 1 (June
2019).
\798\ Id.
\799\ See Press Release, World Bank, Cameroon: World Bank Approves
$274 Million to Support Refugees and Host Communities, May 1, 2018;
Press Release, World Bank, Chad: A $60 Million World Bank Grant to
Support Refugees and Host Communities, Sept. 12, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, World Bank financing has proven most effective at
incentivizing policy change when paired with diplomatic efforts
and incentives beyond aid, such as trade concessions and
private investment.\800\ Although the IDA18 sub-window provides
funds on more favorable terms than they would be available
otherwise, it is still politically challenging for any
country--and particularly, poor countries like Ethiopia--to
accept more debt for the purpose of dealing with refugees.\801\
Crowding in additional bilateral donors such as the United
States, United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union could
increase grant financing and incentives for policy change. Such
compact models, detailed below, hold the greatest promise for
new, sustainable approaches to protracted displacement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\800\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 3 (June
2019).
\801\ See Leah Zamore, ``Refugees, Development, Debt, Austerity: A
Selected History,'' Journal on Migration and Human Security (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Compact Model
The country compact model has emerged as a prototype for
coordinating donors, humanitarian and development actors, and
host governments around multi-year agreements that achieve
shared outcomes for refugees and host communities in protracted
crises.\802\ Compacts leverage financial and political
incentives, as well as expertise, to advance joint
solutions.\803\ They also balance the needs of refugees and
host communities, with a focus on unlocking key policy
constraints to refugee self-reliance and local
integration.\804\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\802\ CGD & IRC, Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of
Protracted Displacement, at 6 (2017).
\803\ Id.
\804\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most prominent examples of country compacts are the
Jordan and Lebanon Compacts, agreed in 2016.\805\ The Jordan
Compact promised 700 million dollars annually in 3-year grants,
concessional loans of 1.9 billion dollars, and relaxed trade
regulations with the EU in return for access to the labor
market and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.\806\ Since
2016, Syrian refugees in Jordan have gained greater access to
the formal labor market and are permitted to own and operate
home-based businesses.\807\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\805\ Id. at 9.
\806\ Veronique Barbelet et al., The Jordan Compact: Lessons Learnt
and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts, ODI, at 2 (Feb. 2018).
\807\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The World Bank's concessional financing mechanisms have
been critical to these compact agreements.\808\ However, the
World Bank's financial incentives alone are not always
sufficient to generate critical policy changes. Compacts can be
significantly improved by pooling funds and systematizing joint
analysis and planning across donors, and by leveraging the
political and diplomatic heft of the United States and other
key donors to offer host governments ``beyond aid'' support
that can have outsized benefits for refugees and host
communities in the long term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\808\ CGD & IRC, Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of
Protracted Displacement, at 10 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE JORDAN COMPACT
The Jordan Compact was groundbreaking for its new approach
to dealing with protracted displacement, focusing on improving
access to education and legal employment for Syrian refugees,
in order to foster inclusive growth for refugees and host
communities. While the Compact has made considerable progress,
including policy reforms that have improved the overall
business environment in Jordan, implementation has also dealt
with considerable challenges and there are lessons to be
learned. Two years into the Compact, just 80,000 of 200,000
promised work permits have been issued.\809\ Necessary
improvements include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\809\ Katharine Lenner & Lewis Turner, ``Learning from the Jordan
Compact,'' Forced Migration Review (Feb. 2018).
Better understanding of refugee needs and constraints: The
initial focus on work permits in limited sectors and
factories ignored both the inability of refugees to
logistically reach these factories as well as the
importance of home-based businesses for women refugees,
who often face many barriers to leaving their home for
employment, such as child care, safety concerns, and
cultural norms.\810\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\810\ Nazanin Ash & Cindy Huang, Using the Compact Model to Support
Host States and Refugee Self-reliance, Centre for International
Governance Innovation (CIGI) & World Refugee Council (WRC) at 9 (Dec.
2018).
More robust review and evaluation of evidence base prior to
program design: A focus on outputs rather than outcomes
contributed to insufficient analysis of the investments
and policy changes necessary for success. As a result,
some of the interventions did not strongly reflect
evidence of effective tactics.\811\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\811\ Id. at 9-10.
Increased multi-stakeholder participation: The lack of
inclusion of civil society, NGOs, the private sector,
and in particular, refugees and host communities, in
the analysis and planning process contributed to
suboptimal outcomes. Including these stakeholders could
have identified some obstacles refugees face in seeking
decent employment opportunities.\812\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\812\ Id.
Better understanding of private sector needs and
constraints: Insufficient consultation with the private
sector led to a lacking understanding of the necessary
support and mechanisms needed to translate private
sector commitments into concrete engagement aligned
with needs on the ground.\813\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\813\ Id. at 10-11.
Leveraging and ``crowding-in'' of additional donors: Acting
alone, the World Bank's financing incentives, and
particularly their concessional nature, are
insufficient for incentivizing robust policy reforms.
By partnering with additional donors and leveraging
more aid and non-aid incentives, such as trade
concessions, under a shared strategy and set of policy
changes, compact approaches can vastly strengthen
outcomes.\814\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\814\ Id. at 4.
Overall, the GCR, GCM, and national compacts like the
Jordan Compact are hugely positive steps and important tools
for the international community to have at its disposal, but
implementation is still nascent. Moreover, none of these
initiatives addresses the plight of IDPs. Lack of innovative
solutions for IDPs, who make up over half of those forcibly
displaced, is a huge gap that the international community needs
to address.
Solutions to Better Serve Forced Migrants
As the situation of forced migrants has changed, new tools
have been invented and implemented to serve their needs.
Contemporary forced migrants, who are often displaced for
decades, living in urban environments, and among developing
host communities, require different solutions than short-term,
camp-based forced migrants.\815\ Below we have outlined a few
examples of new efforts and responses aimed to improve the
situations of today's forced migrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\815\ Elizabeth Ferris for The Brookings Institution, ``When
Refugee Displacement Drags on, Is Self-reliance the Answer?'' June 19,
2018; UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 18, 56
(June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emphasis on Evidence- & Outcomes-Based
Humanitarian Action
Over the past decade, humanitarian organizations and donors
have increasingly emphasized the role of evidence and data to
inform humanitarian programs. Donors are increasingly holding
organizations accountable to demonstrate program impacts and
outcomes.\816\ As a result, humanitarian organizations are
increasingly pursuing rigorous and impartial efforts to assess
community needs, monitor programs and their implementation, and
evaluate impact.\817\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\816\ David Miliband & Ravi Gurumurthy, ``Improving Humanitarian
Aid: How to Make Relief More Efficient and Effective,'' Foreign
Affairs, July/Aug. 2015.
\817\ Tom Bundervoet, Monitoring vs. Monitoring, International
Rescue Committee (Aug. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective humanitarian responses rely on understanding the
needs of communities they are serving. As such, humanitarian
needs assessments have become institutionalized across the
sector.\818\ The highest coordinating forum within the UN--
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)--has provided best
practices for humanitarian actors conducting needs assessments.
The UN relies upon needs assessments to create Humanitarian
Needs Overviews, the UN's flagship document serving as a basis
for funding appeals.\819\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\818\ James Darcy et al., The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian
Decision Making: ACAPS Operational Learning Paper, Feinstein
International Center (Jan. 2013).
