[Senate Prints 113-29]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
113th Congress } {
2d Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { S. Prt.
113-29
_______________________________________________________________________
AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION:
U.S. CIVILIAN PRESENCE AND
ASSISTANCE POST-2014
__________
A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
Second Session
October 27, 2014
?
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary and Recommendations............................ 1
Introduction..................................................... 5
I. Enhanced Accountability for U.S. Assistance................... 7
The TMAF as a Mechanism for Incentivized Assistance.......... 7
Improving Afghanistan's Capacity to Budget and Collect
Revenue.................................................... 8
Enhancing Women's Political, Economic, and Social Rights..... 9
Renewed Efforts to Address Corruption and Stem Afghanistan's
Illicit Economy............................................ 9
The Afghan National Security Forces and Protection of Human
Rights..................................................... 10
II. A Refined U.S. Civilian Assistance Approach.................. 12
Sustainability of U.S. Investments........................... 12
Direct ``On-Budget'' Government Assistance................... 13
Lessons Learned and Interagency Information Sharing.......... 14
Monitoring Program Implementation............................ 15
New Silk Road Initiative..................................... 16
III. Robust U.S. Diplomatic Posture and Civilian Presence........ 17
Civilian Staffing............................................ 18
The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program..................... 18
Promoting Regional Connectivity: The New Silk Road
Initiative; Office of the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP); and USAID's Office of
Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs........................... 19
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, October 27, 2014.
Dear colleagues: This report by the committee's majority
staff examines the U.S. assistance and diplomatic approach to
Afghanistan amid the security and political transitions taking
place in the country. As we enter this new phase, it is
critical that the United States reexamine its presence in
Afghanistan to ensure that assistance is provided in the most
efficient, cost effective, and sustainable manner possible.
The U.S. has sacrificed greatly in Afghanistan in terms of
blood and treasure. Our policy and programming objectives
moving forward should focus on sustaining the measurable
developmental gains we have achieved, and ensuring that the new
Afghan government effectively continues on a path of self-
reliance and democratic development.
Later this year, international donors will meet with the
new Afghan government to discuss assistance to the country.
This report is meant to inform those deliberations and other
engagements with the new Afghan government to combat corruption
and bolster efforts to ensure that U.S. tax dollars are spent
wisely. It is equally important that the benchmarks for
strengthening rule of law and women's rights are reinforced by
the Afghan government and the international community.
This report examines increasing accountability for U.S.
assistance, refining the U.S. assistance approach, and creating
a more robust U.S. diplomatic posture and civilian presence,
and offers a series of recommendations for the U.S. Government
as it engages the new government in Kabul and contends with the
remaining security and development challenges across the
country.
Sincerely,
Robert Menendez,
Chairman.
(v)
AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION: U.S. CIVILIAN PRESENCE AND ASSISTANCE POST-
2014
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Executive Summary and Recommendations
As the international community draws down its forces,
Afghanistan will experience historic political and security
transitions that will set the course for the country's future.
The political unity government established by President Ashraf
Ghani Ahmadzai and CEO Abdullah Abdullah creates a framework
for progress, and both leaders must work to fully implement all
elements of the deal. While the 2014 presidential election
process was contentious and difficult, there is reason for
optimism as the new Afghan government takes steps to establish
credibility with its people and international partners. The
immediate signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement with the
United States was an important first step in the right
direction, but many important challenges lie ahead.
The political and security transitions provide an important
inflection point to reexamine how the U.S. resources its
efforts in Afghanistan. This report examines increasing
accountability for U.S. assistance, refining the U.S.
assistance approach, and creating a more robust U.S. diplomatic
posture and civilian presence, and offers a series of
recommendations for the USG as it prepares to engage the new
government in Kabul.
i. enhanced accountability for u.s. assistance
U.S. political support for assistance to Afghanistan has
diminished in recent years, even though precipitous cuts in
funding could have a destabilizing effect on the country. To
maintain support for future funding, key accountability
measures must be strengthened. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework (TMAF), despite its shortfalls, provides a foundation
for dialogue with the new Afghan government on reform and
accountability for international assistance. The U.S. must now
work with the new Afghan government to refocus the TMAF hard
deliverables in ways that will best position Afghanistan to
address its long term challenges. The U.S. should also
condition a higher percentage of its funding: if done properly
by ensuring Afghan buy-in, conditioning U.S. assistance can
improve the accountability of our aid, strengthen reformers and
institutions in the Afghan government and result in better
development outcomes. Finally, increasing reports of abuses by
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are a worrying
trend. With fewer U.S. personnel on the ground and with
tremendous amounts of U.S. assistance going to the ANSF, the
U.S. must identify new ways to ensure that any security force
abuses are properly investigated, documented, and prosecuted.
Recommendations
Increase Incentives: A higher proportion of U.S. assistance
should be conditioned based on specific reforms by the
Afghan government. The U.S. should make clear to the
new government that the appointment process factors
into how the U.S. allocates assistance.
Refocus Reform Priorities: The U.S. has set aside $100
million in a reform incentive fund for the Afghan
government. The following reforms should be prioritized
in conversations with the Afghan government:
Enhanced Budgeting and Revenue
Collection to include:
Developing uniform and
consistent methods to collect and
report data on customs collection;
Fully deploying electronic
payment systems at all customs
collection locations; and
Swiftly implementing a
value added tax and improving the
transparency of contracts in
legislation regulating the mining
sector.
Support for Women's Political,
Economic, and Social Rights to include:
Fully implementing the
Elimination of Violence Against Women
(EVAW) law and the National Action Plan
for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA),
as well as reforming laws that
discriminate against women;
Committing to developing
the capacity and empowering the
Ministry for Women's Affairs (MOWA);
and
Creating a more robust
shelter system for Afghan women.
Renew Efforts to Address Corruption and
the Illicit Economy to include:
Adopting pending anti-
corruption legislation;
Appointing genuine
reformers to positions within key
ministries;
Recovering stolen Kabul
Bank assets and prosecuting those
responsible;
Strengthening the Afghan
Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
(MEC); and
Curbing poppy cultivation
and production.
Security Assistance and Protecting Human Rights:
Robust U.S. support for the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) will be contingent on respect for human
rights. The State Department's Bureau for Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (DRL) must be actively engaged
at every step in the process of determining the
suitability of security assistance recipients. Economic
Support Fund assistance for Afghanistan should include
at least $10 million for DRL grants to Afghan
organizations for conducting oversight of the security
sector. Given the scale of assistance and concerns
about robust oversight, this report also recommends an
interagency review mechanism to address reported rights
abuses.
ii. a refined u.s. civilian assistance approach
In 2011, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority
staff released a report on civilian assistance to Afghanistan
that called upon the USG to implement assistance programs that
were necessary, achievable, and sustainable. This
recommendation holds true today, and though the USG has taken a
more strategic approach, several concerns remain. First, given
Afghanistan's limited resources, sustainability of development
projects is an ongoing and significant challenge. Second, a
comprehensive interagency effort to assess lessons learned from
stabilization projects must take place in short order. Third,
there is an imperative to support the capacity of the Afghan
government, but serious corruption continues to hamper progress
and support for direct assistance to ministries. Fourth, with
the military drawdown, it will be more difficult to monitor
development projects. Finally, Afghanistan's future lies in
good economic relations with its neighbors. While the U.S.
Government is focused on a ``New Silk Road'' initiative to help
build critical economic links between Afghanistan and its
neighbors, there have been modest resources committed to this
task, particularly in Central Asia.
Recommendations
Sustainability: The State Department and USAID should
produce detailed plans for the sustainability of
assistance programs in Afghanistan, without which
Congress cannot make fully informed funding decisions.
If there is not a clear plan for how program
activities--especially infrastructure projects--can
eventually be sustained by Afghans, USAID should not
implement them.
Lessons Learned and Interagency Information Sharing: There
must be an interagency assessment of the efficacy of
U.S. funded large-scale infrastructure projects and
stabilization programs, including whether such programs
achieved their stated goals, the challenges associated
with civilian-military cooperation, and the unintended
consequences of such programming in a conflict
environment. The Department of Defense and USAID should
also establish criteria whereby information on
development projects implemented by the military can be
safely transferred and included in the Afghan Info
database.
