[Senate Prints 116-48]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




116th Congress   }                                           {  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
2d Session       }                                           {  116-48
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                        GLOBAL FORCED MIGRATION

                    THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME

                               __________

                        A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

                      PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     One Hundred Sixteenth Congress

                             SECOND SESSION

                             June 18, 2020
                             

                                     
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations




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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
41-888 PDF            WASHINGTON : 2020                        
                       
                       
                       


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman        
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    TIM KAINE, Virginia
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TED CRUZ, Texas                      CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
                  Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director        
               Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        

                              (ii)        




                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

Executive Summary................................................     1

Chapter One--The Scale of Today's Forced Migration Crisis........    13


Chapter Two--Trends in Forced Migration..........................    17

    Why More People Are Fleeing: The Changing Nature of Conflict 
      and Violence...............................................    17

    Climate Change's Impact on Forced Migration..................    24

    Internally Displaced Persons Under-Recognized................    27

    New Challenges for Forced Migrants...........................    29


Chapter Three--Human Rights Denied...............................    33

    Pervasive Restrictions on Freedom of Movement................    33

    Obstacles to Accessing Identity Documentation................    34

    Barriers for Accessing Healthcare and Education..............    36

    Widespread Lack of Livelihood Opportunities and Barriers to 
      Work.......................................................    39

    Gender-Based Violence: An Under-Recognized Risk..............    42

    High Risks of Human Trafficking..............................    45


Chapter Four--Inadequate and Inconsistent International Responses    49

    Diplomatic Deficit Resulting in Persistent Conflicts and 
      Impunity...................................................    50

    Insufficient and Inflexible Humanitarian Funding.............    51

    Aid Effectiveness and Humanitarian Sector Reform.............    53

    Need for Expanded International Legal Protections............    55

    Shrinking Access to Traditional Solutions....................    63

    Inconsistent Country-level Responses to Forced Migration.....    66


Chapter Five--The Trump Administration's Domestic Agenda: 
  Blocking All Pathways to Refuge................................    73

    The Trump Administration's Decimation of Existing Programs...    74

    The Impact of Trump Administration Policies at the U.S. 
      Border.....................................................    85

    The Positive Contributions of Refugees and Immigrants in the 
      United States..............................................    97

    Damage to U.S. Military Interests............................   100


Chapter Six--The Trump Administration's Global Retreat from 
  Forced Migration...............................................   103

    Repeated Attempts to Cut U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Funding   103

    Withdrawal from International Fora...........................   106

    The International Implications of the Administration's 
      Retreat....................................................   109




                                 (iii)

Chapter Seven--Current Innovative Efforts........................   117

    New Compacts to Improve International Coordination & Response   117

    Innovative Models of Financial Assistance....................   119

    The Compact Model............................................   122

    Solutions to Better Serve Forced Migrants....................   124

    Incorporating Technology.....................................   128

    Increasing Private Sector Participation......................   132


Findings & Recommendations.......................................   137

    Findings.....................................................   137

    Recommendations..............................................   140


Acronyms & Initialisms...........................................   147


      
      
      
      




                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                     Washington, DC, June 18, 2020.



    Dear Colleagues: The United States must revive its global 
and moral leadership to address the urgent plight of millions 
of people forced to flee their homes due to conflict, violence, 
persecution, and severe climate-related events. This global 
forced migration crisis is one of the most profound and least 
understood challenges of our time. More than ever before, 
conflict and violence are driving people from their homes and 
forcing them to live decades in displacement. Warring parties 
are consistently ignoring humanitarian laws designed to protect 
civilians during conflict, leading to civilian casualties, the 
destruction of critical infrastructure, and mass displacement. 
Other drivers of forced migration, including generalized 
violence and severe climate-related events, such as droughts, 
flooding, extreme weather, and rising sea levels, show no signs 
of abating. Meanwhile, the global response has not kept pace 
with the enormity of need. The international community and 
national authorities have failed to address these causes of 
displacement. International organizations and host countries 
are struggling to protect and facilitate solutions for a 
growing population of forced migrants. More than ever before, 
U.S. leadership is needed to foster and catalyze a global 
coalition to address this crisis.
    Since its founding, the United States has offered freedom 
and opportunity to people around the world fleeing danger. Our 
history of welcoming desperate people with open arms--from 
European Jews following World War II to Indochinese boat people 
to Kosovar victims of ethnic cleansing--has reinforced our 
reputation as a place of refuge. Many of those who originally 
came to the United States seeking protection have gone on to 
become shining beacons for our nation--artists, innovators, 
public servants, and even representatives of the U.S. 
government. The Trump administration, however, has departed 
sharply from this historical precedent, abdicating U.S. 
leadership and undermining a global response. Available legal 
pathways for asylum, refugee resettlement, and protection in 
the United States have been severed. Refugees from Muslim-
majority countries, including those fleeing atrocities in 
Syria, have been barred. Small children have been forcibly 
separated from their families and held in detention centers. 
Migrants fleeing violence and threats to their lives have been 
returned by the United States to dangerous border encampments 
in Mexico, waiting for decisions on their applications for 
months or even years.



                                  (v)

    Given this challenging landscape, I directed my senior 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member for 
Migration & Human Rights, Charlotte Oldham-Moore, and SFRC 
Democratic Staff to prepare a comprehensive report on the 
global forced migration crisis. In conducting research for this 
report, SFRC Democratic Staff interviewed dozens of migration 
and humanitarian experts, analyzed key documents and reports, 
and carried out research trips to Colombia, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Bangladesh, Mexico, and Ethiopia, meeting with U.S. and 
national, provincial, and municipal government officials, 
United Nations and international nongovernmental organization 
representatives, as well as forced migrants and their host 
communities. I also want to thank Marisa Lowe, Judith Williams, 
and the SFRC Democratic Staff for their work on this report.
    The result of this research is a comprehensive report that 
lays bare the facts of today's global forced migration crisis, 
the drivers of displacement, the trends impacting the 
situations of forced migrants, the international community's 
response, and the Trump administration's retreat. It describes 
a global forced migration crisis that is, at its crux, a 
political crisis requiring political solutions to confront the 
drivers of forced migration, as well as address the large 
numbers living in displacement.
    This report makes the case for urgent and sweeping action 
on the global forced migration crisis and argues the need for 
the United States to make a dramatic course correction in 
leading this global response. The report also makes timely 
recommendations for Congress, the Executive Branch, the United 
Nations, and other stakeholders to improve policies on forced 
migration. Today, there must be a bipartisan sense of urgency 
for renewed U.S. efforts to reform our domestic policies and 
international engagement relating to migration. Ignoring the 
plight of millions of forced migrants worldwide will only 
ensure that our future--the world's and the United States'--
will be far less secure and far bleaker. As the world grapples 
with global crisis, we must come together in global solidarity 
and remember those among us who have experienced the utmost 
dangers and require protection.
    Sincerely,


                                           Robert Menendez,
                                                    Ranking Member.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  A young Afghan girl waits to receive assistance at her returnee and 
refugee village on the outskirts of Farah City in western Afghanistan. 
 Lt. j.g. Matthew Stroup, 130209-N-LR347-329, U.S. Navy, Feb. 9, 2013.



                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

                              ----------                              

    A girl born in a refugee camp lives her whole life in a 
temporary shelter, waiting to return home to a community she 
has never known, a community repeatedly ravaged by war. A 
farmer leaves his village when insurgents arrive, then searches 
and fails to find shelter, water, and food. He is told to 
return home and is then displaced again by conflict, cycling 
back and forth in continuous, destitute movement. A nurse, 
terrorized by gang violence outside her home and domestic 
violence inside her home, fears for her and her daughter's 
lives and leaves. They are turned away at the border, forced to 
wait, living in perilous tent encampments on the border, and 
finally deported back to danger. A fisherman is forced from 
their coastal community due to rising sea levels--they are no 
longer able to find sufficient potable water for their family 
to drink. They move to an urban slum to live amongst thousands 
of others who have suffered the same plight. A local official 
is forced to leave her island after tropical storm after 
tropical storm forces her to come to terms with the fact that 
her home is no longer inhabitable. She struggles to not only 
find somewhere for herself and her family, but for her whole 
island's population--now forced to flee. No one is willing to 
provide them safe haven. The rich countries have closed their 
borders and erected walls that thousands of individuals attempt 
to circumvent daily. The poorer countries are inundated, less 
stable, and unable to provide services or safety. Thousands die 
each year attempting to find some place that will accept them. 
Millions are subjected to violence and abuse. Millions of 
children go uneducated.
    These are the stories of forced migrants today. The 
exponentially increasing number of men, women, and children 
forced from their homes due to conflict, persecution, and 
severe climate-related weather events is one of the most 
profound and least understood challenges facing the world. 
Despite the global upheaval this crisis presents, too few 
political leaders, policymakers, and members of the public are 
aware of the facts. By the end of 2018, 70.8 million people 
were forcibly displaced across the world, including 25.9 
million refugees, 41.3 million internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), and 3.5 million asylum seekers.\1\ These figures may 
not include, however, forced migrants who are not recognized 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its accompanying 
international legal framework, such as those fleeing 
generalized violence or severe climate-related events. The 
forced migrant crisis will continue to swell as existing 
conflicts continue, new conflicts arise, and the impacts of 
climate change spur new conflicts, render communities 
uninhabitable, and cause severe weather events. In the absence 
of swift, effective action, the number of forced migrants could 
climb to more than 300 million over the next decade--a 
population nearly equal to that of the entire United States.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global 
Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2, 65-66, 68-69 (June 2019). 
This number also includes 25.9 million refugees and 3.5 million asylum-
seekers. Id. Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A Guide to International 
Refugee Protection and Building State Asylum Systems, Inter-
Parliamentary Union and UNHCR, at 11, 16 (2017).
    \2\ Erol K. Yayboke & Aaron N. Milner, Confronting the Global 
Forced Migration Crisis: A Report of the CSIS Task Force on the Global 
Forced Migration Crisis, Center for Strategic & International Studies 
(CSIS), at 33 (May 2018). Yayboke & Miller (2018) projections based on 
extrapolations from trends found in UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2016 (June 19, 2017); U.S. Census Bureau, ``World and 
Population Clock,'' https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited June 
9, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Faced with the magnitude of today's global forced migration 
crisis, many countries, including the United States, have 
chosen to turn their backs on these desperate and resilient 
people. The loss of support from key world leaders has dealt a 
startling blow to an international community already struggling 
to address the drivers of forced migration, and to protect and 
find permanent solutions for forced migrants. Without a 
significant course correction towards robust U.S. leadership 
and an engaged international community, the global forced 
migration challenges we face today will compound in coming 
decades. If we fail to act, the crisis will not only pose 
serious risks to the many million forced migrant lives at 
stake, but will inevitably challenge global stability, economic 
growth, and U.S. national security.
    Today's forced migration crisis is driven by several 
factors, including increasingly frequent and intense conflict, 
as well as climate change. From 2013 to 2018, the number of 
active conflicts worldwide increased by 53 percent from 34 to 
52 conflicts.\3\ As of 2013, the average length of conflict was 
37 years.\4\ State and non-state actors alike are more 
blatantly violating international humanitarian law and 
deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, 
such as medical facilities and schools.\5\ In 2018, a record-
breaking 12,000-plus children were killed or maimed by 
conflict.\6\ Nearly 31 million children were displaced at the 
end of 2017.\7\ Furthermore, the effects of climate change, 
including more frequent and severe natural disasters, are 
increasingly forcing people to flee their homes.\8\ In 2016, 24 
million people were newly displaced due to sudden-onset natural 
disasters--outnumbering new displacement associated with 
conflict and violence by 3 to 1.\9\ Unfortunately, there is no 
clear end or reversal in sight for any of these trends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Scott Gates et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2014, Peace 
Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2016). Harvard Strand et al., Trends in 
Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
    \4\ Christina Bennett et al., Time to Let Go: Remaking Humanitarian 
Action for the Modern Era, Overseas Development Institute, at 29 (Apr. 
2016).
    \5\ David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue 
Committee, ``Welcome to the Age of Impunity,'' Remarks at the World 
Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 24, 2020.
    \6\ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA), Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 11 (Dec. 2019).
    \7\ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Data: Child 
Displacement, https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-
displacement/displacement/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
    \8\ United States Geological Survey, ``How Can Climate Change 
Affect Natural Disasters?,'' https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-can-climate-
change-affect-natural-disasters-1?qt-news--science--products=0#qt-
news--science--products (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
    \9\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ``Disasters and 
Climate Change,'' https://www.internal-displacement.org/disasters-and-
climate-change (last visited Apr. 13, 2020); UNHCR, ``Climate change 
and disaster displacement,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-
change-and-disasters.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    International bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council, are struggling to effectively address drivers 
of forced migration, including prolonged conflicts, proxy wars, 
violations of international humanitarian law, and climate 
change.\10\ Furthermore, the situations of those already 
displaced have continued to worsen. Despite specific 
conventions affording refugees international protection, 
refugees are frequently denied access to rights and 
services.\11\ Without international accountability, the 
situation of vulnerable refugees continues to deteriorate.\12\ 
Yet the circumstances are far worse for those without formal 
international protections, including those forcibly displaced 
within their countries (IDPs), as well as those forced to flee 
due to severe climate change-related events and generalized 
violence.\13\ Although some countries and regions have taken 
steps to provide IDPs with protection, many still, including 
the United States, have yet to recognize and address these 
vulnerable populations.\14\ Moreover, the traditional solutions 
for refugees--voluntary return, resettlement in a third 
country, or integration into their host country--are proving 
difficult to achieve, with voluntary returns and resettlement 
at historic lows.\15\ Without drastic international 
coordination and action, the magnitude of need will continue to 
swell.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``No Refuge: Why the World's 
Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking Options,'' Feb. 12, 2019; 
World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance Innovative, 
A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, at 2-3 
(2019).
    \11\ See, e.g., Asylum Access & the Refugee Work Rights Coalition, 
Global Refugee Work Rights Report 2014 (Sep. 2014); Amnesty 
International, Fears and Fences: Europe's Approach to Keeping Refugees 
at Bay (Nov. 2015).
    \12\ World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance 
Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, 
at 10, 27 (2019).
    \13\ Kathleen Newland, Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels, 
New Tools, Transatlantic Council on Migration & Migration Policy 
Institute (Apr. 2015).
    \14\ World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance 
Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, 
at 10 (2019).
    \15\ Danish Refugee Council et al., Joint NGO Recommendations on 
Durable Solutions for the Global Compact on Refugees' Programme of 
Action, at 3 (Dec. 12, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At this critical moment, the United States has deliberately 
turned its back on those seeking refuge. The Trump 
administration has crippled the United States' refugee 
resettlement, asylum, and temporary protection systems, and 
even closed our borders to those with legitimate asylum claims 
and protection needs. After resettling over 207,000 refugees in 
1980, we resettled just 30,000 refugees in Fiscal Year 
2019.\16\ For Fiscal Year 2020, the Trump administration's 
refugee ceiling is 18,000--the lowest in U.S. history at a time 
when the number of forced migrants has reached its highest in 
recorded history.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Migration Policy Institute, ``U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement 
Ceilings and Number of Refugees Admitted, 1980-Present,'' https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-
resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2019); U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration Refugee Processing Center, ``Historical 
Arrivals Broken Down by Region (1975-Present),'' https://
www.wrapsnet.org/documents/
Refugee%20Admissions%20by%20Region%20since%201975%20as%20of%204-9-
20.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
    \17\ Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal 
Year 2020, Presidential Determination No. 2020-04, Nov. 1, 2019; UNHCR, 
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These regressive actions have damaged the United States' 
moral leadership, demonstrated a retreat from global leadership 
in responding to crises, and compromised our ability to forge 
cooperative relationships with our international partners. The 
administration's ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' separated terrified 
migrant children, including infants, from their parents, and 
drew criticism from Congress, the United Nations, religious 
leaders, and medical professionals, among many others.\18\ The 
decimation of U.S. refugee resettlement has left refugee-
hosting countries like Jordan, Bangladesh, Uganda, and Turkey 
in a bind with fewer opportunities for resolution.\19\ While 
the United States previously led the charge on championing 
refugee resettlement and human rights, the Trump administration 
has actively hindered international efforts to respond to the 
forced migration crisis. By damaging our global reputation and 
relationships with other countries, the United States' actions 
towards forced migrants impair our ability to effectively rally 
international cooperation, including in situations where our 
own security and stability is threatened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Kevin D. Williamson, ``Immigration Policy: Bordering on 
Madness,'' National Review, June 25, 2019; Catherine E. Shoichet, 
``Doctors Saw Immigrant Kids Separated from Their Parents. Now They're 
Trying to Stop It,'' CNN, June 14, 2018; Amy Wang, ``Officials Blast 
Trump Policy After Visiting Detained Immigrants,'' Chicago Tribune, 
June 10, 2018; Emma Green, ``Religious Leaders Condemn Family 
Separations--but Not Necessarily Trump'', The Atlantic, June 19, 2018; 
Brad Tuttle, `` `Heartless, Cruel, Immoral.' Every Major CEO Who 
Condemned Trump's `Zero Tolerance' Border Policy,''Money, June 20, 
2018; Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Rights Chief Tells U.S. to Stop Taking 
Migrant Children From Parents,'' The New York Times, June 18, 2018; 
Tara Isabella Burton, ``Pope Francis Condemns Trump's Family Separation 
Policy,'' Vox, June 20, 2018.
    \19\ Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, ``Trump's Refugee Cuts Threaten Deep 
Consequences at Home and Abroad,'' The New York Times, Sept. 11, 2019; 
Michelle Nichols, ``Exclusive: Bangladesh PM says expects no help from 
Trump on refugees fleeing Myanmar,'' Reuters, Sept. 18, 2017; Queen 
Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan, ``Why Global Leadership on Refugees 
Matters,'' CNN, Sept. 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    New tools have been developed to address the modern forced 
migration crisis, but more innovation, implementation, and 
commitments are needed. Such efforts are game-changing, but 
nascent. The World Bank has partnered with the United Nations 
and others to extend concessional financing and grants to low- 
and middle-income countries struggling with the fiscal impact 
of hosting large refugee populations.\20\ There is also growing 
use of technology and private sector engagement working to 
better serve forced migrant populations.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ World Bank Group International Development Association, 
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited Aug. 27, 2019); 
Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), 2017-2018 Annual Report, 
at 5-6 (Dec. 2018). Concessional financing can be in the form of 
grants, or loans. Concessional loans have more generous terms than 
market loans. They generally include below-market interest rates, grace 
periods in which the recipient is not required to make debt payments 
for several years or a combination of low interest rates/grace periods. 
See U.S. Agency for International Development, ``What Sources of Grants 
or Concessional Financing Exist to Help with Mini-Grids in Developing 
Countries?,'' Feb. 13, 2018.
    \21\ Ammar A. Malik et al., Private-Sector Humanitarians?: New 
Approaches in the Global Refugee Response, Urban Institute (Sept. 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite these positive examples, the overall global 
response is not keeping pace with the enormity of need. While 
funding for humanitarian responses has increased, exponentially 
increasing needs have created a wider gap. In 2007, the United 
Nations reported a 2 percent or approximately 2 billion dollar 
shortfall on its appeals for humanitarian response funding.\22\ 
As of 2018, the number has risen to an appalling shortfall of 
39 percent, or approximately 10 billion dollars in unmet 
needs.\23\ At the same time, vulnerable groups remain in limbo 
while solutions to their plight cannot keep pace. In 2018, for 
example, there was a more than 99 percent gap between the 
number of refugees worldwide and global resettlement 
spaces.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, ``Appeals and response 
plans 2007,'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2007 (last 
visited June 5, 2020). Note that OCHA/FTS figures rely on accurate and 
timely reporting by governments and organizations and therefore may be 
incomplete. Id.
    \23\ UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, ``Appeals and response 
plans 2018,'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2018 (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
    \24\ International Rescue Committee, 10 things to know about the 
Global Refugee Crisis and America's lack of leadership: An IRC analysis 
of the latest annual reports from the UN Refugee Agency (July 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic has reaffirmed the 
vulnerability of forced migrant populations around the world--
often living in overcrowded settings, lacking adequate access 
to healthcare, unable to access reliable information, working 
in the informal sector, and reliant on humanitarian aid.\25\ 
Well-intentioned government policies to mitigate the spread of 
the virus may exacerbate inequalities and disproportionately 
impact the already disadvantaged, including forced 
migrants.\26\ At the same time, some governments, including the 
United States, have used the COVID-19 pandemic as pretext for 
accelerating regressive actions--blaming foreigners for the 
spread of COVID-19, deporting migrants, and denying access to 
asylum procedures.\27\ As the world grapples with how to 
contain the virus and recover from the pandemic, we must 
remember that this is a global phenomenon, and we are only as 
strong as our most vulnerable link. The fates of millions of 
desperate and suffering forced migrants cannot be ignored--at 
the very least, because their susceptibility to the virus 
represents a potential obstacle in the global fight against the 
pandemic. The path to solving global crises is forged through 
international cooperation and commitments--not cowardice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced: Addressing 
the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian Emergencies (Mar. 
30, 2020); International Rescue Committee, COVID-19 in Humanitarian 
Crises: A Double Emergency (Apr. 2020); Andrej Mahecic, ``Displaced 
people urgently need aid and access to social safety nets as 
coronavirus causes severe hardship,'' UNHCR, May 1, 2020; UNOCHA, 
Global Humanitarian Response Plan: COVID-19, at 13-16 (Mar. 2020).
    \26\ Mauro Testaverde, ``Social protection for migrants during the 
COVID-19 crisis: The right and smart choice,'' World Bank Blogs, Apr. 
28, 2020. UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Response Plan: COVID-19, at 15 
(Mar. 2020).
    \27\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced: Addressing 
the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian Emergencies (Mar. 
30, 2020); Nicole Narea, ``The US has abandoned asylum seekers in 
Mexico during the pandemic,'' Vox, May 13, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States can and must lead a new global effort to 
address the global forced migration crisis. Current trends, 
including the challenge of climate change, will force more 
people to flee their homes, be on the move, and live in 
displacement. As the number of those forcibly displaced 
continues to balloon, the need for innovative and comprehensive 
international responses is imperative. Under the Trump 
administration, the United States has responded to the forced 
migration crisis with fear and regressive policies. In order to 
mitigate global instability and regain our standing as a nation 
committed to principled leadership in the world, the United 
States must reverse course and lead the charge in securing 
international cooperation and new solutions for today's forced 
migrants. How the United States chooses to respond to these 
events will define the world we will live in, and the role the 
United States plays in it.
Defining Forced Migration
    For the purposes of this report, we use the term ``forced 
migration'' to refer to the movement of people in which the 
drivers involve force, compulsion, or coercion. This includes 
those forcibly displaced by persecution and conflict across 
country borders (refugees and asylum seekers) and within 
country borders (IDPs), and additionally seeks to encompass 
people who migrate due to other situations of violence, severe 
climate-related events, trafficking, as well as a range of 
potentially overlapping causes. The term ``forced migration'' 
is not meant to take a stand in ongoing debates regarding 
protections under international law and the concept of agency 
in relation to a distinction between ``forced'' and 
``voluntary.''\28\ ``Forced migration'' is not used in defiance 
or to criticize the various terms that have been adopted to 
describe these populations, but aspires to capture the pressing 
and diverse needs and realities of those forced to flee their 
homes today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Glossary on 
Migration, at 77 (2019). ``While not an international legal concept, 
this term has been used to describe the movements of refugees, 
displaced persons (including those displaced by disasters or 
development projects), and, in some instances, victims of trafficking. 
At the international level the use of this term is debated because of 
the widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists rather 
than a voluntary/forced dichotomy and that it might undermine the 
existing legal international protection regime.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methodology
    In conducting research for this report, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Democratic Staff interviewed dozens of 
migration and humanitarian experts, analyzed key documents and 
reports, and carried out research trips to Colombia, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Bangladesh, Mexico, and Ethiopia. In each country, staff 
met with U.S. and national, provincial, and municipal 
government officials, UN and international nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) representatives, as well as forced migrants 
and their host communities. In Colombia, staff focused on the 
plight of Venezuelan refugees, and in Tunisia, staff focused on 
forced migrants in and traveling through Libya.\29\ Egypt is 
host to Syrian, Palestinian, and African refugees.\30\ 
Bangladesh hosts over 900,000 stateless Rohingya refugees from 
Burma.\31\ Ethiopia is not only one of the largest refugee-
hosting countries in Africa, but also has over 3 million 
IDPs.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ In the absence of a U.S. embassy in Tripoli, the U.S. Libya 
External Liaison Office is based in Tunis.
    \30\ UNHCR, Egypt Fact Sheet, at 1 (May 2019).
    \31\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 22 (June 
2019).
    \32\ UNOCHA, Ethiopia Situation Report No. 23, at 1 (June 2019); 
UNHCR, ``Ethiopia,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ethiopia.html (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of Report
    This report provides an analysis of the present global 
forced migration crisis, the challenges it presents to local 
communities, national governments, the international system, 
and to the vulnerable men, women, and children themselves who 
are forced to migrate. Taken together, these facts represent a 
clarion call urging for strong leadership, international 
solidarity, and innovation to reduce the suffering of forced 
migrants and effectively address the sheer magnitude of the 
crisis. Chapter One lays out the magnitude of today's global 
forced migration crisis. Chapter Two explores the global trends 
catalyzing the forced migration of people and the 
characteristics of their displacement. Chapter Three examines 
the systematic denial of forced migrants' fundamental human 
rights across all phases of their forced migration. Chapter 
Four outlines international efforts to address forced 
migration, including diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and 
international legal frameworks. The chapter also highlights 
regional and country efforts to more adequately address forced 
migration, as well as dramatic inconsistencies in country-level 
responses. Chapter Five details the Trump administration's 
domestic policies and practices towards forced migrants, with 
particular attention to refugees and asylum seekers. Chapter 
Six describes the administration's erosion of U.S. diplomatic 
engagement and international leadership in addressing forced 
migration and humanitarian crises. Chapter Seven examines the 
urgent need for new, innovative solutions as traditional 
responses have proven inadequate to address the scale and 
complexity of forced migration today. Finally, the Findings and 
Recommendations outline necessary actions needed to respond to 
the current forced migration crisis in order to prevent and 
mitigate disastrous global effects.
    Below, we have summarized the principal findings and 
principal recommendations of this report. More detailed 
Findings & Recommendations can be found beginning on page 137.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
    Through expert interviews, observations from the field, and 
research of current policies and best practices to date, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democratic Staff found the 
following:


   The scale of today's forced migration crisis is 
        unprecedented and, if left unaddressed, will grow in 
        size and complexity. A confluence of factors, including 
        persistent climate-related shocks and increasingly 
        frequent, highly violent, and protracted conflicts 
        impacting civilians have resulted in a record number of 
        people forced to flee their homes around the globe. By 
        the end of 2018, there were over 70 million refugees, 
        asylum seekers, and IDPs worldwide. Many forced 
        migrants are unable to return home for decades, often 
        live in urban environments in developing countries, and 
        face severe restrictions to and violations of their 
        human rights. The COVID-19 pandemic has only magnified 
        the extreme vulnerabilities of forced migrant 
        populations, highlighted by dangerously overcrowded 
        settings and inadequate access to basic healthcare.

   The international community has struggled to address 
        drivers of forced migration and support the growing 
        number of forced migrants worldwide. Armed actors have 
        increasingly failed to adhere to international law, 
        attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure, and 
        interfering with humanitarian aid with impunity. The UN 
        Security Council, largely due to vetoes by its 
        permanent members, has struggled to uphold its core 
        mandate of maintaining peace and security, and has 
        failed to hold violators of international law 
        accountable. Despite specific international legal 
        conventions affording refugees protection, some 
        countries have denied refugees basic rights and 
        services. The situation is often much worse for those 
        without pathways for national and international 
        protection, including IDPs and those displaced by 
        severe climate-related events.

   The United States' retreat from humanitarian obligations 
        and international cooperation under the Trump 
        administration has dealt a grave blow to the 
        international system. The United States has 
        historically served as a global leader in humanitarian 
        response, humanitarian diplomacy, and refugee 
        resettlement. The Trump administration, by contrast, 
        has used every mechanism at its disposal to block legal 
        pathways for refuge, undermining longstanding U.S. 
        policies. As global need continues to grow, major 
        donors such as the United States have reduced 
        humanitarian financing, and the scale of need is far 
        outpacing available assistance. Furthermore, the United 
        States' regressive leadership has emboldened other 
        countries to abandon their responsibilities to protect 
        refugees and other forced migrants, and has impaired an 
        already-weakened system of international cooperation 
        for responding to global crises like forced migration.

   A dramatic change in course is needed to address the 
        drivers of forced migration and adequately meet the 
        needs of today's forced migrants. Recent efforts in 
        humanitarian financing, aid, diplomacy, and the private 
        sector highlight opportunities to reinvigorate forced 
        migration responses, although greater support is needed 
        to drive these innovations. These initiatives include 
        new international and national compacts on refugees, 
        the World Bank's concessional financing, and a myriad 
        of private partnerships aimed at providing services and 
        opportunities to forced migrants. Given the scale of 
        today's forced migration crisis, these efforts also 
        underscore a need for collaborative action and 
        widespread rethinking across all sectors--government, 
        finance, and private companies--in order to 
        comprehensively address the crisis.

                              ----------                              


PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
    Forced migration will fuel future destabilization if not 
addressed and managed appropriately. While President Trump has 
repeatedly requested severe cuts to the humanitarian assistance 
budget, Congress has consistently appropriated funds well above 
the presidential request. The needs, however, remain enormous, 
and more must be done to increase resources, encourage 
innovation, empower policy leadership, and address root causes 
diplomatically. To these ends, this report recommends the 
following actions be undertaken by Congress, the Executive 
Branch, and the United Nations:


   The United States Government must reinvigorate efforts to 
        uphold international humanitarian law and resolve 
        conflict, a primary driver of forced migration. 
        Congress should authorize the expanded use of sanctions 
        and other tools against perpetrators of international 
        humanitarian law violations and those who deny aid 
        access for life-saving assistance. The Executive 
        Branch, including the Departments of State and Defense, 
        should ensure U.S. military assistance, such as arms 
        sales, military training, and other defense services, 
        is contingent on the implementation of civilian harm 
        mitigation policies and adherence to international 
        humanitarian law.

   The United States must pursue protection for all forced 
        migrants worldwide. Both Congress and the Executive 
        Branch must ensure that protections afforded to 
        refugees, IDPs, and other forced migrants by 
        international and national laws are upheld within, at, 
        and outside our borders. Congress should mandate 
        regular reports from the State Department and USAID on 
        the rights and situations of forced migrant 
        populations, including refugees and IDPs.

   The United States must reform and improve upon domestic 
        efforts to address forced migration by restoring the 
        U.S. refugee resettlement program and creating 
        complementary pathways for protection. Harmful Trump 
        administration policies towards forced migrants, 
        including the Remain in Mexico policy and ``safe third 
        country'' agreements, must be terminated. Both Congress 
        and the Executive Branch must take steps to ensure that 
        the U.S. refugee ceiling is increased in line with 
        global need. Both branches should also work to expand 
        our understanding of U.S. refugee law based on current 
        realities and create complementary pathways to protect 
        other forced migrant populations. By reclaiming our 
        reputation as a place of refuge, the United States can 
        lead on securing global solutions.

   The United States must promote global cooperation efforts 
        to address the forced migration crisis. The Executive 
        Branch should join the Global Compact for Refugees, the 
        Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular 
        Migration, and the Paris Climate Agreement. 
        Reinvigorating the momentum behind the 2016 New York 
        Declaration, the United States should lead efforts 
        convening host governments, donors, the private sector, 
        civil society, and forced migrant representatives to 
        form a new compact supporting the inclusion of forced 
        migrant populations in host countries.

   The United Nations should take further action to enforce 
        international humanitarian law and improve protections 
        for forced migrants. The UN's role in responding to and 
        alleviating the forced migration crisis has never been 
        more important. The UN must use its tools, including 
        Boards of Inquiry, Commissions of Inquiry, and the 
        International Court of Justice, to enforce 
        international law and end rampant impunity, including 
        by publishing findings and identifying perpetrators of 
        violations of international law. The UN Secretary-
        General should call on host countries to incorporate 
        forced migrant populations into their national action 
        plans. Moreover, the UN Secretary-General should 
        promote awareness and renewed responses for IDP 
        populations by elevating the role of Special Rapporteur 
        on the Human Rights of IDPs to Special Representative 
        on IDPs and encouraging the implementation and 
        ratification of the UN's Guiding Principles on 
        International Displacement.


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        

  Committee staff analysis based on UNHCR Population Statistics Data 
   (last visited May 27, 2020). Excludes United Nations Relief Works 
    Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) refugee 
   populations due to lack of consistent year-over-year reporting of 
  figures. These figures include populations categorized as refugees, 
internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers and do not necessarily 
  capture all forced migrants who do not meet specific definitions of 
                           these categories.



                              CHAPTER ONE



              The Scale of Today's Forced Migration Crisis

                              ----------                              

    While forced migration is not a new phenomenon, the 
magnitude and complexity of today's global forced migration 
crisis is unprecedented.\33\ Media images and daily news from 
all over the world shed light on the plight of desperate 
civilians on the move. The haunting photo of a drowned three-
year old Syrian boy on the beach in Turkey.\34\ Reports of mass 
rape, executions, torture, and burning villages in Burma, 
driving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from their homes.\35\ 
These are just snapshots in time. To properly understand the 
scale of today's forced migration crisis, the overarching facts 
and figures need to be laid bare:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ There is some debate over whether the number of forced 
migrants today is truly ``unprecedented'' given there has not been 
accurate global data collected on forced migration for much of the 
world's history. In addition to its scale, however, the current crisis 
is unprecedented due to the protracted nature of displacement, the 
atrocities driving displacement, and the incredibly vulnerable 
situations of forced migrants. See Benjamin Thomas White, ``Talk of an 
`unprecedented' number of refugees is wrong--and dangerous,''  The New 
Humanitarian, Oct. 3, 2019; Elizabeth Ferris, ``Unpacking the numbers 
on global refugees,'' Brookings Institution, June 20, 2017; UN News 
Services, ``UN, humanitarian community struggling to meet unprecedented 
needs of refugees,'' Oct. 5, 2015; See also Chapters 2 and 3 for 
further details.
    \34\ See Diane Cole, ``Study: What Was The Impact Of The Iconic 
Photo Of The Syrian Boy?,'' NPR, Jan. 13, 2017.
    \35\ See, e.g., ``Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the 
crisis,'' BBC, Jan. 23, 2020; Human Rights Watch, ``Rohingya Crisis,'' 
https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya-crisis (last visited May 27, 2020).


   On average, 37,000 people were forced from their homes 
        every single day in 2018;\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 
2019).

   In 2019, 1 out of every 109 people in the world was either 
        a refugee, asylum seeker, or internally displaced 
        person (IDP);\37\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020); United Nations, 
``World Population Prospects 2019,'' https://population.un.org/wpp/
DataQuery/. Using the world population of 7.7 billion in 2019 against 
the UNHCR-reported figure of 70.8 million forcibly displaced from June 
2019.

   The world's refugee, asylum-seeking, and IDP populations 
        totaled at least 70.8 million in 2019.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020). This figure 
includes populations categorized as refugees, internally displaced 
persons, and asylum seekers, but does not necessarily capture all 
forced migrants who may not be recognized under the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention and its accompanying international legal framework.


    The following statistics only begin to illustrate the scale 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and complexity of today's forced migration crisis:


   57 percent of refugees registered with the United Nations 
        High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) fled from three 
        countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan;\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020); See Chapter 4 for 
further details on UNHCR.

   Nearly 25 million people were newly displaced due to 
        disasters in 2019;\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on 
Internal Displacement 2020 (Apr. 2020).

   About 80 percent of refugees reside in countries 
        neighboring the countries from which they fled;\41\and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ UNHCR, ``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited June 8, 2020).

   The world's refugee, asylum-seeking, and IDP populations 
        include approximately 30 million children.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Press Release, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Around 
30 million children displaced by conflict need protection now and 
sustainable solutions over the long term, June 19, 2018.


    Just a handful of crises have caused massive forced 
migration, and their effects are felt far beyond their borders. 
Violence in Burma, Syria, South Sudan, and Venezuela has 
generated massive spillover effects to neighboring 
countries.\43\ As these contexts have also demonstrated, 
significant surges in forced migration can exacerbate fragile 
situations in impacted countries and destabilize entire 
regions.\44\ Many such countries are not prepared for large 
influxes of forced migrants and are unable to meet basic 
humanitarian needs.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ See ``MSF estimates more than 6,700 Rohingya killed in 
Myanmar,'' BBC, Dec. 14, 2017; UNHCR, ``Operational Portal: South 
Sudan,'' https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan (last visited 
May 27, 2020); UNHCR, ``Syria emergency,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
syria-emergency.html (last visited May 27, 2020); Regional Inter-Agency 
Coordination Platform, ``Response for Venezuelans,'' https://r4v.info/
en/situations/platform (last visited May 27, 2020).
    \44\ Uri Dadush & Mona Niebuhr, ``The Economic Impact of Forced 
Migration,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Apr. 22, 2016.
    \45\ Susan Fratzke & Camille Le Coz, Strengthening Refugee 
Protection in Low-and Middle-Income Countries, Migration Policy 
Institute (Feb. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An exhaustive review of ongoing conflicts and humanitarian 
emergencies is not necessary to begin appreciating the horrors 
that civilians experience in times of crisis. Still, it is 
worthwhile to outline some contemporary examples of conflict--
resulting in forced migration populations Committee staff met 
with in-person--that continue to challenge the humanitarian 
community and the existing political and legal frameworks 
intended to support vulnerable forced migrants.


   Burma: In August 2017, a brutal military campaign in 
        Rakhine, Burma triggered the flight of an estimated 
        745,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, including more than 
        400,000 children.\46\ In Burma, entire villages were 
        burned to the ground, thousands were killed, families 
        were separated, and women and girls were raped. The 
        massive influx of refugees quickly overwhelmed Cox's 
        Bazar, Bangladesh and led to the growth of the world's 
        largest refugee camp.\47\ Prior to the crisis in 2017, 
        thousands of Rohingya refugees already resided in this 
        region of Bangladesh after fleeing earlier episodes of 
        violence and, to this day, the root causes for their 
        flight from Rakhine, Burma have not been resolved.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ UNOCHA, ``Rohingya Refugee Crisis,'' https://www.unocha.org/
rohingya-refugee-crisis (last visited June 8, 2020).
    \47\ Id.; ``Former UN Chief Says Bangladesh Cannot Continue Hosting 
Rohingya,'' Al Jazeera, July 10, 2019.
    \48\ Medecins Sans Frontieres, ``Timeline: A Visual History of the 
Rohingya Refugee Crisis,'' Aug. 23, 2019.

   Syria: Since the conflict in Syria began in 2011, more than 
        half of Syria's population of 21 million has been 
        displaced, including 6.6 million who are internally 
        displaced and 5.6 million refugees who fled to and are 
        still residing in neighboring countries.\49\ At least 
        13 million who remain inside Syria need basic 
        humanitarian assistance.\50\ In 2018, an average 4,477 
        civilians were displaced each day, a figure which 
        increased dramatically in early 2020 during the 
        military offensive in northwest Syria, when nearly one 
        million people were displaced within three months.\51\ 
        From December 2019 to February 2020, more than 11,000 
        Syrians were displaced from their homes each day.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ UNHCR, ``Syria emergency,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-
emergency.html (last visited June 8, 2020); World Bank, ``Population, 
total--Syrian Arab Republic,'' https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SY (last visited June 8, 2020).
    \50\ UNHCR, ``Syria Emergency,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-
emergency.html (last visited June 8, 2020).
    \51\ UNOCHA, ``Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019,'' https://hno-
syria.org/#key-figures (last visited May 27, 2020); UNOCHA, Syrian Arab 
Republic: Recent Developments in Northwest Syria (Mar. 5, 2020).
    \52\ `` `A horrifying new level': UN says 900,000 displaced in 
Northwest Syria since December,'' France24, Feb. 17, 2020.

   South Sudan: The conflict in South Sudan--which began in 
        December 2013--has had ripple effects across the 
        region, with more than two million people fleeing to 
        neighboring countries.\53\ To make matters worse, South 
        Sudan's neighboring countries were already struggling 
        to manage pre-existing humanitarian emergencies and 
        support displaced populations.\54\ As of May 2020, 
        Uganda hosted more than 880,000 refugees from South 
        Sudan.\55\ Within South Sudan, two-thirds of the 
        population needs humanitarian aid.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ UNHCR, ``Operational Portal: South Sudan,'' https://
data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan (last visited May 27, 2020).
    \54\ See UNOCHA, Annual Report, at 1 (2013); Sulaiman Momodu, 
``Refugees turn to Ethiopia for safety and asylum,'' Africa Renewal, 
Apr. 2015; UNHCR, ``Dadaab Refugee Complex,'' https://www.unhcr.org/ke/
dadaab-refugee-complex (last visited June 8, 2020); USA for UNHCR, 
``Central African Republic Refugee Crisis,'' https://
www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/car/ (last visited May 29, 2020).
    \55\ UNHCR, ``Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal,'' 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga (last visited May 27, 2020).
    \56\ UNOCHA, South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, at 26 
(Nov. 2019).

   Venezuela: Although not considered a traditional conflict, 
        Venezuela's crisis is, by many measures, one of the 
        world's worst forced migration crises.\57\ More than 
        five million people have fled the country, and, if the 
        rate of forced displacement continues, it will soon 
        overtake Syria as the world's largest refugee 
        crisis.\58\ Widespread electricity and water shortages, 
        a crumbling heathcare system, as well as dwindling food 
        supplies, have forced many to flee in search of basic 
        services to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and elsewhere in 
        the region.\59\ Meanwhile, widespread violence, 
        propagated by gangs and government security forces, 
        have exacerbated refugee flows.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ See Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, The Brookings Institution, 
``Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and most underfunded 
in modern history,'' Dec. 9, 2019; Mercy Corps, ``The facts: 
Venezuela's humanitarian crisis,'' Aug. 13, 2019.
    \58\ Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, ``Response for 
Venezuelans,'' https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform (last visited 
May 27, 2020); Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, The Brookings Institution, 
``Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and most underfunded 
in modern history,'' Dec. 9, 2019.
    \59\ Mercy Corps, ``The facts: Venezuela's humanitarian crisis,'' 
Aug. 13, 2019; Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, ``Venezuela refugee crisis 
to become the largest and most underfunded in modern history,'' Dec. 9, 
2019.
    \60\ Dany Bahar & Meagan Dooley, ``Venezuela refugee crisis to 
become the largest and most underfunded in modern history,'' Dec. 9, 
2019; Oriana Van Praag, ``Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee 
Crisis,'' Wilson Center, Sept. 13, 2019; Frank Jack Daniel, ``Ultra-
violent gangs thrive in chaotic Venezuela despite crackdown,'' Reuters, 
Aug. 31, 2016.


    These examples only begin to paint a picture of the forced 
migrant crisis impacting our world today. The following 
chapters provide further details with the hope that greater 
understanding can spur new efforts to address the political, 
economic, social, and humanitarian elements of this crisis, and 
reduce the scale of immense human suffering it entails.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  A child carries a water jug, part of a bundle of supplies given to 
refugee families after they register, at the Dagahaley refugee camp in 
 Dadaab, Kenya. David Lienemann, Child with relief supplies in Kenya, 
                     The White House, Aug. 8, 2011.



                              CHAPTER TWO



                       Trends in Forced Migration

                              ----------                              

    Today, more men, women, and children are forced to flee 
their homes than ever before. Conflicts across the globe have 
increased in frequency and intensity. Furthermore, the rise of 
non-state armed actors like terrorists and violent gangs, urban 
conflict, restrictions on humanitarian access, violations of 
international humanitarian law, and climate change have 
exacerbated migration trends and complicated the international 
community's ability to respond. New trends, such as protracted 
displacement and urbanization, have challenged many of the 
available tools to support forced migrants. As these 
developments continue, protecting the human rights and meeting 
the basic needs of forced migrant populations will be 
increasingly challenging.