\819\ UNOCHA, ``Needs Assessment and Analysis,'' https://
www.unocha.org/es/themes/needs-assessment-and-analysis (last visited
Mar. 30, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The result of increasing emphasis on evidence-based
approaches are numerous studies demonstrating effective and
ineffective mechanisms for serving displaced populations, which
can inform future programming. For example, a partnership
between the UK Department for International Development, the
World Bank, and UNHCR is conducting impact evaluations on
projects addressing protracted forced displacement over a
seven-year period (2016 to 2023).\820\ Assessments are
currently being conducted on programs across 14 different
countries tackling education, reintegration of returnees, child
protection, the prevention of intimate partner violence,
healthcare, labor outcomes, and more.\821\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\820\ World Bank, ``DFID--UNHCR--World Bank Program: Building the
Evidence on Forced Displacement,'' https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
fragilityconflictviolence/brief/building-the-evidence-on-forced-
displacement-a-multi-stakeholder-partnership (last visited June 8,
2020).
\821\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emphasis on evidence and measurable outcomes should not
hinder overall assistance and donations to humanitarian
organizations providing life-saving aid. Robust evaluations
often require additional resources--namely time and money.\822\
The ability to collect and generate meaningful evidence is
often difficult in the context of conflict and other urgent and
sudden emergencies. Although it can be costly to gather, data
and evidence can significantly improve how we understand forced
migration crises and help us identify best practices for
response.\823\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\822\ Tom Bundervoet, Monitoring vs. Monitoring, International
Rescue Committee (Aug. 2011).
\823\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Movement Towards Cash Assistance
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Saboune Adakar Abdoukaye lost everything, including his home and
business, when his village in Chad was burned to the ground by militia.
Now living in an IDP camp in Goz Beida, Chad, Saboune cares for his own
six children, as well as his sister's seven children, after she died
from illness in the camp. He is seen here in the successful shop he
opened with the help of World Concern's Cash for Work program, which is
funded by USAID. He used his earnings from daily labor to feed and
clothe the 13 children in his care, as well as purchase goods for his
shop. His business now not only supports his family, but he employs
seven other people as well. Derek Sciba, November 2010 FrontLines Photo
Contest Top Entry, World Concern, July 9, 2010.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, cash and voucher assistance
(CVA) is widely recognized as one of the most significant areas
of innovation in humanitarian assistance, with profound
potential to revolutionize the scale, efficiency, and efficacy
of assistance.\824\ In comparison to conventional humanitarian
assistance focused on delivering specific services, cash and
voucher assistance shifts decision-making directly to the
recipient, allowing for flexibility based on individual needs
and providing beneficiaries with a greater sense of
dignity.\825\ Studies show that cash and voucher assistance not
only facilitates access to basic needs such as food, health,
and shelter, but also reduces the cost of delivering
humanitarian aid.\826\ Moreover, CVA has demonstrated
additional positive impacts on longer-term goals, including
financial inclusion and support to host communities.\827\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\824\ See, e.g., Thabani Maphosa, ``Cash Transfers: An Innovative
Solution to Humanitarian Challenges,'' Global Citizen, May 23, 2016.
\825\ Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model,
CGD, at 9 (May 2018),
\826\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance
Report 2019, at 13 (2019); ODI & CGD, Doing Cash Differently: How Cash
Transfers Can Transform Humanitarian Aid, at 8 (Sept. 2015).
\827\ ODI & CGD, Doing Cash Differently: How Cash Transfers Can
Transform Humanitarian Aid, at 8, 14 (Sept. 2015)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the benefits of cash and voucher assistance in many
settings have resulted in adoption, efforts to scale CVA are
still needed. From 2015 to 2018, CVA volume grew by 135
percent.\828\ Over the same time period, the proportion of cash
transfers also grew, as UN agencies and NGOs increasingly used
cash over vouchers.\829\ In 2018, an estimated 4.7 billion
dollars in humanitarian assistance was disbursed through
CVA.\830\ However, this figure only represents 16 percent of
global humanitarian assistance and year-over-year growth in CVA
has slowed.\831\ CVA programming grew by 10 percent from 2017
to 2018, compared to 38 percent from 2015 to 2016.\832\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\828\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance
Report 2019, at 71 (2019) (some of this growth was due to newly
available data.)
\829\ Id. at 72.
\830\ Id.
\831\ Id. at 10, 71 (based on $28.9 billion in global humanitarian
assistance).
\832\ Id. at 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advances to Address the Education & Learning Crisis
New education solutions for forced migrant populations not
only increase access, but also efficiency and efficacy. First,
humanitarian organizations are increasingly moving away from
creating schools specifically for forced migrants, to promoting
the inclusion of forced migrants in national education
systems.\833\ This new approach, articulated by UNHCR in 2012,
recognizes the reality of contemporary forced migrants'
situations as increasingly protracted, increasingly urban, and
without adequate, stable funding for education.\834\ While many
host countries already struggle with under-resourced education
systems, support for forced migrant education through national
systems aims to not only improve learning for forced migrants,
but host communities as well.\835\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\833\ Sarah Dryden-Peterson et al., Inclusion of Refugees in
National Education Systems, United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Global Education Monitoring Report, at 7
(2018).
\834\ Id.; UNHCR, Education Strategy: 2012-2016, at 8 (Jan. 2012).
\835\ Sarah Dryden-Peterson et al., Inclusion of Refugees in
National Education Systems, United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Global Education Monitoring Report, at
8-9 (2018); UNHCR, Refugee Education 2030: A Strategy for Refugee
Inclusion, at 2 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, new education initiatives aim to improve the
quality of education--addressing inefficiencies in current
education programs that hinder learning. Recognizing that
school systems organized by age and grade are often unable to
address the evolving needs of students, the Indian NGO Pratham
created a simple assessment tool, Teaching at the Right Level,
that facilitates the grouping of learning levels and tailored
curriculums.\836\ In Nigeria, a six-week Teaching at the Right
Level intervention increased the proportion of children able to
read a simple paragraph by 9 to 23 percent.\837\ In Syria,
easy-to-use assessment instruments not only help teachers
measure reading and numeracy skills, but also social-emotional
skills for IDP and conflict-affected children.\838\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\836\ Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, ``Teaching at the
Right Level to improve learning,'' https://www.povertyactionlab.org/
case-study/teaching-right-level-improve-learning (last visited June 1,
2020).
\837\ Teaching at the Right Level, ``Kano and Akwa Ibom, Nigeria,''
https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org/tarl-in-action/kano-akwaibom-
nigeria/ (last visited June 1, 2020).
\838\ Email from Sean Snyder, Public Partnerships Manager, UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF), to SFRC Staff, June 2, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improving How We Feed the World's Hungry
Hunger can be both a cause and a consequence of forced
migration.\839\ After steadily declining for a decade, world
hunger is once again on the rise.\840\ In 2014, there were an
estimated 775 million undernourished people worldwide.\841\ By
2018, that number had increased to 820 million.\842\ The World
Food Programme has warned that the COVID-19 pandemic could
almost double the number of people suffering from acute hunger
worldwide.\843\ As the global imperative to provide food
assistance becomes increasingly urgent, a renewed emphasis on
innovation in food science, food production, food delivery, and
treatment of malnutrition is improving support for the world's
hungry.\844\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\839\ Laura Hammond, ``Forced Migration and Hunger,'' SOAS
University of London, Oct. 2018.
\840\ Action Against Hunger, ``World Hunger: Key Facts and
Statistics,''
\841\ Id.
\842\ Id.
\843\ Press Release, World Food Programme (WFP), Covid-19 will
double number of people facing food crises unless swift action is
taken, Apr. 21, 2020.