On-Budget Assistance: The U.S. must increase efforts to
bolster the capacity of Afghan governing institutions
through direct on-budget assistance to Afghan
ministries. USAID should also enhance the capacity of
government watchdog organizations that can further
scrutinize the work of government ministries receiving
on-budget assistance.
Tiered Monitoring: The State Department and USAID should
provide regular reports to Congress on the challenges
of monitoring assistance programs in insecure
environments. Programs that cannot be sufficiently
monitored should be terminated.
The New Silk Road Initiative: The State Department should
invest more sustained senior level engagement and
funding to realize the goals of the New Silk Road
initiative, including utilizing up to $150 million in
Afghanistan Economic Support Fund assistance to bolster
economic connectivity between Afghanistan and its
neighbors in the region. Planning for Fiscal Years 2015
and 2016 should be reviewed to ensure the dedication of
adequate resources towards these objectives. The State
Department and USAID should also look to better
integrate the NSR initiative with its democracy and
governance goals in the broader region.
iii. robust u.s. diplomatic posture and civilian presence
Through these transitions, the U.S. must maintain a robust
diplomatic and assistance presence in the country, despite
being hindered by bureaucratic structures that could impede
policy goals. U.S. implementing agencies continue to face the
loss of institutional knowledge due to a high turnover rate
among diplomats and aid workers and the loss of critical Afghan
expertise due to the Special Immigrant Visa program. In
addition, while the State Department touts the importance of
regional economic integration and development through the New
Silk Road initiative, Afghanistan and Pakistan remain
bureaucratically separated from the South and Central Asia
Bureau at the State Department and the Asia Bureau at USAID.
Finally, the USG's long term vision for engagement in
Afghanistan and the broader region remains unclear--maintaining
support for sustained U.S. engagement requires that the
administration clearly state and make the case for U.S.
interests in Afghanistan and the broader South and Central Asia
region.
Recommendations
Communicating the Policy: The U.S. Government should
clearly state the critical national security interests
in Afghanistan to the American public and work to
generate support for continued robust engagement. The
USG should work to reassure Afghanistan and our allies
in the region that the U.S. remains committed to the
security and economic prosperity of South and Central
Asia.
Personnel: The State Department and USAID should institute
staffing measures that ensure more continuity in
diplomatic and assistance engagements, including more
incentives for diplomats and aid workers to serve
extended tours.
Special Immigrant Visas: As the drawdown of U.S. troops
continues, the State Department should accelerate the
SIV process to prevent any unnecessary backlog of
applicants. The U.S. Congress should expand the number
of Special Immigrant Visas offered to Afghan staff that
have worked for the U.S. and extend the program through
the end of 2016. Future authorizing legislation on SIVs
should also allow for newly arrived SIV recipients to
work in the U.S. for the State Department, USAID or
other agencies working to support U.S. interests in
Afghanistan. The USG should identify creative ways to
ensure that SIV recipients' knowledge and expertise is
captured to ensure continuity of effort.
Promoting Regional Integration: The State Department should
continue its efforts to integrate the Office of the
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
into the Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs and
USAID's Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs into
the Asia Bureau.
Introduction
A stable, democratic, and secure Afghanistan is a
U.S. national interest; it will be a bulwark against al
Qaida and other dangerous extremist groups and a
partner in the effort to prevent those groups from
using Afghanistan to plan and launch attacks against
our people and our allies . . . [who have participated
in] a truly extraordinary international civilian
campaign to help heal the scars of decades of war and
years of life under a system of government that made
the cruel commonplace.--Ambassador James Dobbins,
former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan (SRAP) \1\
In 2014, Afghanistan is experiencing political and security
transitions that will mark an inflection point in the country's
history and the international community's role. Decisions made
during these transitions and beyond will impact Afghanistan's
security, politics and development for decades to come. In the
1990s, U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan proved disastrous
for the country, the region and the international community.
Today, the U.S. must avoid making the mistakes of the past and
take steps to ensure the strength and sustainability of U.S.
assistance spending, diplomatic posture, and regional strategy.
These goals will resonate through the country's political
and security transitions and the U.S. has a strong base of
accomplishments upon which to build. Afghanistan has made
substantial development progress since 2001 in education,
health, and infrastructure. According to the Afghan government,
7.3 million students are attending school, more than one third
of whom are girls, compared to only one million children in
2001, almost all of whom were boys.\2\ Life expectancy has
increased from around 40 to 60 years old, and infant and
maternal mortality rates have been cut in half. Since 2001,
Afghanistan's GDP increased from $2.4 billion to more than $20
billion today.\3\ From 2001-2012, Afghanistan had the highest
Human Development Index (HDI) growth in the world, which
combines measures of education, health, and income. Largely due
to the progress made in these key areas, the Afghan people
broadly support continued engagement with the U.S. and the
international community. The strength of this support will be a
significant bulwark against Afghanistan again becoming a safe
haven for extremist groups.
Democratic institutions have also made strides in
Afghanistan since 2001, and Afghanistan now lays claim to
vibrant civil society groups and an independent media sector
which could never exist under Taliban rule. Organizations
representing the rights of Afghan women have been particularly
effective in advocating for social change, though they have a
long road ahead. And the 2014 presidential election, while
deeply flawed, demonstrated the determination of the Afghan
people to participate in the democratic process. Afghanistan's
democratic institutions are still fragile and vulnerable to
fraud and abuse, but its civil society groups are well
positioned to advocate with the new administration for more
political space and an enhanced role in the years to come.
Following this contentious election process, both President
Ghani and CEO Abdullah have a responsibility to bolster
democratic institutions in the country and build trust with the
Afghan people. To that end, President Ghani should work closely
with Dr. Abdullah on the full implementation of all elements of
the political unity deal brokered by Secretary Kerry in August
2014. As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will monitor the implementation of
this agreement as it considers future assistance.
Afghanistan still faces significant institutional
challenges that could roll back the considerable progress made.
A stubborn insurgency will continue to threaten security, and
the capacity of the Afghan government to provide goods and
services remains very weak. The economy will likely face
significant budget shortfalls in the coming years, due to a
decline in revenue collection and a diminished international
presence. As security costs increase, the Afghan portion of the
budget dedicated to development efforts will likely decrease.
Illicit poppy cultivation and opium production is on the rise.
Perhaps most challenging, corruption remains rampant:
Transparency International ranks the country as one of the most
corrupt in the world. Amid these challenges, the U.S.
relationship with Afghanistan deteriorated significantly
towards the end of President Hamid Karzai's term, which has
eroded support in the U.S. for continued engagement.
Critical to a successful transition in Afghanistan is
maintaining support in the U.S. for a sustained diplomatic,
assistance and security engagement with the new Afghan
government. The administration should clearly state U.S.
interests in Afghanistan and make a strong public case for the
importance of remaining focused on the region. Amid competing
interests around the world, sustained senior level attention to
the region will be critical to safeguarding hard-fought gains
throughout the transition.
Those gains have been made possible through the sacrifices
made by the U.S., our coalition partners and the Afghans over
the last 13 years. The Afghan and American people owe a
profound debt of gratitude to our armed forces, diplomats and
aid workers who have been instrumental in Afghanistan's
positive trajectory. The U.S. has lost more than 2,300
servicemembers in Afghanistan and many thousands more have
returned home with grievous injuries, both visible and
invisible. The State Department, USAID and their partner
organizations have lost more than 400 people. We honor the
memory of those who made the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan,
the sacrifices made by their families and those who will bear
the lifelong wounds of war.
I. Enhanced Accountability for U.S. Assistance
As resources become more limited, prioritization and
improving efficiency and effectiveness of aid in order
to maximize the benefits of development outcomes become
crucial.--Joint report of the Government of Afghanistan
and the international community\4\
Given ongoing budget constraints in the U.S., it is
unlikely that assistance for Afghanistan will increase in the
coming years, making the accountability of funds even more
important. A strong and clear framework for accountability can
both ensure that U.S. taxpayer funds are spent wisely and
bolster support for continued assistance. This requires a more
focused use of existing accountability tools like the TMAF.