                     Why More People Are Fleeing: 
               The Changing Nature of Conflict & Violence

    Libya. South Sudan. Cameroon. Syria. Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Burma. Mali. The list of countries plagued by conflict 
goes on and on. The number of conflicts occurring worldwide is 
more than 60 percent greater than it was a decade ago.\61\ The 
characteristics of conflict have changed as well--conflicts 
last longer, are more likely to be within states rather than 
between states, are increasingly urban, and are more frequently 
involving non-state actors. These changes have taken place 
amidst major socio-economic and political changes around the 
globe, including a rise in populist nationalist governments, a 
weakened United Nations (UN) Security Council, and the absence 
of a single superpower willing to call for principled action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Emma Samman et al., SDG Progress: Fragility, crisis and 
leaving no one behind, Overseas Development Institute, at 13 (Sept. 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2019, conflict remained the primary driver of global 
humanitarian need.\62\ By the end of 2018, at least 70.8 
million people were forcibly displaced, primarily due to 
conflict and generalized violence, as well as persecution and 
human rights violations.\63\ Around 30 million children were 
displaced by conflict alone.\64\ These figures are the highest 
on record and represent dramatic increases over the past 
decade.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 5-6 (2019).
    \63\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2-3 
(June 2019); Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global 
Report on Internal Displacement 2019 Summary, at 6 (May 2019).
    \64\ Press Release, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Around 
30 million children displaced by conflict need protection now and 
sustainable solutions over the long term, June 20, 2018.
    \65\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 5 (June 
2019); UNHCR, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, 
Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, at 2 (June 16, 2009). UNHCR 
identified 42 million forcibly displaced persons at the end of 2008 
compared to over 70 million in 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increasingly Frequent & Prolonged Conflicts
    In 2013, there were 34 active conflicts globally.\66\ Just 
five years later, in 2018, there were 52.\67\ The world is not 
only seeing more outbreaks of conflict, but also conflicts that 
last longer than ever before. From 1990 to 2013, the average 
length of conflict nearly doubled--from 19 to 37 years.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Scott Gates et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2014, Peace 
Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2016).
    \67\ Harvard Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 
Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
    \68\ Christina Bennett et al., Time to let go: Remaking 
humanitarian action for the modern era, Overseas Development Institute, 
at 29 (Apr. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today, conflict is the main driver of humanitarian need--
accounting for 80 percent of global humanitarian assistance--
whereas ten years ago, the same percentage of humanitarian 
assistance went to victims of natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes and floods.\69\ In 2019, the UN estimated that just 
six conflict-driven humanitarian emergencies would be 
responsible for more than half of all people in need of 
humanitarian assistance and protection: Yemen, Syria, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Nigeria, and 
South Sudan.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Statement of Nancy Lindborg, President of the United States 
Institute of Peace, Hearing on Flashing Red: The State of Global 
Humanitarian Affairs, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Mar. 22, 2017, at 5.
    \70\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 4-5, 26 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Traditional Warring Parties & Proxy Warfare
    The characteristics of contemporary armed conflicts are 
vastly different from traditional wars. First, the parties to 
conflict have changed--they are more likely to be non-state 
actors, such as ethnic and religious groups, terrorist 
organizations, and criminal enterprises.\71\ These parties 
increasingly target civilian populations to further their 
political ambitions, create chaos to destabilize governments, 
and generally assert power.\72\ From gangs in Central America 
to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, civilians increasingly 
flee from persecution and violence resulting from these groups' 
brutal tactics to conquer territory and assert control over the 
populace.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Harvard Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 
Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
    \72\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary 
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 6 (2019).
    \73\ David James Cantor & Malte Plewa, Forced displacement and 
violent crime: a humanitarian crisis in Central America?, Overseas 
Development Institute (June 2017); International Crisis Group,`Averting 
an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, at 14 (Oct. 2019).'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Accordingly, conflicts are increasingly within countries 
(intrastate) as opposed to between countries (interstate).\74\ 
However, the rise of great power competition has led to 
increased proxy warfare and internationalized civil conflict, 
where external actors are involved in intrastate conflicts.\75\ 
Over the past decade, internationalized civil conflict has 
grown to make up almost 40 percent of conflicts today.\76\ In 
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, the influx of material support 
from external powers has increased the lethality and duration 
of these conflicts.\77\ Furthermore, external nations' military 
support has weakened the effectiveness of humanitarian 
diplomacy and relief. In the case of Yemen, the United States 
is uniquely positioned to be a force for de-escalation in the 
conflict, but humanitarian diplomacy efforts have been 
undermined by U.S. military support for one side of the 
conflict.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Harvard Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 
Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (2019).
    \75\ ``Proxy war,'' Cambridge Dictionary (2011). A proxy war is 
defined as ``a war fought between groups or smaller countries that each 
represent the interests of other larger powers, and may have help and 
support from these.'' Id.
    \76\ Kendra Dupuy & Siri Aas Rustud, Trends in Armed Conflict, 
1946-2017, Peace Research Institute Oslo, at 2 (May 2018). Based off of 
2017 data of 49 armed conflicts, of which 19 were intrastate conflicts 
where external states contributed to troops on at least one side. Id.
    \77\ Candace Rondeaux & David Sterman, Twenty-First Century Proxy 
Warfare: Confronting Strategic Innovation in a Multipolar World, New 
America Foundation (Feb. 20, 2019).
    \78\ Michael LaForgia & Walt Bogdanich, ``Why Bombs Made in America 
Have Been Killing Civilians in Yemen,'' The New York Times, May 16, 
2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Widespread Violence & Criminality Driving
  Forced Migration
    While armed conflict is a well-established driver of 
displacement, it is increasingly urgent to address broader 
patterns of violence and criminality prompting forced 
migration. In Central America, for instance, the recent surge 
of displacement due to violence and insecurity has reached 
levels not seen since the 1980s, when the region was suffering 
from widespread armed conflict.\79\ The violence--largely 
perpetrated by organized gangs--is targeted against civilians 
and is more deadly than many conflicts taking place across the 
globe, leaving millions in need of basic humanitarian 
assistance.\80\ However, generally this type of violence is not 
officially recognized under international humanitarian law (the 
International Committee of the Red Cross categorizes it as 
``other situations of violence''), and challenges traditional 
criteria for refugee status and international protection.\81\ 
Nevertheless, the rapidly growing number of individuals from 
the region who are considered asylum seekers and refugees 
underscores the urgent need to address this trend.\82\ As of 
June 2020, there were 400,200 recognized refugees and asylum 
seekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras--a figure 
increasing at an annual rate of 13 percent.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ Nora Sturm, ``UNHCR calls for urgent action as Central America 
asylum claims soar,'' UNHCR News, Apr. 5, 2016.
    \80\ Press Release, Norwegian Refugee Council et al., A Regional 
Humanitarian Response Plan for an Intensifying Humanitarian Crisis in 
the North of Central America, June 28, 2019.
    \81\ Marguerite Cawley, ``Is Central America's Gang Violence A 
Humanitarians Crisis?,'' Insight Crime, July 18, 2014; International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Characteristics of Armed Conflicts & 
Other Situations of Violence (Oct. 2017).
    \82\ UNHCR, ``Displacement in Central America,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/displacement-in-central-america.html (last visited 
June 5, 2020).
    \83\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urbanization of Conflict
    The rise of urban warfare in places like Syria, Yemen, and 
Libya presents a complex set of challenges for the humanitarian 
community. First and foremost, civilian casualties are more 
likely to increase during urban conflicts.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Jan Egeland & Stephen O'Brien, ``International humanitarian 
law is unravelling before our eyes,'' The Guardian, Mar. 25, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, urban populations depend on large-scale 
infrastructure and networks for basic services, such as 
electricity and water, but do not have the means to directly 
control or restore them.\85\ As a result, damage to 
infrastructure has large-scale impacts.\86\ For example, the 
destruction of a single power line could impact an entire 
neighborhood with hundreds of thousands of residents, as well 
as hospitals and water pumping and treatment centers.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ ICRC, Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: a call 
for a better approach to assisting affected people, at 14 (2015).
    \86\ Id. at 14-15.
    \87\ Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between 2015 and 2018 in Yemen, for example, the Saudi-led 
coalition conducted 18,000 airstrikes--roughly one every 100 
minutes--one-third of which hit non-military targets.\88\ As a 
result, 50 percent of hospitals and clinics were closed, more 
than 70 percent did not have regular supplies of essential 
medicines, and more than 68 percent of the population was left 
without access to basic health care.\89\ The conflict has 
resulted in a collapsed health system unequipped to deal with 
the worst cholera outbreak in modern history, as well as the 
COVID-19 pandemic.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Press Release, International Rescue Committee, Civilian Deaths 
in Yemen up by 164% as United States Recertifies Support for the War, 
Sept. 25, 2018.
    \89\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 47 (2019); Press 
Release, International Rescue Committee, The Conflict in Yemen: Time 
for a New Approach, Apr. 5, 2018.
    \90\ World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for the 
Eastern Mediterranean, ``WHO experts sustain decrease in new cholera 
cases and deaths in Yemen,'' June 12, 2019; Stephanie Nebehay, 
``Yemen's health system `has in effect collapsed' as COVID spreads: 
U.N.,'' Reuters, May 22, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lastly, active conflicts in densely-populated urban areas 
lead to volatile population movements--a rapid influx of 
displaced civilians can significantly increase pressure on 
basic services relied upon by host populations, an especially 
dire situation when access to services was already poor.\91\ 
Today, most of the world's refugees and IDPs reside in cities 
or other urban areas.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ ICRC, Urban Services During Protracted Armed Conflict: a call 
for a better approach to assisting affected people, at 15-16 (2015).
    \92\ Hans Park, ``The Power of Cities,'' UNHCR, Nov. 25, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions on Aid Organizations & Attacks on Aid Workers
    In more than 40 countries, warring parties are denying 
humanitarian organizations access to desperate populations, 
with several of the worst crises, including Syria, Somalia, and 
Yemen, considered virtually inaccessible to humanitarian 
actors.\93\ Access restraints--where organizations are unable 
to reach affected populations or those populations are unable 
to obtain assistance--hinder humanitarian operations and 
exacerbate conditions on the ground.\94\ Furthermore, these 
restrictions directly violate international humanitarian law, 
which states that all parties to armed conflicts ``must allow 
and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian 
relief for civilians in need.''\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Humanitarian Access 
Overview (Aug. 2018).
    \94\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary 
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 9 (2019).
    \95\ International Committee of the Red Cross, ``Rule 55. Access 
for Humanitarian relief to Civilians in Need,'' https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1--rul--rule55 (last visited 
June 5, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Humanitarian organizations increasingly face bureaucratic 
restrictions and direct interference from warring parties.\96\ 
State and non-state actors employ a variety of tactics to 
restrain or deny humanitarian access by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and international agencies, including but 
not limited to: denying access to certain populations, 
restricting movement, interfering with activities, threatening 
relief personnel, and establishing burdensome bureaucratic 
measures.\97\ Some of the more alarming and illustrative cases 
of access challenges take form when siege is used as a tactic 
of war, which we have seen recently in the contexts of Nigeria 
and Yemen.\98\ In northeastern Nigeria, government authorities 
have restricted aid organizations from operating outside of 
government-controlled areas.\99\ As a result, aid agencies 
cannot reach an estimated 1.2 million people.\100\ In Yemen at 
the end of February 2020, 123 NGO projects were waiting on 
government approval, having waited on average for six months--
effectively denying aid to 8.2 million people who would have 
been served by the pending projects.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary 
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 9 (2019); 
UNOCHA, OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Access (2012).
    \97\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary 
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 9 (2019); 
UNOCHA, OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Access (2012).
    \98\ Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Army Restrictions Stifling Aid 
Efforts (Mar. 4, 2020); UNOCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Update, at 3 (Feb. 
2020).
    \99\ Id.
    \100\ UN Civil-Security Cooperation in Humanitarian Interventions 
in the North-East Workshop, Opening Remarks by Edward Kallon, Resident 
and Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria (Nov. 6, 2019).
    \101\ UNOCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Update, at 3 (Feb. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, aid workers and humanitarian facilities are 
frequently attacked. On what the UN considers its ``darkest 
day,'' a brazen attack against the UN in Baghdad in August 2003 
killed 22, including the UN Representative Sergio Vieira de 
Mello.\102\ In years since, however, attacks against aid 
workers have become more widespread. The Aid Worker Security 
Database, which independently tracks these incidents, 
documented 228 major incidents in 2018, a 31 percent increase 
from 2017 and the second highest number on record.\103\ 
Specifically, attacks on health facilities, supplies, and 
workers continue today at alarming rates--in 2019, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recorded 1,009 such attacks, compared 
to 795 attacks in 2018.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ ``In solemn tributes, UN to mark first anniversary of deadly 
terror attack in Baghdad,'' UN News, Aug. 18, 2004.
    \103\ The Aid Worker Security Database, ``Major attacks on aid 
workers: summary statistics (2008-2018),'' May 27, 2020, https://
aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary.
    \104\ WHO, ``Surveillance System for Attacks on health Care 
(SSA),'' https://publicspace.who.int/sites/ssa/SitePages/
PublicDashboard.aspx (last visited June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impunity & the Degradation of International
  Humanitarian Law
    State and non-state actors alike are increasingly ignoring 
the traditional rules of war enshrined in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, which seek to reduce the devastating impact of 
wars on civilians. Armed actors often fail to take precautions 
to protect civilians, and some even delibera\105\1 In 2018, the 
UN Security Council reported that civilians accounted for the 
vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts across the 
globe.\106\ 2018 also saw 12,000 children killed or maimed by 
conflict--the highest figure on record.\107\ At one point 
during the conflict in Yemen, civilians accounted for 93 
percent of documented casualties.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary 
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 6 (2019); 
UNOCHA, ``5 ways to better protect civilians in conflict zones,'' Aug. 
15, 2018.
    \106\ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary 
General: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, at 1 (2019).
    \107\ ``New UN report shows record number of children killed and 
maimed in conflict,'' UN News, July 20, 2019.
    \108\ Nigel Fisher, ``93% of deaths and injuries in Yemen are 
civilian--this must change,'' The Guardian, Oct. 27, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today, the world is witnessing widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law, and yet the available 
mechanisms to ensure compliance by warring parties are 
limited.\109\ Formal accountability for violations of 
international law are rarely pursued. Accountability mechanisms 
were designed to address international armed conflicts between 
states, as opposed to today's civil wars, intrastate conflicts, 
and internationalized intrastate conflicts.\110\ In addition, 
rising tensions between global powers has reduced the ability 
to protect humanitarian access and resolve conflict through 
diplomacy.\111\ The UN Security Council, the primary 
international body responsible for maintaining peace and 
security, has faced deadlock as some of its permanent members 
are involved in conflict, particularly internationalized 
intrastate conflict, and are directly or indirectly implicated 
in violations of international law.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ ICRC, Strengthening Compliance With International 
Humanitarian Law, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, at 8 (Oct. 2015).
    \110\ Id. at 9.
    \111\ Bruce Jones et al., Competitive Multilateralism; Adapting 
Institutions to Meet the New Geopolitical Environment, Brookings 
Institution, at 1 (Sept. 2019).
    \112\ See, e.g., United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 43rd Session (Jan. 28, 2020); Julian Borger, ``Russia 
committed war crimes in Syria, finds Un report,'' The Guardian, Mar. 2, 
2020; Gwendolyn Sasse, Revisiting the 2014 Annexation of Crimea, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Mar. 15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The resulting impunity impacts displacement in three 
primary ways. First, the targeting of civilians and critical 
civilian infrastructure causes people to flee, either in 
anticipation of or as a result of direct violence.\113\ Second, 
violations of international humanitarian law make it less 
likely that those who have fled will return, as they will doubt 
whether they can do so safely.\114\ Lastly, as violators of 
international law go unpunished, more violations occur, leading 
to more displacement and more suffering.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ ICRC, Displacement in Times of Armed Conflict, How 
International Humanitarian Law Protects in War, and Why it Matters, at 
6-7 (Apr. 2019).
    \114\ Id.
    \115\ David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue 
Committee, ``Welcome to the age of impunity,'' Remarks at the World 
Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 24, 2020. 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 The remnants of a patient exam room at Alzerbeh Primary Health Clinic 
 in the countryside of Aleppo. The clinic was targeted directly by an 
     air-to-surface missile, despite having previously shared its 
  coordinates through the UN deconfliction system to avoid targeting. 
            Syrian American Medical Society, Aug. 30, 2019.

In Focus: SYRIA: THE UNRAVELING OF
    INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
    The brutality of Syria's conflict--which has resulted in 
the largest displacement crisis in a generation--persistently 
underscores the horrors and impunity that exist in modern 
conflicts. On top of the more than 500,000 civilians killed and 
more than 10 million displaced, there has been a complete 
breakdown of international humanitarian law.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2019: Syria (2019); Vincent 
Bernard, Conflict in Syria: Finding Hope Amid the Ruins, International 
Review of the Red Cross, at 866 and 872 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Throughout the course of the conflict, the regime has 
indiscriminately targeted densely populated urban areas, 
including repeated attacks against health facilities and other 
civilian infrastructure.\117\ In blatant violations of the laws 
of armed conflict, the Syrian regime has also routinely 
besieged cities and starved civilians as a military 
tactic.\118\ These tactics were on full display during the 
early 2020 military offensive on Idlib province in northwest 
Syria, which displaced more than one million civilians in three 
months.\119\ To make matters worse, the humanitarian response 
has been challenged by a complex bureaucracy imposed by the 
Syrian government upon aid organizations, who are routinely 
denied access to desperate populations.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ Brent Eng & Jose Ciro Martinez, ``Why the Syrian regime has 
been targeting civilian infrastructure,'' The Washington Post, Apr. 16, 
2018.
    \118\ UN Security Council, Those Besieging Syrian Cities Know 
Security Council Unable, Unwilling to Stop Them, Emergency Relief 
Coordinator Says in Briefing, 7817th Meeting (Nov. 21, 2016).
    \119\ UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Recent Developments in 
Northwest Syria (Mar. 5, 2020).
    \120\ UNOCHA, Humanitarian Access Analysis: Syrian Arab Republic 
(Sept. 17, 2019); Jesse Marks, ``Humanitarian aid in Syria is being 
politicized--and too many civilians in need aren't getting it,'' The 
Washington Post, Aug. 6, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, in January 2020, the UN Security Council, due 
to disagreement among its permanent members, halved the number 
of border crossings into Syria, undermining cross border 
operations that 4 million Syrians rely on to survive.\121\ Over 
the course of the nearly 10-year conflict, numerous formal and 
independent investigative mechanisms have been established, 
including by the UN Secretary General, but none have resulted 
in formal accountability for these atrocities.\122\ For 
instance, the UN Board of Inquiry in northwest Syria released 
its findings in April 2020, but failed to conclusively identify 
perpetrators or follow-on mechanisms for accountability.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \121\ Michelle Nichols, ``U.N. renews Syria cross-border aid 
operation but halves crossings, length of time,'' Reuters, Jan. 10, 
2020.
    \122\ Press Release, United Nations Secretary General, Statement 
attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General--on UN Board 
of Inquiry in northwest Syria, Sept. 13, 2019; UN Security Council, 
Letter dated 21 December 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, Dec. 21, 2016.
    \123\ Evan Hill, ``U.N. Inquiry into Syria Bombings Is Silent on 
Russia's Role,'' The New York Times, Apr. 6, 2020.



              Climate Change's Impact On Forced Migration

    We cannot ignore the increasing role of climate change as a 
driver of forced migration. The impacts of climate change are 
innumerable, and include depleted natural resources, rising sea 
levels, extreme weather events, and conflict--all of which can 
force people to leave their homes.\124\ In 2016 alone, extreme 
weather-related disasters displaced around 24 million 
people.\125\ The UN estimates that by 2050 between 150 and 200 
million people will be at risk of climate change-induced 
displacement, most of whom are expected to remain inside their 
countries.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ UNHCR, ``Climate change and disaster displacement,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html (last visited 
June 4, 2020).
    \125\ Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate Displacement in 
Bangladesh (2018) (excluding those displaced by slow-onset 
environmental degradation).
    \126\ Michela Miletto et al., Migration and its interdependencies 
with water scarcity, gender and youth employment, United Nations 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) & World Water 
Assessment Programme, at 8 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While climate change is never the sole cause of conflict--
poor governance and weak state institutions often enable, if 
not directly cause, conflict--climate change has certainly 
contributed to factors spurring conflict. As a 2014 U.S. 
Department of Defense study asserted:


        The impacts of climate change may cause instability in 
        other countries by impairing access to food and water, 
        damaging infrastructure, spreading disease, uprooting 
        and displacing large numbers of people, compelling mass 
        migration, interrupting commercial activity, or 
        restricting electricity availability. These 
        developments could undermine already-fragile 
        governments that are unable to respond effectively or 
        challenge currently stable governments, as well as 
        increasing competition and tension between countries 
        vying for limited resources.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ U.S. Department of Defense, 2014 Climate Change Adaption 
Roadmap, at 4 (2014).


    A recent scientific study estimated that a 2-degree Celsius 
rise in temperature--which the Paris Climate Agreement aims not 
to exceed--would more than double the influence of climate on 
conflict, rising to 13 percent.\128\ A 4-degree Celsius rise in 
temperature would increase the influence of climate on conflict 
to 26 percent.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ Devon Ryan, ``How much does climate change affects the risk 
of armed conflict,'' Science Daily, June 12, 2019.
    \129\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to spurring conflict, climate change will 
inevitably result in more extreme weather events, including 
droughts, floods, storms, and landslides, causing 
displacement.\130\ In 2019, the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre estimated that 1,900 disasters triggered 24.9 
million new displacement across 140 countries--three times the 
number of new displacements caused by conflict and 
violence.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\ United States Geological Survey, ``How can climate change 
affect natural disasters?,'' https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-can-climate-
change-affect-natural-disasters-1?qt-news--science--products=0#qt-
news--science--products (last visited June 4, 2020).
    \131\ IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 (Apr. 
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The effects of climate change disproportionately impact the 
most vulnerable people who are least able to adapt. Women and 
girls are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change. For example, in regions experiencing drought, girls are 
more likely to be withdrawn from school to collect water.\132\ 
Once girls are out of school, it is more likely that they will 
become child brides, which profoundly impacts their mental, 
physical, and overall wellbeing, and reduces their ability to 
be financially independent.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ Maram Ahmed, World Economic Forum, Global Agenda, ``How 
climate change exacerbates the refugee crisis -- and what can be done 
about it,'' June 20, 2019.
    \133\ Laurie Goering, ``With climate change driving child marriage 
risks, Bangladesh fights back,'' Reuters, July 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT
    IN BANGLADESH
    In 2017, the world watched in horror as hundreds of 
thousands of Rohingya were forced from their homes in Burma by 
a military-led crackdown and sought safe haven in 
Bangladesh.\134\ Bangladesh itself, however, was already and is 
still suffering from a desperate displacement crisis. In a 
country with low elevation, high population density, and 
inadequate infrastructure, Bangladeshis are extremely 
susceptible to climate change displacement.\135\ By 2050, it is 
estimated that 1 in 7 people in Bangladesh will be displaced by 
climate change.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Jennifer Chowdhury, ``Bangladesh, growing tired of hosting 
Rohingya refugees, puts new squeeze on the teeming camps,'' The 
Washington Post, Sept. 11, 2019.
    \135\ Kumari Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal 
Climate Migration, World Bank, at 127 (2018); Environmental Justice 
Foundation, Climate Displacement in Bangladesh (2018).
    \136\ Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate 
Migration, at 127; Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate 
Displacement in Bangladesh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rising sea levels are expected to displace 18 million 
people in Bangladesh by 2050 due to loss of land, tidal 
flooding, and other negative effects.\137\ Salinization, or the 
contamination of water supplies with salt, has been and will be 
exacerbated by rising sea levels, leaving 33 million people 
vulnerable to related health problems by 2050.\138\ Inland, 
melting Himalayan glaciers are already causing rising river 
levels and erosion driving the displacement of 50,000 to 
200,000 people annually.\139\ Climate change is also causing an 
increasing frequency and severity of tropical storms. In 2016, 
there were four cyclones in the Bay of Bengal, compared to one 
normally.\140\ Other causes of climate displacement in 
Bangladesh include increasingly erratic rainfall patterns 
causing drought in the drier north-western regions and 
landslides in the hilly north-eastern and south-eastern 
regions.\141\


    \137\ Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate 
Migration, at 156; Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate 
Displacement in Bangladesh.
    \138\ Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate Displacement in 
Bangladesh.
    \139\ Robert Glennon, ``The Unfolding Tragedy of Climate Change in 
Bangladesh,'' Scientific American, Apr. 21, 2017.
    \140\ Environmental Justice Foundation, Climate Displacement in 
Bangladesh (2018).
    \141\ Id.
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
            Maggie Moore, [Rohingya] Girl with bowl on head,
                         USAID, Jan. 16, 2018.

             Internally Displaced Persons Under-Recognized

    At 41.3 million globally, IDPs vastly outnumber refugees, 
yet they receive a fraction of international humanitarian 
assistance and lack formal international protections.\142\ 
National governments have the responsibility to provide 
protection for IDPs and otherwise allow for humanitarian 
organizations to provide assistance; however, in many contexts, 
government authorities are unable or even unwilling to provide 
or allow for necessary assistance.\143\ In countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, persistent cycles of 
violence have created huge numbers of IDPs that the government 
has either chosen not to protect or struggled to serve.\144\ In 
some cases, like Syria, the government has actually perpetrated 
the violence and forced many to flee their homes.\145\ 
Humanitarian organizations often lack the resources, capacity, 
and government permission to adequately respond to an IDP 
crisis.\146\ IDP populations are often explicitly or implicitly 
left out of national action plans and resources, and 
international organizations lack the authority to enforce 
sovereign responsibility for IDP populations.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \142\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 3, 7 
(June 2019); UNICEF & IDMC, Protecting and Supporting Internally 
Displaced Children in Urban Settings, at 2 (July 2019).
    \143\ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights (UNOHCHR), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Feb. 11, 
1998). The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that, 
``National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to 
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced 
persons within their jurisdiction.'' Id.
    \144\ Mark Yarnell, ``The World Is Failing Internally Displaced 
People. Here's One Solution,'' Refugees Deeply, July 10, 2018; IDMC, 
Ethiopia tops global list of highest displacement in 2018 (Sept. 12, 
2018).
    \145\ Mark Yarnell & Mikaela Rear, ``Dear UN secretary-general, 
don't forget the internally displaced,''  The New Humanitarian, July 
15, 2019.
    \146\ Mark Yarnell, ``The World Is Failing Internally Displaced 
People. Here's One Solution,'' Refugees Deeply, July 10, 2018; Mark 
Yarnell, The Crisis Below the Headlines: Conflict Displacement in 
Ethiopia, Refugees International (Nov. 2018).
    \147\ Press Release, International Rescue Committee, Statement by 
David Miliband, President and CEO of the International Rescue 
Committee, at the conclusion of his four-day visit to Chad and 
Cameroon, July 10, 2019; Roberta Cohen, The Development of 
International Strategies to Protect Internally Displaced Persons, The 
Brookings Institution, May 7, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The failure to fully address the needs of IDPs is an urgent 
and persistent problem that will only increase with time. In 
addition to conflict-induced internal displacement, climate 
change could increase the number of IDPs to well over 140 
million people by 2050.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \148\ Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate 
Migration, at xix.

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                   New Challenges for Forced Migrants


Decades in Displacement

    As conflicts last longer, most displaced civilians are 
unable to return home. Today, estimates for the average length 
of time refugees remain displaced from their home country range 
between 10 and 26 years.\149\ For IDPs, most experience serial 
or cyclical displacements--after attempting to return to their 
areas of origin, many are forced to flee again.\150\ Today, the 
rate of new displacements vastly exceeds the rate at which 
civilians are returning home or obtaining other permanent 
solutions. In 2018, less than 3 percent of refugees and less 
than 6 percent of IDPs returned home.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \149\ Xavier Devictor & Quy-Toan Do, How Many Years Have Refugees 
Been in Exile?, World Bank (Sept. 2016); Elizabeth Ferris, ``When 
refugee displacement drags on, is self-reliance the answer?,'' The 
Brookings Institution (June 19, 2018); UNHCR, Contribution to the 
Fifteenth Coordination Meeting on International Migration, at 2 (Feb. 
10, 2017).
    \150\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 2 (2019).
    \151\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2-3 
(June 2019). Note that IDP solutions are incredibly hard to determine, 
especially the solution of local integration. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Multiple generations are growing up in displacement. The 
longest refugee situation is that of Palestinian refugees, five 
million of which are eligible for services from the UN Relief 
and Works Agency in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, the 
West Bank, and parts of East Jerusalem.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ Id. at 23; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), ``Palestine Refugees,'' 
https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (last visited June 17, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Numerous conflicts elsewhere have caused generational 
refugee crises:


   Eritrean refugees have been displaced in Sudan for close to 
        30 years;\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 23 
(June 2019).

   Many Burundian refugees have been in Tanzania for over 45 
        years;\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Millions of forcibly displaced Afghan nationals have been 
        living in Pakistan for 40 years;\155\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \155\ Id. at 22.

   In Ethiopia, one South Sudanese refugee camp has been 
        operating for over 25 years.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ UNHCR Ethiopia, Pugnido Refugee Camp (May 2019).


    The number of protracted refugee situations--formally 
defined as when more than 25,000 refugees have been displaced 
more than five years--continues to grow.\157\ In 2018, nine 
additional crises became protracted, and none were 
resolved.\158\ Unsurprisingly, people experiencing protracted 
displacement struggle to obtain essential support for their 
development and growth, such as reliable access to education, 
the opportunity to learn employable skills, or sustained 
employment.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 22 
(June 2019); see map on page 28, ``Protracted Refugee Situations.''
    \158\ Id.
    \159\ See Chapter 3 for further details.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
 Committee staff analysis based on UNHCR, ``Global trends 2018 annexes 
 and tables,'' June 19, 2019; World Bank, ``GDP (current US$)'' (last 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        visited Feb. 27, 2020).

Poor Countries Bear a Disproportionate Responsibility

    Although migrants making the long journey to Europe 
captured global attention in 2014 and 2015, the overwhelming 
majority of refugees--nearly 4 in 5--reside in countries 
directly adjacent to their country of origin.\160\ In addition, 
84 percent of refugees and asylum seekers reside in developing 
countries, which places enormous additional pressure on these 
countries' already limited resources.\161\ The top ten refugee-
hosting countries host 63 percent of the world's refugees, but 
account for just 7 percent of global Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).\162\ Bangladesh received more refugees from Burma in 
three weeks in 2017 than mainland Europe received in all of 
2016, and Bangladesh is responding with just 1.46 percent of 
the European Union's (EU) GDP.\163\ Elsewhere, in Lebanon, 
roughly 1 in every 5 inhabitants is a refugee, making it the 
largest per capita refugee-hosting country in the world.\164\ 
The influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees comes at a 
remarkably difficult time for Lebanon's socioeconomic balance; 
among many issues, it is one of the most indebted nations in 
the world.\165\ And Colombia, which already had the world's 
largest IDP population and hosted 1.8 million Venezuelan 
refugees as of April 2020, is confronting the worst 
humanitarian emergency to hit the Western Hemisphere in a 
generation.\166\ The list goes on.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 
2019).
    \161\ Id. at 18.
    \162\ Data retrieved from UNHCR, ``Global trends 2018 annexes and 
tables (.zip),'' June 19, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/
search?comid=56b079c44&&cid=49aea93aba&tags=globaltrends.
    \163\ United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
``Violence in Rakhine State and the UK's response'' (Dec. 8, 2017); 
Committee staff calculations based on World Bank, ``GDP (current 
US$),'' https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2020).
    \164\ Government of Lebanon & United Nations, Lebanon Crisis 
Response Plan 2017-2020 (2019 update), at 8, 10 (Jan. 2019).
    \165\ Dina Eldawy, ``A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee 
Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge?'', Migration Policy Institute, Feb. 
21, 2019.
    \166\ Ivan Duque, ``Colombia is committed to helping Venezuelan 
refugees. But we can't do it alone,'' The Washington Post, Feb. 27, 
2020; Response for Venezuelans, Venezuelan Refugees & Migrants in the 
Region (Apr. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet increasingly, developed nations are less willing to 
share the burden, and are turning their backs on migrants and 
refugees by closing their borders, restricting access to their 
asylum systems, and externalizing their border enforcement. The 
EU, for example, has instituted security measures in West and 
North Africa that have, in effect, externalized--or pushed 
out--their borders. These measures include the Trust Fund for 
Africa, an expansive EU-funded effort to stem irregular 
migration and refugee flows to Europe. Among its programs is 
support for the Libyan Coast Guard, who intercepts boats of 
asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants fleeing for Europe and 
returns them to areas embroiled in conflict in Libya.\167\ One 
Egyptian official in the Department of Refugee Affairs 
described the need for burden sharing to Committee staff: ``It 
is quite obvious that Northern countries are less welcoming for 
refugees and migrants. They must therefore support other host 
countries.''\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ Anny Bhan et al., Pushing the boundaries: Insights into the 
EU's response to mixed migration on the Central Mediterranean Route, 
International Rescue Committee, at 2 (July 2018); Oxfam, The EU Trust 
Fund for Africa: Trapped between aid policy and migration politics 
(Jan. 29, 2020).
    \168\ Department of Refugee Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Interview with Committee Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Staff Visit to Cairo, Egypt, May 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Increasingly Urban Settings

    Forced migration is becoming increasingly urban, resulting 
in modified and increased protection needs. In contrast to past 
decades, the majority of refugees, IDPs, and other migrants now 
live in urban settings, as opposed to rural areas or formal 
camps.\169\ The humanitarian system--which is traditionally 
accustomed to short-term, life-saving, camp-based responses--is 
still adapting to the new reality of more urban and longer-term 
displacement. In 2014, UNHCR's Policy on Alternatives to Camps 
placed a strong preference against establishing formal camps, 
recommending that they only be set up as a last resort in rapid 
onset displacement crises.\170\ These changes in policy aside, 
however, the humanitarian system has struggled to identify and 
adequately assist forced migrants in urban contexts.\171\ As 
the global population continues to urbanize, the humanitarian 
community and governments need to adapt to create a coherent 
response to urban displacement and migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 17, 56 
(June 2019); Cindy Huang & Jimmy Graham, ``How Urban are IDPs and What 
Does that Mean for Their Economic Integration?,'' Center for Global 
Desvelopment, May 10, 2019.
    \170\ UNHCR, Policy on Alternatives to Camps, at 46 (July 2014).
    \171\ Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez et al., ``Refugees and internally 
displaced persons in cities--the ``hidden'' side of forced 
displacement,'' World Bank, May 22, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    The reality is that forced migration--in its root causes 
and challenges--has radically transformed in recent decades, 
rendering traditional tools no longer fit to respond 
effectively. As a result, more people are displaced than ever 
before. The increased frequency and duration of conflicts means 
that refugees and IDPs are living in precarious conditions for 
decades on end, while the available solutions are proving more 
elusive than ever. Moreover, the profile of those forced to 
flee has changed--climate change's effects are rendering 
communities uninhabitable and forcing many to leave their 
homes. These trends will continue to prompt human adaption and 
force people to flee their homes in search of safety.
    Forced migration is the result of the failure of national 
and international community to address the root causes of 
displacement--war, endemic violence, corruption, weak 
governance, abusive leaders, and poor accountability. At its 
crux, the international community is suffering from a political 
crisis that has resulted in a global forced migration crisis. 
International bodies, like the UN Security Council, must use 
all of the powers at its disposal to pursue its core mandate--
maintaining international peace and security--by resolving and 
preventing conflicts, and holding perpetrators of international 
humanitarian law violations accountable. In addition, the 
United States must make concerted efforts to address drivers of 
displacement--promoting international law and accountability, 
imposing sanctions, supporting conflict resolution and atrocity 
prevention, strengthening the UN Security Council, and 
rejoining and championing global efforts to act on climate 
change.
    Without dramatic efforts, these trends suggest the forced 
migrant crisis will continue to grow in numbers and severity, 
impacting the stability of the entire world and the United 
States.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Ashique Rushdi, [Rohingya] Man with umbrella, USAID, Jan. 16, 2018.



                             CHAPTER THREE



                          Human Rights Denied

                              ----------                              

    Many forced migrants face unimaginable trauma and severe 
violations of their human rights during the course of their 
journey, such as exploitation, family separation, kidnapping, 
torture, enslavement, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, 
drowning, and arbitrary killing. Those that survive continue to 
face significant challenges once they reach safety. Forced 
migrants often face severe restrictions on their human rights, 
including the right to freedom of movement, and access to 
identity documents, education, and healthcare. These 
restrictions push many to the fringes of society, and make it 
difficult for forced migrants to provide for themselves and 
their families, and contribute to their host communities. Women 
and children face especially severe restrictions, and are 
vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation.

             Pervasive Restrictions on Freedom of Movement

    For ordinary people forcibly displaced by conflict, their 
circumstances vary widely--the image of a fenced refugee camp 
represents life for only a fraction of forced migrants 
globally.\172\ Whether living in a camp or not, many forced 
migrants experience restrictions on their ability to move 
freely. In Bangladesh, the government bars Rohingya refugees 
from leaving their camps--confining 900,000 people.\173\ In 
Lebanon, local authorities illegally enact curfews on Syrian 
refugee populations.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 57 
(June 2019).
    \173\ Bill Frelick, ``Bangladesh is not my Country'': The Plight of 
Rohingya Refugees from Myanmar, Human Rights Watch (Aug. 5, 2018).
    \174\ ``Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian 
Refugees,'' Human Rights Watch, Oct. 3, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In extreme cases, authorities restrict the movement of 
refugees by holding them in detention centers with appalling 
living conditions. Most migrants arrive at detention centers 
already weakened by the hardships of the journey, and human 
rights abuses at detention centers further compound their 
vulnerability and can be fatal.\175\ For example, in Libya, 
forced migrants are held for months in squalid and disease-
ridden conditions.\176\ Detainees lack food, clean water, and 
ventilation, and continuously face exploitation and abuse, 
including forced labor, physical abuse, sexual violence, 
trafficking, torture, and even murder.\177\ Moreover, many of 
these Libyan detention centers are located on the frontlines of 
the armed conflict, exposing migrants to an additional level of 
danger due to their restricted movement.\178\ In July 2019, a 
Libyan National Army missile struck the Tajoura detention 
center near Tripoli, killing 53 migrants held there.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \175\ See, e.g., Sally Hayden, ``The U.N. Is Leaving Migrants to 
Die in Libya,'' Foreign Policy, Oct. 10, 2019.
    \176\ Maggie Michael, ``Migrants stranded in Libya endure sewage, 
maggots, disease,'' AP, June 30, 2019; Izza Leghtas, ``Death Would Have 
Been Better'': Europe Continues to Fail Refugees and Migrants in Libya, 
Refugees International, at 3 (Apr. 2018).
    \177\ Maggie Michael, ``Migrants stranded in Libya endure sewage, 
maggots, disease,'' AP, June 30, 2019; Izza Leghtas, ``Death Would Have 
Been Better'': Europe Continues to Fail Refugees and Migrants in Libya, 
Refugees International, at 3 (Apr. 2018); Sally Hayden, ``The U.N. Is 
Leaving Migrants to Die in Libya,'' Foreign Policy, Oct. 10, 2019.
    \178\ Sally Hayden, ``The U.N. Is Leaving Migrants to Die in 
Libya,'' Foreign Policy, Oct. 10, 2019.
    \179\ ``Six children among 53 confirmed fatalities after Libya 
detention centre airstrikes: Security Council condemns attack,'' UN 
News, July 5, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             Obstacles to Accessing Identity Documentation

    Many forced migrants lack proper identity documents, such 
as birth certificates--a significant obstacle as they seek to 
travel to a safe location and gain legal recognition, 
protection of their human rights, and access to services.\180\ 
Forced migrants are more likely to lack identity documents 
because of the extreme conditions of their home countries and 
journeys. Reasons vary widely--from those whose home 
governments lacked the capacity to provide identity 
documentation, to those facing persecution who fear approaching 
government officials to request or renew documents, to those 
whose documents were lost, damaged, or stolen on their 
journey.\181\ In Somalia, for example, the process for gaining 
identity documentation is cost prohibitive for most Somalis, 
involving travel to Mogadishu, a criminal reference check, and 
a fee of 12.50 U.S. dollars.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\ Nicholas Oakeshott et al., ``Empowering refugees and 
internally displaced persons through digital identity,'' World Bank 
Blogs, June 19, 2018; Bronwen Manby, Identification in the Context of 
Forced Displacement, The World Bank, at 1 (June 2016).
    \181\ Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), 
Refugees and Identity: Considerations for Mobile-Enabled Registration 
and Aid Delivery, at 6 (June 2017).
    \182\ Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, Ottawa, ``Somalia: Identification documents, including national 
identity cards, passports, driver's licenses, and any other document 
required to access government services; information on the issuing 
agencies and the requirements to obtain documents,'' European Country 
of Origin Information Network, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/
1167317.html (last visited June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Forced migrants without identity documents face a long list 
of obstacles, including:


   Risk of detention or deportation;

   Risk of abuse or exploitation;

   Risk of statelessness, particularly for children;

   Limited access to services and benefits, including 
        education, health care, and banking;

   Inability to document subsequent life events such as 
        marriage, birth, and death (and potentially those of an 
        undocumented individuals' children as well); and

   Inability to repatriate, especially for children of forced 
        migrants.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\ Bronwen Manby, Identification in the Context of Forced 
Displacement, World Bank, at 1, 8-9, 21 (June 2016).


    Formal documentation often serves as the basis for the 
provisioning of other legal rights and basic services. As such, 
forced migrants without identity documents often lack access to 
rights, including freedom of movement and the right to work, 
and are often more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.\184\ 
Furthermore, forced migrants without identity documents are 
less likely to report abuse or exploitation due to fear of 
arrest or deportation.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \184\ GSMA, Refugees and Identity: Considerations for Mobile-
Enabled Registration and Aid Delivery, at 6, 21; Bronwen Manby, 
Identification in the Context of Forced Displacement, World Bank, at 9.
    \185\ GSMA, Refugees and Identity, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While states are ultimately responsible for registering 
refugees and issuing identity documentation, the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) often plays a supporting 
role.\186\ UNHCR has implemented and partnered with various 
technological solutions for identity documentation.\187\ These 
efforts are discussed further in Chapter 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \186\ Bronwen Manby, Identification in the Context of Forced 
Displacement, World Bank, at 1 (June 2016).
    \187\ GSMA, Refugees and Identity, at 9-13; Mark Latonero et al., 
Digital Identity in the Migration and Refugee Context: Italy Case 
Study, Data & Society Research Institute, at 4 (Apr. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sidebar: STATELESSNESS AND FORCED MIGRATION
    Within the growing numbers of refugees, IDPs, and other 
forced migrants around the world, there are millions of 
stateless persons.\188\ As defined in international law, a 
stateless person is someone whom no state considers as a 
national under operation of its law.\189\ Stateless people have 
no legal status and no right to vote, and they often lack 
access to education, employment, health care, justice systems, 
property rights, and registration of birth, marriage, and 
death.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 51-52 
(June 2019); UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011: Addressing 
Statelessness (Dec. 1, 2009).
    \189\ UN, Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
at 6 (Sept. 28, 1954).
    \190\ Anna Roberts & Mehgan Gallagher, ``No Place to Run: The 
Forgotten Vulnerabilities of the Stateless,'' O'Neill Institute for 
National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, 
Oct. 3, 2016; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNOHCHR) & UNHCR, Meeting Report: Regional Expert Meeting on the Human 
Rights of Stateless Persons in the Middle East and North Africa, at 17, 
19, 21, 26 (Feb. 18-19, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Forced migration is both a cause and consequence of 
statelessness for millions of people. Lacking citizenship in 
any country, stateless people are highly vulnerable to forced 
displacement, trafficking in persons, and other abuses.\191\ In 
some situations, like that of Rohingya, statelessness can be 
grounds for persecution in an asylum claim.\192\ Forced 
migration can cause statelessness when states stipulate the 
loss of citizenship with residency abroad, identity documents 
are lost, forfeited, or destroyed, or children born to refugees 
are unable to register with host countries or countries of 
origin.\193\ For example, because Syria's citizenship law 
permits only fathers to transmit Syrian citizenship to children 
born outside of Syria, millions of Syrian refugee children are 
at risk of statelessness due to difficulty documenting their 
connections to a Syrian father, including situations where 
fathers have been killed or separated from their families and 
where parents lack official documentation of their 
marriage.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ Anna Roberts & Mehgan Gallagher, ``No Place to Run: The 
Forgotten Vulnerabilities of the Stateless,'' O'Neill Institute for 
National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, 
Oct. 3, 2016.
    \192\ UNHCR, Representing Stateless Persons Before U.S. Immigration 
Authorities: A Legal Practice Resource from the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees, at 17-18 (Aug. 2017).
    \193\ UNHCR, Self-Study Module on Statelessness, at 26 (Oct. 1, 
2012).
    \194\ Dilys Hartley, ``Statelessness and the Syrian Conflict,'' 
Oxford Human Rights Hub, June 21, 2017; Zahra Albarazi & Laura van 
Waas, Understanding statelessness in the Syria refugee context, 
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion & Norwegian Refugee Council, 
at 37 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because they are not recognized by any government, official 
statistics on stateless people remain largely unavailable.\195\ 
UNHCR--the agency mandated to prevent and reduce 
statelessness--reported data on 3.9 million stateless persons 
from 78 countries at the end of 2018, but has estimated that 
the global figure may be closer to 12 million.\196\ In the 
United States alone, one Center for Migration Studies report 
estimated 218,000 U.S. residents were potentially stateless or 
at risk of statelessness.\197\ Although UNHCR launched a 10-
year Global Campaign to End Statelessness by 2024 and UN member 
states, civil society organizations, and international and 
regional organizations have made over 350 pledges to take 
concrete actions to prevent and reduce statelessness, progress 
in reducing statelessness remains limited.\198\ Furthermore, 
the risks of creating new stateless populations grow as forced 
migration and xenophobia increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 51 
(June 2019).
    \196\ Id.; `` `12 million' stateless people globally, warns UNHCR 
chief in call to States for decisive action,'' UN News, Nov. 12, 2018.
    \197\ Donald Kerwin et al., Statelessness in the United States: A 
Study to Estimate and Profile the US Stateless Population, The Center 
for Migration Studies of New York, at 2-4 (Jan. 2020). The availability 
of data on stateless persons in the U.S. is inconsistent due to 
insufficient and inconsistent tracking practices.
    \198\ UNHCR, Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024 
(Nov. 4, 2014); UNHCR, The Campaign to End Statelessness: October--
December 2019 Update, at 2 (Jan. 20, 2020); `` `Dangerous nationalism' 
seriously threatens efforts to tackle statelessness: UNHCR chief,'' UN 
News, Oct. 7, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Barriers for Accessing Healthcare and Education

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 A health clinic at an IDP camp on the former site of the Petionville 
  country club in Haiti. Ben Edwards, Health Clinic, USAID (Mar. 29, 
                                 2011).