\844\ WFP, World Food Assistance 2017, at 136 (July 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scientific research has significantly improved malnutrition
treatments. Research has emphasized the critical role of
adequate nutrition on growth and development within the first
1,000 days or before the age of 2.\845\ In addition, ready-to-
use food products have revolutionized food assistance and
malnutrition treatment.\846\ These products not only enable
humanitarian organizations to target specific populations in
need of emergency food assistance, but are easier to distribute
and store.\847\ To ensure that humanitarian actors can meet
rising global needs, increased and sustained investment is
needed to improve coordination, simplify treatment protocols
for malnutrition, and better enable community health workers to
provide treatment.\848\
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\845\ Jessica Hartl, ``From the Lab to the Field: New Science for
Better Food Aid,'' U.S. Agency for International Development, Nov./Dec.
2011; WFP, WFP and Nutrition (Oct. 2018), https://docs.wfp.org/api/
documents/WFP-0000099337/download/?--
ga=2.16029686.1314341884.1590779765-1018911202.1579039603.
\846\ Jessica Hartl, ``From the Lab to the Field: New Science for
Better Food Aid,'' U.S. Agency for International Development, Nov./Dec.
2011; Action Against Hunger, ``What is Therapeutic Food (Plumpy'
Nut)?,'' https://actionagainsthunger.ca/what-is-acute-malnutrition/
what-is-therapeutic-food/ (last visited June 9, 2020).
\847\ Marion Hart & Sarah Ferguson, ``What Is Ready-to-Use
Therapeutic Food?.'' UNICEF USA, Mar. 6, 2019.
\848\ David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue
Committee, Remarks at ``2018 World Innovation Summit for Health,''
Doha, Qatar, Nov. 13, 2018.
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Incorporating Technology
The recent global forced migration crisis has occurred in a
world markedly different from that of the post-World War II
era. New technologies, and specifically the advent of digital
technology with mobile phones, internet connectivity, and new
data and analysis capabilities, have transformed the daily
lives of people around the world. For humanitarian
organizations, the adoption of innovative technological tools
and techniques has enhanced their ability to monitor forced
migration crises and implement effective programs. For forced
migrants specifically, technology opens new channels of access
for communication, information, education, language and
translation, employment, faith-based activities, health care,
identity documentation, financial management, and much
more.\849\ A renewed, comprehensive response to the forced
migration crisis will need to utilize technology effectively,
but must be aimed at long-term gains as opposed to short-
sighted quick fixes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\849\ Shelly Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide:
Applying Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, Rand Corporation, at
xii (2019).
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Data to Inform Humanitarian Responses
Innovations in data collection and analysis have profoundly
impacted the humanitarian sector by improving understandings of
ongoing crises and coordination in response. From tracking
migration patterns to rapidly mapping areas impacted by
conflict and displacement to collecting detailed data on
humanitarians needs, the availability of near real-time data
has improved humanitarian responses to forced migration
crises.\850\ Furthermore, improved data collection and analysis
has also allowed humanitarian organizations to assess impact,
evaluate effectiveness, and improve evidence-based decision-
making.\851\
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\850\ James Darcy et al., The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian
Decision Making: ACAPS Operational Learning Paper, Feinstein
International Center (2013),
\851\ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management Sector Update
(Oct. 2015); Press Release, IRC, ``The World Humanitarian Summit needs
to deliver concrete commitments towards improving aid effectiveness,''
May 20, 2016.
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Across the board, UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs have
embraced the role of data in humanitarian responses. In 2017,
the UN Secretary-General launched the Centre for Humanitarian
Data, which works to expand data usage and impact in the
humanitarian sector.\852\ By aggregating data, creating data
standards, and making data easily accessible, the Centre has
enabled users in over 200 countries and territories to access
critical humanitarian data.\853\ At the same time,
organizations working on the ground play a vital role in
collecting data to inform other agencies working in the
response. For example, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)
is a key source of information related to displacement and
migration crises. Through a variety of survey technologies and
analytical techniques, IOM tracks displacement flows in near
real-time to provide a better understanding of where people are
moving and their evolving needs.\854\ As of March 2020, DTM
tracked displacement in 65 countries around the world.\855\
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\852\ UN Centre for Humanitarian Data, ``What We Do,'' https://
centre.humdata.org/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); Press
Release, UNOCHA, ``OCHA's new Centre for Humanitarian Data a signpost
to the future,'' Dec. 22, 2017.
\853\ UN Centre for Humanitarian Data, ``What We Do,'' https://
centre.humdata.org/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
\854\ International Organization for Migration (IOM),
``Displacement Tracking Matrix: About,'' https://dtm.iom.int/about
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
\855\ European Commission, ``IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix
(DTM),'' Oct. 9, 2019; IOM, ``DTM Global'' (click ``DTM Global''),
https://displacement.iom.int/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
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Advancements in satellite imagery and mapping technology
have further aided humanitarian response to forced migration.
Today, it would be unheard of to lack a basic map of a refugee
camp, or a map showing displacement patterns within a country.
Use of this technology, however, has only become mainstream in
the sector within the last decade. In addition, new innovations
for gathering and analyzing data continue to improve responses.
For example, crowdsourcing, or soliciting data points from a
large group, has become a useful tool in humanitarian
response.\856\ In 2010, first responders to the earthquake in
Haiti were aided by maps supplied by online volunteers using
satellite imagery to trace roads and buildings. In other
contexts, like Uganda and Bangladesh, rapidly growing refugee
camps were mapped in detail within hours through a similar
approach, enabling humanitarian agencies on the ground to
identify where to establish water points and build health
facilities.\857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\856\ Cambridge Dictionary, ``crowdsourcing,'' https://
dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/crowdsourcing (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020); Amelia Hunt & Dough Specht, ``Crowdsourced
Mapping in Crisis Zones: Collaboration, Organisation and Impact,''
Journal of International Humanitarian Action (Jan. 7, 2019).
\857\ Weiyi Cai & Simon Scarr, ``The Rohingya Crisis: Life in the
Camps,'' Reuters, Dec. 4, 2017; Nina Strochlic, ``A City Rises,''
National Geographic, Apr. 2019.
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Information Dissemination for Forced Migrants
Mobile phones and internet connectivity allow forced
migrants to keep in touch with family and friends, seek
information about their journeys, and learn about their host
countries.\858\ For humanitarian actors, information
communication technology provides two-way communication about
the needs of forced migrants and the availability of services.
According to an International Rescue Committee (IRC) study,
these information communication technology platforms are
particularly well-suited for forced migrants living in urban
contexts with diverse populations, geographically dispersed
populations, dynamic movement among populations, and a large
number of service providers.\859\ IRC and its partners have
launched a myriad of global and regional platforms to provide
information to forced migrants, including Service.Info,
Refugee.Info, which was expanded into SignPost, and
CuentaNos.org.\860\
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\858\ Shelly Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide:
Applying Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 21-22.
\859\ IRC, Using ICT to Facilitate Access to Information and
Accountability to Affected Populations in Urban Areas: A Review of the
ServiceInfo and Refugee.Info Platforms, at 5 (June 2017).
\860\ Id.; Press Release, IRC, Signpost digital initiative reaches
1 million people across three continents, Dec. 12, 2018; Press Release,
IRC, The Latest Central American Caravan is a symptom of an even larger
crisis, says IRC, Jan. 16, 2020.