The TMAF as a Mechanism for Incentivized Assistance
In 2012, international donors and the Afghan government
agreed to the TMAF, which included a pledge by donors to
provide $4 billion per year from 2012-2015 and to sustain
assistance at or near the same levels of the past decade
through 2017. In return, the Afghan government agreed to
benchmarks related to democracy and governance, public finance
and revenue generation, and economic development.\5\ At the
center of the TMAF agreement was a commitment by the
international community to provide a higher percentage of
funding directly to the Afghan government, or ``on-budget.''
On-budget funding helps the ministries develop administrative
capacity and pay for operations, personnel, and development
initiatives.\6\
In 2013, the U.S. announced the U.S.--Afghanistan Incentive
Fund,\7\ which incentivized up to $175 million in funding
through the World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund's
``recurrent cost window.'' \8\ In early 2014, the U.S. released
$15 million after it assessed that Afghanistan had completed
benchmarks on electoral reforms, and another $15 million in
recognition of the Afghan government's adoption of a provincial
budgeting policy, which will be essential for the
sustainability of decentralization efforts. Lack of progress in
the areas of rule of law, human rights, women's rights, and
public and commercial finance resulted in the U.S. withdrawing
$45 million from the incentive fund, to be reprogrammed for use
in other U.S. assistance programs in the country.\9\ By
reducing the amount of funds available for on-budget
assistance, the U.S. demonstrated the consequences of the lack
of progress made by the Afghan government. The remaining
incentive funding has been set aside pending discussions with a
new Afghan government on reform priorities.
Donor countries and Afghan officials have committed to
meeting before the end of 2014 to review the TMAF, and the U.S.
must clearly state that assistance will be subject to increased
scrutiny. The TMAF need not be completely renegotiated, but the
incentive structure should be strengthened and funding should
be tied to improving Afghanistan's capacity to collect revenue,
enhance women's rights, address corruption and stem the illicit
economy, and protect human rights. USAID should also enhance
the capacity of non-governmental watchdogs that can scrutinize
the work of government ministries receiving on-budget
assistance.
Improving Afghanistan's Capacity to Budget and Collect Revenue
The Afghan government will face severe fiscal shortfalls
for many years to come and will require long-term support from
the international community. Overall, the incoming government
should work to establish realistic plans for budgeting that
include prioritizing expenditures and improving budget
execution. The government should also prioritize revenue
collection as a means towards bolstering the country's long
term economic stability, while also building the confidence of
the international community.\10\ Early in its tenure, the
incoming government can take four immediate steps to improve
revenue collection: First, it should fully deploy electronic
payment systems at all customs collection locations. Second, it
should develop uniform and consistent methods to collect and
report customs data. Third, it should work to improve the
transparency of contracts in current law regulating the mining
industry and pass legislation establishing a value-added tax
(VAT). Any relevant U.S. assistance programs should support
these revenue generation objectives and provide technical
assistance to the government, where possible.\11\
Customs revenue collected by the Afghan government accounts
for nearly 50 percent of the country's overall revenue, but the
process is riddled with corruption, especially at key border
crossings.\12\ While corruption at customs collection points is
difficult to quantify, USAID and Afghan customs officials
estimate that a significant reduction in corruption could
potentially double Afghanistan's customs revenue, essentially
increasing overall government revenue by one-third.\13\
The U.S. has spent at least $198 million to develop the
capacity of the Afghan government to assess and collect
revenue.\14\ A key component of one USAID program to increase
customs revenue is the technological capability to
electronically transfer custom fees, which improves efficiency
and diminishes the possibility for corruption. According to a
2014 report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR), the employment of this electronic
payment system has been ``delayed, due in part, to a proposal
by an Afghan official to allow only one Afghan bank to process
all of the electronic customs payments.'' \15\ Despite a
decline in customs collection in recent years, the Afghan
government has not yet moved forward with this critical
technology.
SIGAR has also raised concerns about the reliability of the
revenue data produced by the Afghan Customs Department (ACD),
including the lack of consistent data related to border
closures, which compounds Afghanistan's revenue challenges and
creates more opportunities for corruption. The U.S. should
prioritize the above issues with the new Afghan government.
Increased revenue collection will not immediately solve
Afghanistan's fiscal challenges, and the country will continue
to be reliant on the international community for assistance.
Nevertheless, if the new Afghan government cannot show a strong
political commitment to revenue collection in its first year,
then the U.S. taxpayer should not be expected to contribute the
same levels of robust funding.
Enhancing Women's Political, Economic, and Social Rights
Afghan women are concerned that hard-fought gains for their
rights and freedoms will erode as the international community
draws down troops or as the Afghan government negotiates a
peace deal with the Taliban. With respect to women's rights,
the TMAF focused only on the implementation of the Elimination
of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law and the National Action
Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The relevant
benchmark required the Afghan government to publically report
on incidents of violence against women across the country. The
government did not meet the deadline in releasing the report so
the U.S. withdrew $15 million in incentive funding.
In determining funding incentives, the U.S. should
prioritize efforts which seek to protect the most vulnerable
women in Afghan society, ensure that women are actively engaged
in the political process, and guarantee that their perspectives
are taken into account in the peace and reconciliation process.
Lasting peace and prosperity in Afghanistan will require an
inclusive political settlement which not only respects the
rights of women, but also includes them as active participants
in the process. Similarly, any TMAF benchmarks regarding
women's rights should be negotiated in close consultation with
women leaders in Afghan civil society.
The U.S. and other international donors should pressure the
incoming Afghan government to make substantial and measurable
commitments to supporting women's political, economic and
social rights in Afghanistan. First, international donors
should reiterate the importance of the full implementation of
the EVAW law and the NAPWA, as well as amending or repealing
laws that discriminate against women. Second, the international
community should tie funding to measurable gains in the
capacity and empowerment of the Ministry for Women's Affairs
(MOWA). With provincial offices spread across the country, MOWA
is well placed to represent and protect the interests of women
at the local level, but it remains weak relative to other
government ministries. Finally, although the State Department's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement supports
Afghanistan's most vulnerable women through funding of women's
shelters, more should be done to ensure stable, predictable,
and long-term assistance for shelters, perhaps through
incentivizing a portion of funding based on improving the
capacity of shelters, increasing their number, and ensuring
that they are performing their expected duties.
Renewed Efforts to Address Corruption and Stem Afghanistan's Illicit
Economy
The great challenge to Afghanistan's future isn't the
Taliban or Pakistani safe havens or even an incipiently
hostile Pakistan. The existential threat to the long-
term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption. For
too long we've focused our attention solely on the
Taliban as the existential threat to Afghanistan. They
are an annoyance compared to the scope and the
magnitude of corruption with which (Afghanistan) must
contend.--Former ISAF Commander General John Allen\16\
The influx of security and development funds into
Afghanistan after 2001 helped create an environment susceptible
to corruption. While decreased levels of international funding
and enhanced U.S. accountability measures may mitigate the
impact of corruption, the new Afghan government should address
corruption through legislation, personnel appointments, and
capacity building.
First, the government should adopt long delayed anti-
corruption legislation which the U.S. established as a
benchmark for its Incentive Fund. The U.S. should again tie
assistance to this benchmark, and if the new government fails
to achieve it, the U.S. should use those funds to bolster the
work of anti-corruption Afghan civil society groups.
Second, the incoming government must appoint genuine
reformers to positions within key ministries; these reformers
can be empowered by strong TMAF requirements which they can use
to advance reforms. The new government will indicate its degree
of seriousness in tackling corruption with these appointments.
Third, the new government has taken steps to address the
Kabul Bank scandal which resulted in the theft of nearly $900
million. The government should continue this focus, work to
recover lost funds and prosecute those responsible.
Fourth, the government should bolster its own internal
capacity to confront corruption. The government auditor, the
Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), should be enhanced
with political and financial support from the Afghan government
and continued financial and capacity-building assistance from
the international community.
Afghanistan's illicit economy and drug trade will
significantly hamper its political and security transitions.