    Although international law affords everyone the right to 
access healthcare, ready access is rarely the case for forced 
migrants.\199\ Given the complete collapse of Venezuela's 
healthcare system, thousands of pregnant Venezuelan women have 
made the dangerous crossing into Colombia to give birth.\200\ 
Colombian emergency rooms along the border are on the verge of 
collapse due to strained resources, forcing many patients to go 
unseen by a health care professional.\201\ For many forced 
migrants, poor living conditions and the difficult journey 
result in disease, infections, and other ailments.\202\ The 
inability to receive the most basic medical attention can cause 
a treatable illness to be fatal.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \199\ UNOHCHR, The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 31, at 3-4, 18-
20 (June 2008).
    \200\ Alejandra Romo, ``Pregnant women flee lack of maternal health 
care in Venezuela,'' UNHCR, July 23, 2019.
    \201\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Hospital in 
Cucuta, Colombia, Mar. 20-23, 2019; Anastasia Moloney, ``FEATURE--As 
Venezuela's health system crumbles, pregnant women flee,'' Reuters, 
June 18, 2018; Luisa Torres, ``Colombia Kindly Offers Free Health Care 
to Venezuelans--Up To A Point,'' NPR, Aug. 20, 2019.
    \202\ See e.g., Anastasia Moloney, ``FEATURE--As Venezuela's health 
system crumbles, pregnant women flee to Colombia,'' Reuters, June 18, 
2018.
    \203\ See e.g., id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Forced migrants also frequently struggle to access 
education. The benefit of quality education cannot be 
overstated. In addition to providing a venue for children to 
expand their knowledge, schools serve as safe havens and 
sources of psycho-social development.\204\ These forms of 
education and intervention are critically important for 
children living in crisis who often experience violence, 
separation from caregivers, and severe restrictions on their 
most basic rights.\205\ During critical stages of development, 
particularly from birth to five years old, these adverse 
experiences have detrimental effects on the developing brain 
and stress response system with life-long repercussions for the 
child's future health and well-being.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers: 
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 15 
(Oct. 2018); Jenni Lee, ``5 Reasons to Care About Education for 
Refugees,'' United Nations Foundation, Nov. 23, 2016.
    \205\ NGO Committee on Migration, Positive Effects of Innovative 
Early Childhood Development Programs on Refugee Youth Resilience (Nov. 
2016); Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers: 
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 13 
(Oct. 2018).
    \206\ NGO Committee on Migration, Positive Effects of Innovative 
Early Childhood Development Programs on Refugee Youth Resilience (Nov. 
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More than half of the 7.1 million school-age refugee 
children are not in school.\207\ Many refugees who do receive 
primary education do not or cannot access secondary education. 
While 63 percent of refugees are enrolled in primary education, 
only 24 percent are enrolled in secondary education--compared 
to the global rate of 84 percent.\208\ Only 3 percent of 
refugees have access to higher education.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ UNHCR, Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis, at 11 
(2019).
    \208\ Id. at 6.
    \209\ UNHCR, ``Tertiary Education,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
tertiary-education.html (last visited June 2, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Often, host countries do not provide or even allow 
educational resources or institutions for forced migrants 
living within their borders. Only 16 out of 25 UNHCR priority 
countries allow refugees full access to their education systems 
at the primary and secondary level.\210\ Until January 2020, 
Rohingya refugees living in Cox's Bazaar in Bangladesh were 
only allowed access to provisional learning centers providing 
playtime and early primary education.\211\ These limited 
resources, in combination with their inability to move freely 
beyond the refugee camps, effectively denied a majority of the 
world's Rohingya populations an education for several years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \210\ Sebastien Hine & Joseph Nhan-O'Reilly, Losing out on 
Learning: Providing refugee children the education they were promised, 
Save the Children, at 7 (2017).
    \211\ ``Bangladesh: Rohingya children get access to education,'' 
Amnesty International, Jan. 28, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 2020, Bangladesh finally announced it would 
begin to allow formal schooling and skills training for 
Rohingya refugee children.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \212\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While inadequate education access for refugees and other 
forced migrants is a common challenge, children often need to 
work to help support their families, presenting an additional 
and complex barrier to accessing education.\213\ In Jordan, for 
example, 47 percent of Syrian refugee households entirely or 
partly rely on income generated by a child.\214\ In certain 
contexts, working almost always guarantees that a child will 
not return to school.\215\ Additional barriers to accessing 
education include safety concerns, prohibitive transportation, 
uniform and supplies costs, the need for remedial education for 
refugee children who have been out of school, and restrictions 
on movement.\216\ Such barriers have contributed to the over 
250,000 Syrian refugee children who remained out of school in 
Lebanon in 2018.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \213\ Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers: 
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 24 
(Oct. 2018).
    \214\ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) & Save the Children, 
Small Hands Heavy Burden: How the Syria Conflict is Driving more 
Children into the Workforce, at 2 (July 2, 2015).
    \215\ Id.
    \216\ UNHCR, Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis, at 29 
(2019); Claire Mason & Shannon Orcutt, Hear It from The Teachers: 
Getting Refugee Children Back to Learning, Save the Children, at 25, 38 
(Oct. 2018).
    \217\ ``Lebanon: Stalled Effort to Get Syrian Children in School,'' 
Human Rights Watch, Dec. 13, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whole generations of children are missing educations, which 
has repercussions for not only them, but for their families, 
their communities, and, ultimately, their countries. The need 
for greater access to education has been highlighted on the 
global stage, including at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit 
with the creation of a global fund for education in emergency 
situations--Education Cannot Wait.\218\ As a result, education 
funding as a proportion of humanitarian assistance reached a 
five-year high in 2018 at 4.3 percent, with a remaining 56 
percent funding gap in appeals.\219\ More needs to be done to 
support refugee populations and their host communities to help 
them secure a brighter future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \218\ Education Cannot Wait, ``About Us,'' https://
www.educationcannotwait.org/about-ecw/ (last visited June 3, 2020).
    \219\ Education Cannot Wait, Annual Report 2018, at 6, 9 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Widespread Lack of Livelihood Opportunities 
                          and Barriers To Work

    Inadequate job opportunities for forced migrants can 
increase their vulnerability to other abuses, including 
exploitation, abuse, and even trafficking.\220\ Numerous 
refugee-hosting countries, such as Egypt and Bangladesh, 
completely bar refugees from legal employment.\221\ In others, 
such as Lebanon, refugees are only permitted to work in 
specific sectors.\222\ One study of 15 countries found that 45 
percent legally barred employment for refugees.\223\ In 
countries where migrants can legally work, significant de-facto 
barriers to employment--such as discrimination, restrictions on 
mobility, access to safe transportation, barriers to 
registering home-based businesses, prohibitive start-up costs, 
and access to financial services--undermine forced migrants' 
ability to access sustainable employment.\224\ Women often face 
these barriers and more, including lack of affordable childcare 
options and cultural norms.\225\ Even without these 
restrictions, sustainable employment for forced migrants is by 
no means guaranteed and is especially challenging in economies 
that already suffer from high unemployment rates. In Ethiopia, 
the government has set aside 30,000 economic opportunities, 
including work permits, for refugees through the World Bank 
Jobs Compact.\226\ However, the Ethiopian government told 
Committee staff that work permits will not be available to 
South Sudanese refugees in camps because of the prioritized 
employment needs of the Ethiopian host community, as well as 
potentially Ethiopian IDPs.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \220\ Anna Wirth et al., Global Refugee Work Rights Report: Taking 
the Movement from Theory to Practice, Asylum Access & the Refugee Work 
Rights Coalition, at 28, 31 (Sept. 2014).
    \221\ Email Attachment from Karim Saad, Counselor, Embassy of Egypt 
in Washington D.C., to Committee Staff, Apr. 15, 2019; Kristy 
Siegfried, ``The Refugee Brief--30 April 2019,'' UNHCR, Apr. 30, 2019; 
Anna Wirth et al., Global Refugee Work Rights Report: Taking the 
Movement from Theory to Practice, Asylum Access & the Refugee Work 
Rights Coalition, at 5 (Sept. 2014).
    \222\ Shelly Culbertson & Krishna B. Kumar, ``Jobs Can Improve the 
Lives of Syrian Refugees and Their Host Communities--and Support 
Stability in the Middle East,'' RAND Corporation, Mar. 11, 2019.
    \223\ Anna Wirth et al., Global Refugee Work Rights Report: Taking 
the Movement from Theory to Practice, Asylum Access & the Refugee Work 
Rights Coalition, at 5 (Sept. 2014).
    \224\ Id.; International Rescue Committee, In Search of Work: 
Creating Jobs for Syrian Refugees: A Case Study of the Jordan Compact 
(Feb. 2017), at 13, 15-16; Cindy Huang & Kate Gough, ``The Jordan 
Compact: Three Years on, Where Do We Stand?'' Center for Global 
Development, Mar. 11, 2019.
    \225\ International Rescue Committee, In Search of Work: Creating 
Jobs for Syrian Refugees: A Case Study of the Jordan Compact, at 12 
(Feb. 2017); Raiyan Kabir & Jeni Klugman, ``Unlocking Refugee Women's 
Potential: Closing Economic Gaps to Benefit All,'' International Rescue 
Committee & Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, at 11 
(July 2019).
    \226\ World Bank, International Development Association Program 
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit From the IDA18 Regional Sub-
Window on Refugees in the Amount of SDR 58 Million (US $83.33 Million 
Equivalent) and a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 82.6 Million (US 
$118.67 Million Equivalent) Including US $83.34 Million Equivalent from 
the IDA18 Regional Sub-Window on Refugees to the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia for a Program-For-Results/Investment Project 
Financing Economic Opportunities Program, at 2, June 4, 2018, http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/226021530243071432/pdf/NEW-ETHIOPIA-
PAD-06072018.pdf.
    \227\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia, 
May 24-June 1, 2019.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Children playing in the streets of the Hittein Refugee Camp in Zarqa, 
  Jordan. Simple Pleasures of Running Around, USAID/Jordan, Jan. 24, 
                                 2014.

In Focus: AN ALARMING INCREASE IN CHILDREN WHO ARE FORCED MIGRANTS
    At the end of 2018, nearly 31 million children were 
displaced as refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs.\228\ For 
children, the probability of being a refugee, asylum seekers, 
or IDP is about 50 percent greater than for the overall 
population.\229\ The number of child refugees under UNHCR's 
mandate has more than doubled in just 10 years.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \228\ UNICEF, ``Data: Child displacement,'' https://
data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-displacement/displacement/ 
(last visited June 3, 2020).
    \229\ For children, the probability is approximately 1 in 71 based 
on 31 million children forced migrants and 2.2 billion children 
worldwide. Committee staff calculations based on UNICEF, ``Data: Child 
displacement,'' https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-
displacement/displacement/ (last visited June 8, 2020); UNICEF, ``The 
State of the World's Children 2017 Statistical Tables,'' Dec. 2017, 
https://data.unicef.org/resources/state-worlds-children-2017-
statistical-tables/. For the overall population, the probability is 
approximately 1 in 109 (see Chapter 1) based on 2019 figures for forced 
migration (70.8 million) and world population (7.7 billion). UNHCR, 
``Figures at a Glance,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-
glance.html (last visited May 27, 2020); United Nations, ``World 
Population Prospects 2019,'' https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/.
    \230\ UNICEF, Uprooted: The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant 
Children, at 3 (Sep. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Restrictions on access to healthcare and education, as well 
as restrictions on movement, such as detention, can have 
devastating consequences on children. These consequences can 
overshadow the rest of their lives.\231\ Furthermore, 
children--and especially unaccompanied minors--are often 
particularly vulnerable to some of the worst forms of abuse and 
harm, including trafficking.\232\ In 2015, nearly 100,000 
children filed asylum claims with UNHCR as unaccompanied or 
separated children--representing a three-fold increase from the 
previous year and the highest number on record.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \231\ Id.
    \232\ Id.
    \233\ Id. at 38-39.
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  A young Farahi girl stares into the camera at a local returnee and 
 refugee village in Farah province, Afghanistan. HMC Josh Ives, 130209-
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                 N-IE116-052, U.S. Navy, Feb. 9, 2013.

In Focus: VULNERABILITIES FOR
    WOMEN AND GIRLS
    Women and girls make up around half of the world's forced 
migrant population and face significant additional barriers, 
including discrimination and violence.\234\ While forced 
migrant populations, such as refugees and IDPs, are often 
treated as second-class citizens within their host countries, 
the treatment of women and girls is even further degraded on 
account of their gender. This places a double burden on women 
and girl forced migrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \234\ UNHCR, ``Women,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/women.html 
(last visited June 3, 2020); UN Secretary General, In safety and 
dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, 70th 
Session, at 9 (Apr. 21, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Women often face gender-specific restrictions that limit 
their ability to access human rights. In addition to child and 
family care responsibilities, women face significant additional 
economic barriers. The 15 largest refugee-hosting countries in 
2014 together had 170 women-only legal restrictions on seeking 
employment.\235\ The five economies with the most restrictions 
on women's right to work include four of the top refugee 
hosts.\236\ These economic restrictions not only impact women, 
but also whole families. During and after conflict, there is 
often a significant increase in female-headed households.\237\ 
In Jordan, 29 percent of Syrian households are female-
headed.\238\ In southern Syria, studies have shown that the 
income of female-headed households is 15 to 32 percent less 
than male-headed households.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \235\ World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach 
Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts, at 87 
(2017).
    \236\ The four countries are Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and Yemen. 
Id.
    \237\ Mira Philips, ``Gender & post-conflict development: 
Experiences of female-headed households,'' The Island, Aug. 25, 2014.
    \238\ CARE International in Jordan, Fact Sheet: 8 Years Into 
Exile--Urban Syrian refugees, non-Syrian refugees, and vulnerable host 
communities, at 1 (Aug. 2018).
    \239\ Beatrix Buecher & James Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala, Women, Work & 
War: Syrian women and the struggle to survive five years of conflict, 
CARE, at 16 (Mar. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the context of healthcare and education, women and girls 
face extreme vulnerability to restricted access to these 
critical services. Sixty percent of all preventable maternal 
deaths take place in settings of conflict, displacement, or 
natural disasters, where women and girls cannot access critical 
health care.\240\ Moreover, girls in conflict settings are 2.5 
times more likely to be out of school than boys.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \240\ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State of World 
Population 2015--Shelter from the Storm: A Transformative Agenda for 
Women and Girls in a Crisis-Prone World, at 4 (2015).
    \241\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 17 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Women and girls also face particular protection risks 
during transit and displacement. These include, but are not 
limited to, health complications, physical harm and injury, and 
risks of exploitation, gender-based violence, and 
trafficking.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \242\ UN Women--Europe and Central Asia, ``Women refugees and 
migrants,'' https://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-refugees-
and-migrants (last visited June 3, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Gender-Based Violence: An Under-Recognized Risk

    Though the international humanitarian community has 
increased its attention towards gender-based violence (GBV), it 
remains a major challenge as both a driver of and risk during 
forced migration.\243\ Women and girls are particularly 
vulnerable to GBV abuses in humanitarian settings. The risk of 
GBV rises during times of conflict and emergency.\244\ An 
estimated 2 out of every 3 women killed in Central America is a 
victim of femicide--killed specifically because of their 
gender.\245\ The COVID-19 pandemic has also been accompanied by 
an increase in GBV cases in countries around the world.\246\ 
GBV can and does affect men and boys as well, but nowhere near 
the magnitude experienced by women and girls.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \243\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, ``Gender and Gender-Based Violence,'' https://www.state.gov/
other-policy-issues/gender-and-gender-based-violence/#ftn1ref (last 
visited June 3, 2020). According to the Department of State, gender-
based violence (GBV) is an umbrella term for any harmful threat or act 
directed at an individual or group based on actual or perceived 
biological sex, gender identity and/or expression, sexual orientation, 
and/or lack of adherence to varying socially constructed norms around 
masculinity and femininity. It is rooted in structural gender 
inequalities, patriarchy, and power imbalances. Id. Anja Parish, 
``Gender-Based Violence against Women: Both Cause for Migration and 
Risk along the Journey,'' Migration Policy Institute, Sept. 7, 2017.
    \244\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, ``Gender and Gender-Based Violence,'' https://www.state.gov/
other-policy-issues/gender-and-gender-based-violence/#ftn1ref (last 
visited June 3, 2020).
    \245\ Sebastian Essayag, From Commitment to Action: Policies to End 
Violence Against Women in Latin America and the Caribbean, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) & UN Women, at 11 (Nov. 15, 2017).
    \246\ Oscar Lopez, ``Femicides in Argentina reach 10-year high 
under coronavirus lockdown,'' Reuters, May 18, 2020.
    \247\ European Institute for Gender Equality, ``What is gender-
based violence?,'' https://eige.europa.eu/gender-based-violence/what-
is-gender-based-violence (last visited June 8, 2020).

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 A woman from Kassab IDP camp in North Darfur shows her sorrow for the 
increase of rapes in the area. She addressed the United Nations-African 
 Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative Ibrahim 
   Gambari and asked him to assure their protection. Albert Gonzalez 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Farran, Woman's sorrow, UNAMID, Jan. 19, 2012.

    An estimated one in five women refugees or displaced women 
in humanitarian settings has experienced sexual violence.\248\ 
Due to stigma and shame surrounding sexual violence, incidences 
of GBV often go underreported.\249\ Moreover, there is a 
shortage of trained experts to monitor, prevent, mitigate, and 
respond to GBV.\250\ For example, at a South Sudanese refugee 
camp Committee staff visited in Ethiopia, there were no 
protection officers for GBV for a population of 80,000.\251\ 
The South Sudanese refugee women at the camp said they have to 
go in groups to collect their daily firewood for cooking, as 
they are afraid for their safety if they go alone.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \248\ International Rescue Committee, Clinical Care for Survivors 
of Gender-Based Violence, at 2 (Aug. 2016).
    \249\ Charles North, ``Overcoming the Stigma of Gender-Based 
Violence,'' USAID, Dec. 9, 2016.
    \250\ Elhra Humanitarian Innovation Fund, Gender-Based Violence 
Interventions: Opportunities for Innovation--Gap Analysis, at 54 
(2016); U.S. Department of State Archive, ``Safe from the Start,'' 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
    \251\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to the 
Nguenyyiel Camp in Ethiopia, May 30, 2019.
    \252\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For women and girls, extreme restrictions on their other 
rights, including healthcare and education, makes them even 
more vulnerable to GBV. Lack of education, poverty, gender 
inequality, and displacement can all serve as factors creating 
situations where girls are more at risk of being forced into 
child marriages.\253\ In Jordan, for example, child marriages 
among Syrian refugees more than doubled in 4 years--from 15 
percent in 2014 to 36 percent by 2018.\254\ In Syria itself, 69 
percent of communities assessed by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported early 
marriage as a concern.\255\ In child marriages where girls 
marry before 15, girls are 50 percent more likely to experience 
physical and sexual violence from their partner.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \253\ Girls Not Brides, ``Why Does Child Marriage Happen?,'' 
https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/why-does-it-happen/ (last visited June 
4, 2020); Omer Karasapan & Sajjad Shah, ``Forced displacement and child 
marriage: A growing challenge in MENA,'' The Brookings Institution, 
June 19, 2019.
    \254\ ``Child marriage on the rise among Syrian refugee girls in 
Jordan,'' Al Jazeera, Apr. 18, 2018.
    \255\ UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: The Humanitarian Crisis in 
Syria, at 1 (Apr. 23, 2018).
    \256\ Girls Not Brides, ``What is the impact of Child Marriage: 
Violence against girls'' https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/themes/
violence-against-girls/ (last visited June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GBV causes severe and long-lasting physical, psychological, 
and emotional trauma.\257\ Access to post-GBV services, 
however, is extremely limited for forced migrants.\258\ Despite 
recent initiatives focused on GBV, the international community 
too often fails to prioritize GBV as a pressing issue. In 2013, 
the United Kingdom and Sweden launched a multi-stakeholder 
initiative, the Call to Action on Protection from Gender-based 
Violence in Emergencies, with the aim of providing 
comprehensive post-GBV services as well as mitigating GBV risk 
from the earliest phases of a crisis.\259\ In September 2013, 
the United States launched Safe from the Start, a joint 
Department of State and USAID initiative, to help reduce the 
incidence of GBV and ensure quality services for survivors from 
the onset of emergencies.\260\ Safe from the Start dedicates 
new resources to GBV interventions, risk mitigation, and 
accountability in emergency settings.\261\ These initiatives 
are extremely positive steps, but collectively the 
international community can do more to prioritize GBV, 
including increasing funding. Between 2016 and 2018, less than 
0.2 percent of humanitarian response funding was spent on GBV 
prevention for women and girls.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \257\ World Health Organization Health Cluster, ``Gender-based 
violence in health emergencies.''
    \258\ See Marcy Hersh et al., The Call to Action on Protection from 
Gender-based Violence in Emergencies: Field-Level Implementation 
Urgently Required, Women's Refugee Commission (Dec. 2016).
    \259\ Id. at 1.
    \260\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, ``Gender and Gender-Based Violence,'' https://www.state.gov/
other-policy-issues/gender-and-gender-based-violence/ (last visited 
June 4, 2020).
    \261\ U.S. Department of State Archive, ``Safe from the Start,'' 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
    \262\ Megan Clement, ``Q&A: Why does so little aid money go to 
preventing violence against women and girls?,''  The New Humanitarian, 
Nov. 27, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sidebar: THE UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND
    The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), established in 
1969, is the UN's reproductive health agency, which seeks to 
end preventable maternal deaths, meet needs for voluntary 
family planning, and end gender-based violence, child marriage, 
female genital mutilation, and other harmful practices.\263\ 
UNFPA works on the ground during and after humanitarian 
emergencies, distributing health supplies in refugee camps and 
setting up birthing centers in IDP camps.\264\ UNFPA does not 
provide or fund abortion services anywhere in the world.\265\ 
UNFPA prioritizes the provision of voluntary family planning to 
reduce recourse to abortion and also provides post-abortion 
care to save the life of a woman.\266\ UNFPA also provides 
essential aid during conflicts, natural disasters and public 
health emergencies, when access to health care is diminished 
and women are most vulnerable.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \263\ UNFPA, ``About us,'' https://www.unfpa.org/about-us (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
    \264\ UNFPA, ``Humanitarian Emergencies,'' https://www.unfpa.org/
emergencies (last visited June 9, 2020); ``Refugees' and migrants' 
reproductive health needs overlooked,'' UNFPA, Sept. 14, 2016; Press 
Release, UNFPA, UNFPA Helps Displaced Pakistani Mothers Deliver Safely, 
Mar. 2, 2010.
    \265\ Press Statement, UNFPA, Statement on the United States 
Decision to Again Withhold Funding from UNFPA, July 15, 2019.
    \266\ Id. UNFPA, ``Frequently Asked Questions,'' https://
www.unfpa.org/frequently-asked-questions (last visited June 8, 2020).
    \267\ See UNFPA, Humanitarian Action 2020 Overview (Feb. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    High Risks of Human Trafficking

    Human trafficking is one of the world's most serious human 
rights violations, involving the acquisition and exploitation 
of human beings for labor or sex through fraud, force or 
deception.\268\ Forced migrants are at a particularly high risk 
for human trafficking. Dangerous living conditions, trauma and 
their lack of legal status makes them easy prey for 
traffickers.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \268\ UN, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 
2000.
    \269\ Anne P. Wilson, Trafficking Risks for Refugees, Third Annual 
Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, University of 
Nebraska--Lincoln, at 1 (Nov. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because of their displacement, forced migrants often cannot 
meet their individual or family's basic needs, making them 
targets for organized criminal networks who profit from human 
trafficking.\270\ Destitute Iraqi refugees, for example, have 
received offers of up to 6,000 U.S. dollars to sell their 
daughters to criminal trafficking rings.\271\ Human traffickers 
readily exploited the Rohingya, who are stateless and 
considered one of the most oppressed minorities in the 
world.\272\ Destitute Rohingya refugees have recounted stories 
of men, women, and children being recruited with false promises 
of paid work in fishing, small commerce, and domestic 
work.\273\ Once they started their jobs, they were not paid 
what was promised, often deprived of sleep, and were barred 
from leaving their work sites.\274\ Women and girls were 
sexually abused.\275\ According to an International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) counter-trafficking officer in 
Bangladesh, ``Many of them were physically tortured and abused 
psychologically they were paid little money or no money at 
all.''\276\ Credible reports indicate that some Bangladeshi 
border guards, military, and police officials facilitated the 
trafficking of Rohingya women and children, ranging from 
receiving bribes from traffickers to allowing them access to 
refugee camps, to direct involvement in facilitating their 
exploitation.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \270\ Jamille Bigio & Rachel Vogelstein, The Security Implications 
of Human Trafficking, Council on Foreign Relations, at 12 (Oct. 2019).
    \271\ Id.
    \272\ Naimul Karim, ``Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh warned to be 
wary with human trafficking rising,'' Reuters, Aug. 23, 2019; UNOCHA, 
`Rohingya Refugee Crisis,'' https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-
crisis (Last visited June 8, 2020).
    \273\ ``UN warns of trafficking, sexual abuse in shadow of Rohingya 
refugee crisis,'' UN News, Nov. 14, 2017.
    \274\ Id.
    \275\ Id.
    \276\ Naimul Karim, ``Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh warned to be 
wary with human trafficking rising,'' Reuters, Aug. 23, 2019.
    \277\ U.S. Department of State,Trafficking in Persons Report, at 87 
(June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, fear of human trafficking can be a powerful 
driver of displacement.\278\ In Central America's Northern 
Triangle region, many women and girls reported that high levels 
of gang violence, including human trafficking, was a major 
factor in their decision to migrate.\279\ The region has come 
under increasing control by sophisticated, organized criminal 
armed groups, often with transnational reach, driving up rates 
of murder and gender based violence.\280\ In September 2019, 
Committee staff traveled to Matamoros, Mexico to assess the 
impact of the Trump administration's Migrant Protection 
Protocols (MPP), also known as the Remain in Mexico policy. In 
Matamoros, Committee staff observed between 700 and 1,000 women 
and children asylum-seekers living in squalid, makeshift camps, 
where they waited their turn for months under the MPP.\281\ A 
female asylum-seeker from Honduras shared with Committee staff 
her terror of being forced to return home after receiving 
threats of sexual violence from gang members who engaged in 
human trafficking.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \278\ Jamille Bigio & Rachel Vogelstein, The Security Implications 
of Human Trafficking, Council on Foreign Relations, at 13 (Oct. 2019).
    \279\ UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of 
Organized Gangs, at 3, 7-8 (Mar. 31, 2010; UNHCR, Women on the Run: 
First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Mexico, at 15-16 (Oct. 2015).
    \280\ UNHCR, Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees 
Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, at 2.
    \281\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Matamoros, 
Mexico, Sept. 2019.
    \282\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    Forced migrants experience restrictions on basic rights 
limiting their ability to work, move freely, and access basic 
services. These restrictions make them particularly vulnerable 
to extreme abuses, including those that exist in informal and 
illicit sectors. The situation is particularly stark for women 
and girls, who face greater challenges in accessing employment, 
healthcare, and education, and are also often targets of 
gender-based violence and human trafficking.
    Governments in host countries and the international 
community must work to ensure that the human rights of forced 
migrant are upheld and that they have access to basic services. 
National, regional, and municipal governments in host countries 
should enact more inclusive and rights-respecting policies, 
incorporate forced migrant populations into national plans, and 
work to protect forced migrant populations from violations of 
their rights and abuse. Global leaders, like the United States, 
the United Nations, and international organizations, should 
mandate more robust human rights reporting, increase diplomatic 
pressure around human rights, continue efforts to provide basic 
services and protections, and provide economic incentives for 
host countries to enact inclusive policies that promote the 
human rights of forced migrants.
    Today, too many forced migrants are living in vulnerable 
situations and being denied ``recognition of the[ir] inherent 
dignity.''\283\ Guaranteeing forced migrants rights provides 
them with the opportunity to not only survive, but also thrive 
and contribute in their new communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \283\ United Nations, ``Universal Declaration of Human Rights,'' 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited 
June 6, 2020).

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A young girl in Sudan holding a baby near a USAID tent in the Al Salam 
          IDP camp. Sven Torfinn, Sudan, USAID, Oct. 3, 2011.



                              CHAPTER FOUR



          Inadequate and Inconsistent International Responses

                              ----------                              


    The scale of today's crisis has made abundantly clear that 
existing international instruments are insufficient to meet the 
current challenges.\284\ Today's migration flows are often 
mixed--refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and victims of severe 
climate-related events are moving along the same routes and 
often vulnerable to the same abuses.\285\ The international 
community has struggled to respond to large, mixed flows of 
forced migrants with its traditional toolbox of diplomacy, 
humanitarian assistance, international law, and durable 
solutions. Without appropriate international legal conventions, 
monitoring, and enforcement, countries are provided more leeway 
in how they respond to the global forced migration crisis, and 
many react in ways that are harmful to forced migrants, violate 
human rights and international law, hinder international 
coordination, and exacerbate an already overwhelming crisis. 
Furthermore, humanitarian financing and assistance mechanisms 
must evolve in order to better serve vulnerable populations and 
account for the changing nature of forced migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\ Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Worldwide displacement tops 70 million, UN Refugee Chief urges 
greater solidarity in response, June 19, 2019 (regarding the scale of 
today's crisis).
    \285\ UNHCR, ``Asylum and Migration,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
asylum-and-migration.html (last visited June 9, 2020); Mixed Migration 
Centre, ``MMC's Understanding and Use of the Term Mixed Migration,'' 
Oct. 2019; International Organization for Migration (IOM), Challenges 
of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed Migration Flows Discussion 
Note, 96th Session (Nov. 7, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Diplomatic Deficit Resulting in Persistent 
                         Conflicts and Impunity

    International diplomacy has repeatedly failed to resolve 
the underlying political, economic, and climate-related sources 
of conflict.\286\ Furthermore, international diplomatic efforts 
and institutions have struggled to strengthen fragile state 
institutions that would prevent new conflicts and help meet the 
needs of refugees and IDPs on their territories.\287\ As a 
result, the number of individuals impacted by conflicts and 
forced migration has ballooned, unmitigated by international 
pressure.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \286\ See e.g., Katy Collin, ``The year in failed conflict 
prevention,'' The Brookings Institution, Dec. 14, 2017; see e.g., 
Celine Charveriat & Thorfinn Stainforth, ``Despite bold UN diplomacy, 
Climate Action Summit fails to galvanise world's largest emitters,'' 
Institute for European Environmental Policy, Sept. 24, 2019.
    \287\ See Katy Collin, ``The year in failed conflict prevention,'' 
The Brookings Institution, Dec. 14, 2017.
    \288\ Press Release, UNHCR, Worldwide displacement tops 70 million, 
UN Refugee Chief urges greater solidarity in response, June 19, 2019; 
World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance Innovative, 
A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, at 2 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Traditional conflict response tools in place since the end 
World War II have been challenged by the nature of today's 
conflicts. The UN Security Council, the primary body charged 
with maintaining international peace and security, has 
repeatedly failed to prevent and resolve conflicts, and thus 
forestall displacement crises.\289\ Intensifying rivalries 
between the five veto-wielding permanent members of the 
Security Council have crippled the Council's 
effectiveness.\290\ Despite numerous UN reports and briefings 
on war crimes committed in Syria, UN Security Council permanent 
members Russia and China have exercised the veto 13 times since 
2011 to block resolutions addressing war crimes against Syrian 
civilians.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \289\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``No Refuge: Why the World's 
Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking Options,'' Feb. 12, 2019.
    \290\ Id.
    \291\ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ``UN 
Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect,'' Jan. 17, 2020. 
See e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Panel Says Russia Bombed Syrian 
Civilian Targets, a War Crime,'' The New York Times, Mar. 2, 2020; see 
e.g., Sherine Tadros, ``New low for the UN Security Council as Russia 
takes Syrian human rights off the table,'' Amnesty International, Mar. 
23, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Repeated failures to enforce international rules and hold 
violators accountable sends a dangerous signal to political 
leaders, armed forces, and perpetrators of violence and abuse 
worldwide. These high levels of impunity are likely to fuel 
more conflict and forced migration in decades to come.\292\ 
Without peaceful resolutions of conflicts--and a global 
recommitment to conflict prevention, the laws of war, and 
conflict resolution--forced migrants cannot return home safely. 
In 2018, less than three percent of the global refugee 
population of nearly 26 million were able to return home.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \292\ UNOHCHR, ``Combating impunity and strengthening 
accountability and the rule of law,'' https://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/
Pages/Combatingimpunityandstrengtheningaccountability.aspx (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
    \293\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 and 7 
(June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Insufficient and Inflexible Humanitarian Funding

    As humanitarian need continues to grow, humanitarian 
funding and practices have not kept pace. In 2020, nearly 168 
million people will need humanitarian assistance--a fivefold 
increase from 2007.\294\ In 2020, there were 23 UN Humanitarian 
Response Plans for humanitarian emergencies--up from 12 in 
2008.\295\ If current trends continue, more than 200 million 
people will need assistance by 2022.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \294\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 4 (Dec. 4, 
2019); Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), 
Briefing: EU Humanitarian Aid Matters More Than Ever (Feb. 2020).
    \295\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 26 (Dec. 4, 
2019); UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 18 (Dec. 4, 2018).
    \296\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 4 (Dec. 4, 
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, humanitarian financing has not kept up with 
growing humanitarian need, and financing has instead stagnated 
in recent years as major donors, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany, have reduced humanitarian 
financing.\297\ UN appeals are chronically underfunded. In 
2007, the UN reported a 28 percent shortfall on its 
humanitarian appeals.\298\ In 2017, that number had risen to an 
astounding 40 percent.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \297\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2019, at 32 (2019). Humanitarian assistance financing grew by 1 
percent from 2017 to 2018, compared to 30 percent in cumulative growth 
during the five years before 2018. Id. at 32; Ben Parker, ``Ten donors 
and 10 crises dominate humanitarian spending,''  The New Humanitarian, 
Oct. 9, 2019.
    \298\ David Miliband, ``A Battle Plan for the World Bank: Why 
Refugees Are at the Center of the Fight Against Poverty,'' Foreign 
Affairs, Feb. 19, 2019.
    \299\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given existing trends, humanitarian aid is increasingly 
directed to protracted crises. Globally, 89 percent of 
humanitarian aid funding goes to locations that have been 
served for over three years, and 66 percent of funding goes to 
locations with needs stretching more than eight years.\300\ The 
average length of the UN's Humanitarian Response Plans has 
increased from 5.2 years in 2014 to 9.3 years in 2018.\301\ 
Furthermore, a handful of large, protracted crises command the 
majority of resources.\302\ In 2019, just two emergencies 
received 42 percent of all humanitarian funding: Yemen and 
Syria.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \300\ World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach 
Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts, at 127 
(2017).
    \301\ Press Release, UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Appeal aims to 
reach 93.6 million people with assistance in 2019, Dec. 4, 2018.
    \302\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, at 4 (Dec. 4, 
2018).
    \303\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With increasingly drawn-out forced migrant situations, the 
current international financing model struggles to sufficiently 
support host countries and communities who shoulder tremendous 
global responsibility. Although migration to Europe from 
countries including Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq captured 
global attention in 2015, the reality is that the overwhelming 
majority of refugees--nearly 4 out of 5--remain close to their 
home country.\304\ These host countries are often those least 
equipped to meet the needs of forced migrants. As previously 
discussed in Chapter 2, the top ten refugee-hosting countries 
host 63 percent of the world's refugees, but only account for 7 
percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\305\ Although 
host governments' policies and national plans are critical to 
ensuring the safety, health, education, and self-reliance of 
refugees over the long term, humanitarian responses typically 
bypass host governments systems.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \304\ Press Release, Eurostat, Asylum in the EU Member States: 
Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered 
in 2015, Mar. 4, 2016; UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 
2018, at 2 (June 2019).
    \305\ See Chapter 2.
    \306\ Paul Harvey, Towards good humanitarian government: The role 
of the affected state in disaster response, Overseas Development 
Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, at 1 (Sept. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to address both short-term needs as well as 
longer-term development, donors need to find ways to provide 
humanitarian funding that allows for greater flexibility in 
programming and is multi-year, which is known to increase 
planning and efficiency.\307\ Short-term funding produces 
short-term solutions to long-term problems, limiting strategic 
and effective programming in protracted situations.\308\ 
Although humanitarian appeals today typically last for 7 years, 
the vast majority of large donors still grant funding in 12 
month cycles.\309\ Based on evidence that demonstrates 
multiyear financing reduces operational costs and delivers 
better outcomes, multiyear financing is already a core 
component of many countries' development assistance.\310\ 
Donors, including the United States, should increase multiyear 
financing to support multiyear planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \307\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2019, at 68 (2019); Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, at 3, 6 (2017).
    \308\ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, at 1 (2017).
    \309\ UNOCHA, An end in sight: Multi-year planning to meet and 
reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises, at 4 (July 2015); Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al., Living up to 
the Promise of Multi-Year Humanitarian Financing, at 12 (2017); see, 
e.g., U.S. Department of State, ``General NGO Guidelines,'' Dec. 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/funding-opportunities/general-ngo-guidelines/ 
(last visited June 10, 2020).
    \310\ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, at 3, 6 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the majority of forced migrants now live in urban 
areas, the international community should also continue to 
shift away from the delivery of services and in-kind assistance 
and instead prioritize providing cash or vouchers (commonly 
grouped together and referred to as ``cash and voucher 
assistance,'' or CVA).\311\ Evidence shows CVA can reach people 
faster and at lower cost, secure better outcomes for health, 
education and livelihoods, is more secure than in-person 
service delivery, and can generate twice the return to local 
economies.\312\ Although CVA is increasing in popularity, the 
majority of CVA is still concentrated among a minority of 
humanitarian organizations, and challenges remain in attaining 
wider adoption of a cash-first model.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \311\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 57 
(June 2019); see International Rescue Committee, CVA for Protection: A 
mapping of IRC's use of Cash and Voucher Assistance to help achieve 
protection outcomes (2019); Tina Rosenberg, ``For Refugees in Lebanon, 
Cash Instead of Camps,'' The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016.
    \312\ Magdalena Mikulak, Cost-effectiveness in humanitarian work: 
cash-based programming, Knowledge, Evidence, and Learning for 
Development (K4D), at 2 (Sept. 2018); Overseas Development Institute, 
Doing cash differently: How cash transfers can transform humanitarian 
aid, at 6, 13 (Sept. 2015); The Campbell Collaboration, Cash-based 
humanitarian assistance approaches can increase food security and are 
more cost effective than in-kind food transfers (2017).
    \313\ The Cash Learning Partnership, The State of the World's Cash 
Report: Cash Transfer Programming in Humanitarian Aid, at 6-7 (Feb. 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Aid Effectiveness and Humanitarian Sector Reform

    The humanitarian system is composed of an interconnected 
network of operational entities that provide support when 
national and local-level resources are insufficient to meet 
humanitarian needs. While increased levels of need have forced 
the system to rapidly grow in recent decades, this has 
inevitably resulted in inefficiencies across the vast 
humanitarian system.\314\ The UN, which receives the majority 
of humanitarian funding, is often criticized for having 
agencies with overlapping mandates and responsibilities.\315\ 
In some contexts, this overlap can result in unnecessary 
competition and poorly coordinated assistance in humanitarian 
responses. For example, in Bangladesh in 2017, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) experienced friction while 
vying to be the designated official lead responding to the 
Rohingya refugee crisis.\316\ In another example, two different 
UN agencies share responsibility for responding to 
malnutrition--the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) for severely 
malnourished children and the World Food Programme (WFP) for 
moderately acute malnourished children--and use two different 
procurement and treatment systems with little coordination, 
resulting in unnecessary costs and malnourished children left 
untreated.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \314\ Rachel Scott, Imagining More Effective Humanitarian Aid: A 
Donor Perspective, OECD, The Development Assistance Committee, at 7-8 
(Oct. 2014).
    \315\ Charlotte Lattimer, ``Will a `grand bargain' solve the 
humanitarian funding crisis?,'' The Guardian, Jan. 18, 2016; Heba Aly & 
Imogen Wall, ``Humanitarian reform: What's on--and off--the table,''  
The New Humanitarian, Feb. 11, 2016.
    \316\ Ben Parker, ``Bangladesh resists greater UNHCR role in 
Rohingya crisis,''  The New Humanitarian, Oct. 23, 2017.
    \317\ Press Release, UNICEF & World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF 
and WFP intensify efforts to defeat malnutrition in South Sudan, Sept. 
9, 2015; David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue 
Committee, Speech at the World Innovation Summit for Health in Doha, 
Qatar, New York, NY, Nov. 13, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite these criticisms, UN agencies are often viewed as 
possessing the necessary expertise and capacity to identify 
critical needs across numerous sectors, lead prominent advocacy 
campaigns, and implement humanitarian programs.\318\ 
Accordingly, the UN has been viewed as the most viable large-
scale actors to absorb substantial international funding, and, 
as a result, has developed significant influence across the 
humanitarian system by assuming an ``end-to-end'' role in 
assistance--serving as a global coordinator, donor to NGOs, 
implementer, monitor, and evaluator.\319\ Critics of this 
system assert that because the UN often dominates humanitarian 
programming, its assessments are self-reinforcing, and little 
incentive exists for objective evaluations, checks-and-
balances, and reform to resolve issues, such as the overlapping 
mandates described above.\320\ On the other hand, the UN's 
unique role across leadership and program implementation, in 
combination with its global reputation, allows the organization 
to not only fund programs, but also management, coordination, 
and advocacy--costs that NGOs usually struggle to find donors 
to fund.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \318\ Boston Consulting Group & MANNET, OCHA Functional Review 
Final Report, at 3 (July 29, 2016); Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the 
Humanitarian Business Model, Center for Global Development, at 2 (May 
2018).
    \319\ Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model, 
Center for Global Development, at 2, 5, 11 (May 2018).
    \320\ Id. at 2; Heba Aly & Imogen Wall, ``Humanitarian reform: 
What's on--and off--the table,''  The New Humanitarian, Feb. 11, 2016; 
Katharine Derderian et al., ``UN humanitarian reforms: a view from the 
field,'' Humanitarian Practice Network (July 2008).
    \321\ Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model, 
Center for Global Development, at 11 (May 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During an international forum in 2015 on improving 
humanitarian action, a group of leading humanitarian non-
governmental organizations recommended a set of priority areas 
for UN reform, such as simplifying and streamlining the UN 
system for managing natural disasters and rectifying 
overlapping and competing mandates of different UN 
agencies.\322\ Similarly, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit 
launched an agreement termed the ``Grand Bargain,'' which 
promised improvements in aid efficiency and efficacy from large 
donors, UN organizations, and NGOs.\323\ Although major UN 
organizational restructuring has yet to occur, many of the 
operational commitments from the Grand Bargain could be 
achieved through sustained investment over the course of the 
coming years.\324\ These recent efforts at humanitarian sector 
reform have resulted in important new models of financing and 
assistance delivery recognizing the unique and diverse needs of 
forced migrants and host communities, including increased focus 
on impartial needs analyses, more support for local responders, 
cash transfers, and country-based ``pooled funds'' where 
funding is allocated based on on-the-ground needs.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \322\ Imogen Wall, `` `Outdated and resistant to change': how can 
we fix the humanitarian system?'' The Guardian, Feb. 10, 2016.
    \323\ Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General, at Round 
Table, Commits to Making Humanitarian Action `Local as Possible, 
International as Necessary,' May 23, 2016; Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain (last 
visited June 10, 2020).
    \324\ Victoria Metcalfe-Hough et al., Grand Bargain annual 
independent report 2019, Humanitarian Policy Group, at 4 (June 2019).
    \325\ Andras Derzsi-Horvath et al., Independent Grand Bargain 
Report, Global Public Policy Institute, at 7-8 (June 2017); UNOCHA, 
Country-Based Pooled Funds and the Grand Bargain (June 5, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: THE ``CLUSTER'' SYSTEM COORDINATION
    MECHANISM
    A critical element of international response in 
humanitarian contexts is the coordination among a constellation 
of different actors and across various sectors. In major 
crises, the humanitarian community uses a formal ``cluster 
approach,'' where humanitarian organizations are grouped by 
each of the sectors of a response, such as shelter, food 
security, education, water, health, and many others.\326\ The 
``clusters'' were established during a larger humanitarian 
reform effort in 2005 as a way to ``strengthen system-wide 
preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian 
emergencies, and provide clear leadership and accountability in 
the main areas of humanitarian response.''\327\ In the context 
of major humanitarian emergencies--including conflicts and 
natural disasters--the clusters are established to enable a 
clear line of responsibility and coordination among 
organizations and the local authorities.\328\ Overall, the 
approach is generally viewed as having improved humanitarian 
response during emergencies, though recent evaluations have 
pointed out a range of possible improvements, such as better 
inclusion of local NGOs in the process.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \326\ UNOCHA Humanitarian Response, ``Clusters,'' https://
www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters (last visited 
June 9, 2020). In scenarios where the ``cluster approach'' is not 
activated, the humanitarian sector nonetheless tends to organize itself 
along these sectors to improve coordination among all actors involved 
in a response.
    \327\ Id.
    \328\ Id.
    \329\ Overseas Development Institute, Cluster Approach Evaluation 
(Nov. 2007); Paul Knox Clarke & Leah Campbell, Exploring Coordination 
in Humanitarian Clusters, ALNAP, at 9 (2015); Brian Majewski et al., 
Joint Evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster, The Konterra Group, 
at 2 (Aug. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           Need for Expanded International Legal Protections

    International conventions, complemented by regional 
treaties and declarations, provide legal protection to refugees 
and serve as the bedrock upon which international response 
systems to forced migration operate today.\330\ Unfortunately, 
these binding international legal frameworks have not been 
updated in the past half-century and do not provide protection 
to large swaths of vulnerable forced migrant populations today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \330\ Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A guide to international 
refugee protection and building state asylum systems, Inter-
Parliamentary Union & UNHCR at 15-32 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Of the more than 70 million forcibly displaced from their 
homes worldwide today, only 20 million--or 29 percent--are 
considered refugees under UNHCR's mandate and afforded formal 
protections under the relevant international refugee 
conventions.\331\ The remaining 50 million are not protected 
under the same conventions that specifically protect refugees, 
including over 41 million IDPs.\332\ Our world leaders must 
realize that the current international system is in dire need 
of reform to ensure protection and support for forced migrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \331\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 
2019). This 70 million forcibly displaced figure includes populations 
categorized as refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum 
seekers, but does not necessarily capture all forced migrants who may 
not be recognized under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 
accompanying international legal framework.
    \332\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
    FOR REFUGEES
    The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
was created during the aftermath of World War II in 1950 and 
established by the General Assembly on January 1, 1951 to help 
millions of refugees who had fled or lost their homes.\333\ 
UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action 
for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of 
refugee problems.\334\ UNHCR also works with IDPs, persons who 
are stateless or whose nationality is disputed, and former 
refugees who have returned to their homeland.\335\ During times 
of displacement, UNCHR provides emergency assistance including 
protection, shelter, and health services and advocates for 
policies and services that affect displaced people to better 
safeguard their human rights.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \333\ UNHCR, ''History,'' https://www.unhcr.org/ph/history (last 
visited June 10, 2020); The Nobel Prize, ``Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees History,'' https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/peace/1954/refugees/history/ (last visited June 10, 2020).
    \334\ The Nobel Prize, ``Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees History,'' https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
peace/1954/refugees/history/ (last visited June 10, 2020).
    \335\ UNHCR, ``Persons of Concern to UNHCR,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/ph/persons-concern-unhcr (last visited June 10, 2020).
    \336\ UNHCR, ``What we do,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/what-we-
do.html (last visited June 10, 2020).


---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              ----------                              



Sidebar: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
    FOR MIGRATION
    The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was 
established in 1951 to arrange transport and resettlement for 
the large number of displaced people following World War 
II.\337\ IOM's works to ensure the orderly and humane 
management of migration, and provides humanitarian assistance 
to refugees and other displaced persons.\338\ In September 
2016, IOM became a related organization of the UN.\339\ Today, 
IOM has offices in over 100 countries.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \337\ See OECD, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
(Oct. 2017); Megan Bradley, The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM): Gaining Power in the Forced Migration Regime, Refuge 
(2017).
    \338\ See OECD, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
(Oct. 2017); Megan Bradley, The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM): Gaining Power in the Forced Migration Regime, Refuge 
(2017).
    \339\ Megan Bradley, The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM): Gaining Power in the Forced Migration Regime, Refuge (2017).
    \340\ IOM, ``Contact Us,'' https://www.iom.int/contact-us (last 
visited June 9, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

International Legal Frameworks for Protection

    On the basis of their personhood, forced migrants are 
afforded rights based on numerous international conventions, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.\341\ These include protections against arbitrary 
detention and non-refoulement, as well as the right to freedom 
of expression, property, education, and work.\342\ Governments 
are traditional enforcers of these rights.\343\ However, forced 
migrants' governments have proven unwilling or unable to 
protect them from threats that have driven their displacement 
and prevented their safe return home.\344\ Without governments 
to protect their rights, forced migrants require international 
protection.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \341\ UN, ``Human Rights,'' https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/human-rights/ (last visited June 9, 2020); UN Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984); 
UN, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989 (The United 
States is the only UN Member State that is not a party to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child).
    \342\ UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
    \343\ UNHCR, ``Protecting Refugees: questions and answers,'' Feb. 
1, 2002.
    \344\ UNHCR, Persons in need of international protection, at 1-2 
(June 2017).
    \345\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the sixty million displaced in Europe by 
World War II, the international community came together to 
develop the first legal framework to provide international 
protection to refugees.\346\ The 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (``1951 Convention'') serves as the 
cornerstone of international legal protection frameworks, and 
defines a refugee as anyone who:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \346\ UNHCR Canada, ``The 1951 Refugee Convention `is as Relevant 
Today,' '' Dec. 5, 2016.


        owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
        reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
        particular social group or political opinion, is 
        outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
        or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
        of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
        nationality and being outside the country of his former 
        habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
        unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
        to it.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \347\ UNHCR, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 
1A(2), at 14 (1951).