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While information communication technologies represent an
opportunity to optimize information dissemination, existing
efforts bring forward the issue of ``digital litter.'' Many
refugee and forced migrant-focused technology projects are
launched but not maintained, creating a sizable amount of
digital litter--broken links, defunct webpages, and outdated
and misleading information online.\861\ According to one
tracking initiative, of 169 technology projects for refugees
launched in 2015 and 2016, most were inactive as of July
2018.\862\ Therefore, reviews of the use of technology to serve
refugees and forced migrant populations have repeatedly
underscored the need for long-term plans for maintenance,
conspicuously marked update dates for information posted, and
the deletion of online presences for projects that are going or
have gone defunct.\863\
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\861\ Meghan Benton, ``Digital Litter: The Downside of Using
Technology to Help Refugees,'' Migration Policy Institute, June 20,
2019; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at x, xi, 19.
\862\ Benton, ``Digital Litter: The Downside of Using Technology to
Help Refugees.''
\863\ Id.; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 34.
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Digital Solutions for Identity Documentation
In Chapter 3, we discussed restrictions faced by forced
migrants, including limited access to identity documents, which
can subsequently hinder access to legal protections, basic
services, and much more. For populations on the move,
technology can serve as a gateway for accessing identity
documents and credentials. Forced migrants use Google Drive and
other technologies to acquire, save, and share important
documents, including birth certificates and diplomas.\864\
Asylum seekers often take smartphone pictures of their flimsy
paper registration documents, allowing them to both protect
their documents from overuse and disintegration, as well as
ensure they have back-up copies in case their original
documents are lost or destroyed.\865\
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\864\ Id. at 45.
\865\ Id. at 24.
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For those forced migrants without access to identity
documents, digital identity and registration systems can serve
as alternative mechanisms for authentication and access to
services. In pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goal of
leaving no one behind and achieving legal identity for all by
2030, UNHCR has increasingly turned to digital identity systems
to empower identity recognition, digital inclusion, and service
delivery for forced migrants.\866\ UNHCR's Population
Registration and Identity Management EcoSystem (PRIMES) uses
state-of-the-art biometrics to create a consolidated tool
enabling identity management, case management, assistance, and
data management for forced migrants.\867\ By the end of 2018,
more than 7.1 million forced migrants in 60 countries had
registered a biometric identity with UNHCR.\868\
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\866\ Nicholas Oakeshott et al., World Bank Blogs, ``Empowering
refugees and internally displaced persons through digital identity,''
June 19, 2018; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 32.; UNHCR, UNHCR Strategy
on Digital Identity and Inclusion (2018).
\867\ UNHCR, UNHCR Strategy on Digital Identity and Inclusion
(2018); UNHCR, ``Registration and Identity management,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/registration.html (last visited June 8, 2020).
\868\ UNHCR, ``Data of Millions of Refugees Now Securely Hosted in
PRIMES,'' Jan. 28, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/data-millions-
refugees-securely-hosted-primes/.
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Other humanitarian and aid organizations have also turned
to technology to overcome the obstacle of missing identity
documents. In Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp, blockchain platform
BanQu has helped refugees establish a verifiable digital
identity, enabling refugees to build credit and access
financial institutions.\869\ In Jordan, the World Food
Programme's Building Blocks program uses biometrics and
blockchain technology to deliver assistance to 106,000 Syrian
refugees.\870\ Early results of the program showed a 98 percent
reduction in traditional fees imposed on money transfers.\871\
Furthermore, the program reduces processing time, including
time spent waiting for local banks to transfer the money and
time spent registering with local banks to receive the cash
assistance.\872\
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\869\ Roya Pakzad, Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging
Technology for the Refugee System, CIGI & WRC, at 3 (May 2019).
\870\ WFP, ``Building Blocks,'' https://innovation.wfp.org/project/
building-blocks (last visited Apr. 15, 2020); Russ Juskalian, ``Inside
the Jordan Refugee Camp That Runs on Blockchain,'' MIT Technology
Review, Apr. 12, 2018.
\871\ Juskalian, ``Inside the Jordan Refugee Camp That Runs on
Blockchain.''
\872\ Id.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A refugee in Uganda's Oruchinga settlement uses an iris scan to claim
food assistance. Claire Nevill, WFP, Mar. 5, 2018.
Critics have lamented that these efforts are often small in
scale and lack the ability to bring about real, comprehensive
change.\873\ The fragmented and short-sighted nature of
projects to implement digital systems often means that identity
systems are not compatible for connection with registration,
case management, and aid distribution systems--hindering, not
enhancing, coordination.\874\ Additional concerns include a
lack of data privacy protections, data security, and informed
consent in the mass collection of forced migrants' data.\875\
Data security is of special concern in the case of UNHCR's
biometric database, which is stored centrally and lacks
blockchain protections.\876\ These concerns regarding
consistency, privacy, security, and consent also extend to
other efforts to use technology to address the forced migration
crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\873\ Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 33.
\874\ Id. at 31.
\875\ Pakzad, Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging Technology
for the Refugee System; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide:
Applying Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at xvii.
\876\ Pakzad, Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging Technology
for the Refugee System, at 3.
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Increasing Private Sector Participation
As efforts to address protracted refugee crises
increasingly emphasize longer-term development for refugee and
host communities, private sector actors can play a strategic
role in directly contributing to, enhancing, and scaling these
efforts. A November 2017 review found more than 170 private
sector initiatives to address the refugee crisis. Private
sector actors can do their part by providing humanitarian
funding, extending services and sharing capabilities and
technologies, and enabling employment and education.\877\ While
investment to deal with the refugee crisis remains
insufficient, private partners are now playing an important but
modest role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\877\ Danielle Berfond et al., Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways
to Scale, The Bridgespan Group & The World Bank's International Finance
Corporation (May 12, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increasing Private Sector Donorship
Recent influxes of forced migrants and growing anti-
migration sentiment among industrialized countries,
humanitarian organizations, and non-profits have increasingly
looked to diversify their funding sources--and the private
sector has stepped up to help.\878\ From 2007 to 2017, private
sector financial support for UNHCR increased from 34 million to
400 million dollars--from 2 percent to 10 percent of total
contributions.\879\ In December 2019, more than 100 companies
and foundations attended the most recent Global Refugee Forum
in December 2019, pledging more than 250 million dollars in
funding for UNHCR in addition to many other commitments to
service provisions and actions.\880\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\878\ See Ammar A. Malik et al., Private-Sector Humanitarians?: New
Approaches in the Global Refugee Response, Urban Institute (Sept.
2018),.
\879\ United Nations Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme, Private Sector Fundraising and Partnerships, 73rd meeting,
at 3 (Aug. 31, 2018).
\880\ Press Release, UNHCR, Private Sector Steps Pp for Refugees as
Global Refugee Forum Opens in Geneva, Dec. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Canada, an innovative model has allowed for private
companies, individuals, and organizations to directly fund the
resettlement of additional refugees since 1979.\881\ Under
Canada's Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, private
sponsors cover refugees' living costs for their first 12 months
of resettlement or until the refugee becomes self-sufficient,
whichever comes first.\882\ Sponsorship groups range from
private companies to churches to family members of the refugee
being resettled. Since the program's inception, private
sponsors have resettled more than 288,000 refugees to Canada,
over and above those resettled with government resources.\883\
From January 2015 to August 2017 alone, 40,130 privately
sponsored refugees were admitted to Canada, or 47 percent of
total refugees admitted.\884\ Following Canada's lead,
Argentina, Australia, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, New
Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom have all launched or
pledged to launch refugee sponsorship programs.\885\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\881\ Canada Council for Refugees, ``Private Sponsorship for
Refugees,'' https://ccrweb.ca/en/private-sponsorship-refugees (last
visited June 8, 2020).