SIGAR has expressed concern that the international community's
military and civilian drawdowns will result in a loss of
``critical manpower at precisely the time that poppy
cultivation and drug trafficking is expanding.'' \17\
The drivers and consequences of this illicit economy could
serve to shatter the fragile gains that Afghanistan has made
over the years. Given the growing scale of this problem and
diminishing resources, the U.S. faces extreme odds in making
progress in countering narcotics. This has been a very
sensitive issue to confront in the past given the impact that
eradication can have on poor Afghan farmers. There was little
mention of counternarcotics in the original TMAF negotiations.
But this issue should be addressed in new TMAF negotiations,
and the U.S. should take the lead in tying assistance to
efforts by the new government to confront the illicit economy.
The Afghan National Security Forces and Protection of Human Rights
In recent years, the ANSF has made steady progress in
recruitment and in its ability to conduct operations against
insurgents. During the 2014 election season, the ANSF were
instrumental in protecting voters and candidates from insurgent
attacks. Continued robust international security assistance is
essential to the viability of the Afghan state and the U.S.
should abide by its pledged commitments.
But the U.S. must also maintain the highest standards in
ensuring that security assistance recipients do not violate
human rights. With the NATO drawdown, international forces will
have diminished opportunity to mentor and monitor the work of
ANSF troops in the field. Alongside this drawdown, the United
Nations and international human rights organizations have
expressed concerns about reports of rights violations by
elements of the ANSF.\18\
The Afghan Local Police (ALP), which were stood up by the
U.S. military and mentored by U.S. Special Forces, deserve
special scrutiny. In 2013, the United Nations reported that 121
civilian casualties, as well as documented cases of torture,
were attributed to the ALP. Working with the Ministry of
Interior, which has jurisdiction over the ALP, the U.S. should
propose measures to integrate ALP units and functions into the
Afghan National Police.
Currently, U.S. security assistance to Afghanistan is
provided through the Department of Defense (DoD), not the State
Department (as is normal practice).\19\ U.S. planners do not
expect to transition security assistance in Afghanistan from
the DoD to the State Department in the near future. While the
complications associated with such a transfer of
responsibilities are prohibitively high at the moment, the
State Department should regularly brief Congress on how and
when this transfer will eventually take place. The uniqueness
of the current arrangement necessitates a pro-active role by
the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor (DRL) in ensuring that statutory human rights vetting of
the ANSF is rigorous and held to the highest standards.
If found complicit of serious human rights violations,
American support for the ANSF could diminish significantly and
rapidly. The USG should therefore take several steps to enhance
oversight of the ANSF.
First, the U.S. should stress to the new Afghan government
that continued robust support for the ANSF is contingent on
respect for human rights, a commitment that the Afghan
government made at the Chicago NATO conference in 2012. The
ANSF should take measurable steps to improve internal
accountability by strengthening the capacity, independence, and
power of its Inspector General (IG). The U.S. could be
instructive in sharing techniques and expertise from its own
IGs working at different levels in Afghanistan, especially
SIGAR and the DoD's IG.
Second, DRL should be actively engaged in determining the
suitability of security assistance recipients and assisting DoD
with its extended vetting efforts.\20\ Given the scale of
assistance and concerns about robust oversight, this report
also recommends an interagency review mechanism to address
reported rights abuses.
Finally, to maintain the highest standards of human rights
vetting, the U.S. will need more sources of information and
more ``eyes-on'' the ANSF. In many countries, domestic civil
society watchdog organizations are able to play this critical
role. Afghanistan's civil society has proven its ability to
conduct oversight of the parliament, advocate for women's
rights, and observe elections. In the future, U.S. assistance
to Afghanistan should include at least $10 million for DRL to
provide grants to Afghan organizations to conduct oversight of
the security sector.
II. A Refined U.S. Civilian Assistance Approach
The USG's civilian assistance transition strategy seeks to
reinforce and expand gains made in health, education, women's
empowerment, agriculture, infrastructure, governance, and
private sector development.\21\ With these goals in mind, the
U.S. assistance approach in Afghanistan should be refined in
six key areas: sustainability, capacity-building, lessons
learned and information sharing, oversight, and regional
integration.
Sustainability of U.S. Investments
In 2011, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) majority
staff produced a report that analyzed U.S. assistance in
Afghanistan and recommended a re-evaluation of the performance
and impact of stabilization programs in conflict zones as well
as an enhanced focus on the sustainability of U.S. assistance
programs. The report also emphasized that U.S. assistance
programs should be necessary, achievable, and sustainable. In
large measure, the State Department and USAID have taken on the
recommendations laid out in the 2011 SFRC report, but several
concerns remain, especially regarding sustainability.
According to the World Bank, the United States, and other
international donors fund more than 60% of the Afghan national
budget as well as several reconstruction projects that operate
off-budget. The IMF and the World Bank estimate that Afghan
maintenance of donor-supplied infrastructure--roads, buildings,
utility, and equipment--will cost 15% of Afghanistan's GDP.\22\
In some circumstances, local authorities lack the ability to
keep projects running and revenue shortfalls may force
Afghanistan to abandon some development initiatives.
For example, according to SIGAR, the operation and
maintenance costs for a USAID program called Partnership
Contracts for Health Services, which helps fund hospitals,
clinics, and other medical facilities, far exceed what the
Afghans can sustain. It remains unclear how these costs will be
covered in light of diminishing assistance levels, though the
Ministry of Public Health is reportedly working with the World
Bank to develop operations and maintenance policies and
budgeting, as well as asset registries.\23\
USAID has taken significant measures to promote
sustainability in its programming, including the June 2011
``Administrator's Sustainability Guidance for USAID in
Afghanistan.'' In addition, the FY 14 foreign operations
appropriation law requires that the Secretary of State certify,
prior to the obligation of funding, that funds are used in
accordance with this guidance. According to USAID, all major
infrastructure projects are subject to a sustainability
audit.\24\
Certain U.S. assistance projects, such as infrastructure
for hydroelectric power and electrical grids, have helped put
Afghanistan on a path towards self-sustainability. The Afghan
national power company, DABS, collected $220 million from the
sale of electricity in 2012, an increase of 67 percent from
2010. According to USAID, for the first time in 70 years, DABS
was able to contribute $25 million to the government's coffers
to help fund the national budget.\25\
Yet concerns in other program areas remain. According to a
recent State Department IG report, ``most current International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs cite the goal of
building sustainable Afghan capacity, however, the degree to
which sustainability is incorporated into program design and
performance measures vary considerably.'' \26\ According to the
IG, a range of factors--including political will, management
systems, finances, and human capacity--are not always included
in planning programs. The 2011 SFRC majority staff committee
report on Afghanistan highlighted significant concerns about
the sustainability of INL programming. INL should renew its
efforts to implement sustainable programming, in accordance
with the USAID sustainability guidelines.
The importance of sustainability has only grown with the
drawdown of U.S. military and civilian personnel, a decrease in
assistance funds, and domestic fiscal constraint. During this
period, the USG must increase its focus on sustainability to
ensure that U.S. investments are not lost and that Afghans can
and will maintain the important gains made. The State
Department and USAID should produce detailed plans for the
sustainability of assistance programs in Afghanistan, without
which Congress cannot make fully informed funding decisions. If
there is not a realistic plan for how program activities--
especially infrastructure projects--can eventually be sustained
by Afghans, USAID should not implement them.
Direct ``On-Budget'' Government Assistance
On-budget assistance is an essential element in building
the sustainability and capacity of the Afghan government to
administer to the needs of its citizens. Yet, given the high
U.S. standards for disbursing funds and the low capacity of the
Afghan government, this type of assistance is very difficult to
implement. For example, at the prompting of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), USAID conducted independent
evaluations of 16 individual ministries to assess their
suitability to receive U.S. funding. Only seven ministries were
found eligible and received on-budget assistance.\27\
On-budget programming has not been without controversy. In
January 2014, SIGAR issued an audit of on-budget funding
provided to Afghan ministries and asserted that USAID had not
required the ministries to address most of the risks identified
through USAID's evaluations.\28\ While SIGAR acknowledged that
USAID had measures intended to mitigate some risks associated
with on-budget assistance, it expressed concern that these
measures did not address all of the most serious problems.