    Under the 1951 Convention, this definition applied only to 
refugees in Europe in the aftermath of World War II.\348\ The 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees removed 
geographic and temporal limitations.\349\ The 1951 Convention 
also prescribed a number of rights to refugees, cardinal of 
which was the principle of non-refoulement, or protection 
against return to a country where a person has reason to fear 
persecution.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \348\ Id. at 15.
    \349\ UNOHCHR, Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 
1 (1967).
    \350\ UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High 
Commissioner) EC/SCP/2, Aug. 23, 1977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    International and national implementation of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol is inconsistent and 
unenforced. The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol mandate 
UNHCR to supervise implementation; however, it does not provide 
any authorities for monitoring and enforcement.\351\ Some 
states are not party to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
(such as Iraq), and many states who are party also reserve 
against specific provisions (such as China and the United 
States).\352\ As a consequence of inconsistent levels of 
commitment to refugee protections, their rights and protections 
vary across different countries.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \351\ UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the Unites Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (Oct. 2010); UNHCR, Protecting Refugees: 
Cyprus (Dec. 2017). UNHCR's role as laid out in the 1951 Convention 
complements that of States by: ``Promoting accession to, and 
implementation of, refugee conventions and laws; Ensuring that refugees 
are treated in accordance with internationally recognized legal 
standards; Ensuring that refugees are granted asylum and are not 
forcibly returned to the countries from which they have fled; Promoting 
appropriate procedures to determine whether or not a person is a 
refugee according to the 1951 Convention definition and/or to other 
definitions found in regional conventions; and Seeking durable 
solutions for refugees.'' Id. at 4.
    \352\ UN Treaty Collection, ``Status of Treaties: Chapter V 
Refugees and Stateless Persons,'' https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg--no=V-5&chapter=5 (last visited June 
9, 2020); Library of Congress, ``Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq,'' June 9, 2015.
    \353\ See World Refugee Council, Centre for International 
Governance Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global 
Refugee System, at 21-25 (2019); Council on Foreign Relations, ``No 
Refuge: Why the World's Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking 
Options,'' Feb. 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the 1951 Convention's refugee definition fails 
to protect many forced migrants, including victims of 
generalized violence, severe climate-related events, and 
internal displacement.\354\ As many of these populations 
forcibly migrate alongside refugees, implementation of the 1951 
Convention thus requires sorting through mixed migration flows 
to identify who among these vulnerable populations meets the 
refugee definition.\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \354\ See IOM, Challenges of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed 
Migration Flows, 96th Session, at 2 (Nov. 7, 2008); Anny Bhan et al., 
Pushing the boundaries: Insights into the EU's response to mixed 
migration on the Central Mediterranean Route, International Rescue 
Committee, at 9 (July 2018).
    \355\ See IOM, Challenges of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed 
Migration Flows, 96th Session (Nov. 7, 2008); Anny Bahn et al., Pushing 
the boundaries: Insights into the EU's response to mixed migration on 
the Central Mediterranean Route, International Rescue Committee, at 9 
(July 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One example of the 1951 Convention's limitations in 
addressing contemporary forced migration is the current crisis 
in Libya. In Libya's urban settings and detention centers, 
forced migrants converge from Syria, Sudan, Eritrea, the West 
Bank and Gaza, Somalia, Iraq, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Yemen, 
Mali, Nigeria, and Libya itself.\356\ Given that the 1951 
Refugee Convention only affords refugees international legal 
protections, in application this often requires intensive 
search and screening efforts to locate and identify individuals 
fitting the definition of refugee among large flows of mixed 
migrants.\357\ As of April 2020, UNHCR had identified 870,909 
people of concern in Libya and had registered 48,627 refugee 
and asylum cases--less than 6 percent of the population of 
concern.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \356\ UNHCR, ``Operational Portal: Libya,'' https://
data2.unhcr.org/en/country/lby (last visited June 9, 2020); IOM, 
Libya's Migrant Report Round 29, at 12-13 (April 21, 2020).
    \357\ UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, at 7, 12 (Jan. 1992).
    \358\ UNHCR, ``UNHCR Libya Response in 2020,'' Apr. 10, 2020. 
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
 Committee staff analysis based on UNHCR, ``Global Trends 2018 annexes 
and tables'' June 19, 2019; UNRWA, ``UNRWA Figures 2018-2019,'' Feb. 1, 
    2019. This figure includes populations categorized as refugees, 
    internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers, but does not 
necessarily capture all forced migrants who may not be recognized under 
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its accompanying international legal 
                               framework.

Regional Efforts for Comprehensive Frameworks

    In addition to international frameworks, regional bodies 
have also developed frameworks to coordinate and share 
responsibility for responses to forced migrant flows.\359\ Due 
to their non-binding and regional natures, the effectiveness of 
these regional frameworks in addressing a global crisis remains 
in question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \359\ See Susan Kneebone, Comparative Regional Protection 
Frameworks for Refugees: Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs, The 
International Journal of Human Rights (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted 
in 1984, is a regional, non-binding instrument meant to govern 
protection of refugees in Latin America.\360\ Prompted by 
challenges Organization of American States (OAS) members faced 
in responding to large flows of refugees from Central America, 
the Cartagena Declaration provides an expanded refugee 
definition beyond the scope of the 1951 Convention definition, 
including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \360\ Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 4-5 (June 2013).


        persons who have fled their country because their 
        lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by 
        generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
        conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other 
        circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
        order.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \361\ Id. at 4; Declaracion de Cartagena sobre Refugiados, adopted 
during the Coloquio Sobre la Proteccion Internacional de los Refugiados 
en America Central, Mexico y Panama: Problemas Juridicos y 
Humanitarios, held in Cartagena, 19-22 November 1984 (hereinafter 
``Cartagena Declaration''), art. III(3). The Cartagena Declaration 
noted ``that, in view of the experience gained from the massive flows 
of refugees in the Central American area, it is necessary to consider 
enlarging the concept of a refugee.''


    This expanded refugee definition has gained legal force in 
some countries through incorporation into national laws.\362\ 
According to Colombian officials Committee staff met with in 
March 2019, Colombia's incorporation of the Cartagena 
Declaration's refugee definition into national legislation has 
shaped efforts to address Venezuelans fleeing to Colombia, and 
recognized them as refugees.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \362\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia, 
Mar. 2019; Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 5 (June 2013).
    \363\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia, 
Mar. 2019; Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 17 (June 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For the broader region, however, a 2013 UNHCR study 
concluded that the Cartagena Declaration has largely failed to 
effectively expand the definition of refugee.\364\ The study 
found inconsistent adoption and arbitrary application among 
states, including some states that required both the regional 
definition and the 1951 Convention definition be met.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\ Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence in Latin America, UNHCR, at 5 (June 2013) 
(concluding that the Cartagena Declaration ``has been seldom applied in 
practice, guidance on its interpretation is undeveloped and national 
authorities rarely consult its provisions when providing international 
refugee protection.'')
    \365\ Id. at 18-23, 32-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ongoing Debate over Protections for Climate-Related

  Forced Migrants

    For those who flee their countries as a result of severe 
climate-related events, as well as those displaced within their 
countries by climate-related events, there are no formal 
protections provided by international law.\366\ Some countries, 
including the United States, have developed tools that allow 
the admission of civilians displaced by disaster, but these are 
usually circumstantial and temporary in nature.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \366\ The Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-
Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate 
Change: Volume 1, at 7-8 (Dec. 2015).
    \367\ Id. at 8; see e.g., Temporary Protected Status under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254a; see Chapter 
5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A robust debate is taking place in various multilateral 
fora, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
on affording legal protections to those displaced by events 
linked to, or exacerbated by, climate change.\368\ Most 
recently, in January 2020, a landmark decision by the UN Human 
Rights Committee acknowledged that it might be illegal to 
return individuals to countries where they face immediate or 
long-term risks due to climate change, potentially paving the 
way for future recognition of climate refugees.\369\ However, 
progress on adopting new international principles has been 
slow, due in part to the Trump administration's unfounded 
skepticism of climate change.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \368\ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
``Workplan--Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage,'' https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-
bodies/executive-committee-of-the-warsaw-international-mechanism-for-
loss-and-damage-wim-excom/workplan (last visited June 6, 2020); see 
Abdikarim Ali, Climate-Induced Migrants, International Law, and Human 
Rights, University of Ottawa (Apr. 2015).
    \369\ ``UN Human Rights Ruling Could Boost Climate Change Asylum 
Claims,'' UN News, Jan. 21, 2020.
    \370\ Helier Cheung, ``What does Trump actually believe on climate 
change?,'' BBC, Jan. 23, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Children belonging to families displaced from Miran Shan, North 
 Waziristan at IDP Camp, Bannu. Asad Zaidi, AZ--Banu--IDP--063, USAID, 
                             July 16, 2014.

Internally Displaced Persons Largely Left Unprotected

    While the international community has granted refugees 
certain legal rights and protection, less protections exist for 
IDPs. In response to a growing number of IDPs worldwide, the UN 
enlisted a panel of international legal experts to develop 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that were presented 
to the UN in 1998.\371\ These Guiding Principles provide 
governments and NGOs with a framework for responding to IDP 
crises--defining internally displaced persons, addressing the 
protection and assistance of IDPs, and recommending 
solutions.\372\ The Guiding Principles were met with broad 
support on the international stage, helped catalyze numerous 
regional frameworks, including the 2009 Kampala Convention on 
IDPs, and have had its provisions incorporated into some 
countries' national laws.\373\ However, the non-binding nature 
of the document means it is unable to uniformly enforce 
protections for IDPs nor accountability for governments 
responding to IDPs.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \371\ UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), E.S.C. 
Res. 1998/53, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at 4 (July 22, 1998); 
Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, ``The Genesis and the Challenges,'' in 
Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson (eds.), ``Ten Years of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement,'' Forced Migration Review, at 4 
(Dec. 2008).
    \372\ Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, ``The Genesis and the 
Challenges,'' in Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson (eds.), ``Ten Years 
of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,'' Forced Migration 
Review, at 4 (Dec. 2008).
    \373\ Roberta Cohen, ``Lessons Learned from the Development of the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,'' Institute for the Study 
of International Migration, at 11 (Oct. 2013).
    \374\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without binding international conventions for international 
protection, IDPs depend primarily on their own governments for 
protection.\375\ These same governments are sometimes either 
perpetrators of abuses that prompt displacement (in the case of 
the Syrian regime), complicit in such abuses (as in the case of 
the DRC), incapable of or unwilling to stop abuses by non-state 
actors (as in the case of Colombia), or unwilling to 
acknowledge the extent of problems resulting from displacement 
(in the case of Ethiopia).\376\ As Committee staff observed in 
Ethiopia in May 2019, governments are often unable or unwilling 
to provide adequate protection, leaving IDPs without national 
protection and without the same international legal protections 
as refugees.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \375\ UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), E.S.C. 
Res. 1998/53, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at Principle 3.1 (July 22, 
1998).
    \376\ See UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: 
Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 31st session (Feb. 3, 
2016); ``Syria: `Massive waves of civilian displacement and loss of 
life must stop now': UN Special Envoy,'' UN News, Feb. 6, 2020; Press 
Release, UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), 
DRC: UN reports hundreds of human rights violations as security 
situation in North Kivu deteriorates, Dec. 19, 2018; UN Human Rights 
Council, Situation of human rights in Colombia, 43rd session, at 10 
(Feb. 26, 2020) (concluding that ``police presence remained 
insufficient in most rural areas,'' and more); Mark Yarnell, The Crisis 
Below the Headlines: Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees 
International, at 9 (Nov. 2018).
    \377\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia, 
May 24-June 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regional bodies have also attempted to close the 
``protection gap'' and create protections for IDPs. African 
countries in particular have struggled to deal with mass 
internal displacement due to armed conflict, internal strife, 
climate change-related severe droughts and flooding, and 
upheavals due to natural or human-made disasters.\378\ In 
response, countries on the continent developed the first 
legally binding regional instrument, mirroring many elements of 
the UN's Guiding Principles, to address internal displacement: 
the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance 
of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known as the 
Kampala Convention.\379\ This instrument, which builds on many 
elements of the UN's Guiding Principles, was adopted in 2009 
and entered into force in 2012.\380\ As of March 2020, the 
Kampala Convention has been ratified by only 31 of the African 
Union's 55 member states, and Niger remains the only country to 
have implemented its provisions through national 
legislation.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \378\ See John Podesta, The Climate Crisis, Migration, and 
Refugees, The Brookings Institution (July 25, 2019); ``Southern Africa: 
Conflict, development and natural disasters fuel internal 
displacement,''  The New Humanitarian, Feb. 14, 2006; Anthony Navone, 
``How to Address Africa's `Staggering' Displacement Crisis,'' United 
States Institute of Peace, May 30, 2019.
    \379\ Allehone M. Abebe, The Emerging Law of Forced Displacement in 
Africa, at 2 (Oct. 2017) Megan Bradley, A Landmark for Human Rights: 
The Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement Comes into Effect, The 
Brookings Institution (Dec. 6, 2012).
    \380\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Making the Kampala 
Convention work for IDPs, at 7 (July 2010); International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Translating the Kampala Convention Into Practice: A 
Stocktaking Exercise, at 7 (Oct. 2016); African Union Commission, 
African Union Model Law for the Implementation of the African Union 
Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa [``Kampala Convention''] (Apr. 2018).
    \381\ Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia's ratification 
of Kampala Convention, Feb. 14, 2020; Press Release, UNHCR, Niger 
becomes the first country in Africa to adopt a national law for the 
protection and assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, Dec. 5, 
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sidebar: THE UNITED NATIONS ON IDPs
    The limitations of traditional humanitarian response tools 
are even more glaring when considering the situation of IDPs. 
In the 1990s, the UN Secretary-General established a Special 
Representative for IDPs.\382\ Since then, however, the position 
has been downgraded as a Special Rapporteur to the UN Human 
Rights Council and no longer reports directly to the Secretary-
General.\383\ In response to a letter signed by 37 UN member 
states, the UN Secretary-General announced in October 2019 the 
establishment of a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement to 
increase global attention and support, and identify long-term 
solutions for IDPs.\384\ The Panel began work in early 2020 and 
should submit its final recommendations in early 2021.\385\ 
With over 41 million IDPs living in dire conditions and 
receiving minimal if any humanitarian assistance, the global 
system for responding to and supporting IDPs needs urgent 
reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ UNOHCHR, ``Introduction to the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs),'' https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Mandate.aspx 
(last visited June 4, 2020).
    \383\ Mark Yarnell, ``The World Is Failing Internally Displaced 
People. Here's One Solution,'' Refugees Deeply, July 10, 2018.
    \384\ Mark Yarnell & Mikaela Rear, ``Dear UN secretary-general, 
don't forget the internally displaced,''  The New Humanitarian, July 
15, 2019; Press Release, UN, High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, 
Dec. 3, 2019;``UN chief: New panel to focus on millions of displaced 
people,'' AP, Oct. 23, 2019.
    \385\ Press Release, UN, High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, 
Dec. 3, 2019; ``UN panel to rally global political will to tackle 
internal displacement crisis,'' UN News, Feb. 25, 2020.

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               Shrinking Access to Traditional Solutions

    UNHCR's statute mandates that the organization searches for 
``permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.''\386\ 
Therefore, UNHCR, in line with the broader international 
community, promotes three ``durable solutions'' for refugees:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \386\ UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, at 8 (Dec. 14, 1950).


   Voluntarily return to their country or place of origin once 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        the conditions there are deemed permissible;

   Integration into the host community with legal status; or

   Resettlement in a third country.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \387\ UNHCR, ``Solutions,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
solutions.html (last visited June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and 
corresponding Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally 
Displaced Persons discuss the need for durable solutions for 
IDPs and describes solutions of return, local integration, and 
settlement.\388\ However, the promotion and creation of such 
solutions is left up to ``national and local authorities, 
humanitarian and development actors'' without any international 
mechanisms for monitoring or enforcement.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \388\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 
Walter Klin: Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced 
Persons, 13th Session, at 1-2 (Feb. 9, 2010).
    \389\ Id. at 2; Roberta Cohen, Introduction to the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, The Brookings Institution (Sept. 
23, 2001); Global Protection Cluster Working Group, Handbook for the 
Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, at 32 (Oct. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other forced migrant populations, such as those displaced 
by severe climate-related events, who are not covered by the 
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, also do not have a 
formal international mechanism to assist them in evaluating and 
facilitating solutions to their forced migration.\390\ For all 
forced migrant populations, however, accessing durable 
solutions has become increasingly challenging.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \390\ Megan Bradley and Jane McAdam, Rethinking Durable Solutions 
to Displacement in the Context of Climate Change, The Brookings 
Institution (May 14, 2012).
    \391\ Megan Bradley, Resolving Refugee Situations: Seeking 
Solutions Worthy of the Name, World Refugee Council, at 1 (Mar. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Voluntary return, for example, is predicated on the 
assumption that a forced migrant could return home after 
fighting stopped or the repressive regime was replaced--and 
that the timeline for such returns would be months or years, 
not the decades seen today.\392\ Most forced migrants will 
never be able to return home because their homes are engulfed 
by protracted conflict or because they fear persecution if they 
return. In 2018, only three percent of global refugees and five 
percent of IDPs voluntarily returned to their country or place 
of origin.\393\ As climate change forces more migration, return 
may be increasingly impossible as communities of origin are 
submerged underwater, vulnerable to frequent disasters, or 
otherwise uninhabitable.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \392\ Kathleen Newland, Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels, 
New Tools, Transatlantic Council on Migration & Migration Policy 
Institute, at 6 (Apr. 2015).
    \393\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 7 (June 
2019).
    \394\ UNHCR, Reach Out Refugee Protection Training Project: Module 
9, at 5 (2005); Megan Bradley and Jane McAdam, Rethinking Durable 
Solutions to Displacement in the Context of Climate Change, The 
Brookings Institution (May 14, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For the vast majority of forced migrants, local integration 
into the host community, while imperfect, is the most viable 
path to a secure life. A host of legal, regulatory, and other 
systemic challenges, however, stand in the way. Refugees in 
many countries face serious restrictions to human rights, 
including the right to work, freedom of movement, access to 
identity documentation, and access to healthcare and education, 
all of which prevent them from achieving self-sufficiency or 
contributing to host communities.\395\ At the same time, 
research demonstrates how inclusive integration policies lead 
to benefits for refugees and their host communities.\396\ 
According to one such study in 2014 in Kampala, Uganda, one of 
the few countries where refugees have the right to work, 21 
percent of refugees run a business with one or more employees, 
of which 40 percent are Ugandan citizens.\397\
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    \395\ See Chapter 3 for details on human rights restrictions.
    \396\ Catholic Relief Services, Exploring the Impact of Social 
Acceptance on Refugee Integration into Host Communities: Policy 
Research (2017); Council of Europe, Human Rights Aspects of Immigrant 
and Refugee Integration Policies, at 7-8 (Apr. 16, 2019).
    \397\ Alexander Betts, et al., Refugee Economies: Rethinking 
Popular Assumptions, University of Oxford Humanitarian Innovation 
Project, at 19 (June 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, while resettlement can be a lifesaving permanent 
solution for extremely vulnerable refugees, the opportunity is 
available to less than one percent of the world's 
refugees.\398\ Refugee resettlement is reserved for only the 
most vulnerable refugees who cannot return home and who cannot 
find safety in countries of first refuge. These include victims 
of torture or gender-based violence who may need specific 
support, families with medical needs, victims of religious or 
ethnic persecution who remain at risk in countries of first 
refuge, or, specifically for the United States, those at risk 
because of their assistance to the U.S. Government.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \398\ International Rescue Committee (IRC), 10 things to know about 
the Global Refugee Crisis and America's lack of leadership: An IRC 
analysis of the latest annual reports from the UN Refugee Agency (July 
2019).
    \399\ UNHCR, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, at 243 (2011); U.S. 
Department of State Archive, ``Refugee Admissions and Resettlement,'' 
https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/prm/c26471.htm (last visited June 10, 
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, despite the fact that the number of refugees 
under UNHCR's mandate nearly doubled from 2012 to 2018, the 
number of global refugee resettlement slots has tumbled in 
recent years.\400\ The gap between resettlement needs and 
resettlement slots is more than 90 percent.\401\ At the 2016 
Leaders' Summit on Refugees, hosted by the United States, 52 
countries and international organizations made wide-ranging 
humanitarian commitments, including significant contributions 
in humanitarian financing and an increased number of global 
resettlement slots.\402\ However, in 2019, just 29 countries 
were accepting refugees for resettlement.\403\ The risk of this 
retreat has both humanitarian and strategic consequences: as 
wealthy nations turn away from obligations to refugees, low- 
and middle-income countries who host the vast majority of 
refugees are closing borders, tightening policies on refugee 
access to work or other pathways to self-reliance, and 
encouraging and coercing premature returns.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \400\ UNHCR, UNCHR Global Report, at 216 (2017); UNHCR, Refugee 
Resettlement Facts (Mar. 2020); UNHCR USA, ``Information on UNHCR 
Resettlement,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/information-on-unhcr-
resettlement.html (last visited June 4, 2020); UNHCR, Global Trends: 
Forced Displacement in 2018, at 13 (June 2019).
    \401\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 30 
(June 2019).
    \402\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on the Leaders' 
Summit on Refugees, Sept. 20, 2016.
    \403\ UNHCR, Refugee Resettlement Facts (Mar. 2020); U.S. 
Department of State, ``Leaders' Summit on Refugees,'' https://2009-
2017.state.gov/p/io/c71574.htm (last visited June 10, 2020).
    \404\ See Stephanie Schwartz, ``Sending Refugees Back Makes the 
World More Dangerous,'' Foreign Policy, Nov. 27, 2019; Kareem Chehayeb 
& Sarah Hunaidi, ``Turkey's Deportation Policy is Killing Syrian 
Refugees,'' Foreign Policy, Aug. 8, 2019; Afghanistan's refugees: forty 
years of dispossession, Amnesty International, June 20, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These traditionally durable solutions of return, local 
integration, and resettlement are insufficient to deal with the 
number of forced migrants nor the length of their displacement.
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Ashique Rushdi, [Rohingya] Group of women and children, USAID, Jan. 16, 
                                 2018.

        Inconsistent Country-level Responses to Forced Migration

    Given the limitations of current international frameworks, 
countries have met today's global forced migration crisis with 
wildly varying responses. Some countries have made commendable 
efforts to address forced migration and protect forced 
migrants--at least as far as refugees are concerned. When 
refugee numbers surged in 2015, Germany opened its borders to 
those fleeing Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, admitting close to 
900,000 refugees in 2015 alone.\405\ Jordan hosted over 1.3 
million Syrians as of December 2018 and has sought to create 
livelihood opportunities for both Syrians and Jordanians.\406\ 
Uganda, the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, has a 
history of providing refugees freedom of movement and the right 
to work, as well as small plots of land for growing food.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \405\ Wesley Dockery, ``Two years since Germany opened its borders 
to refugees: A chronology,''  Deutsche Welle, Sept. 4, 2017; Pew 
Research Center, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 
Million in 2015 (Aug. 2, 2016).
    \406\ Nazanin Ash & Cindy Huang, Using the Compact Model to Support 
Host States and Refugee Self-reliance, World Refugee Council, at 6-7 
(Dec. 2018).
    \407\ Sulaiman Momodu, ``Uganda Stands Out in Refugees 
Hospitality,'' Africa Renewal, Dec. 2018-Mar. 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff observed the progressive refugee policies 
of both Ethiopia and Colombia. In Ethiopia, the government has 
instituted a number of reforms supporting refugees. In February 
2019, the government passed a Refugee Proclamation providing 
refugees the right to work, freedom of movement, and access to 
education among other rights.\408\ Since 2016, the Ethiopian 
government has also improved refugee access to vital 
documentation by issuing birth certificates for refugees and 
capturing them in the national system.\409\ Civil documentation 
is critical in helping to prevent statelessness, protect a 
range of human rights, and provide access to services.\410\ 
While these developments are positive steps for Ethiopia's 
treatment of refugees, however, the Ethiopian government has 
also been overwhelmed and unable to meet the needs of its 
millions of IDPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \408\ This proclamation was done in the context of the Global 
Compact on Refugees and to align with the Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework; [ETHIOPIA FEDERAL REGISTER] Refugees Proclamation, 
Proclamation No. 1110/2019, Federal Negarit Gazette of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Feb. 27, 2019, at 1, 15-24.
    \409\ Cindy Huang et al., Tackling the Realities of Protracted 
Displacement: Case Studies on What's Working and Where We Can Do 
Better, Center for Global Development (CGD) and International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), at 8 (Apr. 18, 2018).
    \410\ Norwegian Refugee Council & the International Human Rights 
Clinic at Harvard Law School, Registering rights: Syrian refugees and 
the documentation of births, marriages, and deaths in Jordan (Oct. 
2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Colombia, the government granted many Venezuelans 
temporary border-crossing and temporary residence permits, 
allowing them access to basic health services, education, and 
work for up to two years.\411\ To prevent statelessness among 
children of Venezuelan refugees, Colombia's president announced 
in August 2019 that his government would grant them Colombian 
citizenship.\412\ Committee staff visited the border city of 
Cucuta where the hospital serves over 3,000 Venezuelans 
monthly, half of the 1,600 school students are Venezuelan 
children, and a soup kitchen serves two meals daily to over 
4,000 Venezuelans.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \411\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia, 
Mar. 2019; Melanie Teff & Daphne Panayotatos, Crisis Colliding: The 
Mass Influx of Venezuelans Into the Dangerous Fragility of Post-Peace 
Agreement Colombia, Refugees International, at 10-12 (Jan. 13, 2019).
    \412\ Anatoly Kurmanaev & Jenny Carolina Gonazalez, ``Colombia 
Offers Citizenship to 24,000 Children of Venezuelan Refugees,'' The New 
York Times, Aug. 5, 2019.
    \413\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Hospital in 
Cucuta, Colombia, Mar. 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As generous as some governments have been, available 
resources do not match the level of need among vulnerable 
forced migrants, including unaccompanied minors, sick children 
and infants, pregnant women, and elderly. Some Venezuelans whom 
Committee staff spoke with at the soup kitchen in Colombia, for 
example, said they had walked for several hours just to get a 
meal.\414\ The Venezuelans that staff spoke with hoped they 
would be able to find work in Colombia, but had not been able 
to obtain citizenship documentation from their own government 
and, therefore, a Colombian temporary work visa.\415\ The 
school staff visited only received 1,050 lunch rations a day 
for its 1,600 students.\416\ Consequently, unregistered 
Venezuelan children over age eight do not get fed on a daily 
basis.\417\ The hospital in Cucuta was at three times its 
capacity.\418\ Undocumented Venezuelans were only able to 
access emergency healthcare, and subsequently emergency rooms 
along the border were on the verge of collapse due to 
strain.\419\ Despite positive efforts to address the forced 
migrant crisis, the need for additional assistance, services, 
documentation, and jobs in Colombia remains critical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \414\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia, 
Mar. 2019.
    \415\ Id.
    \416\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to School in 
Cucuta, Colombia, Mar. 2019.
    \417\ Id.
    \418\ Id.
    \419\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without additional international support, Colombia will not 
be able to sustain its early progressive policies for displaced 
Venezuelans, and the Venezuelan displacement crisis could 
possibly catalyze further crisis across the region.\420\ The 
Venezuelan crisis remains severely underfunded relative to the 
scale of displacement. In 2019, the UN's humanitarian response 
plan for Venezuela was only 34 percent funded; the regional 
response plan was 53 percent funded.\421\ In 2020, funding 
needs for the region doubled to 1.4 billion dollars.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \420\ International Rescue Committee, The Venezuelan Displacement 
Crisis: A Test of Global Commitments and Solidarity, at 1 (Oct. 2019).
    \421\ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, ``Venezuela 2019 
(Humanitarian response plan),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/827/
summary (last visited June 4, 2020); UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, 
``Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (for Refugees and Migrants 
from Venezuela) (Other),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/726/summary 
(last visited June 4, 2020).
    \422\ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, ``Regional Refugee and 
Migrant Response Plan (for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela) 
(Other),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/726/summary (last visited 
June 4, 2020); UNOCHA Financial Tacking Service, ``Refugee and Migrant 
Response Plan 2020 for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (RMRP 
(Other)),'' https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/944/summary (last visited 
June 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today's forced migration crisis has also resulted in 
restrictive practices shrinking protection space. Countries 
have closed borders, increased detention, refused asylum on the 
basis of nationality, coerced early returns, externalized 
border controls, and fomented xenophobic violence by depicting 
refugees and asylum seekers as threats to public health and 
national security.\423\ This in turn has served to increase the 
vulnerability of already desperate populations and exacerbated 
the effects of an already growing crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \423\ See Amnesty International, Fears and Fences: Europe's 
Approach to Keeping Refugees at Bay, at 7-10, 79 (Nov. 2015); Kavitha 
Surana, ``Italy quietly rejects asylum seekers by nationality, 
advocates say,'' Al Jazeera, Oct. 19, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, although refugees are not explicitly denied 
the right to work in Egypt, refugees need permits to work, 
which are costly and require evidence that no Egyptian is 
available to fill the same job.\424\ Without access to the 
labor market, refugees are unable to achieve self-sufficiency, 
contribute to the local economy, and are often pushed into 
informal markets where exploitation is rampant.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \424\ Asylum Access & the Refugee Work Rights Coalition, Global 
Refugee Work Rights Report 2014, at 26 (Sep. 2014).
    \425\ Id. at 6, 38 (Sep. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The European Union has spent millions of euros supporting 
the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and forcibly returning 
migrants and refugees to often inhumane detention centers in 
Libya rife with trafficking, sexual abuse, and torture.\426\ 
Italy and Malta have also denied embarkation to rescue boats 
that reach their shores, and Italy passed a law fining boats 
that rescue refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean.\427\ In 
2019 alone, more than 1,200 migrants died while trying to cross 
the Mediterranean to Europe.\428\ The fate of hundreds more 
remains unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \426\ See e.g., Tom Miles & Steve Scherer, ``EU support of Libyan 
coast guard `inhuman:' UN rights chief,'' Reuters, Nov. 15, 2017; UN 
Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on 
the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya, at 4-7 
(Dec. 20, 2018); UN Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Abuse Behind 
Bars: Arbitrary and unlawful detention in Libya, at 3-6 (Apr. 2018).
    \427\ ``Italy forces 130 migrants to stay on docked coast guard 
vessel,''  Deutsche Welle, July 28, 2019; Associated Press, ``Migrant 
ship with 64 people denied safe port by Italy and Malta,'' The 
Guardian, Apr. 4, 2019; Samuel Osborne, ``Italy passes law to fine 
people who rescue refugees at sea: Repeat offenders risk having boats 
seized,'' The Independent, June 12, 2019.
    \428\ Press Release, IOM, IOM: Mediterranean Arrivals Reach 110,699 
in 2019; Deaths Reach 1,283. World Deaths Fall, Jan. 3, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed and exacerbated 
inconsistencies in protections and available services for 
forced migrant populations around the world. The pandemic is a 
huge concern for already vulnerable populations of forced 
migrants living in crowded environments, often with limited 
access to basic sanitation, health services, and reliable 
information, and frequently dependent on humanitarian aid.\429\ 
The UN, aid groups, and experts have all pleaded with national 
governments to include forced migrant populations in national 
COVID-19 plans and allow forced migrant populations access to 
national health systems.\430\ Similarly, groups have appealed 
to Bangladesh's government to lift telecommunications 
restrictions on Cox's Bazaar that hinder the delivery of 
critical and credible health information to hundreds of 
thousands of Rohingya refugees.\431\ Amid the pandemic, some 
governments have barred access to asylum systems and placed 
additional restrictions on forced migrants. Greece, Hungary, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States effectively 
shut down access to asylum systems.\432\ In Lebanon, at least 
eight municipalities used COVID-19 as justification for 
implementing discriminatory curfews that targeted Syrian 
refugees.\433\ Furthermore, countries and leaders across the 
world have exploited the virus to advance xenophobia.\434\ In 
Malaysia, authorities conducted mass raids to detain refugees 
and migrants after the COVID-19 pandemic stoked a spike in 
xenophobia against refugees.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \429\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced: 
Addressing the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian 
Emergencies (Mar. 30, 2020).
    \430\ UNHCR, Coronavirus emergency appeal UNHCR's preparedness and 
response plan (REVISION), at 13 (May 9, 2020); Jonathan Clayton, ``Q&A: 
Access to health services is key to halting COVID-19 and saving refugee 
lives,'' UNHCR, Mar. 27, 2020; Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, ``New front: 
Worry over COVID--19 spreading in African refugee camps,'' Al Jazeera, 
Mar. 29, 2020.
    \431\ ``Joint Letter: Re: Restrictions on Communication, Fencing, 
and COVID-19 in Cox's Bazar District Rohingya Refugee Camps,'' April 2, 
2020; ``Bangladesh Urged to Lift Telecom Ban on Rohingya Camps to Ease 
COVID-19 Risks,'' Voice of America, Apr. 2, 2020.
    \432\ Refugees International, COVID-19 and the Displaced: 
Addressing the Threat of the Novel Coronavirus in Humanitarian 
Emergencies (Mar. 30, 2020).
    \433\ ``Lebanon: Refugees at Risk in COVID-19 Response,'' Human 
Rights Watch, Apr. 2, 2020.
    \434\ ``Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia 
Worldwide,'' Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2020.
    \435\ Zsombor Peter, ``Malaysia Rounds up Hundreds of Undocumented 
Migrants amid Coronavirus Fears,'' Voice of America, May 3, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without consistent implementation and enforcement of 
international legal protections, countries violate refugees' 
human rights with impunity. The situation is often more dire 
for forced migrants without the same international legal 
conventions for protection as refugees, including millions of 
victims of generalized violence, severe climate-related events, 
and internal displacement.
In Focus: SITUATION OF IDPs IN ETHIOPIA
    Ethiopia has struggled to deal with a growing population of 
IDPs. In 2018, the number of conflict-induced IDPs in Ethiopia 
was almost three million people--more than four times the 
number in 2017.\436\ While the government of Prime Minister 
Abiy Amed has been praised for its positive response to refugee 
influxes, the government only ratified the Kampala Convention 
in February 2020 and has struggled to deal with its IDP 
crisis.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \436\ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on 
Internal Displacement, at 14 (May 2019).
    \437\ Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia law granting 
more rights to refugees, Jan. 18, 2019. For details on Refugee 
Proclamation see Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia's 
ratification of Kampala Convention, Feb. 14, 2020; Mark Yarnell, The 
Crisis Below the Headlines: Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees 
International, at 4 (Nov. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After over 800,000 Ethiopians were displaced by ethnic 
clashes and violence in the first half of 2018, the government 
initially collaborated with the UN and other organizations to 
mobilize a large-scale humanitarian response.\438\ Within a 
couple of months, however, the government began pushing for the 
premature return of IDPs to their homes.\439\ The government 
even restricted aid--including food assistance--at IDP sites, 
telling IDPs they would receive assistance if they returned 
home.\440\ And in May 2019, the Ethiopian government announced 
a new Strategic Plan to Address Internal Displacement in 
Ethiopia, forcing all IDPs to return home within 2 months.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \438\ Mark Yarnell, The Crisis Below the Headlines: Conflict 
Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees International, at 8-9 (Nov. 2018).
    \439\ Id. at 9.
    \440\ Id. at 9.
    \441\ Ethiopian Ministry of Peace and National Disaster Risk 
Management Commission, Strategic Plan to address internal displacement 
in Ethiopia, at 3 (Apr. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Ethiopia, Committee staff visited horrendous IDP sites 
lacking any semblance to ``satisfactory conditions'' as called 
for in the Guiding Principles and Kampala Convention.\442\ At 
one IDP site Committee staff visited, tiny makeshift shelters 
made of cloth and sticks housed whole families, and left them 
completely vulnerable to the impending rainy season.\443\ At 
this same site, the NGO that delivered water had to shut down 
its operations two days prior due to lack of funding.\444\ 
Recently-built latrines were located hundreds of feet from the 
makeshift shelters, with no lights or other protection 
mechanisms along the way.\445\ People therefore chose instead 
to defecate out in the open instead of risk the journey.\446\ 
At another IDP site, IDPs had not received food for three days, 
also due to the provider's lack of funding.\447\ Many of the 
IDPs were already on the brink of starvation, and yet food 
assistance was not expected for two weeks.\448\ Host 
communities, who were often quite poor themselves, were 
generously providing rice for the IDPs.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \442\ UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), E.S.C. 
Res. 1998/53, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at 7 (July 22, 1998); 
African Union Commission, African Union Model Law for the 
Implementation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of 
and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa [``Kampala 
Convention''], at 8 (Apr. 2018).
    \443\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia, 
May 24-June 1, 2019.
    \444\ Id.
    \445\ Id.
    \446\ Id.
    \447\ Id.
    \448\ Id.
    \449\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the horrible conditions of the IDP sites, IDPs 
often preferred to stay. For many IDPs, there was nothing to 
return to. Their homes had been burned, their property looted, 
and their livelihoods destroyed. Without significant assistance 
upon their return, IDPs who returned in effect experienced 
secondary displacement.\450\ IDPs most often ended up in 
abandoned churches or warehouses--ostensibly the same as IDP 
sites, except with fewer services available.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \450\ Mark Yarnell, The Crisis Below The Headlines: Conflict 
Displacement in Ethiopia, Refugees International, at 7-10 (Nov. 2018).
    \451\ Tom Gardner, `` `Go and we die, stay and we starve': the 
Ethiopians facing a deadly dilemma,'' The Guardian, May 15, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, IDPs still feared the armed groups that drove 
them from their homes. Although the government had brokered 
peace deals among local ethnic groups in the IDPs' home areas, 
these areas were still active conflict zones, and IDPs did not 
believe it was safe to return. Committee staff heard from U.S. 
and NGO officials that some IDPs were forcibly displaced 
multiple times as the government continued to force IDP returns 
amidst continued violence.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \452\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Ethiopia, 
May 24-June 1, 2019.


                               Conclusion

    Traditional international frameworks have been unable to 
adequately protect and address today's forced migrants. 
Traditional diplomacy has failed to prevent and mitigate 
conflicts and crises. Humanitarian assistance has not grown and 
evolved to meet the scale and demands of need. And finally, the 
failure to mandate specific legal protection for those persons 
displaced by war, violence, climate change, and internal 
displacement leaves millions vulnerable. Individual countries 
are reacting to a global crisis with wildly inconsistent 
standards.
    Our international response needs a reboot. The UN Security 
Council and its permanent members must recommit to their core 
mandate of maintaining international peace and security, and 
consider measures to prevent obstructions in the Council that 
thwart efforts to effectively address conflict and flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law. The United States 
and other UN member states should redouble efforts to prevent 
and end protracted conflict, as well as violations of 
international human rights law. Innovative reforms to 
humanitarian assistance that have proven to be best practice, 
including multi-year funding and cash assistance, should be 
quickly implemented. Governments of host communities, 
international leaders like the United States, and the United 
Nations should consider codifying complementary protections for 
forced migrants not included under the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol in order to address this growing population that 
includes IDPs and those displaced by severe climate-related 
events.
    By reinvigorating international norms, laws, and solutions, 
we can ensure better responses, greater protection for forced 
migrants, and more effective international coordination.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Photo: Robert Bushell, U.S. Marines fortify the border near San Luis 
        PoE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Nov. 21, 2018.



                              CHAPTER FIVE



     Trump's Domestic Agenda: Blocking All Legal Pathways to Refuge

                              ----------                              

    For many in the United States, our history with immigration 
is best exemplified by Emma Lazarus's poem at the Statue of 
Liberty: ``Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses 
yearning to breathe free . . . Send these, the homeless, 
tempest-tost to me!''\453\ Lazarus's vision, however, fails to 
reflect the varied history of U.S. immigration policies, which 
have always existed in tension with debates about U.S. 
identity. At our most inclusive, the United States was 
perceived as the world's standard-bearer in welcoming 
immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees. In times of hostility 
towards foreigners, the United States has banned and mistreated 
desperate victims of violence and persecution seeking refuge 
within our borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \453\ Emma Lazarus, ``The New Colossus,'' National Park Service, 
Nov. 2, 1883, https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/
colossus.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ebb and flow of U.S. immigration policy is most 
apparent in the periods before and after World War II. In the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, growing religious, racial, 
and ethnic intolerance resulted in exclusionary policies 
against Asians and the establishment of national-origin 
quotas.\454\ In 1939, Jewish passengers fleeing Nazi Germany on 
the St. Louis were denied the opportunity to disembark in the 
United States.\455\ After World War II, the United States' 
refusal of these Jewish refugees, in conjunction with the 
United States' enhanced role on the global stage, pushed us to 
become a leader in responding to refugee crises around the 
world.\456\ In the decades following, the United States 
provided refuge to Hungarian dissidents, Indochinese boat 
people, Soviet Jewry, Sudanese orphans and Kosovar victims of 
ethnic cleansing, among many others.\457\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \454\ Walter A. Ewing, Opportunity and Exclusion: A Brief History 
of U.S. Immigration Policy, American Immigration Council, at 3-4 (Jan. 
2012).
    \455\ David W. Haines, Learning from Our Past: The Refugee 
Experience in the United States, American Immigration Council, at 4 
(Nov. 25, 2015).
    \456\ Id.
    \457\ International Crisis Group, How to Save the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program, Sept. 12, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under the Trump administration, the United States has 
reverted to xenophobic and racist migration policies creating 
some of the darkest chapters in our history. President Trump 
and his administration have enacted executive actions and 
policies to restrict legal pathways to refuge in the United 
States, including travel restrictions on people from Muslim-
majority countries, the destruction of the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program, and additional barriers to asylum. These 
policies represent a regression on forced migrant issues and a 
failure to uphold international law, including the principle of 
non-refoulement, and have been received with domestic and 
international criticism.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \458\ See, e.g., Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's 
Travel Ban,'' The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017; Ana Campoy, ``Pro-
immigrant Americans are beating Trump back with a flood of lawsuits,'' 
Quartz, July 25, 2018; Letter from Chad Hayward, CEO of Accord Network, 
et al., to President Trump & Vice President Pence, Jan. 29, 2017; 
Sophia Tareen, ``Jewish groups speaking out against Trump immigration 
policy,'' AP, Aug. 22, 2019; ``Trump executive order banning refugees: 
World reacts,'' BBC, Jan. 29, 2017; Amnesty International, Overlooked 
and Under-Protected: Mexico's Deadly Refoulemont of Central Americans 
Seeking Asylum (Jan. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the Trump administration's actions have 
violated the rights outlined in the U.S. Constitution, 
conferred on the basis of personhood--not citizenship.\459\ The 
violation of these rights, including the right to due process 
and the right to legal counsel, undermine the sanctity of our 
laws and our values in the name of hatred and fear.\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \459\ Corey Brettschneider, ``Why Trump's Immigration Rules Are 
Unconstitutional,'' Politico, Feb. 1, 2017; Gretchen Frazee, ``What 
constitutional rights do undocumented immigrants have?,'' PBS, June 25, 
2018.
    \460\ Gretchen Frazee, ``What constitutional rights do undocumented 
immigrants have?,'' PBS, June 25, 2018.




       The Trump Administration's Decimation of Existing Programs

SUMMARY OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS AIMED TO RESTRICT OR PREVENT 
        REFUGE SOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
          The following courses of action have been pursued by 
        the Trump administration to restrict legal pathways for 
        seeking refuge in the United States for those fleeing 
        dire situations in their home countries:


   Travel restrictions for individuals from 14 countries, 
        including 10 Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, 
        Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, North Korea, 
        Venezuela, Nigeria, Burma, Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, and 
        Tanzania;\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \461\ Executive Order 13769, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27, 
2017.

   Suspension of all refugee admissions for 120 days;\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \462\ Id.

   Reduction in the U.S. refugee ceiling from FY 2016 to FY 
        2020 by 79 percent;\463\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \463\ Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), Proposed Refugee Admissions 
for FY 2016, Oct. 1, 2015; Press Release, U.S. Department of State, 
PRM, Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, Nov. 
2, 2019.

   New regional and thematic allocations for refugee 
        resettlement irrespective of global need;\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \464\ President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on 
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, The White House, Nov. 1, 2019.

   The discontinuation of UNHCR referrals for 
        resettlement;\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \465\ Id.

   Reduction in refugees resettled in the United States from 
        FY 2016 to FY 2019 by 65 percent;\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \466\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee 
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, 
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 
2020--01--31--.xlsx.

   Termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6 countries: 
        El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and 
        Sudan;\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \467\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on 
Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador, Jan. 8, 2018; Press 
Release, DHS, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary 
Protected Status for Haiti, Nov. 20, 2017; Press Release, DHS, Acting 
Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for 
Nicaragua and Honduras, Nov. 6, 2017; Press Release, DHS, Secretary 
Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for 
Nepal, Apr. 26, 2018; Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), Temporary Protected Status for Sudan to Terminate in 
November 2018, Sept. 18, 2017.

   Termination of the Central American Minors Program;\468\ 
        and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \468\ Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 
Fed. Reg. 38926, Aug. 16, 2017.

   Disqualification of domestic violence and gang violence 
        asylum claims.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \469\ Matter of A-B-, Interim Decision 3929, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 
June 11, 2018).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Demonstrators block traffic as they protest against Donald Trump's 
immigration order at San Francisco International Airport. Getty Images, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Jan. 28, 2017.

The Muslim Ban

    On January 27, 2017--just days after taking office--
President Trump issued an executive order decreasing the number 
of refugees admitted to the United States in Fiscal Year 2017 
from 110,000 to 50,000, suspending the U.S. Refugees Admissions 
Program (USRAP) for 120 days, suspending the entry of Syrian 
refugees indefinitely, and suspending the entry of individuals 
from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 
days.\470\ This order came to be known as the ``Muslim Ban,'' 
since all of the countries targeted were predominately 
Muslim.\471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \470\ Executive Order 13769, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27, 
2017.
    \471\ Pew Research Center, ``Religious Composition by Country, 
2010-2050,'' Apr. 2, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tens of thousands of Americans denounced the Trump 
administration's actions, showing up to more than forty 
protests across the country.\472\ Muslim, Jewish, and Christian 
religious groups voiced public criticism.\473\ Lawyers set up 
informal pro-bono shops at airports to provide legal services 
to those impacted by the ban.\474\ Legal challenges began 
almost immediately.\475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \472\ Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's Travel Ban,'' 
The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017.
    \473\ Letter from Chad Hayward et al., to President Trump & Vice 
President Pence, Jan. 29, 2017; Sophia Tareen, ``Jewish groups speaking 
out against Trump immigration policy,'' AP, Aug. 22, 2019; Hans 
Holznagel, ``UCC, Muslim leaders urge limits on presidential travel 
bans,'' United Church of Christ, Aug. 29, 2019; Press Release, CAIR, 
CAIR Files Federal Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of Trump's 
`Muslim Ban,' Jan. 30, 2017.
    \474\ Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's Travel Ban,'' 
The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017.
    \475\ American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), ``Timeline of the 
Muslim Ban,'' https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The executive order tasked the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) with reviewing the refugee admissions 
process and implementing new procedures to ensure that 
prospective refugees do not threaten U.S. security and 
welfare.\476\ The agency heads concluded that refugee 
admissions could resume subject to certain conditions, 
including the de-prioritization of refugee admissions of 
nationals from 11 countries designated as higher risk on the 
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) list.\477\ The memo also 
declared an indefinite pause in admitting all ``following-to-
join'' refugees--spouses and unmarried minor children of 
principal refugees--until further screening mechanisms were 
implemented.\478\ However, a District Court injunction on 
December 23, 2017 blocked the administration's enforcement of 
most provisions in the memo, particularly those regarding 
refugees from the 11 SAO countries and ``following-to-join'' 
refugees.\479\ These actions sought to gut U.S. migration from 
Muslim-majority countries and paralyze the U.S. refugee 
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \476\ Executive Order 13769, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27, 
2017; Executive Order 13780, ``Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,'' 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, Mar. 6, 
2017.
    \477\ Memorandum from Rex W, Tillerson, Secretary of State, et al., 
to President Trump, ``Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions 
Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities,'' Oct. 23, 2017; Krishnadev 
Calamur, ``Trump's New Refugee Policy Targets These 11 Countries,'' The 
Atlantic, Oct. 25, 2017 (Although the 11 countries were not named, they 
were widely understood to be Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, North 
Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen).
    \478\ Memorandum from Rex W, Tillerson, Secretary of State, et al., 
to President Trump, ``Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions 
Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities,'' Oct. 23, 2017.
    \479\ Doe et al. v. Trump, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order Issuing a Preliminary Injunction, No. 2:17-cv-00178-JLR (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 23, 2017); Josh Gerstein, ``Judge blocks Trump refugee 
order,'' Politico, Dec. 23, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On October 24, 2017, President Trump issued another 
executive order resuming the refugee admissions program subject 
to certain conditions, including ``special measures'' for 
refugees who ``pose potential threats'' to U.S. security and 
welfare based on a review by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).\480\ In January 2018, following the 90-day 
review, DHS announced ``additional security enhancements and 
recommendations,'' including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \480\ Executive Order 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee 
Admissions Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, 82 Fed. Reg. 
50055, Oct. 27, 2017.