\882\ Shahana Bhaduri, Exploring Private Refugee Sponsorship
Option(s) for the United States, Harvard University, at 2-3, 87 (Mar.
2018).
\883\ Press Release, UNHCR, Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative
Promotes Canada's Private Refugee Sponsorship Model, Dec. 16, 2016.
\884\ Bhaduri et al., Exploring Private Refugee Sponsorship
Option(s) for the United States, at 79.
\885\ Susan Fratzke et al., Refugee Sponsorship Programmes: A
Global State of Play and Opportunities for Investment, Migration Policy
Institute Europe, at 3 (Dec. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aside from dollars, private sector companies have also
addressed the global forced migration crisis by donating goods
and services. IKEA's partnership with UNHCR has resulted in
thousands of donated mattresses, bed linens, and shelter
units.\886\ At the 2019 Global Refugee Forum, 20 law firms
committed 125,000 hours per year to pro-bono legal support for
refugees and stateless people.\887\ Equity Bank, a financial
services company serving East Africa, began extending its
services to refugees in 2012, helping refugees with personal
banking, microcredit, and group savings and lending
products.\888\ By dedicating significant resources to refugee
communities, Equity Bank extended access to financial
institutions to a populations often denied inclusion and
overlooked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\886\ IKEA, ``Brighter Lives for Refugees,'' https://www.ikea.com/
ms/en--JO/good-cause-campaign/brighter-lives-for-refugees/index.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
\887\ Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR, Private Sector Steps Up for
Refugees as Global Refugee Forum Opens in Geneva, Dec. 16, 2019.
\888\ Berfond et al., Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale,
at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the needs of forced migrants around the globe continue
to grow, we need must think about ways to expand private sector
assistance--in pure dollars and methods--in our efforts to keep
up.
Private Sector Support for Education & Employment
With increasingly protracted conflicts and increasing focus
on integration as the most accessible solution, private sector
responses need to focus not only on humanitarian aid but also
longer-term development. Investing in education and employment
is a paramount way to meet pressing forced migrant needs and
serve longer-term goals--and many private sector companies are
well-positioned to provide support.
UNHCR's efforts to achieve education parity for refugees in
pre-primary, primary, and secondary schooling have been
bolstered by private sector support.\899\ The Vodafone
Foundation has served as UNHCR's partner in creating 36 Instant
Network Schools providing digital education across Africa.\890\
The education platform Coursera has provided free access to
courses for refugees, reaching 18,000 refugees in 110
countries, who have taken more than 80,000 courses
combined.\891\ Clothing retailer H&M's global holiday campaigns
have resulted in 3.3 million dollars' worth of school supplies
reaching 500,000 children through UNHCR.\892\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\889\ See UNHCR, Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis (Aug.
2019).
\890\ Press Release, Vodafone, ``Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR
Expand Instant Network Schools to Benefit Bore than 500,000 Young
Refugees,'' Dec. 16, 2019.
\891\ Berfond et al., Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale,
at 45.
\892\ Id. at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As employers, private companies are also well-suited to
support refugees with workforce training, skills, and
employment opportunities. Private sector initiatives range from
those providing business training to supporting refugee
entrepreneurs with loans to providing remote work opportunities
to pledging job opportunities for resettled refugees.\893\
These initiatives support the economic development and self-
sufficiency of forced migrant populations, counter economic
burden myths, and foster community integration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\893\ See id. at 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Education and employment represent two sectors where the
private sector is enormously well-suited to provide support.
And while companies have brainstormed innovative initiatives
and provided generous funding, more support is needed. As we
look to expand our understanding of vulnerable forced migrant
populations around the world to not only include refugees, but
also internally displaced persons, victims of generalized
violence, war, and climate-related events, this need balloons.
Private sector partnerships will be an important partner in
innovating, funding, and serving the needs of these large and
growing populations.
Sidebar: AHLAN SIMSIM: SESAME STREET FOR
SYRIAN REFUGEES
In partnership with the IRC and local educators, Sesame
Workshop, the nonprofit educational organizations behind Sesame
Street, launched a new show called Ahlan Simsim, or ``Welcome
Sesame,'' in February 2020.\894\ Aired in Arabic and Kurdish,
the show is geared towards displaced children in Jordan,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.\895\ The show has two main
characters, Basma and Jad, and focuses on managing
emotions.\896\ The project is estimated to reach up to nine
million children, making it the largest early-childhood
intervention in the history of humanitarian response, and will
be coupled with studies by child development specialists.\897\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\894\ Alex Carp, `` `Sesame Street' Is Opening Up to Syrian
Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 31, 2020; Press Release, IRC,
Sesame Street and the IRC Are Helping Refugee Children Overcome Trauma,
Feb. 2, 2020.
\895\ Alex Carp, `` `Sesame Street' Is Opening Up to Syrian
Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 31, 2020.
\896\ Id.
\897\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
Sidebar: VODAFONE FOUNDATION & UNHCR
INSTANT NETWORK SCHOOLS
Started in 2014 with funding from the Vodafone Foundation
and UNHCR, the Instant Network Schools (INS) program provides a
digital `school in a box,' including internet and electricity
sources, tablets, curriculums, and teacher training, to
increase educational resources in refugee camps. For under-
resourced regions with insufficient schools, teachers, and
materials, the INS program provides an innovative
solution.\898\ As of December 2019, there were 36 Instant
Network Schools across eight refugee camps in Kenya, Tanzania,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan.\899\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\898\ Duke Mwancha, ``Innovation: UNHCR and Vodafone Bring Tablet-
based Learning to 18,000 Somali Refugees,'' UNHCR News, Oct. 9, 2014;
UNHCR, Stepping Up, at 16 (2019).
\899\ Press Release, Vodafone, ``Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR
Expand Instant Network Schools to Benefit More than 500,000 Young
Refugees,'' Dec. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of December 2019, INS program evaluations showed higher
levels of school attendance, a 61 percent increase in
informational communications technology literacy for students,
and a 125 percent increase in improved confidence, motivation,
and academic performance among trained teachers.\900\ The
program does, however, need to work towards equal access across
genders--in the first half of 2019, 70 percent of users were
male.\901\ At the Global Refugee Forum in December 2019,
Vodafone and UNHCR announced an expansion of the INS program to
benefit more than 500,000 refugees.\902\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\900\ Id.
\901\ Caroline Opile, ``Vodafone Foundation Sponsored Instant
Network Schools are Transforming Refugee Lives in Kenya,'' UNHCR News,
Sept. 18, 2019.
\902\ Press Release, Vodafone, ``Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR
Expand Instant Network Schools to Benefit More than 500,000 Young
Refugees,'' Dec. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
While the costs of addressing this global crisis are
significant, the consequences of inadequate responses and
inaction will be even greater. Existing initiatives have shown
the potential for international cooperation and innovation to
create modern solutions to address the realities of the current
forced migration crisis. Given the magnitude of today's crisis,
however, new initiatives need to be scaled across nations and
across public, private, and non-profit sectors, in order to
have a meaningful impact.
In a renewed global effort to address and mitigate the
global forced migration crisis, international, national,
private, and civil society organizations need to collaborate to
ensure responsibilities are shared and best practices are
implemented. We cannot and should not stand idly by as large
swaths of the world's population are fleeing harm, seeking
safety, and spending decades in displacement.