USAID responded that the ministry weaknesses highlighted in the
SIGAR audit were not addressed by USAID risk mitigation
measures because they were not relevant to USAID funding
streams and the implementation of relevant programs.
Upon review of the USAID evaluations and the SIGAR audit,
SFRC majority staff found that USAID had developed a sufficient
system to deliver assistance while taking steps to implement
safeguard measures and mitigate against the effects of
institutional weakness. Nonetheless, significant concerns
remain about the capacity of Afghan ministries to absorb
assistance. For example, the World Bank found that only three
Afghan ministries with development budgets of more than $50
million (the Ministries of Health, Finance and Rural
Development) were able to execute more than 20 percent of their
budgets.\29\ As a result, there are significant pipelines of
direct on-budget U.S. funding from past years that remain
unspent.
Ministerial capacity to disburse development funds will
continue to be a significant challenge in the years to come,
and the U.S. should not lower its oversight standards in
providing on-budget assistance. There have been positive
examples where USAID has shifted course based on capacity
concerns. For example, USAID decided to discontinue elements of
its on-budget assistance to the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) when the ministry determined
that it did not have the capacity to process the funds.
Implementing assistance too quickly can sometimes do more harm
than good by distorting local economies and facilitating
corruption.
The U.S. should continue to increase the capacity of Afghan
governing institutions through a gradual and calibrated
expansion of direct on-budget assistance. Given the
complexities associated with this type of assistance, USAID
should provide regular reports to Congress regarding on-budget
programming, ministry by ministry. USAID should also make every
effort to address the capacity weaknesses identified by SIGAR
within the Afghan ministries that receive assistance.
Lessons Learned and Interagency Information Sharing
Alongside the military surge, stabilization programming in
the form of small-scale, quick-impact projects rapidly
increased. Because of the urgent need for these programs, a
baseline assessment was not conducted, making evaluation of
project results difficult. The 2011 SFRC majority staff
committee report asserted that too much aid could have a
destabilizing effect on the local economies of these
communities. While stabilization programming may have had a
short-term impact in some cases, there is scant evidence that
these projects won over local populations over the long-
term.\30\
USAID is conducting a study to better understand the impact
of stabilization programming and how lessons learned can be
applied to future programming in unstable environments.
Unfortunately, the assessment does not extend to all government
agencies that have implemented stabilization assistance in
Afghanistan. Without a comprehensive and centralized
assessment, the USG will not have a clear picture of the impact
of its programs, nor will it have a comprehensive set of
lessons learned that could be applied in the future.
USAID and all other U.S. assistance providers, including
the DoD, should conduct an interagency assessment on the
efficacy of all U.S. stabilization programs in Afghanistan
(including the Commander's Emergency Response Program) to
determine whether they achieved their stated goals. This
assessment should also examine the challenges associated with
civilian-military cooperation and the unintended consequences
of such programming in conflict environments.
Beyond stabilization programming, the USG can improve
information sharing on its full complement of development
initiatives in Afghanistan. Proper planning, monitoring, and
evaluation of future programs needs to be done with a clear and
complete understanding of U.S. assistance programs implemented
since 2001, including those conducted by the military. USAID
stores data related to its programs in the Afghan Info
database, which captures various tiers of data and initial
analysis.\31\ Afghan Info also serves as a useful tool for
facilitating interagency cooperation and information sharing.
The Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, and
several State Department bureaus and offices, including
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Political Affairs,
Public Affairs, Rule of Law and Population and Resource
Management, have contributed to the database.\32\
Yet USAID's IG found that, due to concerns about security
classification levels, Afghan Info does not include data
related to DoD assistance programming.\33\ As a result, there
is no way to ensure that future USAID assistance decisions take
all past DoD efforts into account. While recognizing that
interagency communication and coordination already occurs
between the two agencies at some level, DoD and USAID should
still establish criteria whereby DoD assistance programming
data can be safely transferred and included in Afghan Info.
Monitoring Program Implementation
The drawdown of U.S. military forces and civilian personnel
combined with the tenuous security environment in Afghanistan
will impact the ability of the U.S. to monitor and evaluate
projects. Corruption and low government capacity heighten the
importance of, and make more difficult, sufficient oversight of
U.S. assistance. USAID has taken several measures to enhance
oversight of its programs in Afghanistan, including the
Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A3) initiative, which
seeks to ensure that development funds are not diverted to
nefarious actors. It has also established a tiered monitoring
system to verify the implementation of development projects
that, for security reasons, cannot be physically monitored by
U.S. personnel.\34\
USAID has experience conducting monitoring and evaluation
in insecure environments with little or no U.S. security
presence. USAID asserts that its current tiered monitoring
program in Afghanistan is similar to those used in other
countries like Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, and South Sudan.\35\
Yet Afghanistan poses a unique set of challenges: its
assistance levels are higher than any other country, it is one
of the most corrupt countries in the world, and parts of the
country remain active conflict zones. As a result, SIGAR has
expressed serious concern about programs which fall outside
areas that can be directly monitored by U.S. personnel.\36\
The State Department and USAID should provide regular
reports to Congress on the challenges posed by indirect
monitoring of assistance programs and on the methodology of
such monitoring. The tiered monitoring system\37\ is a creative
method, but also creates significant risks and will be subject
to ongoing scrutiny by Congress. In a time of shrinking
budgets, programs that cannot be sufficiently monitored should
be paused until security conditions improve or, in other cases,
closed down completely.
The State Department's policy on monitoring and evaluation
directed agencies to establish ``specific trip wires for
deciding when projects should be postponed, put on hold or
terminated.'' \38\ Congress should be fully briefed on these
``trip wires'' and any ongoing challenges related to program
monitoring. USAID should also regularly brief Congress on
programs they have postponed, paused, or terminated because of
poor monitoring conditions. USAID should similarly inform
Congress of its efforts to coordinate with other international
donors on tiered monitoring efforts.
USAID works in a very difficult environment in Afghanistan.
While it should be held to the highest standards of
accountability, operating in a conflict environment is
inherently and uniquely risky. USAID cannot be expected to
operate completely risk-free programs. However, USAID should
regularly inform Congress on the nature of the risks involved
to help it determine whether the costs are worth the benefits.
New Silk Road Initiative
The New Silk Road (NSR) is an ambitious and worthwhile
initiative to help Afghanistan build better economic
interconnectivity with its neighbors. Countries in South and
Central Asia have significant barriers to inter-regional trade
which the NSR hopes to overcome. The NSR's long-term vision
comes amid substantially increased investment and engagement in
the region by China and Russia. In recent years, China has made
large investments in infrastructure in Central Asia,
particularly in the energy sector. Russia has also increased
its engagement in Central Asia through the launch of the
Eurasian Customs Union and has increased defense ties with
several countries. The NSR's proposed North-South trade routes
complement growing East-West connections across Eurasia,
creating additional economic opportunity for Central Asian
states. While progress has been made with limited resources,
more robust U.S. diplomatic and financial investment in Central
Asia is needed to make substantial progress towards an
Afghanistan that can freely trade with its neighbors. There are
also significant opportunities for the USG to facilitate
economic connections between Pakistan and Central Asia via
Afghanistan, particularly on energy and trade issues, which can
help promote needed stability in Pakistan and the greater
region.
Between FY 2010 and FY 2014, the State Department asserts
that it leveraged more than $2 billion from international
financial institutions and donors ``including the Asian
Development Bank and the World Bank, in support of energy
transmission lines, hydropower plants, and energy-sector
reforms.\39\ Notably, the U.S. has dedicated $15 million to
supporting the CASA1000 regional electricity project, which
will result in the export of much-needed electricity from
Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan.\40\ Afghanistan and
Pakistan recently signed a pricing agreement paving the way for
CASA1000 to move forward. In September 2014, the State
Department and USAID reprogrammed an additional $15 million in
funds appropriated for Afghanistan to focus on projects that
enhance regional economic connectivity. The NSR initiative has
improved customs and border operations and corresponding legal
frameworks throughout the region, easing the cost and time
associated with transporting goods. It has also enhanced
people-to-people ties, particularly among business people.\41\
While these efforts have clearly yielded some initial
results, the administration could do more to bolster its
commitment to the NSR initiative. First, it should dedicate
more sustained senior level engagement with other governments
to break the diplomatic logjams that inevitably emerge among
the countries of South and Central Asia. In addition, there
should be more interagency cooperation across the Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Central Asia directorates, as well as the
National Security Council.