   Additional screening for certain nationals of ``high-risk 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        countries;''

   Administering the Refugee Admissions Program with an 
        emphasis on risk when considering the overall 
        admissions ceiling, allocations, and groups of 
        applicants considered for resettlement; and

   Periodic reviews and updates of the refugee ``high-risk 
        country'' list and selection criteria.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \481\ Id.; Press Release, DHS, DHS Announces Additional, Enhanced 
Security Procedures for Refugees Seeking Resettlement in the United 
States, Jan. 31, 2018.


    On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the Trump 
administration's travel bans and restrictions in a 5-4 
ruling.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \482\ Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. (2018); Adam Liptak & Michael D. 
Shear, ``Trump's Travel Ban Is Upheld by the Supreme Court,'' The New 
York Times, June 26, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On January 31, 2020, President Trump expanded the travel 
ban, adding travel restrictions for six additional countries in 
a proclamation.\483\ This expansion suspended immigrant visas 
for four countries--Nigeria, Burma, Eritrea, and Kyrgyzstan--
while people from Sudan and Tanzania were barred from the U.S. 
diversity visa program.\484\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \483\ President Donald J. Trump, ``Proclamation on Improving 
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry,'' White House, Jan. 31, 2020; Caitlin Oprysko et al., ``Trump 
administration expands travel ban,'' Politico, Jan. 31, 2020.
    \484\ President Donald J. Trump, ``Proclamation on Improving 
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry,'' White House, Jan. 31, 2020; Caitlin Oprysko et al., ``Trump 
administration expands travel ban,'' Politico, Jan. 31, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sidebar: BACKGROUND ON U.S. REFUGEE
    ADMISSIONS PROGRAM
    Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 to create a 
permanent and systematic procedure for refugee resettlement to 
the United States.\485\ The act, which amended the U.S. 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), largely incorporated the 
1967 Refugee Protocol's definition of a refugee into U.S. law 
and established the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
(USRAP).\486\ The INA authorizes the admission of refugees to 
the United States who satisfy certain requirements. The INA 
generally defines a refugee as a person who is outside his or 
her country and is unable or unwilling to return to his or her 
country of origin because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.\487\ To be eligible for admission as a refugee, an 
individual must meet the above definition, must not be firmly 
resettled in any foreign country, must be determined to be of 
special humanitarian concern to the United States, and must be 
admissible to the United States according to the terms of the 
INA.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \485\ Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212.
    \486\ Immigration and Naturalization Act Sec. 101(a)(42)(A), 8 
U.S.C. Sec. 1001(a)(42)(A) (A unique aspect of the refugee definition 
in U.S. law is that it allows for in-country processing. In addition, 
the Refugee Act incorporated the 1967 Protocol's criteria for excluding 
individuals from admission to the United States as refugees, such as 
perpetrating war crimes or crimes against humanity. This definition 
conforms with the definition used in the United Nations 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees.)
    \487\ Id.
    \488\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Bipartisan U.S. Tradition in Refugee Resettlement

    Until recently, the United States was by far the global 
leader in refugee resettlement, admitting more refugees than 
all other resettlement countries combined.\489\ Prior to the 
Trump administration, the United States resettled roughly 
80,000 refugees per year since 1980, reaching near record-high 
totals under Republican administrations.\490\ Even in the years 
following 9/11, when ``security protocols threatened to 
strangle it in red tape,'' both the Bush and Obama 
administrations maintained a robust U.S. resettlement 
program.\491\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \489\ Jens Manuel Krogstad, ``Key facts about refugees to the 
U.S.,'' Pew Research Center, Oct. 7, 2019.
    \490\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee 
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, 
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
    \491\ International Crisis Group, How to Save the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program, at i (Sept. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The USRAP was not only viewed as an important humanitarian 
program for protecting some of the world's most vulnerable 
people, but also as a tool for advancing U.S. strategic 
interests.\492\ Republican and Democratic national security 
leaders recognized that refugee resettlement enhanced America's 
global influence, demonstrated U.S. burden-sharing with 
refugee-hosting countries such as Jordan, Thailand, and Kenya, 
undercut anti-U.S. and anti-Western propaganda, supported the 
recruitment of military partners and foreign intelligence 
assets abroad, and helped promote stability in countries to 
which refugees initially flee.\493\ In addition, prioritizing 
resettlement for highly vulnerable refugees, such as female-
headed households, the elderly, and victims of torture, 
reflected a proud U.S. tradition of responding to grave human 
suffering.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \492\ Idean Salehyan, Insider's Perspectives: Forgotten Refugee 
Resettlement Consensus and Motivation, Niskanen Center, at 2 (Sept. 
2019).
    \493\ Refugee Council USA, ``20 Former National Security Officials 
Sign Letter to Congress in Support of the U.S. Refugee Program,'' Dec. 
1, 2015; Letter from General Keith B. Alexander, Former Director, 
National Security Agency, et al., to President Donald J. Trump, Sept. 
3, 2019; Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, ``Trump 
Administration Considers a Drastic Cut in Refugees Allowed to Enter 
U.S.,'' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2019.
    \494\ David Miliband, Rescue: Refugees and the Political Crisis of 
Our Time, TED Books Simon & Schuster, at 94-95 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recent years, efforts have sought to diversify the USRAP 
to better meet the resettlement needs of highly vulnerable 
refugees.\495\ The program evolved from focusing on refugee 
admissions from relatively few nationalities to resettling 
refugees from over 60 nationalities by 2011.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \495\ Congressional Research Service (CRS), U.S. Refugee 
Resettlement Assistance, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2011).
    \496\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Trump, however, has drastically cut the number of 
refugee resettlement slots and has distorted the few remaining 
allocations to serve his political objectives.\497\ New 
security screenings and criteria also have substantially 
reduced the number of refugees resettled to the United States, 
particularly from Muslim-majority countries.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \497\ Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the 
Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' 
Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019.
    \498\ Statement of Eric Schwartz, President of Refugees 
International, A Global Crisis: Refugees, Migrants, and Asylum Seekers, 
Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 
Organizations, Feb. 26, 2019, at 6.


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Committee staff analysis based on U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
  Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions--Refugee 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Processing Center, Summary of Refugee Admissions, Jan. 31, 2020.

Sharp Reductions to Refugee Resettlement Ceilings

    By law, annual refugee admission numbers are set by the 
President in consultation with Congress.\499\ One of the 
President's first official acts upon taking office was to 
reduce the FY 2017 refugee ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000 with 
an executive order.\500\ This downward trend continued in FY 
2018 when the ceiling was lowered to 45,000, again in FY 2019 
when the ceiling was lowered to 30,000, and most recently in FY 
2020 when the administration announced a ceiling of just 
18,000.\501\ In the midst of the world's worst displacement 
crisis in modern history, the Trump administration authorized 
the lowest refugee ceiling in U.S. history.\502\ As a result, 
global refugee resettlement capacity has plummeted. UNHCR 
reports that 92,400 refugees were resettled to 25 countries 
during 2018, representing only 7 percent of refugees in need of 
resettlement, and only 0.4 percent of the global refugee 
population.\503\ Other resettlement countries have not stepped 
up to fill the large gap created by the United States, and the 
bold resettlement commitments made at President Obama's 2016 
Leaders' Summit and subsequent Global Compact on Refugees 
remain largely neglected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \499\ INA Sec. 207(a), 8 USC Sec. 1157(a).
    \500\ Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 58977, Jan. 27, 
2017.
    \501\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Proposed Refugee Admissions 
for FY 2018, at 6 (Oct. 4, 2017); U.S. Department of State, PRM, 
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2019, at 4 (Nov. 24, 2018); Press 
Release, U.S. Department of State, PRM, Presidential Determination on 
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, Nov. 2, 2019.
    \502\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 
2019); Press Release, PRM, Presidential Determination on Refugee 
Admissions for FY 2020, Nov. 2, 2019.
    \503\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2-3, 
30, 32 (June 2019) (Committee staff calculations based on 92,400 
refugees resettled, 1.4 million refugees in need of resettlement, and 
25.9 million refugees).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fiscal Year 2020 Changes to Refugee Resettlement

    In addition to drastically lowering the refugee ceiling, 
the administration altered the composition of where refugees 
are being resettled from. From FY 2016 to FY 2018, the largest 
increase was from Europe (from 5 to 16 percent) and the largest 
decrease was from Near East/South Asia (from 42 to 17 
percent).\504\ Whereas the top five home countries for refugees 
admitted to the U.S. in FY 2016 were the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Syria, Burma, Iraq, and Somalia, in FY 2018 the top five 
were Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma, Ukraine, Bhutan, and 
Eritrea.\505\ With measures meant to prevent refugee admissions 
from Muslim-majority countries, admissions from Syria, Iraq, 
and Somalia dropped dramatically in FY 2018 to less than 2 
percent of FY 2016 admissions.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \504\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee 
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, 
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
    \505\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019. 
U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing 
Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://
www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--
01--31--.xlsx.
    \506\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee 
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, 
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 
2020--01--31--.xlsx (Committee staff calculations based on 459 
admissions in FY 2018 and 31,487 admission in FY 2016. Admissions from 
these three countries combined represented about 37% of total refugee 
admissions in FY 2016 and about 2% of total refugee admissions in FY 
2018 admissions.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its FY 2020 plan, the administration took the 
unprecedented step of designating new regional and thematic 
allocations for resettlement--not only altering how many 
refugees the United States resettles, but who we resettle.\507\ 
These changes represent a dramatic shift from resettlement 
decisions that have historically considered global needs as 
well as U.S. interests, to decisions now solely based on 
national or ``special interest'' to the United States.\508\ The 
new categories include allocations for refugees persecuted on 
account of religion, but exclude designations for crises 
resulting in large numbers of refugees, including the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Syria.\509\ Many 
groups allege that these categorizations surreptitiously 
complicate the process in order to make it all but impossible 
to meet the annual ceiling.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \507\ President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on 
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, The White House, Nov. 1, 2019; Kristie 
De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the Details: Digging 
Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' Niskanen Center, Nov. 
18, 2019.
    \508\ International Rescue Committee, Who is left behind when the 
U.S. resettles fewer refugees?, Mar. 17, 2020.
    \509\ President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Determination on 
Refugee Admissions for FY 2020, The White House, Nov. 1, 2019; Kristie 
De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the Details: Digging 
Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' Niskanen Center, Nov. 
18, 2019.
    \510\ Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the 
Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' 
Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019; Letter from Senator Kamala D. Harris, 
et al., to Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State & Kevin McAleenan, 
Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Nov. 6, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In keeping with the Trump administration's pattern of 
cutting ties with international organizations, the 
administration also eliminated UNCHR referrals, except those 
related to the new categories in its FY 2020 plan.\511\ As a 
result, the United States is squandering valuable data that 
UNHCR has collected on millions of refugees seeking 
resettlement--data that could help vet refugees, improve the 
security of resettlement programs, and make U.S. decision more 
informed.\512\ The United States also loses insight into 
whether individuals are already under consideration for 
resettlement to another country, thereby making U.S. 
resettlement activities far more inefficient and 
ineffective.\513\ Lastly, without UNHCR referrals and an active 
system for embassy referrals, it is unclear how the United 
States will fill its pipeline to meet its annual ceilings.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \511\ Ted Hesson, ``Trump ending U.S. role as worldwide leader on 
refugees,'' Politico, Oct. 11, 2019; Kristie De Pena & Matthew La 
Corte, ``The Devil is in the Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee 
Resettlement Changes,'' Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019.
    \512\ Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, ``The Devil is in the 
Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes,'' 
Niskanen Center, Nov. 18, 2019.
    \513\ Id.
    \514\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In September 2019, President Trump issued an executive 
order providing state and local officials with the authority to 
consent or reject to refugee resettlement placements in their 
jurisdictions.\515\ The order required that refugee 
resettlement organizations receive written consent from state 
and local jurisdictions in order to pursue resettlement.\516\ 
As of January 2020, 42 states and 100 localities had consented 
to receive refugees.\517\Only one state, Texas, had rejected 
refugee resettlement.\518\ On January 15, 2020, the District 
Court of Maryland issued a preliminary injunction, placing a 
hold on the executive order's implementation.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \515\ President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order on Enhancing State 
and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement, The White House, Sept. 
26, 2019.
    \516\ Bobby Allyn, ``Judge Blocks Trump's Executive Order Allowing 
Local Officials to Reject Refugees,'' NPR, Jan. 15, 2020.
    \517\ Miriam Jordan, ``Judge Halts Trump Policy That Allows States 
to Bar Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 15, 2020.
    \518\ Id.
    \519\ Hias v. Trump, Memorandum Opinion, No. 8:19-cv-03346 (D. Md. 
Jan. 15, 2020); Bobby Allyn, ``Judge Blocks Trump's Executive Order 
Allowing Local Officials to Reject Refugees,'' NPR, Jan. 15, 2020; 
Miriam Jordan, ``Judge Halts Trump Policy That Allows States to Bar 
Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 15, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The cumulative effect of the Trump administration's 
restrictive policies has decimated the U.S. Refugee 
Resettlement Program. As a result, the number of refugees 
resettled in the United States represented a 65 percent drop in 
FY 2019 from FY 2016 levels.\520\ This drastic drop has 
impacted the capacity of non-profit and faith-based agencies to 
support refugees' reception and integration into American 
communities. From January 2017 to April 2020, over 100 local 
resettlement offices closed, weakening the United States' 
refugee resettlement infrastructure and the ability to reverse 
current trends and respond to growing resettlement needs.\521\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \520\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee 
Processing Center, ``Summary of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, 
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 
2020--01--31--.xlsx.
    \521\ Refugee Council USA, Where are the Refugees?: Drastic Cuts to 
Refugee Resettlement Harming Refugees, Communities, and American 
Leadership, at 19-20 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ending Temporary Protected Status Designations

    As part of the Immigration Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
649), Congress established the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) 
program to provide humanitarian relief to foreign nationals 
within the United States who are unable to return to their 
country of origin due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or 
other extraordinary circumstances that prevent their safe 
return. In establishing TPS, Congress re-affirmed the need to 
provide temporary safe haven to certain foreign nationals that 
did not meet the legal definition of refugee or asylee.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \522\ CRS, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, 
Mar. 29, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2017 and 2018, the Trump administration announced plans 
to terminate TPS designations for six of the ten countries 
whose citizens were eligible: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan.\523\ The administration argued 
that conditions in these countries no longer warranted 
extending their TPS status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \523\ Press Release, DHS, Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen 
M. Nielsen Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador, 
Jan. 8, 2018; Press Release, DHS, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke 
Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti, Nov. 20, 2017; 
Press Release, DHS, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on 
Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua and Honduras, Nov. 6, 2017; 
Press Release, DHS, Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on 
Temporary Protected Status for Nepal, Apr. 26, 2018; Press Release, 
USCIS, Temporary Protected Status for Sudan to Terminate in November 
2018, Sept. 18, 2017; President Donald J. Trump, Presidential 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, The White House, Mar. 27, 2018 (The Trump Administration also 
attempted to phase-out Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Liberians. 
DED is similar to TPS but is based on the President's constitutional 
powers to conduct foreign relations, and Liberia is the only country 
currently with this designation. The number of Liberians affected is 
between 850 and 4,000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration's plans to terminate TPS for these six 
countries would affect more than 400,000 current TPS 
beneficiaries, including many who have been living the United 
States for at least 20 years.\524\ More than 80 percent of 
these beneficiaries are Central American, including 
approximately 252,000 Salvadorans, 81,000 Hondurans, and 4,500 
Nicaraguans.\525\ While the U.S. Government does not keep data 
on the number of U.S.-born children of TPS recipients, external 
organizations have produced estimates of 273,000 to 279,000 
children of TPS recipients from El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Haiti.\526\ In terminating the TPS designations for these 
countries, the Trump administration consciously decided to 
strip legal protections from hundreds of thousands of foreign-
born individuals and put hundreds of thousands of their U.S.-
citizen children at risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \524\ CRS, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, 
Mar. 29, 2019; Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, ``A Statistical and 
Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations 
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti,''  Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 5, no. 3, at 1 (2017).
    \525\ CRS, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, 
Mar. 29, 2019.
    \526\ Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, ``A Statistical and 
Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations 
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti,''  Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 5, no. 3, at 2 (2017); Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, ``What 
Do We Know About Immigrants With Temporary Protected Status?,'' Center 
for American Progress, Feb. 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, the termination of TPS would result in lost 
work authorization and potential removal from the U.S. for 
beneficiaries. According to the Center for Migration Studies, 
more than 80 percent of TPS recipients from El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Haiti have jobs, and many hold home 
mortgages.\527\ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has expressed 
concern that termination will result in a shortage of 
authorized, experienced workers for the construction, food 
services, landscaping, and childcare industries.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \527\ Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, ``A Statistical and 
Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations 
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti,''  Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 5, no. 3, at 1 (2017).
    \528\ Letter from Neil L. Bradley, Senior Vice President & Chief 
Policy Officer at the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, to Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Oct. 
26, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. District Court for Northern California issued a 
preliminary injunction on October 3, 2018 enjoining DHS from 
terminating TPS for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and 
Sudan.\529\ The court ruled that DHS had failed to consider 
recent events in those countries when making its decision, and 
noted serious questions as to whether DHS's decision violated 
the equal protection clause given Trump's statements suggesting 
race was ``a motivating factor.''\530\ Separate court cases 
enjoined the termination of TPS for Honduras and Nepal pending 
resolution of the government's appeal.\531\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \529\ Ramos v. Nielsen, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Preliminary Injunction (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018); U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), ``Temporary Protected Status,'' https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020).
    \530\ Ramos v. Nielsen, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Preliminary Injunction (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018).
    \531\ Bhattarai v. Nielsen, Stipulation to Stay Proceedings, No. 
3:19-cv-00731-EMC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019); USCIS, ``Temporary 
Protected Status,'' https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-
protected-status (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A Human Rights Watch report investigated 138 cases of 
Salvadorans killed after deportation from the United States, 
underscoring the dangerous and often fatal conditions for those 
forcibly returned to El Salvador and other TPS countries.\532\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \532\ Human Rights Watch, Deported to Danger: United States 
Deportation Policies Expose Salvadorans to Death and Abuse, Feb. 5, 
2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: TERMINATION OF THE CENTRAL
    AMERICAN MINORS PROGRAM
    In December 2014, the Obama administration stood up the 
Central American Minors (CAM) Program, a refugee/parole program 
created in response to a surge in unaccompanied child arrivals 
from the Northern Triangle.\533\ The program allowed eligible 
minors with a parent lawfully present in the United States to 
apply for refugee resettlement in the United States while 
remaining in their home country. The objective was to remove 
the need for unaccompanied children to undertake the dangerous 
journey across Mexico to the U.S. border to seek asylum. 
Applicants ineligible for refugee status under the program were 
considered for parole, which allowed temporary entrance to the 
United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit.\534\ According to the Department of State, 
about 2,300 individuals were granted refugee status and about 
1,500 granted parole under the CAM program.\535\ The majority 
of refugees and parolees were from El Salvador.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \533\ USCIS, ``In-Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (Central American Minors--CAM),'' 
Nov. 15, 2017, https://www.uscis.gov/CAM; David Nakamura, ``Trump 
administration ends Obama-era protection program for Central American 
minors,'' The Washington Post, Aug. 16, 2017.
    \534\ U.S. Department of State, PRM, ``In-Country Refugee/Parole 
Program for Minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras With Parents 
Lawfully Present in the United States,'' Nov. 14, 2014; USCIS, ``In-
Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Honduras, El Salvador 
and Guatemala (Central American Minors--CAM),'' Nov. 15, 2017, https://
www.uscis.gov/CAM (Qualified parents included individuals with lawful 
permanent resident status, temporary protected status, deferred 
enforced departure, and deferred action, among others).
    \535\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019.
    \536\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the fact that the CAM program pertained only to 
vulnerable children who were legally processed in-country, 
legally travelled to the United States, and legally placed in 
the care of relatives, in August 2017, the Trump administration 
announced it was ending the CAM parole program and would no 
longer automatically consider unsuccessful refugee applicants 
for parole.\537\ Furthermore, the administration indicated in a 
report on proposed refugee admissions for FY 2018 that it 
planned to phase out the CAM refugee program, because most of 
the individuals applying were not eligible for refugee 
resettlement.\538\ Indeed, State stopped accepting new CAM 
applications in November 2017 and DHS stopped interviewing 
applicants in early 2018.\539\ In March 2019, a federal court 
ordered the U.S. government to resume processing the 
applications of the approximately 2,700 children in the CAM 
program.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \537\ Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 
Fed. Reg. 38926, Aug. 16, 2017; David Nakamura, ``Trump administration 
ends Obama-era protection program for Central American minors,'' The 
Washington Post, Aug. 16, 2017.
    \538\ U.S. Department of State, DHS, United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2018 
Report to Congress, at 43 (Sept. 2017).
    \539\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019.
    \540\ S.A. v. Trump, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Case No. 18-cv-03539-LB 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019); Press Release, International Refugee 
Assistance Project, Court Orders Government to Resume Processing 
Central American Minors in Terminated Humanitarian Program, Mar. 4, 
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disqualification of Domestic & Gang Violence Asylum

  Claims in Matter of A-B-

    Prior to the Trump administration, gender-based persecution 
had been recognized as a basis for asylum for decades in the 
United States.\541\ In 2016, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
found that the applicant in Matter of A-B- qualified for asylum 
as a ``particular social group'' because as a woman in El 
Salvador, her government was not able to protect her.\542\ A-B- 
had credibly testified that she had endured 15 years of abuse 
by her husband, including death threats, rapes, and beatings, 
and had fled to different parts of El Salvador, divorced her 
husband, and filed two restraining orders against him, yet he 
continued to find and abuse her without consequence.\543\ In 
June 2018, Attorney General Sessions vacated the 2016 Board of 
Immigration Appeals decision and remanded the case to the 
immigration judge for further proceedings.\544\ Sessions 
concluded that domestic and gang violence asylum cases involve 
``private criminal activity'' and ``generally . . . will not 
qualify for asylum.''\545\ This decision was then passed down 
into U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) guidance 
for officers screening asylum cases.\546\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \541\ Cody Wofsy & Katrina Eiland, ``Jeff Sessions' Illegal Attacks 
on Asylum Seekers,'' ACLU, Aug. 7, 2018.
    \542\ Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, ``Sessions Says Domestic 
and Gang Violence Are Not Grounds for Asylum,'' The New York Times, 
June 11, 2018.
    \543\ Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Slamming the Door on 
Domestic Violence Survivors: Matter of A-B- (July 2019); Deborah Anker, 
``The History and Future of Gender Asylum Law and Recognition of 
Domestic Violence as a Basis for Protection in the United States,'' 
American Bar Association, Apr. 28, 2020.
    \544\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, Apr. 12, 2019; 
``In re A-B-,'' 132 Harv. L. Rev. 803, Dec. 10, 2018.
    \545\ Matter of A-B-, Interim Decision 3929, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 
June 11, 2018).
    \546\ DHS & USCIS, Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, 
Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of 
A-B-, at 10 (July 11, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia ruled that policies set forth in Matter of A-B- and 
USCIS's memorandum conflicted with provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act, and defied 
Congress' intention for the credible fear determination to be a 
``low screening standard.''\547\ The court thus vacated several 
of the policies established by Matter of A-B- and USCIS's 
policy memorandum, and enjoined the government from applying 
them in future credible fear screenings.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \547\ Grace v. Whitaker, Memorandum Opinion, No. 18-cv-01853 at 8 
(D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018); Jennifer Chang Newell, ``Federal Judge Blocks 
Trump's Policy Gutting Asylum for People Fleeing Domestic and Gang 
Violence,'' ACLU, Dec. 19, 2018.
    \548\ Grace v. Whitaker, Memorandum Opinion, No. 18-cv-01853 
(D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  The Impact of Trump Administration 
                      Policies at the U.S. Border

    Coupled with efforts to limit the number of refugees 
resettled in the United States, Trump administration policies 
have made the process of applying for asylum increasingly 
difficult and inhumane, particularly for asylum seekers 
arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, most of whom are from 
Central America.
    Under the INA, most foreign nationals in the United States 
or arriving at or between U.S. Ports of Entry may apply for 
asylum regardless of immigration status.\549\ To be granted 
asylum, an applicant must establish that they meet the INA's 
refugee definition, among other requirements.\550\ The Trump 
administration has taken a number of troubling and potentially 
illegal actions to restrict asylum seekers' access to the 
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \549\ CRS, Immigration: U.S. Asylum Policy, Feb. 19, 2019. Special 
asylum provisions apply to aliens who are subject to a streamlined 
removal process known as expedited removal. To be considered for 
asylum, these aliens must first be determined by a USCIS asylum officer 
to have a credible fear of persecution. Under the INA, credible fear of 
persecution means that ``there is a significant possibility, taking 
into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in 
support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the 
officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.'' 
Individuals determined to have a credible fear may apply for asylum 
during standard removal proceedings. Id.
    \550\ INA Sec. 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1001(a)(42)(A). This 
definition conforms with the definition used in the United Nations 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

   Jerry Glaser, Mexico Repatriation Flight, January 16, 2020, U.S. 
              Customs and Border Protection, Jan. 16, 2020

SUMMARY OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS EXTERNALIZING THE BORDER & 
        HARMING VULNERABLE FORCED MIGRANT POPULATIONS
    The following courses of action have been pursued by the 
Trump administration to restrict entry at our borders, and 
access to our asylum system and other migration systems:


   Under the ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' all adults apprehended 
        crossing the border between Ports of Entry were 
        prosecuted and more than, 4,200 children were separated 
        from their families;\551\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \551\ Memorandum from Attorney General, Zero-Tolerance for Offenses 
Under 8 U.S.C. Sec.  1325(a), Apr. 6, 2018; Leila Rafei, ``Family 
Separation, Two Years After Ms. L,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.

   Metering policies restricted the number of asylum seekers 
        allowed to cross into U.S. territory--at the El Paso 
        Port of Entry, the average number of asylum cases 
        processes dropped 66 percent with metering in 
        effect;\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \552\ Stephanie Leutert, et al. Asylum Processing and Waitlists at 
the U.S.-Mexico Border, Robert Strauss Center for International 
Security and Law, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Migration Policy 
Centre, at 5, 13 (Dec. 2018).

   The Remain in Mexico policy (MPP) has pushed more than 
        62,000 asylum seekers into dangerous settings where 
        they face kidnapping, abuse, murder, and refoulement--
        75 percent of Doctors Without Borders (MSF) patients in 
        Nuevo Laredo due to MPP had experienced 
        kidnapping;\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \553\ Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers, The devastating toll 
of `Remain in Mexico' asylum policy one year later, Jan. 29, 2020.

   A new Interim Final Rule prevents asylum seekers from 
        applying for asylum in the United States if they had 
        not already sought protection from countries through 
        which they transited;\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \554\ Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33829, July 16, 2019.

   ``Safe third country'' agreements allow the swift removal 
        of asylum seekers to Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
        Salvador, where concerns about threats to safety and 
        protection remain;\555\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \555\ DHS, Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and 
El Salvador, Nov. 7, 2019; Nicole Narea, ``Trump's agreements in 
Central America are dismantling the asylum system as we know it,'' Vox, 
Nov. 20, 2019.

   Under two new expedited removal policies, asylum seekers 
        are effectively denied counsel and therefore access to 
        the U.S. asylum system.\556\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \556\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum 
Seekers at the Border: The Migrant Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum 
Claim Review, Humanitarian Asylum Review Process, Metering, Asylum 
Transit Ban, and How They Interact (Jan. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Family Separation & Zero Tolerance

    The Trump administration has implemented cruel and unusual 
policies to deter asylum seekers from coming to the United 
States.\557\ On April 6, 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
announced a new ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' that would criminally 
prosecute all adult migrants apprehended crossing the border in 
between ports of entry for improper entry into the United 
States, including asylum seekers and those with minor 
children.\558\ Although thousands of children had been 
separated prior to the announcement, this represented a drastic 
escalation in the enforcement of existing law--one that 
resulted in a substantial increase in family separation.\559\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \557\ Daniella Diaz, ``Kelly: DHS Is Considering Separating 
Undocumented Children from Their Parents at the Border,'' CNN, Mar. 7, 
2017. In a March 7, 2017 interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, on ``The 
Situation Room,'' then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly was 
asked if DHS was considering separating children from their parents to 
deter migration to the United States and he responded, ``Yes, I am 
considering [it], in order to deter more movement along this terribly 
dangerous network, I am considering exactly that.'' Id.
    \558\ Memorandum from Attorney General, Zero-Tolerance for Offenses 
Under 8 U.S.C. Sec.  1325(a), Apr. 6, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Public Affairs, ``Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks 
Discussing the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the Trump 
Administration,'' May 7, 2018; CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero 
Tolerance'' Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019.
    \559\ CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero Tolerance'' 
Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019; Family separation 
occurred prior to the May 2018 policy when DHS suspected the veracity 
of the familial relationship or were concerned about the child's 
safety. For example, DHS separated 1,065 children from the parents in 
FY 2017 and 703 children in the first five months of FY 2018. Email 
correspondence from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
Legislative Affairs to CRS, June 8, 2018. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under this new level of law enforcement, adults crossing 
the border between Ports of Entry were criminally prosecuted 
and subjected to detention in federal criminal detention 
centers, where children cannot be housed. As a result, any 
accompanying children were designated as Unaccompanied Alien 
Children and transferred to the custody of the Department of 
Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR), which housed them in their own shelter facilities.\560\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \560\ CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero Tolerance'' 
Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A February 2020 Government Accountability Office study 
found that inaccurate record keeping was due in part to Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) officers' human error, preventing 
an accurate count of the total number of separations.\561\ In 
total, it estimated that the Trump administration separated 
over 4,200 children from their parents.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \561\ U.S .Government Accountability Office, Southwest Border: 
Actions Needed to Improve DHS Processing of Families and Coordination 
Between DHS and HHS (Feb. 2020).
    \562\ Leila Rafei, ``Family Separation, Two Years After Ms. L,'' 
ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After tremendous public uproar, including from Congress, 
Fortune 500 companies, the United Nations, religious leaders, 
and medical professionals, President Trump issued an executive 
order on June 20, 2018, mandating that DHS maintain custody of 
migrant families together pending any criminal trial or 
immigration proceedings.\563\ CBP subsequently stopped 
referring most illegal border crossers to DOJ for criminal 
prosecution, but DHS is still separating some families based on 
DHS enforcement protocols in place prior to the ``Zero 
Tolerance Policy.''\564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \563\ CRS, The Trump Administration's ``Zero Tolerance'' 
Immigration Enforcement Policy, Feb. 26, 2019; Kevin D. Williamson, 
``Immigration Policy: Bordering on Madness,'' National Review, June 25, 
2019; Catherine E. Shoichet, ``Doctors Saw Immigrant Kids Separated 
from Their Parents. Now They're Trying to Stop It,'' CNN, June 14, 
2018; Amy Wang, ``Officials Blast Trump Policy After Visiting Detained 
Immigrants,'' Chicago Tribune, June 10, 2018; Emma Green, ``Religious 
Leaders Condemn Family Separations--but Not Necessarily Trump,'' The 
Atlantic, June 19, 2018; Brad Tuttle, `` `Heartless, Cruel, Immoral.' 
Every Major CEO Who Condemned Trump's `Zero Tolerance' Border Policy,'' 
Money, June 20, 2018; Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Rights Chief Tells 
U.S. to Stop Taking Migrant Children From Parents,'' The New York 
Times, June 18, 2018; Tara Isabella Burton, ``Pope Francis Condemns 
Trump's Family Separation Policy,'' Vox, June 20, 2018; Executive Order 
13841, Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separation, 
83 Fed. Reg. 29435, June 25, 2019.
    \564\ A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, Class Action Complaint, No. 4:19-cv-
00481 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 26, 2018, the U.S. District Court for Southern 
California ruled that the policy violated constitutional rights 
and issued a preliminary injunction, which remains in effect, 
barring the Trump administration from involuntarily separating 
families and requiring the reunification of separated 
families.\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \565\ CRS, Family Separation at the Border and the Ms. L. 
Litigation, July 31, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. government, however, has struggled to reunite 
families that were separated under the Zero Tolerance Policy. 
CBP records omitted information about the separated children's 
family members; the IT systems for tracking families were 
limited, separate, and unable to be integrated with each other; 
and, uncoordinated implementation forced several thousand 
children to wait days if not months in Office of Refugee 
Resettlement shelters for reunification.\566\ According to 
government status reports to the court, 27 children still had 
not been reunited with their parents as of September 2019--15 
months after the District Court's ruling.\567\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \566\ DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), Special Review--
Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero 
Tolerance Policy (Sept. 27, 2018); U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) OIG, Separated Children Placed in Office of Refugee 
Resettlement Care (Jan. 2019).
    \567\ Mike LaSusa, ``Feds Say Dozens of Migrant Kids in Class Suit 
Still Separated,'' Law360, Sept. 12, 2019. Of the 27 remaining 
separated, 1 where the parent is not eligible for reunification or 
discharge at this time, 4 arrived without parents, 8 had parents deemed 
unfit for reunification, 13 whose parents did not intend to reunify 
with their children, 1 for whom parental preference could not be 
obtained. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: FAMILY SEPARATION & THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN
    Thousands of children impacted by the Trump 
administration's ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' experienced 
significant trauma as a result of being unexpectedly separated 
from their families and placed in detention centers.\568\ Once 
separated, children were often moved several times to different 
facilities, which exacerbated the trauma they experienced.\569\ 
For some infants, at the time of reunification, they had spent 
more time in immigration custody than they had with their 
parents.\570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \568\ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and 
Reform, Child Separations by the Trump Administration, at 1 (July 
2019).
    \569\ Id. at 19.
    \570\ Id. at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The HHS Inspector General released a report on the mental 
health needs of children in U.S. custody, detailing ``intense 
trauma from a variety of events before and upon their arrival 
in the United States.''\571\ In the report, a program director 
described the extent of emotional trauma in separated children: 
``A seven or eight year-old boy was separated from his father, 
without any explanation as to why the separation occurred. The 
child was under the delusion that his father had been killed 
and believed that he would also be killed. This child 
ultimately required emergency psychiatric care to address his 
mental health distress.''\572\ A medical director spoke to the 
physical manifestation of the trauma caused by separation, 
``Physical symptoms felt by separated children are 
manifestations of their psychological pain. You get a lot of 
`my chest hurts,' even though everything is fine [medically]. 
Children describe symptoms, `Every heartbeat hurts,' `I can't 
feel my heart,' of emotional pain.''\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \571\ HHS OIG, Separated Children Placed in Office of Refugee 
Resettlement Care, at 9 (Jan. 2019).
    \572\ Id. at 11.
    \573\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An October 2019 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
lawsuit describes the story of Jairo and Beatriz, a father and 
his three-year-old daughter. Jairo and Beatriz were separated 
after watching CBP officers beat a mother who refused to turn 
over her young child. Jairo was told by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) officers that if he signed paperwork in 
English--a language he did not understand--he would be reunited 
with his daughter sooner. Jairo signed a voluntary deportation 
form and was sent back to Guatemala. Meanwhile, Beatriz was 
moved to custody in New York. When Beatriz was finally reunited 
with her family in Guatemala, they noticed scars on her back 
and bruises on her legs. Beatriz told Jairo that a woman in New 
York had hit her with the hard part of a belt. Furthermore, by 
the time Beatriz was reunited with her family, she had lost the 
ability to speak Mam, an indigenous Mayan language, and 
therefore lost the ability to communicate with her mother and 
other family members.\574\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \574\ A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, Class Action Complaint, No. 4:19-cv-481 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A Physicians for Human Rights evaluation of 17 adults and 9 
children separated under the ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' found 
that most individuals experienced severe trauma, met diagnostic 
criteria for at least one major mental health condition, 
exhibited ongoing functional impairment, and required further 
intervention and therapeutic support.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \575\ Hajar Habbach et al., ``You Will Never See Your Child 
Again'': The Persistent Psychological Effects of Family Separation, 
Physicians for Human Rights (Feb. 25, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Trump administration's policies have scarred thousands 
of children. The families subjected to these policies will deal 
with the psychological and emotional fallout for years to 
come.\576\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \576\ See, e.g., Kimberly Howard et al., ``Early Mother-Child 
Separation, Parenting, and Child Well-Being in Early Head Start 
Families,'' Attachment & Human Development Journal (Jan. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Metering at U.S. Ports of Entry

    The Trump administration has implemented metering policies 
to discourage and turn away asylum seekers at the U.S. border. 
Also referred to as ``queue management,'' metering regulates 
the number of individuals allowed to claim asylum or enter the 
United States without proper documentation to address 
overcrowding at U.S. Ports of Entry.\577\ When metering is in 
effect, CBP officers walk halfway across the U.S.-Mexico border 
to stand at the international boundary. Before allowing a 
potential asylum seeker to cross into U.S. territory, they 
radio back to the Port of entry to confirm that space is 
available in holding facilities.\578\ If the facilities are 
full, the asylum seeker is refused entry until space opens 
up.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \577\ DHS OIG, Special Review-Initial Observations Regarding Family 
Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 6 (Sept. 27, 
2018); American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum Seekers 
at the Border: The Migrant Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum Claim 
Review, Humanitarian Asylum Review Process, Metering, Asylum Transit 
Ban, and How They Interact, at 1 (Jan. 2020).
    \578\ DHS OIG, Special Review-Initial Observations Regarding Family 
Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 6 (Sept. 27, 
2018).
    \579\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to a September 2018 DHS Office of the Inspector 
General report, the metering policy has existed at least as far 
back as 2016, although a December 2018 report co-authored by 
the University of Texas's Strauss Center for International 
Security and Law found that CBP only began ``solidifying and 
uniformly implementing the turn-back practices'' in May 
2018.\580\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \580\ Id.; Stephanie Leutert, et al. Asylum Processing and 
Waitlists at the U.S.-Mexico Border, Robert Strauss Center for 
International Security and Law, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 
Migration Policy Centre, at 3 (Dec. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBP's metering policy raises serious legal questions 
regarding federal immigration statutes, including whether these 
statutes apply to foreign nationals who are physically about to 
enter the United States but have not yet reached the 
border.\581\ Specifically, if CBP officers are stopping 
migrants before they have an opportunity to request asylum, it 
is unclear if they are violating asylum processes mandated in 
the INA.\582\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \581\ CRS, The Department of Homeland Security's Reported 
``Metering'' Policy: Legal Issues, Aug. 13, 2019.
    \582\ Id. A lawsuit (Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen) brought by an 
immigration advocacy organization and 14 asylum seekers contends that 
CBP's metering policy denies, and in some cases unreasonably delays 
asylum seekers' access to the asylum processes violates INA provisions 
that allow any alien who is physically present or arriving in the 
United States to pursue asylum, and that require CBP to refer any alien 
subject to expedited removal who indicates an intention to apply for 
asylum or a fear of persecution for a credible fear interview. The 
plaintiffs also argued that CBP has violated their due process rights 
by denying or delaying their ``access to the asylum process.'' Finally, 
the plaintiffs argued that CBP's policy violates the international law 
concept of non-refoulement, which instructs that no country should 
expel or return an individual to a place where he or she faces 
persecution. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Metering significantly reduced access to legal processes 
for asylum seekers at the U.S. border, thus pushing more asylum 
seekers to seek illegal methods for gaining entry to the United 
States. By limiting the number of people who could enter at 
legal Ports of Entry, the metering policy resulted in higher 
numbers entering between legal Ports of Entry, thus also 
increasing the likelihood of criminal prosecution.\583\ Citing 
CBP data for the El Paso Ports of Entry, the University of 
Texas report indicates that between April and June 2018--when 
metering was in effect--the average number of asylum seekers 
processed each day fell from 77 to 26.\584\ Moreover, the 
metering practice coincided with the administration's 
implementation of the ``Zero Tolerance Policy'' and criminal 
prosecution of all persons apprehended for not using official 
ports of entry in May 2018. The DHS Office of Inspector General 
found that both Border Patrol officers and aliens reported an 
increase in illegal border crossings when metering was in 
place.\585\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \583\ DHS OIG, Special Review-Initial Observations Regarding Family 
Separation Issues under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 7 (Sept. 27, 
2018).
    \584\ Stephanie Leutert, et al. Asylum Processing and Waitlists at 
the U.S.-Mexico Border, Robert Strauss Center for International 
Security and Law, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Migration Policy 
Centre, at 13 (Dec. 2018).
    \585\ DHS OIG, Special Review--Initial Observations Regarding 
Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Remain in Mexico Policy

    In addition to restricting the number of asylum seekers who 
can enter the United States to begin their asylum process, the 
administration developed an additional layer of cruelty with 
the Remain in Mexico policy, denying asylum seekers entrance to 
the U.S. while they wait for their immigration court date. The 
Remain in Mexico policy, also known as the Migrant Protection 
Protocols (MPP), began on January 28, 2019 at the San Ysidro, 
California Port of Entry--the country's busiest--but 
subsequently expanded to all ports of entry along the southern 
U.S. border. The Remain in Mexico policy requires many asylum 
seekers who arrive at the southern border to wait in Mexico 
while U.S. immigration courts process their case.\586\ As of 
January 2020, more than 62,000 asylum seekers had been returned 
to Mexico under MPP, including more than 16,000 children.\587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \586\ CBP, ``MPP Guiding Principles, Jan. 28, 2019. According to 
CBP's ``MPP Guiding Principles,'' categories of individuals ``not 
amenable to MPP'' include unaccompanied alien children, citizens or 
nationals of Mexico, aliens processed for expedited removal, and aliens 
more likely than not to face persecution or torture in Mexico. Id.
    \587\ Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers, The devastating toll 
of `Remain in Mexico' asylum policy one year later, Jan. 29, 2020; 
Kristina Cooke et al., ``Exclusive: U.S. migrant policy sends thousands 
of children, including babies, back to Mexico,'' Reuters, Oct. 11, 
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While waiting in Mexico, asylum seekers have limited access 
to lawyers and shelter, making it nearly impossible for them to 
prepare their cases and effectively denying them meaningful 
access to the U.S. asylum system.\588\ An estimated 4 percent 
of people returned to Mexico under MPP are able to find 
representation for their court cases, compared to 32 percent 
for those who were allowed to stay in the U.S.\589\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \588\ Priscilla Alvarez, `` `I don't want to return to Mexico, your 
honor': Asylum seekers make their plea to immigration judges,'' CNN, 
Mar. 24, 2019; Kate Morrissey, ``Scheduling glitch affects first 
hearings for `Remain in Mexico' returnees,'' San Diego Tribune, Mar. 
14, 2019; Statement of Laura Pena, Pro Bono Counsel, American Bar 
Association Commission on Immigration, Examining the Human Rights and 
Legal Implications of DHS' `Remain in Mexico' Policy, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations, U.S. 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov. 19, 2019.
    \589\ TRAC Immigration, ``Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP 
Immigration Court Cases, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/587/ 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The processing of U.S. immigration cases can last for 
months and even years, forcing a growing number of men, women, 
and children to wait in dangerous situations in parts of Mexico 
plagued by violence. Asylum seekers under MPP are still 
expected to appear at their court hearings in the United 
States, and are living in dangerous and overcrowded Mexican 
border cities, including Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, 
and Matamoros.\590\ Tijuana, for example, counted 2,009 
homicide cases in 2018, an increase of 22 percent from 
2017.\591\ In Ciudad Juarez, there were 1,004 homicide cases in 
2018, a 62 percent increase from 2017.\592\ The State 
Department issued a travel advisory for the Mexican border 
state of Tamaulipas, which includes the cities of Nuevo Laredo 
and Matamoros, due to the prevalence of crime and 
kidnapping.\593\ Overcrowding in border cities has forced many 
migrants to live in large tent encampments without access to 
drinking water and bathrooms, and vulnerable to severe weather 
and abuse.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \590\ Caitlin Dickerson, ``Confusion on the Border as Appeals Court 
Rules Against Trump's `Remain in Mexico' Policy,'' The New York Times, 
Feb. 29, 2020; Caitlin Dickerson, ``Desperate Migrants on the Border: 
`I Should Just Swim Across,''' The New York Times, Nov. 1, 2019.
    \591\ NBC staff and Telemundo 20 Staff, ``More than 2,000 Homicides 
Reported in Tijuana, Mexico,'' NBC San Diego, Oct. 28. 2018.
    \592\ Laura Y. Calderon et al., Organized Crime and Violence in 
Mexico, University of San Diego, at 4 (Apr. 2019); Patrick Timmons, 
``Across Mexico Border from safe El Paso, violence surges in Juarez,'' 
United Press International, Jan. 23, 2019.
    \593\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Mexico 
Travel Advisory, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html (last 
visited June 8, 2019).
    \594\ Dickerson, ``Confusion on the Border as Appeals Court Rules 
Against Trump's `Remain in Mexico' Policy,'' The New York Times, Feb. 
29, 2020; Caitlin Dickerson, ``Desperate Migrants on the Border: `I 
Should Just Swim Across,''' The New York Times, Nov. 1, 2019; ``US 
`Remain in Mexico' policy endangers lives of asylum seekers in 
Tamaulipas state,'' Medecins Sans Frontiers, Sept. 5, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As of May 2020, Human Rights First had documented at least 
1,114 publicly reported cases of murder, kidnapping, rape, 
torture, and violent assault against asylum seekers in Mexico 
under MPP, including 265 cases of children kidnapped or nearly 
kidnapped.\595\ In October 2019, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) 
reported that 75 percent of their patients sent to Nuevo Laredo 
through MPP had been kidnapped.\596\ Approximately 80 percent 
of MSF patients in Nuevo Laredo during the first nine months of 
2019 had suffered at least one violent incident.\597\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \595\ Human Rights First, ``Delivered to Danger: Trump 
Administration sending asylum seekers and migrants to danger,'' https:/
/www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico (last visited Apr. 20, 
2020); Human Rights First, Publicly reported cases of violent attacks 
on individuals returned to Mexico under the ``Migrant Protection 
Protocols,'' as compiled by Human Rights First, May 13, 2020, https://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
PubliclyReportedMPPAttacks-5.13.2020.pdf.
    \596\ Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers, The devastating toll 
of `Remain in Mexico' asylum policy one year later, Jan. 29, 2020.
    \597\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since its inception, MPP has been the subject of legal 
proceedings with mixed results. First, in April 2019, the 
District Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction 
questioning DHS's authority to carry out returns and potential 
violations of the principle of non-refoulement.\598\ However, 
in May 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
granted an emergency stay of the injunction, which effectively 
allowed for the implementation and enforcement of MPP.\599\ 
Subsequently, in February 2020, the Ninth Circuit reinstated a 
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the policy violates 
federal law.\600\ However, a few hours later, the judges 
granted the administration an emergency stay allowing MPP to 
continue pending further order of the court.\601\ In March 
2020, the Supreme Court granted a stay allowing MPP to continue 
while legal challenges play out.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \598\ UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees (Oct. 4, 1967). The 1967 UN Refugee 
Protocol, to which the United States is a party, includes language that 
prohibits member states from returning refugees to territories where 
their ``life or freedom would be threatened'' on the basis of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. Id.
    \599\ Stephanie Manning, ``Ninth Circuit allows `Remain in Mexico' 
policy to stay in effect,'' Innovation Law Lab, May 8, 2019.
    \600\ Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, Opinion, No. 19-15716 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 28, 2020); Maria Sacchetti et al., ``Federal appeals court blocks 
President Trump's `Remain in Mexico' policy but stays its own ruling,'' 
The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 2020.
    \601\ Maria Sacchetti et al., ``Federal appeals court blocks 
President Trump's `Remain in Mexico' policy but stays its own ruling,'' 
The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 2020.
    \602\ Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 589 U.S., Mar. 11, 2020; Adam 
Liptak & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, ``Supreme Court Revives `Remain in Mexico' 
Policy for Asylum Seekers, The New York Times, Mar. 11, 2020; Ariane de 
Vogue, ``Supreme Court lets Remain in Mexico' asylum policy stay in 
place,'' CNN, Mar. 11, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Interim Final Rule