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
----------
Findings
The scale of today's forced migration crisis is
unprecedented. A confluence of factors, including
persistent climate-related shocks and increasingly
frequent, highly violent, and protracted conflicts
impacting civilians have resulted in a record number of
people forced to flee their homes around the globe. By
the end of 2018, there were over 70.8 million refugees,
asylum seekers, and IDPs worldwide. In addition, many
more have been forced to flee their homes due to severe
climate-related events. Without dramatic efforts to
address the forced migration crisis, it will continue
to grow in scale and complexity.
Climate change will exacerbate the core drivers of forced
migration by increasing the risk of conflict over
natural resources and dramatically impacting the
availability of food and water. The impacts of climate
change are innumerable, and include depleted natural
resources, rising sea levels, extreme weather events,
and conflict--all of which can force people to leave
their homes.
Armed actors have increasingly failed to uphold
international law, attacking civilians and civilian
infrastructure with impunity. The brutal nature of
armed conflict and its destruction of civilian
infrastructure is a major driver of large-scale
displacement, and reflects a growing lack of respect
for the traditional laws of war. Without deterrence of
and accountability for these violations, armed actors
will continue to brutalize civilians and cause massed
displacement.
The UN Security Council, largely due to vetoes by its
permanent members, has struggled to uphold its core
mandate of maintaining peace and security, and to help
resolve prolonged conflicts or ensure that violators of
international law are held accountable. Without
international bodies enforcing accountability and
imposing consequences, government and independent armed
actors will continue to violate international laws and
norms, spur forced migration, and shirk responsibility
in addressing this global crisis.
The nature of forced migration has dramatically changed
since the end of World War II, and the scale of global
need has far outpaced available assistance. Many forced
migrants are unable to return home for decades and
often live in urban environments in developing
countries. These changes to the nature of displacement
often render traditional solutions based on short-term
displacement in camp settings ineffective, and
necessitate new and innovative responses. As global
need continues to grow, major donors such as the United
States and the United Kingdom have reduced humanitarian
financing, while China and other countries have not
stepped up to address the need. As a result, many
humanitarian agencies and response plans are
drastically underfunded.
Forced migrants often face severe restrictions to and
violations of their human rights. These include
restrictions on the right to work, freedom of movement,
documentation, access to healthcare, and the right to
education. These affronts to forced migrants' rights
and dignity have resulted in the repression of large
swaths of the world's population.
The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the extreme
vulnerabilities of forced migrant populations,
highlighted by dangerously overcrowded settings,
inadequate access to healthcare, increased incidences
of gender-based violence, exclusion from host country
preparedness and response plans, the scapegoating of
forced migrants as vectors of the virus, and
restrictions placed on their access to international
legal protections and asylum systems.
Women and girls face particular vulnerabilities as forced
migrants, including barriers to accessing life-saving
healthcare and education, gender-based violence, and
human trafficking, yet international funding and
support remains minimal. Women and girls are more
likely to face restrictions on their ability to work,
be refused an education, denied life-saving healthcare,
subjected to gender-based violence (GBV), and
trafficked as forced migrants. Despite severe
vulnerabilities faced by women and girls, less than 0.2
percent of humanitarian response funding was spent on
GBV prevention programs between 2016 and 2018.
The unprecedented number of children who are forced
migrants presents an urgent call to action for their
protection and education. The number of refugee
children has doubled in the past 10 years, and the
number of unaccompanied and separated children asylum
seekers hit record highs in 2015. By the end of 2017,
more than 31 million children were refugees, asylum
seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Without proper access to education, health care, and
other services and protections, displacement has the
potential to derail the future outlook for an entire
generation of children.
Despite specific international legal conventions affording
refugees protections, some countries have denied
refugees basic rights and services. Even those who meet
the strictest definition of refugee status are often
denied documentation, shelter, human rights, and basic
services. Without consistent implementation and
enforcement of international legal protections,
countries are able to violate refugees' rights with
impunity.
Forced migration today is driven not only by conflict and
persecution, but also generalized violence and severe
climate-related events, and many forced migrants lack
pathways for national and international protections.
Today, many of those forced from their homes and
seeking refuge do not meet the definition of
``refugee'' in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.
Without the same international protections as refugees,
these populations are more likely to be ignored, denied
life-saving assistance and services, and refused
support in finding solutions to end their displacement.
As the population of forced migrants continues to grow, the
traditional solutions of voluntary return and
resettlement are increasingly inaccessible. As
conflicts are increasingly prolonged and unending,
forced migrants, many of whom want to return home, are
unable to do so safely. Even prior to the Trump
administration, the opportunity for resettlement in a
third country was only available to a small percentage
of the world's refugees. As a result, greater focus
must be paid to the third durable solution--local
integration.
Humanitarian aid is not reaching those in need due to
restrictions by countries and interference by non-state
armed actors. These restrictions and interference
violate international humanitarian law (IHL) and
disrupt life-saving services, forcing more civilians to
flee their homes.
Inefficiencies in humanitarian response by donor countries,
host countries, the United Nations, and NGOs have
contributed to shortcomings in responding effectively
to forced migration and humanitarian need. While the UN
and many of its donors recognize areas for reform and
realignment, there has been a lack of clear progress on
reform across the entire humanitarian system. During
the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, a number of
sensible reforms were agreed to in order to improve the
effectiveness of humanitarian programs, not all of
which have been fully implemented. These included
increasing cash-based assistance, multi-year funding,
and streamlining redundant programming.
The Trump administration has used every mechanism at its
disposal to block legal pathways for refugees,
undermining longstanding U.S. policies towards forced
migrants, and inspiring--or sometimes bullying--other
governments to adopt regressive responses to today's
forced migration crisis. These methods include the
externalization of the U.S. border, the decimation of
refugee resettlement programs, cuts to humanitarian
assistance, the shirking of U.S. responsibility in
international coordination and partnerships, and the
propagation of false narratives sowing hatred against
foreigners and forced migrants. The Trump
administration has, in fact, gone beyond simply
blocking forced migrants from accessing the United
States to actively harming those who seek refuge
through deliberate policies of family separation, the
Remain in Mexico policy, and ``safe third country''
agreements that force asylum seekers into dangerous and
sometimes fatal settings.
The Trump administration's retreat from U.S. humanitarian
obligations and the multilateral system has dealt a
harmful blow to an already-weakened system of
international cooperation for responding to global
crises like forced migration. The United States'
regressive leadership on the international stage, as
evident by its actions relating to the Global Compact
for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Global
Compact on Refugees, has emboldened other nations to
neglect their responsibilities to protect refugees and
other forced migrants.
Recent efforts in humanitarian financing, humanitarian aid,
diplomacy, and the private sector highlight
opportunities to reinvigorate forced migration
responses from the top-down, although greater support
is needed around the world to drive these innovations.
These initiatives include new international and
national compacts on refugees, the World Bank's
concessional financing, increase usage of cash
transfers for humanitarian assistance, and a myriad of
private partnerships aimed at providing services and
opportunities to forced migrants. Given the scale of
today's forced migration crisis, these efforts also
underscore a need for collaborative action and
widespread rethinking across all sectors--government,
finance, and private companies--in order to
comprehensively address the crisis.
Recommendations
For Congress
Congress should continue to recognize the enormous needs
and adequately fund humanitarian assistance for
vulnerable populations around the world. Congress has
provided leadership by appropriating humanitarian aid
funding far above the Trump administration's proposed
budgets, and should continue to do so. Restoration of
effective U.S. leadership on the international stage
will result in increased responsibility sharing in
responding to the global forced migration crisis.