Second, the U.S. administration should review its FY 15 and
FY 16 planning to ensure that adequate resources are requested
for the NSR Initiative. In the FY 14 appropriations law,
Congress authorized the State Department to use up to $150
million in Afghanistan Economic Support Fund assistance to
bolster economic connectivity between Afghanistan and its
neighbors in the region. Given the low U.S. assistance levels
in Central Asia, the administration should follow the guidance
of this authorization and invest more funding in the NSR
initiative. Additional funding appropriated for Pakistan could
also support regional economic initiatives to connect Pakistan
to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which would directly support
U.S. national security interests in Pakistan.\42\
While primarily a tool to build economic connectivity
within the region, the State Department and USAID should also
look to further integrate the NSR initiative with its democracy
and governance goals, particularly in Central Asia. As the
potential of Central Asian markets increases, international
investors will increasingly demand legal frameworks that are
fair, transparent, and enforceable. The NSR initiative should
coordinate with USAID's Rule of Law programming in these
countries. Alongside this push to enhance economic
interconnectivity, the USG should also do more to develop the
capacity of domestic NGOs and watchdog organizations capable of
holding their governments accountable. Second, the USG should
expand efforts to connect civil society groups in the region,
especially businesswomen and non-governmental organizations
that promote women's rights and empowerment.
III. Robust U.S. Diplomatic Posture and Civilian Presence
The U.S. continues to face significant challenges in
conducting diplomacy and providing assistance in Afghanistan,
ranging from an insecure environment, corruption in Afghan
governing institutions and limited Afghan government capacity
to reform and implement development programs. These challenges
will likely grow throughout this critical transition period,
which will only increase the need for sustained diplomatic
engagement, vigorous oversight, renewed focus on strategic
objectives, and commensurate resourcing in terms of personnel
and assistance funds. To face these challenges, the USG should
consider several measures with respect to its U.S. civilian
staffing, Afghan employees, and bureaucratic structure.
Civilian Staffing
The Administration's FY 2015 appropriations request
includes $961 million to support embassy and consulate
operations. As of August 2014, the State Department plans to
maintain diplomatic facilities in Kabul (embassy) Mazar-e-
Sharif and Herat (consulates), Kandahar (a regional diplomatic
facility) and Bagram (a liaison office with the DoD and NATO)
to include nearly 700 direct hires, as well as 1,100 locally-
employed staff and 3,400 contractors.\43\ The U.S. diplomatic
and assistance presence will only grow in importance with the
drawdown of U.S. troops, heightening the need for sufficient
levels of staff and infrastructure, as well as maintaining
continuity and institutional knowledge.\44\ State Department
diplomats generally serve one-year deployments with the option
to extend; USAID has maintained the same practice. The
resulting frequent turnover of U.S. personnel in Kabul has
created challenges in the quality of analytic reporting\45\ and
in establishing and maintaining relationships critical to
diplomacy and development efforts. Anecdotal reports from U.S.
officials indicate that by the time an officer gets a firm
handle on their position, it is already time for them to move
on.
To address the loss of institutional knowledge and
expertise, the State Department IG recommended that the USG
expand off-shoring and outsourcing of certain responsibilities,
as well as increase the use of more long term ``temporary
duty'' staff (officials who temporarily leave their U.S.-based
jobs for stints abroad).\46\ The State Department and USAID
should also consider enhanced incentives for those who agree to
deploy for two or more years. Incentives could include
additional financial bonuses or expanded shelter-in-place
benefits (allowing families to remain at the diplomat's last
overseas post). This is not a new challenge to the Foreign
Service but is one that continues to bedevil U.S. contingency
operations. The State Department and interested parties within
the foreign service, including the American Foreign Service
Association, should cooperate in developing a plan to address
this issue. The OIG also recommends establishing a pilot
program that would allow eligible family members at other
overseas posts to apply for short-term employments at Embassy
Kabul.\47\
The State Department should also conduct a review on how it
retains staff knowledge and captures lessons learned. Due to
security concerns, some departing American staff do not overlap
with their successors in Kabul and do not have the chance to
personally transfer tasks and knowledge. The USG should
consider requiring that departed U.S. staff dedicate some time
in their new post to regularly communicating with their
successor in Afghanistan to ensure a smooth transition. This
effort should include creative use of technology to record
lessons learned.
The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program
The SIV program in Afghanistan provides visas to Afghan
nationals and their families who are under threat because of
their work for the U.S. military, State Department, USAID or
U.S. contractors. The SIV program is critically important to
protect Afghans who have worked and sacrificed to advance U.S.
interests in Afghanistan, and the U.S. has a profound
obligation to ensure the security of these courageous
individuals and their families. In 2009, Congress passed the
Afghan Allies Protection Act, authorizing up to 7,500 Special
Immigrant Visas. There was a significant backlog of thousands
of applicants over the course of this program, which has only
recently begun to be addressed by the State Department.\48\ In
July of 2014, the U.S. Congress voted to expand the number of
SIVs by 1,000 in FY14 and the measure was signed into law.
Congress should extend the program through the end of 2016 and
expand the overall number of SIVs available to 4,000 per
year.\49\ The USG should also consider further reforms to
streamline the overall SIV process while still maintaining high
security standards. As the drawdown of U.S. troops continues,
the State Department should accelerate the SIV process to
prevent any unnecessary backlog of applicants.
The GAO reports that a majority of USAID's foreign national
staff have applied for SIVs.\50\ Coupled with the high rotation
rate of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, the loss of locally-
employed staff has also diminished the USG's institutional
knowledge of development programs, relationships with local
actors, and understanding of Afghan culture.
At a time when U.S. implementers are not as able to deploy
to the field, local Afghan expertise is needed more than ever
to assist U.S. efforts.The State Department should take further
steps to ensure that institutional knowledge of outgoing SIV
recipients is better captured.
First, U.S. employees rotating to Afghanistan should be
able to easily identify and communicate with Afghans who had
previously worked on their portfolios but have since relocated
to the United States under the SIV program.
Second, future authorizing legislation on SIVs should also
allow for newly-arrived SIV recipients to work in the U.S. for
the State Department, USAID or other agencies working to
support U.S. interests in Afghanistan.
Third, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul must also take steps to
maintain institutional knowledge among its Locally Employed
Staff (LES). The State Department reports that it works to
ensure overlap among incoming and outgoing LES and uses
Portfolio Continuity, an IT-based program which seeks to
maintain institutional knowledge.\51\ While essential, this
system cannot compensate for the critical relationships and
experience accumulated by seasoned and experienced Afghan
staff. The Embassy should make every effort to connect outgoing
and incoming LES members by videoconference or telephone to
ensure institutional knowledge is maintained and there is
continuity of effort.
Promoting Regional Connectivity: The New Silk Road Initiative; Office
of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
(SRAP); and USAID's Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs
In 2009, the Office of the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan was formed to lead diplomatic and
development efforts in both countries. At the time of the
military and civilian surge into Afghanistan, and an increased
emphasis on government-to-government ties with Pakistan, this
arrangement was a worthwhile and important indication of
American commitment to the region.
The U.S. administration has repeatedly asserted that the
long-term economic sustainability of Afghanistan will be
determined by its enhanced integration within the region,
driven by the New Silk Road initiative. The USG's foreign
policy bureaucratic structures should reflect this assertion.
The FY 14 Appropriations law called for the State Department to
begin planning for the reintegration of Afghanistan and
Pakistan into the SCA bureau. The State Department and USAID
should continue to normalize the diplomatic and assistance
approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan by reintegrating both
countries into the SCA bureau at the State Department and the
Bureau for Asia at USAID. \52\ Given the strategic importance
of both countries and their significant aid packages, this
change should not mean precipitously diminishing the level of
senior engagement associated with both countries. However, to
achieve the administration's overarching objective of regional
integration, the State Department and USAID need better
bureaucratic alignment.