    On July 16, 2019, DHS and DOJ jointly issued an Interim 
Final Rule (IFR) rendering aliens ineligible for asylum in the 
United States if they arrived at the southern border without 
first seeking protection from countries through which they 
transited.\603\ The IFR would apply both to unlawful entrants 
and to aliens who present themselves at ports of entry on the 
southern border. The IFR effectively prohibits almost all non-
Mexican nationals who reach the U.S. southern border from 
seeking asylum. The new rule also makes it easier for DHS to 
swiftly remove aliens without proceedings in immigration court 
if they lack visas or other valid entry documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \603\ Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33829, July 16, 2019. The IFR would not apply to Mexicans who seek 
asylum in the United States, as Mexico is the only country through 
which they transited. U.S. Department of Justice, DOJ Guidelines 
Regarding New Regulations Governing Asylum and Protection Claims, July 
16, 2019. Exceptions to the Interim Final Rule include: 1) if an alien 
applied for protection in at least one transit country and was denied; 
2) if the alien is a victim of ``a severe form of trafficking in 
persons'' provided in 8 C.F.R. 214.11; or 3) if the only countries the 
alien transited were not (at the time of transit) parties to the 1951 
UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, or 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural 
Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33829, July 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By restricting access to the U.S. asylum system, the United 
States has placed even greater stress on a flawed Mexican 
immigration system. Mexico's own human rights commission 
declared the protection system ``broken.''\604\ The Mexican 
government has at times violated the international legal 
principle of non-refoulement by involuntarily returning Central 
American asylum seekers to their home countries despite fears 
of persecution or torture.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \604\ Human Rights Watch, Deported to Danger: United States 
Deportation Policies Expose Salvadorans to Death and Abuse (Feb. 5, 
2020).
    \605\ Amnesty International, Overlooked and Under-Protected: 
Mexico's Deadly Refoulemont of Central Americans Seeking Asylum (Jan. 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Almost immediately after the IFR was announced, two 
separate lawsuits were filed challenging the legality of the 
rule.\606\ On July 24, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction 
blocking the IFR's implementation nationwide while lawsuits 
moved forward.\607\ On September 11, 2019, the Supreme Court 
stayed the lower court ruling pending appeal, allowing the 
administration to enforce the IFR in the interim.\608\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \606\ Debra Cassens Weiss, ``New Asylum Rule Is Quickly Challenged 
in Two Lawsuits,'' ABA Journal, July 17, 2019.
    \607\ East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction, No. 19-cv-04073 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2019).
    \608\ Pete Williams, ``Supreme Court allows Trump administration to 
enforce toughest restriction yet on asylum requests,'' NBC News, Sept. 
12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

``Safe Third Country'' Agreements

    Simultaneously with the Interim Final Rule, the Trump 
administration has pursued ``safe third country'' agreements--
also known as Asylum Cooperative Agreements--that similarly 
seek to deter and deflect asylum applications in the United 
States. Under the INA, an alien is ineligible to apply for 
asylum in the United States if he or she can be removed, 
pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a third 
country where the ``alien's life or freedom would not be 
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 
and where the alien would have access to a full and fair 
procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent 
temporary protection.''
    Between July and September 2019, the Trump administration 
signed ``safe third country'' agreements with Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador, though to date it has only begun 
implementing the Guatemala agreement.\609\ Under these 
bilateral agreements, some asylum seekers who arrive at a 
southern U.S. port of entry can be deemed ineligible for 
protection in the United States, and subsequently sent to the 
third country where they can apply for asylum.\610\ Per U.S. 
law the agreements must satisfy two primary requirements: (i) 
the partner country provides access to ``full and fair'' asylum 
procedures; and (ii) must be a place where the individual would 
not face persecution.\611\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \609\ Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
American and the Government of the Republic of Guatemala for 
Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims, 84 Fed. Reg. 
64095, Nov. 20, 2019; Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of American and the Government of the Republic of Honduras for 
Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims, 85 Fed. Reg. 
25463, May 1, 2020; DHS, Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements with Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador, Nov. 7, 2019; CRS, Safe Third Country 
Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries: Background and Legal 
Issues, Jan, 30, 2020.
    \610\ CRS, Safe Third Country Agreements with Northern Triangle 
Countries: Background and Legal Issues, Jan, 30, 2020.
    \611\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Shortly after the Guatemala agreement was publicly 
announced on July 26, 2019, Guatemala's Constitutional Court 
blocked the agreement from going into force without 
Congressional approval.\612\ The court issued a subsequent 
ruling that was more ambiguous, however, and the Morales 
administration proceeded to implement the agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \612\ Sofia Menchu, ``Guatemalan court halts `safe third country' 
designation for asylum seekers,'' Reuters, July 15, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Trump administration made the determination that asylum 
seekers in Guatemala have access to a full and fair procedure, 
although it has not made that determination public nor 
responded to SFRC requests to provide the determination.\613\ 
The determination reportedly refers to Guatemala having a legal 
framework meeting that standard, not whether it is implemented 
in practice.\614\ Guatemala passed an immigration law in 2017 
that reformed its migration system and listed refugees' rights 
in accordance with international instruments. However, in 2019, 
the U.S. Department of State report on Guatemala still cited 
inadequacies regarding identification and referral mechanisms 
for asylum seekers, as well as inadequate training for 
authorities on establishing refugee status.\615\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \613\ Nicole Narea, ``Trump's agreements in Central America are 
dismantling the asylum system as we know it,'' Vox, Nov. 20, 2019.
    \614\ Id.
    \615\ U.S. Department of State, ``2019 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices: Guatemala,'' Mar. 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the United States, the immigration and humanitarian 
community expressed serious concerns over the proposed 
agreement. Refugees International doubted the legality of the 
Guatemala ``safe third country'' agreement given that 
``Guatemala lacks a full and fair procedure for determining a 
claim to asylum,'' and ``individuals forced into Guatemala 
would constitute an especially vulnerable social group subject 
to grave risks at the hands of gangs and other criminal 
elements'' thus constituting persecution.\616\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \616\ Press Release, Refugees International, Statement: Reported 
U.S.-Guatemala Asylum Pact `A Stain on this Nation's Honor,' July 12, 
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the ``safe third country'' agreement with Guatemala 
went into effect in November 2019, more than 900 Central 
Americans have been sent by the United States to Guatemala, 
including more than 300 children.\617\ On January 15, 2020, the 
ACLU and its partner organizations filed a lawsuit challenging 
the Trump administration's ``safe third country'' agreements, 
arguing that the countries fail to pass the test of having 
``full and fair'' asylum procedures as required by the 
INA.\618\ One of the plaintiffs in the case, referred to as 
U.T., is a gay Salvadoran man who was removed by U.S. 
authorities to Guatemala.\619\ U.T. still fears of homophobic 
persecution in Guatemala, where the UN High Commission on Human 
Rights found persistent ``discrimination and violence against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.''\620\ In March 
2020, Guatemala temporarily suspended the transfer of asylum 
seekers from the United States to Guatemala under the ``safe 
third country'' agreement, citing the need to establish 
``sanitary protocols'' amid the COVID-19 pandemic.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \617\ Kirk Semple, ``Asylum Sekers Say U.S. is Returning Them to 
the Dangers They Fled,'' The New York Times, Mar. 17, 2020; Reuters, 
``Guatemala wants to limit migrants returned under U.S. asylum 
agreement,'' NBC News, Mar. 6, 2020.
    \618\ Press Release, ACLU, Groups File Federal Lawsuit Challenging 
Trump Administration's So-Called `Safe Third Country' Asylum Policy,'' 
Jan. 15, 2020.
    \619\ Id.
    \620\ Id.; United Nations Human Rights Council, Activities of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Guatemala: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 40th Session, at 13 (Jan. 29, 2019).
    \621\ Camila DeChalus, ``Guatemala suspends US flights carrying 
asylum-seekers,'' Roll Call, Mar. 17, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Expedited Removal Programs

    In October 2019, the Trump administration secretly rolled 
out two ``expedited removal'' programs in El Paso, the Prompt 
Asylum Claim Review (PACR) and the Humanitarian Asylum Review 
Process (HARP), to speed up asylum processes for non-Mexican 
and Mexican migrants, respectively.\622\ Under PACR and HARP, 
asylum seekers do not go through the formal asylum process, 
going through an expedited process instead to receive a 
decision on their asylum request in less than 10 days.\623\ In 
essence, these programs hollow out an already imperfect asylum 
process in order to expediently remove asylum seekers from the 
United States.\624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \622\ American Immigration Lawyers Association, ``Featured Issue: 
Border Processing and Asylum,'' Mar. 13, 2020; American Immigration 
Council, Policies Affecting Asylum Seekers at the Border: The Migrant 
Protection Protocols, Prompt Asylum Claim Review, Humanitarian Asylum 
Review Process, Metering, Asylum Transit Ban, and How They Interact 
(Jan. 2020); Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging 
Programs That Push Migrants Through Asylum Screenings Without Access to 
Attorneys in Border Patrol Facilities, Dec. 6, 2019.
    \623\ American Immigration Lawyers Association, ``Featured Issue: 
Border Processing and Asylum,'' Mar. 13, 2020.
    \624\ Ruth Epstein & Shaw Drake, ``Ban on Attorney Access for 
Asylum Proceedings in Inhumane CBP Jails Key to Trump's Attack on 
Asylum,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Asylum seekers under PACR and HARP are held in short-term 
CBP holding cells known as hieleras or iceboxes, because of 
their freezing temperatures.\625\ Whereas under formal asylum 
procedures ICE is required to provide access to a telephone and 
the ability to meet with attorneys, CBP only provides asylum 
seekers under PACR and HARP 30 minutes to contact a lawyer or 
family member before their credible fear interview, which 
occurs within the first 24 hours of their detainment.\626\ CBP 
does not provide any means to locate people in its custody, and 
detainees do not have access to a phone outside of their 30-
minute window for counsel to return a call or reach out.\627\ 
These processes effectively deny asylum seekers access to 
counsel and allow for courts to easily deny their cases without 
adequate assessment of their protection needs, and expediently 
remove them from the United States.\628\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \625\ Ruth Epstein & Shaw Drake, ``Ban on Attorney Access for 
Asylum Proceedings in Inhumane CBP Jails Key to Trump's Attack on 
Asylum,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020; J. Edward Moreno, ``Federal judge sides 
with migrants in lawsuit over conditions in border facilities,''' The 
Hill, Feb. 19, 2020.
    \626\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum 
Seekers at the Border; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit 
Challenging Programs That Push Migrants Through Asylum Screenings 
Without Access to Attorneys in Border Patrol Facilities, Dec. 6, 2019; 
Press Release, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Congressional 
Leaders Call for Immediate Halt of Trump Programs that Rush Migrants 
Through Asylum Screenings, Jan. 31, 2020.
    \627\ Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Programs 
That Push Migrants Through Asylum Screenings Without Access to 
Attorneys in Border Patrol Facilities, Dec. 6, 2019.
    \628\ Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center v. Wolf, First Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:19-cv-03640 
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between October and December 2019, more than 1,000 asylum 
seekers had been subjected to PACR and HARP programs.\629\ The 
program was set to expand to the rest of the border by early 
February 2020.\630\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \629\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum 
Seekers at the Border; Ruth Epstein & Shaw Drake, ``Ban on Attorney 
Access for Asylum Proceedings in Inhumane CBP Jails Key to Trump's 
Attack on Asylum,'' ACLU, Feb. 26, 2020.
    \630\ American Immigration Council, Policies Affecting Asylum 
Seekers at the Border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 2019, a lawsuit challenged PACR and HARP 
practices arguing that the policies are wholly inadequate and 
unlawful substitutes for a fair and meaningful asylum 
process.\631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \631\ Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center v. Wolf, First Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:19-cv-03640 
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exploiting the COVID-19 Pandemic

    Amidst the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trump 
administration has effectively halted the United States' asylum 
and refugee system, closing the U.S.-Mexico border, 
implementing an expulsion order, and postponing immigration 
court hearings for those applying for asylum under MPP.\632\ 
Between March 21, 2020 and May 13, 2020, only 2 people seeking 
humanitarian protection at the southern border were allowed to 
stay.\633\ Over a similar period, the Trump administration 
chartered more than 59 deportation flights to Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 
Jamaica.\634\ The United States did not test deportees for 
COVID-19, and several countries have reported positive cases 
among migrants deported by the United States, including more 
than 200 cases in Guatemala.\635\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \632\ Priscilla Alvarez, ``Refugee admissions to the US temporarily 
suspended,'' CNN, Mar. 18, 2020; Letter from Grace Meng, senior US 
researcher at Human Rights Watch & Sirine Shebaya, Executive Director 
at the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, to 
Joseph V. Cuffari, Department of Homeland Security Inspector General & 
Cameron Quinn, Officer at DHS Office for Civil Rights & Civil 
Liberties, Apr. 13, 2020; Letter from Patrick Leahy, United States 
Senator, et al., to Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, 
Apr. 7, 2020; Nicole Narea, ``Trump is continuing deportations during 
the pandemic. It's causing the coronavirus to spread.,'' Vox, May 12, 
2019.
    \633\ Nick Miroff, ``Under Trump border rules, U.S. has granted 
refuge to just two people since late March, records show,'' The 
Washington Post, May 13, 2020.
    \634\ Jake Johnston, ``Exporting COVID-19: ICE Air Conducted 
Deportation Flights to 11 LAC Countries, Flight Data Shows,'' Center 
for Economic and Policy Research, Apr. 27, 2020 (between March 23, 2019 
and April 26, 2019).
    \635\ Nicole Narea, ``Trump is continuing deportations during the 
pandemic. It's causing the coronavirus to spread,'' Vox, May 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Trump administration's actions amid the COVID-19 
pandemic are only their latest attempts to gut existing 
refugee, protection, and immigration programs--placing the 
burden on other countries, including our neighbors in Mexico 
and Central America, to deal with today's global crisis.


              The Positive Contributions of Refugees and 
                    Immigrants in the United States

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  VH Produce owner Vue Her is a Hmong farmer on a 10-acre field, who 
 grows several Asian specialty crops in Singer, CA, near Fresno. Lance 
Chueng, 20181109-FPAC-LSC-1236, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Nov. 9, 
                                 2018.

    Since the announcement of his presidential campaign in 
2015, in which he described Mexico as sending ``drugs,'' 
``crime,'' and ``rapists'' to the United States, President 
Trump has spewed xenophobic rhetoric and promoted false anti-
immigrant and anti-refugee narratives.\636\ These hateful words 
distort the true public benefit of accepting forced migrants 
into our communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \636\ Todd Scribner, ``You are Not Welcome Here Anymore: Restoring 
Support for Refugee Resettlement in the Age of Trump,'' T3Journal on 
Migration and Human Security,T1 at 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Safe Members of Communities

    The Trump administration has sought to justify its 
restrictive approach to resettlement by suggesting that 
refugees are potential terrorists, and therefore pose an 
outsize security risk to the United States.\637\ This is a 
misleading narrative that has been denounced by an array of 
experienced diplomats, military, and national security 
experts.\638\ In reality, no resettled refugee has committed a 
lethal attack on U.S. soil since the 1980 Refugee Act.\639\ The 
probability of an American being killed in a terrorist attack 
carried out by a refugee in a given year is estimated to be 1 
in 3.64 billion.\640\ In comparison, the odds of being struck 
by lightning are far greater at 1 in 1.22 million.\641\ The 
threat in the U.S. of being killed by a U.S.-born terrorist is 
far greater than a foreign-born terrorist, with the odds of 
being murdered by a U.S.-born terrorist at 1 in 28 
million.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \637\ Dan De Luce and Julia Ainsley, `` Trump admin rejected report 
showing refugees did not pose major security threat,'' NBC News, Sept. 
5, 2018.
    \638\ Refugee Council USA, Blogs & Stories, ``20 Former National 
Security Officials Sign Letter to Congress in Support of the U.S. 
Refugee Program'' Dec. 1 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael D. 
Shear, ``Trump Administration Considers a Drastic Cut in Refugees 
Allowed to Enter U.S.,'' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2019.
    \639\ Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and 
Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2017, CATO, at 23 (May 2019).
    \640\ Id. at 1; Methodological issues involving the distinction 
between immigration status at time of entry into the U.S. and status at 
the time of an incident, and a reliance on publicly available data to 
conduct the research likely impact this estimate, but according to the 
report, when ``conflicting numerical estimates exist, the highest 
plausible figures are used with the intent to maximize the risks and 
costs of terrorism in terms of human life. Id.
    \641\ National Weather Service, ``How Dangerous is Lightning?,'' 
https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-odds (last visited June 8, 
2019).
    \642\ Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and 
Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2017, CATO, at 1 (May 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More often, refugees are the victims--not the 
perpetrators--of terrorism. Many refugees have fled the same 
terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Al 
Shahab, which the United States and its allies seek to 
dismantle. Closing the door on refugees and labeling victims 
potential terrorists emboldens the anti-U.S. narratives of the 
extremists they have fled.\643\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \643\ Refugee Council USA, Blogs & Stories, ``20 Former National 
Security Officials Sign Letter to Congress in Support of the U.S. 
Refugee Program,'' Dec. 1 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael D. 
Shear, ``Trump Administration Considers a Drastic Cut in Refugees 
Allowed to Enter U.S.,'' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Refugees were already the most heavily vetted group in the 
U.S. before the Trump administration added additional security 
measures in 2017.\644\ Refugees considered for resettlement in 
the United States ``face the most rigorous vetting of any 
individuals or groups that come to the United States,'' 
according to James Ziglar and Doris Meissner, former 
commissioners of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service for Republican and Democratic administrations, 
respectively.\645\ This rigorous screening process can take 
anywhere from 18 months to 3 years and involves numerous stages 
of screening that include the collection and analysis of 
biographical and biometric data, multiple security background 
checks, and in-person interviews.\646\ These screenings are all 
conducted before a potential refugee sets foot in the United 
States.\647\ Once they arrive at their point of entry, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection and Transportation Security 
Administration officials conduct additional screening.\648\ 
Mostafa Hassoun, a Syrian refugee living in the United States, 
said of his experience: ``Over 15 months I was interviewed five 
times--in person, over the phone, by the United Nations and by 
the United States. They asked me about my family, my politics, 
my hobbies, my childhood, my opinions of the U.S., and even my 
love life. No less than four U.S. government agencies had the 
opportunity to screen me. By the time I received my offer to 
live in the United States, the U.S. officials in charge of my 
case file knew me better than my family and friends do.''\649\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \644\ Amy Pope, The White House, ``Infographic: The Screening 
Process for Refugee Entry into the United States'' Nov. 20, 2015.
    \645\ Doris Meissner & James Ziglar, ``Halting refugee resettlement 
compromises the security of all,'' The Hill, Dec. 3, 2015.
    \646\ Idean Salehyan, The Strategic Case for Refugee Resettlement, 
Niskanen Center, at 1 (Sept. 2019); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Service, Refugee Security Screening Fact Sheet (June 3, 2020).
    \647\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, Refugee Security 
Screening Fact Sheet, at 4 (June 3, 2020).
    \648\ Id. at 4; Erol K. Yayboke & Aaron N. Milner, Confronting the 
Global Forced Migration Crisis, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, at 70 (May 2018); Memorandum from Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary, 
Department of State, to President Donald Trump, Oct, 23. 2017.
    \649\ Mostafa Hassoun, ``I Went Through America's Extreme 
Vetting,'' Politico, Jan. 28, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Economic Contributions of Refugees

    The Trump administration has also sought to paint refugees 
as an economic drain on the United States.\650\ In contrast to 
this misleading message, refugees generally contribute more in 
taxes than they receive in benefits, revitalize cities and 
towns by offsetting population decline, and boost economic 
growth by buying homes and opening businesses.\651\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \650\ Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. 
Government A New Foundation For American Greatness FY 2018, at 16 (May 
23, 2017); ``The Economic Impact of Refugee Admission & Resettlement,'' 
University of Pennsylvania, Nov. 20, 2018, https://
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/2720-the-economic-impact-of-
refugee-admission-.
    \651\ William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the 
United States: Evidence From The ACS, at 33 (June 2017); Matthew La 
Corte, Refugees are Revitalizing Some Great Americans Cities Facing 
Decline, Niskanen Center (June 2016); New American Economy, From 
Struggle to Resilience: The Economic Impact of Refugees in America 
(June 2017); Charles Kenny, ``The Real Immigration Crisis: The Problem 
Is Not Too Many, but Too Few,'' Foreign Affairs, Nov. 11, 2019; Global 
Detroit, The Economic Impact of Refugees in Southeast Michigan (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Research has overwhelmingly debunked the idea that refugees 
strain the U.S. economy. In July 2017, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services conducted an internal study 
subsequently suppressed by the Trump administration, which 
found that ``the net fiscal impact of refugees was positive 
over the ten year period, at 63 billion dollars, meaning they 
contributed more in revenue than they consumed in 
expenditures.''\652\ Similarly, a National Bureau of Economic 
Research report based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2015 Economic 
Community Survey estimated that on average refugees pay 21,000 
dollars more in taxes than they receive in benefits over their 
first twenty years in the United States.\653\ And a New 
American Economy (NAE) report based on the same U.S. Census 
data found that refugee households earned 77 billion dollars in 
2014, of which 21 billion dollars went to taxes, leaving 56 
billion dollars in spending power to be invested into the U.S. 
economy.\654\ The NAE study showed that while refugees may 
receive initial assistance upon arrival, they see sharp income 
increases and remarkable upward mobility. The average refugee 
earned around 21,782 dollars their first 0 to 5 years in the 
United States, but 67,000 dollars after 25 years in the United 
States--greater than the median U.S. household income.\655\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \652\ Department of Health and Human Services, The Fiscal Costs of 
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program at the Federal, State, and Local 
Levels, from 2005-2014 (Draft), at 31 (July 29, 2019).
    \653\ William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the 
United States: Evidence From The ACS, at 33 (June 2017).
    \654\ New American Economy, From Struggle to Resilience: The 
Economic Impact of Refugees in America, at 5-6 (June 2017). The 2.3 
million ``likely refugees'' categorized based on country of origin and 
year of arrival. Id.
    \655\ Id. at 8; Gloria Guzman, ``New Data Show Income Increased in 
14 States and 10 of the Largest Metros,'' U.S. Census Bureau, Sept. 26, 
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On a local level, studies have shown that refugees have a 
positive economic impact on their communities.\656\ In Akron, 
Ohio, where the local economy has struggled in recent years, 
the influx of refugees has revitalized the city, boosted 
property values, and turned once vacant neighborhoods into 
vibrant economic corridors.\657\ In Erie, Pennsylvania, where 
refugees and their children comprise approximately one-fifth of 
the population, refugees have opened an estimated 100 
businesses and helped forestall population decline.\658\ In the 
2010 census, Michigan was the only U.S. state whose population 
declined. Since then, refugees have been responsible for the 
state's net population growth, and Michigan was the fourth 
largest state for resettlement between 2007 and 2016.\659\ A 
study of Southeast Michigan, where over half of the refugees 
who arrived in that period resettled, found that refugees 
arriving between 2007 and 2016 created over 220 million dollars 
in new spending and over 1,700 new jobs.\660\ In Georgia, where 
the state does not fund any programs specifically for refugees, 
91 percent of refugee households manage to work and pay their 
own expenses within 6 months of arrival.\661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \656\ Matthew La Corte, Refugees are Revitalizing Some Great 
Americans Cities Facing Decline, Niskanen Center (June 2016).
    \657\ Partnership For A New American Economy & Knight Foundation, 
Welcome to Akron: How Immigrants and Refugees Are Contributing to 
Akron's Economic Growth (June 2016).
    \658\ Tim Henderson, ``Immigrants Prevented or Minimized Population 
Loss in a Fifth of U.S. Counties,'' The Pew Charitable Trusts, Apr. 24, 
2019; Deborah Fallows, ``What It Takes to Settle Refugees,'' The 
Atlantic, Oct. 28, 2016.
    \659\ Global Detroit, The Economic Impact of Refugees in Southeast 
Michigan, at 7 (2017).
    \660\ Id.; In Macomb, Oakland, Washtenaw, and Wayne Counties, 
including cities like Detroit and Ann Arbor. New spending was estimated 
between 229.6 million to 295.3 million, and jobs created was between 
1,798 and 2,311. Id.
    \661\ ``Refugees and Immigrants in Georgia: The Facts,'' Coalition 
of Refugee Services Agencies, Feb. 2017.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane, Refugee camp, U.S. Air Force, Jan. 19, 2014.

                   Damage to U.S. Military Interests

    The Trump administration's gutting of the refugee system 
has damaged the effectiveness of U.S. military, diplomatic, and 
intelligence operations abroad. For example, tens of thousands 
of Iraqi and Afghan nationals have put their lives on the line 
to support U.S. intelligence gathering, operations planning, 
and other essential services during the Afghan and Iraq 
conflicts. Resettlement is not only an instrument to ensuring 
their safety, but also maintaining strong intelligence and 
counter-terrorism partnership in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite 
this--as well as the fact that they are heavily vetted before 
ever serving alongside U.S. troops--the Trump administration 
has severely reduced resettlement numbers through the U.S. 
Government's Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) and the Iraqi direct 
access (P-2) programs. Responding to the administration's 
resettlement reductions, 27 national security leaders, 
including General Martin Dempsey, General Joseph Votel, and 
General Raymond Odierno wrote to the President. In their letter 
they explained that, ``U.S. military, diplomatic and 
intelligence operations abroad rely on the support of thousands 
of interpreters, translators, advisors, engineers and others to 
fulfill their objectives. When their lives and those of their 
families are threatened because of this support, the U.S. 
refugee resettlement provides a critical lifeline. We have 
personally borne witness to how these programs ensure the 
safety of our service members and success of US 
missions.''\662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \662\ Letter from General Keith B. Alexander, et al., to President 
Donald J. Trump, Sept. 3, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Drastically reducing refugee numbers also feeds into the 
anti-American narratives of terrorist groups, threatening the 
success of U.S. counter-terrorism work. In refusing to admit 
refugees into the United States and issuing travel bans for 
Muslim-majority countries, the United States' reputation abroad 
suffered. Narratives propagated by al-Qaida and ISIS about U.S. 
and Western hostility towards Muslims is validated by the Trump 
administration's actions. As General Michael Hayden and Admiral 
James Stavridis stated, ``Welcoming refugees regardless of 
their religion, nationality, or race exposes the falseness of 
terrorist propaganda and counters the warped vision of the 
extremists.''\663\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \663\ Michael Hayden & James Stayridis, ``U.S. must lead on refugee 
crisis,'' Miami Herald, July 8, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    The Trump administration's destructive policies toward 
immigrants and asylum seekers have sparked domestic dissent 
from humanitarian organizations, immigration organizations, 
civil rights groups, religious groups, and individuals from 
coast to coast.\664\ Moreover, the Trump administration's 
actions have been met with significant international criticism. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle 
Bachelet responded to the United States' ``Zero Tolerance'' and 
family separation policies, stating: ``This should never happen 
anywhere.''\665\ On the issue of the Muslim Ban alone, UNHCR, 
IOM, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, the German Chancellor, 
and the French President all spoke out against the 
administration's actions.\666\ These domestic policies 
undermine the United States' ability to speak and lead with 
credibility on the global stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \664\ See, e.g., Andy Newman, ``Highlights: Reaction to Trump's 
Travel Ban,'' The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2017; Ana Campoy, ``Pro-
immigrant Americans are beating Trump back with a flood of lawsuits,'' 
Quartz, July 25, 2018; Letter from Chad Hayward, CEO of Accord Network, 
et al., to President Trump & Vice President Pence, Jan. 29, 2017; 
Sophia Tareen, ``Jewish groups speaking out against Trump immigration 
policy,'' AP, Aug. 22, 2019.
    \665\ ``UN rights chief `appalled' by US border detention 
conditions, says holding migrant children may violate international 
law,'' UN News, July 8, 2019.
    \666\ ``Trump executive order banning refugees: World reacts,'' 
BBC, Jan. 29, 2017; Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Joint IOM-UNHCR Statement on President Trumps' Refugee Order, 
Jan. 28, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to re-establish U.S. leadership on the global 
stage, the United States must first reckon with the morality of 
actions taken within and at our borders. As a first step, the 
United States must terminate harmful policies, including the 
Remain in Mexico policy and ``safe third country'' agreements, 
ensure that asylum seekers, immigrants, migrants, and refugees 
are afforded protections, restore refugee resettlement to 
historic norms, and create new methods for resettlement and 
complementary protections in order to help meet tremendous 
global need.



                              CHAPTER SIX



                   The Trump Administration's Global 
                     Retreat from Forced Migration

                              ----------                              

    Over the past three years, the Trump administration has 
drastically eroded U.S. diplomatic engagement and leadership in 
addressing humanitarian crises and forced migration. Prior to 
the Trump administration, the United States helped lead the 
world through humanitarian assistance, political engagement, 
and coordination on the international stage. President Trump, 
however, has promoted an ``America First'' foreign policy that 
often rejects multilateral action and coordination.\667\ The 
Trump administration has pulled the United States out of 
international agreements that U.S. diplomats helped design, 
proposed severe cuts to humanitarian funding, and drastically 
reduced the number of refugees resettled to the United States. 
The Trump administration's anti-immigrant policies and 
mistreatment of asylum seekers and refugees have badly undercut 
the United States' credibility in advocating for other 
countries to offer protection and asylum, and in some cases, 
even emboldened harsh policies by foreign governments.\668\ As 
a result, the United States has ceded international leadership 
and emboldened other nations to turn their backs on the current 
global forced migration crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \667\ See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, President Donald 
J. Trump's Foreign Policy Puts America First, Jan. 30, 2018; President 
Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump to 74th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 
NY, Sept. 24, 2019. Donald Trump, President of the United States, 
Remarks at the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
United Nations, Sept. 25, 2018. In his remarks before the UN General 
Assembly in 2018, President Trump said, ``America is governed by 
Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the 
doctrine of patriotism.''
    \668\ See ``Jordan, US Discuss Ties, Refugee Crisis,'' Jordan 
Times, Feb. 14, 2017. Shortly after the White House announced its first 
travel ban and reduction in the U.S. refugee admissions ceiling, in 
Feb. 2017 Acting Assistant Secretary of State Simon Henshaw met with 
Jordanian government officials to urge them not to forcibly return 
Syrian refugees. Instead, Jordanian authorities increased deportations 
of Syrian refugees, including some already approved for resettlement in 
the United States. Id.; ``Aid Groups: Jordan Deports Thousands of 
Syrian Refugees,'' Voice of America, May 12, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Repeated Attempts to Cut U.S. Humanitarian 
                           Assistance Funding

    Global humanitarian need is rapidly outpacing the provision 
of aid. These are international, system-wide challenges, but as 
the world's largest humanitarian donor, the United States plays 
a critical role in shaping global responses to these 
challenges.\669\ U.S. contribution to humanitarian funding 
accounts for one quarter to one third of global public 
expenditures.\670\ As a percentage of Gross National Income 
(GNI), however, the United States is the seventeenth largest 
international donor.\671\ Under the Trump administration, 
multiple proposed cuts to humanitarian assistance have signaled 
a global retreat. The global community has largely followed, 
resulting in a stagnation of global humanitarian financing in 
the face of growing needs. For example, the growth in financing 
from 2017 to 2018 was just one percent, which stands in stark 
contrast to 30 percent cumulative growth over the five years 
before 2018.\672\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \669\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2019, at 10-11 (2019). The United States is the largest 
international humanitarian assistance donor, spending more than $6 
billion in 2018.
    \670\ Id. at 36.
    \671\ Id. at 38.
    \672\ Id. at 32; Ben Parker, ``Ten Donors and 10 Crises Dominate 
Humanitarian Spending,'' The New Humanitarian, Oct. 9, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Every year in office, President Trump has proposed 
significant reduction in humanitarian assistance funding from 
previously appropriated levels. And every year, Congress has 
come to the rescue by appropriating humanitarian assistance 
funding levels far greater than the administration's request, 
allowing lifesaving humanitarian assistance programs to 
continue. In the administration's first budget proposal, for FY 
2018, the request for 5.3 billion dollars in humanitarian 
funding was a 43 percent decrease from the previous years' 
appropriation.\673\ In FY 2021, the Trump administration 
requested 6.27 billion dollars--a 34 percent decrease from the 
9.55 billion dollars appropriated in FY 2020.\674\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \673\ U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, Administration's Detailed 
FY18 Budget Request Similar to Skinny Budget: Proposal Would Make 
America Less Safe by Slashing International Affairs Budget, at 4 (May 
23, 2017).
    \674\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Fiscal 
Year 2021 (Feb. 10, 2020); U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, Out of 
Touch With America's Interests: International Affairs Programs Slashed 
for Fourth Straight Year Despite Growing Global Crises, at 8 (Feb. 10, 
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In most years, the United States allocates more than half 
of its humanitarian assistance to UN entities, many of which 
address the needs of forced migrant populations. Key recipients 
of this assistance include UNHCR, IOM, and numerous other 
specialized UN agencies and programs.\675\ Thanks to Congress's 
engagement and recognition of pressing global needs, U.S. 
obligations to UNHCR increased from 1 billion dollars in FY 
2013 to 1.57 billion dollars in FY 2018, and U.S. funding to 
IOM has remained steady based on needs and priorities.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \675\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, May 9, 2019, at 
4. The International Committee of the RedCross, WFP, UNICEF, and UNOCHA 
also receive assistance. Id.
    \676\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, FY 2018 Summary of Major Activities, at 4 (Feb. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite robust Congressional support for humanitarian 
assistance to address forced migration, the administration has 
successfully cut funding to a number of critical UN programs 
that seek to assist these populations. In August 2018, the 
administration announced it would no longer provide voluntary 
funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an organization that 
provides life-saving assistance to Palestinian refugees in the 
West Bank, Gaza, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.\677\ In addition, 
the Trump administration has withheld funding from the UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA), the lead UN agency for ensuring that 
women and girls who have fled conflict have access to life-
saving services relating to gender-based violence, and sexual 
and reproductive health.\678\ In doing so, the Trump 
administration has further endangered women and girls, who are 
particularly vulnerable to abuses in humanitarian 
settings.\679\ Furthermore, in April 2020 amid the COVID-19 
pandemic, President Trump suspended U.S. financial support for 
the World Health Organization (WHO), and, in May 2020, 
President Trump declared that the United States would terminate 
its relationship with the WHO.\680\ In doing so, the Trump 
administration suspended critical support for global activities 
working to combat COVID-19, polio, Ebola, HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other diseases, particularly among 
vulnerable populations like forced migrants.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \677\ Hady Amr, ``In One Move, Trump Eliminated US Funding for 
UNRWA and the US Role as Mideast Peacemaker,'' The Brookings 
Institution, Sept. 7, 2018; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), ``Who We Are,'' https://
www.unrwa.org/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 21, 2020).
    \678\ Planned Parenthood, ``Tracking Trump,'' https://
www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/tracking-trump/policy/un-population-
fund (last visited Apr. 21, 2020); Liz Ford & Nadia Khomami, ``Trump 
Administration Halts Money to UN Population Fund over Abortion Rules,'' 
The Guardian, Apr. 4, 2017; see Congressional Research Service, 
Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provision in U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Law and Policy, Oct. 23, 2019.
    \679\ Eric Schwartz, A Global Crisis: Refugees, Migrants, and 
Asylum Seekers, Refugees International, at 9 (Feb. 26, 2019).
    \680\ Kaiser Family Foundation, ``The U.S. Government and the World 
Health Organization,'' Apr. 16, 2020; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., ``Trump 
Says the U.S. Will Cut Ties with World Health Organization,'' CNBC, May 
29, 2020.
    \681\ Stephanie Nebehay & Kate Kelland, ``Explainer: What the U.S. 
Funds Freeze Could Mean for WHO and Its Work,'' Reuters, Apr. 15, 2020; 
Amy S. Patterson & Emmanuel Balogun, ``Trump Wants to Defund the World 
Health Organization. That Could Hurt Health Partnerships in Africa,'' 
The Washington Post, May 5, 2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 A huge number of Haitians make their way to the relief supplies (food 
 and water) handed out at the stadium in Port au Prince, Haiti. Master 
  Sgt. Jeremy Lock, 00120-F-1644L-189, U.S. Air Force, Jan. 20, 2010.

Sidebar: PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. HUMANITARIAN FUNDING AND POLICY 
        OPERATIONS
    In addition to slashing humanitarian assistance funding in 
its annual budget request to Congress, the Trump administration 
has sought to consolidate distinct U.S. overseas humanitarian 
assistance accounts into a single new global International 
Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account.\682\ Under the new 
proposal, the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) newly established Humanitarian Assistance Bureau would 
manage the IHA account, while the Department of State's 
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Bureau would lose its 
authorities to program and administer humanitarian assistance 
in response to overseas crises.\683\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \682\ U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, Analysis of the 
Administration's FY 20 International Affairs Budget Request (Mar. 12, 
2019).
    \683\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal 
Year 2020, at 77 (Mar. 2019); U.S. Department of State, Congressional 
Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs Fiscal Year 2021, at 78 (Feb. 10, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For the United States to effectively respond to 
humanitarian crises, most of which are the result of conflict, 
the Department of State must be enabled to marshal a wide range 
of tools, including diplomatic engagement, humanitarian 
assistance funding, and refugee resettlement.\684\ The existing 
architecture between State and USAID provides for comprehensive 
responses to crises, including diplomatic pressure for 
political resolutions to humanitarian emergencies, 
collaborative work toward permanent solutions for refugees and 
other displaced populations, and strategic engagement on 
emerging humanitarian policy issues.\685\ State's PRM bureau 
excels at leveraging robust humanitarian diplomacy and policies 
to protect refugees, internally displaced people, and other 
vulnerable forced migrants based on experience managing 
programs on the ground.\686\ The direct channels of 
communication between PRM field staff and the Ambassador, or 
between PRM program officers in Washington and the Secretary of 
State, are critical to advocating for humanitarian access, 
humane border policies, and other life-saving protections under 
international human rights and humanitarian laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \684\ Refugees International, Congress Urged to Resist Massive Cuts 
in U.S. Humanitarian Aid, Mar. 26, 2019; UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian 
Overview 2019, at 5-6 (2019).
    \685\ Refugees International, Congress Urged to Resist Massive Cuts 
in U.S. Humanitarian Aid.
    \686\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contrary to the administration's desire to shift PRM's 
mandate to USAID and potentially even DHS, it is imperative 
that PRM remain positioned with State to coordinate directly 
with State Department officials, UN agencies, foreign 
governments, and NGO partners on the ground.\687\ The United 
States' stellar record at responding to international 
humanitarian emergencies relies upon a fusion of diplomatic and 
humanitarian expertise, and dismantling this would hamper U.S. 
efforts in this time of immense global humanitarian need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \687\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Withdrawal from International Fora

    Over the past several years, the international community 
has convened high-level meetings and events to address the 
forced migration crisis. The United States was previously an 
active participant and lead convener of these diplomatic 
efforts to address humanitarian issues, including the forced 
migration crisis. For example:


   At the first UN World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, 180 
        countries came together to address the challenges 
        facing the global humanitarian system.\688\ A key 
        outcome was the signing of a ``Grand Bargain,'' which 
        aimed to make aid more efficient and effective, to 
        include greater local and national participation and 
        partnerships, and to establish coherence between 
        humanitarian and development responses.\689\ USAID led 
        the U.S. delegation, which also included 
        representatives from the White House, Department of 
        State, and the Department of Defense.\690\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \688\ Agenda for Humanity, ``World Humanitarian Summit,'' https://
agendaforhumanity.org/summit (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
    \689\ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ``The Grand Bargain 
(Official website),'' https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-
bargain (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
    \690\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: World 
Humanitarian Summit--U.S. Government Priorities, May 24, 2016.

   On September 19, 2016, at the UN General Assembly High-
        Level Plenary Summit on Refugees and Migrants, world 
        leaders agreed to the New York Declaration, which aimed 
        to save lives, protect rights, and share responsibility 
        for refugees and migrants on a global scale.\691\ The 
        United States participated in the High-Level Plenary 
        Summit as part of the regular General Assembly session 
        that unanimously adopted the Declaration.\692\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \691\ UNHCR, ``New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,'' 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-
migrants.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
    \692\ Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Adopts 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, as United Nations, International 
Organization for Migration Sign Key Agreement, Sept. 19, 2016; UNHCR, 
The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions, at 2 (Feb. 2018).

   On September 20, 2016, as a complement to the High-Level 
        Plenary Summit, President Obama co-hosted a Leaders' 
        Summit on Refugees asking nations to increase their 
        efforts to respond to the global displacement 
        crisis.\693\ Participants agreed to increase 
        contributions to UN appeals, expand options for 
        resettlement and other legal channels of admission, and 
        improve access to education for one million refugee 
        children and lawful work for one million refugees.\694\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \693\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on the Leaders' 
Summit on Refugees, Sept. 20, 2016.
    \694\ Id.


    Since President Trump took office, however, the United 
States has disengaged from cooperative international efforts 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and even jeopardized their success.


   Under President Obama, the United States participated in 
        all of the member state consultation meetings prior to 
        the start of negotiations of the Global Compact for 
        Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM).\695\ Under 
        the Trump administration, however, the United States 
        withdrew from negotiations in December 2017, stating 
        concerns regarding U.S. sovereignty even though the 
        Compact is nonbinding.\696\ In early December 2018, the 
        international community met in Marrakech, Morocco to 
        sign the GCM. The United States was not present in 
        Marrakech.\697\ The United States did, however, attend 
        a December 19, 2018 session of the UN General Assembly 
        where member 154 member states voted in favor of 
        adopting a resolution endorsing the GCM.\698\ At the 
        session, the United States called for a vote on the 
        resolution and subsequently voted against it.\699\ 
        Moreover, according to reporting, the United States 
        sought to convince other nations to vote against the 
        Compact.\700\ Ultimately, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
        Israel, and Poland also voted against it.\701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \695\ Olivia Beavers, ``US Pulls out of Global Compact on 
Migration,''' The Hill, Dec. 3, 2017.
    \696\ Press Release, U.S. Mission to International Organizations in 
Geneva, U.S. Ends Participation in the Global Compact on Migration, 
Dec. 3, 2017; Press Release, United States Mission to the United 
Nations, National Statement of the United States of America on the 
Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular 
Migration, Dec. 7, 2018.
    \697\ Faras Ghani, ``UN members adopt global migration pact,'' Al 
Jazeera, Dec. 10, 2018.
    \698\ Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Endorses 
First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation among 
Members States in Protecting Migrants, Dec. 19, 2018.
    \699\ Id.
    \700\ Georgi Gotev, ``Nine EU Members Stay Away From UN Migration 
Pact,'' EURACTIV, Dec. 20, 2018; AFP & The Times of Israel Staff, ``UN 
Ratifies Migrant Pact; Israel and US Among Five to Vote Against,'' The 
Times of Israel, Dec. 19, 2018.
    \701\ Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Endorses 
First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation among 
Members States in Protecting Migrants, Dec. 19, 2018.

   Similar to the GCM, the United States participated in the 
        consultative process for the Global Compact on Refugees 
        (GCR). However, at the eleventh hour the Trump 
        administration withdrew from the GCR in November 2018 
        based on objections to its reference to the New York 
        Declaration.\702\ In December 2018, the UN General 
        Assembly adopted the GCR in New York by a voting margin 
        of 181-2, with only the United States and Hungary 
        voting against the resolution adopting the 
        Compact.\703\ The United States explained that: 
        ``Although we value much of what is contained in the 
        resolution and the [GCR], including improving UNHCR's 
        responses to refugee crises as well as facilitating the 
        work of UNHCR in refugees hosting countries, concerns 
        expressed by my government during negotiations remain 
        unaddressed.''\704\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \702\ Alice Thomas & Mark Yarnell, Ensuring that the Global 
Compacts on Refugees and Migration Deliver, Refugees International 
(Nov. 2018).
    \703\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, May 9, 2019; 
Nayla Rush, ``A Historic Victory for the UN: Global Compacts on 
Migration and Refugee Adopted This Week,'' Center for Immigration 
Studies, Dec. 20, 2018.
    \704\ Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, 
Explanation of Vote in a Meeting of the Third Committee on a UNHCR 
Omnibus Resolution, Nov. 13, 2018.

   In addition to withdrawing from the Compacts, the Trump 
        administration has also ceased U.S. participation in 
        IOM's annual International Dialogues on Migration, 
        which discuss challenges and opportunities related to 
        migration. Whereas the State Department sent three 
        delegates in 2016 and two delegates in 2017, no U.S. 
        government officials attended the Dialogues in 2018 and 
        2019.\705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \705\ CRS, Research Conducted for Committee Staff, May 9, 2019.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
  Committee staff calculations based on data from UNHCR, ``Population 
       Statistics: Resettlement,'' (last visited June 15, 2020).

  The International Implications of the Trump Administration's Retreat


Leading the World in Retreat from the Global Forced Migration Crisis

    While the United States is still the world's largest 
humanitarian donor, the Trump administration's efforts to 
undercut a holistic response to the global forced migration 
crisis sends a message to other nations and impacts their 
actions. It was U.S. leadership at the 2016 Leaders' Summit on 
Refugees that drew commitments from countries on funding, 
resettlement slots, and basic human rights protections.\706\ By 
the same token, the absence of U.S. humanitarian leadership 
since then has contributed to a lack of global progress on 
meeting the 2016 commitments. For example, although global 
funding has increased, it has not caught up nor kept pace with 
increasing need; underfunding of UN appeals has grown from a 28 
percent shortfall in 2007 to 46 percent in 2019.\707\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \706\ Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: World 
Humanitarian Summit--U. S. Government Priorities, May 24, 2016.
    \707\ UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, at 26 (Dec. 31, 
2019); David Miliband, ``A Battle Plan for the World Bank: Why Refugees 
Are at the Center of the Fight Against Poverty,'' Foreign Affairs, Feb. 
19, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the U.S. led the world in a global retreat 
from refugee resettlement. In 2016, the United States was by 
and far the world's leader in refugee resettlement, resettling 
over 96 thousand refugees--50 thousand more refugees than the 
next highest refugee resettlement country.\708\ Therefore, when 
U.S. refugee resettlement declined by over 65 percent in 2017, 
this gap was felt globally.\709\ Furthermore, the next leading 
refugee resettlement country, Canada, followed the United 
States' suit, reducing refugee resettlement by 43 percent in 
2017.\710\ Overall, while refugee resettlement in the United 
States alone has declined by 76 percent from 2016 to 2018, 
refugee resettlement totals for the next four largest refugee 
resettlement countries in 2016--Canada, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Norway--also declined by 41 percent from 2016 to 
2018.\711\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \708\ Committee staff calculations based on U.S. Department of 
State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing Center, ``Summary 
of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://www.wrapsnet.org/
documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--01--31--.xlsx (based 
on calendar year); UNHCR, ``Population Statistics: Resettlement,'' 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement (last visited June 15, 2020).
    \709\ Committee staff calculations based on U.S. Department of 
State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing Center, ``Summary 
of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://www.wrapsnet.org/
documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--01--31--.xlsx 
(calendar year figures of 96,874 resettled in 2016 and 33,368 resettled 
in 2017);
    \710\ Committee staff calculations based on UNHCR, ``Population 
Statistics: Resettlement,'' http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement 
(last visited June 15, 2020).
    \711\ Committee staff calculations based on U.S. Department of 
State, PRM, Office of Admissions--Refugee Processing Center, ``Summary 
of Refugee Admissions,'' Jan. 31, 2020, https://www.wrapsnet.org/
documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20Report%20FY 2020--01--31--.xlsx (based 
on calendar year); UNHCR, ``Population Statistics: Resettlement,'' 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement (last visited June 15, 2020) 
(2019 figures not yet available).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Global refugee resettlement fell by 51 percent in 2018 
compared to 2016.\712\ While 37 countries committed to 
resettling refugees in 2016, just two years later only 25 
countries resettled refugees.\713\ In 2019, 63,696 refugees 
were resettled through UNHCR--just 4.5 percent of the 1.4 
million refugees in need of resettlement.\714\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \712\ Committee staff calculations based on UNHCR, ``Population 
Statistics: Resettlement,'' http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement 
(last visited June 15, 2020).
    \713\ International Rescue Committee (IRC), 10 things to know about 
the Global Refugee Crisis and America's lack of leadership: An IRC 
analysis of the latest annual reports from the UN Refugee Agency (July 
2019).
    \714\ Press Release, UNHCR, More resettlement needed as only 4.5 
per cent of global resettlement needs met in 2019, Feb. 5, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regardless of intent, the United States leads by example. 
The Trump administration's regressive actions towards forced 
migrants in the international sphere have set the stage for 
other countries to follow suit. These actions have aggravated 
imbalanced burden sharing, increased global instability, and 
furthered the plight of forced migrants worldwide.