Congress should mandate regular reports from the State
Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) on the human rights and
humanitarian situations of forced migrant populations,
including refugees and IDPs. Regular assessments on
forced migrant populations will help inform government
responses across agencies, including humanitarian aid
and resettlement, and increase the effectiveness of
those responses.
Congress should permit Economic Support Funds to be used to
support multilateral efforts to advance the inclusion
of forced migrants in host country development efforts,
such as the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing
Facility.
Congress should address rampant gender-based violence in
humanitarian emergencies around the world, and pass the
Keeping Women and Girls Safe from the Start Act of
2020. Women and girls, including women and girl forced
migrants, face extreme violence and threats of violence
during humanitarian crises. Passage of the Act will
advance efforts to prevent, mitigate, and respond to
gender-based violence in humanitarian crises around the
world.
Congress must increase humanitarian assistance for
comprehensive health services, including reproductive
health and gender-based violence-related services, and
remove restrictions that impede access to health care,
including the Mexico City Policy and restrictions on
funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
These services are critical in addressing the acute
vulnerability of women and girl forced migrants, where
adequate and equitable access to healthcare can
transform long-term outlooks and save lives. The COVID-
19 pandemic has only reinforced the essential nature of
these services, especially in times of crisis.
Congress should authorize the expanded use of sanctions and
other tools against perpetrators of international
humanitarian law violations and those who deny aid
access for life-saving assistance. Without the presence
of accountability, violent actors will continue to
attack civilians, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian
organizations, and humanitarian workers with impunity,
further stoking mass displacement.
Congress should ensure that asylum seekers and refugees are
afforded the protections stipulated under U.S. law and
increase the U.S. refugee ceiling to align with global
need. Such Congressional action would serve as a first
step in reversing the Trump administration's actions
decimating the asylum and refugee system and the U.S.'s
historical leadership on refugee issues.
In addition to bolstering existing refugee resettlement
programs, Congress should create complementary pathways
to protect forced migrants who do not meet the refugee
definition under U.S. law, but for whom return is not
possible or advisable. Congress must reform and update
the existing statutory framework for Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) and should provide complementary
pathways to meet the protection needs of individuals
displaced by generalized violence and gender-based
violence, among other forces. It is critical that
complementary pathways be additive to refugee
resettlement and avoid discrimination. These
complementary pathways must guarantee the minimum
protections of non-refoulement, access to identity and
travel documents, family unity, resolving
statelessness, addressing vulnerability to exploitation
and abuse, and ensuring access to a permanent solution.
For the Trump administration and future administrations
The Executive Branch must reverse policies and practices
undermining U.S. refugee law. The U.S. sets a model for
regressive action in response to the global forced
migration crisis. Accordingly, the Executive Branch
must terminate harmful programs, including the Remain
in Mexico policy (also known as the Migrant Protection
Protocols) and ``safe third country'' agreements (also
known as the Asylum Cooperative Agreements).
The Executive Branch should adopt a robust and inclusive
interpretation of U.S. refugee law that takes into
account the changed nature of conflict and persecution.
Addressing the global forced migration crisis requires
dealing with mixed migration flows and acknowledging
the protection needs of many forced migrants who may
not fit the strictest definition of ``refugee,''
including victims of generalized violence, gender-based
violence, IDPs, and those displaced by severe climate-
related events.
The Executive Branch should increase support for efforts to
educate refugee children and initiate campaigns to
educate IDP children. The United States should continue
to provide funding to refugee education initiatives
such as Education Cannot Wait, work to increase
enrollment in early education and secondary education,
and increase educational opportunities for IDP
children, who are often overlooked. Furthermore,
funding should be coupled with robust diplomatic
efforts that prioritizes access to education by forced
migrant children.
The Executive Branch, including the Departments of State
and Defense, should ensure U.S. military assistance,
such as arms sales, military training, and other
defense services, is contingent on the implementation
of civilian harm mitigation policies and adherence to
international humanitarian law. The United States
should identify conditions that would prompt limits on
or suspension of partnership with actors, including a
failure to protect civilians and civilian
infrastructure and a failure to provide unfettered
humanitarian access.
USAID should ensure inclusion of forced migrant populations
in its five-year Country Development Cooperation
Strategies. This would help ensure that forced migrant
populations are not overlooked in country development
plans. U.S. agencies must help host countries
facilitate plans that are mutually beneficial for host
communities and displaced populations.
The Executive Branch must re-engage and re-establish
constructive leadership in the multilateral system and
at the United Nations on issues related to forced
migration. Proposed actions include the nomination and
appointment of qualified and internationally-respected
individuals to posts at multilateral institutions and
the restoration of funding for UNFPA, the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and the World
Health Organization (WHO).
The Executive Branch must lead the race to the top in
urging all countries to uphold international law,
including international humanitarian law and
international human rights law. In today's age of
impunity, we risk serious regional and global
instability without effective justice. The failure to
ensure accountability for violations of international
humanitarian and human rights laws is helping to drive
forced migration. The United States must recommit to
championing respect for international law by activating
a whole-of-government approach, including strong
efforts by the White House, U.S. Mission to the UN, and
State Department in calling for accountability.
The Executive Branch must redouble efforts to resolve
ongoing and prolonged conflicts, as well as efforts to
prevent the outbreak of future conflicts, including by
strengthening atrocity prevention programs. The United
States must address conflict, a primary driver of
forced migration, by strengthening diplomacy at the
United Nations, other multilateral institutions, and in
our bilateral relationships, as well as reinforcing our
ability to detect early warnings of and coordinate
responses to potential mass atrocities as directed by
the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act
of 2018.
The United States should support the proposal to suspend
veto power at the UN Security Council in cases of mass
atrocities. Supporting the veto suspension would send a
bold message of support for the sanctity of
international law and zero tolerance for widespread and
systematic violence against civilian populations.
The Executive Branch should restore U.S. leadership on
refugee resettlement back to historic norms and in line
with tremendous global need. Changes should reverse
harmful Trump administration policies--increasing the
refugee ceiling to be in line with global need, re-
designating allocations for refugee resettlement to
account for global need, and accepting UNHCR referrals
for resettlement--as well as create new policies to
strengthen refugee resettlement efforts.
In addition to refugee resettlement, the Executive Branch
should increase alternative legal pathways for refuge
in the United States, including through private
sponsorship programs, to allow for the resettlement of
refugees above and beyond government commitments.
Private sponsorship would support refugee resettlement
above and beyond existing ceilings or caps. Refugees
resettled through private sponsorship would have the
same rights and opportunities afforded to them as those
resettled through the U.S. government.
The Executive Branch should join the Global Compact for
Refugees, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and
Regular Migration, and the Paris Climate Agreement to
signal its solidarity with international community
efforts and pursue coordination on global efforts to
respond to the global forced migration crisis.
Reinvigorating the momentum behind the 2016 New York
Declaration, the United States should lead efforts
convening host governments, donors, the private sector,
civil society, and forced migrant representatives to
form a new compact supporting the inclusion of forced
migrant populations in host countries. In line with the
World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility
(GCCF) and International Development Association (IDA)
mechanisms and the Jordan Compact and U.S. Millennium
Challenge Corporation, the approach would incentivize
countries to include forced migrant populations in host
communities, through access to work, legal status,
education, and freedom of movement, in return for aid
and other benefits. The United States should establish
a fund to provide financial support to these compacts
and forced migrant-hosting nations.