In recent months, several steps have been taken to improve
communication and coordination between the SRAP office and SCA,
including ``dual hatting'' senior officials in both places as
well as increasing regular interaction among those at a working
level. These efforts are welcome, and the State Department
should continue this glide path toward full integration of SRAP
in the SCA Bureau.
----------
Notes
\1\ Ambassador James Dobbins Testimony before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, December 10, 2013.
\2\ USAID Response to question from SFRC staff, September 15, 2014.
\3\ World Bank Development Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#
\4\ Joint report of the Government of Afghanistan and the
international community presented at the January 2014 Special Joint
Coordinated Monitoring (JCMB) meeting. Full report can be found here:
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/sites/default/files/documents/
Special%20JCMB_Joint%20Report_28%20Jan%202014.pdf
\5\ The TMAF benchmarks cover five main areas of focus:
Area 1: Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections
Area 2: Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights
Area 3: Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking
Area 4: Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Sub-National
Governance
Area 5: Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development
Within each area, the TMAF charted out a series of specific goals
and 16 indicators. The Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board (JCMB),
the main group of international donors, agreed to meet on a regular
basis to measure progress against the TMAF indicators. These indicators
ranged from the relatively subjective (ensure respect for human rights
for all its citizens) to the very detailed (improve budget execution to
75% by 2017).
\6\ TMAF donors have committed to increase incentive funding
provided through mechanisms like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF) to 10 percent by 2014, and up to 20 percent by 2024.
\7\ The U.S. also supports incentive programs offered by
multilateral institutions including the Incentive Program of the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and conditions included in the
Expanded Credit Facility provided by the International Monetary Fund.
\8\ The recurrent cost window is an on-budget funding mechanism
that provides the Afghan government with some flexibility in covering
budget shortfalls in paying salaries or covering operational costs.
Specific budget line items associated with this mechanism are the most
visible elements of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan that is tied to
tangible macro-level reforms implemented by the Afghan government.
USAID also has stringent conditions built into bilateral on-budget
assistance provided to Afghan government ministries. The reforms
required under these programs however are narrower in scope, relevant
to the specific ministry and do not have the same macro-level reach of
the conditionality attached to the TMAF hard deliverables.
\9\ The U.S. also tied $15 million in funds to Afghanistan passing
mining legislation, which it did. However, the legislation missed the
April 2014 deadline set by the U.S., and it was not determined that the
law met international standards, as required by the deliverable, so the
funding was not released. This funding was reprogrammed to activities
that enhance regional economic connectivity.
\10\ After years of steady and incremental progress, revenue
collection by the Afghan government has steadily declined over the past
few years: 11% of GDP in 2011, 10.3% of GDP in 2012 and 9.6% of GDP in
2013. The State Department cites a number of factors which contributed
to this downturn, including a slowdown in economic growth, the early
collection of some 2013 taxes in 2012 and rent-seeking by officials who
engaged in ``corrupt behavior as they contemplated the possible loss of
their government positions post-election.'' (Response by Special
Representative James Dobbins to a Question for the Record submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez, December 10, 2013) The World Bank blamed the
shortfall on ``leakages and weakness in administration, particularly in
customs.'' These recent shortfalls in revenue collection will require
the Afghan government to raise revenues by 1% of GDP from 2015-2018 in
order to meet its fiscal targets. (World Bank, Afghanistan Economic
Update, October 2013.
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2013/10/24/000442464_20131024131051/Rendered/PDF/
820120WP0WB0Af0Box0379855B00PUBLIC0.pdf)
\11\ Afghanistan has made revenue commitments through several
international mechanisms. The TMAF includes benchmarks that call for
revenue to be 17% of GDP by 2025. Afghanistan has also committed to
reform its customs collection practices to align with the World Customs
Organization's Revised Kyoto Convention and to comply with required
steps to gain admittance into the World Trade Organization. The
international community should continue to hold Afghan officials
accountable for these commitments.
\12\ SIGAR Report: ``Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some
Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable
Source of Income for Afghanistan.'' April 2014.
\13\ Ibid.
\14\ USAID has funded at least three programs that seek to improve
Afghanistan's capacity to improve revenue collection, including two
Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan programs (TAFA I and
TAFA II). These programs generated some success--for example,
improvements in the efficiency at key customs locations resulted in
savings of $39 million for the Afghan government and importers.
Currently, USAID supports the Afghan Trade and Revenue Project (ATAR)
which seeks to improve Afghanistan's ability to collect revenues by
focusing on the collection of taxes and customs fees. This program
works to develop the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry "to improve customs and border
procedures, use improved procedures and technology to reduce
corruption, complete Afghanistan's accession to the WTO and build
fiscal capacity." (SIGAR Report: ``Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have
Had Some Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a
Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan.'' April 2014.)
\15\ SIGAR Report: ``Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some
Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable
Source of Income for Afghanistan.'' April 2014.
\16\ U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearing ``A
Transformation: Afghanistan Beyond 2014'' April 30, 2014.
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Allen_Testimony.pdf
\17\ Testimony of John Sopko, Special Inspector General,
Afghanistan Reconstruction, before the U.S. Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control Hearing on ``U.S. Counternarcotics
Efforts in Afghanistan,'' January 15, 2014.
http://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/hearing-1-15-14/
SIGAR%20John%20F%20%20Sopko.pdf
\18\ In February 2014, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) issued a report which expressed concerns about credible reports
of human rights violations by some Afghan security forces during their
ground operations in 2013. UNAMA received credible reports of beatings
of civilians, property destruction and theft of personal property,
including motorcycles, money, jewelry and valuable items. (UNAMA,
Afghanistan Annual Report 2013 Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, February 2014)
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/
Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf
\19\ The State Department is usually the lead implementer of
security assistance in order to ensure that such programs are aligned
with U.S. foreign policy priorities and that program recipients are
vetted in accordance with human rights requirements in U.S. law.
\20\ The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76),
contains a provision extending the prohibition on any support or
training where a gross violation of human rights occurred to ``any
training, equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a
foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible
information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights.''
\21\ The administration's total FY 2015 foreign assistance request
for Afghanistan is $1.595 billion, a 29% reduction from the FY 2013
appropriation. According to the administration, this request keeps the
U.S. on track to meet commitments made at the 2012 Tokyo donors'
conference, but adjusts for a new implementing model due to fewer
staff, uncertain security environment and a shift to more technical
assistance. In March 2014 congressional testimony, USAID laid out a
transition strategy that includes the following elements:
Maintain and make durable the gains made in health, education, and
the empowerment of women;
Mitigate the economic impact of the drawdown through a robust
focus on the agricultural sector, private sector development,
the operations and maintenance of infrastructure investments,
and the future potential of the extractives industry; and
Foster improved stability by supporting legitimate and effective
Afghan governance, including the 2014 presidential election.
\22\ SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30,
2014, pg 6.
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf
\23\ Response by Special Representative James Dobbins to a Question
for the Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, July 11, 2013
\24\ Response by Special Representative James Dobbins to a Question
for the Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, July 11, 2013
\25\ USAID Frontlines Publication, January/February 2014
http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/energy-infrastructure/
powering-afghanistan
\26\ State Department Office of Inspector General ``Inspection of
Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan''(ISP-1-14-22A) August 2014
\27\ USAID Assistant Administrator Donald Sampler outlined the
layers of protection to mitigate the risks associated with providing
on-budget assistance. These measures include:
requiring the establishment of a non-commingled, separate bank
account for each project with USAID;
disbursement of funds only after USAID has verified that the
ministry has achieved a performance milestone or USAID has
verified incurred costs;
an annual audit by a USAID OIG-approved firm;
substantial involvement and oversight by USAID staff in procurement
processes;
independent management, monitoring and evaluation of services; and
technical assistance through other projects to increase the
capacity of ministries while addressing any vulnerabilities or
weaknesses identified in the assessments
(U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform Hearing April 3, 2014)
USAID also provides technical assistance to ministries to develop the
capacity of ministry officials and staff.
\28\ SIGAR 14-32 Audit Report ``Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken
Positive Action to Assess Afghan Ministries' Ability to Manage Donor
Funds, but Concerns Remain'' January 2014.
\29\ World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2013
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2013/10/24/000442464_20131024131051/Rendered/PDF/
820120WP0WB0Af0Box0379855B00PUBLIC0.pdf
\30\ Alongside the military drawdown, stabilization programming has
diminished significantly in scale, but will remain in some form for the
coming years. USAID has also expanded the scope of stabilization to
include more focus on local decision-making and governing bodies.
Today's USAID stabilization programming is perhaps better characterized
as 'democracy and governance' programming.
\31\ USAID Written Response to SFRC Majority Staff Question,
December 2013
\32\ Ibid.
\33\ USAID reports that ``there are interagency coordination
mechanisms currently in place like the Deputies-level Executive Working
Group, regular field level coordination and close cooperation between
working level project teams at USAID, State and the Department of
Defense (DoD) that ensure development-type projects implemented through
the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), Afghanistan
Infrastructure Fund (AIF), and Task Force for Business Stability
Operations (TFBSO) are coordinated and not duplicative.'' (USAID
Written Response to SFRC Majority Staff Question, December 2013)
\34\ According to USAID, some of the approaches used under A3
include:
1. Limiting the number of sub-contracting tiers;
2. Implementing a robust vetting system of non-U.S. companies
and key individuals, at both the prime and sub-contractor
level, and establishment of the Vetting Support Unit;
3. Enhancing financial controls on project funds, such as
using electronic funds transfers in lieu of cash payments,
using independent audit firms to verify appropriate usage of
funds, reviewing of recipients' claims prior to payment, and
performing 100% audits of locally incurred costs; and
4. Implementing robust oversight of all USAID projects in
Afghanistan through a five-tiered monitoring approach,
encompassing monitoring information gathered from USAID and
other U.S. Government staff, USAID implementing partners, other
donors, Afghan civil society and beneficiaries, as well as
independent monitoring contractors.
(http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/USAID-Donald-
Sampler-Testimony.pdf),
\35\ U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing ``The
Transition in Afghanistan'' December 10, 2013 http://www.foreign.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sampler_Testimony.pdf
\36\ John Sopko letter to Secretary John Kerry, October 10, 2013
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/SIGAR_14-4-SP.pdf
\37\ USAID's current monitoring and evaluation program is broken
out into five tiers of entities that can be involved in data collection
process to include:
Tier 1: USG representatives
Tier 2: Implementing Partners
Tier 3: Government of Afghanistan representatives and other donors
from the international community
Tier 4: Civil society groups and beneficiaries
Tier 5: Independent Monitoring Contractors
In March 2014, USAID issued a Request for Proposals to conduct a
remote monitoring program to evaluate whether programs in the field
have been implemented. The RFP calls for the use of several monitoring
methods, including third party monitors, time-stamped photographs, use
of Global Positioning Systems (GPS) technology and other forms of data
collection. USAID has established an Implementation Support Team (IST)
in Kabul ``to centralize and analyze project performance and security
information relevant to USAID activities.'' The IST will integrate
security and portfolio-level monitoring data, provide monitoring data
and facilitate relationships between the Afghan government and other
donors with the USAID Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) and
Agreement Officer Representatives (AOR) who manage day to day oversight
of programs. Based on the integration of this information the IST will
be able to make programmatic recommendations to decision-makers for
current and planned projects. (USAID presentation for Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff, February 2014)
\38\ Response by Special Representative James Dobbins to a Question
for the Record submitted by Senator Robert Menendez, July 11, 2013
\39\ Response to Question for the Record by Deputy Assistant
Secretary Fatema Sumar, April 30, 2014
\40\ The U.S. has spent more than $1.7 billion on energy programs
in Afghanistan since 2010 and has helped add 1,000 megawatts to
Pakistan's power grid. Source: http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/
newsilkroad/
\41\ Some people-to-people regional initiatives include USAID's
Central Asia Trade Forums, the Central Asia and Afghanistan Women's
Economic Symposium (WES) and the South Asia Women's Entrepreneurship
Symposium (SAWES).
\42\ The State Department and USAID have committed $24.3 million in
regional Central Asia Economic Support Fund assistance from FY 12-FY14
for programs that increase trade and investment, improve transit,
advance cooperation on energy trade, promote effective natural resource
management, and support civil society exchanges. USAID has also
leveraged bilateral resources from the Regional Economic Cooperation
(REC) project in Central Asia, the Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR)
project and Pakistan Trade Project (PTP) to contribute to connectivity
efforts. Source: Response to Question for the Record by Deputy
Assistant Secretary Fatema Sumar, April 30, 2014.
\43\ GAO Briefing for Congressional Committees. ``Afghanistan:
Status of U.S. Planning for Post-2014 Civilian Presence'' August 2014
The OIG reported that, "The Foreign Service staffing process
optimally requires U.S. missions to make staffing decisions one year in
advance, which means Embassy Kabul has to establish much of its summer
2014 Foreign Service positions in mid-2013 based not on actual post-
2014 programs and operations but based on its own assumptions and
resulting transition plans." (``Audit of the Department of State and
Embassy Kabul Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-Led Mission in
Afghanistan'' U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General,
(AUD-MERO-14-15) December 2013)
\44\ In 2011, Embassy Kabul began planning for the 2014 security
transition with two offices which were consolidated into a single
``Transition Office'' in May 2013. Seeking to learn from the challenges
posed during the rushed transition in Iraq, the State Department said
that it purposefully sought out veterans of the Iraq transition to fill
key positions in the Department and at USAID overseeing the transition
process in Afghanistan. (Ambassador James Dobbins ``Question for the
Record'' Response following Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, July 11, 2013.) This effort involved a State Department led
``Transfer of Tasks'' exercise which ``helped to inform the U.S.
Embassy and USAID Mission on how to responsibly transfer development-
related activities undertaken by ISAF to other U.S. Government entities
or to the Afghan government.'' As this ``right-sizing'' initiative
continues, Congress will monitor the planning associated with the
necessary office and residential space for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to
ensure that it appropriately correlates with the amount of personnel in
country. (``Audit of the Department of State and Embassy Kabul Planning
for the Transition to a Civilian-Led Mission in Afghanistan'' U.S.
Department of State Office of Inspector General, (AUD-MERO-14-15)
December 2013)
\45\ State Department Office of Inspector General ``Inspection of
Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan''(ISP-1-14-22A) August 2014
\46\ Ibid.
\47\ State Department Office of Inspector General ``Inspection of
Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan''(ISP-1-14-22A) August 2014
\48\ According to the State Department, more than 9,000 SIVs have
been issued to Afghans in FY 2014, including over 3,400 to Afghan
principle applicants and over 5,600 to their family members.
\49\ Background and history on the SIV program can be found on the
State Department's website: http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/
english/immigrate/types/afghans-work-for-us.html as well as the Iraqi
Refugee Assistance Project: http://refugeerights.org/
\50\ U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National
Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Statement of
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. Government Accountability Office, March
13, 2014 http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661700.pdf
\51\ Response to Question for the Record for Secretary John Kerry,
April 8, 2014
\52\ While the principle deputy in SRAP is dual-hatted as a Deputy
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs
(SCA), it is unclear of this has led to enhanced policy coordination.
In Recognition
U.S. and Afghan civilian personnel have operated in a very
dangerous and challenging environment in Afghanistan. These
individuals should be commended for their courageous work and
sacrifices made in support of the U.S. mission and national
interests. Since 2001, at least 435 individuals working for
USAID partner organizations have been killed and at least 768
have been wounded. U.S. civilian agencies have lost three
direct-hire American personnel in violent attacks: USDA Foreign
Agricultural Service Advisor Steven Thomas Stefani, IV; USAID
Foreign Service Officer Ragaei Said Abdelfattah; and State
Department Foreign Service Officer Anne T. Smedinghoff. These
individuals and their Afghan and international partners who
have lost their lives embodied the values, courage and
determination needed to make Afghanistan a better place. The
committee honors their work and their sacrifice.