Placing Increased Burden on U.S. Allies & Partners

    Refugee resettlement programs and humanitarian assistance 
can serve as political release valves, relieving economic and 
social pressure to ease some of the burden for countries 
hosting large refugee populations.\715\ Though global refugee 
resettlement accounts for less than one percent of the refugee 
population, the Trump administration's decision to slash U.S. 
resettlement has significantly impacted major refugee-hosting 
countries, many of which are developing countries.\716\ In the 
past, the United States leveraged its willingness to resettle a 
small percentage of refugees to encourage host countries to 
provide safe haven to significantly larger populations of 
displaced people, thereby preventing forced returns of refugees 
as well as discouraging onward migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \715\ Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, ``Trump's Refugee Cuts Threaten 
Deep Consequences at Home and Abroad,'' The New York Times, Sept. 11, 
2019.
    \716\ UNHCR, ``Resettlement,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
resettlement.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today, however, these same countries are less willing to 
continue hosting large refugee populations when the United 
States and other wealthy nations will not. In 2016, almost 
19,300 of Jordan's mostly Syrian refugees were resettled to 
countries like the United States and Canada, providing critical 
relief.\717\ In FY 2018, however, the United States resettled 
just 47 refugees from Jordan.\718\ As Jordan continues to host 
a significant number of Syrian refugees, the abdication of U.S. 
commitments has not gone unnoticed. King Abdullah of Jordan has 
made clear his country needs greater international support, 
saying, ``We are shouldering an immense refugee burden and 
cannot be left alone as we undertake this humanitarian 
responsibility on behalf of the world.''\719\ Queen Rania of 
Jordan went further, saying that the country has reached a 
breaking point: ``Our infrastructure, social services and 
economy are buckling under the strain. Nonetheless, Jordan--and 
other countries such as mine--continues to do the right thing. 
The same cannot be said of wealthy nations.''\720\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \717\ UNHCR, Jordan Factsheet (June 2017); U.S. Department of 
State, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017 
Report to Congress, at iv, September 2016; Press Release, UNHCR, 
Canada's 2016 record high level of resettlement praised by UNHCR, April 
24, 2017.
    \718\ IRC, Refugee resettlement by the numbers: FY17 vs. FY18 
Arrivals Comparison (Sept. 18, 2018).
    \719\ Michele Kambas, ``Jordan, Greece and Cyprus Say More Support 
Needed to States on Refugee Frontline,'' Reuters, Jan. 16, 2018.
    \720\ Queen Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan, ``Why Global Leadership on 
Refugees Matters,'' CNN, Sept. 20, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jordan is not alone in its criticism of the United States 
and other wealthy, developed nations for their inadequate 
response to the current forced migration crisis. For example, 
Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stated that she does 
not expect any help from the United States: ``Already America 
declared that they will not allow any refugees. . . . What I 
can expect from them, and especially [the] president. He 
already declared his mind . . . so why should I ask?''\721\ UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has said that 
President Trump's slashing of refugee resettlement slots leaves 
thousands without a ``life saving'' option and hurts the UN's 
efforts to increase resettlement numbers across the world.\722\ 
This sentiment was echoed by UNHCR officials who spoke with 
Committee staff in Egypt in May 2019: ``U.S. actions have 
greatly affected UNHCR's work. The United States had been 
taking three-quarters of our resettlement slots. Now they've 
gone from number one [in terms of slots] to number seven. 
People who would have proceeded onwards are now in a protracted 
asylum situation. Absence of U.S. leadership has made it 
tougher to convince other countries to accept more.''\723\ The 
United States' failure to accept and resettle refugees 
domestically emboldens other countries to also shirk 
responsibility and amplifies the tremendous burden placed on 
those countries who have chosen to respond positively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \721\ Michelle Nichols, ``Exclusive: Bangladesh PM Says Expects No 
Help From Trump on Refugees Fleeing Myanmar,'' Reuters, Sept. 18, 2017.
    \722\ Rebecca Kheel, ``UN Refugee Chief: Trump Refugee Cap Takes 
Away `Life Saving' Option,'' The Hill, Oct. 20, 2017.
    \723\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Cairo, 
Egypt, May 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Increased Risk of Global Instability

    This increased burden has implications for security and 
global stability. Of the 25.9 million refugees in 2018, 84 
percent lived in developing regions.\724\ These countries 
included Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Turkey, and Lebanon, 
which hosts the largest percentage of refugees relative to its 
national population--1 out of every 6 people in Lebanon is a 
refugee.\725\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \724\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2, 18 
(June 2019).
    \725\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed in Chapter 5, research shows that in the long-
run forced migrants are a great benefit to societies; however, 
in the immediate-term, large influxes of forced migrants can 
increase security concerns and place enormous economic and 
political pressure on host countries.\726\ These poor and 
middle-income countries hosting large numbers of forced 
migrants have weak political and socio-economic infrastructures 
less equipped to handle a large influx of forced migrants--many 
of whom will remain for decades, unable to return home due to 
ongoing instability.\727\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \726\ William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the 
United States: Evidence From The ACS, at 33 (June 2017); UNHCR, Social 
and economic impact of large refugee populations on host developing 
countries, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme 
(Jan. 6, 1997); see Kevin Shellito, The Economic Effect of Refugee 
Crises on HostCountries and Implications for the Lebanese Case, 
University of Pennsylvania (2016).
    \727\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 18, 22 
(June 2019); Stephanie Nebehay, ``Poor Nations Hosting Most Refugees 
Worldwide, Need More Western Help: U.N.,'' Reuters, June 18, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, since 4 out of 5 refugees live in host 
countries which neighbor their home country, conflicts that 
triggered refugees to flee their own country in the first place 
may potentially spill across borders and destabilize host 
countries.\728\ In Tunisia, for example, government officials 
told Committee staff they fear their fragile democratic 
transition could be reversed if a large influx of Libyan forced 
migrants suddenly enter Tunisia and strain its already fragile 
economic situation.\729\ In Colombia, Committee staff heard 
from government officials, civil society leaders and 
journalists their fear that the Venezuelan refugee crisis would 
place additional pressure on the country's fragile peace 
process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the National Liberation Army (ELN).\730\ Reporting from 
2019 suggests that Colombia's armed groups were keen to recruit 
desperate Venezuelan civilians as they crossed the porous 
1,380-mile border, with some forced migrants willing to take up 
arms in return for food and shelter.\731\ Colonial Arnulfo 
Traslavina, a military commander of a special unit fighting 
armed groups in Colombia's eastern border states, noted that, 
``[r]ecruitment of Venezuelans is happening. The ranks of the 
illegal armed groups are increasing. It's a major threat to 
Colombia.''\732\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \728\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 2 (June 
2019).
    \729\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Tunis, 
Tunisia, April 2019.
    \730\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Visit to Colombia, 
March 2019.
    \731\ Helen Murphy & Luis Jaime Acosta, ``Exclusive: Colombian 
Armed Groups Recruiting Desperate Venezuelans, Army Says,'' Reuters, 
June 20, 2019.
    \732\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The abdication of U.S. leadership on forced migrant issues 
is felt globally--by wealthy countries who have chosen to mimic 
the United States' inaction and regression, by poor and middle-
income countries forced to deal with large influxes of forced 
migrants, and by forced migrants struggling in their quest to 
find safety and security.

Forced Returns and Cycles of Conflict & Forced Migration

    Stymied by inadequate resources and solutions to deal with 
large influxes of forced migrants, some developing countries 
resort to policies that force or even coerce premature returns 
of forced migrants to their home countries.\733\ As opposed to 
being a solution, however, forced returns to unstable 
environments can foment instability and result in repeated 
forced migration.\734\ Measures to coerce returns--including 
threats of camp closures, reduction in humanitarian assistance, 
and harassment by government officials--have been implemented 
with regard to Rohingya in Bangladesh, Somalis in Kenya, 
Afghans in Pakistan, Syrians in Lebanon and Turkey, and 
Burundians in Tanzania.\735\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \733\ Jeff Crisp, ``Unwilling and Fearful Refugees Should Not Be 
Forced to Return Home,'' The Guardian, Oct. 7, 2019; Jesse Marks, ``Why 
Syrian Refugees Are at Risk of A Forced Return to Syria,'' The 
Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2019.
    \734\ Stephanie Schwartz, ``Sending Refugees Back Makes the World 
More Dangerous,'' Foreign Policy, Nov. 27, 2019.
    \735\ Jeff Crisp, ``Unwilling and Fearful Refugees Should Not Be 
Forced to Return Home,'' The Guardian, Oct. 7, 2019; UNHCR, Global 
Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 29 (June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Forced and premature returns of refugees and other forced 
migrants to unstable areas can exacerbate current 
conflicts.\736\ Of the fifteen largest population returns since 
1991, approximately one-third were followed by renewed fighting 
within a couple of years.\737\ As the U.S. military works to 
contain terrorist insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and 
the Horn of Africa, compelling refugees and other forced 
migrants to return would not only violate international law and 
risk their safety, but would also challenge existing efforts to 
create peace.\738\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \736\ See World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development 
Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts 
(2017).
    \737\ Id. at 108.
    \738\ Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Eric Schmitt, ``Despite Vow to End 
`Endless Wars,' Here's Where About 200,000 Troops Remain,'' The New 
York Times, Oct. 21, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States' refugee resettlement reductions have 
contributed to the dire situations of developing host 
countries, and the United States' retreat from international 
responsibilities has compromised its ability to prevent 
countries from enacting policies and taking actions that lead 
to forced and premature returns. In 2016, Kenya threatened to 
close Dadaab--at that time the largest refugee camp in the 
world--and return hundreds of thousands of refugees back to an 
unstable Somalia.\739\ Intense engagement from U.S. diplomats 
at the time helped convince the Kenyan government to reverse 
course.\740\ However, the threat of camp closure and reduced 
food rations in Dadaab, combined with diminished hope for 
resettlement, has left many Somali refugees with no option 
other than to consider premature return to Somalia.\741\ 
Meanwhile, refugees continue to flee from Somalia, and in some 
cases, refugees who have returned to Somalia have fled again 
back to Kenya in search of safety.\742\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \739\ Michel Martin & Gregory Warren, ``Kenya Threatens to Close 
Refugee Camp,'' NPR, May 21, 2016.
    \740\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``Kenya Backpedals on Decision to Close 
World's Biggest Refugee Camp Yet Again,'' Quartz Africa, Aug. 24, 2016.
    \741\ Maggie Fick, ``Somali Refugees in Kenya Caught Between Ration 
Cuts and War at Home,'' Reuters, Dec. 19, 2017; Amnesty International, 
Not Time to Go Home: Unsustainable Returns of Refugees to Somalia, at 
19 (Dec. 21, 2017).
    \742\ Tonny Onyulo, ``Somalis Who Returned Home Flee to Kenya a 
Second Time,'' News Deeply, Jan. 10, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Obstacles to Legal Pathways Make Forced Migrants More Vulnerable to 
        Exploitation

    There are also profound, unintended security consequences 
of drastically reducing safe and legal ways for forced migrants 
to find asylum. In 2016, President Trump was elected, in part, 
by promising to extend a wall the entire length of the U.S. 
border with Mexico to keep out Central American asylum seekers 
among others.\743\ Other foreign leaders have promised or built 
barriers to keep Africans out of Israel, Zimbabweans out of 
South Africa, and Pakistanis out of Iran to name a few.\744\ 
But shutting down borders and closing off legal pathways to 
refuge only serve to create greater security risks. Desperate 
people fleeing for their lives are going to flee one way or 
another. When countries shut their borders or severely restrict 
access to their asylum systems, people have no choice but to 
move into the shadows.\745\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \743\ ``Trump Wants to Build a Wall on the Border with Mexico. Can 
He Do It?'' PBS, May 2, 2016.
    \744\ Charles Bybelezer & Terrance J. Mintner, ``Israel's Border 
Walls: a Case Study for Trump's Mantra,'' The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 17, 
2018; Maxim Bolt, ``The Precarious Road Zimbabweans Travel to Seek a 
New Life in South Africa,'' The Conversation, May 8, 2016; Naimat Khan, 
``Pakistan Approves $18.6 Million to Fence Border with Iran,'' Arab 
News, Apr. 29, 2020.
    \745\ Erol K. Yayboke & Aaron N. Milner, Confronting the Global 
Forced Migration Crisis, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
at 35 (May 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Forcing people into the shadows, however, means that 
governments have less insight into who enters their countries 
and by which means. When states restrict legal pathways for 
people to escape danger, many forced migrants are driven to use 
irregular migration routes also used by smugglers and 
traffickers.\746\ Human traffickers, for example, not only 
enslave and exploit vulnerable people, but their illicit 
trafficking activities can in turn fuel the growth of national 
and international organized criminal networks.\747\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \746\ Id. at 35-37.
    \747\ Victoria Greenfield et al., Human Smuggling from Central 
America to the United States, RAND Corporation (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Along the U.S.-Mexico border, for example, a wide range of 
actors including gangs, ``coyotes,'' and ad hoc smugglers have 
taken up migrant smuggling and human trafficking because of the 
enormous profits derived from their human cargo.\748\ In the 
Sahel region of Africa, smugglers and human traffickers prey on 
vulnerable forced migrants attempting to cross the Sahara on 
their way to the Mediterranean and on to Europe.\749\ At the 
mercy of smugglers, migrants are subject to starvation, 
dehydration, physical abuse, and even abandonment in the 
desert.\750\ Close to 7,000 migrants have died trying to cross 
the Sahara over the past five years.\751\ For those who make it 
to Libya, the final crossing to Europe can prove fatal--since 
2014, more than 20,000 people have died or gone missing while 
making the dangerous Mediterranean Sea crossing.\752\ In Libya 
itself, these same smugglers and traffickers taking advantage 
of the chaos are helping to fuel militias in the armed 
conflict.\753\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \748\ Id. Yayboke & Milner, Confronting the Global Forced Migration 
Crisis, Center for Strategic & International Studies, at 36 (May 2018).
    \749\ Richard Skretteberg, ``Living off human suffering,'' 
Norwegian Refugee Council, June 20, 2016.
    \750\ Id.
    \751\ Lisa Schlein, ``Thousands of African Migrants Die Crossing 
Sahara Desert,'' Voice of America, Dec. 23, 2018.
    \752\ Retrieved data from International Organization for Migration 
Missing Migrants Project, ``Download Missing Migrants Project data,'' 
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/downloads (last visited Apr. 23, 2020).
    \753\ See UN Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Detained and 
Dehumanized: Report on Human Rights Abuses Against Migrants in Libya 
(Dec. 13, 2016); UN Support Mission in Libya & UNOHCHR, Desperate and 
Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and 
refugees in Libya (Dec. 20, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    Today's unprecedented levels of forced migration demand 
action from world leaders. In the face of this global crisis, 
the United States has abandoned its role as an exemplar and 
abdicated its responsibilities to shoulder this increased 
burden. More than ever, we are demonstrating a willingness to 
turn away those who seek our protection, spurn international 
mechanisms designed to support forced migrants throughout the 
world, and actively reduce our financial and diplomatic support 
for these efforts worldwide. Consequently, our global standing 
is compromised, not only in the humanitarian sector but more 
broadly as a global force for good. The Trump administration 
has transformed the United States from a leader on addressing 
forced migration issues to a deadweight ignoring the plight of 
today's global forced migration crisis and emboldening other 
countries to do the same.
    In order to reverse this trend and resuscitate U.S. moral 
and global leadership, the United States must first end harmful 
practices toward forced migrants, revive humanitarian 
assistance to meet global need, restore refugee resettlement to 
historic norms, and rejoin global efforts to address the forced 
migration crisis and its drivers. Then, the work of proactively 
addressing the crisis and supporting forced migrants and their 
host communities can begin.



                             CHAPTER SEVEN



                       Current Innovative Efforts

                              ----------                              

    The scale, complexity, and protracted nature of forced 
migration has resulted in need that far surpasses the world's 
traditional efforts to respond to forced migration. Recent 
diplomatic efforts have proved inadequate to resolve protracted 
conflicts that simmer and flare in a seemingly unending 
cycle.\754\ Without conditions of peace and safety, the number 
of voluntary returns of forced migrants to their home countries 
has hovered at historic lows.\755\ Refugee resettlement has 
also plummeted in the absence of U.S. leadership.\756\ 
Government donors have not kept pace with the growing 
humanitarian needs.\757\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \754\ See e.g., Katy Collin, ``The Year in Failed Conflict 
Prevention,'' The Brookings Institution, Dec. 14, 2017; Thomas M. Hill 
& Nate Wilson, ``From Foreign Interference to Failed Diplomacy, Libya's 
Conflict Drags On,'' United States Institute of Peace, Mar. 24, 2020.
    \755\ Kathleen Newland, Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels, 
New Tools, Transatlantic Council on Migration & Migration Policy 
Institute, at 2-3 (Apr. 2015).
    \756\ World Refugee Council, Centre for International Governance 
Innovative, A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System, 
at 6 (2019).
    \757\ David Miliband, ``A Battle Plan for the World Bank,'' Foreign 
Affairs, Feb. 19, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Diminishing access to voluntary return and resettlement as 
solutions has spurred new responses in support of local 
integration as an interim solution.\758\ At the crux of these 
efforts is the mission to provide not only short-term 
humanitarian aid, but also longer-term development 
assistance.\759\ With access to work education, and the right 
support, many forced migrants are net contributors to their 
host nations.\760\ While the international community has 
undertaken some efforts to reform and innovate to meet today's 
challenges, new solutions will be critical to bend the 
trajectory of global forced migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \758\ UNHCR, ``Local Integration,'' https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
local-integration-49c3646c101.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
    \759\ ``Consequences of Severe Global Funding Shortages for 
Refugees and Migrants `All Too Real', Warns UNHCR,'' UN News, Oct. 9, 
2018; UN High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, Too important to 
fail--addressing the humanitarian financing gap (Jan. 2016); 
Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019 
(2019); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
The United States: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2011 
(2011).
    \760\ Dany Bahar, ``Why Accepting Refugees is a Win-Win-Win 
Formula,'' The Brookings Institution, June 19, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 New Compacts to Improve International
                        Coordination & Response

    In response to the acute challenges posed by global forced 
migration, members of the international community have come 
together in a variety of forums to identify innovative ways to 
better manage the crisis. In 2016 alone, international events 
included President Obama's Leaders' Summit on Refugees, the 
Supporting Syria and the Region conference in London, the World 
Humanitarian Summit, and the UN General Assembly High-Level 
Plenary Summit on Refugees and Migrants.\761\ At the latter 
event, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.\762\ The Declaration 
expressed a determination to address the root causes of mass 
movements, save lives, protect human rights, and increase 
responsibility sharing through cooperation on a global 
scale.\763\ As a result of this initiative, UN member states 
developed two global compacts--a Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR), and a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration (GCM).\764\ Both compacts were launched in 
politically turbulent global contexts that pose challenges to 
their implementation.\765\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \761\ Elizabeth Ferris, In Search of Commitments: The 2016 Refugee 
Summits, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, at 1-2 (Nov. 
2016).
    \762\ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the 
General Assembly on 19 September 2016: New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants, 71st Session (Oct. 3, 2016).
    \763\ Id.
    \764\ Cindy Huang et al., Tackling the Realities of Protracted 
Displacement: Case Studies on What's Working and Where We Can Do 
Better, Center for Global Development (CGD) and International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), at 2 (Apr. 18, 2018).
    \765\ Solon Ardittis, ``What's to Fear in the U.N. Global Compact 
for Migration?,'' News Deeply, Dec. 5, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Compact on Refugees
    Despite the United States' vote against it, the GCR was 
approved with overwhelming support by UN member states on 
December 17, 2018.\766\ The GCR put forward a wealth of policy 
ideas for addressing the record flow of refugees by not only 
engaging traditional humanitarian actors, but also multilateral 
institutions, global development actors, and the private 
sector.\767\ The GCR is a legally non-binding pledge to 
strengthen international cooperation for ``predictable and 
equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing'' for hosting and 
supporting refugees among Member States and other 
stakeholders.\768\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \766\ Edith M. Lederer, ``UN Approves Compact to Support World's 
Refugees; US Objects,'' AP, Dec. 17, 2018.
    \767\ UNHCR, Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II) 
(Aug. 2, 2018).
    \768\ Id.  3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The GCR's four objectives are to:


   Ease pressures on host countries;

   Enhance refugee self-reliance;

   Expand access to resettlement in third countries; and

   Support conditions in countries of origin for return in 
        safety and dignity.\769\


    \769\ Id. at 4.


    The GCR provides a potentially transformative blueprint for 
refugee response in a period of rising nationalism and 
xenophobia.\770\ By incorporating the New York Declaration's 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, the GCR provides an 
action plan to facilitate comprehensive responses geared 
towards the GCR's objectives.\771\ Critics argue, however, that 
instead of a non-binding GCR, the international community 
should move toward binding multinational solutions, pointing to 
failed refugee governance before World War II, which relied on 
the voluntary, collective action of states.\772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \770\ Alice Thomas & Mark Yarnell, Ensuring that the Global 
Compacts on Refugees and Migration Deliver, Refugees International 
(Nov. 2018).
    \771\ Sergio Carciotto & Filippo Ferraro, ``Building Blocks and 
Challenges for the Implementation of the Global Compact of Refugees in 
Africa,''  Journal on Migration and Human Security , at 87 (2020).
    \772\ Lama Mourad & Kelsey P. Norman, ``The World Is Turning Its 
Back on Refugees,'' The Atlantic, Dec. 24, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
    The Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration 
(GCM) is the first global pact to create a universal framework 
to address all aspects of international migration, and was 
adopted overwhelmingly by UN member states on December 18, 
2018.\773\ The GCM sets forth 23 objectives, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \773\ See UN, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly ad Regular Migration 
(July 13, 2018); Nick Cummings-Bruce, ``U.N. Approves Sweeping Deal on 
Migration, but Without U.S. Support,'' The New York Times, Dec. 10, 
2018.


   Utilizing accurate and timely information for decision-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        making;

   Providing access to basic services;

   Managing borders in integrated, secure, and coordinated 
        manners; and

   Enhancing the availability and flexibility of pathways for 
        regular migration.\774\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \774\ UN, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly ad Regular Migration,  
16-39 (July 13, 2018).


    Participating states committed to fulfilling these 
objectives by implementing measures at the global, regional, 
and national levels, ``taking into account different national 
realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting 
national policies and priorities.''\775\ As with the GCR, 
implementation and review of progress involves an International 
Migration Review Forum to take place every four years beginning 
in 2022.\776\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \775\ Id.  41.
    \776\ Id.  49. The International Migration Review Forum will take 
the place of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development, previously scheduled to take place every fourth session of 
the General Assembly. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While U.S. participation in the Compact process began in 
2016, the Trump administration ended US participation, 
asserting its global approach was ``simply not compatible with 
U.S. sovereignty.''\777\ It is also notable that the United 
States--the world's largest humanitarian donor and, until 
recently, the largest refugee resettlement country--voted 
against both Global Compacts in December 2018.\778\ While the 
vast majority of member states voted for and easily adopted the 
Compacts, there were a few nations who followed the United 
States' lead in voting against them, including Israel and 
Hungary.\779\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \777\ Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, 
``United States Ends Participation in Global Compact on Migration,'' 
Dec. 2, 2017.
    \778\ ``UN Affirms `Historic' Global Compact to Support World's 
Refugees,'' UN News, Dec. 17, 2018; ``General Assembly Officially 
Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering,'' UN 
News, Dec. 19, 2018.
    \779\ Georgi Gotev, ``Nine EU Members Stay Away From UN Migration 
Pact,'' Euractiv, Dec. 20, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Innovative Models of Financial Assistance

    The World Bank has launched significant new financing 
mechanisms focused on the economic development of refugee 
populations and host communities. Specifically, the World Bank 
helped create the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) 
for middle-income countries impacted by refugee crises, and the 
International Development Association (IDA) Window for Host 
Communities and Refugees (WHR) for low-income countries hosting 
large refugee populations.\780\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \780\ Global Concessional Financing Facility, ``About Us,'' https:/
/globalcff.org/about-us/ (last visited May 18, 2020); Rebecca Root, 
``World Bank Pledges $2.2B for Refugees and Host Communities,'' Devex, 
Dec. 19, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is still too early to know whether these two new World 
Bank financing mechanisms will be transformative of the current 
global response to forced migrant populations; however, they do 
represent some of the most significant and innovative new 
financing streams in decades.\781\ They also point towards a 
new model in refugee response providing long-term, development 
financing to host countries to support refugees, while 
encouraging host governments to reform policies to allow 
refugees access to work, education, and other benefits that 
support refugee self-reliance and ultimately independence from 
aid.\782\ Both mechanisms require host governments to enact 
policy changes favorable to refugees, as well as focus 
programming to benefit host communities and refugees 
alike.\783\ Both are unique in that they provide multi-year 
concessional financing and grants through host government 
systems to meet the needs of refugees and their hosts.\784\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \781\ Courtenay Cabot Venton et al., Innovative Financing For 
Responses to Refugee Crises, at 14 (Mar. 2019); Lauren Post et al., 
World Bank Financing to Support Refugees and Their Hosts: 
Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 1 (June 2019).
    \782\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees 
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC (June 2019).
    \783\ Id.
    \784\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Concessional Financing Facility
    The World Bank first established the Global Concessional 
Financing Facility (GCFF) to help middle-income countries 
hosting at least 25,000 refugees that otherwise could not 
access financing on concessional terms. The World Bank, UN, 
Islamic Development Bank, and other organizations created the 
GCFF in 2016 to address this gap, with an initial focus on 
Jordan and Lebanon, who were hosting large influxes of Syrian 
refugees.\785\ In Lebanon, for example, 1 in 6 residents was a 
refugee in 2017.\786\ As of June 2019, 695 million dollars had 
been pledged in total, with the United States pledging 75 
million dollars, of which 35 million dollars has been 
received.\787\ To date, Jordan has received the most GCFF 
funding, which the government has used to support the Jordan 
Compact, detailed below.\788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \785\ World Bank, Global Concessional Financing Facility 2017-2018 
Annual Report, at 5 (2018).
    \786\ UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, at 2 (June 
2018).
    \787\ World Bank, 2018-2019 Global Concessional Financing Facility 
Annual Report, at 59 (2019).
    \788\ Veronique Barbelet et al., The Jordan Compact: Lessons Learnt 
and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts, Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), at 2 (Feb. 2018) (Recognition of the dual nature of 
protracted displacement in countries that are already struggling 
economically gave rise to a new policy model, the so-called refugee 
compacts); Cindy Huang et al., Tackling the Realities of Protracted 
Displacement: Case Studies on What's Working and Where We Can Do 
Better, CGD & IRC, at 13 (Apr. 2018) (These compacts seek sustainable 
solutions in displacement contexts through enabling refugee self-
reliance, which makes them less dependent on aid while also allowing 
them to contribute to and thus strengthen their local host 
communities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities
    The second World Bank mechanism is a fund for the poorest 
countries, the International Development Association (IDA). In 
late 2016, the Bank decided to raise a dedicated 2 billion 
dollars in its IDA18 replenishment (for the period of July 1, 
2017 to June 30, 2020) to create a regional sub-window for 
refugees and host communities.\789\ The IDA18 sub-window, 
renewed for IDA19 with an additional 2 billion dollars in 
financing, makes concessional financing available to low-income 
countries hosting large refugee populations.\790\ Like the 
GCFF, the IDA18 and IDA19 sub-windows require host governments 
to enact policy changes, and funds are provided on more 
favorable terms for medium-term investments that benefit host 
communities as well as refugees.\791\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \789\ World Bank Group International Development Association, 
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited June 8, 2020).
    \790\ Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Announces $2.2 Billion 
Scale-up in Support for Refugees and Host Communities at First Global 
Refugee Forum, Dec. 17, 2019.
    \791\ World Bank Group International Development Association, 
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Early results are promising. Fourteen countries are 
eligible for refugee sub-window financing; as of June 2019, 10 
countries had projects approved.\792\ All projects are designed 
to deliver benefits to both refugee and host communities.\793\ 
For example, a project in Djibouti aims to strengthen existing 
host country health systems to improve services for host 
communities and extend services to refugees.\794\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \792\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees 
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 1 (June 
2019).
    \793\ World Bank Group International Development Association, 
``IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities,'' http:/
/ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-
sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
    \794\ Press Release, World Bank, Djibouti: World Bank Approves $6 
Million to Ensure Refugees and Host Communities Access Healthcare 
Services, May 3, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While it may be too soon to gauge programmatic impact, the 
promise of financing alone though the GCFF and the IDA18 sub-
window has had a positive impact on national refugee policies 
and on the inclusion of refugees in national systems in select 
countries. In Jordan, World Bank financing and dialogue secured 
a commitment to provide 200,000 work permits to refugees, and 
the legalization of refugee home-based business.\795\ In 
Lebanon, World Bank engagement has extended education to half 
the population of Syrian refugee children.\796\ In Ethiopia, 
World Bank dialogue led to the adoption of reforms that shift 
away from the decades-old encampment model and offer refugees 
socioeconomic rights, including to move freely, work, and 
access services.\797\ In Pakistan, World Bank dialogue 
contributed to a new policy that allows refugees to open bank 
accounts.\798\ In Cameroon and Chad, the World Bank is 
supporting the transition from humanitarian to national service 
delivery of health, education, and social protection, reducing 
reliance on humanitarian financing and supporting sustainable 
service provision.\799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \795\ World Bank International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and International Development Association, Program 
Appraisal Document on Proposed Loan and Credit in the Amount of US$300 
Million to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for Economic Opportunities 
for Jordanian and Syrian Refugees Program-for-Results, at 4, 29 (Sept. 
2, 2015); World Bank, Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian 
Refugees P4R (P159522) (July 20, 2018).
    \796\ World Bank, ``Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon 
Support Project,'' https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/project-detail/P159470?lang=en&tab=ratings (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2020); see Noah Yarrow, ``Addressing the Education Emergency 
in Lebanon,'' World Bank Blog, Mar. 24, 2016.
    \797\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees 
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 1 (June 
2019).
    \798\ Id.
    \799\ See Press Release, World Bank, Cameroon: World Bank Approves 
$274 Million to Support Refugees and Host Communities, May 1, 2018; 
Press Release, World Bank, Chad: A $60 Million World Bank Grant to 
Support Refugees and Host Communities, Sept. 12, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, World Bank financing has proven most effective at 
incentivizing policy change when paired with diplomatic efforts 
and incentives beyond aid, such as trade concessions and 
private investment.\800\ Although the IDA18 sub-window provides 
funds on more favorable terms than they would be available 
otherwise, it is still politically challenging for any 
country--and particularly, poor countries like Ethiopia--to 
accept more debt for the purpose of dealing with refugees.\801\ 
Crowding in additional bilateral donors such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union could 
increase grant financing and incentives for policy change. Such 
compact models, detailed below, hold the greatest promise for 
new, sustainable approaches to protracted displacement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \800\ Lauren Post et al., World Bank Financing to Support Refugees 
and Their Hosts: Recommendations for IDA19, CGD & IRC, at 3 (June 
2019).
    \801\ See Leah Zamore, ``Refugees, Development, Debt, Austerity: A 
Selected History,'' Journal on Migration and Human Security (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           The Compact Model

    The country compact model has emerged as a prototype for 
coordinating donors, humanitarian and development actors, and 
host governments around multi-year agreements that achieve 
shared outcomes for refugees and host communities in protracted 
crises.\802\ Compacts leverage financial and political 
incentives, as well as expertise, to advance joint 
solutions.\803\ They also balance the needs of refugees and 
host communities, with a focus on unlocking key policy 
constraints to refugee self-reliance and local 
integration.\804\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \802\ CGD & IRC, Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of 
Protracted Displacement, at 6 (2017).
    \803\ Id.
    \804\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most prominent examples of country compacts are the 
Jordan and Lebanon Compacts, agreed in 2016.\805\ The Jordan 
Compact promised 700 million dollars annually in 3-year grants, 
concessional loans of 1.9 billion dollars, and relaxed trade 
regulations with the EU in return for access to the labor 
market and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.\806\ Since 
2016, Syrian refugees in Jordan have gained greater access to 
the formal labor market and are permitted to own and operate 
home-based businesses.\807\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \805\ Id. at 9.
    \806\ Veronique Barbelet et al., The Jordan Compact: Lessons Learnt 
and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts, ODI, at 2 (Feb. 2018).
    \807\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The World Bank's concessional financing mechanisms have 
been critical to these compact agreements.\808\ However, the 
World Bank's financial incentives alone are not always 
sufficient to generate critical policy changes. Compacts can be 
significantly improved by pooling funds and systematizing joint 
analysis and planning across donors, and by leveraging the 
political and diplomatic heft of the United States and other 
key donors to offer host governments ``beyond aid'' support 
that can have outsized benefits for refugees and host 
communities in the long term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \808\ CGD & IRC, Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of 
Protracted Displacement, at 10 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Focus: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE JORDAN COMPACT
    The Jordan Compact was groundbreaking for its new approach 
to dealing with protracted displacement, focusing on improving 
access to education and legal employment for Syrian refugees, 
in order to foster inclusive growth for refugees and host 
communities. While the Compact has made considerable progress, 
including policy reforms that have improved the overall 
business environment in Jordan, implementation has also dealt 
with considerable challenges and there are lessons to be 
learned. Two years into the Compact, just 80,000 of 200,000 
promised work permits have been issued.\809\ Necessary 
improvements include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \809\ Katharine Lenner & Lewis Turner, ``Learning from the Jordan 
Compact,'' Forced Migration Review (Feb. 2018).

   Better understanding of refugee needs and constraints: The 
        initial focus on work permits in limited sectors and 
        factories ignored both the inability of refugees to 
        logistically reach these factories as well as the 
        importance of home-based businesses for women refugees, 
        who often face many barriers to leaving their home for 
        employment, such as child care, safety concerns, and 
        cultural norms.\810\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \810\ Nazanin Ash & Cindy Huang, Using the Compact Model to Support 
Host States and Refugee Self-reliance, Centre for International 
Governance Innovation (CIGI) & World Refugee Council (WRC) at 9 (Dec. 
2018).

   More robust review and evaluation of evidence base prior to 
        program design: A focus on outputs rather than outcomes 
        contributed to insufficient analysis of the investments 
        and policy changes necessary for success. As a result, 
        some of the interventions did not strongly reflect 
        evidence of effective tactics.\811\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \811\ Id. at 9-10.

   Increased multi-stakeholder participation: The lack of 
        inclusion of civil society, NGOs, the private sector, 
        and in particular, refugees and host communities, in 
        the analysis and planning process contributed to 
        suboptimal outcomes. Including these stakeholders could 
        have identified some obstacles refugees face in seeking 
        decent employment opportunities.\812\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \812\ Id.

   Better understanding of private sector needs and 
        constraints: Insufficient consultation with the private 
        sector led to a lacking understanding of the necessary 
        support and mechanisms needed to translate private 
        sector commitments into concrete engagement aligned 
        with needs on the ground.\813\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \813\ Id. at 10-11.

   Leveraging and ``crowding-in'' of additional donors: Acting 
        alone, the World Bank's financing incentives, and 
        particularly their concessional nature, are 
        insufficient for incentivizing robust policy reforms. 
        By partnering with additional donors and leveraging 
        more aid and non-aid incentives, such as trade 
        concessions, under a shared strategy and set of policy 
        changes, compact approaches can vastly strengthen 
        outcomes.\814\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \814\ Id. at 4.


    Overall, the GCR, GCM, and national compacts like the 
Jordan Compact are hugely positive steps and important tools 
for the international community to have at its disposal, but 
implementation is still nascent. Moreover, none of these 
initiatives addresses the plight of IDPs. Lack of innovative 
solutions for IDPs, who make up over half of those forcibly 
displaced, is a huge gap that the international community needs 
to address.

               Solutions to Better Serve Forced Migrants

    As the situation of forced migrants has changed, new tools 
have been invented and implemented to serve their needs. 
Contemporary forced migrants, who are often displaced for 
decades, living in urban environments, and among developing 
host communities, require different solutions than short-term, 
camp-based forced migrants.\815\ Below we have outlined a few 
examples of new efforts and responses aimed to improve the 
situations of today's forced migrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \815\ Elizabeth Ferris for The Brookings Institution, ``When 
Refugee Displacement Drags on, Is Self-reliance the Answer?'' June 19, 
2018; UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, at 18, 56 
(June 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Emphasis on Evidence- & Outcomes-Based

  Humanitarian Action

    Over the past decade, humanitarian organizations and donors 
have increasingly emphasized the role of evidence and data to 
inform humanitarian programs. Donors are increasingly holding 
organizations accountable to demonstrate program impacts and 
outcomes.\816\ As a result, humanitarian organizations are 
increasingly pursuing rigorous and impartial efforts to assess 
community needs, monitor programs and their implementation, and 
evaluate impact.\817\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \816\ David Miliband & Ravi Gurumurthy, ``Improving Humanitarian 
Aid: How to Make Relief More Efficient and Effective,'' Foreign 
Affairs, July/Aug. 2015.
    \817\ Tom Bundervoet, Monitoring vs. Monitoring, International 
Rescue Committee (Aug. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Effective humanitarian responses rely on understanding the 
needs of communities they are serving. As such, humanitarian 
needs assessments have become institutionalized across the 
sector.\818\ The highest coordinating forum within the UN--
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)--has provided best 
practices for humanitarian actors conducting needs assessments. 
The UN relies upon needs assessments to create Humanitarian 
Needs Overviews, the UN's flagship document serving as a basis 
for funding appeals.\819\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \818\ James Darcy et al., The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian 
Decision Making: ACAPS Operational Learning Paper, Feinstein 
International Center (Jan. 2013).
    \819\ UNOCHA, ``Needs Assessment and Analysis,'' https://
www.unocha.org/es/themes/needs-assessment-and-analysis (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The result of increasing emphasis on evidence-based 
approaches are numerous studies demonstrating effective and 
ineffective mechanisms for serving displaced populations, which 
can inform future programming. For example, a partnership 
between the UK Department for International Development, the 
World Bank, and UNHCR is conducting impact evaluations on 
projects addressing protracted forced displacement over a 
seven-year period (2016 to 2023).\820\ Assessments are 
currently being conducted on programs across 14 different 
countries tackling education, reintegration of returnees, child 
protection, the prevention of intimate partner violence, 
healthcare, labor outcomes, and more.\821\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \820\ World Bank, ``DFID--UNHCR--World Bank Program: Building the 
Evidence on Forced Displacement,'' https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
fragilityconflictviolence/brief/building-the-evidence-on-forced-
displacement-a-multi-stakeholder-partnership (last visited June 8, 
2020).
    \821\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Emphasis on evidence and measurable outcomes should not 
hinder overall assistance and donations to humanitarian 
organizations providing life-saving aid. Robust evaluations 
often require additional resources--namely time and money.\822\ 
The ability to collect and generate meaningful evidence is 
often difficult in the context of conflict and other urgent and 
sudden emergencies. Although it can be costly to gather, data 
and evidence can significantly improve how we understand forced 
migration crises and help us identify best practices for 
response.\823\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \822\ Tom Bundervoet, Monitoring vs. Monitoring, International 
Rescue Committee (Aug. 2011).
    \823\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Movement Towards Cash Assistance
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

   Saboune Adakar Abdoukaye lost everything, including his home and 
business, when his village in Chad was burned to the ground by militia. 
Now living in an IDP camp in Goz Beida, Chad, Saboune cares for his own 
 six children, as well as his sister's seven children, after she died 
  from illness in the camp. He is seen here in the successful shop he 
opened with the help of World Concern's Cash for Work program, which is 
  funded by USAID. He used his earnings from daily labor to feed and 
 clothe the 13 children in his care, as well as purchase goods for his 
  shop. His business now not only supports his family, but he employs 
seven other people as well. Derek Sciba, November 2010 FrontLines Photo 
            Contest Top Entry, World Concern, July 9, 2010.

    As mentioned in Chapter 4, cash and voucher assistance 
(CVA) is widely recognized as one of the most significant areas 
of innovation in humanitarian assistance, with profound 
potential to revolutionize the scale, efficiency, and efficacy 
of assistance.\824\ In comparison to conventional humanitarian 
assistance focused on delivering specific services, cash and 
voucher assistance shifts decision-making directly to the 
recipient, allowing for flexibility based on individual needs 
and providing beneficiaries with a greater sense of 
dignity.\825\ Studies show that cash and voucher assistance not 
only facilitates access to basic needs such as food, health, 
and shelter, but also reduces the cost of delivering 
humanitarian aid.\826\ Moreover, CVA has demonstrated 
additional positive impacts on longer-term goals, including 
financial inclusion and support to host communities.\827\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \824\ See, e.g., Thabani Maphosa, ``Cash Transfers: An Innovative 
Solution to Humanitarian Challenges,'' Global Citizen, May 23, 2016.
    \825\ Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model, 
CGD, at 9 (May 2018),
    \826\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2019, at 13 (2019); ODI & CGD, Doing Cash Differently: How Cash 
Transfers Can Transform Humanitarian Aid, at 8 (Sept. 2015).
    \827\ ODI & CGD, Doing Cash Differently: How Cash Transfers Can 
Transform Humanitarian Aid, at 8, 14 (Sept. 2015)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the benefits of cash and voucher assistance in many 
settings have resulted in adoption, efforts to scale CVA are 
still needed. From 2015 to 2018, CVA volume grew by 135 
percent.\828\ Over the same time period, the proportion of cash 
transfers also grew, as UN agencies and NGOs increasingly used 
cash over vouchers.\829\ In 2018, an estimated 4.7 billion 
dollars in humanitarian assistance was disbursed through 
CVA.\830\ However, this figure only represents 16 percent of 
global humanitarian assistance and year-over-year growth in CVA 
has slowed.\831\ CVA programming grew by 10 percent from 2017 
to 2018, compared to 38 percent from 2015 to 2016.\832\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \828\ Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2019, at 71 (2019) (some of this growth was due to newly 
available data.)
    \829\ Id. at 72.
    \830\ Id.
    \831\ Id. at 10, 71 (based on $28.9 billion in global humanitarian 
assistance).
    \832\ Id. at 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Advances to Address the Education & Learning Crisis

    New education solutions for forced migrant populations not 
only increase access, but also efficiency and efficacy. First, 
humanitarian organizations are increasingly moving away from 
creating schools specifically for forced migrants, to promoting 
the inclusion of forced migrants in national education 
systems.\833\ This new approach, articulated by UNHCR in 2012, 
recognizes the reality of contemporary forced migrants' 
situations as increasingly protracted, increasingly urban, and 
without adequate, stable funding for education.\834\ While many 
host countries already struggle with under-resourced education 
systems, support for forced migrant education through national 
systems aims to not only improve learning for forced migrants, 
but host communities as well.\835\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \833\ Sarah Dryden-Peterson et al., Inclusion of Refugees in 
National Education Systems, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Global Education Monitoring Report, at 7 
(2018).
    \834\ Id.; UNHCR, Education Strategy: 2012-2016, at 8 (Jan. 2012).
    \835\ Sarah Dryden-Peterson et al., Inclusion of Refugees in 
National Education Systems, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Global Education Monitoring Report, at 
8-9 (2018); UNHCR, Refugee Education 2030: A Strategy for Refugee 
Inclusion, at 2 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, new education initiatives aim to improve the 
quality of education--addressing inefficiencies in current 
education programs that hinder learning. Recognizing that 
school systems organized by age and grade are often unable to 
address the evolving needs of students, the Indian NGO Pratham 
created a simple assessment tool, Teaching at the Right Level, 
that facilitates the grouping of learning levels and tailored 
curriculums.\836\ In Nigeria, a six-week Teaching at the Right 
Level intervention increased the proportion of children able to 
read a simple paragraph by 9 to 23 percent.\837\ In Syria, 
easy-to-use assessment instruments not only help teachers 
measure reading and numeracy skills, but also social-emotional 
skills for IDP and conflict-affected children.\838\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \836\ Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, ``Teaching at the 
Right Level to improve learning,'' https://www.povertyactionlab.org/
case-study/teaching-right-level-improve-learning (last visited June 1, 
2020).
    \837\ Teaching at the Right Level, ``Kano and Akwa Ibom, Nigeria,'' 
https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org/tarl-in-action/kano-akwaibom-
nigeria/ (last visited June 1, 2020).
    \838\ Email from Sean Snyder, Public Partnerships Manager, UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), to SFRC Staff, June 2, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Improving How We Feed the World's Hungry

    Hunger can be both a cause and a consequence of forced 
migration.\839\ After steadily declining for a decade, world 
hunger is once again on the rise.\840\ In 2014, there were an 
estimated 775 million undernourished people worldwide.\841\ By 
2018, that number had increased to 820 million.\842\ The World 
Food Programme has warned that the COVID-19 pandemic could 
almost double the number of people suffering from acute hunger 
worldwide.\843\ As the global imperative to provide food 
assistance becomes increasingly urgent, a renewed emphasis on 
innovation in food science, food production, food delivery, and 
treatment of malnutrition is improving support for the world's 
hungry.\844\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \839\ Laura Hammond, ``Forced Migration and Hunger,'' SOAS 
University of London, Oct. 2018.
    \840\ Action Against Hunger, ``World Hunger: Key Facts and 
Statistics,''
    \841\ Id.
    \842\ Id.
    \843\ Press Release, World Food Programme (WFP), Covid-19 will 
double number of people facing food crises unless swift action is 
taken, Apr. 21, 2020.
    \844\ WFP, World Food Assistance 2017, at 136 (July 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Scientific research has significantly improved malnutrition 
treatments. Research has emphasized the critical role of 
adequate nutrition on growth and development within the first 
1,000 days or before the age of 2.\845\ In addition, ready-to-
use food products have revolutionized food assistance and 
malnutrition treatment.\846\ These products not only enable 
humanitarian organizations to target specific populations in 
need of emergency food assistance, but are easier to distribute 
and store.\847\ To ensure that humanitarian actors can meet 
rising global needs, increased and sustained investment is 
needed to improve coordination, simplify treatment protocols 
for malnutrition, and better enable community health workers to 
provide treatment.\848\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \845\ Jessica Hartl, ``From the Lab to the Field: New Science for 
Better Food Aid,'' U.S. Agency for International Development, Nov./Dec. 
2011; WFP, WFP and Nutrition (Oct. 2018), https://docs.wfp.org/api/
documents/WFP-0000099337/download/?--
ga=2.16029686.1314341884.1590779765-1018911202.1579039603.
    \846\ Jessica Hartl, ``From the Lab to the Field: New Science for 
Better Food Aid,'' U.S. Agency for International Development, Nov./Dec. 
2011; Action Against Hunger, ``What is Therapeutic Food (Plumpy' 
Nut)?,'' https://actionagainsthunger.ca/what-is-acute-malnutrition/
what-is-therapeutic-food/ (last visited June 9, 2020).
    \847\ Marion Hart & Sarah Ferguson, ``What Is Ready-to-Use 
Therapeutic Food?.'' UNICEF USA, Mar. 6, 2019.
    \848\ David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue 
Committee, Remarks at ``2018 World Innovation Summit for Health,'' 
Doha, Qatar, Nov. 13, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Incorporating Technology

    The recent global forced migration crisis has occurred in a 
world markedly different from that of the post-World War II 
era. New technologies, and specifically the advent of digital 
technology with mobile phones, internet connectivity, and new 
data and analysis capabilities, have transformed the daily 
lives of people around the world. For humanitarian 
organizations, the adoption of innovative technological tools 
and techniques has enhanced their ability to monitor forced 
migration crises and implement effective programs. For forced 
migrants specifically, technology opens new channels of access 
for communication, information, education, language and 
translation, employment, faith-based activities, health care, 
identity documentation, financial management, and much 
more.\849\ A renewed, comprehensive response to the forced 
migration crisis will need to utilize technology effectively, 
but must be aimed at long-term gains as opposed to short-
sighted quick fixes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \849\ Shelly Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: 
Applying Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, Rand Corporation, at 
xii (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Data to Inform Humanitarian Responses

    Innovations in data collection and analysis have profoundly 
impacted the humanitarian sector by improving understandings of 
ongoing crises and coordination in response. From tracking 
migration patterns to rapidly mapping areas impacted by 
conflict and displacement to collecting detailed data on 
humanitarians needs, the availability of near real-time data 
has improved humanitarian responses to forced migration 
crises.\850\ Furthermore, improved data collection and analysis 
has also allowed humanitarian organizations to assess impact, 
evaluate effectiveness, and improve evidence-based decision-
making.\851\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \850\ James Darcy et al., The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian 
Decision Making: ACAPS Operational Learning Paper, Feinstein 
International Center (2013),
    \851\ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management Sector Update 
(Oct. 2015); Press Release, IRC, ``The World Humanitarian Summit needs 
to deliver concrete commitments towards improving aid effectiveness,'' 
May 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Across the board, UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs have 
embraced the role of data in humanitarian responses. In 2017, 
the UN Secretary-General launched the Centre for Humanitarian 
Data, which works to expand data usage and impact in the 
humanitarian sector.\852\ By aggregating data, creating data 
standards, and making data easily accessible, the Centre has 
enabled users in over 200 countries and territories to access 
critical humanitarian data.\853\ At the same time, 
organizations working on the ground play a vital role in 
collecting data to inform other agencies working in the 
response. For example, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) 
is a key source of information related to displacement and 
migration crises. Through a variety of survey technologies and 
analytical techniques, IOM tracks displacement flows in near 
real-time to provide a better understanding of where people are 
moving and their evolving needs.\854\ As of March 2020, DTM 
tracked displacement in 65 countries around the world.\855\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \852\ UN Centre for Humanitarian Data, ``What We Do,'' https://
centre.humdata.org/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); Press 
Release, UNOCHA, ``OCHA's new Centre for Humanitarian Data a signpost 
to the future,'' Dec. 22, 2017.
    \853\ UN Centre for Humanitarian Data, ``What We Do,'' https://
centre.humdata.org/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
    \854\ International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
``Displacement Tracking Matrix: About,'' https://dtm.iom.int/about 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
    \855\ European Commission, ``IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix 
(DTM),'' Oct. 9, 2019; IOM, ``DTM Global'' (click ``DTM Global''), 
https://displacement.iom.int/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Advancements in satellite imagery and mapping technology 
have further aided humanitarian response to forced migration. 
Today, it would be unheard of to lack a basic map of a refugee 
camp, or a map showing displacement patterns within a country. 
Use of this technology, however, has only become mainstream in 
the sector within the last decade. In addition, new innovations 
for gathering and analyzing data continue to improve responses. 
For example, crowdsourcing, or soliciting data points from a 
large group, has become a useful tool in humanitarian 
response.\856\ In 2010, first responders to the earthquake in 
Haiti were aided by maps supplied by online volunteers using 
satellite imagery to trace roads and buildings. In other 
contexts, like Uganda and Bangladesh, rapidly growing refugee 
camps were mapped in detail within hours through a similar 
approach, enabling humanitarian agencies on the ground to 
identify where to establish water points and build health 
facilities.\857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \856\ Cambridge Dictionary, ``crowdsourcing,'' https://
dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/crowdsourcing (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2020); Amelia Hunt & Dough Specht, ``Crowdsourced 
Mapping in Crisis Zones: Collaboration, Organisation and Impact,'' 
Journal of International Humanitarian Action (Jan. 7, 2019).
    \857\ Weiyi Cai & Simon Scarr, ``The Rohingya Crisis: Life in the 
Camps,'' Reuters, Dec. 4, 2017; Nina Strochlic, ``A City Rises,'' 
National Geographic, Apr. 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Information Dissemination for Forced Migrants

    Mobile phones and internet connectivity allow forced 
migrants to keep in touch with family and friends, seek 
information about their journeys, and learn about their host 
countries.\858\ For humanitarian actors, information 
communication technology provides two-way communication about 
the needs of forced migrants and the availability of services. 
According to an International Rescue Committee (IRC) study, 
these information communication technology platforms are 
particularly well-suited for forced migrants living in urban 
contexts with diverse populations, geographically dispersed 
populations, dynamic movement among populations, and a large 
number of service providers.\859\ IRC and its partners have 
launched a myriad of global and regional platforms to provide 
information to forced migrants, including Service.Info, 
Refugee.Info, which was expanded into SignPost, and 
CuentaNos.org.\860\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \858\ Shelly Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: 
Applying Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 21-22.
    \859\ IRC, Using ICT to Facilitate Access to Information and 
Accountability to Affected Populations in Urban Areas: A Review of the 
ServiceInfo and Refugee.Info Platforms, at 5 (June 2017).
    \860\ Id.; Press Release, IRC, Signpost digital initiative reaches 
1 million people across three continents, Dec. 12, 2018; Press Release, 
IRC, The Latest Central American Caravan is a symptom of an even larger 
crisis, says IRC, Jan. 16, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While information communication technologies represent an 
opportunity to optimize information dissemination, existing 
efforts bring forward the issue of ``digital litter.'' Many 
refugee and forced migrant-focused technology projects are 
launched but not maintained, creating a sizable amount of 
digital litter--broken links, defunct webpages, and outdated 
and misleading information online.\861\ According to one 
tracking initiative, of 169 technology projects for refugees 
launched in 2015 and 2016, most were inactive as of July 
2018.\862\ Therefore, reviews of the use of technology to serve 
refugees and forced migrant populations have repeatedly 
underscored the need for long-term plans for maintenance, 
conspicuously marked update dates for information posted, and 
the deletion of online presences for projects that are going or 
have gone defunct.\863\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \861\ Meghan Benton, ``Digital Litter: The Downside of Using 
Technology to Help Refugees,'' Migration Policy Institute, June 20, 
2019; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying 
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at x, xi, 19.
    \862\ Benton, ``Digital Litter: The Downside of Using Technology to 
Help Refugees.''
    \863\ Id.; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying 
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Digital Solutions for Identity Documentation

    In Chapter 3, we discussed restrictions faced by forced 
migrants, including limited access to identity documents, which 
can subsequently hinder access to legal protections, basic 
services, and much more. For populations on the move, 
technology can serve as a gateway for accessing identity 
documents and credentials. Forced migrants use Google Drive and 
other technologies to acquire, save, and share important 
documents, including birth certificates and diplomas.\864\ 
Asylum seekers often take smartphone pictures of their flimsy 
paper registration documents, allowing them to both protect 
their documents from overuse and disintegration, as well as 
ensure they have back-up copies in case their original 
documents are lost or destroyed.\865\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \864\ Id. at 45.
    \865\ Id. at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For those forced migrants without access to identity 
documents, digital identity and registration systems can serve 
as alternative mechanisms for authentication and access to 
services. In pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goal of 
leaving no one behind and achieving legal identity for all by 
2030, UNHCR has increasingly turned to digital identity systems 
to empower identity recognition, digital inclusion, and service 
delivery for forced migrants.\866\ UNHCR's Population 
Registration and Identity Management EcoSystem (PRIMES) uses 
state-of-the-art biometrics to create a consolidated tool 
enabling identity management, case management, assistance, and 
data management for forced migrants.\867\ By the end of 2018, 
more than 7.1 million forced migrants in 60 countries had 
registered a biometric identity with UNHCR.\868\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \866\ Nicholas Oakeshott et al., World Bank Blogs, ``Empowering 
refugees and internally displaced persons through digital identity,'' 
June 19, 2018; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying 
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 32.; UNHCR, UNHCR Strategy 
on Digital Identity and Inclusion (2018).
    \867\ UNHCR, UNHCR Strategy on Digital Identity and Inclusion 
(2018); UNHCR, ``Registration and Identity management,'' https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/registration.html (last visited June 8, 2020).
    \868\ UNHCR, ``Data of Millions of Refugees Now Securely Hosted in 
PRIMES,'' Jan. 28, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/data-millions-
refugees-securely-hosted-primes/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other humanitarian and aid organizations have also turned 
to technology to overcome the obstacle of missing identity 
documents. In Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp, blockchain platform 
BanQu has helped refugees establish a verifiable digital 
identity, enabling refugees to build credit and access 
financial institutions.\869\ In Jordan, the World Food 
Programme's Building Blocks program uses biometrics and 
blockchain technology to deliver assistance to 106,000 Syrian 
refugees.\870\ Early results of the program showed a 98 percent 
reduction in traditional fees imposed on money transfers.\871\ 
Furthermore, the program reduces processing time, including 
time spent waiting for local banks to transfer the money and 
time spent registering with local banks to receive the cash 
assistance.\872\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \869\ Roya Pakzad, Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging 
Technology for the Refugee System, CIGI & WRC, at 3 (May 2019).
    \870\ WFP, ``Building Blocks,'' https://innovation.wfp.org/project/
building-blocks (last visited Apr. 15, 2020); Russ Juskalian, ``Inside 
the Jordan Refugee Camp That Runs on Blockchain,'' MIT Technology 
Review, Apr. 12, 2018.
    \871\ Juskalian, ``Inside the Jordan Refugee Camp That Runs on 
Blockchain.''
    \872\ Id.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
 A refugee in Uganda's Oruchinga settlement uses an iris scan to claim 
           food assistance. Claire Nevill, WFP, Mar. 5, 2018.

    Critics have lamented that these efforts are often small in 
scale and lack the ability to bring about real, comprehensive 
change.\873\ The fragmented and short-sighted nature of 
projects to implement digital systems often means that identity 
systems are not compatible for connection with registration, 
case management, and aid distribution systems--hindering, not 
enhancing, coordination.\874\ Additional concerns include a 
lack of data privacy protections, data security, and informed 
consent in the mass collection of forced migrants' data.\875\ 
Data security is of special concern in the case of UNHCR's 
biometric database, which is stored centrally and lacks 
blockchain protections.\876\ These concerns regarding 
consistency, privacy, security, and consent also extend to 
other efforts to use technology to address the forced migration 
crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \873\ Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: Applying 
Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at 33.
    \874\ Id. at 31.
    \875\ Pakzad, Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging Technology 
for the Refugee System; Culbertson et al., Crossing the Digital Divide: 
Applying Technology to the Global Refugee Crisis, at xvii.
    \876\ Pakzad, Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging Technology 
for the Refugee System, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Increasing Private Sector Participation

    As efforts to address protracted refugee crises 
increasingly emphasize longer-term development for refugee and 
host communities, private sector actors can play a strategic 
role in directly contributing to, enhancing, and scaling these 
efforts. A November 2017 review found more than 170 private 
sector initiatives to address the refugee crisis. Private 
sector actors can do their part by providing humanitarian 
funding, extending services and sharing capabilities and 
technologies, and enabling employment and education.\877\ While 
investment to deal with the refugee crisis remains 
insufficient, private partners are now playing an important but 
modest role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \877\ Danielle Berfond et al., Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways 
to Scale, The Bridgespan Group & The World Bank's International Finance 
Corporation (May 12, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Increasing Private Sector Donorship

    Recent influxes of forced migrants and growing anti-
migration sentiment among industrialized countries, 
humanitarian organizations, and non-profits have increasingly 
looked to diversify their funding sources--and the private 
sector has stepped up to help.\878\ From 2007 to 2017, private 
sector financial support for UNHCR increased from 34 million to 
400 million dollars--from 2 percent to 10 percent of total 
contributions.\879\ In December 2019, more than 100 companies 
and foundations attended the most recent Global Refugee Forum 
in December 2019, pledging more than 250 million dollars in 
funding for UNHCR in addition to many other commitments to 
service provisions and actions.\880\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \878\ See Ammar A. Malik et al., Private-Sector Humanitarians?: New 
Approaches in the Global Refugee Response, Urban Institute (Sept. 
2018),.
    \879\ United Nations Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, Private Sector Fundraising and Partnerships, 73rd meeting, 
at 3 (Aug. 31, 2018).
    \880\ Press Release, UNHCR, Private Sector Steps Pp for Refugees as 
Global Refugee Forum Opens in Geneva, Dec. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Canada, an innovative model has allowed for private 
companies, individuals, and organizations to directly fund the 
resettlement of additional refugees since 1979.\881\ Under 
Canada's Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, private 
sponsors cover refugees' living costs for their first 12 months 
of resettlement or until the refugee becomes self-sufficient, 
whichever comes first.\882\ Sponsorship groups range from 
private companies to churches to family members of the refugee 
being resettled. Since the program's inception, private 
sponsors have resettled more than 288,000 refugees to Canada, 
over and above those resettled with government resources.\883\ 
From January 2015 to August 2017 alone, 40,130 privately 
sponsored refugees were admitted to Canada, or 47 percent of 
total refugees admitted.\884\ Following Canada's lead, 
Argentina, Australia, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, New 
Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom have all launched or 
pledged to launch refugee sponsorship programs.\885\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \881\ Canada Council for Refugees, ``Private Sponsorship for 
Refugees,'' https://ccrweb.ca/en/private-sponsorship-refugees (last 
visited June 8, 2020).
    \882\ Shahana Bhaduri, Exploring Private Refugee Sponsorship 
Option(s) for the United States, Harvard University, at 2-3, 87 (Mar. 
2018).
    \883\ Press Release, UNHCR, Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative 
Promotes Canada's Private Refugee Sponsorship Model, Dec. 16, 2016.
    \884\ Bhaduri et al., Exploring Private Refugee Sponsorship 
Option(s) for the United States, at 79.
    \885\ Susan Fratzke et al., Refugee Sponsorship Programmes: A 
Global State of Play and Opportunities for Investment, Migration Policy 
Institute Europe, at 3 (Dec. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Aside from dollars, private sector companies have also 
addressed the global forced migration crisis by donating goods 
and services. IKEA's partnership with UNHCR has resulted in 
thousands of donated mattresses, bed linens, and shelter 
units.\886\ At the 2019 Global Refugee Forum, 20 law firms 
committed 125,000 hours per year to pro-bono legal support for 
refugees and stateless people.\887\ Equity Bank, a financial 
services company serving East Africa, began extending its 
services to refugees in 2012, helping refugees with personal 
banking, microcredit, and group savings and lending 
products.\888\ By dedicating significant resources to refugee 
communities, Equity Bank extended access to financial 
institutions to a populations often denied inclusion and 
overlooked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \886\ IKEA, ``Brighter Lives for Refugees,'' https://www.ikea.com/
ms/en--JO/good-cause-campaign/brighter-lives-for-refugees/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
    \887\ Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR, Private Sector Steps Up for 
Refugees as Global Refugee Forum Opens in Geneva, Dec. 16, 2019.
    \888\ Berfond et al., Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale, 
at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the needs of forced migrants around the globe continue 
to grow, we need must think about ways to expand private sector 
assistance--in pure dollars and methods--in our efforts to keep 
up.

Private Sector Support for Education & Employment

    With increasingly protracted conflicts and increasing focus 
on integration as the most accessible solution, private sector 
responses need to focus not only on humanitarian aid but also 
longer-term development. Investing in education and employment 
is a paramount way to meet pressing forced migrant needs and 
serve longer-term goals--and many private sector companies are 
well-positioned to provide support.
    UNHCR's efforts to achieve education parity for refugees in 
pre-primary, primary, and secondary schooling have been 
bolstered by private sector support.\899\ The Vodafone 
Foundation has served as UNHCR's partner in creating 36 Instant 
Network Schools providing digital education across Africa.\890\ 
The education platform Coursera has provided free access to 
courses for refugees, reaching 18,000 refugees in 110 
countries, who have taken more than 80,000 courses 
combined.\891\ Clothing retailer H&M's global holiday campaigns 
have resulted in 3.3 million dollars' worth of school supplies 
reaching 500,000 children through UNHCR.\892\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \889\ See UNHCR, Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis (Aug. 
2019).
    \890\ Press Release, Vodafone, ``Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR 
Expand Instant Network Schools to Benefit Bore than 500,000 Young 
Refugees,'' Dec. 16, 2019.
    \891\ Berfond et al., Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale, 
at 45.
    \892\ Id. at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As employers, private companies are also well-suited to 
support refugees with workforce training, skills, and 
employment opportunities. Private sector initiatives range from 
those providing business training to supporting refugee 
entrepreneurs with loans to providing remote work opportunities 
to pledging job opportunities for resettled refugees.\893\ 
These initiatives support the economic development and self-
sufficiency of forced migrant populations, counter economic 
burden myths, and foster community integration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \893\ See id. at 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Education and employment represent two sectors where the 
private sector is enormously well-suited to provide support. 
And while companies have brainstormed innovative initiatives 
and provided generous funding, more support is needed. As we 
look to expand our understanding of vulnerable forced migrant 
populations around the world to not only include refugees, but 
also internally displaced persons, victims of generalized 
violence, war, and climate-related events, this need balloons. 
Private sector partnerships will be an important partner in 
innovating, funding, and serving the needs of these large and 
growing populations.
Sidebar: AHLAN SIMSIM: SESAME STREET FOR
  SYRIAN REFUGEES
    In partnership with the IRC and local educators, Sesame 
Workshop, the nonprofit educational organizations behind Sesame 
Street, launched a new show called Ahlan Simsim, or ``Welcome 
Sesame,'' in February 2020.\894\ Aired in Arabic and Kurdish, 
the show is geared towards displaced children in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.\895\ The show has two main 
characters, Basma and Jad, and focuses on managing 
emotions.\896\ The project is estimated to reach up to nine 
million children, making it the largest early-childhood 
intervention in the history of humanitarian response, and will 
be coupled with studies by child development specialists.\897\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \894\ Alex Carp, `` `Sesame Street' Is Opening Up to Syrian 
Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 31, 2020; Press Release, IRC, 
Sesame Street and the IRC Are Helping Refugee Children Overcome Trauma, 
Feb. 2, 2020.
    \895\ Alex Carp, `` `Sesame Street' Is Opening Up to Syrian 
Refugees,'' The New York Times, Jan. 31, 2020.
    \896\ Id.
    \897\ Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              ----------                              


Sidebar: VODAFONE FOUNDATION & UNHCR
  INSTANT NETWORK SCHOOLS
    Started in 2014 with funding from the Vodafone Foundation 
and UNHCR, the Instant Network Schools (INS) program provides a 
digital `school in a box,' including internet and electricity 
sources, tablets, curriculums, and teacher training, to 
increase educational resources in refugee camps. For under-
resourced regions with insufficient schools, teachers, and 
materials, the INS program provides an innovative 
solution.\898\ As of December 2019, there were 36 Instant 
Network Schools across eight refugee camps in Kenya, Tanzania, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan.\899\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \898\ Duke Mwancha, ``Innovation: UNHCR and Vodafone Bring Tablet-
based Learning to 18,000 Somali Refugees,'' UNHCR News, Oct. 9, 2014; 
UNHCR, Stepping Up, at 16 (2019).
    \899\ Press Release, Vodafone, ``Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR 
Expand Instant Network Schools to Benefit More than 500,000 Young 
Refugees,'' Dec. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As of December 2019, INS program evaluations showed higher 
levels of school attendance, a 61 percent increase in 
informational communications technology literacy for students, 
and a 125 percent increase in improved confidence, motivation, 
and academic performance among trained teachers.\900\ The 
program does, however, need to work towards equal access across 
genders--in the first half of 2019, 70 percent of users were 
male.\901\ At the Global Refugee Forum in December 2019, 
Vodafone and UNHCR announced an expansion of the INS program to 
benefit more than 500,000 refugees.\902\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \900\ Id.
    \901\ Caroline Opile, ``Vodafone Foundation Sponsored Instant 
Network Schools are Transforming Refugee Lives in Kenya,'' UNHCR News, 
Sept. 18, 2019.
    \902\ Press Release, Vodafone, ``Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR 
Expand Instant Network Schools to Benefit More than 500,000 Young 
Refugees,'' Dec. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    While the costs of addressing this global crisis are 
significant, the consequences of inadequate responses and 
inaction will be even greater. Existing initiatives have shown 
the potential for international cooperation and innovation to 
create modern solutions to address the realities of the current 
forced migration crisis. Given the magnitude of today's crisis, 
however, new initiatives need to be scaled across nations and 
across public, private, and non-profit sectors, in order to 
have a meaningful impact.
    In a renewed global effort to address and mitigate the 
global forced migration crisis, international, national, 
private, and civil society organizations need to collaborate to 
ensure responsibilities are shared and best practices are 
implemented. We cannot and should not stand idly by as large 
swaths of the world's population are fleeing harm, seeking 
safety, and spending decades in displacement.



                       FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

                              ----------                              




 
                                Findings

   The scale of today's forced migration crisis is 
        unprecedented. A confluence of factors, including 
        persistent climate-related shocks and increasingly 
        frequent, highly violent, and protracted conflicts 
        impacting civilians have resulted in a record number of 
        people forced to flee their homes around the globe. By 
        the end of 2018, there were over 70.8 million refugees, 
        asylum seekers, and IDPs worldwide. In addition, many 
        more have been forced to flee their homes due to severe 
        climate-related events. Without dramatic efforts to 
        address the forced migration crisis, it will continue 
        to grow in scale and complexity.

   Climate change will exacerbate the core drivers of forced 
        migration by increasing the risk of conflict over 
        natural resources and dramatically impacting the 
        availability of food and water. The impacts of climate 
        change are innumerable, and include depleted natural 
        resources, rising sea levels, extreme weather events, 
        and conflict--all of which can force people to leave 
        their homes.

   Armed actors have increasingly failed to uphold 
        international law, attacking civilians and civilian 
        infrastructure with impunity. The brutal nature of 
        armed conflict and its destruction of civilian 
        infrastructure is a major driver of large-scale 
        displacement, and reflects a growing lack of respect 
        for the traditional laws of war. Without deterrence of 
        and accountability for these violations, armed actors 
        will continue to brutalize civilians and cause massed 
        displacement.

   The UN Security Council, largely due to vetoes by its 
        permanent members, has struggled to uphold its core 
        mandate of maintaining peace and security, and to help 
        resolve prolonged conflicts or ensure that violators of 
        international law are held accountable. Without 
        international bodies enforcing accountability and 
        imposing consequences, government and independent armed 
        actors will continue to violate international laws and 
        norms, spur forced migration, and shirk responsibility 
        in addressing this global crisis.

   The nature of forced migration has dramatically changed 
        since the end of World War II, and the scale of global 
        need has far outpaced available assistance. Many forced 
        migrants are unable to return home for decades and 
        often live in urban environments in developing 
        countries. These changes to the nature of displacement 
        often render traditional solutions based on short-term 
        displacement in camp settings ineffective, and 
        necessitate new and innovative responses. As global 
        need continues to grow, major donors such as the United 
        States and the United Kingdom have reduced humanitarian 
        financing, while China and other countries have not 
        stepped up to address the need. As a result, many 
        humanitarian agencies and response plans are 
        drastically underfunded.

   Forced migrants often face severe restrictions to and 
        violations of their human rights. These include 
        restrictions on the right to work, freedom of movement, 
        documentation, access to healthcare, and the right to 
        education. These affronts to forced migrants' rights 
        and dignity have resulted in the repression of large 
        swaths of the world's population.

   The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the extreme 
        vulnerabilities of forced migrant populations, 
        highlighted by dangerously overcrowded settings, 
        inadequate access to healthcare, increased incidences 
        of gender-based violence, exclusion from host country 
        preparedness and response plans, the scapegoating of 
        forced migrants as vectors of the virus, and 
        restrictions placed on their access to international 
        legal protections and asylum systems.

   Women and girls face particular vulnerabilities as forced 
        migrants, including barriers to accessing life-saving 
        healthcare and education, gender-based violence, and 
        human trafficking, yet international funding and 
        support remains minimal. Women and girls are more 
        likely to face restrictions on their ability to work, 
        be refused an education, denied life-saving healthcare, 
        subjected to gender-based violence (GBV), and 
        trafficked as forced migrants. Despite severe 
        vulnerabilities faced by women and girls, less than 0.2 
        percent of humanitarian response funding was spent on 
        GBV prevention programs between 2016 and 2018.

   The unprecedented number of children who are forced 
        migrants presents an urgent call to action for their 
        protection and education. The number of refugee 
        children has doubled in the past 10 years, and the 
        number of unaccompanied and separated children asylum 
        seekers hit record highs in 2015. By the end of 2017, 
        more than 31 million children were refugees, asylum 
        seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
        Without proper access to education, health care, and 
        other services and protections, displacement has the 
        potential to derail the future outlook for an entire 
        generation of children.

   Despite specific international legal conventions affording 
        refugees protections, some countries have denied 
        refugees basic rights and services. Even those who meet 
        the strictest definition of refugee status are often 
        denied documentation, shelter, human rights, and basic 
        services. Without consistent implementation and 
        enforcement of international legal protections, 
        countries are able to violate refugees' rights with 
        impunity.

   Forced migration today is driven not only by conflict and 
        persecution, but also generalized violence and severe 
        climate-related events, and many forced migrants lack 
        pathways for national and international protections. 
        Today, many of those forced from their homes and 
        seeking refuge do not meet the definition of 
        ``refugee'' in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
        Without the same international protections as refugees, 
        these populations are more likely to be ignored, denied 
        life-saving assistance and services, and refused 
        support in finding solutions to end their displacement.

   As the population of forced migrants continues to grow, the 
        traditional solutions of voluntary return and 
        resettlement are increasingly inaccessible. As 
        conflicts are increasingly prolonged and unending, 
        forced migrants, many of whom want to return home, are 
        unable to do so safely. Even prior to the Trump 
        administration, the opportunity for resettlement in a 
        third country was only available to a small percentage 
        of the world's refugees. As a result, greater focus 
        must be paid to the third durable solution--local 
        integration.

   Humanitarian aid is not reaching those in need due to 
        restrictions by countries and interference by non-state 
        armed actors. These restrictions and interference 
        violate international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
        disrupt life-saving services, forcing more civilians to 
        flee their homes.

   Inefficiencies in humanitarian response by donor countries, 
        host countries, the United Nations, and NGOs have 
        contributed to shortcomings in responding effectively 
        to forced migration and humanitarian need. While the UN 
        and many of its donors recognize areas for reform and 
        realignment, there has been a lack of clear progress on 
        reform across the entire humanitarian system. During 
        the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, a number of 
        sensible reforms were agreed to in order to improve the 
        effectiveness of humanitarian programs, not all of 
        which have been fully implemented. These included 
        increasing cash-based assistance, multi-year funding, 
        and streamlining redundant programming.

   The Trump administration has used every mechanism at its 
        disposal to block legal pathways for refugees, 
        undermining longstanding U.S. policies towards forced 
        migrants, and inspiring--or sometimes bullying--other 
        governments to adopt regressive responses to today's 
        forced migration crisis. These methods include the 
        externalization of the U.S. border, the decimation of 
        refugee resettlement programs, cuts to humanitarian 
        assistance, the shirking of U.S. responsibility in 
        international coordination and partnerships, and the 
        propagation of false narratives sowing hatred against 
        foreigners and forced migrants. The Trump 
        administration has, in fact, gone beyond simply 
        blocking forced migrants from accessing the United 
        States to actively harming those who seek refuge 
        through deliberate policies of family separation, the 
        Remain in Mexico policy, and ``safe third country'' 
        agreements that force asylum seekers into dangerous and 
        sometimes fatal settings.

   The Trump administration's retreat from U.S. humanitarian 
        obligations and the multilateral system has dealt a 
        harmful blow to an already-weakened system of 
        international cooperation for responding to global 
        crises like forced migration. The United States' 
        regressive leadership on the international stage, as 
        evident by its actions relating to the Global Compact 
        for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Global 
        Compact on Refugees, has emboldened other nations to 
        neglect their responsibilities to protect refugees and 
        other forced migrants.

   Recent efforts in humanitarian financing, humanitarian aid, 
        diplomacy, and the private sector highlight 
        opportunities to reinvigorate forced migration 
        responses from the top-down, although greater support 
        is needed around the world to drive these innovations. 
        These initiatives include new international and 
        national compacts on refugees, the World Bank's 
        concessional financing, increase usage of cash 
        transfers for humanitarian assistance, and a myriad of 
        private partnerships aimed at providing services and 
        opportunities to forced migrants. Given the scale of 
        today's forced migration crisis, these efforts also 
        underscore a need for collaborative action and 
        widespread rethinking across all sectors--government, 
        finance, and private companies--in order to 
        comprehensively address the crisis.





                            Recommendations

For Congress
    Congress should continue to recognize the enormous needs 
        and adequately fund humanitarian assistance for 
        vulnerable populations around the world. Congress has 
        provided leadership by appropriating humanitarian aid 
        funding far above the Trump administration's proposed 
        budgets, and should continue to do so. Restoration of 
        effective U.S. leadership on the international stage 
        will result in increased responsibility sharing in 
        responding to the global forced migration crisis.

   Congress should mandate regular reports from the State 
        Department and the U.S. Agency for International 
        Development (USAID) on the human rights and 
        humanitarian situations of forced migrant populations, 
        including refugees and IDPs. Regular assessments on 
        forced migrant populations will help inform government 
        responses across agencies, including humanitarian aid 
        and resettlement, and increase the effectiveness of 
        those responses.

   Congress should permit Economic Support Funds to be used to 
        support multilateral efforts to advance the inclusion 
        of forced migrants in host country development efforts, 
        such as the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing 
        Facility.

   Congress should address rampant gender-based violence in 
        humanitarian emergencies around the world, and pass the 
        Keeping Women and Girls Safe from the Start Act of 
        2020. Women and girls, including women and girl forced 
        migrants, face extreme violence and threats of violence 
        during humanitarian crises. Passage of the Act will 
        advance efforts to prevent, mitigate, and respond to 
        gender-based violence in humanitarian crises around the 
        world.

   Congress must increase humanitarian assistance for 
        comprehensive health services, including reproductive 
        health and gender-based violence-related services, and 
        remove restrictions that impede access to health care, 
        including the Mexico City Policy and restrictions on 
        funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 
        These services are critical in addressing the acute 
        vulnerability of women and girl forced migrants, where 
        adequate and equitable access to healthcare can 
        transform long-term outlooks and save lives. The COVID-
        19 pandemic has only reinforced the essential nature of 
        these services, especially in times of crisis.

   Congress should authorize the expanded use of sanctions and 
        other tools against perpetrators of international 
        humanitarian law violations and those who deny aid 
        access for life-saving assistance. Without the presence 
        of accountability, violent actors will continue to 
        attack civilians, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian 
        organizations, and humanitarian workers with impunity, 
        further stoking mass displacement.

   Congress should ensure that asylum seekers and refugees are 
        afforded the protections stipulated under U.S. law and 
        increase the U.S. refugee ceiling to align with global 
        need. Such Congressional action would serve as a first 
        step in reversing the Trump administration's actions 
        decimating the asylum and refugee system and the U.S.'s 
        historical leadership on refugee issues.

   In addition to bolstering existing refugee resettlement 
        programs, Congress should create complementary pathways 
        to protect forced migrants who do not meet the refugee 
        definition under U.S. law, but for whom return is not 
        possible or advisable. Congress must reform and update 
        the existing statutory framework for Temporary 
        Protected Status (TPS) and should provide complementary 
        pathways to meet the protection needs of individuals 
        displaced by generalized violence and gender-based 
        violence, among other forces. It is critical that 
        complementary pathways be additive to refugee 
        resettlement and avoid discrimination. These 
        complementary pathways must guarantee the minimum 
        protections of non-refoulement, access to identity and 
        travel documents, family unity, resolving 
        statelessness, addressing vulnerability to exploitation 
        and abuse, and ensuring access to a permanent solution.

For the Trump administration and future administrations
   The Executive Branch must reverse policies and practices 
        undermining U.S. refugee law. The U.S. sets a model for 
        regressive action in response to the global forced 
        migration crisis. Accordingly, the Executive Branch 
        must terminate harmful programs, including the Remain 
        in Mexico policy (also known as the Migrant Protection 
        Protocols) and ``safe third country'' agreements (also 
        known as the Asylum Cooperative Agreements).

   The Executive Branch should adopt a robust and inclusive 
        interpretation of U.S. refugee law that takes into 
        account the changed nature of conflict and persecution. 
        Addressing the global forced migration crisis requires 
        dealing with mixed migration flows and acknowledging 
        the protection needs of many forced migrants who may 
        not fit the strictest definition of ``refugee,'' 
        including victims of generalized violence, gender-based 
        violence, IDPs, and those displaced by severe climate-
        related events.

  The Executive Branch should increase support for efforts to 
        educate refugee children and initiate campaigns to 
        educate IDP children. The United States should continue 
        to provide funding to refugee education initiatives 
        such as Education Cannot Wait, work to increase 
        enrollment in early education and secondary education, 
        and increase educational opportunities for IDP 
        children, who are often overlooked. Furthermore, 
        funding should be coupled with robust diplomatic 
        efforts that prioritizes access to education by forced 
        migrant children.

  The Executive Branch, including the Departments of State 
        and Defense, should ensure U.S. military assistance, 
        such as arms sales, military training, and other 
        defense services, is contingent on the implementation 
        of civilian harm mitigation policies and adherence to 
        international humanitarian law. The United States 
        should identify conditions that would prompt limits on 
        or suspension of partnership with actors, including a 
        failure to protect civilians and civilian 
        infrastructure and a failure to provide unfettered 
        humanitarian access.

  USAID should ensure inclusion of forced migrant populations 
        in its five-year Country Development Cooperation 
        Strategies. This would help ensure that forced migrant 
        populations are not overlooked in country development 
        plans. U.S. agencies must help host countries 
        facilitate plans that are mutually beneficial for host 
        communities and displaced populations.

   The Executive Branch must re-engage and re-establish 
        constructive leadership in the multilateral system and 
        at the United Nations on issues related to forced 
        migration. Proposed actions include the nomination and 
        appointment of qualified and internationally-respected 
        individuals to posts at multilateral institutions and 
        the restoration of funding for UNFPA, the United 
        Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and the World 
        Health Organization (WHO).

   The Executive Branch must lead the race to the top in 
        urging all countries to uphold international law, 
        including international humanitarian law and 
        international human rights law. In today's age of 
        impunity, we risk serious regional and global 
        instability without effective justice. The failure to 
        ensure accountability for violations of international 
        humanitarian and human rights laws is helping to drive 
        forced migration. The United States must recommit to 
        championing respect for international law by activating 
        a whole-of-government approach, including strong 
        efforts by the White House, U.S. Mission to the UN, and 
        State Department in calling for accountability.

  The Executive Branch must redouble efforts to resolve 
        ongoing and prolonged conflicts, as well as efforts to 
        prevent the outbreak of future conflicts, including by 
        strengthening atrocity prevention programs. The United 
        States must address conflict, a primary driver of 
        forced migration, by strengthening diplomacy at the 
        United Nations, other multilateral institutions, and in 
        our bilateral relationships, as well as reinforcing our 
        ability to detect early warnings of and coordinate 
        responses to potential mass atrocities as directed by 
        the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act 
        of 2018.

   The United States should support the proposal to suspend 
        veto power at the UN Security Council in cases of mass 
        atrocities. Supporting the veto suspension would send a 
        bold message of support for the sanctity of 
        international law and zero tolerance for widespread and 
        systematic violence against civilian populations.

  The Executive Branch should restore U.S. leadership on 
        refugee resettlement back to historic norms and in line 
        with tremendous global need. Changes should reverse 
        harmful Trump administration policies--increasing the 
        refugee ceiling to be in line with global need, re-
        designating allocations for refugee resettlement to 
        account for global need, and accepting UNHCR referrals 
        for resettlement--as well as create new policies to 
        strengthen refugee resettlement efforts.

  In addition to refugee resettlement, the Executive Branch 
        should increase alternative legal pathways for refuge 
        in the United States, including through private 
        sponsorship programs, to allow for the resettlement of 
        refugees above and beyond government commitments. 
        Private sponsorship would support refugee resettlement 
        above and beyond existing ceilings or caps. Refugees 
        resettled through private sponsorship would have the 
        same rights and opportunities afforded to them as those 
        resettled through the U.S. government.

  The Executive Branch should join the Global Compact for 
        Refugees, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and 
        Regular Migration, and the Paris Climate Agreement to 
        signal its solidarity with international community 
        efforts and pursue coordination on global efforts to 
        respond to the global forced migration crisis.

  Reinvigorating the momentum behind the 2016 New York 
        Declaration, the United States should lead efforts 
        convening host governments, donors, the private sector, 
        civil society, and forced migrant representatives to 
        form a new compact supporting the inclusion of forced 
        migrant populations in host countries. In line with the 
        World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility 
        (GCCF) and International Development Association (IDA) 
        mechanisms and the Jordan Compact and U.S. Millennium 
        Challenge Corporation, the approach would incentivize 
        countries to include forced migrant populations in host 
        communities, through access to work, legal status, 
        education, and freedom of movement, in return for aid 
        and other benefits. The United States should establish 
        a fund to provide financial support to these compacts 
        and forced migrant-hosting nations.

   The White House should initiate an expansion and update to 
        the U.S. government's policy on IDPs, which now 
        consists solely of the 2004 USAID Assistance to 
        Internally Displaced Persons Policy. The creation of a 
        new, comprehensive policy will enable the U.S. 
        government to play a more strategic and effective role 
        in responding to the more than 41 million IDPs in the 
        world today.

For the United Nations, other multilateral institutions,
  and the international community
   Members of the UN Security Council--elected and permanent--
        must, through voluntary agreement or amendment of the 
        UN Charter, refrain from voting against any credible 
        draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass 
        atrocities, a critical driver of forced migration. The 
        failure of the UN Security Council to protect civilians 
        from mass atrocity crimes like genocide, ethnic 
        cleansing, and crimes against humanity has severely 
        impaired its effectiveness and credibility in the eyes 
        of the general public and governments. Repeated vetoes 
        and obstruction by China and Russia, two UN Security 
        Council permanent members, have undermined the UN 
        Security Council, shielded perpetrators from 
        accountability, and cost lives in Syria, Burma, and 
        elsewhere.

 The UN Secretary-General should elevate the role of the 
        Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
        Displaced Persons to the Secretary-General Special 
        Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. The 
        delegation of a more senior role responsible for IDPs 
        will highlight a need for greater global awareness of 
        IDP populations and renewed responses on IDP issues. We 
        applaud the Secretary-General's appointment of the 
        High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement and encourage 
        that all mechanisms for finding solutions for the 
        world's 41 million IDPs be pursued. To that end, the UN 
        should energetically reinforce the implementation of 
        the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
        and encourage national governments to ratify it into 
        binding law.

  The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 
        should regularly publish reports documenting and 
        assessing UN member states' performance in upholding 
        international protections and human rights for 
        refugees, IDPs, and other forced migrants. The 
        international community must recognize that the vast 
        majority of forced migrants are displaced for the long-
        term and host countries must make it possible for 
        forced migrants to rebuild their lives, sustain 
        themselves, and contribute to their new communities. 
        This requires allowing forced migrants freedom of 
        movement, the right to work, and access to education 
        and other basic services. These measures would increase 
        accountability and provide additional enforcement 
        mechanisms to ensure these rights are afforded to 
        forced migrant populations.

   The World Bank and other international and national 
        organizations should make financial assistance 
        contingent on assessments of countries' records 
        upholding international protections and human rights 
        for refugees, IDPs, and other forced migrants. The 
        pursuit of clear, measurable outcomes for forced 
        migrants and host communities--such as inclusion in 
        national plans and improvements in income, health, and 
        education--will ensure financing delivers its intended 
        effect. The World Bank has made tremendous efforts to 
        respond to the needs of forced migrant populations and 
        host countries--they have supported the prototypes for 
        new responses that should be continued and improved 
        upon.

   The United Nations must use its tools, including Boards of 
        Inquiry, Commissions of Inquiry, and the International 
        Court of Justice, to enforce international law and end 
        rampant impunity by publishing findings and identifying 
        perpetrators of violations of international law. At its 
        crux, the international community is suffering from a 
        political crisis that has resulted in a global forced 
        migration crisis. Forced migration is the result of the 
        failure of national and international community to 
        address the root causes of displacement, which include 
        war, endemic violence, corruption, weak governance, 
        abusive leaders, and poor accountability.

   The UN Secretary-General should call on host countries and 
        all other countries to incorporate forced migrant 
        populations into their Sustainable Development Goals 
        national action plans. Host countries must also 
        recognize that forced migrants are displaced for the 
        long-term, that it is their responsibility to promote 
        better futures for all people within their territories, 
        including forced migrant populations, and that 
        supporting better futures for forced migrant 
        populations is mutually beneficial.

   The UN should reduce redundancies and improve aid 
        effectiveness by prioritizing and accelerating the 
        implementation of reforms. Reform efforts and 
        agreements such as the Grand Bargain, first proposed by 
        the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on 
        Humanitarian Financing, should continue to remain a 
        priority in order to modernize humanitarian assistance 
        and ensure programs are effectively helping people in 
        need. Moreover, the UN should prioritize operational 
        efficiency by streamlining how disparate UN agencies 
        approach similar sectors within a humanitarian 
        response, for example, adopting a simplified treatment 
        process for children with severe malnutrition across UN 
        agencies.

  Regional financial institutions must engage proactively to 
        address the forced migration crisis in their regions. 
        Regional financial institutions, such as the African 
        Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank 
        for Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American 
        Development Bank, should develop regional financial 
        support responses to the forced migration crisis 
        following the model of the World Bank.

   Governments in host countries should respect the human 
        rights of forced migrant populations and should include 
        forced migrant populations in their national plans. 
        Best practice policy changes include ensuring refugees 
        have freedom of movement, the right to work, access to 
        healthcare and other services, and recognizing IDPs, 
        climate-related forced migrants, and other forced 
        migrant populations as requiring urgent protection and 
        aid. For countries where climate change is expected to 
        cause mass movements in coming years, incorporating 
        climate migration into national plans could help 
        prepare governments to weather these changes and 
        prevent situations of prolonged displacement and 
        humanitarian emergencies.

  The UN Secretary-General should create a High-Level Panel 
        regarding information security and privacy for forced 
        migrants. By convening experts on forced migration, 
        data consent, privacy, and data security, this High-
        Level Panel will result in resources to inform the 
        United Nation's privacy and data policies. The 
        implementation of such policies will ensure that forced 
        migrant populations are not left more vulnerable by the 
        information they provide to UNHCR, UN Children's Fund 
        (UNICEF), International Organization for Migration 
        (IOM), and other humanitarian agencies as they seek 
        protection.

For other stakeholders
  Non-governmental organizations should continue to improve 
        how they measure program outcomes and effectiveness, 
        and strive to make information publicly available to 
        increase transparency. Using data, analysis, and other 
        evidence-based approaches to assess programs, 
        strategies, and tactics will allow for the humanitarian 
        sector to continue to improve the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of programs, ideally producing improved 
        outcomes for more people with each iteration.

  Non-governmental and private sector organizations should 
        create comprehensive plans to incorporate technology 
        into their responses, meeting twenty-first century 
        issues with twenty-first century solutions. 
        Organizations should be especially cognizant of privacy 
        concerns and ``digital litter,'' or outdated online 
        resources. While technology can enable more efficient 
        and effective strategies in a world where forced 
        migrants are reliant on digital resources, technology 
        plans must focus on long-term sustainability, and 
        create exit plans to ensure that the plan's demise does 
        not lead to misleading and outdated information.

   Private sector companies should increase engagement in 
        addressing the problem of and finding solutions for 
        forced migration, supporting the integration and 
        resettlement of forced migrant populations. Efforts to 
        increase private sector involvement should not only 
        occur at the multinational level, but also at the 
        regional, national, and local levels. It is critical 
        that private sector involvement focuses on localized 
        contexts and needs in order to have real impact.

   U.S. educational institutions, especially U.S. higher 
        educational institutions with established international 
        student bodies and significant endowments, should 
        develop and continue to develop pathways to educate 
        forced migrant students. Incorporating refugee and IDP 
        populations in student bodies will help increase access 
        to education, create an especially diverse student 
        body, and showcase that U.S. institutions are leading 
        the way in responding to global challenges.



                         ACRONYMS & INITIALISMS

                              ----------                              


 
 
 
 
CAM                  Central American Minors
CBP                  United States Customs and Border Protection
RS                   Congressional Research Service
CVA                  Cash and voucher assistance
DHS                  United States Department of Homeland Security
DNI                  United States Director of National Intelligence
DOJ                  United States Department of Justice
DRC                  Democratic Republic of Congo
EU                   European Union
FY                   Fiscal Year
GBV                  Gender-based violence
GCFF                 Global Concessional Financing Facility
GCM                  Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
GCR                  Global Compact on Refugees
GDP                  Gross domestic product
HARP                 Humanitarian Asylum Review Process
HHS                  United States Department of Health and Human Services
IASC                 Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICE                  United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
IDA                  World Bank International Development Association
IDMC                 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP                  Internally displaced person
IFR                  Interim Final Rule
IHL                  International humanitarian law
INA                  United States Immigration and Nationality Act
IOM                  International Organization for Migration
MPP                  Migrant Protection Protocols (``Remain in Mexico'' policy)
NGO                  Non-governmental organization
PACR                 Prompt Asylum Claim Review
PRM                  United States Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
SAO                  Security Advisory Opinion
SFRC                 United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee
TPS                  Temporary Protected Status
UN                   United Nations
UNESCO               United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA                United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR                United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF               United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA               United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOHCHR              United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNRWA                United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USAID                United States Agency for International Development
USCIS                United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
USRAP                United State Refugee Admissions Program
WFP                  United Nations World Food Programme
WHO                  World Health Organization