The White House should initiate an expansion and update to
the U.S. government's policy on IDPs, which now
consists solely of the 2004 USAID Assistance to
Internally Displaced Persons Policy. The creation of a
new, comprehensive policy will enable the U.S.
government to play a more strategic and effective role
in responding to the more than 41 million IDPs in the
world today.
For the United Nations, other multilateral institutions,
and the international community
Members of the UN Security Council--elected and permanent--
must, through voluntary agreement or amendment of the
UN Charter, refrain from voting against any credible
draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass
atrocities, a critical driver of forced migration. The
failure of the UN Security Council to protect civilians
from mass atrocity crimes like genocide, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity has severely
impaired its effectiveness and credibility in the eyes
of the general public and governments. Repeated vetoes
and obstruction by China and Russia, two UN Security
Council permanent members, have undermined the UN
Security Council, shielded perpetrators from
accountability, and cost lives in Syria, Burma, and
elsewhere.
The UN Secretary-General should elevate the role of the
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons to the Secretary-General Special
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. The
delegation of a more senior role responsible for IDPs
will highlight a need for greater global awareness of
IDP populations and renewed responses on IDP issues. We
applaud the Secretary-General's appointment of the
High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement and encourage
that all mechanisms for finding solutions for the
world's 41 million IDPs be pursued. To that end, the UN
should energetically reinforce the implementation of
the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
and encourage national governments to ratify it into
binding law.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants
should regularly publish reports documenting and
assessing UN member states' performance in upholding
international protections and human rights for
refugees, IDPs, and other forced migrants. The
international community must recognize that the vast
majority of forced migrants are displaced for the long-
term and host countries must make it possible for
forced migrants to rebuild their lives, sustain
themselves, and contribute to their new communities.
This requires allowing forced migrants freedom of
movement, the right to work, and access to education
and other basic services. These measures would increase
accountability and provide additional enforcement
mechanisms to ensure these rights are afforded to
forced migrant populations.
The World Bank and other international and national
organizations should make financial assistance
contingent on assessments of countries' records
upholding international protections and human rights
for refugees, IDPs, and other forced migrants. The
pursuit of clear, measurable outcomes for forced
migrants and host communities--such as inclusion in
national plans and improvements in income, health, and
education--will ensure financing delivers its intended
effect. The World Bank has made tremendous efforts to
respond to the needs of forced migrant populations and
host countries--they have supported the prototypes for
new responses that should be continued and improved
upon.
The United Nations must use its tools, including Boards of
Inquiry, Commissions of Inquiry, and the International
Court of Justice, to enforce international law and end
rampant impunity by publishing findings and identifying
perpetrators of violations of international law. At its
crux, the international community is suffering from a
political crisis that has resulted in a global forced
migration crisis. Forced migration is the result of the
failure of national and international community to
address the root causes of displacement, which include
war, endemic violence, corruption, weak governance,
abusive leaders, and poor accountability.
The UN Secretary-General should call on host countries and
all other countries to incorporate forced migrant
populations into their Sustainable Development Goals
national action plans. Host countries must also
recognize that forced migrants are displaced for the
long-term, that it is their responsibility to promote
better futures for all people within their territories,
including forced migrant populations, and that
supporting better futures for forced migrant
populations is mutually beneficial.
The UN should reduce redundancies and improve aid
effectiveness by prioritizing and accelerating the
implementation of reforms. Reform efforts and
agreements such as the Grand Bargain, first proposed by
the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on
Humanitarian Financing, should continue to remain a
priority in order to modernize humanitarian assistance
and ensure programs are effectively helping people in
need. Moreover, the UN should prioritize operational
efficiency by streamlining how disparate UN agencies
approach similar sectors within a humanitarian
response, for example, adopting a simplified treatment
process for children with severe malnutrition across UN
agencies.
Regional financial institutions must engage proactively to
address the forced migration crisis in their regions.
Regional financial institutions, such as the African
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American
Development Bank, should develop regional financial
support responses to the forced migration crisis
following the model of the World Bank.
Governments in host countries should respect the human
rights of forced migrant populations and should include
forced migrant populations in their national plans.
Best practice policy changes include ensuring refugees
have freedom of movement, the right to work, access to
healthcare and other services, and recognizing IDPs,
climate-related forced migrants, and other forced
migrant populations as requiring urgent protection and
aid. For countries where climate change is expected to
cause mass movements in coming years, incorporating
climate migration into national plans could help
prepare governments to weather these changes and
prevent situations of prolonged displacement and
humanitarian emergencies.
The UN Secretary-General should create a High-Level Panel
regarding information security and privacy for forced
migrants. By convening experts on forced migration,
data consent, privacy, and data security, this High-
Level Panel will result in resources to inform the
United Nation's privacy and data policies. The
implementation of such policies will ensure that forced
migrant populations are not left more vulnerable by the
information they provide to UNHCR, UN Children's Fund
(UNICEF), International Organization for Migration
(IOM), and other humanitarian agencies as they seek
protection.
For other stakeholders
Non-governmental organizations should continue to improve
how they measure program outcomes and effectiveness,
and strive to make information publicly available to
increase transparency. Using data, analysis, and other
evidence-based approaches to assess programs,
strategies, and tactics will allow for the humanitarian
sector to continue to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of programs, ideally producing improved
outcomes for more people with each iteration.
Non-governmental and private sector organizations should
create comprehensive plans to incorporate technology
into their responses, meeting twenty-first century
issues with twenty-first century solutions.
Organizations should be especially cognizant of privacy
concerns and ``digital litter,'' or outdated online
resources. While technology can enable more efficient
and effective strategies in a world where forced
migrants are reliant on digital resources, technology
plans must focus on long-term sustainability, and
create exit plans to ensure that the plan's demise does
not lead to misleading and outdated information.
Private sector companies should increase engagement in
addressing the problem of and finding solutions for
forced migration, supporting the integration and
resettlement of forced migrant populations. Efforts to
increase private sector involvement should not only
occur at the multinational level, but also at the
regional, national, and local levels. It is critical
that private sector involvement focuses on localized
contexts and needs in order to have real impact.
U.S. educational institutions, especially U.S. higher
educational institutions with established international
student bodies and significant endowments, should
develop and continue to develop pathways to educate
forced migrant students. Incorporating refugee and IDP
populations in student bodies will help increase access
to education, create an especially diverse student
body, and showcase that U.S. institutions are leading
the way in responding to global challenges.
ACRONYMS & INITIALISMS
----------
CAM Central American Minors
CBP United States Customs and Border Protection
RS Congressional Research Service
CVA Cash and voucher assistance
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
DNI United States Director of National Intelligence
DOJ United States Department of Justice
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EU European Union
FY Fiscal Year
GBV Gender-based violence
GCFF Global Concessional Financing Facility
GCM Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
GCR Global Compact on Refugees
GDP Gross domestic product
HARP Humanitarian Asylum Review Process
HHS United States Department of Health and Human Services
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICE United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
IDA World Bank International Development Association
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP Internally displaced person
IFR Interim Final Rule
IHL International humanitarian law
INA United States Immigration and Nationality Act
IOM International Organization for Migration
MPP Migrant Protection Protocols (``Remain in Mexico'' policy)
NGO Non-governmental organization
PACR Prompt Asylum Claim Review
PRM United States Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
SAO Security Advisory Opinion
SFRC United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee
TPS Temporary Protected Status
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
USRAP United State Refugee Admissions Program
WFP United Nations World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization